

Lund University
Department of Political Science

SIMV07 Master's Thesis in Global Studies
Dr Annika Bergman-Rosamond



LUND UNIVERSITY

Serbia in transition

Berta Hegedusova
MSc in Global Studies
Major in Political Science

Content

Content	2
Abstract.....	4
1 Introduction	5
1.1 Contribution of the study.....	6
1.2 Serbia and the European Union –power relationship.....	7
1.3 Epistemological and ontological positioning	7
1.4 Research Question and Thesis Structure	8
2 Theoretical and conceptual framework.....	10
2.1 Introducing poststructuralism.....	10
2.2 Understanding identities.....	12
3 Methodology.....	17
3.1 Discourse Analysis.....	18
3.2 Reflexivity.....	23
4 The Milosevic era	24
4.1 Serbia and “the Other”	25
4.2 Milosevic’s foreign policy.....	28
4.3 Change of power	29
4.4 Towards the reforms.....	31
5 The civilisation discourse and The Balkans	34
5.1 The dynamics of identity construction from the outside	34
5.2 Europe’s Other	37
5.3 The European Union and Serbia	42
5.4 Europeanization – where next?	46
6 How European?.....	49
6.1 The Balkan question is a European question	51
6.2 Foreign policy and Identity.....	52
6.3 Kosovo.....	53

7	Concluding remarks	58
7.1	Summary	59
8	References.....	61

Abstract

The thesis aims to offer an insight into how is Serbian identity re-constituted in the post-conflict period and what role does the European Union play in the process of identity reconstruction. Specifically, it aims to discuss the issue of how is Serbian identity being reproduced in relation to the prospect of EU membership. How is the possibility of joining the EU changing the discursive construction of Serbian identity? The core of the study is the post-conflict challenges facing Serbian society analysed within a context of cooperation with the European Union, and Serbia's relationship with its own radical past. The study thus focuses on the tension between two strands of Serbian identity—one based on a 1990s Milosevic's political discourse and another on supranational identification with "EU" structures. Also, by looking at the political changes in Serbia after 2000, this thesis aims to investigate how national identity is being re-structured in relation to foreign policy decisions.

Keywords: Serbia, identity, EU, the Balkans

1 Introduction

At the beginning of the twenty-first century Serbia's political setting started to change intensely. After a long period of conflict which started in the early 1990s and resulted in an overthrow of Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, post-conflict transition came at great cost. The post-Milosevic years were being spent in difficult political circumstances that challenged all aspects of the Serbian state, such as the unresolved status of Kosovo and the cooperation with international institutions and organizations – with the European Union, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, etc. The post-war period of recovery and democratisation posed further challenges to the political elites in terms of how to adapt to the new environment and articulate their political identities.

The presidency of Slobodan Milosevic increasingly distanced Serbia from the international community, as well as Serbia's possibilities of joining the European Union. Therefore, the loss of Slobodan Milosevic to a coalition of nearly twenty opposition parties and movements which were brought together in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) opened up possibilities for transformation and reformulation of national goals and norms harmonious with European positions. The breakthrough parliamentary and presidential elections that took place in 2000 indicated the possibility of a new path that would direct Serbia towards membership in the European Union and away from the protectionist politics that characterised the Milosevic era. The creation of a new political environment was thus received with anticipation and optimism and the membership of the European Union was put forward as a major foreign policy goal after the year 2000.

The European Commission recently announced (22.4.2013) that EU-Serbia membership negotiations should soon begin. According to the recent statement, EU-Serbia negotiations would begin in January 2014 at the latest.¹ The significance of opening accession talks with Serbia after a period of rather tense relations between the two units is enormous. Arguably, the new era for Serbian politics has begun and the country is closer to the membership than it has ever been – “closing” its radical nationalist past and becoming a member of the European Union.

¹ 'EU set for Serbia membership talks', 2013, BBC News, [online]

This research aspires to contribute to the understanding of the processes that led to the possible opening of accession talks more than a decade after the war. I argue that for such changes to occur, a profound redefinition of Serbian identity was needed. The focus of this research is thus the issue of Serbian political identity and how that has been changing in the post-conflict environment. Based on Lene Hansen's *Security as Practice*², I start with a premise that identity and foreign policy choices are intertwined. Therefore, I believe the changes in political actions regarding the questions of cooperation with the European Union and the unresolved status of Kosovo which will be addressed are telling in terms of identity change of Serbia.

In order to highlight the process of Serbian identity change, an emphasis on identity construction/the process of othering and the discursive construction of the Balkans will be stressed. The hypothesis is that the process of Serbia's transformation into a supposedly pro-European country is connected to Serbia's particular perception of the European Union and its own political identity. The analysis looks at the ways in which the relationship between the European Union and Serbia figures in the Serbian political discourse and the way this construction shapes discourse on Serbian identity. Specifically, the study highlights two cases by focusing on how is national identity manifested in political practice: the nature of cooperation with the EU and the problem of unresolved territorial boundaries with Kosovo. The relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is chosen to help assess the manifestation of the EU in Serbian foreign politics and the role it plays in the shaping of Serbian identity. I believe each case study is closely connected to the understanding of Serbia's political identity and policy choices in these areas are the most telling in terms of Serbia's identity transformation. How is Serbian identity reconstructed within a broader framework of European integration and Serbia's relationship with the Kosovo?

1.1 Contribution of the study

Using a poststructuralist theorisation on identity and discourse analysis, this paper analyses the representation of Serbian identity by the Serbian political elites. It seeks to map out how Serbian identity is being discursively reproduced in relation to European integration processes and broader transformation processes in the post conflict period. It

² Hansen 2006

seeks to capture changes in Serbian politics through awareness of the role of identity in political decisions and vice-versa. The main contribution of this study is that it attempts to shift away from an incentive perspective on the European integration and to contribute to a growing field of studies focused on the role of identity in politics. Awareness of processes of identity construction and re-construction in Serbia can help with producing other insights into the on-going transformation processes in the Western Balkans.

1.2 Serbia and the European Union –power relationship

Since the focus is on the changing character of Serbian identity seen in the light of political changes, and discussion on the influence of the European Union as an actor of change, it would be beneficial to acknowledge the existing power relations between these political actors. I assume that these two political subjects, the EU and Serbia, do not have an equal position since the EU finds itself in a position to “dictate” the conditions which have to be met and to which Serbia must react to if the country wishes to join the EU. Therefore, the EU sets an environment for a new type of discourse on the Serbian political identity. The evolving relationship between the EU and Serbia is in my view changing the character of Serbian politics from the isolationist foreign policy of Slobodan Milosevic and his leading party in the 1990s to the foreign policy of cooperation, whether with international institutions or regional actors. The role of the European Union will be thus to act as a broader political framework for my analysis.

1.3 Epistemological and ontological positioning

As many other IR schools of thoughts, poststructuralism finds itself divergent in its nature and offers a wide array of perspectives on how to address reality. In a very broad sense, poststructuralist scholars take on an anti-positivist understanding of the social reality. Ontologically, interpretation and understanding is favoured against causal mechanisms and laws. Knowledge is understood as social and context is important when one wants to make sense of the world around them. Interpretative epistemology is reflected in poststructuralist methodological underpinning which stresses the role of language in

explaining the social world and so poststructuralism can be defined as a qualitatively orientated research method.³

In terms of further epistemological and ontological positioning the thesis works with poststructuralist theory, which in terms of broader assumptions about identities mean they are understood as unstable and changing; evolving and capable of taking up an altered character. The foundation principle of this study is that the central subject of an analysis, Serbian identity, lacks a stable core. Serbian identity is seen as a “subject in process” where subject’s identity is reconstructed within a certain political setting. The proposed research therefore questions the singularity and homogeneity of what constitutes Serbian and pays attention to how Serbian political elite presents what Serbia is in the political discourses. In order to clarify chosen methodological approach to the studied phenomenon, focus is on the poststructuralist understanding of identity and the relationship between “the subject” and “the other”.

1.4 Research Question and Thesis Structure

The changing nature of Serbian identity in the post-Milosevic era is analysed by utilising the poststructuralist framework with an emphasis on identity construction and taking the prospect of EU membership as a wider political framework of analysis. Special focus is paid to discursive changes that have appeared in relation to the cooperation with the EU and the unresolved status of Kosovo. By questioning how Serbian policy choices have been changing during the course of Serbian post-conflict transition, the thesis aims to provide a lesson about the complexity of political change and identity formation. In words of Charles Tilly, identities presented in this research are seen as “always contingent, always negotiable, but also always consequential” and “when political identities change, so do a wide range of other meaning, practices and relations”.⁴ The purpose of the study is to analyse the process of re-construction of Serbian identity and how is the EU involved in the process. The aim is to address the following research questions:

³ Fawcett 2008

⁴ Tilly 2003: 611

1. How is Serbian identity being discursively presented by the Serbian political elites in the post-conflict period?

2. What role does the EU play in the process of identity construction?

The following theoretical chapter will present some central topics which I believe should be addressed when analysing Serbia's changing political identity. It will serve as a foundation for the selected case study of Serbia's attitude to Kosovo in relation to cooperation with the EU. The role of Serbian "other" and the geopolitical meaning of the Balkans will be discussed in order to better understand the complex character of identity and political change. The thesis will introduce important political developments marking Serbia's transformation of its political identity and opening towards the European Union. The focus will be on the process of othering of Serbia's past represented by Milosevic's regime and attempts of new Serbian political representatives to shift country's political roadmap westwards. Arguably, political action takes place in a certain political space. Therefore, the focus will be also on the meaning of the Balkans as a geo-political region and positioning of Serbia into a specific regional structure as perceived by the EU and what are the implications of such categorization. The nature of an old regime, with its implications on formulations of Serbian other, will be presented in order to better understand why Kosovo is the central reference point when it comes to transformation of Serbian political identity from the negative connotation as a conflict prone Balkan country towards pro-European country. I will argue that Kosovo serves as a nodal point of reference in the European discourse determining Serbia's position in Europe – as it is currently in a state of limbo between the West and the Balkans. As will be illustrated, such articulation acquired a stable position in the official discourse by the European political representatives. The focus will be on the contrasting nature between the deeply rooted anti-Kosovar discourse in the Serbian politics and the pressure by the EU to accept Kosovo's independence in order to be considered ready to be accepted into Western structures. Overall, this study of re-construction of Serbian political identity within a framework of cooperation with the EU will hopefully reveal a fragment of the complex nature of relationship between identity and political change.

2 Theoretical and conceptual framework

2.1 Introducing poststructuralism

Poststructuralism refers to an array of theoretical viewpoints.⁵ When it comes to the constitution of social reality, as an antimetaphysical and antihumanist school of thought, it stresses the importance of language.⁶ In this sense it shares some characteristics with structuralism. Poststructuralism emphasises the operation of language, it focuses on how the language shapes, reflects and reveals social phenomena.⁷ Language on a political level has an ability to justify often questionable political steps and naturalize the meanings until they become to be perceived as certain and are thus not questioned in terms of their legitimacy.⁸ Such hegemonic construction is for example a statement “Kosovo is Serbian” to which attention will be paid and its implications for the political which acquired a taken for granted quality in Serbian nationalist discourse.

Although as in any other schools there is variation among the ideas each of them presents, central focus themes can be identified.⁹ First, a subject’s existence develops its identity not by being self-aware of ‘I’ but by deriving it from its position in language or its participation in other systems of signification. Second, focus on intertextuality is paid, which means all texts are interrelated as language relies on earlier discursive structures. In this sense, intertextuality refers to “how a text responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in doing so helps to make history and contributes to wider processes of change”.¹⁰ Intertextuality is also linked to the process of social change since it can stabilise the dominant discourse (social order) or challenge it. Third, all meanings are fluid and thus authors stress the shifting nature of meanings. Also, in terms of the relation of language to empirical reality, language in use is linked to social processes.¹¹

Deployment and understanding of discourse varies accordingly. For example, Derrida’s understanding of discourse and deconstruction offered a new way how to look

⁵ Fawcett 2008: 667

⁶ Schwandt 2007: 238-239

⁷ Phillips & Hardy 2002 : 6

⁸ Laclau & Mouffe 1985

⁹ Schwandt 2007: 238

¹⁰ Fairclough 1992: 102

¹¹ Faber 2003; Chreim 2006

at text.¹² In simplified terms, when we look at a structure of any text, we can see that the structure has some boundary (although uneven) which is limited by a centre serving as a guiding term explaining the nature of the structure. An intending person (who can be an author of the text) brings center to its existence but it is not the center itself since it is always on the outside of the intentional structure. The Centre is not really the centre, Derrida argued, as the centre arranges a particular structure without being in the structure. In Western culture, this centre is believed to be human consciousness. Human consciousness is therefore understood as an agency from which everything derives. But in Derrida's theorisation, language comes after man. He sees the world as linguistic. When language displaces the man, everything becomes a discourse. He asserts the language while removing it at the same time. Language is manifested in speech and it is seen as not merely communicative, but also constitutive of the social world – social identities and relations. It is “ambiguous, indeterminant, and replete with taken-for-granted meanings”.¹³ His theorisation of inside/outside of the subject will be indirectly used for my own analysis. Also his deconstruction as an approach to text reading objects to the logic of fixed categories like East/West, which I will discuss in relation to the Balkans. Instead of seeing these categories as binary oppositions, they should be understood as whole, both including and excluding at the same time.¹⁴ These Derrida's central aspects of his thinking can be applied to political issues, and he is often referred to as a writer known for providing “an ethnical turn” in thinking about texts, since academics appraise deconstruction from an ethical standpoint, how it is moving from subjectivity and totality to openness.¹⁵

Other writers, Laclau and Mouffe, developed discourse theory which argues for the necessity to recognize the unstable character of social identities and that meanings depend on the discourse.¹⁶ Discourse is constitutive of the social – the social is therefore a discursive construction.¹⁷ The consequence is that there is a constant effort and struggle to define identity. The writers agree that signs (identities) obtain their meanings through difference, but this difference depends on the nature of relations between the signs. If we position the signs in different relations to each other, their meanings might change.

¹² Derrida in Bass 1998: 278-294

¹³ Mathison 2005: 105

¹⁴ Lockyer 2004: 243-244

¹⁵ Devine 1993

¹⁶ Laclau & Mouffe 1985

¹⁷ Kress & van Leuven 2001

Attempts to grasp the meanings of signs by knowing in which relationship they are with other signs is what constitutes the basis of discourse analysis.¹⁸ Laclau's and Mouffe's discourse theory starts from a premise of instable language which does not allow for meanings to be fixed. Again, language plays an active role in creating and changing identities as well as social relations. Discourse is changing through interaction with other discourses which is known as discursive struggle. Each discourse presents a specific understanding of the social and it strikes to achieve hegemony over other discourses in order to fix the meaning of language in its own way.¹⁹ Meaning is partially fixed around nodal points, which serve as central signs around which other signs are ordered – the meaning of other signs depends on their relationship to nodal points.²⁰ Also, nodal points have sense only within a particular discourse. What discourse excludes is called the field of discursivity. This field offers multiplicity of meanings which can change discourse and the meaning of the signs can be temporarily fixed.

