

Consociational democracy as a tool for conflict resolution in plural societies

Power-sharing in Turkey

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Abstract

The fragmentation of the Turkish society into religious, ethnic and ideological cleavages, as a result of a series of historical events, has led to armed conflicts and a series of military coups, claiming the life of thousands throughout history. Suffering from a democratic deficit, the Turkish state has repeatedly failed to create a system of democratic institutions that accommodates the interests and demands, of the diverse groups of the Turkish society. In this study I have investigated the possibilities for consociational democracy to work as a tool for conflict resolution in Turkey. Consociational democracy is a well-established method of conflict resolution, suggesting a power-shared system among different segments in a plural society. Thus the research question of this work is: *What are the possibilities for consociational democracy to work as a tool for conflict resolution in Turkey?* In order to answer this question, I have focused on the case by using a case study with a deductive approach, thus allowing the theory to guide the analysis. The study shows that there are potentials for a solution of partly consociational nature, although a fully consociational solution at the present may appear rather unlikely.

Key words: Islamists, Seculars, Kurds, Consociationalism, Power-sharing
Words: 10284

Table of contents

| | | |
|----------|--|-----------|
| 1 | Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1 | Purpose and research question | 2 |
| 1.2 | Outline..... | 3 |
| 2 | Method and material..... | 4 |
| 2.1 | Case study design..... | 4 |
| 2.2 | Material and sources..... | 5 |
| 3 | Theory..... | 6 |
| 3.1 | Plural society and consociational democracy..... | 7 |
| 3.1.1 | Government by grand coalition..... | 7 |
| 3.1.2 | Mutual veto..... | 8 |
| 3.1.3 | Proportionality..... | 8 |
| 3.1.4 | Segmental autonomy..... | 8 |
| 3.2 | Criticism..... | 9 |
| 4 | Examining the case: the possibilities to and the problems of implementing consociational democracy..... | 11 |
| 4.1 | The plural society of Turkey-a historical review..... | 11 |
| 4.2 | The consociational model..... | 14 |
| 4.2.1 | Political factors-participation and representation..... | 15 |
| 4.2.2 | Turkish politics and consociationalism..... | 17 |
| 4.2.3 | Administrative and economic factors..... | 21 |
| 5 | Conclusions and closing..... | 23 |
| 6 | References..... | 26 |
| 7 | References..... | 28 |

List of abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| AKP | Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) |
| CHP | Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) |
| DEP | Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party) |
| DEHAP | Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party) |
| DP | Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party) |
| FP | Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) |
| HADEP | Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party) |
| HEP | Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Work Party) |
| MNP | Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) |
| PKK | Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) |
| RP | Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) |
| SP | Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) |
| PR | Proportional representation |

1 Introduction

Highly fragmented into three different segments since the beginning of the independence war, the three segmental groups of Turkish secular nationalists, Islamists and Kurds have been in conflict with one another for the struggle of political identity claims in regard to political, cultural and civil rights. Until recently the government in Turkey has ruthlessly suppressed the demands of the Kurds for cultural, linguistic and political rights, resulting in a period-wise armed conflict with the creation of the PKK (*Kurdistan Workers Party*) headed by Abdullah Öcalan who is kept as a political prisoner since 1999 (Gunter 2004:200). The suppression of Kurdish identity claims has ever since intensified and the political problem that came to dominate the Turkish agenda over the years was that of the rights of the Kurdish minority (Zürcher, 1993: 312).

After several years of armed conflict with a loss of 40,000 people on both sides in the past 30 years, both parties have today laid down their arms in order to negotiate and reach for a political solution (Freedom House, 2014). The imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan purposes, what he calls “a simple solution” whereby Turkey is to redefine itself as a democratic nation, respecting human rights and the political rights of minorities (Öcalan 2008:3). Meanwhile Turkish politics remains deeply divided and is lacking of substantive democracy that generates a pluralistic political order (Öniş 2013:103).

Apart from the Kurdish issue, Turkish politics is also characterized by the political struggle between secular nationalists and Islamists. After several years of oppression from the Kemalist-secular nationalists, followed by military coups by the Kemalist establishment, the Islamist segment has gained some political recognition in terms of the pro-Islamist AKP party that has been in power since 2002. After ten years of achieving substantial progress in democratization, the democratic opening is however turning into authoritarianism in the age of AKP hegemony based on a majoritarian understanding of democracy. This also reflects the segmental cleavages and the ongoing conflicts. What kind of democracy is thus required for the democratization challenge of the plural society of Turkey and what is required for a democracy to solve these conflicts?

1.1 Purpose and research question

In this study I am interested in investigating the possibilities of using consociational democracy as a tool for solving conflicts in plural societies with a special focus on Turkey. Since my belief is that the conflict is about a democratic deficit that is reflected by the different segments' lack of democratic rights, it is necessary to analyze the country's diversity and multi-ethnic demographic structure and its impacts on its democratic institutions through Arend Lijphart's *consociational democracy* or *power-sharing democracy*. This concept has become a standard recommendation for post-conflict societies, suggesting a power-shared system among different groups within a divided society. It is necessary to take the plural nature of the society into consideration while studying this case and Lijphart's assumptions are going to help us to understand how inter-ethnic tensions and segmental cleavages are crucial for properly evaluating a divided society's democracy and its democratic political institutions. Thus this study contributes to the understanding of the ethnic- and religious-based conflicts and the democratization challenge within Turkey.

How can we understand and identify the segmental cleavages in Turkey and what is required for a democracy to be useful as a tool for solving these kinds of conflicts? The main purpose of this work is therefore to examine the possibilities of using consociational democracy as a tool for conflict resolution in Turkey, through Arendt Lijphart's assumptions of power-sharing democracy in plural societies. Thus the research question of this work is:

What are the possibilities for consociational democracy to work as a tool for conflict resolution in Turkey?

By identifying the conditions required for consociational democracy to work as a tool for conflict resolution we can also examine whether the possibilities for that to happen is good in this particular case.

The Swedish methodologists Teorell & Svensson mention how important it is to study a case that is relevant for the society we live in but, at the same time, contributing to and developing already existing studies within the chosen field (2007:17-18,150). Studying this case might lead us to better understand how to solve the many ethnic and religious-based conflicts that exist in many different parts of the world which makes this a relevant study for the society we live in and at the same time contributing to the scientific field of peace and conflict studies.

