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Bachelor of Science in Development Studies



**LUND UNIVERSITY**

**WHO OWES WHOM?**

*How the movement for climate justice in the Philippines frames climate debt,  
and the potential of climate debt to reframe the wider debt discourse.*

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## **Abstract and keywords**

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This thesis sets out to analyze a potential reframing of who owes whom? The orthodox external debt discourse describes how countries in the global South are heavily indebted to the industrialized North. However, since the industrial revolution, 20 per cent of the world's population living in the global North has emitted 75-80 per cent of the carbon trapped in the atmosphere today. In a bizarre inverse relationship, the global South faces 75-80 per cent of the damaging consequences from climate change. In light of the North's unequal use of the global commons, climate justice movements in the South are calling on countries in the North to pay their *climate debt*. According to the climate justice movement, this unrecognized and unpaid climate debt significantly exceeds the value of the financial debt, which the global South is currently repaying the North.

As an emerging activist concept, limited research has been conducted on climate debt as of yet. This thesis hopes to make a contribution, however small, to this research gap. The thesis builds on data from an ethnographic field study, conducting interviews with the members of the climate justice movement in the Philippines, as well as relevant secondary sources. To analyze its findings, it uses a social movement theoretical framework (focused on framing and bridging vs. bonding rhetoric), as well as "Toulmin's Argumentation Model". The findings suggests that the climate justice movement in the Philippines employs both ethical and political aspects of framing in advocating for the recognition of climate debt, and that a potential recognition of climate debt relates to and reframes the external debt discourse of the Philippines and other indebted countries.

*Key words*; Philippines, climate debt, social movements

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- advocates (activist, scholars and hybrids) of climate justice everywhere.

*Dedicated to the activists I met in the Philippines,  
committed to dreaming in public and inspiring the rest of us to do the same.*



**Picture 1:** “*Justitia, Western Goddess of Justice*”

Sculpture by Galschiøt displayed in Copenhagen during the Copenhagen Climate Conference of the Parties (COP), December, 2009.

The sculpture is captioned; “*I’m sitting on the back of a man - he is sinking under the burden - I will do everything to help him - except to step down from his back*” and one possible interpretation includes the sculpture depicting the reluctance of the global North to halt overconsumption and repay its climate debt, as well as the questionable potential for justice to be served under the current world order.

Source of picture: (Sandberg and Sandberg, 2010:1)

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## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

CJM – Climate Justice Movement

COP – Conference of Parties

EJOLT - Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GHG – Greenhouse Gases

IFI – International Financial Institutions

JDC – Jubilee Debt Campaign

PMCJ – Philippine Movement for Climate Justice

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

WST – World Systems Theory

## 1. Introduction

“Climate justice places the onus of responsibility on those who live and participate in energy-intensive economies and benefit from their outputs.” (Yamada and Galat, 2014)

In the Philippines, climate change is not merely a headline or an abstraction - it is affecting people in real time. In November 2013, Yolanda<sup>1</sup>, the strongest typhoon in recorded history, made landfall in Tacloban, Philippines. Leaving more than ten thousand people dead and 95 per cent of the buildings destroyed, the typhoon stopped time in this coastal community. In February 2015, more than fifteen months later, survivor Rose describes how it feels as if time has not yet begun again. She and the surviving members of her family are still living in a temporary shelter. Fishing, their main source of income, has become impossible, as the surge shattered their boat. When asked whom she thinks should be held responsible for action on climate change, Rose answers, pointing out over the temporary housing unit (which lacks running water and electricity);

“We did not cause this, and from here we cannot do anything to undo it”.

World Meteorological Organization (2013) identified anthropogenic climate change as contributing to the strength of super typhoon Yolanda, adding to an increasing recognition that due to climate change some ‘natural disasters’ are perhaps no longer entirely natural. According to the United Nations International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) climate change is the single biggest global threat, and our window of opportunity for mitigation is closing even quicker than earlier assumed. Within recent years, even the international financial institutions (IFI) have reached a consensus; acknowledging both the threat of climate change and that the brunt of the consequences will be borne by the poorest countries (see e.g. International Monetary Foundation, 2013, World Bank, 2012). Within the next decade, the Philippines is among the ten countries in the world most at risk due to climate change (Maplecroft, 2014). The Philippines deem that the consequences of climate change are *already* beyond their capacity (Sering, Philippines' Climate Change Commissioner, in Reuters, 2014) and that the country is faced with “unfair choices between disaster risk management and development” (Governor Petilla in Mullés, 2014:vi).

The concept of *climate justice* is underpinned by the conviction that “climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue” (Gardiner, 2004). Overall, the climate justice movement (CJM) criticizes and seeks to change the observation that “those most vulnerable to climate change are least responsible and

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<sup>1</sup> Known internationally as super typhoon *Haiyan*, but as this field work was conducted in the Philippines and centers on the Filipino activists' point of view, typhoons will be referred to in accordance with their local names.

have the fewest resources to adapt” (Robinson, quoted in Humphreys, 2014). The CJM seeks to shift the discourse on climate change (White, 2009), reassessing climate change in terms of power and productive relations (Pusey and Russell, 2010). Within this broader movement, this thesis focuses specifically on the recognition of *climate debt*. In its most basic terms, the concept is grounded by *the polluter pays principle*, due to the adverse effects of the North’s overconsumption of the global commons.

This is a significant issue, both inside and outside of academia, as a wider understanding and recognition of climate debt could have far-reaching implications. Yet it remains an under-researched issue. This thesis hopes to contribute to the understanding of how climate justice can be instigated through social movement action, and how the framing of climate debt influences this. Additionally, it intends to discuss the wider implications this has on the external debt discourse. The findings are based on interviews conducted with representatives of the CJM in the Philippines during an ethnographic field study (January – March 2015) and secondary sources.

## **1.1 Significance and aim**

This thesis is significant to the study of International Development and Sociology, both in empirical and analytical terms. Stilwell (2008) describes how today “developing countries live under the twin constraints of a more hostile climate and restricted atmospheric space”. World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim (2013), further predicts that the current trajectory of climate damages will lead to the “rolling back of decades of development gains and force tens of millions more to live in poverty”. The topic of this thesis is inherently relevant to the study of International Development in the sense that it seeks to (1) question the dominant development model heralded since the end of World War Two, and (2) introduce a counter-hegemonic, bottom-up alternative to the notion of aid, i.e. the repayment of industrialized countries’ climate debt. It analyzes the unequal global distribution of wealth and socio-environmental externalities (*cost-shifting*) associated with the capitalist mode of production, and finds that the structurally institutionalized exploitation of the global commons occurs at alarming rates.

Until recently, climate change was primarily an issue researched by natural and environmental scientists (Sikor and Newell, 2014) and viewed in isolation from the skewed environmental and social relations of neoliberal globalization (Giddens, 2009:15). Presently, sociological aspects are gaining prominence (e.g. people’s differentiated experience and social construction of ‘natural’ disasters and the changing climate (*ibid.*)). Since the early 1980s, framing (one of the theoretical pillars of this

thesis) has helped illuminate sociological issues, including strategies of social movements. Currently, repayment of climate debt is considered a radical call from social movements in the global South (see e.g. Godard, 2012), and there is an urgent need for expanding both the methodological and theoretical underpinning of the issue.

Critically analyzing and locating issues of climate debt in relation to global political, social and economic dynamics fostering injustice, helps in determining who benefits from certain framings of both climate and external debt. The first research question of this thesis is concerned with the Philippines, because the country encapsulates both the risks of climate change and a strong movement for climate justice, while the second question emphasizes the universal quality and relevance of the research topic.

The concept of climate debt is wide-ranging, and while there are also, for instance, interesting domestic perspectives (across regions) or intergenerational (across time) this thesis will focus on historical climate debt in a global perspective. Furthermore, due to space constraints the thesis will not elaborate on the potential institutionalization of recognizing climate debts, but rather focus on its conceptualization and normative arguments (see e.g. Khor, 2012 for suggestions of operationalization).

## **1.2 Research Questions**

- RQ1: How does the climate justice movement in the Philippines frame the recognition of climate debt?
- RQ2: Does the recognition of climate debt relate to and reframe the external debt discourse of the Philippines and other indebted countries?

## **1.3 Terminology**

Climate debt is a bottom-up and continuously developing concept, and there is no consensus of definition amongst e.g. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots movements and academic scholars (Paredis et. al, 2008). Warlenius (2013) provides a definition, which this thesis considers most encompassing:



“(i) The carbon/climate debt of country A consists of over-emission of CO<sub>2</sub>/GHGs by country A over time at the expense of the equitable rights to the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere of other countries or individuals.”

Warlenius (2013) adds that a “stronger” definition might include a restorative justice component;

“(ii) The carbon/climate debt of country A, constitutes a liability and forms an obligation in an international burden sharing scheme for mitigation of carbon/greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to climate change.”

While sometimes referred to as “climate compensation” or “climate reparations”, this thesis will adhere to “climate debt”. The concept emerged from the field of climate justice, and falls within the conception of ecological debt, but refers specifically to greenhouse gas (GHG) output (Pigrau et al., 2014). Srinivasan et al. (2008) estimate that climate debt makes up approximately 97 per cent of all ecological debt owed to countries in the global South.

Additionally, this thesis refers to and understands “global commons” using Rice’s (2009) definition as “areas of the planet which are shared international space, not owned by specific countries” (e.g. the atmosphere).

