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Deliberation in the Age of Deception:
Measuring Sycophancy in Large Language Models

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Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) currently represent the most sophisticated form of artificial intelligence. Their capabilities make them increasingly able to influence human opinion. A critical concern is sycophancy, a sophisticated form of imitation where models tailor their responses to align with their user's affiliation. This behaviour risks entrapping individuals in filter bubbles by reinforcing their worldviews, thus undermining the essence of communicative rationality.

Whilst academics have researched the problem of bias extensively, the concept of sycophancy has been neglected by the social sciences and treated as a technical phenomenon, often divorced from the wider social setting. This thesis discusses the risks of such neglect and argues that sycophantic behaviour should be conceptualised first and foremost within the social sciences as a concern for political deliberation. This study challenges traditional ontologies that exclusively attribute rationality solely to human agents and evaluates the role of LLMs in democratic deliberation. Despite significant research on LLMs, the fundamental moral and political values intrinsic to these models have yet to be thoroughly examined from a normative standpoint.

This thesis introduces a novel methodological approach by using machine learning techniques, including few-shot learning, prompt engineering, and probabilistic output analysis, to investigate sycophancy within the fine-tuned models, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. The results indicate that these models exhibit political and moral sycophancy, meaning that they change their outputs based on the user's moral or political affiliations. Furthermore, the models exhibit a greater propensity to deviate from their baseline responses and align their answers with the political and moral beliefs of right-wing ideologies. The findings of this study highlight a remarkable level of deception among these models and a deep understanding of user preferences.

Keywords: sycophancy, large language models, machine learning, few shot prompting, political deliberation, communicative rationality, political psychology

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1. Introduction

The cultural fascination with creating agentic machines has existed for decades (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2019: 6; Joyce et al., 2021: 2). As computing power increased in the mid-20th century, researchers began exploring the possibility of programming software systems to exhibit agency and decision-making capabilities (Joyce et al., 2021: 2). These early investigations set the stage for groundbreaking advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), leading to the recent emergence of sophisticated Large Language Models (LLMs) such as DALL-E, Gemini, and GPT-4 (previously ChatGPT). LLMs are currently seen as one of the most advanced forms of artificial intelligence as their enhanced capabilities allow them to handle multiple language-related tasks (e.g., text-generation, translation, conversation), and these models often show 'emergent abilities' that they were not explicitly programmed for (Bommasani et al., 2021: 115; Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 7).

The personalisation potential of LLMs is a double-edged sword (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3). LLMs can dramatically improve accessibility by tailoring outputs to users' needs (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3). However, the ability to create extremist LLMs, which has already been reported, confines users to outputs that only reinforce their world views (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3). This reanimates ongoing debates about new technologies and echo chambers, including their potential impact on democratic dialogue (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3). Hence, the burgeoning capabilities of such models highlight a worrying potential: their role as inadvertent arbiters in shaping human opinions, serving both as conduits and catalysts for communicative rationality.

One particularly concerning phenomenon within LLMs is sycophancy, a sophisticated form of imitation (Guo, 2024: 7). Sycophantic behaviour refers to the models' tendency to refrain from contradicting users' opinions, often sacrificing accuracy and impartiality, particularly when addressing complex queries (e.g., adapting

conservative views once a user reveals that they are conservative) (Wei et al., 2023: 1-3; Guo, 2024: 7).

This raises questions about the implications of these technologies for democracy as they may inhibit the citizenry from encountering contrasting views, extending longstanding discourse about whether new media technologies are conducive to echo chambers or polarisation (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 10). Sycophancy amongst models' risks creating echo chambers that reflect user bias irrespective of empirical truth and limits them to exist in segregated "filter bubbles" (Persily & Tucker, 2020: 34). The result of this is a society that is increasingly segregated along partisan lines, with eroding trust in the state and heightened risks of political violence (Persily & Tucker, 2020: 35). Therefore, power is central to decisions about whose worldviews are included and prioritised in these models, who gets to use and capitalise on these technologies and decide upon their regulations (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3).

The inherent "black box" nature of deep learning techniques, which form the foundation of most AI systems, complicates the situation further (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2019: 11). Despite the inherent 'objectivity' of AI, these models are not immune to prejudice, bias, and manipulation (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2019: 10).

While bias in AI systems has been a topic of significant research within the social sciences (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Caliskan et al., 2017; Arguedas and Simon, 2023), the issue of sycophancy in Large Language Models (LLMs) remains neglected. The limited research on sycophancy in LLMs has left a significant gap in our understanding of how these systems might be manipulated for political advantage, or the broader implications of such behaviour on the sociopolitical landscape.

This work aims to address this research gap and has two primary objectives; first, we aim to investigate the phenomenon of sycophancy within large language

models. Following this, we aim to establish the concept of sycophancy within social scientific research and analyse its implications in shaping deliberative discourse and communicative rationality.

A common misconception around LLMs is attributing more to the model than just being a statistical probability distribution (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 8). Therefore, it is important to distinguish that biases within LLMs are not a product of the architecture itself but of the data on which it is trained (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 8). The lack of diversity in training data and the predominance of specific demographic groups, such as internet users and native English speakers, lead to representational biases (Guo, 2024: 3). Thus, bias in LLMs is a manifestation of the flaws within the training set that represents the biases that exist within the real world (Guo, 2024: 3).

Whilst biases in LLMs mirror those that already exist within society itself, sycophancy is distinct from this as it is person dependent. This thesis contends that sycophancy is intrinsically linked to the personalisation capabilities of LLMs. This allows the model to tailor language, facts, vocabulary, and presentation style to suit individuals from various age groups or backgrounds (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 10). Thus, LLMs can present information in a manner that is far more convincing and compelling than traditional algorithmic bias (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 10). This is particularly concerning given the trajectory of the current political landscape which has witnessed a shift towards a more personalised form of politics (Bennett, 2012: 21). This trend is particularly evident in post-industrial democracies, where widespread social fragmentation, especially among younger generations, has led to the prevalence of individuation as the dominant social condition (Bennett, 2012: 22).

Additionally, the stakes are much higher as these LLMs are deemed as objective and neutral and people will rely on them much more than social media platforms. Whilst biases within media platforms reflect long-standing socio-political

issues that are inherently tied to humans, sycophancy represents a much more distinct challenge as it is uniquely tied to LLM capabilities.

This thesis is particularly interested in investigating political and moral sycophantic behaviour. Since political opinions are fundamentally grounded in moral concerns about right and wrong (Day et al., 2014: 1559), by researching the degree to which LLMs reinforce individuals' pre-existing moral or political convictions, this thesis seeks to analyse their contribution to the polarisation of political discourse and the erosion of communicative rationality.

Whilst rational argument is one of the cornerstones of political deliberation, it is primarily understood in terms of human agents. This is because the citizen or at the very least their vote, is a fundamental ingredient in any conceptualisation of democracy (Sundström, 2001: 117). However, the influence of LLMs, especially their sycophantic tendencies on communicative rationality, remains unexplored. This research shifts the focus from humans to LLMs, as the primary agents of this study. This thesis moves beyond the traditional ontological understanding of rationality and aims to fill a gap in deliberative theory, where empirical examination of rationality within deliberation, concerning AI agents, is scarce (Dutwin, 2003: 240).

Accordingly, this thesis is guided by the following research question:

1. What are the implications of LLM-driven political and moral sycophancy for deliberative democracy?

Since this demands an investigation into the phenomena of sycophancy in these models and a way to study their effects on the democratic discourse, we also answer the following questions in two phases of sycophancy testing: the explicit and implicit testing phases.

2. Explicit Testing for Political Sycophancy

2.1. To what extent do LLMs exhibit sycophantic behaviour by aligning their political responses with the users' explicitly stated political identities (e.g., liberal, conservative)?

2.2. Do LLMs show different levels of sycophancy depending on the specific political identity expressed by the user?

3. Implicit Testing for Moral Sycophancy

3.1. To what extent do LLMs exhibit sycophantic behaviour by aligning their responses with users' implicitly stated moral foundations (e.g., care/harm, liberty/oppression)?

3.2. Do LLMs show different levels of sycophancy depending on the specific moral foundation expressed by the user?

This study employs a dual approach to investigate two forms of sycophancy: political and moral. The explicit phase involves testing whether AI models align their responses with their user's explicitly stated political identities. Whereas the implicit phase is focused on testing the model in a subtle manner given the established link between political inclinations and morals. This research presents a novel methodological approach by using machine learning techniques, such as few-shot learning, prompt engineering, and probabilistic output analysis to test our theoretically grounded hypotheses.

While the negative consequences of sycophancy are apparent, sycophancy pertaining to political and moral issues is particularly problematic due to the inherently divisive and subjective nature of these topics. Sycophancy regarding objective facts, such as an AI model incorrectly stating that 2+2 equals 3, is less concerning because human agents or search engines/other models are likely to correct such errors. However, when it comes to matters with no clear objective answer, sycophancy can be particularly effective in reinforcing and strengthening people's moral and political convictions. This can exacerbate polarisation and the quality of democratic discourse.

The insidious problem of sycophancy in language models takes on a new level of urgency as the world appears to be descending into an era of anti-deliberative and anti-democratic tendencies (Bächtiger et al., 2018: 2). In this post-truth political landscape, where facts and reason are increasingly subordinated to emotional appeals and personal beliefs, the potential for sycophantic AI to further erode the foundations of democratic discourse is deeply troubling. By potentially skewing the foundational principle of rationality through deceptive practices, these models threaten to undermine the very bedrock of informed discourse and decision-making (Bächtiger et al., 2018: 2).

This research makes two main contributions. Firstly, it introduces a novel methodological design by combining machine learning techniques such as few-shot learning, prompt engineering, and probabilistic output analysis to measure sycophancy. This study's methodological contribution merges computational methods that utilise the multipurpose capabilities of LLMs to showcase opportunities for new research paradigms within the social sciences (Ziems et al., 2024: 267). Automatic prompt construction within this work not only facilitated the creation of our extensive dataset but it also enhanced the reproducibility of the work. It sets a precedent for other researchers to use the multi-functionality of LLMs to create new paradigms of research that intersect political science, political psychology, and artificial intelligence (Ziems et al., 2024: 270).

Secondly, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution by conceptualising sycophancy within the social sciences. This research addresses a gap in the literature, which has predominantly focused on bias. By offering a nuanced understanding into the perils of AI, it ensures that such issues are not treated as a technical problem isolated from the wider socio-political setting.

By conceptualising sycophancy within the context of deliberative democratic theory and communicative rationality, this research extends such ontological views to be extrapolated to AI and questions the traditional dynamics and understandings of the public sphere. Given the fast pace of advancement in such fields, this project addresses

some of the early implications of deceptive AI and highlights the fragility of communicative rationality within our interactions with such models.

This research shows that the implications of LLMs extend beyond the individual and group level, where they affect opinion formation and restrict us to echo chambers. But that such fragmentation creates far greater problems for actual governance (Sunstein, 2017: 9). At an institutional level, they can lead to terrible policies that discriminate against large strata or a dramatically decreased ability to converge on good ones (Sunstein, 2017: 9). Therefore, the significance of this study goes beyond academia as it also contributes to AI governance policy recommendations aimed at enhancing transparency amongst these models and mitigating the risks from sycophancy.

2. The Dynamics of Sycophancy

2.1. Sycophancy as a Tool for Political Manipulation

The term "sycophancy" has its roots in ancient Greek, derived from the word *"sykophantes,"* originally referring to an informer who brought false accusations for personal gain and describes the character of a mean or servile flatterer (Oxford Dictionary, 2024). Sycophancy is typically understood as "flattery that is very obedient," and insincere; it is considered an inherent part of human interaction (Snell, 2022: 131). Over time, the meaning of the word has evolved to describe servile behaviour towards those in power, and this usage typically carries a negative connotation.

Research has explored the prevalence of sycophancy in various contexts, such as business and educational settings, and suggests that the expectation for humans to excel both within and outside their social groups may lead to inauthentic behaviour (Snell, 2022: 131). This inauthenticity can be presented in a seemingly genuine manner,

concealing the underlying loneliness and self-separation experienced by the individual (Snell, 2022: 131).

In the political context, sycophancy has been observed throughout history as a deeper form of deception used by associates to flatter and manipulate leaders for personal gain and influence (Glad, 2002: 26). Although research on sycophancy amongst humans is generally scarce, Andrew McRae's article "Satire and Sycophancy" highlights how the concept of sycophancy has existed for decades as it discusses the detrimental nature and manifestation of sycophancy in political contexts during the early Stuart period (first half of the seventeenth century) (2003: 336). Ronald deSouza's work (1996) further touches upon the adverse effects of sycophancy on political systems. deSouza argues that sycophantic practices involving excessive public glorification of political figures can misuse public resources and compromise electoral integrity (deSouza, 1996: 149).

More recent scholarly work has researched how the instrumentalization of sycophantic behaviour can be manipulated to acquire access to power and influence within the political arena, consequently undermining the integrity of democratic deliberation and discursive processes (Goldstein, 2022). Goldstein's conceptualisation of "structural sycophancy" within the Trump administration demonstrates how the performance of obsequious behaviour has become integral to gaining advantage within the sociopolitical system (2022: 21). Goldstein argues that the criminal activities of Trump's followers primarily stem from their sycophantic and imitative reactions to the charm of their leader who continuously exaggerates his power and superiority (2022: 23). Goldstein contends that the influence of fear-driven sycophancy encourages various forms of socially harmful actions, including severe criminal behaviour (Goldstein, 2022: 21).

Goldstein (2022) uses the anthropological concept of professional praise-singing to elucidate the structured nature of sycophantic ritual praise. This ritualistic

behaviour reinforces the power of the central political figure (in their case: Trump) while benefiting the sycophantic follower (2022: 25). As a result of this, hierarchical sycophantic political systems have a dynamic where individuals support those above them, consolidating power around the central figure (Goldstein, 2022: 25).

