

FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM

Tracing the Changing Political Attitudes and Behaviours among Young
Kenyans

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the evolving political attitudes and behaviours toward democracy among young Kenyans, examining whether they are becoming increasingly apathetic toward democracy or are evolving innovative democratic behaviours. Using a mixed-methods approach, the research combines quantitative data from Afrobarometer surveys with qualitative interviews with Kenyan youths conducted during fieldwork in Nairobi. The findings indicate a decline in traditional political participation, such as voting and party membership, among the Kenyan youth. However, this apparent political apathy is contrasted by a rise in alternative forms of political engagement, such as community meetings and digital activism. The study reveals that while dissatisfaction with political authorities and disillusionment with political elites drive this apathy, there is also a growing structural support for democratic institutions. Young Kenyans are not abandoning democratic values but are instead seeking new ways to engage and demand accountability from their democratic institutions. This thesis contributes to understanding the complex dynamics of evolving political attitudes and behaviour among youths in emerging democracies.

Keywords: political apathy, antipathy, youth engagement, democracy, Kenya.

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1. Introduction

In the post-Cold War period, democracy had become the new norm in Africa. In the latter part of the 1980s, African countries democratized *en masse*, something that has been coined the ‘third wave’ of democratization within the international system by Samuel P. Huntington. Scholars attribute the shift from authoritarian to democratic governance in Africa to the downfall of single-party communist regimes, severe economic stagnation under structural adjustment programs, and the rise of organized civil societies (Schraeder, 1995). Kenya rode this democratization wave, returning to multi-party politics in 1994 after 16 years of one-party rule under President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi. While some of its East African neighbours quickly fell into violent ethnic conflict and state collapse, Kenya continued its democratic path with optimism for democracy's promises. In 2002, Moi's 24-year rule ended when his former vice president, Mwai Kibaki, won the democratic elections, bringing hope, impressive economic growth, and improved living standards to Kenya.

With its new constitution of 2010, Kenya sought to further consolidate its democratic gains. The constitution devolved power from the national government to 47 county governments, established a new Supreme Court, and an Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Despite these reforms, Kenya is experiencing what is seemingly growing levels of political apathy among its young population (Makori, 2015; Odanga, 2022; Mutuku et al., 2023; Kivoi, 2014 and Renick, 2015, in: Odongo, 2023). Voter turnout among youth is both low and on the decline, while levels of distrust in the country's government and electoral processes are on the rise (The East African, 2022).

Declining political engagement among youth in Kenya is echoed across both long-established and new democracies across the world, some of which are also seeing young people turning their backs to democratic ways of governing in favour of authoritarian alternatives (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017a; 2017b; 2019). As a result, there is growing concern that young people's changing attitudes toward democracy is a sign that contemporary democracies are facing a legitimacy crisis (Fuchs & Roller, 2019, p. 222). An empirical investigation is required to determine if and to what degree young people are losing support for democracy. This thesis examines this question in the Kenyan context.

1.1 Research aim

The puzzle of this research is why Kenyan youth are seemingly becoming more apathetic toward democracy despite the country's recent democratic reforms, which, among other things, sought to improve the transparency of its elections and include more young people in politics. The specific aim of this research is to examine the changing political attitudes and behaviour among young Kenyans

with a view of establishing whether they are becoming increasingly apathetic, withdrawing from democratic processes, antipathetic, supporting authoritarian alternatives, or finding new innovative ways to participate in democracy thus affirming their commitment to democratic values.

The following research question was developed to guide this research aim:

RQ: How are the political attitudes and behaviours among young Kenyans evolving in the context of democracy, and what drives these transformative shifts?

1.2 Significance and scientific contributions

The significance of this academic inquiry lies in the opportunity it offers the researcher in contributing to the body of knowledge on political apathy among youth in newly established democracies, specifically in the case of Kenya. Secondly, this study represents a more current and comprehensive body of research on the evolving political attitudes and behaviours among the Kenyan youth and offers crucial insights into whether the young Kenyans are drawing away from, or reaffirming their committing to, democratic ways of governance. Unlike previous studies that focus on explaining growing political apathy in Kenya, this study distinguishes and operationalizes different patterns of change in both specific and diffuse support for democratic processes, institutions, and values among Kenyan youth. Its scientific contributions thus lie in its comprehensive examination of the varying and overlapping kinds of political apathy and antipathy that can exist simultaneously at different levels of support for democracy and what their existence tells us about young Kenyans' support for their democratically elected political leaders, for their democratic institutions, and democratic values in general.

1.3 Structure

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework drawn upon in this paper, which is based on the concepts of support within political systems theory, as well as a literature review on academic debates on political apathy and antipathy. Chapter 3 presents the methods of this thesis, including its mixed-methods research design, the data collection processes, and ethical considerations. Chapter 4 presents the analysis, which includes findings on the changing political attitudes and behaviours among young Kenyans and the motivations behind these shifts as cited by interviewed youths and youth leaders in Nairobi during fieldwork in Kenya. Chapter 5 summarizes the research findings to address the research question presented above.

2. Theoretical framework

The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for measuring changing political behaviours and attitudes of young people in Kenya toward democracy, drawing from past research that I discuss below. This includes Eastons' (1975) distinction between specific and diffuse support for political systems and Fuchs' (2007) hierarchical model of democratic support. Using these two models for theorising support for political systems, a literature review is then carried out on recent scholarly literature on political apathy and political antipathy in established and emerging democracies by scholars such as Foa & Mounk (2016; 2017a; 2017b), Zilinsky (2019), and Nkansah & Bartha (2023). These insights are further supported by case studies from Kenya and the Global South.

Section 2.1 below first presents David Easton's concepts of specific and diffuse support, and Fuchs' hierarchical model of democratic support. Section 2.2 then presents the literature review on political apathy and antipathy, which it maps against the two models of political support presented in section 2.1, which allow us to distinguish and operationalize different patterns of change in both specific and diffuse support for democratic processes, institutions, and values. These insights are lastly supplemented by a review of existing literature on political apathy and antipathy from Kenya and select cases from the Global South. It concludes with the key gap in reviewed literature from Kenya that this study seeks to fill.

2.1 Support for political systems

2.1.1 Specific and diffuse support

David Easton (1975) defines 'support' as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object, either favourably or unfavourably, which may be expressed through both attitudes and corresponding actions. Not all unfavourable expressions have the same implications for the political system. Some expressions may be directed towards certain actions of political authorities yet still be supportive of the basic aspects of a political system, while other expressions may target the very foundation of the system itself. Hence, according to Easton (1975), support is not a monolithic concept. It should instead be differentiated into two kinds, i.e., specific and diffuse support.

Specific support refers to people's satisfaction with the existing political authorities and authoritative institutions based on their performance. It is related to a perceived fulfilment of the public's needs and demands by these authorities. It is specific to the incumbents and their policies, reflecting a more immediate and transactional relationship between the public and their leaders.

However, perceived fulfilment is not merely enough; it must be attributed causative force to the authorities, such that members of the public can lay the blame or praise for political outputs on their leaders. Specific support is variable and can change rapidly in response to specific political events, decisions, or the behaviour of political authorities.

Conversely, diffuse support refers to an evaluation of what an object represents rather than what it does. In other words, diffuse supports describe a broad, enduring loyalty to the political system and its guiding ideals. It is a combination of favourable attitudes or goodwill that makes citizens in a political system accept or tolerate outcomes they may disagree with or believe to be detrimental to their interests. This type of support is less prone to swings depending on how well political authorities function. It is also more stable. It is developed by socialisation processes over time and is based in deep attachments to the regime, its institutions, and its values (Easton, 1975).

2.1.2 Support for democracy

Fuchs (2007) expands on Easton's (1975) types of support by adding a third layer in-between specific and diffuse support that contain overlapping elements of both. The base and top layers of Fuchs' hierarchical model correspond to Easton's definitions of specific and diffuse support, respectively. The former (viz. base layer) is linked to support for the government holding office, i.e., for the individual political leaders within a democratic regime, primarily measured through satisfaction with their governance. The latter (viz. top layer) relates to citizens' adherence to core democratic values, encapsulating their commitment to democracy as governance by the populace. The additional middle tier evaluates support for the specific democratic regime of a country, assessing how closely the regime's practices align with democratic values and culture. This conceptual differentiation between supporting democratic rule and the institutional setting of a country allows for the scenario in which citizens can prefer democratic rule but just not the type of democracy present in their country, in turn demanding reform and improvements of their country's democratic institutions.

2.2 Literature review on political apathy & antipathy

This literature review presents the scholarly debate on political apathy and antipathy in new and established democracies (Foa & Mounk (2019); Heywood, 2019; Zilinsky, 2019; Nkansah & Bartha, 2023). These concepts allow us to distinguish and operationalize different patterns of change in both specific and diffuse support for democratic processes, institutions, and values.

Table 1 below presents a conceptual model for analysing changes in democratic behaviours and attitudes. It specifically maps the reviewed scholarly literature on youth apathy and antipathy against the concepts presented above on support for political (and democratic) systems of governance

(Easton, 1975; Fuchs, 2007). The review of literature on political apathy and antipathy distinguishes between *citizen attitudes* and *behavioural consequences*. This distinction is important since it adds clarity not only on how best to measure changes in political behaviours, i.e., political apathy, antipathy, or new forms of democratic engagement, but also on how to identify the changing attitudes among young people that are driving their changing democratic behaviour, from allegiant and assertive perspectives respectively.