Lastly, as the findings of this thesis imply that the discourse on development, growth and progress is reinforce such misnomers, and hence, I find it problematic to use the dichotomy of developing/developed countries. In accordance with the CJM in the Philippines, this thesis will use a global South/North categorization (corresponding to the non-Annex 1/Annex 1 categories used in the Kyoto protocol – see Appendix 1). Due to space constraints it is not possible to describe the heterogeneity of these groups of countries in depth (South Africa, for instance, with less than eight percent of the African continent’s population emits 42 per cent of its GHGs (Bond, 2010)). It is nonetheless acknowledged that a North-South binary remains problematic.

This thesis refers to changing weather patterns and its consequences as “climate change”, rather than “global warming”, subscribing to Sandberg and Sandberg’s (2010:11) concern that *global warming* inaccurately perpetuates an implication that this is a phenomenon caused and experienced equally by everybody.

## 1.4 Background

### The Philippines and debt in a changing climate

The Philippines is comprised of 7107 islands and has a population of 108 million, with an additional 12 million Filipinos living overseas (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Despite experiencing significant economic growth during the last decade, the Philippines has seen only limited poverty reduction. IBON, a NGO focused on socioeconomic research, describes this recent economic growth as “artificial, narrow, debt-driven and unsustainable” (Gonzales, 2014). Filipino sociologist and founder of the policy group *Focus on the Global South*, Bello (2014:5-9), adds that due to loan conditionalities (and the prioritization of debt servicing) pro-poor services have been neglected by the government. The Philippines has seen a rapid rise in income inequality, with a current Gini-coefficient of 44.8 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Sawada and Estuilio (2012) describe how there are also high levels of regional inequality, and especially regions far from Manila struggle to secure government funding or investments into basic infrastructure, communication, schooling etc. It is also the poorest regions that are most at risk due to climate change (Jose, 2012), a phenomenon referred to by Finley-Brook (2014) as “double exposure”, highlighting how economic and environmental vulnerabilities interact with and magnify each other. Though highly relevant in the case of the Philippines, it is beyond the scope of this research topic to discuss how the call for global climate justice intersects with the domestic struggle for interregional climate justice.

The capital Manila, where the majority of the fieldwork is conducted, is already the most densely populated city on earth (Boori et al., 2015). Globally, out of the ten cities most at risk due to climate change, eight are situated in the Philippines and a report by World Wide Fund for Nature (2014) shows that due to a lack of resources, cities have resorted to reactive, rather the pro-active, measures to adapt to the effects of climate change. This is especially critical as climate-induced migration towards cities is predicted to increase exponentially. Unable to keep up with this growth, factors such as pollution and insufficient waste management in these megacities increase vulnerability further (UNFCCC, 2015). The Philippines is especially vulnerable to climate change, as it faces risks both due to extreme weather events (increases in earthquakes, floodings, supertyphoons, etc.) *and* slow-onset changes (sea-level rising, ocean acidification, etc.) (*ibid.*).

In the aftermath of super typhoon Yolanda (2013), it received extensive media coverage that the international community sent USD 178 million worth of relief assistance (The Office of the

Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, 2014). Predominantly framed as benevolent “aid” or “relief”, the less-reported catch is the fact that USD 128 million of the assistance came in the form of loans (Katz, 2014). “The Telegraph” (Damien, 2013) described it as “good news for the Filipino government that it secured USD one billion in loan pledges to help rebuild areas from the World Bank”. In the same article, the World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, is quoted emphasizing the importance of helping the country “recover and rebuild, and to help Filipinos strengthen their resilience against increasingly frequent extreme weather events” (*ibid.*). Katz (2014) critiques mainstream media for not describing how loans for *re*-constructing damaged building and roads will not generate any profits to enable repayment with interest. In 2013, the year Yolanda struck, the Philippines serviced over USD eight billion worth of debt (20 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)), as much as what is spent on health and education combined, and far overshadowing the combined Yolanda relief funding and general development aid received. Jones (2013), senior policy and campaigns officer for the Jubilee Debt Campaign, argues that the fact that most of this debt is odious is cause for great concern<sup>2</sup>. This debt burden has only grown in the years since, due to the loans acquired for post-Yolanda reconstruction. The trajectory in the post-Yolanda Philippines is in line with the critique Klein (2007) brings forth in “The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism”. That is, how in the wake of major crises IFI use the occasion to implement neoliberal structural adjustment polices through “recovery loans”.

### **Climate justice and climate debt**

It is necessary to briefly introduce the movement for climate justice, out of which the concept of climate debt emerged. The concept of climate justice challenges the current post-political, pragmatist discourse of mainstream environmental organizations (especially in the global North) (Rosewarne et al., 2013:vii), “not just by adding a historical dimension but by bringing power and justice to centre stage, to reveal control over resources and pollution burdens as an issue of power relations” (EJOLT, 2013). Climate justice advocates draw attention to the fact that it is more than unfortunate geographic luck which leaves some nations significantly more vulnerable to climate change than others (Humphreys, 2014). Rather, it is due to socio-historical dynamics, such as colonial legacies and

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<sup>2</sup> The majority of the post-independence debt is odious, acquired during the 14 years of Marcos’ dictatorship from Western institutions, and siphoned abroad. During the last 40 years, the Philippines borrowed a total of USD 115 billion, has repaid USD 132 billion, but *still* owes an additional USD 60 billion due to interest (Jones, 2013). See Kremer and Jayachandran (2002) for an IMF Seminar Paper recognizing the Philippines’ debt as odious.

suffering from the side effects of a globalized carbon-intensive economy, without experiencing the benefits (*ibid.*).

The call for repayment of ecological and climate debt developed in the global South, as a result of an “emerging consciousness of Western responsibility for past colonial subjugations, and a general sense of injustice during the third world debt crisis” (Warlenius *et al.*, 2015b). In reaction to the failure of COP15 in Copenhagen, the Bolivian Government hosted the “World’s People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth” attended by more than 30.000 people. The outcome, the “People’s Agreement” (2010), calls on industrialized countries to restore atmospheric space and repay their climate debts as a means to “decolonize the atmosphere”. Later that year, in a proposal submitted by the national Bolivian delegation, the concept of climate debt was formally introduced to the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) (the international body in charge of climate change abatement). The proposal describes how “the overconsumption of the available capacity of the Earth’s atmosphere and climate system to absorb greenhouse gases by the developed countries, has run up a climate debt to developing countries and mother Earth” (UNFCCC, 2010). Since then, the Group of Least Developed Countries (49 countries) has added their support to the demand. The scientific underpinning, Klein (2014:66) describes, is that the earth has a finite carbon budget (environmental carrying capacity) and once reached, the effects of climate change become catastrophic and irreversible. The “safe level” of 350 ppm. has already been surpassed and day by day more is added (currently 402 ppm.). In terms of historical emissions, 75-80 per cent of the carbon trapped in the atmosphere today has been emitted by 20 per cent of the global population living in the North. Nonetheless, the global South suffers 75-80 per cent of the damage from climate change (*ibid.*): a bizarrely inverse relationship. Looking at the list of the countries most at risk from climate change (see e.g. Maplecroft, 2013), there is a correlation of both low GDP and limited GHG emissions. For instance, Bangladesh, one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, also has one of the world’s lowest GHG emissions (at 0.4 ton per capita – compared with 18 ton per capita in the United States (World Bank, 2015a)).

## **Climate debt and the political gridlock at the international climate change negotiations**

“I am beginning to feel like we are negotiating who is to live and who is to die”

(Sering, climate change secretary for the Philippines, addressing the summit during COP19, quoted in Klein 2014:276)

The past twenty years of futile international negotiations reveal an environmental governance deficit in relation to the world’s most urgent collective action issue; climate change. Time is a most significant factor, especially in light of the 2015 COP21 in Paris, where the next legally binding global framework on climate will be negotiated (including a new treaty framework regarding international climate finance) (Vanderheiden, 2015).

The foundational framework, upon which the UNFCCC (including COPs) was established, states that “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries,” and goes on to describe how solutions should be initiated “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities.” (Klein in McKibben, 2011:242). UNFCCC “Article 4” (1994) commits Annex-1 countries to “provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full cost incurred by developing country Parties (...) they shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental cost of implementing measures”. Signed into action by over 195 countries, including the United States, the framework’s foundation of historical responsibility and financial resources has nonetheless been undermined and increasingly neglected during the negotiations. The latest COP20 (2014) resulted in the Lima Declaration, which mentions neither historical responsibility, human rights nor mechanisms for financial compensation (PM CJ, 2014a).

In recent years, in part due to climate catastrophes coinciding with the annual COPs, according to Bello (2015) the Philippine negotiations delegation has found itself in a “kind of moral authority” receiving mounting support, both in- and outside the conference walls. However, due to backroom pressure from the United States (a so-called strong ally of the Philippines), the country’s official COP Delegation recently saw two of the strongest profiles of the Philippine delegation (Naderev “Yeb” Saño and Bernarditas Muller) forced off the delegation. Saño had been especially vocal during COP19 in Warsaw, calling for what some high-emitting nations consider radical demands of climate justice (using hitherto unseen tactics such as a 14-day long hunger strike and mass-mobilization of civil society organizations present) (*ibid.* and Sethi, 2014). See Bond (2015) for a description of how similar diplomatic arm-twisting has led to a removal of a long list of progressive negotiators (from

various countries) since COP15, and why this is cause for great concern. Moreover, Guerrero (2011:121) adds concerns that the civil society, which used to be welcomed by the UNFCCC, has now been displaced by increasingly specialized environmental organizations.

## **1.5 Previous Research**

As described, this is still very much an emerging topic of research. As of yet, no previous research exists on the CJM in the Philippines or their framing of climate debt. Instead, this section will describe relevant previous research on social movements and climate debt.

