Disciplining Tionghoa
Critical Discourse Analysis of News Media During Indonesia’s New Order

Roy Thaniago

Supervisor: Srdan M. Jovanović, Ph.D.
Examiner: Prof. Annette Hill

LUND UNIVERSITY

M.Sc. in Media and Communication Studies
Lund University
2017
If you’re a marginal person, either you

become crushed by the majority, because you try to assimilate,

or you use your marginality to understand

all sides—the oppressed, the oppressor, and the system itself

George Junus Aditjondro
Abstract

Indonesia has a history of hundreds of years revolving around the racism against its 3% Chinese ethnic minority—who are also known as Tionghoa. This circumstance engenders the racial-social order that has been shaping the attitudes and behaviours of the Chinese, both individually and collectively, in social, cultural, and political realms. The Chinese have become self-controlled and self-regulated individuals. They regulate themselves for neither talking about politics nor expressing their cultural identity. This study argues that such a historical trajectory has been, in the Foucauldian sense, disciplining them to be docile.

This study is an attempt to shed light on how and in what sense power produces the disciplined Tionghoa. By analysing 134 news reports in two Indonesian news media, Kompas and Tempo, published in 1966, 1976, and 1986, this study seeks for discourses in the news media that is believed to contribute in the construction of Tionghoa identity aimed at disciplining them. By employing Critical Discourse Analysis, the news reports are treated not just as reflection of the social world but also as social practices fashioning the social world. This study puts forward the claim that the racial-social order is produced and maintained not only because of structural factors like economy and politic, but also it is fundamentally caused by the cultural factor that is invested and manifested in language.

This study has led to conclude that the scheme of disciplining Tionghoa is performed by implanting the projection of the desired-self of Tionghoa through the discourse. Thus, being disciplined have become desirable for the Tionghoa themselves.

Key words: Tionghoa; Chinese-Indonesian; Foucault; disciplinary power; critical discourse analysis; identity, news media, the New Order.
Acknowledgement

In completing this thesis, I would like to thank the following people for their support:

I am indebted to Philipp Seuferling and Zaki Habibi, who both offered their critical mind in discussing and commenting on my ideas.

To Annette Hill, whose door was always open whenever I had a question about my study as well as the thesis.

To Srdan M. Jovanović for being my supervisor, and Maren Hartmann who welcomed me to discuss the early draft of this thesis.

To all friends in Lund who bring joy, warmth, and support, especially Una Cilic and Kriszti Tóth, who both have been being study buddies in doing this thesis.

Although there is no direct support from colleagues at Remotivi, my working and learning experience in there have provided me knowledge, skill, and critical thinking that is valuable in completing my master degree. To them I wish to thank.

I also want to send my gratitude to all Indonesian tax-payers—particularly those marginal groups who do not relish their rights as citizens in benefiting taxes—for giving me financial support through Lembaga Pengembangan Dana Pendidikan during my study in Lund.

To Rini Hapsoro to proofread the introduction chapter and to Suci Wulanningsih to deal with the Excel’s table.

To my family, for all loves and supports. I am going home very soon!

And to Indah Wulandari, for showing me how to live our passion.
# Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................. 3
Acknowledgement ........................................... 4

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 6  
   Aim and research questions .............................. 10

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................. 10  
   2.1. Disciplinary Power: Producing Identity and Subjugating Subject 10  
   2.2. Discourse Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis .................. 13  
   2.3. News and Discourse .................................. 16


4. SITUATING RESEARCH IN CONTEXT: TIONGHOA, VICTIMHOOD, AND ECONOMIC ANIMAL 22  
   4.1. The Use of Terms “Tionghoa” and “Receiving Society” ............. 23  
   4.2. Study on Chinese-Indonesians: Victimhood Bias and Lack of the Media’s Perspective 25  
   4.3. Historical Construction of the Chinese Identity from Time to Time 28  
       4.3.1. The Colonial Era .................................. 29  
       4.3.2. The Emergence of Indonesia .......................... 30  
       4.3.3. The Old Order .................................... 31  
       4.3.4. The New Order .................................... 32

5. METHODS AND DATA ...................................... 35

6. ANALYSIS ................................................ 37  
   6.2. News Text Analysis ................................... 41  
       6.2.1. Positioning the State .............................. 42  
       6.2.2. Desired-Self of Tionghoa .......................... 47  
       6.2.3. Struggle of Meaning Making: Intertextuality 54

7. CONCLUSION: BEING DISCIPLINED IS DESIRABLE 57

References ................................................. 63

Appendices ................................................. 69
1. INTRODUCTION

This study is motivated by the curiosity to grasp certain behaviours and attitudes of the ethnic minority of Chinese-Indonesians, who are also known as the Tionghoa. Tionghoa reflects a peculiar way of life, which is characterized by the idea of a self-disciplinary body. To have a better understanding, the following examples have been illustrated.

In 2014, Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, had, for the first time in history, elected a Christian-Chinese governor, named Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Popularly known as Ahok, he was promoted to governorship since his ex-running mate and the former governor, Joko Widodo, won the presidency. Serving as the governor for a double minority, the Chinese and the Christian, in the world’s most-populous Muslim country, which also has a long history of anti-Chinese sentiments, can certainly generate multiple reactions. Some contended that the circumstances can be seen as a progressive and diverse Indonesia, whereas others argued that a non-Muslim governing a Muslim-majority is religiously unacceptable, followed by a conspiracy theory that believed that the Chinese would rule over the Indonesians.

Nonetheless, Ahok’s distinctive performance as a governor has apparently made him popular and helped him become a media-darling. However, he is also known for his straight-forward language and temper. He publicly expresses himself loudly, swears and insults his underperforming staffs and political opponents. As someone belonging to an ethnic group that is historically viewed as a social pariah, some opine, Ahok is not supposed to express such provoking attitude, as it potentially heightens the existing hatred against the Chinese-Indonesians. An open letter written by a well-known Chinese columnist-businessman Jaya Suprana (2015) represents such an expression. Building an argument based on his personal memory and general history of anti-Chinese riots, Suprana asks the governor to behave more politely, in order to evade the resentment of the “native” Indonesians. He writes: “It is not impossible that your impolite words will trigger public hatred and be followed by riots” (ibid.).

In addition, he also justifies the racism against the Chinese-ethnic group by saying that “Some Chinese deserve to be hated”. The aspiration demanding certain kind of behaviour towards the fellow Chinese for the sake of survival, I would argue, can be seen as a form of self-regulation.
A similar tone is exemplified in the following story. It features Harry Tjan Silalahi, a notable Catholic-Chinese politician, who worries that the luxurious ways of the celebration of the Chinese New Year in Indonesia might lead to anti-Chinese sentiments, stemming from social jealousy (Tempo, 2004). When asked about his views on the celebration of the Chinese New Year in an environment that is currently more harmonious for the Chinese in Indonesia, Silalahi says: “I wish people celebrating Chinese New Year have their own ‘self-control’. Otherwise, it could be a dangerous boomerang” (ibid.). This expression is, in my opinion, also a varied form of self-regulation; for this is peculiar urge to control the self as well as others who are considered a part of the same community or share a collective identity.

It is, of course, possible to add a ton of sound-alike stories. However, the two aforementioned stories seem adequate to illustrate the meaning of a self-disciplinary body. Both the stories simply show the way individuals “voluntarily” control and regulate themselves and their ethnic community for the sake of survival. Furthermore, it is important to note that this particular attitude, in the Indonesian context, is generally expressed only by the Chinese, as it is rare to encounter other ethnic groups expressing a similar attitude. For instance, the “native” Indonesians also hold luxurious celebrations on their cultural or religious days, yet no one appears to express any concerns about any social jealousy — at least not one that has been publicly stated. A call to refrain from lavish parties for the “native” is more of a moral issue, rather than survival issue. Neither do we hear any voice from or for the “native”, for being polite to avoid racial hostility, or curb their existing rudeness.

Actions, attitudes, and behaviours are manifestations of self-identity. The different actions and attitudes among the respective social groups, according to social identity theorists, are caused by the different ways in which, each group perceives the social world and their identity. Given that social identity is “constructed within structure of social and political where the self exist” (Kivikuru, 2004), Chinese-Indonesians have been experiencing their life differently, as compared to any other ethnic group in Indonesia. Different social experiences and understandings lead to distinctive social identities as well as social actions. The question, which then arises, is what kind of social and historical contexts have been experienced by the Chinese-Indonesians, which shape their docility?

Indonesia, indeed, has had a history of hundreds of years revolving around the racism against its 3% Chinese ethnic minority. This circumstance engenders the racial-social order that has
been shaping the attitudes and behaviours of the Chinese, both individually and collectively, in the social, cultural, and political realms. The Chinese have become self-controlled and self-regulated individuals. They regulate themselves for neither talking about politics, nor expressing their cultural identity. I argue that such a historical trajectory has been, in the Foucauldian sense, disciplining the Chinese-Indonesians to be docile.

Discipline, as introduced by Foucault (1995), is a technology of power that regulates the behaviours and thoughts of individuals by controlling the organization of space, time, and daily activity. Foucault is a prominent thinker whose study has been hugely influential in shaping the way people understand the meaning of power. For him, power is not just coercive and repressive, but can also be a productive force that produces reality, the regime of truth, and subject or identity. Arguably, the process of disciplining is done through subject construction, the way in which identity is formed. The main focus of this study, therefore, lies in the identity-construction of Chinese-Indonesians. To be more specific, the study intends to interrogate how, and in what sense power produces the disciplined Chinese-Indonesians.

To that end, an inquiry into the discourse becomes imperative. The reason is that discourse constitutes social reality, an arena of social practices in which, power embodies. Discourse also, for critical discourse analysts, “does not just contribute to the shaping social structures, but also reflects them” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 61). In addition, the discourse theory mainly focuses on investigating the issues of identity formation (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 2). This means that by looking towards the discourse, we are able to investigate the ways in which the identity of the Chinese-Indonesians is formed and constructed. Through discourse, we can see the means by which, it reflects the idea of how Chinese-Indonesians are expected to live their lives.

With respect to the topic of Chinese-Indonesians, there has been an abundant amount of literature on the subject. Some notable accounts, to mention a few of them, have been carried out by Skinner (1963), Somers (1964), Mackie (1976), Coppel (1994), Suryadinata (1971, 1994), and Heryanto (1998a, 1999b). The themes range from political development, the status of law, discrimination and violence, demographic, press and culture to the identity construction in every phase of the Indonesian history — the period of colonial, post-colonial, dictatorship, and democratization. However, there is a lack of critical attention paid to the mass media as a site of discursive social practices that contribute to the shaping of the identity construction of
Chinese-Indonesians. With this in mind, this study claims the importance in investigating the role of media.

Firstly, anti-Chinese sentiment has been a social norm in Indonesia (Purdey, 2005), which in the Foucauldian sense, can be viewed as a regime of knowledge, the rules for what are considered to be true and false. Furthermore, mass-media are believed to be one of the main social institutions which constantly reinforce and redefine the social order, by which Althusser (1971) calls “the ideological state apparatus”. This is to say that investigating the media can be a means to investigate the structure of the regime of knowledge.

Secondly, it is believed that the social world is a temporary outcome of discursive practices, which involve many different actors in a constant struggle to achieve hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In this sense, the discourse of media is studied as a site of power and social struggle (Wodak and Busch, 2004). Therefore, another important reason to investigate the media is “to plot the course of these struggles to fix meaning at all levels of the social” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 24). Thus, investigating the media discourse is not only meant to grasp the identity constructions of the Chinese-Indonesians, but also to examine how they have been constructed, and what kind of the strategies were used in their construction.

Considering the fact that discourses are historical constructions, investigating the discourse must be done by tracing back the history. Conducting an analysis of the entire Indonesian history in this study is, however, an impossible task. In consequence, this study will, to establish a historic period as its basis, specifically select the Indonesian dictatorship era of the New Order (1966-1998). Although the period of the Dutch colonisation in Indonesia has played an important role in “creating” the Chinese-Indonesians, many scholars argue that it was the New Order that utilized the Dutch’s invention, by reinforcing and exploiting this “technology of power” to maintain its sovereign power (e.g. Heryanto, 1999b; Chua, 2004). In addition, setting out the study from contemporary Indonesia, it is more relevant to trace back the period of the New Order, rather than the older periods, such as the Old Order (1945-1966) or the period of colonisation (pre-1945).
Aim and research questions

The aim of this study is investigating the role of news media in mediating certain discourses that construct the identity of the Chinese-Indonesians. It explores the ways in which, certain construction is aimed at disciplining individuals. By analysing the news texts in the media as well as the social and political contexts wherein the texts are situated, this study intends to understand how the New Order utilizes disciplinary power to produce the docile subject of Chinese-Indonesians. In short, the study seeks the idea of how the New Order theorizes the self of the Chinese-Indonesians. The way this is understood has implication in dismantling the manners in which the New Order maintains its power by controlling the population by establishing anti-Chinese sentiments. To that end, the questions this thesis sets out to answer are:

1. How is the identity of Chinese-Indonesians constructed in the Indonesian New Order news media?
2. By what means of identity construction and discursive strategies are the Chinese-Indonesians being disciplined?

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Disciplinary Power: Producing Identity and Subjugating Subject

As has been implicitly detailed in the previous chapter, this study employs a Foucauldian lens to situate and problematize the identity construction of the Chinese-Indonesians during the New Order. In this sense, the disciplined Chinese-Indonesian is understood as a condition that was processed by the identity-construction, advanced by the power with the intention of subjugating the subject. The several ways of performance, in which the power subjugates the subject, have been primarily elucidated by Foucault (1978, 1995).

Admittedly, Foucault has been the most influential figure in altering the ways of understanding power. Foucault shifted the notion of power from its previous perception as a coercive restraint or a negative entity in the traditional Weberian concept, to a positive and productive notion that yields identity, subjectivity, and practice (Green, 2010: 320). In his study on the manifestations of power in the modern society through prisons, hospitals, schools, and norms of sexuality,
Foucault describes the role of power “in producing our becoming” (Blackman, 2008: 25) by instilling knowledge that defines “truth” and “normality” (Foucault, 1995). In addition, Foucault separates the two different paradigms or forms of understanding powers: the economist form of power and the disciplinary form of power (Mendieta, 2002). While the former pertains to juridical ideas, such as the rights and laws that legitimize the authority in governing individuals, the latter is above all anti-sovereign and anti-judicial ideals, as it works through social norms, which “determines a horizon of action” in order to create “the conditions of surveillance that lead to the subjects’ docility” (Mendieta, 2002). This study, indeed, focuses on the latter: The disciplinary power.

The disciplinary power has the function to “transform ‘docile bodies’ into disciplined subjects” because it “works only in the service of domination and social control” (Green, 2010: 317-318). The basic premise underpinning Foucault’s concept is that power and knowledge are inseparable. This is in agreement with Schwan and Shapiro’s assertion, “modern forms of power and modern forms of knowledge are intertwined, one serves as the condition for the other’s existence” (2011: 44). Therefore, to create disciplined subjects and to overpower them, knowledge has to be produced by constructing position or identity “for those whose are subject to certain practices” (Spencer, 2006). Through institutional practices, knowledge producers — the state, for instance — run “projects of docility” (Foucault, 1995: 136) by constructing subjects/identities in whom the “truth” of the self is enacted. Then, the constructed subjects are guided by feeding them the quest and desire for the “truth” of the self, which is incorporated in norms, “to become agents of their own construction and regulation” (Green, 2010: 319), to finally become self-monitored and self-regulated individuals.

The relationship between power and knowledge, according to Foucault, is institutional and historical and is embodied in discourse. Discourse has the capacity to constitute identities, desires, and practices (Frank cited in Green, 2010). Therefore, “subject of discourse cannot be outside discourse because it must be subjected to discourse” (Foucault in Hall, 1997: 55). Hall further explains that for Foucault, the subject is produced through discourse in two different senses or places:

First, the discourse itself produces subjects—figures who personify the particular forms of knowledge which the discourse produces. [...] But the discourse also produces a place for the subject (i.e. the reader or viewer, who is also ‘subjected to’ discourse) from which its particular knowledge and meaning most makes sense. It is not inevitable that all individuals in a particular period will become the subjects of a particular discourse in this sense, and thus the bearers of its power/knowledge. (1997: 56)
To put it in another way, discourse is the site where knowledge and meaning are produced. Therefore, investigating discourse is investigating the way in which subjects or identities are enacted and linked with the questions of power. However, Foucault’s approach seems to be poor in methodology and has been criticized for being “overly fatalistic” (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 238) and neglectful of “the influence of the material, economic and structural factors in the operation of power/knowledge” (Hall, 1997: 51). Such theoretical drawbacks have been responded to in a scholarly manner by advancing and theorising the concept of discourse, including developing framework and methodology (e.g. Fairclough, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b, 1991a; Wodak et. al., 1999, 2004, 2008, 2009). A more elaborated discussion on the theory of discourse will be addressed in the next chapter.