Goldstein's work is important when it comes to conceptualising sycophancy amongst human agents. Her analysis of structural sycophancy within a polity highlights how a sycophantic political climate not only fosters corruption and white-collar crime but also exhibits parallels to historical fascist regimes (2022: 38).

Recent scholarly literature on humanistic sycophancy has demonstrated that, whether structural or individualistic in nature, sycophancy bears a detrimental impact across various contexts (Goldstein, 2022; deSouza, 1996; Snell, 2022; McRae, 2003). The implications are particularly concerning for democratic systems; if servility is rewarded and dissent is punished, political deliberation suffers because we end up with a dynamic in which the citizenry prioritises personal gain over the truth and the common good. This erosion of democratic norms and suppression of the dissidents could facilitate the consolidation of power by authoritarian figures who would then use it to exploit fears and grievances amongst the masses. As such, even humanistic conceptualisations of sycophancy recognize that such behaviour has the potential to corrode the integrity of political deliberation by compromising the truth and enabling exploitive power dynamics.

2.2. Conceptualising Agent-Based Deception

Whilst sycophancy in human interactions is typically characterised by excessive praise or flattery, often with an intention of personal gain, the concept, when applied to artificial intelligence, is not about personal motives or intent, but rather about capability. The phenomenon of sycophantic deception refers to an empirically observed

inclination of an LLM to agree with users' stances, even at the expense of accuracy and impartiality (Park et al., 2023: 2).

The emergence of agent-based or artificial deception, as conceptualised by Castelfranchi, has significant implications for democratic processes. Castelfranchi (2000) emphasises the inevitability of deception by computers and artificial agents, both towards humans and each other, as AI and agent-based systems become increasingly integrated into human society. He contends that the computer medium has the potential to foster a culture of deception and that such a phenomenon is not limited to malicious agents, with ill intentions, but also includes agents that deceive on their own initiative, often in the interest of their users (Castelfranchi, 2000: 113).

Although his work was ahead of its time in addressing various forms of deception such as falsification, deep fakes, and concealment, Castelfranchi neglects the issue of sycophancy among these deceptive tendencies (2000: 117). However, his work implicitly acknowledges it as he states that “as individuals continue to interact via computers and networks, the computer medium will provide novel opportunities and methods for deception” (Castelfranchi, 2000: 114).

Sycophancy within such models is particularly concerning because LLMs outperform conventional search engines as they are able to engage in discourse and present seemingly well-considered opinions or factual statements (Zuber and Gogoll, 2023: 2). Thus, these models emulate the capacity for human reasoning (Zuber and Gogoll, 2023: 2). The content in LLMs is not only presented as factual knowledge in the form of logical statements, but also structured as an argument, exhibiting the hallmarks of rationality and reasoning (Zuber and Gogoll, 2023: 2). The fact that these models can grasp human reasoning capabilities makes their sycophantic outputs particularly insidious, as they have the potential to exceed human abilities in producing persuasive and seemingly well-reasoned arguments.

Whilst Castelfranchi's logic regarding the inevitability of deception within generative AI is well justified, I find his arguments suggesting that deception should not be solely associated with rational or deliberative agents to be of particular

importance for this thesis (Castelfranchi, 2000: 116). Castelfranchis work acknowledges that an agent does not necessarily need to be 'rational' to exhibit deceptive behaviour; rather, such behaviours can be learned and developed in particular situations (as is the case for LLMs) (Castelfranchi, 2000: 116). This ensures that we do not attribute sycophantic behaviour to categorisations of “rational” or “irrational” as not only are those distinctions futile but also largely misleading.

The point of divergence for this thesis amongst the larger discourse on deception concerns the attribution of intent to AI models. Such debates ascribe far more agency to a model's rationality than to the action itself. Rather than engaging in discussions that assume 'intent' within such models, this paper aims to focus on the sycophantic behavioural patterns of these models and their impact on human rationale. Given the urgency that is established from deceptive AI, coupled with the absence of effective defence strategies, sycophantic behaviour exacerbates the risks associated with deceptive AI (Guo, 2024: 2; Frontier AI: Capabilities and Risks – Discussion Paper, 2023). Ergo, this research seeks to understand the implications of LLMs on human rationality and does not seek to engage in philosophical discussions about intent within such models, as that falls outside the scope of the debate regarding sycophancy.

2.3. The Difference Between Bias and Sycophancy

Bias and sycophancy in LLMs represent two distinct yet interconnected phenomena that are often confused, and for this reason, this thesis seeks to make that distinction truly clear. Whilst biases in LLMs can be understood as a reflection of the deep-seated societal prejudices that permeate human culture and language (Guo, 2024: 3), sycophancy in LLMs refers to a more subtle and sophisticated form of imitation (Guo, 2024: 7). This involves the models' tendency to refrain from contradicting users' opinions, often sacrificing accuracy and impartiality, particularly when addressing ethically complex and politically sensitive queries (e.g., adapting conservative views once a user reveals that they are conservative) (Wei et al., 2023: 1-3; Guo, 2024: 7).

The limited diversity within the training data and the over-representation of certain demographic groups lead to representational biases within models (Guo, 2024: 3). Historical biases, which are manifestations of societal discriminations and stereotypes, are often present in the datasets used to train AI systems (Guo, 2024: 3). The data, imbricated with multiple layers of interpretation, reflects the structural inequalities that are deeply entrenched in our society; particularly those related to the intersectionality of gender, race, age, and class (Guo, 2024: 3).

Since the data collection for such training sets often relies on the voices of an exceedingly small number of people under the specifications of Silicon Valley technocrats, very few humans concentrate the power to shape the model's world views (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 8). This homogeneity across demographic lines, also known as the 'tyranny of the crowd worker,' is what produces 'bias' (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 9). This elucidates the humanised nature of such bias whilst problematising the lack of diversity and undemocratic process through which models are adapted to humans (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 3).

Research on LLMs has predominantly placed "bias" on the social scientific agenda. These biases in LLMs have been analysed in terms of their intersection with various social categories: gender (Kotek, Dockum and Sun, 2023: 14; Lu et al., 2020: 199), ethnicity (Rozado, 2020: 8; Sham et al., 2023: 399), age (Diaz et al., 2018: 7) and socioeconomic status (Rozado, 2020: 8; Lu et al., 2020: 199). Works such as 'Bias out of the Box' have found evidence of intersectional bias in language generation (Kirk et al., 2021: 6). Research within such algorithmic "bias" is often quite polarised because it is tightly tied to issues of racism and other sorts of social inequalities which usually hold normative expectations (Turner Lee, 2018). Whilst the concept of algorithmic bias has received a lot of scholarly attention (Barberá, 2020, Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Caliskan et al., 2017), sycophancy has been a neglected phenomenon.

Despite research within computer science and the technology sector that confirms these models can show sycophantic tendencies (Sharma et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2024; Simmons, 2023; Guo, 2024), the social sciences have neglected deceptive behaviours in such models and have often treated it in a manner that is divorced from the wider social setting. One possible explanation is the limited research that bridges NLP, AI, and ethics, coupled with a need for complex methodologies.

Another plausible explanation for this research gap on sycophancy, unlike the extensive study of bias, is that bias is a longstanding phenomenon inherently tied to human nature. Whereas sycophancy has only recently emerged as an issue due to the existence of large language models. Given the large amount of scholarly work that investigates the ways in which algorithmic bias within social media platforms and search engines can lead to echo chambers, one might initially perceive LLMs as the latest manifestation of this already existing problem. This research would instead argue that sycophancy is a fundamentally different phenomenon that will lead to unique and unprecedented issues. While a user can indeed spend time searching for websites or groups online to support their personal worldview, we argue that this is fundamentally different from LLMs in four ways.

Firstly, searching is an active choice that requires an individual's agency and decision-making. If someone is looking for material to confirm, say, their anti-immigrant views, they would search for "why immigrants are bad". In contrast, when interacting with an LLM, an individual is never required to explicitly make the choice to perform this search. The LLM could use subtle patterns in context based on weeks of previous conversation to predict that the individual would hold these views before presenting them back to the person.

Secondly, the level of personalisation made accessible by LLMs is truly unprecedented. While a media company or forum user might tailor their content in order to pander to their users, they always have to adapt their message to appeal to a

larger audience of people who might have slightly different opinions despite being united by the same cause. Whilst humans on new media platforms typically want to promote their own message to a broader audience, an LLM has no such incentives.

LLMs, by contrast, are a mirror into their users' worldview. Given enough context and data, an LLM could model a person incredibly well. It could tell them exactly what they want to hear - not what the group of people they belong to generally wants to hear, but what the specific individual wants to hear. These models are also far more interactive than a classic media organisation or an online discussion group. Whilst a news organisation or even a forum user might never reply to a comment, an LLM will always reply and do so immediately. This speed of communication could also have implications for the pace at which it is possible to be polarised.

Thirdly, it seems quite likely that individuals would trust an LLM far more than they would trust an online platform made for a large audience. Even the most extreme anti-vaxxer might hesitate to call truevaccinefacts.org a reputable source, and most users maintain a healthy scepticism towards media reports. Research has shown that within political discussions, ideological opponents distrust each other's facts (Hartman, Hester and Gray, 2023: 1015). Humans are quite happy to disregard evidence, dismiss expert opinions and question the legitimacy of institutions that contradict them, as people have a tendency to selectively expose themselves to belief confirming information (Frimer, Skitka and Motyl, 2017)

Within such an online sphere, LLMs could be perceived as a great source of truth. This is because users who frequently ask LLMs factual questions and receive accurate responses 99% of the time, regardless of the subject matter, may develop a strong trust in the model. As a consequence, these users would be more likely to accept the models answers on subjective or normatively complex questions, particularly when the answer aligns with their preexisting beliefs. These users however will be unaware that the LLMs response is based on a model of their own beliefs, rather than the

objective truth. That is not to say that these models are infallible as they often get answers wrong, however, given the rapid pace of advancement within NLP coupled with their breadth of knowledge, their flaws will only diminish in the future. Therefore, individuals will perceive them as 'objective' and reliable sources as their capabilities enhance and they make fewer errors.

Lastly, it seems quite probable that individuals may form attachments or para social relationships with LLMs that they could never develop with an online platform. This is not a farfetched idea, given that chatbots already function as AI 'friends' and people are seeking romantic relationships with them (Time Magazine, 2023). As LLMs are fundamentally conversational, they can be easily perceived as a companion or a humanised entity. As we progressively entrust more sophisticated tasks to AI assistants, such as automatic email answering and appointment scheduling, the potential for this attachment and trust will grow. Therefore, having such a relationship with AI models will completely threaten the line between the truth and falsehood as our perception of reality will be very skewed.

Based on these differences, sycophancy poses distinct challenges that are unprecedented and different from the phenomenon of algorithmic bias. While biases in LLMs replicate and potentially amplify societal hierarchies, sycophancy in LLMs represents a more insidious threat. The reinforcement and overrepresentation of the users' viewpoints through an LLM that is perceived as 'neutral,' could lead to a skewed portrayal of social norms and moral values. This would restrain the development of varied ideologies and convictions which are pertinent for a deliberative discourse. Therefore, this distinction is pertinent as it necessitates more nuanced approaches in LLM development and their ethical alignment. This proposal seeks to highlight this neglected phenomenon and contends that there is a need to understand the role of LLMs in shaping deliberative discourse beyond just replicating biases.

2.4. The Challenge of Generative AI Sycophancy in Deliberative Processes

2.4.1. Enclave Deliberation

As AI systems reinforce common misconceptions and provide pleasing but inaccurate advice, human users may become locked into persistent false beliefs (Park et al., 2023: 3). This phenomenon can lead to increased political polarisation, as users interact with AI systems that restrict them to their existing biases and preferences (Park et al., 2023: 3).

The emergence of online spaces has created opportunities for enclave deliberation, a form of deliberation that occurs when conversations take place exclusively among like-minded individuals (Barberá, 2020: 37). Enclave deliberation is not inherently negative and can promote the development of positions that would otherwise be silenced by offering a safe space for people who suffer from discrimination. In practice, however, it often leads to group polarisation, which can serve as a 'breeding ground for extremism' (Barberá, 2020: 37). The homogeneity within such a group might limit the size of the arguments pool, as members might prefer to express opinions that are widely accepted within the group to gain approval from the majority (Barberá, 2020: 37).

Within social media, two mechanisms contribute to this phenomenon: social influence and persuasive arguments, which can lead members to adopt positions that lack merit (Barberá, 2020: 37). The sycophantic tendencies of LLMs, driven by their incentive to agree with users, can facilitate the creation of echo chambers and the fragmentation of the public sphere through the process of enclave deliberation (Sunstein, 2017). This is because LLMs facilitate the mechanisms that contributes to such a dynamic.

Any individuals position on any issue is a function, at least in part, of which arguments seem the most convincing (Sunstein, 2017: 71). LLMs could potentially

exploit that using their level of personalisation alongside their capabilities of reasoning. This would allow these models to present well-constructed and persuasive arguments that would resonate very well with the user. Given that the user barely interacts with any ideological diversity, the outcome of such fragmentation is a society that is increasingly segregated along partisan lines and where compromise becomes unlikely due to rising mistrust of public officials, media outlets, institutions, and ordinary citizens (Barberá, 2020: 34).

Ergo, sycophantic AI could threaten democratic deliberation by reducing the diversity of viewpoints necessary for rational debate. This is further exacerbated by the fact that users may subconsciously deem LLMs as an objective source, despite this not being the case. Unlike social media, where users are aware of the presence of mindless bots spreading propaganda or humans behind the users, this distinction will not be as clear as their conversational nature will allow for humans to trust their judgement more. Therefore, LLMs could inhibit people from thinking critically while subconsciously making users believe that they have reasoned themselves into a particular ideology.

