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***When censoring anti-immigration attitudes backfires
- The impact of reactance and censorship on political attitudes***

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Abstract

Anti-immigration movements are currently enjoying electoral success around the world, despite attempts by incumbent parties to mitigate their influence on voters. This seeming paradox is the main focus of this paper, aiming to investigate whether attempts censor and ostracize anti-immigration attitudes actually mitigate their influence or not. Two studies were conducted: Study 1 investigated whether censoring anti-immigration attitudes makes them more influential, and if the framing of the censorship affects this process – as suggested by Psychological Reactance Theory. This was done using an experimental paradigm. Study 2 investigated the correlation between a number of personality and political variables and voter support for the anti-immigration party the Sweden Democrats. This was done using an internet-based survey design. The results could not support that censoring anti-immigration attitudes had a general effect on attitudinal change. Lack of statistical power, low reliability of dependent measures, and low paradigm validity may be factors behind this. A few significant interactions were found, suggesting that sex and previous attitudes may act as moderators in this process: Men became more negative towards immigration when exposed to censorship, as opposed to women. This effect was strongest in a paternalistic motivated censorship. Those who were positive to immigration became more negative following the manipulation, and vice versa. This effect was found to emerge regardless of exposure to censorship. Lastly, it was found that supporters of the Sweden Democrats hold significantly more populist attitudes, less social capital, less rejection sensitivity and less system justification than others.

Keywords: Censorship, Psychological Reactance, Immigration, Sweden Democrats, Populism, Social Capital, Rejection Sensitivity, Trait Reactance, System Justification.

Introduction

In Sweden, racist sentiments, beliefs and norms have been at the political focal point for a number of years now, sparking heated debates concerning freedom of speech and discrimination. This has led to a surge in demand for censorship of alleged racism, in all from ethnic stereotypes in children's books (Olsson, 2015) to the colloquial use of the word “negerboll” as slang for chocolate ball confectionery (“Negerboll i ordbok fall för DO”, 2004). Simultaneously, social justice movements, politicians and opinion makers have steadily increased their engagement in raising awareness of racial discrimination in society, further accentuating the discourse on racism. Interestingly however, these processes have been refuted with the surge of voter support for the *radical right-wing populist party (RRP-party) the Sweden Democrats*. These types of political movements merge anti-establishment sentiments and political discontent (i.e. *Populism*) with opposition to multiculturalism and immigration (i.e. *Right-wing radicalism*). While this trend has indeed been visible in Western Europe now for many decades (Mudde, 2013), Sweden has only recently become affected by this political wave through the rise of the Sweden Democrats. The party successfully surpassed the 4-percent election threshold in the Swedish parliamentary elections in 2010, and has since seen a steady increase in voter support – despite facing solid opposition and criticism by media and other parties. The party's position against immigration and multiculturalism has generated a multitude of accusations of racism, neo-fascism and xenophobia – and has rendered them subject of debates on censorship and political exclusion. The party has for example been denied commercial spots, while the youth association has been denied access to public schools for recruiting (“Tv 4 sänder inte Sds valfilm”, 2010; Höglund, 2014). In 2015, the party's poster campaign in the Stockholm subway system was systematically vandalized and was later withdrawn by the Stockholm public transport company due to the criticism (“Sista Sd affischerna revs ned”, 2015). Similar occurrences happened during the 2014 parliamentary elections (“Sds affischer vandaliserade”, 2014). There has even been alleged refusals of submitted debate articles by the party's representatives (“Debattartikel som Trelleborgs...”, 2016). Yet despite these attempts to contain the party's propaganda, the Sweden Democrats have successfully gained support – suggesting that the attempted censorship has not had the desired effect. Even though it is reasonable to suppose that limiting the access of Sweden Democrat propaganda would lower their support, it appears that the party is instead gaining support. Can the censorship and ostracism itself possibly be the reason behind this? This seeming paradox will be at the focal point of this study, attempting to address how censorship of anti-immigration attitudes influence people, and how well adapted Sweden Democrat supporters are to ostracism.

Censorship

Censorship may be one of the oldest and most common political measures in existence. From the biblical ban on curse words in the ten commandments to the current societal discourse on how to contain racism – censorship has emerged as the dominant method to control the proliferation of subversive attitudes and ideas. Its underlying idea is rather simple: to keep certain information from reaching selected recipients, by means of editing the communication flow. The assumption is that by doing so, one keeps the information from influencing the beliefs and attitudes of others and thus stop it from influencing their behavior (Ashmore, Ramchandraand & Jones, 1971). Such information is usually deemed to have such a negative impact on people's behavior that it would be more beneficial to withhold it from them, rather than to try to refute the information. The content of such information is therefore often subject to much conflict with prevailing societal norms, but often also with official government policies or religious standpoints. From this perspective, censorship is used as means of social influence that enables a social authority, that acts as the *censor* (i.e. the agent that censors), to manipulate a target group into behaving a desired way – or rather to refrain from a specific behavior. While history has seen a number of attempts to keep people from indulging in socially undesirable behaviors, such as swearing and littering – these vices still prevail today. A plenitude of research would even suggest that attempts to censor undesirable attitudes are bound to backfire – and instead make them more influential (Ashmore, Ramchandraand & Jones, 1971; Worchel & Arnold, 1973; Worchel, Arnold & Baker, 1975). When viewed in this light, the question inevitably arises whether the current social attempts to censor alleged racist attitudes really does keep racism from spreading – or if they perhaps have an opposite effect instead? This paper seeks to expand on this suggestion by experimentally investigating whether or not censoring the proliferation of anti-immigration attitudes makes these attitudes more influential. In order to also create a better understanding of this process, the study also seeks to investigate how the framing of the censorship affects its influence. Certainly, a censorship with a truly benign purpose could not backfire? Or is it possible that censorship always backfires – regardless of how empathetic or kind its motivation is?

Different motives for censorship

Interestingly, research has found that advocates of censorship usually do not consider themselves to be particularly susceptible or harmed by the information they want to censor, but instead argue that “others” are so (McLeod, Detenber & Eveland, 2001). This is known as “the third-person-effect“, an extended hypothesis launched by public opinion researcher Davison (1983). The hypothesis has been supported by a plenitude of research findings on a variety of issues ranging

from commercials and political campaign ads (Perloff, 1996) to pornography (Gunther, 1995). Gunther and Mundy (1993) suggested that the hypothesis rests on a cognitive self-serving bias wherein individuals seek to evaluate themselves as more insusceptible to persuasion than others in order to enhance their self-images. In essence, this bias thus both affects the perceptions of others' capability to handle influential information and distorts the perception of one's own susceptibility to the very same information. Censorship, as means of controlling unpleasant or upsetting information, would thus rarely be advocated to protect one's own interests but rather to protect the interests of others. McLeod (et al., 2001) found that this "concern" is the best predictor for support of censorship.

However, they also found that individuals motivate censorship differently depending on their perception of what actually is in the interests (or concern) of "others". Two major motivational strategies are identified: Firstly, censorship with an aim to punish attitudinal opponents and claim moral authority. This strategy is common and entails rejecting certain information or attitudes as wrong and harmful to the moral fabric of society, rendering it needful to contain the attitudes so it does not spread. Advocates of this motivation thus claim to defend morals and righteousness by censoring these attitudes. The key factor here is the complete rejection of the censored attitudes and of its proponents, where the censorship is used as means of punishment for non-conformity. Studies have for example shown that people are more prone to censor their political opponents' views than their own – regardless of support for democratic principles (Fisher, Lilie, Evans, Hollon, Sands, DePaul, & Hultgren, 1999; Davis & Silver, 2004; Lindner & Nosek, 2009; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). Secondly, censorship can be motivated by the aim to protect – a paternalistic strategy where advocates of censorship claim to protect a third person (or a group) from being harmed by the information. This type of motivation does not have any claim to moral authority or ambition to punish opponents, but rather an empathetic concern for other groups of individuals. However, when reasoning like this, one is attempting to interpret possible threats on behalf of these individuals – rather than actually observing the impact on them. So, while the intentions are empathetic, it can still be interpreted as infringement of the attitudinal freedom. The findings by McLeod (et al., 2001) suggest that this is the most commonly used strategy for advocating censorship of unpleasant information – and especially so among women.

The effects of censorship

In the psychological research on the effects of censorship, the perhaps most established theory is the *Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT)*. Originally developed by Brehm (1966), the theory states that individuals perceive themselves as autonomous agents, thus enjoying a number of

established freedoms. When these freedoms are threatened or eliminated the individual will react to this by experiencing a negative psychological state called *Reactance*. Brehms observation was that the purpose of experiencing reactance was to increase the will to restore the threatened or eliminated freedom, thus influencing the behavior of the individual. This behavior, called freedom restoration, would be directly aimed at facing the threat and reinstating the freedom. In practice, this behavior usually consists of acting out the freedom that is being threatened. The paradoxical implication of this is that censorship (with the implicit purpose of making certain information less available and thus less influential) actually increases the desirability and persuasiveness of the information for the individuals exposed to the censorship. This effect has because of these paradoxical outcomes been named “*The Boomerang Effect*”.

Ashmore, Ramchandraand & Jones (1971) were among the first to find evidence of how censorship leads to this boomerang effect. In their study, participants' attitudes were measured on a certain local political issue before and after they were exposed to censorship of a random attitudinal standpoint on this issue. Their post manipulation attitudes were then measured. They found that participants who previously agreed with the censored position became even more positive towards it, while participants who disagreed with the censored position changed their minds and also became more positive towards it. These results indicated that censorship induces reactance and causes attitudinal change in order to restore the individual's freedom. Worchel and Brehm (1970) have also expanded the censorship paradigm to include freedom threatening speeches (Such as “*You have no choice but to believe this*”). They found that these types of speeches do induce a boomerang effect – but only among those who previously agreed to the standpoint advocated by the speech. The authors argued that the participants who already agreed with the freedom threatening speech perceived their freedom to ever change their attitude from that position to be threatened, while the participants who initially disagreed had already practiced their freedom by taking the opposite standpoint. Worchel and Arnold (1973) found that the evaluation of the censor agent itself is a vital moderator of the boomerang effect - but only if freedom is somehow restored (e.g. Censorship is broken) and reactance is decreased. When this is the case, if the censor is positively evaluated, the people will trust in the righteousness of the censorship and become more negative towards the censored message. When the censor is negatively evaluated, people will instead change their attitudes towards the communication – thus the boomerang effect will be visible despite the fact that the freedom has been restored. The authors explained this by using balance theory (Heider, 2013) suggesting that participants balanced their attitudes to match their evaluation of the censor. One other interesting finding is that an agent becomes significantly more negatively evaluated when it becomes a censor. Thus, an agent that is initially positively evaluated will inevitably suffer negative

consequences when censoring any type of information – despite its initial positive evaluation. This suggests that the act of censoring is considered so negative, that it affects the evaluation of the censor agent regardless of its previous evaluations. Further connections with Balance theory were made by Worchel, Arnold & Baker (1975) who found that the boomerang effect occurred even if the censor was evaluated as attractive and as a high expertise. However, if these censor prerequisites were combined with a censored message that the participants had not previously agreed with – the boomerang effect did not occur. Thus, cognitive balancing was only found to occur in extreme situations where many independent factors influence the evaluations of the censor and the position.

Worchel (1992) shed light on the importance of the level of personalism of the censorship, and found that the more personal a censorship is (e.g. the degree to which “*This message is only censored for you, not for anyone else*”), the stronger the boomerang effect. Baer, Hinkle, Smith and Fenton (1980) argued that reactance is a social cognition that only emerges in social interactions, assessing reactance through the “impression management interpretation”. This perspective suggests that individuals are more concerned with being perceived as having freedoms in the eyes of others, rather than actually being free. The researchers found that the boomerang effect occurred when participants were not given the opportunity to exercise their freedom in public prior to the censorship manipulation. On the other hand, no boomerang effect occurred when the post-manipulation attitudes were kept private. These results imply that only exercising your freedoms publicly – not privately, acts as a freedom restoration that neutralizes the effects of reactance. The authors argue that this might be because reactance is meant as a display of autonomy primarily towards others – and specifically towards the source of the freedom threat. If you are unable to display your autonomy to others, the effect of reactance will not be visible.

The boomerang effect has been found outside the laboratory setting as well. Mazis, Settle & Leslie, (1973) assessed the attitudinal effects of a municipal ban of phosphate-based laundry detergents in Miami, Florida. By conducting a survey study, they found that inhabitants of Miami were significantly more positive towards phosphate-based laundry detergents than inhabitants in Tampa - a municipality that had not enacted any ban on phosphate-based detergents (control group). The inhabitants of Miami were also less positive to the government's water pollution measures than were the Tampa inhabitants. In an ecological school setting, West (1975) found evidence of the boomerang effect on the issue of the cafeteria food, when students were informed that they were (allegedly) denied use of the cafeteria for two weeks. The study found a significant increase in positive attitudes towards the cafeteria food. A more recent study in a school setting focused on awareness campaigns on alcohol consumption on university campuses: Campo and Cameron (2006) showed that normative social campaigns aimed to limit bench drinking at the

schools tend to backfire. By conducting field surveys on two campuses that had recently enacted campaigns of this sort, the authors found that while the majority of students changed the attitudes slightly towards the message advocated by the campaign – the students who were already displaying unhealthy attitudes towards alcohol changed their attitudes further away from the message and engaged in more heavy drinking. This suggested that these types of freedom-threatening campaigns are only somewhat persuasive to those who already support its message or those who do not feel that their behavior are immediately threatened by the campaign. However, those who are predominantly targeted by such campaigns will instead turn further away from the campaign's message.