2.2 Understanding identities

Poststructuralism has enriched the field of IR with its theorisation of identity. According to poststructuralist theorisation of identity, identities are not given, but constructed, and the process of construction happens via discourses. Secondly, identities are unfixed.²¹ Thirdly, identity construction relies on a difference: it is against the difference of other on which identity formation builds.²² Often, violent form of the articulation of identity takes over a less violent version. This is what David Campbell refers to as “the radical interdependence” of political identities.²³ Therefore, when analysing Serbian identity, we assume the identity of the studied object is a result of a complex process of interactions between self and other. One establishes his/her own identity through the establishment of contrast and difference. Identities are thus seen as a result of practices of othering:

“In simplified terms this means that the sources of our identities exist outside of us; they are created through those images with which we identify and through the linguistic order that assigns

¹⁸ Laclau & Mouffe in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 5-7

¹⁹ Ibid. 7

²⁰ Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112

²¹ Laclau and C. Mouffe 1985

²² Derrida 1998

²³ Campbell 1996

names and terms to these images. Our identities are thus created through a series of identifications and relations with significant others but also through collective cultural discourses or narratives such as those of nation, religion, and sex”.²⁴

Indeed, identity studies are becoming a growing area of interest in all social sciences.²⁵ When we talk about identity, one could spend several pages explaining the concept, since the question of identity can arise in many different ways. For the purpose of this study, however, social level is taken: belonging to a particular national community. National identity will be understood as an imagined community which is constituted around a central nodal point, which represents identity of community by stating its boundary/limit by the presence and through contrast with ‘other’.²⁶ National identities, as other social identities, will be therefore understood as discursively produced and reproduced. Along with Hall and Anderson, Serbian nation will be understood as an ideological and linguistic construction created through imagination, which is a product of historical discursive processes.²⁷ Based on Hansen and Waever’s book *European integration and National Identity*²⁸, I take the concepts of “nation-state-Europe” not as “ideal types” but types in making which are “generated in specific national debate”, focusing on their usage and constructions in national debate. For example, in *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, Anastasia Karakasidou's presents an idea that Greek nationalism invented Macedonia as Greek, as part of the construction of Greek national self-identity.²⁹ Similarly, among competing national claims, part of Kosovo became seen by Serbs as part of Greater Serbia. Therefore, when I talk about the nation, I understand nation as a unit continually in the making, and national identity as “a process rather than outcome”.³⁰ Also, the construction of difference “us” versus “them” will be analysed as part of the discursive construction since the articulation of national identity is also reflected in its relationship with the other. I focus on symbolic production/reproduction of Serbian nationhood and how is nationhood reflected in the political discourse by utilising the stated

²⁴ Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking 2011: 8

²⁵ Huddy 2011: 127

²⁶ Anderson 1983; Glasze 2007: 662

²⁷ Hall 1993; Anderson 1993

²⁸ Waever & Hansen 2002

²⁹ Karakasidou 1997

³⁰ Keith & Pile 1993: 28

poststructuralist theories of identity formation and discourse theory as two key theoretical concepts.

Coming back to writers influencing poststructuralist theorising on identities and discourse, Foucault's understanding of identity questions the individual subjectivity by stressing institutional practices through which individuality is produced.³¹ An individual's social identity relies not on an individual experience, but on a social representation which is collective - shared among a specific social group – constraining how individual acts.³² Foucault understands discourse as a system of social relations and practices, where political action and policy also constitutes a discourse. He argues that truth is determined by different regimes of knowledge in a process of discursive construction and it is power which constitutes discourse. In this sense, universal truth is unattainable because we can never stand outside of discourse as we represent a particular regime of knowledge. The relationship between the social and the linguistic is one of constant mediation. Social and political reality is constituted by discourse and discourse is at the same time constituted by it.³³

When it comes to Laclau's and Mouffe's theorising on subject, they argue the subject is never autonomous, since it has a specific position within discourse which designates how subject should act.³⁴ Moreover, since there are many different competing discourses which give subject different positions, subjects are fragmented. Subjects are also overdetermined because due to the nature of discourses - they acquire multiple subject positions (for example soldier-Serb-Christian).³⁵ Identity is therefore established relationally, through chains of equivalence which links together different signifiers.³⁶ According to Laclau and Mouffe, identity is acquired in a process of representation via a group of signifiers with a central nodal point and it is being constantly “accepted, refused and negotiated in discursive processes”.³⁷ In our case, the discursive construction of Serbian points towards what Serbian equals and what it differs from. For example, the prevalent discourse on nationalism during the Milosevic presidency equated Serbian with

³¹ Foucault 1972

³² Ibid.

³³ Foucault 1972

³⁴ Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 11

³⁵ Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 41

³⁶ Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 127

³⁷ Ibid. 43

signifiers such as strength, Christian, soldier and contrasted it with Albanians in relation with weakness, Muslim, perpetrator of violence, etc.³⁸

In terms of collective identities, group identities enable some possibilities of identification while reducing/ignoring others. They serve to dissolve the boundaries between different social groups or different interests by “relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to define the forces to be opposed, the enemy”.³⁹ In Serbian war society, everyone who was not Serb was put into a specific category as non-Serb, whether he or she was Croat, Albanian, etc. What is problematic with such classification is that any internal differences within the group formations are ignored (for example, Serbian women and Croatian women might have more in common than Serbian men and Serbian women).⁴⁰

According to Laclau, group and representation are formed at the same time, offering an understanding of society as a whole.⁴¹ In this study, focus is on the political representation of identity since political actors are the ones talk about/on behalf of the group. Especially relevant for the analysis is Laclau’s and Mouffe’s concept of social antagonism, when one identity excludes another. During the existence of Yugoslav state, one could be Serb and Yugoslav, Albanian and Yugoslav, Croat and Yugoslav at the same time. However, after the disintegration of the state, these identities related antagonistically to one another. The new discourse on national identity allowed people to fight those whom they previously considered to be fellow Yugoslavs, with whom they shared a common identity. This is what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as hegemonic articulation, when the hegemonic articulation of people as Serbs, Croats and Albanian replaced the articulation of people as Yugoslavs. Boundaries between the inside and the outside were established based on such antagonistic articulations. By stating these examples, one sees how political articulations of identity have social consequences.⁴²

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) and Mouzelis (1990) criticise Laclau and Mouffe for not taking into account structural relations of dependency (class, gender, ethnicity), which according to them explains “which social forces have greater capacity to effect articulatory changes and why”⁴³. Laclau and Mouffe argue that change –

³⁸ Ronayne 2005: 57-59

³⁹ Mouffe 1993: 50

⁴⁰ Hall 1991

⁴¹ Laclau 1996:27

⁴² Laclau and Mouffe 1985

⁴³ Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 125

hegemonic intervention – is possible for any social group since any social group has access to hegemonic discourse but they fail to explain how exactly political interest is constituted.⁴⁴ Another point of departure when it comes to analysing national identity through political representatives is the question of who has power to represent the nation. I would like to emphasise that I acknowledge argument by Vasquez which says that political elites “control identity” and have “profound influence over life of society”.⁴⁵ Although it would be interesting to analyse how these relations of dependency influence discursive practices and to what extent representation reflects societal understands,⁴⁶ such theorising will have to be omitted due to the limitations of research area.

Most of the poststructuralist work on identities is based on the contrast of difference between self/other. In the Serbian society a strong dichotomy between Serbs and Albanians will be evident. In this case, I will focus on issues constraining harmonious identity formations. However, according to Hansen and Waever, one should be also willing to take into account a less bipolar approach when it comes to identity formation.⁴⁷ Waever argues that the self/other dimension of identities emerges only in rare situations. What is problematic with a model of distinction between self and other is that it creates only two possibilities for an articulation of identity and is limiting in its nature. Such categorisation creates a clear image of an enemy. Therefore, I will also partly apply such distinction because I will argue that Europe in the Serbian political discourse and foreign decisions takes on a specific role of not quite self but not quite the other, taking the mentioned less bipolar approach for such articulation.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Mouzelis 1990

⁴⁵ Vasquez 1995: 223

⁴⁶ Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 62

⁴⁷ Waever & Hansen 2002

⁴⁸ Waever 2002: 24

3 Methodology

The conceptual and methodological framework of the presented analysis is mainly based on poststructuralist discourse theory described in the previous part. To restate, the theory offers new ways of approaching identity in politics by paying attention to the construction of social meanings. It reveals that identities are formed on the basis of constitutive outside, known as ‘otherness’.⁴⁹ Formulation of national identity, as other identity, is made through discursive construction of such difference. Serbian identity studied in the thesis is thus understood as relational, varied, and intertwined with discursive articulations.⁵⁰ Discourse theory’s ontological frame is suitable for explaining identities’ changing and contingent character, which is the aim of the thesis with regard to Serbian identity. The frame offers a valuable perspective on the processes of identity reconstruction. Second, it also offers an insight into how specific articulation of the ‘other’ fosters or hinders post-conflict reconciliation, which is relevant to the current nature of Serbian politics trying to come in terms with its recent conflict ridden past. Third, it highlights the relevance of identities to politics.⁵¹

Poststructuralist methodology stresses the role of language and so it relies on qualitative research methods. Qualitative methods of research are especially suitable for those studies which wish to capture process and context, which is the goal of the thesis too.⁵² Discourse analysis as a chosen method of research involves analysis of the discursive constructions of Serbian identity by the political elites which helps to better understand complexities of the process of identity transformation. More specifically, I explore the ways in which Serbian identity is being constructed in the context of the European Union. Since language does not only reflect the social world but is constitutive of it, I assume that different articulations of how Serbia is presented in the political discourse offer different approaches to formulations of national policies. To put differently, when discourse changes, so does a wide range of social practices.

⁴⁹ Butler 1999

⁵⁰ Hansen 2006

⁵¹ Nancheva 2012: 8-9

⁵² Devine 2002

3.1 Discourse Analysis

Poststructuralist scholars recognize the power of discourse and the role it plays in shaping reality. They also acknowledge that social processes are arguably anything but stagnant. Discourse within this thesis is understood as a system of knowledge that “conveys the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates” and “the social norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and proposed solutions”.⁵³ According to Kinnvall, discourse in a poststructuralist sense can deal with “the way in which language, but also ideas and practices, produces knowledge and shapes human conduct according to that knowledge”.⁵⁴ Moreover, discourses are interactive which means they are given a meaning when defined in relation to other discourses and thus we can talk about a mutually constitutive discourse agenda.

Discourse analysis refers to a number of related methods that analyze text by focusing on language in use⁵⁵, such as critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis, etc. Therefore, the term discourse can be used in different sense depending on a discipline it emerges from (sociology, linguistic, philosophy, etc.).⁵⁶ Thus, discourse analysis offers several ways of analysing text and it can be used with both written and spoken data.⁵⁷

Discourse analysis has also enriched political studies with its insights into the discursive constructions and dynamics of identity formation.⁵⁸ Its linkage with discourse theory has an implication for the way in which it combines meta-theoretical elements of discourse theory with an alternative methodology.⁵⁹ The purpose of discourse analysis is to pay attention to constructions of social meanings, where discursive constructions of identities also belong to, to “map out the processes in which we struggle about the way in which the meaning of signs is to be fixed, and the processes by which some fixations of meaning become so conventionalised that we think of them as natural.”⁶⁰

⁵³ Kinnvall 2011: 7

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Hall 1996

⁵⁶ Potter 2008: 218

⁵⁷ Schiffrin 1994: 7

⁵⁸ Torfing 1999

⁵⁹ Wood & Kroger 2000: 3

⁶⁰ Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 25-26

Central to this approach is language and the connection it creates between knowledge and social reality, “language used to do something and mean something, language produced and interpreted in a real-world context”.⁶¹ Special attention is paid to the language because language is in positivist understanding seen as something which describes the social reality but which also shapes it. As stated in the theoretical part, in a centre of discourse lie the so called nodal points which help to temporarily stabilise the meanings and also define other concepts. My nodal point is the European Union as it unifies different streams in Serbian politics and shapes the construction of Serbian identity.

Discourse analysis goes further than merely describing texts; it questions how the studied text fits into a broader political setting. As a method, discourse analysis seeks to find patterns in discursive constructions and (political) context behind them.⁶² Building on Laclau’s and Mouffe’s understanding of discourse where everything social is contained within discourse and all social actions are discursive, the focus of the presented discourse analysis will be on a political process and the dynamism between language and political processes.⁶³ The functional and normative use of discourse will be emphasised. The focus will be on discourse as social action, how political representatives use discursive construction and with what effect. Also, attention will be paid to those discursive constructions which appear to be true and taken for granted. Language will be understood as constitutive of social reality, helping with interpretation of the social world.

Discourse analysis will be used to “recover meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena”.⁶⁴ Specifically, I will use discourse analysis as a qualitative research method for investigating particular social phenomenon: Serbia’s identity transformation translated in political actions. I will illustrate how has the discourse on Serbian identity been changing with the growing interaction of Serbia with the European Union in the post-conflict Serbia, and what is the EU’s role in the construction of Serbian identity, taking into account wider geo-political setting. In terms of my analytical focus, I do not wish to present a systematic empirical analysis of texts, but instead attempt to grasp a more abstract and all-encompassing nature

⁶¹ Ibid. 13

⁶² Waever 2002

⁶³ Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 9

⁶⁴ Abdelal, Yoshiko, Johnston & McDermott 2009: 6

of the discourses within Serbian political scene. In particular, I question how particular national discursive constructions limit Serbia's possibilities for political action.

In discourse analysis, theory and method are inseparable. Laclau and Mouffe are relevant for the chosen study because they stress the role of the political processes.⁶⁵ According to Laclau and Mouffe, language is principally unstable and no meaning can be permanent. Discourse is understood as an open unit, and it interacts with and is being altered by other discourses. Each discursive unit attempts to stabilise the meaning of language in its own way and destabilise the other discourse which is understood as a discursive struggle.⁶⁶

For the analysis itself, political texts and talks/speeches by political representatives are selected in order to illustrate a complex process of the discursive construction of Serbian identity in the political sphere. I will seek to answer how Serbian identity is constructed in the political discourse by Serbian official representatives and in political acts within the broader EU integration process Serbia finds itself in. This means I will be looking at the texts in a spectrum of a wider political framework. I will attempt to go beyond description and seek more complexity when it comes to understanding of Serbian identity transformation reflected in policy choices and nature of cooperation with other political units. At the same time, I will include a wide range of secondary sources to illustrate and discuss the complexity of the identity transformation and political challenges Serbia faces. Since I established discourse and social and mutually constitutive, I will be not analysing political speeches only, but the whole spectrum of political and identity related processes in Serbia.