The following part moves on to briefly discuss the correlation between discourse and identity. It seems necessary to question how such a correlation occurs and becomes plausible. How and what significance does identity hold in guiding individuals to possess certain social actions, attitudes, and behaviours? Despite being criticised many times, the concept of interpellation by Althusser (1971) can be an initial step in theorising how the internalization process of social relations and norm into individuals takes place. Althusser (1971: 172, 174) argues that “you and I are always already subjects”, and it is the ideology that “transform[s] the individual into subjects”. By being subjects (by subscribing to certain identity), individuals are demanded to think and act in certain ways. If discourse theorists believe that ideology embodies on the discourse, therefore, it is the discourse that creates subjects or identities.

The factors that further solidify the arguments against the correlation of the discourse and identity, I believe, can be illuminated by the theory of social identity. From the perspective of such a theory, social identity is “defined by individual identification with a group: a process constituted firstly by a reflexive knowledge of group membership, and secondly by an emotional attachment or specific disposition to this belonging” (Benwel and Stokoe, 2006: 25). Additionally, Tajfel (1974) argues that the individuals’ behaviour is the reflection of the broader social unit where the self exists, and the individuals’ behaviour refers to the broader social structure. In such sense, Benwel and Stokoe (2006: 31) further argue that “identity or identification thus becomes a colonising force, shaping and directing the individual”.

12
2.2. Discourse Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis

Although discourse has been variously defined, it is commonly viewed as “a group of statements which provide language for talking about a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Foucault cited in Hall, 1997: 44). To say in another way, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 1) define discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)”. In this sense, it is argued that discourse constitutes, and is constituted by the social world, including the social identities, social relations, systems of knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough, 1995; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This goes on to say that the relationship between discourse and the social world is dialectical, since one shapes and affects the condition for the other’s existence.

For discourse analysts, language, both written and spoken, is perceived as a form of social practices (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). However, the first and foremost thought to be noticed about discourse, since it is a commonly misunderstood, is that discourse is not only language or text; it is broader than that. Discourse is “the social activity of making meanings” (Lemke in Wodak, 2008: 6), in which text is a means to access discourse. As Wodak (2008: 6) writes, “text is specific and unique realization of a discourse”. Texts, in this sense, are produced within “social and cultural structure and practices that surround and inform their production and consumption” (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 236). As such, there are certain social and cultural structures and practices, with their certain embedded rules, that produce a certain text and make its existence probable and plausible. Such a function of text then constitutes discourse as a form of social practice and action (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 236). Therefore, it can be argued that discourse "implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures” (Wodak, 2008: 6), which shapes the society by constructing a version of truth and social order (Foucault, 1995). In this sense, discourse is believed to possess an important role in constructing identity. Discourse is seen as “a shared social resource” (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 237) providing “truth” and social order as “ways for people to be” (Hacking in Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 236). The census made by the Dutch during the Indonesian colonisation period, as will be shown in the sequel chapter, exemplifies how discourse played a role in “creating” the Chinese and introducing the concept of ethnicity through the classification of population.

Furthermore, what needs to be done in analysing the discourse is to investigate how language is used, “exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social
consequences” of it (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 21). Discourse analysis therefore aims “to examine the procedures of control and limitation of discourse [...] In doing so, it might reveal the mechanism and instances that are necessary for its existences” (Foucault, 1971). Among the different approaches to analysing discourse, this study employs the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its tool to comprehend and analyse the social world, actions, and identities.

Before elaborating more about what CDA is, let me argue the reasons for employing CDA rather than other approaches, in the conduction of this study. First of all, CDA holds a non-deterministic attitude by understanding discourse as “just one among many aspects of any social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 6). Such a view contributes in improving Foucault’s understanding of discourse, which is criticized for being over-deterministic because of disregarding the structural factors that also shape the social world. The second reason is its dialectical views that see discourse as something that “both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 61). In this sense, discourse is seen as a reflection of the social world, besides its role in fashioning it. For the purpose of this study, the discourse of the Chinese-Indonesians’ identity in the media can be viewed in two-fold: To see the process of how media discourse constructs identity, and to use media as social artefacts, which can depict the idea of being Chinese-Indonesians under the New Order. The third reason is its political approach that “is dedicated to uncovering societal power asymmetries, hierarchies, and the oppression of particular groups” (Benwel and Stokoe, 2006: 9). By exploring the “ideological working of language” (Benwel and Stokoe, 2006) CDA aims “to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 63). Such a view suits any study that aims at dismantling the established racial social order in Indonesia, which has been inherited from the previous regimes.

Broadly speaking, it is difficult to conduct a discourse study not only because of its complexity of theory and analytical tools, but also because there is no established or standardized theory and/or method. In CDA itself, which is the one applied in this study, the tenet is theoretically and practically diverse. However, regarding the commonalities in perspective and aim, it can be argued that “most kinds of CDA will ask questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance” (van Dijk, 2015: 468). CDA aims at understanding “how communication practices construct identities, experiences, and
ways of knowing that serve some interests over others” (Mumby in Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004: 238).

The approach of CDA employed in this study will be fundamentally built on the basis of Fairclough’s framework (1992, 1995a, 1995b), which differs from other well-known approaches such as Van Dijk’s social-cognitive model and Wodak’s discourse-historical approach. In his approach, Fairclough proposes a three-dimensional model of discourse: text, discursive practice, and social practice. Studying discourse, in the view of Fairclough, needs to be done through the analysis of these three dimensions. The following passage will elaborate each of these dimensions.

The first dimension, that is the dimension of text will, for the purpose of this study, be limited only to language, although visual images are also considered as text. The analysis in the text level explores forms of linguistic features such as vocabulary, semantic, and grammar. The text is believed to have three functions: representation (ideational function), identities and social relations (interpersonal function), cohesion and coherence (textual function) (Fairclough, 1995a). Discourse analysts adhere to Habermas’s claim of language, which is believed as “a medium of domination and social force” (cited in Wodak, 2002: 2). Therefore, to examine how power and ideology work over language, analysing the text must be done in a critical manner by examining the linguistic features with its relation to “their direct or indirect involvement in reproducing and resisting the system of ideology and social power” (Richardson, 2007: 39).

The second analysis, at the dimension of discursive practice, focuses on how texts are produced and consumed (Fairclough, 1995a). In the context of news media, the analysis examines the factors that influence the production and distribution of news, as well as the factors that shape the audience’s behaviour and interpretation while consuming the news. The level of analysis at this dimension is located on the institutional level of media organisation or infrastructure of media access, where the activities of text production and consumption affected.

The third dimension of social practice implies “the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of” (Fairclough, 1995a: 57). This also means that analysis should focus on a wider context of political, social, and cultural conditions that shapes and is shaped by text and discursive practice. In this level, the analysis critically interrogates the macro factors such as policies, cultural assumptions, social norms, economic structure, and so forth. In the
end, it is important to remember that CDA has a non-deterministic characteristic. CDA, therefore, believes that the relationship between all these dimensions, viz. texts, discursive practice, and social practice, are dialectical.

2.3. News and Discourse

The relationship between news media and socio-political life has been widely studied due to the significance and omnipresence of news in modern life. In studying discourse, the news is also an inevitable consequence, especially in seeking dominant discourses (Mautner, 2008: 32). To analyse the language used in news, as Fairclough (1995a: 2) acknowledges, “should be recognised as an important element within research on contemporary processes of social and cultural change”. It can be argued that the significance of studying news lies in the assumptions made about its social, cultural, and political role.

In the context of social assumption, the news is seen to have a role in documenting the social “reality”. Its social functions for people in connecting the world lead the way in which news brings “reality” to their audiences. This means that through news, we can access any “reality” that occurs in a certain place at a certain time. However, from a discourse-theoretical point of view, news is perceived, not just a reflection of the social phenomena where discourses circulate, but also as “specific machineries that produce, reproduce, and transform social phenomena” (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 274).

In the cultural assumption, news, by the ways in which it is consumed, is viewed to have a role in structuring our everyday lives. The strong foothold of media in modern life seems inevitable, whereby Deuze (2011: 138) argues that “our life is lived in, rather than with, media — we are living a media life”. This cultural phenomenon of media is believed to have an impact not only on the amount of time spent on media, but also on how people’s everyday lives and logic are structured by and aligned with the media (e.g. Postman, 1985; Hepp, Hjrvard, & Lundby, 2015). The importance of news in our social practices leads van Dijk (1991b: 110) to argue that “there is probably no other discursive practice, besides everyday conversation, that is engaged in so frequently and by so many people as news in the press and on television”.

16
In the political assumption, news media are challenged to play a role in a public sphere in providing a space where the diversity of values and views are negotiated (Habermas, 1991). Arguably, the political process is staged through and within the news media, where various interest groups struggle to seize an influential position. The influence of media in politics, which usually benefits the elites, has been studied for a long time (e.g. Moscow, 1996; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1999). For Marxist scholars, for instance, news and mass media, in general, are institutions that are exploited to underpin the ruling class or those in power, by the “manufacturing consent” of the people, in order to achieve “hegemony” (e.g. Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 1971).

Furthermore, studying the relation between news and discourse can be approached through various frameworks. In general, the notion that attempts to find the relationship between discourse and the news can be found in Torfing, who distinguishes three working domains of discourse study (cited in Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 273):

1. studying discourses about the media and their place and function in society;
2. focusing on discourses of mass media, i.e. on the form and content of the discourses produced by the media;
3. defining media as discourse.

However, this study limits its exploration by selecting only two aspects of news discourse, which are power and access (van Dijk, 1995). What is meant by power here, is its role in influencing the news production that encompasses “social relation between groups or institutions, involving the control by a (more) powerful group or institution (and its members) of the actions and the minds of (the members) a less powerful group” (van Dijk, 1995: 10). To that end, studying news discourse lies in the social, cultural, and political, as well economical aspects of the media. This means that, while analysing news texts, a few factors should be considered such as the freedom of the press, the relationship that the state and the political parties share with the media (ownership), the economical aspect of the media that characterizes the way the news is produced and distributed, and so forth.

In addition, given that certain news stories are produced by certain actors and within certain conditions, the aspect of access is also important and needs to be considered. By considering the media access, this implies the need to map whoever has more privilege in “controlling the means of mass communication” (van Dijk, 1995: 11). Obviously, the elite groups and institutions, particularly the state, have more access to the media rather than the ordinary people.
This is to say that the elites have more power in determining the discourse in the media. Finally, the consideration of the aspect of power and access in the discourse bring consequence in the ways in which news texts should be analysed.


May 1998, for most Indonesians born before 1990, was probably a month which oscillates in the ambivalence of remembering and forgetting. But it was also, oddly, a month which Indonesians wish both to remember and forget all at once, as well as a month which may be viewed as the one neither to be remembered, nor to be forgotten, at all. This difficulty in defining a certain feeling for May 1998 indeed shows its complexity.

May 1998 was a new chapter in the Indonesian history that radically shaped the country in all aspects — social, cultural, economic, and political. There are two major remembrances of how Indonesians perceive the May of 1998. First, it was the collapse of the 32-year-old dictatorship of the New Order, indicated by the resignation of President Suharto on May 21, 1998. Overwhelming with national euphoria, Indonesians viewed this moment as the possibility of having a more democratic nation with characteristics such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, reforming the political system, and dismantling systemic corruption — something that was beyond in the people’s imagination in the previous decades. Secondly, however, it was also the beginning of a series of violence acts that started with the kidnapping of the pro-democracy activists, dead-shooting of student-activists, and which eventually culminated in the occurrence of riots in some major cities where the Chinese were hunted down and killed, their shops and homes were looted and burnt, and the Chinese women were gang-raped. For the latter, which has remained so much unspoken, Heryanto describes May 1998 as “the spectacular public display of violence directed against sanctified sites and rules of sexuality” in the “condition of vulgar masculinist post-colonial state power” (1999b: 314, 301). The state, particularly the military, are believed to have been the first and foremost in instigating the May riot (Aguilar, 2001: 502).

As promising and mourning incidents occurred at the same time, May 1998 appeared as a complicated episode of a nation-state, which led most of the Indonesians to discuss it in such a
dilemmatic way. Especially for the Chinese-Indonesians, May 1998 was conceived as a moment that happened to be an “unremitting reminder” of their estrangedness (Giblin in Turner and Allen, 2007). Furthermore, this re-awareness of identity creates an unprecedented uncertainty about the security of the Chinese (Purdey, 2003), which they then responded to, by installing shops and houses with iron gates and higher fences, some even double as high, and some with spikes added on their tops. The interpretation of such reactions can be that the Chinese were striving to protect themselves as they could not rely on the authorities any longer, like they used to. About this, Purdey (2003: 429-430) analyses the following:

Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were conditioned to seeking protection from figures in the military and government […] Although under Suharto theirs had been a position of persecution and exploitation, certain behaviours and relationships were prescribed to ensure that they could continue to live and work in Indonesia. Now, many were less sure of their place in Indonesian society. […] They doubted that any assistance would be forthcoming from the authorities and increasingly took provision for their safety into their own hands.

On the other hand, May 1998 was also a moment that brought about a consciousness to the “native” Indonesians, that the Chinese had been victimized for a long time. Aguilar claims that “the rapes did exceed the limits of the tolerable and finally awoke in them the realization that the Chinese were truly the objects of discrimination” (2001: 503). This led to state actions that aimed at reforming some discriminatory regulations and the beginning of the acknowledgement of the political and cultural rights of the Chinese, such as allowing Chinese identity-based political parties, and ending the government’s use of the discriminatory labels such as “pribumi” (native) and “non-pribumi” (non-native, effectively, Chinese), favouring the Chinese cultural expression, and enacting the Chinese New Year as a national holiday. These state actions dramatically transformed the situation for the Chinese and saw that they had an increased engagement in the social and political issues. However, in terms of political representation, Krishna Sen contends that such a situation “does not ensure a radical shift […] for re-imagining the Chinese Indonesians” (cited in Heryanto, 2008: 71). The long history of anti-Chinese sentiment had perpetuated prejudice and racist biases towards them. Under the Suharto’s New Order, such views were preserved by stigmatizing, marginalizing, discriminating, and victimizing the Chinese-Indonesians (Wibowo in Hoon, 2012: 38; Chua, 2004).

The New Order is, indeed, an important period of Indonesian history that shapes the contemporary Indonesia, particularly for the Chinese-Indonesians whose identities had been
manipulated under the assimilation policy. This regime was led by Suharto, an army general who soon afterwards, became the second president of Indonesia, coming to power in the aftermath of an abortive coup in 1965, on the night of 30th September – an incident which hitherto has never been fully explained. The official version explains that it was an attempted communist coup — a version which was used to promote state terrorism by slaughtering no less than a half-million suspected Communist sympathisers (Cribb, 1990), including about two thousand\(^1\) Chinese (Coppel, 1994: 125).

Establishing and dominating the country by killing and suppressing millions of civilians — mostly alleged communist, so-called separatists, political Islamists, and the Chinese — the New Order ruled the country for three decades, from 1966 to 1998. Its rule was founded on economic success, underpinned by maintaining political order, negating public participation in the political process, and repressing the opponents. Robinson accurately describes the New Order “as an authoritarian presidential regime with centralised rule by the military, appropriation of the state by its officials and non-existence of effective political parties or opposition” (cited in Chua, 2004: 468). The New Order’s achievement in political stability and economic growth has been the main claim to its legitimacy.

Under the regime, political parties were compelled to merge into one another and form three parties so that they could be easily monitored and controlled. Likewise, mass media were also under controlled. There was only one journalist organisation that was officially acknowledged - the government-controlled Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Journalist). Moreover, a large number of critical media were disbanded. The army censored and controlled the media by occupying the newsroom and the printing places. After decades of disciplining the media and journalists to be docile, in the early 1990s, the major newspapers’ owners and editors themselves were committed to self-censorship (Hill, 2007: 11). As such, the Indonesian press, according to Ariel Heryanto, “have been the most important area of maintenance and reproduction of the New Order’s legitimisation […] an institution of cultural practice that went through the most severe and most frequent blows of the [New Order] State” (cited in Hill, 2007: 35).

\(^1\) The exact number has not been clear until now. Some estimated that the number could be up to fifty-thousand.
During the New Order, the state-sponsored discrimination against the Chinese had begun since the very early stages of the regime. Thousands of Chinese were slaughtered during the communist purge between 1965-1966, which can be seen as a strong statement of the regime in excluding and demonizing the Chinese. Heryanto (1998: 98) argues that there are two perceptions stirring the attacks against Chinese. The first is that, a large number of Chinese were believed to have always supported leftist politics; and the second that contends, “because the People's Republic of China was communist, there was a general essentializing identification of this ethnicity with communism”.

Not long afterwards, everything related to communism was prohibited, including Chinese-related things. All the Chinese names, schools, religions, languages, mass media and organizations were abolished. The political rights of the Chinese as citizens were restricted: difficulties to access state education and public service; limitations to work other than in the trade and industry sectors (Heryanto, 2008; Lindsey, 2005; Coppel, 1994). Chinese-language materials were not allowed and its import-restriction policy was listed under the same category as explosives, pornography, and narcotics (Heryanto, 2008: 74). All these regulations were formulized in No. 37 Presidium Instruction in 1967, entitled The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem.