Table 1: Mapping political apathy and antipathy against typologies on support for political regimes

Support for political systems theory				Political apathy/antipathy literature				
Types of support *	Hierarchical structure **	Attitudinal constructs **	Systemic consequence **	Citizen attitudes		Behavioural consequences		
				Allegiant disposition	Assertive disposition	Democratic apathy ***	New democratic citizens****	Democratic antipathy ***
Diffuse	Values	Commitment to democratic values	Preference for a democratic system of the country	Cynicism of democratic values	New critical democratic norms and values	Loss of support for democracy	Continued support for democracy	Support for authoritarian systems of governance
Overlap	Structure	Support of the democratic regime of the country	Persistence of the type of democratic regime of the country	Lack of trust in democratic institutions	Constructively critical towards democratic institutions	Do not engage in public accountability or demand reforms	Demand greater accountability from democratic institutions	Support anti-democratic reforms, e.g., concentration of power
Specific	Process	Support of the political authorities	Re-election or de-election of political authorities	Disillusionment with existing political elite	Dissatisfaction with empirical outcomes of political authorities in terms of performance	Declining formal political participation	Increase in alternative forms of political participation	Support for anti-establishment parties

Sources: Developed by the author based on the following literature: * Easton (1975); ** Fuchs (2007); *** Foa & Mounk (2019); Heywood, (2019); **** Zilinsky, (2019); Nkansah & Bartha, (2023).

2.2.1 Changing citizen attitudes toward democracy

Dalton & Welzel identify two main types of citizen attitudes toward democracy and its institutions: the *allegiant* and *assertive dispositions* (Dalton & Welzel, 2014). These two positions are discussed below, broken down into specific/process-related support, specific and diffuse structural support, and diffuse, value-based support for democracy, respectively.

In terms of *specific, process-related support for democracy*, the assertive position argues that young people are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the empirical outcomes of political authorities. A

range of factors have contributed to this apathy, including a shift from programmatic to ‘catch-all’ parties, leading to a ‘de-ideologization’ that strips parties of distinct ideological character and emotional engagement for voters. This transformation results in a predominantly centrist political landscape where differences between parties are minimal, making elections less meaningful (Heywood, 2019, p. 768). According to Nkansah & Bartha (2023), young people have too high expectations of their governments who are unable to satisfy the increasing demands arising from younger voters. The allegiant position, on the other hand, argues that young people not only are becoming dissatisfied with the failure of governments to address their own needs but that they are also becoming increasingly disillusioned with existing political elites (Foa & Mounk, 2019). This disillusionment is caused by a breakdown of trust in the political class which they generally perceive as being ‘out-of-touch’, ‘privileged’, ‘corrupt’ or ‘self-serving’ (Heywood, 2019, p. 767).

At a structural level, attitudes towards democratic institutions range from sceptical to constructively critical. The allegiant position argues that young people are becoming sceptical towards democratic institutions due to perceived inefficacies and corruption within democratic regimes (Foa & Mounk, 2019; Wike, 2019). In their study of the European and World Values Surveys waves 5-6 (2005-07 and 2010-14), Foa and Mounk (2017a) report a decrease in young American’s level of formal political participation as well as a decrease in their trust in *democratic institutions* such as Congress and the Presidency, as well as in their trust of the *media*. Foa & Mounk (2017a) argue that a certain generational gap is apparent in these trends. According to the authors, the proportion of young people who are dissatisfied with democracy is a majority in most countries. The assertive position contends that young people are losing trust in democratic institutions. For example, Zilinsky (2019) finds no evidence that young people are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with democracy but instead notes that young people are generally more satisfied with democracy than older citizens. Instead, they argue that young people are becoming constructively critical of their countries’ democratic institutions pushing for improvements in democratic structures and demanding greater accountability and reforms (Dalton, 2009; Norris, 1999; Stoker et al., 2017). This constructive criticism is crucial as it indicates not just a passive distrust but an active engagement in seeking better governance.

Finally, regarding *diffuse value-related support for democracy*, the allegiant perspective ultimately argues that young people’s increasing dissatisfaction with their own governments or democratic institutions results in a loss of support for core democratic values (Foa & Mounk, 2017a). In other words, young people hold growing disaffection with democracy as a political system (Foa & Mounk, 2016), which, according to (Foa & Mounk, 2019), is primarily due to their limited experience living under authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the assertive position posits that young people's perceived anti-democratic attitudes reflect changing attitudes from ones that uncritically support democracy

towards alternative sets of critical norms and values toward democracy (Dalton, 2009; Norris, 1999; Stoker et al., 2017, in: Nkansah & Bartha, 2023). As argued by Norris (2011) “Any perceived critical disposition toward democracy is consequently a manifestation of the growing public expectation with democracy, not a rejection of the system” (in: Nkansah & Bartha, 2023, p. 557).

2.2.2 Behavioural consequences of changing attitudes toward democracy

The attitudes detailed above manifest in three distinct behavioural patterns concerning democracy: apathy, antipathy, and the rise of new democratic citizens. These are briefly discussed below, broken down into specific/process related support, specific & diffuse structural support, and diffuse, value-based support for democracy respectively.

In terms of *specific, process-related support for democracy*, political apathy refers to a decline in formal political participation, such as voting, driven by disillusionment with the performance of political authorities. Young individuals often feel their expectations are not met by the political elite, leading to disengagement from established political processes (Foa & Mounk, 2019). Democratic antipathy also arises from dissatisfaction with the empirical outcomes delivered by political authorities. However, this active opposition is not just a withdrawal but a rejection of the status quo, which may manifest in support for anti-establishment parties that promise radical changes and challenge democratic norms (Foa & Mounk, 2019; Heywood, 2019, pp. 764-767). In contrast to these two views, new democratic citizens refer to a behaviour in which, despite general dissatisfaction with the outcomes of political authorities, young people find alternative forms of participating politically. They are not content with the traditional avenues but rather look to influence change through innovative and often non-traditional means, reflecting a proactive approach to remedying democratic deficits (Norris, 1999; Stoker et al., 2017, in: Nkansah & Bartha, 2023).

At a structural level, democratic apathy manifests as scepticism towards democratic institutions, where individuals do not engage in public accountability or demand reforms. Instead, young people become ‘free-riders’ who enjoy all benefits of citizenship without accepting associated costs (Heywood, 2019, 774). Individuals critical of democratic institutions may also adopt antipathetic behaviour, such as being more prone to support anti-democratic reforms or candidates who seek to make such reforms, e.g., a concentration of power to the president, allowing the president to bypass parliament or the courts of law. This antipathy is driven by a deep-seated frustration with the existing democratic regime, often fuelled by perceived failures to address societal needs and the desire for a more authoritarian approach to governance. Others argue that people may become ‘new democratic citizens, who are constructively critical of democratic institutions, actively demanding greater accountability and substantive reforms. They engage in pushing for enhancements within the

democratic structures, advocating for more responsive and inclusive governance models (Nkansah & Bartha, 2023).

At the diffuse, value-based support for democracy, democratic apathy is characterized by a loss of support for democracy itself. Young people may feel that democracy is no longer the best form of governance, leading to a disinterest in participating in democratic processes as they see little value in their actions affecting change (Foa & Mounk, 2017). Antipathy towards democratic values can lead to support for authoritarian alternatives to democracy. This is evident among those who, disillusioned with democracy, see authoritarian systems as preferable due to perceived efficiency or stability. This shift reflects a fundamental questioning of the democratic ideals themselves (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Last, despite a backdrop of general disillusionment with democratic values, new democratic citizens continue to support the idea of democracy. They believe in its principles and strive to uphold and rejuvenate these values through active participation and advocacy, underscoring their continued belief in democracy as a preferable system (Voeten, 2017; Nkansah & Bartha, 2023).

2.2.3 Evidence from Kenya and the Global South

In Kenya and across the Global South, evidence points to growing political apathy among the youth, manifesting in specific, process-related disengagement such as declining political participation, including voting and political party membership (Makoori, 2015; Odanga, 2022; Mutuku et al., 2023). Scholars like Makoori (2015) note that young Kenyans are increasingly disillusioned with political parties and institutions, which they view as corrupt and ineffective. This disillusionment stems from a perceived lack of integrity and the divisive nature of ethnic politics, contributing to a withdrawal from traditional political involvement.

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, Mwonzora (2023) identifies a disillusionment with the political process, where deep-seated mistrust in elections and political organizations actively discourages youth participation. This reflects a broader sentiment where dissatisfaction with empirical outcomes of political authorities diminishes specific support for democracy, leading to reduced formal political participation.

According to Mutuku et al. (2023), in Kenya, the combination of political apathy and ineffective public institutions fosters a cycle of corruption and decreased public accountability. This cycle results in diminished citizen participation and paves the way for corrupt leaders who exploit the system, undermining the rule of law. Similar observations are made by Chukwudi (2022) in Nigeria and Marsuki et al. (2022) in Indonesia, where political apathy allows for the rise of governance that does

not align with the public interest, demonstrating a shift towards antipathy in the behavioural consequence of apathy.

Odongo (2023) reports a higher prevalence of political apathy among Kenyan youth compared to older generations, possibly due to the older generation's experiences under authoritarian rule. The political culture, dominated by older individuals, likely contributes to youth and women feeling marginalized and uninformed about civic engagement and participation mechanisms. Contrasting with this view, Gerenge (2014) suggests that traditional metrics may not fully capture how youth are engaging politically. He proposes that young people are not necessarily apathetic but are instead turning to new platforms and methods like digital engagement, which might not align with conventional measures such as voting or physical protests. However, Chiweshe (2017) counters that while digital platforms like Facebook can engage Zimbabwean youth politically, they often lead to distractions with non-political content, inadvertently fostering a kind of apathy that reflects a diffuse, value-based disengagement from democracy.

