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# **Voting Behavior in the Aftermath of Earthquakes in Turkey**

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment  
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### ***Abstract***

*In democracies, elections are events in which the public evaluates not only the promises for the coming years, but also the actions of the past period. When an incident adversely affects the welfare of all or part of a society, such as an economic crisis or a natural disaster, the general expectation according to the retrospective voting theory is that society will punish those responsible through elections. However, the incumbents in Turkey were reelected only 3 months after the deadly earthquakes in 2023. In this study, by conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews in Hatay province, which received the most severe damage, I conclude that people's voting behaviors in reelecting incumbents were largely affected by the role of the state, the ideas it spread, and the aid it provided in return of votes.*

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## 1. Introduction

In democracies, elections are events in which the public evaluates not only the promises for the coming years, but also the actions of the past period. As such, elections are a test for competing political parties. The political preferences of the individuals may be rational, economic, class-based, or ideological, but they may also be influenced by actions, promises or incidents. Especially when an incident adversely affects the welfare of all or part of a society, such as an economic crisis or a natural disaster, the general expectation according to the retrospective voting theory is that society will punish those responsible through elections.

In 2023, Turkey experienced the most dramatic natural disaster of its modern history; two back-to-back earthquakes of 7.8 and 7.5 magnitude hit the south-east of the country on February 6, only 3 months before the election, which cost more than 50 thousand lives in 11 adjacent provinces (Badendieck, 2023). 3 months later, the incumbent president, R.T. Erdoğan came victorious in 8 out of 11 provinces in the first round of the presidential elections and in 9 out of 11 provinces in the second round thereof. In 8 of these provinces (except Adana, Diyarbakır and Hatay), the range of votes in favor of R.T. Erdoğan was 59-72% in the first round and 62-76% in the second round (Sözcü, 2023a, 2023b) (**Table 1**). Moreover, R.T. Erdoğan's ruling AKP party received the most votes vis-à-vis other parties in 10 out of 11 provinces (Diyarbakır being the only exception).

**Table 1.** Share of votes the ruling AKP government and President R.T. Erdoğan received in 11 affected provinces in the 2023 elections.

Province:	Percentage of votes AKP candidates received in 2023 General Elections:	Percentage of votes R.T. Erdoğan received in the <u>first round</u> of 2023 Presidential Elections:	Percentage of votes R.T. Erdoğan received in the <u>second round</u> of 2023 Presidential Elections:
Adana	29.94	43.93	45.96
Adıyaman	52.09	66.2	68.84
Diyarbakır	22.25	26.48	28.34
Elazığ	39.79	67.18	70.27
Gaziantep	44.39	59.76	62.72

Kahramanmaraş	47.2	71.88	75.77
Malatya	44.75	69.39	71.96
<b><u>Hatay</u></b>	<b><u>33.14</u></b>	<b><u>48.03</u></b>	<b><u>50.14</u></b>
Kilis	38.92	65.55	69.99
Osmaniye	32.29	62.32	66.2
Şanlıurfa	42.47	62	64.84

*Sözcü, 2023a, 2023b*

Until 2023, Turkey experienced many earthquakes but one of the most destructive one in its recent history was 1999 Gölcük earthquake with a magnitude of 7.4. The earthquake affected 7 adjacent regions and resulted in more than 18 thousand deaths according to official numbers (BBC, 2019). The earthquake was followed by an economic crisis in 2001. Eventually, people went to polls in 2002 general elections. The voters heavily punished the DSP-led coalition government, and the political spectrum was totally transformed with new parties such as AKP coming to the political arena. However, as 3 years passed since the 1999 earthquake, AKP's rise, and the coalition's fall were not only connected to the earthquake but also to the economic crisis (which was also affected by the earthquake). Yet the aftermath of 1999 earthquake revealed the incompetence of the coalition government, wide corruption, and poor standards of residential buildings alongside with some other defects in the state, which overall led to the 2002 "political earthquake" (Akarca and Tansel, 2016). Therefore, it is interesting see different political behavior of Turkish voters between two devastating earthquakes in different years although poor governance, corruption and poor standards of residential buildings were still present in 2023 after 24 years passed since the Gölcük earthquake. To put it in another way, while electorate in Turkey retrospectively punished the incumbents in 2002 elections, they rewarded the incumbents in 2023 elections despite many similarities in circumstances between the two. Indeed, the wide expectation among the opponents of ruling AKP party before 2023 elections was that it will be an easy win for the opposition. One of the reasonings is that AKP, having been in power for 21 years by 2023, had consolidated its voter base through ideological policies for many years while the DSP-led coalition came to power in May 1999 and the earthquake hit 3 months later. Hence, not enough time for DSP to consolidate its base around a political/ideological cause, which resulted in DSP losing

all its 136 seats in the parliament in just 3 years and disappearing from the political arena (Kiras, 2023).

Nonetheless, ideological consolidation cannot be the sole explanation for why R.T. Erdoğan and his government were reelected in 2023 general and presidential elections. What was rational for his opponents might not be so rational for his supporters. Besides, it is equally a success for himself to win an election that was considered “impossible” by others in such a short period of time. People witnessed different policies in that three-month period after the earthquakes and before the elections. In the beginning, the general attitude of the government was to control media and curtail the spread of information about the incompetence of the government. However, once the devastating situation was becoming obvious as the social media circumvent the media control, the grand strategy of the government changed. R.T. Erdoğan started to describe the earthquake as “the disaster of the century” (*asrın felaketi*) and called it “fate” (*kader*), this time in an effort to magnify the destruction as much as possible to justify that the destruction was natural with a religious blend and well beyond the capacity of the state. Moreover, media started to promote the idea that no other government in the world, let alone the AKP, would be able to deal with such a destruction, had the others experienced such big earthquakes in their countries.

Certainly, it was not the only strategy of the President and his government. High ranking officials including President himself and ministers made frequent visits, regularly appeared in television programs, introduced reconstruction plans, made promises to swiftly recover houses, workplaces, social life, and economy in the disaster regions. Moreover, all complaints about the lag of search and rescue services and past policies of AKP to grant licenses to haphazard planning were muted. Since many Turks make distinction between the state and the government to glorify and bless the former and to emphasize the impermanence of the latter, after the earthquakes any complaints towards the government was quickly equated to complaints towards the state. Thus, many people who were in grief simply because of the incompetence of the government were all of a sudden demonized as “traitors”.

All these events made me think about the dilemma in **what motivated those people in the disaster regions to display such a political behavior? How R.T. Erdoğan and his party persuaded the locals after all these drama and destruction?**

The questions I posed for myself could be useful in understanding political psychology of the electorate in declining democracies and electoral strategies in the

developing countries of the Middle East. Besides, Turkey sits on such a geological region that has historically been prone to earthquakes. It means answers to my questions would not only deal with the past but also with the future prediction of government policies and political behavior.

