Green is the new brown
Ecology in the metapolitics of the French far right today

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Abstract:
In this thesis I examine the metapolitics of the French far right, a sphere of organisations and personalities that are waging a counter-hegemonic cultural fight, thought to be a precondition to political change. In France, singularly an incubator for a green nationalist narrative, this “Gramscianism of the right” is today embodied by countless media outlets. This research, grounded in a socio-constructivist realist approach, critically investigates the trends formed within this sphere in relation to ecology, and analyses the main discourses around this topic. The results reveal a diversity of articulations to ecology, in line with the variety of trends identified in the far-right metapolitics. From remains of climate denialism to right-wing degrowth, ecology revolves around an opposition to immigration, perceived as a symbol of a wider left globalist ideology that threatens European identity at large. “Rootedness” and “localism” are described as requirements for a “true ecology”, along with the affirmation of natural limits applicable to nature but also to humans alike. Such instrumentalisations of ecology come to justify ethno-differentialist, anti-egalitarian and conservative visions of the world, feeding an identitarian and cultural racist political agenda. This research emphasises the convergence of climate and racial issues, and the urgent need for far-right ecology to be further studied through intersectional lenses.

Keywords: Political ecology, Metapolitics, French far right, Integral Ecology, Gramscianism of the Right, Right-wing Degrowth, Identitarian Ecology
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“Green nationalism is the only true nationalism

There is no Conservatism without nature, there is no nationalism without environmentalism, the natural environment of our lands shaped us just as we shaped it. We were born from our lands and our own culture was molded by these same lands. The protection and preservation of these lands is of the same importance as the protection and preservation of our own ideals and beliefs.”

(Breton Tarrant, Christchurch terrorist, 2019, 37)
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Disclaimer
This thesis expands on the preliminary research presented in the article “Ecology in the metapolitics of the French far right today: Rootedness, borders and anti-capitalism to counter a ‘totalitarian’ globalist left ideology” published in the Special Issue on the Political Ecology of the Far right of Ecología Política in July 2020. My interest in the topic was enhanced through more general research on the political ecology of the French far right as I joined the Zetkin Collective in 2019 and contributed to our book: White Skin, Black Fuel: On the dangers of fossil fascism, forthcoming at Verso in 2021, with a French edition at La Fabrique in 2020 Fascisme Fossil: l’Extrême droite, l’énergie, le climat.

List of acronyms
AF: Action Française
AfD: Alternative für Deutschland
BLM: Black Lives Matter
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CETA: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
CSA: Community Supported Agriculture
EELV: Europe Écologie Les Verts
E&R: Égalité et Réconciliation
FN: Front National
FRE: Far-Right Ecologism
GI: Génération Identitaire
GRECE: Groupement de Recherche et d’Études sur la Civilisation Européenne.
IDF: Ideological Discursive Formation
IFP: Institut de Formation Politique
ISSEP: Institut des Sciences Sociales, Économiques et Politiques
MEI: Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant
ND: Nouvelle Droite
NLC: National-Liberal-Conservative
RN: Rassemblement National
SD: Sverigedemokraterna
1. Introduction

Climate change mitigation is facing yet another obstacle: in the last decades, countries around the world have experienced a significant rise of far-right populist parties (Mudde 2007, 2019, Rydgren 2018). While the majority openly display a climate denialist line, France seems to be an incubator for a different narrative of green nationalism, expressed primarily by the Rassemblement National (RN) (Malm and The Zetkin Collective forthcoming 2021). The party’s manifesto for the last European elections, tailored by Hervé Juvin, a European MP since then, spells out the wish to create a “European ecological civilisation”: protection of identity and protection of environment go hand in hand through localism and rootedness in a closed territory (RN 2019) – a notion summarized by Jordan Bardella in the slogan “the best ally of ecology is the border” (Landrieu 2019). The party’s prominence has significantly grown in the last years, as evident when Marine Le Pen reached second place in first round of the 2017 presidential elections with 21,3% of the votes behind Emmanuel Macron with 24,01% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017). In both the 2014 and 2019 elections to the European Parliament, it reached the first place with similar percentages (European Parliament 2019). The party-politics billboard, however, constitutes only the tip of the far-right iceberg.

The metapolitical enterprise of the far right, starting around the Nouvelle Droite (ND) movement, “New Right”, in the late 1960’s, is today embodied in numerous media outlets. Countless websites, magazines, social media accounts, Youtube channels, etc., wage a cultural battle outside of parliamentary politics. This slowly but surely contributes to the normalisation of far-right narratives, eventually assisting their success in elections, in an effective dialectical relation with the party-political actors.

The Covid-19 pandemic crisis might have accentuated the attention given by mainstream media to the identitarian implications of the Rassemblement National’s (RN) pseudo environmental localism (see e.g. Berteloot 2020 or François 2020, both in Libération). However, the underlying understanding of what ecology means and how it is used on the French far right is a niche topic that remains widely understudied and whose implications are commonly ignored. What lies behind the RN’s “ecological turn”? This is the starting point of the present thesis. This study firstly maps the major trends present in the metapolitics of the French far right in relation to ecology. It then critically looks at a selected sample of articles and videos in order to identify and analyse the main discourses on ecology that emerge from this metapolitical sphere, and eventually reflect on their implications in relation to the current socio-environmental crisis.

1.1 Relevance of the thesis, aims and research questions

This thesis aspires to contribute to the broader fields of political ecology and far-right studies. First, despite a wide range of research on the far right (or radical right, extreme right or alt right), Jens Rydgren 1

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1For the FN, compare with 17,9% of the votes (third place) in the 2012 presidential elections and 16,86% in 2002 for Jean-Marie Le Pen at the first round.
(2018) points out that this has been done mainly with a focus on party politics, obscuring the organisation of the far right in a much wider web of social movements, information channels, think-tanks, leaving the interaction between this sphere and the parliamentarian scene severely understudied.\(^2\) This gap underscores the relevance of examining the metapolitical dimension of the far right.

Second, Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective (forthcoming 2021) warn that the political ecology aspect of the far right is similarly in need of closer investigation as it is almost completely absent from the numerous studies of this political current. It is in this context that I conduct the following exploratory research on the political ecology of the metapolitics of the French far right. This thesis thus aims to understand and expose problematic narratives around what far-right interpretations of what ecology entail, a necessary enterprise in the current socio-environmental context.

The following research questions structure my investigation. Answering question 1-, which aims to understand who are the actors that form the metapolitics of the French far right today, is a precondition for examining the main discourses communicated by this sphere. However, 2- is the most important and substantial part of my research.

1- Who are the actors that constitute the metapolitical sphere of the far right and what trends do they form in relation to ecology?

2- What are the main discourses around ecology in the metapolitics of the French far right today?

1.2 Structure of the thesis
Chapter two provides a contextual background to my research, both on the origins and rise of green nationalism and metapolitics. Chapter three presents a thematic literature review and conceptual framework, around key notions of far-right ecology. Chapter four outlines my positionality and methodological approach. The results and analysis are combined in chapter five, with a conclusive discussion putting my analysis in a broader perspective.

2. Background
2.1 FN/RN and the greening of nationalism
The main far right party-political actor in France is the Rassemblement National, “National Rally”, formerly known as Front National, “National Front” until it was renamed in the wake of Marine Le Pen’s takeover and later reshaping of the party after her father’s reign. Ecology became a topic of interest to the RN only in the last three years, with the exception of a brief early appearance of ecological concerns around Bruno Mégret in the 1990’s, before his scission with the party (François 2016). A milestone in the ecological turn was the creation of the Collectif Nouvelle Écologie, "New Ecology

\(^2\)Each term (radical, extreme or alt right) having its own variations; I chose to use far right as an overarching term as it is not the focus on my thesis to conduct an terminological investigation.
Collective”, as a Front-affiliated organisation in 2014. Advocating a “patriotic ecology” and led notably by Philippe Murer, a self-proclaimed “environmentalist” to whom ecological challenges are indissociable from the problem of migration flows, Nouvelle Écologie aimed to create local branches but remained overall rather inconsequential. ³ Its “21 propositions” nevertheless announced the main themes of the new turn: French “green” economic protectionism and therefore opposition to international free-trade agreements, French energy autonomy, preservation of French agriculture, and “considering biodiversity as national wealth” (Collectif Nouvelle Écologie 2016, 4).

The definite ecological (re)birth of the party took place around the 2017 presidential elections, with a vision of protecting the environment revolving around the culture-heritage-identity trinity (Boukala and Tountasaki 2019). It culminated around the 2019 European elections. The party branded its new young face for the occasion: the 23-year old Jordan Bardella, who firmly believes that “it is by returning to the borders that we will save the planet” (Sapin 2019). He explains that “the two major issues of the 21st century are immigration and the environmental challenge”, opposing “globalists” to “localists” and promoting localism as the only way forward (ibid.). These ideas were elaborated by Hervé Juvin, the ideologist behind the party’s European manifesto, also a self-proclaimed environmentalist who emphasises an opposition to globalised capitalism. He believes that we are experiencing a critical “political moment” (Juvin 2018) for “the arrangement between nature, identity and society” which is breaking apart due to the empty promises of growth, market and progress (Bastié 2018).

Closed borders are central to Juvin’s ecological thought: “combining ecology and open borders, when every being depends on its capacity to regulate its exchanges with its environment, to harness what feeds it and to reject what harms it – how daring!” (ibid.). To him, indeed, borders do not only mean to “preserve the French treasure of the beauty of its landscapes, the generosity of its land and the diversity of the shapes that life has taken”, but above all to “allow the amazing expression of the human genius that is the diversity of cultures and civilisations”: borders are the prerequisite of a “realistic politics of diversity”, considered as “pacify[ing]” tools to protect the unity, the security and therefore the identity of the French people (ibid.). Ecology is clearly understood as inseparable from sovereignty over a closed national territory. It therefore comes as no surprise that the party’s European manifesto states that “only a state and a population in full possession of their territory can ensure the survival of ecosystems” (RN 2019, 45), and that “there is an ideological battle between nationalists and globalists, between patriots who defend ‘those who are from somewhere’ and post-nationalists who would like to see new men emerge, ‘those who are from nowhere’, between supporters of rootedness and supporters of nomadic ideology” (ibid., 7).

³See the description of his Twitter account: https://twitter.com/philippemurer?lang=en.
Similar positions explain the RN’s strong opposition to renewable energy and its specific hate towards wind turbines. Classified as “visual and sound pollution” or as “a disaster for the environment” (Europe1 2019), wind power is reviled for its detrimental consequences for the rural landscape, symbol of a national cultural heritage to be preserved. Protecting the national territory as the common determinant, Marine Le Pen offers the analogy herself: “Migrants are like wind turbines, everyone agrees to have them, but no one wants them in their backyard” (LePoint.fr 2019b).

Another party that promotes a similar line is Les Patriotes, “The Patriots”, led by Florian Philippot. This former vice president of the FN split from the party in 2017 to create his own, as he objected to the party’s softening of the line on the necessity of a “Frexit”, therefore moving towards euro-reformism. The organisation Collectif Nouvelle Écologie simultaneously split to be incorporated in the new party (Les Patriotes, n.d.). Ecology was then presented as a pillar of Les Patriotes, fitting perfectly with the demand for regained sovereignty: “ecology and patriotism: a happy marriage!” (Les Patriotes 2017). Just like the FN/RN, ecology conveniently comes at the right time to continue the battle against transnational trade agreements and international corporations, and to promote national and local consumption, all framed within a friendly-sounding “patriotic ecology” – “patriotic” supposedly having slightly less aggressive and controversial connotations than “nationalist”.

In both cases, sudden environmental preoccupations seem to suit their nationalist agenda. Such a position – whether as a co-optation of environmental issues or rooted in genuine concern for nature as some would argue – can be referred to as green nationalism: a situation where the defence of nature go hand in hand with the protection of the white nation (Malm and the Zetkin Collective forthcoming 2021). John Hultgren’s (2015) Border Walls Gone Green: Nature and Anti-Immigrant Politics in America, depicts such a tradition of anti-immigration claims ingrained in the protection of an overloaded nature. This thinking is tightly tied to neo-Malthusian concerns explained in more details in section 3.4. Lubarda (2018, 443), on the Latvian case, frames green nationalism as a scheme where the protection of the environment articulates the membership to an imagined community. This concept is certainly very much dependent on contextual and cultural specificities. Despite a strong nationalist emphasis on the party-political side of the French far right, hence a potential influence on other similar European parties, the metapolitical dimension rather adopts a regionalist approach. There is a stronger focus on the defence of local identities within the protection of an imagined European identity at large. One could therefore extrapolate green nationalism into the concept of green pan-europeanism.

