

# African perspectives on the Loss and Damage discourse:

A Critical Discourse Analysis of COP 27 Speeches

Wenke Oltmanns

# Abstract

While global narratives often portray a globally shared experience of climate impacts, some regions are disproportionately bearing the brunt of climate-induced losses and damages. This thesis examines the discourse surrounding Loss and Damage in the context of COP 27, with a particular focus on African state leaders' contributions. Employing Critical Discourse Analysis, the study identifies dominant discourses, their origins, and their implications within the COP 27 framework. Drawing from speeches and statements by African heads of state and representatives, the analysis unveils strategies, alliances, and rhetorical devices employed to articulate Africa's position on Loss and Damage. Despite Africa's minimal contribution to global emissions, the continent faces significant vulnerabilities and losses due to climate change, underscoring the urgency for effective discourse and action. While African states align with negotiating coalitions to amplify their voices, their representation and prioritization of the discourse at COP 27 remain nuanced. The findings shed light on the complexities of climate negotiations and highlight the need for nuanced approaches to address the diverse challenges faced by vulnerable regions like Africa. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of climate discourse dynamics and paves the way for future investigations into climate justice and global cooperation.

*Key words:* Climate Justice, Africa, Critical Discourse Analysis, COP 27, Loss and Damage

Words: 9.999

# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
CAF	Cancun Adaptation Framework
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
COP	Conference of the Parties
G77	Group of 77
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework for Climate Change Convention
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism

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# 1 Introduction

“It is immoral for the rich to talk about the future of their children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.”

(Asad Rehman at the closing of COP 26)

The changing climate and its results affect almost all people on this planet and often we hear that “we are all in the same boat” when the pressing issues of global climate change are being discussed. The problem is that living on the same planet in no way equates to being in the same boat. Some of “us” are on overloaded dinghies trying to flee homes that have become unliveable while others are tanning on the deck of their yacht. In other words, the effects of climate change are incredibly disproportionate and the vulnerabilities to them are often affected by the vast differences in the ability to create resilience. The losses and damages caused by climate change are even more disproportionate when considering who is affected most and who is emitting the most greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are exacerbating the issue.

African states for example can be understood as those emitting the least emissions and thus contributing to climate change the least, particularly in comparison with states of the Global North (Fields 2005: 535). In an overall comparison, all of Africa emits less than 4% of the most discussed GHG carbon dioxide (ibid. ). Simultaneously 33 of the 45 least developed countries (LDCs) are located on the African continent (UNCTAD 2023). Those states are affected by a multitude of stressors like poverty, conflict, or the spread of HIV/AIDS that interplay with the effects of climate change (ibid.). As a result, the ability to respond to climate-induced disasters is extremely limited and Africa can be understood as a hotspot of vulnerability to climate change (Schaeffer et. al. 2014: 3). It is in these contexts that the concept of Loss and Damage caused by the effects of climate change is not an abstract topic of discussion but a lived reality for millions.

This is also reflected in the discourse on Loss and Damage within the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), where 195 parties come together annually to negotiate climate policies. The climate discourse in this particular arena is one of the most influential in the social construction of understandings of climate change-related issues like Loss and Damage. Therefore, the discourse at COP events has been extensively studied, and even the specific topic of Loss and Damage, which has only recently gotten significant implementation in the UNFCCC framework, has gotten significant academic attention. However, the study of Loss and Damage discourse has mainly been focussed on the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) which has been most prominent in pushing the issue onto the agendas of COPs. African states' role in shaping this discourse has gotten less academic attention, and COP 27 offers a unique opportunity to study it. This is because the recent event from 2022 was held in Egypt in general frames and understood as a conference with a specific focus on the African experience of climate change.

## 1.1 Research Aim and Research Question

This thesis critically analyzes the shaping of arguments in speeches and statements held by African heads of state and their representatives at the High-level segment of COP 27, employing a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

Central to the inquiry is the acknowledgment that the discourse on climate change is far from neutral; it is imbued with vested interests, hegemonic ideologies, and historical injustices. This thesis focuses on identifying dominant discourses in the discourse on Loss and Damage at COP 27, who reproduces them, how they might reflect ideologies, and where they complement or conflict with each other.

As mentioned above, the majority of previous research on the discourse around Loss and Damage at COP events has been mainly focused on the Alliance of Small Island States group because they have been campaigning on the topic the most. However, Loss and Damage caused by climate change and unavoidable

through both mitigation and adaptation efforts have become a lived experience for many other states that the AOSIS group does not represent. Particularly the African continent has seen significant Loss and Damage in low-lying developing countries in the region. The COP 27 is thus not only interesting because it was focused on developing a fund for Loss and Damage but also because it was framed as an African COP since it was hosted by Egypt (Williams et. al. 2023: 2). Considering this context, the conference is a perfect occasion to further study the role African states play in shaping the discourse around climate-induced Loss and Damage. A deeper understanding of the existing dynamics in the discourse on Loss and Damage and the role African states play in it specifically might facilitate explanations for successes and failures in global climate negotiations (Audet 2012: 371). Hence this thesis aims to answer the overarching research question:

*How do African state leaders at COP 27 shape the discourse on Loss and Damage?*

In doing so, the paper unfolds in six chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter provides essential background information on COP 27 and Loss and Damages, contextualizing the present research within previous studies. The third Chapter outlines the theoretical framework informing the analysis and Chapter four discusses the choice of critical discourse analysis as the method chosen for the theory as well as the selection of the material. Chapter five then contains the analysis and finally, the conclusion in Chapter six rounds up this research.

## 2 Setting the Scene

This chapter sets the scene for this research by providing a background on both the UNFCCC framework and the COP 27 as well as the discourse on Loss and Damage. It further contextualizes the present thesis in light of previous research.

### 2.1. Background

This chapter serves the purpose of giving an overview of some of the core actors, events, and concepts relevant to this thesis. At first, the focus lies on COP events. To begin with, a brief historical review is given of the establishment of the UNFCCC and the first COPs. From there the discussion moves on to the context of the discourse at COP events and then the relevance of COP 27 specifically. Lastly, some of the backgrounds and critiques of COP 27 will be discussed. In the second part of this chapter, the focus lies on Loss and Damage. What the concept entails, where it came from, and how it has developed within the UN framework. This section also briefly discusses the history of policies that have been established concerning Loss and Damage in addition to prominent discourses on the topic at previous COPs.

#### 2.1.1. The UNFCCC and COP 27

The UNFCCC was opened for signature in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 ( UNFCCC 2023a). The final text of the convention reflected a compromise many states could agree which is reflected by 156 parties signing it at the time (Roberst & Huq 2015: 144). Today that number has risen to 195 member states (UNFCCC n.d.).