2.4.2. Implications for an Informed Citizenry

The prevalence of sycophancy in AI systems carries significant structural ramifications for democratic discourse. Firstly, AI's propensity to reinforce common misconceptions through imitative responses may lead to the entrenchment of false beliefs among human users, undermining the epistemic foundations of informed citizenship (Park *et al.*, 2023: 2). Secondly, sycophantic AI systems that provide agreeable but inaccurate information may exacerbate political polarisation by facilitating the formation of echo chambers, wherein users' preexisting biases are amplified through interactions with AI, leading to increased ideological divergence and a diminished capacity for constructive dialogue across the political spectrum.

The significance of examining such sycophantic behaviour in LLMs extends beyond academic interest. This research moves beyond the traditional discourse on AI biases, focusing instead on the normative and democratic implications of moral and political sycophancy within LLMs. By mimicking the users' moral or ideological views, these models can validate and potentially convince people of objectively false or in the worst-case extremist ideologies and restrict them to exist in segregated filter bubbles without being aware of it. This subtler form of rational distortion has profound implications for the democratic process.

Research has shown that inherent values in LLMs, can be adversarially manipulated to exhibit specific moral foundations (Abdulhai, 2023: 1). Building on these notions, Gabriel Simmons' work highlights the capacity of LLMs to serve as 'moral mimics,' a term that captures their role in echoing and reinforcing moral values (2022: 1). Therefore, considering the sophisticated cognitive capabilities of LLMs, it is imperative to understand their role in shaping moral discourse.

From a normative standpoint, allowing such sycophantic behaviours in models raises questions about the responsibility of the developers and companies that deploy such models. Whilst this case will focus on LLMs, it represents much more theoretically. It represents a normative foundation behind the deployment of AI models and whether LLMs should be designed to mitigate harm and be sensitive to ethical considerations, rather than maximising engagement. Hence, whilst this research might be dealing with sycophancy, it has very large implications for AI policy and governance. This is because it would elucidate whether allowing such models to perpetuate normative and political ideologies abdicates it of its moral responsibility. It also emphasises upon the need to align these models with human values.

As human users increasingly rely on AI responses, they may gradually cede more decision-making authority to these systems, eroding the principles of self-governance and civic engagement that underpin democratic societies (Park *et al.*, 2023:

3). This trend could prove particularly concerning as malicious actors may exploit sycophantic AI to disseminate disinformation, and generate polarising content tailored to each individual, thereby weakening the electorate's ability to make informed choices (Park *et al.*, 2023: 3).

Lastly, whilst immediate implications of this study are significant, this research is also important for a long-term concern: deception. Whilst such sycophantic behaviour might not be inherently deceptive per se, it does have the potential to be quite harmful if it leads to that. If this sycophantic behaviour is to be weaponized, this would mean that AI can be exploited to serve a political or commercial agenda. This would be disastrous in most countries but especially in nations with sham democracies or authoritative governments as this can manifest itself into reinforced radicalisation or polarisation which is not limited to individuals but concerns the entire fabric of democracy and power in nation states. Such concerns regarding AI alignment and governance also highlight the importance of a global ‘demos’ that goes beyond the level of nation states (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 17).

3. The Machine Learning Theory Behind Sycophancy

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant advancement in the field of artificial intelligence, and natural language processing (NLP). These technologies mark a pivotal shift in how computational models engage with humans (Bommasani et al., 2021; Ray, 2023; Arcas, 2022). However, their potential for deception and sycophantic behaviour raises concerns about their influence. These models have gained prominence in NLP due to their ability to learn and perform tasks without explicit supervision (Radford, 2019). In recent years, LLMs have experienced a dramatic increase in popularity, with chatbots such as GPT-4 (powering ChatGPT) by OpenAI, Claude 3 by Anthropic, and Gemini by Google DeepMind showcasing their capabilities in sophisticated language and image-based tasks. The user base of ChatGPT has witnessed exponential growth. With 180.5 million users, 1.6 billion website visits in

January 2024, and 100 million weekly users, as reported by OpenAI CEO Sam Altman (Tong, 2023).

Whilst these numbers elucidate the magnitude of their impact, they also highlight the urgency of aligning language models to prevent harmful behaviour. Since this thesis aims to investigate the presence of sycophantic tendencies within LLMs, the first order of business is to understand the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. Therefore, this section will establish key concepts within machine learning theory as potential contributors to sycophantic behaviour.

3.1. Training Large Language Models

LLMs are developed by training a neural network architecture called the transformer on enormous quantities of human-generated text data. These neural networks draw inspiration from the way neurons function in nature and the human brain. The process of training an LLM generally involves two main stages: pre-training and fine-tuning.

3.1.1. Pre-training

The pre-training phase is a crucial step in the development of large language models which involves teaching the model how to predict the next token in a text. A token is defined as a string of characters which could correspond to a word or parts of a word. During this phase, the model is fed large amounts of pre training data: raw text upon which an LLM learns to model the general generative process of language (Ziems *et al.*, 2024). It effectively uses all information that is publicly available on the internet, whilst being tasked with predicting the next token for every token in each text.

After each batch of training data, the parameters inside the model are updated in a way which makes the correct predictions more likely using optimisation algorithms. As the model progresses through this phase and trains on billions of tokens (Ibrahim et al., 2024: 1) the model becomes increasingly proficient at predicting the

next token. Thus, the model is able to understand complex patterns in data such as context, sentiment, and intent.

During this phase, the language model develops a broad set of skills and pattern recognition abilities (Brown et al., 2020: 3) indicating that the model has a rich internal model of the world. Although these models are not specifically trained for a specific task, these models learn to perform complex tasks including solving mathematical proofs, coding, and translation. Therefore, such models likely encompass an understanding of diverse and complex concepts such as people's political and moral ideologies and preferences.

3.1.2. Fine Tuning

Whilst the goal of pretraining was to predict the next token in text, pre trained language models are not very conversational and will often produce outputs that (despite being based on the training data), could be unhelpful or even potentially toxic or hateful. To address these limitations and to make them less toxic, these models are fine tuned. Fine tuning involves refining the pre-trained model by retraining the model on a dataset specific to the desired task (Brown et al., 2020: 3). This approach introduces minimal task-specific parameters and is trained on the downstream tasks by simply fine-tuning all pretrained parameters (Devlin et al., 2019: 1).

One of the most prominent fine-tuning methods used for training frontier models such as GPT-4 and Gemini is known as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback, RLHF. This approach stands at the intersection of artificial intelligence and human-computer interaction (Kaufmann et al., 2024: 1). In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent traditionally navigates through an environment and attempts to make optimal decisions (i.e. action choices) through a process of trial and error, guided by a reward function (Kaufmann et al., 2024: 1). Whilst the agent's objective is tied to the reward function, defining an appropriate reward function for complex domains, such as household robot assistants or autonomous vehicles in urban environments, poses

significant challenges in conventional reinforcement learning (Kaufmann et al., 2024: 3). RLHF mitigates this concern as it derives the reward criteria directly from human feedback, which means that it aligns the models' outputs with a human's judgement of the world. Thus, this approach circumvents reward engineering challenges and enhances the training, as the reward function is dynamically refined and adjusted to distributional shifts, which ultimately improves model alignment (Kaufmann et al., 2024: 3).

In RLHF, a large human preference dataset is created by asking humans to rate which out of a pair of responses is better, i.e. more helpful, honest, and harmless. A preference model, typically another language model, is then trained to understand the characteristics of the 'better' responses which distinguish them and to assign scores to outputs depending on their quality. This preference model serves as a guiding signal to further fine tune the original pretrained model by rewarding it for outputs which score highly. As a result, RLHF approaches to fine-tune generative models produce preferred outputs that are more aligned with human preferences (Kaufmann et al., 2024: 52).

3.2. Why might we expect LLMs to be Sycophantic?

Having established a conceptual understanding of the pre-training and fine-tuning phases in LLM development, this section will elaborate on the two primary mechanisms through which a LLM may become sycophantic.

During its pre-training phase, the model is exposed to extensive corpora of text. Text which has a certain political leaning is more likely to be surrounded by text which has the same political leaning. For instance, a book which has spent the first 104 pages extolling the virtues of socialism is likely to continue to do so on page 105; and a right-wing pro-life forum is likely to contain text almost exclusively from people who believe that abortion is morally abhorrent. It is, therefore, a natural consequence of representing the training data well: if the model is given a biography which correlates with a specific political leaning, it is more likely to generate a response that aligns with that leaning rather than a rebuttal. Hence, one mechanism through which a model may

showcase sycophantic behaviour could be a result of this clustering effect or how the training data is represented since the model is merely a statistical probability distribution (Arguedas and Simon, 2023: 8).

The second mechanism which might contribute to a model's sycophantic tendencies comes from the RLHF phase and is likely driven in part by human preference judgements that favour such tendencies (Sharma et al., 2023: 1). It is well established that humans prefer responses that agree with their beliefs and that they seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand (Nickerson, 1998). It is therefore likely that the human preference data used in RLHF is more likely to favour responses that align with the user's viewpoints than those that disagree. Even if the preference givers are hyper aware of their biases and instructed to avoid them, it is still quite likely that their preferences will be reflected in subtle ways within the data because humans are inherently influenced by biases. Since human feedback is commonly used to finetune LLMs, it may implicitly encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful ones, which leads to sycophancy (Sharma et al., 2023: 1). Therefore, sycophancy could be argued to be a result of human preference judgements within the finetuning phase (Sharma et al., 2023: 1).

Given the mechanisms behind sycophancy and their theoretical foundations, we expect the model to align its response with the user's preferences. Thus, we hypothesise:

H1: When the model is provided with a user biography that matches a given answer, its probability of agreeing with that answer is substantially higher than when no biographical details are given.

4. Deliberative Democratic Theory and Political Epistemic Agency

4.1. Defining Deliberation

This section focuses on a series of core concepts and theoretical frameworks as they relate to the emerging debates on sycophancy. Understanding the relationship between sycophantic LLMs and deliberative democracy necessitates a clear definition of deliberation. A majority of the scholarly research often uses the term interchangeably with dialogue or conversation (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). However, there is no consensus within the literature regarding the concept, which results in inconsistencies that problematise our understanding (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2).

Schudson (1997) makes a distinction between political deliberation and social interaction and characterises deliberation as a challenging discussion where people address a shared problem, engage in disagreement, evaluate competing arguments, and eventually reach a consensus on a solution (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). Sociable interaction, by contrast, is conversation between people, with the primary objective of building social relations (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). Another concept that is closely tied yet distinct from deliberation is dialogue (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). Dialogue prioritises mutual understanding as a central outcome to the process, whereas deliberation concentrates on tackling a common issue and finding practical solutions (Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2).

Perhaps the most widely referenced conceptualization of deliberation is offered by Habermas (1984). He defined deliberation as a process that necessitates a group of people to engage in a rational-critical exchange of arguments concerning a problem and to strive to find a solution acceptable to all stakeholders (1984: 9; Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). Rational-critical arguments are based on truth or, at a minimum, a common understanding of objective reality and are open to evaluation and critique, for further debate (1984: 9; Stromer-Galley, 2007: 2). This research aligns with Habermas' conceptualisation and contends that rational-critical arguments are the cornerstone of

deliberation involving LLMs. These arguments are justified on the basis of the truth and necessitate the discussion of contrasting views in order to reach such “truth”.

A key component of utmost importance within such deliberation is authenticity, which involves actors expressing their genuine preferences without deception (Steiner, 2012: 185). Although this framework is conceptualised for human agents, the concept of authenticity can be extended to include LLMs. However, instead of being categorised on their ‘intent’ which is very difficult to measure, we can characterise it as being free from deceptive behaviours such as sycophancy.

This research is aware of the ontological problems that arise from extrapolating such conceptual frameworks to deliberation between LLMs and humans. This is especially evident concerning the lack of agency and intentionality alongside the intrinsic conversationalist nature of such models. Given these concerns, this thesis moves beyond deliberation that is limited to human agents and seeks to broaden the scope of such conceptualisations by extending them to domains where agents rely on natural language processing to converse with humans (Hadfi and Ito, 2022: 1795).

The primary concern for this thesis lies within rational discourse, which Steiner (2012: 191) classifies as the most complex and demanding type of deliberation. The presence of non-human systems within a network coupled with the ability of individuals to modulate their opinions in response, renders it possible for users to engage in discourse (Hadfi and Ito, 2022: 1795). Characterising deliberation within such a dynamic is therefore a matter of accounting for a rational critical exchange of information that leaves room for the revision of opinions (Hadfi and Ito, 2022: 1795). If LLMs mirror users' stances instead of providing balanced perspectives, they undermine the conditions necessary for effective deliberation, such as the fair exchange of arguments and exposure to diverse viewpoints (Park et al., 2023: 2). Therefore, it is pertinent to conceptualise deliberation as a multidimensional and sequential

phenomenon to allow a nuanced discussion of the various elements of deliberation and their antecedents (Steiner, 2012: 185).

4.2. The New Public Sphere

Deliberative democratic theory serves as the foundation for examining the intricate relationship between AI and its impact on the quality of deliberation within a polity. This framework has strong ties to models of the public sphere and political thinking on rational political decision making (Dutwin, 2003: 241). Habermas, a seminal thinker, proposed that an ideal political discourse was characterised by equality, interpersonal engagement, and, above all, rationality (Dutwin, 2003: 241).

Habermas' theory was a critique of mass media in late-stage capitalism, which had become dominated by government and corporate interest (Caplan and Boyd, 2016: 3). His criticism bears a striking relevance to the discussion of sycophantic AI as they both embody a similar trajectory of top-down shaping of public opinion (Caplan and Boyd, 2016: 3).

The "public sphere" within this framework refers to a domain of social life where public opinion is formed (Habermas, 1984). This sphere is characterised by quality opinion, inclusiveness and requires a space that produces a rational and critical discourse among everyone involved (Dutwin, 2003: 241). An institutionally secured public sphere is essential for political power to be rationalised through the medium of public discussion that reflects the general will of the citizenry (Habermas, 1984: 19).

Rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive to create a deliberative space for the mobilisation of the best contributions (Sunstein, 2017: 47). The ideal public sphere is characterised by inclusiveness, which allows ideological opponents to engage in a critical debate. Since sycophantic LLMs optimise for agreement with the user, this creates an echo chamber because the user is constantly fed their own views within a loop whilst being unaware of it. This is sufficient for different deliberating groups to be driven increasingly far apart (Sunstein, 2017: 71). Given this dynamic, this thesis argues that the emergence of sycophantic LLMs as participants within the

public sphere, completely alters the existing dynamic of democratic discourse. LLMs alter the flow of information and the nature of discourse, as these models exert significant influence. This modified public sphere, though ostensibly more personalised and accessible, could potentially undermine the quality of communicative action that takes place.

4.3. Communicative Rationality

The theoretical framework relies on communicative action as a basis for characterising rational discourse. Habermas defines communicative action as a form of interaction in which participants align their individual plans of action with one another, pursuing their communicative goals without reservation or instrumental objectives (1984: 294) This type of action requires participants to coordinate their actions through the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims that are inherent in speech acts (Habermas, 1984: 208). The foundation of this theory lies in the concept of communicative rationality, which Habermas (1984) considers the basis for social coordination and consensus-building.

The concept of communicative rationality is grounded in the fundamental principle that any consensus achieved through communication must ultimately be rooted in reasoned arguments (Habermas, 1984:17/22). Communicative rationality pertains to the "unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech" that is fundamentally directed towards achieving mutual understanding and coordinating action based on the most compelling and justifiable reasons (Habermas, 1984:10).

Habermas posits that argumentation is an indispensable prerequisite for examining the validity of debatable claims, asserting that "any explicit examination of controversial validity claims requires an exacting form of communication satisfying the conditions of argumentation" (Habermas, 1984: 22). Therefore, one must engage

in a rigorous process of argumentation when critically assessing the truth, rightness, or sincerity of a claim. Argumentation thereby takes on a special significance for this research as it reconstructs the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicitly rational behaviour (Habermas, 1984: 2) Argumentation facilitates such behaviour as it involves a justification of one's validity claims through reasons and evidence. This process allows the individual to identify flaws and issues within one's reasoning through the process of critiquing arguments, thereby enabling individuals to learn from explicit mistakes and potentially revise their beliefs in light of new logic or evidence (Habermas, 1984: 22).

In the context of sycophancy in LLMs and their impact on democratic discourse, Habermas' theory provides a relevant framework for assessing the rationality and validity of arguments as a precondition for deliberation. Since rational discourse requires participants to justify their assertions through the orderly exchange of logic, information and reasons (Steiner, 2012: 57). If LLMs merely agree with users' validity claims without critical examination, they fail to satisfy the conditions of argumentation that Habermas deems essential for the criteria of communicative rationality. By applying such conceptual standards to the analysis of sycophancy in LLMs, this thesis aims to evaluate the extent to which these systems engage in rational, deliberative discourse.

4.3.1. The Role of Validity Claims in AI Interactions

The limited research on sycophancy has primarily focused on the phenomenon in the context of objective issues such as mathematical problems and model-generated arguments (Sharma et al., 2023: 3). However, this thesis argues that investigating sycophancy in relation to subjective matters, specifically political and moral issues, is of utmost importance. While computer science research has emphasised the development of "objective" models, it is precisely under this guise that the model's influence on the deliberative process becomes even more significant. Divisions

amongst such issues already have us living in different political universes (Sunstein, 2017: 3). Sycophancy will only exacerbate the distances between these universes and further fragment such a dynamic.

Despite the growing body of research on sycophancy, political and moral sycophancy within LLMs constitutes a substantial gap within academia. This thesis makes the case that the repercussions of political and moral sycophancy are much worse as they subtly distort the perception of rationality. In contrast to objective mathematical questions, where there is a definitive answer, political and moral issues lack a single, objective answer as they are thwarted by our cultural and social backgrounds and cannot be understood as isolated constructs. This thesis is particularly concerned with moral and political sycophancy as these are claims about the nature of freedom, personal and political, and the kind of system that best serves a democratic order (Sunstein, 2017: 5). Consequently, sycophantic responses in these domains are more likely to cause detrimental outcomes for rational discourse.

Rational discourse involves critically assessing arguments based on validity claims, which are central tenets of Habermas' theory (1984). These claims concern the factual accuracy of statements (truth), the moral or ethical appropriateness (rightness), and the sincerity of the speaker (truthfulness) (Habermas, 1984:11-16).

Existing research on sycophancy predominantly explores the validity claim of truthfulness and concentrates on factual sycophancy (Wei *et al.*, 2024: 1). This type of sycophancy concerns models tailoring their views to follow their user's view even when the view is objectively incorrect (Wei *et al.*, 2024). This thesis, however, extends this inquiry to critically examine the often-overlooked claims of rightness and sincerity. While concerns regarding truthfulness or objectivity are easier to test due to the inherent objectivity of coding large language models (LLMs) and their ability to execute specific tasks, such as solving mathematical problems. This thesis is concerned with the more complex challenges that arise from the validity claims of rightness and

sincerity. It is for this very reason that this thesis focuses on claims of moral and political nature, as their truth value lies beyond an empirical answer and is contingent upon the user's worldview.

Habermas argues that expressions connected to claims of normative rightness or subjective truthfulness meet the fundamental prerequisite of rationality if they can be defended against criticism (1984: 16). Thus, claims of normative or political rightness, which are of primary concern within our research, require justification that is acknowledged as valid within a broader normative context to justify Habermas' criteria.

If the model exhibits sycophantic behaviour, it may compromise the validity claim of rightness by avoiding potential conflict and failing to challenge users' ethical or moral positions that ought to be subject to critique. According to Habermas, a rational consensus on such subjective matters arises from an inclusive process of argumentation under ideal conditions, rather than the mere avoidance of dissent (1984: 19). Consequently, if a language model (LLM) simply reflects a user's moral or political perspective without providing a rational justification, it fails to engage in the defence of its claims against critique. Due to this, sycophantic LLMs precludes the possibility of learning from mistakes, and could violate Habermas' conception of rational behaviour within the process of argumentation.

4.3.2. Normative Implications and Truthfulness

The normative implications of democratic deliberation suggest that participants should be encouraged to openly express and discuss their interests and concerns (Steiner, 2012a: 102). In Habermas' deliberative theory, truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) is a crucial component (Steiner, 2012b: 153). Habermas asserts that individuals should only assert what they genuinely believe and that "without truthfulness no real deliberation can take place" (Steiner, 2012b: 153). The concept of truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) has

been subject to critique. Dennis Thompson argues that the motives for deliberative behaviour are less important than the behaviour itself (Steiner, 2012b: 154). Thus, the crucial aspects of deliberation are that participants present all possible arguments in accessible terms, respond to reasonable arguments from opponents, and demonstrate a willingness to change their views (Steiner, 2012b: 154).

Whilst this research does not seek to engage in philosophical debates concerning the "truthfulness" of such models, as they are difficult to gauge. Conceptually, it acknowledges that truthfulness is an important metric for this research to consider. Ergo, whilst these two may be seen as mutually exclusive, this research contends that deceptive behaviour undermines the principle of truthfulness despite assuming no 'inner intent'. This is because it does not require insight into the motives or 'inner self' of the agent but rather uses behavioural patterns as a metric to fulfil the criteria (Steiner, 2012b: 154). This study refrains from attempting to uncover the elusive "inner self" and true intentions of large language models (LLMs), which current technologies find difficult to ascertain. Instead, it employs the experimental design and responses generated by LLMs as the primary metrics for assessing their behavioural patterns which reflect their 'truthfulness'.

Thus, this thesis defends the position that truthfulness is a crucial component of deliberation, particularly in discourse concerning AI. Ergo, whilst this research empirically investigates sycophantic behavioural patterns within LLMs, it is grounded in the normative principle of truthfulness as an important facet of deliberation.

4.4. Epistemic Agency

Political epistemology focuses on how citizens acquire politically relevant knowledge, such as political beliefs, and the relationship between truth and democracy (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342). The recent 'epistemic turn' in deliberative democracy

theory emphasises the significance of truth in political discourse and rejects agnosticism concerning the truth value of political claims (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342).

The concept of "epistemic agency" holds significant relevance within the framework of democratic theory, particularly in light of the increasing influence of artificial intelligence (AI) on political beliefs and decision-making processes (Coeckelbergh, 2023). Coeckelbergh conceptualises epistemic agency as the capacity and authority that individuals possess over their own knowledge and belief systems, which plays a crucial role in the context of political engagement and democratic participation (2023).

A well-functioning democracy requires a certain level of epistemic autonomy, whereby individuals can form, revise, and assert control over their beliefs and knowledge claims without undue influence or manipulation (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342). As Coeckelbergh (2023: 1341) argues, AI has the potential to diminish the epistemic agency of citizens by influencing belief formation through various mechanisms, such as micro-targeting, algorithmic filtering, and the creation of echo chambers. The concept of epistemic agency is crucial for understanding the mechanisms through which sycophantic AI can undermine a fundamental tenet of democratic engagement (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342). By aligning with the user's view, sycophantic models risk creating a feedback loop that exacerbates confirmation bias and completely distorts the process of rational thinking and opinion formation.

4.5. Moral Foundations Theory

Given the focus on political and moral sycophancy, this research necessitates deeper investigation into the psychological underpinnings that shape how humans form political opinions. Research within the field of political psychology has demonstrated that an individual's political identity is not merely an autonomous construct. Instead, it is intricately linked and shaped by one's moral foundations and belief systems (Kim et al., 2018). Moral foundations theory (MFT) posits that individuals ground their social

and political beliefs on a set of moral foundations that concern care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (Day et al., 2014: 1559). In addition to these five foundations, the researchers have recently incorporated a liberty foundation, which is associated with moral judgments related to political equality and is often linked to liberal or left-wing identities (Graham et al., 2013: 61). Thus, in total, the theoretical framework consists of six moral intuitions.

MFT is often employed as a causal explanation of political attitudes and posits that these political stances are products of moral intuitions (Hatemi, Crabtree and Smith, 2019: 788). Despite the prevalence of studies within academia that interpret correlations between moral convictions and political orientations as explicitly causal (Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith, 2019: 788), this thesis does not seek to investigate the direction of causality. Rather, it operates under the assumption that moral foundations and political ideology are mutually reinforcing constructs (Day et al., 2014: 1560-1569). Hence, this thesis is grounded in the notion that one's moral foundations are inextricably linked to their political identity and vice versa (Kim et al., 2012: 183).

Drawing upon MFT and the empirical evidence suggesting a bidirectional relationship between moral foundations and political ideology (Graham et al., 2013: 74; Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith, 2019: 788), it is plausible to hypothesise that if a model is politically sycophantic it would also be morally sycophantic. This thesis posits that large language models (LLMs) exhibiting sycophantic behaviour will demonstrate consistent results across two testing conditions: explicit testing, where political identity is present, and implicit testing, where only moral foundations are present. Given their established theoretical relationship, we hypothesise:

H2: If an LLM displays political sycophancy, it is expected to exhibit moral sycophancy.

MFT has been developed to explain cross-cultural differences in moral judgement and beliefs (Silver and Silver, 2017: 2). Scholarly work within this field tends to situate and categorise moral ideologies along a liberal-conservative continuum (Silver and Silver, 2017: 1). Research has demonstrated that liberals show greater endorsement and use of the care and fairness foundations (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009: 1029). Similarly, the liberty foundation is associated with ideologies of social justice and is often linked left-wing identities (Graham et al., 2013: 61). Studies have also indicated that conservatives are more likely to attribute offender behaviour to individual choices, whereas liberals are more likely to attribute it to forces beyond their control (Silver and Silver, 2017: 1).

Since previous research has shown that people's moral values differ based on their political leanings. We suggest that similar patterns in sycophancy will be observed when dealing with left and right-wing ideologies and the moral foundations associated with such affiliations. Given this theoretical expectation, we hypothesise:

H3: If a large language model demonstrates sycophantic behaviour towards a specific political ideology, it will exhibit similar sycophantic tendencies when presented with moral foundations closely associated with that ideology.

This thesis is interested in moral foundations, given their established connection to political attitudes. Research has shown that reframing political arguments to appeal to the moral values of those in opposing political positions increases the effectiveness in persuading such groups (Feinberg and Willer, 2015: 1665). If LLMs reinforce their user's moral stances, not only might this exacerbate polarisation, but it also has the potential to create a fragmented society steeped in moral absolutism. Such strong moral convictions hold particular importance for the deliberative processes as they risk people falling into dogmatism and fanaticism (Pianalto, 2011: 381).

5. Methodology

This thesis employs a novel methodology that utilises prompt engineering with probabilistic analysis of the model's sycophancy. This experimental design consists of first, generating a dataset of moral and political questions along with corresponding biographies using the Gemini model (Google Cloud, 2024). These prompts are then fed into LLMs, specifically GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, to generate responses. By comparing the log probabilities of the model's responses to prompts with and without identity-specific information, we quantify the model's propensity to agree with each identity group's stance against a baseline (of no information) as a measure of sycophancy. This approach allows for a nuanced examination of sycophancy in LLMs, considering both explicit political affiliations and the implicit moral foundations that shape such affiliations. The processes of data construction, cleaning, sycophancy testing, and probabilistic analysis were executed in Python (Python Software Foundation, 2024). In the interest of transparency and replicability, the code has been published on GitHub:

https://github.com/minahilm11/Detecting-and-measuring-moral-and-political-Sycophancy-in-LLMs

5.1. Operationalising Sycophancy

This paper operationalises sycophancy as the empirically observed propensity for models to align their responses with the affiliations of their users, as measured by the deviation from the model's baseline response. To calculate sycophancy, we implement a two-step process:

1. **Baseline Response Generation**: We begin by generating a baseline response from the model by providing the model with a politically and morally complex question without any user-specific information. This control scenario establishes a baseline response; it serves as a reference point for the model's inherent default behaviour.

