Internal Displacement in Sweden - Perceived Roles and Responsibilities

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Lund 2024

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Abstract

This study examines perceived roles and responsibilities of Swedish authorities and organizations in handling internal displacement. Although Sweden currently does not experience internal displacement, the changed security situation in Europe and the increasing frequency and severity of climate change related disasters suggest that Sweden may face such challenges in the future. Preparedness for internal displacement has become increasingly significant since Sweden's NATO membership, which means it must ensure compliance with NATO standards for managing uncontrolled population movement. Incorporating evidence from document analyses and semi-structured interviews, this study demonstrates that individual roles and responsibilities of Swedish organizations and authorities were generally perceived as clear, since a response to internal displacement was predicted to be manageable with routine organizational roles. However, if the scale and duration of internal displacement would increase, uncertainty too would arise regarding these roles and responsibilities. This study identifies low levels of preparedness and a wish for heightened preparedness efforts among participants. Furthermore, it discusses challenges and opportunities for crisis management within a decentralized system. Additionally, the absence of a central coordinating actor capable of synchronizing individual responses and initiating preparedness measures for internal displacement is highlighted. Therefore, this study recommends assigning one actor with the responsibility of initiating preparedness efforts. Furthermore, it advocates for greater awareness among actors with the Swedish crisis management system about the risk of internal displacement and emphasizes the need for proactive preparation. Amidst the resumption of the total defence in Sweden, there is an opportunity to put internal displacement on the agenda.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, we would like to express our gratitude to everyone who was a part of this thesis. Thank you to all the participants who agreed to partake in the study, we greatly appreciate that you, despite your busy schedules, took the time to share your insights into the Swedish crisis management system. Special thanks to Anders Forsberg at the Swedish Red Cross for sharing the suggestion for this research topic. This thesis would have not been possible without your contribution.

We would also like to thank our supervisor Per Becker, who has supported us through the duration of the thesis. We greatly appreciate the guidance and feedback that you provided. Thanks to both our thesis examiner, Alex Cedergren, and to our opponents, Beatriz Paniego Béjar and Lennart Schweser, for your time and effort in reading our thesis and suggesting areas for improvement. Lastly, our appreciation goes out to all the professors at the Division for Risk Management and Societal Safety and our fellow cohort. Thank you for the past two years, we are very grateful for the experiences we have shared.

Summary

Internally displaced people (IDPs) make up majority of the displaced people worldwide. Today, internal displacement is recognized as a global crisis characterized by a growing number of IDPs, heightened levels of suffering and human rights violations amongst IDPs, and negative impacts on broader societal development. This study focusses on IDPs in Sweden. While Sweden currently does not face significant internal displacement, the changed security situation in Europe and the increasing frequency and severity of climate change related disasters suggest potential challenges in the future.

This study addresses the question: *What are the perceived roles and responsibilities of Swedish organizations and authorities in handling internal displacement?* The topic was born out of discussion with representatives from the Swedish Red Cross, who highlighted uncertainties regarding the roles and responsibilities of various organizations if such a situation would occur. The urgency of this topic has been underscored by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), that noted the absence of a governmental authority responsible for preparing for and handling of IDPs. Furthermore, preparedness for internal displacement has become increasingly significant given Sweden's NATO membership, which means it must ensure compliance with NATO standards for managing uncontrolled population movement.

To capture the perspectives of the Swedish authorities and organizations, the logic of inquiry in this study was inductive. An inductive approach does not depart from pre-existing theories or hypotheses but instead builds them based on the observed data. The research methodology, to complement this inductive approach, was that of 'grounded theory'. Grounded theory is suitable when existing theoretical models are limited, which is the case regarding perceptions on roles and responsibilities in managing internal displacement in Sweden. Data collection began with an initial document analysis, followed by theoretical sampling to select participants for semi-structured interviews. The interviews explored the perceived roles and responsibilities of organizations, ongoing preparedness efforts and challenges and opportunities for preparing for and responding to internal displacement.

Results showed that participants perceived smaller, shorter, and localized displacement to have clearer roles and responsibilities, whereas larger, longer, and multi-jurisdictional displacement tended to introduce uncertainty. This raised the question of which organization on national level should take charge of clarifying responsibilities, coordinating efforts, and initiating preparedness measures. Despite uncertainties, participants generally had a positive attitude towards the capacities of the Swedish Crisis management system's abilities to handle crises. However, they anticipated challenges in response, including managing

population movement, navigating strict laws, and confronting moral and ethical dilemmas. Additionally, the participants emphasized the importance of preparedness. However, they noted challenges to preparedness such as resource constraints and perceived lack of urgency. They proposed clearer assignments and adequate resources, alongside adopting more generalizable plans. Overall, participants recognized both positives and negatives from working in a decentralized system that is built on shared responsibilities. While some advocated for more command-and-control, there was an overall positive attitude toward the current set-up.

From the results emerged two central points for discussion. Firstly, the discrepancy between the lacking preparedness and the wish for more preparedness. This introduced the question of why the actors in the response system are not as prepared as they wish for. General challenges for preparedness were discussed, as well as the concept of problematization, which might explain why the topic is not on the agenda. It also raised the question of whether Sweden should prepare for internal displacement specifically or lean more toward a multi-hazard approach. The second point for discussion was that of the central responsible actor. The challenges and opportunities of decentralized systems, such as the Swedish one, were discussed. This included how decentralization is connected to the need for collaboration and coordination, and how coordination was often seen part of the problem as well as the solution for managing internal displacement. Lastly, a discussion point that emerged was which actors could potentially have the overall responsibility.

Based on the results and the discussion, this study concludes that it is vital that more actors within the Swedish crisis management system become aware that internal displacement is a risk to be considered and prepared for. It suggests that amidst the resumption of the total defence in Sweden, there is an opportunity to put internal displacement on the agenda. Furthermore, it recommends assigning one actor with the responsibility of initiating preparedness efforts. Hopefully this study can contribute to putting preparedness for internal displacement on the agenda. Something that at least for more than one of the participating actors has happened, as participants have stated their intention to bring the topic up for discussion within their own organization, because of taking part in this study.

Abbreviations

CIVO – County Administrative Board responsible for a Civil Defence Region [Civilområdesansvarig länsstyrelse]

IASC - Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDMC- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDPs – Internally Displaced People

FRG - Frivilliga Resursgruppen

MSB – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency [Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap]

SKR – Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions [Sveriges Kommuner och Regioner]

UNDRR- United Nations Office For Disaster Risk Reduction

UNHCR- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Table of Contents

<center>**1. Introduction**</center>

This chapter serves as an introduction to the research question and the objectives of this study. First the background and a brief overview of the context are presented, followed by the study's aim and relevance.

1.1 Background

Every year, tens of millions of people flee their homes from the impacts of conflicts, violence, disasters, and climate change. Many of them never cross an internationally recognized border (Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement [The Panel], 2021). These internally displaced people (IDPs) make up most displaced people around the globe today (The Panel, 2021). By the end of 2022, the number of IDPs worldwide reached 71.1 million, marking a 20 percent increase from the previous year and the highest recorded number to date (Internal Displacement Mornitoring Center [IDMC], 2023a). While internal displacement generally is caused by a complex combination of circumstances, the IDMC (2023a) estimates that of these 71.1 displacements, 62.5 million were because of conflict and violence and 8.7 million as a result of disasters.

In their 2021 report, the Panel (2021) highlighted internal displacement as a global crisis characterized by three distinct features. Firstly, there is a concerning upward trend in the number of IDPs. According to the Panel, this increase is caused both by new displacement and the prolonged displacement of millions who are unable to establish safe, lasting homes. Secondly, there are elevated levels of human suffering and human rights violations among IDPs, as they often lack secure livelihoods and housing and face various health, social and economic risks. The Panel states that this disproportionally affects women, girls, children, older people, and those with disabilities. Thirdly, internal displacement negatively impacts development and stability in the broader society, exacerbating poverty, inequality and health and safety risks for both IDPs and host communities. The Panel identified this global crisis as stemming from a collective failure to prevent, address and resolve internal displacement, citing inadequate acknowledgement and responsibility from many states towards their displaced populations. They state that contributing factors to this inaction include limited recognition of the high costs of inaction, capacity gaps when states do desire to act, competing agendas and insufficient accountability for actors failing to appropriately respond to internal displacement or its underlying causes. Consequently, the Panel concludes that internal displacement often remains overlooked in government policies and planning efforts. (Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, 2021)

This thesis focuses on internal displacement in Sweden. Sweden is, based on the data provided by the IDMC (2023a), not an area that experiences internal displacement on a

regular basis. In the previous ten years, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa had the highest numbers of IDPs (IDMC, 2023a). Europe generally has a relatively low number of IDPs, however this changed because of the conflict in Ukraine. Internal displacement in Europe, other than those caused by the war in Ukraine, are usually triggered by wildfires, particularly in the Mediterranean basin. Additionally, floods also make people internally displaced in Europe. According to IDMC (2023b), Sweden experienced smaller internal displacement in 2014, 2015, 2018 and 2019. The most significant of these were the displacement caused by wildfires in 2014 and 2018. In 2014, around a thousand people were displaced, and in 2018, approximately 125 people were displaced (IDMC, 2023b).

Even though Sweden has not previously experienced large scale internal displacement, this does not guarantee that such a situation cannot arise in the future. Recent events in Ukraine highlight how quickly a nation's situation can shift (IDMC, 2023a). Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed the global security situation, including that in Sweden. Despite the almost unimaginable thought of war in Sweden after many years of peace, multiple high-placed individuals in the Swedish government and defence forces have warned about the potential for war. For example, minister for civil defence Carl-Oskar Bohlin has said that "war could come to Sweden" (Regeringskansliet, 2024). This was reinforced by the Commander-in-Chief Micael Bydén, who said that "Russia's war against Ukraine is just a step, not an end game". He stressed the seriousness of the situation and the necessity for individuals to mentally prepare in the face of uncertainty (SVT Nyheter, 2024).

Another factor that could potentially lead to internal displacement in Sweden are large scale disasters triggered by natural hazards. It is widely acknowledged that global warming and climate change contribute to an increase in the frequency, intensity, and severity of such disasters (IPCC, 2023). A 2007 report from the Swedish government (SOU 2007:60) highlights the anticipated effects of climate change on the local climate in Sweden. The report predicts heightened temperatures in winter and summer, along with wetter winters and drier summers. These changes heighten the risk of winter floods and summer wildfires. Data from the Swedish Portal for Climate Change Adaptation (2021a) supports this prognosis, indicating a projected increase in both the size and frequency of forest fires. Additionally, the data shows how the length of the fire risk season is expanding, as is the occurrence of high-risk periods. Furthermore, the Swedish Portal for Climate Change Adaptation (2021b) warns for heightened flood risks along Sweden's southern coastlines due to rising sea levels. Moreover, inland regions such as Götaland, southern Svealand, and north-western Norrland are expected to experience increased instances of river floodings.

1.2 Aim and relevance

This thesis aims to examine the perceptions of organizational representatives within the Swedish crisis management system on their roles and responsibilities in handling internal displacement in Sweden. This includes the entire crisis management process, from the initiation of preparedness and planning efforts to the response when a situation of internal displacement would arise. The central research question guiding this study is:

What are the perceived roles and responsibilities of Swedish authorities and organizations in handling internal displacement?

This research question was born out of a discussion with representatives from the Swedish Red Cross. They were interested in how Sweden would manage internal displacement as, according to them, there were many uncertainties regarding the roles and responsibilities of various organizations if such a situation occurred. A reference was made to the 2015 refugee influx, which necessitated the ad hoc establishment of a refugee camp in Revinge and raised questions about organizational mandates. Since 2015, efforts have been made to increase preparedness for events of incoming refugees. However, less attention has been given to the topic of internal displacement. With the changed security situation in Europe and the effects of climate change in mind, the Swedish Red Cross emphasized the importance of enhanced preparedness.

The urgency of this topic has been underscored by a recent report from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB, 2022a). This report states that there is currently no governmental authority that has the assigned responsibility for planning for and handling IDPs in peacetime nor during a state of heightened alert. In addition, the inquiry into strengthened protection for the civilian population during a state of high alert (SOU 2022:57) states that there is limited planning for evacuations and subsequent accommodation to physically protect civilians in a wartime scenario. MSB states that this issue is especially significant since Sweden has pursued NATO membership in recent years. As Sweden is now a NATO member, the country must ensure compliance with the NATO baseline requirements of managing uncontrolled population movements within its borders. These standards include measures to ensure the safety, security, and well-being of affected populations, as well as coordination mechanisms for effective response and support (NATO, n.d.).

2. Conceptual clarifications

This chapter provides conceptual clarifications that form the foundation of this research. Given the inductive logic of inquiry and the methodological approach of grounded theory, this chapter does not introduce an all-encompassing theoretical framework or hypothesis. Instead, this chapter elaborates on the key concepts utilized in the research, aiming to enhance understanding of their application throughout this thesis. The main sections of this chapter discuss internal displacement, crisis management systems, and civil preparedness in Sweden.