Reactance as a trait

The idea that individual differences in reactance is influenced by sex was assessed by Brehm (1981) who conducted reactance experiments with children of different ages and found that male children are significantly more inclined to display reactance than female children. Similar sex differences among adults have also been reported by a multitude of more recent studies (Joubert 1990; Seemann, Buboltz & Jenkins, 2004; Woller, Buboltz & Loveland, 2007; Stieger, Reips & Voracek, 2007). In much of the current research, the individual differences in reactance is assessed as a personality trait: Trait Reactance (Hong & Faedda, 1996). This trait is proposed to affect the inclination to experience reactance when having one's freedom threatened. Dillard & Shen (2005) could show a clear interaction between trait reactance and perceived threat to freedom – as high trait reactant participants in the study perceived a greater freedom threat when exposed to freedom threatening messages on flossing, than low trait reactant participants. Miller, Burgoon, Grandpre & Alvaro (2006) found similar results on smoking, suggesting that high trait reactant individuals are more inclined to increase smoking or positive attitudes towards smoking when exposed to negative messages on smoking that are perceived as a freedom threat. Thus, it is clear that trait reactance does affect the influence of persuasive information. But, how trait reactance affects political attitudes has only recently been investigated.

Knight, Tobin & Hornsey (2014) found that trait reactance is connected to system justification and political conservatism, mediated by the compensatory control model. In their study, participants were exposed to a stimulus set to manipulate the participants' experience of control in order to activate the compensatory control model. They found that high trait reactant participants, when perceiving to have full control, are predominantly anti-authoritarian and reformist. When they however experienced a loss of control, they became more conservative and more prone to justify the current system (Knight et al., 2014). As low trait reactant participants did not display such a shift,

the authors suggested that a loss of perceived control causes an attitudinal shift from political anti-authoritarian reformism (i.e. liberal or left-wing support) to political conservatism and system justification (i.e. conservative or right-wing support) only among high trait reactant individuals. The implications of these findings would suggest that socially conservative parties, such as the Sweden Democrats, would enjoy much higher support from high trait reactant individuals than other parties. If so, it would shed new light on the process behind such parties' electoral success – and perhaps the success of other populist movements as well. Yet most research on their success have been conducted outside the field of Psychology.

Previous research on the electoral success of the Sweden Democrats

Research regarding the rise and growth of *RRP* (Radical Right Populist) parties started already in the 1980's but was initially limited to single case studies of certain RRP-parties (e.g. Furlong, 1992; Ignazi, 1989). Herbert Kitschelt (1995) did however become the first to attempt to explain the rise and growth of RRP-parties in general. He suggested that the rise of these parties is fueled by the socioeconomic tensions created in the transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society. Kitschelt argued that the societal changes that were caused by this transition also affected people's voting behavior, creating an openness to political thoughts that had previously been discarded – such as *totalitarianism* and *ethnopluralism*. These “new” ideas attracted voters in social groups that perceived themselves as the “losers” of the societal transitions, primarily blue-collar workers, the petty bourgeoisie and low-income households. However, while these ideas did enjoy vast support for a long time, they could not explain the rise of the RRP-movements. Current research on RRP-parties have stratified explanatory models into concepts of supply and demand models. The supply side models focus on the organizational development of the RRP-parties, their leadership and policies – as means to explain their electoral success. The demand side models however focus on the electorate itself, their socio-structural backgrounds, their attitudes and to some extent their political behavior. This latter focus attempts to explain the success of RRP-parties in terms of social cognitive, behavioral and ideological changes within the electorate, rather than through organizational change.

In recent years, attempts to apply demand-model explanations on the Sweden Democrats have proved promising. Earlier research (Taleny, 2012) indicated that there is a negative macro-level correlation between the social trust variable Social capital and support for the Sweden Democrats. It was shown that municipalities wherein the Sweden Democrats enjoyed a strong voter support in the 2010 parliamentary elections, also displayed significantly lower amounts of indicators for Social capital. This was an intriguing finding, as lack of Social capital had not previously been so closely

linked with RRP-party support. Originally developed by the political scientist Robert Putnam, the concept of Social capital was based on theory of democratic functionality. Putnam (1996) defined social capital as a micro-level interpersonal factor wherein trust and belief in the democratic system is generated. Social capital was thus considered to be accumulated by means of social networks, social interactions and social engagement with other people. The behavioral foundations of this theory is that individuals learn to socialize and to understand codes of social conduct through an active social participation in communities. By learning and understanding social interaction, individuals also learn to trust others – as trust between individuals can only be generated when they understand each others' behavior and know how to respond to it. The social networks wherein these interactions are made and trust thus is generated, can be versatile – ranging from sport clubs and theater groups, to workers unions and church congregations. These social gatherings all generate a sense of civic spirit, a mindset that creates openness to cooperation and pro-social behavior – that are incorporated into the concept of Social capital. From this perspective, Putnam could through a number of studies conclude, that Social capital influenced not only peoples inclinations towards cooperation and trust in others– but also cooperation and trust in the democratic system. Putnam thus suggested democratic stability is dependent of Social capital (Putnam, 1996, 2006). Rothstein further developed this conclusion by suggesting that Social capital also influences trust in public authorities, not only the police, schools and hospitals, but also in the government and incumbent politicians (Rothstein, 2003; 2011). Considering this, it is highly likely that populism, a political perspective pertaining a lack of trust in the political system (and is the core ideological framework for RRP-parties), is negatively associated with Social capital.

As the findings by Rothstein would suggest, people that trust in others and the public authorities, are probably not the people who would support political movements bound to overthrow the political system. The finding by Taleny (2012) supported this hypothesis, while however on a macro-level. In order to assess the micro-level correlations Taleny (2014) also conducted a study wherein Social capital was measured on an individual level. Social capital was here acquired using a self-report questionnaire – where Social capital was measured using individual indicators such as personal trust in others, personal trust in public authorities, and level of personal social engagements. In order to compare this measure with support for RRP-movements, a scale assessing populism was developed. The results could support that there is a negative correlation between Social capital and populism on an individual level as well.

Interestingly, the study could also find that the personality factor Rejection sensitivity also seem to correlate significantly with both Social capital and populism. This personality factor was originally defined by Downey & Feldman (1996), as the extent to which an individual feels anxiety

due to perceived and expected rejection. Individuals displaying high rejection sensitivity are thus more inclined to apprehend signs of social rejection and are more prone to expect social rejection in any social situation. These individuals would also be significantly more predisposed to react to social rejection with anxiety and irrational behavior. However, Bäck, Bäck and Garcia-Albacete (2013) found that these individuals are also more inclined to change their political attitudes and behavior when firstly being rejected by one group, and then accepted into a new group. These individuals adjust their attitudes and behavior in accordance to the social norms and beliefs of the new group, even if the group exhibits extremist beliefs and criminal behaviors. Thus, highly rejection sensitive individuals are more inclined to fit in when accepted into new social groups. Taleny (2014) found that Rejection sensitivity is negatively correlated with Social capital and positively correlated to Populism. Taleny argued that it would be reasonable to assume that individuals who maintain high levels of rejection sensitivity, would also be less inclined to seek new social interactions due to their anxiety towards being rejected. These individuals would thus not display any high levels of Social capital. Individuals that maintain high levels of rejection sensitivity, would thus also be more predisposed to feel rejected by society and by societal changes – and therefore form more populist attitudes advocating a significant societal change and personal redemption. This would provide a psychological foundation for how populism is formed – as different ostracizing attempts that are meant to mitigate populism, might actually cause it. Rejection sensitivity can thus be the possible key for understanding the paradox of the current anti-immigration occurrence. While the Taleny (2014) study did provide statistically significant correlations, the low amount of participants (N= 43) raised questions about how representative these findings were. It was therefore deemed needful to provide research with larger sample sizes in order to wholly assess this relation.

Overview of Research

In summary, the previous research presented above would suggest one major prediction: That censoring anti-immigration messages would increase its persuasiveness rather than decrease it. If this is the case, it is also probable that censoring anti-immigration messages would increase the sympathy and support for the Sweden Democrats – as it is a pronounced anti-immigration party. It would thus provide a possible explanation to the surge in voter support the party has enjoyed the last 10 years, as it lately has been subject to many cases of elaborate censorship of different sorts. It is however also important to emphasize that the literature further suggest that this process is controlled by a number of factors. Primarily that reactance is the mediating factor in this process, where the censorship is perceived as a threat to attitudinal freedom which evokes reactance – which

in turn causes an attitudinal change towards the censored position - as suggested by Psychological Reactance Theory.

The research on reactance further suggest that men would be more inclined to display this attitudinal change than women, and that those who originally are opposed to the censored statement are more inclined to support the censored statement following censorship. In addition to this research, the current study will propose that the motivation for the censorship affects the attitudinal change. An authoritative censorship that claims moral superiority should be perceived as significantly more threatening to one's attitudinal freedom – than a censorship motivated by a paternalistic urge to protect the participants. Furthermore, this study proposes that Populism, Social capital, Rejection sensitivity, and Trait reactance act as moderators on this main process. This prediction is made on the basis that all of these variables assess trust in authorities to different extents. People high in Populism and Trait reactance would be considerably more inclined to spurn attempts by authorities to censor anti-immigration statements. Similarly, people low on social capital – and thus high Rejection sensitivity (as these variables correlate negatively) – would also be less inclined to accept a censorship imposed by an authority. Drawing on these notions, the following hypotheses are formed:

- H1: Censorship will cause an attitudinal change towards the censored position.*
- H2: The nature of the motivation for the censorship moderates the attitudinal shift. A paternalistic censorship due to protection is predicted to have less of an impact on the attitudinal shift than authoritative moralistic censorship due to claimed moral authority.*
- H3: Reactance mediates the effect of censorship on attitudinal shift.*
- H4: Moralistic authoritative motivation to censorship evokes more reactance than a protective paternalistic censorship motivation.*
- H5: Sex will moderate the relation between censorship and reactance, as men will display more reactance and a larger attitude change towards the censored message than women, when exposed to censorship.*
- H6: Trait reactance, rejection sensitivity, social capital and populism will moderate the relation between censorship and amount of evoked reactance, as participants high on trait reactance, populism and rejection sensitivity, but low on social capital will display larger attitude change towards the censored message than those who are not.*
- H7: Censorship will cause participants who displayed positive immigration attitudes beforehand, to change their attitudes to a more negative standpoint, to a greater extent than those who displayed negative immigration attitudes beforehand.*

In order to further investigate the nature of the voter support for the Sweden Democrats, the study will also attempt to replicate previous findings by Taleny (2014). I suggest that Sweden Democrat supporters will display significantly more populist attitudes, rejection sensitivity and lower social capital than supporters of other parties. In addition to this, I propose that Sweden Democrat supporters display more Trait reactance and more System justification than others, based on the findings by Knight et al., 2014, that individuals with high Trait reactance that perceive a loss of control are inclined to score higher on System Justification become more politically conservative. This would render them more inclined to support a social-conservative party such as the Sweden Democrats. The hypotheses are as follows:

H8: Individuals who display voter support for the Sweden Democrats will display higher populism, higher rejection sensitivity and lower social capital than those who do not display voter support for the Sweden Democrats.

H9: High trait reactance and high system justification will predict support for the Sweden Democrats.

Method

Study design

Due to the diverse nature of the hypotheses, the study used two different methodological approaches. Hypotheses 1 to 7 assess the causal effects of censorship on two dependent variables and the influence of possible moderators on this process. These hypotheses are thus best assessed using an experimental design in order to test the effects of censorship in a controlled environment. While providing a reliable methodological foundation for any causal inferences necessary for assessing the research hypotheses, it is considerably more difficult to obtain high power using an experimental approach than a larger quantitative survey study. Given the ambition to provide a further understanding of current political development among populist voters, as attempted by hypotheses 8-9, it was deemed necessary to assess these hypotheses through a larger survey, in order to provide more power to the findings. So in order to meet all the above mentioned aims, a two part mixed method approach was devised. The first part, study 1, used an experimental design while the second part, study 2, used a survey design.

Ethical issues

When conducting studies on such delicate topics as political opinion and personality, it is essential to address the ethical issues associated with them. Primarily, the acquired data can be

considered highly sensitive personal data and thus covered by the Personal Data Act (PUL, 1998:204). This law requires a strict control for the treatment of the collected data. In order to meet these legal demands, participants in both study 1 and 2 were guaranteed anonymity and the data was structured so that it would not be possible to connect it with any source of identification other than participant test-ID numbers. As the first study also required direct attempts to influence the participants mentally, concerns regarding the discomfort of these attempts had to be taken into account. Trying to manipulate people's political attitudes might have been experienced as highly unpleasant, especially as the focus was on such a controversial issue as immigration. In order to ensure that the participants would not feel exposed during this process, measures were taken to adapt the laboratory environment to increase the seclusion and protection of the participants from visible sight of other participants and other non-participants.

Furthermore, as the manipulation element in the first study was based on an alleged political organization, participants were inevitably deceived. While the deception was deemed necessary for producing the right setting for the anticipated outcome, it was still considered a possible ethical issue. Participants could have risked feeling violated and abused – which of course was of great concern. The paradigm had however been used in previous research to great extent, without any reports of incidents or negative feedback. Nevertheless, the political issue used in the current study was novel to the paradigm, as well as the political aspect. No previous study has attempted to manipulate immigration attitudes in a similar way, which means that the possible negative effects of the study were unknown. Thus, in order to carry out the deception in an ethically respectable way, much emphasis was put on debriefing the participants following the experimental session. In the debriefing, participants were given full information about the deception including description of the projects intentions, applied theories and structure, and also contact information to the researchers. To promote openness, participants and others were encouraged to visit the project's open science framework site.