Using Laclau and Mouffe's theory in empirical analyses means being familiar with the following concepts:

- Nodal points, master signifiers and myths, which can be collectively labelled key signifiers in the organisation of discourse;
- The concept of chains of equivalence which refers to the investment of key signifiers with meaning;

⁶⁵ Laclau 1990:3

⁶⁶ Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 6-7

- Concepts concerning identity: group formation, identity and representation; and
- Concepts for conflict analysis: floating signifiers, antagonism and hegemony.⁶⁷

First, one should identify key signifiers in empirical material: nodal point. Nodal point around which the studied identity is organised is Serbian. As established in the previous sections, investigating identity in discourse analysis means looking at its linkage with other signs, whether in positive or negative sense.⁶⁸ Therefore, attention to binary constructions of the self and the other such as democratic, undemocratic, violent, peaceful, should be paid. Second, focus is on discursive organization of the signs – how are identified key signifiers combined with other signs? Moreover, since every construction (sign) can be linked to other constructions, it is necessary to see these linkages in a broader (political) framework. When such chain of signs acquires a temporarily stable position within the discourse, identities are also temporarily stabilised.

Considering ontological foundations of poststructuralist thought, it is impossible to answer what Serbia is, but it is possible to question how it came about – to focus on the process of identity construction. How is Serbian identity being discursively constructed in the process of identity construction? Since subject of analysis is looked at through its relation to “other”, how “other” is seen by “self” constitutes the very “self”. Discourses on “other” and discourse on “self” are thus mutually constitutive.

The purpose of investigation is to reveal and identify the specific chains of meaning that a particular discourse brings together.⁶⁹ An identity, as well as social space, is established in relation to something it is not – the Balkans is not Europe, Serb is not Albanian, etc. A social space ‘Balkans’ links a geographical part of Europe to signs ‘civilisation’, ‘violence’, etc. In practical terms, analysis of the Serbian other which is created together with the creation of Serbian self points toward what discourse about Serbian self excludes and what are the social consequences of this exclusion. If, for example, ‘European’ in a given discourse is linked with ‘progress’, then I as the discourse

⁶⁷ Ibid. 50

⁶⁸ Hansen 2006: 45

⁶⁹ Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 50

analyst can show how this pairing has been established discursively and what consequences it has for both 'European' and 'Serbian'.

The discourse on the enemy/other is anchored in binary oppositions like civilised/uncivilised, which are known as floating signifiers.⁷⁰ Here again, the other's identity constitutes outside, providing boundaries for the identity of the self.⁷¹ Identity depends on subject's position within discourse:

Whenever we use the category of "subject" in this text, we will do so in the sense of "subject positions" within a discursive structure. Subjects cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations-not even in the limited sense of being endowed with powers that render an experience possible- as all "experience" depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility .⁷²

Floating means these signifiers do not have a fixed meaning – it changes with time. One of the floating signifier which will be reoccurring during the analysis is Europeanness. Both Serbian and European political statements are trying to fix the meaning of the term in their own particular way.

When it comes to the selection of political speeches, most of them come from the chosen time frame after year 2000, focusing on the speeches during presidency of Boris Tadic. However, when it came to selecting texts for the study, texts from another period of time had to be used in order to increase my understanding of the broader political setting and identify the prevailing discursive constructions. I looked for those topics which were reoccurring in different texts, whether media reports or secondary sources quoting political speeches, paying attention to repetitions of existing discursive constructions. I selected texts on the basis of their availability which means I focused on those which can be widely read. As mentioned earlier, I worked with language on a political level since politicians and other state representatives have an authority to present official political positions. Various statements and speeches will be used to complete the analysis.

Methodologically, this study can be principally regarded as an analytical and qualitatively orientated work. It largely relies on the descriptive / qualitative data. A

⁷⁰ Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112-113; Žižek 1989: 97

⁷¹ Laclau, 1990: 17

⁷² Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 115

content related analysis will be used instead of a linguistic analysis.⁷³ The reason for choosing a content related analysis is due to focus on a broader relation between political realities and discourse. The aim is to look for patterns within a broader context, where language is seen as part of political processes.⁷⁴ Specifically, I focus on the discourse of politicians. This study relies on wide range of secondary qualitative data gathered from numerous books, journals and reports. The process of transition is of enormous scope and thus it is not possible for one to grasp all the elements of such a complex issue. Therefore, our study analyses solely the political aspects of the process of transition.

3.2 Reflexivity

The aim of presented discourse analysis is not to discover the truth about reality but to describe how discursive struggle constructs reality - how Serbian political elites present Serbian identity so that it appears natural. For a discourse analyst, discourse becomes the object of analysis, not the reality, since reality cannot be reached outside discourse. One should instead look for patters in the text/speech and identify the social implications of dissimilar discursive representations of reality, paying attention to naturalised statements.⁷⁵

In terms of limitations of the study, official discourses will be used to study the process of identity construction since I am interested in constructions of Serbian identity at the decision-making level. It would be probably beneficial to look at the media discourse or public opinion surveys to complete the proposed research question, but I have decided to delimit my study to official political discourses because I already possessed some understanding of it. All in all, a complete closure is never possible and so the same research question remains opened to various interpretations.

⁷³ Jorgenson-Phillips 2002: 82

⁷⁴ Wetherell et al. 2001

⁷⁵ Carpentier 2011: 21

4 The Milosevic era

In order to provide an insight into what the post-conflict transition meant to Serbian state representatives, as they were the ones who are in a position to officially ascribe what transition is, the discourse of the old regime is important to consider. This is because the new political regime has some elements of the old regime yet it is also novel – positioning itself as somewhat in-between the past and present, characterised by a degree of relatedness.

The 1990s started a period of political and diplomatic crisis in the region of the former Yugoslavia, a decade marked by years of ethnic violence, population dislocation and “hate-speech” rhetoric.⁷⁶ The desire for national self-determination appeared to be stronger than the will to live in a multi-national state. It was a period when national identity and national sentiments shaped the formation of new states, in a rather violent way. New states’ declarations of independence often came in violence.⁷⁷

In Serbia, Milosevic’s political party exploited and instrumentalised what Griffin calls an illiberal form of nationalism. While nationalism can be understood as “an ideology whose affective driving force is the sense of belonging to and serving a perceived national community (and) the carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a distinctive cultural identity which sets it apart from other nations and gives it a special place in the historical process”, illiberal nationalism is “fulfilled by a particularly intense form of affective attachments to one’s own homeland . . . or people, one often maintain through the demonization of other nations or out-groups, ethnic or otherwise, within the nation”.⁷⁸ Another defining feature of the regime was its militant nature, where militarism embodied “a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force. . .”.⁷⁹ Discourses and practices of militarism were also supported by the central role of the army in the state.

Discourse of Serbian nationalism is believed to cause a shift in general beliefs and values in ways that actually normalized the use of force.⁸⁰ Political statements legitimised the use of force against those perceived as “the others” and began to construct

⁷⁶ Bechev 2011: 14

⁷⁷ Koppa 1999: 149-164

⁷⁸ Griffin 1999: 154–55

⁷⁹ Sorensen 2009: 147

⁸⁰ Geyer 1989: 79

it as inevitable if the Serbian nation was to survive. Such representation of nationalism had deforming capacities on the state and perpetuated certain notions of identity which crystallised in the form of an ethnically defined nationalism and its hegemonic supremacy⁸¹. It was also a period when less visible process of hierarchism – of class and gender, took part.⁸² The impact of Milosevic’s nationalistic policies reached beyond its obvious manifestation in conflicts with the neighbouring states; it had also pervasive effects on economy and general livelihood options available to people.

4.1 Serbia and “the Other”

National identity, dependant on values and ideology, is hereby understood as “mental construct sustained in being by imaginative labour and discursive habit”.⁸³ As established in the theoretical part, national identities are discursively reproduced with the construction of difference.⁸⁴ Milosevic was able to create a feeling of threat among the population which helped him to form a vision of a unified national identity and support for his policies. The concentration of power in Milosevic’s hands was arguably possible because of a formulation of one prevailing national identity which defined itself in an opposition to “the other”.⁸⁵ In the case of Serbian aggressive nationalist policies in the 1990s, Milosevic’s political party kept stressing the difference between Serbian self and other (Albanian/Croatian/the EU/NATO/Muslim) which constituted outside of the nationhood.⁸⁶

When it comes to Kosovo, discriminatory policies targeting the Albanian population and anti-Muslim propaganda fuelled an already tensed situation between the ethnicities. Stereotypes served to reproduce boundaries between an in and out group. One of the common prejudices was that Albanians would outnumber Serbs due their larger families.⁸⁷ An analysis of Milosevic’s political discourse shows usage of dichotomies, where against the “passive” and “peaceful” Serbian stood the “aggressive” and “violent”

⁸¹ Smith 1993: 10-11

⁸² Lutz 2002: 5

⁸³ Cubitt 1998: 3

⁸⁴ Hall 1996

⁸⁵ Jansen 1999

⁸⁶ Subotic 2011

⁸⁷ Bracewell 1996 in Cockburn 2007: 83

Albanians. These binary constructions made a significant impact on the population also because of their widespread usage in the media.⁸⁸

“Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat; [. . .]. What is shocking about these developments is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness.”⁸⁹

The solution to the dangerous “other” embodied by the Albanians was to incorporate Serbian minority living in Kosovo into ‘Greater Serbia’ at the expense of Albanians. This was problematic since Kosovo as “space/homeland” in a symbolic way was used as a marker of nationhood and it was regarded as homeland to both the Albanians and the Serbs. The bond between the nation and homeland was for both ethnicities strong, since each of the nations tied its uniqueness with the territory of Kosovo. On-going tensions related to different interpretation of the space in national history resulted in the Kosovo War.⁹⁰

Milosevic used a discourse on the historical statehood referring to the medieval Serbian kingdom and legitimacy and continuity of Serbian presence in the disputed area of Kosovo.⁹¹ The rhetoric of national territory was closely tied to the understanding of nationhood and was considered as one of the delimitating indicators of nationhood. Milosevic’s mythical interpretation of Kosovo as homeland to Serbs enabled an exclusion of those which were perceived as different / the other. Kosovo served as the nodal point for Serbian nationalism. If one analyses the available political rhetoric, such nationalist mystification was crucial for such exclusion, since it gave moral justification to believe the Serbs were waging a “just war” and it was in their national interest and a matter of preserving “the Serbian”.⁹² This does not mean that nationalism causes violence but it means that nationalism can provide the values and symbols which make violence possible.

⁸⁸ Matic 2004

⁸⁹ Benhabib 1996:3

⁹⁰ Kostovicova 2004

⁹¹ Bar-Tal 2007

⁹² Ibid.

Analysis of national identity and its link to politics is especially relevant when it comes to ethnic violence and conflict. During the war, Albanians were portrayed not as individuals but as members of the other group.⁹³ In cases like this, ethnic belonging and not belonging were used to distinguish who is and is not part of the nation. Milosevic's approach to create a unified vision of Serbs built on a notion of "other", whether on historical, geographical or cultural basis. "European," i.e., Serbian, was contrasted to "oriental," i.e., Muslim⁹⁴. Serbs also presented themselves as guardians of European values, stressing their European identity⁹⁵:

[. . .] the truth about Kosovo and Metohia has not changed much overtime, so that even today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knock-ing at the door of Kosovo and Metohia, is trying to approach Europe. It is hard to believe that Europe is not aware of this. Even those in Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know very well that this old Balkan state represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam.⁹⁶

It is sometimes argued that a great majority of Serbs justified the war as a form of protection from the dangerous Albanian 'other'. At the end of the war, Kosovo was placed under the UN administration and political battle over the status of the territory began. The sense of injustice and victimisation resulting from Western military action towards Serbia and following presence in the disputed province in order to facilitate post conflict reconciliation created resistance towards European/Western powers.⁹⁷ Anti-European stance can be traced in the speeches made by Milosevic as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church.⁹⁸ Milosevic presented the Western intervention and involvement in the conflict as a causing factor for the destruction of the Serbian state. Legitimacy of EU's democratic principles was openly criticised:

"As you know yourselves, for a whole decade efforts have been under way to place the entire Balkans under the control of certain Western powers. Most of that work has been done by

⁹³ Tajfel & Turner 2004

⁹⁴ Hayden 1995

⁹⁵ Erjevac & Volčić 2007

⁹⁶ Saric 1990: 67-69

⁹⁷ Ramet 2007: 41-58

⁹⁸ Vjekoslav 2006

installing puppet governments in certain countries, by turning these countries into countries of limited sovereignty or depriving them of any sovereignty.”⁹⁹

In order to conceptualise the process of Serbian post-war identity transformation, the Kosovo War and anti-Western attitudes should be understood as a regular point of reference when it comes to Serbian transition, since I believe the symbolism of it remains central to delimitation of present development regarding Serbian identity. The narratives of war are still alive and cannot be easily eradicated as discourse of Serbian victimhood prevailed in the immediate post-conflict years too, as will be later illustrated. Discourse of justice and responsibility for the war crimes became an integral part of the Serbian politics after year 2000.

4.2 Milosevic’s foreign policy

Arguably, Serbian foreign policy is affected by a specific view of Serbian national identity which affects the state’s political development. Political decisions produce discourse and therefore it is the political power (and those who represent the power) which has means to unify the discourse and decide what is credible when it comes to nation’s past/present. Discourse and political power are therefore intertwined. In this sense, historical/current events can be interpreted via determined identities/y in a specific way and rationalise a particular political response.

It might be argued that Milosevic consistently deployed force and manipulation to dismiss internal contestation of the Serbian “self”. Milosevic’s attempt to create a singular national identity, the Serbian nation, was characterised by a clear delineation of belonging and not belonging. The concept of nation was postulated to constitute the inside and outside of Serbian nation and to draw boundaries between an inclusion and exclusion.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, those remaining outside the drawn boundaries enabled the assertion of existing distinctions. Whether Milosevic’s vision of the nation were shared by the population or were forcefully imprinted on it, described articulations of national identity had an impact on the nature of state’s foreign relations. Serbia became isolated from the international economics and politics and post-Milosevic government had to deal with the consequences of its previous regime. A series of conflicts, nationalist wars,

⁹⁹ ‘Milosevic speech: Beware external threats’, 2000, BBC News, [online]

¹⁰⁰ Bar-Tal 2007

international crisis, economic sanctions, and anti-Western sentiment following NATO's attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 have all negatively affected the Serbian society.¹⁰¹

The impact of Milosevic's political practices on Serbian identity had consequences on the reinforcement of ethnical identities while attempting to discursively define what Serbian national identity stood for. The argumentation underpinning Serbia's right to Kosovo was focused on revival of national sentiments. By referring to a common tradition, Milosevic's political regime produced a vision of a unified and homogenous Serbian identity. With the loss of public support, Milosevic, facing mounting pressure from the public movement, resigned. His resignation profoundly altered notions of nation and identity and opened a new space for re-definition of what it meant to be Serbian, to accept responsibility for the past.

I argue that it is important to take into account discourse of previous regime because discourses of Milosevic's nationalist politics and post 2000 political developments are closely linked. In order to understand Serbia of today, one should therefore acknowledge the discursive interconnectedness with its previous regime, since it influenced the nature of political discussion in a domestic, as well as international scene.

4.3 Change of power

The next part will present the political events surrounding the demise of Milosevic and formation of a new government. It will serve to describe the political setting in Serbia in a chosen study period and to point towards the role of the country's past in the construction of Serbian political identity.

