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# Welfare Attitudes, Political Trust and Its Determinants in Sweden

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Master's thesis WPMM42, 30 credits
Spring semester 2018
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# ABSTRACT

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Korea is characterized by the state's low responsibility for welfare provision and low political trust, while Sweden exemplifies a welfare state with universal welfare provision and high political trust. These characteristics in Sweden arouse interest in the question of whether political trust is causally linked to welfare attitudes and what factors influence political trust. Thus, the present study aims to explore *whether political trust affects welfare attitudes and what factors are influencing political trust in Sweden*. From the perspective of welfare attitude's multi-dimensionality, the author conducted a quantitative research with different statistical methods, Ordinal Logistic Regression and Multiple Linear Regression, depending on the scale of dependent variables, using data from *the 2016 European Social Survey*. The key findings of the research are that political trust does not significantly or strongly influence the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitude, while it significantly and strongly affects the implementation and outcome dimensions in Sweden and that political trust is not significantly affected by formal and informal networks, electoral and institutionalized participation, internal efficacy, media exposure and socio-economic variables, while it is significantly affected by social trust, non-institutionalized participation, government performances, external efficacy, policy issue, partisanship and political interest. The author concludes that *political trust does matter for welfare attitudes in Sweden and that politicians and political institutions' responsiveness, government performances and policy issue are major determinants of political trust*.

Key words: welfare attitude, welfare state, political trust, European Social Survey, Korea, Sweden

# Trust in politicians and government crucial for support for the welfare state in Sweden

Popular Science Summary
Seong Ho Lee

People's trust in politicians and government is of great importance for their support for a variety of aspects of the welfare state in Sweden and politicians and government's responsive attitude, government performances and policy issue are major causal factors influencing their trust in politicians and government. According to the European Social Survey in 2016, it is striking that the Swedes have higher trust in politicians and government and more positive attitudes for their welfare state than other Europeans. Although the causal relationship between trust in politicians and government and support for welfare policies has been studied for decades by Political Sociologists, we are lacking conclusive evidence or results to prove their relationship. Thus, it is important to explore their relationship comprehensively and exhaustively. Here I suggest a yet untried conceptual framework of welfare attitude's multi-dimensionality to understand the relationship between trust in politicians and government and support for welfare policies.

In this study, I investigated the effects of trust in politicians and government on various dimensions of people's attitudes towards the welfare state in Sweden. The results show that people's trust in politicians and government does not have a significant or strong effect on their support for the welfare state's goal of income equality and the state's responsibility for ensuring reasonable standard of living for the old, the unemployed and the working parents, but that it does affect strongly and positively their attitudes towards how effectively welfare policies are implemented and how desirable the welfare state's outcomes are. I also examined the causal factors of trust in politicians and government in Sweden. Trust in politicians and government is not significantly or strongly affected by social networks, political participation and social groups, but it is strongly affected by politicians and government's responsive attitude, government performances, immigration attitude as policy issue and social trust.

The results of this study broaden the horizons of understanding the relationship between trust in politicians and government and support for the welfare state. I emphasize, "Trust in politicians and government was, is and will always be of critical importance for support for the welfare state in Sweden."

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# 1. Introduction

The development of the Korean welfare state, which was initially designated as *productivist welfare regime* by Wood and Gough (2006: 1706), was significantly different from that of most Western welfare states. While most welfare states in the West were formed in the first half of the 20th century from the experience of the Great Depression and expanded in the postwar Golden Age under the high economic growth with industrialization, class compromise and modern family, the Korean welfare state has been making its way under the unfavorable circumstances of post-industrialization, post-class politics and post-familism which led to the restructuring of the Western welfare states (Kim, 2009: 20).

As the often-cited 'welfare developmentalism' arguments (Kwon and Holliday, 2007: 243; Choi, 2012: 280; Peng, 2012: 638; Chon, 2014: 704; Kim, 2015: 59) put it, prior to the late 1990s, the Korean authoritarian government and its bureaucrats placed high priority on economic growth and subordinated social policy to economic objectives in order to gain its political legitimacy, which, consequently, led to a very low level of public social expenditure and a heavy reliance on private-sector welfare provision. Yet, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and some important socio-economic-political changes such as democratization, globalization, post-industrialization, population aging and weakened family solidarity has transformed the Korean welfare regime (Choi, 2012: 280-281; Chon, 2014: 706, Kim, 2015: 45-50). To overcome the crisis and cope with the changes, the government has adopted or substantially expanded social benefits and services, including social insurance programs (unemployment, pension, health care and long-term elderly care), public assistance, incapacity benefits and child care (Kim, 2015: 50-57), and consistently increased its public social spending from 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997 to 10.4 per cent in 2016 (OECD Statistics).

Nevertheless, South Korea's proportion of public social spending in relation to GDP is the lowest among the OECD countries, accounting for only half of the OECD average of 21.0 per cent in 2016 (OECD Statistics). This means that much of the responsibility for welfare provision is still left to private sectors like family and firms and that, thus, the state is required to expand its role for welfare provision. Moreover, Korea is facing serious challenges that threaten its welfare state. The most serious one is *exceptionally rapid population aging*, reflecting the prolonged lifespan on the one hand and low fertility level on the other. Korea,

which entered an aging society in 2000, is estimated to go into an aged society in 2018, with more than 14.3 per cent of its population aged 65 and over, and to become a super-aged society in 2025, with its projected elderly population more than 20.0 per cent (Korea Statistical Information Service, KOSIS). Rapid population aging will impose a greater burden on public social spending, in particular, for basic pension, health care and long-term care that are far from sufficient to meet the current needs.

Another major challenge is *rising income inequality* and *high relative poverty*. Indicators related to it have deteriorated since the 1997 financial crisis. The Gini coefficient based on urban household's market income showed a fluctuating but increasing trend from 0.259 in 1995 through 0.298 right after the crisis to 0.317 in 2016 (KOSIS). The ratio of the top income quintile to the bottom increased from 3.85 to 6.27 and the relative poverty rate – measured as the share of people who live on less than half of the median income – rose from 8.3 per cent of the population to 15.4 per cent during the same period (KOSIS). One of the main reasons is *labor market dualism* or the expansion of temporary workers as a considerable portion of the labor force works in precarious jobs at relatively low wages (Jones, 2012: 99; Hong, 2016: 47). To solve this problem requires the government to intensify the redistribution policy, for example, the National Basic Livelihood Security Program (NBLSP) which is criticized to cover only 3.0 per cent of the population, well below its relative poverty level, due to its strict eligibility criteria (Jones, 2012: 100; Kim, 2015: 59).

In response, the current left-wing government in Korea is pursuing an aggressive welfare expansion policy, such as the expansion of health insurance coverage, the increase of basic pension, the introduction of child allowance and the alleviation of NBLSP eligibility criteria (National Planning Advisory Committee, NPAC, 2017: 73-87). Meanwhile, it has emerged as an urgent task to gain support from opposition parties and stakeholders and to build a consensus among the general public, as can be seen from the example of the public backlash against the sharp increase in minimum wage in early 2018. Even if minimum wage is not a direct redistribution policy, many small and medium-sized business owners revealed a strong antipathy to the excessive burden of raising the minimum wage (Song, 2018). The government is currently pushing for welfare expansion 'without an additional taxation' (NPAC, 2017: 173), but there are not many people who believe its feasibility and sustainability. In order to truly expand the welfare coverage, it is imperative for the government to reach an agreement with

opposition parties about the increase of taxing and social spending and get the nation's consent to it, because what matters is political compromise and people's consensus, as the history of the Nordic welfare states shows.

In this regard, political trust has important implications for the welfare expansion policy in Korea. The higher the level of trust is, the more likely members of a society are to cooperate for the collective goals, as Robert Putnam (1993: 171) put it: "Trust lubricates cooperation." Political trust promotes active citizenship and enables the effective implementation of public services. Those having a positive attitude toward the political system are more willing to participate in civic affairs and to pay taxes that contribute to public services. It also facilitates the consent of political losers, helps pave the way to agreements or compromises, and makes it easier to enact controversial legislation (Norris, 2011: 37; Newton et al., 2017: 38; Uslaner, 2017: 6; OECD, 2017: 214). In a word, the welfare state expansion needs trust in government as a provider of welfare services (Svallfors, 2011: 809). Unfortunately, in Korea, political trust remains at a very low level. Only 24.0 per cent of the people surveyed have trust in government in 2016, among the lowest in the OECD areas (OECD, 2017: 215). Accordingly, this low political trust is suspected as an obstacle to the further development of the Korean welfare state.

Such a suspicion naturally leads my attention to the Nordic model, particularly, 'the Swedish Model' which has been referred to as a welfare state prototype (Lindert, 2004: 264; Hort, 2017a: 35) and, furthermore, renowned for a high-trust society (Rothstein, 2001: 229), which is in contrast to those of Korea. The Swedish Model established during the postwar period was characterized by political stability and legitimacy, collaborative relationship between the state and labor market organizations, considerable economic growth on workfare, and universal and generous welfare provision (Rothstein, 2001: 209; Hort, 2017a: 23-25).

From 1880 to 1930, Sweden had already been one of the leading countries in social transfer as a percentage of GDP (Lindert, 2004: 13). From the 1950s, Sweden accelerated its welfare state expansion over the next quarter century on the basis of its economic outperformance and reached the highest level of social spending among the OECD countries in 1980 (Lindert, 2004: 13, 268). Despite the economic crises between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, Sweden's welfare state did not shrink (Lindert, 2014: 268, Hort, 2017a: 31). Although it no longer stands out compared with the other Nordic countries, the Swedish welfare state model has survived

even in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Hort, 2017b: 143, 161).

In addition, Sweden was a high-trust society, both vertically between citizens and the elite and horizontally between individuals during the postwar period (Rothstein, 2001: 209). There had been a long-term decline in political trust during the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s (Listhaug, 1995: 274; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995: 306; Holmberg, 1999: 104-105), but political trust showed a growing trend from 1997 to 2010 despite its sharp fluctuations (Norris, 2011: 70-77; Oscarsson and Bergström, 2016: 9). What is clear is that Sweden is still one of the countries with high political trust, along with the other Nordic countries.

This extensive welfare state and high political trust in Sweden arouse interest in the question of whether political trust is causally related to the welfare state and what factors engender political trust. Therefore, the purpose of my research is to explore the relationship between political trust and welfare attitudes and the causal factors influencing political trust in Sweden. Thus, my overall research questions are, first, "*Does political trust affect welfare attitude in Sweden?*" and, second, "*If so, what factors are influencing political trust in Sweden?*" There can be various theoretical or methodological approaches of making sense of welfare attitudes, political trust and its factors, but I try to understand them from the perspective of Positivism. Accordingly, I assume that there exist empirically observable objective facts regarding them and present the following concrete research questions: "*Is there a relationship between political trust scores and welfare attitude scores in Sweden? Specifically, is political trust not significantly or strongly related to the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitudes but significantly or strongly related to the implementation and outcome dimensions?*" and "*How much of the variance in political trust scores in Sweden can be explained by the following set of variables: social capital (social trust and network), political participation (electoral, institutionalized and non-institutionalized), government performance (economic, educational and healthcare), political efficacy (internal and external), partisanship (political distance), policy issue (immigration), political interest, media exposure, and socio-economic background variables (gender, age, education, and income)? Which of these variables is a better predictor of political trust in Sweden?"*

This paper is structured as follows: The first section is a short summary of previous research about the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude and about the factors affecting

political trust in Sweden. This is followed by a description of the conceptual framework and theoretical model. Then, I will delineate methods, including data, variables and their operationalization and limitations. Next, I will analyze the data and present its results. Finally, I will conclude with a summary and a discussion about the results in light of the paper's objectives.

## 2. Previous Research

### 2.1 Political Trust and Welfare Attitude

Political trust has been usually treated as a dependent variable in lots of scholarly works, but a few attempts have been made to explore whether political trust as an independent variable affects welfare attitudes. The pioneer of the field in America was Virginia Chanley, Thomas Rudolph and Wendy Rahn who empirically proved, using aggregate-level time-series data from 1980 to 1997, that people's attitude for government spending and activity, including health care and welfare, is a positive function of *trust in government* (Chanley et al., 2000: 252). They argued that political trust has important implications for the public's policy preferences (Chanley et al., 2000: 254).

It was Marc Hetherington that elaborated the causal relationship between political trust and welfare attitudes. In his book *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism (2004*), he argued, using aggregate-level data and individual-level data from the National Election Survey, that when asked to sacrifice their own material interests for the expansion of public services for others, individuals are more likely to support it when they have *trust in government* (Recited in Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 661). Specifically put, political trust is not related to support for *distribution policies* in which both costs and benefits are universally distributed, such as environmental protection and national defense, whereas it is significantly associated with support for *redistribution policies* in which costs may be widely distributed but benefits are narrowly concentrated, such as welfare, healthcare and poor relief (Recited in Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 661). What differs is whether or not there is *material sacrifice* without expectation for future return.

Thomas Rudolph and Jillian Evans, unlike Hetherington, embraced *political ideology* as a predictor of welfare attitudes. Although they did not deny the effects of material sacrifice on welfare attitudes, they showed, using data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, that the effects of political trust on welfare attitudes are moderated by political ideology, i.e., political trust has a larger impact on welfare attitudes among conservatives than liberals, because conservatives, who have been ideologically opposed to government intervention, bear the burden of ideological as well as material sacrifice (Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 664-667). They further demonstrated that the effects of political trust on welfare attitudes are conditioned by political ideology, not only in redistribution policies but also in distribution policies, at least among conservatives (Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 664).

A different perspective was offered by Stephen Craig, Jason Gainous, and Michael Martinez, who differentiated between political trust and *ambivalence* which means a combination of positive and negative feeling about governments, because people harbor a mix of both positive and negative feeling simultaneously rather than either of trust or distrust (Craig et al., 2006: 3-4, 16). Using data from a 2004 telephone survey of the electorate in Florida, they argued that ambivalence about governments is a fairly common phenomenon in America and negatively associated with welfare attitudes, while traditional political trust is not significantly connected to welfare attitudes. Also, they contended that the impact of ambivalence on welfare attitudes is more pronounced among conservatives (Craig et al., 2006: 16-19).