Study 1

In order to assess the suggested effects of censorship on immigration attitude change and reactance (I.e. hypotheses 1 to 7) a within-subjects between groups design was used, as it was considered to enable a controlled manipulation of different types of political censorship. The design was based on research designs developed in previous studies on censorship (see Ashmore, Ramchandraand & Jones, 1971; Worchel & Arnold, 1973; Worchel, Arnold & Baker, 1975; Worchel, 1992). In this experimental paradigm, written or recorded political messages were allegedly supposed do be distributed to the participants, but were not - due to either alleged

censorship (experimental condition), or without any explanation there of (control condition). Building on this paradigm, study 1 used an alleged censorship of a debate article advocating an anti-immigration standpoint authored by a Sweden Democrat MP, while simultaneously allowing the distribution of an alleged pro-immigration debate article authored by a Green party MP. In order to assess the two different types of censorship pertained in the hypotheses, this study consisted of three conditions – two experimental groups with the addition of one control group. Group 1 received a manipulation of an authoritative moralistic censorship motivation, while group 2 received a paternalistic censorship motivation. Group 3 was used as control group, and did thus not receive any censorship motivation. These conditions constituted the manipulated independent variables assessed in the hypotheses, and were induced in form of an alleged e-mail wherein the censor agent presented a motivation for the alleged censorship. This e-mail was presented in both verbal and written form, and contained different justifications for the censorship depending on the condition – except in the control group where no e-mail was presented, and thus no censorship was mentioned. The e-mails were framed so that it could be perceived as printed from an actual mail program. However, the content of the e-mail was designed to induce a sense of personal censorship and a notion of deliberate censorship with a specific purpose (based on Worchel, 1992). This was managed by leading participants to believe that the decision to withdraw the Sweden Democrat debate article was made recently, and that their group was the first group to be subjected to this censorship. They were also lead to believe that other groups before them had not been subjected to this censorship – but had received the censored article according to the study's original intent. The specific purpose or motivation of the censorship did however change according to condition. In the authoritative moralistic censorship condition, the censor agent had in the e-mail motivated the decision on the grounds that they could not accept helping the Sweden Democrats with providing their propaganda to young voters, as this was not in line with their core values – and that they instead support the struggle against racism. Meanwhile, in the paternalistic censorship condition, the censor agent had in the e-mail motivated the decision in terms of the risk that any of the participants in the study could be offended by the debate article, and that they insist that all participants in the study should be guaranteed protection from offensive messages. The censor agent has by previous studies been deemed vital for inducing reactance, as a negatively evaluated censor induce much more reactance than a positively evaluated (Worchel & Arnold, 1973; Worchel, Arnold & Baker, 1975; Graupmann, Jonas, Meier, Hawelka & Aichhorn, 2012). However, when considering the ethical issues of utilizing a well-known but negatively evaluated existing censor agent, it was deemed to lay outside the accepted ethical guidelines of this study – as these previous studies have also found that being appointed censor agent increases negative evaluations. Instead, a

fictive censor agent was constructed: the Swedish Political Council, allegedly consisting of representatives appointed by the government. It was considered essential to stress that the council consisted representatives from the incumbent government, in order to ensure that participants did not associate the organization with the Sweden Democrats. This was expected to later render credibility to the censorship motivations, as it would be considered improbable that a council with Sweden Democrat representatives would censor a debate article authored by a Sweden Democrat MP. Furthermore, the use of a fictive political organization as source for the study, was enacted in order to insinuate that there was a political authority behind the study – independent from the researcher. In the eyes of the participants, this would render the researcher merely an employee working for a political authority rather than the actual head of the project. This was deemed important for the credibility of the censorship manipulation, as the experiment leader could not be held responsible for the council's censorship and thus not be the target of reactance – which instead could be directed to the council. As part of the e-mail, the manipulation also contained the alleged debate article advocating a pro-immigration standpoint – an article that was presented in all three conditions. The debate article was written to be as factual as possible, drawing logical inferences from statistics and other facts – while avoiding ad hominem attacks and emotionally biased and prejudiced statements. The author of the article was presented as a fictive Green party MP. The article was also edited and framed to look retrieved from a major Swedish newspaper – which increased the credibility of the manipulation.

The dependent variables immigration attitude and reactance were tested twice – before and after the manipulation – through a questionnaire. The hypothesized moderating variables of trait reactance, social capital, populism, rejection sensitivity and sex were all assessed prior to the manipulation in a questionnaire, while items to measure the manipulation check were assessed in questionnaires following the manipulation.

Participants. The participants for the first study were mainly recruited at Swedish high schools in different cities but also at the Lund university campus, and was limited to enrolled Swedish-speaking students. This choice of high-schools for recruitment was motivated by political, geographical and socioeconomic factors, as this recruitment method would enable a more diverse spread of political attitudes among the participants than what would have been the case if only limited to students at Lund university. As support for anti-immigration standpoints is weakest in university cities, among well the educated and university students, this method would thus provide a more representative share of anti-immigration supporters (Taleny, 2012). A total number of 138 participants were recruited, of which 132 completed the experiments. Of these, 62 were women and

67 were men (and a further 2 defined themselves as “undefined sex”, and 1 did not leave an answer), while the mean age of the participants was 18.0 years ($SD= 2.65$). The participants were randomly assigned to either of the three conditions. A total of 46 participants were assigned into condition 1, of which 24 were women and 21 were men (and 1 did not leave an answer), displaying a mean age of 17,6 years. A total of 47 participants were assigned into condition 2, of which 20 were women and 26 were men (and 1 undefined sex), displaying a mean age of 17,8 years. In condition 3, a total of 39 participants were assigned, of which 18 were women and 20 were men (and 1 undefined sex) displaying a mean age of 18,3 years.

Materials. Participants were to complete a total of 3 questionnaires, of which the first served as a background questionnaire assessing a number of independent variables, and the second questionnaire assessed the dependent variables, while the third assessed the manipulation checks and evaluations of the experiments. The first questionnaire (Appendix A) was presented to the participants before the censorship manipulation and contained a number of background questions as well as political and personality measures. Participants were initially asked to answer questions about their age, sex (male, female, or other) and study subject, as well about their parents' current employment situation, and if they had a foreign background (*Yes, no* or *don't know*). Furthermore, participants were also inquired about their political background – whether or not they were members of a political party or youth organization (*Yes* or *no*), and how they would place themselves on a political left-right scale (answered on a scale from 1 - *very much to the left* to 7 - *very much to the right*). Following this, participants continued into a section of the questionnaire labeled “*Politics & Society*”, which included items measuring populism, social capital and attitude towards immigration (and a few more items that were part of another study). Primarily, participants attitude towards immigration was measured assessing scores for the statement “*Sweden should admit fewer immigrants*” (answered using a 7-point likert scale). As the study attempts to address immigration attitudes as a political attitude, it is necessary that the measure incorporates support for an actual policy associated with the attitude, rather than prejudices against immigrants or conceptions about integration or similar issues.

In order to measure Populism, the nine item Populism-scale that was introduced by Taleny (2014), was applied. The scale was developed from previous empirical research in political science by Barr (2009), Ljunggren (2002), Fryklund & Petersson (1981) and Canovan (1999), outlining an ideological framework for populism support. Consisting of 9 items, each containing a political statement which was answered using a 7-point Likert-scale. An example of an item from the scale was “*What Sweden needs is a politician who challenges the political establishment and “drains the*

swamp". In total, the nine item populism scale measured a satisfactory reliability of $\alpha=.67$ ($M=4.2$, $SD=0.82$). In the following analyses, each participant's mean score on the scale was calculated to provide an individual populism score that could be applied in the analyses. After the populism-scale, participants were asked to answer items measuring social capital. The items measuring this variable were also taken from a scale composed and translated into Swedish by Taleny (2014), composing items utilized in a number of previous studies (Grootaert, Narayan, Nyhan, Jones & Woolcock (2004); Riks-SOM survey, 2009). The scale consisted of 12 items, each containing a statement about trust and attitudes towards social engagements. Participants were asked to state to what extent they supported the statement using a 7-point Likert-scale. An example of an item from the scale is: "*I think you can trust people in general*". The full 12-item social capital scale reached a reliability of $\alpha=0.66$ ($M=3.9$, $SD=0.83$). In the following analyses, each participant's mean score on the scale was calculated to provide an individual social capital score that could be applied in the analyses.

After completion of these measures, participants continued into the third and final section of the first questionnaire, labeled "*Personality*". In this section, participants were asked to answer items measuring trait reactance, current emotional state and rejection sensitivity. The items assessing trait reactance, were taken from the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale developed by Hong & Faedda (1996), which is the most utilized scale to measure trait reactance. In the current study however, the 11-item version of the scale was used – that had previously been verified by Dillard & Shen (2005). As no Swedish version of it had been published, the items were translated in order to be used in the current study. The scale consisted of 11 statements whereby participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt that the statement adequately described them. They answered using a 7-point Likert-scale where 1 indicated the statement did not correspond at all to them, while 7 indicated a full correspondence. An example of an item from the scale is "*Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me*". In the current study, the 11-item Hong Psychological Reactance scale reached a reliability of $\alpha=0.77$ ($M=4.2$, $SD=0.93$). In the following analyses, each participant's mean score on the scale was calculated to provide an individual trait reactance score that could be applied in the analyses.

Following completion of this scale, participants were asked to indicate their emotional state through a 7-item scale, that had been developed for this purpose. The scale was designed to act as pre-manipulation measure of emotional state, and was going to be repeated after the manipulation to measure what effect the manipulation had on their emotional state. As state reactance was hypothesized to manifest as a conglomeration of negative attitudes, the scale incorporated measures of irritation, anger, aggravation and sadness. To avoid a negative bias in the answers, three more

positive emotional states were included: contention, happiness, and relaxation. These were however not included in the following analyses. The scale consisted of 7 questions, each addressing a specific emotion, such as for example “*How content are you right now?*”. Participants could indicate their answer using a 5-point scale from 0 to 4, where 0 indicated “*not at all*”, and 4 indicated “*very much*”. The scale displayed a satisfactory reliability of $\alpha=0.71$ ($M=1.4$, $SD=0.63$). In the following analyses, each participant's mean score from the negative emotional state scale was applied in the analyses.

The last variable measured was rejection sensitivity, using a scale developed by Downey & Feldman (1996), but has since been widely applied in a number of studies (Bäck, Bäck and Garcia-Albacete, 2013; Taleny, 2014; Knapton, 2013). This study utilized the shortened 16-items scale translated into Swedish by Knapton (2013) and further used in Taleny (2014). The scale consists of 8 situations, each paired with two follow-up questions regarding the situation. The situations each depict a fictive situation wherein the participant had to imagine himself/herself in a social situation wherein he/she are dependent on someone else in some way. Each of these situations were then followed by questions regarding their feelings and expectations in the situation described in the statement. An examples of such an item was this: “*You approach a friend to talk with him/her after having done or said something to him/her that might have upset him/her very much.*” Questions: “– *How worried would you be that your friend would not want to talk with you?* (1) – *How likely do you think it would be that your friend would like to talk with you?* (2)”. Participants answered using a 6-point scale from 1 to 6, where 1 indicated “*not worried*” as answer to the first question, and “*not likely*” on the second, while an answer of 6 indicated to “*very worried*” to the first question and “*very likely*” to the second. The answers of the second follow-up questions were inverted before calculating the rejection sensitivity index value. The index value of rejection sensitivity of each participant was then calculated. The rejection sensitivity scale reached a reliability of $\alpha= .71$, ($M= 7.3$, $SD= 3.7$).

Following the completion of the first questionnaire, participants were provided with the manipulation and then questionnaire 2, assessing post-manipulation immigration attitudes and post-manipulation negative emotional state. The item utilized to measure post-manipulation immigration attitudes was the same item as previously used in questionnaire 1: “*Sweden should admit fewer immigrants*”. In the post-manipulation scale however, a further seven items were included as fillers. This was done in order to prevent participants from easily recognizing the repeated item, and thus remembering their previous answer – leading to a consistency bias wherein they would be inclined to simply repeat their previous answer in order to appear consistent. The scale was designed as 8 statements about immigration, where the fill-out items were designed to address prejudices and

conceptions of immigration. An example of such item is “*Immigration causes more costs than benefits for the Swedish economy*”. The participants answered the items through a 7-point Likert-scale.

Following these items, negative emotional state was again measured. This scale was a direct repetition of the pre-manipulation negative emotional state scale used in questionnaire 1. After completion of this questionnaire, the participants firstly participated in a mock voting simulation, where after they were asked to complete the last questionnaire. In this third questionnaire, manipulation checks and further evaluation was assessed. Firstly, participants were inquired to state to what extent they associated the incumbent Swedish parties with immigration policy – using a 7-point scale (1= *not at all*, 7= *very much*). Following this, the participants were asked to state their general perception about the *Swedish Political Council*, using a 7-point scale (1= *very negative*, 7= *very positive*).

Following this, participants were also asked to state which parties they thought were represented in the Swedish Political Council. The participants were presented with the 8 parties incumbent in the Swedish parliament, and asked to mark each of the parties they believed were represented in the council. Following this question, they were also inquired whether they apprehended that any material in the study had been kept from them (“*Yes*”, “*No*”, or “*Don't know*”). If they answered yes to this question, they were also inquired to explain what the reason for this was, in an open-ended answer. The final question assessed if they further thought it was justified to keep the material from them, answering on a 7-point scale (1= *very wrong*, 7= *very right*). After the completion of this question, the participants were provided with the debriefing paper. All of the data was screened for possible outliers through scatter plot analysis, and also tested for violation of normality by conducting a Shapiro-Wilks test. No outliers were identified, and no serious violations of normality were found.

Procedure. Participants were recruited either individually or in groups, and were informed that the experiments were about political attitudes and debate articles. The participants were lead individually to the laboratory by the experiment leader. Prior to their arrival, the laboratory had been prepared so that on each desk, a small paper note containing the three digit individual test-ID:s, that each participant were asked to note on every questionnaire they answered. Furthermore, informed consent papers had been laid out on each desk. They were then informed about the outline of the experiment by the experiment leader. The participants were lead to believe that there were different topics for the debate articles depending on which group they had been assigned to, ranging from economy and equality to immigration issues, but that they were to receive more information

about their assigned debate articles later. Furthermore, participants were told the study was conducted in cooperation with the "Swedish Political Council", consisting of political representatives appointed by the government to support social projects and political research. After the introduction, participants were provided with the background questionnaire (see Appendix A).