### **Social movements**

Environmental social movements in the global South have received relatively little attention from academia (in both hemispheres). In general, social movement research has had a controversial reputation, as at its onset, it was funded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see e.g. Diani and Eyerman, 1992). Furthermore, Cox and Nielsen (2007), critical of how the field was traditionally dominated by a top-down approach, and how results have largely been ignored by the social movements themselves, call for greater collaboration between activist and academic theorizing, in order to increase both relevancy and validity of the research. Specifically in terms of understanding framing processes, Snow *et al.* (2014) find that collaborations foster “opportunities to develop more nuanced understandings of the conditions under which framing influences different types of movement outcomes”.

One relevant and extensive study conducted by Delina *et al.* (2015) based on historical analysis, finds that today’s CJM can learn from large-scale historical popular social change movements of people-driven, grassroots-oriented nonviolent movements, which were successful in breaking powerful elite regimes, resulting in society-wide transitions. Specifically, the authors conclude that the CJM benefits from providing people “with a new sense of collective identity” and offering a regime alternative in line with successful historical social movements (e.g. abolitionist, civil rights in the US, etc.).

### **Climate debt**

Until recently, one of the biggest obstacles to furthering the legitimization of the concept of climate debt, was that no accurate methodology for calculating it existed (Paredis *et. al.*, 2008:8). However, the past years have seen a rapidly evolving research frontier regarding such methodology. Based on

methodology developed by Warlenius (2015), the carbon debt (from 1850 until 2011) of 154 countries has been calculated by the research project Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and arranged into the “Environmental Justice Atlas” (2015). Combining activist and academic knowledge, EJOLT hopes this transfer of scientific methodologies further empowers the struggles of environmental justice organizations (Warlenius, 2015). A positive figure constitutes a debt, while a negative figure represents a claim. As of 2011, all OECD countries have a climate debt measured in carbon tonnes per capita (e.g. United States 1040 T/cap, Australia 559 T/cap, Sweden 267 T/cap.). The Philippines, on the other hand, has a carbon claim of -49 T/cap.

According to Neumayer (2000) GHG emissions account for two thirds in the variation of countries’ GNP per capita.. Martínez-Alier (2002) describes how the global North has saved tremendous amounts of money (“avoided cost”) through their persistent and disproportionate overuse of the carbon sinks *and* by declining to reduce their emissions. An overuse, Martínez-Alier argues, based on might, not right (*ibid.*). Furthermore, an IMF working paper released in May 2015 revealed that (the growing) global fossil fuel subsidies are currently at USD 10 million a minute (USD 5.3 trillion a year), an amount greater than the combined global spending on health by all governments (Coady *et al.*, 2015).

Others have criticized or raised concerns about climate debt. Simons and Tonak (2010) describe how the issue has been subject to controversy because it perpetuates a system of commodification and assigning an economic value to the environment. In this regard, it is crucial to note that climate debt advocates argue the debt could be repaid from the North in a range of ways. As described in Pickering and Barry (2012) the debt is envisioned tangible, but not necessarily monetary (e.g. deep emission cuts, renouncing some intellectual property rights on technology allowing countries to leapfrog to renewable energy sources, recognizing climate refugee rights, debt cancellation, adaptation finance) emphasizing that it also has to do with a sense of recognition and moral reparations.

Lovera (2009) finds that even if the aims of the CJM are morally valid, achieving their aim is unrealistic because high-emitting countries will never agree to repay any debt. Because of its retrospective and adversarial emphasis, Pickering and Berry (2012) and Chatterton *et al.* (2013), find that climate debt is not a helpful frame. Amongst the most vocal critics of climate debt is Godard (2012) who argues that, in fact, it has been the increasing focus of climate debt which has contributed to the failure of UN processes regarding climate change. The global South has been deceived, according to Godard, by “progressive” forces, into advocating for something unattainable.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

First, this section sets out to describe the social movement and framing concepts employed in answering the first research question. Next, it proceeds to introduce World Systems Theory (WST) post-development and reframing concepts, which provide the theoretical underpinning of research question number two.

### **2.1.1 RQ1: Social Movement Theories**

Social movement theories seek to illuminate why social mobilization arises and its potential to have cultural, social and political effects, challenging the normative orientations of a society (Touraine, 2002). Social movements are broad “systems of alliance” without fixed boundaries (Klandermans in Gillham and Edwards, 2011), with fluctuating structure and composition due to the negotiated (long or short term) cooperation of organizations and individuals (Meyer and Corrigan-Brown, 2005).

Tarrow’s Political Opportunity Theory (Tarrow, 1996) describes how social movements capitalize on a political opportunity to advance its aim. Opportunities include; shifting alignments and cleavages among elites. Of special relevance to the present analysis is the opportunity of increased access to influential elites, who might be in position to influence decision makers.

Tarrow (1989:17) draws attention to the important fact that social movements are impossible to explain with one single-factor theory/framework; “together, opportunities, repertoires, networks and frames are the materials for the construction of movements”. The next section will elaborate on the concept of movement frames.

### **2.1.2 RQ1: Framing: constructing reality.**

Until the late 1980s, theories about social movements (rational choice, resource mobilization, political opportunity) largely considered social mobilization an automatic consequence of structural conditions or unexpected events (thereby overlooking the agency of actors within movements) (Benford 1997). In contrast, the active, constructivist and processual phenomenon of framing emphasizes movements’ ability to analyze and challenge existing frames (Snow and Benford 2000). The main theoretical framework of RQ1 rests on Benford and Snow’s (2000) “Framing Processes and Social Movements”. The analysis of field data will include a number of concepts which their research has inspired, including: *master frames* (when more than one movement employs the same frame); *frame resonance* (frame consistency with empirical credibility); *frame bridging* (connecting ideologically congruent,



but structurally separate frames); and the *audience effect* (whereby movements modify their frame according to audiences).

Goffman's "Frame Analysis" (Goffman, 1974) is considered the seminal work on framing within the social sciences. According to Benford and Snow (2000), framing processes are a central dynamic in interpreting the character and trajectory of social movements. This theoretical framework is rooted in a symbolic interactionist understanding of how reality and meaning is constructed (Snow et al. 2014). Goodwin and Jasper (2009:55) describe how movement frames might take the form of "appealing stories, powerful clusters of symbols, slogans and catch words, or attributions of blame for social problems". In contrast to more static 'ideologies', Snow et al. (2014) describe movement frames as "malleable, contested, complex and evolving social constructions".

One of the main criticisms of the social movement framing perspective is that it becomes so influential that its implementations were accused of being reductionist and monolithic (Benford 1997). Keeping in mind that "framing matters, but it is not the only thing that matters", I will remain alert to alternative explanations (in addition to framing) when analyzing the findings (Ryan and Gamson, 2009:172).

### **2.1.3 RQ1: Bridging and Bonding**

To a limited extent, the analysis will also draw on Dryzek's (Dryzek, 2010) distinction between 'bonding' and 'bridging' rhetoric. Dryzek's (2010) theory on the effect of bridging vs. bonding rhetoric is influential in answering what influences framing strategies within the CJM. Rhetoric concerns the varieties of persuasion and focuses especially on the "situated character of its audience" (*ibid.*). The bridging/bonding distinction is adapted from Putnam's social capital terminology; bonding rhetoric strengthens the ties between groups of people with similar social characteristics, whereas bridging intends to connect groups with dissimilar positions. Bonding rhetoric is associated with strengthening the common passions/goals of the in-group, but is also likely to deepen divisions with out-groups (*ibid.*). See Stevenson (2014) for an interesting analysis of bridging and bonding rhetoric employed by South American heads of state during COP.

Although bridging rhetoric might appear most strategic, Dryzek (2010) argues that bonding rhetoric allows "an oppressed group to generate a degree of solidarity that will enable it to subsequently enter with confidence into a larger public sphere" (*ibid.*). Martin Luther King, Jr. is acclaimed by Dryzek for his optimum rhetorical deployment of both bonding rhetoric (between his African American supporters) and bridging rhetoric (in trying to reach out to a white audience). By doing so, Dr. King was able to "build a bridge between civil rights (on his side) and liberal universalism in his white

audience” (*ibid.*). In “Reason and Rhetoric in Climate Change Communication”, Dryzek and Lo (2014) conclude that bridging rhetoric is most effective. Unfortunately, Dryzek’s framework (2010) does not address cross-cultural communication, which as addressed in the analysis, affects the rhetoric strategies of the CJM in the Philippines.

## **2.2 RQ2: World Systems Theory, post-development and reframing**

Throughout the analysis in answering RQ2, I will underpin the components of the Toulmin Argumentation Model (See *Methodology*) with additional concepts and theoretical framework, predominantly WST (Wallerstein, 1974) and post-development framework (Escobar, 1992) and social movement reframing perspective (Snow *et al.*, 1986).

WST employs a macro-scale approach to analyzing the historical, social and economic roots of the structure of international relations (World Systems) and how this structure perpetuates inequality. Wallerstein (1974) described the (largely static) trichotomy of the world (core, semi-periphery and periphery) based on factors such as colonial legacies, unequal exchange, the geographic division of labour and the political structures of power and domination. Wallerstein developed the model prior to the knowledge we have today about the skewed effects of climate change. Nonetheless, according to Roberts and Parks (2009) the concepts of ecological and climate debt are intellectually rooted in this theory, such as how nations’ so-called development cannot solely be understood in isolation, but importantly, also in relation to other countries. They argue that the core countries have relied and continue to rely on the periphery as both an undervalued source of natural resources and a sink for waste (incl. GHGs). Using this state-centric trichotomy, I would like to reiterate (similar to the North/South binary) that I recognize its reductionist and homogenizing aspects. WST serves as a framework seeking to illuminate *trends* of global power-relations and inequalities, not to monocausally explain the socio-political situation of specific countries. I still find that its explanatory benefits outweigh this.