2.2 Nouvelle Droite and metapolitics
At the end of the 1960’s, the intellectual movement Nouvelle Droite was launched around its think-tank GRECE, Groupement de Recherche et d’Études sur la Civilisation Européenne, “Research and Study Group on the European civilisation”, with the main figures of Alain de Benoist, Jean-Yves Le Gallou, Pierre Vial, Dominique Venner, among others. Moving away from street activism and parliamentary politics, it ventured onto the intellectual path of “metapolitics”. The underlying strategic program of the
movement is that cultural and ideological change is a precondition for political transformations; hence they advocate what they call a “Gramscianism of the right” (GRECE 1982; Bar-on 2013; Dohet 2016; Keucheyan 2017; Savatier 2017; Veugelers and Menard 2018; Camus 2019). Adapted versions of this movement have emerged internationally in Germany, Italy and Belgium, but it has also had considerable influence in Russia and the American alt-right, as well as in the Brazilian far right (Keucheyan 2017; Veugelers and Menard 2018; Camus 2019; Malm and the Zetkin Collective forthcoming 2021).

Today, Alain de Benoist remains the central personality of the old-fashioned ND, the other figureheads having taken a separate yet similar path of their own, still in the sphere of metapolitics (see section 5.1). de Benoist is specifically driven by a combination of anti-capitalism, anti-egalitarianism (connected to his anti-christianism) and regionalism (Keucheyan 2017). He sees the Indo-European origins of the European people and favours the preservation of local and regional specificities – hence his neo-paganism (Camus 2019).

It is de Benoist who drove the ecological turn of the ND in the 1980’s (François 2016). In 1993 the GRECE’s annual colloquium had “The issues of ecology” (Les enjeux de l’écologie) as its central theme (GRECE 1993). From then on, ND’s publications on ecology blossomed (See e.g. Élements 1994 n°79, 2005 n°119, Krisis 1993 n°15) and the movement developed the ecological views and concepts elaborated further in sections 3.4 and 3.5. The GRECE has today disappeared but rose from ashes around the same personalities into the think-tank Institut Iliade, whose next 2020 colloquium is on “Nature as a base: putting ecology the right way up” (Institut Iliade 2020).

This “battle of ideas” is a strategy that has gained power throughout the years and is today waged through a plethora of media outlets, generated by an interconnected network of leading figures and mother organisations. A “Fachosphère” in expansion (Albertini and Doucet 2016; François 2018), with internet being a powerful tool to spread ideas and propaganda as well as form alliances (Veuglers and Menard 2018), allows metapolitical enterprises of cultural “reconquest” to thrive like never before.4

3. Literature review and conceptual framework

In this chapter I review the ideas and notions that both frame and guide my study. Due to an extensive background and the very limited existing research on the political implications of far-right ecology, the literature review component is merged with the presentation of key concepts that provide the needed understanding of and approach to my analysis.

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4“Fachosphère” is the combination of “facho”, the French colloquial term for fascist and “ sphère”, sphere, i.e. the fascist sphere.
3.1 The far right as a diverse yet strong ideological actor

3.1.1 A non-essentialist and broad approach to the far right

The far right has been extensively studied, not the least in the past decade with the remarkable surge of right-wing parties across the world (e.g. Lazaridis 2016; Camus and Lebourg 2017; Rydgren 2018; Mudde 2007, 2019). The far right is an international and transnational phenomenon, whose extreme diversity should be recognised and appraised rather than essentialised into one definition or fitting label (Mammone et al. 2012; Godin et al. 2013). There are, however, several recurring characteristics to the far right that revolve around an exclusionist and xenophobic vision of the community and the nation based on ethnicity and race, nativist ideologies of inequality and hierarchy between people, attachment to traditional values and a mythical past, combined with a populist posture that communicates these issues in professed opposition to the elite (Mudde 2007; Harrison and Bruter 2011; Mammone et al. 2012; Griffin 2013[1993]; Rydgren 2018). With Saull (2015), the far right is understood as both an ideology and a socio-political movement. Yet, despite acknowledging the importance of the non-party sector, Rydgren (2018) does not mention the role of far-right actors in spreading cultural and ideological narratives. Godin et al. (2013) briefly elaborate on how it can strengthen collective political identities, but only Veugelers and Menard (2018) seem to have given attention to far-right projects that pursue cultural (counter-)hegemony, undertaken by the non-party sector, which I believe must be crucially comprehended.

3.1.2 The need for a cultural turn in far-right studies

Some scholars have consequently advocated a “cultural turn” in the field of right-wing populism studies (Rensmann 2017), an orientation followed by Jansma (2019) and her study of populist cultural narratives. Rensmann frames today’s populism as a “cultural counter-revolution” against “liberal-cosmopolitan socio-cultural transformations and culturally inclusive identities in globalised immigration societies” (Rensmann, 2017, 124). Far-right narratives must therefore be envisaged as a contribution to individual and collective representations of the world, in line with my critical social-constructivist realist approach (see 4.1).

Kølvraa and Forchtner (2019) similarly argue for the study of far-right socio-cultural imaginaries and Forchtner (2019a) further elaborates on the existence of an influential “ecological imaginary” among far-right actors. Lubarda (forthcoming 2020) insists on an ideological approach to far-right social imaginaries, on which I elaborate in the next section. Consequently, the study of the metapolitical dimension of the far right, essentially participating in a counter-hegemonical ideological battle, represents a cornerstone to a cultural approach to far-right discourses.

3.2 Far Right Ecologism (FRE) as a framework

To study the ecological social-ideological imaginary of the far right, Lubarda (forthcoming 2020) proposes the broader conceptual framework of Far-Right Ecologism (FRE). The author sheds light on the limitedness of the term “eco-fascism”, as it appears “inadequate” to encompass the scope of the
variety of discourses expressed by the far right on the natural environment (ibid., 1). He argues that eco-
fascism is rather a category that falls under the wider spectrum of the diversity of far-right approaches
to environment and ecology. In his attempt to develop an encompassing conceptual framework, Lubarda
(ibid.) suggests three core values of FRE:

- **organicism and autarky**: a strong holism that envisages the community embedded in a nature
  in which it continuously dwells, forming together a sort of natural socio-ecosystem where the
  natural (national, and I add local) community self-sufficiently takes care of the land.

- **spirituality and mysticism**: in line with the first values, whether it is of Christian, pagan or
  non-religious character, the connection to nature has a spiritual aspect.

- **naturalism**: i.e. the idea that the natural world translates into natural social relations and a given
  stable order, including borders.

This FRE framework, with its three core values, provides a conceptual base for study as it embraces the
diversity of the examined sources, beyond the narrow and sometimes simplistic category of eco-fascism.
FRE enables me to identify several yet overlapping views and concepts that drive the political thoughts
of the metapolitics of the French far right. From this base, to root my understanding of the French far-
right ecology, I shall also give attention to the other key concepts of climate denialism, eco-fascism
and neo-Malthusianism, ethno-differentialism and rootedness, and a critique of neoliberal capitalism.

3.3 Varieties of climate denialism: evidence, process and response.
A characteristic often associated with the far right when it comes to climate: a climate denialist or
“sceptic” attitude (Hultman et al. 2019, Malm and the Zetkin Collective forthcoming 2021). The French
far-right metapolitical actors do talk about ecology and the climate, therefore spreading ecological
narratives of their own. The denial of the existence of climate change altogether is no longer a
predominant theme; despite Marine Le Pen’s turn, Jean-Marie Le Pen was previously famous for his
climate-denialist lines. However, as the findings show in chapter five, a certain type of denialism
remains present in the discourse. This section does not present an extensive literature review on climate
denialism, but draws on Van Rensburg’s (2015) conceptual re-evaluation of “climate scepticism” (read
denial), and the subsequent qualifications of “climate sceptics” (read deniers), terms he criticises for not
being able to grasp the complexity and the variety of shapes that climate denialism can take. From the
basic definition of climate denialism as “arguments and […] individuals that reject, dispute, or question
the mainstream/orthodox thesis that the global climate is changing primarily due to human activities and
that these changes will affect severely both ecosystems and human populations if left unarrested” (ibid.,
1), he suggests the differentiation of three strands of denialism:

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I actively chose to use “climate denialism” as I believe that it is the denial of facts that underly such positions
and not a scientifically sceptic approach.
- **Evidence scepticism:** denial of the trend, cause and impact, drawing on the seminal classification in Rahmstorf (2005) – i.e the denial of the data, of the problem of climate change as such.

- **Process scepticism:** the criticism of the scientific processes, questioning for example the funding of climate research, the uncertainty of computer modelling – i.e the denial of the production of the data.

- **Response scepticism:** drawing on Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) and Akter et al. (2012), this type of denial relates to the policy aspect; for example to the questioning of the efficacy of mitigation, the global cooperation strategy, the relevance of climate change at a societal level – i.e the denial of the response to the data.

The utility of this categorisation is to acknowledge that climate deniers can be positioned differently on the doubt/rejection spectrum, that they do not have the same denialist foundations and therefore do not necessarily subscribe to all the three positions, some of which can of course reinforce one another (Van Rensburg 2015). Moreover, Van Rensburg emphasises the need to distinguish between people who are genuinely misled by such denialist arguments and those who deliberately use them to serve their own ideological interest, a distinction that adds a moral dimension to climate denialism (ibid.). Parliamentary actors such as the RN clearly fit with the instrumentalization dimension; yet I believe that it might not be that easy to draw this line for some of the metapolitical actors.

### 3.4 Eco-fascism and neo-Malthusianism

Eco-fascism, as a movement revolving today around personalities such as Pentti Linkola, a Finnish radical deep ecologist author, can be broadly defined as the intersection between authoritarianism and environmentalism, which involves the high valuation of an organic whole with an intrinsic value (outside of the human instrumentalization of it) to be preserved by means of (racial) purity and sacrifices of individual interests (Zimmerman 2008). One key concern is overpopulation, thought to be burdening a suffering and overwhelmed nature. This was precisely the central theme in the manifestos produced by Breton Tarrant before he committed the massacre in Christchurch and by Patrick Crusius before he copied the act in El Paso: immigration needs to be stopped in the name of keeping the homeland pure from racially and culturally different others (supposedly the invaders), overloading an already endangered nature that must be preserved in order to secure it for the white people (supposedly the natives) (see e.g. Tarrant 2019). Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier (1995) identify the roots of this ideology in German Nazism and especially in the *Blut und boden*, “Blood and soil” ideology, which continues to feed a certain idea of purity of the people and the land in far-right ecological thought today (Forchtner 2019a).

Similar ideas are present in radical versions of Arne Naess’ deep ecology. Deep ecology also sees the world as an organic whole, merging spirituality and materiality, moving away from anthropocentric
views of ecology (Devall and Sessions 1999). It celebrates the diversity of all forms of life, acknowledging the consequent diversity of human cultures, and advocates a dramatic decrease of the population (Drengson 1995). Both eco-fascism and deep ecology are simultaneously inspired by and feeding neo-Malthusian arguments that denounce the exponential growth of the world population as a major ecological threat, and therefore they both champion strict population control and limitation. Such claims have classical support in Paul Ehrlich’s *The Population Bomb* and Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons”, both published in 1968, both stressing concerns about population growth that are, according Thomas Robertson (2012), at the origin of American environmentalism. A perfect illustration of the constant relevance of the theme, the June 2020 *Éléments* (n° 184), an Alain de Benoist magazine, had the headlines “Overpopulation – the threat”.

Despite the apparent distance between the metapolitics of the French far right and the eco-fascist terrorists of Christchurch or El Paso, I contend that they share ideological foundations regarding the protection of the land where a natural community belongs. The next section focuses on this specific connection with the natural territory, further examining how the ND’s key concepts have inspired other far-right actors and how they are, today, central to the understanding of far-right ecological discourses.

### 3.5 Ethno-differentialism and rootedness

A concept that helps to grasp such understandings of the land and the community is ethno-differentialism. In clear opposition to multiculturalism and assimilationism, ethno-differentialism states that different ethnic groups and cultures are incompatible with one another and consequently emphasize the need to keep them separated. To preserve and defend this “right to difference”, mixing should be avoided at all cost and every people kept in their “natural” environment. Ecology is thereby framed as a mixophobic ecology of population, the blending of people supposedly causing the loss of difference (François 2009, 2016; Forchtner 2019b). Anti-racist scholars have denounced this advertised diversity as a mere smokescreen for a new form of racism: a cultural one (Taguieff 1990), a differentialist one (François 2009). This serves as a base for the rejection of immigration, perceived as ethno-culturally disruptive (François 2016). This position echoes in the discourse of the RN and Juvin.