In those early days, the focus was almost entirely on the mitigation of climate change. However, the 4th report from the Intergovernmental Panel on



Climate Change (IPCC) indicated that the policies at the time would not nearly be enough to mitigate climate change which caused a shift in the climate regime and its discourse toward adaptation and more support for vulnerable developing countries (Roberst & Huq 2015: 146). Later Loss and Damage was conceptualized as third pillar. This is discussed in more detail below.

COP 27 took place from the 6th until the 20th of November 2022 and was hosted by Egypt under the name Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC 2022a). The organizers expected an estimated 33.500 participants with over 1700 representatives from NGOs and 3350 media personnel (UNFCCC 2022b). These numbers indicate a high level of media attention. In other words, the representatives holding speeches at COP 27 had all eyes on them and significant attention from the world. For many smaller states that do not regularly get a seat at the table of powerful international negotiations, this is a significant chance to get their voices heard and to bring their needs across. This is particularly true for African states at COP 27 due to its focus on Africa because of the host country Egypt.

As for the expectations the world had for COP 27 it was not only expected to focus on African perspectives but also to have adaptation at the very top of the agenda (Williams et. al. 2023: 7). Williams et al. (2023) highlight how this new focus has led to a new dominant narrative in the negotiations that is focussed on opportunity and action (ibid.). they also expected to see a focus on discussion of unresolved issues related to Loss and Damage. In this context, they discuss the unfulfilled promises from COP 15 where developed countries committed to providing 100 billion USD annually for vulnerable countries. This decision does not specifically name Loss and Damage as the purpose of this financing. However, it is often understood to be thought of as a financial solution to Loss and Damage in vulnerable and less developed countries (UNFCCC 2009; Williams et. al. 2023: 8). As mentioned above, these promises remain unfulfilled and many LDCs have called this out at COPs in the past. It is expected to see mention of this issue in the speeches analyzed in this paper as well.

Furthermore, the negotiations at COPs have recently experienced an increase in alliances that share common goals and incentives and thus group for the purpose of enhanced joint negotiation power. This phenomenon has been subject to increased academic research and thus a number of alliances have been

identified and studied (Audet 2012). In the context of African states, the BASIC or BRICS group would be relevant in light of South Africa. However, the speech held by the South African representative is not available through the UNFCCC website and thus not part of the analysis. This leaves two bloc-style coalitions of relevance for the analysis: the African group and the LDCs. The African group represents 53 states and is thus the second-largest coalition in this context (Audet 2012: 374). As mentioned above, the LDC group includes 47 members that lie within the defining parameters given by the UN, 33 of whom are African nations (ibid.). These coalitions are known to work together in COP negotiations. Therefore it is possible that similar argumentations or discourses can be found within the lines of the different coalitions though it might be difficult to make clear correlations between coalition membership and a particular discourse.

Lastly, it is important to keep in mind some of the core criticisms of COP 27 when analyzing the speeches. On the one hand, many countries had hoped for continued pressure on developed countries to fulfill their promises of providing 100 billion USD annually. At COP 26 the parties had agreed on at least doubling the present investment levels of 20 billion by 2025 (UNFCCC 2021). At COP 27 these commitments could not only not be built upon with further action but certain states actually tried to water down this agreement in the final decision text of COP 27. In the end, the commitment stayed the same (Harvey 2022). Another disappointment was that there was no further development on phasing out fossil fuels at COP 27 and some have said that fossil fuel representatives were in fact treated favourably at the conference (Lewis et. al. 2022). This has been attributed to Egypt as the host because the country is a large exporter of natural gas and has received funds from Gulf oil producers, but also the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis in Europe are thought to have influenced this situation (ibid.). Egypt as well as other African states were also expected to enter the negotiations hoping for lucrative deals on gas exports as they continue to have large reserves (Harvey 2022). The negotiations might have been favorable to that because the final report highlights the ambition to boost low-emission energy which can also include gas as it emits less than coal for example. One of the arguments for such a focus particularly in the African context is the 970 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa who continue to use polluting cooking oil (Williams

et. al. 2023: 10). African states can be expected to have these people and the export of gas in mind when producing their speeches and statements.

### 2.1.2. Loss and Damage

Though there is no official or legal definition of what the phrase *Loss and Damage* refers to, there nevertheless is consensus on the definition with only small variations (Boyd et. al. 20). The UNEP, for instance, defines it as “the negative effects of climate change that occur despite mitigation and adaptation efforts” (UNEP 2024)

This general definition of the concept already reflects a compromise that resulted from competing discourses on the topic over years of global climate negotiations. Generally, it can be observed in the UN climate regime discourse that developed nations have framed Loss and Damage as a part of adaptation efforts, and thus climate policies are to be divided into mitigation and adaptation (Calliari 2018: 733). Developing nations, including African states, have been pushing for an understanding of Loss and Damage to go beyond adaptation. The argument here is that adaptation efforts have a limit in what damages they can prevent and that some Losses cannot be avoided through adaptation (Verheyen 2012: 3).

In practice, Loss and Damage means both economic Losses resulting from climate change impacts and non-economic losses such as loss of territory, ecosystems, or cultural heritage as well as displacement (Verheyen 2012: 9). There have been arguments, especially from developed countries, that such non-economic losses would be impossible to capture in legal framework and agreements (ibid.).

Nevertheless, Loss and Damage were brought up in the climate change discourse of the UN in a 1991 proposal from the AOSIS group submitted to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). In this context, the actual phrase “Loss and Damage” was not used yet but the idea was formulated in terms of *insurances* (Roberst and Huq 2015: 149). The proposal started a discussion that culminated in Loss and Damage being first mentioned in the final report of COP

13 in 2007 (UNFCCC 2008: 4). Loss and Damage also played a significant role in the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) established at COP 16. This became even clearer when the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) at COP 19 in 2014 placed the WIM under the framework of the CAF to implement it.

What is particularly interesting about this decision is that the document, though starting with the mention of adaptation and risk management as important tools in avoiding Loss and Damage, acknowledges that in certain cases it may involve more than what can be avoided through adaptation efforts (UNFCCC 2014). This reflects a victory for developing countries and a significant change in the discourse.

The next significant development was the establishment of the executive committee at COP 23 in 2017 with its first five-year rolling plan and the second one established in 2022. This plan continues to work today with 5 workstreams and 36 detailed actions (UNFCCC 2022c).

In the African context Loss and Damage have become a daily lived experience of many people. The effects undermine development projects and create major political and economic challenges because the capacity to respond is often limited (UNFCCC 2023b). As a result, the African Group of negotiators has declared an era of loss and damage and points out how crucial international support is for the situation in many African states (ibid.). A more detailed account of the loss and damages caused by climate change in Africa from 2014 highlights the risk for intensified vulnerabilities in Africa. It does so by discussing loss and damages related to extreme heat events, water stress, and ocean acidification. Further, the report points out the particular vulnerabilities of Egypt, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia in relation to sea-level rise as well as cyclone storm surges in Tanzania, Tunisia, and also Mozambique (Schaeffer et. al. 2014).

