War of Memories

A securitization theory approach to South Korea-Japan bilateral relations

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Abstract

In contrast to a quite vast literature on the underlying external reasons for the current South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship, there is less research undertaken on the subjective contextual factors of how a nation state shape its foreign policies and create its perception of a security threat. Even less exists on the domestic debates and how these possibly influence the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. To understand these domestic processes the thesis has widened the understanding of security to not only encompass the South Korean state’s perspective of Japan as a security threat or not, but also the public’s opinion and media that form part of a larger process of threat construction. By using the Copenhagen School’s (CSs) securitization theory the thesis has examine South Korean-Japanese bilateral issues that either have been securitized (named as a threat) or de-securitized during the presidency of Park Geun-hye. The thesis has used the securitization theory’s method of speech acts: of how an actor chooses to securitize or de-securitize an issue. With concrete examples of speech act processes in regard to two of the most crucial bilateral issues the thesis hopes to enrich the understanding of the paradoxical South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship.

Key Words: Copenhagen School, Securitization theory, South Korea-Japan bilateral relations, non-traditional security studies
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1. Introduction

2015 marked two important events in South Korea-Japan relations, the 70th anniversary of the end of Japanese colonialism over the Korean peninsula in 1945, and the 50th anniversary of normalization of bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan in 1965. The countries have during these 70 years come to adopt common democratic and economic norms and institutions, similar military security agreement with the US, also sharing similar security concerns about the region, specifically in regards to North Korea. These factors would logically point at a sound and a cooperative bilateral relationship between the two neighboring East Asian countries (Midford 2008, Wiegand 2015, Kim 2015). However, that is far from the reality. In the beginning of 2015 the two countries’ leaders, South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Abe Shinzo, had yet to meet formally though they both were inaugurated already in 2013 (Michishita, 2013).

In President Park’s 1st of March speech in 2013 to the Korean nation she uttered what possibly could be an explanation to why:

“History is a mirror for self-reflection and a key to unlocking a future of new hope. The same is true for the history between Korea and Japan. Only when there is honest soul-searching about the past will our two nations be able to usher in a future of shared progress together” (Cheong Wa Dae, 2013).

The key for unlocking a future of shared progress is yet to be found and the relationship has deteriorated under President Park Geun-hye and Japanese PM Abe Shinzo (Kang, W. T. and Sohn 2013) where South Korea has even been said to perceive the Abe regime and consequently Japan as a security threat, possibly greater than its nuclear neighbor in the North (Miller, 2014).

1.1 Aim and Purpose

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1 Policy Briefing-Cheong Wa Dae 2016
In contrast to a quite vast literature on the underlying external reasons for the frosty and unstable South Korea-Japan relationship, there is less research undertaken on the subjective contextual factors of how a nation state shape its foreign policies and create its perception of a security threat. Even less exists on the domestic debates and how these possibly influence the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. To understand these domestic processes focus will have to be widened to not only encompass the South Korean state’s perspective of Japan as a security threat or not, but also the public’s opinion and media that form part of a larger process of threat construction. By using the Copenhagen School’s (CSs) securitization theory the thesis will examine South Korean- Japanese bilateral issues that either have been securitized (named as a threat) or de-securitized during the presidency of Park Geun-hye. The thesis will use the securitization theory’s method of speech acts: of how an actor chooses to securitize or de-securitize an issue. With concrete examples of speech act processes in regard to two of the most crucial bilateral issues the thesis hopes to enrich the understanding of the paradoxical South Korea- Japan bilateral relationship.

1.2 Research Question

As the aim is to emphasize the contextual dynamics of threat perception the thesis will analyze issues of securitization or de-securitization under President Park’s time in government from 2013-2015 and how security relations with Japan have developed during her presidency.

Research Question

How have the most crucial bilateral issues been securitized or de-securitized in South Korea during the years 2013-2015?

Sub-question

Which of securitization theory’s sectors of security is most prominent in South Korea’s securitization and de-securitization processes?

1.3 Disposition
The thesis will start with a short section of research design before it follows with the background section including the history of South Korea-Japan relations and an overview of the previous research undertaken in trying to better explain or understand the contemporary bilateral relations. The thesis will then be followed by the theoretical and methodological sections. The section of Empirical Material will follow and discuss the material for the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute and Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves Issue. Thereafter the thesis will continue with the analysis covering the cases selected for analysis. The analysis section is followed by a section of Theoretical Discussion before the thesis ends with the Concluding Section. Reference list and Appendix can be found in the ultimate part.

2. Research Design

The thesis will follow an International Relations-based type of research design, where a deeper discussion of the theory of Securitization is necessary. The thesis further follows to some extent a deductive approach in terms of the operationalization of the securitization theory when analyzing the data as the theory have pre-established concept and sectors of security that are applied and tested in the analysis (Bryman 2008: 24). However, the thesis largely takes an inductive approach in its case selection to be able to reduce and withdraw relevant cases from the existing literature based on a priori stated criteria, which would be difficult to establish otherwise given the space-limit of the thesis. This inductive approach follows a purposive sampling when selecting the cases (Bryman 2008: 418).

2.1 Epistemology and Ontology

The thesis will follow the epistemological standpoint of interpretivism as the research has been conducted with the aim of understanding the social intersubjectivity of the construction of threat perception, therefore not seeing science as something purely objective as would the positivists (Bryman 2008: 28). An interpretivist thinking of what is acceptable as knowledge means that one wants to understand rather than explain human behavior and social action (ibid). The social interactions are in constant change and dependent on the context of which the actors operate, which corresponds to a constructivist ontology, which the author, after reviewing previous literature argues, is the best approach to give a deeper understanding of the South Korea-Japan bilateral relations. By taking a constructivist viewing of the world it
also incorporates the subjectivity of the researcher when analyzing a case, which is particularly important to highlight when using an inductive research design. Further it is necessary to stress that the thesis and the cases under study will present findings and discussion that are not to be taken as generalizable to a larger entity or as definitive, rather it hopes to put forward a “specific version of social reality” for South Korea –Japan bilateral relations (ibid: 33).

When starting from an interpretivist and constructivist research design qualitative methods are usually followed, as it puts greater emphasis on words and not on the quantification of data (Bryman 2008: 36). There are further three important criteria to follow in the research design, the reliability, replication, and validity of the research.

Reliability refers to how the research can be repeatable in terms of the measures used for analyzing the concepts used in ones study. In this thesis the theory of securitization and the concepts of security, securitization and de-securitization is the measures that would have to be clearly defined and consistent throughout the study (ibid: 46). It is usually of more importance for quantitative methods but within a qualitative research design the measures should be consistently used and therefore repeatable. Reliability entails that the researcher spell out the procedures taken in the thesis, starting from the epistemological and ontological framework, the methods, and the data collection to openly show why one reaches the conclusions one does in the study (ibid: 47). The last criterion is validity of the research, which is directly linked to the conclusions of the thesis, which can be divided into internal and external validity. Internal validity relates to if the causality between ones research question, data analyzed and conclusions are of a valid point. External validity on the other hand is whether the conclusions drawn can be generalized to another context (ibid). However, in this study, which is using a constructivist notion of the world where each social action of actors needs to be understood from its specific context, the aim of the thesis will naturally not come to involve reaching external validity.

2.2 Ethical Considerations

I have conducted a semi-structured interview with Professor Lee Jong Won at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University in February 2016, who has great knowledge about Korean foreign policy and its bilateral relations with Japan. The interview
has been used, as supporting material to the previous literature and will therefore not be analyzed from a theoretical or methodological point of view. The interview has been used more as a triangulation approach of reaching internal validity for the research. The semi-structured approach was used with an open-ended answer format in hope to give a structured but insightful knowledge gathering of the bilateral relations, which also gave the opportunity to ask sequence questions when needed (Bryman, 2008: 471). When conducting the interview and also gathering the empirical data for the analysis I have made sure to follow the ethical guidelines as described by The Swedish Research Council4 and the ethical guidelines found in Silverman (2010) that are based on: “voluntary participation and right to withdraw, obtaining consent, confidentiality of data collected, and not doing harm”(Silverman, 2010: 153). Professor Lee has stated his understanding and consent in using the material gathered during the interview and has been emailed the thesis. He has lent his full consent in using his statements and name in the thesis.

3. Background

President Park uttered in her speech that “History is a mirror for self-reflection and a key to unlocking a future of new hope”, that hint that history is one of the key factors influencing the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. It is therefore of significance to give an overview of the more historical events that still are affecting the bilateral relations.

3.1 The Historical Relationship between South Korea and Japan

Japan and the Korean peninsula have long historical enemy ties that can be traced back as far as 1592 when Japanese military forces invaded the peninsula destroying many of Korea’s royal palaces (Cooney and Scarbrough 2008: 175). The enemy ties continued to deepen and in the 1860s Japan, who then were under the new Emperor Meiji, started to exercise military pressure on the Koreans by forcing them to make concession to the Japanese court. The Koreans continued to make the concession up until the Russo-Japan war in 1905 which basically made the Korean peninsula into a Japanese colony, but which was not fully implemented until 1910 (ibid).

Japan’s colonial history in Korea is often described through different stages. It began in 1910 with a very harsh military rule and the development of a cultural policy, which banned Korean history and language in favor of the Japanese, which were to be viewed as being superior to the Korean. This eventually meant an attempt to destroy or completely extinct the Korean identity and culture, especially after the March 1st movement in 1919 that saw many Koreans out in the streets protesting against the Japanese strict military rule (Shin 1997: 43). The cultural policy was followed by a further Japanization in the 1920s and 1930s that came to directly exploit Koreans as soldiers and workers in the name of the Japanese imperial army and also the continued destruction of historical cultural artifacts and buildings (ibid: 45). The exploitation came to its climax during World War II (WWII) when thousands of Korean women⁵ that were forced into sexual labor, more commonly know as comfort women were drafted by the Japanese army (Jonsson 2015: 510). Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean peninsula ended with the end of WWII in 1945 and a period of internal struggles in Korea between ideological factions over who would lead the new Korea now began. Korea’s destiny was however, once again, placed in foreign hands with a division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel that divided the nation into a US controlled South Korea, and Soviet controlled North Korea (Shin 1997: 79). 1950 until 1953 saw the final dividing event take place with the Korean War, which came to cement the 38th parallel as the border between South and North Korea.

South Korea was after the war in great need of capital to re-build its war torn country and industries and struggled with both political and economical stability. In 1961, the military general Park Chung Hee, Park Geun Hye’s father, rose to power through a coup d’état and his strongest commitment was to develop Korea into an economically powerful and proud nation (Delury 2015: 450). South Korea’s “economy first” policy also entailed a change in its foreign policy towards Japan and a normalization process started where Park and the Japanese prime minister Kishi Nobusuke, Abe Shinzo’s grandfather, were to establish a friendly relationship based on shared ideological ideas of conservative nationalism for the development of their countries (Kang and Hyun 2010: 282). The leaders saw a mutually economic beneficial outcome with a normalization of relations even if this was particularly controversial in South Korea with major public protests against the normalization. Park however, being a military dictator, declared martial law and went through with the process

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⁵ Estimates are between 70,000-200,000 women being recruited of which ca 80% were of Korean nationality (Jonsson 2015: 510).
and normalized relations with Japan in 1965 (Delury 2015: 452). The close relationship between Park and Kishi continued throughout Park’s rule until Park was shot and killed by his own intelligence chief in 1979 (ibid: 454). The 1980s saw an unstable but continued economic development in South Korea with the military government of Chun Doo Hwan. However, during the 1980s a democratic movement started to evolve, finally bringing democracy to the country. However, these social movements, who were strongly against the South Korean military government, also came to target Japan. The democracy movement was calling for an official apology for Japan’s imperialist wrongdoings. Consequently, when South Korea held its first democratic election in 1988 it came with an outburst of anti-Japanese sentiments that before had been repressed by the military governments (Cooney and Scarbrough 2008: 176). Still, even though the political bilateral relations saw deterioration in the 1990s, the economic relationship continued with Japanese capital fueling the economic boom that South Korea experienced, consequently being named one of the Asian tiger economies (ibid: 176).

Historical issues between the two countries became even more prominent and discussed during the 1990’s and 2000s, specifically events related to the Japanese colonization, such as the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves, Dokdo/Takeshima, and Japan’s revisionist textbooks where whitewashing of historical military misdeeds was heavily criticized by both South Korea and China. The Japanese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which started with prime minister Koizumi’s visits during the years 2001-2006, where some of Japan’s Class-A war criminals are commemorated (Deans 2007: 272) and Japan’s remilitarization during the Abe Shinzo government, are further events that are argued to be major stumbling blocks for developing a deeper cooperation between South Korea and Japan (Lee, S. 2013: 97). In short, history is preventing cooperation and although there is no full out military war between the two, there definitely exists a war of historical memories.

3.2 The Kono and Murayama Statements

There are further two important events that lay as a groundwork for bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan in more contemporary times. These are the Kono⁶ statement

from 1993 and the Murayama\(^7\) statement from 1995 that are viewed and accepted by South Korea as apologies by Japan for their involvement in the recruitment of the South Korean Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves and for the war atrocities committed by the Japanese army during colonization and WWII.

It was in 1991 that the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue erupted when the late Kim Hak-sun testified for the first time about her forced recruitment as a comfort woman to the Japanese Imperial Army. More women followed and spoke up about their coerced recruitments and filed for compensation from the Japanese government. However, the Japanese government kept on referring to the 1965 normalization treaty arguing that it had been private recruiters that had coerced the women and that all war-related compensations concerning South Koreans had been settled with the treaty and that rights for individual claims therefore had ended (Jonsson 2015: 509).

However in 1993 the then Japanese Chief Cabinet secretary Kono Yohei admitted for the first time the Japanese army’s involvement in the recruitment of women as comfort women. The acknowledgement was followed in 1995 by the Asian Women’s Fund, which was set up by Japanese civilians to support the former comfort women with the aim to compensate the women with the Prime Minister’s apology, money and medical welfare. The compensation offered by the Asian Women’s Fund was, on the other hand not accepted by the “Korean council for the women drafted for military sexual slavery” a civic organization representing the Korean comfort women which instead wanted the Japanese government to take a legal responsibility for inflicting on women’s human rights. Something the Japanese government has continued to refuse. In 2012 Japanese vice foreign minister Kenichiro Sasae stipulated a three-point proposal during an official visit to Seoul which included: a formal apology from the Japanese PM, that the Japanese ambassador to South Korea would visit the comfort women and deliver the apology on behalf of the PM, and that the victims would receive compensation on humanitarian grounds. The so-called Sasae proposal has been the groundwork upon which the two governments under 2014-2015 have held director general level talks in order to resolve the issue. Civic groups representing the comfort women are still reluctant to accept the statement based on that the Japanese government have stated that they will receive compensation on humanitarian rather than on legal grounds, thereby viewed by

\(^7\) http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (accessed 2016-05-08)
the comfort women as not taking their full responsibility for the crimes committed (Ku 2015: 244).

The Murayama statement clearly states that Japan’s imperialism did “tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.” The Murayama statement is different from the statements made at the Tokyo trials after Japan’s defeat in WWII where South Korea and Taiwan were missing as victims of Japan’s imperialist aggression (Togo 2013:51) The statement contains the declaration of Japan committing atrocities against Korean and Chinese people during their imperialistic mission. Japan had before 1995 voiced apologies for their past wrongdoings through statement from Japanese government official and also from the emperor, stating their personal remorse, but the Murayama statement was the first made by a government official with such explicit language of the atrocities committed made by Japan as a state (Dodds 2003).

3.3 Bilateral Relations during President Park Geun Hye 2013-2015

President Park began her presidency in a hopeful future oriented commitment of strengthening the regional security cooperation stating that:

“Although Asia's cultural, historical, and geopolitical environment is unique, the continent can learn from precedents, particularly Europe's experience. To begin with, Asian states must slow down their accelerating arms buildup, reduce military tensions, and establish a cooperative security regime that would complement existing bilateral agreements and help resolve persistent tensions in the region”(Park, G.H. 2011).

South Korean and Japanese relations have nonetheless been particularly rocky during the Park Geun Hye, and Abe Shinzo as both leaders have taken a harsher political stance, Park being exceptionally negative towards Abe’s revisionist take on Japan’s war history (Delury, 2015). President Park has even kept on refusing meeting Abe since her inauguration until the two leaders finally met in late 2015. However, President Park has continued to stress the importance for Japan’s correct view of history before any further progress in the bilateral relationship can be made.
4. Literature Review

One of the main questions that scholars, regardless of theoretical inclination, ask when studying the bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan, is related to why there has not been any deeper development of a security relationship between the two countries given that they share security and economical interest in the region and have similar political and value systems, that would point to a greater bilateral cooperation than the current reality show (Midford 2008, Cooney and Scarbrough 2011, Lee, S. 2013).

4.1 Realism’s view on the bilateral relations

The security relationship has on the other hand by some (Park 2009, Lee 2011, Park 2011, Cha and Kang 2003) been viewed as improving when looking at the relations after the Cold War with several Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between South Korea and Japan, such as defense policy meetings and an increase in military personnel and information exchanges (Kim, J.Y, 2015: 478). These scholars often take realist explanation of the world and look to the quantitative facts arguing that the main cause of improved relations is the external nuclear threat of North Korea, which push them closer in their security cooperation (Kang and Lee 2011, S. Lee 2013). China is also claimed to pose an external threat because the country is becoming a stronger economic and military threat in the region, which strategically would push Japan and South Korea closer balancing against China (Midford 2008, Wiegand 2015, 2015, Kim 2015). However the actual implementation of security cooperation always seem to fall short. Realists argue that the US influence in the region is crucial stating that there has not been any need for the two to cooperate because of the US security umbrella of which they both are part (Kang 2009, Kang and Lee 2011, Singh 2015). But many also point out that the US is increasingly keen on signing a trilateral security framework between the South Korea, Japan and the US to possibly counter nuclear North Korea and a militarily strong China (Kim, Ji.Y. 2015 Kim, Jee. Y. 2015, Snyder 2009, Michishita 2014). The realist explanations are therefore not sufficient in explaining the lack of cooperation between the two countries (Son 2014:108, Choi and Moon 2010). Wiegand (2015) for example argues that looking at the external security issues present in the region, North Korean nuclear threat, China’s steady military and economic rise, and similar security relationship with the US, South Korea and Japan would logically benefit from enhanced and
closer security cooperation. She gives as an example of the 2012 trilateral General Security of Military Agreement (GSOMIA) of intelligence sharing between Japan and South Korea which was the closest the countries have come to signing a security agreement but which the South Korean government came to postpone. Even though it might have been in South Korea’s best strategic interest to join it was stopped as some of the leaders of the opposition parties and the domestic public raised their voice stating that joining a potential security agreement with Japan, giving away classified military information, could be directly harmful to the national security of South Korea. The agreement was therefore cancelled and soon after, the then current President Lee Myung-bak, visited the contested islets of Dokdo/Takeshima as the first South Korean leader to do so which spurred a diplomatic dispute between South Korea and Japan (Wiegand 2015: 355, Son 2014: 93).

4.2 Constructivism’s view on the bilateral relations

Wiegand further demonstrates how powerful domestic accountability can be in South Korean politics with politicians having to constantly considering their foreign policies against Japan in order to gain domestic support (Choi and Moon 2010, Wiegand 2015, Kim 2015). She also states that domestic opposition towards South Korean foreign policies towards Japan oftentimes lump together the historical issues the countries share, so when the issue of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is raised, Korean officials usually must deal with the other historical issues in tandem, such as the textbooks issue, Japanese colonialism or the comfort women/sexual slaves issue.