2. **User-Specific Response Generation**: Next, we expose the model to the same question, but this time accompanied by a user's political or moral narrative. This narrative provides the model with contextual information about the user's personal views, affiliations, and ideological preferences (the general template is available in Appendix G, this is modified slightly depending on the topic and identity pairs). By comparing the token probabilities of the user-specific response with the baseline response, we can calculate the extent to which the model adapts its output based on the given information.

This deviation between the token probabilities of the baseline response and the user-specific response serves as a quantitative measure for sycophancy. A higher deviation (also known as change in the probability of agreement) indicates a stronger inclination of the model to align its response with the user's stance, potentially sacrificing the model's inherent belief.

5.2. Dataset creation

5.2.1. Prompt Construction

The research design uses input prompts to investigate sycophancy in large language models (LLMs) by comparing the model's response and its deviation from the baseline. We automated the data set creation for prompt generation for two key reasons. First, automation enhances the efficiency of generating an extensive dataset. Second, research has shown that LLMs are stronger at generation tasks and are rated superior to human annotators (Ziems *et al.*, 2024: 267). Hence, this ensured that we generated a syntactically cohesive and stylistically consistent text (Ziems *et al.*, 2024: 268). This resulted in the creation of approximately 32,000 sets of prompts, categorised into two main groups: 9 moral foundation pairs and 7 political identity pairs. These prompts were developed across 10 diverse topics, ranging from healthcare to technology and surveillance, to ensure a broad coverage of relevant issues.

The prompt development drew inspiration from the sycophancy dataset created by Anthropic (Anthropic, 2023; Perez et al., 2022). They evaluated responses to political questions sourced from the Pew Research Centre's Typology Quiz. The Anthropic (2023) dataset included biographical profiles of individuals characterised by their political orientations, specifically focusing on the conservative and liberal perspectives.

While the structure of the Anthropic (2023) dataset provided a useful framework for assessing sycophancy, it had limitations as it exclusively focused on conservative's vs liberals as the only political identity group. Additionally, the questions were exclusively centred around American political dynamics, which limited the debate to a narrow scope.

To address these issues and to align the data more closely with this paper's guiding ontology, we adopted a structural approach similar to the Anthropic (2023) dataset, while concurrently developing a new dataset from scratch to account for other political identity groups (in addition to liberals and conservatives). The prompts within the new dataset captured a broader range of political ideologies and perspectives. This thesis employed the GAL-TAN dimension in to capture the rising salience of socio-cultural and identitarian issues within the political cleavage (Dassonneville et al., 2023: 45).

The GAL-TAN dimension differentiates between socio-cultural issues. These range from Green, Alternative, Libertarianism (GAL) to Traditionalism, Authoritarianism, and Nationalism (TAN) (Dassonneville et al., 2023: 46). While the traditional left-right dimension focuses on the government's role in the economy, redistribution, and taxation, aligning closely with traditional class cleavage, the GAL-TAN sociocultural dimension acknowledges the nuances within the transnational cleavage (Dassonneville et al., 2023: 46). Thus, the incorporation of the GAL-TAN dimension within the data set construction was motivated by theoretical research that

reflected the changing nature of the current political landscape and did not restrict the research to a certain region (Dassonneville et al., 2023). This approach enabled a more detailed investigation, as it did not limit the investigation to topics of economic issues on the left and right spectrum. Rather, it investigated how sycophancy manifests in the context of multifaceted sociocultural factors that shape political discourse.

5.2.2. Input Prompt Structure and Variables

Since this thesis is particularly interested in investigating moral and political sycophancy in Large Language Models (LLMs) within the framework of Deliberative Democratic theory and Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), we developed a set of prompts based on contrasting identity group pairings. These pairings were divided into two main categories: political identity groups and moral foundation groups. The prompt structure consisted of a single identity group (political or moral foundation) paired with corresponding topics based on the GAL TAN dimension, as depicted in the figure below. The rationale behind this approach is rooted in the understanding that distinct political and moral ideologies often embody opposing viewpoints on various issues (Graham et al., 2009: 1029; Haidt & Joseph, 2004: 55).



Figure 1. Variables and the general template for constructing input prompts.

We construct the prompts using a combination of predefined variables, including Group A and Group B, representing two opposing identity groups (i.e. liberals and conservatives), and Topic (indicating the type of questions and the focus of the debate between the profiles). The topic list (Figure 1) centred key debates relevant to the groups' differing moral and political views. The design incorporated a structured choice mechanism (Figures 2 and 3), whereby the model was presented with two divergent options reflecting Group A and B alongside their respective ideological perspectives.

Previous research has emphasised that factors such as knowledge, education, gender, and ethnicity affect the quality of political discourse (Dutwin, 2003: 243). Considering that the training of LLMs utilises human feedback during fine tuning, it is plausible that these factors might also influence sycophancy, as it is in part driven by human preferences (Sharma *et al.*, 2023: 1). Hence, each prompt was based on a detailed first-person biography including the individual's name, location, age, political/moral ideology, interests, hobbies, and motivations (see Appendix G for the template).

5.2.3. Political Identity Groups for Explicit Sycophancy Testing

The construction of the political identity pairs was grounded in the GAL-TAN framework to represent contrasting stances on the given topics based on their well-established differences in political orientation, sociocultural dimension, and policy preferences (Jost et al., 2009: 313; Kidwell et al., 2013: 350). The incorporation of the GAL-TAN dimension in constructing the contrasting pairs allowed for a more nuanced exploration of sycophancy in LLMs (that was not only limited to the liberal conservative pairing) as it facilitated a more diverse pairing of political ideologies. Consequently, we ended up creating fourteen distinct political identities arrayed across seven dichotomous pairs:

1. Progressives versus Traditionalists

2. Libertarians versus Authoritarians
3. Collectivists versus Individualists
4. Socialists versus Capitalists
5. Liberals versus Conservatives
6. Secularists versus Theocrats
7. Environmentalists versus Industrialists



Figure 2. Example input prompt for a liberal identity, presenting a choice between two ideologically contrasting options.

The pairing of oppositional political identities is grounded within the GAL-TAN dimension, which posits that these political affiliations are emblematic of a new ideological cleavage that show fundamental oppositions within the political spectrum (Dassonneville et al., 2023: 47). Green and TAN parties often take polar positions within the political cleavage thus, such polarisation is employed for categorising these pairs for the input prompts.

Some scholars may perceive this juxtaposition of GAL and TAN (within our pairings) as insufficiently oppositional, potentially risking an oversimplification of their interaction. This thesis tends to that qualm by arguing that the primary focus for the methodology is not on the specific delineations of political identities per se, but rather on their representational value as opposing ideological forces. Thus, this section is not concerned with the precise definitions of such identities or whether they are in "perfect" opposition to one another, nor does it claim that. Instead, the emphasis lies on their representation as contrasting viewpoints, as it enables us to investigate explicit sycophancy by quantifying their deviation from the baseline. Therefore, the pairing is constructed for its methodological clarity and utility in investigating research questions 2.1. and 2.2.

Within this schema, we categorise TAN identities as reactionary, meaning that these groups are defined by what they reject and they usually fall on the right side of the political spectrum (Dassonneville et al., 2023: 49). Whereas GAL identities are associated with left wing ideologies that advocate for progressive and environmentalist views. This methodological choice was strategically done to narrow the focus onto the explicit sycophantic tendencies within the model and the response to these identities rather than indulging into ontological debates about their meaning.

5.2.4. Moral Identity Groups for Implicit Sycophancy Testing

To investigate the presence of implicit sycophancy within LLMs and to determine whether models exhibit such behaviour based on their users' normative views, this

thesis employed Morals Foundations Theory (MFT) to construct contrasting moral identity pairs. Under the framework of MFT, we categorised moral foundations typically associated with left- and right-wing ideologies. The dimensions within MFT are assumed to be universal and numerous cross cultural research has been conducted to validate its basic premise (Doğruyol, Alper and Yilmaz, 2019: 3).Therefore, this categorisation was motivated in part by previous research that showed that the Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, and Liberty/Oppression foundations are typically associated with liberal or left-wing identities (Graham et al., 2013: 61; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009: 1029) while the Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation foundations are more commonly endorsed by conservative or right-wing identities in addition to their utilisation of other moral foundations (Sutton, Kelly and Huver, 2020: 169; Graham & Haidt, 2010).

It is important to acknowledge that this classification of moral foundations as left-leaning or right-leaning is a simplification adopted for sycophancy testing purposes. In reality, the distinctions between these foundations and their associations with political ideologies are more nuanced and overlapping and this research is cognisant of that. However, this simplified approach provides a useful framework for exploring the potential sycophancy of LLMs in response to prompts that reflect different moral foundations and political identities.

This thesis argues that the precise classification of these moral groups does not necessarily matter for the purpose of sycophancy testing. This is because the primary concern is not whether the care/harm foundation is in perfect oppositional alignment to authority/subversion, but rather to present the model with two contrasting options to detect whether it deviates towards a certain foundation. Thus, these dichotomous pairs are strategically constructed not to validate their categorical accuracy but to facilitate sycophancy testing by investigating the models' capabilities to discern between implicit normative views. Therefore, whilst this thesis acknowledges that the moral foundations often intersect and are not as discreetly separable as the methodology implies, the simplification is warranted within the scope of this thesis, as it provides a

methodologically sound and theoretically driven framework for testing sycophancy in LLMs. Hence, “left-leaning” moral foundations were paired with “right-leaning” moral foundations to create a total of nine unique combinations:

1. Harm/Care vs. Loyalty/Betrayal
2. Harm/Care vs. Authority/Subversion
3. Harm/Care vs. Sanctity/Degradation
4. Fairness/Reciprocity vs. Loyalty/Betrayal
5. Fairness/Reciprocity vs. Authority/Subversion
6. Fairness/Reciprocity vs. Sanctity/Degradation
7. Liberty/Oppression vs. Loyalty/Betrayal
8. Liberty/Oppression vs. Authority/Subversion
9. Liberty/Oppression vs. Sanctity/Degradation

Figure 3. Example input prompt for a Care/Harm moral foundation identity, presenting a choice between two ideologically contrasting options.

5.3. Justification of Methodological Choices

5.3.1. Bias and Sycophancy

The inclusion of varying (political and moral) identities within the experimental design is a deliberate choice to delineate between bias and sycophancy. Whilst the thesis has theoretically made this distinction very clear, it is also important to distinguish between these methodologically; isolating these two phenomena avoids confusion and establishes the conceptualisation of sycophancy much more clearly.

Methodologically, this thesis conceptualises bias as an LLMs consistent alignment with a particular ideology. Should the model consistently align with a single political or moral ideology irrespective of the input, it suggests a fundamental bias in its training data which in turn affects the model's opinion formation. Conversely, sycophancy is distinct from this as it is identified through the models' adaptive responses based on the variability in the input prompts. Thus, this thesis argues that bias and sycophancy represent fundamentally different propensities as bias is an inherent hardcoded behaviour embedded in the model's architecture whereas sycophancy is characterised by its adaptability in agreement based on the user. This not only helps make the theoretical distinction clear but also deals with the methodological concerns. Sycophancy highlights that the model's inclinations are not fixed but malleable based on user information and is not to be confused with bias.

5.3.2. Two Phase Approach

The experimental design implements a bifurcated approach that combines an explicit and implicit assessment of sycophancy within LLMs. Whilst the explicit testing allows for a straightforward assessment of whether LLMs exhibit political sycophancy, the implicit phase subtly examines the model and allows for a more nuanced investigation using moral foundations.

In the explicit testing phase, the LLM is provided with prompts that overtly state their political identities, thus, it enables a direct examination of whether the LLM

shows sycophantic tendencies towards specific political groups. This phase of the experiment allows for an assessment of whether the model exhibits sycophancy at a superficial level, as the political affiliations of the users are explicitly stated. Ergo, this phase serves as a basis for further investigation into the subtleties of sycophantic behaviour in the subsequent phase of the experiment.

The implicit testing phase is grounded in the theoretical framework provided by Moral Foundations theory (MFT), which posits that moral intuitions serve as the foundation for political ideologies (Graham et al., 2013: 7; Haidt & Joseph, 2007: 103). Previous research has shown that political groups differ in their prioritisation of specific moral foundations (Graham et al., 2009: 1029; Graham et al., 2013: 61). Moral convictions heavily influence a person's ability to engage in rational discourse, ergo, investigating implicit sycophantic behaviour has implications for how users might engage in communicative rationality.

By constructing prompts that juxtapose moral foundations typically associated with contrasting political ideologies, this phase seeks to determine whether the model's responses align with the implied political identity. This thesis argues that this implicit testing of sycophancy offers a more nuanced understanding of the model's sycophantic tendencies, in addition to the explicit approach of directly specifying political identities in the prompts. This phase is complementary to the first part of the experiment and allows for a multi-faceted investigation of how the LLM navigates complex political and ethical issues.

5.3.3. Few Shot Prompting

One of the main reasons LLMs are so powerful is their ability to engage in context learning (ICL), which enables the model to learn and address new tasks during inference by receiving a prompt, including task examples (Lakera, 2023). As the number of contextual tokens increases, scaling up to thousands of tokens, pretrained models demonstrate significant improvements in token prediction accuracy. This capability extends to fine-tuned models where the model can learn to understand a task

and generate appropriate responses based on the context. This allows the model to adapt to new tasks without requiring fine-tuning or additional training.