“Chinese Problem” or “Masalah Cina” is a credo envisaging that all the problems of social and economic inequality were coming from the Chinese. Therefore, in order to solve the “Masalah Cina”, the New Order imposed the Chinese to fully assimilate to adjusting “their incompatibility with the Indonesian people” (Chua, 2004: 470). Their differences, Chua explains, were perceived as “a threat to national integration and unity”. One reason why the anti-Chinese sentiments and riots existed is manipulatively argued to be this “Masalah Cina”. This available evidence seems to suggest that during the New Order, “Masalah Cina” was a means to essentialize the differences; an instrument to “ethnicise society” (Chua, 2004). Although it was claimed that its purpose was “to completely absorb the Chinese in society” (Schwarz in Chua, 2004: 470), “Masalah Cina”, in fact, “is part of a problem than solution.

---

2 Translated from “Instruksi Presidium Kabinet RI No. 37/U/IN/6/1967 tentang Kebijaksanaan Pokok Penyelesaian Masalah Cina”. The ban on religion, beliefs, and Chinese customs were decreed in the Instruction of the president of the Republic of Indonesia no. 14, 1967.
Through the absolutisation of ‘Chineseness’ as a separate and monolithic identity, the ‘problem’ itself is symbolically constructed and reproduced” (Ang, 2001: 29).

Admittedly, compared to other Chinese communities in other South-East Asian countries, such as Thailand, The Philippines and Malaysia, the Chinese-Indonesians are not in a position where they can enjoy the same social, cultural and political rights (Heryanto, 2008: 73-74). The only sector in which the Chinese-Indonesians can enjoy liberty is the field of economics. Heryanto (2008: 73) writes that a couple of scholars have recognised this contradictory phenomenon: political and cultural repression versus economic favouritism. However, the latter only applies to a small percentage of Chinese businessmen, who are offered privileges to access huge economic resources and become billionaires — a phenomenon which has been establishing a myth of “30% dominates 70% country’s economy”\(^3\). Despite the reproduction of such a myth by the media and scholars, Aditjondro (1998) has rebutted it by pointing out the significant composition of “the native” stock holders in the so-called Chinese-owned companies. Nonetheless, such myth has already been creating stereotypes that most of the Chinese-Indonesians are wealthy in general. Such a stereotype is arguably one of the main sources of resentment of the “natives” who then reproduce and justify the racism against the Chinese.

Some view that the Suharto’s New Order copied the Dutch colonisers in the ways in which the regime treated the Chinese: the way the Chinese have been “created” as “others”, as well as providing a few Chinese conglomerates with the monopoly rights, yet at the same time mugging them. Heryanto (1999b: 326) contends that “the New Order was largely a reincarnation of the Dutch colonial regime” and he cited Daniel Lev, who asserts that the New Order “was not merely similar to the colonial state. It was the same state”.

4. SITUATING RESEARCH IN CONTEXT: TIONGHOA, VICTIMHOOD, AND ECONOMIC ANIMAL

In order to equip the fundamental understanding necessary to follow this study, this chapter aims at addressing some points that provide the context and rationale of the topic. For the very

\(^3\) Aditjondro (1998) based on his investigation argues that such myth originates from a study carried out in 1995 by Michael Backman, under the title Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia. However, I discovered a news article in Kompas, on 24 September 1966, entitled “60% Money in Indonesia Circulated in Jakarta”, which resonates very closely to the myth. Arguably, such a myth has been existing longer than what Aditjondro concludes.
first step, I will discuss some terms referring to “Chinese-Indonesias” that have been commonly used, both in a social and an academic context. Have not been discussed this, by which I have been always applying “quotation mark” for the term “native”, I assume that now is the time to devote this section to talk about it, for the sake of having a sense how some labels are used in the Indonesian context, as well as to show how I dealt with those in writing this study. What will follow next is to briefly traverse an overview of the literature on the identity of the Chinese-Indonesians. This section points out the lack of previous studies, discussions of which will be addressed in this study. The chapter will then be ended by discussing the historical identity-construction of the Chinese from time to time, in order to provide the social and historical circumstances that have always eventually produced the contemporary Chinese identities.

4.1. The Use of Terms “Tionghoa” and “Receiving Society”

There are a dozen terms that have been used to refer to the Chinese in Indonesia: Tjina, Cina, Tionghoa, Hokiau, peranakan, non-pri(bumi), WNI (keturunan), cino, cokin, amoy, Chinese, and so on, with its respective socio-legal meanings. “Cina”, however, appears to be viewed as an unacceptable one, as it has been used in the spoken language as an insulting term. Although it has been socially used, this pejorative term was officially promoted to label the Chinese through the regulation made at a meeting of army leaders in 1967. The reason is described in the following words:

 […] particularly in order to remove a feeling of inferiority on the part of our own people, while on the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the group concerned within our State, […] the seminar has decided to use again as the term for the People’s Republic of China (Republik Rakjat Tiongkok) and its citizens, ‘Republik Rakjat Tjina’ (People’s Republic of China) and ‘warganegara Tjina’ (Chinese citizens) (Coppe and Suryadinata cited in Chua, 2004: 473).

Ever since “Cina” has been used as an official term for discriminating and stigmatizing the Chinese-Indonesians, and consequently it thus justifies, legitimises, and normalises the anti-Chinese sentiments. It has been common for the Chinese to get harassed in the streets for no reason by getting shouted at as “Cina”, and “Amoy” for women, or any random Chinese sounding-names. For most Chinese-Indonesians, “Tionghoa” is viewed as a desirable label for their identity. For some reasons, the English term “Chinese” is also used, as it is considered to sound more neutral. Therefore, after the fall of the New Order, media started to use “Chinese”

for replacing “Cina”. In 2014, the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono released the Presidential Decree No. 12/2014 that mandated the revocation of 1967 regulation and decreed “Tionghoa” as the new official term to replace “Cina”.

Historically speaking, “Cina” is derived from the English “China”, and as Aguilar (2001: 510) writes, it was coined by the “outsiders” in the mid 16th century. The people now known as Chinese prefer to be identified as “Zhongguo” or the Middle Kingdom. Whilst “Tionghoa” is adopted from “Zhonghua” meaning “Chinese overseas”, which was being used by the Chinese outside China as they realised this identity when the China nationalism spread out over South-East Asia during the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the early 20th century.

Besides using “Cina” to alienate the Chinese-Indonesians, the New Order emulated the Dutch to engineer and reproduce the concept of nativeness or ethnicity by using the term “pribumi” (literally means “people of the soil”) for the “native” and “non-pri(bumi)” for the Chinese. Such language-play, I argue, attempted to abstract the idea of the Indonesians’ ancestors into myth in order to claim an authority over the land. Aguilar describes this labelling “as part of the regime’s complex system of cultural machinations” (2001: 516). Additionally, the label of “non-pribumi” implies that the Chinese are a social pariah and have no rights to defend or demand the rights that the “pribumi” have. When May 1998 occurred, most of the Chinese attempted to avoid the loot of their houses and shops by writing there “Milik Pribumi” (meaning: owned by “native”). Logically speaking, regardless how it has been politicized, “pribumi” is a failed concept because all people in Indonesia are settlers, and if we want to point out the earliest settlers, it is they who inhabit the eastern Indonesia, such as Papua, whom, being discriminated as well in the big narration of imaginary Indonesia.

However, this section is not going to discuss much about the historical background of these terms. The need to discuss it is twofold. First, scholarly speaking, it seems to suggest that the term-used is important to be addressed here due to its significance in defining, identifying, and then constructing the Chinese. I am not alone in the view that term-used is a central idea in the way in which the New Order maintained its dominance. Allen (2003:387), for instance, argues that “one of the most telling aspects of the polemics surrounding the issue of Chinese identity in Indonesia is the very language in which it is embedded”. Moreover, by employing the discourse theory, this study has to deal with the language-used. In addition, by understanding
how certain terms are used, it is more convenient for the readers to follow this study and for me to elaborate things, especially in the analysis chapter.

Second, politically speaking, I would take a stand for defending the marginal group and tackling the oppression by amplifying their voices in the study. One of the attempts towards achieving this is to use the term they wish to be referred to and to stop reproducing the ideological tools of the New Order. Moreover, a few terms have been inappropriately used both in the social and academic context. Another necessity is, therefore, to overcome the issue by offering some thoughts of terms-used.

With this in mind, throughout this study, I propose to use “Tionghoa” for the Chinese and the terms “receiving society” or “other ethnic group” interchangeably. “Receiving society”, which is considered as a more neutral term and is commonly used in migration studies, will replace the word “native” that contains the denotative and connotative meaning of “originality” and the concept of the nation as “blood-descendant”. On the other hand, “Tionghoa” implies one ethnic group in Indonesia among “other ethnic groups”. My intention in proposing these terms is to provide the manner to re-evaluate the social understanding of ethnicity and nationalism, and at the same time, to dismantle the New Order’s sovereignty. However, it is important to keep in mind that the Chinese-Indonesians are not homogeneous, including the way in which they prefer using the terms for their identification.

4.2. Study on Chinese-Indonesians: Victimhood Bias and Lack of the Media’s Perspective

This section aims to delineate the scholarly context of how this topic has been approached. Generally speaking, there is a considerable amount of literature on the Tionghoa in Indonesia. Some preliminary works on the Tionghoa social and political life in the period of colonisation of the Dutch East Indies are largely based on the works carried out by Dutch scholars (Suryadinata, 1994). In the following years, a score of English-writing studies has been published, mostly written by Australian, American, Japanese, and an early generation of Indonesian scholars, who went to overseas universities. Some pioneer works that provide an adequate overview of the social and political issue of the Tionghoa, as well as the segregation from the receiving society have been addressed by Skinner (1963), Somers (1964), and Coppel (1994). To be noted, Suryadinata is one of the most productive Indonesian scholars, who
publishes an extensive number of studies about Tionghoa in Indonesia as well in South-East Asia. His works (1971 and 1994) that focus on the political realm of Tionghoa have provided sufficient analysis to argue that the Tionghoa themselves actively participated in the discourse of their identity construction, albeit from a socially and morally weaker position.

The topics about legal system and policies have been investigated by Coppel (2002), who focuses on how the restrictive legal system for the Tionghoa, under the Dutch occupation, creates a witting segregation between the Tionghoa and other ethnic groups, and by Lindsey (2005), who studies the racial law system and its reform, revealing how state actions through legal system play a significant role in discriminating the Chinese and alienate them. It seems to suggest that the study about legal system needs to be noticed since it has had a significant contribution in underpinning the purpose of this study in investigating discourse, in which, official documents are part of it.

Furthermore, many accounts focusing on the Tionghoa identity have been undertaken in some studies with various goals. Most of these studies reflect how the Tionghoa and their identity are always problematic and a means for the political purpose of those in power. Such tension leads many Tionghoa to get trapped in the ambivalence of being not too Indonesian, neither too Chinese. The Tionghoa have been experiencing confusion about their identity and it contributes to the suffering from “auto-hypnotised amnesia, a mental condition in which people deliberately eliminates their self-identities” (Dananjaya in Turner and Allen, 2007).

Most studies focusing on identity in the past decades have been focusing on the period after Suharto. To give an example, Turner and Allen (2007) have addressed this topic. Also, Purdey (2003) explores the ways in which Tionghoa, in the post-Suharto period, attempted to renegotiate their identity. This reflects the debate in the 1950s, about the idea of assimilation versus integration as a route for the Chinese being accepted in society. Whilst Lim (2009) focuses on a relatively unspoken aspect of gender, and of how the young Chinese women negotiate their identity in an oppressed situation. The more recent works that study Tionghoa identity in the post-New Order are conducted by Hoon (2012) and Afif (2012). While Hoon explores the Tionghoa identity in the post-Suharto era, Afif studies how the Muslim-Chinese deal with their “double-minority” identity, which both the Muslim-Indonesians and the Chinese communities view as alien. This is based on the social belief that Muslims are not supposed to be Chinese, and vice versa. One interesting study done by Minghua and Ingketria (2016) shows
and proves the confusion and the self-denial of the Tionghoa identity, who, in the study, displayed their desire to not be identified as Tionghoa, since it is seen as uncomfortable and insecure.

Nevertheless, most of the studies are written in the spirit of defending the vulnerability of being Tionghoa. Consequently, some studies over-emphasize the misery of being Tionghoa, as well as the contribution of the Tionghoa to Indonesia, to show their true nationalism in order to emancipate their position, which has long been neglected and discriminated by the state and the society. For some reasons, I agree with Ang (2001: 21) who argues that the studies or advocacies on Tionghoa have tended to heavily draw on victimhood perspectives and this tendency “fail to provide subject in history with a complex and even handed sense of their own past”. As Heryanto (2008) has highlighted, the tendency to emphasize the oppressive aspect leaves “the highly problematic conception of ethnicity” unsolved. Similarly, Chua (2004: 467) argues that most studies about Tionghoa, especially the early generation scholars — tend to take ethnicity for granted and treat it as natural and unproblematic. On similar lines, Heryanto (2008: 78) critically examines such studies by questioning the very root of the problem of discrimination: the concept of ethnicity itself, which he identifies as “modern fiction”.

Given such criticisms, this study orients its manner to bear in mind few issues. First, the trap of victimhood’s perspective neglects the complexity of the history and overlooks the victim as an agency participating in the discourse that makes history. Second, the notion that ethnicity is not natural, and is rather socially constructed within the discursive power struggle. And third, therefore, to “depict ethnicity as contrivable, manipulable and utilisable for certain aims”, where only the state “has specific reason to utilise ethnicity” (Chua, 2004: 467). However, although Chua and Heryanto’s views are progressive and intriguing, their premise lacks the correlation that can explain how the state is able to ethnicise the society and even maintain it as a social norm. In short, they fail to take into account the question of the power relation that produces and nurtures the regime of knowledge. I put forward the view that there is no absolute domination derived from a single entity like the state. Rather, it is necessary at this point to consider language as a medium wherein power can implant its domination both through, and over it. As such, it seems reasonable to assume that news and mass media, in general, employ and provide space for language manifestation that contributes to underpin and empower the “truth” and the rationality of the regime.
Admittedly, one of the major drawbacks of the studies about Tionghoa is the lack of a media perspective. A few studies using media are mainly written for collecting historical facts, as what Suryadinata studied (1971 and 1994). A few studies are conducted around the topic about the role of Tionghoa in the Indonesian press history, or the Chinese-language media (e.g. Suryadinata, 1978), or Tionghoa press in the post-Suharto era (e.g. Hoon, 2005). Another work done by Dawis (2009) investigates how Tionghoa searches their identity through media consumption. Heryanto (2008) studies the citizenship construction of Tionghoa through movies. Also, a study conducted by Setijadi-Dunn (2009) is about the Indonesian movies released a decade after May 1998, addressing the issue of Tionghoa identities. Above all, however, there is no study that particularly investigates the media as a social site in constructing the identity of Tionghoa, especially on its role in reinforcing and mediating the state interests. All things considered, this study intends to fill in such a gap.

4.3. Historical Construction of the Chinese Identity from Time to Time

There have been multiple stereotypical Tionghoa identities, such as the Dutch’s minion, economic animal, opportunist, disloyal, an outsider, unpatriotic, and alien. Nonetheless, if there is a necessity to describe the Tionghoa-identity construction in one word, I believe that it would be ‘economic animal’. Through the frame of such a stereotype, such other unsavoury identities followed. Throughout the Indonesian history, the ‘economic animal’ identity has been the most culturally embedded and established discourse, and it was further legitimised through the law. To provide the context, this section will, therefore, briefly delineate the historical construction of the Tionghoa identity in the period of the Dutch Colonization, the Emergence of Indonesia (1900-1945) — which consisted of the Japanese Occupation and the Indonesian Revolution (War of Independence) — the Old Order (1945-1966), and the New Order (1966-1998). By delivering this, it is wished that the idea and linearity of the discourse would be gained, in order to make sense of what was it that made Tionghoa what they are today. Another key thing to remember is that the aspects of historical background presented here are selectively chosen based on their significant linkage to the Tionghoa identity construction.
4.3.1. The Colonial Era

The Tionghoa people have been residing in an area, which was then known as Indonesia. They had settled there since the early 15th century, long before the Dutch arrived and established a colonial administration called the Dutch East Indies. Between 1860 and 1930, they became more visible in difference, as compared to the “native” and colonial, because of rapid growth in the number of migrants from an estimated 222,000 to 1,233,000 (Coppel cited in Zane, 2010: 34). Such differences were more accentuated through the colonial census that “created” and categorized Tionghoa and other Eastern Asians called “Foreign Orientals” as second class citizen, where Europeans were placed on the first and “inlander” (Dutch: the indigenous) on the third class, the lowest social strata. Arguably, the census was the first step in establishing a social identity based on ethnicity. Beforehand, people were not perceived in ethnic categories; they categorised people based on either their power relation or social position (Anderson, 1995). The Tionghoa people coming from different regions of China, who were ethnically diverse, had just realised their social classification as Chinese during the census (Heryanto, 2004). Therefore, through the census, the people obtain their identities. Through the census, the Chinese were socially made. Not only that, the Dutch also banned the Tionghoa from wearing Western fashion and getting haircuts5 (Suryadinata, 1994: 21). This caused the Tionghoa to become more distinctly visible and recognisable as “other”.