This ethno-differentialist standpoint is intertwined with Renaud Camus’ “great replacement” theory, which has lately become central for much of the far right (Camus 2015[2011]). The belief of every people having a given territory of its own enables immigration to be perceived as an invasion. Camus strongly believes that the European peoples are going extinct due to an unstoppable and organized wave of foreign (i.e. non-white) mass immigration: an all-out *replacement* of the European population, a white “genocide by substitution” (Soullier 2019c). This belief is not to be undermined and discarded as some sort of old man’s fabulations: a 2019 report from a survey conducted for the Jean Jaurès Foundation reveals that one fourth of the participants (a representative sample of 1760 people) “agree” or “rather agree” with the following statement: “Immigration is deliberately organized by our political, intellectual and media elites in order to result eventually in the replacement of the European population by an
immigrant population.” (Fondation Jean Jaurès 2019). Moreover, it is important to note that Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto was titled “The Great Replacement”. There he explains how he received “the final push [to his action] witnessing the state of French cities and towns”, since wherever he went on his visit to France, “the invaders were there” (Tarrant 2019, 8):

I remember pulling into a shopping centre car park to buy groceries in some moderate sized town in Eastern France, of roughly 15-25 thousand people. As I sat there in the parking lot, in my rental car, I watched a stream of the invaders walk through the shopping centre’s front doors. For every French man or woman there was double the number of invaders. (ibid.)

Such ideologies lead to the affirmation of the rootedness in one’s territory in order to defend one’s identity, and consequently to “rooted” vision of ecology that would enhance the defence of this very territory. Ecology is therefore envisaged from an identitarian viewpoint (François 2009, 2016; Carle 2017; Schlegel 2018; Vincent 2019; Forchtner 2019b). Once again, such theories are echoed on the party-political scene by the RN and The Patriots with their ideas of rooted and patriotic ecology, and the opposition between rootedness and nomadism is foundational to the RN’s ecological views (Guillibert 2019).

3.6 A far-right critique of capitalism: overcoming the left-right divide
The other side of the mixophobia coin is a fear of homogenisation at large. Immigration certainly embodies a threat, but several actors also identify another enemy: neoliberal globalised capitalism. Scholars have argued that it is precisely what drives the ecological concerns of Alain de Benoist: the market is destructive of cultural specificities and lifestyles, leading to a globalised and uniform (American) way of life (Dard 2006; François 2016; Keucheyan 2017), on top of inducing an unrealistic/impossible multicultural society. He especially despises the “ideology of the same” engendered by liberalism, the consumer society, and egalitarian ideals. Similarly, Renaud Camus, in line with his replacement mania, expresses his concerns towards an ongoing uniformization that turns individuals into “replaceable beings” (Soullier 2019c). The blood and soil nexus has therefore been completed with a third dimension: culture, which has, at first sight, a slightly more positive connotation than race.

Furthermore, ecology is presented as a theme that challenges the traditional left/right divide, as it provides a diagnostical common ground for critics of capitalism on both ends of the political spectrum: neoliberal capitalism is a destructive system that needs to be countered, even more in its current globalised form. Despite the overwhelming presence of the Left in environmentalism, with an indissociable link to social justice since the 1970’s, in the 1980’s the French ecologist party Les Verts, “The Greens”, was rather driven by the motto “neither left nor right”, under the influence of Antoine Waechter, up until 1994 (Europe Écologie Les Verts, n.d.). Waechter, president of the still active party Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant (MEI), “Independent Ecologist Movement”, advocates for re-rooting and warns against the explosive growth of the population, linking the protection of nature and identity already in the 1990’s (Flipo 2018). He has controversially collaborated in the past with “Teddy”
Goldsmith, founder of *The Ecologist*, and Laurent Ozon, an identitarian ecologist close to the ND and its GRECE, and later to the FN (Gauthier 1999). More recently, one of the vice-presidents of his MEI, Fabien Niezgoda, had openly participated in a far right identitarian colloquium organised by Robert Ménard, an “independent” politician known for his close connections to the RN and his far-right positions. Niezgoda just as openly supports Alain de Benoist’s theses (Besse Desmoulières 2016). He is representative of a nowadays rising conservative ecology (Flipo 2018) that seeks to ignore or overcome left-right positioning.

It is the ideology of progress and growth altogether that is criticised. The ND’s approach to modernity is, however, more complex than a straightforward anti-modern and conservative position – according to Bar-On (2013), it seeks alternatives to modernity that are neither liberal nor socialist. The issue of degrowth illustrates the left-right tension and the supposed transcendence of it (Cazenave 2018; François 2019). It has succeeded in bringing about controversial collaborations like those between the French degrowth philosopher Serge Latouche and Alain de Benoist, who is also a *décroissance* proponent (de Benoist 2018[2007]). Every so often, Latouche comfortably spreads degrowth ideas through de Benoist’s media outlets such as *Krisis* (Latouche 2018), *Éléments* (Latouche 2017) or in Thibault Isabel’s *l’Inactuelle* (Latouche 2019). Isabel is an author of the same circles. The magazine *Limite*, presented in more details in section 5.1.3, confuses the lines even more. It blends degrowth, anti-technicism, anti-economism and pro-life arguments (*Limite*, n.d.; François 2016) – a new anti-liberal conservatism where tradition and reaction remain nevertheless central (Schlegel 2018). Yet degrowth scholars have repeatedly denounced right-wing co-optations of degrowth. They emphasize the fundamental differences and incompatibilities between movements such as the Nouvelle Droite and the degrowth movement, especially in terms of equality, justice, solidarity, democracy and wider intersectionality (Flipo et al., 2012; Lepesant, 2012; Demaria et al., 2013; Cattaneo 2016; Eversberg, 2019) – values traditionally considered left-wing.

In this chapter I emphasised the need to approach my study from a non-essentialist and cultural angle. I then outlined and reviewed central ideas and concepts for the examination of far-right understandings of ecology, more specifically in the French context. The next chapter presents my methodology and methods.

### 4. Methodology and methods

#### 4.1 Beyond Critical realism: social-constructivist realism

##### 4.1.1 Critical realism

In my thesis I follow a hybrid of qualitative and quantitative research design. My human ecology lenses clearly make me see the world critically. A critical approach is what allows to profoundly question and challenge dominant assumptions and views about the world, in order to uncover and acknowledge the

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6*Décroissance*” is the French word for “degrowth”.

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underlying structures and mechanisms that contribute to their perpetuation (Gray 2014). I am inspired by critical realism (Bashkar 1975) and especially by its emancipatory dimension of “reclaiming reality” (Bashkar 1989) that aims to oppose and change unsatisfactory or oppressive situations (Benton and Craib 2011; Gray 2014). I am a realist in the sense that I believe that there is a real world out there, independent from our interpretation of it (Sayer 2000; Benton and Craib 2011). Critical realism proposes a three-layered understanding of reality: the empirical, the actual and the real (ibid.). This stratification aims to examine the generative causes of experiences (Plant 2001), tracing empirical experiences (the rise of far-right parties, RN in our case and its vision of ecology) to the real drivers (e.g. the spread and normalisation of far-right narratives, including far-right ecology). Moreover, a critical realist approach rejects judgmental relativism (Sayer 2000), enabling me to acknowledge and denounce the harmfulness of certain epistemologies.

4.1.2 Social-constructivist realism
Yet I am going one step further. A key premise for my research is that interpretations of the world are socially constructed and therefore changeable. I am in this sense in line with the social constructionist claim that changing the way we think and communicate about the world does have an impact on the social world itself, as I believe that elements of the social world such as culture, knowledge, discourse and language play a key role in the construction of the latter (Elder-Vass 2012). Through its aforementioned layered reality, as well as the transitivity of the knowledge and interpretations of the world as opposed to the intransitivity of the physical world, critical realism already overlaps with social-constructionist arguments. However, for the specific purpose of this research, I adopt social-constructivist realism, an epistemological and ontological framework elaborated by the critical realist scholar Dave Elder-Vass (2012), in The Reality of Social Construction. He argues against both radical constructionism and radical realism. Other scholars have similarly identified the compatibility of those apparently opposite worldviews, such as Sayer (2000) among others (See Elder-Vass 2012, 13-14). Social-constructivism fully embraces the need for a realist approach – even more needed in times of climate crisis that directly confronts us with the materiality of the real world, as emphasised by Malm (2018) – and the acknowledgment of social construction. I am hereby fusing a critical realist approach and a constructivist perspective into a critical social-constructivist realist epistemology that constitutes my underlying standpoint as a researcher that examines discourses.

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7Elder-Vass proposes either of the two terms: social-constructivist realism or realist social-constructivism. I chose the first one to emphasise that I add a social-constructivist dimension to my pre-existing critical realist stance, rather than the other way around.
4.2 A (Critical) Discourse Analysis
4.2.1 Methodological framework

Discursive constructionism
Discourses crucially contribute to shaping the social world (Elder-Vass 2012). Elder-Vass proposes a post-Foucauldian realist theory of discourse that is concerned with “the impact of discourse on the social world” and “is moderately social constructionist without denying the significance of material reality, the human individual, or social structures” (ibid., 157). Concerned with answering the social ontological question of how discourses have causal effect in the world, Elder-Vass elaborates on the existence of “discursive norm circles” (ibid., 153). He extrapolates the influence of the regulations around discourse to a causal power that eventually creates broader norm circles around the discourse, circles that therefore determine what is appropriate to say or not – those discourse circles are major components of discursive constructionism (Elder-Vass 2012).

Critical discourse analysis as a framework
As emphasised by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), discourse analysis cannot be detached from its contextual foundations and used independently as a method: it must be embraced as a “complete package” (ibid., 11). Despite the different traditions of discourse analysis, I note here similarities with Fairclough’s (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This approach serves as a wider positioning for the framing of my discourse analysis, but I do not use it as a precise method per se.

I draw the parallel between Elder-Vass’ discursive norm circles and Fairclough’s Ideological Discursive Formations (IDF), whose characteristic, drawing on Althusser and Gramsci’s concepts, is “the capacity to ‘naturalise’ ideologies, i.e. to win acceptance of them as non-ideological ‘common sense’”. (Fairclough 1995, 27). This is relevant in the context of the metapolitical enterprise endorsed by my material. As a response, CDA through its critical approach, aims to “denaturalize” such ideologies (ibid., 27). CDA therefore has an emancipatory dimension in the challenging of these IDF, that become more and more “naturalized” if left unchallenged (ibid., 41) Fairclough also insists on the dialectical relations between structures and actions, and especially on the fact that “discourses make people” just as much as “people make discourse”. Discourse is therefore socially shaped and socially constitutive (ibid., 35, 39, 131). My research is in line with the CDA objective to critically investigate communication practices while acknowledging the production of the text as well as its effects on social structures (ibid.). Fairclough emphasise how discourse is both a bearer of ideology and a vector of it (ibid.). Consequently, “changing discursive practices is an important part of wider processes of social and cultural change” (ibid., 87). And this is precisely what I am trying to counter here. It is a counter-emancipatory research, since I am in the odd position of using the same arguments as the metapolitical actors: it paradoxically corresponds to the strategies of the ND movement adopted to change the world in the desired direction, but it also serves as a useful tool for studying and understanding precisely that endeavour.
4.2.2 Method: discourse analysis

Countering problematic discourses
I thereby adopt the following definition of discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 1), and this includes language (both spoken and written) as well as visual and semiotic practices (Fairclough 1995). In line with my social-constructivist realist epistemology, I believe that language and discourse provide access to a reality that exists on its own, as they give representations and meaning to it. Along these lines, I envisage discourse as both embedded in norms and as creating new norms. As those norms are not politically neutral (Elder-Vass 2012), I believe that discourses are charged with political implications. Moreover, discourses are vectors of beliefs. Beliefs are elements of what forms culture, which happen when individual beliefs are collectively shared and endorsed – indeed, culture is the end result of norm circles (ibid.) and the “discursive norms circles” are one of them. This is precisely why this thesis focuses on the discourses on ecology within the metapolitics of the far right: to challenge the norm creation process they are actively working on.

By conducting discourse analysis
For this research I conduct a discourse analysis of articles that have a focus on ecology, retrieved from sources within the sphere of the metapolitics of the French far right. The aim of the present thesis being to get an understanding and of the different discourses around ecology present in this sphere, my data set is extensive, which hinders an in-depth linguistic analysis of it but justifies my focus on discourses as I want to expose their implications. I draw on CDA in the sense that I contextualise the different discourses identified, as I believe that attention needs to be given to both text and context (Fairclough 1995) (hence RQ 1). Moreover, the focus of my research is not to uncover the causal relation between the text and the social practice; I take the existence of this relation for granted, be it direct or indirect, short or long-term, and rather wish to identify the existing discourses that are communicated. This does not undermine the influence of language, embedded in the discourse but forming that discourse as much as the discourse impacts the choice of the language.