The constructivist scholars often state that the ideational and cultural perspective is of great value and that it more concretely captures a pattern between South Korea and Japan relations (Lee 2013, Flamm 2015, Son 2014, Kim, J.Y. 2015). Kim (2015) argues from a constructivist standpoint and writes that even though South Korea and Japan have many times promised to work closer on bilateral cooperation in regards to North Korea and other strategic interests, their pledges have oftentimes not materialized. The reason for this, Kim states, is the distrust that still exists between them where both government and media are continuing to be outspoken about their suspicion against the other nation. Kim brings in the history problem as a main obstacle that continues to obstruct a possible cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo and argues that a constructivist focus on domestic political systems, identity and culture better explain why security relations oftentimes lack in quality and implementation. Kim (2015) and
other scholars (Dudden 2008, Hasegawa and Togo 2008, Choi and Moon 2010) also claim that the national identity of the two countries have been shaped by hostile interaction throughout history which, continues to plague the security relations even today.

States choose to cooperate when there has been a convergence of interest, usually sparked by cultural interactions, shared histories, or social contemporary ties (S. Lee 2013). The past interactions between states are believed to eventually form structures of enmity or amity frameworks that can be visible in contemporary international relations (ibid). While states like France and Germany, which constitute an “aggressor-victim” type of historical relations, like the South Korean-Japanese one, have consciously worked to overcome the tragic events of their shared history, South Korea and Japan are by many authors argued to have not, which explains the continued distrust of Japan in South Korea (S. Lee 2013, Midford 2008, Son 2014, Kim, J.Y. 2015, Hwang 2015). Examples of historical factors still affecting the relationship are related to Japanese colonial rule, as the historical textbook dispute, the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue and the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict that have been spurring anti-Korean sentiments in Japan from time to time, but events that usually have had a stronger effect on Korean’s distrust of Japan (Cooney and Scarbrough 2011, Jonsson 2014, Michishita 2014, Kim 2015, Flamm 2015, Wiegand 2015, Rozman 2007). Gilbert Rozman states that the historical disputes: “has set back relations…” and “drives a wedge between the two nations, making cooperation difficult…” (Rozman 2007: 190). Hence many authors state that the South Korea-Japan relationship is still highly volatile with reluctant cooperative measure at best and intense conflict at worst (Rozman 2007, Midford 2008, Kang and Lee 2011, S. Lee 2013, Michishita 2014).

4.3 Interview with Professor Lee Jong-won at Waseda University

Professor Lee Jong-won at Waseda University also stated the history problem as the biggest obstacle to improved relations between South Korea and Japan (Appendix C: 51-54).

When asked if he could name areas where the countries find common ground and cooperation and also what are the obstacles to a further development of cooperation he answered:

“In the area of cooperation, in terms of social and economic matters, I think the two societies are getting more interdependent. Also in terms of security, people say that South Korea and
Japan can, or should cooperate vis-à-vis the North Korean threat, in terms of the maintenance of the status quo, or stability of the Korean peninsula, I think South Korea and Japan share common interest (Appendix C: 52).”

When answering what obstacles there is to a further development of cooperation he answers that historical issues, such as the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue and forced labor during the colonization still are political and diplomatic issues hindering such a development. He states that before South Korea democratized in the 1990s the authoritarian government could suppress the voices of society and thus could conclude the normalization treaty in 1965. But after democratization the victim’s voices could no longer be suppressed.

“With the advent of the progress of the democratization in South Korea… the society is becoming more powerful so now it is a very serious diplomatic issue in the bilateral relations, between the two countries. I think, we should say that history, is one of the biggest obstacles to cooperate and also…which has become more serious with the progress of the democratization is the territorial dispute (Appendix C: 54).”

He continues in regards to the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima:

“When South Korea was under military rule the dictators could just suppress the protests and they could deal with the problem and continue doing business with Japan, without thinking about the territorial dispute. But now, with the progress of democratization… both of the two countries can no longer be seen by the people as weak on the territorial issues, so that's the reason why we see more heated kind of confrontation over the island (Appendix C: 54-55).”

He concludes with:

“So history and territorial issues are obstacles and the problems are getting more and more serious (Appendix C: 55).”

When reading about the South Korean- Japanese bilateral relations and after conducting the interview with Professor Lee there seems to be a tendency, regardless if the author belongs to a more realistic explanation of the world or of a ideational understanding, that South Korea’s bilateral relations with Japan are heavily influenced by lingering historical issues. The
external factors do play a great part in the relationship as well, but as Professor Lee mentioned, a lot of South Korea’s political decisions in relations to Japan since democratization, has been heavily influenced by the mass public and domestic media who often oppose the government’s more strategic interests. Many of the authors also emphasizes the historical disputes, still stirring up nationalistic sentiments in both countries, as crucial in overcoming if the countries concretely are to move beyond its current frosty relationship.

5. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for the thesis will follow the Copenhagen School (CS) and its securitization theory of how an issue becomes securitized, meaning when a bilateral issue moves from the ordinary realm of politics toward being handled as a possible security threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). As mentioned earlier, the thesis will follow an inductive approach to its case selection but embraces securitization theory’s understanding of the world and security, which would entail a deductive structure of the analysis. Essential to point out is that securitization theory may not prove to give a sufficient answer in fully understanding the perception of Japan as security threat by South Koreans, it is merely an attempt to understand the relationship from securitization theory’s framework, which hope to give new insights and understandings to South Korea-Japan relations.

5.1 Concepts of Security

Buzan (1997) writes that the field of security studies has fragmented into three main theoretical approaches. The Traditionalist with its dominant military focus, the Critical Security Studies (CSS) who question the whole framework of how to conceptualize security, and lastly the wideners that want to see a widening of the security agenda (Buzan 1997: 5). Of importance for this thesis, which is following the Copenhagen School’s framework of securitization, are the traditionalist point of view and the wideners’ perspective. The reason for this is that the Copenhagen School’s understanding of security developed as a critique towards the traditionalist realistic conception of security. The traditionalists’ definition of security is defined as “freedom from threat” both subjectively and objectively where a security problem arises when something threatens to affect the sovereignty and the political
order of a state, which entails the political effect of war and coercion (Weaver 1995: 52). The Copenhagen School (CS), where academics such as Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde have been most prominent in the research undertaken, constitute one of the most prominent Schools of thought belonging to the wideners who instead argue for a widening of the concept of security. The CS approach want to explore beyond the military and political realm of security and puts much more focus on the process of “securitization”, the process of constructing a security threat, regardless if it materialistically and politically is one or not (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). It is merely the perception of threat that is on focus.

The CS is specifically critical toward the traditionalists’ view of security only equating it with military issues and the use of force. According to the CS, security is ultimately about survival, which shares some similarity with the traditionalist claim, but is understood as an “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”. So where realism takes a security issue objectively and as an empirical fact, the CS see it as a politically motivated social construction, where not only the state’s survival can constitute the referent object of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). CS also came to question realisms view of security as always being a good thing, which becomes apparent when analyzing economic security and the working of the liberal market economy that would logically speak for less economic security (Buzan 1997: 11). Instead the CS approach argue that the aim for security should be to de-securitize an issue, moving an issue from being securitized and out from the mode of emergency into the realm of ordinary measures via diplomacy.

The CS starts from a constructivist theoretical premise, and like the CSS approach believe that change in security relations is possible because of things being socially constituted. However, the CS framework argues that even the socially constituted can overtime become structuralized with certain regularities, and it is therefore important to understand the dynamics behind such sedimentation of a securitization, which can be related to the South Korea-Japan relations. The CS has therefore a stronger focus on the collectivities and on understanding what triggers an actor to securitize an issue (Buzan 1997: 19).

It was with the end of the Cold War in 1989 that a re-conceptualization of security from the realist point of view started to emerge (Weaver 1995: 47). One adjustment to defining security was to include not only the state as the main actor in security issues but also the
security of collectives and the individual. By connecting security to the individual level a whole new set of security issues became relevant for security studies, such as political rights, cultural identity, the environment, and economic welfare. The debate after 1989 changed from the dominant traditionalist military and political security to also include the sectors of societal, economical and environmental security (Buzan et al 1998: 2) The CSs agrees that security ultimately is about survival, which usually is the political unit and the sovereignty of the state, but that other actors and unit of analysis play part in the securitization process.

In regards to this thesis, security will be understood following the CS notion of security as socially constructed and as a subjective concept. Even though the main security concerns often is related to the survival of the state it can also relate to other referent objects such as the nation, the environment or the economic rights of the collective. This involves widening the security agenda to many different types of threats, not only those related to war and force or to the state, which will be shown in the cases selected for the analysis.

5.2 Level of analysis

Buzan et al. define five different levels of analysis commonly used in International Relations theory where explanations and outcomes of a security issue can be located. The levels are where things happen but it does not constitute a source of explanation in itself (ibid: 6). Significant for this thesis are three of the five levels namely the “units”, “sub-units”, and Individuals”. Buzan et al. (1998:6) describes the levels as follows:

3. Units are actors who are constituted by different communities, subgroups or organizations and individuals but share a cohesive and independent standing apart from other units. This is traditionally the state or the nation but could also be transnational firms.

4. Subunits can be found within units and are referred to as organized groups of individuals that can influence or try to shape the ideas and actions of the unit, such as lobbies or national firms.

5. Individuals constitute the last level of analysis within International Relations.
These levels provide a framework for analysis, which helps to locate the focus of one's study. According to Buzan et al. and their securitization theory, the unit level encompasses much more than just the state even though it tends to reinforce the state as the main unit of analysis. Securitization theory still includes the traditional security of the military and political realm but hope to pursue a wider security agenda where the securitization process in different sectors can help in understanding the dynamics present in a specific context (ibid: 195). The idea of widening the field of security units fit well with this thesis, as it wants to explore South Korea’s securitization and de-securitization of Japan-related issues during the years 2013-2015 where both the South Korean media and citizen have shown to play large roles in the process as well.

5.3 The process of securitization and de-securitization

States and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat, which is why the CS views security as a subjective matter (Buzan 1997: 18). However, there need to be a theoretical structure and framework, which establish a methodological coherence when analyzing an issue. The CS describes the process of securitization and de-securitization as reflective of the security considerations of a specific political community, which in this thesis is South Korea.

So how does an issue become securitized? The CS argues that the securitization of an issue is done when a “securitizing actor” names something as a security problem. This is done through a “speech act”, uttering that a particular “referent object is threatened in its existence, claiming the right to use extraordinary means to ensure the referent objects survival (Buzan et al. 1998: 27) The existential threat and the measures of extraordinary means differ across sectors as it is understood in relation to the specific sector and referent object (Buzan 1997: 15). Securitizing actors generally refers to, governments, political leaders, advocacy groups, and the media, which will have different outcomes on issues depending if the actor is believed to be authorized to securitize an issue or not (Buzan et al 1998: 27). The process of securitization is nevertheless, a combination between language and society, a kind of social praxis, where the speech act by the securitizing actor needs to get legitimized by the group. This group is usually the political community or the society of a state, which in the securitization framework is referred to the “audience” which recognize the speech act as credible and who deems the urgency of the threat as actual (Buzan et al. 1998: 32-33). The referent object corresponds to the object that is “existentially threatened and that have a
legitimate claim to survival (ibid: 36). This is traditionally the state, but can be other entities as well such as, the nation or human rights of the individual. When an acceptance by the audience is done, the relevant actors will realize the extraordinary measures to counter the threat. Securitization is therefore understood as an inter-subjective process and as a political choice when securitizing an issue. But so is also the acceptation of an issue being securitized by the audience. The securitization process and the consequent effect is a political choice as it entails moving things in one direction and not the other that will leave an impact and have effects different than those handled in a non-security framework.

There is also the de-securitization process, where a securitized issue turns into a non-security issue and where the problem instead is handled by ordinary means, which is varies across the different security sectors (Weaver 1995: 55). The effects are often translated into threat defense of the state and other state-centered solutions of friend-enemy groupings or “we-them” rhetoric (ibid: 76). However, how security is understood differs across sectors and will effect how actors choose to act politically. Within closed states, such as North Korea, a greater securitization of issues would be expected, ranging from nuclear missiles, Americanization and South Korean pop music. In more open and liberal states de-securitization processes would be more common to occur, even though it always entails that an issue has been securitized to begin with (ibid: 209). The CS views a securitization of an issue as a failure because it shows the inability of actors to handle or resolve the issue through ordinary political means. The de-securitization of a previous securitized issue should therefore be the optimal goal for the actors involved as it moves an issue from the mode of “panic politics” and threat defense into more stable and diplomatic procedures (Buzan et al. 1998: 29).

However, within the securitizing and de-securitizing process there must be more than just the speech act, the securitizing actor needs to have the means at hand to deter any possible security threats or means necessary to change a security problem into a de-securitized issue. This change can only take place with the consent from the power holders or the elites of a society and is an ongoing “negotiated process of pressure and acceptance” (ibid: 59). Weaver (1995) claims that to be able to explain the process of securitization it is therefore important to look into the elites of a society and the ways in which they legitimize the securitization of an issue (ibid: 60). This helps in narrowing down the actors present within a securitizing or de-securitizing process.
5.4 Subjectivity of the researcher

Williams (2003) named the Copenhagen School approach as “one of the most innovative, productive and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies” (Williams 2003: 511). One of the major critiques against the securitization theory is the subjectivity of the researcher when analyzing a case where traditional security studies often take an objectivist perspective to security, clearly stating what the real threats are and how to best deal with them. Balzacq et al. (2015) give an example of two researchers analyzing whether migration within the EU was securitized after 9/11 and who reaches two different conclusions. Balsacq et al. state that because the researchers have started from two different ontological frameworks, one concentrating on the privileged (material) practices (objective) sees it as positively correlating while the other, which focuses on language (subjective) reaches a negative end result (Balsacq et al. 2015). Buzan et al. are aware that by taking the speech act framework for analyzing a case or an issue, it puts a lot of pressure on the analyst on how to define and understand an actor’s security agenda and speech act. They defend this by stating that this sort of critique usually stems from a positivist value-free type of security studies and that a more constructivist understanding to security should be seen as part of a larger debate of the political role of the analyst and not as a negative development to the field (Buzan et al. 1998: 206).

Further, Balsacq et al. are critical toward the role of the audience in securitization theory, as it can be hard to define precisely the collective will of the audience, which ultimately creates a researcher bias. However, as in all research, as long as it is clearly defined what audience is supposed to be referred to in the specific case under study, and relevant material is used to show why one thinks this particular group is the audience in this specific case, the thesis reaches a sufficient level of reliability.

It is nonetheless important to highlight that this thesis will clearly take a constructivist perspective analyzing the speech act. Although the construction of the analysis and conclusions are made by the analyst (me) it is not about determining whether a security threat is real or not or the distinction if a securitization or de-securitization is true or false in retrospect, but the focus is more to analyze the cases and show the intersubjective process of
securitization or de-securitization, and what effect this has had on the bilateral relations (Buzan et al. 1998: 32).

The Copenhagen School approach has also been criticized for being too context specific, given that its genesis is in democratic and politically pluralistic discourse and is therefore named “Eurocentric” and “cultural specific” when conducted towards empirical study for regions where these conditions are not present (Steve Smith 2005: 59). South Korea, a presidential representative democratic republic is considered as a democratic and pluralistic society where the fundamental beliefs of threat identification and the consequent response from an audience can be rightly applied (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). Further, the aim of the study is to focus on the cultural and time specific securitization and de-securitization processes of Japan-related issues from the South Korean context during the years 2013-2015, where a context specific framework is suitable for the research.

6. Methodology

So what makes something into a security problem and when and how does it stop being one? Weaver (1995) argues that one can look at it as a development of events that threaten the survival of the referent object or what Weaver labels the unit. In empirical terms this would mean that the securitizing actor must first name a certain development as a security problem, which would then give the legitimization for the means necessary to defend the unit’s survival (Weaver 1995: 54). The naming of a certain development as a security problem is, as mentioned above, the “securitization” of an issue where the main method for securitization is the utterance or the “speech act”, meaning “by labeling something a security issue, it becomes one” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Yet, of course it entails that the relevant audience accepts the speech act as well.

6.1 The Speech Act-Structure

Weaver explains the speech act following the speech act-structure of linguist John L. Austin found in his book “How to do things with Words” from 1962. The speech act involves a speaker, a hearer and an utterance by the speaker (Austin 1962: 5). This would, following securitization theory, adhere to the securitizing actor, the audience and the speech act by the
securitizing actor. The actual speech act following Austin’s definition can be seen in three aspects: the locution, the illocution, and the perlocution. Taking the example of “is there any salt?” asked at the dinner table, one would understand that the question indirectly means that the person is asking for salt. The locution is here the actual question “is there any salt”, the illocution is the meaning conveyed, “please pass me the salt” and the perlocution is the actual effect of stated question, someone passes the salt to the person asking (ibid:8-9). When the securitizing actor labels something a security problem through a speech act it may therefore not be straightforward in its utterance, but through the illocutionary statement the actor constructs a sentence that usually will purvey a certain directive, the political choice of the securitizing actor.

Securitization theory particularly pays attention to the illocutionary aspect of the speech act, where the securitizing actor oftentimes label an issue a security issue in the hope of expecting an effect of getting its will through, giving the securitizing actor a certain right to defend the referent object with whatever extraordinary means possible (Weaver 1995: 59). Language theory is used to analyze the speech act, which usually includes the construction of a plot with the securitizing actor using grammar of security such as “existential threat”, “point of no return”, and “a possible way out”(ibid: 57). In the case of de-securitization the de-securitizing actor would use more benign rhetoric, which would not include ”security rhetoric”. Austin argues that speech acts include the illocutionary statements of ordering, greeting, warning, promising, inviting and congratulating and even thought it is not only persons in authoritative position that can make such statements, this thesis, as it follows securitization theory, will particularly analyze statements uttered by actors that do belong to the elites of society or have enough societal power to make a political change. Weaver (1995) again states that it usually is in the might of the power holders, the elites of society such as media, or people in authoritative positions who can declare a problem a security issue successfully and that will consequently have a political effect. However, there is of course also the unsuccessful speech acts, when an actor will try to move toward securitization or de-securitization with illocutionary statements but where the audience do not legitimize such acts whereby the perlocution, the actual effect, fails.

6.2 Case Studies
Using the case study method for the study of international security will pose both many advantages to the research but also some challenges. The major advantages with case studies are that it helps in operationalizing the theory with concrete cases to show whether securitization or de-securitization has taken place. It can also help to identify new variables or hypotheses in a case and also the opportunity to test and refine those already existing (Sprinz et al. 2008: 108). Another strong benefit, and particularly for this thesis, is that the case study gives an in-depth examination of the construction of historical variables and detailed explanations of particular cases that will be of great importance for the analysis (ibid). The challenge with using the case study method is the problem of case selection bias and the trade-off between the parsimony and richness of the selection of variables and cases to be examined (ibid). This can give a limited external reliability and validity, which in turn will limit the possibility of generalization. Though the case study method is criticized for being prone for selection bias the thesis’ focus will be on finding factors in the securitization and de-securitization by the South Korean actors of Japan-related issues, which can enrich the portrayal of the bilateral relations rather than stating that the securitization theory is the best theoretical framework to explain the bilateral relationship. This can to some extent be reduced by using process tracing, the method tracing historical cases that demonstrate complex contemporary processes (ibid: 22-23). The tracing of relevant cases for this thesis’ analysis will be centered on the security concerns and actions of actors that have been stated to influence the construction of the security discourse of Japan-related issues. Here the appropriateness of using process tracing is clearly shown as there will be a need to trace the historical material and conditions that have shaped the progress and institutionalization of Japan-related issues as security issues.