October 5, 2000, date that marks the fall of Slobodan Milošević's regime, resulted in significant changes in the Serbian politics. In the presidential elections in 2000 Milosevic was defeated by a coalition of opposition movements which lead to collapse of his authoritarian regime. Milosevic dominated Serbian politics and society for the whole decade from the 1990s, when he had taken control over the entire state apparatus, creating a powerful authoritarian regime. His legacy left Serbia as an outcast state, a blocked state and eventually, a bombed state. Serbia's international standing and reputation suffered

¹⁰¹ Svilanovic, G., 'THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS', Statement at the London School of Economics, 31 October 2002, [online]

greatly during the war and together with the worsening economic conditions and living standards it appeared to fuel anti – Milosevic sentiments.¹⁰²

Different social groups, political parties, opposition parties, culture elite, independent media led parallel processes to overthrow the leader. The result of these actions lead to a nearly twenty opposition parties and movements being brought together in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), the goal of which was an electoral defeat of Milosevic and an establishment of democracy. Members agreed to name Vojislav Koštunica as a presidential candidate, an opponent of Milosevic. On the 24th of September 2000, the opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica, defeated president in the first round of presidential election. Milosevic denied the results, claiming a tie. Reluctant to admit his defeat, he ordered to repeat the elections. This caused a huge wave of anti-government demonstrations held in Belgrade, demanding Milosevic to admit his defeat in the first round. The next day, under massive public pressure, Milosevic officially stepped down.¹⁰³

Kostunica's victory was to some extent a surprise for the whole Serbia, fearing Milosevic could manipulate the elections and "legitimately" continue his policy.¹⁰⁴ The political change was believed to be a result of a strong anti-government campaign, the unity of opposition political parties and different NGOs which stressed the need for political, economic and other reforms that could transform Serbia and that were not possible until Milosevic would have been defeated. Therefore, the beginning of the new millennium was for many more than an end of a decade.¹⁰⁵

However, transition of power was not easy. The new government tried to rhetorically distance itself from the previous one and to construct a new image of Serbia in a domestic, as well as international setting. After all, trust in public institutions and state administration was low, the economic development stagnating, the rate of unemployment high and the state had also to deal with refugees and displaced persons.¹⁰⁶ The international isolation of the country manifested itself in imposed trade sanctions, limited travel options for the citizens, etc. Despite all the negatives, Vojislav Kostunica's election as a new president was portrayed as a choice of the Serbian people to follow the

¹⁰² 'The End Of Milosevic', 2000, Mc Geary, J., [online]

¹⁰³ '10 years since fall of Milošević regime', 2010, B92/Tanjug, [online]

¹⁰⁴ 'Elections Planned in Serbia As Shift in Power Takes Hold', 2010, The New York Times, [online]

¹⁰⁵ Bujosevic & Radovanovic 2003

¹⁰⁶ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [online] 2000: 318

path of democracy. The international community seemed to be pleased with the promise of change the results offered, as well as the general public.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the government was required to do a number of things in order to be accepted as a lawful state by the international community.¹⁰⁸

4.4 Towards the reforms

After the fall of Milosevic, who refused the international financial assistance programs and European programmes for transition and reconstruction, the relations between Serbia and the EU relatively rapidly intensified. At the beginning of a new millennium and the advent of democracy in Serbia, European integration has become a priority for the newly elected government. The Democratic Party subscribed to pro-European reforms and it was described as a symbol of Serbia's fast changing direction from the troubled past into perspective, possibly European future.¹⁰⁹

The party promoted rapid and radical reform steps. The main priority was a rapid transformation and integration of Serbia into international structures, primarily the EU. In 2000, Serbia (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)) joined the Process of Stabilization and Association, which included the possibility of future accession to the EU, but it was not bounded by any timeframe. Accession to the EU was made dependant on the speed of Serbia's implementation of EU standards and norms. In 2004, parliament approved a resolution (Resolution on Joining European Union) and shortly afterwards implemented an Action plan for fulfilment of the European Commission recommendations.¹¹⁰

Despite all the progress that Serbia has made since 2000 in the democratic, economic and social areas, it took more than seven years until Serbia signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This was due to the nature of questionable political and economic issues requested by the EU, of which the two most controversial ones were the cooperation of Serbia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the issue of Kosovo. In case of ICTY, the Serbian government had been repeatedly urged to issue wanted war criminals. Strong progress on this issue was recorded only after the new pro-Western government was elected in 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Rupnik 2011: 59

¹⁰⁸ Spasic & Subotic 2011: 351

¹⁰⁹ Rupnik 2011: 65-67

¹¹⁰ 'Serbia and the European Union', The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, [online]

This government helped to successfully track down and arrest Radovan Karadzic, the former leader of Bosnian Serbs, in July 2008 and General Ratko Mladic, who was captured in May 2011.¹¹¹ Another burning question was the problem of Kosovo, where following the NATO bombings Serbia lost sovereignty over this territory, and Kosovo was placed under transitional UN administration. The consequence of international involvement was that Serbia remained a state with an undefined territory.¹¹² The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 led to strong protests in Serbia and bashing of legal independence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which legally confirmed Kosovo's autonomy.¹¹³

Using theorisation of identity, if we acknowledge all group identities are defined in opposition to the "other", then identities can change when what constitutes the other changes too. The "other" is therefore constitutive for the group identity. After year 2000 the discursive construction of Europe as Serbian other and enemy started changing towards more welcoming perceptions. People's identification as European during Milosevic's regime was limited because such possibility for identification was marginalised. Despite a problematic nature of the EU-Serbia relationship in the post-conflict period, Serbia's belonging to Europe began to be stressed, as speeches of president Kostunica illustrates:

"Serbia has always been a part of Europe... no one can introduce Serbia to Europe, or take it out of there... Serbia will be what she has always been, but without Slobodan Milosevic - a part of Europe."¹¹⁴

Such statements reaffirm the centrality of Europe for Serbian identity by indirectly describing the European Union as the only possible future. The quotes also address a distinction the new government was trying to make – that it was Slobodan Milosevic, and his allies, who were responsible for Serbia's isolation from Europe, and not the people, since "the whole country has risen to make one man, Slobodan Milosevic, leave".¹¹⁵ For Serbia, its perception as a perpetrator of war was presented as a result of Milosevic's regime, not the Serbian population. One of the featured themes in the post-Milosevic

¹¹¹ 'The arrest of Ratko Mladic brings hope of peace and prosperity', 2011, Tisdall, S., [online]

¹¹² Ramet 2011: 78

¹¹³ 'Protesters Attack U.S. Embassy in Belgrade', 2008, Videmsek, B., [online]

¹¹⁴ 'Koštunica gives strongly-worded Statehood Day speech', 2008, B92/Tanjug, [online]

¹¹⁵ 'Serbia On Path Towards Democracy', 2001, Kostunica, V., [online]

political discourse was assertion that Serbian population was not to be associated with its former leader and his politics of isolation and extreme nationalism. Political leaders emphasized the negative impact of concentration of power in one leader, stressing isolation and objectification of Serbia:

“...some ten years ago, by most important yardsticks Yugoslavia was closer to the West European integration than any country of East Europe. Today, as a consequence of the policy conducted in the last decade of the twentieth century, it is behind them.”¹¹⁶

The end of Milosevic’s government was to be interpreted as a metaphorical end of the past. Expectations to join the European Union after the change of power were high.¹¹⁷ The official Serbian political discourse presented Serbian identity as European and unquestionably belonging to Europe. Nevertheless, an approval of-from the European Union was needed if such articulations were to be made legally recognisable. However, the EU and Serbia’s visions of what it means to be European often clashed, as will be illustrated on a case study of Kosovo.

To sum up, political transition is a complex and complicated process. The new leading parties in the post-Milosevic era have been trying to shift the direction of the previous isolationist government towards a more opened and Western orientated Serbia. After the conflict, a fast integration into the European structures was expected.¹¹⁸ However, the process of constructing a different Serbia, whether in international or domestic setting, was nothing but smooth. Each Serbian election after 2000 were seen by the international community as an opportunity for Serbia to “shed its rogue image”.¹¹⁹ Paul Hoyot describe rough states as those “lacking in principles and morals” ... having no respect for the international system, preferring to disrupt instead what exists”.¹²⁰ The Serbian political representatives themselves pointed towards a sense of mistrust they felt from Europe, as a result of Serbia’s previous regime’s wrong-doings:

¹¹⁶ Sivilanovic, G., ‘THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS’, Statement at the London School of Economics, 31 October 2002, [online],

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Lazić 2004: p. 207

¹¹⁹ Mertus 2001: 489

¹²⁰ Hoyot in Ibid. 491

“We in Belgrade, and Podgorica, are aware that there continues to exist certain mistrust and that we are expected to provide new confirmations of the seriousness and irreversibility of the changes in our country.”¹²¹

I argue that the identification of Serbia as a rogue state or a state not to be trusted which made the international community treat it as “culturally inferior” ought to be looked at through deeper discursive constructions of the whole region to which Serbia geographically belongs to, the Balkans, as inferior.

5 The civilisation discourse and The Balkans

According to the theoretical underpinning stated in the previous sections, political action, as other social actions, takes place within a certain discursive setting. Mapping of the Serbian political discourse shows the Balkans is one of the principal constituents of Serbian political space. Reference to the Balkans is found in many political speeches and it serves as a concept which helps to define the discourse on Serbian identity.

The analysis suggests that the Balkans is understood not only as a geographical space, but a civilisation region. In line with the poststructuralist theorising on discourses mutually constitute each other, the next part will illustrate how the Balkans is constructed in the European discourse, and what implications such construction have. How is the Balkans perceived and how is the Balkans discursively constructed? What makes its boundaries?

5.1 The dynamics of identity construction from the outside

Robert Kaplan in his book "Eastward to Tartary" argues that the main issue we should be paying attention to when it comes to analysis of the Balkans is an existence of “two Europes”.¹²² He argues that what we are currently witnessing is an existence of two entities, Europe and the Balkans, ideologically merged into one Europe, but distinctively

¹²¹ Svilanovic, G., ‘THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS’, Statement at the London School of Economics, 31 October 2002, [online]

¹²² Kaplan 2001

different. This leads to an emergence of two Europes - a wealthier Europe that includes the former NATO countries and a poorer and unstable Europe which includes much of the former Yugoslavia. Arguably, a cultural, historical, economic and development divide is greater now than it was several years ago. Europe is splitting into two distinct regions, similarly to a previous divide between the Ottoman and Holy Roman empires.

Such construction of the Balkans as a place where conflicts and wars take place is common in the Western discourse. According to cited Samuel Huntington, the Balkans composition of cultures and religions makes it “destined” to remain conflict-prone. He argues that internal heterogeneity of the region does not lead to peaceful coexistence of those living in it.¹²³ Huntington argues for a new division of Europe based on the culture - a division between Western Christianity, Orthodox Christianity and Islam¹²⁴. He claims that each of them needs to have an enemy to get a society mobilised, to fight for higher values, and continue strength of the civilisation. The Balkans is here understood in both geographical and civilisational terms. Thus, for Western understanding of the region, a civilizational-discourse meaning of the term is often stressed.¹²⁵

The ancient hatred argument puts the Balkans in a same position as Huntington, constructing it as a place where century old conflicts resurface over time.¹²⁶ Discourse of historical determinism was used to simplify the conflicts which emerged to be known as Balkan wars. In the 1990s, thus, Balkan emerged as a pejorative term describing geopolitics of the region as violent due to its inherited inclination towards violence.¹²⁷

However, it should be noted that the narrative of ancient hatred is not found in the Western discourse only. The Milosevic regime used the elements of ancient hatred thesis when explaining political steps necessary to “undo” ancient wrongs.¹²⁸ As discussed before, the symbolism of Kosovo as a place where Serbia lost its political entity, power and freedom and became dominated by a foreign culture was used as propaganda for nationalist mobilization in the 1990s and as such used representation of a naturalised conflict between Serbs and Albanians.¹²⁹

The Balkans as a geographical region has defined borders. However, from a civilizational position, it is often referred to as a place in-between, creating imaginary

¹²³ Huntington 1993

¹²⁴ Ibid. 29

¹²⁵ Hansen 2006

¹²⁶ Jovic 2001: 103-104; Kaufman 2001

¹²⁷ Hansen 2006: 141

¹²⁸ Ibid. 146

¹²⁹ Anzulovic 1999

borders between the East and West of Europe in a normative sense.¹³⁰ Politically, the Balkan countries are constructed as both same and different than Europe. The imposed identity of being in-between two contrasting civilisations is something that Serbian political elites distance themselves from. The tendency of official discourse is to place Serbia in the same position as the rest of the European states who are members of the European Union, and so indirectly to stress its non-Balkan civilizational identity. In an interview for French *Le Figaro*, president Tadic stressed how Serbia naturally belongs to Europe and thus the membership in the European Union is seen as country's destiny. He stated that

“... the EU membership is a natural destiny for Serbia, we are a European people, our geographic sphere and our culture are European.”¹³¹

This reoccurring discursive construction of describing Serbia as European signals how European and Europeanness become central to the discourse and shape the relationship between Serbia and other European states. Some authors would suggest that emphasising “European” instead of “Balkan” Serbia is the result of negative usage of the Balkans by the international community which made it “one of the most powerful and widespread pejorative designations in modern history” portraying the Balkans as the “other” of Europe.¹³² According to Larry Wolf, this is because Europe needs to imagine and construct the other in order to construct its own identity.¹³³

Apparently, the Balkans is constructed in the Western discourse in a negative sense, carrying the burden of violent past into the present days. As illustrated, the region has been also notoriously described as violent and unstable due to a series of historical violent events. The ancient hatred rhetoric prescribes the region an unfavourable position in Europe – designated to be violent and conflict prone. The Balkans, according to some authors, became a metaphor of violence.¹³⁴ Such “balkanism” is constructed around certain binary opposition, such as developed/underdeveloped, civilised/uncivilised, etc. The West/Europe has positive qualities while the East/Balkans figures as having negative traits. Both terms are mutually constitutive.

¹³⁰ Bakić-Hayden 1995 & Todorova 2006

¹³¹ ‘EU is Serbia’s destiny, president says’, 2011, Tanjug, [online]

¹³² Todorova 1997

¹³³ Wolf 1994

¹³⁴ Goldsworthy 2002: 25

5.2 Europe's Other

Foreign perceptions of the Balkans should be also considered since based on the theoretical part national identities are determined both from inside and outside. I assume the construction of a Balkan identity from outside influences the policies towards this region. Arguably, the positioning of Serbia into the Western Balkan states has therefore consequences for the Serbian political space. Geographical boundary here carries deeper political demarcations of what is and is not desirable, possible and impossible. The discursive construction of the Balkans is therefore important to address because it marks the political space in which Serbia acts.