Let me turn to Sweden. Prior to the afore-mentioned studies in the USA, Stefan Svallfors explored the causal relationship between political trust and efficacy on the one hand and general welfare state attitudes on the other in Sweden and Norway. Using data from the International Social Survey Program in 1996, he concluded that there is no relationship between political trust, i.e., *trust in political actors and the political system*, and efficacy and *support for welfare state intervention* either in Sweden or in Norway (Svallfors, 1999: 256-259). The plausible explanation he gave is that in the Scandinavian countries welfare policies have been institutionalized to such an extent that welfare attitudes will not be affected by political trust and efficacy (Svallfors, 1999: 262). Later, Svallfors (2002) showed that *attitudes towards more concrete aspects of welfare policy* such as *taxation, service delivery and benefits abuse* are strongly related to political trust (Recited in Edlund, 2006: 396).

Jonas Edlund (2006) narrowed the concept of political trust down to *trust in the welfare state institutions' capability* and, utilizing data nationally surveyed in Sweden in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002, examined the relationship between distrust in institutional capability and *general welfare state support*. According to him (2006: 404, 411), there is no empirical evidence suggesting that distrust in institutional capability weakens support for the welfare state, which reflects the left-right dimension in Sweden, where citizens attribute incapability to insufficient resources and are willing to increase social spending to improve the services.

Also, the concept of *quality of government* (QoG), instead of political trust, was examined in connection with attitudes to taxes and social spending. The QoG developed by Bo Rothstein refers to the public institutions' impartiality and efficiency, which is inseparable from political trust in that people may trust the public institutions behaving according to the principles of impartiality and efficiency (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002: 13; Rothstein, 2011: 13). Stefan Svallfors demonstrated, using the 2008 European Social Survey data, that the QoG and egalitarianism have a clear independent effect on *attitudes to taxes and social spending*. Egalitarians and people who think that the QoG is high want higher taxes and social spending than others. Moreover, the effect of egalitarianism on taxes and spending preferences appears stronger when the QoG is higher (Svallfors, 2013: 373, 375).

In sum, even if the effects of political trust on welfare attitudes do not appear to be fixed, the above research results imply that political trust generally affects welfare attitudes but that such a relationship depends on the dimensions of welfare attitude in Sweden, where a predominant Social Democratic ideological tradition moderates it, which will be discussed later. The results of the above previous researches are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Arguments about the Relationship between Political Trust and Welfare Attitude**

| | Arguments for positive relationship | Arguments for no relationship |
|---|---|---|
| USA | Chanley et al. (2000)<br>Hetherington (2004)<br>Rudolph and Evans (2005) | Craig et al. (2006) |
| Sweden | Svallfors (2002)<br>Svallfors (2013) | Svallfors (1999)<br>Edlund (2006) |

## 2.2 Determinants of Political Trust

Now, I will briefly review the preceding literature regarding the second question, *what factors are influencing political trust in Sweden?* Political trust as a dependent variable has been attributed to a variety of causal factors. Before reviewing, it needs to be mentioned that most studies focused mainly on the causes resulting in the decline of political trust in the late 20th century. First of all, in the *Beliefs in Government* study[1], Ola Listhaug investigated the trend for *trust in politicians* and its causal factors in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, using aggregate-level time-series data from each country's election study. Sweden showed, he argued, a fairly long-term decline of trust in politicians during the period from 1968 to 1988, as mentioned in the introduction section. Although he did not provide firm evidence of causal factors, he demonstrated that it was possibly affected by alternation in government (*'partisanship'*), dissatisfaction with one's own party's performance and negative evaluations of the economy, but was not related to social groups or socio-economic variables such as age, gender and education (Listhaug, 1995: 279-290).

It was Sören Holmberg that conducted an extensive research about political trust in Sweden by updating Listhaug's results and utilizing the SOM survey[2] data. He showed a long-term, sizeable decrease in *trust in politicians and political institutions* in Sweden until the mid-1990s (Holmberg, 1999: 104-105, 112). He also examined the aggregate-level or individual-level determinants of such political distrust according to the core hypotheses presented in Nye et al.'s book, *Why People Don't Trust Government (1997)*. According to him, political trust is not

[1] *The beliefs in Government study* is an exhaustive analysis of mass political beliefs and attitudes examining broad trends in Western Europe from the 1960s to the mid- or late 1990s. The project includes 17 countries and involved 56 scholars from all parts of Western Europe working with cross-national time-series data. *Kaase et al., (1996). A Look at the Beliefs in Government Study, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 226-228: American Political Science Association. http://www.jstor.org/stable/420702.*

[2] The SOM survey is a nationwide survey in Sweden, consisting of several sub-surveys, which since 1986 has been annually conducted by the Society, Opinion, and Media (SOM) Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Its annual sample size is 17,000 respondents who are selected randomly among the persons aged 16-85 living in Sweden. *Oscarsson and Bergström (eds). (2016). Swedish Trend 1986-2015, Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg*.

related to social group (gender and education) and social capital (social trust), whereas it is associated with government welfare performance, national or personal economic situation, policy issues (EU membership and immigration), evaluation of party policies and media exposure (Holmberg, 1999: 114-120). He also argued that Sweden's distinct electoral cycle in political trust suggests that political trust is positively related to contacting politicians and political interest, but that there is no strong evidence for the 'Home Team' theory (*'partisanship'*) suggesting that political trust is affected by whose party controls the government (Holmberg, 1999: 110-112).

Further, Sören Holmberg introduced the multiple regression results of the theoretical model taking into account *demographic*, *economic* and *political* variables and *media exposure* based on the 1994 Election study and the 1996 SOM survey. Political factors were most strongly related to political trust, followed by economic factors, while demographic factors and media exposure had only modest and mostly insignificant effects (Holmberg, 1999: 120).

Lastly, Hee-Bong Park and Dong-Hyun Kim conducted a multiple regression about the relationship between political trust and its factors in three Scandinavian and three East Asian countries, using data from the 1999-2001 Eurasia Political Culture Research Network survey. They showed that *trust in government* in Sweden is significantly related to external political efficacy, social trust, network, voting attitude, party policy preferences, age and income, while it is insignificantly related to internal political efficacy, contacting politicians, gender and education (Park and Kim, 2014: 23). Their result is similar to Holmberg's in that socio-economic variables except age and income are insignificantly related to political trust, but is different from Holmberg's in that social capital (social trust and network) has a significant impact on political trust, while contacting politicians does not have a significant effect on it, which will be discussed later.

The results of the previous researches on determinants of political trust in Sweden are summarized in Table 2. In the next section, the conceptual framework will be delineated for accurate analysis and interpretation and my two theoretical models will be presented on the basis of discussions so far.

**Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Arguments about Determinants of Political Trust in Sweden**

| | Significantly related factors | Insignificantly related factors |
|---|---|---|
| Listhaug (1995) | political party's performance, evaluation of the economy, partisanship | age, gender, education |
| Holmberg (1999) | government performance, national or personal economy, policy issues (EU membership and immigration), party policy, media exposure, contacting politicians, political interest | gender, education, social capital, partisanship |
| Park & Kim (2014) | external efficacy, social capital (social trust and network), voting attitude, party policy preferences, age, income | internal efficacy, contacting politicians, gender, education |

# 3. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Model

As we can see in the previous research section, the results are mixed or even contrary to each other. These conflicting results are striking in the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude as well as the factors influencing political trust. Political trust appears or does not appear to affect welfare attitudes depending on researches. Although these results may reflect the objective facts, it is highly probable that such differences are made by conceptual differences in variables measured. Therefore, building the conceptual framework for two core variables, *political trust* and *welfare attitude*, is a significant start for investigating and understanding the theoretical relationship between them.

## 3.1 Conceptual Framework

### 3.1.1 Political Trust

Political trust is not a single entity. It is a complex, multidimensional and rather ambiguous concept (Easton, 1975: 437; Norris, 1999: 1; Christensen and Laegreid, 2005: 487; van der Meer, 2010: 519; Newton et al., 2017: 40). Some types of trust are closely related to what the political authorities do, others are directed to basic aspects of the political system, which, thus, makes it possible for members of a society to oppose the incumbents of offices and yet retain respect for the offices themselves (Easton, 1975: 437). Also, people may have trust in different institutions for different reasons (van der Meer, 2010: 519).

David Easton, who discriminated between the concepts of diffuse and specific support, specified the domain of political support according to his basic components of a political system: *the political community, the regime*, and *the authorities* (Easton, 1957: 391-393; Easton, 1965: 116). However, Easton's classification needs greater refinement of these categories because it does not reflect people's actual perception of the distinction between different elements of the regime. In practice, for example, people can have strong belief in democratic values (regime principles), while showing discontent with how democratic governments actually work (regime performance). Accordingly, Pippa Norris, Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann expanded Easton's classification into a fivefold framework distinguishing between support for *the political community*, *regime principles*, *regime performance*, *regime institutions*, and *political actors*, ranging from the most diffuse support for the nation to the most specific support for political actors (Norris, 1999: 9, Norris, 2011: 23).

First, at the most diffuse level, support for *the political community* means a basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government, such as a sense of belonging to the community, national pride, and national identity. Second, *regime principles* refer to the values of the political system. In democratic regimes, for example, they mean the idealistic values of democracy such as freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Support for regime principles means agreement with these values or agreement with the idea of democracy as the ideal form of government. Third, *regime performance* represents how political systems function in practice. In democratic regimes, support for it refers to approval of the way democracy actually works. Fourth, support for *regime institutions* means trust in governments, parliaments, judiciaries, the police, the military, and political parties.[3] Last, at the most specific level, approval of *political actors* means evaluations of politicians as a whole and the performance of particular political leaders (Norris, 1999: 10-13, Norris, 2011: 23-31).

[3] Unlike in his book *Critical citizens* (1999), Pippa Norris excludes political parties from regime institutions in his book *Democratic Deficit* (2011) for the reason that there is a long-term erosion of party loyalties in many established democracies since the 1960s and the 1970s (Norris, 2011: 34-35). However, I include trust in political parties because I think that it represents approval of the overall party system rather than the particular party allegiance.

### 3.1.2 Welfare Attitude

Welfare attitude is also multidimensional, ambivalent or even contradictory (Svallfors, 1991: 617; Svallfors, 2011: 809; Roomsa et al., 2013: 236). People may have different attitudes towards the various dimensions of welfare policies. For example, people in Sweden have a strong support for extensive ranges of welfare policies, but they have a widespread suspicion of abuse about some areas (Svallfors, 2011: 809). Also, people are positive about the welfare state's goals and range, while simultaneously negative about its outcomes, like in most European countries (Roomsa et al., 2013: 250). Therefore, welfare attitude needs to be differentiated according to its dimensions.

Svallfors distinguished welfare attitude into four dimensions according to the outcome and organization of the welfare state. The *distributional dimension* refers to the distributive results of welfare policies. The second *administrative dimension* focuses on the institutions and procedures by which welfare policies are implemented. The third *cost dimension* represents the financial aspects of welfare policies. Last, the *abuse dimension* deals with the possible creation of disincentives and moral hazards (Svallfors, 1991: 611-613).

More recently, Femke Roomsa, John Gelissen and Wim Oorschot presented a framework of seven dimensions based on the policy process from the formation of goals to policy outcomes, in the light of Rothstein's theory of welfare state legitimacy. First, the *welfare mix dimension* means attitudes about how the responsibility for welfare provision should be distributed between the public and private domains. The second *goal dimension* represents evaluations of the redistributive goals of the state, such as social security, equality and social inclusion. The third is the *range dimension*, which refers to support for the areas of life for which the government should be responsible, for example, the standard of living for the old and the unemployed. The fourth is the *degree dimension*, which means evaluations of the intensity of government activity within a policy area, i.e., how much money should be spent on a particular policy area. The fifth *redistribution design dimension* refers to attitudes about how to distribute contributions and benefits between people, such issues as 'Who pays?', 'Who benefits?', 'How much?' and 'On what conditions?'. The sixth *implementation dimension* means attitudes about what the welfare state actually can do or is doing in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Finally, the *outcome dimension* refers to attitudes about welfare state performances, which are

divided into intended and unintended outcomes. Intended outcomes relate to the welfare state's goals and the outcomes of the redistribution process, while unintended outcomes relate to economic and moral consequences of welfare policies (Roomsa et al., 2013: 238-240).

## 3.2 Theoretical Model

In this study, I will adopt Norris and her colleagues' framework for political trust and Roomsa et al.'s framework for welfare attitudes respectively, because people do have different attitudes depending upon different objects and dimensions. In addition, the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) which will be used in this study provides useful survey measures that fit these frameworks, although they are not perfectly matched. Regarding political trust, *trust in politicians and regime institutions* is of particular interest because politicians and political institutions are responsible for the decision and implementation of welfare policies and people bear the risk of endowing them with the authority to make and implement binding decisions without conviction that they will behave according to their expectations. Also, much attention will be paid to the *goal*, *range, implementation and outcome dimensions* of welfare attitudes. Unfortunately, the 2016 ESS welfare module does not include questions directly related to welfare mix, degree and redistribution design dimensions.

### 3.2.1 Political Trust and Welfare Attitude

My assumption about the first research question is that political trust is positively related to welfare attitudes, but that such relationships vary depending on dimensions of welfare attitude in Sweden. Specifically put, *trust in politicians and political institutions* is not significantly or strongly related to *attitudes about general welfare state intervention (goal and range dimension)*, while it is relatively strongly associated with *attitudes about the effectiveness and performance of the welfare state (implementation and outcome dimension)* in Sweden.