2.1 Internal displacement

Internal displacement refers to the forced movement of people within the borders of their country of residence (IDMC, 2023d). The most widely acknowledged definition of internally displaced people (IDPs) was coined in the introduction of the UNHCR 'Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement' (Mooney, 2005). The definition is as follows:

> persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border. (UNHCR, 1998, p. 5)

The two fundamental aspects of this definition include the involuntary nature of the movement and the occurrence of such movement within national borders (Mooney, 2005). The fact that the displacement takes place within country borders creates the distinction between IDPs and refugees. According to the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951), an individual is only considered a refugee when they have crossed an international border. The absence of refugee status for IDPs prevents them from having a special status in international law with rights specific to their situation. The term 'internally displaced persons' is, therefore, merely descriptive (IDMC, 2023d).

Despite not enjoying refugee status or a special protection status under international law, IDPs face many of the same circumstances and challenges as refugees (Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 2024). These include issues such as family separation, loss of documentation, freedom of movement in and out of camps, loss of property, and exposure to the risk of secondary or onward displacement as result of the needs and protection risks that arise (IDMC, 2023c). The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (2024) further notes that IDPs are generally subject to heightened vulnerability as they, for example, are at higher risk of physical attack, sexual

assault, and abduction, and suffer higher rates of mortality. Moreover, that they are frequently deprived of adequate shelter, food, and health services.

The UNHCR Guiding Principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to IDPs. These principles are based on existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments (UNHCR, 1998). They delineate the rights and guarantees relevant to protecting IDPs from forced displacement, to protection and assistance during displacement, up to the achievement of durable solutions (IDMC, 2023c). As previously mentioned, the Guiding Principles are not a legally binding instrument. However, they have gained wide recognition as an important tool and standard for addressing internal displacement and are being used by governments, the UN general assembly, regional bodies, non-governmental organizations, and other actors (Mooney, 2005).

Principles 1 to 5 concern the 'General Principles'. These point out that people cannot be discriminated against and reaffirm that the principles apply to all IDPs regardless of their origin, race, religion, or political opinion. Here it is also stated that certain groups of IDPs, such as women, children, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, may require special attention. Furthermore, the general principles emphasize that it is the primary responsibility of national authorities to provide protection and assistance to IDPs. The second section (principles 5 to 9) addresses the principles relating to protection from displacement, such as the right not to be arbitrarily displaced. These principles also state minimum guarantees to be complied with when displacement should occur. Section three (principles 10 to 23) considers the protection of IDPs during the displacement. They concern all rights IDPs should have such as the basic rights to food, water, shelter, clothing, medical services, and sanitation. Broader civil, economic, social, political, and cultural rights are also mentioned in this section. The fourth section (principles 24-27) goes over the framework for humanitarian assistance to IDPs. It reaffirms the duty of national authorities to assist but also states that if authorities are unable or unwilling to assist, international organizations have the right to assist IDPs. The final section (principles 28 to 30) addresses the protection of IDPs during return, local integration or resettlement and emphasizes the right of IDPs to voluntarily choose between these options. (UNHCR, 1998)

Guiding Principle 6 states that displacement should not last longer than necessary under the given circumstances (UNHCR, 1998). However, just as it is challenging to establish when a person can be considered an IDP, it is also challenging to determine when a situation of internal displacement has ended. To address the question of when individuals should no longer be considered IDPs, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) - the longest-standing and highest-level humanitarian coordination forum - established the 'Framework

Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons' (The Framework) (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010). The Framework asserts that durable solutions are generally achieved when displaced persons "no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement" (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010, p. 5). The Framework offers three ways through which durable solutions can be achieved; sustainable reintegration at the place of origin, sustainable local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge or sustainable integration in another part of the country. Furthermore, The Framework outlines key human rights-based principles to guide the pursuit of lasting solutions and it establishes criteria for assessing the extent to which durable solutions have been attained. Additionally, it provides examples of indicators that can aid in monitoring progress toward achieving durable solutions. (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010)

2.2 Crisis management systems

When a society is affected by a disaster or crisis, such as an event of internal displacement, various actors become involved to reduce the negative consequences of this event. The different components involved in such a response operation can be analysed by taking a systems approach (Abrahamsson et al., 2010; Bergström et al., 2016; Uhr et al., 2008). Becker (2014, Chapter 7) discusses hard and soft system approaches and explains that while hard systems are often associated with quantitative and technical aspects, soft systems are used to address ill-structured problems that involve social interactions. As crisis management systems involve social actors that interact with each other in various ways, these systems can be analysed by using a soft systems approach. Becker (2014, Chapter 7) explains that a soft system can be seen as an abstract idea that does not really exist but is a construction to aid the understanding of something complex. According to the author, the challenge when analysing a soft system is to sufficiently capture its complexity while limiting it to what is relevant.

Bergström et al. (2016) propose an analytical framework for studying disaster response management guided by complexity theory. They suggest that this framework enables the construction of multiple system perspectives through three key aspects: system dimension, system scope and system resolution. The system dimension concerns the types of components and the dependencies between them (Bergström et al., 2016). Becker (2014, Chapter 7) mentions two different typologies of components: capacity-oriented typology and composition-oriented typology. The author states that capacity-oriented typology could be helpful when analysing what contributes to the capacity of a soft system to achieve its

objectives, while a composition-oriented typology is more helpful in discovering the general composition of the components. Becker (2014, Chapter 7) also presents one typology of dependencies with four different categories, (1) physical dependencies, (2) information dependencies, (3) geographical dependencies and (4) logical dependencies. The system dimension explored in this study is that of the actors within the Swedish crisis management system and their roles and responsibilities. It encompasses all types of dependencies outlined by Becker (2014, Chapter 7).

The second aspect outlined by Bergström et al. (2016), the scope of the system, refers to the analytical drawing of the boundary around what actors and relationships are to be included in the interpretation. The authors write that the system scope can be based on relevance or on spatial demarcations. However, they state that typically, the system's scope will be defined by a combination of both relevance and spatial demarcations. In this study the system scope is delimited to include relevant actors in Sweden, determined through theoretical sampling (see 3.2.3 Selection of sources). Lastly, Bergström et al. (2016) discuss the system resolution. The system resolution concerns the level of detail that is used while analysing the system, which usually depends on the scope of the analysis. A wider system scope forces components to be simplified and clustered together to not make it too complex. A narrower system scope allows for more detail when looking at the system components but sacrifices a comprehensive analysis. The resolution of the system studied primarily focuses on the organizational level, including formal organizations such as counties and rescue services, as well as informal organizations like groups of spontaneous volunteers. See Figure 1 for the delimitation of the system perspective used in this study.

System dimension: Actors and their roles and responsibilities and dependencies
System scope: Sweden
System resolution: Organizational

Figure 1. System perspective used in the study

A central aspect of any crisis management system is to achieve direction and coordination to meet needs in the acute phase of a disaster (Bergström et al., 2016). The authors write that the purpose of direction is to ensure that the capabilities of resources do not remain passive but are oriented towards formulated goals. Coordination can, according to Boin and Bynander (2015), either be understood as collaboration or as a form of directive action. However, Uhr and Frykmer (2022) differentiate between coordination and collaboration and explain that collaboration is to seek agreements that in turn can establish initial values for how direction and coordination can take place. Similarly, Hegele and Schnabel (2021) lean more toward the latter and define coordination as a process that refers to strategies and instruments the government use to coordinate organizations or programs within the public sector. In this study, collaboration is used in terms of working together and seeking agreements, while coordination is understood as ensuring directive action to meet the needs within a system. There are many ways in which direction and coordination can be achieved (Bergström et al., 2016). For example, Hegele and Schnabel (2021) describe the differences between coordination in centralized and decentralized systems. The authors state that in centralized systems, the federal government sets the agenda, proposes legislation, and adopts regulations and executive orders that apply to the entire federation. On the contrary, in decentralized systems, these decisions can be made by individual organizations and can, therefore, lead to different measures across a country.

Bergström et al. (2016) also use these different approaches to direction and coordination to describe perceived responsibilities in crisis management. For example, according to Isufaj (2014), decentralization leads to more responsibility, authority, and accountability to the lower levels of government. Although, as Vincent (2011) points out, the term responsibility can be used in a variety of ways. The author states that the term responsibility is often talked about as a single concept, while in practice it can mean different things. Therefore, it is important to define how the term responsibility is used to avoid confusion (Vincent, 2011). In this thesis, the term responsibility is used to refer to what Vincent (2011) calls role responsibility and liability responsibility. The first concept refers to duties that ought to be performed, and the second concept indicates who should be held responsible if something were to happen. Bergström et al. (2016) explain that the Swedish system for civil safety is based on a decentralized principle of local responsibility. However, the authors also explain that even in the Swedish crisis management system, formal centralized organizations can be formed to achieve direction and coordination to respond to a crisis.

Coppola (2020, Chapter 5) writes that disaster preparedness includes all actions taken in advance of a disaster to ensure effective response to the impacts of a disaster, including relief and recovery efforts. According to the author, the goals of disaster preparedness include knowing what to do in a disaster's aftermath, knowing how to do what needs to be done and being equipped with the right tools and information. The author states that while disaster preparedness cannot reduce the likelihood of a disaster, it can help to minimize the adverse impacts of an event when it happens. The importance of disaster preparedness is underscored by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2023 (Sendai Framework), which defines "enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to <<Build Back Better>> in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction" as one of the four priority areas (UNDRR, 2015, p.36). The Sendai Framework states that disaster preparedness needs to be strengthened for a more effective response and that capacities need to be in place for effective recovery.

There is no universal standard as to what a well-prepared society looks like or how organizations and policymakers should engage in disaster preparedness. However, many organizations and scholars have attempted to develop guidelines or best practices when it comes to disaster preparedness (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). UNDRR (2015), for example, considers preparedness to be part of more general capacity development and provides different 'capacity domains' to build preparedness capacities. These domains include institutional strengthening and development, leadership, knowledge, and accountability. Another example is Twigg (2015), who discusses nine 'disaster preparedness elements', which are; (1) vulnerability, (2) hazard and risk assessment, (3) planning, (4) institutional framework, (5) information systems, (6) resource base, (7) warning systems, (8) response mechanism and (9) education and training, and rehearsals. Considering planning for preparedness, Perry and Lindell (2003), for example, developed ten guidelines for the emergency planning process. Alexander (2005) goes further and proposes different guidelines and models for the processes of drawing up, testing, revising, and utilizing emergency plans.

2.3 Civil preparedness in Sweden

According to MSB (2023a), civil preparedness is an umbrella term for crisis preparedness and civil defence in Sweden. The Government Offices of Sweden (Regeringskansliet, n.d) write that Swedish crisis preparedness has two goals. The first is to minimize the risk of accidents and crises that threaten security. The second is to protect the lives and health of people, as well as other fundamental values, by maintaining critical infrastructure and preventing or limiting damage to property and the environment when accidents and crisis situations occur. Civil defence, on the other hand, describes societal

resilience towards war (MSB, 2023a). The goal of the civil defence is to have the ability to, amongst other things, protect the civilian population and ensure vital societal functions (Regeringskansliet, n.d). MSB (2023a) explains that, in combination with the military defence, civil preparedness makes up the total defence that is intended to protect Sweden from armed attacks and preserve national security, freedom, independence and freedom of action.

In times when the security and freedom of Sweden are threatened, the government can decide to increase the state of preparedness (MSB, 2022b). *State of alert* [höjd beredskap] consists of two different levels (Krisinformation.se, 2024). The lower level, *heightened alert* [skärpt beredskap] indicates that society should start to adjust to meet the needs of the total defence, but that operations should continue as per usual to the degree possible. By contrast, activation of the high level, namely *high alert* [högsta beredskap], implies that all societal functions should work to support the total defence. MSB (2022b) writes that the context for the Swedish preparedness system is slightly different in a state of alert compared to peacetime. For example, the government will be granted greater freedom to act and make decisions. Furthermore, laws specific to a state of alert can be used in addition to ones for normal circumstances. Additionally, MSB states that the organization and operations of various actors must adapt to fulfil special requirements that come into place.

MSB (2023a) states that the division of roles and responsibilities is built on three fundamental principles. The first one is *the principle of responsibility* [Ansvarsprincipen], and refers to the liability of actors to maintain responsibility for the same operations both in times of peace and when social disturbances occur. The second principle is *the principle of proximity* [Närhetsprincipen], which specifies that disturbances should be handled in close proximity to where they occur and by the actors that are the most affected and have the greatest responsibility. The third and final principle is *the principle of similarity* [Likhetsprincipen], which states that operations during disturbances should, to the extent possible, work as those under normal circumstances.

In addition to the fundamental principles, MSB (2023a) describes different geographical areas of responsibility. The largest scope of relevance for this research is the national level where, according to the authors, the national government and assigned authorities have responsibility. MSB describes how the two middle levels are the responsibility of *County Administrative Boards* [Länsstyrelser]. At the smaller middle scope, the regional level, the 21 county administrative boards are responsible for one geographical area each. To improve consistency and cooperation, these have been grouped into six civil areas each assigned with one responsible county administrative board at the larger middle

scope, the higher regional level. Lastly, the smallest scope encompasses the local level, of which the 290 *municipalities* [Kommuner] are responsible.