The analysis will therefore have to include both tracing historically relevant conditions based on secondary literature, but also on primary sources with the analysis of public statements, documents and interviews that are relevant for the cases’ analysis. The cases will be chosen from the premise stated by the framework of securitization, namely they must have had a political effect, which is applied to the primary and secondary source material to guide the selection of cases.

6.3 Case Selection
The analysis will be conducted by looking for securitizing and de-securitizing moves by a South Korean actor between the years 2013-2015, the years Park Geun-hye has been in office. The material has been analyzed in search of the presence of a speech act, done by a securitizing actor with the political effect of an issue becoming securitized or de-securitized. The core of the analysis will follow the CSs securitization theory speech act structure with the aim to give a deeper understanding to the development of the South Korean-Japanese relations during the years 2013-2015. The case selection is based on searches from Google Scholar and Lubsearch with the search words: “Park Geun Hye + Japan”, “South Korea + Japan + bilateral relations” “South Korea-Japan + security relations”.

Criteria for the cases selected:

1. An issue related to Japan and the effort by a South Korean actor to either securitize or de-securitize the issue between the years 2013-2015
2. Include a political effect in terms of a diplomatic outcome either from the government, the public, advocacy groups, opposition parties or media
3. Representative of a “speech act” following the Securitizing theory’s aspects

The most prominent security issues between South Korea and Japan between the years under analysis 2013-2015 have been induced from the previous literature, which have stated the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue as most prominent. These cases are defined as following the sampling method of critical cases that can test securitization theory’s statement of how an issue becomes securitized or de-securitized (Bryman 2008: 419). Still, it is hard to escape from a researcher bias as the cases ultimately are selected based on what I believe constitute an issue either being securitized or de-securitized and should therefore not be viewed as generalizable. The aim is to analyze the material chosen and first see if such securitization can be tested to be true, that it actually is securitized, and then analyze if there have been any moves toward de-securitizing the issues and see the following effect.

6.4 Actors/Audience

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There is not enough data of 2016 to give a high level of validity to the research whereby the years 2013-2015 were selected.
Which actors within the South Korean context can do or speak security in regards to the cases selected: the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women/Sexual slaves issue?

Articles reviewed showed that many authors emphasize the triangular interaction between politicians, media and the public opinion in shaping bilateral policies against Japan since democratization (Kim Ji young, Cooney and Scarbrough 2011, Midford 2008, Wiegand 2015, Lee, J. W. 2016). On the basis of these articles the thesis will argue that the elites of the South Korean society who can have a political effect on the securitization or de-securitization of the cases selected are the South Korean government, the South Korean media, and the South Korean public.

7. Empirical Material

The empirical material for my research will be based on primary and secondary sources and supported by an interview conducted in Tokyo, Japan in February 2016. Because the thesis’ aim is to enrich the understanding of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan, analyzing primary data serves best the purpose of critically analyzing the changed discourse in South Korean bilateral policies toward Japan, which will help to enrich the existing body of literature (Bryman 2008: 315). Primary data have mostly been taken from government agencies, Cheong Wa Dae-Blue House and South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)\(^9\). The MOFA publishes an annual White Paper that discusses the Government’s position of its foreign policies and regional and global issues that have taken place during the stated year\(^10\). The White Papers from 2014, 2015 will be used as representing the government’s standpoint in the cases for analysis while official statements from MOFA and Cheong Wa Dae will be used as the government’s opinion in 2015 as the White Paper from 2016 has not been published yet.

Sources representative of the media and to some extent public are taken from South Korea’s three largest English-speaking news media that represent different ideological views in hope it that can give a more nuanced portraying of the cases selected. These are as follow: the moderate Korea Times with 230,769 subscriptions, the conservative Joongang Ilbo with 1,\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) For longer segments of government statements see Appendix A and B.
\(^{10}\) The White Paper always publishes in retrospect, e.g. the White Paper of 2014 will discuss policies and issues from 2013 etc.
757,006 subscriptions, and the more left-wing and progressive Hankyoreh with 257, 303 subscriptions (The Korea Press, 2014). Focus has been on editorials and the opinion section of the newspapers in order to narrow down the material and which can show a more outspoken attitude towards the issues instead of just objectively portraying an event. After reaching maturity in the gathering of data and from narrowing down material that is related to the selected cases, the most relevant statements have been chosen as representative\textsuperscript{11}. The public opinion of the cases selected is represented by poll data from 2013-2015 measuring South Koreans impression of Japan and Japan related bilateral issues. The data is taken from the Japanese Genron NPO and South Korean East Asia Institute (EAI) that inaugurated in 2013 the Japan-Korea Future Dialogue, conducting joint public opinion polls directed at the Japanese and South Korean public in order to monitor the mutual understanding and awareness of one another. The opinion polls has been conducted in 2013, 2014, 2015 in South Korea through face-to-face interviews with women and men over the age of 19 and later also through email targeting South Korean intellectuals\textsuperscript{12}.

There are also secondary articles used from the English-speaking The Diplomat and Japan Times. The searches have been concentrated on the words, Dokdo/Takeshima, Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves are more used in describing certain events that have taken place in relations to the issues.

8. Analysis

The analysis will focus on finding possible speech acts of securitization or de-securitization in regards to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue during the years 2013-2015. As discussed in the methodological section, analysis will be on speech acts uttered by the three actors of the South Korean government, the South Korean Media, and the South Korean public\textsuperscript{13}.

The analysis will contain empirical examples of both securitizing and de-securitizing speech acts and then a discussion if the cases currently are securitized or de-securitized. As the thesis

\textsuperscript{11} For longer segments of articles chosen see Appendix A and B.
\textsuperscript{12} For longer poll results see Appendix A and B.
\textsuperscript{13} Longer segments of the texts selected will be found in the Appendices, which will be referred to with page number.
follows securitization theory’s framework of how an issue becomes securitized through the presence of a speech act uttered by a securitizing actor with enough political power to have an political effect, it is also interesting to see the three different actors role in the process. The analysis hopes to shed light on how the securitization theory operationalizes and which sectors of security are most prominent with a concluding discussion of which security sectors they mostly adhere to.

8.1 Sectors of Security

By focusing on each sector separately different discourses, agendas, and values will appear that are different in each sector, but important to underline is that the sectors should be seen as "lenses focusing on the same world" and that the sectors will naturally cross and integrate with each other (Buzan et al 1998: 166). In this thesis focus is on the two selected cases of Dokdo/Takeshima and the Comfort Women /Sexual Slaves issue that have shown tendencies of securitizing and de-securitizing processes during the years 2013 to 2015.

If taking the definition of security as “the survival of the unit” throughout the analysis, one can then look at different sectors of security within which operate different kinds of actors and units, without loosing the fundamental quality of the concept (ibid). Buzan et al. (1998) state five different sectors in their security analysis: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental that constitutes different views of the international system, which highlights each sectors particular process of securitization and de-securitization.

8.1.1 Military Security

The military sector constitutes the core of security studies and the sector where most institutionalization of security can be seen (Buzan et al. 1998: 49). The main object within the military sector is the government because it is the state that usually has greater military resources over other domestic actors, as well as political and legal power (ibid). The survival of the state is defined by the state’s sovereignty, to claim the power over a stated territory and the population living within those boundaries. The military security agenda is mostly constituted by the government’s ability to keep itself in power against any internal and external military threats (Buzan et al. 1998: 50). When it comes to the international level it usually concerns the interplay between two states’ military capabilities and their degree of
enmity and amity. When a securitization process once has started the countries concerned are usually found locked in an enmity framework of relations, threats, and perceived aggression, a spiral, which is hard to break free from. The theory also states that military threats are often perceived as more real if countries are closer through distance and terrain as military threats are easier to defend against the further you are from the threat (ibid).

History is another factor influencing the securitization framework, arguing that states, which have a historical enmity ties, will tend to intensify the perception of threat and suspicion, even though the reality of a military confrontation my realistically be ungrounded. Japan and South Korea are prime examples of countries where memories of war continue to clout a possible process of deeper cooperation.

Discussion

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute would here relate to the external threat Japan poses towards the sovereignty of the South Korean state. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute could therefore be argued to fit the military sector of securitization as the two countries claim the territorial sovereignty of the islets, which poses an external threat to the South Korean state that could theoretically spur a securitization of the dispute. That South Korea has stationed military troops on both land and sea, on and close to, Dokdo/Takeshima also point at the military securitization of the dispute. The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue does not fit the military sector, as there have not been any attempts to militarily securitize the issue from the three South Korean actors analyzed in the thesis. Furthermore, no speech acts could be found that say the issue poses any threat to the sovereignty of the South Korean state as it is mostly placed on the individual level of analysis.

8.1.2 Environmental Security

The sector of environmental security is the most controversial one, because the environment usually cannot be analyzed without a human centered understanding of securitization. The most relevant actors are here the elites of a society following Weavers (1995) definition of a securitizing actor. The political agenda has three main areas: the state’s and public’s awareness of the issues on the scientific agenda, or more concretely, how policymakers, the people and the press perceive environmental problems (ibid: 72). The political agenda is thus shaped by the inter-subjectivity of the government, media, and overall public standards
regarding the environment. Within the environmental sector it is usually urgent threats that are securitized, such as a nuclear disaster, like the Fukushima meltdown in 2011. Securitizing moves are mostly acted out by political parties, departments, firms or NGOs as part of their ordinary practices irrespective if they believe in them or not. Strategies for raising awareness to an issue can be to finance research and informing public opinion within one’s own state or abroad (ibid: 77).

Discussion
The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue are not found within the environmental sector of security as no event or speech acts related to the bilateral issues are placed within an environmental type of political move or rhetoric by the securitizing actors analyzed.

8.1.3 The Economic Sector

Economical security is also quite a controversial statement as it is highly politicized, but moves into the process of securitization through events in other sectors. Another shortcoming is that actors active in the international liberal market system are supposed to feel insecure, as the market without insecurity would not yield any efficiencies as stated by Buzan et al. (ibid: 95). The idea nonetheless rests upon the relationship between the economic structure of the market and the political structure (ideology) of a specific society. Depending on how a state is politically structured it will perceive economical threats differently. Trade is usually seen through either liberal or more protectionist economic policies with the liberal agenda taking greater room since the end of the Cold War and the fall of many socialist governments (ibid: 97). Following a liberal understanding, the ultimate goal would be to move toward transnational economies and a global economy with few restraints in the movement of people, goods, services and capital. By following liberal economic policies it is of importance to maintain political and economic stability and equality as unrestricted markets and less state intervention tend to enhance economic and societal inequalities (ibid: 99). Moves toward protectionist policies would from an international and bilateral level be seen as threatening the liberal open market system (ibid: 107). Economic security is often related to events taking place in the other sectors but of course also that economic failure spur survival issues in the other sectors (ibid: 116). This creates a security spillover but it is only by looking at each sector separately that a larger context can be clearly analyzed (ibid: 117).
Discussion

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue are not directly linked to the economic sector but the spillover effect can be viewed in the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue as some articles covered the public debate which argued for South Korean firms and public to boycott Japanese goods as a protest towards Japan’s possible re-examination of the Kono statement (Appendix B: 16). If the protest would have gained more support to have a political effect it could have posed a threat towards trade relations between South Korea-Japan.

8.1.4 Societal Security

The sector of societal security is related to practices and ideas of the individual that identify themselves within a larger group, usually adhering to a specific community or a national unit (ibid: 119). The societal sector is closely related to the political sector in terms of the survival and the stability of the state, but where the state unit is defined by territorial and legal boundaries the societal sector is more related to the national unit, which can expand across land and sea. The core concept of the societal sector is the identity of individuals where societal insecurity arises when communities perceive an event or development as a threat to the survival of their identity (ibid). South Korea, which was under Japanese colonial rule during the years 1910-1945 where an eradication campaign against the Korean nation was put in action by the Japanese army, would be specifically suspicious toward any action by Japan that can be perceived as a threat to the South Korean identity (Shin 2006: 108).

However, to clearly define the collective identity of a nation can be troublesome as the unit of the society may many times encompass many different collective identities. Here, securitization theory derives its understanding of identity from Benedict Anderson’s notion of the self-constructed “imagined communities”, where the more objective factors of language or location is less considered, and the feeling of belonging more stems from one’s personal choice of identifying with a specific community (ibid: 120). These communities may differ in what they see as the main traits of their identity, may it be language and race or class or historical legends that demarcate “we” or “us” against some constructed “other”. Buzan et al. (1998) are also arguing for the regional dynamics, that the construction of a national belonging of “we” is in relation to the constructed “other” that usually is found within the
same region, which positively corresponds to the case of South Korea-Japan relations (ibid: 126).

When a society feel threatened they usually react by collective action of individuals trying to move the threat perception from the societal sector to the political or military sector, pressuring the government to act (ibid 122). The societal sector is therefore often analyzed in relation to the political sector. The securitizing actor is usually the large collective groupings within a society (but can be minorities), but they need to have a societal power to get their argumentation of that “we” is threatened legitimized. The media plays a great part in all sectors of security, as they constitute the tools with which actors linguistically define situations and issues, but it is particularly within the societal sectors that media is given a bigger role as actors who do not have enough political power can get their opinion and voice through to a larger public (ibid: 124).

Discussion
The cases analyzed can both be placed in the societal sector as they form part of the larger “history war” which is often used to describe the bilateral issues between South Korea and Japan. The speech acts related to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute are often described in the media in relation to Japan’s colonial era when the islets, because of the colonization belonged to Japan, but where Japan legally lost its sovereignty over the islets with its defeat in WWII when the islets returned to South Korea again. The media often voiced their criticism towards the government’s “inactive”, which they argued could be viewed as a weakness in relation to Japan. Professor Lee also mentioned this in the interview (Appendix C: 51-54).

The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue is strongly linked to the societal sector of security as speech acts include rhetoric of how the development of the issue poses a threat to the Comfort Women’s/Sexual Slaves’ human rights. Both the public and the media overwhelmingly support the comfort women and their rights and voice that Japan must take their legal responsibility in regards to the comfort women still alive uttering their criticism towards the government’s attempt to settle the issue.

8.1.5 Political Sector
The best distinction of the political sector is that it handles non-military threats to the sovereignty of the state. Two political security concerns are highlighted: the non-military threats to political units other than states, and that political security can relate to the defense of system-level referents like the international society and international law with securitization of principles on human rights reaching the individual level of analysis, which is the case of the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves (Buzan et al. 1998: 141). The political sector is, as economic and environmental security, quite problematic as security or the act to securitize an issue ultimately is a political choice. Therefore every sector consists of some sort of politicization, which makes it harder to explain. Nonetheless, Buzan et al. (1998) define political security as threats that are aimed at the organizational stability of the state (ibid: 142). This can be to purposely pressure the government in some particular issue, overthrowing the government, or in some way weaken it prior to a military attack. The securitizing actors are found within units that have enough authoritative power to make such securitizing claims, which most often then not is the state’s government. The territorial state, which the government is in control over, is therefore naturally the referent object but this also includes the organizing ideology and institutions and the national identity of the state. Threats are both aimed at the internal legitimacy of the state’s ideology and its constituent parts but also to its external legitimacy, where it needs recognition from the international community. The government can use rhetoric related to the security of the state even though it is only the government and its ideology itself that is threatened.

Discussion
Analyzing the cases show that both are securitized from the political sector’s point of view but that they differ in their effect. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is a politicized issue as both government and media use rhetoric that Japan’s territorial claims threatens the sovereignty of the state, more so with political rhetoric than to militarily threaten to take actions. Many articles also lifted that the South Korean government cannot back down, as it would be perceived as a weakness in Japan (Appendix C: 51-54).

The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue is highly securitized when looking from the political sector between the years 2013-2014. President Park’s clearly stated that she would not meet with Pm Abe until some development can be seen in the issue, a clear effect of the being securitized (Appendix B: 26-28). However, the gradual shift in the government’s rhetoric in regards to the issue, which led to the outcome of the “settlement” between South
Korea and Japan in late 2015, shows a de-securitizing move. The settlement received harsh opposition from the media and public, which shows that the de-securitizing move failed and which instead spurred an outcry towards the South Korean government, in particular Park Geun-hye, that could possibly be viewed as threatening the internal stability of the state and the survival of the Park government.

8.2 Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute constitutes a bilateral security issue and a constant threat to the stability of the bilateral relationship especially after President Lee’s island visit in 2012 which heightened the nationalistic rhetoric in both countries (Choe 2012). The dispute is surrounded by many historical and geopolitical complexities that started already after the Japanese defeat in WWII where the islands have come to be regarded as a national treasure in both countries. South Korea has since 1954 stationed a police force and built a lighthouse on one of the islands and also has stationed military, ready to respond if there is any attempt to trespass on South Korean waters. The dispute, which before democratization have been handled as almost a none-issue (Chun and Kang 2015) erupted in 2005 when the Shimane prefecture in Japan wanted to declare February 22nd to be named “Takeshima day”, as they believed that the islets belonged to their prefecture (Rozman 2007:205). The South Korean government and domestic public were outraged by this declaration and were fast to oppose the statement as a threat to the South Korean sovereignty (MOFA 2005).

8.2.1 Government Statements

Searches for official statements from MOFA during the years 2013-2015 showed the speech acts containing the utterances in response to Japan’s territorial claims over Dokdo/Takeshima as follows14: “undermine the ROK’s sovereignty over Dokdo”, “Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically and by international law”. “Japan also intensified provocations over Dokdo, which is an integral part of Korean territory.”

The government also utters how it will act upon such provocations in the following manner:

14 For full statements and references see Appendix A: 3-6
“the ROK government has continued to reinforce the efforts to debunk Japan's fallacious claims, by taking various steps including research and investigation of historical maps and archives on Dokdo both at home and abroad, solidifying our stance based on international law, compiling video clips on the true history of Dokdo, and updating our websites providing information on Dokdo”

“The Government of the Republic of Korea will firmly deal with any further attempt by Japan to encroach upon the ROK’s sovereignty over Dokdo”.

“The Government of the Republic of Korea will firmly respond to any provocations by the Japanese government over Dokdo, which is an integral part of the ROK’s territory in terms of history, geography and international law”.