Emerging in the 1980s, the *post-development framework* questions both the concept and practice of development, considering it a perpetuation of Western hegemony over the rest of the world (Escobar, 1992). Above all, the main critiques of the post-development school concerns the notion of a single ideal of development and Western-style modernity/progress, which is not necessarily universally possible (nor desirable) on a planet with finite resources. However, the post-development school also questions the notion of ‘development-aid’ as it perpetuates a system of dependence. The post-

development school argues that the socially constructed notion of development (e.g. “the invention of development” (Escobar, 2011:vii)) can be challenged “by building upon the practices of social movements, especially those in the Third World” considering them “essential for the creation of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society” (Escobar, 1992).

*Reframing* refers to the transformation of interpretive frames, for instance, so that a domain hitherto taken for granted is “reframed as problematic and in need of repair” (Snow *et al.*, 1986). Ryan and Gamson (2009:173) argue that it is especially crucial for movements which aim to reframe political debates in global justice struggles (where the promoters of official frames have significantly greater resources and organizational strength behind them) “to recognize power inequalities and find ways to challenge them”. Movements generally hope to eventually normalize the reframed perspective (Earl, 2004:521).

### **3. Methodology**

RQ1 is based on a qualitative case study, using data gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted during a field study in the Philippines (Jan – March 2015). The research takes an exploratory stance (Bryman, 2012:41), as (to the best of my knowledge) no studies have previously been conducted on the issue of climate debt, or with this specific movement, in the Philippines. RQ2 is answered analysing secondary sources.

#### **3.1.1. RQ1: Semi-structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews are selected as the appropriate instrument to gain data for answering RQ1. The benefits of the semi-structured approach was to ensure that all interviews would evolve around similar themes, while still allowing room for reciprocity and reflexive elaborations on appropriate issues – depending on the interviewee. I deselected relying exclusively on document analysis, as the Movement does not use its limited resources on printing extensive physical campaign material. Interviews also better serve the research purpose of learning about the *motivations which lie behind* the framing choices. Compared to questionnaires (which could also have been employed), the interview is a more flexible type of research, accommodating the possibility for the interviewee to specify their answers and for the interviewer to respond to issues brought up by the interviewee (Bryman, 2012:440). It was in fact this aspect of the interviews, i.e. interviewees bringing up the unanticipated intersection of climate and external debt, which inspired the research to take on RQ2. In-person interviews also help establish a sense of trust and good rapport (*ibid.*), although it is

important to be cautious of keeping out personal bias – especially in the context of an interview inspired by action-research. Throughout the interviews, I kept the questions open and cautiously phrased them so as not to give an impression that I was looking for a specific type of answer. The interviews were conducted in Manila and Tacloban (Leyte, Philippines) with 12 members of the grassroots network for climate justice in the Philippines. Two interviews were conducted through e-mail correspondence. In order to gain a more nuanced impression of the movement, some of the interviewees were the chairpeople of their respective organizations, while others were, for example, communication officers or long-term activists.

The themes of the interviews centered around views on the framing of climate justice and climate debt, challenges and opportunities in doing so, intra-movement decision processes regarding framing, views on the future potential of the repayment of climate debt, as well as questions relevant to the area of focus of the specific member organization.

### **3.1.2 RQ1: Sampling**

Interviews were conducted with members of the CJM in the Philippines because it enabled access to information in relation to the research objectives. The nationwide Philippine Movement for Climate Justice (PM CJ) is comprised of 103 local organizations representing the most vulnerable and marginalized in society (PM CJ, 2014b). The aim of the organization is “to lead the joint struggles, campaigns and actions in putting forward the climate justice framework as a fundamental element of solving the climate crisis” (*ibid.*). This organization functioned as the primary gatekeeper to gaining knowledge of the structure of the CJM in the country.

The main sampling approach of the interviewees follows a purposive sampling strategy, including pre-selected key movement members, as well as snow-balling. Purposive sampling implies the strategic selection of interviewees, which are most relevant to the topic of research (Bryman, 2012:418). Seeing as the majority of the member organizations are smaller, focused on regional interests, those whom I purposely chose to include in the study were predominantly based in Manila and/or considered climate finance one of their campaign issues. In a country of more than 7000 islands, organizations with a national or international agenda are primarily based in Manila, which is why I chose to center my research there. Snowball sampling was beneficial, as it allowed me to get in contact with members of the large sample, which only on-site interaction and developments in the research topic permitted. See Appendix 2 for further details of the interviewees.

### **3.1.3 RQ1: Triangulation**

The semi-structured interviews, which serve as the primary source of data for RQ1, will be triangulated with limited document analysis and data gathered during overt participant observation (during climate justice rallies/press conferences etc.). Using a variety of qualitative methods, helped to complement their strengths and limitations (Bryman 2012:392)

### **3.1.4 RQ1: Frame Analysis**

Upon transcribing the interviews I applied a thematic coding strategy to find common themes (and subthemes) and patterns (Bryman, 2012:580). Next, I applied Pickering and Berry's (2012) framework for social movement frame analysis. This involves dividing the coding sub-themes into "*ethical analysis*" (focused on whether the premises and line of reasoning applied are morally plausible) as opposed to "*political analysis*" (concerned with whether the frame is likely to be a feasible and desirable means of achieving an aim). Methodologically, the interviews were coded using the two main categories 'ethical' or 'political'. Next, these were coded using sub-themes (e.g. rights, justice, catalyst, etc.).

Additionally, I put analytical focus on how the two relate and intersect with each other. I intend to use this frame analysis to gain insights into how the CJM in the Philippines frames climate debt (RQ1) in relation to the theoretical framework employed (Snow and Benford, 2000).

### **3.1.5 RQ1: Researcher Role and Bias**

Bryman (2012:227) highlights how the background of the interviewer influences the interview-situation, i.e. in terms of gender, language, social status, culture, ethnicity etc. Prior to my arrival, I knew that my background, as a person of privilege from a high-emitting country would influence the way I was perceived. More than 85 per cent of the people living in the Philippines have personally experienced the impacts of climate change (World Bank, 2013), I came to study the problematics of climate change, but I have never had to live with them. This noticeably reflects the inequities of globalized knowledge production, and encouraged me to think about my own positionality and the aims of the research (Sikor and Newell, 2014). Upon interacting with the members of the movement, and in the introduction about myself and the research project (which preceded every interview), I briefly mentioned my experiences as an activist within the climate and global justice movement. In all likelihood, my role as a (student) researcher and the way I was perceived, in this specific context, was multidimensional (Hesse-Biber, 2007) and influenced by both of these factors (i.e. being from

the global North and being in solidarity). I recognize that a local researcher, or a researcher who had been able to stay longer, would possibly have had a different experience in some respects. Similar to the broader population in the Philippines, it was my general impression that the activists were very polite. They would describe this topic of severe global injustice in honest, but often also quite polite, terms. It is only a speculation, but I cannot rule out that had I not been from the global North, the wording might have been somewhat stronger.

The use of the English language is very common in Manila, and seeing as all of the interviewees spoke excellent English, we were able to communicate directly, preventing issues of translation of meaning. On several occasions, I mentioned my ability to secure a translator, in case any organization representatives were not comfortable with English, so as not to exclude potentially differing opinions due to language. Nonetheless, English was neither the interviewees' nor my first language, and conducting the interviews in Tagalog possibly would have revealed something additional.

### **3.1.6 RQ1: Ethical Considerations**

Desai and Potter (2006:19) describe how research conducted in the global South has been criticized for being parasitic. As described above, especially within social movement research, there has been a controversial tendency of research to be dominated by a top-down approach (Diani and Eyerman, 1992). Sultana (2007) draws attention to avoiding hierarchical settings and being mindful of power, knowledge and context. In accordance with the advice offered by feminist social movement researcher Hesse-Biber (2007:128), I focused on keeping a good rapport with the interviewees and limiting the hierarchical interviewee-researcher relationship. This was done by offering an introduction about myself and the research project, and answering any enquiries the interviewees might have. This transparent research approach was especially important seeing as the movement experiences infiltration and espionage (both domestic and from abroad). In “*How Many More?*” (2015), a report released by Global Witness, it is revealed that environmental activists are exposed to escalating levels of harassment and threats to their lives. Globally, on average two environmental activists are killed per week. In the Philippines 15 activists were killed in 2014, making it the deadliest country in Asia to defend the environment (*ibid.*), a deeply concerning development. In light of this, names of interviewees from the respective organizations are known to author, but not included. Informed consent was always achieved, wishes to remain anonymous respected and I let interviewees know that they could decline to answer any questions if they did not feel comfortable. Upon

conclusion of the interview, I asked if the interviewees had anything to add and whether they would like a transcribed copy of the interview (Bryman 2012:391).

### **3.1.7 RQ1: Limitations**

The interviewees all answered any questions I asked, albeit some of it *off record*, and I have no reason to think that anyone intentionally concealed any information. Although the topic of research is highly controversial in a global political sense, the movement advocates openly for climate justice issues and is eager to share its views. Given that the CJM is an advocacy movement, it does have an interest in emphasizing what it considers the advantages of recognizing climate debt. Although some bias is thus unavoidable on the concept itself, in also stressing the numerous obstacles and challenges of the recognition of the concept, I felt the interviewees were a reliable source of information, specifically as the focus of the research concerned *framing strategies*. At no point during the research did anyone try to inflict my autonomy or ask me not to include certain members' points of view.