3. Methods

This section presents the employed research methods and their motivations. It also reflects on the ethical considerations and dilemmas arising during fieldwork and the mitigating steps that were taken.

3.1 Research design

This research employs a mixed-methods research design to explore the changing political behaviours of Kenyan youth as well as the attitudes driving these changes. This includes quantitative survey data for 32 African countries between 2008 and 2021, as well as qualitative interview data collected through 10 individual and group interviews with a total of 16 participants during fieldwork in Nairobi, Kenya from January to March 2024. The quantitative component help answer my research question as it allows me to analyse trends in political behaviour among young Kenyans, i.e., whether they are exhibiting increasing apathetic or antipathetic behaviour, or whether they are becoming so-called ‘new democratic citizens’ (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p. 19). The qualitative component helps answer my research question in that it allows me to analyse the changing attitudes among young Kenyans that are driving their changing political behaviour (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p. 20), i.e., in what ways they motivate their increasing apathetic, antipathetic, or democratic behaviour.

3.2 Data collection

The research primarily analyses two sources of data: one primary (qualitative) and one secondary (quantitative). These are briefly introduced below.

3.2.1 Quantitative survey data

The secondary, quantitative data consists of the merged datasets from Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8, (Afrobarometer, 2008b; 2011-13; 2016; 2019b; 2022) as well as the Kenya survey rounds 4-9 (Afrobarometer, 2008a; 2011; 2015; 2017; 2019a; 2023). Since the different survey rounds are not standardized, key survey items were identified across the datasets and assigned new variable names before being merged (see Appendix 4 below). The analysed trends filter responses from participants who are 35 years or below, conforming to the definition of youth enshrined in the African Youth Charter (African Union, 2006). The merged Afrobarometer survey rounds are used to compare trends in political behaviour across African regions (see Appendix 3), while the Kenya-specific survey rounds were used for logistic regression analysis of the correlation between age and ‘being youth’ on the probability of voting (see Appendix 4).

3.2.2 Qualitative interview data

The primary, qualitative data was collected through 8 semi-structured individual and group interviews comprising 14 participants across three target groups: (a) university students, (b) youth leaders, and (c) unemployed or underemployed youth, all between 18 and 35 years of age (see appendix 1 and 2 below for the interview protocol and topic guide used). I selected university students as they are easily accessible and often represent a broad range of ethnic groups from different parts of the country (Taaliu, 2017). They have also played a pivotal role in Kenya's previous elections and the country's transition to democratic rule. Youth leaders represent the intelligentsia who will one day be at the reins of power and are thus assumed to be especially vocal on matters of youth participation on politics (Amutabi, 2002). Since they are exposed to a broad range of young people, especially from more marginalised areas, through their community engagement, they are also able to reflect on the perceptions of a broader range of youth compared to university students. Beneficiaries of vocational education and training programmes represent the large number of unemployed youths in Kenya who are often cited as becoming increasingly apathetic (Mapenzauswa, 2022). The target groups further represents a range of different ages, genders, educational backgrounds, employment statuses, and ethnic groups, and come from both rural and urban areas.

In addition to the semi-structured interviews with young people in Nairobi, three expert interviews were also conducted with representatives from the Kenyan Law Reform Commission (KLRC), the Emerging Leaders Foundation (ELF), and the Common Open Market for East and South Africa (COMESA).

All interview data can be provided upon request.

Sampling technique

As a response to certain practical obstacles faced during fieldwork that will be discussed extensively in this paper, a snowball sampling technique was used to access participants across the three target groups outlined above. Established contacts prior to commencing my fieldwork combined with contacts I made in my first few weeks kickstarted the snowball sampling, as participants would reach out to their immediate network, thus broadening my sample size. However, this technique can also increase the bias and reduce the representativeness of my sample (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p. 167). A field diary was also kept throughout the fieldwork process which capture my encounters and informal conversations with people. This helped me to reflect regularly on my observations and experiences throughout the fieldwork process (Scheyvens & Storey, 2014, p. 105).

3.2.3 Strengths and weaknesses

Quantitative survey data

The merged Afrobarometer survey datasets provide a detailed cross-national perspective on African public opinion about democracy, highlighting regional trends and disparities in changing political attitudes and behaviours among young people. These surveys are particularly useful for comparative studies and longitudinal analysis due to their consistent methodology. However, they face challenges such as potential biases from varying sampling and data collection techniques across countries, linguistic and cultural differences that might affect responses, and the necessity for timely data updates to remain relevant in dynamic environments.

Qualitative interview data

On the qualitative front, the data collected through various interview formats provides distinct layers of insight. Informal interviews with individuals from my network reflect a spectrum of personal views on Kenya's electoral processes, though these perspectives may not be widely generalizable. In contrast, interviews with youth leaders tend to offer a more collective viewpoint, representing broader community sentiments. These leaders often have deeper insights into the attitudes of the youth, although their responses may be biased towards portraying positive scenarios due to their roles in promoting good values and mobilizing change. Expert interviews add another dimension by often echoing established academic knowledge, which may or may not corroborate with the views of the youth or youth leaders.

3.3 Data analysis

Descriptive statistics of quantitative survey data

The merged Afrobarometer survey round 4-8 was subjected to descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis (see appendix 4). It is divided into two parts: (a) trends in democratic apathy and (b) trends in democratic antipathy. A typology of political participation was developed based on Odongo (2023) to analyse changing political behaviours and attitudes through changing specific, process-related support for democracy (see Table 2 below). It includes formal political participation, e.g., voting, or political party membership, and alternative political participation, e.g., contacting local political figures. To analyse changing political behaviours and attitudes from arising from structural support for democracy, trends were compared in young people's satisfaction and with Kenya's democratic regime, trust in political institutions and the electoral process. The second part reviews trends in youth antipathy, by analysing changing political behaviours and attitudes from a diffuse,

value-related support for democracy. This includes young people's support for democracy and authoritarian alternatives.

Thematic analysis of interview data

The collected interview data was subjected to thematic analysis, which is useful for developing an understanding of the common or shared experiences, thoughts, and behaviours of my research participants regarding their changing political attitudes and behaviours (Kiger & Varpio, 2020). I specifically used an inductive coding scheme following the five phases of thematic coding analysis in Robson & McCartan (2016, p. 469). This included transcribing my interview data, systematically generating initial codes on young people's political attitudes and behaviours, and identifying broader themes or categories that aggregated the lower-level codes which culminated in two thematic maps that I present and interpret in section 4.1 below.

3.4 Ethical considerations

The research adheres to Lund University Master's In International Development (LUMID) ethical guidelines (see appendix 6). The research ensured participants' full anonymity and confidentiality. Informed consent was obtained from all participants before conducting the interviews, clearly articulate the research aim, and ensuring that participants were fully informed what they were consenting to while allowing participants to withdraw from the study at any time (Robson & McCartan, 2016, pp. 212-215). A validation workshop was also held on the 17th of May with all participants including additional experts from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Union (AU).

3.4.1 Positionality and ethical dilemmas

In examining the influence of positionality on my research process, two primary aspects emerged which affected the production of knowledge (Sultana, 2007; Jaju, 2023). Firstly, the power dynamics between myself as a young, somewhat inexperienced bachelor student and restricted access to essential training and research institutions in Kenya and their target groups revealed a stark power imbalance that limited meaningful engagement at the commencement of my fieldwork (England, 1994). Mitigation was attempted through informal networks, though this approach introduced ethical dilemmas. Secondly, my identity as a 'white, Western, middle-class, heterosexual man' facilitated interactions with local participants who might have perceived me as a resourceful outsider (England, 1994, p. 81). This, however, biased the sample towards urban, educated, and financially better-off males while underrepresenting women, rural and marginalized individuals such as those in the Kibera

and Mukuru slums in Nairobi. Although efforts were made to include diverse voices by engaging with youth leaders in these areas and compensating participants for their time, the outreach to these underrepresented groups was not as robust as needed (Robson & McCartan, 2016).

4. Analysis

This chapter reviews the changing political attitudes and behaviours among young Kenyans as well as the drivers behind these changes. It does so by using the typology of specific and diffuse support for democracy as outlined in Table 1, section 2.2 above, to analyse patterns of change in both specific and diffuse support for democratic processes, institutions, and values in Kenya.

Section 4.1 reviews changes in political attitudes and behaviours among young Kenyans, as reported in the merged Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8, with a view of analysing whether young Kenyans are becoming increasingly apathetic, antipathetic, or whether they are finding new democratic citizens. Section 4.2 then explores how young people and youth leaders in Nairobi Kenya motivate and rationalize their changing political attitudes and behaviours.

4.1 Trends in Political Attitudes and Behaviours Among Young Kenyans

This analysis provides a comprehensive overview of changing political behaviours and attitudes among young Africans, focusing on Kenyan youth within a broader African context from 2008-2021, based on Afrobarometer survey data. The section aims to embed the Kenyan case within the scholarly discourse on political apathy and antipathy among youth across different types of democracies.

4.1.1 Political apathy among Kenyan youth

This sub-section seeks to examine whether Kenyan youth are developing increasingly apathetic political behaviour or whether they are becoming ‘new democratic citizens’. It does so in two ways. First, it measures their *specific, process-related support for democracy*. Here, political apathy would express itself through declining formal political participation, such as decreasing voter turnout, party membership, and participation in political activities among youth (Foa & Mounk, 2017; 2019) while new forms of critical civic engagement express itself through an increase in alternative political participation such as attending community meetings, demonstrations, or contacting political figures (Zilinsky, 2019; Nkansah & Bartha, 2023; Odongo, 2023). Table 2 provides an overview of the Afrobarometer survey items for these forms of political participation.