Data collection
The first step of my study was an investigative inquiry, to identify the main actors and existing trends in relation to ecology (RQ 1). Some actors openly state that they have chosen a metapolitical strategy, such as Marion Maréchal, the niece of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Belaïch 2018; Soullier 2019b), or the ND. With the help of the far-right map of La Horde (2019) (see appendix 1), an anti-fascist organisation, I considered the other sources as similarly belonging to the realm of metapolitics, as I believe they participate in the ideological crusade of the far right. This investigative bricolage of looking at academic and grey literature and joining of far-right communication channels (telegram chat, webinars, newsletters) led me to the selection of 14 metapolitical sources (online and printed, see table 1 below), from where I retrieved my material for the discourse analysis.
Table 1: List of sources and number of pieces retrieved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source (name and subtitle or motto)</th>
<th>Type of source</th>
<th>Type of material</th>
<th>Number of materials analysed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Boulevard Voltaire - Freedom guides our steps</td>
<td>Information website</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>12 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B L’incorrect - Silence him!</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>5 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Causeur - Especially if you disagree</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>printed and online</td>
<td>30 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Les identitaires - Laboratory of ideas for the defense of the European civilisation and Génération Identitaire</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>5 articles, 1 video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Eléments - For the European civilisation</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>printed</td>
<td>6 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Polémia - Foundation for identity, security and European freedoms</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>11 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Action Française - All that is national is ours</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>4 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Dreuz.info - Your morning breath of air to cope better with the lies of the media</td>
<td>Information website</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>3 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Limite - Integral ecology magazine</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>8 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J Institut Iliade - For the long European memory</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>2 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Valeurs Actuelles</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>17 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Salon Beige – Daily news blog by secular catholics</td>
<td>Information website</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>22 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M TV Libertés – You, it’s us</td>
<td>Information website</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>2 videos, 3 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Égalité et Réconciliation - Left-wing labour and right-wing values</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>online</td>
<td>1 video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>128 articles, 4 videos</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of all the identified potential sources, I excluded the ones that had no content on ecology. I collected my data mainly by using the keyword “ecology” in the search bar of the websites. In a few specific cases, an article would lead me to another by referring to similar articles, therefore including it in my sample if relevant. To limit the quantity, I decided on a one-year timeframe, from the first of January 2019 to the 29th of February 2020. This data set is a purposive or convenience sample, from the choosing of the sources to the articles retrieved. It does not aim at being exhaustive in anyway, as I acknowledge the extreme plurality of the sources, the difficulty to draw the line around the far-right and its
metapolitics in the first place, the variety of orientations and the evolving dimension of all of the above. A second exclusion stage happened if the articles retrieved did not have ecology as their focus from any angle. I collected overall 128 articles and 4 videos for analysis (See appendix 2 for detailed list of all the articles analysed).

**Data analysis: a hybrid of qualitative and quantitative methods**
I analysed my data using a hybrid blend of qualitative and quantitative methods. My research is mainly qualitative in the sense that the aim is to identify the main discourses around ecology present in the metapolitics of the far right. However, finding out what are the *main* discourses is enhanced by a quantitative approach. I then conducted a thematic analysis using both inductive and deductive coding (Lapadat 2010; Krippendorff 2018), as despite mainly letting codes emerge from my data set through an open-coding approach (Elo and Kyngäs 2008), some codes did not come as surprise after an extensive literature review on the topic. My unit of analysis is never a single word, but a combination of words that can stretch from a bit of a sentence to a couple of sentences communicating the same idea or message. I used a spreadsheet in excel for the coding process and combined all the sentences belonging to the same code into one cell for each article. I coded the title of the article only if it added an information or if that code was not present in the rest of the article. This process was circular in the sense that I kept adding news codes and adapting them along the way. The codes were set so as to identify key elements of the discourses around ecology communicated within my data set. In a second step, I conducted a quantitative analysis of the recurrence of the codes overall among my entire data set, per journal and per trends of thought. This complements my analysis by enabling to situate the discourses within the sources and the trends.

**4.3 Limitations and self-reflectivity**
Several limitations of and to the research need to be stated and acknowledged. Firstly, the data collection process was limited by the fee-paying access to some of the articles. Depending on the sources, this reduced drastically the number of articles retrieved, making the number of articles retrieved not representative of the real number of articles published by the sources on the topic of “ecology”. I did pay for two of the magazines (*Éléments* and *Causeur*) but this was a dilemma from both a student-budget and ethical standpoint. It was a personal decision to draw a line and to retrieve only the articles that I could read entirely for free and leave the partly available ones aside. The “ecology” keyword search was limiting as such and does not encompass the totality of the articles related to environmental questions; using “climate” or “environment”, for example, would give other results. In most of the cases, the chosen sources also have a Twitter account, a Youtube channel and the like, which I did not look at; further ecological narratives might be shared there. I nevertheless collected enough data for my research in this way. Lastly, the Covid-19 pandemic forced me to adapt my data collection as I was unable to attend a conference from the Institut Iliade, a far-right think-tank, on “Nature”, which was postponed.
The second limitation is related to the data analysis process. In light of the number of articles analysed and the exploratory goal of my study, combined with the limited time frame for thesis writing, I made the active choice to gather the different units of analysis that were linked to one code into the same cell for each of the article. Consequently, all the codes that are present in one article have the same weight even though they might not take the same space within the article. I believe that a more in-depth study of the material would require their separation, but this does not impact the relevance of the overview of the discourses provided through my research. Moreover, I wish I had, with hindsight, used a coding software such as Nvivo. Additionally, the material was entirely in French and the translations that appear throughout the thesis are my own.

Finally, I need to acknowledge my positionality as a researcher. On top of the previously described social-constructivist realist ontological-epistemological stance that I subscribe to, I am conducting this research with my critical lenses provided by my human ecology background, combined to my position of white woman raised in the Global North. I am aware that I talk about racism without having been subject to it myself, and even socialised within ordinary racism practices. To speak in Elder-Vass’ words, I am myself part of norms circles; the academic one is the reason I am writing this thesis in the first place. In that sense, I am not detached from my data and never expected to produce neutral, value-free knowledge, especially in the light of my positionality as a climate and anti-racist activist. My methods also reflect my own subjectivity and bias: the analysis of discourse as well as the coding exercise are impacted by my own interpretations, experience and sensitivity as a researcher (Fairclough 1995; Elo and Kyngäs 2008; Braun and Clarke 2006).

5. Findings and analysis
5.1 Mapping the trends in the metapolitics of the far right in relation to ecology
This section answers my first research question: who are the actors that constitute the metapolitical sphere of the far right and what trends do they form in relation to ecology? This is a necessary first step to get a broader understanding of the different trends of thought and approaches towards the topic. Step zero was even to make sense of the French far right as a whole (see appendix 3). Taking inspiration from the work François (2016) and Carle (2017), the two French scholars that to my knowledge have specifically looked at the ecology of the metapolitics of the French far right, combined to my investigative inquiry, I suggest the following broad trends: Identitarian, Survivalist, Christian and a National-Liberal-Conservative (NLC) one. In line with the non-essentialist approach, I do not aim to design strict and immutable categories. On the contrary, I am aware that the metapolitics of the far right is a constantly evolving sphere actor-wise as much as content-wise and position-wise. Some may not speak about ecology today but will tomorrow. Moreover, the lines between them can be blurry, some actors might belong to several and collaborations between the different actors happen on a regular basis (promotion, partnerships, writing in each other’s outlets, interviewing each other, etc.). At the end of the section I offer a visual mapping of the examined sources according to those trends. The trends must be
perceived as guidelines, as a help to understand the variety of positions, where they come from and how to anticipate alliances.

5.1.1 Identitarian trend
The GRECE and its thinkers are often considered as the intellectual forefathers of the Identitarian movement (Camus 2019), a movement that is also historically linked to the FN/RN.8 I gather in this trend actors that have an understanding of ecology ensuing from the focus of the preservation of identity, be it regional, national or European. Identity is certainly a key element for all the trends and among the far right generally, but for the following actors it is especially central to the formation of their ecological thought.

The first one is therefore the Nouvelle Droite and more specifically the publications of Alain de Benoist. He created three magazines: Nouvelle École (annual since 1968), Krisis (bi-annual since 1988) and Éléments (bi-monthly since 1968), the latter of whose editor-in-chief François Bousquet also owns the bookshop and publishing house La Nouvelle Librairie, “The New Bookstore”. The think-tank Institut Iliade also grew out of the GRECE (Soullier 2019c) and was set up in 2014 by Jean-Yves le Gallou, Bernard Lugan and its president Philippe Conrad.9 With the ambitious objective to protect and promote “the long European memory”, it maintains a resource database (online and printed, including a recent collection of books stamped by the Nouvelle Librairie) and organises one-year educational “metapolitical” trainings to create leaders of the hoped European renaissance, weekly conferences at the Nouvelle Librairie, as well as yearly colloquiums on the greatness of European identity and how it should be protected through borders, or on the aforementioned 2020 colloquium on nature as being the base of this very identity.10 Those colloquiums gather personalities from Alain de Benoist, to activists from Génération Identitaire (GI) and Marion Maréchal (Soullier 2019a).

Another actor that essentially belong to this trend is the Identitarian movement around Les Identitaires, formerly known as Bloc identitaire, “Identitarian bloc” and from which GI, “Generation Identity”, their youth branch emerged in 2012 (formally independent from its mother organisation since 2016).11 They spread information on their website but also through their “re-information” website Novopress.info. “Re-information” is a strategy to counter “the unique ideology” communicated by mainstream media.12 The Identitarians and Generation Identity see every issue in the world through the prism of their one and

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8See map in appendix 3.
9Especially in the wake of Dominique Venner’s thought, with the first conferences dedicated to him, after committed a symbolic suicide in Notre Dame in 2013.
10See https://institut-iliade.com/formation/. The aim of this training is to create “a new generation of stakeholder/participants to the awakening of the nations and peoples of Europe so as to fight the risk of ‘great erasure/effacement/wipeout’ of our civilisation and reconnect with the thread of our common identity”.
11See https://generationidentitaire.org/.
12See https://fr.novopress.info/.
only battle: against immigration, the number one enemy of the European civilisation.\textsuperscript{13} Adepts of Camus’ great replacement theory, their obvious solution is what they refer to as remigration – i.e. the physical removal of those considered as foreigners – to protect Europeans from an Islamic invasion in particular. They are known for their symbolic activist-like actions, such as the occupations of a Mosque construction site in the symbolic city of Poitiers (Chambraud 2017), of social services buildings in the Parisian suburbs (Hernandez 2019), of the offices of the migrant-saving organisation SOS Méditerranée (Leroux 2019) and the 2018 “Defend Europe” action of physically blocking a mountain pass between France and Italy with a banner saying “Closed border. You will not make Europe your home. Back to your homeland” (in English!).\textsuperscript{14} Despite no official connection with political parties, it is easy to find overlaps with the RN, with for example Damien Rieu, a central figure of the movement who has been several times the parliamentary assistant for RN’s MPs at the European Parliament. Breton Tarrant himself has been inspired by the work of GI and donated money to them in 2017 (LePoint.fr 2019a).\textsuperscript{15} Their concern about ecology is very limited, as the article collection from this source show. Yet they strongly advocate, on lines like Juvin’s ideas, a “rooted vision of ecology which respect people and their traditions” (\textit{ Valeurs Actuelles} 2019).

Jean-Yves Le Gallou, the theorist of the concept of “national preference” in response to immigration, is also the founder of Polemia, a “re-information” website which, on a side-note, clearly has the same web designer as The Identitarians.\textsuperscript{16} Le Gallou has been part of the FN and especially close to Bruno Mégret. He is also a founding member of another far-right metapolitical think-tank, Le Carrefour de l’Horloge, presided by Henry de Lesquen (formerly Club de l’Horloge). Contrary to the anti-capitalist and anti-liberal positions of de Benoist, he holds a national-liberal line reflected in his outlets. Directly advocating an aforementioned “Gramscism of the Right” (Savatier 2017), Polemia is an identitarian organisation raising awareness on the coming “shock of civilizations”.\textsuperscript{17}

Another actor that emerged from the Nouvelle Droite figure Pierre Vial in 1994, is the cultural organization Terre et Peuple, “Land and People”, a name that appears to allude to the notion of blood and soil. Fighting for a “European identitarian resistance”, this branch is the closest to the legacy of the German conservative revolution and the romantic völkish tradition (François 2016).\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Terre et
Peuple Magazine is published quarterly since 1999 and recently featured interviews of the Le Pen family members. In addition to blogs, think tanks and magazines, the identitarian line can also count on TV and radio media channels. Radio Courtoisie, supposedly promoting all the right-wing spectrum but strongly influenced by de Lesquen’s chairmanship of this radio organisation from 2006 to 2017, is an outlet faithful to the Institut Iliade, Alain de Benoist’s Éléments and the like. The WebTV channel TV Libertés claims its emancipation from “the filter of the politically correct” and also subscribes to the “re-information” mission. It aims to provide a platform for “everyone who defends the French spirit and the European civilization”. This medium created in 2014 by former FN and Identitarian members has broadcasted shows held by Hervé Juvin, Le Gallou, Gilbert Collard (RN) or Charlotte d’Ornellas (an “independent” journalist). It continuously hosts a variety of far-right personalities and Alain de Benoist’s famous show, Les idées à l’endroit, “Ideas the right way up”, named after his eponymous book (de Benoist 1971).