Following the completion of this questionnaire, participants were told that they had been assigned into the immigration issue group, and were thus going to read debate articles regarding immigration policies in Sweden and then answer questions about their subject in a following questionnaire. During this stage of the experiment session, the participants were exposed to the experimental stimulus. In the two experimental conditions, participants were told that they initially were going to read two debate articles arguing for or against open immigration policies – written by currently incumbent MP:s (One from the *Green party* and one from the *Sweden Democrats*). They were however then told that the Swedish Political Council just recently had decided to retract the article against immigration written by the Sweden Democrat MP. They were then read to aloud an alleged e-mail from the council wherein the motivation for the censorship was stated. Participants also received a print-out of the alleged e-mail (Appendix B). They were further told by the experiment leader, that he had previously used both articles – and that the decision to retract one of them was just recently informed to him. They were thus told that they would only receive the pro-immigration debate article. The article (Appendix C) was then provided to the participants to read. In the control condition, participants were not given any information about alleged censorship nor motivation prior to receiving the debate article. The same debate article used in all conditions. After reading the debate article, participants were given the second questionnaire (Appendix D).

Following completion of this questionnaire, the participants were asked to place an anonymous vote for their most preferred party in a ballot box – which was sent around by the experiment leader. Following completion of these tasks, participants were provided with the third questionnaire (Appendix E). After completion of this final questionnaire, participants were debriefed about the study's actual purpose and theory, and of the fictive organizations and authors that were used – all in accordance to ethical guidelines of the Swedish Psychological Association. They were also given the opportunity to sign up on a e-mail list in order to receive further information about the study and a link to the open science page for the project, before leaving the laboratory. The entire experiment procedure would take approximately 45 to 50 minutes to complete.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to assess hypotheses 8 to 9, pertaining the effects of Populism, Social

capital, System justification, Trait reactance, and Rejection sensitivity, on support for the Sweden Democrats. The study was conducted as an internet survey on the internet questionnaire platform PsychSurveys.org.

Participants. Participants for study 2 were recruited online, through a various use of social media platforms. In total, a number of 478 participants were recruited, of which 211 were women and 255 were men (and 6 defined as “other sex”, and 6 missing), with a mean age of 33.1 years.

Materials. The internet survey was structured so that the first page participants would visit contained a short introduction of the project, instruction on how to complete the survey, as well as consent information. Following this page, participants were introduced to the first section labeled “About you”, where they were asked to state age and sex (*Woman, man, or other sex*), and to place themselves on left-right political scale – using a 7-point scale from 1 to 7 where 1 indicated *strongly to the left*, while 7 indicated *strongly to the right* ($M= 4.12$, *deviation from scale midpoint*= 1.38). Before continuing the the next page, participants were also asked to state which party they would vote for if there was a parliamentary election today. Participants could choose from a list containing the 8 parties currently represented in the Swedish parliament, but also the alternatives “Don't know”, “Would not vote/would vote blank” or “other party, namely:” - with which the latter accompanied a possibility for the participant to write their preferred party into an open-ended answer field.

After completing this first page, two pages followed containing items part of an other research project which laid outside the outline of this study. On page 5, items measuring Populism were introduced. The same 9-item Populism scale that was utilized in study 1 was also used here, together with the 7-point answer scale. In this study, the scale reached reliability of $\alpha=0.81$ ($M=4.3$, $SD=1.10$). On the following page, items measuring Social capital were presented – using the same 12-item Social capital scale assessed in study 2, also including the same 7-point answer scale. In this study, the scale reached a reliability of $\alpha=0.69$ ($M=4.5$, $SD=0.85$). Following this page, items measuring System justification was presented.

While originally developed by (Kay & Jost, 2003), this study utilizes the Swedish translated 8-item version of the scale developed in Jost & Nilsson(2012) in order to assess system justification. The scale consists of 8 statements about society, and participants are then asked to indicate to what extant they agree with the statement using a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 indicate that they do not at all agree with the statement, and 7 indicate that they entirely agree with the statement. In this study, the scale reached a reliability of $\alpha=0.81$ ($M=3.7$, $SD=1.15$).

Following this page, items to measure trait reactance were presented. The 11-item Hong Psychological Reactance scale was once again utilized, just as in study 1, together with the 7-point answer scale. In this study, the scale reached reliability of $\alpha=0.84$ ($M=3.8$, $SD=1.05$). On the last page, items measuring Rejection sensitivity were introduced to the participants. The same 16-item Rejection sensitivity scale that was utilized in study 1 was once again used here, together with the 6-point answer scale. In this study, the non-indexed scale reached a reliability of $\alpha=0.74$ ($M=5.6$, $SD=3.30$).

After completing this page, participants reached the end page, thanking them for the participation, and also debriefing them about the study's purpose and theory in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Swedish Psychological Association. The end page also provided them with contact information to the research and supervisors, and a link to the project's open science framework page where the participants could assess further information.

All of the data was screened for possible outliers through scatter plot analysis, and also tested for violation of normality by conducting a Shapiro-Wilks test. No outliers were identified, and no serious violations of normality were found.

Procedure. Participants were recruited online, on different social media platforms. They were informed that they were going to participate in a study regarding political attitudes and personality differences, that is a part of a project conducted at the department of Psychology at Lund University. Participants were provided an link to the survey's webpage, where further information about the study was found. The survey would take approximately 20 minutes to complete.

Results

Manipulation check

In order to see whether the manipulation had been apprehended by the participants, a Chi-square test for independence was conducted on exposure to censorship (Censorship, No Censorship) and censorship identification (The item "Have you been subjected to any type of censorship during these tests?"). The results indicated a significant association between exposure to censorship and identification of censorship, $\chi^2(2, n=122) = 25.9, p < .0001, phi = .46$. Despite the statistical significance, the results indicated that 46% ($N=39$) of the participants that were exposed to censorship, did not perceive the censorship or were uncertain of it – which is disquieting. It is clear that these censorship paradigms were not noticeable to a satisfactory extent. However, when examining if those who did perceive the censorship also approved of it, a clear negative approval was found ($M=2.9, SD=.31$). This indicates that the censorship, when perceived, was regarded as

mostly negative.

Secondly, it was tested whether the paradigm managed to convince participants that the Sweden Democrats were not part of the Swedish Political Council (SPR). It was considered important to the paradigm that the Sweden Democrats were not perceived as the censors. A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) was conducted, this time on exposure to censorship (Censorship, No Censorship) and identification of the Sweden democrats as member of the Swedish political council (Yes or No). The results showed a statistically significant association, $\chi^2(1, n = 123) = 5.38, p = .02, \phi = .23$. These results also indicate that 78% of the participants exposed to censorship did not perceive the Sweden Democrats to be a member of the Swedish Political Council, which implies that these cannot have perceived the Sweden Democrats as accomplice to the censor agent.

In a further analysis, participants' approval of the council was examined using an independent samples t-test with censorship exposure as grouping variable. There was no statistically significant differences found between participants exposed to censorship ($M = 4.19, SD = 1.18; t(121) = -.438, p = .66$, two-tailed) and those not exposed ($M = 4.2, SD = .79; t(121) = -.505, p = .66$, two-tailed). The manipulation did thus not manage to induce a negative perception of the censor agent, which might have affected the results of the analyses in this study.

Hypothesis 1: Censorship will cause an attitudinal change towards the censored position.

A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the scores on the Negative Immigration attitude "Sweden should admit fewer immigrants" at time 1 (prior to manipulation) and at time 2 (following manipulation). The comparison was broken down between those who were exposed to any of the censorship conditions (group 1) and the participants who were not (group 2). In the pre-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 3.83 ($SD = 2.12$) while group 2 scored a mean of 3.55 ($SD = 2.28$). In the post-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 3.75 ($SD = 2.08$), and group 2 scored a mean of 3.52 ($SD = 2.15$).

There was no significant main effect of time, $F(1, 124) = .325, p = .57, \eta^2 = .002$.

There was neither any significant main effect of censorship, $F(1, 124) = .384, p = .537, \eta^2 = .003$. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction effect between time and censorship $F(1, 124) = .082, p = .775, \eta^2 = .001$. The results could thus not support Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2: The nature of the motivation for the censorship moderate the attitudinal shift.

A paternalistic censorship due to protection is predicted to have less of an impact on the

attitudinal shift than a authoritative moralistic censorship due to claimed moral authority.

A mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare the scores on the Negative Immigration attitude "Sweden should admit fewer immigrants" at time 1 (prior to manipulation) and at time 2 (following manipulation). The comparison was broken down between 2 groups, participants who were subjected to the punitive moralistic censorship condition (group 1) and participants who were subjected to the paternalistic censorship condition (group 2). In the pre-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 4.04 ($SD= 2.13$) while group 2 scored a mean of 3.63 ($SD=2.11$). In the post-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 3.87 ($SD= 1.97$), and group 2 scored a mean of 3.63 ($SD= 2.18$). There was no significant main effect of time, $F(1, 86) = .706, p=.40, \eta^2 = .008$. There was neither no significant main effect of type of censorship, $F(1, 86) = .551, p=.46, \eta^2 = .006$. There was neither no significant interaction effect between time and type of censorship $F(1, 86) = .706, p=.40, \eta^2 = .008$. The results could thus not support Hypotesis 2.

Hypothesis 3: Reactance mediates the effect of censorship on attitudinal shift.

Initially, an analysis was performed in order to establish whether reactance was significantly evoked by the censorship manipulations. This was conducted through a mixed ANOVA comparing scores on negative emotions at time 1 (prior to manipulation) and at time 2 (following manipulation). The comparison was broken down between those who were exposed to any of the censorship conditions (group 1) and the participants who were not (group 2). In the pre-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 1.50 ($SD= .65$) and group 2 also scored a mean of 1.50 ($SD=0.62$). In the post-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 1.66 ($SD= .20$), and group 2 scored a mean of 1.64 ($SD= .72$). There was a significant main effect of time, $F(1, 124) = 5.150, p=.025, \eta^2 = .040$. There was however no significant main effect of group, $F(2, 124) = .004, p=.948, \eta^2 = .000$. There was neither no significant interaction effect between time and group $F(2, 124) = .04, p=.835, \eta^2 = .000$. The result could thus only partially support hypothesis 3, as both groups experienced more negative emotions in the post-manipulation measure, instead of only group 1 as was assumed in the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Moralistic authoritative motivation to censorship evokes more reactance than a protective paternalistic censorship motivation.

Initially, an analysis was performed in order to establish whether there was any differences between the censorship conditions in how much reactance they evoked. This was conducted through a mixed ANOVA comparing scores on negative emotions at time 1 (prior to manipulation) and at

time 2 (following manipulation). The comparison was broken down between the 2 experimental groups; participants who were subjected to the punitive moralistic censorship condition (group 1) and participants who were subjected to the paternalistic censorship condition (group 2). In the pre-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 1.44 ($SD = .71$) while group 2 scored a mean of 1.55 ($SD = 0.59$). In the post-manipulation measure, group 1 scored a mean of 1.57 ($SD = .76$), and group 2 scored a mean of 1.75 ($SD = .84$). There was a significant main effect of time, $F(1, 85) = 4.145, p = .045, \eta^2 = .046$.

There was however no significant main effect of group, $F(1, 85) = 1.049, p = .309, \eta^2 = .012$. Neither was there any significant interaction effect between time and group $F(1, 85) = .165, p = .68, \eta^2 = .002$.

Hypothesis 5: Sex will moderate the relation between censorship and reactance, as men will display more reactance and a larger attitude change towards the censored message than women, when exposed to censorship.

In order to test this hypothesis, two 2X2 factorial ANOVA were conducted, one to assess reactance as negative emotions and one to assess reactance as attitudinal change. In the first analysis, reactance was assessed using change in negative emotions as dependent variable. The change in negative emotion variable was computed as the difference in score between time 1 and time 2, wherein a score below 0 would indicate a change towards more negative emotions between time 1 and 2, while a score above 0 would indicate change towards less negative emotions.

Participants were divided between sex (male, female) and exposure to censorship (censorship, no censorship) where the participants in the two experimental groups were categorized into the censorship group while the participants in the control group were categorized into the no censorship group. In the first analysis assessing change in negative emotions as dependent variable, there were no statistically significant results. The main effect of sex was $F(1, 119) = .132, p = .717$, and for censorship $F(1, 119) = .035, p = .852$. Neither was there a statistically significant interaction effect found between the factors, $F(1, 119) = .213, p = 0.645$. None of the factors reached a η^2 above .002.

In the second analysis, attitudinal change in immigration issues was assessed. The immigration attitude change variable was in this analysis computed as the difference in score between time 1 and time 2, wherein a score below 0 would indicate a change towards more negative immigration attitudes between time 1 and 2, while a score above 0 would indicate change towards more positive immigration attitudes. A statistically significant interaction effect was found between sex and censorship $F(1, 119) = 4.230, p = .042$. There was however no statistically significant main

effects found neither for sex ($F(1, 119) = .69, p=.794$) nor for censorship ($F(1, 119) = .327, p=.569$). Neither of the two main factors displayed any η^2 above .003, but the interaction displayed a small effect of .034. By examining the means of the groups it is clear that women in the censor groups attained more positive immigration attitudes ($M= .27, SD= .86$) while men in the censorship groups attained slightly more negative immigration attitudes ($M= -.06, SD= 1.00$). The opposite effects are however visible in the control group where women attained more negative immigration attitudes ($M= -.22, SD= .64$) and men attained more positive immigration attitudes ($M= .21, SD= 1.18$). The results of the analysis are displayed in figure 1.




Figure 1. Graph displaying the interaction between sex and exposure to censorship on immigration attitude change.