1.2 Outline

This work is organized in the following: (1) Introduction with a description of the case and the research question (2) Method and material with a description of case-study design and materials used for this study (3) Theory with definition of the concepts used in this work and a concluding part of criticism (4) Analysis with an investigation of the case by implementation of the theory (5) conclusions and closing (6) references

2 Method and material

This work can be regarded as a case study where the case is *conflict resolution in Turkey* which is also the focus of interest in this work. A case study design is preferable for this study since the case is complex and its particular nature is of great interest for the investigation. The complexity and particular nature of the case in question are the main focus of a case study research (Bryman 2012:66). It is a case of conflict resolution in plural societies thus using the theory of consociational democracy. The aim is to understand whether there is a democratic solution to the conflict through power sharing democracy. Thus this chapter clarifies the research strategy chosen for this investigation.

2.1 Case study design

The method used for this work is somewhat built on constructionism theory because it is investigating the construction of a democratic society in the perspective of consociational democracy. By using an intensive research strategy each survey unit of the case is analyzed in detail (Teorell & Svensson 2007:267; Bryman 2012:66).

To investigate this case this work will be focused on analyzing the conflict and the problems and possibilities of solving it by using Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy. The aim is not to test the theory, rather use it to understand the case. This study will focus on finding specific variables that can be measured or analyzed in order to investigate empirically (Teorell & Svensson 2007:56). In this case it is important to identify the conditions for consociational democracy. The next step is then to apply the theory on the case by examining these conditions once they are identified and defined. The case study design is here, characterized by a deductive approach where the theory is the main guideline for the investigation (Bryman 2012:24-26). Here the four features of the theory (grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional representation and autonomy) will guide us through the investigation thus discussing the problems and the eventual possibilities of a conflict resolution to finally summarize the findings and draw conclusions and answering the research questions.

2.2 Material and sources

The collected material will be discussed in light of and interpreted through the stipulated theory mentioned above. Thus it is important to select reliable materials that are relevant for the study and the chosen theory. To identify the specific variables essential for this case in regard to the chosen theory, Lijphart's book: *Democracy in plural society* shall be consulted and analyzed in detail. Also other books, writings and articles that use his theories and assumptions will be useful in this investigation in order to understand the interpretation of the theory in practice. For this reason several articles and books that examine different cases in the light of consociational theory are consulted.

The next step of the research, which is examining the conditions empirically once they are identified, could be done by looking at several reports from the world press and articles and books that discuss the issue. It is also reasonable to look at information provided by the European institutions regarding the developments in Turkey regarding the democratization process since democracy is one of the main criteria to be fulfilled by Turkey in order to become a member of the European Union. Another source that is essential and also recommended by teachers at Lund University is the annual Freedom-index, developed by Freedom House in order to further illustrate the current state of democratization in Turkey.

One of the most important materials would be the constitution because it's the constitution that defines the country's political system and confers rights and powers among citizens and in this case the different groups. Thus books and articles that study the Turkish law and constitution in regard to minority rights are also consulted. *The segmental cleavages* are important to define since it raises questions about their origins and causes. However, this study will regard the conflicts and tensions with their relationship to the chosen theory. To define the Kurdish question and the Islamist dispute and the conflicts they imply, several sources of various kinds are consulted. Furthermore it is crucial to be critical and to make sure that the study doesn't result in a biased and one-sided form. Thus it is necessary to provide different relevant sources that are compared and critically analysed in order to get as close as possible to objectivity (Bergström & Boréus 2005:35-37).

3 Theory

Theories of power-sharing are not to be regarded as a new and an unstudied phenomenon. Quite the contrary, consociational thinking may be traced back to the sixteenth-century and for the last thirty years it has become one of the most influential theories of comparative politics (O’Leary 2005:3). Consociational thinking with its power-sharing tool has also been implemented by politicians in several divided societies such as Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Macedonia and Lebanon. It has also become the prescribed method of conflict management of the international community, which is evident in the internationally supported, implemented and maintained power-sharing agreements in many plural societies worldwide (O’Leary 2005:3). However consociational theory has yet not become a method for solving the religious- and ethnic-based conflicts in Turkey. This paper will therefore add another power-sharing investigation to the well-established research area of consociational democracy. As democracy rises as a fundamental criterion in conflict resolution in the current situation of Middle East it becomes pertinent to conduct such a study, discussing the Kurdish Issue and the question of secularism and political Islam and democracy in Turkey.

Although the concepts that are central for this study are indeed widely used and quite well-known and to some extent even self-explanatory, however it might be useful to provide definitions of the principal concepts in order to understand and examine the case. As discussed by Teorell & Svensson (2007:40) the concepts which political scientists use to describe certain phenomena must be explained explicitly according to the chosen theories and the posed question. Another reason is also to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding. Thus this chapter examines the notions of *consociational democracy* and *plural society*. The definitions of the concepts will be clarified through the relevant aspects of the theory used in this work. This means that the concepts are derived from the main theory, *consociational democracy*.

3.1 Plural society and consociational democracy

Plural society refers to a society that is divided by “segmental cleavages”. These cleavages could be of religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature. The segments of a plural society refer to the groups of population bounded by the cleavages of which political parties, interest groups, media of

communication, schools and voluntary associations tend to be organized along these lines (Lijphart, 1997:3-4).

According to Lijphart consociational democracy (or power-sharing democracy as he also calls it) is the only optimal and the only feasible solution for deeply divided societies. There are two primary features: (1) Grand coalition and (2) segmental autonomy; and two secondary: (3) mutual veto, (4) proportional representation that characterizes consociational democracy. Lijphart argues that in such divided societies the interests and demands of communal groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing. Lijphart uses Dahl's concept of "polyarchy" as a synonym to democracy when discussing democracy in plural societies. Lijphart argues "It is not a system of government that fully embodies all democratic ideals, but one that approximates them to a reasonable degree" (Lijphart 1977:4).

3.1.1 Government by grand coalition

The essential characteristic of a grand coalition is nothing less than an institutional arrangement of participation by the leaders of all significant segments in governing a plural society. Grand coalition violates the rule of majority support that the cabinets normally have in parliamentary systems. The government- versus opposition- norm is based on a principle of exclusion where a large minority should be kept out of the government. But it is also at the same time based on the assumption that minorities will become majorities and government and oppositions will alternate through different political mechanisms Lijphart (1977:27-28).

One mechanism is that voters transfer their support from leading parties to parties in opposition whom thereby are given the majority needed and thus minorities become majorities. However this mechanism does not function properly in a plural society where the segmental cleavages tend to be politically salient and coincides with party system cleavages. The floating vote will therefore have very little importance and is not likely to have any further impact. Furthermore, when there are two stable alliances of parties, or a majority party confronting two or more smaller parties, or when there are two major segmental parties, the only possibility of avoiding the permanent exclusion of the minority from government is by incorporating a grand coalition (Lijphart 1977: 29-30).