5.1.2 Survivalist trend

Less prominent but relevant nonetheless is the survivalist trend. It is actively preparing for the coming socio-economic breakdown and is inspired by thinkers such as the Norwegian Varg Virkenes and the Swiss Piero San Giorgio (Francois 2016, 2020). This is the trend that has the strongest connection with the autarky value identified by Lubarda. The idea is to build a self-sufficient, resilient rural community, called “BAD” for Bases Autonomes Durables, “Autonomous Sustainable Bases”, with the help of survival trainings (François 2016; Guéret 2018). So far, these ambitions could be in line with a radical form of somehow mainstream neo-ruralism, and self-sufficient permaculture projects. However, the idea of reconnecting with the land is as much about reconnecting with and immersing oneself in an ethnically pure community. The survivalists might be preparing for an economic crash, but they are above preparing to face an inevitable racial civil war (François 2020).

Alain Soral, a renowned conspiracy theorist and antisemitic figure, is active in this trend. He is the founder in 2007 of the political organisation Égalité et Réconciliation (E&R), “Equality and Reconciliation”, also subscribing to “re-information”, but likewise of the survivalist organisation Prenons le maquis, “Let’s take the maquis”, (formerly Instinct de survie, “Life instinct”). The latter offers survivalist trainings combining extreme physical activities, living in the wild techniques and construction work, with local and organic products on the menu. In the same thematic, Soral created an online organic food and local artefacts store Au bon sens, “At the common sense” where one can find

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20See [https://www.radiocourtoisie.fr/](https://www.radiocourtoisie.fr/).

21See [https://www.tvlibertes.com/](https://www.tvlibertes.com/).

“healthy and rooted products”. Last but not least, Soral also owns the publishing house Kontre Kulture created in 2011 – publishing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion – where one can find for example the book of Nicolas Fabre (2014) on permaculture, a book Fabre is presenting notably at a talk organised by a local Terre et Peuple branch and advertised by E&R. Ecology is hereby similarly understood from a rootedness perspective, with a stronger focus on preserving the national land rather than the European identity as such. Yet it is important to note that Soral is also famous for his climate denialist positions.

5.1.3 Christian ecology trend
Another trend derives from Christianity and thus proposes a Christian-inspired ecology. There are, for some, an inevitable overlap between this category and the next; however, the ones included here do not only have Christianity as a major part of their worldview, but as a base for their understanding of ecology. This takes shape in the name of an écologie intégrale, “integral ecology” and is mainly embodied in the quarterly magazine Limite, founded in 2015. The concept of integral ecology emerged in the wake of the Encyclical Laudato Si from the Pope the same year, and it is “integral” in the sense that it is only concerned with the natural environment, but that presents itself as a human ecology too. For Limite, the title says it all: there are limits to the exploitation of resources as much as to humans, leading to anti-contraception, anti-abortion, anti-assisted-reproductive-technology, anti-surrogacy positions, all seen as manifestations of the fusion progress and neoliberal capitalism looking for new markets. The integral ecologists claim to be “conservative of the planet and the human body” (Schlegel 2018, 209). To them, nature serves as a legitimation for what is “natural” as opposed to what is not, so that nature translates into the social world as a set of immutable laws (Carle 2017).

The magazine professes to blur the line between left and right and strongly promotes degrowth, with anti-liberal, anti-capitalist and anti-technicist positions. It was born out of an ultra-catholic group formed mainly by Eugénie Bastié, Gaultier Bès and his partner Marianne Durano, all three of whom were engaged in the Manif pour tous mouvement, “Demonstration for all”, set up in response to the same-sex-marriage law in 2012. Eugénie Bastié is also a journalist for Le Figaro, a right-wing newspaper, in which she has interviewed Hervé Juvin on several occasions. She is also known for her anti-feminist positions and hostility to the #MeToo movement. In their book Nos Limites: Pour une Écologie Intégrale, “Our Limits: For an Integral Ecology”, Bès and Durano (2014) explain straightforwardly: “the human being wouldn’t be able to thrive […] without acknowledging humbly his finitude, without accepting the limits to his condition. Hence, he has to consent to see his desires defined by nature or by

#References
23See https://www.aubonsens.fr/
24See https://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Retour-a-la-terre-mode-d-emploi-Conference-de-Nicolas-Fabre-a-Clermont-Ferrand-56949.html
25See https://revuelimite.fr/
26Reference to the name of the law Mariage pour tous, “Mariage for all”.
society” (ibid., 9). There are natural “determinisms” and neoliberal capitalism only creates “fantasies” (ibid., 16). These integral ecologists further advocate the “restoration of the border and rootedness” (ibid., 58), a precondition for living freely in a given space. The local and the family are therefore central, and they support Community Supported Agriculture schemes (CSA) and non-monetary exchange initiatives, along with carpooling, Worldwide Opportunities on Organic Farms (WWOOFING) – volunteer farm work – and general conviviality and simple living (ibid.). Bès’ more recent book (2017) directly calls for “politics through rooting”; the idea, again, is to oppose localists to globalists, a division central to identitarian thought.

The Action Francaise (AF), “French Action”, an ultra-nationalist and royalist group, founded in 1898 and working towards the restoration of the French monarchy, similarly promotes an “integral ecology”. Highly xenophobic, they claim that integral ecology is inspired by Charles Maurras’ “integral nationalism”. The organisation recently published the book *Quelle écologie pour demain?*, “Which Ecology for Tomorrow?” (Venciton and Sandré 2020) and had (at least planned) its 2020 colloquium on the theme “At the service of integral ecology: be limited” – not the first conference on the topic.28

One of the organisers of this AF 2020 colloquium was the magazine *L’Incorrect* created by Jacques de Guillebon. Not only is he close to the AF, but he also co-presides the scientific board of Marion Maréchal’s graduate school in political, social and economic sciences (ISSEP).29 The list of authors features Olivier Rey (also writes for *Éléments*) and other personalities simultaneously giving lectures at the right-wing private political school Institut de Formation Politique (IFP), such as Charlotte d’Ornellas. Unsurprisingly, it promotes anti-multiculturalist, nationalist, pro-life and anti-LGBT stances.30

Another actor that does not openly subscribe to integral ecology but still sees the world through the lenses of the “social doctrine of the Catholic church” is the blog Salon Beige created in 2004.31 From this standpoint ensues the pro-life, anti-same-sex-marriage, anti-gender theory positions. Lastly, the website Dreuz.info, contributing to the “re-information” on geopolitics, gathers pro-Israeli and conservative Christians and features authors such as Bat Ye’Or, creator of the Eurabia conspiracy theory, which alleges, similarly to Renaud Camus, that an organised transformation of Europe into an Islamic colony is underway since the 1970s. On Dreuz.info, the section dedicated to ecology is interestingly named “Ecolo-totalitarianism”, within the broader category of “Evil axis”. Yet, they promote there a reactionary Christian vision of ecology, less elaborated however than they counterparts at *Limite*.

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28See [https://www.actionfrancaise.net/2020/01/18/vers-une-ecologie-integrale/](https://www.actionfrancaise.net/2020/01/18/vers-une-ecologie-integrale/) and e.g. [https://www.actionfrancaise.net/evenement/toulouse-cercle-du-18-octobre/](https://www.actionfrancaise.net/evenement/toulouse-cercle-du-18-octobre/)

29See [https://www.issep.fr/le-conseil-scientifique/les-membres/](https://www.issep.fr/le-conseil-scientifique/les-membres/)

30See [https://lincorrect.org/notre-offre/](https://lincorrect.org/notre-offre/).

31See [https://www.lesalonbeige.fr/a-propos/](https://www.lesalonbeige.fr/a-propos/).
5.1.4 National-Liberal-Conservative trend

This section is looser and gathers actors that might not have a strictly defined political line, because they claim themselves to be pluralists, allegedly aiming to provide a platform for a varied debate rather than a specific ideology. However, I actively decide to mark them with a “National-Liberal-Conservative” label, as they express concerns for France as a national entity as well as typical conservative viewpoints, be it on family, gender, tradition, and the like; alongside a more liberal economic approach.

Let me start with the hybrid personality of Marion Maréchal, ex-Le Pen, niece of Jean-Marie Le Pen. I believe she could just as well be included in the identitarian trend, and she simultaneously belong to the Christian tradition, a component of the European heritage she emphasises. However, her FN/RN history keeps her closer to national-conservative positions. Marion Maréchal officially left party politics in 2017 to switch to the metapolitical front. Ideologically, she rather subscribes to national-liberalism, like Jean-Yves Le Gallou, with a techno-optimism that demarcates her from any degrowth orientation. She held a speech at the 2019 Convention de la droite, “Convention of the right”, the first edition of a large right-wing gathering initiated by Eric Zemmour, a far-right political journalist and author, whose goal is to be independent from “progressivism, multiculturalism and free-tradism”.

Marion Maréchal directly mentioned Gramsci, the need for metapolitics and hence her engagement in a “cultural battle”, simultaneously underlining the threat of “the great replacement” – the major challenge of today’s society – after which comes “the great ecological run-out” (Soullier 2019b). She passed on a clear message: “I claim it today: in reality, ecology is a conservatism. Preserving landscapes, preserving the local, […] all this is actually an identitarian fight”. Hence the need for “protective borders” to enhance “local consumption” (ibid.), i.e. protecting from immigration under cover of ecological concern – a poorly hidden instrumentalization once again.

Maréchal’s main metapolitical enterprise was the creation in 2018 of a graduate school in Lyon, ISSEP, which displays “rootedness” as its pillar, intended to enhance the transmission of “the taste for [the] civilizational heritage” to the students. Jean-Yves Le Gallou is one of the professors there and some conference guests include Eric Zemmour and François Bousquet. With the aim to prepare right-wing conservative executives and entrepreneurs, the Institute was surely inspired by the IFP, which also features Jean-Yves Le Gallou as a lecturer along with Philippe Conrad, Eugénie Bastié, Geoffroy Lejeune (journalist for Valeurs Actuelles), Ludivine de La Rochère (founder of La Manif pour tous), Charles Begbeider (founder of L’Incorrect), Elisabeth Lévy (founder of Causeur), among many others.

This list emphasises the right-wing and conservative orientation of the knowledge taught and

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32 See [https://conventiondeladroite.fr/](https://conventiondeladroite.fr/).
33 Again, this shows the normalisation of such a discourse: this was not a far-right event, but far-right personalities were invited.
34 See [https://www.issep.fr/presentation/](https://www.issep.fr/presentation/).
disseminated there. I believe such teaching institutions are central nodes in the metapolitical web, as they can easily help shape candidates to join the troops of GI and the like – which is precisely the aim.

Boulevard Voltaire is yet another “re-information” website, created by Robert Ménard, an “independent” politician known for his close connections to the RN and his far-right positions. The director of publications of the website is Gabrielle Cluzel, a catholic journalist also participating to the IFP, who earlier this year published her book *Enracinés!, “Rooted!”*. On the “our contributors” page, one can encounter a happy gathering of RN personalities such as Louis Aliot, Gilbert Collard, Jordan Bardella, Nicolas Bay, Jean Marie and Marine Le Pen; but also Charles Beigbeder and Jacques de Guillebon from *l’Incorrect*; Elise Blaise from TV Libertés; Philippe Conrad and Bernard Lugan from the Institut Iliade; Gaultier Bès from *Limite*; Alain de Benoist; Jean-David Cattin and Fabrice Robert from Les Identitaires; Romain Espino from GI; Philippe Murer, Laurent Ozon, Eric Zemmour, Charlotte d’Ornellas; in short, another meeting point for the metapolitics of the far-right.

I also chose to put *Valeurs Actuelles* in this category. Created in the 1966, the magazine radicalised towards the right-wing in the recent years. I believe, however, that it can be referred to as far-right and that it belongs to its metapolitical dimension, precisely because it has one foot in the mainstream liberal-conservative right and hence an extensive readership potential. The former head of the editorial board attended a conference organised by Ménard, alongside Renaud Camus and the rest (Albertini 2016). Since 2016, Geoffroy Lejeune is in this position; like many others, he also trains IFP students.

A last actor that I have identified in this trend is the website and printed magazine *Causeur*, created in 2007 notably by Elisabeth Lévy. It claims itself to be pluralist and is also in line with the “re-information” goal to fight “ready-made” opinions. Lévy is known for her conservative positions, such as the hostility to feminism along similar lines to Eugénie Bastié’s.

To sum up, in this section I have identified four main trends in the metapolitics of the French far right in regard to positions on ecology: an identitarian one, a survivalist one, a Christian one and a National-Liberal-Conservative one. Religious differences between Christian and neo-pagan approaches to ecology stand out, as well and different positions as regards economic liberalism, but the common themes of identity and rootedness are present in all the trends.