## **2. Literature review**

The literature on the voting behaviors in countries that experienced substantial disasters is not wide and mostly based on the elections in North America, yet it is relatively divided into two camps. On the one hand, a group of scholars think that voters hold incumbents responsible for the destruction and losses, and they naturally punish them in the next elections. Thus, this camp upholds retrospective voting theory. Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels seem to be founders of retrospective voting theory and are widely cited by both camps in relatively modern literature. In a more recent book, Achen and Bartels (2017) analyze droughts, floods and shark attacks, and the following electoral responses. According to the authors, voters are likely to punish the government when they are in pain, “so long as they can justify doing so with whatever plausible cultural constructions are available to them”. That is, incumbents will pay at the polls for bad times, whether or not there is a rational basis for blame: “Voters consistently and systematically punish the incumbents for conditions beyond their control.” Thus, Achen and Bartels (2017) call it “blind retrospection”. The voters do not punish for the occurrence of disasters per se, but for insufficient responses to those disasters. The authors also note the role of mass media in people’s attribution of responsibility to the government. One interesting example of Achen and Bartels (2017) is about the flu pandemic of 1918-1920 when the government of the United States reacted poorly to the people’s needs and pandemic aid but blaming the government at the time of the war would be “unpatriotic”. This example can be connected to what people in Turkey thought after the earthquakes. The R.T. Erdoğan, government affiliated media and even some of the earthquake victims rushed to classify people as “traitors” who claimed that the search and rescue teams were late, and the state institutions were not present. Moreover, patriotic Turks tend to make distinction between government and state, and as such, any blaming on state is deemed treason. One remarkable strategy of the government after the earthquakes was that any criticism against the AKP was considered criticism against the state. Hence, it was utilized as a method to make people avoid criticism of the state. Another useful point in Achen and Bartels (2017) is that they

refer to “typology of causal frameworks”, where voters regarded the pandemic as part of the natural world (“the realm of fate and accident”) rather than as part of the social world (“the realm of control and intent”). Thus, they did not punish the government. This will be useful in understanding the approach of the Turks to disasters as R.T. Erdoğan called the 2023 earthquakes “fate” (*kader*) and “the disaster of the century” (*asrın felaketi*) in an effort to cover the government’s neglect in disaster preparedness investment and show that it was natural and beyond the government’s capacity. Cole et al (2012) studied rainfall and election data from India conclude that voters punish the incumbents weather events beyond its control, even if the governments positively respond to people’s needs. “Rainfall just one standard deviation from the optimal level reduces the incumbent coalitions vote share by 3.25 percentage points”, the authors find. They also add that the timing is critical. That is, rainfall shock in the year before an election negatively affect the incumbents but rainfall in the year previous to that have no effect on the incumbents’ chances of reelection. This finding is not consistent with what was observed in Turkey as the election took place only 3 months after the deadly earthquakes. Yet the authors also find that relief spending two years prior to the election is not rewarded at all. This may be supported by the events in Turkey as the government rushed to relief spending immediately after the earthquakes as the elections were approaching. Moreover, the authors find no evidence that the voters’ education level determines their response. Klomp (2020) also arrived at similar findings. The author proposes several hypotheses, but I focus mainly on two of them considering the events in Turkey. Firstly, he claims that the incumbent will provide more public disaster support in a year prior to an election. The author asserts that 10 percent of the public disaster spending provided in an election year can be explained by the incumbent’s urge for rent seeking, in other words buying votes, rather than helping the people in need. He goes further to make distinctions in the kinds of disasters. That is, in case of droughts and floods, the disasters increase election induced disaster spending in proportional and parliamentary systems, while in case of earthquakes, majoritarian and presidential systems have strong incentive to increase spending for the victims. Elections in Turkey induced disaster support by the incumbent government, but the political system of the country is proportional and presidential. That is, the case of Turkey partially supports Klomp’s findings. Secondly, the author concludes that incumbents have greater incentive in more providing disaster spending when access to media in the country is high. The reasoning is that the media is a platform for the politicians to showcase their policies and efforts. This finding is in line with the events after the earthquakes in Turkey as the President and his government widely



utilized the media for frequent appearances and promotion of the disaster relief. Besley and Burgess (2002) focus on levels of the newspaper circulations and electoral accountability and their effects on the governments' incentive to provide relief expenditure based on the panel data from India. They conclude that higher media coverage and higher media independence push the governments to react to people's needs. In case of Turkey media coverage of the disasters was huge, yet the mainstream media is controlled by the families closely affiliated with the government. Hence, no independence. Heersink et al (2017) analyzed catastrophic floods in 1927 in the American South. They find that although Herbert Hoover, who was the Republican candidate for presidency in 1928, was severely punished by the voters in affected regions, although he personally oversaw the broad and fairly distributed post-disaster aid. Hence, the authors's findings largely overlap with Achen and Bartels' "blind retrospection". However, they note a caveat to "blind retrospection" in their analysis. That is, voters in less affected counties punished Hoover more than those in harder-hit ones. Ashworth et al (2018) in their empirical analysis posit that the natural disasters are useful moments for rational voters to discover about the incumbent's capacity. That is, consequences of a disaster depend on the incumbent's capacity to deal with catastrophes. After a disaster, people will have an opportunity to learn about the incumbent's performance and preparedness efforts and will vote accordingly. A well-performed incumbent and high-quality preparedness will be rewarded while a poorly performed incumbent and low-quality preparedness will be punished. In any case that is outside of this equation, authors identify voters as irrational. Gasper and Reeves (2011) studied severe weather events and their subsequent effect on the voter responses in over 3,100 counties in the United States from 1970 to 2006. The authors conclude that the electorate punish both the president and the governor who they deem to be responsible for the damage after severe weather conditions. Moreover, the authors find that the electorate do not punish the officials for the events beyond their control, rather they punish politicians for inaction. Lazarev et al (2014) borrow the same reasoning from Achen and Bartels in case of forest fires in central Russia in 2010 that exposure to a natural disaster leads more people to blame the government and more negative attitudes. Moreover, exposure to a natural disaster at the same time increases support for the authorities because of the disaster aid, which eventually leads to more support if the victims are satisfied with the aid. In addition, appearance, and portrayal of the incumbent as "strong leader" on the mass media as well as direct experience of further dealing with authorities (visits to affected regions) enhance the support. However, since Russia is an authoritarian state and the elections are

not truly free and fair, the authors based their findings on the survey data. That is, they cannot measure the aforementioned effects on the election results. Eriksson (2016) had a different but similar approach to retrospective voting. Instead of focusing on the immediate election after a disaster, the author focuses on 3 consecutive elections after the storm Gudrun took place in Sweden in 2005, which affected 730 thousand people (or 8% of the population) and cost a damage of 2.8 billion dollars to the Swedish economy. The storm revealed significant structural weaknesses in Swedish emergency response system and rescue response was insufficient despite the largest peacetime mobilization ever of the Swedish army. This, in turn, decreased the incumbent **Swedish Demoratic Party's** share of votes in 3 parliamentary elections (2006, 2010, 2014) that followed. The media also played a role in the effects of poor government response on elections. According to the data, storm Gudrun was still covered by the media in 2010 and 2014, although to a lesser degree compared to 2006, even though 5 and 9 years respectively passed since the disaster.