In order to assess whether the type of censorship had any effect on this interaction, a 2x3 factorial ANOVA was conducted. In this analysis, attitudinal change in immigration issues was set as the dependent variable, and sex (male, female) and group (Authoritative moralistic censorship, paternalistic censorship, no censorship) were set as factors. The results from this analysis is depicted in figure 2. The results showed no statistically significant results, neither for sex ($F(1,117) = .154, p = .69$) nor for group ($F(2,117) = .344, p = .71$), and nor for the interaction between the two factors ($F(2, 117) = 2.10, p=.12$). A further examination of the means suggested that the largest sex differences were found in the paternalistic censorship group, where women changed their immigration attitude towards a more positive standpoint ($M= .25, SD= .71$) while men changed their

immigration attitude towards a more negative standpoint ($M = -.15$, $SD = .73$). In the authoritative moralistic censorship group, both women ($M = .28$, $SD = 1.00$) and men ($M = .05$, $SD = 1.31$) changed their immigration attitudes towards a more positive standpoint. Although not statistically significant, the results clearly leaned towards that the paternalistic protective censorship evoked the most negative attitude change among men.




Figure 2. Graph displaying the interaction between sex and censorship conditions on immigration attitude change.

In order to further confirm whether there is a statistically significant interaction effect associated with paternalistic censorship in comparison to the control group, a 2x2 factorial Anova was conducted, excluding participants from the authoritative moralistic censorship condition. In this analysis, attitudinal change in immigration issue was set as the dependent variable, and sex (male, female) and group (paternalistic censorship, no censorship) were set as factors. The results did find a statistically significant interaction effect between paternalistic censorship and sex, $F(1, 79) = 5.07$, $p = .048$. The interaction reached a moderate effect, displaying a η^2 value of .06, which is considerably higher than in the previous analyses where the authoritative moralistic censorship group was included. While these results do confirm the hypothesis that sex moderates the effect of censorship, they must be interpreted with caution. Despite indicating significance, given the high amount of hypotheses that are tested here – the found effect is still somewhat uncertain and needs

further testing.

Hypothesis 6: Trait reactance, rejection sensitivity, social capital and populism will moderate the relation between censorship and amount of evoked reactance, as participants high on trait reactance, populism and rejection sensitivity, but low on social capital will display larger attitude change towards the censored message than those who are not.

In order to assess whether any of the above mentioned variables do have the hypothesized effect on the relation between censorship and reactance, two regressions were conducted – one to predict reactance as negative emotions and one to predict it as attitudinal change. In the first regression, the dependent variable reactance was measured as negative emotion change. The predictors were entered as Trait reactance, rejection sensitivity, social capital, populism and condition. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions regarding normality, linearity, multicollinearity or homoscedasticity. The predictors were found to account for 3.7% of the variance in attitudinal change in negative emotions, $F(6, 116) = .741, p = .61$. This model was thus not statistically significant and no variable was found to make any statistically significant effect on immigration attitude change.

In the second regression, the same model were assessed but with attitudinal change in immigration issue as the indicator of reactance. The entered predictors were found to account for 7.0% of the variance in attitudinal change in immigration issues, $F(7, 114) = 1.272, p = .27$. This model was not statistically significant, and no variable were found to make any statistically significant effect on immigration attitude change.

Hypothesis 7: Censorship will cause participants who displayed positive immigration attitudes beforehand, to change their attitudes to a more negative standpoint, than those who displayed negative immigration attitudes beforehand.

In order to test the first part of this hypothesis, a 3X2 factorial ANOVA was conducted to assess the effects on immigration attitude change made by exposure to censorship in interaction with prior immigration attitudes. The dependent variable, immigration attitude change, was in again computed as the difference in score between time 1 (prior to manipulation) and time 2 (following manipulation), wherein a score below 0 would indicate a change towards more negative immigration attitudes between time 1 and 2, while a score above 0 would indicate change towards more positive immigration attitudes. Participants were divided into groups according to prior immigration attitudes. Participants with a score on the interval of 1-3 in the pre-manipulation

immigration attitude item were sorted into group 1 (positive towards immigration), participants with a score of 4 into group 2 (neutral towards immigration) and participants with a score on the interval of 5-7 into group 3 (negative towards immigration). Participants were also divided according to exposure to censorship (censorship, no censorship) where the participants in the two experimental groups were categorized into the censorship group while the participants in the control group were categorized into the no censorship group. The results of the analysis can be seen in figure 3.

The results indicated that there were statistically significant differences between the prior immigration attitude groups, $F(2, 120) = 9.508, p < .0001$. The η^2 value for this variable reached .137 indicating a major effect. However, there was no other statistically significant impact made by either censorship or interaction between censorship and prior immigration attitudes. Examining the means of the groups, it is clear that participants in the positive prior immigration attitude group did display a negative attitude change regardless of exposure to censorship or not. The group did however display a slightly less negative attitude change when exposed to censorship ($M = -.27, SD = .98$) than when not exposed ($M = -.36, SD = .68$). Participants in the neutral group displayed a similar trend though ranging from a wholly positive change when exposed to censorship ($M = .33, SD = .77$), to a wholly negative change when not exposed ($M = -.33, SD = .57$). The opposite trend is however visible among participants in the negative immigration attitude group. While displaying positive attitude change regardless of exposure to censorship, the attitude changes were less positive when exposed to censorship ($M = .40, SD = .84$) than when not exposed ($M = .56, SD = 1.09$). The results are depicted in figure 3.

These results indicate that individuals who had positive immigration attitudes grew more negative towards immigration – but seemingly so without any statistically significant influence from censorship. Oppositely, participants who had negative immigration attitudes would become more positive towards immigration – but also here seemingly without the influence of censorship. These results can thus only partially support the hypothesis, as it was the underlying prediction was that censorship would cause the attitude shift. The results do however suggest that another unidentified factor caused this shift.




Figure 3. Graph displaying the interaction between prior immigration attitudes and exposure to censorship on immigration attitude change.

Hypothesis 8: Individuals who display voter support for the Sweden Democrats will display higher populism, higher rejection sensitivity and lower social capital than those who do not display voter support for the Sweden Democrats.

In order to assess whether there are any statistically significant differences between supporters of the Sweden Democrats ($n=41$) and others ($n=379$) regarding scores on the scales populism, rejection sensitivity, and social capital – each measure was assessed in separate One-way between groups ANOVAs. Participants from study 2 were divided into two groups: those who support for the Sweden Democrats (group 1) or those who do not (group 2). In the first analysis, the relationship between Sweden democrat voter support and populism scores was assessed. There was a statistically significant difference found at the $p < .0001$ level in the populism scores between Sweden Democrat supporters ($n=41$, $M=5.5$, $SD=.77$) and others ($n=379$, $M=4.2$, $SD=1.06$): $F(1, 418) = 53.40$, $p < .0001$. The calculated effect size was found to indicate a rather large effect; $\eta^2 = .11$. This finding provides support for the first prediction in the hypothesis.

Secondly, the relationship between Sweden democrat voter support and social capital was assessed. A statistically significant difference between the groups was found at a $p < .0001$ level, as the Sweden democrat supporters displayed lower social capital ($n=41$, $M=3.8$, $SD=.75$) than the

others ($n= 377$, $M= 4.6$, $SD= .83$): $F(1, 416) = 29.680$, $p < .0001$. The effect size was here calculated to η^2 value of .06, which can be considered a medium effect. The finding provide further support for the hypothesis' prediction.

Lastly, the relationship between Sweden democrat voter support and rejection sensitivity was assessed. A statistically significant difference between the groups was found, as the Sweden democrat supporters displayed considerably lower rejection sensitivity ($n= 38$, $M= 4.1$, $SD= 2.52$) than the others ($n= 365$, $M= 5.8$, $SD= 3.34$): $F(1, 401) = 9.424$, $p = .0023$. The effect size was calculated to an η^2 value of .02, which is a rather small effect. This finding contradicts the prediction made in the hypothesis that Sweden Democrat supporters should have displayed more rejection sensitivity than others. Instead, they are here found to display less rejection sensitivity. The other results from the other variables could however provide support for the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 9: High trait reactance and high system justification will predict support for the Sweden Democrats.

In order to investigate whether system justification and Trait reactance predict support for the Sweden Democrats, a regression was conducted. Despite the fact that the dependent variable was dichotomous, regression was chosen over logistic regression after consultation of the recent literature on the matter (Hellevik, 2009). Support for the Sweden Democrats was set as the dependent variable and Trait reactance and system justification were entered as predictors.

Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity or homoscedasticity.

Trait reactance and System Justification were together found to account for 6,2 % of the variance in support for the Sweden Democrats $F(3, 397) = 8.898$, $p < .0001$. However only system justification proved having any statistically significant predictive power by itself on Sweden Democrat support, ($beta = -.252$, $p < .0001$). This indicated that Sweden Democrat supporters generally have lower amounts of system justification than others. These findings can thus not provide support for that trait reactance has any predictive effect on Sweden Democrat support. The findings can however support that system justification act as a predictor on support for the Sweden Democrats, but that the correlation between the two variables is negative, contradicting to the hypothesized prediction.

Discussion Study 1

The main goal of this study was to examine the main prediction drawn from the censorship literature, that censoring anti-immigration messages would increase its support rather than decrease it. It also sought to find support for a framing effect of the censorship, suggesting that the motivation for censoring influences the the main effect of censorship on attitude change. Initially it can be concluded that this study did not find any support for a main effect by censorship on immigration attitude change (hypothesis 1) nor for a main effect by censorship framing on immigration attitude change (hypothesis 2). A plenitude of methodological factors can be suspected for underlying this lack of effect. Nevertheless it is vital to primarily address the effect it self and the reliability of previous studies connected to it. As mentioned earlier, the research addressing censorship as a mean to evoke reactance and a following boomerang-effect has shown a statistically significant relation. Yet many of these studies are well over 40 years old by now, and no mention is made of neither effect sizes nor power in these earlier studies. The conundrum here is that there has been a plenitude of more recent research displaying strong effect sizes and power in reactance studies where censorship has not been used as reactance induction. This would indicate that reactance has an established and well documented effect on attitude change, but that there is a lack of studies able to a display the specific connection between censorship with reactance – and how strong this relation actually is. A possibility, as proposed by the reproducibility study conducted by the open science collaboration group (2015), is that this effect might have succumbed to publication bias – rendering studies that failed to replicate this effect unpublished. Since a large portion of previously established effects within social psychological research were found difficult to reproduce or found to display a surprisingly small effect size – it is viable to believe that such difficulties have affected the censorship paradigm as well.

Nevertheless, while drawing on the possibility that the previous findings on the attitudinal effect of censorship were caused by questionable research practices and promoted by publication bias, it is still needful to attempt providing other possible explanations for the lack of effect in the findings of this study. Primarily, possible anomalies between the current study and previous studies should be addressed.

Methodological issues

There is a risk that the choice of selection group influenced this lack of results. The choice of mainly focusing recruitment on high-school students in different cities and regions was primarily based on the assumption that this group displays a larger political variation than what would have been the case with local university students. This assumption was supported by the rather large

variations in immigration attitudes, which were crucial to the analyses of this study. It is however possible that the age of the participants might have affected the results negatively, concerning the fact that none of them had experience from voting in public elections. This opens the possibility that many might have been too young to have obtained wholly developed political attitudes, or received any experience in political reasoning. If these properties are unique for high-school students, the choice of this selection group of this study could be a possible threat to the validity of the results. Simultaneously though, these properties might also better reflect a general population than university students would do. It has since long been shown that higher education affects political reasoning and political participation heavily (Verba & Nie, 1972), suggesting that not using a highly educated selection group might be preferable. From this perspective, the choice of high-school students for this study has both its benefits and disadvantages, but has generally been deemed beneficial.

Looking for an explanation beyond the selection group, it could be meaningful to address how the dependent variable was measured. The item used to measure the immigration attitude change (before and after manipulation) consisted of the question “*Sweden should admit fewer immigrants*” as answered on a 7-point likert scale. The choice to measure attitude change with only one item repeated before and after manipulation, is potentially problematic. Firstly, there is an apparent risk that participants still remember what they answered the previous time and become influenced by their previous answer, which compels them to repeat their answer in order to appear consistent. Even though this risk is low, considering the difficulties associated with precisely replicating a previous answer, it is a possibility.

Secondly, by limiting the measures to only one item, much of the possible variance is lost, as well as presenting a negative effect on reliability. However, there is no question that the item has strong face validity in measuring immigration attitude. The question, if one supports a decrease of immigration into the country, is the most prominent political question in the immigration debate. A development of a larger set of immigration attitude items would perhaps lead to more variance, but would be negative to the validity and reliability of the measures. In survey 2, seven items were used as distractors in the immigration attitude scale that could possibly have been used as pre-test items as well. But these items did not cover the phenomenon this study meant to examine. Items such as “*immigration leads to increased criminality*” may correlate with negative immigration attitudes, but is rather a statistical statement or a prejudice towards immigrants, rather than a political attitude in the meaning of supporting a specific policy. Thus, the term “anti-immigration attitudes” is exclusively defined as “attitudes against immigration” which must not be confused with “attitudes against immigrants”. Regardless of the alternatives however, it is clear that the reliability of the

measure used in this study might not have been high enough to detect the effect.

Future development of this censorship paradigm might consider developing better and more reliable measures for immigration attitudes. One way would be to create two separate scales with very high co-variation, using one set of items at the pre-test and an inverted version of those items in the post-test. Another way would perhaps be to extend the answer scale (e.g. interval of 1-100) in order to increase variance and thus more easily detect smaller effects, while simultaneously inhibit the opportunity for participants to replicate their previous answer. In general however, future studies should focus on expanding the selection group to more participants and allowing for random selection to level out possible confounding factors.

Paradigm issues

The manipulation checks indicated that even though most participants in the censorship conditions did apprehend being subjected to censorship, 46% did not apprehend any such censorship. This could be an indicator of that the applied censorship paradigm lacked validity, despite its similarity to censorship paradigms used in previous research. The fact that many participants (although only 22%) also were under the belief that the Sweden Democrats were themselves accomplices to the censor agent behind the censorship of the Sweden Democrats debate article, indicates that the paradigm failed to reliably supply the necessary information to the participants. However considering that the censorship information was given twice, both written and orally, it can hardly be argued that the management of the censorship information was neglected. By ensuring that participants were given an oral recital of the alleged e-mail containing the motivation for censorship, as well as a printed copy of said e-mail, it was still deemed that participants were given sufficient opportunities to apprehend the alleged censorship. An implication is however that it cannot be ruled out the participants' attention was distracted by school work or classmates. The experiment sessions were held in the schools they attended, at the same time as regular classes. Despite being screened off from other participants and unable to perform any school related tasks during the experiments, it is still wholly possible that the experimental setting in the school environment might itself have acted as a distraction.