### 5.1.5 Visual mapping of the sources

Figure 1 is a visual mapping of the selected sources within the identified trends in relation to ecology in the metapolitics of the French far right.

**Figure 1**: Visual mapping of the studied sources within the identified trends
In order to be consistent with the analysis, it is important to note the proportion of articles and videos retrieved among the trends (table 2). Despite a minor overall presence within the metapolitics of the French far right, the survivalist trend is clearly underrepresented in terms of sources and pieces of material collected. This trend shall certainly deserve further attention in complementary studies; but to produce a relevant comparison, I exclude the survivalist trend from further quantitative analysis in my study.

Table 2: Number of sources per trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Number of pieces of material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDENTITARIAN</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTIAN</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVIVALIST</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2 Discourse Analysis
5.2.1 List of codes and quantitative overview
I conducted a discourse analysis through thematic coding on 128 articles and 4 videos retrieved from the 14 sources presented above. The semi-inductive process lead to the identification of 17 different codes (table 3).

Table 3: List of codes and their description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code name</th>
<th>Description of the code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antrophobia VS. humanism</td>
<td>Denouncing anti-humanist positions of ecology and/or the need to preserve the mastering position of humans in nature and/or ethno-diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist dictatorship/totalitarianism</td>
<td>Ecology means the establishment of a communist dictatorship; it has totalitarian dimensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspiracy/manipulation</td>
<td>Behind ecology lies a global conspiracy and/or Greta Thunberg is a symbol of it. (excluding religious aspects; see religion vs. reason code below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>Demographics is the real ecological problem: due to immigration and/or overpopulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denialism</td>
<td>Denialist arguments around ecology: questioning of the reality of climate change or other environmental issues and/or normalising scepticism and/or CO2 is good and/or undermining the consequences and/or denial of responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of conflicts</td>
<td>Pseudo-descriptive neutrality/neutral tone on ecology, while emphasizing existing conflicts among environmentalists or other actors of the issue (underlying sarcasm).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Statement of a position related to energy, e.g. renewables are an economic disaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European genius/liberal techn-optimism</td>
<td>Belief in the superior European intelligence to solve the climate/ecological crisis, and/or through continuous technological improvements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greta</td>
<td>Personal comments and attacks on Greta Thunberg related to her age, illness, appearance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt and burden</td>
<td>The idea that ecology puts an illegitimate guilt and burden (moral, normative or economic) on France or Europe at large and/or that it targets the wrong responsible actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian integral ecology</td>
<td>Promotes an integral ecology, with human and nature living hand in hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left ideology</td>
<td>Ecology represents a despised broader left-wing ideology, which has unrightfully co-opted the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right divide</td>
<td>Ecology transcends the left/right divide and/or should not belong to any/is a trans-party issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To give a quantitative overview, five codes stand out as the most recurring ones, appearing in at least one article out of five; five others follow right behind (table 4).\textsuperscript{36} It is apparent that the most frequent codes are mainly the ones that relate to criticism and rejection of a perceived left-wing ecology, denouncing its religious, totalitarian and guilt-inducing aspects alongside denialist positions. Proposed solutions and their own visions only come second, with the themes of limits, demographics, and rootedness. This data can also be seen through the trend filter (table 5).\textsuperscript{37}

The quantitative analysis by trend reveals that despite “Religion vs. reason” being the overall recurring code, it is the “Rootedness/sovereignty/identity” that, unsurprisingly, prevails among the Identitarians, shortly followed by “Demographics”. “Denialism” holds the second place within the National-liberal-conservative trend. The theme of “Limits” is noticeably most frequent within the Identitarian trend, which have a strong localist and territorial orientation, while being three times less important within the National-Liberal-Conservative trend, not proponents of economic constraints.

Table 4: Ten main codes and their frequency (most frequent to least frequent):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Nb./132</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion VS. reason</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left ideology</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist dictatorship/totalitarianism</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denialism</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt and burden</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greta</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to: growth, globalisation, technology and marketisation</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootedness/sovereignty/identity</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Ten main codes and their frequency per trend (most frequent underlined):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Identitarian</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>NLC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nb./30</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nb./42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion VS. reason</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left ideology</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist dictatorship/totalitarianism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denialism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt and burden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits: growth, globalisation, techno and marketisation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootedness/sovereignty/identity</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{36}For the frequency table of all the codes, see appendix 4.
\textsuperscript{37}Similarly, find a table with all the codes per trend in appendix 5.
5.2.2 Qualitative results and analysis

“Maybe our grandchildren will be too hot, maybe they will be too cold, we have no clue” (C14)

Despite the widespread acknowledgment of the reality of climate change on the French far right, one can still find statements such as “the causal link between climate changes and human activity is not clearly proven” (C4). Several highly problematic classical denialist arguments remain in circulation, questioning and downplaying the consequences of a global warming: warmer temperatures are rather enjoyable, CO2 benefits humanity, the weather has always changed anyway (C4,7; F5,6; H2; N1; K11). Indeed, how could there be a “climate imbalance” when “there’s never been a climate balance in the first place”? (N1). If warming there is, it is “rather weak and has at least as many benefits as inconveniences” (K11), one benefit being the freedom to “stay longer on the terrace”: everyone knows that “people tend to prefer Mediterranean climates” anyway (F5).

It is the anthropogenic responsibility that is mostly questioned, because of the obvious implications of political change that it has. Some directly oppose the scientific consensus (C14; L17), or even say that “it’s not a proof” (K11). Global warming could just as well be caused by volcanos, the sun or another astronomic phenomenon that are unrelated to human or industrial activities (F5; N11). The alleged dramatic consequences are certainly “imaginary” (H2) if not belonging to “science fiction” (L6). There are overall too many uncertainties, and the society would need a balanced debate on the potential implications (A4; C2,7, 14; F5). And climate denialism is not only legitimate but necessary within this debate (C14): it is unrightfully considered as the tabooed, black-listed word in discourses on ecology, said to be the equivalent to what “racist” is to politics, whereas it is a “reasonable ecological approach that allows us to handle the issues of the next decades calmly and effectively” (L13). This position is connected to a general distrust of the production of climate data and the overall putative alarmism of the climate discourse.

“Climanipulation ?” (F1): reason over the “Thunbergian dogma” (F7)

Climate denialists are thought to be dissidents from the climate orthodoxy (C6). The climate emergency is perceived to be “an apocalyptic faith” (C1), a new “eco-religion” unnecessarily catastrophist, namely “ecologism” (A4; B4; C4; D1,2; F7,10,11; G3,4; H1). The IPCC is the “ultimate cult body” (C13) proselytising its “doctrine” (L22). Greta Thunberg is denounced as the “great priestess” (D2; F10; M2), a new “goddess” (L4), a “climatic guru” or an “ecolo-catastrophist shaman” (F7) prophesising as an “oracle” (L4). The profusion of religious references continues with the idea of one “blasphemes” when disagreeing (M2), attacks on a “climate catechism” and comparisons of Fridays for future’s marches with “crusades” (C1). The extent to which this “religious” climate discourse appeals to people’s feelings is also denounced. Overly spread anxiety and fear, or in other words a “dictatorship of emotions” (M2), is said to be highly irrational and should be opposed by reason, pragmatism, scientific rationality and common sense (B3; C1,7; F4,7).
Some take the analysis further and argue that the “eco-religion” is a “compensatory religion” coming to fill the “void” created by “liberalism” and “modernity” (C20), appropriating this “existential crisis” for its ideological purposes (D2). “Some take refuge in drugs or pornography, but others throw themselves into the religion of the Other (multiculturalism) or of Nature” (C20). The moral aspect is therefore emphasised, ecology supposedly creating a “green Manicheism” (C38), a self-proclaimed “Good side” in opposition to an Evil rest (K17).

As for Greta, she is violently targeted even beyond the religious aspect and triggers outpourings of indignation: how does this rebellious, “prepubescent”, school-striking, “ill-mannered” young girl dare to tell us what to do? (A2,6; F7). She is undermined and ridiculed through personal attacks on her physical appearance (C1,20; L16) and the constant mentioning of her age and Asperger syndrome (B4; C9; G3; K14; L12; M2). This is sometimes purposively dramatized, as in references to “her naïve disturbed mind” or “severe personality disorder” (C16), when she is not purely and simply referred to as “mentally retarded” (N1).

Despite this will to portray Thunberg as a weak child that should “rather get two smacks on the bottom and be dragged back to school by her parents” (L20; M2) than try to handle such an adult issue, there is a clear emphasis on her manipulative impact. This sheds a double discourse, often simultaneous, on the perception of her figure as ridiculous yet threatening. Some see her as the “Malcom X of ecology” (L8), or the “Joan of Arc of CO2” (C16). Greta Thunberg is however manipulated herself and regarded as a mere symbol of a greater power at work – so “who is behind Greta?” (F11). Some claim that she is a propaganda puppet, a “marketing product” of green capitalists who manipulate her for their economic interests (A10; B1; E1; F6,7,10; G3; L6,11; M2,4), but also of a wider ideology.

“Green is the new red” (B.4)
In a broader context, Thunberg is seen as an ambassador of the “green alarmist doxa”, spreading the ideology of the left at large (D2; F6). A simple proof is seen to be her intersectional approach to the climate crisis: her statements on the links between the latter and racism, colonization, patriarchy, capitalism – a confusing neo-Marxist mishmash typical of far-left globalists (A1; D2,3; F4; K10; L12). Here lies a core opposition: to globalisation and its implications. It is not so much ecology that is despised, but a left-wing ecology. Environmentalists are “globalists” and “internationalists” who therefore advocate global governance to solve the environmental crisis (L14; M3). And this “delirious globalist ecology” (J1) is a synonym for multiculturalism and progressivism, evils to far-right ideology (F1,6). Connecting minority struggles to ecology epitomises their horror: countless “deliriums” such as post-colonialism and decoloniality, gender studies, LGBT rights, veganism and the like (C13,15; F4; J2). Added up, this would only signify the “de-virilisation of the world” (F8) and more generally the “organised suicide of a civilisation” (L22). The Identitarians recycle to their favourite theme: “We are witnessing an attempt of Great Replacement: the one of imposing a left-wing ‘ecology’ as the new global ideology instead of identitarian themes” (D1).
The left-wing “eco-religion” is considered as a new moralism trying to control people’s lives and thoughts, burdening them with illegitimate culpability (A5; D2; F5,7; J1; K13,17). “For the Nazi, the designated enemy is the Jew, for the Communist the threat is embodied by capitalism, and finally for the fervent and blinded environmentalist, the enemy to destroy is above all the Western man” (K14), as the intersectional discourse makes the “white heterosexual man and father responsible of all the world’s tragedies” (L6), seeing environmentalism as trying to get rid of the white (Christian) European man (C1; D3). This moral penance targets the Western world at large: “Unemployment? Coronavirus? Grandma’s cancer? Repeat after me: in the end, it’s always because of colonisation” (A1). Two arguments emerge from this premise. First, ecology is yet another guilt strategy already burdening the European memory (A1; D1; F5; C25): “ecological self-flagellation” (A11), “prosecution” towards western European countries (K14), “Western masochism” (C11; L6) – white Western men are wrongly portrayed as the only responsible of climate change and consequently have to make the most sacrifices. This is seen as severely unfair compared to highly polluting countries such as China and India (K14; C11). For example, as for the “Plastic-free day: we’ll have to tell that to Indians…” (C11). Until then, Europe giving up on plastic cotton buds will not make a big difference (C25). This penance is also seen through religious lenses, as humans are thought to be trying to obtain forgiveness from destroying the planet (M2): it is as if “the planet replaces God, which humans have deeply offended. They then need to do penance” (D1), man transforming himself into a new and ecological “Homo Redemptionis” (C13; F1). Secondly, the burden is also economic and embodied by heavy and nonsense taxes, both on private citizens and private companies (A4,11; C13; F2,7; H2; L19; N1; C13).

Lastly, this perceived socio-cultural takeover frames ecology as both the tool and the path to the implementation of a communist dictatorship (B4; C17; E1; F8,11; H3; L16): “When will we get a little green book?” (F11). This is a “red-green political ecology” (K14), re-using Jean-Marie Le Pen’s famous comparison between environmentalists and a watermelon: green on the outside and red on the inside (F2). “Marxism has mutated into ecologism” (C24) and the earth is to ecologism what the proletarian was to the communist (B.4). Measures such as the enforcement of taxes and norms and worldviews mentioned above are thought to be totalitarian (C1,13,14,15; D1; H2,3; K13,14) – a “green totalitarianism” (C26, 27), going as far as naming it “green fascism” with references to Hitler (C15,16; F2) (– rather ironic). Ecology is therefore thought to be instrumentalized and people manipulated by media, politicians, corporations, trying to achieve undercover political projects such as cultural Marxism, the “replacement” of the European population, or the implementation of a “world government” (A4,5; C16; F1,5,6,7,10; G5; L2,20; N1), terms worshipped by conspiracy theorists.