On the other hand, in the second camp scholars assert that voting preferences after disasters depend on myriad factors and incumbents know ways to manipulate. Eventually, certain factors hinder the voters from holding the incumbents responsible and they continue to vote for them. Masiero and Santarossa (2021) by exploiting data from 13,338 municipal electoral cycles where incumbents seek reelection between 1993 and 2015 in Italy concluded that destructive earthquakes in Italy, indeed, increased the incumbents' chances of reelection by 8.2%-10.6% and vote share by 5.0-5.5 percentage points. The authors offered two explanations for this behavior. First, incumbent mayors are the first to offer immediate recovery to the earthquake victims and after the earthquakes, money and investment pour into the disaster region. Second, they have higher visibility on the media. One claim of the authors, which I wanted to test in my own study in Turkey, is that people in the modern societies are generally aware that earthquakes are not connected to God and are natural phenomena. Moreover, they find evidence that farther the next election, higher the chances of reelection because the incumbent has more time to recover. In my opinion, this finding is also challenged in Turkey as R.T. Erdoğan and his incumbent party won only 3 months after the earthquakes. Last but not least, authors suggest that incumbents appear more in the media outlets relative to their main challengers after earthquakes, which eventually raises both the probability of being reelected and the vote share. Similarly, Gallego (2018), who is interested in voting behavior in Colombia after floods and landslides, post-disaster aid helps the incumbents to survive the elections. The author finds that in a municipality where whole population is affected by the disaster experienced an

increase in the probability of reelection of the incumbent party by 23 percentage point. This is explained by the incumbents' immediate ability to reach and distribute resources to buy votes. Furthermore, Gallego (2018) proposes a distinction between the types of aid. That is, money distributed for relief has a positive effect on the incumbent's reelection while reconstruction aid has no impact. The reasoning is that relief spending is a particularistic and private benefit that is delivered directly to the victim while reconstruction aid is a collective good. Healy and Malhotra (2009) also ended up at similar results. The authors collected data from 3,141 counties in the United States and concluded that the voters reward the incumbent party for delivery of disaster relief spending but not for investing in disaster preparation. According to the authors, 1\$ preparedness spending is equal to 15\$ in future damage reduction. However, for the same reason that Gallego (2018) proposed, voters offer limited incentive to the incumbents to spend on preparation (collective good) but encourage them to spend money after the damage has been done (individual good). An increase of relief spending from 1\$ to 10\$ per person raises the vote share of the incumbent by 0.77 percentage points. Hence, the incumbents have incentive to underinvest in preparedness, although preparedness spending **would more** lives and reduce the damage. Therefore, Healy and Malhotra (2009) call voters "myopic". Flores and Smith (2013) divide their analysis of natural disasters' impacts on leader survival into two groups: small coalition systems (autocracies) and large coalition systems (democracies). The authors find that the occurrence of disasters leads to an increase in the level of protest in small coalition systems but has no significant effect in large coalition systems. "The occurrence of disasters imperils autocrats and helps democratic leaders stay in office", the authors conclude. In a reverse fashion, the level of fatalities affects the level of protest in large coalition systems but has no significant effect in small coalition systems. If 10,000 people die in a democracy, the estimated hazard for leader removal nearly doubles. Lay (2008) wrote about hurricane Katrina in 2005 that devastated New Orleans and the city mayor Ray Nagin who poorly performed after the disaster. Yet he was reelected after less than a year. The author analyzed two pre-election polls and concluded that the voters blamed the federal government for poor response. The most crucial point of Lay (2008), however, is that the mayoral election of 2006 was racially polarized and eventually, Nagin's race mobilized African Americans en masse in support of Nagin so that the mayoral post was not lost to a white candidate. Although race theory is not applicable to the case of Turkey, one might explain Erdoğan's re-election in conservative/religious people's strong bonds with him. The politics of Turkey is highly polarized between secular and conservative voters. "Us vs them" has been widely

utilized by the government that even two devastating earthquakes might not challenge the bond. So, the voters might have opted for R.T. Erdoğan so that the most important post in the country – presidency – was not lost to “them”. According to the table 2 presented below in the methodology part, Adana, Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakır were the least affected provinces in terms of the damage done to the residential buildings and among 11 provinces, R.T. Erdoğan received the least votes in Adana and Diyarbakır. However, this tendency can be explained with the former’s secular leanings and the latter’s strong Kurdish electorate who disliked R.T. Erdoğan anyway. Chen (2013) is interested in the effect of disaster aid prior to an election on incumbent’s voter turnout and vote share. The author asserts that in both cases, disaster aid prior to an election increases both of them in his analysis of hurricanes in Florida. Interestingly, Chen (2013) finds that an incumbent’s disaster relief spending, while increasing the incumbent’s voter turnout, also suppresses the opposition party turnout. He also notes that in developed democracies, government agencies do not participate in selective aid and stay non-partisan. Bodet et al (2016) analyzed river floods in Calgary, Canada in 2013, which devastated 25 neighborhoods and displaced 75 thousand people. The authors find that floods did not affect significantly and meaningfully the incumbent’s vote shares or voter turnout. The reasoning is that even though the people in Calgary held the mayor responsible for the consequences of the floods, they did not evaluate the mayor’s leadership solely based on the disaster efforts. That is, attribution of a disaster to an incumbent does not necessarily translate into punishment in the next election. This finding is highly related to what was observed in case of Turkey.

### **3. Methodology**

I utilized in-depth semi-structured interviews in Antakya district of Hatay between 8<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> of May. There were certain reasons behind choosing Hatay and Antakya for the interviews. Firstly, despite the fact that Kahramanmaraş province was the epicenter of the earthquakes, Hatay province received the largest destruction among 11 affected provinces. According to “2023 Kahramanmaraş and Hatay Earthquakes Report” by the Directorate of Strategy and Budget under the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, more than 215 thousand residential buildings in Hatay were classified as “needs urgent demolition”, “severely damaged” and “collapsed” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve

Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2023). That is more than double the amount of the same classification for Kahramanmaraş (**Table 2**).

**Table 2.** Number of residential buildings classified according to the degree of damage they received in 11 affected provinces.