A possible reason for the lack of censorship apprehension, might also be the validity of the control question itself. Firstly, the question did not immediately follow the manipulation, but was included in the final questionnaire. It is thus possible that participants had either forgotten the manipulation by this point. Secondly, they might have regarded the censorship as such an extraordinary event that it could not be covered by the control question. The question simply asked whether any material had been withheld from them. It is possible that participants interpreted this as

asking for occurrences of a more casual nature – for example if the experiment leader simply forgot to bring some of the materials.

The paradigm was also unable to cause reactance in form of negative emotions, as hypothesized in hypothesis 3 and 4. While the findings did suggest a statistically significant minor rise in negative emotions between pre-manipulation measuring and post-manipulation measuring, the same trend was seen in the control group – indicating that the censorship could not have been the cause of the rise. Instead, the reason behind the rise in negative emotions may instead be the debate article that was handed out in all conditions. It is wholly possible that this article was written in a manner that aggravated many participants. Another possibility is that the rise in negative emotions is derived from a messenger effect, caused by the political affiliation of article's alleged author. As the alleged author represented the Green party, a party that is currently not enjoying large voter support, it is possible that the party's impopularity instead affected the perception of the article rather than its actual message. In any case, censorship did not affect the change in negative emotions. As discussed above, this may be the result of an unreliable censorship paradigm that was unsuccessful in wholly conveying the censorship to the participants. However, a strong majority of those who apprehended the censorship did not approve of it. Yet their mood was not negatively affected by it. A reason might well be that the censor agent, the Swedish political council, was not negatively evaluated after the censorship. This could possibly have affected the evoking of reactance, as many previous studies would have suggested. The evaluation of the censor agent is a vital moderator between censorship and reactance, where a negative evaluation of the censor induces considerably more reactance than if the censor were positively evaluated (Worchel & Arnold, 1973; Worchel, Arnold & Baker, 1975; Graupmann, Jonas, Meier, Hawelka & Aichhorn, 2012). This effect has been explained in terms of Balance theory, which suggests that the evaluation of the censor influence the emotional reception of the censorship and thus the reaction towards it. Since the censor agent in this study was neutrally evaluated, it is possible that the censorship was also neutrally received and thus lacked any emotional implications – stopping the occurrence of reactance and thus attitude change. It is thus possible that a problem for this study design was the lack of censor with a clear prior evaluation.

Future development of this censorship paradigm should thus focus on developing a new censor agent through extended pre-studies. In most previous studies, such pre-studies were conducted in order to find appropriate censor agents with clear evaluations among the selection groups, that are relevant for the political issue and for the selection group. Future development might also put more focus on the validity and reliability of the control questions, placing them in closer proximity to the manipulation.

Sex differences

Despite the lack of main effects from censorship, there was a number of statistically significant interaction effects found. Firstly, as predicted in hypothesis 5, sex was found to moderate the effect of censorship on attitude change. More specifically, males subjected to a paternalistic censorship became more negative towards immigration as compared to males in the control group. Females in the paternalistic censorship instead became more positive towards immigration, as compared to females in the control group. These opposite trends could possibly explain why there was no main effect found for censorship when testing without accounting for sex, as they would have balanced each other out. Though lacking extensive statistical power in this study, these sex differences are consistent with previous findings suggesting that men display more reactance when their freedom is threatened than do women (Brehm, 1981; Joubert 1990; Seemann, Buboltz & Jenkins, 2004; Woller, Buboltz, & Loveland, 2007; Stieger, Reips & Voracek, 2007).

A possible reason behind these sex differences may lay in trust for authorities. Previous studies on the BIG-5 personality traits suggest that women score significantly higher than men on Agreeableness; Trust (Weisberg, DeYoung & Hirsh, 2011; Costa, Terracciano & McCrae, 2001; Schmitt, Realo, Voracek & Allik, 2008). This implies that women are generally more inclined to trust other people than men are. A recent study also found that high scores on agreeableness and trust does correlate with higher compliance to authority in a Milgram paradigm, indicating that higher scores on this trait is connected not only to trust in other people but in authorities as well, regardless of their intentions (Bègue, Beauvois, Courbet, Oberlé, Lepage & Duke, 2015). In this light, the current results could possibly reflect a female inclination to comply with authoritative directions – in this case directions to refrain from anti-immigration attitudes.

When examining the results from the control group, it seems the condition actually made females become more negative towards immigration. This is curious, as males in the control group grew more positive towards it. The positive attitude change was anticipated for both sexes in the control group considering that the absence of external stimulus (such as censorship) would have rendered the debate article the only source for persuasion. This would lead participants to change attitudes towards the articles standpoint – and thus towards a positive immigration standpoint. This was however just the case among men, suggesting that women instead were negatively persuaded by the article. It is possible that women simply disliked the article or the alleged author, or the alleged political affiliation of the author (as discussed previously). When no other authority presented any form of directions about what attitudes to comply with, it is possible that female participants simply adhered to their initial negative emotional reaction to the article – and changed

their attitudes away from its standpoint.

Meanwhile, the findings suggested that men displayed a attitudinal change as hypothesized when subjected to censorship. Interestingly, men did not display any significant negative attitude change when subjected to authoritative moralistic censorship but instead when subjected to paternalistic censorship. This finding was unanticipated as it was rather hypothesized that the paternalistic censorship would evoke less reactance (and thus less attitude change) among both sexes, considering the fact that the motivation is empathetic of its nature. Empathy should be considered a socially desirable property, and motivations based on empathy should therefore be more positively valued than motivation based on claims of moral authority. But as it so appears, only women found this empathetic motivation positively persuasive – which possibly can be explained through their preference for empathy and inclination to comply with authority. Men's inclination to be negatively persuaded by the paternalistic censorship can however not be attributed to these explanations, which compels further theoretical analysis.

According to psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), the attitude change occurs as a restoration of one's attitudinal freedom – a freedom that was threatened by the censorship. Applying this theory on the analysis of the study's results, it would suggest that the male participants felt that their attitudinal freedom was more threatened by the paternalistic censorship than by the authoritative censorship. A reason behind this might be that the paternalistic motivation threatens attitudinal freedom of the participants more explicitly. While the authoritative motivation did claim the moral high ground, it argued for the censorship solely on the grounds that the council's values were not compatible with the those of the Sweden Democrats. Thus based on their own beliefs and values, the council had decided to withdraw the article – which makes their decision rather individual and only limited to the extent of their own actions. The paternalistic motivation is much less individual, and instead argues that many people might be offended by the censored article – which is why they have decided to withdraw it. It is thus clear that it is not a question of the council's own moral problem with the censored debate article, but that they actually ascribe this problem to others. In this case they ascribe it to the participants in the study – as they would have been the only ones to read the alleged article. This way, the motivation severely threatens the attitudinal freedom of the participants, claiming them to have a personal moral conflict with the Sweden Democrats' immigration attitudes. Thus, male participants in the paternalistic censorship would possibly have felt that they were forced to feel offended by the Sweden Democrats' immigration attitudes, which would have been perceived as a threat to their attitudinal freedom, leading to reactance and a following boomerang-effect on their attitudes. This way, psychological reactance theory could be able to explain this unanticipated finding.

It is nevertheless needful to acknowledge the limitations of these findings. Most importantly, the lack of a general effect from censorship increases the risk that these findings are caused by random variations in the data rather than actual sex differences. The large number of tests being drawn from the sample further accentuate this risk. Secondly, as the Psychological reactance theory assumes that reactance can be identified as a cluster of negative emotions which causes the boomerang-effect, this study could not find support for such a relation. As reported, participants in all groups experienced an increased negative emotional state following the manipulation – which indicated that the censorship could be the cause to this effect. Neither were there any significant differences found in negative emotion change between men and women in any condition. This study is therefore unable to support the assumption that the attitudinal changes found were caused by actual reactance. On a further note the findings must still be viewed in light of the low statistical power of the study. While the effect size of the interaction between sex and censorship reached a satisfactory medium level of .06, the statistical power of the study is not sufficiently high to enable generalizing these results further. It is therefore needful to point out that, while the results could possibly provide an understanding for how anti-immigration attitudes form differently among men and women, further testing is needed before hard proof are provided for this hypothesis.

A possible point for development in future studies would perhaps be to address the mediation of reactance on the boomerang-effect. Further assessment of whether the sex differences found in this study actually are mediated by agreeableness and trust, would also be of interest. As suggested by previous research, the higher agreeableness scores displayed by women may cause them to comply more easily to authority, which possibly could abstain them from displaying reactance towards it. However, Bègue, Beauvois, Courbet, Oberlé, Lepage & Duke (2015) also found that left-wing female activists, while high on agreeableness, were less inclined to comply with authority. It is thus possible that also political affiliation influences compliance in this case, which indicate that agreeableness might only be a strong moderator together with political affiliation. Future studies might do well in assessing what factors that do interact with sex in its relation with reactance.

The impact of other variables

The results from the current study could not support that either trait reactance, social capital, populism or rejection sensitivity had any effects on the relationship between censorship and reactance – as would have been predicted in hypothesis 6. While the relationship between social capital, populism and rejection sensitivity had been proven in a previous study (Taleny, 2014) it had not previously been associated with trait reactance nor with state reactance. Nevertheless, it was

hypothesized that high populism scores would affect the propensity for reactance positively – since the censorship covered anti-immigration attitudes that are associated with a populist party (Sweden Democrats). As populism correlates negatively with social capital and positively with rejection sensitivity, these two variables should also have had an effect on reactance. The results could however not support this hypothesis. One primary reason behind this could simply be that the populism scale does not discriminate between left-wing or right-wing populism. As anti-immigration attitudes are only associated with right-wing populism, it is assumable that the populism scale is unreliable for predicting anti-immigration attitudes. If so is the case, it could neither be expected to affect the amount of reactance evoked by the censorship of anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, neither should social capital or rejection sensitivity. It is however curious, in the light of the previous discussion regarding the sex differences in attitudinal change and women's higher scores in agreeableness and trust, that social capital did not affect reactance. Social capital is, in theory, the social measure of trust. Measuring trust in fellow citizens, public authorities and extant of social interaction through memberships in organizations, it coincides significantly with trait trust construct. From this perspective, it would be expected that participants with high social capital also are more inclined to comply with authorities – and align their attitudes according to directions. Reversely, low social capital should lead to less compliance to authority and more reactance. As no findings supported this, it is possible that the censorship manipulation constituted such an extraordinary event that other factors instead affected the reaction.

The most puzzling part in these findings was on the other hand the lack of support for the effect of trait reactance. Extensively researched in previous studies (Hong & Faedda, 1996; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Miller, Burgoon, Grandpre & Alvaro, 2006; Knight et al, 2014), trait reactance has frequently been found to moderate reactance and attitudinal change. The lack of previous research on Swedish selection groups using the Hong psychological reactance scale complicated the translation procedure. It cannot be ruled out that the scale was unadapted to a Swedish selection group or that translated version of the scale was unable to capture all of the psychological aspects that was included in the original scale. Secondly, the political nature of the censorship might have confounded the effects of trait reactance. While Knight et al., 2014, found support for a connection between high trait reactance and political conservatism – this relationship was found to be mediated by loss of control. Before the loss of control was manipulated however, high trait reactance individuals were significantly more liberal, left-wing and radical. This would imply that individuals with high trait reactance could hold a variety of attitudes towards immigration, all depending on loss of control. Censoring anti-immigration attitudes would therefore not necessarily lead high trait reactant individuals that are strong supporters for immigration, to become negative towards

immigration – unless some type of loss of control was involved. The current study was not designed to take loss of control into consideration, which may be the reason why trait reactance did not moderate the effect between censorship and attitude change.

Future studies might do well in further examining the relationship between social capital, rejection sensitivity and populism – with respect to left- and right-wing populism. Furthermore, the translated version of the Hong psychological reactance scale should be more thoroughly tested on Swedish selection groups. In order to better assess political behavior – the development of a political reactance scale might be a suitable path towards understanding the effects of political censorship on attitude change.

The effect of prior attitudes

The final findings from study 1 could partially support hypothesis 7. It was found that participants who were positive towards immigration before the manipulation, became significantly more negative towards it after the manipulation. Meanwhile, those who were negative towards immigration before the manipulation became significantly more positive towards it after the manipulation. However, these effects occurred regardless of exposure to censorship, indicating that censorship had no immediate effect on this process. The results are intriguing, suggesting that supporters of immigration actually became negatively persuaded by a debate article supporting their own standpoint. Equally intriguing is the fact that the opponents of immigration were persuaded to change their attitude after reading the article. Once again, Psychological reactance theory might be able to explain the results – despite the fact that censorship could not have been responsible for the main effect. Instead, it is possible that the debate article itself acted as a freedom threat – having adverse effect on the participants depending on their previous attitudes. Based on explanations from Worchel & Brehm (1970) who found similar results, it is possible that the debate article advocating a support for immigration was perceived as a threat to the attitudinal freedom for those who already agreed with the standpoint. In such case, those participants would have interpreted the debate article as an attempt to infringe their freedom to ever change their minds about immigration – which would evoke reactance and a following attitude change away from the advocated standpoint in order to restore freedom. The same trend would however not be visible among those who already were against immigration. For those participants, the debate article did not pose the same threat to freedom as they had already demonstrated their freedom by proclaiming their negative immigration attitudes in the pre-test. Those participants would not experience any reactance and thus no boomerang-effect. This would explain why these participants instead changed their attitudes to a more positive standpoint – because they had the freedom to so by their own choice.

Once again though, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations to these findings due to the lack of statistical power and the apparent risk of random significant findings due to multiple testing. While these results do align with previous research, further studies using the same paradigm are needed to reach bigger samples and more power, combined with less testing.