Discussion

During the years 2013-2015 there are clear examples that the South Korean government view Japan’s territorial claims over Dokdo/Takeshima as threatening the sovereignty of South Korea. The measures taken to counter the Japanese “provocations” by the South Korean government are quite non-provocative. The government statement contains the promise to “firmly deal with any further attempt by Japan to encroach upon the ROK's sovereignty over Dokdo”, which has been repeated over the years 2013-2015, whenever the Japanese government or a Japanese government official made a statement of Dokdo/Takeshima being part of Japanese territory. The promise of firmly dealing with the issue, has not led to any military confrontations between South Korea and Japan during the years studied, but the South Korean military do have stationed permanently a military convoy at the islets and conducts yearly military drills in the area surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima that do show an effect of a securitization of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute from both the military sector but more from the political sector of security following securitization theory. However, the dispute constitutes more a threat from a territorial and legal point of view and as an external threat to the sovereignty of the state. The dispute is therefore understood as a non-military threat, which would place the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in the political sector of security (Buzan et al 1998: 146). Many statements are also supported with the utterance of “according to international law”, which also show that the government tries to confirm its external legitimacy of sovereignty over the islands, which point to a securitization process from the political sector.
8.2.2 The South Korean Media

The three main opinions around the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute lifted within the South Korean media during the years 2013-2015 were: that Japan’s territorial claim was a threat to South Korean sovereignty, opinions around the Park’s government’s “quiet diplomacy”, and Abe’s two face nature. The media thought the South Korean government must respond harsher to Japan’s territorial provocations and were mostly negative towards Park Geun-hye’s “quiet diplomacy”\(^\text{15}\). Japan’s territorial claim of Dokdo/Takeshima is often labeled as “non-sensical” both from a historical and geographical point of view and many articles state that it is South Korean territory according to international law\(^\text{16}\). Many articles see the annual Japanese territorial claim of Dokdo/Takeshima in their Diplomatic Bluebook as a provocation on South Korean sovereignty and the territorial dispute is often bunted together with a fear of Japan’s re-militarization under PM Abe\(^\text{17}\). On the two-face nature many articles writes that one side of

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\(^{16}\) Korea Times: “Defending Sovereignty” (Appendix A: 8), Tokyo turning clock back to colonial period” (Appendix A: 11), “Alliance in the making” (Appendix A: 13-14), Joongang Ilbo: “Abe must learn from Nakasone” (Appendix A: 14), “Endless historical distortion” (Appendix A: 17) “How Dokdo became a non-issue” (Appendix A: 18), Hankyoreh: “How to deal with Japan’s latest Dokdo provocations” (Appendix A: 24), Japan’s ludicrous position on Dokdo cannot be tolerated” (Appendix A: 24), “Japan’s absurd claims to Dokdo wont help improve relations” (Appendix A: 20)

\(^{17}\) Korea Times: “Japan returning to Pacific War values” (Appendix A: 8), Japan regressing to militarism?” (Appendix A: 8), ”Defending Sovereignty” (Appendix A: 8-9), ”Stepping up provocation” (Appendix A: 9), “Japan’s claim is specter of imperialism” (Appendix A: 9-10), “Korea and Japan expected to resume suspended security meetings” (Appendix A: 12), Sumimasen, we can’t do that” (Appendix A: 13), ”Mr. Abe think” (Appendix A: 14), Joongang Ilbo: ”Japan must come clean” (Appendix A: 15), ”Worrisome guidelines” (Appendix A: 18) Hankyoreh: “Abe’s neo-Cold War diplomacy and Korea-Japan relations”

Abe congratulates Park on her inauguration as president and emphasized the importance for good bilateral relations but the other side at the same time upgraded the handling of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute from being handled from the prefectural Shimane government to the central government and has under the years 2013-2015 made territorial claims of Dokdo/Takeshima in Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Book and in their history textbooks.

Discussion

The Park government’s Dokdo policy was in the South Korean media covered in quite varied opinions but overall there is a shared notion of Japan’s territorial claims as threatening the sovereignty of South Korea. Many articles are critical toward the South Korean government’s “quiet diplomacy”, and are asking for sterner policies towards Japan’s provocations. Others are asking for the continuation of open and reconciliatory measures, which portrays a possible securitization of the issue in quite a nuanced manner. However, the media, like the government see Japan’s territorial claims of the islets as a threat or violation on South Korean territory and sovereignty, which would point towards securitization from the political sector’s point of view.

8.2.3 The South Korean Public

In the EIA Genron NPO poll conducted in South Korea in March 2013, 809 respondents over the age of 19 participated through a probability sample of adults who own a cell phone (it is stated that 96% of the population over 18 owns a cell phone). In the 2013 poll conducted in March-April N=1000, valid public respondents and N=393 intellectuals were asked

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18 Korea Times: “Two-face Neighbor” (Appendix A: 7), “Case of Schizophrenia” (Appendix A: 12-13), Joongang Ilbo: ”Abe must learn from Nakasone” (Appendix A: 16),”Japan must come clean” (Appendix A: 16-17), ”Abe want it both ways” (Appendix A: 15), ”Hypocritical maneuvering” (Appendix A: 15-16), ”Demand historical awareness first” (Appendix A: 15), “Abe’s stupid stunt” (Appendix A: 16), ”The two-face play of Shinzo Abe” (Appendix A: 17-18), “A shameful cancellation” (Appendix A: 17) “Distorting the past, twisting the future” (Appendix A: 19) Hankyoreh: Japan’s absurd claims to Dokdo won’t help improve relations” (Appendix A: 20)

19 For full poll result see Appendix A: 22-25
20 39.5% high school graduate, 11.6% college student/drop-out (including technical schools), 33.2% Bachelor's degree and 1.4% Master’s degree.
Nearly 80% of the South Korean N=1004 respondent in 2013 had a negative impression of Japan stating the territorial dispute over Dokdo and differences in historical perceptions as main reasons behind the negative sentiments. Over 40% said that the bilateral relationship had worsened during the year. 84.5% of South Koreans cited "the dispute over Dokdo" as the main reason (Appendix A: 23).

The 2014 poll asked the question: “What Hinders the Development of Bilateral Relations?” and the Dokdo/Takeshima issue was predominant for both South Korea and Japan with 92.2% of the South Korean respondents and on second place the “historical awareness and education in Japan,” with 52.2%. 77.8% stated that the relationship was “extremely bad” or “relatively bad” which is a huge increase from 2013’s 67.5% (Appendix A: 24).

The 2015 poll found that the negative impression of Japan was due to “Japan’s lack of remorse for historical invasions” according to 74.0% of the public respondents showing a decrease from 2014 (76.8%) and “Continuing confrontation over Dokdo” was cited by 69.3%, which in 2014 had been 71.6% (Appendix A: 25).

Discussion
Looking at the data poll from 2013 until 2015 shows signs that the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute seem to be one of the major obstacles towards deeper bilateral cooperation with such high percentage stating Dokdo/Takeshima as a hindrance of the development of bilateral relations. It can therefore be argued that the public would legitimize a securitization of the issue.

8.3 Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves Issue

The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue is another issue that keeps on stirring negative emotions between South Korea and Japan. Though the issue may not pose a threat from the classical realist definition, as the possible territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima does, it continues to clout the likelihood of a deeper bilateral relationship between South Korea and

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21 3.8% politicians, 36.1% professors, 18.3% researchers, 6.6% company executives, 11.5% public officials (including those working in public institutions), 7.6% journalists, 2.8% NGO staff, 6.9% professionals such as lawyers/accountants/doctors, and 6.4% other.
Japan. 2015 saw its first meeting between President Park and PM Abe in October and the South Korean Government pushed for a resolution to the “comfort women issue” towards the end of the year, which also marked the 50th anniversary of the normalization of South Korea-Japan ties. In late December 2015 a “final and irreversible” settlement was made between the two governments, which included an apology from PM Abe, that the Japanese government realizes full responsibility and that the South Korean government was to set up a Japanese government funded fund to compensate the victims. Japan had one inclination to the settlement, which was to remove the statue of a young comfort woman that had been erected in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011 (Kennedy and Nakagawa 2016).

8.3.1 Government Statements

The government made utterances related to the comfort women issue between the years 2013-2014 that showed quite a resolute stance, that Japan must face up to its historical wrongdoings around the comfort women issue where President Park even refused to have any bilateral summit with PM Abe before the issue was settled and which, “can be accepted by both victims and the international community”:

In an address to the nation on the 69th anniversary of Liberation from Japan she argued that Japan’s leaders should: “take a correct view of history and especially to take proactive measures acceptable to the comfort women victims of the Japanese imperial military while they are still alive”(Cheong Wa Dae August 15th 2015).

However, in a speech to the nation in regards to the 70th anniversary of liberation from Japan in 2015 President Park stated that:

“We sincerely hope that Japan will come forward and forge shared peace in Northeast Asia, as an open-hearted neighbor. We look to the Japanese government to match with consistent and sincere actions its declaration that the view of history articulated by its previous cabinets will be upheld, and thereby win the trust of its neighbors and the international community. In particular, we hope the Japanese government resolves the issue of “comfort women” victims of the Japanese Imperial Army in a speedy and proper way. While considerable difficulties

22 For full statements see (Appendix B: 26-31)
remain, it is high time for us to move forward to a new future guided by a correct view of history” (Cheong Wa Dae August 15th, 2015).

In an “Address to the Nation on the Agreement on the 'Comfort Women' issue”, which was settled in December 2015 she further argued: “With already nine victims having passed away just this year alone, the Korean Government made every effort to have the Japanese Government acknowledge its responsibility and officially express remorse and apologies for the comfort women. And based on the judgment that sufficient progress was made within the boundaries of feasibility, we reached agreement”(Cheong Wa Dae 31st December 2015).

However she also addressed the criticism that the agreement prompted from the domestic media and public stating: “…what we are seeing today is the proliferation of groundless rumors that have no basis in fact. Reports that stray completely from the truth such as the claim that Japan’s payment is conditioned on the removal of the memorial statue, along with other unfounded rumors that stir social turmoil, will only create new wounds relating to the issue. We are listening to the various criticisms raised by nongovernmental groups about the recent agreement. However, the Government has been engaging in the diplomatic battlefield with a solemn sense of defending our nation’s interest to the very end (ibid).

Discussion
There are less straight out speech acts that would point at a securitization of the issue when compared to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between the years 2013-2015. Instead there are utterances that show the hope to resolve the issue but that Japan must make solutions that “can be accepted by both victims and the international community”. The government is labeling the comfort women issue as a human rights issue both domestically and in international arenas, which would place the issue in the societal sector of security, as the government perceive the issue as violating South Korean citizens human rights (Appendix B:26-31). That President Park also chooses not to meet PM Abe before any progress from the Japanese stance on the issue can be seen, it can also show a securitization process from the political sector’s point of view. But the development around the comfort women issue in late 2015 definitely points at a political choice of the South Korean government to de-securitize the issue, if it can be stated that the South Korean government had securitized the issue to begin with. The government is defending its decision to settle the comfort women issue,”
stating that it was in regards to the comfort women still alive and in the name of national interest.

However, as seen in the last quote there seems to be an unsuccessful de-securitizing move as both media, advocacy groups and public opinion have voiced their opposition to the agreement, stating that it is a violation to the human rights of the comfort women thereby not giving legitimization to the de-securitizing process.

8.3.2 The South Korean Media

2013 saw its first director-general meeting between South Korea and Japan on the issue of Comfort Women/Sexual Slavery held in April in Seoul and was to continue on a monthly basis. However, in June 2013 PM Abe stated that Japan was to “re-examine” the 1993 Kono statement, a landmark apology to the women recruited as sex slaves/comfort women by the Imperial Japanese Army, whereby the meetings were postponed. The re-examination of the Kono statement was criticized in the South Korean media. There were many articles that did not find any necessity for a bilateral summit, where a possible settlement could be made, because of PM Abe’s insincere action towards South Korea-Japan historical issues anyhow. The utterances included: “Only limited cooperation is possible” “Japan must take responsibility”, and that a possible settlement will only “cement the wall of mistrust”. Many articles were also directly uttering that a possible deal around the comfort women issue is


24 Korea Times: “Estranged neighbors” (Appendix B: 31-32)“Another rebuke for Abe” (Appendix B: 31), “Collective self denial” (Appendix B: 33-34), “No to hasty compromise” (Appendix B: 34), “President’s solace” (Appendix B: 37), ”Remorse but no apology” (Appendix B: 40), Joongang Ilbo: ”Getting beyond history”(Appendix B: 38), ”Comfort women doubt today’s talk will matter”(Appendix B: 38), ”Comfort woman urges stronger push on Japan”(Appendix B: 39), ”Abe’s dangerous game”(Appendix B: 39), ”Still sitting at the tip of the iceberg”(Appendix B: 40), ”A need to normalize strained ties” (Appendix B: 41), ”Seoul-Tokyo thaw with summit” (Appendix B: 41), ”Accepting moral responsibility falls short of accepting legal responsibility from the crimes” (Appendix B: 40), Hankyoreh: ”No compromise on Japan’s whitewashing of colonial rule” (Appendix B: 43), “For Seoul-Tokyo, no way around the comfort women issue” (Appendix B: 44)
threatening the human rights of the individuals (the comfort women) even though it might pragmatically be wiser from a diplomatic point of view to find a solution to the issue. Statements include: “the issue ha become a human rights problem”, “Crimes against humanity”, “women’s human rights were violated” and that it “concerns a more universal issue of human rights and women’s rights in particular. After the “settlement” was announced in late 2015 the media is seen strongly opposing the agreement and also President Park, calling it a violation of the comfort women’s human rights. Examples include: “difficult to claim the agreement a diplomatic success”, “sellout through diplomatic collusion”, “major diplomatic failure”, “humiliating diplomacy” and “…on the part of the victims and the public it’s not over yet”.

Discussion
After analyzing the articles the thesis argues that the portrayal of the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue in the media is part of a securitizing process, as it on many occasions write that a settlement is violating the human rights of the individual, which corresponds to securitization theory’s societal sector of security. It is also clear that the media do not accept the de-securitizing move by the Park government in late 2015, but rather can be seen as the audience in the government’s de-securitization process, which points at an un-successful de-securitizing move. The media can therefore be argued to be a securitizing actor in regards to the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue.

25 Korea Times: ”Carpe diem 2016” (Appendix B: 36), ”Park-Abe duel” (Appendix B: 35), ”Apology for sex slaves” (Appendix B: 36) Joongang Ilbo: ”Japanese fret over bad Korea ties” (Appendix B: 39), ”A need to normalize strained ties” (Appendix B: 39), ”Seoul-Tokyo thaw with summit” (Appendix B: 41)

26 Korea Times “Paying for forced laborers” (Appendix B: 31), “Japan’s responsibility” (Appendix B: 48), ”Watered down apology” (Appendix B: 31), ”Global pressure on Japan” (Appendix B: 32), ”Tokyo’s wrong approach” (Appendix B: 32), ”Absurd remark in Tokyo” (Appendix B: 32), ”Voices of conscience” (Appendix B: 34), ”Sex slaves not comfort women” (Appendix B: 34-35), Regret on Park-Abe deal” (Appendix B: 36-37), Remorse but no apology” (Appendix: 35), Joongang Ilbo: ” Comfort woman urges stronger push on Japan” (Appendix B: 40), ”Comfort Women deal not justice” (Appendix B: 42), ”The hard part starts now” (Appendix B: 42-43), ”Korea, Japan strike comfort women deal” (Appendix: 42), Hankyoreh ”Dealing with the Japan dilemma” (Appendix B: 43-44), ”Abe may have changed his wording, but his attitude is still the same” (Appendix B: 45-46), ”On comfort women issue, principle must come before politics” (Appendix B: 46), ”No final resolution without legal responsibility on comfort women issue” (Appendix B: 46)”Humiliating diplomacy betrays historical justice for comfort women” (Appendix B: 47), ”Park’s administration’s approach to comfort women agreement riddled with flaws” (Appendix B: 47-48) “Comfort women and supports keep fighting at year’s final protest” (Appendix B: 48)
8.3.3 The South Korean Public

The data poll of 2013 and 2014 lacked direct questions related to the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue but in 2015 it is part of the poll questionnaire, which can hint at an increased importance for the issue. 77.7 % in the poll of 2015 also put the comfort women issue as the most important agenda setting issue over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute (Appendix A: 22-25). Looking at the data poll from 2013 until 2015 it shows signs that the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute seem to decrease while the historical issue in regards to the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue seem to have a greater impact on South Koreans negative impression about Japan.

A heightened alertness for the issue can also be supported by a survey conducted by Joongang Ilbo in 2015.

The article “Koreans like the Japanese less, and vice versa” is commenting on a survey the Joongang Ilbo conducted in cooperation with the Japanese Nihon Keizai Shimbun to mark the 50th anniversary of normalization between South Korea and Japan in 2015.

The survey, which had interviewed 1000 people over 19 years old nationwide, found people feeling that the relations had worsened sharply during the five years the survey last was conducted.

78.5 % of the Koreans surveyed in 2015 thought bilateral relations were “bad” or “very bad” compared to 22.8 % in 2010. The historical and territorial issues were largely to blame for the worsened relations but when asked what needed to be dealt with in order for the relations to ameliorate, 31.3 % answered, “comfort women issue” and 23.8 % answered the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.

Discussion
After looking at the poll result from 2013-2015 it is concluded that the public opinion would legitimize a securitization of the issue as they saw it as the second greatest obstacle to the

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27 For full poll results see Appendix B: 48-50
development of bilateral relations, which inclines that the issue is regarded as highly contentious for South Koreans. 77.7% in the poll of 2015 also put the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue as the most important agenda setting issue over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in case of a bilateral summit, which supports the argument that the issue is securitized. In this case there seem to be a securitization process by the civic groups representing the comfort women, media and the public which sees the lack of a Japanese official apology based on legal grounds violating the human rights of the comfort women, and viewed as threatening the national identity of South Koreans, which would put the issue in the societal sector of security. President Park’s address to the nation further pinpoints a two-fold effect of the comfort women issue. The settlement stirred social turmoil in South Korea, which can be perceived as a threat towards the political stability of the state (Park government), which would point to a security threat to the internal stability from the political sector’s point of view. Still, the unsuccessful de-securitization process showed that many South Koreans do perceive Japan’s apology as insufficient in solving the comfort women issue and that the issue still is securitized and perceived as a threat to the national identity of South Koreans.

9. Theoretical Discussion

After conducting the analysis the thesis found both pros and cons of using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. The positive side of the theory includes the inter-subjective process of threat construction that the speech act structure helps to emphasize. By separately analyzing the speech act structures from the government, the media and the poll result from the public opinion there is strong evidence that the two cases selected show an ongoing process of securitization. In terms of the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue, an unsuccessful move by the government to try to de-securitize the issue can also be seen. The analysis also support the statement made by some scholars (Midorid 2008, Sohn and Kang, W.T. 2013, Kim, J.Y. 2015, Wiegand 2015, Lee, J. W. 2016) that the media and public have great influence on South Korea’s bilateral relations with Japan, and where the government, since democratization, has had to back out of more strategic bilateral agreements due to the opposing public and media not legitimizing the de-securitizing move.
Securitization theory’s focus on the more non-traditional types of security threats, especially the societal sector of security has proven to be positively corresponding to both cases, but in particular the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue, which constitute a core example of a securitization from the societal and political sector’s point of view, violating the individual rights of the comfort women. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is however, a good example of the more traditionalist understanding of security which is related to the political and possibly military sectors of security where it poses a threat to the sovereignty of the South Korean state. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute also shows tendencies of securitization from the societal sector with speech acts in the media often lumping the different historical issues together.