Does the EU take the Balkans as part of in-group or put-group unit? The Western Balkans appears to be positioned in between the EU. Some references suggest it is a geopolitical space which differs from the European democratic states and it lack behinds the standards when it comes to values they adhere to. The EU and the Balkans are in this case perceived as mutually incompatible. The European construction of the region positions it as inferior and lacking in terms of values, institutions, etc. Overall, the Balkans appears to be described as the most underdeveloped European region and as a region deficient in political and socio-economic progress when compared to other European regions.¹³⁵ After all, the Western Balkan countries were put together into one category when it comes to EU's regional policies because of their weaker state institutions, conflict ridden past, etc. and required to comply with a specifically designed set of norms. Such symbolic division of Europe imposes a sense of otherness to the Balkan states.¹³⁶ At the same time, regional association is presented as a positive feature of current Serbian political direction. EU membership is portrayed as a possible future for all the countries of the Western Balkans region.¹³⁷

Neumann refers to portrayals of the regions as the Balkans as discursively invented, with political actors being the creators.¹³⁸ He also stresses the invention of the common regional past (violent Balkan Peninsula) and the process of othering in negative

¹³⁵ 'The Balkans: Europe's Soft Underbelly', 2013, The Globalist, [online]

¹³⁶ Balibar 2004; Graan 2010

¹³⁷ European Commission, "Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans; A policy priority for the European Union", Belgium, 2005, [online]

¹³⁸ Neumann 2001: 58

sense (I am Serbian to an extent I am not Croatian) which positions nations in an antagonistic relationship. Following his argumentation, the sense of difference between the nations is being constructed in dynamic processes of socialisation and othering.¹³⁹ Whether the political leaders accept or reject the term Balkan as a negative Western construct, they have to react to existing labelling.¹⁴⁰

Many scholars try to demystify the sense of the Balkans, showing that it means more than a peninsula of these negative associations. They are pointing towards a shared culture which is identifiable, although at the same time there are many different people with a very strong sense of national identity that differentiate it from the other people they share their space with.¹⁴¹

Transitional experience of Serbia itself has been marked by a constant reminder of the violent past, stressing its role in the Yugoslav conflict. Therefore it is possible to ask a question how long such negative construction and demarcation of the region as Europe's "other" can remain a hegemonic construction. According to Waever, it is Europe's own history which constitutes Europe's other, not any geographical part of it. Europe, constructed as civilised and peaceful, has history of violence which cannot be localised to one particular region. It is this violent past which Europe should come in terms with, not victimisation of the Balkan people as sole perpetrators of conflicts in Europe.¹⁴² Nowadays, the image of progressive Europe is present in the national discourse. Europe is seen as model of development ought to be followed. The negative elements of European history (colonialism, wars, totalitarian regimes, etc.) are mostly omitted from the Europeanization discourse and Europe is therefore constructed as an ideal model to follow, taking into account only its "peaceful" post-World War II history.¹⁴³

I agree with the vision that the Balkan state are seen as balancing between the difference and similarity; it is the other within, wishing to join the European structures but at the same time seen as unstable.¹⁴⁴ As a metaphor, the Balkans can be used and sometimes misused for political purpose. Specific discourse of the Balkans thus provides a space for interpretation of political actions and attitudes towards the region.

¹³⁹ Ibid. 59

¹⁴⁰ Bechev 2011: 15

¹⁴¹ Todorova 1997, Hayden 1995

¹⁴² O. Weaver 1998: 100

¹⁴³ Ibid. 16

¹⁴⁴ Jordanova 2001: 56; Noris 1999:27; Todorova 1994: 453

As established above, the relation between the West and the Balkans was often defined as a relation of opposition.¹⁴⁵ Nowadays, Serbia is neither a “traditional” Balkan state in a pejorative term as it has managed to stick to certain principles of cooperation but it is not fully Western yet because it is not a member of the EU (NATO). The construction of the Serbian “self” in the political discourse is in the process of transformation from the dominant conflict-prone vision of the nation (Milosevic’s radical nationalistic Serbia), into Western disputably civilised nation. In an interview with Euronews, president Tadic clearly distanced Serbia from an ‘old’ Serbian regime of Milosevic, and stressed its democratic projection, where he stated:

“... we had a democratic revolution in Serbia... 16 years ago, that was a government of Slobodan Milosevic...”¹⁴⁶

However, in time of crisis, such as were the protests over Kosovo’s independence, Serbia is described as still vulnerable to a step back into its “dark” past:

“when they speak positively about us, they call us South East Europe. And when they don’t, we are simply Balkans...”¹⁴⁷

Arguably, transformation of the whole region, Serbia included, offers two alternatives – the positive development towards the Western structures and backward negative transformation towards the “Balkan” past. Thus, within the political discourse, one can distinguish patterns of the Western and the Balkan alternative¹⁴⁸:

“Serbia has to choose between its nationalist past and a European future.”¹⁴⁹

In the context of regional development, the memories of war remind the states of their violent past, but prospect of EU membership offer to former Yugoslav states another

¹⁴⁵ Neofotistos 2008

¹⁴⁶ Tadic presses on with Serbia’s EU bid’, 2013, Euronews, [online]

¹⁴⁷ Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate, 2010, Public Lecture, [online]

¹⁴⁸ Neofotistos 2008

¹⁴⁹ Rehn 2006

option. Again, old constructions of West as rational and enlightened while Balkans as passionate and irrational emerges, although in new light.¹⁵⁰

The regions position vis-à-vis Europe is often used in respective national political discourses and such the Balkans-Europe dichotomy has been often used in concrete political programmes and election campaigns. Work of Todorova presents how such negatively is Balkan identity constructed in the discourse of local political elites.¹⁵¹ Belonging to Balkan, being part of it is either accepted or rejected is imposed on the neighbouring states in order to distinguish their own identity as European.¹⁵² Europeanness and Balkanness are put into a sharp contrast. The Balkans is constructed through a discourse that associates progress with EU.¹⁵³ At the same time, it becomes Europe's "antithetical periphery".¹⁵⁴ However, writers like Ole Weaver would question whether something like European Other within Europe's geographical borders exists. He prefers to use the term "less-Europe" than anti-Europe when it comes to societies finding themselves on the borders of Europe, where Serbian society is often said to belong.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, he offers alternative approach to identity formation which is less strict and more opened towards alternative identity formation.

In practical terms, the position of Serbia as part of the Western Balkans region in the European politics means for the changing nature of its political identity a need to improve its relations with neighbouring states with which it was in conflict. Serbian politicians aspire to distance Serbia from being perceived as a conflict prone Balkan state, and to accept foreign policy decisions that would bring it closer to EU membership:

"the future of the Balkans (Serbia) lies in the EU"¹⁵⁶

In some cases, the European decisions were perceived as unjust and they often lead to an atmosphere of unease among the Serbian political elites and the general public. The reoccurring theme in the press releases was postulated around the question of how much would Serbia have to give up in order to be accepted into the EU. The cost of joining the EU was described as high to pay:

¹⁵⁰ Bakic-Hayden & Hayden 1992

¹⁵¹ Todorova 1997

¹⁵² Said 1979, Bakić-Hayden & Hayden 1992; Hayden 1995

¹⁵³ Bjelić & Savić 2002: 2

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 3

¹⁵⁵ Waever 1998

¹⁵⁶ Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate, 2010, Public Lecture, [online]

“the moral price to be in international community was extremely high...”¹⁵⁷

Pro-European political parties found itself in a difficult position of how to present the EU requirements as justifiable and beneficial to the state in a long term perspective. Following Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, nodal point “the EU” around which construction of new post-conflict Serbian identity is being shapes carries a specific set of signifiers such as state, democracy, justice, human rights, etc. which are given meaning in relation to the European Union. These are then articulated in the Serbian political sphere as either compatible or not compatible with the proposed visions of norms. What appears to be stressed by the Serbian politicians is a need to be patient with the transformation process since country’s democratic orientation does not have a long establishment and normalization of pro-democratic values takes time and dedication:

“Our democracy is young and frail and it must gain as many friends and defenders as possible.”¹⁵⁸

To conclude, the Balkans was usually thought of in terms of violence, ethnic rivalry, fragmentation. Constructing the Balkans as barbaric/violent/uncivilised naturalized the position of its people as outsiders of Western civilisation. It is interesting to observe how even today Balkan equalises anti-European. These two terms are being used as mutually exclusive and reproduce the West and East separation. What is also interesting to mention is that Serbia, along with other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, used the notion of “the West” to explain the Self and differentiate it from other ethnic groups.¹⁵⁹ Nowadays, there is a contradiction in the use of the term Balkan within the Serbian political discourse. On one hand, Serbia is in a way forced to accept the Balkans as a region with defined geographical boundaries, a region to which it belongs. On the other hand, Serbia also attempts to distance itself from such belonging and describes it as a matter of the troubled past, where the Balkans is often equalised with Milosevic. Serbia therefore seems to be accepting its geographical position but distancing itself ethically from the past. Also, Europe’s role as a standard setter for Serbia, in spite of many divided opinions on some matters, is strong. EU membership is described as something belonging to the future while the Balkan of the 1990s is constructed as Serbia’s past. Ultimately, the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Tadic, 15th September 2008, Belgrade, speech given on the International Day of Democracy in Dobric 2009

¹⁵⁹ Lazić 2004: 195

discourse on the Balkans shows how space and belonging can be interpreted differently in political realms.

5.3 The European Union and Serbia

Identities as social categories are defined in opposition to each other, as established in the theoretical part. In terms of process of othering in the EU, the region Western Balkans is sometimes used in the EU discourse as reminder of “Europe’s past” which can be only overcome by region’s integration into the current EU structures. To some extent, the Balkans seems to replace what Central and Eastern Europe once was. The discourse of new/old Europe is present in the current debates surrounding Serbia’s transition and it is often this difference between the past and the presence which is used in political speeches on both sides, by Serbia and the EU simultaneously.

European Union indirectly allows for an alternative scheme of identification, which presumes a shared vision of values and norms irrespective of ethnicity/nationality. Arguably, the problem is that no distinct European identity is distinguishable, since “Europe has no essence per se, but is a discursive construct and a product of many overlapping discourses”.¹⁶⁰ The role of Europe for national identification is there also part of a discursive struggle.¹⁶¹ At the same time, an idea of Europe/ the EU is inseparable from Serbian national discourse.

Politically, during the last decade, Serbia has been seen moving away from radical nationalism towards becoming a democratic state. Moreover, Serbia has found itself cooperating with the regional partners as it has improved political and economic relations with the neighbouring countries:

“Regional relations had reached a new level of trust and understanding...we have found ways to work together...”¹⁶²

The political speeches of the EU representatives also suggest we should be optimistic about the current developments in the Balkans and see the region as relatively stable.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Strath & Wodak 2009: 15

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate, 2010, Public Lecture, [online]

The EU discourse on Serbia stresses EU's support for Serbia's integration if it fulfils the set of conditions and offers rhetorical reassurance about EU's intentions to see Serbia as part of Europe:

“I can assure you that the EU wants Serbia to succeed”
(statement by C. Ashton on Serbia's membership)¹⁶⁴

However, although the main pillar of Serbian foreign policy is its relationship with the EU and possible membership,¹⁶⁵ one particular issue offers a different discourse on positive Serbian development. An area where European and Serbian political discourses differ and which has a negative connotation for the discursive construction of Serbian identity in the European discourse is the issue of Kosovo and Serbian opposition to recognize its independence.

Within the European political discourse, it is widely acknowledged that Kosovo's future is Serbia's future. The main construction is that Serbian EU hopes are tied to Kosovo – if Serbia wants to join the EU, it must first normalize ties with Kosovo.¹⁶⁶ The territorial disputes with Kosovo, ongoing for several years, reveal a clash between a European dimension of Serbian politics with its membership aspirations and old-Serbia narratives when it comes to contested notion of Serbian identity. The tension over constructions of Serbian identity and European identity, which are attempting to be mutually compatible, returned an ‘old’ understanding of the signifier Serbian identity with its ethno-national markers. The topic is clearly linked with national priorities. Kosovo is closely tied to Serbian understanding of identity, as illustrated in the following speech:

“I am expecting, I am asking everyone... to expect legitimate Serbian interest... we are member state of the UN, we have our legitimate rights... we have identity... and the origin of our identity is in Kosovo”.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ ‘A Different Balkan Story’, 2013, Ashton, C., [online]

¹⁶⁴ “Serbia wants serious relationship with EU”, 2013, B92/Tanjug, [online]

¹⁶⁵ Rupnik 2011: 70

¹⁶⁶ Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the press point with PM Dačić and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after their meeting together with President Nikolić European Commission - MEMO/12/823 30/10/2012

¹⁶⁷ ‘Serbia after Mladic arrest’, 2011, Euronews, Interview, [online]

Serbian political leaders, being proponents of the pro-European developments, found it difficult to accommodate these developments within the structure of discourse of the European Union. The European Union sees a clash between attempts of Serbian leaders to present Serbia as European, yet at the same time against Kosovo's territorial integrity. Presenting Kosovo as an enemy to Serbian nation or a threat to Serbian sovereignty is seen as an unwelcomed attitude by the European Union. Indirectly, it questions Serbian Europeanness. The signifier of Europeanness appears to have different meanings for Serbia and the European Union. During the war, the political discourse on Kosovo was meant to accentuate the difference between Serbian and Albanian. Nowadays, it is used to accentuate a just and unjust Europe. For Serbia, EU integration stands in opposition to preservation of the state territory which has political consequences. On a more abstract level, Serbia is struggling with the European demands which are in contrast with its own vision of identity. For the EU, ethno-national markers prominent in the discourse of Serbian politicians after Kosovo's independence are unacceptable with the vision of Europeanness. Such discourse is not expected of a country wishing to join the EU.

However, when it comes to political action, while Serbian politicians postulated a direct opposition to recognize Kosovo's independence, they had also made clear the history will not repeat itself and the violent conflicts which took place during Milosevic's political activity are not likely:

“... those who will try to do something like that (*ask Serbia to recognize Kosovo's independence*) will fail” ... but at the same time I don't think Serbia can bring new conflict to the European Union.”¹⁶⁸

Indeed, Kosovo's secession, which in the Serbian discourse figured as a clear political loss of Serbia, did not bring country back into the cycle of violence, although small violent incidents happened.¹⁶⁹ The potential benefits of EU membership seemed to be more valuable than the loss of Kosovo. Leaders openly confirmed their intention not to be involved in a similar conflict. What was also stressed was a willingness to improve relations with the neighbouring countries and Serbia's ambition to become a fully democratic state. Such statements highlight a difference between current Serbia's understanding of the EU and the one of Milosevic.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Rupnik 2011: 60

Selected political issue of Kosovo's independence has to be placed within a broader debate about the accession process and demands made by the EU. Kosovo's independence was an important momentum for the Serbian population and it was the identity rhetoric that was used to explain why Serbia cannot accept its independence *per se*. The issue of Kosovo was presented as an issue of statehood. As discussed in the previous parts, Kosovo's national/historical role in Serbian history is profound. Those who are for Kosovo's independence would be against the Serbian state.¹⁷⁰ The particular nature of discourse reveals that territorial integrity is not the only reason for Serbian opposition to Kosovo's independence; it is about the very core of Serbian identity itself. The EU's demand on Serbia to accept an independent Kosovo is seen as a threat to Serbia's independence and sovereignty.

Nowadays, by borrowing an analogy from Ole Waever's argument on Europe's other, I would argue that it is Serbia's own radical past which stands for Serbia's other, and which does not allow it to become its "present self". The foreign policy issue of Kosovo's independence reveals one example of a clash between EU membership as foreign policy priority and Serbian understanding of the self. This tension between the Serbian and European political discourse on Kosovo and in an abstract sense Europeanness makes Serbian identity to appear incompatible with European identity.