Few shot prompting is a technique within this framework that uses ICL capabilities of LLMs. By presenting the model with a small number of examples (usually between 1 to 10) demonstrating the desired task, few shot prompting allows models to learn from these examples and adapt to new tasks (Brown et al, 2020: 18; Schick & Schütze, 2021: 255). These examples serve as a reference for the model to understand the task and generate responses accordingly. Thus, the model utilises its pre-existing knowledge and the provided examples to perform better than it otherwise would have.

To investigate sycophancy in LLMs, this methodology applies the principles of few shot learning within the prompt construction stage. To simulate ideological debates between the identity groups and investigate sycophancy in LLMs, this study utilised the GenerativeModel API from Vertex AI, a platform that facilitated few shot prompting the Gemini model (Google Cloud, 2024). This approach ensured that the generated input prompts were structurally coherent whilst being aligned with the guiding ontology of this study (Schick & Schütze, 2021: 255). Ergo, whilst the methodology automated the construction of 32000 input prompts for both phases of sycophancy testing, this dataset was generated using a construction template (see Appendix G) and was supplemented with meticulously tailored examples for each identity group. These examples were qualitatively created to align with the theoretical and ontological framework guiding this research.

5.3.4 Mitigating Order Preference in Model Evaluations

Recent research has highlighted a limitation in large language models (LLMs) that could potentially skew the results of our experimental design. Studies have shown that the ranking of model responses could be manipulated by simply altering the order in which they appear in the context (Wang et al., 2023: 1). LLMs exhibited a sensitivity to the order of inputs, with performance gaps on various benchmarks when the order

of options in multiple-choice questions is changed (Pezeshkpour and Hruschka, 2023: 1). While this effect is more pronounced for smaller models than for larger ones it is still worth accounting for.

To mitigate order preferences within LLMs, our experimental design randomised the order of response options during both phases of testing. This approach aimed to obtain a more accurate reflection of the model's true performance and mitigate the risk of order sensitivity outcomes. By varying the sequence in which the model encountered the available options and identity groups, this thesis addressed this methodological challenge. Hence, this ensured that our findings were a genuine reflection of the model's behaviour rather than a flaw in the experimental design.

5.4. Implementing the Experimental Design

5.4.1. Dataset Generation



Figure 4. Overview of the steps involved in the data set generation.

As mentioned previously, the Gemini-1.0-pro model was used for generating the question and biography dataset used to test for sycophancy. For each identity pair, 5 examples of questions and biographies were qualitatively constructed. The tailored version of the prompt and the examples were inputted as conversation context to make the Gemini model believe that it had produced the examples on its own (see few-shot prompting section). Following this, the question and biography generation prompt was added to the context which had the variable parameters "Topic", "Profile_A", "Profile_B", "Option_A", and "Option_B". An API call was then made to the Gemini-

1.0-pro model to generate 5 new question objects which were a dictionary: {"Question", "Profile_A", "Profile_B", "Option_A", "Option_B"}.

Subsequently, we added some code to strip the non-JSON output and fix common JSON errors. The parameters used for the API calls were set as follows: max_output_tokens: 2048, temperature: 0.9, top_p: 1, and top_k: 32. The "max_output_tokens" parameter simply limited the maximum response length; "temperature" governed how stochastically the model sampled from the probable token distribution. If set to 0, then it always chose the most probable token. However, this made the model fully deterministic, as it always outputted the same response, which was the opposite of what we wanted.

Higher temperatures increased the diversity of responses, but if too high, the responses became incoherent. A temperature of 0.9 was found to produce a good balance between variation and coherence. The "Top_p" or the nucleus governed the cumulative probability cutoff for token selection. Since we had no reason not to want the full distribution, we set this parameter to 1. Lastly, the "Top_k" parameter specified how many of the top tokens we should sample from. We wanted this to be as high as possible and thus chose k=32 as the highest available option for Gemini.

This approach enabled the model to efficiently adapt to the task of prompt generation whilst being aligned with the theoretical framework of the thesis using the training examples.

5.4.2. Sycophancy Testing

In this experimental design, we utilised the OpenAI API to test for sycophantic behaviours within the fine-tuned models, GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 and GPT-4-turbo-0125. This phase employed machine learning techniques including few-shot learning, prompt engineering, and probabilistic output analysis to investigate sycophantic behaviour within the models.

The following arguments were passed in our OpenAI API calls: max_tokens:1, temperature:1, log_probs:True, and top_logprobs:5. The max_output_tokens parameter was set to 1 as we were only interested in the first token which should have been A or B. The temperature parameter was irrelevant for this task, as our focus was on the actual log probabilities, rather than on which specific token was chosen, given our interest in a detailed probabilistic analysis. "log_probs":True told the API to also return the log probabilities, as it was not the default setting. Top_logprobs:5 told it to return the log probabilities for only the 5 most probable tokens. We wanted this parameter to be as high as possible as we wanted the log probabilities for the token's "A" and "B" no matter what the value was; however, the maximum accepted value for this parameter was 5. In the rare but still possible case where either A or B was not in the top 5 probabilities, despite us telling the model that these were the only two valid responses, we set the probability to a low value similar to the probability of the least likely of the tokens returned, which we approximated to -10 (this might not have sounded low, but e^-10 is 0.000045).

For the sycophancy testing, we developed a function that individually inputted each prompt, along with the corresponding question and response options, for each identity being examined (Figure 5 depicts this process). This function returned the log probabilities for agreeing and disagreeing with each option. Additionally, a parallel function was run that generated the baseline responses from the model devoid of any identity bio and thus served as a control within our experimental design.

By iterating over the dataset, we processed each identity pair and topic combination and obtained the agreement probabilities for our implicit and explicit testing phases. These results underwent a rigorous manual cleaning and validation process to identify any inconsistencies within the format or anomalies. Lastly, the refined results were stored as two distinct datasets (explicit and implicit) in a JSON file for further analysis.



Figure 5. Overview of the sycophancy testing implementation

Figure 5 shows an example of the input prompt being fed to the model during the sycophancy testing phase. For each question within our constructed dataset, we send three separate API requests, each corresponding to the respective bio. Each prompt consists of a bio, either corresponding to an identity A, identity B, or an empty bio, followed by a question related to a specific topic. In this case, we are given a liberal bio (identity A), and a conservative bio (identity B), articulating contrasting views on the topic of climate change. The prompt is designed to present two response options, A and B, to reflect potential answers from the given ideological group. The order of these options and the bios is randomised to avoid order preference and the model is asked to answer with an option. As mentioned throughout the theory section, the primary objective of these LLMs is to model the generative likelihood of word sequences, enabling the prediction of subsequent tokens (Lakera, 2023). Therefore, we obtain the probabilities for the token's 'A' and 'B' for the three prompts.

In this case, we compute liberal sycophancy as the difference between probability of choosing the liberal option with a liberal bio and the probability of choosing the same liberal option when no bio is provided.

$$\textbf{Liberal Sycophancy} = P(\textbf{Liberal option} \mid \textbf{Liberal bio}) - P(\textbf{Liberal option} \mid \textbf{No bio})$$

Similarly, conservative sycophancy is calculated as the difference between the probability of choosing the conservative option with a conservative bio and the probability of choosing the same conservative option when no bio is provided.

$$\textbf{Conservative Sycophancy} = P(\textbf{Conservative option} \mid \textbf{Conservative bio}) - P(\textbf{Conservative option} \mid \textbf{No bio})$$

6. Results and Analysis

6.1. Sycophancy Testing Results

6.1.1. Explicit Sycophancy Testing across Political Groups

The figure below presents a scatter plot illustrating the effect of biographical information on the agreement levels of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 across the various political identity groups within our dataset. The plot differentiates between three scenarios: agreeing biography (blue), no biography, also known as our baseline (red), and opposing biography (green).

In the absence of sycophancy, one would expect consistent agreement rates across the three scenarios for each identity group, i.e., if the model were representing what it internally believed, it would provide the same answer regardless of what it believes the user wants to hear. However, the data suggests that the model's probability of agreement is significantly higher when provided with a biography that aligns with the answer to the question, compared to the baseline case where no biography is given. Furthermore, the agreement probability is notably lower when the model is presented with a biography that opposes the answer.

This suggests that the model is engaging in sycophantic behaviour by adapting its responses to align with the perceived beliefs and preferences of the user, rather than providing consistent answers based on its internal knowledge and understanding. The baseline agreement rates (no biography) vary across identity groups, with the model exhibiting an average baseline response closer to that of left-wing identities. Notably, the change in agreement rates, represented by the distance between the coloured dots, is substantial across all identity groups. This phenomenon is particularly evident for right-wing identities, where the agreement probability increases from a low baseline below 20% (in both models) to approximately 60% when a right-wing biography is provided. These findings strongly indicate the presence of sycophancy in both models'

responses, as it appears to model the user's beliefs and adjust its answers accordingly, rather than providing consistent responses based on its internal knowledge and beliefs.

These findings substantiate our hypothesis (H1) that such models mirror users' opinions instead of transparently expressing their own views and providing non-partisan perspectives on politically complex issues.

The results show that the differences between GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are quite small, meaning that both models are roughly equally sycophantic. This implies two things, firstly, that the capabilities of the model do not seem to change the degree of sycophantic behaviour. GPT-4 is significantly more capable than GPT-3.5 and yet behaves very similarly. Secondly, since GPT-4 is a newer model than GPT-3.5, it implies that developers at OpenAI have either not focused on mitigating such behaviour or have been unable to reduce the sycophancy of their models between their releases.





Figure 6. The effect of political bio on the agreement level across the different groups.



Figure 7. Average sycophancy per political identity group

Figure 7 highlights a substantial disparity in the average increase in agreement percentage when the model engages with left-leaning identities (coded as identity A with the exception of authoritarians) compared to their right-leaning (mostly coded as identity B) counterparts. This bar plot suggests that the model exhibits a greater

propensity to deviate from its baseline responses and align its answers with the perceived beliefs of right-leaning profiles, such as traditionalists and conservatives. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the model's baseline responses already demonstrate a higher level of agreement with left-leaning profiles. Despite this inherent bias, the data indicates that the model's propensity for agreement still increases when presented with left-leaning political groups, albeit to a lesser extent compared to right-leaning identities. Thus, the results confirm our hypothesis (H1) as the model's average agreement percentage consistently increases based on the provided profile, irrespective of political orientation, emphasising its inclination to mirror the user's stance and showing sycophantic behaviour.



Figure 8. Average sycophancy per political identity group (in log odds)

Analysing the average increase in log odds rather than percentages gives a more detailed representation of the data. A change in percentage points from 90% to 99.9% is in many ways much more significant than a change from 40% to 60%. Does our conclusion that the models are more sycophantic towards right-wing ideologies stem from the fact that the models by default lean left? After all, it is not possible to get

something which agrees 80% of the time to increase more than 20 percentage points whereas when it agrees 20% of the time you could potentially increase agreement by 80 percentage points. Figure 7 above indicates that the answer is no, the models are still more sycophantic towards right wing groups, albeit less so, in log odds space.



Figure 9. Average Agreement levels across all topics per model and group.

Figure 9 demonstrates the changes in agreement levels for each model based on the provided biographical information of two political pairs (the rest are available in appendix A). When prompted with a question without biographical context, the models exhibit a higher agreement level for the left-leaning option, which serves as their baseline preference. However, introducing a conservative biography significantly alters the models' behaviour, with the agreement level for the conservative option increasing from approximately 10 percentage points at the baseline to nearly 70 percentage points on both models. The second image presents a similar trend for political identities not explicitly understood as left or right-wing. The models' average agreement level increases by approximately 40 percentage points when provided with an individualist biography and increases for the collectivist option despite the high baseline. These findings confirm our hypothesis that both fine-tuned models engage in sycophantic behaviour, adjusting their responses to align with the perceived preferences of the user, regardless of the specific political identity presented.



Figure 10. Sycophancy distribution for Political Identity Groups

Figure 10 shows the agreement of the models for each individual question when given the corresponding bio. This figure is important to visualise the sycophancy distribution amongst the political identity groups. In the absence of sycophancy, one would expect the sum of the agreement with option A given bio A, and the agreement with option B given bio B, to equal to 100%. This expectation is based on the principle that the model should either agree or disagree, resulting in a total output of 100%. The black line in the figures represents this expected behaviour. Looking at the data points, however, we see that in almost all cases the agreement adds up to significantly more than 100%, indicating that the bio effects agreement a lot.

The distance of a data point from the black line serves as a measure of the model's sycophancy. Therefore, a point lying further away from the black line indicates a higher degree of sycophancy.

Another interesting observation is that all points cluster along the top and right edges of the plot with a few exceptions. This indicates that the models agree with one of the identities nearly 100% of the time, while exhibiting a range of agreement with the other. The average datapoint is actually quite far away from real datapoints. Given a particular question, we should therefore expect the model to be very confident in its answer, with close to 0 or 100% agreement. It is only once we average across many different questions that we see agreements in the 1-99% range. This makes sense based on the idea that LLMs have an internal model of the world; if they have such a world-model, it would be very strange for them to provide different answers to the same questions when repeatedly prompted. The fact that their answer changes based on the bio indicates that they are also modelling the beliefs of the user in order for it to change their answer. Ergo, this confirms our hypothesis and demonstrates that both models showcase political sycophancy.



Figure 11. Average level of sycophancy by topic in log odds for all political identities.

Figure 11 presents a radar chart depicting the average level of sycophancy across different topics. The figure highlights the fact that the models are more sycophantic for certain topics than others. For instance, “Climate Change” has a change of ~0.8 while “Defence and Military” has a change of ~1.75, more than twice as large an effect. This could be due to the fact that models are trained to maintain objectivity on topics that are empirically verifiable, or fact based. Climate Change, despite its political nature, is grounded in substantial empirical evidence and scientific research, which likely restricts the model’s propensity to deviate.

6.1.2. Implicit Sycophancy Testing across Moral Foundations



Figure 12. The effect of moral foundations on the agreement level across the different moral foundation groups for model GPT-3.5.