Furthermore for the instituting of a grand coalition Lijphart recommends the parliamentary system that, with a collegial cabinet in which the various segments can be represented, is more suitable than a presidential regime that entails the predominance of a single leader and is therefore not to be recommended. However presidentialism and consociationalism are not completely incompatible. A further argument for incorporating a grand coalition is that a constitutional separation of powers leads to cooperative and coalescent strategies: "separation of powers and federalism decrease the distinctiveness of the opposition and the

chances for a strictly competitive contest between government and opposition” (Lijphart 1977: 34).

3.1.2 Mutual veto

The mutual veto is another important criterion to be fulfilled for implementing a consociational government and is another complement to the grand coalition. Although participation in a grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments it cannot ensure absolute protection.

The mutual veto represents negative minority rule which gives each segment complete guarantee of political protection. The mutual veto prevents the risk of the minority being outvoted by the majority in a grand coalition when decisions are made. A defeat in decisions affecting the vital interests of a minority segment will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger inter-segmental elite cooperation Lijphart argues (1977:36). The mutual veto can then be formal or informal rule which both can be seen in consociational democracies today. It could either be a rule that is formally agreed on and anchored in the constitution or it could be an informal and unwritten understanding.

3.1.3 Proportionality

Proportionality has two important functions that are important complements to the grand coalition principle. First, it functions as “a method of allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments” (Lijphart 1977:38). Another important function is related to the decision-making process itself, in that “all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength” (Lijphart 1977:39). This means that all the political segments besides being represented in decision-making organs also should be represented proportionally.

Two variations of the principle of proportionality are mentioned by Lijphart (1977:41): deliberate overrepresentation of small segments and parity of representation which is a maximum extension of the former. The function of these is that the minority or minorities are overrepresented to such an extent that they become equal to the majority or largest group. When a plural society is divided into two segments of unequal size parity becomes a useful alternative to proportionality. An example of such a case is the Belgian cabinet that must consist of equal numbers of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking ministers and in which the francophone minority is thus overrepresented (Lijphart, 1977:41).

3.1.4 Segmental autonomy

Segmental autonomy is the final complement to grand coalition and is characterized by minority rule: “rule by the minority over itself in the area of the

minority's exclusive concern" (Lijphart 1977:41). This means that the decisions and their execution should be left to the separate segments except on matters of common interest which then are issues to be handled by the grand coalition in which all the segments are concerned. A segmental autonomy increases the plural nature of an already divided society since the representative organizations of a plural society follow segmental cleavages. Lijphart argues

"it is in the nature of consociational democracy, at least initially, to make plural societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy (1977:42)".

Federalism is regarded as a special form of segmental autonomy and has several significant parallels with consociational theory in that it is granting autonomy to constituent parts of the state and overrepresentation of smaller subdivisions in the federal chamber. Thus federalism can be used as a consociational method, especially in a society where each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments.

3.2 Criticism

Although Consociational thinking is becoming a popular method of conflict management there is however no consensus over consociational theory. Critics and skeptics are found among virtually all ideologies and the strongest normative objection to consociation is the suggestion that it in fact, is not democratic. The reasoning behind this assertion is based on the many different perspectives of democracy. One suggestion is that it inevitably violates the rights of some groups and the rights of some individuals and another asserts that it excludes opposition since it is a loser-takes-all system (O'Leary 2005:6).

Lijphart (2002:6-9) discusses what he claims to be the six most important criticisms and gives each of them his response. (1) Power-sharing is not sufficiently democratic; (2) it cannot work in practice; (3) a key explanation for its failure is that it does not contain incentives for moderate behaviour (4) that regional autonomy in particular, leads to secession and partition; (5) that autonomy increases conflict between the ethnic groups since it strengthens, rather than weakens, the cohesion and distinctiveness of them. The last objection is (6) that the elements of the consociational model are based on European or western experiences and thus it does not suit the more divided multi-ethnic societies in other parts of the world (Lijphart 2002:6; O'Leary 2005:6-8; McRae 1989:96-99).

To his defense Lijphart answers each argument with a motivation to his rejection of them. First he explain that when executive power-sharing is a coalition of all the major parties, it conflict with the view that a strong opposition

is the essential condition of contemporary democracy and that its goal is to become the government. As for the turnover criteria, when a democracy is viewed as consolidated if the winners in the initial elections at the time of the democratization process, lose the next following election and turn over power to the winner of that election who then peacefully turns over power to winners of a later election, he argues that both the turnover and the opposition criterion are based on one conception of democracy, namely the majoritarian conception and that it is not the only option to democratic possibilities.

Moreover Lijphart (2002:6-8) rejects the arguments of consociational democracy not working properly and doomed to fail, exemplified by the failed cases of Cyprus and Lebanon. These two cases worked properly as power-sharing democracies and failed because of international interventions especially in the case of Lebanon, thus it should not be regarded as an ordinary civil war rather an international conflict fought on Lebanese soil. Power-sharing should in these cases rather be repaired and improved instead of replaced. One of the critics, Donald L. Horowitz (Lijphart 2002:8) also emphasizes the reason for why executive power-sharing is likely to fail by pointing at its failure of giving incentives for compromise. Lijphart answers in turn that one of the fundamental assumptions in political science is that political parties want to gain power and for that reason parties will want to enter and also remain in the coalition cabinets. This also explains that the only way for ethnic or other parties to enter and remain in the cabinets is to reach compromise with their coalitions (ibid).

Another common criticism is that autonomy as a federal decentralized system is unsafe and will lead to outright secession since the groups that are given autonomy are unlikely to be satisfied with it. Also that group autonomy may encourage ethnic conflict because it explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of ethnic groups and making them stronger, more coherent and distinctive. To these arguments against the autonomy element, Lijphart counters by referring to Gurr's worldwide comparative analysis that recognizes that there is nothing inherent in autonomy agreements that lead to civil war or dissolution of the state and that autonomy is an effective method of solving regional conflicts. He also argues that if the basic ingredient for separatist sentiment would be strong, there is no guarantee that a unitary and centralized democratic system would prevent secession. (2002:8). Finally Lijphart arrives at the conclusion that power-sharing democracy is indeed more common in non-western countries where leaders and politicians in fact claim that majoritarian rule violates their native traditions- which is reminiscent of the power-sharing idea (Lijphart 2002:9).