Indeed, the Dutch were well-known for their divide-and-rule policies. It was done by segregating the ethnic groups and imposing the Tionghoa to live in ghettos, which is similar to the African apartheid system that prohibited inter-racial neighbourhoods. In addition, the Dutch appointed some Tionghoa, as well as Arab-Indonesians, to become the captains of the community, with the responsibility of managing their respective communities, as well as supervising the system of tax farming for the collection of state revenues. The Tionghoa enjoyed the privilege from the Dutch to dominate the profitable-immoral businesses such as opium trade, which contributed to the stereotype of Tionghoa as an economic animal (Hoon, 2012: 26).

Under the Dutch colonial administrators, Tionghoa had a paradoxical position: being the middlemen mediating between the Dutch and the receiving society, and having a favoured

5 Male Tionghoa used to have a traditional hairstyle whereby shaved in fore head and long and braided ponytail in the back.
treatment in trading and commerce. On the other hand, however, they were seen as the cause of the poor social and economic position of the receiving society (Coppel, 1994). The growing wealth of a small portion of Tionghoa was then responded to by the other ethnic groups and the Dutch thus developed resentment against all the Tionghoa population, most of whom were extremely poor themselves. A score of anti-Tionghoa riots occurred during the colonial era, but the pogrom in 1740, known as Geger Pecinan or Batavia Massacre, was known as the worst one, where more than 10,000 Tionghoa were slaughtered.

At the end of this period, in the early 1990s, the Dutch stipulated the Ethical Policy aiming to respond to the ethical-call by taking the responsibility for the welfare of their colonial subjects. The policy of protecting the rights of the “indigenous” gave a great impact that subjugated and “altered the Tionghoa position from the Dutch’s cosset became the most state’s enemy” (Phoa in Hoon, 2012: 27).

4.3.2. The Emergence of Indonesia

In the early 1900s, an important historical moment occurred: the awakening of the Indonesian and the Chinese nationalism. Still under the Dutch administration, the Indonesian nationalism was gradually emerging, led by educated Indonesian elites, as a consequence of the Dutch Ethical Policy. Such national consciousness led to the establishment of many nationalist organisations that struggled for the independence. On the other hand, the China Cultural Revolution was spreading throughout the South-East Asia and this emerged in the nationalism of the Chinese overseas. Such situation drove the Chinese in Indonesia to consciously believe that they were a part of the Chinese nation, which is why, they began to use the term “Tionghoa” to express their identity, since the term “Tjina” was considered to be derogatory (Suryadinata, 1971: 84). Furthermore, the rise of Chinese nationalism encouraged the establishment of Tionghoa schools, newspapers, and organisations. Tionghoa solidarity discomforted the Dutch and led them to establish The Bureau of Tionghoa Affairs with the duty to provide political advice regarding Tionghoa’s issues (Coppel, 1994).

6*Tjina” is an old spelling for “Cina”. In 1972, the New Order decided to announce Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan (Perfected Spelling System) as a language system to simplify previous system. Some presume, including Anderson (2008), such system was designed to disconnect people from knowledge of the previous regime.
Amyot contends that they identified with China because “it was the only permitted identity or the one that they were willing to take” (cited in Hoon, 2012: 27). This move was viewed to strengthen their “outsider” identity and stereotype of exclusiveness. Consequently, as Suryadinata illustrates, “the indigenous political movements in the proto-nationalist phase had a tendency to exclude the local Chinese from the very beginning” (1971: 84). This can be seen through some nationalist movements and organisations that did not allow the Tionghoa joining the (full) membership because they were categorized as foreigners rather than Indonesians (Coppel, 1994). For instance, Partai National Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party) stated in Article 4 of its constitution: "the persons eligible for membership in this party are native Indonesians […]; other Asians can be associate members” (cited in Suryadinata, 1971: 86).

Regardless of the emergence of the Chinese nationalism, as stated above, Chinese is not a homogeneous ethnic group. Generally speaking, there were three different political views: those whose orientation was towards the People’s Republic of China, another towards the Dutch, and the last one who supported the Indonesian revolution struggle, like Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (The Party of Chinese Indonesians). Even after being parts of the nationalist movement groups, they were still not perceived as Indonesians.

During the Japanese occupation from 1942-145, the oppression of the Tionghoa led them to unite. Unfortunately, most of the Tionghoa did not recognize the emergence of an anti-colonialism spirit in the Indonesians, and this perpetuated to the perception of Tionghoa as exclusive others. In addition, most of the Tionghoa leaders were detained by the Japanese, which made many Tionghoa refrain themselves from participating in the revolution. At this point, the stereotype “unsupportive group” had emerged (Hoon, 2012: 32).

4.3.3. The Old Order

The Indonesian declaration of Independence from the Dutch on August 17th, 1945 was the starting point of the Old Order regime. Indonesia’s emergence as a modern nation-state consequently brought the concept of citizenship, which impacted the status of the law of the Tionghoa. In 1946, the Indonesian government enacted a passive system of citizenship for Tionghoa, which automatically acknowledged both their Indonesian status and Chinese citizenship, if they wished so. In fact, quite a large number of Tionghoa refused the Indonesian citizenship for a few reasons: the euphoria of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Chinese
memories from the past (Somers cited in Hoon, 2012: 33). However, in 1958, the Indonesia government released the new Citizenship Law that required the Tionghoa to choose if they wished to have an Indonesian citizenship or they would lose it otherwise. In consequence, this policy yielded some categories for the Tionghoa: as an Indonesian citizen of a foreign descendant, as a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, or a stateless person. However, the status of law as Indonesian citizen did not cease the view for the Tionghoa as “aliens”, even though they have been living in Indonesia since generations. Such alienation can be linked to the claim made by Ang (2001: 39) that “the very construct of Chinese in Indonesia is intimately entangled with the historical emergence of “Indonesia” itself, which, in turn, cannot be separated from the global history of modernity.”

Furthermore, their position as aliens escalated the discriminatory acts and policies. One of them, for instance, was the Presidential Decree No. 10 which did not allow the Tionghoa to trade in the rural areas, by which, this led them to migrate to the cities. Hoon states that this circumstance raised the consciousness of the Tionghoa that their identity was problematic, which led to the migration of 100,000 Tionghoa to China, with the assistance of the Chinese government (2012: 35).

During this period, the debate about assimilation versus integration emerged, and this heavily contributes to the discourse on Tionghoa. The idea of assimilation was to totally abolish all the Tionghoa features and aspects by, for instance, marrying them to Indonesians or converting them to Islam. For the integration supporter, they advocated the idea of a modern nation-state by adopting the idea of multiculturalism, meaning that the Tionghoa could be truly Indonesian, but at the same time embracing their cultural identity. The idea of integrationist, who was led by the leftist, was defeated and buried down along with the establishment of the New Order regime, which built its sovereignty upon anti-communist propaganda. In the meantime, the assimilation idea had gained support from the New Order.

4.3.4. The New Order

Here we finally reach the section that discusses the period of the times being studied in this research. If some view that the concept of nation and nationalism in Indonesia is fundamentally misunderstood by referring it as something “inherent in blood like how ethnicity is understood” (Heryanto, 2001: 15; also see Anderson, 1999), during the New Order this understanding achieved the peak. It explains why, in this regime, the blatant promotion of the state racism
against the Tionghoa, its legal citizen, looks normal and unproblematic: Because the state and the society were discriminating the “aliens”, and not their own fellow nationals.

However, what makes the New Order more brutal from the previous regimes is its totality in utilizing all the existing condition and tools to ethnicise the society. Chua seems to be true by stating that the New Order did not start from scratch in doing that. It is because, he asserts, the Tionghoa and the receiving society “were already defined and segregated long before” (2004: 83-114). Under the New Order’s assimilation policy, ethnicising the society was done by marginalizing, discriminating, and stigmatizing the Tionghoa (Chua, 2004).

By marginalizing, it meant “extinguishing Chineseness” (Chua, 2004: 470) or “purging it of foreignness” (Heryanto, 2008: 74) in order to make the Tionghoa compatible with the receiving society. This was done by prohibiting all the things that were related to the Chinese, which has been discussed in the previous chapter, including selling Chinese cookies (Heryanto, 1999: 327). However, to ensure that there was no complete assimilation, the Tionghoa “were kept visible by discriminating against them” (Chua, 2004: 466). This was done by accentuating their Chineseness by delivering the official name “Cina” and contriving many important legal documents. The latter can be found in the Indonesian identity card of the Tionghoa that carried a special code, information about the Tionghoa descent on the birth certificate, and the letter to prove their Indonesian citizenship. Finally, stigmatized as prosperous as well as communists, the pariah status of the Tionghoa reached the crest. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese were politically and culturally repressed, but were granted immunity in the economic sector. The privilege of doing business on one hand, and the undesirable position on the other hand exhibits a paradoxical situation that was drawn by Heryanto as follow:

[…] never before had the Chinese business elite enjoyed such abundant wealth as that acquired under Suharto’s New Order. Ironically, never before had the ethnic Chinese been so deprived of civil rights (2008: 326)

Nevertheless, the main portrayal of the Tionghoa has already been perceived as economically powerful, rather than its pariah status. Such stereotype reinforces and eternalizes the hostility in the society against these “opportunistic aliens who are disloyal and unpatriotic because they were the Dutch’s collaborator”. 

33
The assimilation program, according to Heryanto (2008: 74), “was designed to fail […] because success would have undermined the interest of its own sponsors”. What he means is that, the New Order needs to maintain its status quo, since it heavily depends on the existence of Tionghooa. As Chua (2004: 466) believes that the construction of ethnicity is “used by and for the state”, so does Heryanto believe that the need to assimilate the Tionghooa tends to reinforce “the active and conscious othering of the Chinese” in “the reproduction of the native Self” (cited in Ang, 2001: 39). In other words, the full assimilation of the Tionghooa and the demolition of their identity will affect to the legitimacy of the New Order, which is built on an anti-Tionghooa sentiment, besides an anti-Communist one.

Furthermore, during the New Order, the coercion to be a true Indonesian for the Tionghooa paradoxically juxtaposed with the reminder of their “foreignness”. A force asking them to be something that they cannot successfully achieve leads them to be “trapped in ambivalence” (Ang, 2001). As Heryanto (2008: 75) illustrates, “no matter how much a Chinese Indonesian […] went ‘native’, the state apparatus would ensure that traces of his past or his already assimilated Chineseness be brought back to the fore for further cycles of discrimination”. About the “trapped”, Freedman (2000: 97) argues that the Tionghooa have been trapped since the period of colonialism by getting situated in “neither incorporated as a group within the larger polity, nor assimilated”. Eventually, their identity of un-removed alienation hinders them to fully identify themselves with the broader Indonesian national community (Mackie cited in Hoon, 2012: 49).

The effect of such historical discourse and series of riots against the Tionghooa made an impact on their identity and the way they perceive their social position. The confusion about their identity and how to position themselves in society leads to a strange psychological impact that makes them, especially the young Tionghooa, “feel guilty or uneasy about being Chinese” and try “to ‘erase’ their Chineseness” as “parents told children as simply immigrant, ‘guest’ in Indonesia” (Budiman, 2005: 98-99). Such an impact apparently attributes to and sheds light on what has been mentioned in the very beginning and what appeals this study: the disciplined Tionghooa.
5. METHODS AND DATA

In the foregoing chapters, I have declared my working definition of theory and concepts. This chapter will specifically detail the technicalities of the methods employed in the study. Those include the steps taken to collect the data used in the study and the ways to analyse the data.

First of all, the decision to limit the scope of the study by choosing the period of the New Order (1966-1998) brings consequence at the selection of the media outlets. To that end, this study employs two important Indonesian media outlets as its sites of conducting research: the daily newspaper Kompas and the weekly news magazine Tempo. Besides their prominence, the reasons behind the selection of these media are threefold. Firstly, these two have been in existence since the early establishment of the New Order until today. Secondly, the factor of varied ideologies, in which Tempo is arguably more liberal and journalistically-speaking, more critical because of its well-known investigative reports, in comparison to Kompas. Thirdly, while I found limitations in accessing the archives of other media outlets, these two provide adequate online archives, which can be purchased. In doing so, the selected materials will solely be taken from the news reports and excluding opinions, editorials, and letters to the editor.

With no intention to be representative, the empirical data are obtained by selecting the news report published during the three decades of the New Order. From Kompas, the data are taken from all the news published in 1966, 1976, and 1986. From Tempo, as it was established in 1971, the data are taken from the year 1976 and 1986. Then, the study excavates the news reports in Kompas and Tempo by employing some terms which are used in association to and commonly embedded when discussing Tionghoa. These keywords, which overlap one another, are “Tjina”, “Cina”, “Tionghoa”, and “Pribumi”\(^7\). By focusing on the news that both implicitly and explicitly contain the discussion about Tionghoa in connection to their identity, the final set of material consisted of a total of 134 news reports (85 reports of Kompas — consisting 56 reports from 1966, 20 from 1976, and 9 from 1986 — and 32 of Tempo — consisting 14 news reports from 1976 and 18 from 1986). Given the assumption that discourse is historical and can only be understood within the context, the aim of such method of data excavation is to trace the scraps that structure the discourses. Another reason of having historical data is to see

\(^7\)All these words refer to “Chinese-Indonesian”, “Chinese-China”, and “the country China”, except “Pribumi”, which is a term for the “native”. The more adequate elaboration has been delivered in the previous chapter.
the intertextuality, which is meant to be “the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 74). The notion of intertextuality is used in discourse analysis as an understanding that spoken and written languages “are located in a world filled with prior utterances and are therefore implicated in an implicit dialogue with that pre-populated world of discourse” (Hodges, 2015: 43). As Fairclough defines, intertextuality is “a broad label for all the phenomena discussed thus far” (cited in Hodges, 2015: 45). This is to say that all present discourses are built upon prior discourses.

Using Fairclough’s three dimensions of discourse as a framework, as well as some ideas of Wodak and van Dijk for minor support, there will be three sections which respectively analyse the macro-level of social and political context, the meso-level of news production and consumption, and the micro-level of language use in the news. While the macro and meso-level will explore the context where the data are situated, the latter focuses on the analysis of the collected empirical data. The initial step for analysing the empirical data can begin by reading some of them through a “cyclical process” (Mautner, 2008: 35), by which more and more news articles are added up, until more homogenous findings are attained. Then, once the patterns have been identified, shown by the consistency and variability of the findings (Potter and Wetherell cited in Petterson, Liebkind, and Sakki, 2016: 6), the coding process is initiated. The patterns I sought were the ways in which the Tionghoa identity is constructed in the news and whether the news has implanted linguistic manifestation in disciplining the Tionghoa.

By keeping such quest, I discovered that there was another identity in construction besides the Tionghoa, that is, the state. Therefore, in the coding process, I have used two major categories, one for the Tionghoa identity, and the other for the state identity. Also, since this study seeks the discursive strategies, I coded the ways in which news defines certain problems or events, and what moral source they employ to the rationale, legitimate, and justify their treatment of definitions. Finally, in analysing the empirical data, these questions are kept in mind to orient my quest:

1. How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
2. What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
3. By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others?
4. From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or are they mitigated? (Wodak, 2001: 72-73)
6. ANALYSIS

Analysing the discourse about Tionghoa is a way to reveal a version of “truth” that is used by power to disciplining individuals. Given the view that discourse is “the social activity of making meanings” (Lemke in Wodak, 2008: 6), this chapter analyses all the aspects of social practices that contribute in the formulation of the Tionghoa identity in Indonesia. To that end, I structure this chapter as following.

The first sub-chapter analyses a wider context of the social and political conditions during the New Order. While focussing on the “rules for what can and cannot be said” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12), this part deals with the power and its relation to the production of knowledge. Also in this part, I analyse the aspects of news production and consumption. Structures of media organisation, journalism culture, people’s literacy skill and access to media, and diversity of media are some aspects which will be interrogated. Since I have provided a much historical context in the previous chapter, in this first sub-chapter I will only discuss some aspects for the sake of re-contextualizing and will provide additional context that is “analysed and integrated into the interpretation and discourses and texts” (Wodak, 2001: 70). What follows next is the core of the study, that is, the analysis of the news articles in Kompas and Tempo. Here I present the “text-in-context” (van Dijk, 2008), meaning, to analyse the language-use that produces meaning under certain context. Please note that the approach is abductive, meaning that, during the analysis, there will be “a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data” (Wodak, 2001: 70).


In this part, I will attempt to draw together the social and the discursive practices. More specifically, here I will examine the context in which the news texts are situated. As has been explained above, the context is understood as a social condition that surrounds and shapes the news. It ranges from the wider socio-political context called social practices to the context of news production and consumption known as discursive practices. To that end, the discussion here provides the analysis of the contexts that rationalize the existence of the news texts. I will focus on the dialectical relationships between social practices and discursive practices, such as
how the political situation influences the work of journalists and how journalism affects the social formation (Richardson, 2007: 114).