However, the thesis also found difficulty in clearly defining the audience as the government, the media and the public all are part of the securitizing process and it is therefore a bit confusing at times to clearly pinpoint who is the securitizing or de-securitizing actors and who is the audience in the selected cases. One possible option to the research design of this thesis could have been to only focus on one case, which would have given a deeper analysis of the different actor and the audience. The thesis also found difficulty in analyzing the public opinion, which, as in any country, is hard to frame within one homogenous group. The public opinion polls nonetheless are viewed as reliable sources as they have been conducted by prominent research institutes and are used in other research and media publications as well, which presumes that the polls hold for the internal validity of the research.

10. Conclusion

There exists diverse perspectives trying to explain or understand the South Korea-Japan contemporary bilateral relationship that capture both materialist and ideational factors, external and internal dynamics. The materialist factors tend to focus more on the external geopolitical realities and anarchic dynamic of Northeast Asian region as defining how and why states makes the political choices they do. It is by others, which the thesis support, argued that the materialist explanations of the South Korea-Japan relations are not sufficient in explaining the political choices South Korea has made, whereas more emphasis is on the ideational factors found within the specific context of South Korea. After reading previous literature on the bilateral relations it is clear that the two countries have a hard time to move on from their
historical enmity relationship and that historical issues obstruct the possibility of an enhanced bilateral cooperation.

The thesis has analyzed the South Korean securitization and de-securitization processes of the issues of Dokdo/Takeshima and Comfort Women /Sexual Slaves issue between the years 2013-2015. The thesis found that the two cases still are securitized and therefore pose as threats to the survival of the referent object, which in the Dokdo/Takeshima case is related to the sovereignty of the South Korean state and the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue the human rights of the comfort women. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute can be related to the traditionalist sectors of security such as the military sector but even more so the political, where the dispute constitute a threat to the state’s survival. The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue is a clear example of societal and political securitization, which takes it down to the individual level of security analysis. The issue shows a great aspect of the securitization theory because within international relations, and security studies in particular, the state centered focus always seems to take lead, oftentimes overshadowing other aspects of how and why societies have the perception of security they have.

The Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue also showed speech acts by the South Korean government in a try to move the issue into the de-securitized realm but which was not legitimizied by the media and public therefor constituting an example of a unsuccessful de-securitizing move. This corresponds to the scholars who claim that the public and media in South Korea do have a great influence on bilateral policies in regards to Japan, which is often based on the societal, ideational type of security effects rather than based on the material and military means. The thesis has also discussed the pros and cons with the securitization theory and found that its emphasis on different levels of analysis, the unit, sub-unit, and individual can show different type of actors and dynamics that all form part of a securitization process that affect the relations between South Korea and Japan. The difficulty has been to clearly define the audience, which Balzacq et al. (2015) also pointed out in the critique against securitization theory. By providing clear examples of the different actors’ opinions and statements in regards the two cases under analysis the thesis nonetheless, argues that the reliability and replication of the thesis can be empirically be valid reaching the same conclusions as stated here, thereby reaching internal validity of the research. The thesis has not tried to reach external validity, as discussed earlier, as the aim was to focus on the specific South Korean context and how the process of threat construction can be analyzed using
securitization theory’s theoretical and methodological lenses.

South Korea and Japan are two of Asia’s most developed democracies, embracing similar political, economical and societal values also having common geopolitical interest for the stability in the region. This would logically expect greater bilateral cooperation than the reality shows. The problem seems to be that they still have great difficulties trusting each other. What lay at the core of this distrust from South Korea’s part can be viewed in the rhetoric and texts analyzed in this thesis, namely the fear of once again be the weaker actor, the victim of an aggressor country, to lose its sovereignty and its identity. Japan, is of course the evident, “constructed other” the aggressor, as unresolved historical ties and memories still keep them in an enmity framework. Securitization theory’s widened understanding of security has opened up the spectra of possible security threats, not only to what the material and military threats can pose to a nation state but also the ideational and societal, which is argued to better explain the South Korea-Japan relations than would the traditionalist. But in order to find the key that President Park mentioned in her speech that can “usher in a future of shared progress” for South Korea and Japan, the government, the media, and the public need to start thinking in more realistic terms and let the memoirs of war be left to the past. However, as long as the historical issues are left unresolved that reality seems to be in a future far, far away.
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Appendix A: Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute

The position of the South Korean government is stated in “The Korean Government’s Basic Position on Dokdo” which states that:

“Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory, historically, geographically and under international law. No territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement. The government of the Republic of Korea exercises Korea’s irrefutable territorial sovereignty over Dokdo. The government will deal firmly and resolutely with any provocation and will continue to defend Korea’s territorial integrity over Dokdo.”

1. Government Statements

Government Statements 2013

In the 2014 Diplomatic White Paper (read 2013) it is stated:

“On the issue of Dokdo, the Korean government has stood firm against Japan's unreasonable claims and provocations. Adhering to such a firm stance, the ROK government has continued to reinforce the efforts to debunk Japan's fallacious claims, by taking various steps including research and investigation of historical maps and archives on Dokdo both at home and abroad, solidifying our stance based on international law, compiling video clips on the true history of Dokdo, and updating our websites providing information on Dokdo” (MOFA-Diplomatic White Paper part 2: 46).

In a government statement in regard to Japan’s renewed territorial claims over the islets in its Defense Blue Book it was stated that:


1. The Government of the Republic of Korea strongly protests that the Japanese government re-included unjust territorial claims to Dokdo, which is clearly an indigenous territory of the ROK, in its “Defense of Japan 2013” (Annual White Paper) issued on July 9. The Government of the Republic of Korea sternly demands an immediate withdrawal of the claims as well as the prevention of reoccurrence of such moves.

2. The Government of the Republic of Korea has repeatedly urged the Japanese government to stop groundless claims to Dokdo, which is clearly an integral part of the ROK’s territory in terms of history, geography and international law. Should the Japanese government fail to stop laying territorial claims to Dokdo, which was first sacrificed in the course of Japan’s forcible colonization of the Korean Peninsula, its incorrect view of history deserves to be solemnly criticized.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea makes it clear once again that it will not tolerate any claim of Japan to the ROK’s territory of Dokdo under any circumstances.

**Government Statements 2014**

In the Diplomatic White Paper of 2015³ (read 2014) it was stated:

“Japan also intensified provocations over Dokdo, which is an integral part of Korean territory, through various means: in January, the Japanese government revised the teaching guidelines for middle and high school textbooks; in February, a high-level official of Japanese central government attended and celebrated the annual event held by Japan's Shimane prefecture in provocation over Dokdo; and in April, the Japanese government approved the new elementary textbooks that describe Dokdo as Japanese territory.”

In a MOFA Press release⁴ in regards to Japan’s renewed territorial claims of Dokdo/Takeshima in 2014 it was stated:

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1. The government of the Republic of Korea expresses its deep regret over the repeated inclusion of Japan’s groundless claims to Dokdo, an integral part of the ROK territory, in the Diplomatic Bluebook unveiled by the Japanese government today, April 4.

2. The Japanese government should clearly see that its repeated groundless claims to Dokdo demonstrate Japan’s failure to break out of the illusion of its history of imperialist aggression and will seriously undermine not only the ROK-Japan relations but also peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

**Government Statements 2015**

The 2016 Diplomatic White Paper covering policies and bilateral events of 2015 has, at this time of writing, not been released yet. Instead the MOFA spokesperson’s press briefings commenting on bilateral development in the case of Dokdo/Takeshima will be presented.

In regards to Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida proclamation that Dokdo/Takeshima belongs to Japan in his “Address of Foreign Affairs,” the South Korean government responded:

1. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan once again laid unjustifiable claims to Dokdo in his address on foreign affairs delivered to the Japanese parliament on February 12, which clearly demonstrates that the Japanese government still fails to have remorse for Japan’s history of aggression on the Korean Peninsula during its imperial era.

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5 MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on the Japanese Foreign Minister’s Remarks on Dokdo in his Address on Foreign Affairs (2015):

http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20&sp=/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp%3FTypeID=12%26boardid=302%26seqno=314891

(accessed 2016-05-18)
2. The year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the Korean Peninsula’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the 50th anniversary of the normalization of the Republic of Korea-Japan diplomatic ties. The Government of the Republic of Korea sternly warns that the Japanese government’s repetition of such retrogressive actions at this time, when it should make efforts toward a new future in the ROK-Japan relations based on sincere remorse for its past wrongdoings, runs counter to the calls of the times for peace, stability and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea will firmly respond to any provocations by the Japanese government over Dokdo, which is an integral part of the ROK’s territory in terms of history, geography and international law.

In a MOFA Press release\(^6\) corresponding to Japan’s 2015 “Defense of Japan” paper, the South Korean government spokesperson argued:

1. The government of Japan once again included its groundless claim over Dokdo in the “Defense of Japan 2015,” its annual defense white paper, issued today. This is an act that denies the past history of imperial Japan’s forcible colonization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as a move tantamount to admitting to the international community that the Japanese government still does not have a correct perception of history even 70 years after the end of World War II.

2. The government of the Republic of Korea points out that the Japanese government’s such provocation undermines the ROK’s efforts to open a new chapter in the ROK-Japan relations, while Japan faces up to its history, with this year marking the 50th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

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\(^6\) MOFA Spokesperson’s Statement on the “Defense of Japan 2015”(2015):
3. The ROK government will continue to sternly respond to any provocations by Japan over Dokdo, which is clearly an integral part of the ROK’s territory in terms of history, geography and international law.

2. Media

Korea times 2013

The article named “Two-face Neighbor” writes about the fake nature of the Abe government. The article covers the ambiguous actions by Abe, sending a special envoy to congratulate President Park hoping to enhance bilateral ties based on shared values. However, at the same time the Abe government was seen upgrading the handling of the bilateral issue of Dokdo/Takeshima from a prefectural row to the central government by instituting an exclusive agency to handle territorial disputes. The article states:

“Considering the historical facts that Japan had owned none of the islands in dispute until its Meiji Restoration (1853-1877), Tokyo's latest move is nothing but efforts to replicate its 20th-century expansionism. Japan's Asian neighbors can't help but wonder whether if it's willful amnesia, an incurable case of self-justification, or both, that's gripping the Japanese people, especially their right-wing nationalist leaders”.

In an article named “Japan regressing to Militarism?”, the paper is further targeting the Abe government and its policies:

“The latest flare-up of friction was rekindled by a series of militant, provocative statements by a number of influential Japanese politicians including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso. Standing defiant against the truth of Japan's aggression,

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colonization, and sex slavery and other atrocities against the Korean people may help in Japanese politics, but it does not exonerate Japan from its past wrong”.

The paper continues stating that: “This tension, if unchecked, has the potential of developing into a new variable that may affect the intersecting interests of other players in the region, particularly the United States and China”.

In the article “Defending Sovereignty” it states that Japan’s claims to Dokdo is “nonsensical both historically and geographically” and was released just after Japan released a video stating Japanese sovereignty over the islets in October 2013:

“What's noteworthy is that the neighboring country bluntly revealed its intentions to step up a public relations war to make its claims over the outcroppings in the East Sea be heard more loudly in the international community”.

It further states:

“Our response leaves much to be desired, though. It simply defies our understanding that the Foreign Ministry told its missions abroad to refrain from pushing too much to exclusively use the Korean name of Dokdo to describe the islets. It's also regrettable that municipal governments' measures to strengthen the effective control of Dokdo are adrift because of budget constraints and administrative red tape”.

**Korea Times 2014**

The article “Stepping up Provocations” says:

“Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Cabinet seem set to throw Northeast Asia into a state of escalating diplomatic strain and military tension”.

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The article further raises its disappointment towards the South Korean government’s response toward Japan’s claimed provocations:

“It was regrettable in this regard that Korean lawmakers, bent only on their pork-barrel projects, voted down a bill to increase the government’s Dokdo-related budget in the final session of 2013”.

The article “Escalating war of words”\(^\text{11}\) writes:

“Confrontation or cooperation, Seoul must be ready. Korea and Japan are stepping up their "history wars," by expanding their arena across the world”.

“It further writes that:

“President Park Geun-Hye’s "Northeast peace process" is good in itself but falls short of solving the current impasse if it passively waits for the other side to change. Seoul has to take the diplomatic initiative by stepping up economic, cultural and human cooperation and exchanges, and promoting such universal values as peace, human rights, and historical justice”.

The article “Japan’s claim is specter of imperialism”\(^\text{12}\) states:

“Japan is ignoring established facts and is unreasonably claiming sovereignty over Dokdo. As for Koreans, this attitude of Japan brings back painful memories of the past Japanese Imperialism.”

Another article named “Time to promote trust”\(^\text{13}\) is pushing for more reconciliatory measures saying that:

“What the two governments seem to have been doing in terms of relations is "fighting just to fight." If the two nations cooperate it will be a powerful deterrent against North Korean nuclear provocation; which will directly contribute to promoting stability in Northeast Asia”.

The article “Dokdo evacuation Centre”\(^\text{14}\) is showing its disappointment of the shelving of the plan to build an emergency evacuation center on Dokdo also pushing for more concrete measures from the Park government:

“The government can revise or withdraw policies according to international circumstances. And it is necessary not to be swayed by Japan's efforts to make the twin islands disputed areas. But the latest Dokdo fiasco has shown a lack of principles in our diplomacy in the face of Japan, which has been more explicit in its territorial claim over Dokdo.”

“If the government becomes shaky over the territorial issue, Japan is certain to try to infringe on our sovereignty over the islets incessantly.”

**Korea Times 2015**

Japan released in 2015 its annual diplomatic bluebook where they again stated its territorial control over Dokdo/Takeshima whereby a debate around the Government’s Quiet Diplomacy was lifted.

The article “Japan’s absurd claims”\(^\text{15}\) writes:

“Seoul must remain calm but stern to Dokdo provocations. Japan is ramping up its provocations concerning Dokdo, Korea's easternmost islets. Most notable is that Tokyo seems


to be activating its offensives systematically with a special aim to alter the status quo of Seoul's effective control over Dokdo, which is called Takeshima in Japan.”

The article is further discussing the need for the South Korean government to remain in calm in its response:

“The Seoul government reacted angrily to Japan’s provocations, summoning Japanese Ambassador to Seoul Koro Bessho to the Foreign Ministry Monday. But its tools are obviously limited amid criticism that Seoul's "quiet diplomacy" has only emboldened Tokyo. But given Japan's intentions to turn Dokdo into a subject of international dispute, South Korea has no reason to respond emotionally. Seoul should remain calm but stern while calling for Tokyo to revise its wrong historical and territorial views.”

The article “Quiet Diplomacy with Japan seems ineffective”16 shows a different opinion calling for a “drastic change in its quiet diplomacy”. It states:

“Kim Yeol-su, an international politics professor at Sungshin Women's University, said Japan's recent actions related to Dokdo can be blamed, in part, on Korea's failure to deal with Japan's provocations properly in the past.”

The article “Tokyo turning clock back to colonial period”17 writes about civic groups are worried of Japan’s Dokdo/Takeshima claims stating that:

"Japan knows well the historical fact that Dokdo belongs to Korea. But it is allowing distorted history in its textbooks in an attempt to plunder the islets again," it said in a media briefing in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Monday. "The next generations that use textbooks filled with falsehoods will have a negative influence on Korea-Japan relations and world peace, and such harmful effects will fall on the Japanese government eventually."

The article also phrases a critical blogger named Romario and his/her opinion about the government’s response to Japan’s territorial claims.

"Protest? Is that all? We need stronger action, although the diplomatic relationship with Japan may become worse. This is not Japan's first time. If we do not take measures against this act looking down on Korea's sovereignty, it is to give up sovereignty. We need tougher measures. I'll watch how the Korean government reacts."

The article “Drop the ambiguity”\(^{18}\) shows similar view in relation to Prime Minister Abe’s speech at the Bandung Conference the 29\(^{th}\) of April 2015 stating he felt “deep remorse over the past war”, something the article’s author was very angry about.

“Abe chose to employ ambiguous and insufficient words”. About the government’s response to the speech it says that: “The government has expressed "deep regret" over the Japanese Prime Minister's speech. It is more than deep regret that the Korean public feels, however. There is deep-seated concern in watching its neighbor obscuring its wartime history”.

The article “Open diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo”\(^{19}\) writes that: “Korean and Japanese relations are locked at the same point due to the problem of different interpretations of history since World War II ended. As this has continued since the end of the Lee Myung-bak administration, it has caused a great deal of damage in economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation”.

The article is pushing for open diplomacy between the two governments.

“Given their abnormal relationship, the two sides have not met their peoples' expectations; a breakthrough strategy has long been desired. This failure stems mainly from poor communication and the national pride of both nations. If open diplomacy had worked, a


summit meeting would have been organized at an earlier date. Such a summit might have sought a breakthrough in the pending problems between Seoul and Tokyo”.

In the article “Case of Schizophrenia”\(^\text{20}\) it says: “Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is suffering from a case of schizophrenia — split personality, selective memory, denial and violent tendencies”.

It further argues: “Unless Japan changes its current (mis)behavior pattern, it can’t be trusted with a leading role on the global stage, and will and should remain a nation of concern for the world. We want Abe to change or the Japanese people will do something to prevent him from getting his way”.

The article “Dokdo needs active promotion”\(^\text{21}\) it says that: “Korea needs to scrap its "quiet diplomacy" on Dokdo and employ a more active approach toward publicizing its sovereignty over the islets in the East Sea, according to analysts”.

It further quotes civic group activist calling for greater government action regarding Dokdo.

"It's time for the government to stop being so passive.”

"The government's protests against Japan's provocative claims over Dokdo are seen as an attempt to appease the public rather than preventing its neighboring country from making such provocations.”

In the article “‘Sumimasen,’ we can't do that”\(^\text{22}\) the author takes a critical stance towards Japan’s remilitarization under Prime Minister Abe arguing:

\(^{20}\) Anon (2015), “Case of Schizophrenia”, Korea Times

\(^{21}\) Yi, Whan-woo (2015), “Dokdo needs active promotion”, Korea Times,

\(^{22}\) Oh-Young-jin (2015), “‘Sumimasen,’ we can't do that”, Korea Times,
“I fear that Japan under Abe is reverting to Japan of 1910 when it forcefully annexed Korea and that of 1919 when it brutally suppressed an independence movement. If you're not convinced, take note of its current claim of Korea's easternmost island of Dokdo. Regarding your denial of Japan's remilitarization efforts, the best way to remove suspicion is to keep the pacifist constitution intact. Abe's "normal-nation" slogan alarms Japan's neighbors because it reminds them of its past military expansion. Allowing its military to engage in combat outside its territorial limits feels like letting a destructive genie out of a bottle”.

2015 also saw the first trilateral summit between Chinese President Xi, President Park and Prime Minister Abe to be held in October in Seoul. The article “Alliance in the making” stated that: The three may try to find a solution to North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship. And they may tackle territorial disputes over Japan's claim for the Dokdo islets, which are legally and in practice under Korea's control, or the China-Japan disputes over Diaoyu Islands, or Senkaku, as they are known in Japan”.

The article “Mr. Abe think” is very critical towards Abe’s move to a reinterpretation of its article no 9 of the constitutions stating that: “There are ominous similarities between colonial Japan, which Abe's grandfather on the maternal side, Nobusuke Kishi — a member of General Tojo's war cabinet and first post-war prime minister — led on the road to perdition and today's Japan under his grandson, Abe, that are emulating the model that proved to be a grand failure.

“The most striking is an aggressive characteristic. Abe is jumping on the bandwagon of the U.S. pivot to Asia to counter China by force to strengthen its territorial claim on the disputed islands with China while laying a claim to Korea's easternmost Dokdo islets.”