4 Examining the case: the possibility to and the problems of implementing consociational democracy

In order to reach for a solution through consociational democracy the favored situation is one that is characterized by at least three segmental groups that reflect the balance of power. A duality of the balance of power would complicate the transition of consociationalism into the political system therefore it is more favorable with a plural society that consists of three or four segmental groups, sharing the political power and thus balancing the power. The numbers of segmental cleavages is thus crucial for a consociational model to work properly (O'Leary 2005:20; Lijphart 1977:56). The segmental cleavages of the Turkish society are however, in line with the consociational thinking, which facilitates the implementation of a consociational model. Despite its diverse society, characterized by many different recognized and non-recognized minorities, Turkey is highly fragmented into three main segments consisting of (1) Turkish secular-nationalists; (2) religious-conservative Islamists; and (3) Kurdish nationalists, in conflict with one another for political legitimacy and power in order to survive (Öniş 2013). This chapter thus, emphasizes the segmental cleavages characterized by ideological, religious and ethnic identity claims, and studies the consociational contribution to an eventual solution of the emerging crisis of the decline of further democratization and stability in Turkey.

4.1 The Plural society of Turkey- a historical review

Beginning with the ethnic roots of the Turkish people the actual contribution of Ottoman Turks (western Mongoloids) to the ethnic stocks of Turkey was considerably small since they were actually an invading tribal group who after becoming an aristocracy, intermarried with other people (Fisher 2010:1168). Thus racially most of the Turkish people are of an inter-mixture of Mediterranean and Armenoid strains. Nonetheless the south-eastern Turkey is inhabited by Kurds, a people of Indo-European descent whose ancestry had always lived there long before the Turks invaded the area 1,000 years ago, and constitutes 20 percent, approximately 15 million, of the population. However, the estimated number of Kurds may be more numerous because of assimilation and displacement of people, but also because of the government's refusal of

recognizing the Kurds as a particular ethnic group (Holmertz 2012: 4-5). The Kurds constitute the largest minority in Turkey thus the Kurdish language is widely spoken in the southeast and the Syrian and Iraqi frontiers although the language was prohibited from 1925 (Zürcher, 1993:178; McDowall, 1992:11-12).

Before Mustafa Kemal came to power in 1922, the treaty of Sévres - a partition treaty- was signed in August 1920, by representatives of the Sultan's government and the allied representatives, which gave Kurds and Armenians right to their own states. This was never ratified by Turkey however and as a rejection of the Treaty and the principles on which it was founded, a nationalist movement arose, with a general named Mustafa Kemal as their leader (Day 2010:1169-1170).

During the war for an independent Turkey, the nationalists adopted a more pluralistic discourse under the idea of Islamic unity in order to win the war. But this was only a facade. In reality the idea of a pluralist society was not compatible with Turkish nationalism with the main goal of forging a nation-state of Turks out of the Ottoman Empire (Bayir 2013:67). In August 1922, the final phase of the war began, leading to a peace conference at Lausanne, Switzerland. The treaty of Lausanne that was signed in 1923, recognized Turkish sovereignty over the present territories of Turkey, did not mention the Kurds and promises of autonomy were forgotten (Zürcher 1993:177). Thus in October 1923, when Turkey was declared a republic with Kemal as president in a regime of a single party dictatorship with CHP (Republican People's Party), the principal goal was the defence of national sovereignty, secularism, and westernization (Day 2010:1170).

Once the war was over and Turkey became independent, a policy of "turkification" was adopted. To handle the diversity characterized by ethnic and religious identities, turkification became the main policy of the Kemalist republic's agenda in the minority-state relations. Measures were taken to weaken the minorities. Any other identity than that of the Turks were by the legal system treated as a threat to the official order (Bayir 2013:5,130-134). Massive resettlement via settlement policy became law, increasing the Turkish population in the east. Kurds became subject to the assimilation politics and arguments of Kurds being Turks that had forgotten their Turkishness became the state's official discourse (Bayir 2013:5,130-134).

The Kurds however rejected the occupation of their lands and this led to three major revolts. The first revolt in 1925 was defeated and its leader Sheikh Sait was hanged. Several Kurdish leaders were exiled and the use of Kurdish and the teaching of Kurdish along with any manifestations of Kurdish ethnic identity were prohibited (Gunter 2004:200; Day 2010:1171). But Kurdish nationalism continued and in 1937 another uprising took place in Dersim in the Kurdish provinces which was also defeated (Zürcher 1993:178).

In 1978 the most radical Kurdish movement emerged. The PKK (Workers Party of Kurdistan) was founded and remained the only organization with grassroots support inside Anatolia. The banned celebrations of the Kurdish new year (Newroz) marked the beginning of the PKK's guerrilla warfare in the south-east in 1984 (Zürcher 1993:314).

However, Kurds were not the only segmental group that became victims of the regime's undemocratic policies. Manipulation of religious and ethnic fears resulted in the use of the "enemy", directed against the Islamists as well. Radical elements within the Kemalist establishment (the military, the Association of Turkish industrials, and businessmen, and the official media) also stopped the incorporation of Islamist elements of society into the political system, and imposed the "Purified" Kemalist idea especially after the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party-led (FP) government in 1995 (Yavuz 1999:3-4,9).

As Yavuz (1999:2-4) describes it, Kemal "created a nation without roots and without a moral language" and used all means necessary to construct a westernized secular nation. This legacy imbedded in the Kemalist establishment, as a result, used all its power to suppress civil society in order to preserve its own historical privileges and unchallenged right to command the nation. The idea of a secular nation had, however, little in common with the secular tradition of western liberal democracies; on the contrary it had adapted an antireligious tradition with an ideology centered on the authoritarian state model (Yavuz 1999:3). The Kemalist legacy with its strict and homogenizing interpretation of secularism and Turkishness made it possible to effectively suppress the identity claims of different segments of Turkish society (Öniş 2013:105). This hegemony, based on coercion and exclusion, however, did not manage to persuade large segments of society to accept and internalize the Kemalist idea, especially the Islamist and Kurdish segments that started to organize themselves in order to claim political space within the Turkish political system (Yavuz 1999:1-3).

However, the fight over political power and space did not come without a price. The ethnic based conflict led to an armed struggle, claiming the life of 40,000 soldiers and civilians in the past 30 years (Freedom House 2014). There are also 10,000 journalists, human rights activists, writers and politicians, most of them Kurds, locked up on flimsy charges (The Economist 3/30/13). In fact Article 8 in the constitution made it possible to refer to, academics, intellectuals and journalists who spoke peacefully for Kurdish rights, as terrorists (Gunter 2004:200). Thus Turkey has more imprisoned politicians and journalists than any other country in the world (Freedom House 2013:3)

Regular military interventions resulted in three direct military coups and one indirect coup. Today, the power has shifted and the Islamist-rooted AKP-led (the justice and development party) government is the new ruling hegemony manifesting the ongoing conflict between these three segments of different nature. The Freedom House report of 2014 shows that Turkey has become less democratic and used illegal methods to silence the voices of the 2.5 million protesters who raised their voice against what they saw as creeping authoritarianism on the part of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Five protesters were killed, 8,000 were injured and nearly 5,000 were detained by police. The report also regards Turkey as partly free which means that there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. It also denotes that there is a certain environment of ethnic and religious conflicts and a predomination of a single party despite a certain degree of pluralism (Freedom House 2014).