Province:	Total number of residential buildings that needs urgent demolition + severely damaged + collapsed:	Number of residential buildings with moderate damage:	Number of residential buildings with minor damage:
Adana	2,952	11,768	71,072
Adıyaman	56,256	18,715	72,729
Diyarbakır	8,602	11,209	113,223
Elazığ	10,156	1,522	31,151
Gaziantep	29,155	20,251	236,497
Kahramanmaraş	99,326	17,887	161,137
Malatya	71,519	12,801	107,765
<b><u>Hatay</u></b>	<b><u>215,255</u></b>	<b><u>25,957</u></b>	<b><u>189,317</u></b>
Kilis	2,514	1,303	27,969
Osmaniye	16,111	4,122	69,466
Şanlıurfa	6,163	6,041	199,401
Total:	518,009	131,577	1,279,727

*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2023*

There is no official record of the number of deaths in the abovementioned report, but Hatay's municipality claimed more than 23 thousand deaths in the province, which accounts to nearly half of all deaths in 11 provinces (Hatay Mahalli Haber, 2023). In addition, Hatay was known with its opposition to the ruling AKP government considering the local and general elections in the past. For instance, in the last general election (on the same day with the first round of the presidential election), Hatay was the only province besides Istanbul where a leftist Turkish Labour Party (TIP) candidate was elected. Moreover, in the local elections of 2019, a CHP candidate was elected as the mayor of Hatay. That is, different parties across the political spectrum receive attention and votes in Hatay. Moreover, among 11 provinces the only different result between the two rounds of

the presidential elections was recorded in Hatay. R.T. Erdoğan, who came second behind the opposition candidate in the first round in Hatay, increased his share of votes by 2.11 percentage point in just two weeks from 48.03% to 50.14% and came first in the second round of the presidential elections. Furthermore, after the earthquakes, thousands became homeless, lacked water, tents, and several basic needs. The state and rescue services were late to arrive in the first hours and even days after the disaster. However, although the province received the largest destruction, people of Hatay preferred Erdoğan to the opposition candidate. Considering all the destruction, losses and drama, the results in Hatay was an incredible and equally inconceivable victory for President R.T. Erdoğan. Thus, the voting behavior of Hatay province grabbed my attention. As to Antakya, it was the central and largest district of Hatay before the Earthquakes with a population of more than 383 thousand people according to the 2019 census of the Governorship of Hatay (T.C. Hatay Valiliği, n.d.).

Although I travelled to the center of Antakya district and photographed the destruction, it was difficult to find someone and talk. Because the center of the district was razed by the earthquakes, people were largely moved to container camps (*konteyner kent*). The desired location, therefore, would be the container camps outside the district. However, entrance to and research in these camps were upon the permission from the governorate of the province. This, in turn, required long waiting time and most of the time ended up with rejection simply because the government do not want outsiders to involve in political research. Therefore, I traveled to Serinyol, a small village to the north of Antakya where people, who used to live in the center but moved to container camps, come to work as they also lost their workplaces in the center.

Interviews were conducted in Turkish (see Annex 1 for English and Annex 2 for Turkish versions of the interview handouts) and lasted between 20 minutes and 2,5 hours depending on the person. I first informed them about the research and their rights during the interview. Then I noted down general information such as their gender, marital status, age, education status, profession/job, and how long they have been living in Hatay. Research related questions started with the interviewee's disaster experiences both in the past and during the 2023 earthquakes. A follow-up question was included to ask their opinion about similarities and differences between 2023 earthquakes and previous disasters in case they experienced any in the past. Then I moved to ask their opinions about the measures that have been taken/not taken by the authorities in Hatay after the earthquake and what should have been done to prevent this destruction. The latter had follow-up

questions: if anything could have been done to prevent the destruction, who should have done it and if not, why it could not have been done? Those who believed that nothing could have been done to prevent, were additionally asked whether the destruction was a result of fate (*kader*). I did not include this question in the handouts but wanted to ask to see if R.T. Erdoğan's propaganda of fate was acknowledged by the people. Moreover, my intention was to detect if the interviewees were religiously motivated to believe in fate as a determinant in the destruction. Similarly, to see the effects of the propaganda, I asked a question about the visibility of the authorities after the earthquake. The intention was to check who the locals followed and listened to the most on television, social media or in person after the earthquakes in Hatay.

The second part of the research related questions were more political in nature. I first asked which parties the interviewees voted for in the general elections of the last 40 years. The intention was to grasp the interviewee's political leaning. The reason behind the 40-year period was that the political spectrum and the constitution were largely changed after the 1980 coup d'état. Next, I asked their choices in 2018 and 2023 general elections, and two rounds of 2023 presidential elections. I had a follow-up question to ask in case the interviewee had different choices between the two rounds of 2023 presidential elections. Moreover, although my main research covered 2023 elections, I also asked the interviewee's choice in 2024 local elections. This was to be a transition question to the last section of my interview.

The last section was based on the interviewee's thoughts on present and future. Here, I asked their opinions about the recovery of Hatay and the return to normal life, and what they think/how they feel about the situation in Hatay at the present. My intention was to see whether people hold the same attitude towards the government after a year passed since the earthquakes. Here, depending on the previous responses, I asked one more question that is not included in the annexes:

*In his speech in Hatay on February 4, 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: "If the central government and local government do not work hand in hand, if they are not in solidarity, nothing will come to that city. Has it come to Hatay? At the moment, Hatay has remained lonely, Hatay has remained sad." What did you think / feel about his words?*

My intention was to observe their reaction to the President's speech because the reason for the locals behind voting for R.T. Erdoğan could be fear that they may not receive enough support and recovery investment from the central government, had they voted for

an opposition party/candidate. Moreover, someone who is not contented with the central government's recovery work in the period since the earthquakes might connect it to the fact that Hatay's municipality was run by an opposition party member until 2024 local elections. As a matter of fact, an AKP candidate won 2024 local elections in Hatay.

Interviews ended with my expression of gratitude, a question whether the interviewee wants to add anything that I did not ask and that they deemed important, and a question whether the interviewee could direct me to other people who might be willing to volunteer for this study.

My initial intention was to interview at least 15 people in Hatay. Yet during the fieldwork, circumstances became complicated, and I ended up with 8 interviewees instead as not many people wanted to participate. My observation was that they either did not want to refresh their memory of the tragedy or hesitated to take part in a study with political questions because of the fear of authorities. Hence, random sampling failed. However, I could persuade some with my reiterated assurance that their personal information will be confidential, and I repeated that they should not tell me their name and surname even if they wanted to. Therefore, I numbered the interviews instead of names in coding, did not record their voices (except one person who accepted) and took notes as they were speaking. Moreover, I could find people through snowball sampling as they forwarded me to others who experienced the earthquakes.