“Demographics is the world’s major ecological issue” (F.4)

But conspiracy or not, globalism is a dangerous “no-borderist” ideology (F1,2,3; G4) epitomized in the case of so-called “climate refugees” that are not welcome in Europe, if they are even real (D1; F5; K13). This brings us to a tenet of the far right: a strong hostility to immigration, particularly fuelled by Camus’
great replacement theory. As explained in section 3.4, demographic concerns are predominant within the ecological thought of the far right. Leftist ecology is here portrayed as a “great diversion” (D2; F6), distracting and diverting the attention from both the “migratory invasion” (D1) and the taboo topic of rampant population growth, the two majors ecological challenges of our time (A11; C4; F4,8). Reviving Malthusianism with a classical touch of racism, the blame is to be put on overpopulation, especially generated by the African and Asian continents, which eventually translates into increased immigration towards Europe (A12; C24, 25; F3,4,6,8; K14; L16; M2). This constitutes a fertile ground for green nationalism, as it follows that the best remedy to protect our territory from ecological disaster is the border (G4). Following this logic, it is a necessary tool to keep Africans in Africa, where they produce less CO2 than once they adopt a European lifestyle (B4; F2,5) and to avoid building more housing which covers the land with concrete (M3). On that note, a disconcerting parallel is drawn: “If you like biodiversity (and by the way, peace), you urgently need to defend birth regulation policies and drastically reduce meat consumption” (C25).

On the other side, borders aim to protect nature by preserving human diversity (A11; F3; J1) from the globalist homogenization, in line with the paradigm of ethnopluralism, or ethno-differentialism. The struggle to preserve ethnic diversity goes hand in hand with the humanist fight against the perceived anthropophobia of some environmentalists. Left-wing ecology seems to be willing to get rid of humans altogether for the sake of preserving the earth (D.1; G.3) and is associated with movements such as “no kids”, “save the planet: kill yourself” (K3) or the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, allegedly “close to Greta” (K14). The narrative is to reconcile humanity and a nature sacred for neopagans as much as for Christians, from a pro-diversity standpoint for the first and a pro-life one for the second. “Yet, it is the human that gives sense to the diversity of life” (L3) and it is pure fantasy to let the “Creation” govern “the humanity” when it should be the other way around (H1,2; I3; K8; L3,4). Humans are not enemies and should rather be put back into a mastering position over nature, controlling and rebounding with their territory.

“An authentic ecology” must reconnect “the physical link that binds Man to his land” (B.5) The other side of the anti-immigration coin is the key principle of rootedness. In opposition to the destructive fluid, liquid globalized world, a true ecology is one that is “rooted”, laying the ground for a popular “localism” (B5; C1; D4; F2,4; G4; I1; K13; M5). In line with the “globalism is the worst enemy of ecology” position (M3), rootedness and localism are not goals but means of the protection of the “immediate environment” (L14), another word for the preservation of “material and cultural heritage” – the natural environment merging with “the linguistic, cultural and spiritual tangible realities” (F4) of the local or national community. The local is therefore understood to be as much social as geographical. The individual needs to belong to a community, first and foremost embodied by the natural nuclear family serving as a core that can ensure the transmission and therefore the protection of heritage, tradition and history (i.e major components of what is understood as identity) and a precondition to
achieve Juvin’s “ecological civilisation” (2.5; 4.1; 4.2; 5.4; 7.4; 10.1). The defence of ecology is 
conceived through the prism of the defence of identity and amounts to a “fight for the survival of 
peoples” (E.4). To that end, the protection of ecosystems is indissociable from the preservation of the 
sovereignty over a territory, making borders necessary (G.4; K.13)

It is this romantic vision of the land that can explain stances on energy issues. Renewable energy is 
consistently vilified, especially in the case of wind turbines, which are seen as economically and 
technologically inefficient, dangerous health-wise, but above all catastrophically destructive to the 
cultural landscape (B1,4; C10,26,29,30; F2; K13; L1,7,18,21; M1,2). Conversely, nuclear power 
stations are now “almost free”, already in place and part of “our heritage, just like the Versailles Castle 
or the Eiffel Tower” (C10,28; K16; L5,7). Overall, the idea of being rooted in a territory, a locale dwelt 
by the natural inhabitants, confirms the organicist component of Lubarda’s FRE.

“The real ecology knows no party” (1.10)

Yet, if all agree that the hegemony of the left on ecology must come to an end, some argue that the 
thematic was born within the right and that the latter should reclaim it as the preservation of landscapes 
and biodiversity are “naturally” a conservative concern (A6,7; B3,5; D1; F4; K13; L14). Others, 
however, argue that this is an opportunity to overcome an obsolete left/right divide (1.10; 9.1; 9.8), to 
be replaced with a globalist/anti-globalist one, between the ones who want to destroy identity and those 
who want to protect it (B5; E6). Although this code was proportionally not dominant, the very presence 
of it is significant in itself and should be monitored.

Some of course display a strong techno-optimism rooted in the European genius, connected to the need 
for rationality and not “eco-religion” (B1; F4, H1, K15): “listen to the technicians and not the 
ideologists” (C4). There is, however, a growing critique of technology, integrated in a general critique 
of progress and capitalism as a whole (E3; I2,3, L8.), fighting “the double empire of the soulless 
technology and the lawless market” (I1). More or less radically, many claim that an ecology that does 
not challenge productivism and unlimited economic growth will remain superficial (A11,12; E1; F3; 
G4; I1;13.2). Some denounce the hoax of the “greenwashing” of capitalism (G7), stating for example 
that “ecologism serves the renewal of capital by creating a new demand” (F6) or that “the real question 
should not be ‘do I consume green enough?’ but ‘do I consume something useful?’ (C22). A “radical” 
stance, especially embodied by Limite and Eléments, regularly employs a degrowth vocabulary – 
conviviality, simplicity, anti-economism and anti-technicism – and has in the past directly advocated a 
version of degrowth politics.

Despite two opposed religious standpoints, they meet on the very concept of limits. They agree that the 
dominant liberal ideology gives the illusion of freedom to overcome biological determinisms linked to 
culture, sex, gender and procreation through the market. However, as much as there are limits to natural 
resources, there are limits to human nature which should be acknowledged (A12; F3; II; J1). In short,
“nature is the base of our identity” (J1), from which ensues a natural social order to be embraced, echoing Lubarda’s naturalist dimension of FRE.

The metapolitical web: a diverse network shaping far-right ecological discourses
The metapolitics of the far right is diverse and so are the ecological approaches. I have answered my research questions by identifying four main trends of actors within the metapolitical sphere of the French far right (RQ 1), and shedding light on the main discourses that exist around the topic of ecology (RQ 2). Whether it derives from Christian or neo-pagan, nationalist or pan-Europeanist, anti-capitalist or national-liberal inspirations, ecology is used to reinforce variations of identitarian, “rooted” and “human” conceptions of ecology. These conceptions in turn justify profoundly ethno-differentialist, anti-egalitarian and conservative visions of the world and allow the instrumentalization of ecology to serve nationalist and cultural racist agenda of closed borders. One could argue that this is a matter of ontological insecurity in front of a globalised society combined with the environmental and climate crisis that consequently revives the affirmation of traditional pillars of identity. Hamilton (2002) indeed notes the analogy between threats to ecosystem diversity on the one side and to cultural diversity on the other.

The main discourses identified first display several rejectionist arguments against an imposed climate emergency conspiracy that comes from the left, in line with green nationalism’s hostility to left-wing environmentalism. Moreover, such discourses echo with typical far-right anti-climate politics exemplified by Trump’s arguments in the US, but also by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany or the Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Sweden. Green nationalism certainly overlaps with such stances, at least in the form that it has today. Yet it differs from classical pure anti-ecology stances by offering a far-right alternative vision of what ecology means and should translate into. A possible scenario is that such positions in which ecology feeds far-right narratives will expand and accelerate. Green nationalism, for example, might become increasingly attractive as the ecological crisis intensifies, as it might become increasingly harder to deny the reality of extreme weather events, global warming, and the ensuing consequences. Could the French model, in that case, seduce even currently anti-climate actors such as Trump, the AfD or the SD mentioned above? What is certain is that eco-fascist terrorists are already endorsing French far-right metapolitical concepts, spreading and disseminating their messages on an even bigger, more directly lethal scale. Comparative studies should be envisaged in future research to anticipate potential copycats of the French endeavour.

It is important to notice nonetheless how the disparities among and within the different identified trends remain obstacles to strong alliances between the different actors: the geographical focus on Europe sometimes makes the nation an irrelevant level to fight for and can consequently decrease the support to parties like the RN or Les Patriotes; religion is a key dividing topic: neopagans will never compromise on what the perceived unacceptable universal and egalitarian dimensions of Christianity; the degree of
anti-liberalism and anti-capitalism also plays an estranging role, with diverging opinions on fundamental conceptualisations of progress and modernity.

Overall, the results of my thesis emphasise the urgency and need to give adequate and sharper attention to the metapolitical dimension of the far right, and to investigate the dialectical relation that exists with party-politics. My research has also made clear the relevance of a critical social constructivist realist approach to the political ecology of the far right, so as to measure and understand how the discourses that they spread in turn shape the social world, normalising far-right ecological discourses: a proof of the effective counter-hegemonic mission of the metapolitics.

A question that arises for future research is to what extent should such discourses be given space in the public sphere, a dilemma studied by Léonie de Jonge (2017, 2020) who reflects on the power of a *cordon sanitaire*, i.e. the refusal to provide far-right actors communication platforms in the mainstream media, as a means to prevent the spread of their ideas – which arguably has democratic flaws. This aspect aside, I suggest that the understandings of far-right ecology should be further investigated by uncovering the underlying conceptions of nature that shape these positions. This could be done by trying to understand these conceptions from a more insider perspective, through ethnographic fieldwork methods such as interviews with far-right actors, participant observation at some of their events, alongside continuous discourse and content analysis.

5.3 Conclusive discussion
This section now provides a conclusive discussion by taking a step back and reflecting on the broader implications of such narratives of denialism, felt totalitarian left ideology, perceived demographic emergency, identity and rootedness and the challenging of the left/right divide. I hereby make the following three points: far-right ecology is far from bringing about real solutions to the climate crisis. Then, that the challenging of the left/right divide and the ensuing alliances should be of high concern, emphasizing the need for the reinforcement of left-wing values, critical of capitalism and against the anti-egalitarian, anti-feminist and above all racist dimensions of far-right ecology. Finally, I call for necessary further intersectional research on the political ecology of the far right.

A “rooted ecology” alone will not solve the climate crisis
Despite the general presence of ecological views and the advertised ecological preoccupations, key aspects of far-right ecology contradict any perspective of effective climate mitigation. Firstly, as the fourth dominant code of this study, climate denialism, in all its shapes, needs to be taken seriously. Van Rensberg’s framework helps to grasp the different grounds on which climate denialism can base its arguments and, in this case, it appears that all three dimensions are present in the discourse. Even if evidence “scepticism” is prominent with a general questioning or rejection of the trend and impacts along with the denial of causes, such positions are grounded in a strong “scepticism” towards the process, with an emphasis on the uncertainty of forecasting and the manipulation of climate research.
No matter how local and rooted their ecology might advertise itself as, the premise for actual, concrete action is to acknowledge and work from the trend-causes-impact trio.

On the same line, another blank spot of the ecological vision of the metapolitics French far right is the complete absence of the mention of fossil fuels and the consequences of their production and consumption on the climate. While some affirm the “zero-carbon” energy production of Western Europe (K7), the only mention of fossil fuels is to say that they “come from mother earth” (C26). Despite the will to maintain nuclear power stations in function, there is no plan for an energy transition, even more compromised by the displayed aversion for renewable energies.

I confidently speculate on the most probable explanation to this lack of consistency: ecology is being instrumentalised to serve the agenda of closed borders. It is the will to protect “human diversity” that drives such ecological preoccupations, generally fuelled by underlying racism and conservative worldviews, romanticising closed and local societies in reaction to globalisation. Such a premise cannot lead to the effective and rapid just ecological transition needed to face the climate crisis.

Monitoring alliances beyond the left-right divide: reaffirming left-wing values
Among all the disturbing dimensions of this research, one was the discovery of the degrowth-oriented fringe of the French far right. Being a degrowth proponent myself, I was confronted with the realisation that I did agree with many far-right critiques of the current growth paradigm and of the catastrophic consequences of neoliberal capitalism. I was used to a strict othering of the far right – easier when facing explicitly racist and antisemitic discourses – but this becomes more difficult in the presence of anti-capitalist and anti-commodification positions. This is precisely the danger here. Although such a current might remain marginal as such, my research shows that the acknowledgment of “limits” is an argument made by many, especially as it legitimises physical limits embodied by concrete borders.