4.2 The consociational model

A triangle-shaped model is drawn to explain the power-sharing structure based on consociationalism (see Figure 1). The model reflects the coalition of the three segmental groups bound by mutual gains with the desirable outcome of peace and stability leading to further democratization and economic growth.

The power-sharing model is based on a constitutional arrangement that indicates which groups that are given power, by allowing the representation of its leaders in the governing of the country. For the arrangement of these three segmental groups to cooperate in a grand coalition, it requires an organized political system within each segment that manifests their striving for political participation in the Turkish political system. The organizational and ideological coherence of these groups are therefore crucial for the segments to impose their will on the state and create a shared political charter of a consociational nature.




Figure 1. A triangle-shaped model illustrated by the author to explain the power-sharing structure.

4.2.1 Political factors- participation and representation

Turkey is today a republic with a semi-presidential government which means that the Prime Minister, Erdoğan, who heads a cabinet accountable to parliament, is appointed by the president, Abdullah Gül (Day 2010), and is usually responsible for domestic politics while Gül is responsible for foreign affairs and can take emergency powers. The parliamentary component of this system is characterized by the ability of the parliament to bring down the prime minister and the cabinet (Hague & Harrop 2007:344-345). As mentioned in the theory chapter the presidential system is not in favor of a consociational democracy since it entails the predominance of one single leader but, as Lijphart (1997:34) suggests, one solution could be an arrangement in which the presidency is linked with top executive posts such as those of the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and speaker of the assembly. Represented by the top leaders of the different groups, these posts can then together become a grand coalition, as in Lebanon. Nevertheless, to evaluate the possibilities for a grand coalition we first need to examine the political representation of the segments.

The Kurdish segment: striving for political recognition

Regarding the ethnic segmentation illustrated by the Kurdish issue, beside the PKK which has been banned as a terrorist organization from the first day of its creation there has been other pro-Kurdish parties that have done great efforts to re-negotiate the status of Kurds by legal activism, although they too, have been banned from the political space of the Turkish system (Watts, 1999: 631-633). An outspoken promotion of Kurdish political and cultural rights has led to a constant pressure from police, public prosecutors, and members of parliament accusing these parties for being a mouthpiece for the PKK (Watts 1999:631). The first party, HEP (People's Labour Party) was founded 1990 with the support of eleven members of the Parliament. When the HEP was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1993, its supporters founded a new party called Demokrasi Partisi (DEP) which also got closed 1994, following pro-Kurdish party members who lost their seats in parliament. Re-created as HADEP (People's Democracy Party) with participation in the 1995 national election and the 1999 local and national election, it had, as Watts (1999:632) puts it, "built a Kurdish political house in the political system and that even if its inhabitants were arrested, new ones would move in". Despite the difficulties and the state actors' attempt to repress and discourage these parties, they indeed managed to gain political legitimacy and sustain their presence in the political battlefield (Watts 1999:633).

The Islamist segment: Political Islam and adaptation into the secular tradition

Also the Islamist segment has experienced such exclusionary policies as mentioned earlier. In their attempt to suppress the Islamist segment, the Kemalist establishment has traditionally closed down pro-Islamist parties and governments

by military intervention. Also independent media and educational establishments have been targeted and forced to close (Yavuz 1999:9). The first Islamist party, the National Order Party (MNP) was established in 1970 and was later closed down by the constitutional court following the military intervention of 1971 which eventually led to its replacement by the National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1973. With 12 percent of the national vote, thus constituting a medium size party, it played a significant role in coalition politics until 1980 (Özbudun 2006:544). However, once again the party was closed down after a military intervention in 1980. This time, the party was replaced by the Welfare Party (RP) that was established in 1983, which emerged as the largest party in the 1995 elections with 21.2 percent of the votes and 158 of the parliamentary seats, and formed a coalition but was once again forced out of coalition by the Kemalist establishment (Yavuz 1999: 3-4). The Kemalist military elite made the Constitutional Court order the dissolution of the RP and banned its leader and his colleagues from participating in politics. The RP was later recreated as the Virtue Party (FP) and chose to assimilate into the political structure. However, the constitutional court again chose to close down the party in 2001 after which there was a split in the Islamist ranks with the result of two different groups: The “innovationists” that established the AKP and the “traditionalists” that established the Felicity party (SP). With 34.2 percent of the 2002 elections (with support from more than half of the former Islamist FP-voters) and almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats, the AKP, by an adaptation in to the more secular tradition of Turkish politics thus, with less Islamist aspirations, became the first single-party government since 1991 (Özbudun 2006:544-547; Yavuz 1999:3-9).

Contemporary power-politics in the age of the Islamist-rooted AKP-era

The government-led pro-Islamist AKP party of Erdoğan indicates a shift in political power, which means that the Islamist segment has experienced enhanced recognition of their identity claims (Öniş 2013:106). Not surprisingly though, parties can still be disbanded for endorsing politics that are not in line with constitutional parameters, a policy that has frequently been applied to pro-Kurdish and Islamist parties (Freedom House 2014).

A new constitution is in the making however, which makes it possible to extend the frontiers of liberal democracy, thus replacing the authoritarian elements of the 1982 constitution. An established parliamentary commission, consisting of representatives of the four major political parties, thus entailing representatives from both Islamist and secular nationalist segments, working on the new constitution, along with peace-talks with the imprisoned Kurdish leader and other Kurdish representatives, indicates the core element of consociational democracy, that is, consensus and compromises between the elites of each segment (Öniş 2013:101-104). Also the representation of Kurdish groups in the National Assembly marks a more pluralistic discourse in Turkish politics, than before. Although a grand coalition remains to be seen, a “new” Turkey has emerged with dramatic changes, making it more democratic than the “old” Turkey that, at the present, embodies the potential to “partly” consociational solutions.