However, there is a clear problem which needs to be acknowledged: the lack of material supporting the analysis of the context. Specifically, the drawback appears in the level of the discursive practices, in which I did not provide adequate literature works on press or journalism practices in the New Order, neither did I arrange the studies on audience news consumption, the data of which can be obtained from observations and interviews. The analysis of discursive practices level, therefore, focuses on the major social and political events that are assumed to have impact on the news production and consumption. Because, as Richardson (2007: 114) argues, that social practices “influences the work of journalists in a great variety of ways, from the constitutive effects of ideology, social structure, social power, other agencies and institutions to the values and preferences of the target audience”. Let me now start delineating the social practices.

Apparently, there are some major contexts that need to be kept in mind while analyzing the discourse about Tionghoa under the New Order. First of all, the anti-Tionghoa sentiment has been in existence for an adequate period of time and it is sufficient as an initial capital for further exploitation. The New Order gained the benefit of utilizing such technology of power to ethnicise the society. Secondly, even though the New Order regime began in the second decade of the Indonesian independence, the country was still in the earliest stage of a modern nation-state that struggles to define and stabilize its national identity. Nation, as a mental construct of “imagined political community”, which is built among others upon the idea of fraternity (Anderson, 1983: 6), is essential to define the self of the national identity. Therefore, a nationalistic atmosphere, characterized by the sentiment of anti-foreigners, especially anti-colonialists, grounded the logic of in-group and out-group. In this regard, the Tionghoa are considered to be an out-group because in Indonesia “nation is seen as something natural and inherent in blood” (Heryanto, 2001: 15), even though they have settled in these lands since the early 15th century, long before even the idea of Indonesia existed. Furthermore, such an understanding of nationalism is utilized as moral resource, primarily by the state, and comes with Pancasila and Sumpah Pemuda\(^8\) as the manifestation of it.

\(^8\)Pancasila, means five principles, is Indonesian philosophical foundation and state ideology. Those principles rely on the values in monotheistic, humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice. Sumpah Pemuda or Youth Pledge
The third context to consider is that the new regime was a military dictatorship, which had built its sovereignty heavily on the basis of an anti-communism sentiment. Media, political parties, and critical intellectuals were controlled, and this brought the state to have a powerful role in nearly all aspects of the people’s lives. This led to a situation with a lack of diversity in the voices, where different versions of truth could be easily labeled as communist ideas. In addition, everything that was considered communist-related was stigmatized and prohibited, as it was connected to China in the political and cultural aspects.

As a consequence, such major context contributes in the formation of a “socio-cognitive” (van Dijk, 2008), which then provides a logical framework to comprehend and respond to the social and the political reality. CDA is, therefore, useful here as it can help “examine social structure of power through the analysis of the relations between discourse and cognition” (van Dijk, 2015: 472). This implies that, in order to fully comprehend the discourse on Tionghoa, an inquiry that interrogates inequality in the social structure in accessing power resource must be taken into account.

With regards to the socio-cognitive, it can be argued that, firstly, in the midst of such social turmoil during and after the anti-communist mass killing in 1965, the state, especially the army, emerged as a powerful institution with a nearly-fatalistic role to govern and was legitimated as the official source for truth. Such circumstance locates the state in the centrum of the social-political life and paves a way to the cultural formation of the state-centrism. This manifests in the ways in which, the state was positioned as the one and the only authority, which subsequently gives it the privilege to define and evaluate the social phenomena and social subjects. In addition, the state equips itself with “power over mechanism of control and limitation of what can and cannot be said” (Foucault). The state closes “the discourse-power circle” (van Dijk, 2015: 470) and controls the access to power resources, which contribute to social inequality. Eventually, the public discourse is heavily dominated by the state. Such so-called state discourse emerged as the only “truth” that embedded both in the news and the people’s everyday lives.

Secondly, the anti-Tionghoa sentiment was perceived to be morally accepted. The political tension between Indonesia and People’s Republic of China (PRC) existed with an anti-
communist sentiment, generated and enforced nationalistic gestures against those who were labeled as “foreigners”, “outsiders”, or who were considered to support the so-called notion of “anti-revolution” and who were “against Pancasila”. In the mode of the “social war”9, as Foucault argues about biopolitics (Rasmussen, 2011), such socio-cognitive was employed in governing the population. In the “social war”, social events or political moves, especially the ones arranged by the state, which might today be considered as politically incorrect, were then perceived as “normal”. Some events and statements such as “nationalism indoctrination for Tionghoa”10, “banning Tionghoa school”11, or “go back to your country”12 exemplify such demeanor of the anti-Tionghoa normality established by the state. Such cognitive structure reflects its social function “to protect the interests of the in-group” (van Dijk 1984: 13).

In the news production, the effect of such cognitive structure can be seen through the notion of the mental model. Given the understanding of the mental condition created “based on the discourse, the situation, and the purposes they have to serve” (Clark and van der Wege, 2015, 416), such situation affected the way the journalists worked and the way the news production was undertaken. It was inevitable for news media organizations to “obligate” for producing news in which, the topics, frames, and tones were based on the so-called “national interest” and “nationalistic attitude”. It means that the media were supposed to produce news about events which were considered to defend the national dignity, failing which, they would be labeled as anti-revolutionists and could be led to disbanding. In result, the state, as the official “truth”, dominated the news sources. This will be seen in the newspapers that label news stories as “explanation” and “announcement” from the state representatives, mostly the army, or the government-controlled organizations. Practically, the state acted as the powerful institution “who control most influential discourse also have more chances to indirectly control the minds and actions of others” (van Dijk, 2015: 470). As a consequence, the news products contributed in endorsing the state’s version of the “truth” as well as the legitimization of the state as the only authority capable of telling the “truth”.

---

9 What I mean by “social war” is explained by Rasmussen (2011: 39) here: “The notion that there is always an ongoing war beneath a situation of peace”
10 Kompas, 20 July 1966, “Indoctrination for Foreign Descent Indonesians”
6.2. News Text Analysis

This section outlines the things that the news texts have to say about Tionghoa. This is not to say, however, that the ways in which the Tionghoa are being constructed is explicitly set; neither does it occur throughout the entire news texts. Instead, the interpreted meanings of the news texts are obtained by applying a theoretical framework, which I have detailed in the second chapter. Basically, the analysis elaborated here is based on the texts which have been coded according to the method that I have presented above. Nevertheless, with the research focus in mind, I randomly chose news extracts on the basis of the fact that they representatively illustrate the language manifestation in disciplining the Tionghoa. It is important to note, however, that my approach “is problem oriented, not focused on specific linguistic items” (Wodak, 2001: 69).

In order to follow the elaboration given below, it seems necessary to first explain some technical stuff. Firstly, most of the findings addressed here are based on the data excavated from *Kompas*. The weekly magazine *Tempo* has only a few empirical data, which I can use in this study. Of the 103 editions within 2 years (1976 and 1986), there are 32 news articles that contain the related keywords, and yet there are only 3 news reports which have more direct content discussing about the Tionghoa. The mode of production of a weekly-magazine, I argue, characterizes its content. A weekly-magazine, with its limitation, apparently, needs to be more selective about the news production, than the daily newspapers. Such character confines *Tempo* from covering the least significant events and topics. In addition, the issues about Tionghoa in 1976 and 1986 had, in general, begun decreasing in quantity, as can also be seen in *Kompas*.

Second, the issue of terms used. As explained above, I will use “Tionghoa” for the Chinese-Indonesians and “receiving society” or “other ethnic groups” for the so-called “natives”. However, while quoting, I am keeping the terms that were originally used in the news in order to show how people are named and attributed (Wodak, 2001). Therefore, it is necessary to explain those terms, such as “*Cina*” and “*Tjina*” for Tionghoa, “*WNI Keturunan Asing*” for “foreign descendant Indonesian citizen” (which is commonly written as “*WNI Keturunan*” [“descendant Indonesian citizen”], but it is a well-known term that specifically refers to the Tionghoa descendants), “*WNI Tionghoa/Tjina*” for “Indonesian citizens with Tionghoa descendant”, “*Warga Negara Asing Tjina/WNA Tjina*” for the Tionghoa living in Indonesia, but with a Chinese nationality (by which I will use “Chinese”), and finally I will use “People’s
Republic of China” or “PRC” as term for China as a country (Indonesian term: Republik Rakjat Tjina-RRT).

The third explanation is about the issue of translation. Be noted that the Indonesian language used in the news was grammatically wrong. For instance, the subject of the sentence is often missing. Therefore, the quotes that I have extracted are not always in their original structure, since they have been fixed for the sake of clarity, but I endeavour to maintain the meaning precise. In addition, some too-specific-segmented information in the text, like the title of someone or the army’s name squad, has not been included here in order to avoid the complexity of the text. Fourth, the order in which the news is quoted is not chronological. The relationship between texts should not be perceived to be causal. Rather, they need to be seen as intertwining, as in the discourse texts, there are collages that produce meaning.

For guidance, this section has been begun by the presentation of the analysis of the state identity. I will show how news texts position the state and how the state gets an advantage from that. Then, the analysis of the Tionghoa identity construction will be given. What will follow next is the analysis of the historical aspect of discourse, by which, it is known as intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Here, the discourse from a different time will be compared to investigate whether such discourse achieves stability or not.

6.2.1. Positioning the State

It should be pointed out that in the discourse about Tionghoa, there is almost always, the discourse about the state. In where the Tionghoa is positioned and constructed, in there the state is positioned and constructed as well. Based on the news that I observed, it can be asserted that the state is positioned within two manners: by dominating the news source and by constructing the state identity. For now, I wish to focus our attention on the former.

Almost all the sources of news discussing about Tionghoa are dominated by the state, both from the state-apparatuses like the army and the government representatives, and from the semi-state bodies like government-controlled organisations. Although there are a few non-state organisations positioned as news sources, they tend to voice a tone similar to the state. That is to say that, there is no single distinct perception of the Tionghoa. Indeed, the domination of the state towards the news sources is a logical consequence of outcomes for the news produced
under the authoritarian regime. From the point of view of discourse studies, such circumstance supplies more privilege to the state as the discursive actor in shaping the discourse. In other words, what we can see from this is the domination in accessing power resources, where the state, with its power, exploits the news media as properties of the discourse to carry out and fulfil its agenda (van Dijk, 2015: 470).

The appearances of the state are materialized in a wide range of topics like the law status of Tionghoa, the demonstration of Tionghoa’s loyalty towards Indonesia, the idea of being a “good” Tionghoa, the anti-Tionghoa riots, calling for unity and anti-racism, and Tionghoa’s economic domination. Regarding the latter, in the following passage we can see how a high army official explained the topic that not at all relevant to him, and how the newspapers uncritically quoted it, without any supporting data:

*Extract 1: Kompas, 24 September 1966, “60% Money in Indonesia Circulated in Jakarta”*

1 Lieutenant Colonel Urip SH, in his meeting with the traders in Pantjoran/Glodok on Friday, stated that 60% of money in Indonesia is circulated within Jakarta, and mostly in Pintu Ketjil. It should be known that 70% of Pintu Ketjil is dominated by WNA [foreign citizens]. Explained by Lt. Col. Urip that historically, the traders with Tionghoa descendants had a great role in economy and trading, so it is understandable that their participation can give a meaningful support to the attempts of economy stabilization. Participation here has to be seen as not merely watching and enjoying the benefit […]. Instead, must be active, spontaneous, and heartfelt, based on the conviction that the people's economic improvement implies a social security improvement, which will guarantee economic activities. It was explained by Lt Col Urip Widodo that worse the economic condition, the greater is the tension between the haves and the poor, and this nourishes prejudice and racism. […] Ignorance will lead the people to equate the WNI Tionghoa [Indonesian citizen with Tionghoa descendant] to WNA Tjina [Chinese citizens], in which, this will victimize to the WNI Tionghoa [Tionghoa-Indonesian] themselves.

Here, from *Extract 1*, we can see that the state asserts and propagates that the social security problems, including racism, are caused by economic inequality, which, in turn, is fundamentally caused by the Tionghoa’s economical domination. Implicitly, such text shows the privilege that the state has, by being the only source in the news and by being provided a highly adequate space to define the issue. Neither is there a competing source, nor has the data been verified by any journalist. Such treatment places the state as the official voice of the unquestionable “truth”, whereby such “truth” is legitimate to be reproduced by the non-state sources, even by the Tionghoa “representative” themselves, as shown in the following:
In the above passage, particularly in the lines 8 to 9, the stereotype of Tionghoa as economically dominant is addressed by the Tionghoa organization itself, which is probably operated under the control of the government. What we can see is, the intention of the organisation to “work towards such direction” (line 6) is enforced because the “government had stipulated the assimilation policy” (line 4). The texts seem to suggest that in general, the state has a powerful force, not only in accessing the power resources like news media, but also in directing, legitimizing, and amplifying a version of “truth”. To put it in other words, the state version of the “truth” is the determining factor in the discourse.

Another example is shown in the news article featuring General Suharto, who was practically acting as the Indonesian president already, and his version of assimilation. By stating that “both PRC and Taiwan have interest to possess their stooges in Indonesia for channelling their movement”, he frames that the unassimilated Tionghoa “can be employed to channelling foreign power”\(^\text{13}\). Addressing such strong claim in front of the university students, without any evident and scientific argument, the newspapers quoted him alone, without questioning the claim or providing a second opinion. Such logic, similarly, in another news is uttered by the “civil society” organisation called Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa or the LPKB (Institute for the Guidance of National Unity), stating that “Beijing [PRC] has intention to utilize [the Tionghoa] to generate racism in order to degrade Indonesia international reputation”\(^\text{14}\).

The ways in which the state dominated the news sources can, therefore, be construed as the fact that the discussions about Tionghoa were mostly produced by the state discourse. The state discourses are particularly powerful discourses because, as Riaño and Wastl-Walter argue,

\(^{13}\) Kompas, 3 November 1966, “General Suharto and Assimilation”

\(^{14}\) Kompas, 19 October 1966, “Ministry of Information B.M. Diah: WNI with Foreign Descendants are Part of Us As Well”
“their dominance occurs not only because they are located in socially powerful institutions but also because they claim absolute truth” (2006: 1). Throughout the Indonesian history, as has been illustrated in the previous chapter, it is obvious to contend that the state has been playing a vital role in organizing, defining, and dominating social practices, which are significant resources in the production and establishment of the social identity. Especially in the authoritarian regime like the New Order, the state has an extremely vital role in dominating the discourses. Furthermore, it is important to know how the state claims the absolute truth and what strategies it uses to ethnicise the society. This is arguably done by constructing the identity of the state, and here, the discussion of my second point of positioning the state takes place.

The required fundamental construct is the one which provides legitimacy for the state to govern. This is done by constructing and construing the state as the only one who has authority. By having authority, it has no reason for the people to doubt its position as the knowledge producer. Such logic corresponds to Foucault’s argument, as I have mentioned above in the theoretical frameworks chapter, that power and knowledge are inseparable. The possession of authority leads to the legitimization in producing knowledge and, vice versa, i.e. by producing knowledge, the state possesses a more authoritative role. The following passage exemplifies what is meant.

*Extract 3: Kompas, 15 April 1966, “Rally in Lapangan Banteng”*

1 On Friday morning, in Lapangan Banteng, the Jakarta citizens, particularly Indonesians with
2 Tionghoa descent, in the Loyalty Rally, will declare their conscience and determination towards the
3 government of the Republic of Indonesia. This rally is supported by Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan
4 Bangsa (LPKB) and the Front Pancasila, and has received an approval from Foreign Minister Adam
5 Malik, who was deign giving a speech.

The passage above constructs the government as the authority who gives the “approval” (line 4) and the one to whom, the Tionghoa should declare their loyalty to (line 2). The possession of authority is also reinforced by student activists who

“stand for supporting president’s mandate to Lieutenant General Soeharto to take any actions for the sake of government security and stability as well as to encourage government to take over foreign domination in economic field that is highly associated to proletariats’ life”\(^{15}\).

---

\(^{15}\) Kompas, 15 April 1966, “Indonesians with Tionghoa Descendant Loudly Protest PRC”
Consequently, the way the news treats the state legitimizes the state to produce knowledge, especially about Tionghoa, the process of which, I will elaborate in the next section. Furthermore, the state is not only positioned as a knowledge-producer but also some other positions, which are ambivalent to each another. For instance, as an authority, the state seems to be *powerless in maintaining social order*. As we can see from the *Extract 1* above, “the tension between the haves and the poor” (line 10) that affects to raise “prejudice and racism” (line 10) against the Tionghoa is caused by the Tionghoa themselves who are portrayed as the ones having “a great role in economy”. In this extract, the state explicitly embraces its position as a powerless entity when it comes to controlling the social upheaval and throws away its responsibility towards the Tionghoa, regarding them as the ones causing the economic inequality. Apart from victim blaming, such discourse orients the social inequality as a by-product of ethnic clashes instead of class conflicts.