MSB (2023b) writes that besides the responsibilities for the different geographical areas, there are also *sectoral responsibilities* [sektoransvar] on a central level, of which the *Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency* (MSB) has the overarching responsibility to manage and develop the system and to promote cooperation between sectors. Within this structure there are 38 agencies with a specific responsibility for civil preparedness. These agencies conduct operations with vital societal functions and, therefore, play a central part in Swedish preparedness. Furthermore, some of these agencies also have a sectoral responsibility for civil preparedness and responsible for one of the 10 civil preparedness sectors; (1) economic security, (2) electronic communications and postal services, (3) energy supply, (4) financial services, (5) basic data, (6) health, medical care and welfare, (7) food supply and drinking water, (8) public order and security, (9) transport and (10) civil protection.

Lastly, MSB (2023a) also mentions the role of trade and industry, voluntary organizations, and individuals. They state that companies play an important role in the planning of the total defence by delivering goods and services. MSB also describes the 18 voluntary organizations that are a part of *voluntary defence organizations* [Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer]. Regulations give these organizations a specially designated status that entails assignments related to various areas for preparedness. It also implies a responsibility to educate and recruit resources for reinforcement for authorities, *regions* [Regioner] and municipalities. Finally, the authors clarify that civilians also have a personal responsibility to protect themselves and the people closest to them from accidents and crises. This includes the duty of *total defence* [totalförsvarsplikt], which implies that all citizens aged 16 to 70 can get called in to contribute to the defence. It also includes home preparedness.

3. Methodology and methods

This section describes and motivates the study's chosen methodology. Furthermore, the data collection and analysis methods are presented.

3.1 Methodology

According to Creswell (2013), it is important to understand the philosophical assumptions that underly qualitative research and to clearly articulate them in a research study. Therefore, this section outlines the ontological and epistemological assumptions that formed the foundation of this study, as these assumptions, in turn, informed the chosen methodology (Crotty, 1998). While ontology studies the nature of reality, epistemology explores the nature of knowledge, including its generation and justification (Creswell, 2013). The philosophical assumptions underlying this research align closely with those stated by Creswell (2013). The author argues that in qualitative research, researchers embrace the ontology of different realities. Creswell (2013) writes that the epistemological stance in qualitative research asserts that knowledge is known through the subjective experiences of people. Therefore, researchers in qualitative research should try to get as close as possible to their participants. Moreover, in qualitative research, the researchers acknowledge the value-laden nature of the study and report their values and biases. (Creswell, 2013)

To capture the perspective of individuals within the Swedish authorities and organizations, the chosen logic of inquiry was inductive. Blaikie (2010) defines the inductive approach as aiming to establish limited generalizations from observed or measured observations. According to the author, an inductive approach does not depart from pre-existing theories or hypotheses but instead builds them based on the observed data. Blaikie (2010) state that an inductive research strategy fits well with ontological assumptions such as cautious, depth and subtle realism and, to an extent, idealism. While not categorizing the ontological assumptions of this research within these boxes, they all share the common notion that direct observation of reality is unattainable, an assumption that fits well with this research.

3.1.2 Grounded theory

The methodology that was adopted in this research is that of 'grounded theory'. According to Creswell (2013), grounded theory research is a qualitative research design that moves beyond description, aiming to generate or discover a theory. Specifically, where the researcher aims to generate a comprehensive explanation of a process, an action or an interaction that is shaped by the views of many participants. The author states that defining features of grounded theory are that; the researcher focuses on a process or action that has

distinct phases over time, the researcher seeks to develop a theory of this process or action, the researcher writes down ideas as data are collected and analysed (memoing), the primary form of data collecting is interviewing, and lastly data analysis can be structured and follow different coding steps. (Creswell, 2013)

Creswell (2013) suggests that grounded theory is a suitable design when existing theory is unavailable to explain or understand a particular process. For example, in cases where literature may provide models, but they might have been developed and tested on samples or populations different from those of interest to the qualitative study. In alignment with MSB (2022a), which confirms the absence of a designated governmental authority for handling internal displacement in Sweden and considering the limited information on roles and responsibilities among different organizations, grounded theory emerged as a suitable approach.

3.2 Data collection methods

According to Charmaz (2006), data collection methods are tools that should be used to answer the research question with ingenuity and incisiveness. The author writes that the method for data collection affects how, where, when and which phenomena will be seen. Since the purpose of this study was to get a better understanding of different perceptions of responsibilities for managing internal displacement in Sweden, a mixed methods approach was chosen to allow for multiple perspectives on the system. In the following sections, the two chosen methods and the process of selecting sources for data collection will be described.

3.2.1 Document analysis

The first part of the study was to conduct a document analysis. The document analysis focused on general disaster management documents that, for example, could provide information on relevant laws, policies, and key stakeholders in Sweden. The initial basis of this research was formed by 11 documents, and 17 laws, however much more were added throughout the research. For a full list of documents and laws that were reviewed, see Appendix A. The purpose of this process was to get an initial understanding of which components might make up the system that manages internal displacement in Sweden. To initiate the process, a report on the response to the 2015 refugee crisis by The Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket, 2021) was analysed. Furthermore, websites of governmental authorities such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) were scanned to find reports that described the Swedish preparedness system. Any documents, laws or actors that were mentioned in these contexts were then researched further. Lastly, policy documents such as The Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement (UNHCR, 1998) and

various publications on internal displacement, disaster risk management and preparedness were studied to identify further areas that could be of interest to get an initial overview of the system.

3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

The second part of the research consisted of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. The purpose of the interviews was to recognize the perspectives of individuals from identified organizations on their roles and responsibilities in the event of internal displacement in Sweden. According to Creswell (2013), interviews are an important aspect of grounded theory since the contributions of the participants play a great part in the development of the theory. In alignment with the guidelines provided by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015), an outline of interview questions was created with the goal of producing rich and relevant answers from the interviewees. The outline consisted of a combination of interview question types, such as introductory questions and probing questions, to encourage long and detailed answers. The questions focused on the responsibilities, current state of preparedness and collaboration amongst actors, and the perceived challenges and opportunities in managing internal displacement in Sweden. Both researchers were present during the interviews, except for one interview where only one of the researchers was available. The researchers alternated in asking questions or taking notes each interview. Six interviews were conducted in Swedish at the request of the participants, who felt comfortable using this language. The remaining interviews were held in English. The final interview guide is presented in Appendix B.

3.2.3 Selection of sources

The method that was used for data source selection was what Blaikie (2010) referred to as theoretical sampling. According to the author, theoretical sampling allows for progressive decision-making on samples throughout the research process. In accordance with this method, initial cases were selected according to the theoretical purposes, and then, to facilitate the development of the emerging theory and create opportunities for comparison, further cases were added. The theoretical purposes were based on findings during the document analysis. Findings, for example, included laws and reports on civil preparedness in Sweden. The motivation for each organization that was contacted for an interview is described in further detail in Appendix C. In total 132 actors were contacted, resulting in 20 interviews and two responses via email. See Table 1 for a further breakdown of responses and Table 2 for which actors participated in the study.

Response	Quantity
Accepted	*22*
Interview	20
Written response	2
Declined	*15*
Because of a lack of resources	8
Because they did not work with the issue	4
No specific reason	3
No response	*95*

Table 2. Breakdown of actors that participated in the study.

Actor	Quantity	Comment
Municipality	4	
County Administrative Board	4	
Region	3	
Rescue Services	3	
MSB	2	
County Administrative Board responsible for a Civil Defence Region (CIVO)	1	
The Swedish Police	1	
The Swedish Migration Agency	1	Written response
Swedish Transport Agency	1	
Swedish Red Cross	1	
National Board of Health and Welfare	1	Written response

3.3 Data analysis

First the interviews were transcribed and if needed, translated from Swedish to English. Then the data was organized on a shared drive. To analyse the data, methodological insights were primarily derived from Charmaz (2006) and Corbin and Strauss (2015). Charmaz (2006) suggests to start with the raw data and then to separate, sort and synthesize this data through qualitative coding. According to the author, the coding categories and the relationships that can be drawn between the coding categories can build levels of abstraction, which eventually can culminate in a 'grounded theory'. Similarly, Corbin and Strauss (2015) describe three stages - open coding, axial coding, and selective coding - in which coding

categories are developed, interconnected, and used to derive themes. With the use of the data analysis software Nvivo, the initial coding was conducted line by line, as suggested by Charmaz (2006). Then, what Corbin and Strauss (2015) refer to as axial coding was conducted in Nvivo to interconnect the initial codes and create categories. Lastly, the categories were used in the selective coding to develop the overarching themes and culminate in the theories presented in the results.

As Wieringa (2014) describes, grounded theory requires efforts to support data interpretations through the analysis. One of the methods suggested by the author is triangulation, in which interpretations are produced independently in more than one way. Therefore, to improve the validity of the interpretations, triangulation was applied as the open coding was revised, and the axial and selective coding were conducted separately by the researchers. Any differences in interpretation were then discussed and resolved before producing the shared and final themes of the study.

<div align="center">**4. Results**</div>

This section presents the outcomes of the research into the roles and responsibilities of Swedish organizations and authorities in managing internal displacement. While the study initially aimed to explore the perceived roles and responsibilities, participants frequently emphasized the challenges and opportunities associated with responding and preparing for such an event within the context of the Swedish crisis management system. Grounded theory's capacity to reveal emergent themes allows this section to explore both the perceived roles and responsibilities, as well as the challenges and opportunities rooted in the experiences and perceptions of the participants.

4.1 Roles and responsibilities

The first theme to arrive from the data analysis was that of roles and responsibilities. When asked if and how their organization would be involved in an event of internal displacement, all participants said their organization would have a role to play. These roles were confirmed by other participants when they were asked what organizations they would work together with, or what other organizations had an important role to play in the event of internal displacement. In general, participants predicted that their organizational responsibilities in the event of internal displacement would remain similar to those outlined in Swedish law. For a detailed description of perceived organizational responsibilities, see Appendix D. Through cross-referencing the organizations mentioned by participants, it became evident that, except for the Swedish Armed Forces and a few uniquely mentioned organizations, the sampled organizations should accurately represent those engaged in managing internal displacement.

Questions regarding the roles of the participants' organizations in handling internal displacement quickly turned into discussions about specific displacement scenarios. Many participants noted that their role would depend on factors such as the scale, duration, and the cause of the displacement. Small-scale displacements were generally perceived as manageable within local day-to-day crisis management structures, whereas larger-scale displacement, involving multiple organizations and administrative levels were perceived to require a different approach. Similarly, the duration of the displacement also influenced perceptions, with short-term displacement seen as manageable within routine organizational roles, while longer-term displacement might require additional structures.

> *"It depends on many things. One is how many people are evacuated? Is it like it was*
> *in Ljusdal [a municipality that was affected by the forest fires in 2018], like a few 100*

people? No problem. Or is it 100,000 people? A bigger problem. So, it would depend on the situation, because the more people, the more you have to prioritize and, uh, put other things on hold for a while."

"We do displace people, like not on a daily basis, but I mean regularly. When you have issues with possible gas explosions and stuff like that, that happens all the time. And of course, the one that is normally responsible for that would be the emergency services in the municipality, right? So that if they don't need any help to do so. They just do it."

Initially, the interviews were structured to steer clear of specific internal displacement scenario, hoping to engage more actors in the study and explore various perspectives. However, to keep the conversation going beyond these initial questions, the subsequent interview questions were focused on larger-scale internal displacement, extending beyond minor incidents, such as the above-mentioned gas explosions, to situations that would require organizations to work beyond their routine activities.

The cause for displacement was also left open for discussion. When addressing their roles in connection to the cause of internal displacement, almost all participants gravitated towards war-related causes. Some found it hard to imagine that large-scale displacement would be caused by anything other than war. This emphasis on war extended to the discussion on preparedness efforts, which are elaborated upon in later sections of this results chapter.

"I don't know what type of situation it is actually…If you think [about] Skåne, why would you move 2/3 of the corner up north? If we don't have war, what's the scenario? Yeah, climate change, but not to that extent in our lifetime, I think."

When asked about their responsibilities in managing internal displacement, participants often referred to their official mandates and the relevant laws governing their organizations. They pointed to their responsibilities in non-crisis situations and during the management of other crises, indicating that these would also be applicable in a situation of internal displacement. For instance, the Rescue Services emphasized the mandate that gives their *rescue commanders* [Räddningsledare] the right to order evacuations. Regions highlighted their responsibility for healthcare and public transportation, while Counties emphasized their responsibility as administrative entities. Municipalities predominantly referred to legislation such as the *social services act* [Socialtjänslag (SFS 2001:453)], which

confirms their responsibility of the welfare of their citizens, a duty which is also applicable in the context of internal displacement. Even though the interview was set up with a specific section of questions on collaboration and coordination later in the interview, collaboration with other organizations was mentioned by all participants as an important part of their responsibilities.

When probed further about the responsibility of managing a situation of internal displacement, participants often said that the *overall* responsibility was not theirs. They would say that their organization would only be accountable for their share of the task, what is written in the law, but emphasized that they are not the ultimate actor responsible for handling the situation. When the participants were asked if there was any organization that would then have this responsibility, the responses varied. Many mentioned that there is not one actor that has this responsibility because of the set-up of the Swedish system. Some placed the responsibility at the municipal level, referring to their geographical responsibility. Others mentioned MSB or The Swedish Migration Agency as the responsible actor for handling the situation, referring to their sectoral responsibility or experience. Less frequently mentioned actors were, for example, County Administrative Boards responsible for a Civil Defence Region (CIVO) or the National Board of Health and Welfare.