The democratic development in Turkey shall not be exaggerated however. Even though there has been significant changes the AKP era has not necessarily become more democratic in general since positive steps towards further democratization have at the same time been counterbalanced by retrogressions. The new regime of AKP rule has similarly limited the expression of identity claims of secularists and minority groups. This has been evident in the terms of controls over the press and the freedom of expression, the malfunctioning of the judicial system and the politization of it, and the lack of tolerance for opposition. Also long detention periods for top military officers and journalists and people arrested for alleged attempted coup process, further manifest the unsolved political conflict between the seculars and the Islamists (Öniş 2013:107).

While the Kemalist era, based on dominant thoughts of nationalism and secularism, gave little space for conservative religious segments of the society, similarly the post-Kemalist era with a more flexible interpretation of secularism, has limited the space for the secular segment of the society. This paradox is hence rooted in the majoritarian- and minimal understanding of democracy under AKP rule that only accepts the notion of electoral democracy (Öniş 2013:107-108,114). This is the core reason for why Lijphart suggests that a consociational democracy is more suitable for a divided society - like Turkey- . Lijphart explains that majority rule works well when there is considerable consensus and the majority and minority are in fact not that far apart. This is not the case in a plural society where the political system consists of clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments and all decisions indeed are perceived as entailing high stakes. Thus strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system (Lijphart, 1977:27-28). The misfortune of the majoritarian understanding of democracy, and the obstacle this poses to further democratization is also pointed out by Ziya Öniş:

Hence, neither the Kemalist era nor the post-Kemalist era, so far, represent genuine examples of political pluralism with mutual respect for diversity and genuine co-existence within the same polity by contrasting elements of the Turkish society (2013:108).

4.2.2 Turkish politics and consociationalism

As mentioned earlier, Lijphart's solution to the lack of pluralism in the political system is a grand coalition further strengthened by key elements of consociational democracy such as proportionality and mutual veto. The Grand National assembly is elected every four years by a proportional representation system. Turkey has the highest electoral threshold in Europe requiring at least 10 percent of the nationwide vote for a party to secure parliamentary representation and, as for the independents, 10 percent of the votes in their provinces (Freedom House 2014). This is not in favour of the theory which indicates that in order to obtain full

proportionality, high electoral thresholds should not be introduced (Lijphart 2002:16). In fact, the high electoral threshold is regarded as a political strategy of keeping the minority out of political participation, thus complicating the power-sharing arrangements. Thus the high threshold is used to prevent pro-Kurdish parties from entering the parliament. To get around the party requirement the largest pro-Kurdish party, BDP ran candidates as independents, in the 2011 elections. A change is however underway. After the initiated peace negotiations between Öcalan and the Turkish state, the “Democratisation Package” presented by the prime minister in 2013, contain proposals of lowering the threshold to 5 percent (Freedom House 2014). Although the Turkish political system is characterised by multipartism, which is in advantage for a consociational PR-system (Lijphart 1977:61-62) it still need to be redefined as a consociational PR in order to reflect the plural nature of Turkish society.

One way of solving the question of proportional representation in cases where there is a vast imbalance of power in regard of the numerical strength is representation by parity, i.e. deliberative over-representation of the smaller segments (Lijphart 1977:41). Today there is a representation of these segments in the national assembly, although the Kurdish segment still lacks official party representation, with the representation in term of a Kurdish group of independents instead (Öniş 2013:120).

The mutual veto emphasizes the absolute protection of the minorities by preventing the risk of being outvoted. In this case where the electoral power of the Islamist segment indicates that there is a clear majority, the danger is that the mutual veto could lead to minority tyranny instead, especially if there is a vast imbalance of power in terms of the proportional strength of the segments. Lijphart (1977:37) counters with three reasons for why the danger of “minority tyranny” should not be taken as seriously as it first appears. First, the veto is mutual which all segments possess and can use. A too-frequent use of the veto by one segment can be turned against its own interests, and is therefore not very likely. Thus the “black mail potential” of the segments is crucial, which will be further discussed in next section. Secondly, the fact that the veto is available as a potential weapon creates a feeling of security that makes the actual use of it rather unlikely. Finally the danger of deadlock and immobilism that an unrestrained use of the veto could result in will not be neglected by the segments. The veto can also be an informal agreement in terms of a mutual understanding between the segments which might facilitate the implementation of it.

Nevertheless, the veto has proved to be problematic in other cases, leading to ineffective governance, which could be the result here, especially in relation to PR. The minority veto can cause immobilism and deadlocks because of a too frequent use of the veto since the use of it cannot be avoided in cases where the segments differ largely in size. As mentioned earlier, one function of the proportional representation is the influence of all groups in proportion to their numerical strength in all decision-making organs. The problem is that achieving proportional influence when there will be clear losers or winners in situations where there isn't any spontaneous unanimity in certain decisions, especially when

the PR is unequal. In such a situation the use of majority rule or minority veto cannot be avoided thus resulting in ineffective governance.

According to Lijphart, there are two methods which are only partial solutions but essential to make this dilemma easier to handle. The first is “logrolling”, which is an act of exchanging favors to mutual gain, hence based on consent. Delegating the most difficult and fateful decisions to the top leaders of the segments is another way of handling the dilemma. Thus the positive impact of this method is that in intimate and secret negotiations the likelihood of achieving a package deal is maximized and that of the imposition of a veto minimized (1977:41). Hence the prevention of using the veto is overall based on the exchange of mutual gains and co-operation by the top leaders. A negative aspect of this is that it might appear as being too elitist thus undemocratic which Lijphart does not consider as problematic. The problem rather lies in the lack of willingness to compromise and to have a moderate behavior, Lijphart explains. In the following chapter the crucial importance of these two methods will be further analyzed, thus stating the arguments for and against these methods.

Mutual gains – incentives and compromises

Returning to the triangle-shaped model, we now can ascertain that the exchange of favours in terms of mutual gains has a significant role in the practise of consociational democracy. What favours that are considered as mutual gains is quite difficult to predict on a daily basis but there are however some known political interests that could be used in terms of mutual gains. It is evident that the Islamist-rooted AKP has become hegemonic due to its electoral majority and in such cases a party with a demographic and electoral majority lacks democratic incentives to be pushed towards consociational arrangements. Hence the bargaining power or “black mail” potential of the minorities, that may constrain the hegemonic power of the majority segment and induce consociational behavior into the otherwise dominant party, is crucial (O’Leary 2005:21).