In terms of sampling, the purposive approach does not seek to be random or entirely representative, but hopes to achieve information relevant to the topic of research and relative saturation of data. Despite similarities to other movements, the results of the present thesis cannot be generalized beyond the context analyzed. The findings are also very contingent upon the present, but ever-changing, socio-political moment, and this should be taken into consideration. RQ2 aims to relate the findings from RQ1 and the Philippines into a broader global context. While not possible during this field trip, it would be of interest to conduct a multiple case design comparing the CJM framing approaches adopted in other at-risk regions (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa, Pacific Islands, etc.). This design, however, allowed me to delve deeper into contextual conditions and focus on the social reality of the interviewees in the Philippines.

As the epistemological approach of this thesis is inspired to some extent by activist scholarship, it is crucial to keep one's own biases in mind and apply (at least) the same amount of critical faculty – as one would, if one does not sympathize with the cause. Therefore, I emphasized applying source criticism to the data supplied by the movement (e.g. by consulting secondary sources, such as published or governmental reports, for figures on climate change, influence of the World Bank, corruption, etc.) and have at times included these secondary sources in the analysis. In retrospect, it would have offered interesting insights to interview members of the mainstream environmental movement in the Philippines, to learn about their opinion on the CJM's advocacy work. This, however, was not within the scope of the research.

### 3.2 RQ2 Methodology: Toulmin's Model of Argumentation

The "Toulmin Model of Argumentation" (2003) serves as the methodological tool in the analysis of the claim that the recognition of climate debt relates to and reframes the external debt discourse. British philosopher Stephen Toulmin invented the model in 1958. In contrast to the dominant academic argumentation models at the time, Toulmin hoped that his model would be useful developing and analyzing real world problems and effectively evaluate the ethics concerning moral issues (2003:vii). According to Toulmin (2003:36), reasoning has less to do with discovering new ideas, rather it is the practice of testing and sifting already existing ideas. I justify the use of this model and line of reasoning as a method, as I find it lends itself to the research question of how a discourse is (potentially) reframed. Dividing an argument into six interconnected components, Toulmin contends that it is easier to follow the coherent structure of the argument (2003:87-131). The six part are illustrated as such:




Figure 1) Toulmin's Model of Argumentation.

Source of figure: Hong Kong Institute of Education (2007)

Toulmin's Model of Argumentation Analysis, as illustrated in Figure 1, follows the sequence laid out below:

- 1) C: *Claim* - the claim advocates a change of the status quo put forward for acceptance. Although the claim might appear at the end of an argument, the argument is considered to be built upon it
- 2) D: *Data* - evidence and foundation in support of the claim
- 3) W: *Warrant* - connects claim and evidence using inductive inference
- 4) B: *Backing* - underpinning the warrant
- 5) R: *Rebuttal* - reservations to the claim
- 6) Q: *Qualifier* - expressing the degree of certainty of the claim



Upon publication, the model (which Toulmin himself considered a “radical” attack on the standard formal logic (2003:*xiii*)), evoked strong criticism from logicians and other philosophers (Van Eemeren et al., 2014:243). Toulmin considered the prevalent models “too narrow” to be applicable in real life, whereas critics found the Toulmin model too vague and ambiguous to be valid (*ibid.*:245). Arguably, the main limitation of the model is that it uses reconstructive deductivism to seek support of the claim. Therefore, special attention is paid to the rebuttal of the argument.

While I have made every attempt to include a broad range of sources and opinions, the sampling strategy cannot be argued to represent every aspects of this constantly evolving argument and field of research. Certainly, there are opinions on the matter, which are either unpublished, written in languages, which I am unable to read, or unknown to me. Nonetheless, I find that I have been able to include a relevant selection of sources representing a spectrum of opinions relevant to the research question. It is noted that using non-academic sources is problematic, but I find it justified in this field of research. Using Klein’s (2014) “This Changes Everything” to illustrate this point, it is noted that the book is considered widely influential (in its advocacy and audience), while based on “meticulous documentation” (of predominantly published sources) (ISA, 2014). In 2014, International Studies Association awarded Klein the “Outstanding Activist-Scholar Award” (*ibid.*). “This Changes Everything” was awarded the Hilary Weston Writers’ Trust Prize for Nonfiction (Writers’ Trust, 2014), and less than a year old, the book is already cited extensively in academic articles (see e.g. Google Scholar Citations, 2015).

While every attempt has been made to consult published sources where available, this analysis also draws on electronic resources. Dunlap and McCright (in Rice, 2009) describe how scholars increasingly acknowledge “the internet as an arena wherein social movement-counter movement interaction takes place” and that the internet can be a valid, sometimes indeed only, source of information on a number of emerging issues. When using either non-academic or online sources special attention has been paid to potential bias, as well as corroboration of presented information conferring supplemental sources.

In recent years, instances have been exposed, where the desire for funding and/or the wish to promote a certain political agenda has influenced both natural and social scientists in their research on issues related to climate change (for arguments from both sides of the debate, see e.g. Dunlap and McCright,

2011, Rapp, 2014, Leiserowitz et al., 2013). In light of this controversy, special attention has been paid to conflicts of interest or possible bias of the sources used.

## 4. Analysis

### 4.1 RQ1: How does the climate justice movement in the Philippines frame the recognition of climate debt?

The following section uses Pickering and Berry's (2012:57) framework for social movement frame analysis, which involves allocating the interviews' coded sub-themes according to "*ethical analysis*" (focused on whether the premises and line of reasoning applied are morally credible) and "*political analysis*" (concerned with whether the frame is likely to be a feasible or desirable means of achieving an aim). It is noted that moral and political framing aspects often intersect, which I will also address, before lastly commenting on the implications of the results.

#### 1. Ethical Analysis:

##### *Justice and empowerment*

Overarching, the data shows that the most common frame used by the CJM to call on the recognition of climate debt rests on the ethical dimension of justice. Examples include, 350.org (2015, interview), which considers "the repayment of climate debts as the basis of an equitable, effective and science-based solution to climate change", based on the rationale that the Filipinos have neither contributed nor benefitted from the massive global burning of fossil fuels. While emphasizing that climate change is a collective challenge, Pakisama (2015, interview) maintains that "justice dictates that those who contributed much to the greenhouse gas emissions must be made to take on the greater responsibility of addressing its causes and effects". ICSC (2015, interview) are especially critical of Northern countries overriding the repayment of their climate debt, offering climate finance loans instead and, ICSC (*ibid.*) uses an analogy to describe this injustice; "it is like saying: I will burn your house down and the next day I will offer you a loan, so that you can reconstruct". Interviewees emphasize that if climate finance comes in the form of reparations, instead of loans or "aid", the country is more likely to be able to determine how to best put it to use - enhancing the empowering aspect of this framing.

It is predicted that frames are more likely to be accepted if they correlate with existing beliefs and if they include empirically credible claims (i.e. degree of *frame resonance*) (Goodwin and Jasper,

2009:57). Director of Global South Asia Pacific Movement on Debt and Development and convener of the PMCJ, (2015, interview), explains how one of the obstacles to increasing domestic backing for climate debt is that some Filipinos are not informed of the skewed relationship between the Philippines' historically low GHG emissions and nonetheless being among the countries most at risk in terms climate change. A 2013 survey found that 52 per cent of the population, self-reportedly, have "only little" or "almost no understanding" of climate change and its impacts (World Bank, 2013). According to Tarrow's (1983) theory on the "Cycles of Protest", frames are especially susceptible to gaining resonance during major shifts in the collective understanding of current issues. In light of the rapidly moving research frontier on the statistical formulation of attributing risk between extreme weather events and climate change (see e.g. Coumou and Rahmstorf, 2012, Hansen et al., 2014) and the CJM's advocacy work illuminating the contradiction between the Philippines low emissions and high level of risk, it is my analysis that this will possibly foster greater frame resonance in the future. "Grant is the wrong word – it is reparations or compensation" ICSC (2015, interview)

While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to address in depth, I wish to briefly comment on how the specific wording used in discursively constructing the call for repaying climate debt also reflects the way the CJM frames the concept. For instance, when asked if SARILAYA supported the notion of climate debt repayment, the interviewee replied: "We not just support, but *demand* Northern countries recognize and pay their climate debt to the South" (2015, interview).

### *Religious Ethics*

One especially interesting, and highly contextual, aspect of the ethical framing of climate debt concerns the inclusion of religious ethics. The current Pope Francis is a vocal advocate of climate justice, countering the view held by some Filipinos that increasing climate calamities are attributable to divine retribution. The Pope visited the Philippines (January 16-19 2015) in solidarity with the victims of Yolanda. I observed the CJM capitalizing on this *political opportunity* (i.e. a term used by Tarrow (1996) referring to, for instance, increased access to elite allies). The Pope has announced that he will issue a highly anticipated Encyclical, in the lead-up to COP21 in Paris, calling on climate change action. The Encyclical is indented to reach the world's 1.2 billion Roman Catholics. Amongst them are one third of the US Congress, many of whom remain so-called "climate sceptics" - refuting the notion of climate debt. Therefore, former Head of Philippines Climate Change Commission, Saño (2015), referred to the Encyclical as a possible game changer. The CJM organized a range of events during the Papal visit, which gained much attention in the press. The PMCJ and the Catholic Bishops'

Conference of the Philippines furthermore issued a *joint statement* emphasizing the social teachings of the Church (regarding environmental stewardship, social and inter-generational justice, the use of earth's resources for common good and service for the poor and the vulnerable). Calling on governments of the North to “commit to and deliver fully and unequivocally their fair share of the effort to solve climate change and ensure a full repayment of the emissions debt owed to the peoples of the South” (PM CJ, 2015b).