Table 2: Categorization of formal and alternative modes of political participation

#	Mode of participation	Indicator	Afrobarometer survey item
1	Formal political participation	Has voted in the past 12 months	Voted last election
		Is a member of a political party	Feel close to a political party
		Has participated in a political party activity	Worked for a political candidate
2	Alternative political participation	Contacted or met a politician	Contacted either [local government councillor; MP; official of a government agency; political party official; traditional ruler; religious leader]
		Attended a public participation meeting organized by government officials	Attended community meeting
		Signed a petition	
		Participated in or attended a political rally, strike, or demonstration	Joined others to raise an issue Attend a demonstration or protest march
		Contributed to a political discussion online	
		Written or forwarded an email, article, or letter containing political content and messaging	
		Donated money to a political organization/party for political purposes	

Source: Based on Odongo (2023), Table 1, p. 439.


Note: White boxes were not represented as an item in the Afrobarometer questionnaire survey.

Second, the sub-section examines young Kenyan's *structural support for democracy*. Here, apathy would express itself through increasing dissatisfaction with democracy and decreasing trust in political institutions (see also Table 1 in section 2.2 above).

Trends in voter turnout among African youth

Voting rates among Kenyan youth since the troubled 2007 election decreased steadily by 8%pts between 2008 and 2021 (see Figure 1). Declining voter turnout among youth is not exclusive to Kenya. It is instead part of a broader phenomenon across Africa where all regions except for Southern Africa have experienced similar declines in voting rates among youth between 2008/09 and 2019/21 (from -2/4%pt in Western and Eastern Africa respectively to -46%pts in Northern Africa).

Figure 1: Share of survey respondents who voted during last election, broken down by region.




Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Note: Afrobarometer data for Kenya in the 2019-21 period cover the year 2019. The last year 2021 in the figure above that exclusively contains data for Kenya is instead taken from Okello & Iberi (3 October 2023). AD710: Dissatisfaction, disengagement mark outlook of young Kenyans, Available online: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad710-dissatisfaction-disengagement-mark-outlook-of-young-kenyans/> [Accessed 19 April 2024].

Moreover, younger people in Kenya are increasingly less likely to vote compared to the older generation. Figure 2a below presents the results from logistic regression models on the influence of “age” (independent variable) on “voting” (dependent variable) across Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-9 (2008-2022), while Figure 2b presents the results from the influence of “age_dummy” (binary independent dummy variable, measuring whether respondents are ≤ 35 years of age, or older than 35 years of age) on “voting” across the same survey rounds (see Appendix 4: Logistic regression for the regression model outputs).

Figure 2: Coefficients from logistic regression models




Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-9 on Kenya, 2008-2022.

The analysis indicates a clear positive relationship between age and the likelihood of voting among Kenyans from 2008 to 2022. Statistical results show that older age groups are increasingly more likely to vote compared to younger individuals. Specifically, each additional year of age consistently raises the odds of voting, with this effect intensifying over the years (from an increase of 0.055 in the odds in 2008 to 0.14 in 2022, see Figure 2a above). Similarly, being over 35 significantly increases the likelihood of voting, with its impact growing from 1.06 to 2.36 over the examined period (see Figure 2b above). The precision of these findings is confirmed by narrow confidence intervals, and age showing high statistical significance in all models (<0.001). This growing trend underscores that age is an increasingly important factor in voter participation, with younger Kenyans showing lower turnout rates compared to their older counterparts.

Formal and alternative forms of political participation in Kenya

Both formal and alternative political participation is on the decline among Kenyan youth (see Figure 3a & b). While voting rates decreased by -10%pts between 2011 and 2021, the number of people who feel close to a political party decreased by -14%. Interestingly, the number of people who worked for a party increased by 18%pts (Figure 3a). Alternative political participation is also on the decline among Kenyan youth, evidenced by a decreasing number of people who attended a community meeting or joined others to raise an issue by -21%pts and -31%pts respectively. Similarly, the number of people who attended a demonstration fell by -5%pts between 2011 and 2021 (Figure 3b).

Figure 3: Political engagement among young Kenyans, 2011-2021.




Source: Okello & Iberi (3 October 2023). AD710: Dissatisfaction, disengagement mark outlook of young Kenyans, Available online: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad710-dissatisfaction-disengagement-mark-outlook-of-young-kenyans/> [Accessed 19 April 2024].

Note: Parameter “Worked for a political party” is based on author’s calculations of Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

The observed decline in both formal and alternative political participation indicates that young Kenyan’s are becoming increasingly apathetic behaviour rooted in declining specific, process-related

support for democracy. However, there is one exception related a rise in issue-based political participation, i.e., contacting local political figures. This trend dipped after the 2010 constitutional reforms but rebounded by 2013 and remained steady through 2017. Popular methods include reaching out to religious leaders (70% of respondents in 2016), traditional rulers (35% of respondents in 2014-19), and local governments (22% of respondents in 2016 and 2019) (see Figure 4). The 2010 Constitution's emphasis on devolution, which shifted power to county governments, might influence this sustained engagement. However, overall levels of alternative participation have only returned to those seen before 2010, not surpassed them.

Figure 4: Issue-based political participation



Source: Author's calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Note: See appendix 3 for a breakdown of countries for each democracy type and income group.


Easton (1975) provides a theoretical framework to interpret these behaviours, suggesting that while formal electoral participation might be on the decline, issue-specific engagements, like contacting authorities directly, could be influenced more by the systemic setup of the political environment rather than a general disinterest in political processes. Easton argues that the electoral system may not provide a conducive setting for voters to address issues they find important, pushing them to adopt more direct forms of engagement to satisfy their political needs. This "contact mechanism" of engagement is viewed as more rewarding and effective for addressing specific issues and achieving desired changes, especially in contexts where the electoral system feels alienating or ineffective.

Satisfaction with democracy

While decreasing voter turnout among young Kenyans may hint that young Kenyans are becoming increasingly apathetic, i.e., in terms of their specific, process-related support for democracy, the evidence on their structural support for the democratic regime points in the opposite direction.

Young Kenyans views on elections have improved since 2008 (see Figure 5). In fact, the share of youth who viewed Kenyan elections as either “completely free and fair” or “with minor problems” increased from 20% in 2008 to 80% in 2011. This coincided with the introduction of the new constitution of 2010 which included the establishment of its new Supreme Court and the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC). At the same time, mistrust towards the electoral processes seems to have increased slightly following each election since 2011, i.e., following the 2013 and 2017 elections, with an overall increased from 20% in 2011 to 30% in 2019.

Figure 5: Young people’s perception of the integrity of Kenya’s elections




Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Note: Does not include responses coded as “Don’t know”, “Do not understand”, and “Refused to answer”.

Similarly, young people’s views of Kenya’s democratic regime and overall satisfaction with democracy are improving. In fact, the share of young Kenyans who think that the Kenyan regime is either “A democracy with minor problems” or “A full democracy” has increased from just 50% in 2008 to almost 80% in 2019 (see Figure 6a). This is even though the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has ranked Kenya a “Hybrid regime”, i.e., not a democracy, since 2006 (EIU, 2023). Additionally, the share of young Kenyans who are either “Very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with democracy has increased from around 40% in 2008 to 60% in 2019 (Figure 6b).

Figure 6: Young people's perceptions of democracy in Kenya




Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Note: Does not include responses coded as “Don’t know” and “Missing”.

Trust in institutions

Following the adoption of the 2010 Constitution and the subsequent institutional and electoral reforms, trust among young Kenyans in the three branches of government surged to an all-time high in 2011. Notably, trust in the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC) soared from 45% in 2008 to 85% by 2010, as shown in Figure 7. However, since reaching this peak in 2011, there has been a gradual decline in trust levels, particularly following the elections of 2013 and 2017. Specifically, trust in the president and the ruling party decreased by 3% and 10% points, respectively, between 2011 and 2019. Similarly, trust in the judiciary dropped by 8% points and in parliament by 9% points during the same period. Trust in the IEBC also saw a significant reduction, decreasing by 19% points. Despite these declines, trust levels remain overall higher than they were prior to the reforms initiated in 2010.

Figure 7: Young Kenyan's trust in political institutions



Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Note: Trust is considered as the share of total responses that were either “A lot”, “Somewhat”, and “Just a little” when asked “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say.”


4.1.2 Political antipathy among Kenyan youth

This sub-section provides an overview of political participation and attitudes among Kenyan youth, focusing on their growing antipathetic behaviours. It does not examine specific process-related support for democracy, such as the active embrace of anti-establishment parties (see Lockwood & Notes, 2023 for a discussion on the alleged populism of incumbent president Ruto in Kenya) nor does it consider declining structural support for democracy, which includes citizens’ support for power-centralizing executive policies, although indicators exist in the Afrobarometer survey (see Oswald, 2021). Instead, it assesses increasing antipathy through a decrease in value-based support for democracy, marked by diminishing democratic support alongside rising authoritarian inclinations. This level of support addresses whether the evolving political behaviours of young people might cause a democratic backlash through deconsolidation in established democracies or hinder further consolidation in new democracies like Kenya (see Foa & Mounk, 2019).