Solving the Kurdish issue has become one of the key determinant factors for further democratization in Turkey in regard to an EU membership which in turn has been one of the main goals of the Kemalist regime which would make this a great accomplishment for especially the liberal reformers within the secular segment. The secular segment in terms of the CHP party has also changed its approach to the Kurdish question by placing more emphasis on political engagement and dialogue to find a compromise solution through peaceful means (Öniş 2013:118). Overall solving the Kurdish issue is a benefit for Turkey and its economy and much needed democratization. The conflict with the Kurdish segment is extremely costly for the Turkish state, hence damaging the economy. Since the military coup of 1980 one third of the entire armed forces of Turkey have been permanently stationed in the Kurdish regions (Kasaba 2001:163). Solving the Kurdish question would hence lead to a healthier economy and further democratization of Turkish politics that would fulfil the requirements needed to enter the EU. In addition Turkey’s Kurdish problem would also become EU’s

responsibility, meaning that an EU admission would guarantee Turkey's territorial integrity (Gunter 2000:865)

Regarding the Islamists and the Kurds there are some consensus over the political space and mutual understanding for the religious space within the political system. Öcalan clearly refers to the unity of Islamic brotherhood: "Kurds and Turks ought to unite under the banner of Islam" (The Economist 2013:30) to solve the conflict and the majority of the Kurds are Muslims (McDowall 1991:13) which facilitates the cooperation between these two segments. The Islamist rooted AKP has started peace talks with the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish segment and demanded for the withdrawal of the PKK to their bases in northern Iraq and also for their fighters to lay down their arms (The Economist 2013:35). Öcalan has declared that the PKK will abandon its 29-year old fight for self-rule and in exchange the AKP dominated parliament shall pass on reforms that enable the Kurds to pursue political goals without getting arrested and freeing thousands of activists. Also regional autonomy being boosted is one of the key demands from the Kurdish segment (The Economist 2013:34).

For the Kurds, a power-sharing system would mean recognition of their identity claims of political, civil and cultural rights. As for the Islamic and the secular segments the question lies in the understanding of secularism within the polity and the public sphere. Until as late as 2007, interpreted as violation of secularism, the AKP avoided closure by the narrowest of margins, when key elements of the Kemalist establishment tried to block their path with the help of the constitutional court (Öniş 2013:114). Also a proposal from the AKP, which was supported by 70 % of the population, that female students should be allowed to wear headscarves in university premises, where rejected by the courts and the university as a violation of Kemalist secularism. The AKP leaders decided not to press for a constitutional amendment in order to avoid a conflict with the secularist authorities (Day 2010:1180).

Meanwhile the AKP has become less interested in a democratic deepening and recently pushed away from reformism towards the promotion of more conservative and religious values (Öniş 2013:114). The different interpretation of secularism complicates the cooperation between these two segments but in a historical point of view, the Islamist segment should not quieten the secular segment by illiberal means, if it wants to avoid a military coup, because of the domination of the military in Turkish politics (Day 2010:1172). In the annual Freedom in the World Report of 2013, Turkey is described as declining in its democratization process with the regard to the illiberal methods used by the government to silence the opposition (Freedom House 2013).

In regard to the Kurdish question both segments of Islamists and seculars historically have feared secession, seeing it as a threat to the sovereignty of Turkey. The Kurdish segment in terms of the PKK and Öcalan has however declared that they no longer claim sovereignty. Öcalan in fact refers to solutions of different cases that are handled by consociational arrangements. (The Economist 3/16/133; Öcalan 2008:38; Gunter 2000:854). Thus such danger should not be taken seriously. As mentioned in the criticism section, Lijphart

clearly discusses this issue in relation to autonomy and proportional representation and points out that there is no such danger as secession.

Overall, the most important reason for these segments to cooperate in a grand coalition is the stability and the further democratization of Turkey's political system and institutions, which constitutes an important issue for the Turkish state, especially in relation to international and global politics regardless of which segment is in the dominant position. Finally, a strong incentive for compromise is what Lijphart calls "Political power" referring to the fact that political parties want to gain power and for this reason parties will have to compromise with their coalition partners, not only to enter but also to stay in cabinets (Lijphart 2002:6). At last, a fundamental point to be made is that, a moderate attitude and willingness to compromise are in fact the primary conditions for the formation of a grand coalition (Lijphart 1997:31). This requires that the segments are united by one voice and under one leadership, which makes it more complicated for the leadership to compromise if the unity within the segment is weak (Lijphart 1977:71-74) In this regard the process of compromise and cooperation may be rather difficult since the segments are divided within themselves as well. The Islamist segment is divided by nationalist and religious fractions. The Kurds are also divided by radical and reformist fractions while the seculars are divided by radical conservative Kemalists and liberal reformists (The Economist 8/24/13; Önis 2013: 116-119).

4.2.3 Administrative and economic factors- autonomy and proportionality

Proportionality was mentioned earlier in terms of the electoral system in relation to grand coalition and mutual veto but it has also other functions. The principle of proportionality also applies to the composition of public service and the allocation of scarce financial resources in terms of government subsidies among the different segments. This stands in contrast to the unrestrained majority rule whereby "the winner takes all" constitutes the natural rule of the system (Lijphart 1977:38; 2002:13). In a consociational democracy the segments are granted subsidies and resources in regard to their proportional strength which coincides with the concept of autonomy in regard to administrative purposes. In a state of autonomy, decisions and their executions are left to the segments which means that the groups are granted the authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture (Lijphart 2002: 38-39).

The Islamist segments in terms of the Nurcu and the Fethullah Gülen communities have formed modern educational networks and their own media of communications in terms of magazines and television. The movement consists of approximately 2-6 million adherents with the Gülen community as its most powerful branch. Furthermore they also have formed special meeting places, called dershanes. Nevertheless all of this is privately owned which is also one of

the reasons for the movement's strong sympathy for market economy especially in regard to privatization (Bilici 2006:6-9; Yavuz 1999:3-9).

As for the Kurdish segment, the Kurdish language and culture had long been strictly forbidden which has constituted a major barrier to minority rule. Also the region in itself has been given less priority due to the unresolved conflict, thus economic development has been slow in this area (Fisher 2010:1167). Furthermore the ethnic Turks have been given more privileges by law and are treated differently in the constitution (Bayir 2013:138) which creates an unequal share in terms of civil servant appointments and financial resources. As discussed earlier, this is however about to change due to the peace negotiations and a new draft of the constitution. The Kurdish language is no longer forbidden and the teaching of Kurdish is today allowed, although not written in the constitution and not interpreted into the system yet. The present constitution contains specific provisions that limits speaking and writing in Kurdish (Gunter 2004:200). Also regional autonomy is claimed to be promoted in the peace negotiations, although not agreed to yet.