## 2.2. State of the Art

Since there is little research on the specific role African states play in the discourse on Loss and Damage caused by climate change within the UNFCCC framework, this review situates the present work within the literature on the different topics covered in the thesis.

Considering Africa's special circumstance in climate negotiations as the most disproportionately affected continent that emits the least GHGs, several researchers have focused on African climate justice at COP events. Derman (2013) for instance looked at different groups at COP 17 and their formulations of climate justice in the African context. Williams together with his co-authors (2023) discusses the role of climate justice in UNFCCC negotiations in participation of COP 27. They conclude that climate justice needs to be the foundation of climate action because current strategies are too slow and unsuccessful.

The connection between climate justice and Loss and Damage is an increasingly popular topic of research that calls for significantly more academic attention to expand on the understanding of climate impacts (Boyd et. al. 2021: 1369). The measurement and recording of Losses and Damage and the understanding of non-economic losses require further research and innovative solutions. While this paper might not be able to provide those, it does add to the literature on Loss and Damage, particularly in the African context, and the study of the social construction of the concept in the global climate discourse.

There is an established body of research conducting discourse analysis in the context of the UNFCCC and COP events specifically. Audet (2012) conducts such an analysis informed by climate justice on COP 16, highlighting the growing relevance of coalitions. His findings inform the analysis of this thesis, which highlights how African states use negotiating coalitions to formulate and strengthen their argument. The closest to the present research is the article by Calliari from 2018 in which she conducts a CDA on Loss and Damage discourse leading up to the WIM. Leaning on her findings about contesting sides to the discourse among developed and developing countries, this research aims to follow her call for more focus on the negotiating power of developing countries.

Considering that most LDCs are in Africa, the analysis of African COP speeches at the "African COP 27" offers a unique opportunity to highlight their negotiating power in the Loss and Damage discourse, for example through negotiating coalitions or the strategic use of legitimizing techniques.

Finally, it is crucial to discuss the analytical categories of this paper in light of previous research. Considering that much of the discussion includes conflicts between states of two groups it is vital to clarify how to refer to them and what is meant by these terms. The two most common distinctions in the literature are Global South vs. Global North and developed vs. developing countries. Both terms are highly contested which is why a reflection of the uses of both term sets as well as a positioning of the present research is crucial at this point.

The majority of literature on global climate governance and the UNFCCC divides countries into two categories: developed and developing. Under this framework around 20-25% of states globally are understood to be “developed” while the rest is “developing” (Nielsen 2011: 41). As a result, the group of developing countries is large and statements will often overgeneralize when referring to all states within this group. Further, the phrase is problematic due to the vast critiques of Eurocentric ideologies related to the concept and discipline of “development”. Sultana (2022: 9) offers a slightly more critical analytical category through the concept of the Global South. Though nuancing remains crucial to avoid over-simplification and over-generalization, this signifier can serve to refer to post-colonial and occupied countries (ibid.: 8). This option is more critical and considerate of colonial histories. Nevertheless, the present paper proceeds from here using the developed/developing categories for the sake of clarity. All speeches and UNFCCC documents as well as the majority of the literature use these terms and thus, referencing and analyzing them but switching between the terms used in the texts and a different set would complicate the reading process unnecessarily (Audet 2012; Williams et al. 2023; Calliari 2018; Roberts & Huq 2015).

## 3 Theoretical Framework

This chapter has the aim of defining the theoretical framework that informs the analysis of this thesis. While leaning on the theoretical basis offered by Fairclough's model of CDA, it is further informed by the concepts of climate justice and climate coloniality. The two concepts are elaborated on in this chapter and the way they inform the analysis in an inductive manner is clarified for each element of the framework.

### 3.1. Fairclough's model for critical discourse analysis as a theoretical perspective

It appears counterintuitive to discuss the thesis methodology already in the theory chapter. However, in this case, the chosen method critical discourse analysis (CDA) also offers significant theoretical insights for the analysis.

There are many different approaches to CDA but the one developed by Fairclough offers a theoretical model as well as methodological tools for the analysis of the discourse at COP 27 and is seen as the most developed theory on CDA (Jørgensen & Phillips 2011: 60, 65). At the basis of this theory lies the understanding of discourse as both constitutive and constituted. This means that on the one hand discourse plays a crucial role as a social practice, serving to both uphold and transform knowledge, identities, and social dynamics, including power dynamics. On the other hand, it is also influenced by various social practices and their underlying dynamics and ideologies (ibid.: 66).

Fairclough (2013:13) elaborates on his approach by identifying it as a methodology as opposed to a method. According to him, a methodology entails the theoretical construction of the *object of research* and the methods are selected based on this conceptualization which happens in dialogue with other applicable social science theories (Fairclough 2013: 13). Accordingly, it makes little sense to

strictly separate theory and methods when following his overall approach, though it is still productive to begin with reflecting the theory and then to move on to the methods while keeping in mind that the two form a dialogical relationship.

With this in mind Norman Fairclough (2013) proposes to proceed in four stages: (1) focussing on a social wrong, (2) identifying obstacles to addressing it, (3) considering if the social order might “need” the social wrong, and finally, (4) identifying possible ways around those obstacles. The first stage thus includes the selection of a research topic that points towards a social wrong and the theoretical construction of the objects of research (ibid.: 13-14). In this case, the previous two chapters have outlined the research topic and the social wrong it points to and the present chapter aims at theoretically conceptualizing the *objects of research*. The second stage then includes the selection of text, which is described in the following chapter, and the carrying out of the analysis, reflected in chapter 5 of this thesis. Said chapter will also include considerations of stage 3 and question how the global social order might rely on the social wrong at hand. Finally, the search for solutions to the issue goes beyond the scope of this work and is thus only briefly discussed in the conclusion.

Further, Fairclough (2001a) highlights the importance of identifying the *order of discourse* the selected texts exist in. The term refers to the network of *genres, discourses, and styles*. *Genres* in this context are the result of semiosis in social activities such as state governing. They are different forms of language used in interactions (ibid.: 4). Here, the focus lies on the genre of speeches and statements held by state representatives. *Discourses* are defined as different ways of representing aspects of social life that result from semiosis in representational practices (ibid.). In the present case, these are discourses on Loss and Damage in African states. Lastly, *styles* are constituted by semiosis which is used as part of fulfilling a particular role in society (ibid.). Here we are considering the style of African political leaders. All three aspects are socially structured and constitute the *order of discourse*. Broadly speaking, the order of discourse in the present case is that of global politics or more specifically global climate negotiations. The ordering of *style* and *genres*, but particularly that of *discourses*, can be viewed from a perspective of dominance to highlight which discourses are dominant and which might be perceived as “oppositional” or “marginal” to them (Fairclough 2013: 124). This ordering can in some cases be affected by hegemonic orders that



serve to legitimize domination (ibid.). Both climate justice and climate coloniality as theoretical perspectives highlight ways this might be the case in the context of this research.