Furthermore, because the destruction was followed by R.T. Erdoğan's reelection, I considered it a dilemma for myself. Therefore, asking especially AKP voters about this dilemma was my priority. However, as political leanings of the interviewees were to be discovered in the latter part of the interview, I could not stop the interview once I realized that an interviewee voted for an opposition party/candidate. Besides, I did not want to ask their political preferences in the beginning to make sure I found an AKP voter because asking a political question in the beginning could scare off the interviewee. Eventually, I had 5 AKP voters and 3 opposition party/candidate voters. In a sense, this ratio worked well for me as I could discover dissenting opinions about AKP voters. Moreover, I was well aware that AKP voters have long developed an emotional bond with R.T. Erdoğan. Thus, any bias in my facial expression, voice and spelling towards the President could forge an image as "an outsider" in my interviewee's mind. For instance, in one of the interviews, I made a minor mistake when I spelled AKP as "*AKePe*". R.T. Erdoğan and other AKP members use such spelling as "*CeHePe*" or "*CeHaPe*" to despise CHP, the main opposition party, an attitude that is also accepted by AKP voters. Hence, I was kindly



corrected by my interviewee that I should better call it “*AK Parti*”. I swiftly corrected and apologized for my mistake and was later attentive to my spelling. Overall, I had to preserve an utmost neutrality, courtesy and care for political and emotional reasons and thus, I did not encounter any negative event.

General approach of the interviewees was calm and friendly. Although I am not a citizen of Turkey, I was welcomed by the locals because of the friendly relations and ethnic proximity of Turkey with Azerbaijan and because I spoke fluent Turkish without accent, which surprised them and led to curiosity. Hence, I could transcend possible suspicion of malice. Moreover, I knew in advance that the drama was still alive in people’s memories even though more than a year passed since the earthquakes. As such, I brought water and napkins with me to comfort them in case my questions reminded an interviewee of a terrible memory from the earthquakes. In addition, I was attentive to any changes in their voices and facial expressions so that I could change the subject without pushing them into deep grief. Besides, because some people of Hatay feel unnoticed by the authorities and want to freely express themselves, I was determined not to interfere when they spoke even if their answers to earthquake related questions were longer than I expected. Otherwise, I could be seen uninterested in their tragedy.

#### **4. Theory**

State as an idea and entity in Turkey has always been strong. It dated to even before the establishment of modern republic and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s statist policies that paved the way for future generations. The state is widely considered as the ultimate power – an entity that is feared but at the same time, glorified and sanctified by the people. For many Turks, it is “father state” (*devlet baba*) who may get angry for its “children’s” mischief and even rightfully punish them. Nonetheless, it is also an entity that exists to protect the citizen’s interests. The glorification is so deep and wide that some believe that state knows people’s interests better than the people themselves and acts more correctly than the people. Even the tradition of Ottoman Sultans, starting from Mehmet the Conqueror, to kill his brothers and all offspring of his brothers once a Sultan ascends to the throne is widely acknowledged as a requirement for the sake of “the continuity of state” (*devletin bekası*) so that the brothers do not fight over the throne that may lead to an interregnum in the state (as it once happened between 1402-1413). The state, therefore, is granted a right by the people to do anything above law if “the continuity of state” is under

danger. There is also a common belief left in the minds of the Turks from 1990s that there exists some sort of “deep state” (*derin devlet*) which is dormant but attentive to events in the country to wake up any time to make corrections to the derailed political and bureaucratic system and deal with the internal and external enemies. Hence, they usually make a distinction between government and state. While the former may make mistakes and failures and therefore, can be criticized, the latter is sacred, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent – just as the depiction of God in religions. Thus, state cannot be criticized. Therefore, state as a political entity in Turkey is jealous. It does not want to delegate its roles to anyone else and wants all praises to be made solely to itself.

In this sense, Joel Migdal’s (2001) state-in-society model is useful to use as a glass when looking at state-society relations in Turkey. Migdal believes that Edward Shils’ modeling of center-periphery is problematic and proposes his own model that is a *mélange* instead of a dichotomous structure. For him, to understand how societies persist and change, one should start with the organizations that exercise social control (or power) and that subordinates individual inclinations to the behavior these organizations prescribe. That is, one way to depict the state. These organizations utilize various sanctions, rewards, and symbols to induce people to behave according to “the rules of the game”. These rules are norms and laws that these organizations put to define boundaries for the society of what is an acceptable behavior, what can be done and what cannot. The idea of state offers certain strategies for personal survival. It also generates symbols and values that decide how social life should be ordered. These symbols and values, moreover, “either reinforce the forms of social control in the society or propose new forms of social life”. State personnel can gain autonomy from other social groups in determining their own preferred rules for society and monopolize coercive means in the society to ensure that enforcement of these rules is not prevented by other groups.

Migdal states three indicators that reflect increasing levels of social control. First of these is compliance. Level of compliance determines the degree to which the population conforms with state’s demands and means to compliance is force. The state’s “ability to control the dispersal of a broad scope of other resources and services also determines the degree to which the state can demand compliance”. The second indicator is participation. The state wants people to fulfil certain tasks assigned accordingly. The third indicator is legitimacy, which Migdal calls it “the most potent factor determining the strength of the state”. Legitimacy involves an acceptance of the state’s “rules of the game”. It also includes

the state's social control as true and right. Legitimacy formalizes the state's rule as the ultimate sovereign.

Strong role of the state in Turkey, positive attributions to the state by the Turks and state-in-society model as a whole can be explanatory for how people were persuaded by the state with a set of symbols and values and how the state drew boundaries as to which behaviors are in line with the norms defined by the state. It is equally important to utilize in understanding why R.T. Erdoğan and AKP channeled their incompetence and mistakes to the state and lifted themselves to the position of state, which defines "the rules of the game". Besides, I believe there have not been any clear distinction between the government and the state since Turkey move to presidential system in 2018. All state institutions are filled with partisans and all institutions including the judicial system have been redesigned in accordance with the President's interests. So, R.T. Erdoğan is *the* state. I will provide more detailed explanation in the analysis section.

## 5. Findings

All the interviewees were men. Although I wanted to include an equal number of women for the simple fact that I wanted to see whether their emotions, experiences and political leanings were different, I could not find women interviewees through snowball sampling. Ages of the interviewees ranged from 31 to 58 and the median age was 44.5. All of them were married, all were born and raised in Hatay. 5 of the interviewees were high school graduates, 2 of them were primary school graduates and 1 of them was secondary school graduate. So, none of them had a university degree. Their professions/jobs varied from gardener to plumber to tailor but most of them were public servants.