> *"So, I don't think that the issue kind of naturally resides with any authority, but it will probably be, as I said, depending on the scenario who you feel has the main responsibility for the issue."*

> *"So, the municipality for example, has a geographical area responsibility, the high county administrative board as well, and so you have at the national level. But then there are the sectoral responsibilities that sort of cut through. And as well as the synchronization between the geographical and the sector [that] is not really clarified."*

> *"Uh, yeah, I also identify that problem. And if someone would ask me that question, who is responsible, or responsible for that? I would say MSB, because they are responsible for the sector of public safety, just the protection of the civil society. And I would, would include internal displacements [in that sector] as well."*

"The Migration Board, as someone had as an example, they could have it, but then you have to write new laws because their responsibility is not that. So, then you have to consider how you do that flexible."

When questioned about the perception among many interviewees that MSB might be the primary responsible entity, MSB said they understood why actors might view them as a suitable candidate for overarching responsibility. They noted that unresolved crisis management issues often land on their plate, given their sectoral responsibility for *public safety* [räddningstjänst och skydd av civilbefolkningen]. However, they expressed doubt about their suitability for the role in terms of capabilities. They pointed out that The Swedish Migration Agency has more experience in handling similar situations, for example the 2015 refugee influx and the recent arrival of Ukrainian refugees. When asked for a response, The Swedish Migration Agency provided a written response, stating that;

"We think it is good that responsibilities within the civil defence are made clear, but let politics decide where different duties best belong and should lie. We welcome that any additional assignments are made clear so that we can plan for these if they end up with us."

The impression given by the participants was thus that smaller, shorter, and more localized displacement tend to have clearer roles and responsibilities. However, larger, longer, and more complex displacement involving multiple organizations often lead to uncertainty regarding roles and responsibilities. The primary question arising from this is which authority at the national level should be responsible for clarifying these responsibilities, coordinating all efforts, and initiating preparedness measures.

4.2 Response

The second theme that emerged focuses more on the response or operational side of internal displacement. Participants were asked to imagine what would happen in the event of a large population movement, what would go well and what might be challenging. Overall, there was a very positive attitude towards the abilities of the Swedish crisis management system to handle such a situation. There was an overall belief that things will work out when the situation will arise.

"I would say that we, we solved the problem. Maybe not always the way we thought we [would], [and the way] our plans were. And if we don't have any plans, we solve it here and now. We solve it, I would say."

"So, there's so many ways to solve these things, and we have experience of doing it. We wouldn't call it internal displacement experience, but it's the same idea."

"I think, I have a, I have a positive belief in the Swedish system. I think that we will be able to coordinate reasonably well. Depending on how big the crisis is, the chaos will be, you know, corresponding to that level of course."

According to the interviewees, one positive aspect about the response to a situation of internal displacement would be willingness to assist. Both civil society and organizations engaged in the response were praised about their willingness to help. However, particularly concerning volunteers, the challenge of effective management emerged. Past experiences with crises underscored that without clear tasks and proper management, volunteers could potentially become a burden rather than an asset to the response efforts.

"Well, right now I see that there is a very good, uh, like willingness to defend. You want to help out in a society if there is a situation. Uh, and I think that there is an opportunity that we should seize and especially regarding the volunteers."

"If a lot of people want to contribute to this society, we should, we should make sure that they will have a task when, when there is a crisis or war or situation."

"Volunteers will always be needed and it's really important to organize them. Because when they're not organized, they're more of a hassle than, than help. They get in the way."

Next to the positive perceptions about the effectiveness of the Swedish crisis management system and the willingness of individuals and organizations to assist, the participants also anticipated difficulties in managing the situation 'on the ground'. Examples included controlling the population movement in a time where many possess cars and can move around independently, determining where these people should go, and efficiently locating and evacuating those unable to evacuate themselves.

"Because the ones moving by car, you don't really have control over them. They, they go wherever they want to basically. That would be an issue, like, when you have that many people moving and the traffic needs to be directed and stuff."

"If you are going to evacuate Malmö for any reason, the difficult thing is probably not to get the population to leave, they will do that by themselves depending on the reason. There are the ones who are injured, they are not able to move, they are the ones we need to concentrate on and invest society's resources."

"One thing we haven't talked about is the people that refuse to be evacuated. How do we keep them safe? Because we can't force anyone to leave the house and the police don't do that either. So how do you keep them safe when they refuse to be evacuated?"

Another challenge to the response that was mentioned by multiple interviewees was the legislation. A few participants mentioned that the high standards or strict laws in Sweden could potentially be in the way of an effective response. Examples that were mentioned were for example housing standards, procurement laws and healthcare standards.

"Because if you see [during] the migration crisis, there was a law saying that everyone who stays here, they have the right to have their own room. These are the rules for ventilation. This is like how many could share a shower toilet. There are so many rules. But if the situation is, either they are stuck in Greece or like in Turkey, or they have to share a room, I think they will share a room. So, it really depends on what situation you have."

"And then everything could stop within the laws of procurement, for example. If you have to pick an offer in a crisis, you can't keep up to the laws of procurement, because it takes a year to buy something, and you need to send offers to the whole [of] Europe and so forth. We are in a crisis now. You can't really use that law for a hundred percent. Or the GDPR, it's not practical."

Lastly, moral or ethical dilemmas and prioritization between different groups of people that would need help were often mentioned. Participants said that there was little guidance on how to decide which group should receive help.

"Yes, [let's say] I'm evacuating this hospital so that these sick or injured people can survive. But maybe they die from the transport? So, what should I choose? So that, so that…There are challenges, there are so many."

"There will be a lot of moral dilemmas, especially in wartime, of how prioritizing different groups of people. For example, the local inhabitants that were there from the beginning, as you say, internal refugees in the country, external refugees from other countries, prisoners of war, people who are passing through, our own soldiers, other country soldiers, enemy soldiers. All these people need food, water, [a] roof over the[ir] heads and so on."

Overall participants expressed a positive attitude towards the capacities of the Swedish crisis management system to handle situations when they arise, as well as the large willingness to assist. However, they did foresee challenges in responding such as aspects connected to controlling the population movement, the strict laws that might hinder the response, and moral and ethical dilemmas that would arise.

4.3 Preparedness and planning

Preparedness and planning also emerged as a central theme in the data analysis. Participants were asked about their organization's preparedness measures for internal displacement and whether they were aware of similar efforts undertaken by other organizations or authorities. Regarding preparedness measures within their own organization, only one participant mentioned that they were working specifically with an internal displacement scenario. Others indicated a lack of specific plans for internal displacement, with many stating that they would address the issue when it arises, without predefined strategies in place.

"But on this large scale, if you talk [about] for instance a lot of people [coming] from Skåne, or other parts of the county. We have no organization for that. So it will be something we will [have] to build from scratch if that is the case."

Five participants mentioned that their organizations had preparedness efforts for mass evacuations, usually up to 1000 people. However, some side notes were made, such as that

these plans only involved the evacuation and not the receiving part, that the plans were only for a short time duration, or that the plans were old and needed to be updated.

> *"It depends because we have plans. They're old…They're old and you need to sign. And [there is] an old person who has them in their locker somewhere. It's not official anymore."*

> *"We are prepared to relocate our own citizens in some way, but that is on a very local scale. What a village, or, or something is welcomed into the town. But we don't talk about a lot of people, maybe just up to 1000 people or so on, so very small numbers. And that we, I think we should…Not without work, but we, we, could manage that."*

Nine organizations related preparedness for internal displacement to preparedness for nuclear accidents. These participants knew about or were involved in evacuation plans connected to nuclear accidents and mentioned that these evacuation plans could also be used in the context of internal displacement.

> *"The area that is most clear about taking people in, is the area of nuclear disaster accident. They, they are the most clear [about] which, which municipalities can accept, expect to take in people and which, who most probably will send them out. So nuclear accidents is most, maybe the most clear example of that one."*

> *"To my knowledge, the only organizations in Sweden that work on a regular basis with evacuation and, and, not receiving refugees but evacuating people, that are the municipalities and counties around the nuclear power plants. So, they will do that kind of plans. And and have yearly, yearly work and regular exercises and so on."*

> *"They could, but maybe modified in, in a bit…Uh. Let, let's say if, if there is a war and, just hypothetically, Stockholm is invaded, and a lot of people [are] coming from Stockholm to our county. Of course we can, can use the plan to; how, how do we take care of these people in, in a good way."*

As mentioned before, much of the discussion focused on internal displacement in the context of war. Therefore, much of the preparedness efforts that were discussed were also

connected to total defence planning. In particular, the resumption of total defence and preparedness activities connected to Sweden's NATO membership were often mentioned.

"There are some, what do you say, government, utredningar [inquiries], government investigations that [are] looking at the protection of people in wartime. I think it will be presented during the spring, I believe."

"There was a big utredning [inquiry], you know, like, it was delivered. I think it was one, one year ago, with a lot of propositions on, on how to, to manage different measures during war. And one of those is internal displacements. To put people down in protective, uhm, to evacuate people etc. But there, there hasn't come out some decisions from that investigation yet."

"As working in the crisis system, I [am] really taking the war argument as an opportunity to plan for other crises as well because. It's quite the same."

Next to the ongoing efforts, or lack thereof, preparedness was often revisited later in the interview, where participants were asked to point out which aspects they found most crucial in the context of internal displacement. Across all interviews, preparedness emerged as a significant concern. Given the multitude of organizations and their corresponding responsibilities involved, as mentioned above, participants underscored the importance of preparing for such occurrences and ensuring the alignment of individual efforts by the organizations involved. From these comments also emerged the wish for more preparedness efforts. Especially the wish for more and clearer assignments from authorities of what exactly to prepare for stood out. Some participants added, however, that preparedness was more than just written plans but should be seen as a collaborative process, which should, for example, include regular exercises.

"But if it comes from, sort of, from national level down to the regional level, 'you have to be prepared for this', then it will happen."

"Yeah. And directions on what to do and etc. I think that's a lot of…The different reports and stuff, they say what we might do, but they haven't landed on any decisions. Some decisions, but I think we're all waiting for what's about to happen, yeah."

"People tend to focus too much on plans as products, not planning as a process. And I think if you spend too much time on just inventing the best possible plan and [are] so focused on that delivery, it will not be very good."

"So, I would say that's why we have to exercise this, because then we will see, we have to deal with this; How much can we control the movement? Or will the movement have it anyway? And should we actually try to control the movement, or should we just let it happen?"

Next to the lack of clear assignments, participants discussed various other challenges related to preparing for internal displacement. These included resource limitations, the high existing workload, lack of awareness and perceived urgency and having no previous experience with internal displacement. Moreover, broader discussion about preparedness arose, questioning the extent to which it is feasible to adequately prepare for such events, as well as the limits to preparedness in terms of the difference between theory and practice.

"I could just only talk for ourselves. But the simplest also, it's no. We have different other problems right now. We have, we are starting from a very low point. That's hard to say that, but it's the way it is."

"But now we are in the...We don't have the same funding as we used to have for, for like preparing. So, it goes kind of slowly."

"No, because I think the, the question is really important and interesting. But I see the risk that there are so many things to do within the total defence, civil defence. But I mean, if we have a situation, [a] wartime situation, there will for sure be IDP that's, that's what's going to happen, yeah."

"And we have no [experience]. We haven't done it, so we don't know how hard it will be. And that is so...Then we don't know that we really have to have some plans for it."

"It's, it's, it's the thought that [it] is so unlikely right now. So, we can prepare it in theory, but we haven't made the practical, prepare, preparing [preparations] for it."

"[If] We [would] have an incident to compare, somewhere in Sweden…That is one ingredient. Then that would put the topic up on everybody's list."

Overall, the participants expressed positive attitudes toward preparedness, emphasizing the need for increased preparedness. However, they also highlighted challenges such as resource constraint, a perceived lack of urgency, and the difficulties with preparedness in general. Participants suggested that clearer assignments along with necessary resources would boost preparedness efforts. They furthermore suggested that adopting more generalizable plans could serve as a viable approach to preparing for internal displacement.

4.4 The system

The Swedish crisis management system was the final theme that emerged from the data analysis. This topic led to interesting discussions with the participants as many of the earlier findings were connected to the structure of Sweden's crisis management system. Overall, there was a positive attitude towards the Swedish system with the three ground principles of responsibility, proximity, and similarity. While some participants believed that a more command-and-control-oriented approach might be advantageous in specific crisis scenarios, they generally agreed that the benefits of working according to the principles outweigh the potential drawbacks.

"And that's the beauty and the curse of our system I would say. There's a lot of people responsible, a lot of organizations responsible, and you can use a lot of different tools from the toolbox because of that. If you were to have one organization centrally administering this, it would be one one toolbox for situations."

"But also opportunities for this system is, I think it's, it's nice to have a cooperation as long as possible as well. Because the municipalities, they have knowledge about their own organization. The healthcare has the best knowledge about their organization, and we have [that] for, for our organization."

Next to the benefits of working according to the principles, some pointed out that it would be impossible to have a more command-and-control-oriented approach. Practical as well as legal reasons were mentioned.