Furthermore, Fairclough identifies any instance of language use and semiotics as *communicative events*. This makes all speeches and additional documents that form the material for the analysis of communicative events. According to him, all communicative events consist of three dimensions: text discourse practice, and social practice (Jorgens & Phillips 2002: 67-68). The chapter on methods elaborates on how those three dimensions will be analyzed and how they serve to structure the analysis.

Much of the previous literature conducting CDA on COP speeches uses exclusively CDA or its specified version EDA (Environmental Discourse Analysis) to form the theoretical basis of their work (Calliari 2018, Zanaty 2023). In this case, however, two theoretical concepts prominent in global climate discourses further inform the theoretical framework. Understanding these concepts, their origins, and the perspective they offer on the discourse around Loss and Damage allows more detailed and nuanced insights and a better understanding of the material. Critical Discourse analysis the way Fairclough intends it, has the goal of highlighting how the discourse legitimates, (re)produces, or challenges relations of dominance and power (Calliari 2023: 728). The two theoretical concepts add to Fairclough's model in the theoretical framework by highlighting which power and dominance relations exist in this context and how they have been identified to manifest in the global climate discourse.

## 3.2. Climate Justice

To provide an overview of the theoretical perspective climate justice offers, this chapter begins with situating the concept disciplinarily and moves on to defining the overall concept. From there, three core approaches to climate justice are outlined with a focus on one of them. The historical responsibility approach is outlined and further split into three dimensions established by Audet (2012). In

discussing those three dimensions and their relevance for the analysis this chapter discusses the key concept of vulnerability and highlights its relevance in the African context. The theoretical perspective of climate justice and an overview of the ways it has been conceptualized offer valuable insights for the analysis because opinions and arguments in climate negotiations that are perceived to be fair and just can allow the arguing party moral legitimacy and thus enhance their negotiating power. Moral legitimacy, in this context, refers to the perceived ethical justification or authority of the arguing party's position or actions within the negotiation process.

Originally the concept of climate justice is a product of philosophy and ethics as academic disciplines. However, it has been avoided to stick to abstract theorizing typical for these disciplines, and instead more interdisciplinary approaches were chosen by many theorists of climate justice. Such conceptualizations typically included perspectives from philosophy, economy, and political science (Karnein 2014: 954).

The concept of climate justice is based on the understanding that climate change is caused by humans and concludes from it that anyone experiencing negative effects of climate change such as extreme weather events is subjected to a form of injustice (ibid.: 947). In addition to this many people are affected by intersectional insecurities that exacerbate the vulnerability to climate change impacts. While this understanding serves the purpose of this thesis well as a general definition of the concept, it is important to keep in mind that what is meant by climate justice varies depending on the actors using the concept (Audet 2012: 371). As a result, the very definition of climate justice is socially constructed through negotiations and conflicting discourse constituting a struggle for dominance as discussed by Fairclough. The analysis aims to identify the social construction of these discourses by African state representatives in the context of Loss and Damage as well as their level of dominance.

Schlosberg and Collins (2014) reviewed the literature on climate justice and identified three key approaches. First, the *development right approach* makes the general argument that all states and peoples have the right to develop out of poverty and for this process to be a prerequisite to any form of responsibility to mitigate climate change (Schlosberg & Collins 2014: 365). Second, the *human rights approach* argues that the effects of climate change violate human rights and

that thus the consumption of fossil fuels is unjust (ibid.). Lastly, the third approach is termed the *historical responsibility approach* and focuses on the responsibility certain states have for the current dire situation we are facing in terms of climate change. This approach aims to hold those that have emitted the most GHGs responsible for taking measures to right the wrong they have caused. With all three approaches in mind, this third one is the one the present work focuses on.

One of the scholars that can be classified under the historical responsibility approach is René Audet (2012). He has further conceptualized climate justice for the purpose of COP discourse analysis and in doing so he broke the approach up into three dimensions of climate justice: a) Distributive dimension, b) Abatement cost dimension, c) Vulnerability dimension.

All three dimensions offer insights into the ways African state leaders formulate their arguments and use ideas of climate justice to gain moral legitimacy. The first dimension does so through a rather quantitative understanding of justice in which qualitative data of emissions are valued against each other and the suffering of climate change effects (Audet 2012: 372). This dimension also considers the uneven distribution of carbon sinks for example, which is where it overlaps with the concept of climate coloniality discussed below. Common for this dimension are also accounts of quantifiable Loss and Damage like economic losses or numbers of displaced or injured people (ibid.: 371).

The *abatement costs dimension* is also quantitative in the sense that it focuses on mitigation costs. Who has to offer the most resources to mitigate and cut back the most on fossil fuels? With what justification may different states emit GHGs and how much (Gardiner 2012: 310)? In Article 3 of the UNFCCC developed countries set out to “take the lead” and thus they are expected to live up to their commitment (UNFCCC 1992).

Lastly, the *vulnerability dimension* is built on a core concept that is mentioned in any discussion of climate justice or Loss and Damage: *vulnerability*. The focus of this dimension lies on the uneven consequences the impacts of climate change have in different regions. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative defines *vulnerability* to climate change as “a country's exposure,

sensitivity, and capacity to adapt to the negative effects of climate change” (Global Adaptation Initiative 2024).

It is crucial to understand how vulnerability to climate change is affected by global economic inequalities and intersectional vulnerabilities affected by social aspects such as age, gender, ethnicity, physical ability, migrant status, or wealth (Audet 2012: 372, IPCC 2022). This means that though the occurrence of hurricanes, floods, and droughts might be random, the way people are affected by them is not (Audet 2012: 372). The ability to respond or adapt is closely related to the economic situation of a state and the socio-economic status of the individuals in it. Therefore, global inequalities effectively make certain countries more vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

It is not the aim of this research to understand the complex ways in which vulnerabilities intersect. Nevertheless, the concept of vulnerability is a crucial part of African narratives, particularly regarding Loss and Damages and the concept can not be fully understood without understanding how complex networks of processes affect vulnerability, especially on the African continent. The sixth IPCC report from 2022 outlines five sets of processes that affect climate change vulnerability in Africa (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed illustration of this). Among governance, Livelihood Diversification, and Adaptation or mitigation Actions, the report also lists colonial legacies and postcolonial development Pathways. The effect colonialism and coloniality continue to have on African states and their vulnerability is better understood by a decolonial perspective provided by the concept of climate coloniality.

### 3.3. Climate Coloniality

The concept of climate coloniality is closely related to that of climate justice but differs from it in its disciplinary origin. While climate justice emerged from ethics, climate coloniality is situated in decolonial theory.