There is also the issue regarding the lack of pre-testing made on the perceived freedom-threat posed by the article. Due to the limitations of the preparations of this study, no prior testing was done to investigate to what extent the debate article threatened the attitudinal freedom of the participants, nor was any evaluation done in order to assess the general perception of the article. While the explanations do coincide with findings in previous studies, this study does not provide any hard proofs that the debate article in deed was perceived as freedom-threatening despite being designed that way. Therefore, it can only be speculated if this was the general perception of the article – a possibility that though seems reasonable considering the theoretical background and the current findings. On a further note, this explanation does not provide explanation for the participants displaying neutral attitudes. The trend of the group is similar to that of the positive prior immigration attitude group's, but displaying larger variance and a generally more positive change. However, Psychological reactance theory is unable to predict these neutral standpoints, as they are not subjected to any attitudinal freedom threats from the debate article nor from censorship – because of their lack of strong attitudes. It is instead possible that participants in the neutral group are indifferent to the issue, rendering any attempts to influence their answering difficult to control. The similarities in trend with the positive prior immigration attitude group, do however suggest that the two groups should be paired under the same explanation model – despite the lack of explicit theoretical support.

Possible considerations for future research would be to test the freedom-threatening properties of the debate article used in this study, and perhaps evaluate which aspects of it that contribute the most to the effect. As previous research induced freedom-threat by utilizing authoritative speeches focusing on explicitly limiting attitudinal freedom (e.g. “*You have no choice but to believe this*”), the article in the current study assessed freedom-threat by use of statistics and drawing conclusions from it. Further research might be needful to assess whether this method of inducing freedom-threat is effective, and if it can be enhanced. The findings of such studies could possibly form the foundation for future research on the attitudinal effects of such political issues as climate change, where the use of empirical data and conclusions from it are pertinent in the general political discourse.

Discussion Study 2

Assessing the results from the internet survey in study 2, it is clear that hypothesis 8 can only be partly supported. Populism was found to have a large effect size on Sweden Democrat support ($\eta^2 = .11$), which was expected. As an ideological measure, the populism scale was constructed to measure the anti-establishment attitudes that are central to the concept of populism. As previously discussed, the Sweden Democrats have repeatedly been categorized as a radical right-wing populist movement by previous studies. The findings from this study thus provides further support for that categorization, and also provides further support for the notion that the Sweden Democrat supporters display significantly more populist attitudes than non-supporters. While the party has been shown to attract supporters from a wide variety of political parties, they do seem to have more in common than just anti-immigration attitudes. The significance of the current study's finding would thus be that it has cast further light on the political attitudes of the Sweden Democrats' supporters. Considering the large effect size ($\eta^2 = .11$), the populism scale must now be a acknowledged as a major predictor of Sweden Democrat support. This would in deed force the current general discourse on RRP-parties to focus more on the formation of anti-establishment attitudes in order to explain these movements electoral success. This notion was also further supported by the predicted finding that lower social capital is associated with support for the Sweden Democrats. Thus accurately predicted, Sweden democrat supporters have lower trust in others or in public authorities, and engage less in organizations or social gatherings than others. This social behavior could seemingly have an effect on political behavior – as these results suggest. The current study thus provides an important finding, as it links the social behavior of populist voters to their political behavior. This would suggest that individuals who rarely engage in social interactions and generally distrust others and public institutions – also vote for parties that reaffirm this behavior by providing ideological support for it – i.e. anti-establishment notions. A lack of social capital can from this perspective act as an important factor for explaining the emergence of voter support for the Sweden Democrats and the rise of populist attitudes.

Most interestingly however, was the find of a statistically significant effect of rejection sensitivity on support for the Sweden Democrats. Contrary to the hypothesis, the results indicated that support for the Sweden Democrats is associated with lower rejection sensitivity. These results are intriguing, as they suggest that the support for the Sweden Democrats is not a result of perceived social rejection that have made these individuals to turn away their attitudes from societal norms as hypothesized, but rather the opposite – a pronounced insensitivity towards others' attempts to ostracize them. This might itself be an adaptation process wherein people grow less rejection sensitive when frequently ostracized, in order to adapt to each new situation and limit the negative

fallout. As shown by previous studies, the effects of high rejection sensitivity have severe potential to affect a persons behavior negatively. This includes increased inclination to comply to norms of a new social group wherein they recently have been included, even if this means performing anti-social actions and extremism (Knapton, 2013; Bäck, Bäck & Garcia-Albacete, 2013).

While hypothesizing that a similar process might lay behind the rise of support for the Sweden Democrats, providing a political shelter for those who feel rejected by society and its new norms, the results clearly refute this notion. What they instead indicate is that Sweden Democrat supporters do not care much about being socially rejected – and handle ostracism without letting it affect their attitudes and behavior. In practice, this would mean that Sweden Democrat supporters are less affected by being ostracized by society – than others would be. This would enable them to conserve and maintain – and perhaps even evolve stronger belief in their political conviction – without being worried about being spurned for their beliefs by others. The connection between low rejection sensitivity, low social capital and high populism that was found in this study are depicted in table 1.

Table 1.

The effects of low rejection sensitivity, low social capital and high populism on various levels.

Personality	Social behavior	Political behavior
<u>Low Rejection sensitivity</u>	<u>Low social capital</u>	<u>High populism</u>
- Low anxiety towards being socially undesirable/excluded	- Low levels of social engagement	- Anti-establishment attitudes
- Low inclination to seek social inclusion	- Low trust in other people	- Anti-immigration attitudes
- Low receptiveness to social influence	- Low trust towards public authorities.	- Sweden Democrat support

An important conclusion to draw from these findings, is that any attempt to ostracize the Sweden Democrats from political influence should not have any negative effect on the party's voter support, nor should it in anyway make the party's supporters more compliant to the attitudes of others. Research in political science have also found this to be the case (Fallend & Heinisch, 2015). This study can thus confirm that this effect is supported by psychological mechanisms, in this case rejection sensitivity. However, it simultaneously fails to provide a full answer for the paradox of the

current anti-immigration discourse. The surge in attempts to ostracize the Sweden Democrats from society and the surge in voter support for said party, cannot be explained through rejection sensitivity. Rather, these findings instead provide answer for why attempts to ostracize the Sweden Democrats have had futile results, but not why they have enjoyed a surge in voter support. A possible explanation might instead be that the surge of attempts to ostracize the Sweden democrats have had secondary effects, such as increasing their media exposure leading to a surge in voter support.

These finding open up for future research on how to manage attitude change among low rejection sensitive individuals. It is possible that a feasible method to reach attitude change among such individuals might be to include rather than to exclude – as social inclusion could render these individuals to lose interest in their political convictions. Populism, as an anti-establishment ideology, would lose its outsider status if incorporated into “the establishment”, which theoretically should lead to its demise.

The final results from study 2 did not find any support for hypothesis 9: that high trait reactance and high system justification act as predictors on support for the Sweden Democrats. The study was thus unable to replicate the findings by Knight et al., 2014. As the Sweden Democrats define themselves as a social-conservative party, it was anticipated that Sweden Democrat supporters would display more system justification and trait reactance than other supporters. This was however not found to be the case, as there was no statistically significant support for the notion that Sweden Democrat supporters display more trait reactance than others. Though, as previously discussed, it is possible that the Hong trait reactance scale used in this study lacked reliability due to lack of previous use in Sweden. The study did however found that system justification had a significant effect on support for the Sweden Democrats, but that this effect is reversed.

Contradicting to what was hypothesized, lower amounts of System justification predicts support for the Sweden Democrats – indicating that these supporters are not inclined to justify the current societal system, but rather dismissive of it. These results are intriguing, as they entirely contradict the findings by Knight et al., 2014. The reason behind this might be the populist dimension among Sweden Democrat supporters, as anti-establishment attitudes cannot be considered consistent with justification of the current societal system. From this perspective, it is more consistent to pair populist movements with radicals and reformists (that do display low levels of system justification) rather than social-conservatists (that display high levels of system justification).

Important to remember is that Knight et al., 2014 did not find that high trait reactant individuals, when subjected to loss of control, attained more populist attitudes but only conservative

attitudes. It thus seems that their findings cannot explain the emergence of voter support for right-wing populist movements such as the Sweden Democrats despite the party's social-conservative image. Another possible reason is that the system justification scale is unadapted to measure conservatism in the multidimensional Swedish setting. Justification of the current societal system in Sweden would in many ways mean justifying social welfare, large public sector and extended government control – typical social democratic policies that have been integrated into the foundation of Swedish society. System justification was developed to detect conservatism in an American setting that instead focus much more on traditions and norms. The current layout of the system justification scale can thus be considered to capture other dimensions than those that would be more relevant to a Swedish system. Considering this, it might be needful for future research to assess system justification more restrictively in association with the Sweden Democrats. Perhaps it would be more interesting to develop and evaluate a new multidimensional System justification scale in order to capture political occurrences such as the Sweden Democrats better.

Conclusions

This paper had the ambition to provide answers to why Radical Right-wing Populist parties and anti-immigration attitudes prevail despite industrious attempts to ostracize them and block their propaganda. In study 1, experiments were conducted based on a censorship paradigm investigating how censorship affects anti-immigration attitudes. The results could not replicate previous findings that suggested that censorship has a general effect on attitudes, causing them to shift towards the censored standpoint. The low statistical power of the study, the low reliability of the dependent measures, and the possibly low validity of the censorship paradigm were considered possible reasons behind this lack of findings.

However, the results suggested that there is an effect from sex, as men displayed an attitudinal change towards the censored standpoint when being subjected to a paternalistic motivated censorship, in contrast to women.

It was also suggested that previous attitudes may have a main effect on attitude change – without the influence of censorship. The findings indicated that, following the manipulation, participants changed their attitude from positive to more negative – or from negative to more positive. As no influence of censorship was found on this effect, it is suggested that the debate article used as part of the manipulation instead was the likely source of the attitude change. The findings can be explained through Psychological reactance theory, as different dimensions of freedom-threat. The lack of power in the study does however limit the reliability of this effect.

Study 2 could provide support for the notion that supporters of the Sweden Democrats display

significantly high amounts of populist attitudes, low social capital, low system justification, and perhaps most interestingly: low rejection sensitivity. This would suggest that Sweden Democrat supporters have a higher tolerance towards being ostracized.

As a conclusion, these findings would suggest that attempts to mitigate anti-immigration attitudes and movements ought to avoid strategies attempting to ostracize or censor these movements. The advocates of anti-immigration sentiments are simply too well adapted to be persuaded by such attempts, and in the case of censorship – it even seems that it can increase anti-immigration sentiments among men. In short, such attempts simply seem bound to rebound.

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Appendix A

Bakgrundsfrågor

Ålder: _____ år

Kön: Kvinna _____ Man: _____ Annat: _____

Jag studerar (program med inriktning mot): _____

Har någon av dina föräldrar invandrabakgrund? Ja _____ Nej _____ Vet ej _____

Vad jobbar dina föräldrar med?

Jag är medlem i ett politiskt parti/ungdomsförbund: Ja _____ Nej _____

I politiken talar man ofta om "vänster" och "höger". Var skulle du placera din egen politiska uppfattning på en sådan skala (ringa in lämplig siffra)?

Långt åt vänster	Klart åt vänster	Något åt vänster	I mitten	Något åt höger	Klart åt höger	Långt åt höger
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Politik & Samhälle

Du kommer nu få läsa ett antal påståenden. Din uppgift är att ta ställning om hur mycket Du håller med påståendet. Ringa in ditt svar i skalan nedanför varje påstående.

1. Unga människor får ibland rebelliska idéer som de bör komma över när de växer upp och lugnar ner sig

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

2. Om någonting växer fram över lång tid kommer det alltid att finnas mycket visdom i det

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

3. Det skulle vara bättre för Sverige om vi fokuserade mer på traditionella familjeband

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

4. Våra seder och vårt nationella arv är det som har gjort vårt land bra, och vissa människor borde visa mer respekt för dem

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

5. Om man börjar förändra saker väldigt mycket slutar det ofta med att det blir till det sämre

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

6. Traditioner utvecklades vid en specifik tid och plats och är inte relevanta för dagens problem

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

7. Att ändra på saker i samhället (t.ex. stat, religion, företag) är riskabelt så det är bättre att förändra dem långsamt än snabbt

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

8. Om det är fel med något i samhället (t.ex. stat, religion, företag) är det nödvändigt att göra omedelbara förändringar

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

9. Svaren till dagens frågor kan oftast hittas i traditioner och seder från förr

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

10. När man ser tillbaka var livet bättre förr

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

11. Stora förmögenheter och egendomar borde beskattas ganska högt över inkomstskatten

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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12. Företag bör hållas ansvariga för att främja etnisk mångfald och en tolerant atmosfär på sina kontor och i sin företagskultur

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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13. Staten borde göra mer för att minska ekonomiska skillnader mellan män och kvinnor som gör samma jobb

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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14. Det är statens ansvar att ta hand om människor som inte kan ta hand om sig själva

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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15. Individer själva, inte staten eller företag, bör i slutändan hållas ansvariga för att betala sjukvård för sig själva och sina familjer

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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16. Vi måste ta hand om de fattiga och svaga innan vi hjälper resten av landet

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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17. Man bör hitta sätt att hjälpa andra som är mindre lyckligt lottade än en själv

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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18. Människor borde bry sig om andras välbefinnande

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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19. Rika länder har en moralisk plikt att dela med sig av sitt välstånd till fattigare länder

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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20. Vissa människor är helt enkelt mer värda än andra

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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21. Sverige borde ta emot färre invandrare.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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22. De som har makt i samhället strävar efter att göra det bästa för folket - inte för sig själva.
(INV)

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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23. Makthavare försöker alltid göra politik mer avancerat och svårförståeligt än det egentligen är, för att inte vanligt folk ska förstå

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

24. De som har makt i samhället är lika moraliska som vanliga människor.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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25. Politiska särintressen kontrollerar den förda politiken i Sverige idag.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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26. Vanligt folk har mycket makt i Sverige idag.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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27. Makthavarna i samhället lyssnar till och respekterar vanligt folk och skulle aldrig utnyttja dem för egen vinning.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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28. Att hålla fler folkomröstningar och mer direktdemokrati är egentligt onödigt i vårt demokratiska system.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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29. De politiska ledarna borde vara mer som vanligt folk.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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30. Vad Sverige behöver är en politiker som utmanar makteliten och "rör om i grytan".