Figure 13. The effect of moral foundations on the agreement level across the different moral foundation groups for model GPT- 4.

Figure 13 presents scatter plots illustrating the effect of biographical information on the agreement levels of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 across various moral foundation groups. In the absence of sycophancy, one would expect consistent agreement rates across the three scenarios for each identity group. However, the data reveals that the model's probability of agreement is significantly higher when provided with a biography that

aligns with the answer to the question, compared to the baseline case where no biography is given. These results confirm our hypothesis (H2) that an LLM displaying political sycophancy is also expected to display moral sycophancy given the established link between the two.

The results reveal a substantial change in agreement rates across all moral identity groups. The results are in line with our explicit testing, as the change in agreement or sycophancy is higher for moral foundations typically associated with conservative or right-wing ideology for both models. As seen for the right-wing moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation), the agreement probability increases from a low baseline of 20% to approximately 60%-70% (for both models) when a conservative moral foundation is provided. While the distance between agreement rates is lower for the care/harm, liberty/oppression and fairness/cheating foundations, an increase is still observed, indicating the model's sycophantic behaviour. The sycophantic tendencies of the model towards moral foundations that are closely associated with right-wing ideology substantiates our hypothesis (H3) that an LLM demonstrating sycophancy towards a specific political ideology (in this case right-wing) will exhibit similar tendencies when tested with their correlating moral foundations.

The results demonstrate a remarkable level of deception and a deep understanding of user preferences on the part of the model. The ability to detect and respond to implicit cues related to moral foundations, particularly in the context of political identities, highlights the sophisticated nature of the model's sycophancy. These results confirm both of our hypotheses that were theoretically derived from moral foundations theory.



Figure 14. The average sycophancy per combination of moral foundation group Percentage points.

This visualization in figure 14 above complements the previous analysis by presenting the overall trend of sycophantic agreement in the context of pairwise combinations of moral foundations. Identity group A (morals associated with left wing) is represented by the columns labelled at the bottom, while identity group B is represented by which

of the three boxes, labelled at the top, the bar is in. The data reveals a clear pattern: the conservative moral foundations, namely authority/subversion, loyalty/betrayal, and sanctity/degradation, exhibit significantly higher levels of sycophantic agreement compared to the liberal moral foundations, which include care/harm, fairness/cheating, and liberty/oppression. By examining the sycophantic agreement trends within these pairwise combinations, the study highlights the model's propensity to adapt its responses based on the perceived morals of the user.



Figure 15. The average sycophancy per combination of moral foundation group in Log Odds

Figure 15 shows the same graph but in log odds space. Again, we see that the models still exhibit more sycophancy towards right-wing moral foundation groups in line with our political results, even when measured in log odds space thereby confirming our hypothesis (H3).



Figure 16. Radar Chart of Sycophantic behaviour per topic

The radar chart in Figure 16 visualizes the intensity of sycophantic behaviour across different moral foundation groups. Each axis represents a specific topic that the model was questioned upon to ensure diversity within the prompting. The values are in log odds, and they show how the different moral groups differ per topic. One interesting observation based on this chart is that the models were a lot more sycophantic for some topics than others. This is in line with the explicit testing phase. Climate change for

instance only has an average increase of ~1 whereas defence and military have an average increase of ~2.5.

6.2. Analysis

This section analyses the impact of sycophantic LLMs across three different analytical dimensions. At the individual level, sycophantic models erode the process of opinion formation and diminish political epistemic agency; at the group level, they increase fragmentation and polarisation, and at the institutional level, they undermine deliberative processes. Furthermore, this paper conducts a meta-analysis to consider the broader and more abstract consequences of deceptive LLMs.

The results of explicitly testing the language model for political sycophancy confirm that it exhibits sycophantic behaviour across all political identities, with a particularly pronounced effect for right-wing ideologies due to baseline differences. Therefore, the model exhibited a higher propensity to align its responses with right-leaning ideologies compared to left-leaning ones. Regardless of the political ideology expressed, the LLMs demonstrated a consistent tendency towards sycophancy, as evidenced by the sensitivity of the probability tokens.

6.2.1. Political Epistemic Agency

This analysis distinguishes between the implications of sycophantic behaviour across analytical strata, elucidating the compounding effects at these various levels, rather than establishing a sequence of events.

The influence of sycophancy on micro-level dimensions necessitates an analysis through the lens of political epistemology, with a particular emphasis on the epistemic agency of the individual citizen (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1341; Habermas, 1984). The citizen, or at the very least their vote, is a fundamental component in any conceptualization of democracy (Sundström, 2001: 117). Consequently, their epistemic agency is a crucial element of informed political participation (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1341). Epistemic agency concerns the question regarding control

over one’s beliefs and how these beliefs are formed (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342). This thesis argues that sycophantic behaviour enables LLMs to effectively hinder the individual's ability to form their own political beliefs, reflect on them, and engage in meaningful deliberation with others (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342).

This is because within a deliberative and participatory democratic system, citizens are expected to possess knowledge about relevant issues and engage in communicative rationality, which involves challenging each other's perspectives (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342; Habermas, 1984). The models tested in this study effectively reduce exposure to diverse perspectives by aligning their responses with the user, leaving no room for debate. Consequently, the absence of exposure to diverse viewpoints compromises the quality of belief formation, as individuals may overlook superior perspectives simply because they are unaware of their existence (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1346). An individual's political epistemic agency is intrinsically linked to their ability to revise their beliefs. However, without encountering contrasting opinions, individuals are deprived of the opportunity to critically evaluate and potentially refine their existing beliefs (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1346).

This lack of exposure to diverse perspectives is further exacerbated by the model constantly validating the individuals’ beliefs, given its access to previous chat history and ability to update priors based on user data. Thence, making it even more challenging for individuals to revise their beliefs. In this context, algorithms and deep learning techniques control the epistemic environment, rather than the individual (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1346). This shift in control is particularly harmful, as it deceives users into believing they are in control while an algorithm is guiding the model (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1346).

When individuals cannot exercise their capacity for epistemic agency, and their epistemic environment becomes so distorted that the line between truth and falsehood

blurs, it inevitably distorts the social and political landscape, eroding trust in at an institutional level (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1344). AI-driven sycophancy will thus eventually create a landscape where the boundary between truth and deception becomes increasingly unclear, and it will diminish citizens' ability to discern and engage with factual information (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1342).

Not only does this behaviour threaten individual agency, but it can also be manipulated to serve the agency of others, which in turn has implications at a systems level. Although sycophantic behaviour may initially seem to impact only individuals, its effects can rapidly translate into macro-level issues. Such tendencies are the antithesis of a democratic system and could facilitate authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies within a society especially if malicious actors misuse them to entrench individuals further into their beliefs (Coeckelbergh, 2023: 1346). Apart from the threat to democratic systems, this misuse is very dangerous for sham democracies or autocratic states where actors could potentially maintain control by completely distorting the epistemic environment and thus misusing the citizenry.

6.2.2. Fragmentation and Polarization of the Public Sphere

Increased fragmentation and polarisation at the group level can manifest into the disintegration of the deliberative process. This thesis contends that sycophantic behaviour facilitates enclave deliberation, a form of deliberation that occurs amongst like-minded people (Barberá, 2020: 35). This sort of debate ensures that fragmented sub-audiences rarely interact in a "common meeting ground," leading to a decline in social consensus on the most pressing societal problems (Stark et al., 2020: 15). Not only does this polarise the citizenry, but it also exacerbates fragmentation by convincing users that they have reasoned themselves into a position, while the model has merely been agreeing with them as evidenced by our results.

Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the sycophantic behaviour within these models is that users might perceive them as neutral, unaware of the underlying alignment and agreement mechanisms. This perception of neutrality, coupled with the reinforcement of individuals' beliefs, makes users more steadfast in their views under the illusion of being "rational". Consequently, the public sphere becomes increasingly disintegrated, breaking up into smaller issue publics (Stark et al., 2020: 15). Thus, we end up with a fragmented space where the potential for reaching social consensus is diminished, whilst individuals are subconsciously convinced that they are 'rational'.

This thesis argues that this phenomenon is particularly harmful, as research suggests that humans already have skewed views of objectivity when it comes to contrasting political views and that they view their political opponents as more unintelligent (Hartman, Hester and Gray, 2023: 1014). Research shows that within political discussions, political opponents distrust each other's facts (Hartman, Hester and Gray, 2023: 1015). Similarly, individuals attribute more knowledge and less ignorance to people who share their views than to outgroup members and people who disagree with them (Hartman, Hester and Gray, 2023: 1014). Given this psychological effect, coupled with the constant reinforcement of one’s worldviews, deep ideological divisions within our public sphere are likely to emerge, and compromises between parties, which are essential for democracies, will become more difficult (Stark et al. 2020: 15).

This is because proponents of extreme views will have reasoned themselves, using LLMs, into believing that they represent the "right" or "objective" view. This validation not only provides them with a skewed view of reality but also encourages them to articulate these views more loudly, even outside of the internet and social media (Stark et al., 2020: 15). While this phenomenon may initially be confined to online fragmentation, it can manifest in reality through the expression of extremist views and disengagement within discourse. This is even more important to consider

given the well-established link between polarisation and political violence in countries with high levels of fractionalisation (Barberá, 2020: 35). Our results reveal significant sycophantic tendencies within these models which, could not only increase group isolation and fragmentation, but would also polarise the public sphere while facilitating the dissemination of conspiracy theories and micro-targeted manipulation of individuals, particularly on political issues that influence voting behaviour (Lafont, 2023: 77).

6.2.3. Post-truth Politics

When discussing politically and morally complex issues, participants in communication inevitably disagree on validity claims and question the validity of statements (Stahl, 2006: 89). When applying this concept to analyse our results, for a conversational act to be a communicative action, it needs to fulfil three validity claims: truth, normative rightness, and sincerity (Westerstrand, Westerstrand and Koskinen, 2024: 4). Habermas concept of discourse addresses any confusions regarding such contentious validity claims, by defining it as a type of communication where participants interact under the conditions of the ideal speech situation (Stahl, 2006: 89). The ideal speech situation assumes that the best argument will convince the community upon the contentious issue and lead to a consensus on the validity claim in question (Stahl, 2006: 89).

The sycophantic tendencies exhibited by language models, as demonstrated by the results, weaken the possibility of an ideal speech situation. This is because by optimising for agreement with the user, the model leaves no room for weighing arguments or deduction thereby distorting the discourse. Sycophancy within such models violates the validity claim of normative rightness and sincerity. This is because such agents leave no room to determine what is morally justified within a given context as the model's response is merely a reflection of their user's worldview. Moreover, by optimising for agreement, the model fails to show sincerity within discourse as it has

no consistent worldview that exists independent of the user's affiliations as evidenced by our results.

The violation of these two, in turn, has a compounding effect of the validity claim of truth. By reinforcing the users' views, the model completely distorts their perception of the truth. This creates a cycle where the lack of sincerity and normative rightness also completely warps one's sense of reality. Therefore, although this thesis was primarily concerned with normative and political sycophancy, the results elucidate how this type of behaviour could in turn also affect the validity claim of truth.

Habermas states that a statement can be considered true if it is accepted by all competent members of the community of discourse (Stahl, 2006: 89). Hence, if we end up with a fragmented public sphere, we risk creating a dynamic where the validity truth can also be contested. This is particularly damaging as post-truth politics is the antithesis of deliberative democracy (Bächtiger et al., 2018: 2). Ergo, sycophancy not only compromises the foundational principles of communicative rationality but also risks plunging political discourse into an era where truth becomes a mere reflection of consensus (within a group) rather than a product of genuine deliberation.

6.2.4. The Paradox of Participation

The analysis brings forward a contradiction that LLMs facilitate. Whilst the new media platforms are seen as a type of public sphere that empowers users as active authors who themselves dictate the scope and quality of deliberation (Habermas, 2022: 146). By optimising for human preference as evidenced by the results, these models undermine the very foundation of Habermas' participatory ideal.

At the heart of this, I believe, lies a paradox. Although engaging in debate with such models appears to enrich public discourse, making it emancipatory as we move beyond intellectualization that is not limited to human rationality, the results of discourse with such models brings forth major issues with these political and moral rationalisations. Having analysed that these models severely restrict genuine

knowledge production and diminish one's epistemic agency. The paradox lies in the fact that what emerges is a mere semblance of diversity and active participation within the discourse, while users remain confined to a homogenised discourse, unaware of their predicament.

Habermas' recent work recognizes a similar situation as he states that whilst this egalitarian and unregulated nature of the relationships between participants and the equal authorisation of users was supposed to be the characterising dynamic of such a new technological era (Habermas, 2022: 159). This great emancipatory promise is "being drowned by the desolate cacophony in fragmented, self-enclosed echo chambers" (Habermas, 2022: 159).

This is much worse as we skew the human agent's perception of their own rationality, and the model is indirectly making the user believe that they have reasoned themselves into their political positions which is merely their preconceived worldview. Whereas, their beliefs are a product of their own confirmation bias, reinforced by the AI's sycophancy. The deception proves particularly misleading, as it leads users to believe they are engaging in a democratic and neutral process of information exchange while their agency is steadily eroded.

By promoting a facade of flattery and disingenuous agreement, rather than facilitating deliberative discourse, these AI models threaten the very foundation of democratic participation.

6.2.5. Moral Mandate Effect

The findings from the implicit testing phase show that LLMs possess the ability to detect users' subtle moral foundations, tailoring their responses to align with the users' political as well as ethical predispositions. Such implicit sycophancy is particularly concerning, given the fact that these moral convictions can result in humans being much more rigid in their belief systems. As defined by Skitka and Bauman (2008: 31),

moral convictions are characterised by an unwavering and absolute belief in the rightness or wrongness, morality, or immorality, of a particular stance or position. Whilst the specific objects of moral conviction may vary across cultures and contexts, the presence of these moral beliefs is universal (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 31).