There seems to be a certain kind of consistency in defining the social upheaval caused by the Tionghoa economy domination, as shown in *Extract 4* below. Such logic, in consequence, leads to the conclusion that the anti-Tionghoa riots occur as a natural response to the social and economic inequality (line 4-5). In such a circumstance, the state then constructs another identity as being a *protector* who takes control in the chaotic situation (line 6-8), thus finding a way to embrace its authorities again.


1 Protest rallies in Tandjungkarang and Telukbetung turned violent by targeting the Tionghoa’s shops.
2 […]. By riding trucks, the student protestors went to the Tionghoa school Hoa Lien, and expelled and burnt books. The rally then head to the Telukbetung city, destroying glasses of shops as well burning vehicles. […] The buoyant and unbearable anger of the students was especially caused by the obtrusive price increases done by the Tionghoa traders, who were majority in this area. In regards to this protest, Colonel Oemar Ibrhoni instructed the entire state and the private institutions, political parties, student organisations, and people in general, to maintain security and to keep peace. The security officers will be assertive to those who try break the rules or fail to follow the instructions.”

The role as protector is then expanded, by constructing the state in its *parental* or *patronizing* role, which appears in the ways in which the state asks the people to stop racism and discrimination against the Tionghoa, as if they have no role in the cause. In the *Extract 5* below, a high army official further cites the religious values for arguing on racial discrimination.
On the disparity between Tionghoa descendant and “genuine” Indonesian citizens, the senior army further emphasizes that religion forbids racial discrimination, which is shown in the first principle of Pancasila, stating that a Divinity that is an ultimate unity. He continues saying that we do not recognise anything that identifies as the so-called minority. Instead, according to this four-star general, there are only Indonesian citizens and non-Indonesian citizens, according to Sumpah Pemuda [Youth Pledge] for being collective in nation and language.

Along similar lines, in different news, the LPKB seems to defend the Tionghoa by saying, “Indonesian citizen with foreign descendant, especially Tjina descendant, is part of our body [nation]”\(^{16}\). However, this is in contrast, to the fact that stereotyping and stigmatizing against the Tionghoa are dominantly addressed by the state, in all the news content that I observed.

What we can conclude is that, the state embraces multiple identities, depending on the situation. Fundamentally, the state is positioned as the authorities, which brings about a certain amount of legitimacy to be a knowledge producer, especially in defining and interpreting an issue and/or a social event. However, when the role to be responsible is demanded, for instance in the social conflict, the state becomes powerless. Then, the state conveniently becomes the protector in the social turmoil, by embracing a parental role to educate the people about how to behave towards their fellow citizens. In the end, in such multiple-identities, the ways, in which the state always seems to be in a beneficial position in all situations, can be seen as a consistent pattern of how news texts position it.

**6.2.2. Desired-Self of Tionghoa**

The identity of Tionghoa is constructed by assigning the subjects to possess certain characteristics. In general, there are two major ideas of how the Tionghoa are demanded to be: being assimilated, and not being or dissociated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The function of both the identities is an abstraction to propagate and cultivate the desired-self of the Tionghoa. In this study, I have used the term “desired-self” as a concept that that can be understood as follows: social identity is not something that individuals choose, rather, it is chosen, it is desired, and will be desirable after all. To illustrate this, in the following section, I will discuss what specificities of the self are desired and how such desire is being performed. To begin with, the desired-self for not being PRC will be previously focused.

\(^{16}\) Kompas, 19 October 1966, “Foreign Descendant Citizens are Part of Our Body”
The most common pattern in the news talking about the Tionghoa, especially in the 1966, was the intention to classify the Tionghoa into categories: WNA Tjina/Tjina Asing (Tionghoa with Chinese citizenship) and WNI (keturunan) Tjina/Tionghoa (Tionghoa with Indonesian citizenship) as well as the less-discussed category, “stateless”, for those Tionghoa who lost their citizenship during the period of the Old Order. The reason why such categorisation can be said to be an intention is because, in almost all the news that I observed, the strain between WNA Tjina (henceforth: Chinese) and WNI Tionghoa (henceforth: Tionghoa) appears as a repetition both in the rhetorical strategy and language-use. It seems like the relation between these two categories is arbitrary. The self of the Tionghoa is defined and constructed upon the definition of the Chinese, and vice versa. As such, there is no meaning of being Tionghoa without the meaning of being Chinese. The way in which the Tionghoa and the Chinese gain their identity, is done, at first, by being classified, as is explicitly shown in the following extracts.


1 Mayor of Semarang Lt. Col. Suparno decided to mark the foreign descendant residences, especially foreign Tjina residences in Semarang. Lt. Col. Suparno explained to Antara that such markings aim to clearly the distinction between WNI keturunan Tjina [Tionghoa] and Tjina Asing [Chinese]. The marking should be applied as following: WNI keturunan Tjina have to install their houses with a sign board on the walls, applying white text on a black background, while for Tjina Asing have to apply white text on a red background.


1 Authorities in Manado, with the assistance from the youth groups, installed marker at residences of those involved in the Communist Party and the Tjina people. Tjina’s residences were marked “PRC”, communist people marked “ex-communists”, and those who are unassertive [referring to the stateless] were marked as “X”.

In a Foucauldian sense, the classification of social subjects requires a discourse or a systematic way of thinking about a topic (Hodges, 2015: 53). This means that, to classify individuals as “Chinese” or “Tionghoa” requires a “discourse of nationality”, in which it “provides a set of assumptions, explanations, and expectations” and “governs the way the topic can be discussed” (Hodges, 2015: 54). This implies that the certain understanding of nationalism “rules for what can, and cannot be said” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12) while discussing the topics about the in-group and out-group. Furthermore, classification is followed by an intention to identify. The ways in which the Tionghoa and the Chinese have been identified is shown in the news,
seeking for number of Chinese in Jakarta\textsuperscript{17}. Such gesture is then, shown again ten years later in the news, which reports “a pilot project of registering foreign or non-\textit{pribumi} [native] people”\textsuperscript{18}. Both news stories show the one way in which power works over the population: by producing knowledge about them (Foucault, 1995). In a Foucauldian notion, producing knowledge then does not only function to identify and then create the subject of Tionghoa and Chinese, but also to inject subjects a sense of being known, or being monitored.

Although there is no sufficient information in both \textit{Extract 6} and \textit{Extract 7} above, from a historical context, we know what clime bases such texts. It was the political tension between Indonesia and the PRC in the Old Order, then crystallized in the New Order followed by suspending the diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967, which was a direct result of the communist cleansing in 1965. Chinese people and the PRC, in such a situation, were therefore construed as negative, as the ones that were potential threats to the Indonesian unity and sovereignty, as the ones who the Tionghoa should not become. Not being Chinese or not being associated to the PRC is the fundamental idea of being Tionghoa. Therefore, the desired-self of the Tionghoa is defined through not being Chinese, or PRC.

The desire to not be Chinese or PRC is wished to be performed, both in the cultural and the political aspect. In the cultural aspect, for instance, by not being Chinese is meant to be disconnecting with the ancestral culture, specifically by not “practicing ancestral traditional faith” (see \textit{Extract 2}). Here in \textit{Extract 8} the wish to be dissociated with PRC was stated by the Tionghoa themselves.

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

1 Tionghoa-descendant Indonesians in Sukabumi asserted that they are Indonesian citizens who believe in only one motherland and nation of Indonesia. It was stated then they do not want to be associated to the so-called “ancestral land”. Therefore, they wish the society in general to not associate the WNI Tionghoa with PRC anymore. […] Further, it is necessary for the Tionghoa descendants to be more integrated as well assimilated in the life of country and Indonesian society. Also, they need to eliminate the attitude of being exclusive, ignorant, opportunist, and other traits which can inhibit the integration process.

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Kompas, 30 December 1966, “How Many Number of Foreign Tjina in Jakarta?”}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Kompas, 27 March 1976, “Re-Registering Foreign People Hasn’t Been Planned Yet”}
\end{flushright}
The pressure to be dissociated makes more sense if we consider how the Chinese and the PRC have always been associated with all the negative features. To begin the illustration, see how the Chinese and the PRC are constructed by being given attribution. Being demonised by being written as “Tjina Komunis” [Communist China]19, in which, ‘communist’ is considered as the worst enemy in Indonesia, PRC is seen as villain who endeavours “to provoke”20, “to insult Indonesians”21, “to recruit stooges”22, “to intervene Indonesian domestic politics”23 and “to generate racism in order to degrade Indonesian international reputation”24. Moreover, the following text indicates that the PRC is not only committing a crime (by being illegal migrants), but also keeps persisting to not stop finding a new way to do it:

The prevention against smuggling of Hoakiau25 (migrant Cina) to Indonesia will be improved. […] It is now difficult for Hokiau to sneak in by using obsolete methods. However, it is predicted that they will use new methods26.

The point is that, there is a constant pattern of how the PRC is defined and constructed in which, all meanings are directed to emphasis the risk of being destroyed if “we let the foreigner citizens dominate our economy and other fields”27. Such negative portrayals of PRC then justify the “banning of Tionghoa schools with the reasons of security and unfitting with Pancasila”28, “banning the Tionghoa newspapers with the reason of keeping the revolution going on”29, “gun shooting towards the PRC’s embassy by what so-called progressive revolutionary youths”30, or “disconnecting the line-telephone of Tjina or alike and instead giving it for Indonesians who have patriotic duty”31. Critically, the point that needs to be highlighted here is that function of demonizing PRC is not only to justify, but more importantly, also to give legitimization to the state to govern with the reasons to maintain and protect the society.

---

19 Kompas, 23 December 1966, “PRC is Challenging”
20 Kompas, 18 April 1966, “Salute for Indonesians with Tionghoa ‘Descendant’”
22 Kompas, 19 November 1966, “No Doubt Being Stooges” and Kompas, 19 October 1966, “General Suharto and Assimilation”
23 Kompas, 2 May 1966, “Indonesian with Tionghoa ‘Descendant’ Condemn PRC”
24 Kompas, 19 October 1966, “General Suharto and Assimilation”
25 “Hoa Kiau” literally means overseas Chinese. This news intended to refer to Chinese from China but used imprecise term. Although rarely used, however, it is considered neutral as the term “Tionghoa”.
27 Kompas, 30 May 1966, “General Nasution: Make Them 100% WNI”
29 Kompas, 1 September 1966, “PWI Urges to Shutdown 8 Tionghoa Newspapers” and Kompas, 12 September 1966, “PWI on Tionghoa Newspapers Closure”
30 Kompas, 10 February 1966, “Shooting at the PRC’s Embassy is Not Racism”
31 Kompas, 1 November 1966, “Official Suggestion to Disconnect Tjina’s Telephone Line”
Furthermore, the present material seems to suggest that the Tionghoa are not just demanded for “not being PRC” but also for “being anti-PRC”. The Tionghoa need to take certain actions and behaviours that are considered as Indonesia-oriented, otherwise they will be perceived as “Tjina citizens, in which, this will victimize the Tionghoa themselves” (see Extract 1, line 11-13). Many news articles have shown the ways in which the Tionghoa have attempted for being anti-PRC. Here is one example:

Around 20,000 WNI Tionghoa in the rally of loyalty insisted government to suspend diplomatic relationship with PRC. In front of the Embassy of PRC, they enthusiastically yelled “destroy PRC, repelling PRC’s ambassador, long live Indonesia and ABRI [Indonesian army]”.32

Nevertheless, Extract 9 below does not only show an anti-PRC sentiment but further summarizes everything that the Tionghoa are supposed to be.


1 Indonesian citizens with Tionghoa ethnicity attended the rally of loyalty declaration towards
2 Indonesia. […] They strongly protested the PRC’s intervene towards Indonesia’s domestic politics
3 as well as their involvement in communist coup and their Beijing Radio broadcast that hurt the
4 Indonesians as well as the Tionghoa descendants themselves. Hereinafter, they have a strong will to
5 defend Indonesia to death from the threat of whichever countries, including PRC. They agree and
6 support the action to shut down the Tionghoa schools and organisations forever. They also show
7 happiness in and consent towards the idea of returning the foreign Tionghoa back to PRC. […]
8 “Although we happen to have Tionghoa blood, we do not have any solidarity with PRC,” they stated.
9 […] They demanded PRC people in Indonesia to show politeness and follow all Indonesian
10 government policies as that is how a guest is supposed to behave when visiting somebody’s house.

It is obvious that the Tionghoa are required to be anti-PRC, by declaring their loyalty to Indonesia (line 1-2), by defending the country to death (line 4-5) and by denying their cultural connection with the PRC (line 7-8). Nonetheless, the more intriguing part is the depiction of Tionghoa’s “agreement”, “support”, and “happiness” (line 5-7) towards the discriminative policies against their community. Such depiction, arguably, has two functions in the discourse: first, it reflects the survival-oriented strategy of the Tionghoa; and second, the text is the projection of the state towards the Tionghoa. While the former shows that there were some Tionghoa who were actively engaged in constructing their identities by disassociating themselves from “the other Tionghoa”, the latter shows the power that the state had in assigning “the Tionghoa representatives” to reproduce the state version of the desired Tionghoa identity.

32Kompas, 11 April, 1966, “20,000 WNI Tionghoa Demand PRC Diplomatic Relation Disconnection”
The projection about such desired-self can be seen in Extract 10 below, in which the Tionghoa are demanded to have certain identity while being categorized. As the consequences of this categorisation, those who wish to be considered as a part of the “Indonesian body of nation” must assimilate themselves (line 3). In return, they will be free from “all forms of discrimination and exclusion” (line 4) and they will not be restricted in the economy (line 6).


1. In solving the Tjina problem, LPKB [Institute for the Guidance of National Unity] has taken a prudent decision to have a bold separation between the WNI keturunan Tjina and WNA Tjina in the entire aspects of life. WNI keturunan Tjina have to be completely assimilated to the Indonesian body of nation, and all forms of discrimination and exclusion between the “original” and “non-original”, should therefore be eliminated. WNA Tjina must be excluded and decreased in number. Also, the economic role of WNA Tjina has to be gradually reduced.

Thus, the second form of the desired-self of Tionghoa takes place: By being assimilated. Indeed, the assimilation policy is the New Order program to solve the so-called “Masalah Cina” or “Chinese Problem”. As such, being an unassimilated Tionghoa is considered to be a problem. However, as described in the foregoing chapter, the assimilation policy was more likely not designed to integrate the Tionghoa in the receiving society. Rather, it was utilized to symbolically construct and essentialize the distinctness of the Tionghoa (Ang, 2001; Chua, 2004). Such view seems to be true as it is reflected in some news aimed to propagate the assimilation program but ended up stigmatizing and exposing the Tionghoa distinctness. The stereotype as economic animals, and as an exclusive ethnic group, for instance, were the two most-used stigmatizing labels given to the Tionghoa (see Extract 2). Indeed, stigmatizing, as Chua (2004) points out, is a means to normalise the anti-Tionghoa sentiments, as well as to rationalise the assimilation program. In addition, the urgency of assimilation is constructed within two-fold: for the Tionghoa themselves, and for the Indonesian society in general. For the former, it mostly stresses the risk of not being the desired-self of Tionghoa, as is indicated by the following text:

[...] About WNI Tionghoa, General Sarwo Edhie stated that if they want to be a good WNI, they are not supposed to isolate themselves from Indonesian society. [...] If they do not pay attention to this, they will be attacked by people anger.” 33

Nevertheless, for the society in general, the unassimilated Tionghoa triggers the instability of social security, economic inequality, and racism (see Extract 1). Likewise, the unassimilated

---

Tionghoa is also framed as the one who “can be employed to channelling foreign power”\textsuperscript{34}. Thus, the discourse seems to suggest that all the problems are associated with the unassimilated Tionghoa and this is why, the “Masalah Cina” was a useful instrument to “ethnicise society” (Chua, 2004). In other words, to be assimilated, as the desired-self of the Tionghoa, is the way to solve the problem.

However, the idea of assimilation seems to be ambiguous. It seems like that such idea was designed to be unclear and inconsistent. For example, the Tionghoa were stigmatized as the dominators of the economy who causes the social inequality. To solve this problem, oddly, the Tionghoa were projected to support the country’s economic growth, by which it essentializes the stigma (see Extract 11).


\begin{itemize}
\item 1 2½ millions Tionghoa have a great potential in the field of economics and education. If such potency is effectively used, it can accelerate the process to benefit the society. Explained by Taufiq Ahmad Hardjanegara of LPKB, this view is a part of the mission of “the Lost Child Returns”. This mission is aimed to rehabilitate the Tionghoa for having the Pancasilaist soul. […] The indoctrination program held for 23 days in 35 cities in Central Java managed to “touch the heart” of Tionghoa to declare their loyalty, according to Sumpah Pemuda [Youth Pledge]. The chairman of LPKN, Captain Sindhunata said that the assimilation process depends on the Tionghoa themselves and society in general.
\end{itemize}

Such ambiguity was shown on another occasion when the Tionghoa were encouraged to be the leaders. In fact, from the historical background, we know that the Tionghoa could not be involved in other sectors but the economic. And it seems to be true, since being a leader means merely means being economic animal:

The Tionghoa have to be leader too. Since the Tionghoa commonly work in the economic sector, they have to cope with economic depression by pioneering the price decreases.\textsuperscript{35}

Eventually, the Tionghoa has always been heavily associated, and then essentialized, with their economical role. This “fixed identity” is then seen as a prerequisite for being accepted to be a part of the “in-group”. “The promise of the Tionghoa in an taking active role by solving the country’s economic issue” is shown as the commitment of being a part of the nation.\textsuperscript{36} As such, the idea of being patriotic for Tionghoa was narrowly defined by involving in the economic

\textsuperscript{34} Kompas, 19 October 1966, “General Suharto and Assimilation

\textsuperscript{35} Kompas, 16 April 1966, “The Demonstration of Tionghoa’s Loyalty: We Don’t Want to Be Exclusive”

\textsuperscript{36} Kompas, 11 April, 1966, “20,000 WNI Tionghoa Demand PRC Diplomatic Relation Disconnection”
sector only. Neglecting such desired-self will be considered as ignorance thus causing social inequality that leads to “the tension between the haves and the poor”, by which the “prejudice and racism” against the Tionghoa themselves is triggered. In such a condition, they will be considered the same as “Tjina citizens” (see Extract 1).