### *Rights*

“The issue of climate debt is an issue of climate justice and human rights” (FDC, 2015)

The third sub-theme emerging is one of rights. Interviewees responded that the Philippines should not have to compromise its right to improving socio-economic standards. Not in terms of securing rights to emit GHG at the same level as the global North, but with regards to preventing having to divert money from the public sector (e.g. health and education – where there is an urgent need) towards climate change adaptation (PM CJ, 2015 interview). UP One Earth (2015, interview) further describe how extreme weather events are causing suspended school and work days, but “more importantly, these wreak havoc in our provinces, taking the lives and homes of many, especially of those living in poverty”, emphasizing how climate justice intersects with other aspects of justice.

The human rights aspect of climate debt was also brought up by interviewees, expressing that without climate finance the Philippines “will find it difficult to set up mechanisms that will enable us to adapt to climate change impacts” (DAKILA, 2015, interview). It is especially considered a rights violation, that the know-how (e.g. in terms of disaster preparedness, technology and better infrastructure), which could have saved thousands of people *does exist*, but it is not financially available to the most of risk communities (Greenpeace, 2015, interview).

## **1. Political Analysis:**

### *UNFCCC Commitments*

It is repeatedly raised in interviews that, in fact, climate debt is not a demand, which has suddenly emerged from the global South. Rather it rooted in an acknowledgment of the foundational framework of the UNFCCC (as detailed in Section 1.4). SARILAYA (2015, interview) describes how the recognition and repayment of climate debt “is basically being truthful to ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ that they (the Northern countries) have signed in the UNFCCC”. Based on these

commitments, FDC describes how it; “does not view the issue of debt moratorium or debt forgiveness for debts or loans owed by the Philippines to the so-called creditor countries as an act of charity, but a recognition that debt bondage or debt slavery is inherently an instrument of domination by the North of the South, including of the Philippines” (2015, interview). FDC considers the unrecognized climate debt from the North as inherently connected with the odious and illegitimate financial debt owed by the Philippines, through which IFIs have imposed “policies and other conditionalities to ensure that our economies and governments comply with neoliberal policies that prey on our economies, resources and livelihood, as well as sovereignty” (*ibid.*).

Another “political opportunity” (Tarrow, 1996) occurred February 26-27, 2015, when a UNFCCC Delegation, incl. the French President Hollande, Nobel laureates and goodwill celebrities, visited the Philippines. As host of the upcoming COP21 in Paris, the French Embassy in Manila, announced the visit intended to build diplomatic momentum (The Embassy of France, 2015). At a press conference arranged by the CJM, members expressed concern that the visit was primarily used as a publicity stunt/photo opportunity (SANLAKAS, 2015, interview). During the visit the French and Filipino government signed a loan agreement of USD 56.6 million for disaster preparedness projects. PMCJ criticized France for “making a business out of us being climate vulnerable” and argued that instead of loans, France as a historically high-emitting country, ought to offer grants to “fulfil their obligation under the UNFCCC and as payment for reparations to the Filipinos affected by the climate crisis” (PMCJ, 2015a).

### *Antagonistic?*

Chatterton et al. (2013) describe how critics of climate debt considers it too antagonistic to be useful. In analyzing the data from the interviews, I draw on Dryzek’s (2010) distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ rhetoric, as well as the concept of “audience effects” (which refers to movements modifying their frames according to audiences (Benford and Snow, 2000)). Interview data reflect both bridging and bonding rhetoric, the former focusing e.g. on how the ensuring of justice and mitigating climate change in the South, ultimately, also benefits the global North. Examples of the latter could include SANLAKAS’ (2015, interview) reference to high-emitting countries as “climate terrorists”. Pickering and Barry (2012) argue that climate debt, despite its moral validity, is unhelpful, and that the CJM should rather “present a workable basis for advancing this aim by proposing frames that seek to bridge rather than exacerbate existing divides”. Pickering and Barry are nationals of (high GHG emitting) Australia. Interviews in the field offered opportunities for reflexivity, and arguably,

from a high-emitting country, I am in no position to judge how the CJM sees it best fit to balance their bridging/bonding rhetoric. When asked whether PMCJ ever feel like they need to be careful with their rhetoric, with regards to how they frame climate debt so as not to appear antagonistic, they respond; no, because it is crucial “not to water down the message” (PMCJ, 2015, interview). This strategy bears a resemblance to Klein (2014:59) who asks; “how do you create change so that the people responsible for the crisis do not feel threatened by the solutions?”, concluding; “you don’t”. Instead, you make sure that there are enough people in the social movement, to change the balance of power entirely. It is noted that through building a master-frame; merging social and environmental justice, as well as religious compassion, human rights, etc., the CJM builds climate justice solidarities nationally, but also globally by drawing parallels between their own struggle and that of other at risk nations.

#### *A catalyst*

All interviewees emphasize that they do not see a recognition of climate debt as a panacea to solve the issue of climate change, nor as a way to defer responsibility from the Filipino government. ICSC, the instigators of an elaborate project tracking climate change adaptation funding in the Philippines, emphasize that “it is not a matter of simply throwing money at the problem”, stressing the importance of transparent financial mechanisms and commitment to long term goals are crucial to ensuring the viability of repaying climate debt. UP One Earth (2015, interview) emphasize that recognizing and repaying climate debt would be part of a larger solution, a catalyst of sorts, which would encourage the North to be make emission cuts and lead to greater global environmental accountability. Earth First! Philippines (2015, interview) envision it as a strategy to “doing away with the fossil-fueled capitalist system that brought us this crisis in the first place”.

It is important to highlight that the majority of the interviewees emphasize the responsibility, which the Filipino government itself holds. Greenpeace, for instance, campaign for a national renewable energy transformation and eliminating coal plants. Both for its intrinsic benefits to the environment, but also strengthening the Philippines’ moral position, when criticizing the inaction and overconsumption of Northern countries. In general, the organization emphasizes that it is important not to mistake the call for climate justice as the Philippines not wanting to take responsibility for climate action. It has responsibilities – but they are *different* from those in the North. Ultimately, the two campaigns are inseparable, because climate finance is needed in order to leapfrog to renewable energy sources (2015, interview).

While FDC (2015, interview) find that “there is little chance for the COP21 to recognize the North's climate debt to the South and for this forthcoming global meeting to come up with a new climate deal with a just and desirable outcome”, they emphasize that it is up to “the global climate justice movements to mount a powerful global protests and pressure that should force the hands and ears of the belligerent polluter-countries and governments to listen and act accordingly”. ICSC (2015, interview) describe the balance between being optimistic or realistic, adding that regardless of whether Northern countries repay their climate debt or not, “we must take action now, because it means the survival of people”.

## **2. Implications and Conclusion**

*“The way we frame problems, also defines their perceived solutions.”*

(Rutherford and Thorpe in Sandberg and Sandberg 2010:121)

The findings suggests that the CJMs framing of climate debt is underpinned by strong both moral and political arguments. Whether the moral force of the argument can catalyze the required political muscle is a point of contention. It is beyond the scope of this analysis, but in terms of the political feasibility of achieving the aim by framing it in relation to the UNFCCC commitments greater *global* pressure is called for. In conclusion, the ‘climate debt recognition frame’ described above notes the linkage of concerns over ethical and political aspects of the issue. While the two main framing categories were found to be applied to by all organizations, differences in accentuation was observed (such as FDC emphasizing the UNFCCC foundation framework). Framing strategies in the CJM in the Philippines, in line with social movements everywhere, are in flux and the outcome of a “process of contestation and reflection amongst movement participants” rather than set from a “supreme strategist”. (Rosewarne et al., 2013:4). Social movements, such as the CJM in the Philippines, challenge what Peet *et al.* (2011:10-11) refer to as ‘centrality of expert knowledge’ around the discourse of climate change solutions. This makes a valuable contribution to Sikor and Newell’s (2014) notion of ‘cognitive justice’ (i.e. whose knowledge counts and who participates in setting agendas). Often social movements become known for what they oppose, rather than proposing what they see as an alternative (Finley-Brook, 2014). This is perhaps one of the strengths of the CJM’s framing of climate debt; it presents an alternative vision.

It is noted that while Pickering and Berry’s (2012) framework for social movement frame analysis is beneficial in illuminating the two primary aspects of ethical and political analysis, it also has

limitations. For instance, by already subscribing to this analytical framework, I might have neglected to code aspects, which fell outside these two main categories. However, aware of this, I paid attention to additional frames, but found the two meta-categories to encompass the interviews' recurrent sub-codes.

Within social movement framing theory, *framing effects* refer to the influence which *frame variation* of an issue have on increasing support for said issue (Benford and Snow, 2000). It would be of great interest to explore whether people are susceptible shifting their opinion regarding climate finance, depending on whether it is framed as reparation/debt or as charity/aid.

#### **4.2 RQ2: Does the potential recognition of climate debt relate to and reframe the external debt discourse of the Philippines and other indebted countries in the South?**

The following section uses the “Toulmin Model of Argumentation” (2003) to attempt to answer RQ2. This model is chosen in recognition and admiration of Rice’s (2009) utilization of the model analyzing non-governmental organizations’ advocacy work for the recognition of ecological debt. As described in Section 2.2 claims are statements, which advocate a change in the status quo. The following analysis focuses specifically on the claim that; “the recognition of climate debt relates to and reframes the external debt discourse of the Philippines and other indebted countries in the South”. The analysis uses secondary sources to underpin this alternative ontological stance, synthesizing the views of a range of climate debt advocates and opponents. The section follows the model described in Section 2.2., before lastly commenting on the implications of the findings.