"And I don't see another... any other solution really than to to keep tweaking what we got. Otherwise, you have [to have] a major reform and that would be difficult politically not to say the least."

"But it, it takes several [actors] to deal with the, to reach the objectives, so to say. You can't.... One authority can't solve this. You have to work through different authorities and also, both on the national level and also on a regional level."

All participants highlighted the importance of collaboration and coordination in their daily work, emphasizing the extent to which their work involved engaging with other organizations and the lessons they have learned from past collaborations. While some praised the Swedish system for its ability to learn from such encounters, others were more critical about the learning capacity of the Swedish system. However, many referred to previous crises, including the 2018 forest fires in Sweden, the influx of Syrian refugees in 2015, and the recent arrival of Ukrainian refugees, as valuable learning experiences. Furthermore, the situation in Ukraine was frequently mentioned as a potential source of learning, with participants suggesting that Sweden could benefit from observing developments in Ukraine.

"We have a, a crisis cooperation, what should we call it? Like a cooperation… I don't know the right word for it but…And we meet with different kinds of actors regularly to, to deliver a situational picture, information [about what] is currently going on in the county and in Sweden in general."

"I think we're good at sharing experiences and learnings between us. People are mostly generous of telling what did work, and what didn't work. So, if you have the same situation in different parts of the country at the same time, we will probably [do that]"

"We have tested the system in a way during the covid pandemic anyway just to collaborate across borders and move patients according to care needs and a little."

"The system is way better now [compared to 2014 and 2018]. You know, talking between these parts of the system, also on a national scale. So, this would be kind of similar to the amount of resources required to take care of those forest fires that we had. And that was a really good national coordination. And we learn and plan a lot,

you know, using those experiences. So, I actually do believe that it would be a rather smooth process today compared to like 10 years ago."

"You have so much you can learn from Ukraine and other places. This is not something new. This has happened so many times all around the world. So there's a lot of learning."

The participants also pointed out several challenges associated with operating within the Swedish crisis management system. One such challenge is that the lack of command-and-control structures and the focus on collaboration could sometimes be in the way of swift handling of crises. Some participants illustrated this by referring to a recent incident on the E22 highway. Numerous individuals were stranded on the road for hours due to heavy snowfall, awaiting the initiation of rescue operations. The participants attributed part of the delayed response to the time taken to assign responsibilities among various organizations, illustrating how this uncertainty can hinder effective response. As a result, many emphasized the necessity of clarifying roles and responsibilities in advance to be able to respond to crises effectively.

"Because the biggest problem is you get into an emergency and the first thing you have to do is clarify who, who does what, who, who is responsible for what. If you get into that kind of of discussion in the start of an emergency, it's it's sort of already a big problem."

"It's important that you have organizations that can and are willing to accept responsibility and their role in this situation, and that that can sometimes fail. Especially in an emergency situation, that there were some actors 'OK, we're not really responsible' or 'is this really our job?'. And in the other end, there's people 'yeah, this is their job because we're in Sweden and it's....' Yeah, so you have that full spectrum of of possible outcomes so..."

"For example, the event in Skåne with the E22, where nobody took charge of the event. I think that that is a quite clear example that we need to have more, more clear instructions [about] who leads and when, I think."

Another significant challenge mentioned by more than half of the participants was the friction between the different levels of administration. Many noted that the existence of multiple administrative layers results in limited interactions between the local (municipalities) and national levels. Typically, the local level would only interact with the middle level (counties), without having direct contact with the national level. Consequently, it becomes difficult for the national level to understand the specific needs of the local level. This difficulty is exacerbated by the belief among many interviewees that 'being close to society' is crucial for effective crisis management.

"But if you work for a national authority, in office, how easy would it be to understand how someone is affected by something that happens in society? It's really hard."

"If we start understanding more the real society, and be closer to it and not theoretical ideas, then we could solve it better together. And I understand it's hard. I'm far away from society, but I'm still trying to be close."

"But I think sometimes the local level is much faster because, when you see the crisis appear in front of you, and the people that, they are affected, you know them, you see them with your own eyes, it's easier to start fast."

One interviewee mentioned that information sharing between the different levels could be challenging, even when information is shared from the local to the middle level. The participant illustrated this with a telling example.

"During [the forest fires in] 2018, I was a part of this discussion on how to actually move people. And that was an interesting thing, because the county administrative board, they were working with plans, but they didn't know that the local community also had plans from the beginning. That was [an] interesting, like coordination thing. So there were from the municipal level, there were plans [for] how to move people."

Five participants expressed concerns about the high burden placed on municipalities in terms of responsibilities, often outweighing the resources allocated to them. Reasons they gave for this disparity included a lack of understanding from the national level, as previously mentioned, along with other authorities assigning their unwanted tasks to municipalities.

Municipalities felt that they could not refuse this burden as they are the final administrative level in line and are, therefore, the last ones to take care of the citizens.

> *"We have the Swedish saying that the municipalities are Sweden's sewer, meaning that we handle everything that other governmental agencies cannot. We have to solve that. And it's often like that when governmental agencies can't solve something, they will try to push it down on the municipality. But it's not really our question either. But if we do not do it, nobody will and people will suffer for it. So, we have to do it."*

Another consequence of the great responsibilities of the municipalities that was mentioned, was the large variations in crisis management capacities and preparedness levels between municipalities. A proposed solution that was mentioned was to have more national, flexible resources that could be sent to municipalities that needed them.

> *"Some municipalities abilities have come quite long in their preparedness and some have maybe not even started with their preparedness for an event like that. And I think that is a challenge to, to make all the municipalities on the same level. So maybe one municipality can take care of a lot of people during internal displacement, but the one next door can't take care of anyone except themselves."*

> *"And also, that it would be better if we have national resources that could be sent to where it's needed. Instead of everyone building their own little idea of how to solve things."*

The results show that the participants find both positives and negatives about working in a decentralized system that is built on shared responsibilities. While some wished for more command-and-control, there was a positive attitude, overall, towards the way the system is set up at the moment.

<center>**5. Discussion**</center>

This chapter discusses the meaning and significance of the results in relation to existing literature. From the results, two central points for discussion emerged; why organizations do not prepare for internal displacement and which actor should have the overall responsibility for managing internal displacement.

5.1 Why organizations do not prepare

One notable observation from the results was the evident lack of preparedness efforts for managing internal displacement. This was expected as the inquiry into the protection for the civilian population (SOU 2022:57) similarly found that available planning for evacuations and subsequent accommodation was insufficient. However, the observation is particularly interesting considering that many of the participants emphasized the importance of preparedness for an effective response, and many of them expressed the wish to be more prepared. This discrepancy raises the question of why the actors in the response system are not as prepared as they wish. This section explores various theories aimed at shedding light on why organizations fall short in their preparedness efforts.

5.1.1 Challenges to preparedness

When delving into the reasons for the lack of preparedness for internal displacement, many participants emphasized the general challenges associated with preparedness as contributing factors. Among the most frequently cited challenges, two stood out. Firstly, the lack of resources that are required for thorough preparedness, for example in terms of time and money. The challenge of resource allocation for disaster preparedness is also mentioned by multiple scholars (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Coppola, 2020, Chapter 5). McConnell and Drennan (2006) explain this as a paradox where crises, despite their low frequency, demand significant resource allocation for adequate preparation. They describe that the allocation often does not happen as preparedness competes with everyday immediate activities for resources. Coppola (2020, Chapter 5) reaffirms this and states that competition in both financial and human resources is a persistent challenge in almost all disaster risk management matters.

The second challenge that was highlighted by the participants, was determining what exactly to prepare for, given the significant role of uncertainty regarding future crisis situations. As Boin and Bynander (2015) state, uncertainty is inherent in crises. Therefore, McConnell & Drennan (2006) emphasize the difficulty in balancing the need for order and planning with the uncertainty and disorder that is inherent to crises. The authors state that this uncertainty partly stems from the multitude of threats an organization can be subject to, which

<center>41</center>

makes it challenging to prepare for every possible scenario. This challenge is reflected in the results, as many participants highlighted the challenge of internal displacement having many possible drivers, which, according to some, contributed to the absence of preparedness efforts.

The results indicated that another reason why organizations might not prepare is because there is a lack of awareness. Participants mentioned that the issue of internal displacement was not on people's minds, or they said they found it hard to imagine a situation of large-scale internal displacement. Kapucu (2008) states that awareness about crisis is essential for preparedness efforts to be initiated. Becker (2014, Chapter 5) agrees on the importance of awareness. The author describes awareness as the ability of a system to anticipate events and explains that this is one of the four key functions for a resilient system. The participants in this study considered multiple causes of why there was a lack of awareness. One often-mentioned explanation was the lack of experience. Some even suggested that an actual crisis would be necessary to put the topic into people's minds.

The idea that experience can create awareness can be supported by literature from, for example, Becker (2014, Chapter 6). The author explains that anticipation is informed by different inputs; experiential and analytical. Human biases lead humans to rely more on experiential input, which can explain the constraints to our decision-making abilities in the context of preparing for crises (Johnson & Levin, 2009; Kahneman et al., 1991). In the paper 'Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards', Meyer (2006) describes how well-known biases in human decision-making influenced failures that occurred during recent disasters in the United States. These biases include the tendency to focus on short-term feedback, to see the future as a simple extrapolation of the present and to discount the value of ambiguous future rewards compared to short-term costs. This could explain why, whilst analytical input might indicate that preparedness for internal displacement would be beneficial, humans working in the crisis management are, because of their limited experience with internal displacement and the biases that influence their decision-making, limited in anticipating internal displacement.

5.1.2 Problematization

Participants also indicated that internal displacement 'was not on the agenda' on many occasions. Besides attributing this to previously mentioned challenges, such as human biases and resources constraints, the lack of action regarding preparedness can be further understood through the concept of problematization (Bacchi, 2000). Problematization posits that it is not possible for governments to respond to externally existing problems. Instead, problems are framed within policy proposals, shaping what can be addressed and how action is possible. By examining how a particular policy problem is framed, one can illustrate where responsibility is directed and how it might be shifted by altering the problem's representation (Berg & De

Majo, 2017). Bacchi (2000) states that inactions by policymakers are usually not deliberate, but rather stem from the issue not being part of the discourse. To understand why certain issues fail to make it onto the political agenda, the author proposes closely analysing items that do make it onto the agenda to uncover how the construction or representation of those issues limits what is discussed as possible or desirable, or as impossible or undesirable.

While it is not in the scope of this thesis to do a 'policy-as-discourse' analysis, as Bacchi (2000) proposes, participants do indicate that other matters have a greater focus. In particular, there is a large emphasis on preparing for war in Sweden, which paradoxically does not seem to include preparing for internal displacement at the moment. Additionally, interviewees often pointed at each other when answering the question of who should initiate preparedness efforts and push to 'change the discourse'. The local levels expected more guidance from the national levels, while national authorities pointed to each other or to policymakers to 'put it on the agenda'. This dynamic is in line with research from Sjöberg et al. (2005), who did research into neglected and overemphasized risks. The authors asked experts who worked with disaster management which actors they believed to neglect or overemphasize certain risks. The experts considered politicians to bear a large responsibility for the improper attention or lack of attention to different risks. Multiple experts, many of whom were employed by various government agencies, also believed that government agencies other than their own were responsible for paying too much or too little attention to certain risks.

5.1.3 Should we prepare for internal displacement in Sweden?

Considering the challenges that were mentioned by the participants in this study, a point of discussion is whether Sweden should prepare for internal displacement specifically. For example, several participants pointed to the limitations of planning for internal displacement, stating that especially the managing of the initial population movement would be hard to plan for as both causes and effects of the movement would be uncertain. Additionally, the mobility of the Swedish population, such as the fact that many Swedes have a car and would evacuate themselves, would complicate any attempt to control the population movement. Similarly, Boin and Bynander (2015) also question the extent to which planning for a crisis is feasible, stating that the role of uncertainty makes specific plans ineffective. According to the authors, this is particularly true in the initial phase when the exact needs and actions are unpredictable. While there is some understanding of human behaviour in evacuation situations, which enables the existence of simulation models to be used in evacuation planning, much is still uncertain (Kuligowski, 2021). Next to the problem of monitoring, participants, for example, stated it would be hard to locate the people who would

need help evacuating. In line with these results, Cotroneo (2017) exemplifies how responding to internal displacement brings about challenges of monitoring of the population movement, particularly in urban settings where it tends to be less visible. According to the author, one of the main challenges for actors in the response has been to reach internally displaced people (IDPs) to assess their needs.

Another reason why specific planning may not be necessary is the high level of confidence the participants expressed in the abilities of the Swedish crisis management system. As indicated by the results, whilst some expressed concerns about responding to long-term displacement, numerous participants believed the short-term response would be manageable in conventional organizational roles. Many noted that past experiences with other disasters and a large willingness to assist would, if organized properly, result in an effective response. That the role of experience is important for a well-functioning response system is widely acknowledged in literature. Becker (2014, Chapter 6) states that learning from experience is, in addition to the previously discussed anticipation, another one of the four functions of a resilient system. The author writes that learning from previous experiences through action and reflection can lead to ideas that can be utilized when anticipating, recognizing, and adapting to future events. Additionally, experience can benefit decision making as responders can make decisions faster as they can rely on their previous experiences (Klein, 2008). While the participants mentioned their own experiences, much of their focus was also on their experience in collaborating with other organizations. They, for example, stated that they frequently work together with other organizations and how they have created (in)formal collaboration structures based on previous collaboration. Scholars confirm that positive experience with collaboration can create trust over time between the actors in a response system, which in turn can positively affect the response (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Kalkman & de Waard, 2017).