For the past experiences almost all of them mentioned 1997-1999 earthquakes and a flood in 2000 in Hatay. Everyone confirmed that these disasters were small in scale and destruction, and none of them experienced a major loss in the past. As to the question about similarities and differences between the past disasters and the 2023 earthquakes, the responses were sharp. They described the 2023 earthquakes as "totally different" or "I have never seen such a disaster". Then, they proceeded with their experiences in the 2023 earthquakes. The responses were emotional as if words were not enough for them to describe. Some descriptions were common as "fear" and "panic". Yet others were long. One of them described the earthquakes as "not to be told, but to be lived" and said, "with

every tremor we thought we were dead”. Another said, “there is no such disaster in the world” and went on to make the following analogy:

*“We have experienced worse things than the destruction of the tribes described in the Quran. It was a birth after death. You die for 45 seconds [referring to earthquake period].”*

During one of the interviews, when one of the interviewees was describing the earthquakes, his co-worker suddenly interfered stating that he does not want and will not take part in the interview but wants me to write down only this:

*“Those who died were lucky. We want our homes as soon as possible.”*

Although I invited him to take part in an interview after I finished the previous one, he rejected and went away.

None of the interviewees lost their core family members or experienced a physical harm. Yet some of them lost their cars, their furniture and had their houses damaged (either severely or moderately). One reaction that united all of them was to rush to their children in the house and evacuate them before doing anything else once they felt the earthquake.

Opposition voters claimed and complained that they did not and do not receive any financial support besides the container houses. One of them was furious about what he experienced after the earthquakes:

*“My workplace, house, furniture – everything lost. What is worse, 6 months later banks called me for my loan payment. In such a disaster, the state wanted to collect loan payments. Butcher for meat, sheep for life. Damn thier loans, damn their money. The loans should have been postponed. They said there will be furniture support but has not been done. Without honest people and honest institutions, nothing can be done. A system that is based entirely on rents. If the money spent on the elections was spent on the earthquake zone, at least 50 thousand houses would have been built by now. But they held 3 elections since then.”*

Generally, AKP voters were contented with financial support of the central government and response from the authorities after the earthquakes took place, although they acknowledged that immediate response lagged in the early days. However, some AKP voters expressed their complaints. Although they felt happy with the abundance of the support, two of them complained about lack of coordination in distribution of aid and injustice in the distribution of goods in accordance with need. One of them refused to talk about government support or politics but praised people’s own initiatives to help earthquake victims. Another one, who has long been an AKP voter, complained about the

lag and organization of support, post-earthquake evaluation of the buildings and alleged that AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) seized the goods that ordinary people sent to the earthquake victims. “The officials just wandered around and left”, he claimed. Moreover, an AKP voter, who was happy with the support, mentioned that the new houses currently under construction will be delivered to the owners in return of a payment and not free, which makes the interviewee doubtful.

As to what could have been done to prevent the disaster and who should have done it, everyone almost exclusively mentioned the haphazard construction of the buildings and lack of proper government inspection. Some blamed locals too claiming that some locals did not want a proper inspection and bribed the officials instead. On the other hand, some believed that everyone in all levels of government authority is guilty. Some of the interviewees mentioned famous planning amnesty (*imar affi*) policy of the government that was implemented several years ago whereby poorly planned and constructed buildings were licensed by the government to receive wider votes in the elections and the owners circumvented the inspection. The AKP voters, even though they mentioned the government’s mistakes, still believed in somewhat role of the fate in the destruction and that nothing could be done to prevent it. One of them believed that no other states would have been able to prevent, let alone the AKP government, had the same destruction been in their respective country, and asserted that even foreign rescuers confirmed this opinion. The same interviewee stated that this is “the disaster of the century” (*asrın felaketi*) – a propaganda definition that was widely circulated by R.T. Erdoğan to justify that the destruction was beyond his government’s capacity. Another AKP voter believes in the myth, that was conveyed from the previous generations, that there will be an earthquake in Hatay 40 years before the doomsday. Thus, he asserted that the doomsday will be in 2063. However, non-AKP voters united in the idea that although the earthquake itself was a result of fate and natural, the destruction thereof had nothing to do with fate and was purely a byproduct of human neglect. Last but not least, almost everyone regards Lütfü Savaş, mayor of Hatay between 2019-2024 and a CHP member, as one of the primary responsables behind the destruction. They think that Lütfü Savaş prevented the state to strengthen and restructure the buildings against the danger of earthquakes and he sold licenses. This might be a reason why people voted for the AKP and R.T. Erdoğan, as Lütfü Savaş’s poor reputation overshadowed the government’s neglect. One of the interviewee described his anger towards the mayor:

*“The mayor found out about the earthquake 2 days later. He was more interested in money.”*

As to visibility of the authorities, many, including the non-AKP voters, asserted that the opposition parties did not do enough in the aftermath of the earthquakes, and they were present in Hatay solely to pose in front of the cameras and get votes. On the other hand, members of the government, especially, the ministers were interested in people’s problems and were hardworking. Moreover, some of the interviewees did not follow any officials on television or internet. Yet almost all AKP voters followed R.T. Erdoğan’s speeches because “whatever he says is implemented right away”.

One of the interviewees had a lot of opinions and wanted to freely express every one of them. He had been a fervent supporter of AKP until 2024 local elections but I sensed that he is resentful towards the government. “I have not talked to anyone, I am talking to only you”, he said and proceeded with his complaints:

*“I did not vote for anyone [in 2024 local elections], because I do not like what the government has been doing. Nobody did his duty. The state has forgot the nation. Humanity died in Hatay. Interests and profiteering are what matters. The government wants to do everything by itself. Everyone is in race to say, ‘I did it’. They should have inspected the existing buildings instead of building the new. The same mistakes are repeated. Severely damaged buildings that needs to be demolished are being reinforced instead, so that the name of TOKI [government-backed mass housing agency] is not tarnished. [...] All the political parties exploited the nation through elections. The earthquake was forgot and both the government and the opposition simply seeked votes. The earthquake could not be above politics. [...] I voted for Erdoğan in 2023. ‘One more chance, one more chance.’, we said. But I do not have a hope from politics anymore. People of Hatay do not think rationally. I do not care anymore whether we recover or not.”*

In the last section, some AKP voters stated that they trust in the government and life will be back to normal slowly and by time. However, others said that they lost their hopes for the future. An opponent of the government said, “Maybe our children will see. There is no hope”. Another opponent expressed his discontent and hopelessness as such:

*“What can I say?! A piece of heaven turned into a desert. I am having a hard time on my way to my container. Cannot they repair the roads in 1,5 years? Everywhere is a construction site. We are in dust and dirt; we are in filth. We do not know what kind of diseases we will catch in 5 years. 1,5 years have passed, still it is the same mentality that*

*is bogged down in nonsense. Where are all the money collected? What about the promise to rebuild the city in a year? Money was spent for election posters. People do not want to talk; they are tired of talking. Everyone is unhappy, everyone is hopeless.”*

## **6. Analysis**

First of all, my main limitation was the amount of time and financial resources that made my fieldwork in Hatay fairly shorter than I wished it to be. This, in turn, deprived me of finding more ways in search of interviewees. A wider sample would make it possible to include more AKP voters and have a clearer image in an attempt to find answers to my research questions. Yet in my opinion, it does not necessarily mean that I cannot infer certain answers from the in-depth interviews I conducted.