Support for democracy

Not only are young Kenyan’s becoming increasingly satisfaction with Kenya’s democratic institutions, but they are also showcasing increasing support for democracy itself. While young Kenyans’ support for democracy drastically decreased between 2008 and 2011 from 75% to just 60%, it has since rebounded to 73% in 2019 (see Figure 8). In comparison, support for democracy among youth in West- and East African countries increased by 3 and 4%pts respectively between 2008/09 and 2019/21, while it decreased in both Northern and Central Africa (-9%pts and -25%pts respectively) (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Support for democracy among young people in Africa




Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

Support for authoritarian alternatives

Although overall levels of support for authoritarian alternatives remain low among Kenyan youth, they have increased slightly since 2008. In fact, young Kenyans’ support for one-party-, military-, and one-man rule increased by 4%-, 8%-, and 7%pts respectively between 2008 and 2019 (see Figure 9 below).

Figure 9: Support for democracy and authoritarian alternatives



Source: Author’s calculations based on Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-8 merged, 2008-2021.

4.1.3 Summary of findings

To sum up, the changing political attitudes and behaviour of young Kenyans reveals a complex pattern across various dimensions of support: Specific, process-related support for democracy is waning, as indicated by the decline in traditional political activities like voting and party involvement, suggesting a shift away from standard democratic processes. The lack of a corresponding increase in alternative political participation seems to suggest that Kenyans are becoming increasingly apathetic, corroborating the findings from Makoori (2015), Odanga (2022), Mutuku et al., 2023, and Odongo (2023). However, their turn towards more direct ways of participation, such as issue-based politics, do suggest that Kenyans are finding new ways of participating, thus becoming new democratic citizens as championed by Campbell et al. (1960), Resnich (2015), and Teorell et al. (2006) (all in: Odongo, 2023). This last point is supported by young Kenyans' increasing structural support for democracy, indicated by an increasing satisfaction with democracy and trust in the electoral progress post-2010, as well as their high and improving value-based support for democracy, with most young Kenyans preferring democratic governance compared to authoritarian alternatives.

4.2 Tracing motivations behind changing political attitudes and behaviours among youth in Nairobi

The previous section found that although young Kenyans are becoming increasingly apathetic toward democracy in terms of decreasing process-related support for democracy, they are simultaneously becoming new democratic citizens through increased process- and structural support for democracy.

This section explores how young people and youth leaders in Nairobi Kenya motivate and rationalize their changing process-related and structural support to democracy. It does so by reviewing interview data collected of 14 respondents from eight group and individual, semi-structured interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, between 14th February and 12 March 2024.


The section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section explores the rationalizations behind young Kenyans seemingly apathetic behaviour, which it is argued extends both to decreased process-related support for democracy. The second sub-section explores how young Kenyans motivate their seemingly increasing new democratic behaviour that relates to an increasing process-related and structural support for democracy.

4.2.1 Political apathy rooted in changing process-related support for democracy

Most research participants expressed decreasing specific, process-related trust in democracy. This included both dissatisfaction with empirical outcomes of existing successive governments (assertive perspective) but also growing disillusionment with the political elites (allegiant perspective).

Figure 10 below presents the motivations that research participants expressed as driving these two attitudes that participants argued ultimately drive young people to disengage from formal political participation in Kenya.

Figure 10: Attitudes driving declining formal political participation among young Kenyans



Dissatisfaction with empirical outcomes

The first expression of apathy among young Kenyans was expressed through feelings of indifference towards voting, rooted in a belief that their participation will not significantly improve their living conditions. For example, one participant explained, “Some youth believe their vote won't make a difference. Another challenge is that we cannot sometimes get our youth representative because these people don't find our voices really matter” (Anonymous participant, online interview, 18 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

This indifference is primarily driven by feelings of marginalization from development processes and a lack of representation. According to participants, many communities, particularly in the slums of Nairobi, are disenfranchised by unemployment, poverty, and insecurity, and see little to no development initiatives reaching them. Additionally, the existing political parties, coalitions, and alliances do not seem to represent young people's interests. As one participant put it, “They feel like,

even if they vote, they don't feel represented. So even if I vote for someone, what can he or she do? The expectations are very low; that's why they don't vote” (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 15 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). This sentiment was echoed during the 2022 elections, which was seen as a choice the lesser of evils, none of which align with the youths' ideals for a good leader (Anonymous participants, in-person interview, 14 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

Disillusionment with Existing Political Elites

The disillusionment extends to a broader frustration with the political elites, characterized by corruption, nepotism, and a perceived rigging of electoral outcomes. Participants express a cynical view that the electoral process is predetermined, undermining any true democratic choice. As one participant noted, “It kind of feels like your vote doesn't count, really, because at the end of the day, one way or another, even if you vote, even if you do everything right, the outcome is so predictable,” (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 28 February, Nairobi, Kenya).


This cynicism is compounded by participants' views that politicians manipulate the democratic process through corruption and nepotism. One participant criticized, "So parties in Kenya, both [coalitions] steal. [The] winner is who steals better and smarter. So, in terms of who we trust, it's who will steal less and still help us along the way" (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 14 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). Another participant noted “That's why our parliament is full of people who came off the street, drug dealers, people want to con people money, you see, because they con people money to use that money to get into parliament to protect themselves and their businesses, and to continue doing those same deals in the same parliament.” (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 12 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). As a result, trust in political authorities is generally low. Many believe that politicians actively have compromised the independent electoral boundaries commission (IEBC), further eroding confidence in the electoral processes, and contributing to low voter turnout and potential election violence (Anonymous participants, in-person interviews, 28 February and 12 March 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

The ongoing issues with filling the electoral commissioners of the IEBC and its perceived lack of independence highlight a critical challenge in establishing a trustworthy electoral system in Kenya. Participants have witnessed firsthand the manipulation and politicization of this body, leading many to conclude that elections are not only unrepresentative but outright stolen. This perception was particularly poignant in recent elections, where the murder of a key electoral official deepened distrust and fear, discouraging electoral participation. "I think one of the reasons why, for instance, last year, the last election, people didn't turn out [to vote was] because we do not have faith in the electoral process," disclosed a participant (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 12 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

4.2.2 New democratic citizens through changing process-related and structural support for democracy

Despite growing perceived political apathy among young Kenyans, several participants also expressed views that conform with the new democratic citizens framework. This includes a perception that young people are being prevented from formal political participation, but that they are finding alternative ways to participate in democracy. Participants also noted how young Kenyans are becoming increasingly supportive of democratic institutions in the country. Figure 11 shows the thematic map of these perceptions which are discussed below.

Figure 11: Conceptual map of Kenyan youths' changing political behaviour.



Declining Formal Participation

Although many research participants noted a growing apathy among Kenyan youth toward formal political activities, they also argued that several barriers prevent them from engagement through formal channels. A primary obstacle mentioned was the issue of many youths not being registered to vote. Indeed, only 39% of youth was registered to vote during the 2022 elections (Mueller, 2022), which participants linked to challenges in obtaining necessary identification documents, a situation that was made worse by the increasing costs in obtaining IDs (Anonymous participant, in-person group interview, 28 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). Ageism was another issue which participants feel further limits young Kenyans' participation in politics, as older politicians are often preferred for their experience, sidelining younger, potentially more innovative candidates. As one participant noted:

“(…) if there’s one part in Kenya that is dominated by the older generation, then it's politics. So even, the young people who started young in politics, you might even

be more intelligent in the field of politics, have better points, have better ideas, but because the fact that you're young, they will not take you seriously” (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 14 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

This cultural preference for older leaders not only hinders young candidates' entry into politics but also their progress within the political hierarchy, as established politicians resist ceding power to younger counterparts. Another issue was financial barriers preventing young people from running for political positions as they will need large sums of money to campaign and ‘buy voters’ during campaigns. As a representative from the Kenyan Law Reform Commission (KLRC) noted, while several laws have been made to make more order in the electioneering process and provide more equal opportunities for people that want to run for elections, such as the election campaign funding act, the election criminalizing act, and the political parties act, the financial costs of running for a political position continues to be a key barrier faced by young people (in-person interview, 19 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya)

Demand for Greater Accountability

Despite the low levels of trust in political authorities noted in the previous section (see section 4.2.1 above), participants demanded greater accountability with political institutions. They reported increasing trust in key democratic institutions, such as the Supreme Court, and its ability to hold politicians accountable. These improvements were generally linked to reforms stemming from the 2010 Constitution. Participants not only viewed the Supreme Court as independent from manipulation from political elites, but also as capable of adjudicating election disputes effectively (whereas previously, elections were disputed through demonstrations resulting in post-election violence) (Anonymous participants, in-person group interview, 14-28 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). As a representative from COMESA noted,

“The Supreme Court is critical in terms of resolving disputes, especially when it comes to the presidential election, and I think it has played that role quite significantly. If we look at the 2013, the 2017 and the 2022 election, it has really played a very big role in terms of this dispute resolution of presidential elections” (online interview, 20 February 2024).