According to Hetherington's sacrifice-based theory, political trust is expected to be activated when citizens are asked to sacrifice their own material interests for the expansion of public services and benefits for others. For most citizens, redistributive policies are perceived as material sacrifice since their costs are widely distributed but their benefits are narrowly concentrated. Therefore, citizens are more likely to support redistributive policies when they

have trust in the system that will implement those policies (Recited in Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 661). However, Hetherington's sacrifice-based theory is hardly applicable to Sweden because every citizen in Sweden is included in the same public welfare system due to its universal and generous welfare provision. As Svallfors (1999: 262) put it, the causal relationship between political trust and attitude towards general welfare state intervention may not exist in Sweden, where the welfare state's intervention has been institutionalized to a higher degree than elsewhere. More importantly, in spite of the absence of such a relationship, Svallfors also showed that attitude towards specific aspects of the welfare state such as service delivery and benefits abuse is strongly related to political trust (Recited in Edlund, 2006: 396), which suggests that the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude can vary depending on dimensions of welfare attitude.

In addition to political trust, welfare attitude can be influenced by other determinants which cannot be neglected here. The most important determinant commonly mentioned by previous researches is *political ideology*: welfare attitude is more positive among Leftists than Rightists. Rudolph and Evans argued that the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude is moderated by political ideology (Rudolph and Evans, 2005: 664-667). In the similar vein, value orientation such as *egalitarianism* can affect welfare attitude. Egalitarians can be more positive about redistributive policies than those who are not (Svallfors, 2013: 375). Another important determinant is social group such as gender, age, income and education. The disadvantaged group in terms of the position on the labor market can be more positive about welfare policies than the advantaged group. For example, women and elderly people are more dependent on the welfare state than men and young people due to their precarious status in market conditions. Thus, the former can be more positive about welfare policies than the latter. In a similar vein, those with less education and those with less income can be prone to support welfare policies. To control for these variables affecting welfare attitude, it is necessary to explicitly include these variables into my model.

Finally, based on the discussions so far, I designed the first theoretical model that *political trust is not significantly or strongly related to the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitude, while it is relatively strongly and positively related to the implementation and outcome dimensions of welfare attitude in Sweden, controlling for political ideology, value orientation and social groups,* as shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Theoretical Model about the Relationship between Political Trust and Welfare Attitude**




### 3.2.2 Determinants of Political Trust

The second research question is "What factors are influencing political trust in Sweden?". It is possible that political trust is affected by a variety of social, cultural, economic and political factors (Norris, 1999: 21; Newton and Norris, 2000: 59), but here I will focus mainly on the factors mentioned in the previous research section.

The foremost concern is *social capital*, namely *social trust* and *network*. According to social capital theory, face-to-face deliberative activities and horizontal collaborations within voluntary associations promote interpersonal trust, thus creating social capital such as trust, norms and network (Putnam, 1993). It is argued that social and political trust are closely associated and mutually supportive (Zmerli and Newton, 2008: 707) and the activities in trade unions and political parties, i.e., formal network increase both social and political trust (Rothstein, 2001: 233). However, empirical findings are inconclusive (Holmberg, 1999: 115; Newton and Norris, 2000: 62; Rothstein, 2001: 231; Zmerli and Newton, 2008: 719; Park and Kim, 2014: 23).

The second concern is *political participation*. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba argued for the positive relationship between participation and trust: "the degree of participation …. affects the degree of satisfaction with the political system in which one participates" (Almond and

Verba, 1963: 247). Conversely, William Gamson (1968) argued that high trust in authorities implies some lack of necessity for influencing them (Recited in Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 134). Hooghe and Marien (2013: 141-143) showed empirically that political trust is related positively to *electoral* and *institutionalized* participation, while negatively to *non-institutionalized* participation, because distrust can stimulate protest politics such as public demonstration. Thus, such a relationship needs to be understood separately depending on the forms of participation.

The third one is *government performance*. This performance theory is conceptually rather straightforward. Well-performing governments are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; badly-performing ones generate feelings of distrust (Newton and Norris, 2000: 61). However, empirical findings are different depending on the level of analysis. Ian McAllister (1999; 197-200) argued that political trust is modestly but consistently related to economic performance at the micro level, whereas it is not related to macro-level performances such as unemployment, life expectancy and education. Similarly, Holmberg (1999: 115) contended that political trust is significantly related to welfare policy output evaluations at the individual level, and Arthur Miller and Ola Listhaug (1999: 207) argued that political trust is insignificantly related to inflation and unemployment at the macro-level.

In addition to the above factors, there are a few more political and social factors worthy to be considered here, such as *political efficacy* (internal and external), *partisanship* (political distance), *policy issue* (immigration), *political interest*, *media exposure*, and *socio-economic background* (gender, age, education, and income). Political efficacy, for example, is positively related to political trust, because people who think that the political system allows them to influence public affairs are expected to have higher trust in the political system. Also, it is logical to infer that supporters for ruling parties have higher trust in politicians and political institutions in general than supporter for opposition parties. Immigration has been an important political issue in Sweden, not least after the 2015 refugee crisis. Citizens' attitude about the effects of immigration can be positively related to political trust (McLaren, 2010: 12).

Therefore, I present the second theoretical model that *political trust is affected by social capital, political participation, government performance, political efficacy, partisanship, policy issue, political interest, media exposure, and socio-economic background*, as shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2. Theoretical Model about Determinants of Political Trust**




In the next section, I will delineate methods, including data, variables, their operational definition and manipulation, and limitations.

# 4. Data and Method

## 4.1 Data

In order to answer my empirical research questions, I used cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey 2016 wave (ESS Round 8), which was administered in 23 countries. This wave provides a unique opportunity for my research because it contains not only extensive and up-to-date data on social and political trust, political activities and political attitudes but also the welfare module enabling me to measure most of – not all – dimensions of welfare attitude. The samples were selected through the strict random probability sampling and were representative of all persons aged 15 and over resident within private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. To study the above mentioned relationship and the causal factors of political trust in Sweden, I selected only the samples surveyed in Sweden (N= 1,551). Its response rate is 43.01 per cent. The data were collected by

means of the hour-long face-to-face computer-assisted personal interview, using structured questionnaires. As mentioned in the introduction section, I took the theoretical perspective of Positivism that there exist empirically observable objective facts out there. Accordingly, I conducted a quantitative research with the ESS data, which enhanced the generalizability of the findings to the whole Swedish population.

### 4.2 Variables

The variables of my first research question are composed of eleven ordinal dependent variables representing four dimensions of welfare attitude and eight categorical or numerical independent variables indicating political trust, political ideology, value orientation and social group. My second research question has one continuous dependent variable of political trust and nineteen categorical or numerical independent variables related to social capital, political participation, government performances and so on. I will elaborate on the variables below, including how they were operationally defined and measured and how I manipulated them for the analysis. For the detailed questionnaires related to the variables, see Appendix A.

The first and foremost variable is welfare attitudes. The 2016 ESS contains questions directly related to four dimensions of welfare attitude. The goal dimension was measured in a 5-point Likert scale with one item related to equality: *attitude towards government's responsibility for reducing income differences*. For the range dimension, three items were measured in a 11-point Likert scale: *attitude towards government's responsibility for ensuring reasonable standard of living for the old and the unemployed and sufficient child care for working parents*. The implementation dimension was measured in a 5-point Likert scale with three effectiveness items: *evaluations of the unemployed people's effort to find a job, the abuse of unentitled welfare benefits and the underuse of entitled welfare benefits*. The outcome dimension was measured in a 5-point Likert Scale with four items: *attitudes about whether social benefits and services lead to the prevention of poverty and a more equal society* (intended goal-related outcome), *whether they place too great a strain on the economy* (unintended economic outcome) and *whether they make people lazy* (unintended moral outcome). The range dimension items were recoded into variables with five ordinal categories ('Disagree strongly', 'Disagree', 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Agree', and 'Agree strongly') for enhancing comparability with the other welfare attitude variables. All items were grounded at zero and recoded that a higher score

indicates a more pro-welfare attitude. All eleven items were entered as separate dependent variables into my first model because the range, implementation and outcome dimension items respectively do not form a reliable scale (Cronbach' Alpha = .567, .454, .586).

Political trust as an independent variable in the first model and a unique dependent variable in the second model was operationally defined as confidence in politicians and political institutions, as mentioned above. Five items were measured in a 11-point Likert scale: *trust in the country's politicians, parliament, legal system and political parties and satisfaction with the national government*. Political trust index was created by adding the scores of five items and dividing them with the number of items (Alpha = .891, range from 0 to 10).

Social trust was defined as generalized social trust, i.e., trust in the general public not directed at specific people for specific purpose (Uslaner, 2017: 4). Three items were measured in a 11-point Likert scale: *attitudes towards whether most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful in dealing with people, whether most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or they try to be fair and whether most of time people try to be helpful or they are mostly looking out for themselves*. Social trust index was created in the same way as with political trust index (Alpha = .725, range from 0 to 10). Networks were operationalized as formal and informal social network that a person has (Hooghe an Marien, 2013: 139). Formal network was measured in a three-category nominal scale with one item: *the experience of participation in a trade union or similar organization*, which was recoded in a binominal scale (No = 0, Yes = 1). Informal network was measured in a 7-point ordinal scale with one item: *the frequency of social contact with friends, relatives or work colleagues*, which was grounded at zero.

Political participation was divided into three variables. Electoral participation was defined as voting in the last national election. Institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation were defined as all acts directly related to the institutional process except electoral vote and all acts directly not related to the electoral process or the functioning of the political institutions (Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 133). The 2016 ESS contains 9 related items among which one item represents electoral participation and each four items indicates institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation, but they have no good internal consistency (Alpha = .469, .488). Therefore, one item was selected, each for electoral, institutionalized and non-institutionalized

political participation: *voting in the last national election, contacting politicians* and *posting anything about politics online at least once during the last 12 months*. The 'not eligible to vote' category in voting in the last national election was treated as a missing value. All three items were recoded (No = 0, Yes = 1).

Political efficacy was divided into two variables. Internal efficacy was defined as a person's assessment of his or her capabilities to take part in the political process and external efficacy was defined as a person's assessment of the responsiveness of the political system (Hooghe and Marien, 2013: 135). Two items were measured in a 5-point Likert scale, respectively: *the ability to take an active role in a politically-involved group and the confidence in one's ability to participate in politics* (internal efficacy) *and the political system's allowance of people's political remarks and influence* (external efficacy). Those items were grounded at zero and added into two index variables (Alpha = .857, .770, range from 0 to 8).

Government performances were measured in a 0-10 Likert scale with three items: *economic, educational and healthcare performance*. Since their scale reliability was low (Alpha = .665), they were put into the second model separately. Political Ideology was defined as *self-placement between Left and Right* and measured in a 11-point Likert scale, where a higher score represents a more conservative ideology. Partisanship was defined as *political distance between the government and the party that a person voted for in the last national election*. Initially, it was measured in a multi-nominal variable, but converted to a binominal variable (ruling parties = 0, opposition parties = 1), where the ruling parties include the Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left Party). Immigration attitude was measured in a 11-point Likert scale with three items: *attitudes towards the effect of immigration on the country's economy, cultural life, and living condition*. They were added into an immigration attitude index variable in the same way as with social and political trust index variables (Alpha = .857, range 0 to 10). Political interest was measured in a 4-point ordinal scale with one item: *how interested are you in politics?* It was grounded at zero and recoded that a higher score indicates a higher interest in politics. Four dummy variables were created and one dummy ('Not at all interested in politics') was left out of the analysis as the reference category. Media exposure was measured in a continuous scale with one item: *daily time spent on watching, reading or listening to news about politics and current affairs*.

For value orientation, egalitarianism was selected for affecting welfare attitude in the first model and measured in a 5-point Likert scale with two items: *attitude towards differences in income and standard of living among people*. They were measured in the opposite direction to each other for preventing biased answers. Thus, the first income item was recoded that a higher score represents a more egalitarian attitude and they were all grounded at zero. I included them separately in the first model (Alpha = .479). For social group or socioeconomic background variables, *gende*r was recoded with Female = 0 and Male = 1. *Age* and *education (years of full-time education)* were measured in a numerical scale and income was measured in ordinal income decile (range from 1 to10).

What I want to stress is that for methodological rigors, all index variables met the Cronbach's Alpha test requirement (>.7). Again, for correct interpretation of results, all the variables were coded or recoded so that higher scores indicates higher or more positive attitudes except five binary variables (partisanship, gender, and three participation variables).

### 4.3 Methods

I conducted the univariate analysis for descriptive statistics of all the variables. I carried out the bivariate analyses of the relationship between the continuous variable (political trust) and each categorical variable (eleven welfare attitude variables) in the first model, using Comparison of Means, to investigate the strengths of each relationship and assess the significances. For the second model, I also performed the bivariate analyses of the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable (political trust), using Pearson correlation coefficient for binary or numerical independent variables and Eta and Eta Squared for categorical independent variables, for the same purpose. I compared the means of political trust score among the categories of the variables of informal network, political interest, and three government performances for the bivariate analysis.

Finally, in order to test my research models, I used different statistical techniques depending on the research models. For the first model, I performed eleven cumulative odds *Ordinal Logistic Regressions* between an identical set of independent variables including political trust and each dependent variable of welfare attitudes, to assess the significance, direction and strength of each relationship between political trust and welfare attitudes, controlling for the other independent variables. Ordinal Logistic Regression allows for ordinal dependent variables

with more than two categories to be regressed on a number of categorical and/or continuous variables. I conducted PLUM and GENLIN procedures with IBM SPSS Advanced Statistics Module (version 24) without which it would be laborious and time-consuming for me to calculate the odds. For the second model, I carried out the *Multiple Linear Regression* between political trust and all independent variables, in order to investigate the significance and direction of each relationships and the effect size of each of the independent variables on political trust.

Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of multi-collinearity and proportional odds[4] for the first model and the assumptions of multi-collinearity, outlier, homoscedasticity, normality, linearity and independence of residuals for the second model. In the first model, there is no violation of multi-collinearity, but six out of eleven ordinal logistic regressions do not meet the assumption of proportional odds (full likelihood ratio test sig. > .05). Although it is not uncommon for this test to flag violations that do not exist, for example, large sample sizes can lead to a statistically significant result (full likelihood ratio test sig. < .05) when the coefficients are not very different (Laerd Statistics, 2015: 16), I conducted separate binomial logistic regressions on cumulative dichotomous dependent variables to further make sure whether this assumption is met. For these regressions, four cumulative binary variables were created on each welfare attitude variable that does not meet the proportional odds assumption, by recoding the categories cumulatively: 0 → 0 and 1, 2, 3, 4, → 1 (variable 1), 0, 1 → 0 and 2, 3, 4 → 1 (variable 2), 0, 1, 2 → 0 and 3, 4 → 1 (variable 3) and 0, 1, 2, 3 → 0 and 4 → 1 (variable 4). The binomial regressions' results showed the similar odds ratios for political trust variable, which means that the assumption of proportional odds may be tenable. For other independent variables, they showed the similar results. In the second model, there is no particular violation of the above assumptions, but there exist a few outliers whose standardized residual is more than +3 or less than –3. With large samples, it is not unusual to have a number of outlying residuals. So, I did not take any action for this violation of outlier assumption (For detailed information, see Appendix B).

[4] Proportional odds is fundamental to cumulative odds ordinal logistic regression model. This assumption means that each independent variable has an identical effect at each cumulative split of the ordinal dependent variable. See Laerd Statistics (2015: 8), *https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/spss/olr/ordinal-logistic-regression-in-spss-8.php.*

### 4.4 Limitations

This study has some limitations. Most importantly, this study is dependent solely on individual-level survey data conducted at any given point in time, which constrains the interpretation of the results. The results of the individual-level data may differ from those of the aggregate-level data. As we can see in the previous research section, the differences in results between Holmberg's and Park and Kim's may be due to which level of data they used in their analyses. In addition, the results derived from the cross-sectional data can be limited or potentially biased, particularly in the variables changing over time. As Uslaner (2017: 4) put it, political trust is responsive to short-term variations in some causal factors such as government performances. As shown above, political trust in Sweden has fluctuated over time in practice. Therefore, the individual-level cross-sectional data alone cannot fully capture the picture of the relationships that I want to study here and, accordingly, needs to be further complemented by longitudinal survey and/or aggregate-level data, even though both of them might contradict each other.

Another limitation is related to the use of secondary data. The core dimensions of welfare attitude pertaining to welfare expansion policies like those in Korea are range, degree and design dimensions, but the 2016 ESS welfare module does not provide useful measures related to degree and design dimensions. In fact, it includes some questions about the future reconfiguration of redistribution policies, yet they lack relevance to the current attitudes because they just express the weak possibility in the distant future: "In the next 10 years the government may change ….". Therefore, I could not assess the difference in the effects of political trust on all dimensions of welfare attitude, which requires me to be cautious in interpreting the results from the comprehensive perspective regarding welfare attitudes.

The third and last limit is that the response rate in Sweden in the 2016 ESS is 43.01 per cent, fairly low compared to the total average of about 55.86 per cent. People who did not respond to the survey in Sweden might have had different attitudes from those who did respond, which possibly added bias to the results.

All these limitations notwithstanding, the 2016 ESS data gave me a chance to study the above relationships, because my ultimate aim is to examine factors influencing the Swedes' trust in politicians and political institutions in recent years. Bearing in mind these limitations, I will analyze the data and present the results in the next section.

# 5. Analysis

In this section, I will apply the data from the 2016 ESS to my theoretical models with the aforementioned statistical techniques and present its results. This section is composed of two subsections. One is about the first theoretical model between political trust and welfare attitude in Sweden, the other is about the second model explaining the causal factors influencing political trust in Sweden. I will examine them one by one.

## 5.1 Political Trust and Welfare Attitude

### 5.1.1 Univariate Analysis Results

First, the univariate analysis was conducted for the descriptive statistics of all variables in the first model, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the First Model**

| Variables | N | Min. | Max. | Mean | SD | EU Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare attitude (goal - income equality) | 1,520 | 0 | 4 | 2.69 | .90 | 2.78 |
| Welfare attitude (range - the old) | 1,535 | 0 | 4 | 3.23 | .71 | 3.25 |
| Welfare attitude (range - unemployed) | 1,532 | 0 | 4 | 2.77 | .81 | 2.63 |
| Welfare attitude (range - child care) | 1,524 | 0 | 4 | 3.13 | .83 | 3.11 |
| Welfare attitude (implementation - less efforts for job) | 1,509 | 0 | 4 | 2.52 | .90 | 2.00 |
| Welfare attitude (implementation - less benefits) | 1,304 | 0 | 4 | 2.08 | .80 | 1.73 |
| Welfare attitude (implementation - unentitled benefits) | 1,443 | 0 | 4 | 1.81 | .94 | 1.52 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome - preventing poverty) | 1,497 | 0 | 4 | 2.63 | .79 | 2.48 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome - promoting equality) | 1,504 | 0 | 4 | 2.59 | .81 | 2.29 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome - burden on economy) | 1,500 | 0 | 4 | 2.15 | .95 | 2.06 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome - making people lazy) | 1,519 | 0 | 4 | 2.07 | 1.03 | 1.91 |
| Political Trust | 1,467 | 0 | 10 | 5.31 | 1.77 | 4.57 |
| Political ideology (left-right scale) | 1,482 | 0 | 10 | 5.22 | 2.28 | 5.17 |
| Value orientation (egalitarianism - income) | 1,527 | 0 | 4 | 1.91 | 1.04 | 1.88 |
| Value orientation (egalitarianism – living standard) | 1,532 | 0 | 4 | 2.55 | .87 | 2.55 |
| Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) | 1,550 | 0 | 1 | .50 | .50 | .48 |
| Age | 1,547 | 15 | 105 | 51.60 | 19.14 | 48.91 |
| Education (years of full-time education) | 1,545 | 0 | 30 | 13.28 | 3.72 | 13.33 |
| Household income (income decile) | 1,442 | 1 | 10 | 6.30 | 2.92 | 5.24 |

In general, attitudes towards the goal and range dimensions of the welfare state are similar or rather less positive in Sweden, compared with the average of the European countries included in the 2016 ESS,[5] but the implementation effectiveness and outcome dimensions of welfare attitudes are strikingly more positive in Sweden than in the average European countries. Political trust is also higher in Sweden than in the average European countries. These indicate a higher support for welfare policies and a higher trust in politicians and political institutions in Sweden. All other variables except household income are more or less similar.

### 5.1.2 Bivariate Analysis Results

Second, I conducted the bivariate analyses of the relationship between political trust and each of the eleven welfare attitude variables by comparing the means of the political trust score according to the categories of each of welfare attitudes[6]. I identified the significances and strengths of each relationship, but could not avoid checking the directions of each relationship roughly, because Eta does not give information about the direction of relationship.

Table 4 shows a summary of these bivariate analyses' results. Political trust does not have a statistically significant bivariate relationship to the goal dimension variable ($p = .116$). Yet it has a significant connection with all the other welfare attitude variables at the level of $p < .001$ or $p < .01$.

Political trust is relatively strongly related to the implementation effectiveness variables (Eta = .283, .229, .161) and the outcome variables (.245, .204, .190, .163), whereas it is relatively weakly related to the range variables (.134, .121, .100). When not controlling for other variables, 8.0, 5.3 and 2.6 per cent of the variance in political trust score is explained by the *'unentitled benefits'*, *'less efforts for job'* and *'less benefits'* variables of the implementation effectiveness dimension, respectively. The *'promoting equality'*, *'making people lazy'*, *'burden on economy'* and *'preventing poverty'* variables of the outcome dimension account for 6.0, 4.2, 3.6 and 2.7

[5] Since welfare attitudes are measured in a 5-point categorical scale, the mean value or average does not make sense, but it is used for the convenience of comparison.

[6] In this bivariate analyses, I treated political trust as the dependent variable unlike in the first theoretical model, because it makes sense to show the means of the numerical variable (political trust) rather than those of categorical variables (welfare attitudes).

per cent of the variance in political trust score, respectively. On the contrary, the *'the old'*, *'the unemployed'* and *'child care'* variables of the range dimension explain just 1.8, 1.5 and 1.0 per cent of the variance in political trust score, as shown in Table 4.

In general, as welfare attitude variables except *'the old'* and *'child care'* change positively, political trust increases as well. The direction of *'the old'* and *'child care'* variables' effect is not certain. For more information about the direction of each relationship, see Appendix C.

These results are in line with my expectation that political trust is not significantly or strongly related to the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitudes, while it is significantly and relatively strongly related to the implementation and outcome dimensions of welfare attitudes in Sweden. But the ambiguous direction of the two range variables' effect on political trust, particularly *'the old'* variable's effect, is an unexpected result.

**Table 4. The results of Bivariate Analyses between Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes**

| Welfare attitude variables | Goal | Range | | | Implementation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | income equality | the old | the unemployed | child care | less efforts for job | less benefits |
| Significance (p) | .116 | .000 | .000 | .006 | .000 | .000 |
| Eta | .071 | .134 | .121 | .100 | .229 | .161 |
| Eta square | .005 | .018 | .015 | .010 | .053 | .026 |
| Number of cases | 1,451 | 1,458 | 1,455 | 1,448 | 1,435 | 1,262 |
| Welfare attitude variables (IV) | Implement-ation | Outcomes | | | | |
| | unentitled benefits | preventing poverty | promoting equality | burden on economy | making people lazy | |
| Significance (p) | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | |
| Eta | .283 | .163 | .245 | .190 | .204 | |
| Eta square | .080 | .027 | .060 | .036 | .042 | |
| Number of cases | 1,382 | 1,429 | 1,434 | 1,433 | 1,447 | |

*Dependent variable: Political trust

### 5.1.3 Multivariate Analysis Results

Third and more importantly, eleven cumulative odds ordinal logistic regressions were conducted to determine the effect of political trust on each variable of welfare attitudes, controlling for other variables such as political ideology, egalitarianism and socioeconomic backgrounds. The significance, direction and strength of the effects of political trust on each variable of welfare attitudes were examined and compared. The results of such ordinal logistic regressions are summarized in Table 5.

In terms of significance, political trust does not significantly affect the goal-dimension variable and the one range-dimension variable – *'child care'* – of welfare attitude, but it does have a significant effect on the other dimension variables of welfare attitude at the level of $p < .001$ or $p < .01$: two range-dimension variables – *'the old'* and *'the unemployed'* – and all implementation-dimension and outcome-dimension variables.

Regarding the direction of effect, as political trust increases, people are more likely to be in a higher category of all significant welfare attitude variables, excluding the *'the old'* range-dimension variable, which means that the more people trust politicians and political institutions, the more likely they are to support such dimensions of the welfare state. Those positive relationships are confirmed in the odds ratios expressed in Exp(B) in Table 5. This gives us information about the change in the odds that the dependent variable changes in the supposed direction for each unit increase of the independent variable. Once again for emphasis, all variables of this study, except nominal variables, were coded or recoded so that a higher value indicates a higher or more positive attitude. Thus, Exp(B)'s value more than 1.000 represents an increased odds of the dependent variable's value for an increase in one unit of the independent variable. Exp(B)'s value less than 1.000 indicates a decreased odds of the dependent variable's value for each unit increase of the independent variable. We can see in Table 5 that political trust is negatively related to attitudes about the government's responsibility for '*the old'* (.871), while it is positively related to all other significant welfare attitude variables (1.085, 1.228, 1.167, 1.316, 1.149, 1.253, 1.174, 1.206).

## Table 5. Determinants of Welfare Attitudes

| Welfare attitude variables (DV) | | Goal | Range | | | Implementation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | income equality | the old | the unemployed | child care | less efforts for job | less benefits |
| Exp(B) | Political trust | .978 | .871*** | 1.085** | 1.036 | 1.228*** | 1.167*** |
| | Political ideology (left-right) | .809*** | .980 | .902*** | .955 | .889*** | 1.054 |
| | Egalitarianism (income) | 1.662*** | 1.089 | 1.333*** | 1.112 | 1.243*** | .884* |
| | Egalitarianism (living standard) | 2.090*** | 1.317*** | 1.414*** | 1.362*** | 1.238** | .853* |
| | Gender (female) | 1.352** | 1.261* | 1.242* | 1.448** | 1.054 | 1.070 |
| | Age | 1.011*** | .999 | 1.003 | .995 | 1.002 | 1.007* |
| | Education (years of education) | 1.008 | 1.000 | .986 | .973 | 1.106*** | 1.028 |
| | Income (income decile) | .940** | 1.002 | 1.008 | 1.052* | 1.073*** | 1.073** |
| Model Fit | Number of cases | 1,312 | 1,316 | 1,315 | 1,312 | 1,299 | 1,149 |
| | Goodness-of-fit (Pearson) | .000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | .962 | .000 | .744 |
| | Likelihood ratio sig. | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) | (8)500.772 | (8)54.303 | (8)149.875 | (8)67.888 | (8)212.014 | (8)74.993 |
| | Nagelkerke Pseudo $R^2$ | .344 | .046 | .119 | .056 | .165 | .070 |
| | McFadden Pseudo $R^2$ | .149 | .020 | .049 | .023 | .066 | .028 |

| Welfare attitude variables (DV) | | Implement-ation | Outcomes | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | unentitled benefits | preventing poverty | promoting equality | burden on economy | making people lazy | |
| Exp(B) | Political trust | 1.316*** | 1.149*** | 1.253*** | 1.174*** | 1.206*** | |
| | Political ideology | .915** | .951 | .908*** | .722*** | .791*** | |
| | Egalitarianism (income) | 1.226*** | .954 | .994 | 1.212** | 1.483*** | |
| | Egalitarianism (living standard) | 1.104 | 1.258** | 1.554*** | 1.175* | 1.337*** | |
| | Gender (female) | 1.002 | 1.005 | .749* | 1.218 | 1.063 | |
| | Age | .995 | 1.000 | .994* | .993* | 1.010*** | |
| | Education (years of education) | 1.076*** | 1.055** | 1.041* | 1.093*** | 1.086*** | |
| | Income (income decile) | 1.013 | 1.012 | 1.007 | 1.016 | 1.020 | |
| Model fit | Number of cases | 1,256 | 1,295 | 1,302 | 1,299 | 1,308 | |
| | Goodness-of-fit (Pearson) | .218 | .000 | .998 | .002 | .838 | |
| | Likelihood ratio sig. | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | |
| | Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) | (8)183.133 | (8)59.208 | (8)154.908 | (8)289.562 | (8)361.024 | |
| | Nagelkerke Pseudo $R^2$ | .147 | .050 | .125 | .215 | .256 | |
| | McFadden Pseudo $R^2$ | .056 | .021 | .052 | .083 | .098 | |

Exp(B): Odds Ratio, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

Last and foremost, the effect size of political trust on each welfare attitude varies depending on the dimensions or variables of welfare attitude. In general, the effects of political trust are relatively strong in relation to attitudes towards the implementation effectiveness dimension of the welfare state (1.316, 1.228, 1.167), followed by the effects on attitudes towards the outcome dimension of the welfare state (1.253, 1.206, 1.174, 1.149). The effects of political trust are relatively weak in relation to attitudes towards the range dimension – *'the old'* and *'the unemployed'* – of the welfare state in the models (1.085, .871). Specifically speaking, one unit increase in political trust score, controlling for the other variables, increases 1.316 times the odds that people will disagree that *many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled*, 1.228 times the odds that they will disagree that *most unemployed people do not really try to find a job* and 1.167 times the odds that they will disagree that *many people with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to* (implementation effectiveness dimension). Every unit increase in political trust score increases by 25.3 per cent the odds that people will agree that *social benefits and services lead to a more equal society*, by 20.6 per cent the odds that they will disagree that *social benefits and services make people lazy*, by 17.4 per cent the odds that they will disagree that *social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy*, and by 14.9 per cent the odds that they will agree that *social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty* (outcome dimension). On the other hand, every unit increase in political trust score increases just by 8.5 per cent the odds of people supporting *the state's responsibility for a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed* but even decreases by 12.9 per cent the odds of their supporting *the state's responsibility for a reasonable standard of living for the old* (range dimension).