What is observable is that the European political discourse shows patterns of moving away from a negative portrait of Serbian identity to a positive one when Serbia finds itself agreeing to comply with European "standards". If it does not comply, political action is taken, such as when the lack of progress in issuing war criminals cost the country postponing of accession talk. One could argue that the use of sanctions against communities displaying non-European features can point towards on-going attempts to construct European identity and to build a policy as to define what "the other" non-European constitutes. In the next part, I want to pay attention to theorization on the European Union and the problematic of standard setting, since I believe a new identity begins to crystallise around the notions of Europeanness and EU plays an essential role in the construction of Serbian identity.

¹⁷⁰ Obradovic 2008

5.4 Europeanization – where next?

The notion of Europeanness plays a common currency in the identity politics on the European periphery. Attempts at regional reintegration can be interpreted as Europeanization consisting of debalkanization, where the later means establishing peace in the region. Indeed, it seems the discussion about EU's normative pillar proliferated with the ongoing enlargement process.

Scholars have become intrigued in addressing the impact of European integration on domestic policies and offer a wide range of explanations how EU transforms domestic political structures. First, Europeanization has a two dimensional character of “uploading and downloading” which means establishing clear causal factors is extremely difficult as “the challenge is to model the impact of European integration on domestic policy, knowing that at the same time domestic politics is a major factor at work in EU political change”¹⁷¹. Second, both political actors, the EU and aspiring member states, are evolving units, with changing policies and legislation.¹⁷²

According to a rationalist model, the price of compliance with EU conditions plays a central role in willingness of candidate countries to adopt EU rules. States comply with EU rules when the cost calculations favour benefits of EU membership over the domestic price of compliance.¹⁷³ The EU uses the system of “reinforcement by reward” which means it rewards those states which comply with the pre-set conditions and withholds rewards if state fails to comply with them. The rationalists tend to look at the material costs and benefits: how exciting it is to join the EU, what is the level of public support, what public polls say, etc. The constraints on the impact of the EU are therefore about the domestic adjustment costs- if it costs too much to advocate the reform the EU is promoting, to get it through the parliament, there is a less likelihood of successful Europeanization. The focus is on what the EU is “asking” candidate states to do and whether it is worth doing it. To sum up, the EU's influence is all about the incentives it offers, the agenda it sets and how exciting it is for the countries to join the Union.

Another area of Europeanization studies stresses the dimension of social learning, according to which states are willing to adopt pre-set European rules and meet the conditions only if they perceive them in accordance with their value/normative

¹⁷¹ Biilmer & Radaelli 2004: 3

¹⁷² Ibid. p. 4

¹⁷³ Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig 2003

system.¹⁷⁴ European rules have to be perceived as legitimate.¹⁷⁵ Membership in the European Union depends on the level of adherence to deeper constitutive norms. These are referred to as specific normative elements, such as democratic governance, protection of minority rights, and peaceful foreign relations.¹⁷⁶ Similarly, Bulmer and Radaelli highlight an informal element of EU's transformative power as one of the features of Europeanization. According to their definition, "Europeanisation is not simply about formal policy rules but about less tangible aspects, such as beliefs and values."¹⁷⁷

A great number of Europeanization scholars questions how the EU socializes aspiring member states by altering their identities, preferences and interests.¹⁷⁸ One reason for unsuccessful socialisation of potential member states is stated as tension between national interests and European values.¹⁷⁹ Such conceptualisation requires an understanding of the European Union as a system of values, although it can be a system full of contradiction.

In terms of Union's transformative power, its positive impact in the Central/Eastern Europe is often highlighted. It is often argued that no other international organisation had such a deep and extensive influence on the domestic policies of other countries.¹⁸⁰ Accession of these states into European structures had an effect on different layers of the state, ranging from judicial system, the rule of law, various regulatory policies, and environmental issues to identities. The constructivists in IR have a lot to say about how the EU worked in Central-Eastern Europe in terms of construction of an alternative identity after the fall of communism.¹⁸¹ Arguably, after 1989, there was a very strong emotional attachment to the idea of Europe, and particularly the identity politics of Europe played a very positive role in underpinning the whole process of reforms.¹⁸² Enlargement was not about cost-benefit calculations, it was about a shared identity, something people felt was about their own identity as Europeans. The process of identity construction is in this understanding related to the end of the Cold War, ending of an

¹⁷⁴ Esptein 2008

¹⁷⁵ Subotic 2011

¹⁷⁶ Othon & Bechev 2003: 21

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 23

¹⁷⁸ Hooghe 2005; Vjekoslav 2006

¹⁷⁹ Dulić 2011: 29

¹⁸⁰ Moravcsik 1999:1

¹⁸¹ Neumann 1998

¹⁸² Rupnik 2011: 29

artificial division of Europe and finding a European identity.¹⁸³ They argue that the questions of identity and legitimacy are intertwined and the EU's influence also works through identity construction within the EU and with the potential members.

I have been informed by above illustrated strands which all address the issue of Europeanization and take into account their understanding of the subject. All of the approaches have helped me to better understand Serbian transformation processes and with the analysis of the political developments. Nevertheless, my perspective on identity focuses mainly on understanding identities as relational and discursive constructs. For the reading of Serbian identity, it means Serbian identity is also discursively constructed and what is to be considered is how Serbia defines the Serbian Self with contrast to Others. Aligned with this theoretical assumption, poststructuralist approach to identity study would assume that Serbian discourse on the EU and/or Kosovo, through its representation of these units, is telling in terms of discursive constructions of Serbian identity. Therefore, it is important to consider how Serbia talks about the EU/Kosovo and identity. The Europeanization sets specific normative targets for Serbia and the EU as its representative serves as an instrument of change pushing Serbia forward away from its troubled past. Serbia is a unique case because it did not fully identify with the European identity despite formulating the EU membership as an official foreign policy priority. To understand why it is so, we need to take into account Serbia's perception of West/Europe and impact of Serbian post-Yugoslav identity formation. The legacy of the past is still present in the current discourse about Serbia's Europeanness.

¹⁸³ Coppitiers 2004

6 How European?

Europeanization can mean something very specific, as well as elusive. It can describe means as well as an end process. Europeanization is fluid to a certain degree since different regions and countries give it different meaning. In terms of relationship between Serbian national identity and level of Europeanization, it appears to be more an issue of countries willingness to adhere to changes than its capacity to do so. This is because national interest often crash with the EU pressures on reforms.¹⁸⁴ Disagreement over sensitive issues, like the treatment of minorities, territorial integrity and extradition of war criminals, have slowed down the process of reforms.¹⁸⁵ Despite a slow progress, EU rhetoric points to an integration of the country into Europe's fold:

“People in Serbia have a European perspective and Serbia's place is within the European family.”¹⁸⁶

Serbia is currently in the preparatory pre-accession phase which means we are dealing with a process where EU externally defines what change means; it has no influence over the agenda of Europeanization as members of the EU do. The EU therefore can have significant influence on the domestic discourse of the countries.

EU as a normative power defines which norms Serbia has to accept: accept past crimes, reconsolidate with neighbours, etc. Another area is an adoption of *acquis communautaire*. As the Union widens and deepens, the volume of the *acquis* grows too. This means more rules, regulations and agreements than during the previous enlargements. As a country seeking membership of the European Union, Serbia was formally required to conform to the conditions set out by the accession criteria (also known as The Copenhagen Criteria of Accession), established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The criteria can be divided into three sub-groups: political, economic and a specific acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. According to The Copenhagen Criteria¹⁸⁷, any country that wishes to join the European Union is required to meet the following accession criteria:

¹⁸⁴ Rupnik 2011: 73

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. 71

¹⁸⁶ Solana 2008

¹⁸⁷ 'Economic accession criteria', 2011, European Commission, [online]

- political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

An additional requirement was demanded of Serbia: full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The rationale behind this demand was to provide “access to documents and witnesses, in support of on-going or planned ICTY trials” and identification of individuals responsible for war crimes in the Yugoslav conflict.¹⁸⁸ This requirement is sometimes referred to as “conditionality plus”.¹⁸⁹ Initially, the level of cooperation was low and Serbia faced growing dissatisfaction from the international community over its attitude towards the court. According to the political elites, the legacy of the past was not to be perceived as a defining moment for the future direction of the state. Serbian political leaders presented the conflict as a shared responsibility of all the warring states, and expected equal treatment when it came to reconciliation and responsibility for the war crimes. The tension between the European and Serbian visions of responsibility is seen in the following quote of president Nikolic, where it is apparent that Serbian leader accuses the West of presenting the Serbs as the only perpetrators and those responsible for the conflict:

“Someone is trying to establish the conclusion that the Serbian side alone was conducting killings and genocide in a bestial and orgiastic manner, while the other side sat on its hands, dealing with its daily routines and humanitarian work.”¹⁹⁰

However, things have improved over time and on 29 April 2008, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed between the European Union and Serbia.¹⁹¹ The

¹⁸⁸ European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 2012, p.18

¹⁸⁹ Rupnik 2011: 72

¹⁹⁰ 'Nikolić: Hague hinders regional reconciliation', 2013, Tanjug, [online]

SAA granted Serbia the status of associated state to the EU and made it accountable for progress in complying with the stated set of conditions. Serbia showed clear interest in becoming “the acceding EU country with the clear perspective of EU membership”.¹⁹²

Europeanization is therefore an elusive term and can generate domestic clashes over the nature of reforms, as well as identity. The argumentation of what constitutes the “ideal” national interest and national identity is especially heated in the Western Balkans. The countries seem to want a European future, but they are not sure how European it should be. In case of Serbia, domestic resistance was mainly hindered by the nationalist forces. The problem is that part of the political elites seemed to be suspicious of the international community which, according to their view, has been rather anti-Serbian when it comes to its actions. The legitimacy of the changes required by the EU is thus difficult to defend in front of the domestic audience. Nevertheless, European integration remains the most salient issue in Serbian foreign policy:

“The EU is the warranty for our stability, the referee for our quarrels and the groundwork for a long term and maintainable prosperity.”¹⁹³

6.1 The Balkan question is a European question

When it comes to the Balkans, the EU incentives cannot seem to overcome the identity issues - to resolve the issues of unfinished reconciliation. The Balkan states, Serbia included, are dealing with huge political issues about the status of the country, its territory, monopoly, etc. Whether the Balkans should join the EU is sometimes discursively constructed as a pointless question. The argument is that the Western Balkan states are already enclaved in Europe, geographically and politically surrounded by Europe, and there is simply “no alternative” than an eventual accession.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ ‘Serbia - EU-Serbia relations’, European Commission, [online]

¹⁹² ‘Serbia and the European Union’, The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, [online]

¹⁹³ Boris Tadic, the President of Serbia, in a speech given at the St. Galen Symposium, 9th May 2009, St. Galen

¹⁹⁴ Othon & Bechev 2003

"Despite difficulties in the crisis, the European unification has yet to be completed - it continues. Serbia deserves the fully-fledged membership in the EU as it is an essential part of the European unification. Serbia is already a part of Europe in historic, political and human terms".¹⁹⁵

However, Europeanization is extremely demanding¹⁹⁶ and the countries in South East Europe are up against a moving target that runs faster and becomes more demanding by the day".¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, starting from an assumption that an ultimate goal of the Western Balkan countries is the EU membership, and that the EU represents the most influential international organization, it is very likely that the criteria set up by the EU will remain influential on Serbia's transition processes. Nevertheless, the changing nature of political landscape and closer ties with the EU required a new attitude towards understanding of what it means to be European. Cooperation with the Kosovo was a precondition to receive appraisal from the EU Institutions and start moving into the right direction. In the next part, I will focus on the relationship between the EU and Serbia on the issue of Kosovo to highlight this problematic. I specifically focus on national discourse on Kosovo/on European integration. When the Serbian political elites speak about Serbia in relation to Kosovo and the EU, they are also reflecting and creating Serbia's identity.¹⁹⁸ Analysing political discourse provides a lesson about how politicians see Serbia and what reality they construct through their discourse.

6.2 Foreign policy and Identity

Foreign policy is closely tied with representation of identity – one shapes another in a mutual manner. Analysing foreign policy by applying poststructuralist approach means understanding foreign policy as a discursive practise.¹⁹⁹ Policy discourses are results of social processes where addressing opposition and the general public takes place in order to institutionalize policymakers' "understanding of the identities and policy options at stake".²⁰⁰ Mobilisation of identity for the purpose of presentation and implementation of foreign policy is dependent on the discursive practices. Identity is thus inseparable from

¹⁹⁵ "EU enlargement "cannot be completed without Serbia", 2013, B92/Tanjug, [online]

¹⁹⁶ Othon 2005: 80

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. 84

¹⁹⁸ Cameron 2011:172

¹⁹⁹ Hansen 2006: 1

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 26

foreign policy.²⁰¹ In this sense, policies are a direct result of representation of the factor they address. Understanding of the factor requires enunciation of identities of “Other” as well as “Self”. Identity is hereby understood as “discursive and political, relational and social”.²⁰² Identities are not only relationist but also contextual which means they are defined in relation to other identities in a particular time-framed setting. They appear to be stable within a certain discourse.

As established in the theoretical part, language brings things into being and it can be understood as “social and political, and inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference”.²⁰³ Derrida refers to it a system of juxtapositions –set of valued and devalued signs. Due to an ambiguous nature of language as structured and unstable at the same time, one must be aware of possible “undecidability” of texts. This is where Foucault brings attention to political agency and its effects on creation and recreation of discourses (Foucault 1997). Articulation of policies as reactions to problems happen via construction of policy problems which happen via policy discourses (Foucault 1977).

Foreign policy issues require an interpretative approach. Identities are not stable and therefore any conceptualization of identity depends on continuous articulation by opposing discourses. Identities are also relational in a sense they are expressed in contrast to each other and constituted via collective.²⁰⁴ In order to legitimize a particular foreign policy, political actors rely on a representation of identity. Identities are therefore constitutive of foreign policy.²⁰⁵ It should be also acknowledged that fluidity of national identity is limited by specific time and space and certain aspects of national identity are politicized over others.