Participants also noted how digitalization has improved the transparency of elections in Kenya. Digitalization namely comprises the live transmission of results from the polling centre to the IEBC, which make participants feel that there is limited room for politicians to manipulate votes (Anonymous participants, in-person and online interviews, 18-20 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya). This is even though voter manipulation often occurs before the results get transferred from the polling

centre, even as early as during the queuing to the polling station where voters are given handouts by local politicians, as expressed by one participant who served as election observer during the 2017 and 2022 elections (Anonymous participant, in-person interview, 12 March 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

Alternative Political Participation

Despite obstacles to formal participation, Kenyan youth are increasingly engaging in alternative forms of political involvement, facilitated by social media and shifts in electoral attitudes. Youth leaders, for instance, play active roles in political parties and community groups, organizing events and volunteer activities that enhance civic engagement and holding elected leaders accountable. An example of the latter includes follow-ups on the promises made by politicians during their campaigns, most often through town hall meetings, signing petitions, or calling out leaders on social media. Social media platforms like Twitter have become crucial tools for holding elected officials accountable, enabling young Kenyans to demand fulfilment of campaign promises by elected leaders and an overall greater transparency in local governance processes. As expressed by one youth leader, “Social media is one of the things that we do to hold our leaders accountable, because we youth can come up and ask like, ‘why are you not doing these things that you promised, where is the money that was allocated for these things’” (Anonymous participant, online interview, 18 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

Participants also noted how a combination of certain electoral reforms and changing attitudes among youth have increased the number of young people getting into politics. As noted by a representative from the Kenyan Law Reform Commission (KLRC),

“The 2010 Constitution opened a new page for Kenya. It created a lot of optimism, especially for youth, and caused a [positive] change of attitudes towards the electoral process. The constitution gives probation guarantees, promises political rights in its bill of rights, including giving young people the right to vote and participate in politics. So, the 2010 Constitution opened up elections and politics to young people.” (in-person interview, 19 February 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

Most participants also observed changing attitudes of young Kenyans towards elections, moving away from the traditionally strong ethnic affiliations. Historically, voting in Kenya has been deeply tied to ethnic affiliations, with voters supporting their ethnic groups to secure more resources and avoid potential losses if opposing groups gain power (Mueller, 2020). However, contemporary Kenyan youth are increasingly moving away from tribal alliances. This change is partly attributed to the intermingling of different ethnic groups through

relationships and social interactions, diminishing tribal biases. Furthermore, learning from past elections marked by ethnic violence, young voters are now focusing more on candidate policies that address pressing issues like unemployment and the cost of living, rather than ethnic alignment (Anonymous participants, in-person interviews, 11-12 March 2024, Nairobi, Kenya).

4.2.3 Summary of findings

In short, the data reveals that young people in Nairobi have a complex relationship with democracy that is marked by a combination of proactive engagement and growing apathy. By assessing responses from 14 young people and youth leaders, it becomes evident that traditional process-related support for democracy is declining due to dissatisfaction with political outcomes and disillusionment with political elites, corroborating the findings by Makoori (2015) and Mwonzora (2023). Although this trend points to the fact that youth are becoming more apathetic, there is simultaneously a notable increase in process- and structural support for democracy, in turn hinting that youth are becoming new democratic citizens. The latter is expressed through young people's adoption of innovative forms of participation and social accountability, as well as their increasing trust in democratic institutions such as the Supreme Court. This trend corroborates the findings from Odongo (2023) and Gerenge (2014). This dichotomy reflects a transformative shift in the role of young citizens within the democratic framework—from disengaged observers to active participants who utilize alternative platforms and perspectives to demand accountability and drive democratic change.

5. Conclusion

The political attitudes and behaviours of young Kenyans toward democracy are undergoing significant changes, as outlined in this thesis. This research demonstrates a nuanced landscape of evolving political engagement and support for democracy among Kenyan youths. As evidenced by the quantitative analysis, young Kenyans are increasingly exhibiting political apathy, characterized by declining voter turnout and formal political participation. The qualitative analysis of interviews with select youth in Nairobi corroborated this finding and further showed that trends were perceived to be driven by dissatisfaction with the performance of political authorities and disillusionment with the existing political elites. Overall, growing political apathy exhibits a decline in their process-related decline for democracy. However, this apathy is juxtaposed with a growing satisfaction with the country's democratic institutions and electoral processes and growing trust in select political institutions such as the Supreme Court. This growing structure-based support for democracy was manifested through the rise in new democratic citizenship behaviours, where young people are engaging in alternative forms of political participation, such as issue-based politics, and the rise in various forms of engagement in social accountability, especially at the county level and through digital activism, as evidenced from the qualitative interview data. At the structural level, Kenyan youth do not seem to become increasingly apathetic but instead find new ways to demand greater accountability from the country's democratic institutions, thus reaffirming their commitment to democratic ways of governance in favour of authoritarian alternatives. In other words, while traditional political participation in Kenya may exhibit growing apathetic attitudes and behaviour through a declining process-related trust in democracy among Kenyan youth, their commitment to democratic values and innovative participation forms hints of growing structure- and value-based support for democracy among young Kenyans.

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7. Appendices

7.1 Appendix 1: Interview protocol

1. Introduction

- a. Welcome and thank participants for volunteering to participate.
- b. Introduce yourself and any other person like a note taker or an interpreter (if any)
- c. Hand out the consent form or ask for verbal consent.

2. Ask Participants to review, ask any questions, and then sign the consent form.

- a. Offer a copy of the consent form (unsigned) to each participant. Some will want and others may not, but always offer.

3. Give a very brief overview of the research

4. Give participants information about the process: approximate time the interview may take, break if necessary.

5. Let participants know that:

- a. Participation in the interview is entirely voluntary.
- b. The interviews will be recorded, and notes taken but participants' names will not be revealed in any comments or reports. Obtain their consent (verbal consent sufficient) for the recording.
- c. They can decide not to continue with the interview without giving any reason if they feel uncomfortable on any part of the questions being asked.
- d. They can seek clarification on any question that is not clear for them.
- e. Transcripts of the interview will be shared with them for validation, and they are encouraged to respond with their views when contacted.

6. Thank them at the end

7.2 Appendix 2: Topic guide

Thank you for being willing to take part in an interview on democratization and electoral processes in Kenya. Can I first assure you that you will remain completely anonymous, and no records of the interview will be kept with your name on them. The collected data will be destroyed after six months. The research results will not be disseminated, and the research will not be published in any form.

1 What is your experience with elections in Kenya?

- a. Role, e.g., voter, observant, commentator, civil society, expert, Other?
- b. Training and education, e.g., civil education or voter information.
- c. Voter registration.
- d. Electoral campaigns.
- e. Election day, e.g., voting, vote counting.
- f. Verification and results, e.g., official results, complaints/appeals.
- g. Post election, e.g., institutional strengthening, legal reform, audits & evaluations, archiving and research.
- h. Advance to 2.

2 Can you describe the history of democratic elections in Kenyan since independence to the best of your knowledge?

- a. Voting procedures.
- b. Voting patterns.
- c. Electoral campaigns.
- d. Election outcomes.
- e. Transparency & accountability.
- f. Role of ethnicity.
- g. Political alliances.
- h. One party/multi-party politics.
- i. Advance to 3.

3 How has recent elections differed from previous ones?

- a. Before, during, after election.
- b. 2013 Presidential elections.
- c. 2017 Presidential elections.
- d. 2022 Presidential elections.
- e. Peaceful polls.
- f. Voter registration.

- g. Political parties.
- h. Political alliances.
- i. Advance to 4.

4 How have institutional reforms since the 2007 election improved or changed election procedures in Kenya?

- a. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
- b. 2010 Constitution (47 new counties).
- c. ICC tribunal.
- d. New Supreme Court.
- e. Devolution.
- f. Early warning systems
- g. Other judicial reforms?
- h. Advance to 5.

5 How do young people view elections in Kenya?

- a. Electoral processes
- b. Transparency and accountability.
- c. Trust in institutions.
- d. Represented by existing political parties and/or political alliances?
- e. Representation in local and national governments.
- f. Feeling their issues are being heard or addressed?
- g. Advance to 6.

6 What are some of the factors influencing young people's trust in elections in Kenya?

- a. Employment situation.
- b. Education.
- c. Economic development.
- d. Generational divide.
- e. Social media.
- f. Climate change.
- g. Advance to 7.

7 Can you to the best of your knowledge reflect on the low voter turnout among youth during the 2022 presidential election?

- a. Change from previous elections?
- b. Lower trust in elections?

- c. Not politically engaged.
- d. Other?
- e. Advance to 8.

8 What are some of the ways in which young people are expressing their political opinions in Kenya?

- a. Social media.
- b. Demonstrations.
- c. Civic engagement.
- d. Political dialogue.
- e. Peace education.
- f. Campaigns.
- g. Advance to 8.

9 Is there anything that you think the government should do to increase young people's perceptions of -and trust in- elections in Kenya?

“Thank you for all that valuable information, is there anything else you'd like to add before we end?”

7.3 Appendix 3: Afrobarometer survey categorizations

Table 3: Country typologies

Country	Region
Algeria	Northern Africa
Angola	Central Africa
Benin	Western Africa
Botswana	Southern Africa
Burkina Faso	Western Africa
Burundi	Eastern Africa
Cape Verde	Western Africa
Cameroon	Central Africa
Cote d'Ivoire	Western Africa
Egypt	Northern Africa
eSwatini	Southern Africa
Ethiopia	Eastern Africa
Gabon	Central Africa
Gambia	Western Africa
Ghana	Western Africa
Guinea	Western Africa
Kenya	Eastern Africa
Lesotho	Southern Africa
Liberia	Western Africa
Madagascar	Eastern Africa
Malawi	Eastern Africa
Mali	Western Africa
Mauritius	Eastern Africa
Morocco	Northern Africa
Mozambique	Eastern Africa
Namibia	Southern Africa
Niger	Western Africa
Nigeria	Western Africa
São Tomé and Príncipe	Central Africa
Senegal	Western Africa
Sierra Leone	Western Africa
South Africa	Southern Africa
Sudan	Northern Africa
Tanzania	Eastern Africa
Togo	Western Africa

Tunisia	Northern Africa
Uganda	Eastern Africa
Zambia	Southern Africa
Zimbabwe	Southern Africa

7.4 Appendix 4: Logistic regression analysis

7.4.1 Theoretical model

In this study, I hypothesize that:

H1: Young people in Kenya are the less inclined to vote than older people.