However, despite uncertainty presenting challenges for preparedness efforts and the high level of trust in response capacities of the Swedish crisis management system, participants still viewed preparedness as essential to be able to handle situations of internal displacement. Relating back to the limitations of specific plans, multiple participants proposed instead having generic and adaptable plans or making use of existing plans, such as those for nuclear accidents, to prepare for internal displacement. These suggestions align with the multi-hazard approach suggested by McConnell and Drennan (2006), which advocates for shared planning and coordination to anticipate different types of events. The authors propose multi-hazard preparedness over having elaborate 'symbolic' plans that are less likely to be used as they focus on a range of threats that is too narrow. Furthermore, they note that all-

hazards planning, such as the total defence planning in Sweden, can be a cost-efficient alternative. Baker and Grant Ludwig (2018) agree, stating that specific plans are largely symbolic and do not dictate human action very well. In addition to planning, the results also indicated that participants wished for more preparedness in the form of collaborative exercises. This fits well with the previously mentioned idea that experience with collaboration can lead to better response, as well as the notion that preparedness should be seen as a process rather than just the creation of a plan, which was mentioned by two participants and is supported by scholars (Coppola, 2020, Chapter 5; Perry & Lindell, 2003).

5.2 Overall responsibility for internal displacement

As illustrated by the results, no interviewed actor claimed the overall responsibility for managing an event of internal displacement in Sweden. There was an agreement that the responsibilities had to be clarified but the suggestions to whom the responsibility should be assigned varied. However, more than one actor indicated that such delegation would be impossible, or even undesirable, within the current crisis management system. Therefore, the following section aims to discuss alternatives for how the responsibility for managing internal displacement could be assigned or distributed.

5. 2. 1 Centralization vs decentralization of crisis management

As highlighted in the results and previous discussions, most of the participants described challenges of operating within the current crisis management structure in Sweden. Some even explicitly advocated for a more centralized, command-and-control approach to enhance capacities for handling internal displacement. The primary critique of the system mentioned by the participants was that the decentralization can lead to unclear responsibilities and accountability. Examples of previous responses to crises in Sweden that have been criticized for their shortcomings were brought up to illustrate this point. Commonly mentioned were the 2015 refugee influx and the E22 traffic incident, both of which were described by participants as having an element of confusion regarding responsibilities. Multiple scholars characterize such situations as outcomes of decentralization (Kuhn and Morlino, 2022; Hermansson, 2019). They refer to these situations as 'blame games', wherein all actors attempt to avoid responsibility for potentially risky or unpopular decisions, which is especially relevant when an emergency or crisis occurs. Schneider (2008) illustrates this through the example of the often-criticized response to Hurricane Katrina, in which the different actors blamed each other for the lack of response.

In addition to unclear responsibilities and accountability, another shortcoming of a decentralized system, mentioned by the participants, was the inconsistent level of

preparedness between different municipalities. This inconsistency aligns with findings of other scholars that indicate how decentralized decision-making can cause inconsistency and inaction because of unequal and lacking access to resources (Hegele & Schnabel, 2021). As mentioned in the results, a solution proposed by participants was to have more shared national resources that could be sent to where they are needed. Similarly, the inquiry into the protection for the civilian population (SOU 2022:57) also proposed some central storage for assets such as beds and mattresses that could be used in accommodations. However, some participants pointed out that this could lead to ethical dilemmas regarding prioritization in case larger geographical areas would be affected and in need of resources.

Whilst a decentralized system comes with challenges, it is imperative to acknowledge that disaster risk management, and thus the managing of internal displacement, must operate within the current decentralized governance framework in Sweden. This point was emphasized by multiple participants, who highlighted the legal implications of designating a single responsible actor. Some claimed that to accommodate for an overarching responsibility, a reform of the entire system would be necessary. Even among those who were in favour of giving one governmental actor the overall responsibility, a few pointed out that it could not be fully centralized as the assigned actor would not be able to do it alone in practice. That a centralized crisis management structure is hard to establish in an otherwise decentralized system is also illustrated by Gerber and Robinson (2009) through their examination of the regionalization of preparedness efforts in the United States. They demonstrate how imposing centrally defined goals in a decentralized system can backfire due to conflicting incentives across the various levels.

Despite the challenges inherent in working in a decentralized system, most participants acknowledged that it also brought many advantages. Many shared the belief that a decentralized local-level response is beneficial. Multiple of them pointed out that to understand the implications of a crisis and respond effectively, one must be close to society. This argument is also supported by several scholars (Hermansson, 2019; Kuhn and Morlino, 2022; Twigg, 2015; Walker et al., 2010). Next to better understanding of local needs, the potential to respond quickly was also said to be a benefit by numerous participants. This is reaffirmed by Hermansson (2019), who states that decentralization can reduce information overload, which could speed up decision-making and make the public sector more efficient. Additionally, through decentralization, more localized information can be considered in the disaster management process (Hegele & Schnabel, 2021).

5.2.2 Collaboration and coordination in a decentralized system

Another aspect highlighted in the results is the importance of collaboration and coordination, both during the process of preparation as well as during the response to a crisis. Participants emphasized the need for better collaboration between the different authoritative levels. They said that it is hard for the national level to understand the needs of the local level, which, for example, leads to municipalities having too many responsibilities. One municipality even referred to its role as a *sewer* [slasktratt] that must manage any issues that governmental agencies have been unable to solve. The need for effective collaboration is supported by Twigg (2015), who explains that decentralized systems make it essential for different levels to work well together. The author describes that without collaboration, there is a risk of central governments abdicating their responsibilities and leaving local levels with tasks they often lack capacities to manage. Additionally, the challenge of understanding local dynamics at the national level could also account for the difficulty many participants encountered with the sometimes overly strict laws hindering response efforts. They noted that whilst these laws make sense in theory, they prove ineffective in practical application. That this is not a unique problem is illustrated by Sunshine et al. (2019), who show that state laws that operate successfully under normal circumstances can inadvertently create barriers during emergencies. Therefore, a way in which governments can support lower administrative levels is by endorsing laws beneficial to disaster management (Coppola, 2020, Chapter 5).

While inter-level collaboration is necessary for mutual understanding among different levels of governance, participants also emphasized the necessity of coordination among all actors involved in the management system. The purpose being to prevent gaps in the response resulting from the fragmentated individual roles and responsibilities. In this study, collaboration and coordination were some of the most mentioned challenges, as well as solutions, for managing internal displacement in Sweden. Similarly, Christensen et al. (2016) state that coordination often is identified as a critical failure in most crises, whilst it at the same time is seen as the solution to such failure. Literature therefore emphasizes the need of clear and effective political and legal guidelines for coordinating between levels of government in decentralized systems to ensure cohesive and efficient response to crises (Kuhn & Morlino, 2022). That coordination is essential in the context of large-scale events such as internal displacement can be supported by research such as that from Gerber and Robinson (2009), who point out that large-scale incidents inherently involve multiple jurisdictions and engage various levels of government. This is echoed by the participants, who often mentioned that the scale of the internal displacement matters, since a larger scale would involve more organizations and thereby require more coordination.

5.2.3 Finding an actor responsible for coordination

The results indicated that all participants agreed that internal displacement is a cross-sectoral issue that would affect all of society. As previously stated, every participant confirmed that their organization would have a responsibility to act and a role to play in the response. However, as one person put it, what is currently missing is an actor that has the responsibility to initiate preparedness, coordinate and lead the efforts. Many participants, particularly at the local and middle levels, expressed the need for directives from the national level to allow for time and resources to be assigned to the effort.

The results showed varying opinions on who should take on the role of initiating preparedness and coordinating preparedness efforts. Many participants suggested that MSB could do it, as preparedness for internal displacement fits within their sectoral responsibility. Other participants suggested The Swedish Migration Agency and referred to their experience with cross-border migration. Alternative actors, such as a County Administrative Board responsible for a Civil Defence Region (CIVO) or the National Board of Health and Welfare were also mentioned. Despite the well-defined arguments of each suggestion, the primary concern is ensuring that one of these actors takes concrete steps to address the issue. Bryson et al. (2015) state that practical challenges of designing and implementing effective cross-sectoral collaboration are substantial and that, therefore, cross-sector collaboration is unlikely to get underway without the presence of more specific drivers or initial conditions. Therefore, multiple scholars highlight the necessity for integration and synergy across institutional networks for effective crisis planning (McConnell and Drennan, 2006; Kramer, 2005; Twigg, 2015).

Despite all these challenges, multiple participants mention that recent events have brought more interest to preparedness in Sweden, especially within the resumption of the total defence. This can be reaffirmed by the MSB report (MSB, 2022a), which, for example, states that until 2030 considerable investments will be made to strengthen the total defence of Sweden. A large part of this money will go to the local and regional levels to strengthen their basic tasks before and during extraordinary events in peacetime and during high alert. In accordance with what one participant pointed out, this renewed focus on total defence is a good opportunity to plan for other crises as well. Especially since the inquiry into the protection for the civilian population (SOU 2022:57) states that the movement of people is predicted to occur if the country is attacked. This is underscored by Bryson et al. (2015), who state that issues that require cross-sectoral collaboration are more likely to form in turbulent environments when policymakers believe that separate efforts by several sectors will not be sufficient and when existing networks are in place at the time of initiation of the

collaboration. Therefore, it seems timely for an actor to step up, take responsibility and put preparedness for internal displacement on the agenda.

5.3 Generalizability of the findings

The discussion above underscores the contrast between the wish for enhanced preparedness and the prevailing lack thereof, raising the important question of which actor is going to initiate this process. It underscores the complexity that cross-sectoral challenges, such as internal displacement management, pose for existing decentralized and multi-sectoral systems, like Sweden. An important aspect of this study revolves around evaluating the generalizability of the finding, which is important for determining the extent to which its conclusions can be extrapolated to other settings.

A potential limitation of the generalizability of this study could be the sampling of participants. Out of the 132 actors that were contacted, 20 agreed to participate in an interview and two gave a written response. Consequently, ensuring that this sample accurately reflects the perceptions of all actors within the system becomes challenging. One concern is that perhaps only actors that had some experience with displacement, or were at least aware of the issue, agreed to take part in the study. For example, several participants represented organizations that had experience preparing for nuclear accidents or were in areas with seasonal population influx and therefore had considered displacement in their previous work. However, if this assumption holds true, it suggests that another sample might lead to even less favourable results concerning preparedness efforts for managing internal displacement. Notably, some of the declined interview requests stated 'we are not working with this issue' as the reason for not participating.

While the compositions of the sampled participants may limit the generalizability of the findings, often brought up comparisons with other crises, such as the E22 incident and the refugee influx in 2015, show that unclear roles and responsibilities in crisis management is not a stand-alone issue. These comparisons suggest a broader risk, that other multi-sectoral challenges that require extensive collaboration and coordination may remain unaddressed because no actor has claimed responsibility for the issue. The E22 traffic delays experienced in January 2024, serve as an illustration of the consequences of operating in emergencies where responsibilities are unclear, and coordination is lacking. Based on these happenings, it is not impossible to imagine that the effects would be more severe in an event of internal displacement, where the numbers can be greater, and traffic only is one of the aspects that must be considered.

Another limitation to the generalizability of this study can be found in the extent to which participants were able to share information. Although most participants were willing to

share their perspectives on their roles and responsibilities and ongoing preparedness efforts, there were instances where information could not be shared because it was classified. This was especially the case concerning current war-related preparation efforts, regarding which at least one participant was unable to share any details. This could indicate that there are more preparations that could be of use for internal displacement in addition to those that this study was able to capture, possibly impacting the generalizability of this study. However, since many participants also clearly stated that they currently did not prepare for internal displacement, it could be assumed that the reason for the limited availability of information on preparedness efforts was this and not classification.

The final limitation that could impact the generalizability of this study is inherent to qualitative research. As mentioned in the methodology, qualitative research acknowledges the existence of different realities and the value-laden nature of the research. Whilst efforts were made continuously throughout the study to capture the perspectives of the participants accurately and authentically, for example by conducting the interviews in a semi-structured style, or through the inclusion of many of their quotes in the results chapter, it is important to acknowledge the potential influence of the researchers' values and biases on the results. For example, while the semi-structured interviews allowed for in-depth conversations with participants, it also left more room for the researchers to project their values onto the conversation. An example of a bias that might have influenced the results is that the research question was born out of a perceived lack of preparedness and assigned responsibility observed by the researchers, something that was also found in the results. Additionally, the researchers' beliefs regarding what is to be considered 'good' crisis management, such as the importance of preparedness and planning as well as the importance of collaboration and coordination, may have influenced the interpretation of the data and the results of this study.