In addition to political trust, other variables can be important for welfare attitudes in Sweden. Political ideology expressed in a Left-Right scale is significantly related to seven of eleven welfare attitude variables at the level of $p < .001$ or $p < .01$: the goal, range (*'the unemployed'*), implementation effectiveness (*'less efforts'* and *'unentitled benefits'*) and outcome (*'equality'*, *'economic'* and *'moral'*) dimension of the welfare state. But it does not affect attitudes towards the state's responsibility for *'the old'* and *'child care'* (range dimension) and one implementation effectiveness – *'less benefits'* – dimension and one outcome – *'preventing poverty'* – dimension. All significant welfare attitudes are negatively related to political ideology in the model. It means that the more politically right-wing people are, the more likely they are to have negative attitudes towards the welfare state. The effects of political ideology

on welfare attitudes are relatively strong in relation to the outcome dimension (.722, .791, .908) and the goal dimension (.809), but are relatively weak in relation to the range dimension (.902) and the implementation effectiveness dimension (.889, .915). For example, a unit increase in political ideology towards the Right decreases by 27.8 per cent the odds that people will disagree that *social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy* (outcome dimension), while it decreases only 8.5 per cent the odds that they will disagree that *many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled*. (implementation effectiveness dimension).

Two egalitarianism variables are significantly related to seven and ten out of eleven welfare attitudes, respectively, at the level of $p < .001$, $p < .01$, or $p < .05$. Income egalitarianism significantly affects attitude towards the welfare state's *income equality goal*, its responsibility for *'the unemployed'*, its implementation effectiveness (*'less efforts'*, *'less benefits'* and *'unentitled benefits'*) and its *economic* and *moral* outcomes. Living standard egalitarianism significantly affects all attitudes towards the welfare state except the implementation effectiveness of *'unentitled benefits'*. All significant welfare attitudes other than *'less benefits'* implementation effectiveness (.884, .853) show the positive relationship to both egalitarianism variables. The more egalitarian people are, the more positive they are towards the welfare state. But the negative relationship between both egalitarianisms and *'less benefits'* effectiveness is not contrary to my expectation, because egalitarians are more sympathetic to poor people and, thus, more apt to agree that *many people with very low incomes get less benefits than they are legally entitled to*, i.e., poor relief policies are being ineffectively implemented. In general, the effects of income egalitarianism on welfare attitudes are relatively strong in relation to the goal dimension (1.662) and the range dimension (1.333), but relatively weak in relation to the implementation effectiveness dimension (1.243 ~ .884). Its effects on outcomes are rather broadly distributed (1.483 ~ 1.212). The effects of living standard egalitarianism on welfare attitudes are also relatively strong in relation to the goal dimension (2.090) and the range dimension (1.414 ~ 1.317), but relatively weak in relation to the implementation effectiveness dimension (1.238 ~ .853). Its effects on outcomes are also broadly distributed (1.554 ~ 1.175). For example, a unit increase in income and living standard egalitarianism respectively increases 1.662 and 2.090 times the odds that people will agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (goal dimension), while it respectively increases just 1.243 and 1.238 times the odds that they will disagree that *most unemployed people do not*

*really try to find a job* (implementation effectiveness dimension).

When it comes to social groups or socio-economic variables, their effects on welfare attitudes are statistically non-existent, weak or mixed at large. Gender has a significant effect on five out of eleven welfare attitude at the level of $p < .01$ or $p < .05$: attitudes towards the welfare state's income-equality goal, three range dimension variables (*'the old'*, *'the unemployed'* and *'child care'*) and one outcome dimension variable (*'promoting equality'*). Women are more likely to be positive about the goal (1.352) and range (1.261, 1.242, 1.448) dimensions of the welfare state, but more likely to be negative about its equality outcome (.749) than men, which is an unexpected result of the study. Women have a relatively strong preference for the welfare state's goal (1.352) and *'child care'* range (1.448), while they have a relatively weak preference towards its *'the old'* and *'the unemployed'* range (1.261, 1.242). Yet the overall effect of gender is rather small for its small scale (0 to 1).

Age has a significant impact on five out of eleven welfare attitudes at the level of $p < .001$ or $p < .05$: attitudes towards the income-equality goal, the *'less benefits'* implementation effectiveness, and the *'equality*', *'economic'* and *'moral'* outcomes of the welfare state, but its directions are mixed (1.011, 1.007, .994, .993, 1.010) and its effects seems rather small even though its large scale is considered (15 to 105).

Education is significantly and positively related to six out of eleven welfare attitudes at the level of $p < .001$, $p < .01$ or $p < .05$: two implementation effectiveness – *'less efforts'* and *'unentitled benefits'* – attitudes and all outcome attitudes. However, it does not significantly affect the goal and range dimensions of the welfare state. Those with higher education have a more positive attitude for the welfare state's implementation effectiveness and outcomes than those with lower education. Its effects (1.106, 1.076, 1.055, 1.041, 1.093, 1.086) are not small for its large numerical scale (0 to 30).

Income is significantly related to four out of eleven welfare attitudes at the level of $p < .001$, $p < .01$ or $p < .05$. It is negatively related to attitude towards the welfare state's income-equality goal (.940) as expected, but positively related to its *'child care'* range (1.052) and *'less efforts'* and *'less benefits'* implementation effectiveness (1.073, 1.073). It is not significantly related to any outcome dimension attitudes. Its effect sizes are not strong for its scale (1 to 10).

### 5.1.4 Analyses

In the previous literature, competing arguments have been made about the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude. In the US, some authors argued that political trust is significantly related to attitudes towards redistribution policies, not distribution policies, due to material sacrifice without expectation for future return and some authors added that such relationship is moderated by political ideology. On the contrary, other authors contended that political trust is not significantly connected to welfare attitude. They argued that it is ambivalence about governments, not traditional political trust, that significantly affects welfare attitude. In Sweden, some authors claimed that political trust, whether it is defined as trust in political actors and the political system or trust in the welfare state institutions' capability, is not related to support for general welfare state intervention. On the one hand, one of those authors argued that political trust is strongly related to attitudes towards more concrete aspects of the welfare state and that the quality of government which is similar to political trust has a significant effect on attitudes towards taxes and social spending. In order to examine these competing arguments, I conducted a comprehensive analysis of this relationship by building the conceptual frameworks for political trust and welfare attitude and using the 2016 ESS data which allowed me to explore this relationship. Ordinal logistic regressions enabled me to control for other variables such as political ideology and value orientation which may influence or confound the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that political trust is not significantly or strongly related to the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitudes, but it is significantly and relatively strongly related to the implementation and outcome dimensions of welfare attitudes in Sweden, controlling for political ideology, value orientation and social groups. Thus, I confirmed that political trust matters as a determinant of welfare attitudes in most – not all – dimensions of welfare attitudes and the first research question is clearly answered. This result is not contrary to those of most previous researches, excluding one research's results which they admitted can be attributed to the limitation of data collection and indicators different from most researches' (Craig et al., 2006: 20). Political trust does affect welfare attitude when individuals are asked to sacrifice their material interest for others both in the US and in Sweden, as long as the compensation for their material sacrifice is not ensured by the public welfare system. However, such sacrifice-based theory is hardly applicable to Sweden, because every

citizen is compensated and covered with its universal and generous welfare system. Thus, general welfare state interventions such as its goal and range are not perceived as material sacrifice in Sweden, where the Social Democratic tradition has been established and the universal and generous welfare provision has been institutionalized. General welfare state interventions are considered to be perceived in most Swedes' mind as if they were not redistribution policies but distribution policies in which their contributions to public services are expected to be compensated with the future return. Therefore, political trust does not significantly or strongly affect the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitude in Sweden. Nevertheless, political trust does affect attitudes towards the welfare state's implementation effectiveness and outcome dimensions since people can have diverse opinions about such specific issues of the welfare state's performances, as shown above.

In addition, the above result that political ideology and egalitarianism have a significant impact on attitudes towards most aspects of the welfare state, controlling for other variables, is in line with the previous studies' results as well as the common beliefs. Conservatives do not give their approval for even the welfare state's effectiveness and outcomes, let alone its goal and range. Egalitarians may well have a positive attitude towards the welfare state. Even the egalitarians' negative attitude towards poor relief policies' effectiveness is reasonable from the egalitarian perspective, as shown above, because egalitarians are apt to think that poor people get less benefits than they are legally entitled to.

Women are relatively strong supporters of the welfare state's goal and range. The effects of gender are mostly in accordance with my expectation. However, those with higher education largely approve of the implementation effectiveness and outcome of welfare policies, and those with higher income are positive towards the state's responsibility for child care and its implementation effectiveness, which is highly surprising because we could expect the socially disadvantaged groups, such as those with less education and those with less income, to be more in favor of the welfare state than the advantaged group. How can we explain these results? One possible explanation is that notions of social citizenship is so deeply rooted in the Swedish people by citizenship education that those with higher education and higher income are at large more positive about some aspects of the welfare states. These results, along with most non-existent or weak relationships between social group and welfare attitude, can also suggest that social cleavage is not strong in Sweden. Further explanations are beyond my knowledge.

What I want to stress here is that the effect size of each independent variable included in the model should not be compared to each other since the effect size expressed as Exp(B) is not standardized for comparison. Thus, we cannot say that the effect of gender on attitude towards the responsibility for *'the unemployed'* (1.242) is stronger than that of political trust on the same welfare attitude (1.085), because gender has a small scale of 0 to 1, while political trust has a relatively large scale of 0 to 10.

Some questions still remain, though. First, why is political trust negatively related to attitudes towards the state's responsibility for *'the old'* (Exp(B) = .871), unlike the other significant variables of welfare attitudes? In other words, why are people with higher trust less supportive of the state's responsibility for *'the old'*? Second, why are women less likely to agree that social benefits and services lead to a more equal society (Exp(B) = .749) than men? Do women think that they are still discriminated against in the country characterized by gender equality? These questions are beyond my knowledge and the scope of the present study and remain to be explored in further studies.

Bearing in mind that political trust does matter as a determinant of welfare attitudes in Sweden, I will move on to the second research question about the causal factors of political trust in Sweden.

## 5.2 Determinants of Political Trust

### 5.2.1 Univariate Analysis Results

First, the univariate analysis was conducted for the descriptive statistics of all variables in the second model, as shown in Table 6. Political trust, social capital (social trust and network), political participation, political efficacy, economic performance evaluation, immigration attitude and political interest are higher or more positive in Sweden, compared with the average in the European countries included in the 2016 ESS. However, the Swedes are less exposed to media on politics, compared with the average European and they are less satisfied with their country's educational and healthcare performances. The Swedes appear relatively very discontented with their country's educational performance.

**Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Second Model**

| Variables | N | Min. | Max. | Mean | SD | EU Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Trust | 1,467 | 0 | 10 | 5.31 | 1.77 | 4.57 |
| Social trust | 1,536 | 0 | 10 | 6.37 | 1.58 | 5.62 |
| Formal network (0 = No, 1 = Yes) | 1,545 | 0 | 1 | .78 | .41 | .43 |
| Informal network | 1,545 | 0 | 6 | 4.50 | 1.36 | 3.89 |
| Electoral participation (0 = No, 1 = Yes) | 1,455 | 0 | 1 | .93 | .25 | .78 |
| Institutionalized participation (0 = No, 1 = Yes) | 1,547 | 0 | 1 | .17 | .38 | .16 |
| Non-institutionalized participation (0 = No, 1 = Yes) | 1,541 | 0 | 1 | .28 | .45 | .17 |
| Internal political efficacy | 1,526 | 0 | 8 | 3.00 | 1.97 | 2.30 |
| External political efficacy | 1,508 | 0 | 8 | 3.15 | 1.60 | 2.50 |
| Economic performance | 1,501 | 0 | 10 | 6.01 | 2.00 | 5.32 |
| Educational performance | 1,522 | 0 | 10 | 5.24 | 2.11 | 5.98 |
| Healthcare performance | 1,539 | 0 | 10 | 5.66 | 2.21 | 5.79 |
| Partisanship (0 = ruling parties, 1 = opposition parties) | 1,551 | 0 | 1 | .62 | .49 | - |
| Immigration attitude | 1,473 | 0 | 10 | 6.33 | 1.99 | 5.22 |
| Political interest | 1,549 | 0 | 3 | 1.79 | .80 | 1.49 |
| Media exposure (hours and minutes a day) | 1,549 | 0 | 1,410 | 71.18 | 93.11 | 75.75 |
| Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) | 1,550 | 0 | 1 | .50 | .50 | .48 |
| Age | 1,547 | 15 | 105 | 51.60 | 19.14 | 48.91 |
| Education (years of full-time education) | 1,545 | 0 | 30 | 13.28 | 3.72 | 13.33 |
| Household income (income decile) | 1,442 | 1 | 10 | 6.30 | 2.92 | 5.24 |

### 5.2.2 Bivariate Analysis Results

Second, as in the first model, I conducted the bivariate analyses of the relationship between the continuous dependent variable (political trust) and each of the independent variables according to their level of measurement. For binary or numerical independent variables and categorical independent variables, Pearson correlation coefficient and Eta and Eta Squared were used, respectively. The results of the bivariate analyses are summarized in Table 7 and 8.