The literature on political apathy has found several variables to influence voting rates among youth, which includes Education, Gender, Income, and Partisanship. These are therefore included as control variables in my regression analysis. Logistic regression analysis is most suitable to explore this hypothesis since the dependent variable (viz. voting) is binary, i.e., having a value of either 0 = not voted, or 1 = voted. The following logistical regression model was developed:

$$\text{Logit}(P(\text{Voting})) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{Age} + \beta_2 \times \text{Education} + \beta_3 \times \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \times \text{Income} + \beta_5 \times \text{Partisanship}$$

Where:

- P (Voting) is the probability of voting,
- Age is the age of the individual,
- Education represents the individual's level of education (e.g., primary, secondary, tertiary),
- Gender represents the individual's gender,
- Income represents the individual's income or employment status,
- Partisanship represents the individual's political ideology or partisanship, and
- $\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5$ are the regression coefficients for the intercept, age, education, gender, income, and partisanship, respectively.

7.4.2 Data cleaning

The logistic regression models were based on survey data from Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-9 (2008-2022) that includes a total of 12,302 respondents. Since these six survey rounds are not standardized, each dataset underwent a series of preprocessing steps to ensure its suitability for analysis. Initially, each dataset was first imported while relevant variables were renamed and transformed as needed (see Table 4).

Table 4: List of used Afrobarometer variables across Kenya rounds 4-9

Variable	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7	Round 8	Round 9
Voting	Q23D	Q27	Q21	Q22	Q13	Q13

Values	0=You were not registered to vote, 1=You voted in the elections, 2=You decided not to vote, 3=You could not find the polling station, 4=You were prevented from voting, 5=You did not have time to vote, 6= You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register, 7=Did not vote for some other reason, 8= You were too young to vote, 9=Don't know/Can't remember, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data					
Age	Q1	Q1	Q1	Q1	Q1	Q1
Values						
Gender	Q101	Q101	Q101	Q101	Q101	Q101
Values	1=Male, 2=Female					
Education	Q89	Q97	Q97	Q97	Q97	Q94
Values	0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ high school, 5=Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data					
Dummy variables	Primary education: 1 if "2 or 3", all other values = 0. Secondary education = 1 if "4, 5 or 6", all other values = 0. Tertiary/university education = 1 if "7, 8 or 9", all other values = 0.					
Employment status	Q94	Q96	Q95	Q94	Q95A:	Q93A
Values	0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part time (not looking), 3=Yes, part time (looking), 4=Yes, full time (not looking), 5=Yes, full time (looking), 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data					
Relative standard of living	Q5	Q4	Q5	Q5		
Values	1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data					
Partisanship	Q85	Q89A	Q90A	Q88a	Q91A	Q89A
Values	0=No, (not close to any party), 1=Yes, (feels close to a party), 8=Refused to answer, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing data					

Dummy variable for youth

Since I am not merely interested in explaining the effect of age on voting patterns, but specifically interested in exploring whether young people vote to a lower degree than older people, a second regression model was made using a dummy variable for youth:

- Age_dummy represents whether an individual is youth (35 years of age or below) or not.

Dummy variables for education


Educational attainment is coded as a categorical variable in the Afrobarometer surveys, with values from 0 = no formal education to 9 = post-graduate education. To make this variable more suited for the regression, three dummy variables were created:

- Primary education, with a value of 1 if a respondent has either 2: Some primary schooling or 3: Primary schooling completed, with all other values being 0.
- Secondary education, with a value of 1 if a respondent has 4: Some secondary school/ high school, 5: Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6: Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, with all other values being 0.
- Tertiary education, with a value of 1 if a respondent has 7: Some university, 8: University completed, 9: Post-graduate, with all other values being 0.

Variables for income

Due to the lack of a clear indicator of a respondent’s income in the Afrobarometer surveys, Employment status was initially chosen as the replacement. However, due to the large number of NAs for this variable with roughly 25 per cent of values missing (consistent across all rounds, see for Figure 12 on round 4 below), a different variable for “relative standard of living” was chosen instead (see also Table 4 above).

Figure 12: Missing values for chosen variables, Afrobarometer Kenya survey round 4 (2008).



Since the logistic regression outputs using the two different variables do not significantly change the coefficient for “age” (see Table 5 and Table 6 below), the variable for “Relative standard of living” was used in subsequent regression analysis.

Table 5: Regression output for Kenya Round 4 (2008) using Relative standard of living

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-0.59457	0.569049	-1.045	0.296093	
Age	0.055262	0.008363	6.608	3.90E-11	***
Primary_education	0.655646	0.318832	2.056	0.039744	*
Secondary_education	0.754155	0.316093	2.386	0.017039	*
Tertiary_education	0.514578	0.542873	0.95	0.342347	
Relative_standard_of_living	-0.0678	0.084583	-0.802	0.422779	
Partisanship	0.608553	0.167779	3.627	0.000287	***
Gender	-0.49484	0.164105	-3.015	0.002566	**

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 6: Regression output for Kenya Round 4 (2008) using Employment status

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-0.76701	0.64166	-1.195	0.2319	
Age	0.06431	0.01112	5.781	7.44E-09	***
Primary_education	0.50091	0.40098	1.249	0.2116	
Secondary_education	0.59859	0.39274	1.524	0.1275	
Tertiary_education	0.40932	0.63928	0.64	0.522	
Employment_status	0.01788	0.18916	0.094	0.9247	
Partisanship	0.48878	0.19923	2.453	0.0142	*
Gender	-0.43678	0.18732	-2.332	0.0197	*

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Thus, the final logistic regression model for the influence of age on voting became:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Logit}_I(P(\text{Voting})) \\
 &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{Age} + \beta_2 \times \text{Primary_education} \\
 &+ \beta_3 \times \text{Secondary_education} + \beta_4 \times \text{Tertiary_education} \\
 &+ \beta_5 \times \text{Gender} + \beta_6 \times \text{Relative_standard_of_living} \\
 &+ \beta_6 \times \text{Partisanship}
 \end{aligned}$$

The final logistic regression model for the influence of being youth or not on voting became:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Logit}_{II}(P(\text{Voting})) \\
 &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{age_dummy} + \beta_2 \times \text{Primary_education} \\
 &+ \beta_3 \times \text{Secondary_education} + \beta_4 \times \text{Tertiary_education} \\
 &+ \beta_5 \times \text{Gender} + \beta_6 \times \text{Relative_standard_of_living} \\
 &+ \beta_6 \times \text{Partisanship}
 \end{aligned}$$

Below are the regression outputs for the two models for Afrobarometer survey rounds 4-9:

Table 7: Logit_I regression output for Kenya Round 4 (2008)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-0.59457	0.569049	-1.045	0.296093	
Age	0.055262	0.008363	6.608	3.90E-11	***
Primary_education	0.655646	0.318832	2.056	0.039744	*
Secondary_education	0.754155	0.316093	2.386	0.017039	*
Tertiary_education	0.514578	0.542873	0.95	0.342347	
Relative_standard_of_living	-0.0678	0.084583	-0.802	0.422779	
Partisanship	0.608553	0.167779	3.627	0.000287	***
Gender	-0.49484	0.164105	-3.015	0.002566	**

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 8: Logit_II regression output for Kenya Round 4 (2008)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	1.12673	0.45865	2.457	0.014025	*
age_dummy	1.06	0.18601	5.699	1.21E-08	***
Primary_education	0.46965	0.30783	1.526	0.127081	
Secondary_education	0.51829	0.30501	1.699	0.089264	.
Tertiary_education	0.3204	0.53155	0.603	0.54666	
Relative_standard_of_li	-0.08038	0.08355	-0.962	0.336012	
Partisanship	0.60056	0.16606	3.616	0.000299	***
Gender	-0.50799	0.16289	-3.119	0.001816	**

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 9: Logit_I regression output for Kenya Round 5 (2012)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-0.55075	0.380099	-1.449	0.14735	
Age	0.046473	0.004728	9.829	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	-0.00643	0.247134	-0.026	0.97925	
Secondary_education	-0.12356	0.244085	-0.506	0.61272	
Tertiary_education	-0.23247	0.323033	-0.72	0.47175	
Relative_standard_of_living	0.00888	0.051281	0.173	0.86253	
Partisanship	0.32894	0.101125	3.253	0.00114	**
Gender	-0.11054	0.10117	-1.093	0.27455	

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 10: Logit_II regression output for Kenya Round 5 (2012), age_dummy

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
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(Intercept)	0.49573	0.32418	1.529	0.12622	
age_dummy	1.61108	0.12385	13.008	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	-0.03657	0.248	-0.147	0.882767	
Secondary_education	-0.15585	0.24409	-0.639	0.523147	
Tertiary_education	-0.30621	0.32626	-0.939	0.347962	
Relative_standard_of_living	0.00801	0.0521	0.154	0.877805	
Partisanship	0.38497	0.10325	3.728	0.000193	***
Gender	-0.09949	0.10289	-0.967	0.333573	

Note: '*' = 0.01, '**' = .001, '***' = 0.