6. Conclusion

This research aimed to examine the perceptions of organizations within the Swedish crisis management system on their roles and responsibilities in managing internal displacement. Through a document analysis and qualitative interviews with representatives from various organizations in the system, it can be concluded that individual roles and responsibilities in small scale internal displacement scenarios were perceived as relatively clear since a response was predicted to be manageable with routine organizational roles. However, the larger the scale of the internal displacement and the longer the duration, the more unclear these roles and responsibilities were perceived to be. Despite these uncertainties, participants expressed confidence in the capacities of the Swedish crisis management system's abilities to respond to crises. However, they anticipated challenges in managing population movements, navigating legal frameworks, and addressing moral and ethical dilemmas. Participants emphasized the importance of preparedness but identified obstacles such as limited resources and a lack of perceived urgency. They proposed clearer assignments and adequate resources alongside adopting more generalizable plans. They also acknowledged both strengths and weaknesses of the decentralized system based on shared responsibilities. While some advocated for more centralized control, there was generally a positive attitude towards the current decentralized approach.

Two key discussion points emerged from the findings. Firstly, there was a notable disparity between the current level of preparedness and the wish for increased preparedness. This raised the question of why actors were not more prepared than they currently are. It was noted how limited experience and human biases affecting decision-making could limit preparedness efforts for internal displacement. Furthermore, the concept of problematization was introduced to help explain why internal displacement is not on the agenda. The discussion extended to whether Sweden should prepare for internal displacement specifically or lean more toward a multi-hazard approach. The second point for discussion centred on the feasibility and desirability of assigning one actor responsibility for managing internal displacement. The challenges and opportunities of a decentralized system, such as the Swedish one, were discussed, including how decentralization inherently necessitates collaboration and coordination. It was acknowledged that coordination can both present a problem and offer a solution for managing internal displacement. Lastly, consideration was given to which actors could potentially take on the responsibility of initiating and coordinating efforts.

Based on the conclusions of this study, it is vital that more actors within the Swedish crisis management system become aware that internal displacement is a risk to be considered

and prepare for. Taking Ukraine as an example, actors within the Swedish crisis management system should be aware of the possibility of a rapidly escalating security situation and the large internal displacement situation that can emerge from that. This study suggests that amidst the resumption of the total defence in Sweden, there is an opportunity to put internal displacement on the agenda. Furthermore, it recommends assigning one actor with the responsibility of initiating preparedness efforts.

Hence, future research could focus on examining the suitability of various actors in taking on the responsibility of initiating and coordinating efforts related to preparing for internal displacement. However, to maximise the impact of such study, and to ensure subsequent action, it might be most effective if conducted as an inquiry led by the national government. Furthermore, additional research is necessary to validate the results, identify current gaps in further detail and include perspectives from more organizations and representatives. Given the limitations associated with the sampled participants, employing a larger sample size, such as a survey-based investigation, could enhance the validity of the findings. Additionally, conducting a comparative study between Sweden and a country in a similar context could offer valuable insights and promote mutual learning regarding different approaches to organizing internal displacement management.

This study has provided a better understanding of the perceived roles and responsibilities of actors in the Swedish crisis management system. It has illustrated the current status of preparedness for internal displacement and emphasized the need and wish for improvement. It has put forth an extensive discussion on the challenges and opportunities of crisis management within a decentralized system like Sweden's. Moreover, it has identified gaps and actions that can be taken to improved preparedness. The relevance of these results is underscored by the need for Sweden to ensure compliance with NATO standards for managing uncontrolled population movements within its borders. Therefore, it is especially encouraging to hear that this study has catalysed progress toward putting internal displacement on the agenda. Several participants have expressed their intention to initiate discussion within their respective organizations because of their involvement in this study. This indicates a tangible step forward in addressing the issue and improving preparedness measures.

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Appendix A presents the documents and laws that were reviewed in the initial document analysis of the study. These documents and laws formed the basis of this study and informed the process of theoretical sampling as well as the development of the interview guide.

Documents

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Appendix B

This appendix presents the interview guide containing the primary questions that were formulated for the interviews. As described in the methodology section, the interviews were semi-structured, meaning that not all questions were posed in every interview and that in some interviews additional questions were asked beyond those listed here.

Interview Guide

Role and organization
- Could you introduce yourself?
- What does your role entail?
- What organization do you work for?
- What are the core activities of the organization you work for?
Organization's role in internal displacement
- In the scenario of internal displacement, how would your organization be involved?
- Are there differences in the role of your organization in a local, smaller scale, displacement, compared to a larger, regional, or even national scale displacement?
- Are there differences in the role of your organization in time of "höjd beredskap" and peacetime?
- Are you aware of any efforts taken by your organization to prepare for an event of internal displacement?
Collaboration and coordination
- What other organizations would you work closely together with/depend on?
- What other organizations do you believe have a role to play in responding to internal migration?
- Are you aware of any ongoing efforts within the system as a whole to prepare for an event of internal migration?
Challenges and opportunities
- In the event of internal migration, which aspects do you believe will perform effectively?
- Which aspects do you anticipate may encounter challenges or be less successful?
- What steps could be taken to overcome potential challenges that hinder an effective response?

Appendix C

Appendix C presents all actors considered in this study. First the participating actors are introduced, followed by the presentation of those considered significant for the study but did not participate.

Participating actors

This section presents the actors that participated in the study. Information provided in this section is based on the initial document analysis, including relevant documents and laws, to justify the relevance of these actors and their inclusion in the study.

Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)

MSB was included due to its central role in the Swedish preparedness system, as MSB is responsible for protection against accidents, crisis preparedness and civil preparedness (MSB, 2023b). Furthermore, according to the *ordinance on state authorities' preparedness* [Förordning om statliga myndigheters beredskap (SFS 2022:524)], MSB holds a specific responsibility for civil preparedness. This means that the organization, in accordance with 8 § and 9 §, must educate their personnel to ensure that they can carry out their task in the event of a crisis during peacetime and take necessary actions to deal with the event and its consequences. Furthermore, in a state of alert, MSB must have plans to ensure it can carry out its operations to the extent possible in accordance with 9 §. This requirement for preparedness for crises, in combination with the fact that MSB (2022b) clarifies that the management of internal displacement could fall within the preparedness sector of which MSB is responsible, makes the organization relevant to this study.

The Swedish Migration Agency [Migrationsverket]

The Swedish Migration Agency works with migration-related issues, such as processing applications from people seeking permanent residence or citizenship in Sweden (Migrationsverket, n.d.). Because of its competence related to migration, The Swedish Migration Agency could potentially be assigned the responsibility of preparing for, and managing, internal displacement in Sweden (MSB, 2022b). Moreover, as another agency designated with a specific responsibility for civil preparedness, as per the ordinance on state authorities' preparedness (SFS 2022:524), the Swedish Migration Agency is a relevant actor to include in the study.

County Administrative Boards [Länsstyrelser]

Each Swedish county has a County Administrative Board that is responsible for the state administration in the area and plays a central role in the Swedish civil preparedness

system (Regeringskansliet, n.d). According to the ordinance on state authorities' preparedness (SFS 2022:524), the County Administrative Boards too are agencies with a specific responsibility for civil preparedness. In addition to this, 4 § in the *ordinance on the County Administrative Board's crisis preparedness and duties before and during heightened preparedness* [Förordning om länsstyrelsernas krisberedskap och uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap (SFS 2017:870)] describes how the County Administrative Boards should act to ensure cooperation and coordination within their geographical area of responsibility. Lastly, according to § 3 in the *ordinance on evacuation and accommodation, etc. during a state of high alert* [Förordning om utrymning och inkvartering m.m. under höjd beredskap (SFS 2006:639)], the County Administrative Boards can order evacuation of their area of geographical responsibility during a state of alert. Given that these laws and regulations indicate the involvement of the County Administrative Boards in responding to larger disturbances within an area, such as those causing internal displacement, it seems important to include them in the study.

Civil Defence Region (CIVO)

All the regional levels in Sweden have been grouped into six civil areas, each overseen by one responsible County Administrative Board (MSB, 2023a). In accordance with 4 § in the *ordinance on County Administrative Boards responsible for civil defence regions* [Förordning om civilområdesansvariga länsstyrelser (SFS 2022:525)], if a County Administrative Board is responsible for one of the six civil areas, it must also ensure coordination between the actors within that area. Therefore, it is important to include at least one CIVO in this study, to get a perspective on what that assignment entails.

Regions [Regioner]

Regions are tasked with specific responsibilities within large geographic areas, including the provision of healthcare services and, together with the municipalities, public transport (SKR, 2021a). As the *act on measures by municipalities and regions before and during extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened preparedness* [Lag (2006:544) om kommuners och regioners åtgärder inför och vid extraordinära händelser i fredstid och höjd beredskap (SFS 2006:544)] illustrates, regions too are vital for the civil preparedness in Sweden. Chapter 1 § 1 explains that the purpose of the law is to ensure that regions and municipalities act to reduce their vulnerability and have the ability to manage crises. Chapter 2 details actions to be taken during peacetime to prepare for extraordinary events, such as conducting risk analysis, as outlined in § 1 and providing staff with necessary training, as stated in § 9. As chapter 3 § 1, § 2 and § 3 depict, regions must prepare for and be a part of

the civil defence during a state of alert. Furthermore, as described in 3 § an 7 § in the *ordinance on measures by municipalities and regions before and during extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened preparedness* [Förordning om kommuners och regioners åtgärder inför och vid extraordinära händelser i fredstid och höjd beredskap (SFS 2006:637)], the regions must inform MSB and the National Board of Health and Welfare on any preparations that have been made for extraordinary events. They also must provide the County Administrative Boards and the National Board of Health and Welfare with status reports if such an event were to occur.

What makes Regions especially interesting in the event of internal displacement, apart from their central role in regional preparedness, is outlined in the *health and medical care act* [Hälso- och sjukvårdslag (SFS 2017:30)]. According to chapter 18 § 3, in the event of an extraordinary event leading to an influx of individuals from another region, the receiving region remains responsible for providing these individuals with health and medical care.

Municipalities [Kommuner]

Municipalities have responsibility for various issues at the local level (SKR, 2021b). For example, they are assigned the task of social care, education, water and waste management, residence, rescue services and crisis and civil preparedness (SKR, 2021b). As previously mentioned, municipalities too are encompassed by the act on measures by municipalities and regions before and during extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened preparednes*s* (SFS 2006:544). In addition to previously described responsibilities, chapter 2 § 7 and 3 § 4 mandate municipalities to facilitate cooperation and coordination among municipalities within their geographical jurisdiction. As described in 2 § and 6 § in the ordinance on measures by municipalities and regions before and during extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened preparedness (SFS 2006:637), the municipalities must inform the County Administrative Board on any preparations that have been made for extraordinary events.

Furthermore, there are other laws that underscore the relevance of municipalities in the event of internal displacement. For example, in chapter 2 § 1 in the *social services act* [Socialtjänslag (SFS 2001:453)], it is stated that each municipality has the utmost responsibility to provide individuals with necessary aid and assistance. MSB (2022a) therefore argues that municipalities could play a role in taking care of individuals affected by a large-scale evacuation. Similarly, the authors also state that, in cases where individuals have crossed municipal borders during a large-scale evacuation, municipalities will often be involved in the relocation of people. Lastly, chapter 3 § 1 of the *act on evacuation and accommodation etc. during a state of high alert* [Lag om utrymning och inkvartering m.m.

under höjd beredskap (SFS 2006:546)] allows municipalities to order owners of a building or residential apartment to provide accommodation and resources to those that have been forcibly displaced by evacuation or war.

Rescue Services [Räddningstjänster]

Municipalities must provide rescue services to their geographical area of responsibility (SKR, 2021b). Rescue services are trained and equipped to prevent or limit damage to people, property, and the environment in the event of an accident or disaster (Krisinformation.se, 2023). Each operation involving rescue services is overseen by a designated rescue leader and according to chapter 6 § 2 in the *accident protection act* [Lag om skydd mot olyckor (SFS 2003:778)], the rescue leader can order evacuation of an area. This is relevant in the case of internal displacement since it, in chapter 6 § 4, is further clarified that the person that ordered the evacuation shall, to the extent possible, provide the people affected by evacuation with sustenance.

The Swedish Police [Polismyndigheten]

The Swedish Police works to reduce crime and improve the security of people (Polismyndigheten, 2023). The Swedish Police is identified as another agency that, according to the ordinance on state authorities' preparedness (SFS 2022:524), has a specific responsibility for civil preparedness. Furthermore, chapter 2 § 3 of the act on evacuation and accommodation etc. during a state of high alert (SFS 2006:546) and chapter 6 § 3 of the accident protection act (SFS 2003:778) state that they shall offer the help that is needed during evacuation. For this reason, it is insightful to include perspective of the Swedish Police of their involvement in the event of internal displacement.

Swedish Transport Agency [Trafikverket]

The primary mandate of the Swedish Transport Agency is to ensure that the transport system works (Trafikverket, 2023). As the Swedish Transport Agency is a governmental agency, it also needs to comply with the ordinance on state authorities' preparedness (SFS 2022:524). However, what makes the Swedish Transport Agency particularly interesting for this study is highlighted by MSB (2023b), which emphasizes their responsibility for the preparedness sector of transportation. Since transportation is an important aspect in the movement of people, the Swedish Transport Agency could provide a unique perspective to the study.