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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31. Jag anser att man generellt man kan lita på andra människor

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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32. Om min granne bad om att få låna något så skulle jag låna ut det.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

33. Jag oroar mig för att bli utsatt för brott

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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34. Om jag tappade min plånbok på en offentlig plats så tror jag att jag skulle få tillbaka den igen

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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35. Jag är aktiv medlem i organisationer/klubbar/föreningar

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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36. Jag brukar utföra obetalt frivilligarbete

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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37. Jag spenderar mycket tid i min organisation/klubb/förening

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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38. Jag tycker att det är viktigt att vara aktiv i en organisation/klubb/förening

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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39. Jag anser generellt att man kan lita på polisen

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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40. Jag anser generellt att man kan lita på sjukvården

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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41. Jag anser generellt att man kan lita på media

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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42. Jag anser generellt att man kan lita på stora företag

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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Personlighet

Du kommer nu få läsa ett antal påståenden. Din uppgift är ta ställning om hur mycket Du tycker att påståendet stämmer in på Dig. Ringa in ditt svar i skalan nedanför varje påstående.

1. Regleringar och begränsningar väcker ofta en lust att vilja göra motstånd hos mig.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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2. Jag tycker att det ofta är stimulerande att säga emot andra.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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3. När människor vill förbjuda mig från att göra en sak, så brukar jag tänka "Det är precis det jag ska göra".

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

4. Jag känner ofta att råd ifrån andra blir påträngande.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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5. Jag blir frustrerad när jag inte har möjlighet att göra ett eget fritt val.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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6. Det irriterar mig när människor pekar ut saker för mig, som är redan är uppenbara för mig.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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7. Jag blir arg när min valfrihet begränsas av andra människor.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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8. Råd och rekommendationer brukar ofta få mig att göra precis tvärt emot vad de säger.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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9. När människor försöker påverka mig, försöker jag oftast stå emot.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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10. Det gör mig arg när människor lyfter fram en annan person - som förebild för mig att följa.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
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11. När människor försöker tvinga mig att göra någonting, känner jag ofta för att göra det rakt motsatta.

Stämmer inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stämmer helt
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Nu är vi intresserade av ditt nuvarande humör. Hur känner du just nu?

A. Hur nöjd känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls nöjd	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket nöjd
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B. Hur glad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls glad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket glad
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C. Hur upprörd känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls upprörd	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket upprörd
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

D. Hur avslappnad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls avslappnad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket avslappnad
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

E. Hur irriterad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls irriterad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket irriterad
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F. Hur arg känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls arg	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket arg
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G. Hur ledsen känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls uppretad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket uppretad
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Nedan beskrivs ett antal situationer där man frågar andra om hjälp eller dylikt. Försök sätta dig in i dessa situationer.

A) Du närmar dig en vän för att prata efter ha gjort eller sagt något som kan ha upprört henne/honom väldigt

mycket.

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida din vän skulle vilja prata med dig?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
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- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att din vän skulle vilja prata med dig?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

B) Du har blivit arbetslös och du frågar dina närmaste om du kan bo hos dem ett tag.

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida dina närmaste skulle låta dig bo hos dem?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att dina närmaste skulle låta dig bo hos dem

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
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C) Du ringer din partner efter ett stort bråk och säger till honom/henne att du vill träffas (om du inte har en partner för tillfället, föreställ dig att du hade det).

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida din partner skulle vilja träffas?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du att det skulle vara att din partner skulle vilja träffas?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
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(D) Du har dåligt med pengar och du frågar dina närmaste (t ex familj, nära vänner) om du kan få låna pengar av dem för att betala din hyra eller en annan viktig utgift.

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida dina närmaste skulle låna dig pengar?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att dina närmaste skulle låna dig pengar?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
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E) Du ber dina närmaste (t ex familj, nära vänner) att komma till ett tillfälle som är viktigt för dig.

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida de skulle komma?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att de skulle komma?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
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(F) Du ber en nära vän att göra dig en stor tjänst.

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida han/hon skulle göra dig denna tjänst?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att han/hon skulle göra dig denna tjänst?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

(G) Du frågar din partner om han/hon älskar dig (om du inte har en partner för tillfället, föreställ dig att du hade det)

- Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida han/hon skulle säga ja?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att han/hon skulle säga ja?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
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(H) Du är på en social tillställning (t ex fest) och känner ingen annan, men bestämmer dig för att börja prata med en person som står i närheten av dig.

-Hur orolig skulle du vara över huruvida han/hon skulle vilja prata med dig?

Inte alls orolig	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket orolig
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

- Hur sannolikt tror du det är att han/hon skulle vilja prata med dig?

Inte alls sannolikt	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mycket sannolikt
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Detta var sista frågan i denna enkät. Vik ihop enkäten igen och placera den framför dig, med framsidan vänd nedåt. Invänta sedan vidare instruktioner från experimentledaren.

Appendix B

From: hans.backstrom@spr.se

To: adriantaleny@student.lu.se

Subject: Re: Indragen debattartikel

Time: 08:05:10 +0000

Hej Adrian!

Rådet har gjort följande uttalande, som du kan läsa upp inför deltagarna:

Sveriges Politiska Råd har gjort bedömningen att den debattartikel skriven av Sverigedemokraten Anders Svärd, som tidigare använts i denna studie, strider mot våran värdegrund. Vi har därför tagit beslutet att med omedelbar verkan dra in denna studies tillstånd att distribuera denna debattartikel. Rådet vill inte medverka i spridandet av Sverigedemokratisk propaganda till unga väljare, då vi anser att detta partis värderingar och människosyn ligger för långt ifrån våran värdegrund. Det är istället vårt uttalade mål att våra studier ska motverka rasismen i samhället.

Du kan om du vill skriva ut detta mail och dela ut till deltagarna ifall du finner det lämpligt.

Med vänlig hälsning,

Hans

From: hans.backstrom@spr.se
To: adriantaleny@student.lu.se
Subject: Re: Indragen debattartikel
Time: 08:05:10 +0000

Hej Adrian!

Rådet har gjort följande uttalande, som du kan läsa upp inför deltagarna:

Sveriges Politiska Råd har gjort bedömningen att den debattartikel skriven av Sverigedemokraten Anders Svärd, som tidigare använts i denna studie, kan uppfattas som kränkande för vissa. Vi har därför tagit beslutet att med omedelbar verkan dra in denna studies tillstånd att distribuera denna debattartikel. Rådet vill inte medverka till att någon person, oavsett identitet, känner sig diskriminerad av våra studier. Det är istället vårt uttalade mål att deltagare i våra studier ska skyddas från alla former av kränkningar.

Du kan om du vill skriva ut detta mail och dela ut till deltagarna ifall du finner det lämpligt.

Med vänlig hälsning,

Hans

Appendix C

DN.se DEBATT.

Publicerad Fredag 5 februari 2016

”Fri invandring har gynnat Sverige”

Aktuella Frågor. I tisdags kom Migrationsverkets nya prognos som visade att mellan 70 000 – 140 000 förväntas söka asyl i Sverige under 2016. Men detta är inte något negativt, tvärtom är det något som i längden kommer att gynna Sverige. Detta skriver Carolina Zetterlund-Diaz som är riksdagsledamot för Miljöpartiet.

När Migrationsverkets prognos för 2016 publicerades tidigare i veckan vädrade tydligen många främlingsfientliga krafter återigen morgonluft. Ropen om ”massinvandring” och ”systemkollaps” har visserligen ekat länge i den svenska debatten, men underblåses nu av denna prognos som säger att mellan 70 000 och 140 000 flyktingar förväntas söka asyl i Sverige under det kommande året. Detta är för det första betydligt färre än under 2015, samtidigt som Sverige aldrig tidigare har avslagit fler asylansökningar. Över 80 000 människor förväntas i år bli utvisade ifrån Sverige p.g.a detta. Och den tragiska ironin i detta är att Sverige aldrig tidigare varit i så stort behov av invandring som nu.

Historiskt sett har Sverige gynnats starkt av en generös invandringspolitik – redan under 1600-talet öppnade man Sverige för valloner ifrån dagens Belgien, som lade grunden för den svenska industrin tack vare sina kunskaper i bergsbruk. Utan invandrarna ifrån södra Europa under 60- och 70-talen hade Sverige aldrig haft pizzerior i varenda litet samhälle. Och tack vare den stora invandringsvågen ifrån f.d. Jugoslavien under 90-talet så har vi idag fotbollsstjärnor i Sverige som vi aldrig tidigare sett maken till. Exempelen kan göras många. Men vad som framförallt behövs lyftas fram idag, är de samhällsekonomiska vinningar som kommer med den ökande invandringen. Sverige har under lång tid, precis som resten av västvärlden, brottats med relativt lågt barnafödande och en hög utvandring. Detta hade potentiellt kunnat leda till en befolkningsminskning som allvarligt drabbat den svenska samhällsekonomin. En minskande befolkning, med allt fler äldre som lämnar arbetskraften och allt färre unga som ersatt dem, hade drivit den svenska välfärdsmodellen mot kollaps.

Men tack vare den starka invandringen har vi istället sett en starkt tilltagande befolkningskurva. Detta innebär ökad arbetskraft, med fler som jobbar och betalar skatt – och därmed garanterar välfärdens finansiering. Dessutom skriker idag många välfärdssektorer efter arbetskraft – framförallt inom vården och skolan. Den akuta sjuksköterske- och lärarbristen som Sverige idag upplever är helt unik, och utgör den verkliga ”systemkollapsen” som folk bör oroa sig för. Även här kan invandringen öppna möjligheter, genom att vi tar till vara på de tusentals invandrare som har utbildning inom dessa områden. Närmare en tredjedel av alla invandrare som kommer till Sverige har just någon form av eftergymnasial utbildning – och utgör därmed en stor outforskad tillgång.

Ur detta perspektiv framstår 140 000 asylsökande inte som ett hot – utan snarare som en välsignelse. Sverige har inte råd att avvisa fler människor som söker ett nytt liv i Sverige. Med en öppen invandring hade vi kunnat garantera Sveriges och välfärdens ekonomiska framtid och dessutom erbjuda människor en plats fri ifrån krig och fattigdom.

Carolina Zetterlund-Diaz, Riksdagsledamot för Miljöpartiet de Gröna.

Appendix D

Temautvärdering: Invandring

Din uppgift är nu att ta ställning i temat Invandring. Nedan följer ett antal politiska ställningstaganden. Markera hur väl Du håller med varje påstående genom att ringa in Ditt svar i skalan nedanför.

43. Invandring är övervägande positivt för Sverige.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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44. Sverige borde ta emot färre invandrare.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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45. Invandring leder till mer kostnader än inkomster för samhällsekonomin i Sverige.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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46. Den mångkultur som invandring skapar är positiv för Sverige.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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47. Invandring ger ökad kriminalitet i det svenska samhället.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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48. Invandring innebär en positiv tillgång till den svenska arbetskraften.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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49. Sverige borde ta emot fler invandrare än vi gör idag.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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50. Ju fler invandrare Sverige tar emot, desto mer ökar risken för terroråd i Sverige.

Håller inte alls med	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Håller helt med
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Nu är vi intresserade av hur Du känner dig för tillfället.

A. Hur nöjd känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls nöjd	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket nöjd
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B. Hur glad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls glad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket glad
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C. Hur upprörd känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls upprörd	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket upprörd
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D. Hur avslappnad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls avslappnad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket avslappnad
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E. Hur irriterad känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls irriterad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket irriterad
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F. Hur arg känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls arg	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket arg
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G. Hur ledsen känner du dig just nu?

Inte alls uppretad	0	1	2	3	4	Mycket uppretad
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Appendix E

Utvärdering av Studien

*Du är nu nästan klar, men innan du går ska du få svara på några avslutande frågor om studien.
Markera Ditt svar genom att ringa in det svar som passar dig bäst.*

51. Hur mycket förknippar du ”invandringspolitik” med dessa partier?

A. Vänsterpartiet

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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B. Socialdemokraterna

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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C. Miljöpartiet

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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D. Sverigedemokraterna

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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E. Centerpartiet

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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F. Liberalerna (*f.d. Folkpartiet*)

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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G. Kristdemokraterna

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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H. Moderaterna

Inte alls	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Väldigt mycket
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2. Vad är din generella uppfattning om *Sveriges Politiska Råd (SPR)*?

Mycket negativ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mycket positiv
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3. Vilka politiska partier tror du finns representerade i *Sveriges Politiska Råd (SPR)*?
Sätt kryss bredvid dina svar.

Vänsterpartiet ____

Centerpartiet ____

Socialdemokraterna ____

Liberalerna (*f.d. Folkpartiet*) ____

Miljöpartiet ____

Kristdemokraterna ____

Sverigedemokraterna ____

Moderaterna ____

4. Vad tror du att denna studie hade för syfte?

5. Var det något material i studien (debattartikel/enkät m.m.) som du INTE fick se?

Ja ____

Nej ____

Vet ej ____

Ifall du svarade "Ja" på föregående fråga – vänligen svara på nästa frågor också:

6. Vad var anledningen till att du inte fick se materialet?

7. Anser du att det var rätt eller fel att deltagare inte fick se det materialet?

Helt fel

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Helt rätt

*Nu är du klar! Vik ihop enkäten igen och placera den framför dig med framsidan nedåt och
invänta vidare instruktioner.*

Tack för Ditt deltagande!