Generally, everyone agreed on that the immediate aid lagged in Hatay due to bureaucratic, organizational, and infrastructural problems. However, for AKP voters this is compensated by the relief aid in forms of financial and shelter support. The dissenting opinion of opposition voters and my general observation from the interviewees is that there have not been enough aid and promises to relocate the people back to normal housing were not kept on time. Combined with the hope for future and trust in their party that the AKP voters preserve might mean that they do not want to criticize the AKP or President R.T. Erdoğan. That is, compliance - the first indicator we see in Migdal’s state-in-society model - is still intact although they sometimes mentioned mistakes that they witnessed. Moreover, they might be questioning certain issues such as “what will we do when the state will ask payment for new houses?”. Secondly, their behavior is in accordance with the rules of the game that the state has defined through symbols and values. AKP voters in my interviews believe in the “fate” because the state wants to conjure up the idea in their minds that absolutely nothing can be done to prevent the disaster. The state is so strong that it could persuade them that the destruction was beyond the abilities of even the state (“disaster of the century” argument), which is omnipotent. So, in a sense, the state is potent to change its image of omnipotence so that people continue to comply with the rules of the game. Therefore, the state still preserves its legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the people – the third indicator of Migdal.

When considering the arguments from the literature, we may see certain similarities with others' findings. First of all, there is no blind retrospection in case of Turkey simply because at least half of the people in Hatay, including my interviewees, did not punish the President and the AKP. Yet the role of media seems to have played a great role in preventing them from punishing. They acknowledged and justified the official state propaganda in the aftermath of the earthquakes as they exclusively listened to the President's speeches. Moreover, belief in the state's religiously blended slogans, rejects Masiero and Santarossa modern societies can distinguish what is natural and what is connected to God. Secondly, the vote buying phenomenon was also observable as the AKP voters are contented with the aid they received. This as private support, in turn, overshadowed the lack of collective good in the form of disaster preparedness. Therefore, I think the term that Healy and Malhotra dubbed – "myopic voters" – fits in case of my interviewees. Last but not least, Gasper and Reeves' argument that the electorate punish both the president and the governor who they deem to be responsible for the damage seems to have worked in a different way for the interviewees in my study. That is, they were attributing the damage to Hatay's mayor, who is an opposition member, without hesitation. The mayor seems to have absorbed most of the criticism that would otherwise be directed to the state and R.T. Erdoğan.

Going back to my questions I posited in the introduction section as to what motivated those people in the disaster regions to display such a political behavior and how R.T. Erdoğan and his party persuaded the locals after all these drama and destruction, I think I found answers to both. The AKP voters, when trying to justify their electoral preferences, sometimes had difficulties, and even contradicted themselves from time to time. It seems the strong role of the state both culturally and politically set the rules for them as to how to behave. As questioning the actions of the state is outside the rules of the game, the AKP voters did not want to delve into challenging the reasons behind the destruction (at least during the interviews). The state's strong image makes them preserve hope and trust, which may be logical in what they experienced during the earthquakes. The catastrophe and tragedy that they underwent also limits my ability to have clear-cut statements because walking is different than talking. However, one should also note that the state bolstered its image through aids and ideas. It has come again at the right time when the people really needed it.



## 7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the 2023 earthquakes went down into the history of modern Turkey as a tragedy none of them would want to remember. It also made the opposition to cherish hopes for the upcoming election with the idea that there was no point from now on R.T. Erdoğan can turn things around and win the elections again. Yet to the surprise of many, he and his party won the elections. This, in turn, led many, including me, to look for answers. In similar cases with disasters, some scholars uphold that the voters punish the incumbents in hard times even if it is beyond the incumbents' ability. Others, however, claim that disasters are good for the survival of the incumbents for the fact that they increase the amount of relief aid, which is preferred by the victims to collective aid. Moreover, role of the media is also mentioned as crucial for the incumbents' reelection. Hence, the incumbents buy votes from myopic voters. In my study, whereby I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews in Hatay, my findings were more in line with the second camp. Moreover, I looked at my results from Migdal's state-in-society perspective because the state with its strong role and image in Turkish society have explanatory power for my research questions about the voting behavior in the aftermath of earthquakes in Turkey.

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## 9. Appendices

### Annex 1.

I would like to invite you to participate in **the research study** titled "**Voting Behavior in the Aftermath of Earthquakes in Turkey**" conducted by Sanan AHMADLI. Before deciding whether or not to participate in this research, you need to know why and how the research will be conducted. It is therefore very important that you read and understand this form. Please let me know if there is anything that is not clear to you or if you would like more information.

Participation in this study is **entirely voluntary**. You have the right **not to participate** in the study or to **withdraw** from the study at any time after participation. **Answering the questions will be interpreted as your consent to participate in the study.** Do not be under any pressure or suggestion from anyone while answering the questions. The data obtained from this study will be used entirely for research purposes and your personal information will be kept **confidential**.

If you need more information about the purpose of the research now or later, you can ask the researcher during the participation period or contact the researcher via the contact information given below.

**The responses given during the interview will be audio-recorded with your permission so that they can be analyzed later by the researcher.**

Please let the researcher know if you would like the general / specific results to be shared with you when the research is completed.

If you agree to take part in this study, you will be given a copy of this form to keep, with the required fields filled in by you and the principal investigator.

#### 1. Information on the Research:

Purpose of the Research:

Investigation of the impact of the earthquakes centered in Kahramanmaraş in February 2023 on voters' political preferences and voting tendencies in the 2023 general elections.

Reason for the Research:

Scientific Research

The Institution Where the  
Research is Conducted: Lund University, Sweden

Anticipated Duration of the  
Research: 1 week

Number of  
Participants/Volunteers

Expected to Participate in the  
Research: 15 – 20 volunteer participants

Place(s) where the research will  
be conducted: Antakya district of Hatay province

## 2. The Researcher:

Name, Surname: Sanan Ahmadli

Contact information: +994507594209 / snnhmdl@gmail.com

**Date:**

## 1. PERSONAL INFORMATION

Gender	
Marital Status	
Age	
Education Status	
Profession / Job	
How long have you been living in Hatay?	