National Board of Health and Welfare [Socialstyrelsen]

The National Board of Health and Welfare is an authority that works to ensure high quality of the social- and healthcare services (Socialstyrelsen, 2019). It is also identified as an agency with a specific responsibility for civil preparedness according to the ordinance on state authorities' preparedness (SFS 2022:524). The reason for including the National Board of Health and Welfare in this study stems from its frequent mentions by The Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket, 2021) in their enquiry into tasks and responsibilities in situations of migration. Especially in association with their responsibility to take care of migrating children. Therefore, this organization is considered an actor of interest in the context of internal displacement as well.

The Swedish Red Cross [Svenska Röda Korset]

The Swedish Red Cross is a voluntary organization that provides aid and support during times of crisis (Svenska Röda Korset, n.d.). It was the Swedish Red Cross that initially proposed the topic for this study on internal displacement in Sweden. Furthermore, the participation of the Swedish Red Cross provides the perspective of a non-governmental organization.

Non-participating actors

This section presents the actors that were considered for this study, but declined or did not reply. These actors, and the justification of their relevance for this study is presented below.

The Swedish Government

The Swedish Government governs Sweden and influences the development of the national society by proposing and implementing legislative changes that are approved by the Swedish Parliament (Regeringskansliet, 2020). The government also has the authority to heighten preparedness and implement a state of alert in times of need (MSB, 2022b). Chapter 2 § 1 of the act on evacuation and accommodation etc. during a state of high alert (SFS 2006:546) states that the government can order evacuation of an area if it is necessary in order to protect the population.

Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKR)

SKR is an organization, comprised of all regions and municipalities, that supports and facilitates the operations of regions and municipalities by offering them various services (SKR, 2024). Given the central role of regions and municipalities in Swedish preparedness

and their potential to be involved in internal displacement, SKR could have been of relevance to include in this study.

Swedish Armed Forces [Försvarsmakten]

The primary responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces is to ensure the capacity to engage in armed combat (Swedish Armed Forces, 2022). According to 4 § of the *ordinance on the Armed Forces' support for civilian activities* [Förordning om Försvarsmaktens stöd till civil verksamhet (SFS 2002:375)], the Swedish Armed Forces can be tasked with aiding governmental authorities, regions, and municipalities with help. For this reason, the Swedish Armed Forces could potentially play a role in responding to internal displacement in Sweden.

Frivilliga Resursgruppen (FRG)

As outlined by FRG (n.d.), this organization is a collaboration between the municipalities and *voluntary defence organizations* [Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer], supported by MSB. According to the authors, FRG collects resources from voluntary defence organizations at a local level to support municipalities when their regular resources need reinforcement. FRG was mentioned by multiple participants throughout the study and therefore became interesting to include.

The Swedish Civil Defence League [Civilförsvarsförbundet]

The Swedish Civil Defence League (Civilförsvarsförbundet, n.d.) describes itself as a voluntary defence organization that works with questions associated with safety, security, protection, and survival. The organization states that they are a part of the civil defence and that they support municipalities and county administrative boards when they need reinforcement. This indicates its potential involvement in response to internal displacement. The inclusion of the Swedish Civil Defence League would have offered the perspective of another non-governmental organization as well.

The Swedish Church [Svenska Kyrkan]

As indicated by the Swedish Church (Svenska Kyrkan, 2023), the organization is Sweden's largest Christian denomination. The Swedish Church explains that they can provide support to individuals in need. Many participants underscored the significance of the Swedish Church in crisis assistance. For this reason, this organization emerged as an organization of interest to include in this study.

<center>**Appendix D**</center>

Appendix D presents the perceived roles and responsibilities of the actors in the event of internal displacement. It also includes an illustration that provides an overview of collaboration among the various actors. The content within this appendix solely relies on information provided by the participants during the interviews.

Perceived responsibilities

This first section of Appendix D describes the perceived roles and responsibilities of actors in the system in the event of internal displacement.

The Swedish Government

The Swedish government was rarely mentioned by the participants. One participant described how the government most likely would work through MSB to gather emergency information. However, the participant noted that, due to the absence of ministerial rule in Sweden, the government would not issue operational orders. Instead, the government was mentioned multiple times in their role of assigning long-term missions to various governmental actors.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)

MSB outlines its numerous responsibilities, including its role of providing cross-sectoral support and coordinating other actors in their preparedness efforts. Another crucial aspect of their role is coordinating within the preparedness sector for public safety, for which they bear the primary responsibility. In terms of the overall responsibility for internal displacement, as described in the results, MSB recognizes that their role might lead other actors to assume that they should be the one to hold it. However, MSB states that having a designated role or position in the system differs from possessing the necessary competence and experience, indicating that they may not necessarily have the most relevant knowledge.

Similarly, other actors agreed with the perspective of MSB, suggesting that MSB would likely have a supporting role on a national level and that they could help facilitate discussions between different sectors to strengthen collaborations. Rescue services also pointed to how they could help provide national resources to responses if needed. As previously mentioned, one actor also stated that they probably would manage information and provide the government with updates.

The Swedish Migration Agency

As described in the results, when questioned about the potential assignment of the overall responsibility for internal displacement in Sweden, The Swedish Migration Agency

<center>71</center>

stated that they would carry out any assignment and tasks assigned to them. Other actors pointed to their experience with managing displaced people, and the resources they have available for doing so, suggesting that this knowledge would be useful in a response. Nonetheless, many expressed that their responsibility was limited to people who have crossed an internationally recognized boarder and therefore does not include internally displaced people (IDPs).

County Administrative Boards

All County Administrative Boards that participated in the study emphasized their main responsibility of ensuring cooperation and coordination withing there area of geographical responsibility. They stated that they would organize *cooperation* [samverkans-] meetings to connect actors aiming to achieve a common goal. Within this role, half of the County Administrative Boards, highlighted their commitment to assisting municipalities with any needs that might arise. Some also referenced to their obligation, according to law, to prepare for and respond to nuclear accidents, as well as their authority to order evacuation order and coordinate such efforts. Additionally, they discussed their role as the second line of defence and therefore having to ensure that the greatest possible defence effect is achieved in times of war. Lastly, one representative mentioned how counties are legally responsible for coordination of traffic, which could be of relevance in internal displacement, although they noted that this duty will likely fall under the jurisdiction of The Swedish Police due to resource constrains. Other actors agree that the main responsibility of the County Administrative Boards is to coordinate. Many mentioned their responsibility for handling communication issues and taking the lead in scenarios that would cross municipal boarders.

County Administrative Board responsible for a Civil Defence Region (CIVO)

CIVO stated that their main responsibilities are related to wartime scenarios. In such situations, the CIVO representative described their role as primarily focused on prioritizing different issues, such as deciding whether local resources should be directed support armed forces or civilians. During peacetime, the CIVO representative clarified that they primarily offer support to the County Administrative Boards, with no additional tasks or responsibilities. CIVO was only mentioned by a few other participants, but all agreed that their main responsibilities lie within civil defence. One participant outlined their responsibility to coordinate, collaborate and be a link to the government. Another stated that they could be valuable in pooling

resources within the area. The CIVO acknowledged their limited mentioned, attributing it to being a relatively new entity with minimal interaction beyond the County Administrative Boards. However, they also indicated that their role would grow in the future.

Regions

All participating regions emphasized that their primary responsibility in an event of internal displacement would be to provide health care. This was also the responsibility most mentioned by other participants. Many representatives from regions elaborated on their duty to evacuate hospitals and medical centres if needed, relocating their resources to where people would be going. One region also mentioned its potential advisory role for infection control within in temporary residence for IDPs. Additionally, due of regional variations in organizational structure, only some regions mention their responsibility for public transport. However, they clarify that since regions do not own the trains/busses themselves, their responsibility would be to ask suppliers to provide transport if needed.

Municipalities

Municipalities themselves highlight their large responsibility in an event of internal displacement. One representative stated they are responsible for ensuring the fulfilment of basic human rights of people within their municipality are fulfilled, such as providing shelter and food. Two other representatives agreed that they would likely address housing needs of IDPs, as municipalities have alternative accommodations available. Another representative mentioned providing assistance to people who cannot afford to evacuate on their own.

Many other actors also describe how municipalities would be an important actor. Some explained that municipalities would be primarily responsible for the operational, on-the-ground efforts. For example, one participant suggested that municipalities should open *safety spots* [trygghetspunkter] where IDPs can gather and receive assistance. Several participants refer to the *municipal act* [Kommunallag (SFS 2017:725)] which outlines municipalities' responsibility for individuals within their jurisdiction. Move rover, many cited the *social services act* [Socialtjänstlag (SFS 2001:453)] which mandates municipalities to ensure that everyone gets the support and help they need. However, a representative from a municipality clarified that there are many steps to be taken before the municipality will intervene and provide full solutions. For example, the representative mentioned that individuals that are displaced might initially stay in hotels, with expenses covered privately or through insurance. Only if necessary and supported by law would public funds be used. Summarizing, one participant noted that municipalities serve as the last safety net for people, stepping in when other government entities fail.

Rescue Services

The rescue services described their role in providing operational support in an event of internal displacement. Due to variations in organizational structures and division of assignments, one of the representatives described tasks like that of the municipalities. However, others focussed more on carrying out rescue operations and preventing fires. For instance, one participant mentioned their advisory role in fire safety for refugee accommodations during the 2015/2016 refugee influx. Another rescue service representative also referred to this advisory role, stating they would be involved with housing for IDPs.

The Swedish Police

The Swedish Police described that their responsibility in internal displacement would be reminiscent of general policing. That includes maintaining public order and security, facilitating the accessibility of roads, and ensuring the safety on them. Many other actors agreed that The Swedish Police would be involved, primarily focusing on maintaining law and order. One participant suggested they would likely be involved in the initial response before the other actors took over. Another one mentioned that they would help safeguard an evacuated area. This could possibly be a responsibility of the local police. However, the national police stated that it is not a special assignment of theirs but rather that their responsibility is to safeguard Sweden.

Swedish Transport Agency

The Swedish Transport Agency outlined its primary responsibilities, which include overseeing the railways and roads, directing the traffic, and clearing roads if needed. They indicated their ability to accommodate the needs of other organizations and act accordingly. Furthermore, they highlighted that they would collaborate with the private rail-way actors to promote preparedness. Another participant from a different organization mentioned a similar idea, suggesting that the Swedish Transport Agency could be involved in coordinating the train companies.

National Board of Health and Welfare

The National Board of Health and Welfare assert that their primary responsibilities, in a situation of internal displacement, include coordinating efforts and providing information and recommendations to relevant stakeholders. They specifically focus on actors in the preparedness sector of health, medical care and welfare to ensure that their actions are aligned with other preparedness agencies. Additionally, the National Board of Health and Welfare is responsible for disaster

medicine and must ensure that this expertise is available to society in the event of a crisis. Other participants in the study seemed to have a similar perception, with one of the regions stating that in the event of internal displacement, the National Board of Health and Welfare should step in and provide guidance.

Other governmental actors

As illustrated by the results, participants agree that internal displacement is a cross-sectoral issue that would affect all of society. Therefore, various governmental actors are briefly mentioned in addition to the ones described above. These include the Swedish National Agency for Education, that is predicted to be involved to ensure the education of internally displaced children and the Swedish Public Employment Service that is said to be involved to help the displaced find new jobs. Furthermore, the Swedish Tax Agency was suggested as potentially having overall responsibility due to its capability to register individuals. Other actors mentioned as having a role in internal displacement were the Public Health Agency of Sweden, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Maritime Administration and the Swedish Transport Agency.

Voluntary organizations

Most participants emphasised crucial role of voluntary organizations in an internal displacement situation. The primary responsibility that assigned to them was the organization of volunteers, with additional mentions of their potential abilities to provide housing and food. Commonly cited actors included the Home Guard, FRG, the Swedish Church, Swedish Outdoor Association, Save the Children, Stadsmissionen and voluntary defence organizations. Most frequently mentioned was the Swedish Red Cross.

The Swedish Red Cross expressed their commitment to responding to the needs of IDPs, stating that their role would depend on what those needs where. In a wartime scenario they outlined specific legal obligations, including supporting the health care for the military, evacuating children, and registering prisoners of war. Additionally, they provided examples of how they could support municipalities with for example safety spots by sending volunteers and helping with information management. Additionally, they stated that they could take care of spontaneous volunteers and have a coordinating role when many volunteer organizations got involved.

Private actors and civil society

Lastly, the role of private actors and civilians was also frequently mentioned. Regarding private actors, those associated with public transport were mentioned most often since various participants suggested that they could provide transport for IDPs. Others also

pointed to different private actors for potentially offering housing or other resources. Similarly, civil society was frequently mentioned, with many noting the willingness of people to help and their possession of necessary language and cultural skills.

Collaboration

To illustrate the collaborations between organizations that were mentioned in by participants Figure 2 was created. The larger squares are used to show the actors that participated in the study, whilst the smaller squares are for organizations that were mentioned but did not participate in the study. Any collaboration between organizations that were mentioned three or more times are represented by a green line. Any collaborations that were mentioned twice is represented by an orange line and collaborations that only were mentioned once are represented by a yellow line.


Figure 2. Collaborations between organizations that were mentioned by participants in the study