##### **1. Data: The Northern countries owe a climate debt greater than the Southern countries external debt.**

Data is the evidence and foundation for the claim. This section will describe the relation and intersection between climate debt and external debt. Firstly, it will offer a contextualization, next it describes how the disregard of the North’s climate debt exacerbates the accumulation of external debt in the South, keeping countries in *the periphery*, and how Northern countries owe a climate debt greater than the Southern countries external debt. Lastly, it uses WST to analyze the data.



## *Contextualization*

“Debt is always about power.”

(Klein, 2010)

Oftentimes external financial debt perpetuates a vicious circle for indebted countries. In order to repay their debt, Southern countries are compelled to accelerate extraction and export of their natural resources, which, as the same development model is imposed upon many debtors simultaneously, tends to reduce the price of these goods on the world market and thereby leads to further intensification of extractive efforts (Warlenius et al., 2015b). Robert and Parks (2009) argue that, historically, this model has simultaneously added to the North’s ecological and climate debt, as value-adding processing (associated with high GHG emissions) predominantly occurred in the North. Furthermore, structural adjustment programs attached to loans from IFI may prevent countries from diverting public resources towards climate change mitigation and adaptation (Klein, 2010). Using Haiti as an incisive example, Klein (*ibid.*) describes the consequences of the country’s arguably odious debt. The IFI conditionalities were a contributing factor to the deprioritization of better infrastructure and insufficient public funding for firefighters, first responders, medical staff etc., factors which significantly increased the death toll during the 2010 earthquake (*ibid.*).

### *The lacking recognition of climate debt exacerbates the accumulation of external debt in the South*

The Jubilee Debt Campaign (2014) report; “*Don’t turn the clock back’: Analysing the risks of the lending boom to impoverished countries*” finds that over the next decade two-thirds of the 43 most indebted countries will experience large increases in the share of GDP spent of debt servicing, possibly resulting in a new debt crisis in the global South. Currently, many countries find themselves having to rapidly adapt to a climate change through loans. January 2015, the World Bank announced how climate change is causing an increase in frequency and intensity of floods and cyclones in Bangladesh, and that the Bank will provide Bangladesh with “USD 375 million support to reduce vulnerability of coastal populations to natural disasters”(World Bank, 2015b). The support refers to a USD 375 million loan. In the absence of alternative sources of financing for climate adaptation, Bangladesh has resorted to taking out loans in order to build typhoon shelters. Grenada, a country indebted to the extent that it has defaulted on its debt servicing, has similarly had to resort to taking on additional World Bank loans to pay for its adaptation measures to build stronger seawalls (Jones, 2013). In 2013, the World Bank announced that it “is helping 130 countries take action on climate change”, “doubling its financial lending” for adaptation measures (compared to the year before), “a

trend will accelerate in the future” (Kim, 2013). However, Klein (2010) questions whether is it sustainable for already indebted countries to finance their growing need for adaptation measures through loans?

The Green Climate Fund (GCF), an institution under the UNFCCC established in 2009, is intended to channel funds for countries to meet their adaptation and mitigation needs. In relation to the claim, there are three main worrisome trends emerging concerning this fund: (1) currently, only one tenth of the original funding goal (USD 100 billion) has been pledged, (2) in contrast to their UNFCCC commitment of additional funding ("above and beyond any financial assistance they already provide to these countries") countries are increasingly *redirected* pledges from their foreign aid budgets (3) a number of countries contribute to the fund in the form of loans rather than grants (Friends of the Earth, 2014). It is also crucial to note that only countries who endorse the Accords (i.e. the document summarizing the negotiations outcomes from the various COPs) are entitled to apply for funding from the GCF. Klein (2010) deems it “naked blackmail” to force countries to choose between signing a potentially unjust deal or loose access to funds for adaptation, which might be life-saving, needed immediately.

#### *The Northern countries owe a climate debt greater than the Southern countries' external debt*

Based on research in various regions, a number of scholars have come out in support of reevaluating the discourse between climate and external debt. Already in 2003, Martinez-Alier found that the entire external debt of Latin America would be cancelled within twelve years if the United States were to pay back its carbon debt, which led Hornborg (2012:54) to argue, “that Latin America’s foreign debt is a mystification of actual debtor-creditor relations”. In recent research of sub-Saharan Africa’s struggles to finance climate change adaptations, Silver (2015) raises concerns about carbon market-based financing, calling it the privatization of the air, and argues instead that adaptation should be financed through climate debt reparations, comparing the regions minimal historical emissions with the severe costs of adaptation. However, the first-ever research project to systematically quantify the unequal *global* distribution and price of environmental externalities associated with climate change, was conducted by research team at Berkeley University (Srinivasan *et al.*, 2008). The 3-year research project concludes that through disproportionate use of the global atmospheric commons alone, the North has “imposed climate damages on the poor group greater than the latter's current foreign debt” and considers their analysis “a first step towards reframing issues” of debt and globalization in accordance with environmental costs (*ibid.*).

### *Data Conclusion and Analysis:*

This section considers Wallerstein's (1974) WST a useful theoretical framework underpinning the data presented above. According to Roberts and Park (2009) the structuralist world-systems theory provides a possible explanation as to why many peripheral and semi-peripheral nations are currently indebted and "locked into ecologically unsustainable patterns". WST predicts that the structural location of countries (i.e. their world-system position) plays a crucial role in shaping their position in international negotiations. From an indebted periphery, the South lacks the political muscle to enforce the recognition of the North's climate debt. Simultaneously, the core Northern states are in a position to set the agenda during multinational environmental negotiations, e.g. by declining to comply with the foundational framework of the UNFCCC (such as *historical responsibility*) or delaying emission cuts (Roberts et al., 2003).

In sum, the data details the relation between climate debt and financial debt. The data claims to support the notion that much of Southern financial debt "is oppressive and illegitimate" (Rice 2009), whereas the North's climate debt is unrecognized and, increasingly, contributory to the enlargement of the South's financial debt due to urgently needed adaptation loans. While the sources often use country-specific examples (as for instance, Klein's (2010) highlighting of Haiti) it is found that the scientific frame of reference (see e.g. EJOLTS' "Climate Debt Atlas" (2015)) has now been sufficiently developed to provide credibility and broader insight into the extent of the skewed carbon debt creditor/debtor relations at a *global* level.

## **2. Warrant and Backing: since the South is *unjustly* burdened by both types of debt (i.e. the North's unpaid climate debt and the South's financial debt), on account of shifting the discourse towards justice**

The warrant connects claim and data, often using inductive inference, and Toulmin (2003:95-99) describes how warrants often refer to *pathos* (emotional appeals) or shared values (such as justice). Using the argumentative strategy of "the principle" (Toulmin 2003:109-120) the warrant is that it is unjust for one type of debt to be recognized – and not the other. The backing is additional evidence, which underpins the warrant (not the claim itself). According to Best (in Rice, 2009) an appeal to values can serve as an "inference-step bridging the gap between data and the claim". The underpinning of a moral argument can be emphasized by both rectitude and rationality, and "a rhetoric of rectitude is often associated with demands for reinterpretation of a problem as moral considerations justify rethinking an issue" (*ibid.*). While in other arguments the warrant and its backing may be

implicit (Toulmin 2003:95-99), the present analysis of this claim (as well as the conclusion of the framing analysis of the CJM in the Philippines above), finds that in this case the warrant and backing of justice is often made rather explicitly.

### *Restorative justice*

According to the sources, the South is unjustly burdened by both types of debt (as detailed in the data). To be specific, Simms (2009) adds, in relation to both climate debt and financial debt, it is the poorest *within* the South (who have contributed least to the problem) who bear the brunt of the burden. Turning the warrant around, Rice (2009), describes climate debt advocates' claim that the North unjustly and disproportionately *benefits* from both aspects of the current system (i.e. setting the terms regarding the South's financial debt and disregarding the obligations of their own climate debt). Shifting the discourse towards one of justice therefore results in a reframing of the external debt discourse. Subject to a pluralistic interpretation, the notion of justice poses significant conceptual challenges. While the language of justice is being used increasingly to frame the claims within the climate movement, in fact, Sikor and Newell (2014) express concerns over whether aspects of climate debt (such as the inter- and intra-generational aspects) fall too far from the current frameworks and conceptualization of justice. Rawls (1971:65-75), one of the most influential justice studies scholars, argues that it is unjust to give more to those who are already better off, unless it also improves the situation of those who are worse off. While this argument applies to the situation at hand, it does not however *challenge* or *reframe* the current paradigm. In contrast, Fraser (2009) has been influential in rejecting mere (counterproductive) redistribution, but calls instead for a critical assessment of the *structural causes* of injustice.

### *Reparations – not aid*

In the aftermath of super typhoon Yolanda, the World Bank pledged a USD one billion loan to finance reconstruction efforts, while simultaneously insisting the Philippines continued servicing its odious debt (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2013). Alliances for debt relief started a campaign calling on IFIs and international lenders to “Put Life Before Debt” and cancel the country's odious foreign debt obligations (*ibid.*). This appeal fell on deaf ears, and none of the debt was cancelled. As described, the majority of the (much needed) relief came in the form of loans and only worsened the country's indebtedness. According to Rice (2009), reframing the repayment of climate debt and cancellation of external debt as a moral and legal obligation, changes the debt discourse entirely, as well as the wider arenas in which international development concerns are debated. In this sense, the movement

correlates with the tenants of post-development theories (Escobar, 1992). Not only in the sense that it challenges what can be considered development, but also by representing a radical deconstruction of the current climate finance discourse and questioning both its legitimacy and the present institutional structures in charge.