6.3 Kosovo

Why has Serbia been reluctant to accept specific European political requirements to accept Kosovo’s independence which would help Serbia towards EU accession, which is after all Serbia’s primary foreign policy goal? I argue that what can be observed in the EU-Serbia discourse on Kosovo is identity divergence, where political actors define

²⁰¹ Ibid. 26

²⁰² Ibid. 5

²⁰³ Ibid. 15

²⁰⁴ Anderson 1983

²⁰⁵ Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006

themselves in contrast to presumably shared values and norms. I will be looking at discursive practices used by Serbian political elites to interpret foreign policy issues of national importance.²⁰⁶

Borders are key modality when it comes to the fraught relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. When Kosovo declared independence, events and injustices of the past were once again brought into the narratives of the present. The way that some politicians publicly opposed the demands by EU for a separate entity in Kosovo signify differences over a definition of national identity. Serbia's reaction to independence was seen as mirroring a notion of victimhood which again stressed the place of Kosovo in Serbian and Kosovar nation building. Indeed, similar rhetoric to that of Milosevic's nationalist discourse which put Serbs in a position of victims of Western powers who wanted to suppress it emerged.²⁰⁷

The issue of Kosovo's independence was instrumentalised by political forces across the region and the waiting years to dissolve the problem have been deeply traumatizing and destructive both for Kosovo and Serbia. The International Community was accused of keeping the status quo, deliberate ambiguity of the state. Their presence in Kosovo was strongly criticised:

“... the results achieved by the International Community that took over responsibility for solving this problem as of June 10, 1999, are also disastrous. Despite the presence of the international armed forces, police forces and administration, more than 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians were expelled from Kosovo and Metohia, and more than 1,300 Serbs were killed, about 1200 people being reported as missing.”²⁰⁸

Kosovo is also postulated as constitutive of Serbian identity:

For Serbia, the Kosovo problem [...] is not just a question of territorial integrity and sovereignty, but, above all, a question of preserving the identity. [...] Today, we are facing the attempts to usurp the Serbian orthodox identity in Kosovo and Metohija [...] No one without the identity has a future. That question is transcendent

²⁰⁶ The analysis of Kosovo as ethno-space is based on speeches by Serbian politicians on Kosovo in Kuzmanovic 2011: 36-37

²⁰⁷ Ramet 2007: 52

²⁰⁸ Zivkovic, Z., 'TRANSITION IN SERBIA – ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES', lecture at the London School of Economics, 23 January 2004

and it is the core of our existence. [...] Serbia is the Christian cradle of Europe.²⁰⁹

When Kosovo declared independence, one could trace a division within Kosovo Serb community itself between those who were moderate and ready to accept new status of Kosovo, and those who decided to go as radical as they could.²¹⁰ The repetition of the ethnic segregation was visible once again. All the institutions that were built up with the help of the presence of the international community were ethnically segregated, especially the Kosovo police service, where an establishment of separate Albanian Kosovo police and Serbian Kosovo police forces was kept. The Northern Kosovo was also described as a blank area where neither Kosovo nor Serbia can benefit from - neither Kosovo nor Serbia can claim taxes, gain control over illegal businesses, etc. since regional cooperation was basically non-existent.²¹¹

The independence of Kosovo should have been mainly seen as a possibility of conceiving the recognition of Kosovo as a transformative event. Kosovo's independence was a chance to come to terms with what had happened and to move forward. However, Serbia found a position where it could no longer articulate the representation of place extremely difficult. What seemed to underline Serbia's anti-independence rhetoric towards Kosovo is that protecting Serbian national identity was closely tied to protecting "Serbian" territory and those two appeared to be inseparable:²¹²

"Well, for us, Serbs, Kosovo is like the very air we breathe. It's the beating heart of our culture - and home to our most sacred shrines. Kosovo is the land where hundreds of thousands of Serbs gave their lives for their country and the cause of freedom. [...] [Kosovo] is in our dreams at night, and in our prayers in the church. It is the apple of our eye. It is our Jerusalem."²¹³

Support of European states for Kosovo's independence created a strong sense of injustice and antagonism towards the EU. Serbian ambivalent attitudes towards the EU were discursively shaped around the notion that being European comes at great cost. The EU

²⁰⁹ Boris Tadic, the President of Serbia, in a speech delivered for the 150th anniversary of the Serbian Orthodox Municipality in Vienna (Jun 2010), Kuzmanovic 2011

²¹⁰

²¹¹ Schelter 2003

²¹² White 2000: 32

²¹³ Vuk Jeremic, Foreign Minister in Serbian Government since 2007; at Wheaton College, Chicago, March 17 2011, Kuzmanovic 2011

was seen as an actor taking something away, whether described as territory or in more abstract terms national pride, part of history.

Nevertheless, some of the most important things that are happening are not reported in the international press and that is there are direct communications without foreigners intervening for daily issues between Belgrade and Pristina. There has been a shift in Serbian politics on the issue of Kosovo:

“we (Serbs) do not seek confrontation but compromise... Serbian response to Pristina’s independence is wholly unknown to the Balkan experience...”²¹⁴

Although Serbia remains reluctant to accept the independence for Kosovo, the response found in the discourse of Kosovo seems like a rhetorical resistance with eventual acceptance:

“(we are) leaving bad things in the past and trying looking into the future... using a little bit of patience and understanding for the position of the other side... that’s how we see this process.. that is the goal we are trying to achieve when it comes to Kosovo”²¹⁵

One of the arguments that are highlighted by the EU is that if Serbia moves towards Europe, there will be a kind of momentum that will help the other states of the region too. Serbia not only wishes to join the EU, it also aims to help fostering integration of all the Balkans:

“...and at the end of the day (*our Serbian hope is*) to bring all people that are living on the Balkans within the European union”²¹⁶

The EU also stresses a need for a progress in the regional integration and opening of the channels of communication between the states is important and welcomed.²¹⁷ Arguably, through its accession process, the EU has exerted a significant on-going influence on the pace and character of post conflict state building in both Serbia and Kosovo, and the EU membership works here as a conflict prevention strategy:

²¹⁴ Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., *Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate*, 2010, Public Lecture, [online]

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ ‘Serbia after Mladic arrest’, 2011, Euronews, Interview, [online]

²¹⁷ Rupnik 2011: 71

“In our estimation, the best way to proceed is to build a common future in Europe in which borders and minority problems will lose its importance.”²¹⁸

Now, in the post-Milosevic era, the political discourse seems to underline a need for a transformation of Serbian identity from victims to democrats. However, due to the nature of conflict and atrocities resulted from it, the international community at the same time poses limitations on what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate forms of national manifestation when it comes to Serbia. And this is highly problematic. For Serbia, it opens a question if democratic government can and should be held responsible for the acts of the non-democratic predecessors.²¹⁹ It also means coming in terms with its own contested vision of national identity, being positioned between past and present.

“Each nation state in the western Balkans is proud of its identity. It is something to be cultivated and not washed away. Identity is not an impediment to fulfilling the regions potential.”²²⁰

As discussed, political identities in the post-Milosevic transition in Serbia are being constantly rethought and negotiated. The image of Serbian identity within the political discourse of “new” Serbia remains contested. There is still no political consensus on Serbia’s agency in post-Yugoslav conflicts²²¹ and the relationship with European Union remains often unclear too. Moreover, the process of EU integration is burdened by the unresolved national issues. It is often stressed that the stability of the whole region depends on Serbia’s stability and stability/security of the region is important for stability of the Union. Indirectly, the EU requires a re-definition of Serbian identity which needed for successful integration into the EU.

²¹⁸ Svilanovic, G., ‘THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS’, Statement at the London School of Economics, 31 October 2002, [online]

²¹⁹ Mehler 2012

²²⁰ Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate, 2010, Public Lecture, [online]

²²¹ Based on speeches by Serbian politicians in Mehler 2012

7 Concluding remarks

Identities are not consensual or smooth. While I acknowledge the adaptation of domestic formal institutions to EU pressures, I decided to focus on the process of identity transformation of the Serbian state. What is especially poignant is that while the EU requires adherence to European rules and laws (conditionality), it officially does not require adoption of collective European identity per se. However, the changes in domestic structures that are results of EU's formal pressure to adhere to European standards arguably influence the way nations view and presents themselves. Therefore, I tried to illustrate how Europeanization impacts collective understanding of Serbian nation-state. It seems that the effect of European identity depends on its coherence with the state's own idea about its nation and compatibility of visions of political order. It is interesting to look at how Europe and Europeanness is understood and incorporated in the Serbian discourse. European integration is rhetorically used as a tool/insurance against the revival of nationalist tendencies.²²² Western discourse presents the Union as an actor of peace.

Serbian conflict-ridden past is being understood as the Balkans' past, and deeply rooted markers of Serbian nation-state identity are sometimes in opposition to vision of Europe the EU promotes. Despite existing clashes over problematic issue of Kosovo, Serbia stresses its EU aspirations and willingness to become a part of the European Union. It appears that it is Serbia's past that stands for its other, rather than Europe.²²³ Serbia is in the process of reconstruction of national identity - trying to distance from the past and emphasis the European future.

Nonetheless, post-conflict identity formation is a complex process with open-endings. It is not guaranteed that despite the current pro-European rhetoric foreign policy choices will not change and membership will no longer be a priority. The presented insights should be taken as fragments of the current post-conflict transformation process, and these fragments are open to different interpretations

²²² Knaus & Kox 2005

²²³ Rupnik 2011: 59

7.1 Summary

In order to analyse the reconstruction of Serbian identity, this thesis utilized a poststructuralist theoretical framework and a discourse analytical method. The focus of the study was to offer an alternative theorising on identities and the process of othering and politics; on the way identities are constructed and reconstructed through the processes of interactions and implications of identity changes for the political and vice-versa.

The findings on Serbian political developments have identified the civilizational discourse that creates a division between the European Union and Serbia as part of the Balkans, and attempts to discursively construct what European/Europeanness stands for. The Union aspires to clearly define who can belong to and who can be excluded from the membership, setting conditions for those wishing to become an EU members, like Serbia. The Balkans plays a central role in the discourse on Serbian identity. It is constructed as both geographical and civilizational space, but its borders are not fixed. Depending on an intention of political leaders, the meaning of the Balkans shifts from negativist associations, such as violent, backward, un-civilized to positive connotations of transforming, democratic, progressive, etc. While geopolitical belonging is stable, civilizational belonging is intertwined with political decisions. At the same time, attempts to de-Balkanise Serbia are going on – whether through EU’s involvement in posing as a mediator between Kosovo and Serbia, or Serbia’s initiatives aimed at better regional cooperation and improved relations with its neighbourhood countries.

Serbian political discourse is defined by attempts to change the meaning of the self and coming in terms with the radical other which is Serbia’s own past. Because of the nature of political relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the discourse of the backward Balkan is still being reproduced. By perpetuating certain discourses about Kosovo, Serbia identifies itself against the other which helps us to better understand discursive construction of its identity. The construction of the Serbian other has an impact on the construction of the Serbian self. In political terms, it means that cooperation with Kosovo is established as something on which Serbia’s belonging to Europe or the Balkans depends on. Arguably, a new construction of Serbian identity is becoming to crystallise, as improvement in mutual relationship between Kosovars and Serbs is being achieved.

The thesis also theorises how changing political circumstances enable new discursive constructions of Serbian identity and how the nodal point ‘EU’ provides

transforms the meaning of signifiers such as democracy, rights and justice. The European Union, with its construction of 'Europeanness', plays a crucial role in the reconstruction of Serbian identity, as in Serbia's political progress. Moreover, the Europeanization implies a political shift enabling change in the previous constructions of antagonisms by focusing on the present and future. Discourses of nationalist interpretations of identity are being replaced by formulations of wish to become a member of the European Union and thus part of the European space. As a result, constructions of identity perpetuated by militant nationalism of the Milosevic era are becoming gradually marginalized.

To conclude, these assumptions do not wish to be interpreted as an objective description of the transition process in Serbia. They should be instead read as limited interpretations of the outlined process, avoiding totalisation and closure. I aimed to mark out attempts to fix the meaning of the political, understood as processes with open-endings.

8 References

- ‘10 years since fall of Milošević regime’, 2010, B92/Tanjug, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2010&mm=10&dd=05&nav_id=70074, (accessed: 21 April 2013)
- Abdelal, R., Yoshiko M., Johnston, A. I and McDermott, R., *Measuring Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009
- ‘A Different Balkan Story’, 2013, Ashton, C., [online], http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/global/Ashton-Normalizing-Relations-Between-Kosovo-and-Serbia.html?_r=0, (accessed: 5 May 2013)
- Althusser, L., ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatuses’, in Althusser, L., *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*; New York; Monthly Review Press, 1971
- Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso., 1983
- Anzulovic, B., *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, New York, New York University Press, 1999
- Avtar, B., ‘Difference, diversity and differentiation’, in Donald, J. and Rattansi, A., *Race, Culture and Difference*, London, Sage, 1992, pp. 126-145
- Bakic-Hayden, M. and Hayden, R., ‘Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics’, *Slavic Review*, vol. 51, no. 1, 1992, pp. 1-15
- Bakic-Hayden, M., ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, no. 4, 1995, pp. 917-932
- Balibar, E., *We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004
- Balibar, E., *We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004
- Bar-Tal, D., ‘Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 50, no. 11, 2007, pp. 1430-1453
- Bechev, D., *Constructing South East Europe : the politics of Balkan regional cooperation*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011
- Benhabib, B., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996

- Benhabib, S., 'The Democratic Movement and the Problem of Difference', in Benhabib, S., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton, NJ: Princet, 1996, pp. 3-18
- Biilmer and Radaelli, 'The Europeanisation of National Policy', *Queen's Papers on Europeanisation*, no. 1, 2004
- Bjelić, D. I. and Savić, O., *Balkan as metaphor: between globalization and fragmentation*, Cambridge MA, USA, The MIT Press, 2002
- Brault, P. A. and Naas, M., *Two Essays on Reason*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005
- Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I., *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003
- Butler, J., *Gender Trouble. Feminism and The Subversion of Identity*, New York, Routledge, 1999
- Cameron, D., *Working with spoken discourse*, London, Sage Publications, 2011
- Campbell, D., 'The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1996, pp. 129-141
- Campbell, D., *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota press, 1998
- Carpentier, N., 'Discursive mediations of the Self and the Enemy', in Billias, N. and Praeg, L., *Creating Destruction. Constructing Images of Violence and Genocide*, Amsterdam/New York, Rodopi, 2011
- Chouliaraki L. and Fairclough N., *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999
- Chreim, S., 'Managerial frames and institutional discourses of change: Employee appropriation and resistance', *Organization Studies*, vol. 27, no. 9, 2006, pp. 1261-1287
- Cockburn, C., *From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist Analysis*, London, Zed Books, 2007
- Coppitiers, B., et al., *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery*, Gent, Academia Press, 2004
- Cubitt, G., 'Introduction', in Cubitt, G. (ed.), *Imagining Nations*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 1-20
- Damousi, J. and Reynolds, R., *History on the Couch: Essays in History and Psychoanalysis*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2003

Derrida, J. R., 'Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', in Bass, A., *Writing and Difference*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 278-294

Derrida, J., *Of Grammatology*, John Hopkins University Press., 1998

Devine, F., 'Qualitative Methods', in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002

Dobric, N., *Metaphor Choice in Serbian Political Speech - The President and the Image of the Benevolent Father*, *Political linguistics*, no. 30, vol. 4, pp. 93-99, 2009 Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309955>

Dulić, D., *Civic and uncivic values : Serbia in the post-Milošević era*, Budapest/New York, Central European University Press, 2011

Durkheim, E., *The Division of Labor in Society*, translated by George Simpson, New York, The Free Press, 1983

'Economic accession criteria', 2011, European Commission, [online], http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm, (accessed: 17 May 2013)

'Elections Planned in Serbia As Shift in Power Takes Hold', 2010, *The New York Times*, [online], <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/10/world/elections-planned-in-serbia-as-shift-in-power-takes-hold.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>, (accessed: 20 April 2013)