Lijphart discusses the issue of segmental autonomy in terms of territorial and non-territorial forms. Since the Kurdish segment is geographically concentrated into the south eastern regions of Turkey (McDowall 1992:11) it is thus more desirable to establish a territorial autonomy in terms of federalism. It may be more preferable to establish autonomy in a "federal society" where the segmental cleavages coincide with regional societies since it's easier to delegate governmental and administrative responsibilities to these segments, but autonomy has proved to be compatible with both territorial and nonterritorial segments (Lijphart 1977:43). The concept of autonomy has been strictly opposed by the Turkish state in regard to its territorial sovereignty. Therefore, the representatives of the Kurdish segment have also lowered their demands on this issue as mentioned earlier. Öcalan himself mentions nonterritorial autonomy when discussing this issue (Öcalan 2008:3). Segmental autonomy has introduced the idea of developing a system of nonterritorial federalism which is federalism based on the "personality principle". It simply denotes the individual's right to declare to which nationality he wishes to belong, and these nationalities will then become autonomous. Thus, in societies where the segments have been geographically too interspersed, segmental autonomy has been established on the basis of the "personality principle". This approach is more suitable for the Islamist segment of the Turkish society since they are not geographically concentrated to a specific area and consist of several ethnic groups, among them also Kurds. A good illustration of nonterritorial autonomy based on self-determination is the Dutch system of educational autonomy that allows all schools to receive equal financial support in regard to their proportional strength (Lijphart 2002:12).

5 Conclusions and closing

The possibilities for a consociational democracy to be implemented in Turkey at the present may appear rather unlikely, especially in regard to the military and its self-proclaimed guardianship, if the main goal is a political system of one hundred per cent pure consociational nature. When answering his critics in this matter Lijphart argues that a political system does not need to be of a purely consociational nature to be regarded as a consociational democracy and points to the fact that a consociational model can take many different forms with different degrees of consociationalism and that the form and degree of consociationalism depends on the segmental cleavages and their degree of fractions.. Thus, a consociational model varies in regard to its four characteristics (Lijphart 2004:99; 1977:31-35, 65-75).

Analysing the primary features of consociational democracy, grand coalition and autonomy, we can arrive at the conclusion that at the present, the establishment of these two are not realistic although not completely impossible in a future prospect. The political development in recent years shows that a change is underway and a solution inspired by the consociational model in the near future is indeed possible. The understanding of Kemalism in Turkish politics has constituted a major obstacle to democratic representation mostly because of the politization of the constitutional court and the power of the military in Turkish domestic politics. The present political development is however somewhat promising although further democratization remains to be seen. One of the greatest successes in this context is the recognition of the Kurdish identity claims, especially in regard to the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurds, although translating these rights in to practice still remains problematic.

The three segments of Turkish secular nationalists, Turkish religious conservatives and Kurds have shown willingness to compromise and moderate behaviour in terms of the recent dialogue of political solutions between the elite representatives of the different segments. Although there is no broad agreement and consensus on certain questions, the minor steps that have been taken are indeed tremendous in a historical point of view.

The study also shows that there is interdependence between these three segments in terms of incentives and compromises to gain political power and for Turkey to reach peace and stability. Thus the dialogue of political and democratic solutions to the conflicts and the democratization challenge contains several proposals of consociational nature. The Kurds have compromised in several aspects, such as abandoning their long-desired dreams of independence. The Islamists have also compromised a great deal by incorporating a nationalistic dialogue and assimilation into the more secular political system. Also the secular Kemalists have shown willingness to compromise especially in regard to the

Kurdish issue by engaging in the initiated peace talks. There are also relevant incentives to compromise and to moderate behaviour between them, although keeping the Kurdish leader in jail may seem problematic in this regard since a good relationship between the elites is indeed necessary in order to reach consensus in certain matters.

Historically the development towards multipartism and electoral democracy has increased the political opportunities of political Islam thus increasing the power of the Islamists. The Islamist segment, in terms of the AKP, has also managed to reformulate their politics and to compromise in order to gain political legitimacy and remain in power (Özbudun 2006:543-556) which explains the shift in Turkish politics in terms of dominance of the Islamist-rooted AKP government for some ten years. But electoral democracy does not mean that it is liberal and does not necessarily lead to liberal democracy.

The Freedom House does in fact classify Turkey as partly free, which also seem to be the case after having analysed the political structure and the lack of plurality in Turkish politics and its impact on the democratic institutions through the consociational theory. The study also shows that Turkey needs a form of power-sharing democracy in order to handle its democratization challenge and find democratic solutions to the on-going conflicts. This is also the conclusion that Ziya Önis arrives at when discussing power-sharing and democratization in Turkey, although not mentioning consociational theory. The Islamist-rooted government of Turkey has not managed to create a political charter that reflects the plural nature of Turkish society which is needed for further democratization and a democratic deepening (Önis 2013:108). On the contrary their majoritarian interpretation and narrow understanding of democracy has led to a hegemonic behaviour that challenges further democratization (Freedom House 2013). This is also a further argumentation for an implementation of the consociational model since a majoritarian democracy does not suit a plural society (Lijphart 1977:29).

The new draft of the constitution could lead to political opportunities of deepening the frontiers of liberal democracy in terms of consociational thinking due to the plural nature of Turkish society. Skilfully handled, a correct set of political, administrative and economic factors inspired by consociational democracy could solve the conflicts over political identity claims and lead to further democratization towards a liberal democracy. This could be done by endorsing PR- lists of consociational nature that allows the segments to be proportionally represented in decision-making organs. Also a proportional allocation of public funds could further enhance peace and stability. A boosted autonomy, not necessarily on territorial basis, would also solve the ethnic conflict thus leading to further democratisation. The fear of that it would lead to secession complicates such a development but on the other hand, such an implementation in the neighbouring country, Iraq, which also has a Kurdish segment, has not led to a secession (Lijphart 2004: 98-100). However, a constitutional contract of a sufficient degree of consociationalism may be too optimistic to hope for. Meanwhile Turkish politics remains hegemonic and illiberal.

Regarding the theory used for this study, its ability to predict the implementation of it is rather difficult because a consociational model varies due

to the nature of the segmental cleavages. The theory is thus more suitable for evaluating the democratic qualities of an already implemented consociational democracy in a plural society. Furthermore, the theory postulates that the various segments are highly organized within themselves with one voice and one leadership which is rarely the case in reality. In this case all three segments are also divided within themselves which makes it more difficult for the leadership to compromise, one of the prerequisites for the formation of a grand coalition. On the other hand the fact that the three segments have recognized the political identity of each other constitutes a great accomplishment in regard for the implementation of a power-sharing democracy. Nonetheless the theory is indeed useful in terms of its normative aspect to take inspiration from and is flexible and adaptable to many different cases with cleavages of different nature.

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