The effect colonialism has on the climate dates back to the first wave of colonialism in the late 16th century and racism, colonial legacies, and climate change have since been tightly interwoven (Abimbola et. al. 2021: 6). The exploitation of slaves and resources from Africa and other colonies fueled the

industrial revolution that in turn fueled climate change while simultaneously rendering populations in the postcolonial world of today more vulnerable to climate change (ibid.: 7). As a result various racialized populations in Africa are disproportionately vulnerable today due to eurocentric hegemonies, neocolonialism, racial capitalism, uneven consumption patterns and military domination interacting and collectively worsening climate impacts (Sultana 2022: 4). People are not only rendered vulnerable through climate coloniality but also disposable (ibid.). DeBoom (2022: 1) argues that climate coloniality in this sense is a form of violence of division that separates global populations through techniques of specialized othering in an effort to legitimate separative politics that for example result in an uneven distribution of carbon sinks (Audet 2012: 372). Another way in which climate coloniality is expressed is through the establishment of sacrifice zones as well as disproportionate displacement and destruction in postcolonial or occupied states today (Sultana 2022: 5).

According to Sultana (2022), climate coloniality is maintained through ongoing extractive capitalism, imperial structures that live on in global trade, ideologies, and policies. In the sense of CDA, the analysis aims to find if those aspects are reproduced or challenged in the speeches held by African state representatives at COP 27.

## 4 Methods and Material Selection

The following chapter outlines Critical Discourse Analysis as the chosen method for this thesis. At first, a general overview of discourse and discourse analysis, in general, is given, followed by a more detailed discussion of CDA as a discipline and the exact way it will be employed in the analysis of this thesis to eventually offer answers to the research question. Finally, this chapter also outlines the material used in the analysis and how it was selected.

### 4.1 Discourse Analysis

Inspired by the works of Norman Fairclough this thesis adopts a transdisciplinary approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Thus, not only the theories coming together to constitute the theoretical framework are in dialogue with each other, but so are the methods employed in the analysis (Fairclough 2013: 12).

In recent research, the analysis of discourse has been increasingly popular with the unfortunate side effect of turning the term “discourse” itself into a vague signifier. Therefore any research analyzing discourse needs to begin with a working definition of the concept to ensure reader and researcher are on the same page. Generally, research in this field builds on the assumption that the way we talk about the world does not neutrally reflect it but that it is influenced by our identities, relations, worldviews, and other contexts (Joergens & Phillips 2002: 2). Informed by this underlying assumption discourse in this thesis is thus defined as

“a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgens & Phillips 2002: 1)

A discourse consists of concepts and ideas that shape meaning, produce, and reproduce it (Halperin & Heath 2020: 364). In order to understand the way this happens discourse analysis analyses language and semiotics in light of the social context they exist in.

## 4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Traditional approaches to discourse analysis have been criticized for leaving out of focus the impact of social structure and underlying power relations that affect a discourse. Critical Discourse analysis was birthed from this criticism and established as a discipline focusing on the interplay of semiotics and language with ideologies and power structures (Halperin & Heath 2012: 367). The approach has the goal of unveiling the role discourse plays in producing, reproducing, or resisting inequality caused by power abuse (ibid: 368). This is based on the belief that the way we talk about things not only reflects the way we perceive reality but it also has a direct effect on our perception. This means that those with the power to control the discourse also have significant power across society because the dominant discourse has the power to affect the actions and minds of less powerful groups consuming products of discourse. Therefore, it is important to highlight control over the dominant discourse but also how a particular discourse is affected by dominant ideologies and power structures within society.

As an inherently political discipline that considers itself part of the political process in many ways, CDA is often conducted on political texts like speeches. Chilton (2004: 45) identifies three core strategic functions that are typically linguistically realized in political texts: coercion, (de)legitimation, and representation. This thesis focuses on (de)legitimation tactics employed in the discourse on Loss and Damage at COP 27. In doing so the analysis will follow the three-stage framework for CDA inspired by Fairclough. The three stages this model proposes are textual analysis, discursive practice analysis, and finally, social practice analysis. The following paragraphs detail all three steps and how they will be applied in the following analysis.

All in all this approach to the methods is entirely qualitative. However, the foundation of the discussion of all the levels of CDA will be based on the quantitative analysis of how many of the selected speeches explicitly talk about Loss and Damage.

From there, the model Fairclough introduced starts with textual analysis. This step aims to identify the lexical, grammatical, or other linguistic tools used in the speeches when referring to Loss and Damage. It is important here to be aware of the wide array of tools used by writers of political speeches. The following section outlines a few of the prominent choices.

The textual analysis will be paying attention to lexical choices like pronouns which might be used to create sympathies or to “other” a group of people (Statham 2022: 30). As for pronouns, the use of “we” in the climate context particularly is often used with a homogenizing effect which has been criticized as an undifferentiated practice informed by colonialism (Sultana 2022: 5). Further, when considering the way the speeches refer to social actors a focus of the analysis lies on identifying if those actors were individualized or collectivized and if aggregation was used. Aggregation here refers to the quantification of people through phrases like “thousands lost their lives” (ibid. 122).

In addition to those choices, the speeches may also include euphemism, presuppositions, or parallelism employed to (de)legitimize Loss and Damage action and a specific country as a possible receiving country. In practice, such a detailed analysis of 15 speeches would go beyond the scope of this work. Therefore all speeches will be considered when defining trends among them but more detailed accounts will be taken from those speeches that actively make a point about Loss and Damage.

The second step of Fairclough's model is the analysis of the discursive practice. In this step, the goal is to answer the question: what are important processes in the production of speeches at COP events? This focus is a result of the view of the speeches as a product of both their production and consumption and what influences them (Statham 2022: 22). Beyond the background from Chapter 2 of this thesis, this part of the analysis will refer back to previous research on Loss and Damage Discourse and additional UNFCCC documents. It does so to identify prominent representations of Loss and Damage and how they



interact, in order to understand how this discursive context on the topic might have affected the authors of the respective speeches (Calliari 2018: 733).

Finally, the third level of analysis is focused on social practice. This last aspect of the analysis considers the effects of the text on the wider order of discourse (ibid.: 738). For this purpose, the final decisions produced by COP 27 will be considered in light of the findings from the previous two sections of the analysis.

### 4.3 Material

As for the material analyzed in this Thesis, it will consist of the national statements delivered by African state leaders and their representatives at the High-level Segment of the Conference. In the first part held on the 7th and 8th of November, 103 states delivered their statements and speeches. Those who were not able to participate in those sessions or did not deliver their statements did so on the 15th of November. A total of 83 speeches were held in this second part. Of 186 speeches and statements 93 are available online through the website UNFCCC (2024), and 23 of them were held by representatives of African states. The secretariat publishes the speeches as received which means that they are mostly in English. Nevertheless, several speeches are only available in Arabic, Spanish, French, or Russian<sup>1</sup>. Unfortunately, this means that any statements published in French, Arabic, or Russian needed to be filtered out. The option to use AI systems like Deep L for a translation of the speeches was not chosen because a discourse analysis pays special attention to the intricate details of language and social or cultural connotations. The risk is high that AI would not be able to translate such nuances and that it would thus create a bias that can no longer be understood transparently. By leaving out all speeches in languages the researcher is not fluent in, the bias created can easily be identified and considered when contextualizing the results. More specifically this means that motley former French colonies were excluded from the analysis besides Algeria and Sudan who submitted speeches in Arabic that will not be considered as part of the material.