## 2. RESEARCH RELATED QUESTIONS

a. Interviewee's disaster experiences:

- May I know if you experienced any disasters before the February 2023 earthquakes?
- If yes,
  - Can you talk about the similarities or differences with the February 2023 earthquakes?
- Can you share your experiences during the February 2023 earthquakes?

b. Interviewee's thoughts on the February 2023 earthquakes:

- What do you think about the measures that have been taken/not taken by the authorities in Hatay after the earthquake (search and rescue, first aid, economic support, shelter support, etc.)?
- What do you think should have been done to prevent this destruction?
- If it could be done,
  - In your opinion, who should have done this (central government, local governments - metropolitan and district, governorship, civil society organizations, associations, etc.)?
- If it could not be done,
  - Why do you think it could not be done?
- What can you say about the visibility of the authorities after the earthquake?

c. Political leanings of the interviewee:

- May I know which parties you voted for in the general elections of the last 40 years?
- May I know which party you voted for in the 2018 general elections?
- May I know which party you voted for in the 2023 general elections?
- May I know which candidates you voted for in the two rounds of the 2023 presidential elections?
- If a difference is observed,
  - What were the factors that led you to change your political preferences between the elections?
- May I know which party you voted for in the 2024 local elections?

d. Interviewee's thoughts on the future:

- What are your thoughts on the recovery of Hatay and the return to normal life??
- It has been more than a year since the earthquake. What do you think / how do you feel about the situation in Hatay now?

### **3. CONCLUSION and GRATITUDE**

Thank you for your time. Would you like me to contact you about anything else I would like to ask you again or anything else that is on my mind? Is there anything you would like to add?

Can you direct me to other people who you think would be willing to volunteer for this study?

## Annex 2.

Sizi, Sanan AHMADLİ tarafından yürütülen “**Voting Behavior in the Aftermath of Earthquakes in Turkey**” (Türkiye’de deprem sonrası oy verme eğilimleri araştırması) başlıklı **araştırma çalışmasına** davet ediyorum. Bu araştırmaya katılıp katılmama kararını vermeden önce, araştırmanın neden ve nasıl yapılacağını bilmeniz gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle bu formun okunup anlaşılması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Eğer anlayamadığınız ve sizin için açık olmayan şeyler varsa, ya da daha fazla bilgi isterseniz lütfen bildiriniz.

Bu çalışmaya katılmak tamamen **gönüllülük** esasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmaya **katılmama** veya katıldıktan sonra herhangi bir anda çalışmadan **çıkma** hakkında sahipsiniz. **Soruları yanıtlamanız, araştırmaya katılım için onay verdiğiniz** biçiminde yorumlanacaktır. Size yöneltilen soruları yanıtlarken kimsenin baskısı veya telkini altında olmayın. Bu araştırmadan elde edilecek veriler tamamen araştırma amacı ile kullanılacak olup kişisel bilgileriniz **gizli tutulacaktır**.

Araştırmanın amacı ile ilgili verilen bu bilgiler dışında şimdi veya sonra daha fazla bilgiye ihtiyaç duyarsanız katılım süresince araştırmacıya sorabilir veya aşağıda belirtilen iletişim bilgileri üzerinden araştırmacıya ulaşabilirsiniz.

**Görüşme esnasında verilen yanıtların daha sonra araştırmacı tarafından analiz edilebilmesi için sizin izniniz doğrultusunda ses kaydı alınacaktır.**

Araştırma tamamlandığında genel / size özel sonuçların sizinle paylaşılmasını istiyorsanız lütfen araştırmacıya iletiniz.

Bu araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde, gerekli yerlerin siz ve sorumlu araştırmacı tarafından doldurulduğu bu formun bir kopyası saklamanız için size verilecektir.

### 1. Araştırmayla İlgili Bilgiler:

Araştırmanın Amacı:	2023 Şubat ayında Kahramanmaraş merkezli meydana gelen depremlerin seçmenin 2023 genel seçimlerinde politik tercihleri ve oy verme eğilimlerindeki etkisinin araştırılması.
Araştırmanın Nedeni:	Bilimsel Araştırma
Araştırmanın Yürütüldüğü Kurum:	Lund Üniversitesi, İsveç



Araştırmanın Öngörülen Süresi:	1 hafta
Araştırmaya Katılması Beklenen Katılımcı/Gönüllü Sayısı:	15 – 20 gönüllü katılımcı
Araştırmanın Yapılacağı Yer(ler):	Hatay ilinin Antakya ilçesi

## 2. Araştırmacının

Adı-Soyadı: Sanan Ahmadli

İletişim Bilgileri: +994507594209 / snnhmdl@gmail.com

**Tarih:**

## 1. KİŞİSEL BİLGİLER

Cinsiyetiniz	
Medeni Haliniz	
Yaşınız	
Eğitim Durumunuz	
Mesleğiniz / İşiniz	
Ne Kadar Süredir Hatayda Yaşıyorsunuz?	

## 2. ARAŞTIRMA İLE İLGİLİ SORULAR

a. Görüşmecinin afet deneyimleri:

- 2023 Şubat depremlerinden önce herhangi bir afet yaşadığınızı öğrenebilir miyim?
- Evetse,
  - 2023 Şubat depremleri ile benzerlikleri veya farklılıklarından bahsedebilir misiniz?

➤ 2023 Şubat depremlerinde yaşadığınız deneyimlerinizi aktarabilir misiniz?

b. Görüşmecinin 2023 Şubat depremleri ile ilgili düşünceleri:

- Deprem sonrası Hatayda yetkililer tarafından yapılanlar ve yapılmayanlar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz (arama-kurtarma, ilk yardım, ekonomik destek, barınma desteği ve s.)?
- Sizce, bu yıkımın olmaması için ne yapılması gerekirdi?
- Eğer yapılabiliriyse,
  - Sizce, bunların kim(ler) tarafından yapılması gerekirdi (merkezi hükümet, yerel yönetimler – büyükşehir ve ilçe, valilik, sivil toplum kuruluşları, dernekler ve s.)?
- Eğer yapılamazdıysa,
  - Sizce, neden yapılamazdı?
- Deprem sonrası yetkililerin görünürlükleri hakkında ne söyleyebilirsiniz?

c. Görüşmecinin politik eğilimleri:

- Son 40 yılın genel seçimlerinde hangi partilere oy verdiğinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
- 2018 genel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiğinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
- 2023 genel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiğinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
- 2023 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde iki turda hangi adaylara oy verdiğinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
- Eğer farklılık gözlemlenirse,
  - Seçimler arasında politik tercihlerinizin değişmesindeki etkenler neler oldu?
- 2024 yerel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiğinizi öğrenebilir miyim?

d. Görüşmecinin geleceğe yönelik düşünceleri:

- Hatayın ayağa kalkması ve hayatın normale dönmesi hakkında düşüncelerinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
- Depremden üzerinden 1 yıldan fazla bir süre geçti. Şu an Hataydaki durum hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz / ne hissediyorsunuz?

### 3. SONLANDIRMA ve TEŞEKKÜR

Vakit ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim. Tekrar sormak istediğim veya aklıma takılan başka bir konuda sizinle iletişime geçmemi ister misiniz? Sizin eklemek istediğiniz herhangi bir konu var mı?

Bu çalışma için gönüllü katılım sağlayacağını düşündüğünüz başka kişilere beni yönlendirebilir misiniz?