Looking into Table 7, when not controlling for other variables, political trust has a statistically significant bivariate correlation with social trust, electoral participation, internal and external efficacy, partisanship, immigration attitude and education at the level of $p < .001$ or $p < .05$, while it is not significantly related to formal network, institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation, media exposure, gender and age at the level of $p < .05$. Political trust is negatively related to partisanship, which means that people who voted for one of the ruling parties have higher trust in politicians and political institutions than people who voted for one of the opposition parties. All other significant variables are positively correlated to political trust. Regarding the effect size, external efficacy (r=.552) has the largest effect on political trust, followed by immigration attitude (.472) and social trust (.406). Education (.203), internal efficacy (.162) and partisanship (-.111) has a small to medium effect on political trust, while electoral participation (.066) has a small effect.

**Table 7. Correlations between Political Trust and Binary or Numerical Variables**

| Independent variables | Pearson correlation (r) | Sig. (2-tailed) | Number of cases |
|---|---|---|---|
| Social trust | .406 | .000 | 1,460 |
| Formal network (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.014 | .580 | 1,464 |
| Electoral participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | .066 | .013 | 1,389 |
| Institutional participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.008 | .756 | 1,466 |
| Non-institutional participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.005 | .857 | 1,461 |
| Internal efficacy | .162 | .000 | 1,450 |
| External efficacy | .552 | .000 | 1,443 |
| Partisanship (0=Ruling parties, 1=Opposition parties) | -.111 | .000 | 1,467 |
| Immigration attitude | .472 | .000 | 1,408 |
| Media exposure | .014 | .588 | 1,467 |
| Gender (0=Female, 1=Male) | -.008 | .754 | 1,466 |
| Age | -.047 | .072 | 1,463 |
| Education | .203 | .000 | 1,464 |

Dependent variable: Trust in politicians and political institutions

In addition, political trust is significantly related to economic, educational and healthcare performance evaluation, political interest and household income at the level of $p < .001$, as shown in Table 8, while it is not significantly related to informal network at the level of $p < .05$. Three performance evaluation variables have a large effect on political trust (Eta = .557, .438, .424), whereas political interest (.167) and household income (.181) have a relatively small effect. When not controlling for other variables, 31.0, 19.2 and 18.0 per cent of the variance in political trust score is explained by economic, educational, and healthcare performance evaluation ($Eta^2$ = 0.310, .192, .180), while household income and political interest explain just 3.3 and 2.8 per cent of the variance in political trust score ($Eta^2$ = .033, .028). As independent variables change more positively, political trust score also increases at large. Detailed information about direction is attached in the Appendix C.

**Table 8. Eta and Eta Squared between Political Trust and Categorical Variables**

| Independent variables | Eta | Eta squared | Sig. (2-tailed) | Number of cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Informal network | .092 | .009 | .051 | 1,462 |
| Economic performance evaluation | .557 | .310 | .000 | 1,435 |
| Educational performance evaluation | .438 | .192 | .000 | 1,445 |
| Healthcare performance evaluation | .424 | .180 | .000 | 1,461 |
| Political interest | .167 | .028 | .000 | 1,466 |
| Household income | .181 | .033 | .000 | 1,379 |

Dependent variable: Trust in politicians and political institutions

To sum up the bivariate analyses' results, when not controlling for other variables, political trust is significantly and positively related to social trust, electoral political participation, economic, educational and healthcare performance, internal and external political efficacy, policy issue (immigration), political interest, income and education, while it is significantly and negatively related to partisanship. However, it is not significantly associated with formal and informal network, institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation, media exposure, gender and age.

### 5.2.3 Multivariate Analysis Results

Third, the multiple linear regression was run to test the overall model fit and to assess the significance, direction and effect size of nineteen independent variables on political trust, controlling for the other variables.

The present regression model is statistically significant at the level of $p < .001$ or better, as shown in Table 9.

**Table 9. Multiple Regression Results: Overall Model Fit**

| Model | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Regression | 2,401.882 | 21 | 114.375 | 82.432 | .000 |
| | Residual | 1,868.986 | 1,347 | 1.388 | | |
| | Total | 4,270.868 | 1,368 | | | |

a. Dependent Variable: Trust in politicians and political institutions

b. Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Healthcare performance evaluation, Political interest (Quite interested), Gender, Media exposure, Partisanship, Non-institutionalized participation, Informal network, Institutionalized participation, Electoral participation, Social trust, Formal network, Immigration attitude, Education, External efficacy, Economic performance evaluation, Educational performance evaluation, Internal efficacy, Age, Political interest (Very interested), Political interest (Hardly interested)

**Table 10. Multiple Regression Results: Model's Explanatory Power**

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .750 | .562 | .556 | 1.178 | 1.982 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Healthcare performance evaluation, Political interest (Quite interested), Gender, Media exposure, Partisanship, Non-institutionalized participation, Informal network, Institutionalized participation, Electoral participation, Social trust, Formal network, Immigration, Education, External efficacy, Economic performance evaluation, Educational performance evaluation, Internal efficacy, Age, Political interest (Very interested), Political interest (Hardly interested)

b. Dependent Variable: Trust in politicians and political institutions

As shown in Table 10, the present regression model explains 55.6 per cent of the variance in political trust score in Sweden through accounting for social trust, formal and informal network, electoral, institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation, economic, educational and

healthcare performance evaluation, internal and external efficacy, partisanship, policy issue (immigration), political interest, media exposure and socio-economic variables (gender, age, income and education).

As shown in Table 11, after controlling other relevant factors, political trust is statistically significantly affected by social trust, non-institutionalized political participation (*'posting online'*), economic, educational and healthcare performance evaluations, external political efficacy, partisanship, policy issue (*'immigration'*), and political interest at the level of $p < .001$, $p < .01$ or $p < .05$. But there is no statistically significant effect of formal and informal network, electoral (*'voting'*) and institutionalized (*'contacting politicians'*) political participation, internal political efficacy, media exposure and socio-economic variables such as gender, age, income and education on political trust at the level of $p < .05$.

Non-institutionalized political participation (*'posting online'*) and partisanship are negatively related to political trust. People who have *posted or shared anything about politics online during the last 12 months* have .27 less trust in politicians and political institutions on the 0 to 10 scale than people who have never done it. People who *voted for one of the current opposition parties in the last national election* have less political trust by .34 than people who *voted for one of the current ruling parties*. The direction of the relationship between political interest and political trust is rather ambivalent. Compared to those who are *not at all interested in politics* (reference category), those who are *hardly interested in politics* trust politicians and political institutions by .43 more, those who are *quite interested in politics* have .36 more trust, and those who are *very interested in politics* have .37 more trust on the 0 to 10 scale. All other significant independent variables are positively linked to political trust. Every unit increase in social trust, economic, educational and healthcare performance evaluation, external efficacy and immigration attitude increases the level of political trust by .14, .21, .11, .10, .35 and .15 on the 0 to 10 scale, respectively.

A look at the standardized coefficients *Beta* in Table 11 for comparison among the effects of independent variables shows that external political efficacy has the strongest effect on political trust (.317), followed by economic performance evaluation (.241), immigration attitude (.163), educational and healthcare performance evaluation (.129, .128) and social trust (.123). The effects of political interest (.109 ~ .079), partisanship (-.094) and non-institutionalized participation

## Table 11. Multiple Regression Results: Coefficients

| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | B | SE | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | -.464 | .288 | | -1.610 | .108 |
| | Social trust | .137 | .023 | .123 | 5.895 | .000 |
| | Formal network (0=No, 1=Yes) | .008 | .087 | .002 | .097 | .923 |
| | Informal network | .011 | .024 | .008 | .439 | .661 |
| | Electoral participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.041 | .140 | -.006 | -.293 | .770 |
| | Institutionalized participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.085 | .091 | -.018 | -.930 | .353 |
| | Non-institutionalized participation (0=No, 1=Yes) | -.272 | .078 | -.069 | -3.476 | .001 |
| | Economic performance evaluation | .213 | .019 | .241 | 11.095 | .000 |
| | Educational performance evaluation | .108 | .018 | .129 | 5.908 | .000 |
| | Healthcare performance evaluation | .102 | .017 | .128 | 5.883 | .000 |
| | Internal political efficacy | -.002 | .021 | -.002 | -.080 | .936 |
| | External political efficacy | .350 | .025 | .317 | 14.132 | .000 |
| | Partisanship (0=Ruling parties, 1=opposition parties) | -.342 | .070 | -.094 | -4.867 | .000 |
| | Policy issue (immigration attitude) | .145 | .019 | .163 | 7.479 | .000 |
| | Political interest_dummy1 (Hardly interested) | .430 | .153 | .109 | 2.808 | .005 |
| | Political interest_dummy2 (Quite interested) | .357 | .153 | .101 | 2.341 | .019 |
| | Political interest_dummy3 (Very interested) | .366 | .176 | .079 | 2.082 | .038 |
| | Media exposure | .000 | .000 | .016 | .866 | .386 |
| | Gender (0=Female, 1=Male) | .027 | .066 | .008 | .401 | .688 |
| | Age | .001 | .002 | .016 | .696 | .487 |
| | Household income | .015 | .012 | .024 | 1.215 | .225 |
| | Education | .014 | .010 | .029 | 1.349 | .178 |

Dependent variable: Trust in politicians and political institutions

(-.069) are relatively weak. Political trust is more strongly affected by political factors such as external political efficacy, government performance evaluations and policy issue rather than social factors such as social trust.

From the model, we can derive the regression equation that can predict political trust score given a set of values for the independent variables, based on the unstandardized coefficients in Table 11, as shown below:

*predicted political trust = –.464 + (.137 X social trust) + (.350 X external efficacy) – (.272 X non-institutionalized participation) + (.213 X economic performance) + (.108 X educational performance) + (.102 X healthcare performance) – (.342 X partisanship) + (.145 X immigration attitude) + (.430 X political interest_dummy1) + (.357 X political interest_dummy2) + (.366 X political interested_dummy3)*

This regression equation can be used to calculate predicted values of political trust for a given set of independent variables' values.

**Table 12. Custom Hypothesis Tests: Contrast Results (K Matrix)[a]**

| | | | Dependent Variable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contrast | | | Trust in political institutions and politicians |
| L1 | Contrast Estimate | | 5.192 |
| | Hypothesized Value | | 0 |
| | Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) | | 5.192 |
| | Std. Error | | .056 |
| | Sig. | | .000 |
| | 95% Confidence Interval for Difference | Lower Bound | 5.082 |
| | | Upper Bound | 5.302 |

a. Based on the user-specified contrast coefficients (L') matrix number 1

For example, as shown in Table 12, for a typical Swede who voted for one of the opposition parties in the last election (partisanship = 1), did not post or share anything about politics online (non-institutionalized participation = 0) and have average social trust (6.2), government performance evaluations (6.0, 5.0, 6.0), external political efficacy (3.0), immigration attitude (6.33) and political interest ('quite interested'), the regression equation predicts a level of

political trust of 5.19 on the 0 to 10 scale, which is quite similar to the actual mean value (5.31) of political trust in Sweden.[7]

### 5.2.4 Analyses

In the previous literature about political trust in Sweden, a variety of causal factors have been adduced to explain the decline in political trust. Some factors are argued to affect political trust, others are not. There are both similarities and differences in their arguments. In general, it is argued that external political efficacy, evaluation of government's economic and welfare performance, policy issue such as immigration, and political interest are significantly and positively related to political trust. Also, it is argued that media exposure is not strongly but significantly connected to political trust, although the relationship can be positive or negative depending on the character of media. On the contrary, it is argued that internal political efficacy and social groups (*'gender'* and *'education'*) does not significantly or strongly affect political trust, with an exception of income affecting political trust. However, there are conflicting arguments about the effect of social capital (*'social trust'* and *'network'*), partisanship (*'political distance'*), institutionalized political participation *('contacting politicians'*) and social group (*'age'*) on political trust. With a view to examining and comparing the effects of those variables, I performed a rather comprehensive analysis encompassing the above factors at the individual level, taking into account controlling other variables. The evidence presented in the study supports or refutes the existing arguments.

First, similar to the arguments in the previous research, the evidence of this study supports that external political efficacy, evaluation of government performances and policy issue (*'immigration'*) have a significant, strong and positive effect on political trust, whereas internal political efficacy does not significantly affect it. The evidence also shows that political interest has a significant effect on political trust, as in the previous research, but its direction is rather ambivalent, as mentioned above. It is probable that political interest can positively or negatively affect political trust every now and then. My interest here is the direction of immigration attitude's effect. The Swedish government tightened its immigration (refugee) policy, such as

[7] The values for each independent variable included in the equation are the actually possible approximate values to the mean values of each independent variable presented in the above univariate analysis.

border controls and minimum asylum rules, to control the entry of refugees and immigrants after the 2015 refugee crisis. I expected these measures to have undermined pro-immigration people's trust in government and have increased anti-immigration people's trust, resulting in the negative relationship between immigration attitude and political trust. But the current result is opposite to my expectation. The more positive they are towards immigration, the more trust they still have in the government. Why does this happen? The possible explanation I give is that many people do not withdraw their confidence in the government for the reason of the government's tightening immigration policy. They may consider the government's measures as an inevitable choice because the government has no financial capacity of taking in as many refugees as want to come into Sweden. Thus, the government's measures are not likely to affect people's political trust to such an extent that it will reverse the above direction.