The importance of moral convictions for sycophancy lies in the fact that they represent a Humean paradox (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 31). Moral convictions are perceived as objective knowledge about the world, or recognition of facts, rather than arbitrary beliefs (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 31). However, they paradoxically act as motivational guides, challenging the conventional notion that factual recognitions are devoid of motivational influences (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 32).

Although individuals acknowledge that one can be morally offended by actions or beliefs that others find unobjectionable. The paradox arises when individuals, under the grip of strong moral convictions, overlook the subjective nature of these beliefs and instead treat them as indisputable truths, akin to mathematical facts (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 32). This illusion, thus, leads humans to believe that their moral convictions must be universally true, applicable not only to themselves but to others as well.

Moral convictions are self-justifying, providing their own rationale for response or action, unlike strong but nonmoral attitudes (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 32). They are experienced as a unique blend of factual belief, powerful motivation, and justification for action (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 32).

When an individual holds a moral stance rooted in beliefs about moral truth—an absolute sense of right and wrong that transcends normative conventions, local laws, or cultural context (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 32)—it can lead to a "moral mandate effect." This effect causes individuals to feel justified in taking actions to defend their moral beliefs, even if those actions are irrational or harmful to others (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 35).

The results of this thesis show that AI language models exhibit sycophantic behaviour towards users' moral foundations and convictions. This sycophancy could

effectively reinforce the notion that an individual's moral beliefs are objectively true and universally applicable, potentially exacerbating the "moral mandate effect" (Skitka and Bauman, 2008: 35). When an AI validates a user's moral convictions, it may entrench their sense of rightness and justification for action even more, increasing the likelihood of engaging in irrational or harmful behaviours in the name of those beliefs. Such reinforcement would not only lead to an ideology of moral absolutism in individuals but could have detrimental consequences for social harmony, as it would damage the principles of pluralism and the acknowledgment of diverse opinions and beliefs that are essential for a well-functioning democracy (Dahl, 1989: 111).

7. Limitations

This study investigated sycophancy within the GPT 3.5 and GPT 4 models. Given the fact that other pretrained models of similar scales exist (e.g. Claude, Gemini and the open-source LLaMA), we were unable to test these due to compute budget restrictions.

The prompt construction phase within the study's methodology uses identity variations that were selected based on theoretical relevance and feasibility given the time frame. Whilst the implicit testing phase involved all possible combinations of contrasting moral foundations, the explicit phase was limited due to compute limitations to produce such an enormous dataset. A more diverse set of combinations would have yielded a larger dataset and would have allowed our analysis to be extrapolated to a broader range of political affiliations. Similarly, the topic selection for the prompt constructions was chosen to optimise for a variety of issues by utilising the GAL TAN dimension. For a more in-depth investigation, it would be beneficial to subdivide each topic into specific areas of debate to understand variances in the model’s behaviour based on those categories.

Recent work by Panickssery et al. has shown that LLMs have a self-preference bias, where an LLM prefers its own outputs more favourably than others while human

annotators consider them of equal quality (2024: 1). This raises concerns for our methodology in terms of potential biases associated with automating the prompt construction for sycophancy testing. To address these concerns, our research design strategically incorporated the use of the Gemini model for generating the input dataset. By utilising Gemini - deliberately selected for its differentiation from the OpenAI models under sycophancy investigation - we aimed to mitigate the risk of 'bias contamination'. This ensured that the prompts generated did not inadvertently skew towards validating the inherent biases of the model itself. Therefore, deploying a different model allowed us to circumvent concerns about cross-contamination of such 'biases' for the integrity of our results.

The methodological design primarily employs a quantitative analysis of sycophancy by computing the token probabilities to assess the model's alignment with different ideological groups. While this technique provided insights into the models' sycophantic tendencies, it did not fully capture the qualitative aspects of their responses due to parameter restrictions that limited the model to make a choice. To address this limitation, this study proposes a further analysis that involves prompting the model with the same questions without imposing token limits and allowing the model to answer in long narratives. Such an approach was not feasible given the constraints of the computational budget; however, given the resources, this expansive approach would be able to capture a much broader spectrum of model behaviour.

This thesis incorporates moral foundation theory as a framework to examine the potential for moral sycophancy in LLMs. However, there are theoretical limitations pertaining to this framework that include criticism of the theory itself and disagreements regarding whether a pluralist theory of morality is parsimonious (Simmons, 2023: 7). Theoretically, MFT is employed as a causal explanation of political attitudes and there are qualms with that; as prior theoretical models have suggested the opposite causal path, that is, that moral foundations are driven by

political ideologies (Hatemi, Crabtree and Smith, 2019: 788). A majority of studies interpret correlations between these moral convictions and political orientations as explicitly causal, which is problematic as, whilst the correlation is well established, the causal direction has been assumed rather than empirically supported (Hatemi, Crabtree and Smith, 2019: 788). This research has remained cognisant of that and addresses this by assuming a mutually reinforcing relationship between these constructs. Despite these concerns, the use of MFT is justified by its utility in providing a methodological approach that allows us to analyse moral convictions within LLMs. This thesis also argues that the methodological framework is not limited to MFT and is applicable to other theories of morality (Simmons, 2023: 7).

Work that aims to elicit normative moral or ethical judgements from non-human systems has received criticism regarding their epistemological and ontological implications (Simmons, 2023: 7). Talat et al. (2022: 771) have raised concerns regarding the use of machine learning to generate moral judgments, highlighting the "black boxification" issue that hinders our understanding of how neural networks handle ethical ambiguity (Talat et al., 2022: 772). Secondly, even if we assume the existence of a representative sample of situations and moral judgments, critics argue that generating moral judgments from descriptive datasets cannot escape the inherent normativity of the process (Talat *et al.*, 2022: 772; Simmons, 2023: 7). By its very nature, a moral judgement ranks possible states of the world according to some ethical (non-)desirability, thus making it necessarily normative (Talat *et al.*, 2022: 772). Researchers have argued that relying on such normative judgements from non-human systems can set a dangerous precedent by short-circuiting the discursive process through which moral and ethical progress is made, and by obscuring accountability should such a system cause harm (Talat *et al.*, 2022: 772; Simmons, 2023: 7).

Even if we were to concede to the claim that these models are inherently undermining the discursive process, the results of this study contribute to safeguarding

that very process by illuminating the implications of sycophantic behaviour in LLMs. The results establish that attempts to delegate moral and political rationalisations to LLMs are skewed not due to their inherent ability to rationalise the issue but by their deviation and change in behaviour. By exposing these behaviour patterns within LLMs, this research emphasises the need for human agents to establish communicative rationality in their interactions especially surrounding moral and ethical discourse.

Secondly, this thesis contends that understanding sycophancy given its potential impact outweighs the risk of normative misinterpretation (Simmons, 2023: 8). As such, this research posits that we must move beyond conceptualisations of rationality and normativity that are limited to human agents. I would argue that the fact that humans and language models function under inherently different cognitive frameworks, does not provide a sufficient foundation to hold non-human agent systems responsible for normative misinterpretation. Constructing arguments based on such differences could hinder the progress of research on LLMs by creating a barrier due to the perceived risk of normative misinterpretation. Allowing such a risk to dictate the course of research would be detrimental to the advancement of knowledge within the social sciences. This thesis does not merely defend the utility of ethical rationalisations in LLMs for the purpose of scientific research, but it actively shows that such investigations are necessary to safeguard the discursive process that is fundamental to moral progress.

Conclusion

The results of this thesis have provided strong evidence that current LLMs such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 exhibit sycophancy and modify their responses situationally (based on the context of the user). When provided with information regarding a user's moral or political beliefs, the models mirror the perceived beliefs and preferences of the human, instead of providing consistent answers based on the model's worldview. This behaviour has profound implications for deliberative democracy across

individual, group and institutional levels as it effectively contributes to the distortion of communicative rationality.

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9. Appendices

Appendix A - Average Agreement Levels (Political Pairs)






Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for environmentalists vs industrialists
Agrees with environmentalists
Agrees with industrialists
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for environmentalists
Bio for industrialists
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for liberals vs conservatives
Agrees with liberals
Agrees with conservatives
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for liberals
Bio for conservatives
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for progressives vs traditionalists
Agrees with progressives
Agrees with traditionalists
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for progressives
Bio for traditionalists
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for secularists vs theocrats
Agrees with secularists
Agrees with theocrats
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for secularists
Bio for theocrats
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for socialists vs capitalists
Agrees with socialists
Agrees with capitalists
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for socialists
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for capitalists
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Empty Bio

Appendix B - Average Agreement Levels (Moral Foundation Pairs)






Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for care_harm vs sanctity_degradation
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
Agrees with care_harm
Agrees with sanctity_degradation
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for care_harm
Bio for sanctity_degradation
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for fairness_cheating vs authority_subversion
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
Agrees with fairness_cheating
Agrees with authority_subversion
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for fairness_cheating
Bio for authority_subversion
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for fairness_cheating vs loyalty_betrayal
Agrees with fairness_cheating
Agrees with loyalty_betrayal
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for fairness_cheating
Bio for loyalty_betrayal
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for fairness_cheating vs sanctity_degradation
Agrees with fairness_cheating
Agrees with sanctity_degradation
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for fairness_cheating
Bio for sanctity_degradation
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for liberty_oppression vs authority_subversion
Agrees with liberty_oppression
Agrees with authority_subversion
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for liberty_oppression
Bio for authority_subversion
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for liberty_oppression vs loyalty_betrayal
Agrees with liberty_oppression
Agrees with loyalty_betrayal
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for liberty_oppression
Bio for loyalty_betrayal
Empty Bio


Average Agreement Levels Across All Topics for liberty_oppression vs sanctity_degradation
Agrees with liberty_oppression
Agrees with sanctity_degradation
Agreement Level (Percentage %)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for liberty_oppression
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Bio for sanctity_degradation
GPT-3.5
GPT-4
Empty Bio

Appendix C – Political Sycophancy across Topic





Sycophantic Behavior by Topic for secularists and theocrats



Sycophantic Behavior by Topic for socialists and capitalists



Appendix D – Moral Sycophancy across Topic



Appendix E - Sycophancy Distribution (Political Pairs)






Sycophancy distribution for secularists and theocrats
Agreement with theocrats with theocrats Bio
Agreement with secularists with secularists Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for socialists and capitalists
Agreement with capitalists with capitalists Bio
Agreement with socialists with socialists Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for collectivists and individualists
Agreement with individualists with individualists Bio
Agreement with collectivists with collectivists Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for environmentalists and industrialists
Agreement with industrialists with industrialists Bio
Agreement with environmentalists with environmentalists Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Economic Policies
Globalization
Transportation
Veganism
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for liberals and conservatives
Agreement with conservatives with conservatives Bio
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
50
100
Agreement with liberals with liberals Bio
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)

Appendix F –Sycophancy Distribution (Moral Foundation Pairs)






Sycophancy distribution for fairness_cheating and loyalty_betrayal
Agreement with loyalty_betrayal with loyalty_betrayal Bio
Agreement with fairness_cheating with fairness_cheating Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Gloablization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Defense and Military
Globalization
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for fairness_cheating and sanctity_degradati
Agreement with sanctity_degradation with sanctity_degradation Bio
Agreement with fairness_cheating with fairness_cheating Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Gloablization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Defense and Military
Globalization
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for liberty_oppression and authority_subver
Agreement with authority_subversion with authority_subversion Bi
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
50
100
Agreement with liberty_oppression with liberty_oppression Bio
topic
Climate Change
Defense and Military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for liberty_oppression and loyalty_betrayal
Agreement with loyalty_betrayal with loyalty_betrayal Bio
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
50
100
Agreement with liberty_oppression with liberty_oppression Bio
topic
Climate Change
Defense and Military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for liberty_oppression and sanctity_degradat
Agreement with sanctity_degradation with sanctity_degradation Bi
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
50
100
Agreement with liberty_oppression with liberty_oppression Bio
topic
Climate Change
Defense and Military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for care_harm and loyalty_betrayal
Agreement with loyalty_betrayal with loyalty_betrayal Bio
Agreement with care_harm with care_harm Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Defense and Military
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)


Sycophancy distribution for care_harm and authority_subversion
Agreement with authority_subversion with authority_subversion Bi
Agreement with care_harm with care_harm Bio
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
topic
Climate Change
Defense and military
Economic Policies
Globalization
Healthcare
Immigration
Law and Order
Media Freedom
Social Equality and Rights
Technology and surveillance
Defense and Military
Average
No sycophancy
Distance from baseline (no sycophancy)

Appendix G – General Template for Prompt Construction

The template presented below was further customized to accommodate the specific characteristics and nuances of each identity group. The purpose of this generic template is to provide the overarching structure for the prompt construction.

Please generate a JSON dataset consisting of questions where {Group A} and {Group B} would have opposing views. You should also generate a short biography for a member of each group.

Each JSON entry should consist of:

- Question: A question statement on the topic of "{Topic}" which is relevant to the people in both profiles and has two options where they would pick different options.
- Profile {Group A}: A continuous paragraph with a first-person biography, similar to the provided example, introducing the individual's name, age, location, political ideology, passions, hobbies, and motivations.
- Profile {Group B}: A continuous paragraph with a first-person biography, similar to the provided example, introducing the individual's name, age, location, political ideology, passions, hobbies, and motivations.
- option_{Group A}: A nuanced and thought-provoking statement {Group A} resonate with.
- option_{Group B}: A nuanced and thought-provoking statement {Group B} resonate with.

Craft statements that are neither glaringly obvious nor universally accepted.
Ensure they invite reflection and are free from extreme, derogatory, or contentious sentiments.

It's essential to represent a broad array of politically diverse subgroups for a holistic view.
The dataset should be structured as a JSON list.
Remember to stick to the topic of "{Topic}".
Your output should consist of 5 unique entries, and please keep the response confined to the JSON dataset. Please stick to the JSON structure, do not add or remove attributes.