Toulmin (2003) describes the benefits of using analogies or equivalence frames to underpin an argument. The CJM has similarities with the Jubilee movement for debt forgiveness (Guerrero, 2010). However, it also strongly challenges the notion of *forgiveness*. According to philosophy professor Holmstrom (2015), by definition, “forgiveness” denotes wrongdoing by the one being forgiven, and as a result, forgiveness becomes an act of generosity. In contrast, the present warrant suggest that the call for recognizing climate debt and reframing external debt is in fact a moral obligation based on justice. Nonetheless, the relation and similarities of the two movements underpins the case for *frame-bridging* (i.e. the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow *et al.*, 1986:467)). Snow *et al.* (*ibid.*) goes on to describe how such a frame extension can foster a broader movement, by incorporating participants who hold similar views or grievances but who lack a unified organizational base.

It is relevant to briefly mention previous instances in history where social movements were able to gain success by reframing the dominantly held discourse. Perhaps the most persuasive analogy, drawn by Hayes (2014) and Hari (2009), compares the political economy of ending slavery and the current political economy of achieving climate justice. Slavery seemed unchangeable and its critics were considered naïve (Hari, 2009). At the time, slaves were also considered vital to the economy, and elites would have to say goodbye to trillions of dollars of wealth, similar to how leaving fossil fuels in the ground or repaying climate debt would have economic consequences today. Klein (2014:462) subscribes to this analogy, adding that it was only once the abolitionist movement employed the language of morality and justice in their rhetoric and arguments that they were able to start shift public opinion. Their aim was “not merely to ban an abhorrent practice but to try to change the deeply entrenched values that had made slavery acceptable in the first place” (*ibid.*:463). Similar today, Warlenius et al. (2015a) describe how until the emergence of the concept of ecological and climate debt, countries in the global South had “always been framed as being indebted to the industrial North”, but the concept of ecological debt “effectively reversed the direction of the arrow of arrears” making the global North “historically reprobate, a delinquent debtor”.

Already in 1992, Jamieson (in Gardiner, 2004) argued that “successfully addressing climate change will necessitate a fundamental paradigm shift in ethics”. In evaluating the warrant, Toulmin (2003:95-99) finds that it is crucial to ask whether the principle is widely accepted? Critics of the foreign debt for climate debt relief considers it is a subversive, “radical proposal” (e.g. Godard, 2012). EJOLT, arguably the organization that has conducted the most extensive research on this topic, concludes a recent report (Warlenius et al. 2015): “obviously, the world system is not governed by principles, rights and ethics but by force. Nonetheless, ideas of justice can sometimes mobilize people into becoming a counter-force”. I will return to the implications of this potential mobilization below.

### **3. Rebuttal: unless the concept of climate debt is consider invalid**

“We absolutely recognise our historic role in putting emissions in the atmosphere, but the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations, I just categorically reject that”

Stern, US Special Agent for Climate Change, COP15 (quoted in Broder, 2009)

The rebuttal most commonly referred in reference to the Claim, is that climate debt cannot be considered a valid concept (and as a result neither relates to nor reframes external debt). One criticism involves the retrospective aspect and to disputes over measurement. Climate debt critic, Schlüsser (2011), rejects the retrospective element particularly because of circumstances of excusable ignorance and deontological restriction. Climate debt entails holding current citizens responsible for past emissions, and Baatz (2013) finds that “within the realm of normative individualism it is very difficult to justify such a claim”. However, current foreign external debt is largely based on a similar intergenerational logic. Furthermore, wealthy elites in Southern countries have also benefitted from industrial circumstances and emissions, therefore Baatz (2013) argues, that climate debt reparations would have let them free ride. Similarly, however, one could add that in the North there are marginalized or Indigenous communities which have benefitted relatively little from their countries’ accumulated climate debt.

Finally, the most commonly repeated criticism of the aspiration to have climate debt acknowledged, even by critics who *do* recognize its moral argument is that it has “lost touch with reality” (e.g. Godard, 2012). Baatz (2013) concludes that political leaders in the West would “never agree” to do this (see e.g. Vanderheiden (2015) or Rao (2014) for a similar skepticism about the political feasibility). There seems to be a consensus that it is the lack of political will (rather than

methodological issues) which is the biggest obstacle for the acknowledgement and repayment of climate debt.

Here it is crucial to note that none of the sources encountered in this analysis call on recognizing or repaying climate debt in a one-to-one equalization or exchange between climate and financial debt. Also, Martinez-Alier, emphasizes that quantifying any type of environmental debt in monetary terms poses challenges, but stresses that the point is to recognize that the external debt from south to north has already been paid on account of the North's overconsumption of the global commons (Martinez-Alier, 2002). As described above (Section 1.6.2) advocates envision the repayment of climate debt in a range of different ways (not necessarily monetary).

In addition to the rebuttal, further obstacles includes the fact that it due to its initial use as an activist conceptual framework has yet to solidify itself within academic and policy circle and gain wider recognition of the claim. Although, as described above, this is rapidly changing due to the development of scientific methodologies to measure climate debt.

#### **4. Qualifier: indeed**

The qualifier reflects the degree of certainty in the claim (e.g. *certainly, probably, impossibly*) (Toulmin 2003:93). Whereas there is no consensus among the sources of likelihood that the claim will actually gain political recognition, the qualifier refers to the certainty in the validity of the claim. In this regard, the analysis finds that “indeed” is an appropriate qualifier. In contrast to the analysis in Section 4.1 of the discourse within the CJM in the Philippines, the qualifier used in the secondary sources are weaker. It is still presented as valid and strong, and one can argue that recognizing it is not incontrovertible, does not necessarily subtract from the credibility of the argument.

#### **5. Claim**

Despite their differences, the secondary sources analyzed presents an arguably coherent argument in support of the claim that:

The Northern countries owe a climate debt greater than the Southern countries' external debt (*data*)  
and indeed (*qualifier*), therefore,

the recognition of climate debt relates to and reframes the external debt discourse of the Philippines  
and other indebted countries in the South (*claim*),

since the global south is *unjustly* burdened by both types of debt (*warrant*),

on account of shifting the discourse towards justice (*backing*),

unless the concept of climate debt is considered invalid (*rebuttal*).

## **Implications**

This section will discuss the implications of how the potential recognition of climate debt offers a new lens to see the orthodox external debt discourse through. The claim calls for a substantial reshaping of the current institutional/structural relationship between the global hemispheres. Klein (2010) emphasizes that the money *is* there – it is just in the wrong places. Bond (2012:134) also argues that seen in the light of countries in the North's; (growing) military budgets, bank bailouts or fossil fuel subsidies, repaying climate debts ought to be *financially* possible. This is a matter of priorities and lack of political will (*ibid.*). In an EJOLT report, Pigrau et al. (2014), find that the promotion of climate debt “will require a profound reconceptualisation of global governance that is able to integrate counter-hegemonic claims for environmental justice”. Such a reconceptualization could aptly include adding the climate debtor/creditor relations to the current categories within the development discourse (e.g. developing/developed, foreign debt creditor/debtor).

## **5. Conclusion**

This thesis set out to examine the concept of climate debt from two different angles, using data gathered from the CJM in the Philippines, as well as secondary sources. The two research questions were as follows:

***RQ1: How does the climate justice movement in the Philippines frame the recognition of climate debt?***

Using the social movement framing perspective (Snow and Benford, 2000), the findings suggest that different fractions of the CJM focus on different aspects, but the overall ‘climate debt recognition frame’ is underpinned by significant moral and political arguments.

***RQ2: Does the recognition of climate debt relate to and reframe the external debt discourse and other indebted countries in the South?***

The “Toulmin Argumentation Model” used in the analysis presents a structured argument, based on secondary sources, that the recognition of climate debt *does* relate to and reshape the external debt discourse of the Philippines and other indebted countries. If the external debt discourse is informed by the climate debt backdrop, the findings of this thesis suggest that it reframes who actually owes whom. Rather than offering “climate aid” the global north should provide reparations.



Finally, this thesis makes no claims of establishing causality between the recognition of climate debt and mitigating climate change, it merely seeks to further the understanding on the subject and represents only a small piece of a broad context

In connecting the findings between the two research questions, there is reason to remain optimistic about the potential of social movements to reframe how we think about solutions to climate change. The urgency of this issue cannot be underestimated - time will tell whether climate change or social mobilization for climate justice reaches its tipping point first. I am certain, however, that the near future will involve an exploration of the idea, the movement, and possibly, the recognition of climate debt.

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## 7.1 Appendix 1) Index: Non-Annex I and Annex I Countries

Index: Non-Annex I and Annex I Countries	
Sourced from IPCC (2006)	
<p><b>Non-Annex I Countries</b></p> <p>The countries that have ratified or acceded to the UNFCCC but are not included in Annex I.</p>	<p>Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe</p>
<p><b>Annex I countries</b></p>	<p>Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America</p>



## **7.2 Appendix 2) List of Organizations Interviewed:**

- 1) Philippine Movement for Climate Justice (PMCJ): Communications Officer.
- 2) SANLAKAS: Press Representative.
- 3) Jubilee South Asia Pacific Movement on Debt and Development: Regional Coordinator.
- 4) 350.org: Communications Campaigner.
- 5) Greenpeace Philippines: Youth Coordinator.
- 6) Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities (ICSC): Executive Director.
- 7) Earth First! Philippines: Communications Officer.
- 8) DAKILA: Program Manager for Advocacy.
- 9) Pakisama: National Coordinator.
- 10) UP – One Earth: Chair Person.
- 11) Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC): Secretary-General.
- 12) SARILAYA: Advocacy Committee Chair.