Second, the evidence of this study refutes the existing argument that media exposure is significantly related to political trust. It is plausible that the media dealing with politicians and political institutions, such as *Uppdrag granskning* and *Kalla fakta*, can have a significant effect on political trust. But this relation is not detected in my study. Why not? Again, this is beyond my knowledge. It remains to be examined in further studies.

Third, social groups (*'gender', 'age', 'income'* and *'education'*) appear not to affect political trust without an exception in this study, which is at once similar to and different from the results of the previous research. Again, insignificant relationships can suggest that social cleavage is not strong in Sweden.

Fourth, regarding social capital, i.e., social trust and networks, some authors insist that there is no relation between social capital and political trust in Sweden, others argue that social capital significantly and strongly influence political trust. This differences are seen to be primarily due to the difference of the data used. The former stresses, based on the evidence of aggregate-level time-series data, that social capital and political trust are not correlated. The latter uses the individual-level cross-sectional data in arguing for the significant relationship between them. Thus, it can be argued that social capital significantly affects political trust at the individual level, but that such a relation may not exist at the aggregate level. However, the problem is that this study shows the conflicting effect of social trust and networks on political trust in Sweden. In this study, the effect of social trust on political trust is significant and rather strong, while

networks' effect is not significant. Social trust surely can affect political trust at the individual level, but why do not networks affect political trust in Sweden? It also remains to be seen in further researches.

Fifth, when it comes to partisanship expressed as political distance between the government and the governed, one author suggests the possibility that it may influence political trust, while another argues that the 'Home Team' hypothesis does not apply to Sweden. They all use the aggregate-level time-series data collected from a series of national surveys. What makes the difference? Probably, the difference lies in where they focus. A close look at their argument tells us that they have almost the same evidence that people are more – if not highly – trusting when their party is in the Cabinet and that political trust has declined regardless of which party they support, ruling party or opposition party. The author focusing on the former argues that partisanship affects political trust, whereas the other focusing on the latter contends that they have no relationship. The evidence of this study demonstrates that the effect of partisanship is not strong but surely existent at the individual level. It is plausible that supporters of the ruling party have more trust in the government than supporter of the opposition party.

Last, there are also competing claims about the effect of institutionalized participation (*'contacting politicians'*), but the present study supports that *'contacting politicians'* has no effect on political trust in Sweden. This result is contrary to the common belief that the contact with politicians or government officials will increase trust in politicians and governments. Thus, why this result happens needs to be examined in further studies. The evidence also shows that electoral participation (*'voting'*) has no significant effect, while non-institutionalized participation (*'posting online'*) has weak but significant negative effect. However, we should be cautious in expanding the results to the overall political participation because those variables of this study represent only parts of political participation.

In the next section, I will conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion about them in light of the present study's objectives.

# 6. Conclusion and Discussion

I conducted a quantitative research of different statistical methods, *Ordinal Logistic Regression* and *Multiple Linear Regression*, depending on the scale of dependent variables to investigate the relationship between political trust and welfare attitude and the causal factors influencing political trust in Sweden from the perspective of political trust and welfare attitude's conceptual multi-dimensionality, using data from the European Social Survey 2016 wave. My individual research methods and data together were so appropriate and effective that they gave me significant answers to my two research questions and provided a bigger picture of political trust in Sweden, as shown above.

The key finding of my research is that political trust does matter for welfare attitude in Sweden since political trust has a significant effect on nine out of eleven welfare attitude variables. Specifically speaking, political trust does not significantly or strongly influence the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitude, but it significantly and rather strongly affects the implementation and outcome dimensions in Sweden, controlling for other relevant variables. Another key finding is that political trust in Sweden is not significantly affected by formal and informal network, electoral (*'voting'*) and institutionalized (*'contacting politicians'*) political participation, internal political efficacy, media exposure and socio-economic variables such as gender, age, income and education, while it is significantly affected by social trust, non-institutionalized participation (*'posting online'*), government performances, external political efficacy, policy issue (*'immigration'*), partisanship and political interest. The effect of external efficacy is strongest, followed by economic performance, policy issue, educational and healthcare performance, and social trust. The effects of political interest, partisanship and non-institutionalized participation are rather weak or negative.

How can we interpret these findings? The fact that political trust is not significantly or strongly related to the goal and range dimensions of welfare attitudes in Sweden, where the welfare state has been deeply institutionalized in society, means that political trust would have truly affected even the goal and range dimensions – as well as welfare mix dimension – in the past, when the welfare state was not yet established in Sweden. The fact that political trust is significantly and strongly related to the implementation and outcome dimensions means that political trust will severely undermine or intensify support for the welfare state in the future

depending on its efficiency, effectiveness or performances. Therefore, political trust was, is and will always be of critical importance for the support for the welfare state in Sweden.

If people's support for the welfare state depends crucially on political trust in Sweden, the factors influencing political trust are also of great significance. As mentioned above, political trust is strongly affected by external political efficacy, government performances and policy issue. What does it mean? In the end, it tells us that in order to enhance political trust, politicians and government institutions should be responsive to people's needs, perform well in accordance with their expectations and make and implement good policies for them. Many people have diverse needs for various reasons. Some people can have difficulty of finding a job due to the lack of skill, proper education or language barrier. Others can have difficulty of keeping a reasonable standard of living at their old-age due to the deficiency of adequate pension income or savings. Politicians and government institutions would be more trustworthy if they listened to their needs and alleviated their difficulties. People also have an expectation that politicians and government institutions will be moral, efficient and effective. Corruptions are fatal for political trust and it is difficult to imagine that people trust inefficient and ineffective politicians and government institutions for making and implementing policies. Accordingly, well-performing governments and politicians are more trustworthy. It goes without saying that if policies are perceived as good for people, they will generally trust politicians and government institutions making and implementing those policies. Therefore, people are most likely to have confidence in such politicians and institutions that are more responsive to their needs, perform better than expected and make and implement better policies for them.

To conclude, in Sweden, political trust does matter for welfare attitudes and politicians and political institutions' responsiveness, government performances and policy issue are major determinants of political trust.

The above conclusion has implications for the Korean government's welfare expansion policy, although it is very limited due to cultural and institutional differences between the two countries to judge that this conclusion is applicable to Korea as well. When it comes to the relationship between political trust and welfare attitudes, political trust can be of greater importance for welfare attitudes in Korea than in Sweden for two reasons. First, Korea has a relatively short history of welfare state, that is, the welfare state is not yet institutionalized in

the societal and political system in Korea. Moreover, the Confucianism culture in Korean tends to emphasize the family's responsibility for welfare provision rather than that of the state. Accordingly, people may have conflicting opinions even about the welfare state's goal and range in Korea. Second, the welfare expansion policy that the current Korean government pursues will boil down to the questions of 'Who pays?', 'Who benefits?', 'How much?', and 'On what conditions?'. Such issues can be more controversial than the goal and range of welfare policies. Thus, the effect of political trust on attitudes about such redistribution design can be more significant and stronger than the effect on the goal and range of welfare policies. Consequently, political trust is likely to have a greater impact on welfare attitudes in Korea than in Sweden. If people do not trust in politicians and government institutions, this will place an enormous constraint on the welfare expansion policy in Korea.

Regarding the determinants of political trust, major causal factors influencing political trust in Sweden can be of great importance in Korea, as well. Low trust in politicians and government institutions in Korea can be attributed to long social distance and lack of communication between politicians and government officials on the one hand and the governed on the other, which lowers the responsiveness of the political system and, consequently, people's external political efficacy. Another main reason for low trust can be people's dissatisfaction with government policy outcomes. The government did not succeed in attaining major policy goals of improving income inequality, fertility rate, youth unemployment and old-age poverty despite the spending of an astronomical amount of money. As mentioned in the introduction, the relative poverty rate kept rising to 15.4 percent of the population currently. Total fertility rate recorded the historically lowest level of 1.05 in 2017 (KOSIS). The serious social problem of chronic youth unemployment coined a new word *'seven-give-up generation'* representing that most of youths give up love, marriage, childbirth, human relations, home ownership, personal dreams and hope due to their precarious status in the labor market. Almost half of the elderly people aged 65 and over are trapped in relative poverty. In addition, policy issues such as Inter-Korean policy, College Admission policy, Free School Meal policy and Child Care policy have thrown people into confusion and led to considerable controversy, which is estimated to have affected people's trust in governments. In conclusion, external political efficacy, government performance and policy issue are worthy of consideration as major determinants of political trust in Korea, as well.

I gained the meaningful results about political trust in Sweden through the present research and it provided me with an opportunity to reflect on policy implications it has in light of the Korean conditions. However, if I had conducted the research differently, I might have had more meaningful insights. First, if I had manipulated socioeconomic variables into categorical variables with three categories, for example, the young, the middle-aged and the old or low-income, middle-income and high-income group, instead of using them as they were measured, I might have got the significant result that social cleavages are large enough to affect political trust and welfare attitude in Sweden. Further, if I had added aggregate-level time-series data, I could have drawn a more comprehensive picture about political trust in Sweden, as mentioned in the method section. Last, if the present quantitative research had been complemented with qualitative research such as interview methods, it would have demonstrated how political trust is actually understood in the Swedish people's mind and why the above-mentioned unexpected results come about. Therefore, I still have interest in that the present research results will be examined or complemented with different data or in further qualitative researches. Nevertheless, I expect that policy-makers will refer to these current results and utilize them in their policy measures to enhance trust in governments among their people. I hope that despite my lack of research capacity, the present research can contribute in a way to the development of Political Sociology related to political trust in Sweden.

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## Appendix

## A. Questions wording and measurement

### *Welfare Attitude* *(4 dimensions 11 items)*

| Dimension | Items | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Goal | 1 | To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels? | 1: Agree strongly<br>2: Agree<br>3: Neither agree nor disagree<br>4: Disagree<br>5: Disagree strongly |
| Range | 3 | How much responsibility do you think governments should have<br>… to ensure reasonable standard of living for the old?<br>… to ensure reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?<br>… to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents? | 00: Should not be government's responsibility at all<br>~<br>10: Should be entirely governments' responsibility |
| Implemen-tation | 3 | How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country]?<br>Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job.<br>Many people with very low incomes get less benefits than they are legally entitled to.<br>Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled. | 1: Agree strongly<br>2: Agree<br>3: Neither agree nor disagree<br>4: Disagree<br>5: Disagree strongly |
| Outcome | 4 | To what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country]<br>… prevent widespread poverty?<br>… lead to a more equal society?<br>… place too great a strain on the economy?<br>… make people lazy? | 1: Agree strongly<br>2: Agree<br>3: Neither agree nor disagree<br>4: Disagree<br>5: Disagree strongly |

### *Political Trust* *(5 items)*

| Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|
| Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of these institutions.<br>… [country]'s parliament?<br>… the legal system?<br>… politicians?<br>… political parties? | 00: No trust at all<br>~<br>10: Complete trust |
| Now thinking about the [country]'s government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its jobs? | 00: Extremely dissatisfied<br>~<br>10: Extremely satisfied |

***Social Trust** (3 items)*

| Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|
| Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? | 00: I can't be too careful<br>~<br>10: Most people can be trusted |
| Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? | 00: Most people would try to take advantage of me<br>~<br>10: Most people would try to be fair |
| Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? | 00: People mostly look out for themselves<br>~<br>10: People mostly try to be helpful |

***Network** (2 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Formal network | Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organization? If yes, is that currently or previously? | 1: Yes, currently<br>2: Yes, previously<br>3: No |
| Informal network | How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues? | 1: Never<br>2: Less than once a month<br>3: Once a month<br>4: Several times a month<br>5: Once a week<br>6: Several times a week<br>7: Every day |

***Political Participation** (3 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Electoral participation | Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? | 1: Yes<br>2: No |
| Institutionalized participation | During the last 12 months, have you contacted a politician, government or local government official? | 1: Yes<br>2: No |
| Non-institutionalized participation | During the last 12 months, have you posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter? | 1: Yes<br>2: No |

***Political Efficacy*** *(4 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Internal efficacy | How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues? | 1: Not at all able<br>2: A little able<br>3: Quite able<br>4: Very able<br>5: Completely able |
| | How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics? | 1: Not at all confident<br>2: A little confident<br>3: Quite confident<br>4: Very confident<br>5: Completely confident |
| External efficacy | How much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does? | 1: Not at all<br>2: Very little<br>3: Some<br>4: A lot<br>5: A great deal |
| | How much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics? | |

***Government Performance*** *(3 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Economy | On the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? | 00: Extremely dissatisfied<br>~<br>10: Extremely satisfied |
| Education | What do you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays? | 00: Extremely bad<br>~<br>10: Extremely good |
| Healthcare | What do you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays? | 00: Extremely bad<br>~<br>10: Extremely good |

***Political Ideology*** *(1 item)*

| Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|
| In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? | 00: Left<br>~<br>10: Right |

***Partisanship*** *(1 item)*

| | |
|---|---|
| Questions | Which party did you vote for in the last national election? |
| Categories of measurement | 1: "Centern", 2: "Folkpartiet liberalerna", 3: "Kristdemokraterna", 4: "Miljöpartiet de gröna", 5: "Moderata Samlingspartiet", 6: "Socialdemokraterna", 7: "Vänsterpartiet", 8: "FI (Feministiskt Initiativ)", 9: "Piratpartiet", 10: "Sverigedemokraterna", 11: "Annat parti" |

***Policy Issue: Immigration Attitude*** *(3 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Economy | Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? | 00: Bad for the economy<br>~<br>10: Good for the economy |
| Cultural life | Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? | 00: Cultural life undermined<br>~<br>10: Cultural life enriched |
| Living condition | Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? | 00: Worse place to live<br>~<br>10: Better place to live |

***Political Interest*** *(1 item)*

| Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|
| How interested are you in politics? | 1: Very interested<br>2: Quite interested<br>3: Hardly interested<br>4: Not at all interested |

***Media Exposure*** *(1 item)*

| Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|
| On a typical day, about how much time do you spend watching, reading or listening to news about politics and current affairs? Please give your answer in hours and minute. | "No category" |