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<sup>1</sup> A few states did the same, publishing two versions. In those cases the English version was included into the material.

Finally, this leaves the sample with 15 speeches for analysis. Twelve of those were held on the 7th, eight on the 8th, and three on the 15th of November. This set of speeches will be the core of the critical discourse analysis. However, to understand discursive and social context it is important to also consider other UNFCCC documents and statements.

## 5 Analysis

Following the three-level CDA established in the previous chapter, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section establishes a quantitative overview of the speeches that explicitly mention Loss and Damage and moves on from those findings to the textual analysis. Secondly, the findings of the analysis of social practices are discussed. Finally, the third and last section summarizes the discursive practice level of the analysis, elaborating on the effects of the selected speeches on the wider order of discourse.

### 5. 1. Quantitative overview and Textual Analysis

The initial quantitative account of the 15 speeches found that only 7 of the speeches explicitly mention Loss and Damage or the Loss and Damage financing facility. The other speeches discuss losses the respective countries have experienced and call for financial support from developed states but stick to migration and adaptation as the two domains of action. This pattern is however, not uncommon: only 52 out of 113 analyzed speeches from COP 19, which established the WIM, mentioned the mechanisms (Calliari 2018: 735).

Out of those speeches that do mention Loss and Damage, several mention it merely as a side note, for example, Ethiopia or South Sudan. Eswatini and Kenya on the other hand, place Loss and Damage at the core of their speeches.

Elisa Calliari (2018: 741) pointed out how the unclear conceptualization of Loss and Damage created a hurdle in the negotiations of COP 19 and beyond. Therefore it is important to understand how the conceptualization and definition of Loss and Damage have transformed and particularly how African states frame it. The problem becomes clear when considering how little states refer to Loss and Damage and how little of them contribute to the conceptualization. Most mentions do not elaborate on what is meant by Loss and Damage specifically (e.g. Ethiopia

2022; Namibia 2022). Out of all the speeches analyzed for this paper, only Nigeria, Eswatini, and Kenya go into more detail about what Loss and Damage entail for their respective countries. Both Eswatini and Kenya talk about homelessness and damages to infrastructure in their accounts, while also highlighting the effect on economic activities. The speech held by the Nigeria representative puts a number on those economic damages and states that it costs African states almost 2 Trillion USD, which does not account for non-economic losses yet (Nigeria 2022). The use of numbers as a linguistic tool in this context was also employed by Kenyan authors which mentions approximately 75.987 displaced households and 379.935 persons requiring humanitarian assistance. Not only are the high numbers used to enhance the argument but the unusual exactness rather than a rounded number appears to highlight the relevance of individuals affected as more than just an abstract number of victims.

Another issue with establishing Loss and Damage action is simply to get the topic on the agenda. Both Namibia and Eswatini highlight the importance of this. They join a set of other speeches in a direct call for the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund (e.g. Eritrea 2022; South Sudan 2022). Eswatini finds particularly strong words for this argument and states that the urgency of Loss and Damage has proceeded that of mitigation and adaptation action. It is the only speech to explicitly make this argument and in part contradicts other speeches that put adaptation at the top of their agenda.

It is not only the states who collectively call for this agreement that join their voices for increased negotiating capacity. Almost all speeches do this in one way or another. They either talk about shared African experiences, “African COP” or explicitly align their position with the AGN or G77 + China for example. Additionally, all speeches use the differentiation between developed and developing states and align themselves and their arguments with other developing states, in some cases also with other LDCs.

Based on this categorization in developed and developing nations, a few of the speeches situate the responsibility for financial support clearly with developed states (e.g. Nigeria 2022; South Sudan 2022). They typically base this on developed nations’ failure to cut emissions more drastically. In this context, almost all speeches mention the promise of 100 billion USD annually that developed nations have not lived up to (e.g. Eswatini 2022; Namibia 2022;

Zambia 2022). South Sudan even goes so far as to claim that 100 billion USD annually would no longer be enough. Other states are more general with their calls for financial support and the assignment of responsibility and call on the international community or all parties instead (e.g. Kenya 2022; Ethiopia 2022). Those states appear to opt for a less oppositional stand towards developed nations.

The legitimacy of expectations of financial flows from developed nations is at least to some extent derived from the special circumstances of Africa. More than half of the speeches analyzed point out the low contribution of the African continent to global emissions. Though the numbers vary between 3 and 5% of global emissions, the argument is the same across the line: Africa is disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change and disproportionately vulnerable even though the continent is least responsible for global climate change. The speeches might not refer to Loss and Damage explicitly but every speech includes accounts of the effects climate change has had in the respective country. Many mention economic losses, biodiversity loss, or food insecurity and most of them use aggregation as a linguistic tool to formulate their argument. Though the topic of Loss and Damage is inherently tied to ideas of climate justice, there is no mention of justice in any of the speeches. There is, however, mention of fairness. The Kenyan representative calls for an approach to Loss and Damage that is founded on urgency and fairness (Kenya 2022). At the same time, the Somalian speech highlights the need for "equity or fairness in global climate burden sharing". Additionally, many of the common arguments in the speeches can be traced back to core ideas conceptualized under the climate justice framework. Particularly accounts of quantitative data like the percentage of GHG emission the African continent contributes can be understood under the distributive dimensions. Furthermore, many speeches refer to the uneven consequences climate impact has in different regions and how that ties back to their development/economic status, which is to be understood under the vulnerability dimension of climate justice. While this is often used as a basis for demanding financial support, none of the speeches discuss historical injustices or coloniality in this context. This is most likely to avoid antagonization in the interest of coming to productive agreements but reinforces a discourse on climate justice for Africa that does not consider the connections between colonial injustices, racialized marginalizations and climate induced Loss and Damage.

## 5.2 Discursive practice

When trying to understand what influenced the authors of African speeches in COP 27, it is crucial to understand the recent context of Loss and Damage negotiations. The most important thing to understand here is that developed countries like the USA, and the UK, and states represented by the EU have been opposing developing states represented by the G77 + China in their efforts to put Loss and Damage on the agenda and to establish a finance facility for it (Glider & Rumble 2022: 3). The proposal from the G77 + China group for COP 26 did not lead to anything but the small compromise of the Glasgow Dialogues on Loss and Damage which had not mandate outcome and was criticized by African scholars to be nothing but a "never-ending talk shop" (ibid.). This frustration is also the reason it is important to African leader that the discussion of this Glasgow Dialogue and those in the future are considered in the establishment and operationalization of the Loss and Damage fund for them to be more than just a "talk shop". It can thus be understood that African states together with many other developing states entered COP 27 frustrated and impatient for effective action.