Table 11: Logit_I regression output for Kenya Round 6 (2014)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-2.45741	0.4154	-5.916	3.30E-09	***
Age	0.09303	0.00707	13.157	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	0.33827	0.24709	1.369	0.171	
Secondary_education	0.45609	0.24802	1.839	0.0659	.
Tertiary_education	0.79304	0.35512	2.233	0.0255	*
Relative_standard_of_living	0.03858	0.06185	0.624	0.5328	
Partisanship	0.7013	0.11941	5.873	4.28E-09	***
Gender	-0.01712	0.11831	-0.145	0.8849	

Note: '*' = 0.01, '**' = .001, '***' = 0.

Table 12: Logit_II regression output for Kenya Round 6 (2014)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	0.43634	0.32424	1.346	0.178	
age_dummy	1.43391	0.1386	10.345	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	0.16585	0.23048	0.72	0.472	
Secondary_education	0.14333	0.23082	0.621	0.535	
Tertiary_education	0.55924	0.34035	1.643	0.1	
Relative_standard_of_living	0.01068	0.05971	0.179	0.858	
Partisanship	0.73485	0.11504	6.388	1.68E-10	***
Gender	-0.07027	0.11473	-0.612	0.54	

Note: '*' = 0.01, '**' = .001, '***' = 0.

Table 13: Logit_I output for Kenya Round 7 (2016)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	0.677395	0.423926	1.598	0.110063	
Age	0.015708	0.005072	3.097	0.001956	**
Primary_education	0.51497	0.237297	2.17	0.029996	*
Secondary_education	0.260954	0.2359	1.106	0.268637	
Tertiary_education	0.216532	0.330719	0.655	0.512642	
Relative_standard_of_living	-0.04491	0.063907	-0.703	0.482271	
Partisanship	0.510954	0.122194	4.181	2.90E-05	***
Gender	-0.48233	0.124466	-3.875	0.000107	***

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 14: Logit_II output for Kenya Round 7 (2016)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	0.4022	0.36969	1.088	0.27662	
age_dummy	1.4374	0.14912	9.639	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	0.64509	0.24722	2.609	0.00907	**
Secondary_education	0.52796	0.24516	2.154	0.031272	*
Tertiary_education	0.5397	0.34058	1.585	0.113045	
Relative_standard_of_living	-0.03328	0.06652	-0.5	0.616816	
Partisanship	0.48103	0.12584	3.822	0.000132	***
Gender	-0.38818	0.12737	-3.048	0.002307	**

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 15: Logit_I output for Kenya Round 8 (2019)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-2.64447	0.426652	-6.198	5.71E-10	***
Age	0.115156	0.007132	16.145	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	0.300666	0.3134	0.959	0.3374	
Secondary_education	0.303212	0.307916	0.985	0.3248	
Tertiary_education	0.571134	0.345008	1.655	0.0978	.
Partisanship	0.287814	0.111436	2.583	0.0098	**
Gender	-0.09353	0.111688	-0.837	0.4023	

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 16: Logit_II output for Kenya Round 8 (2019)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	0.7667	0.33843	2.266	0.02348	*
age_dummy	1.78285	0.13501	13.205	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	0.13809	0.29113	0.474	0.63527	
Secondary_education	-0.08744	0.28529	-0.306	0.75924	
Tertiary_education	0.12399	0.32316	0.384	0.70122	
Partisanship	0.34288	0.10617	3.23	0.00124	**
Gender	-0.15162	0.10657	-1.423	0.15483	

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 17: Logit_I output for Kenya Round 9 (2022)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-3.61763	0.28103	-12.873	< 2e-16	***
Age	0.14197	0.00715	19.856	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	-0.01197	0.23381	-0.051	0.959168	
Secondary_education	0.0349	0.13873	0.252	0.801362	

Tertiary_education	0.14859	0.16208	0.917	0.359258	
Partisanship	0.36799	0.10963	3.357	0.000789	***
Gender	-0.19669	0.10985	-1.791	0.073364	.

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

Table 18: Logit_II output for Kenya Round 9 (2022)

Value	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	0.12404	0.18534	0.669	0.5033	
age_dummy	2.36331	0.12901	18.319	< 2e-16	***
Primary_education	-0.0432	0.21866	-0.198	0.8434	
Secondary_education	0.07741	0.12853	0.602	0.547	
Tertiary_education	0.13091	0.15156	0.864	0.3877	
Partisanship	0.42916	0.10198	4.208	2.57E-05	***
Gender	-0.20606	0.10204	-2.019	0.0434	*

Note: '**' = 0.01, '***' = .001, '****' = 0.

7.5 Appendix 5: Research license

 <p>REPUBLIC OF KENYA</p>	 <p>NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION</p>
RefNo: 744470	Date of Issue: 07/February/2024
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Mr.. Lauritz Elias Gaard of Lund University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Nairobi on the topic: Youth perceptions on electoral processes in Kenya for the period ending : 07/February/2025.</p>	
License No: NACOSTI/P/24/32770	
744470	
Applicant Identification Number	Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
	Verification QR Code
	
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See overleaf for conditions	

THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013 (Rev. 2014)
Legal Notice No. 108: The Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, hereafter referred to as the Commission, was established under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 (Revised 2014) herein after referred to as the Act. The objective of the Commission shall be to regulate and assure quality in the science, technology and innovation sector and advise the Government in matters related thereto.

CONDITIONS OF THE RESEARCH LICENSE

1. The License is granted subject to provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, and other relevant laws, policies and regulations. Accordingly, the licensee shall adhere to such procedures, standards, code of ethics and guidelines as may be prescribed by regulations made under the Act, or prescribed by provisions of International treaties of which Kenya is a signatory to
2. The research and its related activities as well as outcomes shall be beneficial to the country and shall not in any way;
 - i. Endanger national security
 - ii. Adversely affect the lives of Kenyans
 - iii. Be in contravention of Kenya's international obligations including Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).
 - iv. Result in exploitation of intellectual property rights of communities in Kenya
 - v. Adversely affect the environment
 - vi. Adversely affect the rights of communities
 - vii. Endanger public safety and national cohesion
 - viii. Plagiarize someone else's work
3. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.
4. The license any rights thereunder are non-transferable
5. The Commission reserves the right to cancel the research at any time during the research period if in the opinion of the Commission the research is not implemented in conformity with the provisions of the Act or any other written law.
6. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Director of Education, County Commissioner and County Governor before commencement of the research.
7. Excavation, filming, movement, and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.
8. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
9. The Commission may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project for the purpose of assessing and evaluating compliance with the conditions of the License.
10. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy, and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) onto a platform designated by the Commission within one year of completion of the research.
11. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.
12. Research, findings and information regarding research systems shall be stored or disseminated, utilized or applied in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Commission from time to time.
13. The Licensee shall disclose to the Commission, the relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee, and the relevant national agencies any inventions and discoveries that are of National strategic importance.
14. The Commission shall have powers to acquire from any person the right in, or to, any scientific innovation, invention or patent of strategic importance to the country.
15. Relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee shall monitor and evaluate the research periodically, and make a report of its findings to the Commission for necessary action.

National Commission for Science, Technology and
Innovation(NACOSTI),
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7.6 Appendix 6: LUMID Ethical Review – Self Evaluation

First-Stage Ethical Review

The Lund University Masters in International Development (LUMID) recognizes *self-evaluation* as the general principle guiding the enactment of an ethically-aware research among its staff and students. To this scope, the following document lists a set of questions to be taken into consideration prior to the design of all research projects. All researchers at the department are encouraged to complete this form; however, this rests in no ways prescriptive or associated to any form of ethical clearance or approval.

Should your answers point at some specific ethical issues with regards to your research, you're welcome to contact the LUMID Ethics Advisory Board through the LUMID Director of Studies.

TITLE OF RESEARCH: Election Violence in Kenya
 NAME(S): Lauritz Elias Gaard

Please answer each question YES or NO by ticking the boxes in the Checklist below.

	YES	NO
1. Will the project involve gathering personal information on identifiable living individuals that will remain in non-anonymized form?		X
2. Does the research involve vulnerable groups, which would include such people as: children, those with cognitive impairment, refugees, undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, prisoners or victims of violence?		X
3. Will the project require the co-operation of a gatekeeper (i.e. an authority figure who has the power to grant access to individuals and information possibly without their knowledge or informed consent) for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited?		X
4. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent at the time? (e.g. through covert observation or recording)		X
5. Will the research involve topics that may be deemed to be politically, socially, or culturally sensitive?		X
6. Will the research use data that requires permission from the appropriate authorities or owners before use?		X
7. Will financial inducements or gifts (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?		X
8. Will the research involve gathering and/or sharing data or confidential information beyond the initial consent given?		X
9. Will the research involve means that potentially make respondents identifiable <i>who have requested, or might reasonably anticipate, anonymity?</i> Such means might include, as examples, ISP addresses, video or voice recordings, visual images, or specification of personal characteristics likely to identify an unnamed individual.		X
10. Does the research entail potential security risks to research subjects (e.g. police interrogation, kidnapping, illness) that exceed those experienced in their everyday lives?		X

11. Does the research involve any physically invasive or potentially physically harmful procedures?		X
12. Will the research take place in a location or manner that could expose the researcher or research assistants to risks that exceed those experienced in their everyday lives?		X
13. Could the research induce any psychological stress or discomfort?		X
14. To the best of your knowledge, will the research raise any other issues which should be the subject of ethical consideration and/or review?		X

- If you have responded ‘**no**’ to all of these questions, then your research project entails minimal risk.
- If you have responded ‘**yes**’ to any other questions, your research project entails more than a minimal risk and you are encouraged to contact the LUMID Ethics Advisory Board through the LUMID Director of Studies.