Emerson, M., Aydin, S., De Clerck-Sachsse, J. and Noutcheva, G., 'Just what is this 'absorption capacity' of the European Union?', *CEPS Policy Brief*, Brussels, Centre of European Policy studies, no. 113, 2006

Epstein, R.A., 'The Social Context in Conditionality: Internationalizing Finance in Postcommunist Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 15, no. 6, 2008, pp. 880-898

Erjavec, K. and Volčić, Z., 'The Kosovo Battle: Media's recontextualization of the Serbian nationalistic discourses', *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 12, 2007, pp. 67-86

ESI, *The Road to Thessaloniki: Cohesion and the Western Balkans*, Berlin, 12 March 2003

'EU is Serbia's destiny, president says', 2011, *Tanjug*, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=08&nav_id=73699, (accessed: 23 March 2013)

European Commission, *Serbia 2012 Progress Report*, Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 2012

European Commission, "Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans; A policy priority for the European Union", Belgium, 2005, [online], http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf

European Commission, Western Balkans: Prospect of EU Membership Incites Peace in the Western Balkans, 2006, p 8, [online], http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/west_balk/index_en.htm

'EU enlargement "cannot be completed without Serbia"', 2013, B92/Tanjug, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=10&nav_id=85636, (accessed: 2 October 2013)

'EU set for Serbia membership talks', 2013, BBC News, [online], <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23099379> (accessed: 2 July 2013)

Faber, B., 'Creating rhetorical stability in corporate university discourse', *Written Communication*, vol. 20, no. 4, 2003, pp. 391-425

Fairclough, N., *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992

Fawcett, B., 'Poststructuralism', in Lisa, M., *Given The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Inc., 2008, pp. 667-671

Foucault, M., *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, New York, Pantheon, 1972

Geyer, M., 'The Militarization of Europe, 1914 – 1945', in Gillis, J. R., *The Militarization of the Western World*, New York, Rutgers University Press, 1989

Glasze, G., 'The discursive construction of a world-spanning region and the role of empty signifiers: the case of Francophonía', *Geopolitics*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 656-679

Goldsworthy, V., 'Invention and in(ter)vention: the rhetoric of Balkanization', in Bjelić, D. I., and Savić, O. (ed.), *Balkan as metaphor: between globalization and fragmentation*, Cambridge MA, USA, MIT Press, 2002, pp. 25-38

Graan, A., 'On the politics of imidž: European integration and the trials of Recognition in postconflict Macedonia', *Slavic Review*, vol. 69, 2010, pp. 835-858

Grabbe, H., 'Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process', Paper for the Turin ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 22-27 March 2002, pp14-16

Griffin, R., 'Nationalism', in Eatwell, R. and Wright, A., *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, 2nd ed., London/New York, Continuum, 1999

- Hall, S., 'Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities', in King, A., *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1991
- Hall, S., 'Who needs "identity"?', in Hall, S. and du Gay, P., *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London, Sage, 1996
- Hansen, L., *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, London/New York, Routledge, 2006
- Hooghe, L., 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', *International Organization*, vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 861-898
- Howarth, D., Norval, A. and Stavrakakis, Y., *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000
- Huntington, S., 'The Clash of Civilisations', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, pp. 23-49
- Jordanova, D., *Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and the Media*, London, British Film Institute, 2001
- Jansen, S., 'Against cultural anesthesia: Identity, nationalism and modernity in former Yugoslavia', in Sfikas, T.D. and Williams, C. (ed.), *Ethnicity and nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, Brookfield, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999, pp. 271-294
- Jeremic, V. and Mladenov, N., *Balkans 2020: The Ministerial Debate*, 2010, Public Lecture, [online], <http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=808>, (accessed: 27.october 2013)
- Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. J., 'Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory', in Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. J., *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 24-60
- Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. J., *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Inc., 2002
- Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. J., *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Ltd., 2002
- Jovic, D., 'The disintegration of Yugoslavia – A critical review of explanatory approaches', *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2001, pp. 101-120
- Kaplan, R.D., *EASTWARD TO TARTAR Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus*, New York, Random House, 2001

- Kaufman, S.J., *Modern hatreds: The symbolic politics of ethnic civil war*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2005
- Keith, M. and Pile, S., 'Introduction part 2: the place of politics', in Keith, M. and Pile, S. (ed.), *Place and the Politics of Identity*, London/New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 22-40
- Kelley, J.G., 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006, pp. 29-55
- King, I and Mason, W., *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*, Itaka/London, Cornell University Press, 2006
- Kinnvall, C. and Nesbitt-Larking, P., *The Political Psychology of Globalization: Muslims in the West, USA*, Oxford University Press, 2011
- Knaus, G. and Cox, M., 'The Helsinki Moment in Southeast Europe', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, 2005, pp 39-53
- Koppa, M., 'Post-Communist Balkans and their Minority', in Arvanitopoulos, C., *Security Dilemmas in Eurasia*, Athens, Nereus Editions, 1999
- Kostovicova, D. and Bojičić-Dželilović, V., *Transnationalism in the Balkans*, London/New York, Routledge, 2008
- Kostovicova, D., 'Post-socialist identity, territoriality, and European integration: Serbia's return to Europe after Milosevic', *GeoJournal*, vol. 61, 2004, pp. 23-30
- 'Koštunica gives strongly-worded Statehood Day speech', 2008, B92/Tanjug, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=15&nav_id=47732, (accessed: 17 February 2013)
- Kress, G. and Van Leeuwen, T., *Multimodal Discourse: The Modes of Contemporary Communication*, London, Arnold, 2001
- Kuzmanovic Jovanovic, A., *Preserving the Integrity of National Identity: Metaphors for Kosovo in Serbian Political Discourse*, Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Symposium About Language and Society, Austin, 2011
- Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, London, Verso, 1985
- Laclau, E., 'Universalism, particularism and the question of identity', in Laclau, E., *Emancipation(s)*, London, Verso, 1996
- Laclau, E., *New reflections on the revolution of our time*, London, Verso, 1990
- Lazić, M., *Serbia: A part of both the East and West*, Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, 2004

- Linstead, S., 'Poststructuralism', in Mills, A. J., Durepos, G. & Wiebe, Encyclopedia of case study research, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Inc., 2010, pp. 704-711
- Lockyer, S., 'Deconstructionism', in Lewis-Beck, M. S., Bryman, A. and Futing Liao A., The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science of Social Science Research Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Inc., 2004, pp. 243-244
- Lutz, C., The homefront: A military city and the American 20th century, Boston, Beacon Press, 2002
- Matić, J., Problems facing quality press development in Serbia, in Spassov, O. (Ed.), Quality Press in Southeast Europe, Sofia, SOEMZ Sofia: SOEMZ, 2004, pp. 254-276
- Mathison, S., Encyclopedia of Evaluation, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications Inc., 2005
- Mehler, D., 'Understanding Normative Gaps in Transitional Justice: The Serbian Discourse on the Srebrenica Declaration 2010', Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, vol. 11, no. 4, 2012, 127-156
- Mertus, J., 'Serbia: Reimagining Europe's Outlaw Nation', Columbia Journal Of International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 2, 2001
- 'Milosevic speech: Beware external threats', 2000, BBC News, [online], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/953697.stm, (accessed: 19 April 2013)
- Moravcsik, A. and Vachudova, M.A., 'National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement', CES Working Paper, no. 97, 2003
- Mouffe, C., The Return of the Political, London, Verso, 1993
- Mouzelis, N., Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction of Social Orders, London, Macmillan, 1990
- Nancheva, N., Transforming identities in Europe: Bulgaria and Macedonia between nationalism and Europeanization, PhD Thesis, University of Westminster, School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages, 2012
- Neofotistos, V., 'The Balkans' Other within': Imaginings of the West in the Republic of Macedonia', History & Anthropology, vol. 19, no. 1, 2008, pp. 17-36
- Neumann, I., 'Regionalism and Democratisation', in Zielonka, J. and Pravda, A. (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Oxford/New York, Oxford UP, vol. 2 International Dimensions, 2001, p. 58

Neumann, I., *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European identity Formation*, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 1998

'Nikolić: Hague hinders regional reconciliation', 2013, B92/Tanjug, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=10&nav_id=85636, (accessed: 2 October 2013)

Noris, D.E., *Balkanski mit: Pitanja identiteta i modernosti [In the Wake of the Balkan Myth]*, Beograd, Geopoetika, 1999

Obradovic, J., 'Kosovo: the view from Serbia', European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary election [online], <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/15269>, (accessed: 4 June 2013)

Othon, A. and Bechev, D., *EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process*, Oxford, St. Antony's College, European Studies Centre, 2003

Othon, A., 'The Europeanization of the Balkans', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, p. 77

Petrovic, J., *The return of the Serbian other: Interpretative repertoires of nationalism and identity politics in online news discourses on Serbia's integration in the European Union*, University of New Mexico, July 2013, [online], <http://hdl.handle.net/1928/23362>

Phillips, N. and Hardy, C., 'What Is Discourse Analysis?', in Phillips, N. and Hardy, C., *Discourse Analysis*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002, pp. 2-18

Potter, J., 'Discourse Analysis', in Lisa, M., *Given The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008, pp. 667-671.

'Protesters Attack U.S. Embassy in Belgrade', 2008, Videmsek, B., [online], http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/world/europe/22kosovo.html?_r=0, (accessed: 12 April 2013)

Ramet, S. P., 'The Denial Syndrome and Its Consequences: Serbian Political Culture Since 2000', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2007, pp. 41-58

Rehn, O., European Commissioner for Enlargement, Delo, February 10, 2006

Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the press point with PM Dačić and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after their meeting together with President Nikolić
European Commission - MEMO/12/823 30/10/2012

Ronayne, P., 'Genocide in Kosovo', *Human Rights Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, 2005, pp 57-71

- Rupnik, J., 'The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The Hour of Europe'', Chaillot Papers, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2011
- Said, E., *Orientalism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1979
- Saric, P., 'Alternativa nasilju', *Duga*, vol. 18, 1990, pp. 67-69
- Schelter, K., 'Challenges for Non (and Not-Yet) Schengen Countries', Paper presented at the Workshop 'Managing International and Inter-Agency Cooperation at the Border' 22, organised by the Working Group on the Democratic Control of Internal Security Services of the Geneva Centre, Geneva, 2003
- Schiffirin, D., *Approaches to Discourse*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers, 1994
- Schimmelfennig, F., *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003
- Schwandt, T., *The SAGE Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry*, University of Illinois, SAGE Publications, 2007, pp. 307-623
- Šeleva, E., 'Border Cultures/Cultures at the Border', *Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003
- Sen, A., *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, New York, Norton, 2006
- 'Serbia after Mladic arrest', 2011, Euronews, Interview, [online], <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tEeyE4BwKP4>, (accessed: 12 April 2013)
- 'Serbia and the European Union', The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, [online], <http://www.europa.rs/en/srbija-i-evropska-unija.html>, (accessed: 4 September 2013)
- 'Serbia - EU-Serbia relations', European Commission, [online], http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/serbia/eu_serbia_relations_en.htm, (accessed: 11 August 2013)
- 'Serbia On Path Towards Democracy', 2001, Kostunica, V., [online], <http://www.ex-yupress.com/politika/politika48.html>, (accessed: 13 June 2013)
- 'Serbia wants serious relationship with EU', 2013, B92/Tanjug, [online], http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=10&dd=22&nav_id=88074, (accessed: 22 October 2013)
- Smith, A., *National Identity*, Las Vegas, University of Nevada Press, 1993
- Solana, J., An interview for the German daily *Die Welt*, B92net, 2008

- Sorensen, J. S., *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo*, New York, Berghahn Books, 2009
- Spasić, I. and Subotić, M., *Revolution and order: Serbia after October 2000*, Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2011
- Stråth, B. and Wodak, R., 'Europe – Discourse – Politics – Media – History: Constructing 'Crises'?', in Triandafyllidou, A. et al (ed.), *The European Public Sphere and the Media. Europe in Crisis*, Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
- Subotic, J., 'Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 55, no. 2, 2011, pp. 309-330
- Svilanovic, G., 'THE BURDEN OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS', Statement at the London School of Economics, 31 October 2002, [online], <http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20021104t0955z001.pdf>, (accessed: 27 October 2013)
- Tadic, B., speech given on the International Day of Democracy in Belgrade, 15th September 2008
- Tadic, B., speech delivered for the 150th anniversary of the Serbian Orthodox Municipality in Vienna, 2010
- 'Tadic presses on with Serbia's EU bid', 2013, Euronews, [online], <http://www.euronews.com/2011/06/02/tadic-presses-on-with-serbia-s-eu-bid/>, (accessed: 2 October 2013)
- Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C., 'An Integrative Theory of Inter-group Conflict', in Hatch, M.J. and Schultz, M., *Organizational Identity: A Reader*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004
- 'The arrest of Ratko Mladić brings hope of peace and prosperity', 2011, Tisdall, S., [online], <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/26/ratko-mladic-arrest>, (accessed: 21 June 2013)
- 'The Balkans: Europe's Soft Underbelly', 2013, Milanovic, B., *The Globalist*, [online], <http://www.theglobalist.com/the-balkans-europes-soft-underbelly/>, (accessed 3 July 2013)
- 'The End Of Milosevic', 2000, Mc Geary, J., [online], <http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2000/10/16/cover.html>, (accessed: 27 March 2013)

- Tilly, A., 'Political identities in changing polities', *Social Research*, vol. 70, no. 2, 2003, pp. 605-620
- Todorova, M., *Imagining the Balkans*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997
- Torffing, J., *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999
- Vachudova, M., *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005
- Vasquez, A.J., 'The post-positivist debate: reconstructing scientific enquiry and international relations theory after Enlightenment's fall', in Booth, K. and Smith, S. (ed), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995
- Vjekoslav, P., 'The Politics of Ambivalence: Europeanization and the Serbian Orthodox Church', in Byrnes, T.A. and Katzenstein, P. J., *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006
- Wæver, O., 'Identity, communities and foreign policy', in Hansen, L. and Wæver, O., *European Integration and National Identity*, London, Routledge, 2002
- Wæver, O. and Hansen, L., *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, London, Routledge, 2002
- Wæver, O., 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy – Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory', in Hansen, L. and Wæver, O.(ed.), *European Integration and National Identity*, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 20-49
- Wæver, O., 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West-European Non-war Community', in Adler, W. and Barnett, M. (ed.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998
- Wæver, O., 'Insecurity, security, and asecurty in the West European non-war community', in Adler, E. and Barnett, M., *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1998, pp. 69-118
- Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S.J. (ed.), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, London, Sage Publications in Association with The Open University, 2001
- White, G.W., *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe*, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p 32
- Wolf, L., *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1994

Wood, L. and Kroger, R., *Doing Discourse Analysis*, London, Sage, 2000

Zielonka, J. and Pravda, A., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*, Oxford/ New York, Oxford University Press, 2001

Zivkovic, Z., 'TRANSITION IN SERBIA – ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES', lecture at the London School of Economics, 23 January 2004

Žižek, S., *The sublime object of ideology*, London, Verso, 1989