***Value Orientation: Egalitarianism*** *(2 items)*

| | Questions | Categories of measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Income | How much do you agree or disagree that large difference in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts? | 1: Agree strongly<br>2: Agree<br>3: Neither agree nor disagree<br>4: Disagree<br>5: Disagree strongly |
| Standard of Living | How much do you agree or disagree that for a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small? | 1: Agree strongly<br>2: Agree<br>3: Neither agree nor disagree<br>4: Disagree<br>5: Disagree strongly |

## B. Test of Assumptions

### a) Ordinal Logistic Regression Assumptions: Multi-collinearity and Proportional Odds

| Welfare attitude variables (DV) | | Goal | Range | | | Implementation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | income equality | the old | the unemployed | child care | less efforts for job | less benefits |
| Multi-collinearity (VIF) | Political trust | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 |
| | Political ideology | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 |
| | Egalitarianism (income) | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 |
| | Egalitarianism (living standard) | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 |
| | Gender | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 |
| | Age | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 |
| | Education | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 |
| | Income | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 |
| Proportional odds | Full likelihood ratio sig. | .217 | .008 | .295 | .000 | .003 | .148 |
| | (df) Chi-square | (24)29.093 | (24)43.697 | (24)27.111 | (24)65.014 | (24)47.599 | (24)31.193 |

| Welfare attitude variables (DV) | | Implement -ation | Outcomes | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | unentitled benefits | preventing poverty | promoting equality | burden on economy | making people lazy | |
| Multi-collinearity (VIF) | Political trust | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | 1.063 | |
| | Political ideology | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | 1.247 | |
| | Egalitarianism (income) | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | 1.274 | |
| | Egalitarianism (living standard) | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | 1.169 | |
| | Gender | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | 1.025 | |
| | Age | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | 1.073 | |
| | Education | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | 1.201 | |
| | Income | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | 1.198 | |
| Proportional odds | Full likelihood ratio sig. | .264 | .141 | .000 | .041 | .001 | |
| | (df) Chi-square | (24)27.913 | (24)31.455 | (24)57.284 | (24)37.288 | (24)52.481 | |

### b) Ordinal Logistic Regression Assumptions: Proportional Odds

| Independent variable: political trust | | Cumulative binary variable of each dependent variable | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Variable 1 | Variable 2 | Variable 3 | Variable 4 |
| Proportional Odds (Exp(B)) | Range - 'the old' | .000 | .841 | .942 | .854 |
| | Range - 'child care' | 1.088 | 1.247 | 1.075 | 1.012 |
| | Implementation - 'less efforts' | 1.368 | 1.296 | 1.231 | 1.087 |
| | Outcome - 'promoting equality' | 1.490 | 1.262 | 1.246 | 1.282 |
| | Outcome - 'burden on economy' | 1.281 | 1.204 | 1.135 | 1.159 |
| | Outcome - 'making people lazy' | 1.225 | 1.190 | 1.217 | 1.143 |

## c) Multiple Regression Assumptions

### c.1 Multi-collinearity: Tolerance and VIF

**Coefficients[a]**

| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | | | Collinearity Statistics | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | T | Sig. | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -.464 | .288 | | -1.610 | .108 | | |
| | Social trust | .137 | .023 | .123 | 5.895 | .000 | .751 | 1.331 |
| | Formal network | .008 | .087 | .002 | .097 | .923 | .794 | 1.259 |
| | Informal network | .011 | .024 | .008 | .439 | .661 | .919 | 1.088 |
| | Electoral participation | -.041 | .140 | -.006 | -.293 | .770 | .828 | 1.207 |
| | Institutionalized participation | -.085 | .091 | -.018 | -.930 | .353 | .843 | 1.187 |
| | Non-institutionalized participation | -.272 | .078 | -.069 | -3.476 | .001 | .818 | 1.223 |
| | Economic performance | .213 | .019 | .241 | 11.095 | .000 | .687 | 1.456 |
| | Educational performance | .108 | .018 | .129 | 5.908 | .000 | .678 | 1.475 |
| | Healthcare performance | .102 | .017 | .128 | 5.883 | .000 | .689 | 1.452 |
| | Internal political efficacy | -.002 | .021 | -.002 | -.080 | .936 | .575 | 1.739 |
| | External political efficacy | .350 | .025 | .317 | 14.132 | .000 | .648 | 1.544 |
| | Partisanship | -.342 | .070 | -.094 | -4.867 | .000 | .871 | 1.148 |
| | Policy issue (immigration) | .145 | .019 | .163 | 7.479 | .000 | .686 | 1.457 |
| | Political interest (Hardly interested) | .430 | .153 | .109 | 2.808 | .005 | .215 | 4.657 |
| | Political interest (Quite interested) | .357 | .153 | .101 | 2.341 | .019 | .174 | 5.734 |
| | Political interest (Very interested) | .366 | .176 | .079 | 2.082 | .038 | .225 | 4.444 |
| | Media exposure | .000 | .000 | .016 | .866 | .386 | .905 | 1.105 |
| | Gender | .027 | .066 | .008 | .401 | .688 | .927 | 1.078 |
| | Age | .001 | .002 | .016 | .696 | .487 | .606 | 1.650 |
| | Household income | .015 | .012 | .024 | 1.215 | .225 | .802 | 1.246 |
| | Education | .014 | .010 | .029 | 1.349 | .178 | .713 | 1.403 |

a. Dependent Variable: Political trust

### c.2 Outlier and Homoscedasticity




**Casewise Diagnostics[a]**

| Case Number | Std. Residual | Political Trust | Predicted Value | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32422 | -3.392 | 1.80 | 5.796 | -3.996 |
| 32637 | -3.680 | 3.80 | 8.135 | -4.335 |
| 32679 | -3.257 | .00 | 3.836 | -3.836 |
| 32738 | -3.348 | 1.20 | 5.144 | -3.944 |
| 33319 | -3.458 | .20 | 4.273 | -4.073 |

a. Dependent Variable: Political Trust

**c.3 Normality and Linearity**






### c.4 Independence of Residuals

**Model Summary[b]**

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .750[a] | .562 | .556 | 1.17793 | 1.982 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Healthcare performance, Political interest (Quite interested), Gender, Media exposure, Partisanship, Non-institutionalized participation, Informal network, Institutionalized participation, Electoral participation, Generalized social trust, Formal network, Immigration, Education, External political efficacy, Economic performance, Educational performance, Internal political efficacy, Age, Political interest (Very interested), Political interest (Hardly interested)
b. Dependent Variable: Trust in political institutions and politicians

## C. The Results of Bivariate Analyses

### a) Directions of the Relationship between Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes

| (DV) Political trust | Category | N | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare attitude (range dimension - the old) | Disagree strongly | 2 | 6.80 | .00 |
| | Disagree | 8 | 4.40 | 2.17 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 190 | 5.38 | 1.61 |
| | Agree | 691 | 5.52 | 1.58 |
| | Agree strongly | 567 | 5.05 | 1.97 |
| | Total | 1,458 | 5.31 | 1.76 |
| Welfare attitude (range dimension - the unemployed) | Disagree strongly | 5 | 2.80 | 2.52 |
| | Disagree | 37 | 4.87 | 2.31 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 523 | 5.16 | 1.70 |
| | Agree | 603 | 5.46 | 1.62 |
| | Agree strongly | 287 | 5.39 | 1.99 |
| | Total | 1,455 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Welfare attitude (range dimension - child care) | Disagree strongly | 12 | 5.20 | 1.51 |
| | Disagree | 25 | 4.17 | 2.15 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 243 | 5.15 | 1.73 |
| | Agree | 638 | 5.39 | 1.60 |
| | Agree strongly | 530 | 5.37 | 1.91 |
| | Total | 1,448 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Welfare attitude (implementation dimension – less efforts for job) | Agree strongly | 26 | 4.27 | 2.11 |
| | Agree | 196 | 4.59 | 1.93 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 340 | 5.07 | 1.76 |
| | Disagree | 739 | 5.61 | 1.56 |
| | Disagree strongly | 134 | 5.65 | 1.92 |
| | Total | 1,435 | 5.32 | 1.75 |
| Welfare attitude (implementation dimension – less benefits) | Agree strongly | 22 | 4.43 | 2.30 |
| | Agree | 239 | 4.85 | 1.97 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 648 | 5.36 | 1.68 |
| | Disagree | 308 | 5.58 | 1.63 |
| | Disagree strongly | 45 | 5.78 | 1.76 |
| | Total | 1,262 | 5.32 | 1.76 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare attitude (implementation dimension - unentitled benefits) | Agree strongly | 62 | 3.92 | 2.11 |
| | Agree | 531 | 4.95 | 1.73 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 416 | 5.48 | 1.69 |
| | Disagree | 337 | 5.93 | 1.50 |
| | Disagree strongly | 36 | 5.77 | 1.60 |
| | Total | 1,382 | 5.32 | 1.75 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome dimension – preventing poverty) | Disagree strongly | 9 | 4.80 | 1.32 |
| | Disagree | 140 | 4.82 | 1.86 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 345 | 5.01 | 1.70 |
| | Agree | 820 | 5.46 | 1.73 |
| | Agree strongly | 115 | 5.84 | 1.79 |
| | Total | 1,429 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome dimension - promoting equality) | Disagree strongly | 11 | 3.56 | 2.40 |
| | Disagree | 155 | 4.61 | 1.85 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 348 | 4.96 | 1.82 |
| | Agree | 809 | 5.53 | 1.59 |
| | Agree strongly | 111 | 6.11 | 1.75 |
| | Total | 1,434 | 5.33 | 1.75 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome dimension - burden on economy) | Agree strongly | 34 | 4.51 | 2.44 |
| | Agree | 343 | 4.88 | 1.82 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 524 | 5.30 | 1.64 |
| | Disagree | 436 | 5.62 | 1.67 |
| | Disagree strongly | 96 | 5.90 | 1.84 |
| | Total | 1,433 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Welfare attitude (outcome dimension - making people lazy) | Agree strongly | 57 | 4.44 | 2.29 |
| | Agree | 428 | 4.95 | 1.77 |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | 426 | 5.29 | 1.65 |
| | Disagree | 419 | 5.67 | 1.59 |
| | Disagree strongly | 117 | 5.83 | 1.86 |
| | Total | 1,447 | 5.31 | 1.75 |

### b) Directions of the Relationship between Political Trust and Categorical Independent Variables

| Independent variables | Categories | N | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Informal network | Never | 4 | 5.15 | 2.68 |
| | Less than once a month | 39 | 4.63 | 1.94 |
| | Once a month | 73 | 5.13 | 1.72 |
| | Several times a month | 255 | 5.31 | 1.79 |
| | Once a week | 234 | 5.17 | 1.85 |
| | Several times a week | 451 | 5.32 | 1.64 |
| | Every day | 406 | 5.50 | 1.80 |
| | Total | 1,462 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Political interest | Not at all interested | 69 | 4.16 | 2.17 |
| | Hardly interested | 404 | 5.16 | 1.75 |
| | Quite interested | 729 | 5.40 | 1.65 |
| | Very interested | 264 | 5.59 | 1.86 |
| | Total | 1,466 | 5.31 | 1.77 |
| Economic performance | Extremely dissatisfied | 17 | 2.06 | 1.95 |
| | 1 | 20 | 2.40 | 2.07 |
| | 2 | 40 | 2.82 | 1.50 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 3 | 93 | 3.86 | 1.70 |
| | 4 | 106 | 4.60 | 1.41 |
| | 5 | 259 | 4.79 | 1.58 |
| | 6 | 240 | 5.46 | 1.23 |
| | 7 | 326 | 5.84 | 1.41 |
| | 8 | 242 | 6.30 | 1.43 |
| | 9 | 67 | 6.34 | 1.53 |
| | Extremely satisfied | 25 | 6.93 | 1.84 |
| | Total | 1,435 | 5.31 | 1.76 |
| Educational performance | Extremely bad | 29 | 2.39 | 1.88 |
| | 1 | 27 | 3.39 | 1.83 |
| | 2 | 79 | 4.00 | 1.71 |
| | 3 | 188 | 4.65 | 1.78 |
| | 4 | 187 | 5.39 | 1.49 |
| | 5 | 271 | 5.25 | 1.59 |
| | 6 | 240 | 5.55 | 1.52 |
| | 7 | 231 | 5.96 | 1.45 |
| | 8 | 138 | 6.00 | 1.40 |
| | 9 | 30 | 7.11 | 1.70 |
| | Extremely good | 25 | 6.17 | 2.25 |
| | Total | 1,445 | 5.32 | 1.76 |
| Healthcare performance | Extremely bad | 32 | 2.91 | 2.21 |
| | 1 | 29 | 2.86 | 1.80 |
| | 2 | 70 | 3.98 | 1.92 |
| | 3 | 125 | 4.45 | 1.63 |
| | 4 | 166 | 4.91 | 1.62 |
| | 5 | 229 | 5.34 | 1.63 |
| | 6 | 210 | 5.62 | 1.35 |
| | 7 | 303 | 5.76 | 1.53 |
| | 8 | 207 | 5.93 | 1.54 |
| | 9 | 55 | 6.08 | 1.62 |
| | Extremely good | 35 | 6.14 | 2.14 |
| | Total | 1,461 | 5.31 | 1.77 |
| Household income | J - 1st decile | 92 | 5.17 | 1.81 |
| | R - 2nd decile | 113 | 4.96 | 2.00 |
| | C - 3rd decile | 97 | 4.95 | 2.05 |
| | M - 4th decile | 113 | 4.82 | 1.81 |
| | F - 5th decile | 109 | 5.00 | 1.75 |
| | S - 6th decile | 114 | 5.28 | 1.75 |
| | K - 7th decile | 138 | 5.40 | 1.87 |
| | P - 8th decile | 178 | 5.34 | 1.68 |
| | D - 9th decile | 200 | 5.65 | 1.49 |
| | H - 10th decile | 225 | 5.78 | 1.54 |
| | Total | 1,379 | 5.32 | 1.76 |