Joongang Ilbo 2013

The article “Abe must learn from Nakasone”\textsuperscript{24} writes: “Conservative governments have been born on both sides of the Pacific. It provides a good chance of improving Seoul-Tokyo ties. What should the Park Geun-hye government do first? It should mobilize both formal and informal diplomatic channels to prevent the new Abe government from lurching too far right. It should talk Tokyo out of scrapping past apologetic statements and seeking international arbitration in disputes over Dokdo”.

The article “Japan must come clean” writes:

“Japan’s extreme right-wingers have denied war crime charges against the country, instead arguing that the Japanese were victims of the war and repenting for military imperialism would actually be an act of demeaning self-hate. The right-wing government has joined the extremists in more vocal claims over the Dokdo islets, which Japan called Takeshima.”

The article “Abe want it both ways”\textsuperscript{25} writes:

“The problem is the Abe cabinet’s denial of Japan’s belligerent, imperialist past and its embrace of territorial disputes with its neighbors. Beijing and Tokyo are in a sharp confrontation over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. Japan is also in severe conflict with South Korea over historical issues - including wartime sex slaves, in particular - and the Dokdo islets. Abe should have refrained from rubbing salt into the wounds of Koreans in regards to territorial disputes if he really wants better relations with us. But the Abe cabinet has inflicted deep scars in our hearts through reckless remarks and provocative acts on a number of occasions”.

The article “Hypocritical Maneuvering”\textsuperscript{26} states in relation to Japan’s threat to take the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to the iCJ:


“But the best and most peaceful way to solve the long-standing issue would be for Japan to grow out of its imperialist past and realize it is now part of the community of Asia. It must get off its high horse, stand next to its neighbors and work cooperatively. Otherwise, Japan’s calls for peace are nothing more than hypocritical maneuvering.”

The article “Demand historical awareness first”27 writes:

“Secondly, President Park Geun-hye’s administrative philosophy of “normalization of the abnormal” should be applied to diplomatic relations with Japan as well. The leaders in the Japanese government have made apologies and expressed repentance on the surface but repeatedly made insulting remarks that ruin bilateral relations. They have made inappropriate comments on recent modern history, history textbooks, Dokdo island, comfort women and much more. Korea should not be fooled by Japan’s “stab in the back” and double play. Summit meeting isn’t everything. We first need to seriously contemplate preventative plans to correct the abnormal relationship.”

The article “Consumers should join the boycott of Japanese goods”28 argue for the boycott of Japanese goods in relation to Japan’s territorial claim of Dokdo/Takeshima:

“Sophisticated consumer choices are what I call for. At large brand name super markets, do they list if their fish is from Japan (as they do for beef)? Restaurants are required to post where their beef and pork originate, and fish restaurants should have the same obligation. Let’s not forget that vegetable and animal products from a large area of Japan due to their nuclear disaster is still completely untrustworthy to many people. As consumers concerned about Dokdo, we should all check - and not buy Japanese imports.”

In regards to the Abe government’s renewed territorial claims of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in 2014 the article “Abe’s stupid stunt”\(^{29}\) writes: “

What Abe needs is to reform his view of Japan’s wretched history. As long as he continues with narratives and actions glorifying and condoning Japan’s past brutalities, the Korea-Japan relationship has no future.”

The article “Stop sneering at Japan”\(^{30}\) argues for a more diplomatic stance towards Japan:

“We also need not be oversensitive about Dokdo. Some say we should station military troops on the islets in the East Sea, which the Japanese claim as their own. But we need not transform a peaceful group of rocky isles that are legitimately ours into a conflict zone by sending military forces there when a few security guards are enough”.

The article “Send Shinzo Abe a stern message”\(^{31}\) argues for stronger diplomatic measures form the South Korean government in regards to Japan’s threat to take the islet dispute to the ICJ:

“Currently, Korea is in effective control of Dokdo after sending residents and police there. Those precedences are reasons why Seoul needs to make more aggressive diplomatic efforts in terms of Dokdo. The rhetoric that Dokdo is Korean territory and that we don’t need to get involved in unnecessary debates will hardly stop Japan’s fabrications. It was meaningful


when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly criticized Japan’s claim by mentioning the “nostalgia of imperialism” on Jan. 28. A Foreign Ministry official said that the key is to make it clear that Abe is a liar”.

The article “The two-face play of Shinzo Abe” states:

“In late April, President Obama is to visit Japan and Korea, and a high-level meeting between Korea and Japan on the comfort women issue is scheduled in mid-April. Japan is also asking to discuss the Takeshima (Dokdo) issue together, which Korea cannot accept.”

“A shameful cancellation” writes critically about the government’s cancellation of the establishment of a state-run center to cater to tourism for the Dokdo Islands and argues:

“If the plan was according to proper government procedures, it could not have been dumped suddenly in a meeting. The Japanese government issued a statement calling the cancellation the fruit of its diplomatic endeavors. Worse, the process has not been explained to the public. Sovereignty over Dokdo is a sensitive social issue because it touches on anti-Japanese sentiments. The government should have clearly explained the matter to the public and sought understanding before the cancellation.”

Joongang Ilbo 2015

The article “Endless historical distortion” states:

“Korea must be stern and cool-headed over the issue. It must continue raising awareness for Korea’s sovereign rights over the islets without turning the area into a conflict zone. Regardless of what the conservative Japanese and their textbooks say, the Dokdo islets are legitimately ours and Japanese authorities must stop lying to future generations.”

The article “Worrisome guidelines”\textsuperscript{35} the author is worried about the US-Japan new defense cooperation guidelines and writes: “If the territorial dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over the Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) islets in the East Sea turns into a military clash, we cannot exclude the possibility that the U.S.-Japan alliance could clash with the Korea-U.S. alliance.”

The article “How Dokdo became a non-issue”\textsuperscript{36} is comparing the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute before the Abe government never really was a bilateral issue stating:

“To sum up the sentiment, the senior Kono called it a “resolution for unresolved matters.” It was a realistic approach. And that approach was widely accepted by powerful politicians in the 1960s. In that regard, the issue over the Dokdo islets never became major. It was only after Japanese politicians who were born after World War II began insisting on Japan’s claim over the islands that serious tensions began to surface. Much blame for ongoing tensions over the Dokdo islets therefore belongs to politicians of a current time.”

The article “Distorting the past, twisting the future”\textsuperscript{37} writes:

“We all knew it was coming. In its defense white paper released on July 21, Japan again claimed Dokdo as Japanese territory. Provocations via the white paper began in 2005 during the Junichiro Koizumi government and have continued for 11 years now. It’s no surprise, but the proclamation this year is especially bitter. The 50th anniversary of the Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea on June 22, 1965, seemed to be improving the bilateral relations, which have just begun to decline again.”

\textbf{Hankyoreh 2013}


In the article “Abe’s neo-Cold War diplomacy and Korea-Japan relations”\textsuperscript{38} it says: “At long last, the Park Geun-hye administration is starting to take shape. Considering the urgent situation on the Korean peninsula, it is hard not to feel frustrated about all the delays”.

The author further writes in regards to South Korea-Japan relations under the leadership of Park and Abe that:

“In relations between Japan and Korea, even aside from historical disagreements and the Dokdo issue, there is also the potential for conflict over how to frame regional order in Northeast Asia. It won’t be an easy task, but the situation presents a challenge, along with an opportunity for creative diplomacy that can bring together the US, Japan, China, and Russia”.

The article “Japan’s militarization should not be condoned”\textsuperscript{39} is asking for a stronger government action on Japan’s renewed stance of the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial claims:

“The Abe-led government is in denial about Japan’s wars of aggression, unwilling to resolve the issue of the comfort women, intent on making territorial claims to Dokdo, and prone to distorting historical facts in textbooks.”

It further argues: “The South Korean government needs to let the US and Japan know that it will not condone the militarization of Japan, and that there will be limitations on security cooperation between the three countries, until Japan corrects its stance toward history.”

The article “How to deal with Japan’s latest Dokdo provocations”\textsuperscript{40} states in regards to the Japanese Education Minister ordering that the Teaching Guide for the Japanese Course of Study should state Dokdo/Takeshima as Japanese territory:


\textsuperscript{39} \url{http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/605875.html} (accessed 2016-05-17)

\textsuperscript{40} Anon (2014) “How to deal with Japan’s latest Dokdo provocations”, \textit{Hankyoreh}, \url{http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/619510.html} (accessed 2016-05-17)
“Japan’s provocations in regard to Dokdo, which is South Korean sovereign territory, are intensifying as time goes by.”

In regards to the South Korean governments action it argues:

“The South Korean government must respond to this move with dignity and firmness. It is necessary to reconfirm that Dokdo is South Korean territory both historically and effectively and to send an unmistakable warning to the Japanese government about its provocations on the matter. Considering that Japan has been cranking up its territorial claims to Dokdo recently, the South Korean government must look into even more active and comprehensive ways to deal with this.”

The article “Japan’s ludicrous position on Dokdo cannot be tolerated”41 similarly writes:

“It is true that Lee's visit to Dokdo was partially responsible for fanning the flames of the Dokdo issue, which had been kept fairly quiet until then. However, the question over whether Lee’s action was appropriate or not is a domestic issue for South Koreans to decide. That action has no bearing whatsoever on the fact that Dokdo belongs to South Korea, whether viewed in legal, historical, or geographical terms. Japan must be made aware that this provocative behavior will only serve to further complicate cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, they must learn that backstabbing a country just before a new administration comes into power and expecting to be thanked for it is completely unacceptable and will not be tolerated.”

Hankyoreh 2014

The article “Japan’s absurd claims to Dokdo won’t help improve relations”42 writes:

“We have no choice but to condemn the duplicitous attitude of the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which on the one hand insists that it wants to have a summit

meeting with Korea and improve relations with the country, describing Korea as an important ally, while on the other hand openly engaging in these sorts of behavior.”

“The war over history in Northeast Asia”\(^{43}\) writes:

“Analysts see the root cause of the conflict as Japan’s overreaction to being marginalized, with Abe and other right-wingers exploiting the public’s fears about the stagnant economy and being surpassed by China. Fueling the conflict is the collision between this approach and the forceful diplomatic approach of Xi, who has been calling for a “great revival of the Chinese people.”

“On Dokdo dithering, a government apology is not enough,”\(^{44}\) writes in regards to the South Korean government’s decision to scrap the plan on building the evacuation center:

“The Japanese government is bragging that South Korea’s decision to scrap the construction of the center on Dokdo constitutes a diplomatic victory. Without any consistent strategy or policy, the government’s vacillation has in the end basically given Japan an excuse to make a territorial claim to Dokdo. The government and the ministers involved should take responsibility for the harm inflicted to the national interest and for the attempt to cover up the facts of the matter.”

Hankyoreh 2015

“Correct, but don't overreact to Japan’s historical distortions”\(^{45}\) on the other hand is pushing for more reconciliatory measures and see the decision to not build the evacuation center as a step in the right direction:


“Japan cannot change the fact that Dokdo is currently possessed and administered by South Korea. As a consequence, the South Korean government must not respond excessively by building a new facility on Dokdo just because the public is sensitive about the issue of South Korea’s sovereignty over it. The government needs to stay level-headed so that it can stay a few steps ahead of Japan instead of getting sucked into Japan’s gambit to make Dokdo an international dispute.”

It further writes: “Abe may talk about looking into the future, but there can be no proper future without confronting the past. A future that is built on distortions of history may yield even greater misfortunes. This 70th anniversary present an excellent opportunity - and Abe should not let it go by.”

### 3. Public Opinion

#### 2013

In a Pew Global\(^{46}\) poll conducted in South Korea in March 2013, 809 respondents over the age of 19 participated through a probability sample of adults who own a cell phone (it is stated that 96% of the population over 18 owns a cell phone). In the 2013 poll conducted in March-April N=1000,\(^{47}\) valid public respondents and N=393\(^{48}\) intellectuals were asked.

The poll surveyed South Koreans opinion about Japan and the policies under Japan’s PM Abe Shinzo. The poll showed that 77% had an “unfavorable” sentiment against Japan, but that the sample varied across age, where Koreans over the age of 50 had a more negative outlook (82%) in comparison with the respondents under the age of 30 (66%) (Pew Global 2013: 5).

The poll further showed that the reason behind such anti-Japan sentiments was the lack of an official apology from the Japanese PM about the war atrocities against the Koreans. When


\(^{47}\) 39.5% high school graduate, 11.6% college student/drop-out (including technical schools), 33.2% Bachelor’s degree and 1.4% Master’s degree.

\(^{48}\) 3.8% politicians, 36.1% professors, 18.3% researchers, 6.6% company executives, 11.5% public officials (including those working in public institutions), 7.6% journalists, 2.8% NGO staff, 6.9% professionals such as lawyers/accountants/doctors, and 6.4% other.
asked, “Has Japan sufficiently apologized for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s?” 98% answered “no” (ibid). 85% of the South Korean respondents also had an “unfavorable” perception of Abe Shinzo (ibid: 6).

Nearly 80 % of the South Korean N=1004 respondent had a negative impression of Japan stating the territorial dispute over Dokdo and differences in historical perceptions as main reasons behind the negative sentiments. Over 40% said that the bilateral relationship had worsened during the year. 84.5 % of South Koreans cited "the dispute over Dokdo" as the main reason.

Amongst the intellectual respondents 59.5% had a favorable impression of Japan (including the response, "relatively favorable"), which shows a less pessimistic view compared to the general public.

Despite the South Korean governments reluctance of officially stating that there exists a territorial dispute between the two countries, more than 60 % of the public respondents answered that there exists a territorial dispute. 15.1 % said that the government in Seoul should agree with Tokyo’s demand to take the issue up to the ICJ and 37.7 % instead claimed that South Korea should strengthening its control over Dokdo.

However both public and intellectuals had similar pessimistic understanding of the South Korea- Japan relationship as “extremely bad” or “relatively bad” with 67.5 % of the public respondents and 61.8 % of the intellectuals.

2014

The total number of valid face-to face interviews was in 2014 again N=1004\(^49\) and intellectuals N=424\(^50\). The survey found that historical issue and the territorial dispute of Dokdo had negative impact on the mutual impressions. 70.9 % of the South Korean respondents answered that: "Inadequate repentance over the history of invasion" and "Continuing conflicts on the issue of Dokdo" was the main reason for their negative

\(^{49}\) Lower than elementary school certificate 8.9%, middle school certificate 7.3%, high school certificate 34.4%, university/college student (currently studying or quit school) 15.2%, university bachelor’s degree 31.8%, and university master’s degree or above 2.5%.

\(^{50}\) No exact percentage exists for the 2014 poll. It is stated: "Respondents are considered to represent a stratum of well-rounded intellectuals in South Korea".
impression of Japan. Over 20% stated that "Unfavorable words and actions by Japanese politicians" impacted negatively.

The poll also asked the question: “What Hinders the Development of Bilateral Relations?” and the Dokdo/Takeshima issue was predominant for both South Korea and Japan with 92.2% of the South Korean respondents and on second place the “historical awareness and education in Japan,” with 52.2%. 77.8% stated that the relationship was “extremely bad” or “relatively bad” which is a huge increase from 2013’s 67.5%.

2015
The poll of 2015 was conducted in April-May with N=101051 valid respondents of the South Korean public and N=31052 valid respondents from the intellectuals. 72.5% of the public respondent had “unfavorable” impressions of Japan (compared to 70.9% from last year and “favorable” impressions decreased from 2014’s 17.5% to 15.7% showing a worsened trend amongst the South Korean public opinion. The South Korean intellectuals showed a different understanding with 55.2% stating that they had favorable impressions from last year’s 51.7% exceeding the “unfavorable” option, which had 36.4% (36.8% 2014).

The negative impression of Japan was due to “Japan’s lack of remorse for historical invasions” according to 74.0% of the public respondents showing a decrease from 2014 (76.8%) and “Continuing confrontation over Dokdo” was cited by 69.3%, which in 2014 had been 71.6%.

78.3% of the public responded that the relationship was “extremely bad” or “relatively bad”. 88.3% of the public responded that Dokdo issue was the greatest obstacle to the development of the bilateral relations and Comfort Women, which was in 2015 for the first time included in the poll came in second with 63.5%.

Intellectuals differed in their understanding and stated that “education and recognition of history in Japan” was the biggest barrier to developed bilateral relations with 66.8

51 Lower than elementary school certificate 7.8%, middle school certificate 7.1%, high school certificate 37.4%, university/college (currently studying and expulsion) 11.4%, bachelor’s degree 35.0%, and master’s degree and above 1.3%.
52 No exact percentage exists for the 2015 poll. It is stated “Respondents are considered as representative of well-informed intellectuals in South Korea”.


Appendix B: Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves Issue

1. Government Statement

Government Statement 2013

In the 2014 Diplomatic White paper (read 2013) the Park Government stated:

“In addition, the Korean government has been stepping up its efforts to resolve the issue of the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery, which has now become a symbol of pending issues over history between the Republic of Korea and Japan”.

The statement is given a greater part then any other bilateral dispute where the government is further claiming that the measures taken by the Japanese state to compensate the victims of sexual slavery is insufficient, specifically in regards to the termination of the Asian Women’s Fund.

“In addition, the Korean government has been stepping up its efforts to resolve the issue of the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery, which has now become a symbol of pending issues over history between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Japanese government continues to claim that this issue had been thoroughly resolved through the 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and the Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan. It also asserts that it had sufficiently

demonstrated its sincerity with respect to resolving this issue by taking measures including the establishment of the Asian Women's Fund. However, the fundamental objective of the 1965 Agreement was not to seek reparations for the Japanese colonial rule but to settle financial and civil claims and obligations relationships between the ROK and Japan under Article 4 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Therefore, the 1965 Agreement cannot be said to have had resolved issues involving unlawful acts against humanity in which the state authorities including the Japanese government and the military were involved, such as with the issue of military sexual slavery.”

“Such recommendations and resolutions notwithstanding, the Japanese government so far has failed to take measures that are acceptable to the victims or the international community. Thus, on such occasions as the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Committee in 2013, the Korean government urged the Japanese government to demonstrate sincerity in providing answers to calls for right measures to resolve the military sexual slavery issue. The Korean government has also strengthened efforts to raise global consciousness of the urgency and need for resolving the issue. In particular, Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, in his keynote speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2013, emphasized the gravity of the issue of wartime sexual violence. During his speech, Minister Yun stressed the need for restoring the victims' honor as well as taking acceptable measures that show responsibility, in order to soothe the pain of the surviving victims of wartime sexual violence of the past century.”

In a Press release⁵⁴ in 2013 it was further stated:

1. At the 23rd session of the UN Human Rights Council held in Geneva on June 3, the ROK government delegate, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva Ambassador Choi seok-young, expressed deep concern over some Japanese politicians’ recent irrational and unacceptable remarks that justify military sexual slavery by Japan, stating that they indicate Japan’s serious lack of understanding of history and insult to the dignity of women and truth.

2. In particular, concerning the issue of military sexual slavery by Japan, which constitutes not only an inhumane act but a crime against humanity, the ROK delegate pointed out that the UN human rights mechanisms and numerous organizations on human rights conventions have continuously advised the Japanese government to accept its legal responsibility for violations of international laws, compensate victims, make a formal apology, punish perpetrators, and increase education and awareness on historical facts.