Seeing Latouche’s contributions in de Benoist’s publications, the first being celebrated by the degrowth community and the second by the Identitarians, should trigger loud warning signals as it raises a fundamental question: to what extent can/should/may one make compromises and contemplate alliances with forces of the right in order to counter the socio-environmental crisis, and for the push of degrowth ideas in this specific case? Answering this question would require at least another thesis. However, I am confident to state that crucial questions of hierarchies between people based on ethnicity, skin colour or cultural practices should not even be a subject of bargain. There can be no compromises with advocates of such orders, and they would not be beneficial in any way to progress on the environmental front.

On the other hand, one cannot deny the compatibility between right-wing politics and certain degrowth ideas: one could make an argument for degrowth being in line with concepts of organic and self-sufficient local communities, reconnecting spiritually with the earth in a holistic way, while using naturalistic arguments to counter the ever increasing commodification of the world, productivism and technicism. The degrowth movement/community should be aware of these potential overlaps and deal
with them in a self-critical spirit. Rydgren (2018, 3) reminds us that “parties that actively work against inequalities are usually placed on the left, whereas parties that view inequalities as natural, or at least accept them without active political intervention, are placed on the right” – a simple and key premise that should be the base for a strict opposition to any attempt to blur the line between left and right.

Those two categories might be criticised for their decreased relevance due to a general homogenisation of political leadership especially in relation economic policies: a centre of liberal policies has become the common place for left and right alike, creating indeed an “alternance without alternative” (II). The far right uses a strategy of pointing out the inconsistencies of the left and more specifically of Macron’s government regarding ecology in this case, with the example of inviting Greta Thunberg for a speech at the parliament in the morning and voting on the international trade agreement between Canada and the EU, Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) in the afternoon (M14). It is correct to denounce the ecological implications of technology and that, in the case of renewables, they are produced halfway around the world, with rare materials mined by poorer communities (in living standards and rights), and generating waste difficult to recycle – echoing with Hornborg’s (2016) theory of ecologically unequal exchange and the idea that there is no such thing as neutral technology. The far right is correct when it denounces the greening of capitalism and the impossibility for it to be a real solution in the long run. The reality is that the world’s governments responses to the climate crisis have been dramatically inefficient and not anywhere close to enough. Yet instead of legitimising an alleged irrelevancy of the left-right divide, I believe that precisely the opposite is required. We need to reaffirm, reinforce and fight for left-wing values more than ever before, when we speak about what ecology means and what it should entail as a political project: with non-negotiable core values such as justice and equity, inclusivity and openness, and care and welfare.

The need to look at the political ecology of the far right with intersectional lenses
In June 2020, the moment I am writing this conclusion, some parts of the world slowly re-opens after all the Covid-19 confinement measures. But only to open onto an enraged American civil society, triggering a worldwide support to fight against police violence on black communities and institutionalised racism at large, following the death of the post-mortem famous George Floyd. Both “events” seem to have accelerated and condensed two pre-existing crises towards a new tipping point.

On the one hand the Covid-19, ironically a pandemic gave a foretaste of the far right’s societal ideals. Closed borders suddenly became a dream come true and all the RN and the metapolitical actors’ energy was directed to trying to maintain this state of closed society, which to them appeared to be a godsend. It appeared as the perfect opportunity to give extra fuel to the classic blend of right-wing populism with anti-elite and anti-immigrant rhetoric spiced up by a saviour complex, pushing remigration narratives and “Coranvirus” analogies (e.g. Berteloot 2020; L’Incorrect 2020 n°32). Marine Le Pen words from 2019 echoes: “the border is like the skin, it is for letting in what is good, like when one puts moisturising cream [hand gesture], and it needs to protect from what it bad”– there could hardly be a more naturalistic
way of presenting the border. Again, the disastrous consequences of the neoliberal capitalist economic system benefit the instrumentalization of far-right problematic ecological narratives. The situation, moreover, gave legitimacy to a pre-existing rooted-localist discourse, even though the ecological dimension of Covid-19 was remarkable solely by its absence.

Indeed, on the other hand, ecology was relegated to the least of far right’s concerns, if not completely obscured, as all the enthusiasm was channelled into its main source of anxiety: the disappearance of the white race. The strong opposition to a leftist doctrine of Western European penance not only makes it impossible to recognise a disproportionate responsibility in the climate crisis, but also triggered a sharp opposition to the current Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and claims. GI used yet again the activist tactic of banner drop at a BLM demonstration in Paris, boastfully provoking from the rooftops, showing the following message: “Justice for the victims of anti-white racism #whitelivesmatter”. They later stated proudly that they “would never kneel down”, and Jordan Bardella confirmed that he is “so tired of penance and fed up with the constant victimisation used by certain engaged minorities to express their hatred of France!” (Bardella 2020).

As means of conclusion, I would like to re-emphasise the main take-home points of the present thesis: in the metapolitics of the French far right, ecology is being talked about through the prism of neo-racism and conservative opportunism inherent to the far right, and serves naturalistic, anti-egalitarian societal narratives – natural hierarchies and identitarian neo-malthusianism determining who is worth living. In times of climate crisis, when ecology should be a central topic on the political agenda, it is even more crucial to expose such narratives and counter them with the reaffirmation of left-wing values. Yet such values can only be attained through a real opposition to the destructive forces of neoliberal capitalism and the appropriation and defence of post-growth futures, such as the pathways developed by the degrowth movement. Some far-right actors, slowly but surely, have been co-opting radical anti-capitalist ideas. Attempts enhanced by the current failures and hypocrisy of, the French government in our case, along with the international community, to mitigate the climate crisis.

The metapolitics of the far right serves as an intellectual, activist and communication arm for far-right political parties’ green nationalist endeavours. While nature is used to justify the prevailing social structure – i.e. an imagined racial order and traditional gender roles – the only way to deepen the study of far-right actors is through the prism on intersectionality. It is crucial to pursue this preliminary investigation with complementary methods and to take a step back and compare such phenomena with other countries. The case of this research was France, but the recent months have proved that neither ecological nor racist crises – if we are even able to clearly distinguish one from the other anymore – do not care about borders.

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38 See picture in appendix 6.
39 See picture in appendix 7.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: La Horde’s map of the French far right today (last updated in January 2020).
# Appendix 2: List of all the material analysed by source

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<td>Et si on favorisait une écologie conservatrice et postmoderne ?</td>
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<td>« Jeunesses écologistes » : la marque de la bête?</td>
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<td>L’appli qui bloque votre carte bancaire si vous polluez</td>
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<td>En Ethiopie, l’écologie se paie cher</td>
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<td>La Norvège veut des touristes écoresponsables… mais pas coupables!</td>
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<td>Greta ne sauvera pas la Terre mais votre âme</td>
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<td>Climatoscepticisme: « J’estime qu’il est normal que des gens qui sont sceptiques nous posent des questions »</td>
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<td>Sauver la planète… en faisant payer les pauvres!</td>
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<td>En finir avec l’écologisme</td>
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<td>Éoliennes: Appel à Emmanuel Macron</td>
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<td>Paysages, arrêtez le massacre!</td>
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**D** LES IDENTITAIRES (incl. Génération Identitaire)

1. Analyse du raz-de-marée écologiste dans les médias d’un point de vue identitaire
2. Greta Thunberg ou la nouvelle éco-religion
3. Les SJW, enfants monstrueux de la gauche
4. Ecologie : protéger et sanctuariser la dernière ferme de Lyon
5. "La remigration est la seule solution à la hauteur des défis de notre temps"

**E** ELEMENTS #180 - L’Identité, pour quoi faire?

1. Portrait du Bourgeois en Monsieur météo - La droite est-elle condamnée au climatoscepticisme?
2. Brève histoire du réchauffement - session de rattrapage pour les climatosceptiques
3. Internet! Et si on débranchait? Les nécrotechnologies
4. CETA: le traité qui entérine la disparition des frontières. Les multinationales contre les terroirs.
6. Entretien avec Clément Martin. Génération Identitaire, le "Greenpeace de droite"

**F** POLEMIA

1. Climanipulation ?
2. Europe Écologie Les Verts, l’écologie politique à l’extrême gauche
3. Pas de lutte contre la mondialisation sans fin du dogme de la croissance
4. Marion Maréchal : « Nous voulons défendre une civilisation et non un marché ! »
5. Jean-Yves Le Gallou : « Si le réchauffement climatique est dû à l’homme, alors il faut lutter contre le libre-échange et l’immigration ! »
6. Le lobby vert entend bien se servir en effet de la vague de chaleur qui frappe notre pays, pour fa
7. Greta Thunberg, « La psychologie des foules » appliquée à l’écologie
8. Vers un totalitarisme écolo-bobo-gaucho ?
9. Amazonie : « L’incendie, un élément vital dans le cycle de vie des écosystèmes »
10. Greta Thunberg, outil de la super-classe mondiale ?
11. Greta Thunberg : égérie verte ou garde rouge ?

**G** ACTION FRANCAISE

1. Vers une écologie intégrale
2. Les Royalistes, L’écologie et le Bien Commun
3. Les paradoxes de l’écologie anthropophobe
4. Pour une politique écologique
5. Mathieu Slama : Greta Thunberg, l’égérie verte de Davos ?
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<td>Biotéthique: ne nous trompons pas de combat</td>
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<td>“PMA pour toutes” : l’écologie n’est pas le bon référentiel !</td>
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<td>Écologie : Brune Poirson en guerre contre le “populisme vert”</td>
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<td>À Rouen, les écolos s’attirent les foudres des “antispécistes”</td>
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<td>Le père de Greta Thunberg affirme qu’elle était préparée à “la haine”</td>
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<td>Pourquoi Greta Thunberg a accusé à tort la France</td>
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<td>Écologie : les députés socialistes veulent faire reconnaître… l’“écocide”</td>
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<td>Pour Greta Thunberg, la crise climatique est liée “aux systèmes d'oppression coloniaux, racistes et patriarcaux”</td>
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<td>Ecologie : une valeur conservatrice au cœur de l’ADN de la droite</td>
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<td>L’imposture Greta Thunberg ou l’écologiste apocalyptique et anti-national</td>
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<td>Un célèbre écologiste s’attaque au “jour du dépassement”</td>
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<td>Réchauffement climatique : les Français incriminent (à tort) le… nucléaire</td>
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<td>Pourquoi l’écologiste pourrait ruiner l’écologie</td>
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<td>Et si les incendies en Australie étaient une conséquence de la dictature écologique et non du réchauffement climatique ?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>La mission de l’homme n’est pas de préserver en son état originel ce qui lui a été confié mais de faire fructifier ce qu’il a reçu</td>
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<td>La nouvelle Pythie et l’évêque de Cracovie</td>
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<td>Une urgence française : ne pas se tromper dans l’arbitrage Nucléaire/EnRi</td>
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<td>On est passé de la défense des coquelicots à la volonté de détruire l’homme blanc, hétérosexuel, chrétien et européen</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Les éoliennes, une catastrophe économique et écologique</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>L’un des grands responsables des bouleversements climatiques, c’est au premier chef le progressisme</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Le GIEC, réactionnaire ?</td>
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<td>Feux de forêt en Amazonie : un prétexte pour s’en prendre à Jair Bolsonaro</td>
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<td>Greta Thunberg : l’imposture et les manipulations continuent</td>
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<td>L’urgence n’est pas climatique…</td>
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<td>Face au climato-catastrophisme, être climato-sceptique</td>
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<td>Du réchauffement climatique et de quelques conséquences visionnaires …</td>
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<td>Origine anthropique du réchauffement de la planète : il y a bien des scientifiques dissidents</td>
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<td>L’éolien brasse du vent et beaucoup d’argent</td>
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<td>Marche pour le climat : des jeunes utilisés comme “chair à canon” des élites mondialistes</td>
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<td>Éoliennes : une grande arnaque au détriment du patrimoine ?</td>
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**M TV LIBERTES**

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**N ÉGALITÉ ET RECONCILIATION**

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Appendix 3: Background and historical mapping of the far-right actors and their interconnections (see caption below).
• Red arrows = “at the origins of/founder of”
• Black arrows = “youth organisation of”
• Purple arrows = “connected to”

Appendix 4: Frequency of all the codes

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### Appendix 5: Proportion of all the codes per trends

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Appendix 6: Banner displayed by GI at a BLM affiliated demonstration in Paris

The “#Whitelivesmatter” part is being tore down by the neighbors living underneath. Retrieved from their Telegram communication group on June 13th 2020. Below the picture in a broader perspective within the demonstration.
Appendix 7: Picture released by GI in reaction to the BLM movement.

Retrieved from their Telegram communication group on June 9th 2020.