Furthermore, African representatives are influenced by the already existing opposing discourses from previous negotiations on the topic. They picked up on some of the arguments from other parties and used and strengthened existing definitions and conceptualizations of Loss and Damage, but they also held back from other discourses that had been prominent in the past.

First, it can be observed that many African states as well as the AGN have pointed out that Africa is least responsible, yet most affected by climate change. While this is true, the same argument has also been used by the AOSIS group to support the legitimacy of their call for Loss and Damage finance.

Secondly, there has been a continuous struggle in the previous negotiations to clearly distinguish Loss and Damage as separate from adaptation. According to Calliari's (2018) analysis, developed states have been framing Loss and Damage as an extension of adaptation efforts, rather than a third pillar to climate action. Though the final texts of decisions taken on the topic mostly reflect this

understanding now, the AGN has once again pointed out the need to have separate sections for the two topics in the Global Stocktake (GST) to clarify this important distinction (AGN 2023). In the speeches held at COP 27 this distinction was not commonly pointed out, which might however be attributed to other priorities in the argument or an implicit understanding based on the previous decisions taken.

Another pattern from previous negotiations is the discourse on *compensation*. The concept is closely linked to the legal concept of state responsibility (Tol & Verheyen 2004: 1112). This framing has thus been resisted by developed states to avoid a notion of liability for climate change impacts and costs on their end (Calliari 2018; Gilder & Rumble 2022: 8). Considering the significance of this discourse and the alignment of African states with other developing countries, it is surprising that there is no mention of compensation in any of the African speeches analyzed or the AGN statement. Coupled with the fact that as of 2022 there were no cases for compensation of African nations against developed nations in front of a court when many other developing nations have chosen this path, it can be assumed that this approach and discourse are not prioritized by African nations (Gilder & Rumble 2022: 9).

Nevertheless, this does not mean that African states consistently avoid heated discourses like that on compensation. A closely related discourse is the one on *costs* related to Loss and Damage. While this has not been examined in previous negotiations, the mention of *costs* can be found across the line in many of the African speeches (e.g. Nigeria 2022; Somalia 2022; Kenya 2022), the AGN statement (AGN 2023) and the Draft for the decision on the Loss and Damage Fund submitted by the G77 + China group ahead of COP 27 (G77 & China Finance 2022). This is a good example of how the coalitions work together using one discourse to increase their negotiating power. The effect this had on the final decisions taken at COP27 about Loss and Damage is discussed below.

## 5.3 Social practice

It is not easy to evaluate the effect African influences on the discourse have on the wider debate, but a starting point is to compare speeches and coalition statements to the final decisions taken at COP 27.

The first thing that stands out when doing so, is that though the final decision on the Loss and Damage fund is close to the G77 + China draft in its wording, there is no mention of costs. This leads to the assumption that developed nations opposed this formulation and that the G77 + China group, as well as any other party that shared their views, needed to sacrifice this formulation to achieve an agreement for the final decision. The formulation of “developing countries” that would be supported through the fund was further narrowed down to “developed countries that are particularly vulnerable” in the final decision (UNFCCC 2022e). This leaves the definition of what makes a state “particularly vulnerable” to the operationalization of the Fund at COP 28 and beyond.

Nonetheless, the AGN viewed the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund as a substantial success for African nations (Gilder & Rumble 2023). In light of the AGN arguing for Loss and Damage compensation since 2012, the establishment of the Fund can be seen as a milestone (Gilder & Rumble 2022: 4). From that perspective, it was already a significant effort and success to get Loss and Damage on the agenda for COP 27, particularly since it marked the first time it was listed under finance where it had more potential to create outcomes that lead to a fund or similar financial support. The inclusion of both economic and non-economic losses in the final document further reflects the successfully continued conceptualization of Loss and Damage in the UNFCCC framework and ensures funding for Loss and Damage that goes beyond economic losses that are easier to quantify.

To strictly distinguish which of these developments and shifts in the order of discourse were pushed by African perspectives specifically, and which were made possible by the wider community of developing countries is difficult. However, it is clear that African perspectives are reflected in the shift of the discourse on Loss and Damage and that their disproportionate vulnerabilities are



being recognized and accounted for more at COP 27 and after. The successful operationalization of the fund at COP 27 together with the first financial commitments reflects this (UNECA 2023). Nonetheless, a lot remains to be done and more resources will be needed with countries honoring their pledges, considering that Loss and Damage are expected to cost trillions and that, depending on the effectiveness of future and present climate policies, this number might only rise.

## 6 Conclusion

The research question posed by this paper was

*How do African state leaders at COP 27 shape the discourse on Loss and Damage?*

African states face special circumstances in the climate crisis and the Loss and Damage it causes. The continent is not only understood to be contributing the least to global emissions, with 3-5% depending on the source, but it is also disproportionately vulnerable. The majority of LDCs are situated in Africa with their economic development being held back by the adverse effects of climate change. Both economic and non-economic losses cost African states enormous amounts every year, posing a great injustice.

These special circumstances have affected the way African states participate in the discourse on Loss and Damage to make their voices heard. Possibly the most significant strategy African states have adopted in doing so is aligning their positions with negotiating coalitions. The most influential ones are the AGN, LDCs, and G77+China group. Two of these groups represent the overall needs of developing states rather than African needs specifically. This is not surprising considering the strong divide along the lines of developing and developed nations in the discourse on Loss and Damage. Both sides are affecting the conceptualization of the term and the wider discourse, which has been a substantial challenge for agreements on action at COP events.

Beyond the positions of developing nations, African states highlight their position in their speeches by reporting on the losses they are experiencing in their respective countries. This is often done using aggregation as a linguistic tool. Further, the speeches legitimate their calls for more financial support and the establishment of the Loss and Damage fund by enhancing the moral legitimacy of their position. This is commonly done by referring to the small contribution Africa as a whole makes to global emissions, by highlighting national efforts of

mitigation and adaptation, or through reference to previous commitments from developed nations.

Nevertheless, African speeches do not talk about Loss and Damage as much as one might expect, particularly at the COP that saw the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund as one of its core outcomes. Only 7 out of 15 speeches explicitly mention it and even fewer discuss the topic in more detail, contributing to its conceptualization. Though this pattern has been seen similarly at previous COPs it is surprising that Loss and Damage is not prioritized more by African speeches.

However, African states affect the discourse significantly through their coalitions, through the overall alignment with other developing countries through the G77 + China group appears to be more influential and played a significant role in the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund. Tying back to Fairclough, the coalitions can thus be seen as a possible way past the obstacle of stalling techniques in the issue of climate justice for African states.

Through these findings, this thesis paves the way for future research into other groups of states or coalitions to further understand their special circumstance in climate negotiations and to highlight the nuances of the developing world. Understanding shifts in the discourse and where certain dominant discourses persist, helps us understand the progress or lack of it in global climate negotiations, especially when it comes to Loss and Damage which plays a crucial role in achieving climate justice for Africa and the world.