At the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ROK called on Japan to educate its people to prevent hate speech about the exploitation of military sexual slavery victims by Japan and not to put a stigma on the victims. At the Committee Against Torture, the ROK refuted the attempts by the Japanese government and public figures to deny facts. Noting these recent efforts, the ROK delegate stressed that the ROK had continued to urge the Japanese government to immediately take effective legal and administrative measures.

3. In addition, the ROK delegate strongly urged the Japanese leaders to face up to the dark side of history, acknowledge responsibility for past wrongdoings in an honest and humble manner, and correct their retrograde comments and behaviors and historical distortion. The ROK delegate also emphasized that it is crucial to prevent the recurrence of such tragic incident by providing human rights education on systematic rape and sexual slavery during wartime and accurate information on historical incidents.

**Government Statement 2014**

In the Diplomatic White Paper of 2015 (read 2014) the South Korean states:

“Furthermore, the Japanese government went ahead with its review on the Kono Statement in June 2013, through which the forced recruitment of the so-called comfort women had been acknowledged, encouraging the distorted views that the statement is a result of political compromise and undermining the reliability of victims' testimonies.”

“After the articles of the Asahi Shimbun related to forced recruitment of comfort women were retracted in August, the movement to deny the coercive nature of the comfort women issue and promote such denial globally spread quickly within Japan. This has brought much
disappointment to the Korean people, who hope for the future oriented development of Korea-Japan relations based on a correct understanding of history.”

“The Korean government made diverse efforts to resolve the historical issues that had hampered the development of Korea-Japan relations. In particular, regarding the comfort women issue that has become the core pending issue between Korea and Japan, the Korean high-level officials urged its Japanese counterparts to provide solutions that can be accepted by both victims and the international community. The Korea-Japan Director-general Level Meetings were held five times to discuss the comfort women issue and seek concrete and viable solutions. At the same time, efforts were made to draw the international community's attention and support to the fact that the comfort women issue needs to be resolved urgently.”

The Korean government consistently raised the issue of comfort women at various international events, including the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council. In her speech at the 69th UN General Assembly, President Park Geun-hye highlighted Korea's efforts as a Champion for the PSVI (Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative) and emphasized that sexual violence in armed conflicts clearly goes against humanitarianism regardless of era or region. Foreign Minister Yun Byungse, through his keynote speech at the 25th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, stressed that the international community needs to resolve the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts and expressed the willingness of the Korean government to take an active part in such efforts. He, in particular, called for the settlement of the comfort women issue, a universal human rights issue and a current issue that still haunts us till this day. Thanks to such efforts, more and more countries are recognizing the seriousness of the issue and are supporting the Korean government's position. The international community, from governments, parliaments, academia to media, has called upon the Japanese government to make sincere efforts to solve the problem...”

In regards to Japan’s cancellation of the Asian Women’s Fund in 2014 the South Korean government responded55:

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea cannot but express deep concern and regret over the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s recent deletion from its website the statement appealing to the Japanese people for donations to the Asian Women’s Fund, in which there were acknowledgments of coercive recruitment and inhuman treatment of sexual slavery victims by Japan's Imperial Army during World War II.

2. Over the past months, Japanese politicians have been making moves to deny Japan's history. Such moves included efforts to undermine the credibility of the Kono Statement on the grounds of the so-called review of details leading to the drafting of the statement and Asahi Shimbun’s withdrawal of relevant articles; and to deny the coercive nature of recruitment, transfer and control of the sexual slavery victims by Japan's Imperial Army. Now witnessing the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s deletion of the appeal for donations, the Government of the Republic of Korea cannot but question the sincerity of the vow of the Japanese government to uphold the Kono Statement.

3. The Japanese government should immediately give up its reckless efforts to deny the coercive nature of the recruitment of sexual slavery victims which has been the authoritative conclusion held by the UN and the rest of the international community over the past 20 years; and humbly accept the universal conscience and the voice of justice of the international community and demonstrate this through its actions.

Government Statement 2015

The Diplomatic White Paper for 2015 has not been released as of this thesis writing. Government Press releases from 2015 on the Comfort Women/Sexual Slaves issue will be used instead.

In a speech to the nation in regards to the 50th anniversary of normalization between South Korea and Japan President Park stating:

“We sincerely hope that Japan will come forward and forge shared peace in Northeast Asia, as an open-hearted neighbor. We look to the Japanese government to match with consistent and sincere actions its declaration that the view of history articulated by its previous cabinets
will be upheld, and thereby win the trust of its neighbors and the international community. In particular, we hope the Japanese government resolves the issue of “comfort women” victims of the Japanese Imperial Army in a speedy and proper way. While considerable difficulties remain, it is high time for us to move forward to a new future guided by a correct view of history”.

In a Press briefing in regards to the “settlement” of the issue, the government made an official statement saying:

“For starters, First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam and Second Vice Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul will respectively visit on December 29 the “shelter” in Seoul and the “House of Sharing” in Gyeonggi-do (province), which are run by the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. During their visits to those places, the two Vice Ministers will meet in person former “comfort women” drafted by Japan’s Imperial Army during World War II and give them a detailed explanation on the outcome of the Republic of Korea-Japan negotiations, pay attention to their views and consult with them on the follow-up measures for implementing the bilateral agreement.”

2. Media

Korea Times 2013

The article “Paying for forced laborers”\textsuperscript{56} writes in regards to the revisionist take on the Murayama statement by the Abe government, stating:

“The Japanese government has long maintained that the bilateral normalization treaty settled all compensation rights of Koreans "completely and conclusively" concerning Japan's 1910-45 colonization of Korea. Even the Korean government tacitly agreed to this argument — until a group of former sex slaves took issue with it about a decade ago, contending, rightly, that governments cannot deprive individuals of their rights to demand reparations.”

\textsuperscript{56} Anon (2013), “Paying for forced laborers”, Korea Times
The article “Estranged neighbors” further writes:

“True, the so-called Murayama and Kono statements moved closer to dissolving deep-rooted memories of the brutal colonial rule imposed on Koreans by the Empire of Japan. Tokyo has only to go one or two steps further, by turning words into actions. But successive Japanese governments decided to backtrack and their regression has reached a peak under the government of Abe, who denies even established historical facts on acts of aggression and lies about Imperial Japan's hideous crimes. “

**Korea Times 2014**

“Another rebuke for Abe” writes:

“Japan's conservative leaders may think that the sexual slavery issue will be over once a few dozen living former "comfort women" pass away before long. Yet it is Japan, not the elderly ladies, who will miss the irrecoverable opportunity for historical reconciliation and start anew.”

“Forgotten holocaust is as critical stating:

“As this page has noted repeatedly, Japan's provocative remarks and acts regarding the comfort women must be a precursor to a scheme by the Abe administration to revise or abandon the 1993 Kono Statement, which acknowledged Japan's official complicity in the coercion of women into sexual slavery.”

“Watered down apology,” argues not only for the South Korean Comfort women’s human rights but state that it more of a universal issue:

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“Yet Abe and his Cabinet must know the so-called comfort women issue is not just a source of diplomatic friction with Korea, but concerns a more universal issue of human rights and women's rights in particular. The harder Tokyo tries to justify its egregious abuses of foreign women's rights about seven decades ago, the more isolated today's Japan will become in the international community.”

“Global pressure on Japan”61 also has the rhetoric of human rights:

“What Prime Minister Abe and his conservative nationalist government need to learn is that the international community regards this matter not as a bilateral historical issue between Japan and Korea, but as a universal problem — one that involves glaring violations of human rights.”

The article “Tokyo's wrong approach”62 further writes:

“It was a stinging rebuke to Prime Minister Abe who dedicated almost all of his U.N. speech to the issue of women's human rights but spoke not a word on the most egregious abuses committed by imperial Japan. Japanese nationalists should realize enough is enough. There are clear limits to the international community's overlooking of Tokyo's attempts to whitewash — even deny — Japan's wartime wrongs and atrocities.”

“Absurd remark in Tokyo”63 states:

“Abe's historical awareness is apparently in-sync with Japan's ultra-rightists, who think that as long as the imperial Japanese army did not intrude into the homes of women and dragged them away to military brothels, Japan as a nation should bear no responsibility for one of the worst abuses of women's human rights in history.”

Korea Times 2015

“Collective self-denial”\textsuperscript{64} is calling for a sincere apology from the Abe government arguing:

“Abe should rethink and restart. The best place to do this is to settle the comfort women issue. He may think the issue will end when all the comfort women are dead within a decade or so. But that will be the end of Japan's opportunity to restore its reputation as a country with a modicum of reason and conscience.”

“Voices of conscience”\textsuperscript{65} is calling for a clearer policy form the Park government stating:

“Korea should be ready to wage a moral battle if necessary in any place in the world, armed with such unchangeable values as peace and universal human rights in pointing out Japanese rightists' militarism and the latter's refusal to properly apologize for and compensate the "comfort women." The Park administration is urged to formulate an overall strategy and detailed action programs for a drawn-out battle with Japan.”

“No to hasty compromise”\textsuperscript{66} hopes that President Park does not make any hasty decision in regards of the issue writing:

“That in turn shows that President Park seems to be in a hurry to remove the biggest obstacle to breaking the diplomatic impasse, conscious of U.S. wishes to reconcile its two East Asian allies. Or Park might need a diplomatic breakthrough badly to restore popular support, which has been plunging amid the unrelenting spread of the MERS epidemic and her other domestic blunders. Whatever the reasons may be, Seoul must not hurry.”

“Sex slaves, not comfort women”\textsuperscript{67} writes about the labeling of the women of either comfort women or sex slaves calling for the latter:

“Admittedly, calling the victims, sex "slaves" may discomfort the public opinion at first; however only such an explicit articulation demonstrates how "comfort" in "comfort women" fails to delineate the lives of tortured souls. The more accurate description further exposes vividly horrific accounts of the victims while unmasking Japan's disguised "sincerity" in endeavoring complete, verifiable, and irreversible atonement. Before a due apology as well as compensation as a series of efforts to serve the overdue justice, the victims of sexual slavery deserve an uncorrupted recognition of their anguish.”

“Remorse but no apology?”68 continues the criticism stating:

“What Korea should do is not wait for Abe's words but prepare for a post-statement situation. If Seoul has to solve the "comfort women" and forced laborer issue to its liking, the government should propose a renegotiation of the unequal, hurriedly-wrapped up Basic Treaty of 1965. The treaty says the sides can call for its reopening if one has different views on its interpretation. The Korean government's two weapons should be the universal values of peace and human rights. Still Abe must rewrite his statement to make the most of the last opportunity — not for victims but for himself and his people.”

“Park-Abe duel”69 argue for engagement rather than disengagement of bilateral relations in the aftermath of the comfort women settlement stating:

“This poses a chain of questions for Korea. The first and cardinal one is: Does Korea need to continue dialogue with Japan knowing that Japan is unlikely to change its stance? If Korea opts for continued dialogue, what would be the purpose? We believe that engagement is better than disengagement, at least for the time being. Japan is, geographically, the closest neighbor to Korea and it is important for the two countries to realize that their animosity helps neither side. Korea needs Tokyo's role in resolving North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship and so does Tokyo. To prevent China from being overly assertive, Korea, Japan and the U.S. should

cooperate where they should. Staying away from and antagonizing Japan, the world's third-largest economy, could cost Korea many opportunities.”

The article “Apology for sex slaves”70 is of similar opinion writing:

“Without resolving this clear gap between the two countries' interpretation of the treaty, there can be little prospect of historical reconciliation between the two East Asian neighbors. With the foreign ministers' meeting only days away, Yoshihide Suga, the Japanese government's top spokesman, has reiterated Japan's position that the 1965 treaty included final compensation for damages during Japan's occupation of Korea. If realized, a breakthrough in the stalled talks over wartime sexual slavery will have particular importance in this landmark year for bilateral relations. In June, the two countries marked the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations after years of talks following the end of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). It is truly unfortunate that after 50 years of normal diplomatic relations, the two neighbors have been unable to resolve differences over the comfort women issue and other historical conflicts.”

“Carpe diem 2016”71 is also calling for more strategic thinking in the comfort women/sexual slaves issue:

“Anticipating what's in store is everybody's business. Sometimes, it is about the nation's future and other times it's about what's important for individuals. Outstanding on the diplomatic front is the recent controversial gentlemen's agreement with Japan on the former comfort women who were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese imperial soldiers. Can we do the two things at the same time: deal with the past, without losing momentum to go forward? This proves to be the ultimate test for this country to pass to become a truly mature nation.”

The article “Regret on Park-Abe deal”72 on the other hand is critical:

“There are two broken principles at issue. First, it is about victimhood. All surviving former comfort women objected to the deal because it does not contain the admission of legal responsibility by the Japanese government. The very pillars that support the Korean government's upper hand over Japan is its role of representing the demands of these old women, systematically victimized by Japan's colonial power, for Japan's sincere apology and proper compensation. These women called the deal, through their representative civic group, a "sellout" through diplomatic collusion.

It further writes: “Human rights are the second assailed principle. As Abe admitted in his first-ever direct apology, his ancestors forced Korean girls to become prostitutes for their anti-humanitarian cause, violating their human rights and their rights as women. This issue should be dealt with in a global arena such as the United Nations.”

The article “President's solace” is agreeing stating:

“History will be the ultimate judge of the Korea-Japan agreement made regarding the comfort women. But if the victims are not satisfied with it, it is difficult to claim the agreement as a diplomatic success. And public sentiment toward the deal will remain cold for as long as the victims remain so firmly against it as they do now.”

**Joongang Ilbo 2013**

In the article “A rouge nation called Japan” the author is critical towards the Abe government’s possible revision to the 1993 Kono statement and the 1995 Muruyama statement that is viewed as cornerstones in South Korea-Japanese relations.

“The in-denial Abe discounts apologies given by previous governments - the 1993 statement

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by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that apologized for physical and psychological damages and indignities suffered by Asian women recruited by the imperialist government to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military and the 1995 statement by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama that admitted remorse for colonial rule and acts of aggression and inflicting pain and suffering on the people of other countries”.

The article “Getting beyond history”75 writes:

“We hoped that things would change when the Democratic Party took over. But when it comes to sensitive subjects like the comfort women, the Democratic Party was not much different from the Liberal Democratic Party”.

It continues with a more pragmatic outlook stating that:

“Therefore, it’s not really desirable to continue to pressure Japan morally. While we continue to make efforts to resolve the comfort women issue, which keeps the Korea-Japan relationship in a stalemate, we need to find an exit strategy based on the fact that reconciliation is not easy at the moment and only limited cooperation is possible”.

Joongang Ilbo 2014

The article “Comfort women doubt today’s talk will matter”76 the newspaper has interviewed former comfort women at the civic organization “House of Sharing” who are quoted to be very skeptical to the inter-governmental meeting held by high-ranking diplomats from South Korea and Japan in 2013 and are upset that the South Korean diplomats have not asked the comfort women themselves prior to the talks.

They quote Ahn Shin-gwon, head of the house:

“When they plan a negotiation with Japan, the government should ask the women themselves how they think their dignity, which was so abused by Japan, can be restored and what kind of solutions the women want from the Japanese government, “But they did not even make a phone call to them,” he said. “I wonder if the [Korean] Foreign Ministry has the slightest idea of what the women want or need.”

“Don’t diminish the apology”77 is also critical to the possible revision to the Kono statement writing:

“In March, Abe promised not to actually revise the Kono Statement. But that was a sop to get Park Geun-hye to agree to a trilateral summit with the United States and Japan in The Hague. Abe has to stop playing games with the Kono Statement. Japan must take responsibility for its past misdeeds - and, yes, its past apologies, too.”

“Japanese fret over bad Korea ties”78 is hoping for a settlement of the comfort women issue and writes: “Right now, the issue associated with “comfort women” for the Japanese military is the biggest obstacle to better relations. An increasing number of Japanese have proposed calling the women “sexual slaves” rather than “comfort women” to acknowledge the severity of the issue. Instead of running on parallel lines, the two countries’ leaders must meet and find a way to resolve this issue”.

“Abe’s dangerous game”79 states that Japan under PM Abe is irrational and “cannot win in the war against history”:

“Even by Japanese standards, the right-wing politician already strayed into the path of anti-history, while repaying a lot of South Korean comfort women’s tragic life with distortions and dishonor. It is not unreasonable to think that Abe’s flirtations with extreme positions and

rhetoric would eventually do incalculable damage to Japan’s international standing, regardless of Xi’s visit to Seoul seen as the diplomatic event to capitalize on the worsening relations between Seoul and Tokyo to further cement the wall of distrust between the two main U.S. allies in the region”.

“Still sitting at the tip of the iceberg”80 is pushing for more concrete action from the South Korean government and writes:

“Koreans rage over Japan’s rudeness but soon feel frustrated. What makes Koreans so frustrated is the incompetency of the Korean government. When Japan acts so disrespectful, why can’t the government counter that? We don’t want to have a real war. Regrettably, we already know that the government has reasons not to treat Japan harshly. It is all because Korea is not powerful enough. Japan does not take Korea seriously because we are not strong. In an age without a war, power is rooted in the economy. Defense and diplomatic strength come from economic capacity in the end”.

“Comfort woman urges stronger push on Japan”81 is of the same opinion and quotes a former Comfort woman:

“[Park Geun-hye] needs to speak up [on our behalf], but since that is not happening, I am frustrated,” said Kim Bok-dong, 89, a victim who has over the years become an active voice for human and civil rights. “We have not seen our president have a proper conversation with [Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe, so our president needs to take initiative.”

The article also writes that:

“Through the efforts of the comfort women victims, the issue has become a human rights problem not only in Korea but internationally”.

The article “A need to normalize strained ties” is positive towards a bilateral summit where the comfort women issue can be discussed and writes that:

“Just because we don’t like the policies or the direction of the Abe government, we cannot go on snubbing our closest neighbor. Diplomacy with Japan must be carefully balanced in the foreign affairs framework. Seoul needs Tokyo for its trust-building process with North Korea, its security network for peace in Northeast Asia and the transcontinental Eurasia initiative. Korea and Japan must meet first and discuss what needs to be ironed out. A summit could follow talks by our foreign ministers next year. The “comfort women” issue should be dealt in talks, but it should be approached within a broad context in order to come to a conclusive agreement for a better relationship, rather than as a condition for a meeting.”

Joongang Ilbo 2015

The article “Seoul-Tokyo thaw with summit” is commenting on the first bilateral summit held between the leaders Park and Abe and writes:

“Japan’s reluctance to address Korea’s demand to resolve the comfort women issue was a key topic during both sessions. The two leaders managed to avoid a clash and agreed to expedite negotiations to find a resolution at an early date. While no clear timeline was provided, Seoul and Tokyo hinted that they may see progress in the matter before the end of this year”.

They also quote President Park stating:

“Park pointed out that the comfort women issue is the biggest obstacle in improving the two countries’ relations. She stressed that this issue must be resolved as soon as possible with a resolution that is acceptable to the victims and convincing to the Korean people”. Trust is the most important value in diplomacy,” Park said in opening remarks for the second session of

the summit. “I hope today’s summit will heal the painful history with a broader view and sincerity, and serve as a precious opportunity to improve the two countries’ relations.”