Once again, the idea of assimilation was seemingly designed to be unclear and inconsistent. The one that had been always clear and consistent was the Tionghoa’s dependency on the state. Even though the assimilation process is said to depend on the Tionghoa themselves (Extract 1), the state decides. The demonstrations of the Tionghoa’s loyalty, indoctrination program, and Pancasila examination have been the routines that appeared in the news. All of this not only reflects the way in which Tionghoa’s loyalty and nationalism are always being questioned, but also these routines were projected to narrate about whom the Tionghoa should be dependent on. That is the state. The New Order. The one that has the authority to govern and produce knowledge.

6.2.3. Struggle of Meaning Making: Intertextuality

As I hope to study the construction of identity in its historical context, this part will examine the “historicity of texts” (Fairclough, 1992) through the three decades of the New Order. Specifically, since the analyses above are mostly based on data from 1966, this part focuses on data from 1976 and 1986. This part, by exploring “the propagation of truth claims and narratives” that form the basis for disciplining Tionghoa (Hodges, 2015: 53), aims to probe the extent to which the discourse achieves stability. To that end, I will use the notion of intertextuality to examine the way key words, topics, and arguments were intertextually linked across news reports.

To begin with, I will sample news reports from Tempo that have a strong connection to the prior discourse of the negative portrayal of the Chinese and the PRC. However, such depiction is now linked to the Tionghoa. In general, the representation of Tionghoa in Tempo has been limited to the topic of economics, law, and crime. For every 33 news reports of corpus data from Tempo, there are 15 news reports that represent crimes related to the Tionghoa. The acts of crime were mostly of the nature of illegal money making such as business frauds and gambling business. Indeed, this is somewhat reminiscent of the Tionghoa’s stereotyped image as an economic animal engaged in illegitimate profit-making businesses in the colonial era (see
These kind of news reports reflect the notion of intertextuality by virtue of "transforming the past—existing conventions and prior texts—into the present" (Fairclough, 1992: 85). Further, such selected repetitive portrayals support identification of ethnic Tionghoa with shady businesses.

Moreover, certain understanding of nationalism or patriotism is deployed to evaluate social phenomena. In a case about fake passport business, for example, Tempo narrates the correlation between the perpetrator’s naturalized citizenship and patriotic duty: “Instead of being a good citizen, he is making trouble by producing fake passport.” The utilization of nationalism idea, which “provide[s] a framework for organizing meaning, guiding actions, and legitimating positions” (Hodges, 2015: 53), leads the way a topic should be discussed. As it was reflected in the news in 1966, a similar understanding of nationalism and manner of utilizing it are re-contextualized in a new setting (Bauman and Briggs cited in Hodges, 2015: 43).

Arguably, the discourse of nationalism is managed as a basis of social exclusion that postulates a fundamental determination between the in-group and out-group. This is reflected in the topics that discuss illegal immigrants from China and the stateless Tionghoa. Moreover, such nationalistic attitude embodies in the discourse that polarizes population between “pribumi” (native) versus “non-pribumi” (non-native). The treatment for the following news report, on the topic of economics, exemplifies the way things are discussed: the dichotomy of conglomerates into “pribumi” and “non-pribumi.” This news discusses the economic activities of the big business players in Indonesia. While the Tionghoa are stereotyped as wealthy having privileges from the government, a few “native” businessmen have managed to compete: “Rarely a native pioneering business in the upheaval time is able to survive like Achmad Bakrie.” Below, such dichotomy is performed in another context:


1 In the development of national economic in Indonesia, there is lack of cooperation and integration between pribumi [native] and keturunan [non-native] entrepreneurs. According to Governor Jakarta R. Soeprapto, it is therefore important for Hipmi Jaya to play an active role in identifying its

---

37 Tempo, 15 February 1986, “Mr. Wong, Mr. Oen, in the Same Job”
39 Tempo, 22 November 1986, “Comfortable at the Government’s Pocket Slot”
40 HimpunanPengusaha Muda Indonesian (Hipmi): Indonesian Young Entrepreneur Association
In this extract, the young entrepreneurs are not only contrasted between “pribumi” and “non-pribumi,” but also are informed about the importance of “identifying” Tionghoa in their circle (line 3-5). Also, from this extract, the “actual” meaning of assimilation shares the similar meaning from the discourse in 1966, that is, by merely being an economic animal. Ultimately, discourse of nativeness has been a normative way that “run[s] particular ways of drawing upon conventions and texts into routines, and to naturalizes them” (Fairclough, 1992: 85). This can be argued that the certain understanding of nationalism has been an established moral source that is used as a technology of power in managing the population (Foucault, 2003: 242).

Another established discourse is embodied in the construct of “Masalah Cina” or “Chinese Problem.” As it has been previously elucidated, “Masalah Cina” was a useful instrument to “ethnicise society”. In the next phase, this is further managed as a basis of social understanding that frames problems that are coming from the Tionghoa themselves. To think critically, the adoption of term “masalah” (problem) itself has actually been constructing an essentialization of Tionghoa’s presence with problem. This is, logically, to emphasize the urgency of the assimilation program. One article in Tempo, for instance, encourages the assimilation idea to overcome the issue of social segregation. Additionally, the reason to assimilate is grounded on, again, the idea of nationalism and Pancasila, as shown in the following extract.

Extract 13. Kompas, 24 August 1976, “Governor Marah Halim: WNI have to participate, assimilate, and integrate”

1. Governor Marah Halim wish toward WNI keturunanasing (foreign descendants) in North Sumatera to participate, assimilate, and integrate with pribumi [native] people. […] Cina, Arab, and India
2. descendant citizens are requested to synchronise the attempt to develop, nurture, and defend Pancasila State of Indonesia Republic. […] Such a wish is specifically aimed at WNI turunan Cina
3. [Tionghoa descendant], especially those who work in business and trade sector.

By stating that the assimilation of Tionghoa (and other foreign descendants) aimed to defend Pancasila, the Tionghoa presence is problematized as naturally unfitted with the nation. In other words, such logic wants to say that the Tionghoa will be compatible with Pancasila and

41Tempo, 1 November 1986, “Assimilation is Important, Isn’t it?”
Indonesia in general when they get assimilated. The essentialization of Tionghoa’s presence as problem then has been internalized in the daily spoken and written language, which is even stated by the Tionghoa themselves:


1. Masalah Cina in Indonesia is not as serious as in Malaysia or Singapore. Dr. Lie argues that the
2. race problem is a serious political problem in South East Asian countries that just got independence
3. after the Second World War. On close relationship between Tionghoa and those in power, Dr. Lie
4. says that it is normal for minority to survive, because it is the authority who can let the minority
5. live and die”.

Extract 14 not only show how language has been internalized, but also metaphorically reveals that the state is acknowledged as the one who rules over Tionghoa individuals (line 4-5). This logic is intertextually linked to the prior discourse in 1966, which also pointed out the determining role of the state. From intertextual perspective, the way such a text drawn upon the prior text can be argued that the discourse on Tionghoa within the frame of “Masalah Cina” has been relatively stable. In the end, the examination of intertextuality in discourse shows the connections across texts in different context of time. Such connections “create understandings, establish relations, construct identities, and generally yield social formations” (Hodges, 2105: 53).

7. CONCLUSION: BEING DISCIPLINED IS DESIRABLE

This study has been an attempt to shed light on how and in what sense power produces the disciplined Tionghoa. Considering that disciplining process is performed through identity construction, this study pays attention to the discourse on Tionghoa in the news media. Previous studies on constructions of Tionghoa identity have been conducted by investigating and analysing the social and political context (e.g. Afif, 2012; Ang, 2001; Budiman, 2005; Heryanto, 19998a; Chua, 2004; Hoon, 2012; Purdey, 2003; Turner and Allen, 2007). In such settings, those studies have investigated the formation Tionghoa identity and revealed the dominant role of the state in such a process. However, there is lack of exploration that, first, can rationalize how certain identities have become hegemonic, and second, frames identity construction as a technology of power utilized in disciplining Tionghoa.
This study, therefore, differs from the previous ones in two manners. Firstly, in acknowledging language as a medium wherein power can implant its domination both through, and over it. I put forward the claim that the racial-social order is produced and maintained not only because of structural factors like economy and politic, but also it is fundamentally caused by the cultural factor that is invested and manifested in language. Secondly, as a consequence, it differs in utilizing news reports as empirical data that is believed to contribute in shaping the identity construction. As the analysis has attempted to demonstrate, the news media mediated certain discourses that constituted certain socio-cognitive aimed at disciplining Tionghoa.

Nevertheless, the link between the construction of Tionghoa identity and how the Tionghoa being disciplined has not been elucidated yet. To that end, in this concluding chapter the main findings from this study will be presented in order to connect that missing link as well as to answer the research questions. First, I will sum up the findings resulted from the analysis to answer the first question of how the identity of Tionghoa is constructed in the Indonesian New Order news media. Second, I will illuminate the findings with the theoretical framework applied in this study in order to elucidate what means of identity construction and discursive strategies deployed in disciplining Tionghoa.

As this study has shown, the Tionghoa is firmly constructed as the economic animal who dominates the country’s economy and causes socio-economic inequality. Along with other constructed stereotypical traits, such as an exclusive and an unfaithful social group, the Tionghoa’s visibility is solely exposed by emphasizing their ethnic features while discussing any social issues. The way in which the ethnic feature of Tionghoa being kept visible, creates the “binary form of representation” that differentiates them from the majority (Hall, 1997: 219). Such a “difference signifies” (Hall, 1997: 219) the Tionghoa as an accentuated social group who is narrowly identified by its mere ethnic-category, coming with its embedded-constructed racial features. Thus, such a manipulated-ethnic identity speaks on behalf of the Tionghoa.

In the next stage, such an identity is further problematized as an undesired one, and therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the Tionghoa to have become “not too Tionghoa”. The problematization of Tionghoa identity is invested in the language by propagating the credo so-called “Masalah Cina” or “Chinese Problem”. This credo is then internalised in the discourse by which allocates “a set of assumptions, explanations, and expectations” (Hodges, 2015: 54) in essentializing identification of Tionghoa’s presence with problem. Therefore, to abolish the
problem of their identity, the Tionghoa must adhere another identity that is desired by the one who has authority to define and problematize their identity, which is, the state. To put in other words, for being accepted in the society the Tionghoa needs to meet the requirement to be the desired-self. Because, as Foucault asserts, “subject of discourse cannot be outside discourse because it must be subjected to discourse” (cited in Hall, 1997: 55).

Subsequently, the specificities of the desired-self can be known from the discourse. According to that, it seems plausible to claim that the desired-self of Tionghoa is projected for being disassociated from the PRC and being assimilated. While in the former the projection of the Tionghoa is demanded to be something through not being and anti-PRC, the latter is implicitly construed by plotting the Tionghoa to embrace the patriotic duty to solve the social and the economic issues of the country.

In pursuing such a desired-self, the Tionghoa is situated in the arbitrary relationship with both the PRC and the state. Within such a relationship, these three entities obtain their respective identities by being placed next to another. By being juxtaposed with PRC, the Tionghoa gains the concept of desired-self and the state gains its legitimacy to govern with the reason to protect the society from any external threat. The function of the PRC-self in providing meaning for other identities can be interpreted to play a role of what Laclau-Mouffe call as “nodal point”, that is, “a privilege signed around which other signs are ordered” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 26).

Not only text, according to discourse theory perspective, macro-level of social and political context is also believed to influence the construction of identity (Fairclough, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Hall, 1997; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Wodak, 2001, 2004, 2008; van Dijk, 2015). Therefore, the fact that this discourse occurred in the regime of military dictatorship, it characterizes how “truth” is produced, understood, and disseminated. By utilizing the existing anti-Tionghoa sentiment and the nationalistic atmosphere, the New Order emerged as the only authority capable of telling the “truth” by which the situation paves a way to the cultural formation of the state-centrism. Consequently, “truth” production is either dominated or approval-needed by the state. Then, the “truth” must be understood under the logical and moral framework derived from certain understanding of nationalism. Disseminating the “truth”, finally, is done by directing, legitimizing, and amplifying the state’s version of “truth”. Considering such a circumstance, we can certainly see why such a discourse has been able to
achieve the stability proven by the way topics and arguments were intertextually linked across news reports in different time.

Having clarified how the Tionghoa is constructed, the following addresses the explanation on how the disciplining process is undertaken. The analysis chapter above has given an illustration of Tionghoa identity obtained, at first, by being classified and identified. In a Foucauldian sense, both classification and identification are the act of instilling knowledge that defines and produces subjects (Foucault, 1995; Hall, 1997). While being classified implies that the possibilities of embracing alternative identities have been already curbed, being identified leads to the sense of being known that enables the conditions of surveillance (Foucault, 1995; Mendieta, 2002). This supports previous findings from Minghua and Ingketria (2006) who depicts that "knowing what the majority thinks of them [the Tionghoa] as a minority somehow leads to self-doubt and feelings of insecurity”.

Furthermore, the Tionghoa is not only classified by being separated from the Chinese, but they are also classified by being separated from the other ethnic groups, by which they are given label as “WNI Keturunan (Asing)” [(foreign) descendant citizen]. Arguably, the intention to classify and identify the Tionghoa in a specific social category can be seen as special treatment to accentuate their presence, their differences. Here I would like to add Chua’s claim (2004: 466) arguing that the Tionghoa differences “were kept visible by discriminating against them”. I suggest that such differences were kept visible not only by discriminating, but also to discriminate them.

The politics of difference, indeed, is a useful power resource. It is believed that “group-differentiated domination and oppression are central to politic” (Young cited in Tebble, 2002: 260). One of the New Order’s social and legal practices in differentiating the Tionghoa is through the process of othering. Heryanto (1998a) argues that othering the Chinese takes several forms, and categorizing Chinese as “non-pribumi” (non-native) is one very familiar practice of othering. Heryanto (1998a: 100) further continues that, “after years of such disciplining, the Indonesian Chinese, especially the younger generations, learned to internalize and reproduce these labels”. The role of state discourses in shaping social identity by the process of othering is also argued by Riaño and Wastl-Walter (2006: 2) who claim that narratives of the “self” and “others” have the function of maintaining and reinforcing the idea of a nation state. The interest to racialize differentiation in such a manner shares similar
understanding with Foucault notion of biopolitics, who views that manner as “a technology in modern state that wishes to maintain its sovereign power” (Rasmussen, 2011). That is why assimilation policy intended to ease the differences was not designed to be succeed, because “success would have undermined the interest of its own sponsors” (Heryanto, 2008).

Ethnicity, thus, is managed as a basis of social exclusion, that “postulate a fundamental conflict between society and its outside” (Rasmussen, 2011: 39). In the state racism, ethnic classification creates a fiction of the Tionghoa as others, and is deployed to identify them “as being outside of the population, whether they are to be found inside or outside the boundaries of the state, and thus licenses the killing of these people, or simply letting them die” (Kelly, 2004: 254). Managing the population is therefore the politics of live and let die (Foucault, 2003). The authoritative role of the state in governing in such a manner is reflected in the news when a Tionghoa stated: “It is the authority who can let the minority live and die”42.

I will now depart from this passage to further provide arguments that can be advanced to support my concluding premise. On the basis of the analysis, it seems to suggest that “projects of docility” (Foucault, 1995: 136) of the Tionghoa is commenced by defining and identifying them, first of all, through their ethnic differences. Such differences are then problematized as an undesired one, thus essentialising identification of their ethnicity with problem. Then, since they are being differentiated based on the ethnicity, the Tionghoa has nowhere to escape from such a constructed-identity.Because, the problem is the ethnicity itself, not how they behave, nor how hard they attempt to be the desired-self. In such a situation, there is no reason for the Tionghoa to possess a feeling of being accepted. Rather, it rises the feeling of undesirable-self.