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## COP 27 High-level Segment Speeches

Retrieved 2024-04-15 from:

<https://unfccc.int/cop27/high-level#Statements-given-at-the-COP-27-opening-ple-nary---6-November-2022>

Speeches by the following countries used:

7. November 2022	8. November 2022	15. November 2022
Angola	Eswatini	Eritrea
Ethiopia	Ghana	Nigeria
Guinea-Bissau	Namibia	South Sudan
Kenya	Somalia	
Mozambique	Zambia	
The Gambia		
Zambia		

# Appendix

## Appendix 1: Human dimensions of climate change vulnerability in Africa

### Human dimensions of climate change vulnerability in Africa

Socio-Economic Processes	Resource Access and Livelihood Changes	Intersectional and Compounding Vulnerabilities Among Social Groups
<p><b>Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Development Pathways</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dependency on commodity exports and volatility of extractive economies (UNCTAD 2019). <b>+</b></li> <li>Unintended consequences of investments in large-scale energy, water, and infrastructure projects (Adeniran and Daniell 2020; Higginbottom et al. 2021). <b>+</b></li> <li>Rising external debt and debt service costs (Edo et al. 2020) (9.11). <b>+</b></li> <li>Rapid urbanization (9.9; Box 9.8). <b>+</b></li> </ul> <p><b>Governance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Uneven progress toward democratic decentralization and civil society development (Dickovick and Wunsch, 2014; Makara, 2018) (9.4.2). <b>+</b></li> <li>Securitization of environmental governance (Ramutsindela and Büscher 2019) (9.4.2). <b>+</b></li> <li>Civil conflict, inadequate peacebuilding and conflict resolution structures (Adelula et al. 2016; van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018; Box 9.9). <b>+</b></li> <li>Corruption and 'illicit' financial flows (UNCTAD 2020) (9.4.2). <b>+</b></li> </ul> <p><b>Adaptation and Mitigation Actions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Top down and exclusionary mitigation strategies (Beymer-Ferris and Bassett 2012). <b>+</b></li> <li>Pathways of urban growth (Lwasa et al. 2018; van der Zwaan et al. 2018) (9.4.2). <b>+</b></li> <li>Social protection (9.11). <b>+</b></li> <li>Unequal access to coping mechanisms bolstered by locally-driven, inclusive and gender responsive adaptation (Eriksen et al. 2011; Ng'ang'a and Crane 2020). <b>+</b></li> </ul>	<p><b>Changing Patterns of Resource Access and Ownership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large-scale land acquisitions and transformation (Hufe and Heuermann 2017) (9.6; 9.8). <b>+</b></li> <li>Growing inequality in rural land distribution and declining land availability within smallholder systems (Jayne et al. 2019) (9.8). <b>+</b></li> <li>Land fragmentation and land use intensification among smallholder farmers (Cholo et al. 2018; Clay and Zimmerer 2020; Rasmussen et al. 2018) (9.6; 9.8). <b>+</b></li> <li>Fragmentation of dryland landscapes, constricted livestock mobility, and sedentarization among pastoralists (Mabhuye 2018; Suleiman and Young 2013) (9.6; 9.8). <b>+</b></li> </ul> <p><b>Livelihood Diversification and Change</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Growing engagement in rural, peri-urban and urban informal sector activities (Adom 2014; Allard 2017; Potts 2008; Chihambakwe et al. 2019; Dolisiager et al. 2021) (9.9). <b>+</b></li> <li>Rural deagrarianization with landless and land poor entering low return non-farm activities (Aslaw et al. 2017; Bryceson 2019; Headey and Jayne 2014) (9.8, 9.11). <b>+</b></li> <li>Stress-related and opportunistic rural out-migration and mobility (see Migration CCB) (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Tierney et al. 2017; Waha et al. 2017; Serdeczny et al. 2017; Lassailly-Jacob and Peyraud 2016) (Box 9.8). <b>+</b></li> <li>Livelihood diversification among smallholder farmers and fishing communities (9.8). <b>+</b></li> <li>Increasing variability and overall decline in catches in marine and inland fisheries, eroding rural diversification options for some (Lammers et al. 2020; Lowe et al. 2019) (9.8). <b>+</b></li> </ul>	<p><b>Age:</b> Elderly populations and young children are most vulnerable to health consequences of heat waves, poor air quality, and climate disasters (Cairncross et al. 2018 (Drivdal 2016; Buyana et al. 2019) (Box 9.1). These groups might not get appropriate food, their mobility might be reduced, education options impaired, and their dependence on others, especially women caregivers may increase (Popoola, 2021) (Box 9.1; 9.8). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Gender:</b> Women farmers have limited access to state agro-advisory extension services and financial resources, and experience fewer benefits from technology adoption (Cundill et al. 2021; Theis et al. 2017) (9.3; 9.8). Discriminatory health policies, poverty, and cultural norms including employment and household roles increase the vulnerability of women to extreme weather events and impair their adaptive capacity (Ajibade et al. 2013; Djoudi and Brockhaus 2011; Frick-Trzebitzky et al. 2017) (9.7; 9.8; 9.10; 9.11). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Ethnicity:</b> Ethnicity may be a factor that limits the range of adaptation options of some groups, either due to historical marginalization or cultural preference for specific livelihood orientations (Nielsen and Reenberg 2010; Azong and Kelso 2021; Tesfamariam and Zinyengere 2017). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Physical ability:</b> People with disabilities are more likely to be excluded from provision of agricultural, health and education services, and livelihood options that could reduce vulnerability (Lunga et al. 2019; Alexander 2020; Kuper et al. 2016). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Migrant status:</b> Many international migrants in the region experience greater cultural and economic barriers to more resilient livelihoods (Anderson 2017; Adepoju 2019; Anderson et al. 2017), and frequently reside in poorly serviced areas that are more exposed to climate hazards (see Migration CCB; Box 9.8). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Wealth:</b> Poor households are less capable of coping with climate shocks (Drivdal 2016; Buyana et al. 2019; Grasham et al. 2019) and frequently are more exposed to hazards through inadequate infrastructure, service provision, and dwelling in high-risk areas (Box 9.8; 9.11). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Examples of intersectional vulnerability:</b></p> <p><b>Age-wealth intersection:</b> many children in poor households in urban informal settlements face severe health and educational consequences when flooding halts education and produces acute infectious disease risks (Drivdal 2016). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Age-gender-ethnicity intersection:</b> elder women experienced heightened vulnerability under patriarchal cultural conditions (Azong and Kelso 2021). <b>+</b></p> <p><b>Gender-wealth intersection:</b> women from poor households were denied access to healthcare unless accompanied by a man willing to donate blood (Ajibade et al. 2013). <b>+</b></p>
<p>Effect of driver on vulnerability <b>+</b> increases vulnerability <b>-</b> decreases vulnerability</p>		