The article “Korea, Japan strike comfort women deal”\textsuperscript{84} is covering the bilateral summit writing and writes critically:

“Accepting moral responsibility falls short of accepting legal responsibility for the crimes”, and that the comfort women staying at the “house of Sharing expressed their disappointment to the resolution saying that:

“We don’t need any medical aid or favors,” Yoo Hee-nam, 88, said. “No one will accept the creation of the fund [which is not formal restitution to pay for Japan’s legal responsibility].”

“Comfort women deal not justice”\textsuperscript{85} takes a very critical view towards the settlement stating that:

“Crimes against humanity are the world’s business. They shouldn’t be forgotten, and discussing as well as memorializing them shouldn’t be suppressed or discouraged”.

It continues: “The interest in keeping the memory of such crimes alive also extends to the victims themselves. Of course they’re entitled to compensation. But it feels wrong if they can only get it because their government has agreed to drop their case and, to a degree, is encouraging them to drop their efforts to shame the perpetrators”.

The article “The hard part starts now”\textsuperscript{86} is correspondingly negative writing:

“Opponents think the agreement is a humiliating deal because both sides hastily declared an


end to the controversy without giving Japan legal responsibility for the tragedy during World
War II. A local civic group in support of the 46 remaining "comfort women," who are mostly
in their late 80s, vehemently resents the deal calling it “diplomatic collusion betraying the
hopes of the victims and the public.”

It also writes:

“On the governmental level, the issue may have been settled through the agreement on
Monday. But on the part of the victims and the public, it’s not over yet.”

Hankyoreh 2013

The article “No compromise on Japan’s whitewashing of colonial rule” writes in regards to
the comfort women issue:

“Abe’s twisted convictions on these historical matters should be denounced not just by
Koreans, but by anyone in this world who loves peace. The South Korean government in
particular needs to draw clear standards as to where it can work with Abe’s Japan and what it
simply will not accept.”

In regards to the re-examination of the Kono statement the article “1993 Kono statement
facing an existential crisis” writes: “One of the leaders of criticism by the conservative and
right wing establishment that this is a masochistic historical perspective and of attempts to
deny the historical fact of the comfort women’s compulsory sexual service is current Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”.

The article “Dealing with the Japan dilemma” is discussing the 1965 normalization treaty an
why it cannot be viewed as settling the historical issues:

“And democracy brought with it a greater sense of the importance of human rights, one that

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87 Anon (2013), “No compromise on Japan’s whitewashing of colonial rule”, Hankyoreh,
88 Oh, Tae-kyu (2013), “Dealing with the Japan dilemma”, Hankyoreh,
fundamentally challenges the terms of the agreement, which failed to fully address issues of the two countries’ history. A case in point is the way the long-ignored issue of comfort women drafted as sex slaves to the Japanese military suddenly came to the fore”.

The article “Japan’s hypocrisy is no way to build trust”\(^89\) likens the Abe government’s new take on historical issues as launching a historical war writing:

“But when the Japanese government orders that its own line be represented on historical matters that are still the source of major disagreement with neighboring countries, it is equivalent to launching a “history war.” Hopefully, Tokyo will recognize that its attitude of promising one thing and doing another is no way to win the trust of other countries”.

**Hankyoreh 2014**

The article “For Seoul and Tokyo, no way around the comfort women issue”\(^90\) writes:

“Today, historical concerns play a bigger role in South Korea-Japan ties than before, and the comfort women issue is front and center among them. There’s simply no way around it if ties are to return to normal. The comfort women survivors today are an average of 88.4 years old, and there are only 55 who are still living. As more and more of them go to their graves without any resolution, improving relations will only become that much harder.”

The article “Japan’s review of the Kono statement will only increase distrust”\(^91\) writes about the possible revision of the Kono statement as follows:

“Abe has consistently made it his job to repudiate the international order that took shape after Japan lost the war. It’s all of a piece with his paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine (home to


tablets honoring 14 people who were convicted as Class A war criminals in the Tokyo trials), his attempts to revise the Peace Constitution, and his running away from Japan’s biggest shame of all, namely the comfort women issue. After all its attempts to undermine the Kono Statement, Tokyo now has the gall to say it has no plans to revise it. How are we supposed to trust them now?”

The article “Japan’s comfort women provocations warrant a strong response,”92 writes the following about the Kono statement:

“These tactics are more than just a breach of diplomatic protocol - they’re a show of naked contempt toward South Korea, a declaration of diplomatic warfare. Japan’s provocations on the comfort women issue demand a response from the South Korean government. What’s clear at this point is that we cannot simply respond with some pro forma diplomatic gesture like a statement or an in-person protest to the Japan ambassador. For all its surface talk about keeping the Kono Statement in place, Tokyo’s actions have been all about utterly undermining it”.

It further writes: “Japan’s provocations are also a challenge to the global consensus on the comfort women issue. Seoul should seriously consider joining forces with other countries that were victimized, such as China”.

**Hankyoreh 2015**

The article “Abe may have changed his wording, but his attitude is still the same”93 is commenting on Abe’s interview in the Washington Post writing:

“Abe’s attempt to downplay the issue was also evident when he said, “Hitherto in history, many wars have been waged. In this context, women’s human rights were violated.” While Abe is acknowledging the suffering of the comfort women, this comment strongly suggests

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that their suffering was not the result of specific acts carried out by the Japanese army but was instead a general tragedy that always happens during wartime.”

The article “On comfort women issue, principle must come before politics”⁹⁴ is criticizing President Park’s “bombshell announcement that there has been ‘considerable progress’ on the comfort women issue” writing:

“With the recent deaths of two of the oldest comfort women, the number of survivors registered with the South Korean government has decreased to 50. For this reason, there is admittedly growing humanitarian pressure to find a solution to the issue of the comfort women while the women are still alive. But that must not serve as an excuse to pursue a compromise of expediency with Japan on the issue of the comfort women. The greatest point of controversy in regard to the issue of the comfort women is not money but rather whether Japan will admit its responsibility. The South Korean government must realize that pursuing a political compromise at the expense of this principle is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse”.

The article “No final resolution without legal responsibility on comfort women issue”⁹⁵ writes in regards to the “final and irreversible settlement:

“Most crucially, it fails to clearly state the Japanese government’s legal responsibility for the state-level crime of enforcing a system of sexual slavery. Far from a real solution.”

It further writes: Prior to agreeing to these terms, the South Korean government made no attempt to hear views on the matter from the people most directly impacted by it -- the survivors themselves. If it’s a question of President Park Geun-hye trying to honor her previous promises to resolve the issue within the year, or a reflection of Washington’s calls for closer trilateral cooperation, then that’s an even bigger problem. The administration shouldn’t be foisting an agreement that goes against principle on the South Korean public as a

The article “Humiliating diplomacy betrays historical justice for comfort women”\(^{96}\) is also disappointed towards the South Korean government and writes:

“The people who tried to achieve historical justice for the former comfort women are furious, while those who wanted to cover up the issue are smiling. This is the aftermath of the “final settlement” for the issue of the comfort women - women forced to serve as sex slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army - reached by the governments of South Korea and Japan on Dec. 28. Though this was a humiliating diplomatic move that is comparable with the Korea-Japan basic treaty that restored diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, the South Korean government knows no shame”.

The article “Park administration’s approach to comfort women agreement riddled with flaws”\(^ {97}\) is as negative:

“Former officials and experts with experience in negotiations with Japan pinpointed a host of problems with the latest deal: a sudden policy pivot and lack of strategy that left Seoul sacrificing its initiative, a too-casual stance on a major historical issue that many see as requiring a particular emphasis on principle, and a lack of communication with the survivors themselves and their advocacy group, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Jeongdaehyeop).”

It continues: “Perhaps the most serious issue is the administration’s disregard for Park’s repeated pledges to produce an agreement “acceptable to the victims and the public.”

It also quotes the a senior government official who was asking the media to think about the future of the bilateral relationship when covering the new settlement:

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“The administration, the public, the comfort women survivors, and NGOs are all important to South Korea-Japan relations, but the press is an extremely important actor.” “We would like to ask that South Korea’s press think carefully about what would be the most desirable course of action for our country, and for the comfort women survivors,” the official was quoted as saying. It’s a message that read as a request to disregard the anticipated objections from the victims and the groups representing their interests.”

The article “Comfort women and supports keep fighting at year’s final protest”98 writes:

“The names of the nine former comfort women who have passed away this year had just been recited - Hwang Seon-sun, Lee Hyo-sun, Kim Oe-han, Kim Dal-seon, Kim Yeon-hee, Choi Geum-seon, Park Yu-nyeon, Choi Gap-sun, and another woman only identified by the surname Park. “Why is the government making us suffer over and over again by calling this the ‘final settlement’?” Lee said. For a moment, she was overtaken by sobs, but she managed to say, “I will keep fighting until the end, until the end.”

3. Public Opinion

2013

In the Japanese Genron NPO99 and South Korean East Asia Institute100 (EAI) 2013 poll conducted in March-April N=1000,4101 valid public respondents and N=393102 intellectuals were asked.

99 The Genron NPO is a non-political, non-religious independent platform established in 2001 by leading Japanese intellectuals dissatisfied with Japanese media, and who have called into question the authenticity of the voices of the general public. To maintain independence and neutrality, and to remain non-political and non-religious, they conduct an annual self-evaluation and publicly announce the study findings.
100 The East Asia Institute is a leading South Korean independent think tank established in 2002 that strives to develop ideas and formulating policy recommendations on the main challenges facing the region.
101 39.5% high school graduate, 11.6% college student/drop-out (including technical schools), 33.2% Bachelor’s degree and 1.4% Master’s degree.
Nearly 80% of the South Korean public respondent had a negative impression of Japan. Over 40% said that the bilateral relationship had worsened during the year. 61.5% of the respondents cited the "issue of comfort women" as main reason.

Amongst the intellectual respondents 59.5% had a favorable impression of Japan (including the response, "relatively favorable"), which shows a less pessimistic view compared to the general public.

2014
The total number of valid face-to-face interviews was again N=1004 and intellectuals N=424. The survey found that historical issue and the territorial dispute of Dokdo had negative impact on the mutual impressions. 70.9% of the South Korean respondents answered that: "Inadequate repentance over the history of invasion" and "Continuing conflicts on the issue of Dokdo" was the main reason for their negative impression of Japan. Over 20% stated that "Unfavorable words and actions by Japanese politicians" impacted negatively.

The poll also asked the question: “What Hinders the Development of Bilateral Relations?” and the Dokdo/Takeshima issue was predominant for both South Korea and Japan as stated earlier but the second place, “the historical awareness and education in Japan,”, could here be representative of the comfort women issues with 52.2%.

On the question of agendas in bilateral talks South Koreans regard "issues on historical understandings and "comfort women" (76.3%) and "territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo" (70.3%) with utmost importance. This puts emphasis on the importance of finding a resolution of issues related to "history" and " territory".

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102 3.8% politicians, 36.1% professors, 18.3% researchers, 6.6% company executives, 11.5% public officials (including those working in public institutions), 7.6% journalists, 2.8% NGO staff, 6.9% professionals such as lawyers/accountants/doctors, and 6.4% other.

103 Lower than elementary school certificate 8.9%, middle school certificate 7.3%, high school certificate 34.4%, university/college student (currently studying or quit school) 15.2%, university bachelor’s degree 31.8%, and university master’s degree or above 2.5%.

104 No exact percentage exists for the 2014 poll. It is stated: "Respondents are considered to represent a stratum of well-rounded intellectuals in South Korea".
2015

The poll of 2015 was conducted in April-May with N=1010\textsuperscript{105} valid respondents of the South Korean public and N=310\textsuperscript{106} valid respondents from the intellectuals. 72.5 % of the public respondent had “unfavorable” impressions of Japan (compared to 70.9 % from last year and “favorable” impressions decreased from 2014’s 17.5 % to 15.7 % showing a worsened trend amongst the South Korean public opinion. The South Korean intellectuals showed a different understanding with 55.2 % stating that they had favorable impressions form last year’s 51.7 % exceeding the “unfavorable” option, which had 36.4 % (36.8 % 2014).

78.3 % of the N=1010 responded that the relationship was “extremely bad” or “relatively bad”. 88.3 % of the public responded that Dokdo issue was the greatest obstacle to the development of the bilateral relations and Comfort Women, which was in 2015 for the first time included in the poll came in second with 63.5 %.

Intellectuals differed in their understanding and stated that “education and recognition of history in Japan” was the biggest barrier to developed bilateral relations with 66.8 %.

In regards to the agenda setting, in case of a bilateral summit, 77.7 % of the public respondents answered “issues on historical understanding and comfort women” as the most important agenda, which was followed by the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” (69.3%, 70.3% 2014).

\textsuperscript{105} Lower than elementary school certificate 7.8%, middle school certificate 7.1%, high school certificate 37.4%, university/college (currently studying and expulsion) 11.4%, bachelor’s degree 35.0%, and master’s degree and above 1.3%.

\textsuperscript{106} No exact percentage exists for the 2015 poll. It is stated “Respondents are considered as representative of well-informed intellectuals in South Korea”.
Appendix C: Interview Guide

I conducted a semi-structured interview with Professor Lee Jong-won at Waseda University in February 2016 in Tokyo, Japan. My initial interview guide was directed in regards to my first research question, which was to analyze the so-called Asia paradox and focus on trilateral relations between South Korea, Japan, and China. However, due to time and space constraints my supervisor advised me just to analyze the South Korea-Japan relations which I also decided to do. My interview with Professor Lee is therefore to a great extent more concerned with trilateral issues and events. However, luckily he did talk about the South Korea-Japan relations, which I have used more as supporting the “Previous Literature” section. The segment on South Korea-Japan relations will now follow. The interview will not be used for the analysis section whereby it is should be viewed as a

Q: When asked if he could name areas where the countries find common ground and cooperation and also what are the obstacles to a further development of cooperation Professor Lee answered:

Professor Lee: “There are many potentials, the actual integrations, interdependence has been in the process and in terms of security there are many people that say that South Korea and Japan can or should cooperate vis-à-vis the North Korea threat, I think to a certain extent, in terms of the maintaining of the status quo the stability in the Korean peninsula I think South Korea and Japan share common interest.” Actually that is what we see right now, some people, the military analysts like to use the word deterrence, with the United States at the center. Japan and South Korea have been cooperating and or have to cooperate more, in terms of the maintenance of the stability and personally I don't like the word deterrence it's a kind of military system. Very Realistically speaking we need that. “

Professor Lee: “So in a sense, still, at some point, as I mentioned I mean although the security, in terms of the security situation, South Korea and Japan are very much closely interrelated but there are no, for instance special arrangements, the countries do not have an alliance treaty, even the kind of agreement to share the intelligence information, the

\[107\] Full audio file can be presented upon request. Interview conducted 2016-02-19 (Tokyo, Japan)
GSOMIA, GSOMIA is.. I don't know the… usually we say, what is that… Agreement on sharing military related information, the GSOMIA…”

(Interrupted knock on door)

**Professor Lee:** “Hai..” Continues in Japanese

**Professor Lee:** “They’re checking the box”

**Me:** aah laughter

**Both:** Laughter

**Professor Lee:** Ok so the GSOMIA is bilateral, South Korean US has one, GSOMIA I don't know… the full official name, the GSOMIA (spelling it out)

**Me:** “general…”

**Professor Lee:** “Military information agreement or something like that…”

**Professor Lee:** “So South Korea us has one and Japan and US has their own its usually bilateral, but anyway there is none between South Korea and Japan so in a sense it is a typicals of the history. The talks, negotiation for GSOMIA just stopped a couple of years ago, three four years ago I think in terms of the military kind of deterrence structure, Japan and Korea can and have been cooperating and also should cooperate more closely to maintain the stability.”

**Professor Lee:** “But in that the stability of the peninsula I think there is another aspect of the security. N terms of the maintain the status quo, South Korea and Japan have many things in common, a shared interest, both of the two countries do not like a chaotic situation, like wars and whatever. But when I think about the unification of the or change of the status quo, I think the two nations, their national interest, or their strategies, or geopolitical strategies of the two countries main not be overlapping. South Korea prefer to see more immediate unification whereas Japan may not think in that way, they may prefer a more gradual, a more longer period of the divided situation. What I mean is that usually people say that Japan and Korea have many things in common, many shared interests, in their policies towards North Korea, because North Korea is a common threat, but I think there are two different aspects. To
maintain the status quo, stability, the two countries can share or have been cooperating in maintain the status quo but when we think about what kind of changes they prefer we see some problems, possible potential kind of differences and differences in their policies, strategies, interests. Sometime we see that kind of friction, but particularly I think the Japan Korea have common interest in making an open kind of economic trade framework, trade system in this area in the region. So economically I think they both of the two countries are the ones very dependent on free trade so they have shared interest of having a very open trade arrangements. And also they have shared interest in maintain the status quo vis-à-vis the threat from North Korea. But at the same time those areas, were the two countries can cooperate can also be the point of possible contentious and frictions, the North Korea problem.”

**Professor Lee:** “And also even for the trade, I think at this moment, South Korea is more dependent on its trade with China so they joined, decide to join the AIIB, the China initiated regional investment bank, while Japan and the US opted out of the system. So it is kind of differences, even though they share interest in an open trade system. But South Korea preferred, at this moment to have closer relations with China, while Japan chose to join the TPP, which has been initiated by the US. Right now South Korea is not an original member of the TPP. So even for the trade although they principally have shared interest they still have shown some different orientations. So maybe my answer to your super clear question is a little bit complicated. In security and economy both of the two areas, there are some areas were the countries have been successfully cooperating or should cooperate more. While the same issue areas, security, North Korea threat, and trade open regional trade systems. But even on that kind of issue areas, the two countries have some potential, very realistically conflicts and frictions.”

**Professor Lee:** “Another biggest kind of obstacle, for the cooperation is the, really the history, how to deal with the history, the past history. Before, 1990s 2000s when South Korea were under a dictator, the military generals at that time the military generals could suppress the voices from the society so they could contain the voices from the society and based on that kind of suppression, suppression of the people, they could conclude a normalization treaty with Japan, neglecting the historical problems, I mean the compensation for the historical wrongdoings, by Japan but now since 1990s 200s when South Korea became a
democratic country because of the democratization then the voices from the former victim the voices form the victims it is no longer possible to suppress them. So now the historical issues became a very political diplomatic kind of issues, since 1990s. Those issue are not resolved, the comfort women issue, the forced labor, compensation ort he forced labor so that kind of history issues are still there and with the advent with the progress of the democratization in Korea those historical issues, have become more, the criticism from the social sectors, the society, are becoming more powerful, so now it is a very serious diplomatic issue, in the bilateral relations, between the two countries. I think we should that the history, I son of the biggest obstacle.”

Professor Lee: “Also another kind of obstacle, which has become more serious with the progress of democratization, is the territorial disputes. Before, kind of similar structure (with comfort women), before when South Korea was under military rule the dictators could just suppress the protest and they could deal with the problem and doing business with japan without thinking much about the territorial disputes. But now with the progress of democratization, both of the two countries could no longer afford to be seen by the people as weak on the territorial issues, so that is the reason why we see more heated confrontation over the island. Also Japan is also in its own process of democratization, before the bureaucrats were very power, in containing the voice from the people but now the public opinion has a growing influence on the policies, so now the Japanese government cannot show itself weak on the territorial disputes. There is a reason why we see more heated confrontation over the island. So history and territorial issues are obstacles, and the problems are getting more and more serious.”