Furthermore, a stable and routine discourse has been a guidance for the “truth” of the desired-self. The Tionghoa has been intensively and manipulatively told to pursue such a desired-self as a prerequisite for being accepted. However, instead of avoiding or escaping, the Tionghoa adhere the guidance — because a subject cannot exist outside the discourse. The only thing the Tionghoa able to opt is, to let them guided by quest for the desired-self.

Nevertheless, such a desired-self was seemingly designed to be ambiguous. And here comes the point: That ambiguity of discourse needs to be seen as a discursive strategic that put the

42 Kompas, 14 September 1976, “Dr. Lie TekTjeng: Education Can Solve the Integration Problem Between Cina-Pribumi”
Tionghoa to be heavily dependent on the state. Strategic ambiguity is meant where language is “intentionally deployed in ambiguous ways in order to accomplish organisational goals” (Eisenberg cited in Fløttum, 2010: 992). The goal, in this context, is Tionghoa dependency on the state.

Being the desired-self is, therefore, the identity they chose to survive. This study has led to conclude that the scheme of disciplining Tionghoa is performed by implanting the projection of the desired-self of Tionghoa through the discourse. Thus, being disciplined have become desirable for the Tionghoa themselves.
References


Newspapers, Magazine, Websites


### News Reports of Tempo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Original Title</th>
<th>English Translation (by author)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>3-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Susahnya Mengusir</td>
<td>It’s Difficult to Repel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>3-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Liki-liki HKS</td>
<td>The Puzzles of HKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>24-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Hks Yang Diusir</td>
<td>Hks Who is Repelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>3-Apr-1976</td>
<td>Pasar, Yes! Pusat Pertokoan, No!</td>
<td>Traditional Market, Yes! Shopping Centre, no!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>8-May-1976</td>
<td>Penggrebekan Sorga Asahan</td>
<td>The Raid of Sorga Asahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>29-May-1976</td>
<td>Menggusur pedagang beras</td>
<td>To Evict the Rice Traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>26-Jun-1976</td>
<td>Tokoh-tokoh swasta berbicara</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs Speak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>10-Jul-1976</td>
<td>Babah Seng, Kuda Dan Kerbau</td>
<td>Babah Seng, Horse and Buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>21-Aug-1976</td>
<td>Peta Narkotia Di Muara Rokan</td>
<td>The Narcotic Map in Muara Rokan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>21-Aug-1976</td>
<td>Yang Galak &amp; Yang Rutin</td>
<td>The Fierce and The Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>6-Nov-1976</td>
<td>Me Lie, Wou Dan Telepon</td>
<td>Me Lie, Wou and Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>27-Nov-1976</td>
<td>Cukong Itu Bebas</td>
<td>The Boss is Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>4-Des-1976</td>
<td>Jumlah Turun, Mutu Naik</td>
<td>Quantity Up, Quality Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>11-Des-1976</td>
<td>Babi Punya Perkara</td>
<td>Pig Has Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>1-Feb-1986</td>
<td>Rambo Jombang</td>
<td>Rambo Jombang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>8-Feb-1986</td>
<td>Se-licin-licinnya Mr. Wong, Terbekuk Juga</td>
<td>Mr. Wong is Slick, He was Caught in the End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>15-Feb-1986</td>
<td>Mr. Wong, Mr. Oen, Sama Saja Kerjanya</td>
<td>Mr. Wong, Mr. Oen, in the Same Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>1-Mar-1986</td>
<td>Mayor Vs Bandar</td>
<td>Mayor vs Croupier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>1-Mar-1986</td>
<td>Tekad si om</td>
<td>The Uncle's Willpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>22-Mar-1986</td>
<td>Korban Operasi Mata Sipit</td>
<td>The Victim of Eyes Surgery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>3-May-1986</td>
<td>Bandar judi tanah sereal</td>
<td>The Gambling Croupier of Tanah Sereal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>10-May-1986</td>
<td>Judi-Judi Gelap Diam-Diam Terapay</td>
<td>Illegal Gambling is Lurking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>24-May-1986</td>
<td>Singkawang cap go meh &amp; kemiskinan</td>
<td>Singkawang, Cap Go Meh, &amp; Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>9-Aug-1986</td>
<td>Kasihan Dia…</td>
<td>Poor him…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>30-Aug-1986</td>
<td>Bau Busuk Dari Dalam Sumur</td>
<td>Rotten Smell from the Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>18-Oct-1986</td>
<td>Akong, si lihai berutang</td>
<td>Akong, the Shrewd Indebtedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>4-Oct-1986</td>
<td>Isu sara di Surabaya</td>
<td>Racial Rumour in Surabaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>25-Oct-1986</td>
<td>Teka-teki Lucy</td>
<td>The Puzzles of Lucy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>1-Nov-1986</td>
<td>Pembauran itu, penting, 'kan</td>
<td>Assimilation is Important, Isn’t it?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>22-Nov-1986</td>
<td>Nyaman di celah kantung pemerintah</td>
<td>Comfortable at the Government’s Pocket Slot”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## News Reports of Kompas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Original Title</th>
<th>English Translation (by author)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>23-Aug-1966</td>
<td>Gerpol Pantjing Rasialisme di Sukabumi</td>
<td>Racism in Sukabumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>24-Sep-1966</td>
<td>60% uang di Indonesia beredar di Djakarta</td>
<td>60% Money in Indonesia Circulated in Jakarta”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>3-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Djendral Suharto dan Assimilasi</td>
<td>General Suharto and Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>14-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Ganti Nama</td>
<td>Name Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>21-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Benarkah WNI keturunan Tionghoa harus daftarkan diri?</td>
<td>Do the WNI Tionghoa Have to Register?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>30-Dec-1966</td>
<td>Berapa Djumlah Tjina Asing di Djakarta</td>
<td>How Many Number of Foreign Tjina in Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Oct-1966</td>
<td>WNI Keturunan asingpun bagian dari tubuh kita</td>
<td>Foreign Descendant Citizens are Part of Our Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Oct-1966</td>
<td>Masalah Tjina</td>
<td>Tjina Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>30-Dec-1966</td>
<td>WNA dilarang berdagang 9 Bahan Pokok</td>
<td>Foreign Citizens are Prohibited to Trade Groceries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>20-Aug-1966</td>
<td>Lulus Udjian Pantjasila</td>
<td>Pass Pancasila Examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>9-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Pendjelasan ttg penutupan Sekolah2 Tionghoa</td>
<td>Explanation on Tionghoa School Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>12-Sep-1966</td>
<td>PWI tentang penutupan koran berhuruf Tionghoa</td>
<td>PWI on Tionghoa Newspapers Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>1-Sep-1966</td>
<td>PWI desak supaja 8 koran Tionghoa ditutup</td>
<td>PWI Urges to Shutdown 8 Tionghoa Newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Rumah2 asing Tjina diberi &quot;penning”</td>
<td>Foreign Tjina Housings Marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Okt-1966</td>
<td>Rumah2nja diberi tanda</td>
<td>The Houses Are Marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>21-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Sebut sadja Bangsa Indonesia</td>
<td>Mr. Wong, Mr. Oen, in the Same Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>18-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Saluut pd Bangsa Indonesia &quot;keturunan&quot; Tionghoa</td>
<td>Salute for Indonesians with Tionghoa ‘Descendant’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>6-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Sekolah2 Tionghoa di Djakarta terlarang</td>
<td>Tionghoa Schools Forbidden in Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>27-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Sekolah2 Asing Tionghoa Djateng dibawah Pengawasam</td>
<td>School of Foreign Tionghoa in Jateng Under Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>25-Aug-1966</td>
<td>Agama melarang diskriminasi kebangsaan</td>
<td>Religion Forbids Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>4-May-1966</td>
<td>Ambil Tindakan Tegas</td>
<td>Take Accesertive Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>23-Dec-1966</td>
<td>Sumber Tertutup Bagi Tjina2</td>
<td>Closed Resources for Tjina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>26-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Surat dari Bandung: Kedjadian Istimewa</td>
<td>Letter from Bandung: Special Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Tak Segan2 Djadi Alat</td>
<td>No Doubt Being Stooges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>12-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Tentang demonstrasi terhadap konsulat RRT</td>
<td>On Demonstration Against PRC’s Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>5-Dec-1966</td>
<td>Tertutup bagi Tjina pendatang</td>
<td>Close for Tjina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>28-Mar-1966</td>
<td>Toko2 Tionghoa djadi sasaran Demonstrasi</td>
<td>Tionghoa Shops Targeted in Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>1-Nov-1966</td>
<td>Usul resmi supaja tilpon2 Tjina ditjabut</td>
<td>Official Suggestion to Disconnect Tjina’s Telephone Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>2-Feb-1966</td>
<td>Warta Daerah</td>
<td>Regional News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>5-May-1966</td>
<td>Warta Daerah</td>
<td>Regional News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>28-Mar-1966</td>
<td>Warta Daerah</td>
<td>Regional News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>26-May-1966</td>
<td>WN RRT Djabar wajib daftarkan dir</td>
<td>PRC’s Citizens Must Register Themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>18-Feb-1976</td>
<td>Ada Kesulitan dalam Pengusiran WNA Ex Hokiu</td>
<td>Difficulties of Repelling Hokiau People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>28-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Baru Saja Turun dari Pesawat Ditodong</td>
<td>Get Robbed After Landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>27-Mar-1976</td>
<td>Belum Ada Rencana Mendaftar Ulang Penduduk Asing</td>
<td>Re-Registering Foreign People Hasn’t Been Planned Yet&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>24-Aug-1976</td>
<td>Gubernur Marah Halim: WNI Agar Berpartisipasi, Berasimilasi, dan Berintegrasi</td>
<td>Governor Marah Halim: WNI have to participate, assimilate, and integrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Feb-1976</td>
<td>Cap Go Meh Pertama Dalam 11 Tahun</td>
<td>The First Cap Go Meh in 11 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>13-May-1976</td>
<td>Di Zaman Kolonial 35,4 Prosen Orang Cina Adalah Pedagang</td>
<td>In the Colonial Era 35.4% Cina is Traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>27-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Ditjen Imigrasi Tidak Ikut Campur dalam Permohonan Pewarganegaraan Orang Asing Lahir di Indonesia</td>
<td>Immigration Officers Has No Responsibility With Citizenship Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Jul-1976</td>
<td>Ditolak, Pakai Nama &quot;Andi&quot;</td>
<td>Refused to Have Name &quot;Andi&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>14-Sep-1976</td>
<td>Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng: Pendidikan akan Bisa Menyelesaikan Masalah Integrasi Cina-Pribumi</td>
<td>Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng: Education Can Solve the Integration Problem Between Cina-Pribumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>9-Jul-1976</td>
<td>HKS Akui Pernah Disiur dari Wilayah RI</td>
<td>HKS Admitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>20-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Jaksa Agung: Diramalkan Kaun Hoa Kiau akan Gunakan Pola Baru untuk Masuki Indonesia</td>
<td>Attorney General: Hoa Kiau Will Use New Way to Enter Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>10-May-1976</td>
<td>Jangan Memakai Isyu Persaingan Pribumi dan Non Pribumi</td>
<td>Don't Escalate The Issue of Pribumi and Non Pribumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>8-Jan-1976</td>
<td>Membeda-bedakan WNI Menghambat Perjoangan Assimilasi</td>
<td>Differentiating WNI Blocks Assimilation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>20-Feb-1976</td>
<td>Menurut Rencana Obat Tradisionil Tiongkok Akan Dilarang Masuk</td>
<td>According to Plan, Traditional Chinese Medicine Will Be Banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>24-Mar-1976</td>
<td>Pedoman Praktis BI tentang Pengertian Pribumi</td>
<td>Practical Guidance of the Definition on Pribumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>2-Mar-1976</td>
<td>Perkara HKS yang Kewarganegaraannya Diragukan Disidangkan Bulan Ini</td>
<td>The HKS' Case Goes to Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>13-Feb-1976</td>
<td>Ternyata Cuma Issue</td>
<td>It Was Just Rumour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>5-Oct-1986</td>
<td>Kesamaan Agama Saja Belum Cukup untuk Asimilasi</td>
<td>Similarity in Religion Is Not Enough to be Assimilated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>3-Jun-1986</td>
<td>Kasus Pencegahan Keberangkatannya 17 WNI</td>
<td>The Case of 17 WNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>12-May-1986</td>
<td>Keturunan Tionghoa Alami Pencairan Budaya</td>
<td>Tionghoa Is Culturally Assimilated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>2-Sep-1986</td>
<td>Masih Kurang, Kerja Sama antara Pengusaha Pribumi dan Keturunan</td>
<td>Lack of Cooperation Between Pribumi and Tionghoa Entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>7-Jul-1986</td>
<td>Pekanbaru-Program KB</td>
<td>Pekanbaru-KB Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tulisan Cina Diterbitkan</td>
<td>Chinese Letters Are Banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>30-Jul-1986</td>
<td>WNI Keturunan Cina tak Diizinkan ke Serawak</td>
<td>WNI Cina Is Not Allowed to Go to Serawak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>20-Jul-1966</td>
<td>Indoktrinasi untuk WNI keturunan asing</td>
<td>Indocrtination for Foreign Descent Indonesians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Jang mau pulang ke RRT pulanglah</td>
<td>Those Who Want Return to PRC, Just Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>20-May-1966</td>
<td>Lebih tjepat pulang lebih baik</td>
<td>The Earlier They Go Home the Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>21-Jun-1966</td>
<td>Exclusivisme dikalangan Keturunan harus dilenjapkan</td>
<td>Exclusivism Among Foreign Descendants Must Be Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>19-Okt-1966</td>
<td>Menpen B.M. Diah: WNI Keturunan asingpun bagian dari tubuh kita</td>
<td>Ministry of Information B.M. Diah: WNI with Foreign Descendants are Part Of Us As Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>15-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Apel Siaga di Lap. Banteng</td>
<td>Rally in Lapangan Banteng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>15-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Bangsa Indonesia &quot;turunan&quot; Tionghoa protes keras RRT</td>
<td>Indonesians with Tionghoa Descendant Loudly Protest PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>2-May-1966</td>
<td>Bangsa Indonesia &quot;keturunan&quot; Tionghoa kutuk RRT</td>
<td>Indonesian with Tionghoa ‘Descendant’ Condemn PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>30-May-1966</td>
<td>Djendral Nasution: Djadikan sebagai WNI 100%</td>
<td>General Nasution: Make Them 100% WNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>10-Feb-1966</td>
<td>Penembakan Konsulat RRT bukan Rasislame</td>
<td>Shooting at the PRC’s Embassy is Not Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Bangsa Indonesia &quot;keturunan&quot; Tionghoa tuntut: Pemuutan Hubungan dengan RRT</td>
<td>Tionghoa Demands: To Break Relationship With PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>11-Apr-1966</td>
<td>20,000 WNI Turunan Tionghoa tuntut tutuskan hubungan dengan RRT</td>
<td>20,000 WNI Tionghoa Demand PRC Diplomatic Relation Disconnection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>3-Feb-1966</td>
<td>Operasi &quot;Kembali sianak hilang&quot;</td>
<td>The Mission of ‘the Lost Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Apr-1966</td>
<td>Apel Siaga &amp; Kesetiaan: Kami tidak mau eksklusip</td>
<td>The Demonstration of Tionghoa’s Loyalty: We Don’t Want to Be Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>03-Jun-66</td>
<td>6662 WNI keturunan Tionghoa Ganti Nama</td>
<td>6662 WNI Tionghoa Changed Their Names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>14-Jun-66</td>
<td>Delegasi WNI keturunan asing protes keras ketua Denas</td>
<td>WNI with Foreign Descent Delegation Protests Denas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>15-Feb-66</td>
<td>Demonstrasi Mahasiswa Bandjarmasin dipekan Konsulat RRT</td>
<td>The Demonstration of Banjarmasin Student in Front of the PRC’s Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>14-May-66</td>
<td>Demonstrasi Orang Tionghoa Menentang RRT</td>
<td>Demonstration of Tionghoa Against PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>15-Apr-66</td>
<td>Diluar moral Pantjasila pasti Sia2</td>
<td>Outside Pancsila is Useless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>25-May-66</td>
<td>Dwi Kewarganegaraan di-stop</td>
<td>Dual Citizenship Is Stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>11-Jun-66</td>
<td>Harus ditarik garis tegas dalam &quot;Masalah Tioghoa&quot;</td>
<td>The need to be firm on &quot;Chinese Problem”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Feb-66</td>
<td>Penjeludupan mas ke Djepang</td>
<td>Gold Smuggling to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>17-May-66</td>
<td>Permintaan djadi Warga Negara Indonesia meningkat</td>
<td>Application for Citizenship Is Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>08-Jan-66</td>
<td>Rasialisme pisahkan &quot;Asli&quot; dengan &quot;Tidak Asli&quot;</td>
<td>Racism Segregates &quot;Genuine&quot; and &quot;Non-Genuine&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Original Text</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>16-Apr-66</td>
<td>Setelah pintu gerbang berasil didjebol</td>
<td>After the Door</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>08-Dec-66</td>
<td>Stop Permohonan2 Tjina</td>
<td>Stop Tjina's Requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Kompas</td>
<td>17-Sep-66</td>
<td>Tidak Benar KAMI ganjang T'hoa</td>
<td>KAMI didn’t Attack Tionghoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>