Governing, Policing and Racialisation through POL-INTEL
An analysis of data-driven policing in Denmark

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GNVM03, Spring 2021
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Abstract

In this thesis, I critically scrutinize the data-driven policing tool POL-INTEL, which was implemented in the Danish police in 2017. To better understand how we are governed and policed through POL-INTEL I look at the problematisations and forms of subjectifications constituted in the policies to acquire and implement the system in the police and through the technology of POL-INTEL itself. For this purpose, I subject a range of documents and an interview, that all relate to the acquisition, implementation and functions of POL-INTEL to a discourse-analysis inspired by Bacchi’s WPR-approach. Theoretically, I draw on race-critical, post-colonialist, feminist and foucauldian perspectives on technology and data-driven policing. My analysis shows how POL-INTEL was initially presented primarily as a solution to terrorism, while it later in the implementation process was presented primarily as a solution to crime. Based on this, I argue that POL-INTEL represents a militarization of the logics and technologies in the Danish police. I further find that the policies and technology present the problems of terrorism and crime as problems of the racialized other, and as increasingly complex yet increasingly predictable problems. This, I argue, draw on and make possible pre-emptive logics of policing where the prediction of future threats work to produce and justify police action in the present.

Key words: Data-driven policing, predictive policing, racialization, militarization, problematisations
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Introduction

All over the world, policing increasingly relies on the gathering, processing and analysis of data from every aspect of our everyday lives. CCTV footage of our facial features, income statistics for our zip code-area, our social media updates and the digital traces of our engagements with social institutions - all of this data is being put to use for more efficient, effective and targeted crime control (Ferguson, 2017; Wang, 2018; Winston, 2018; Benjamin, 2019b). This development towards more data-driven policing can be seen as a result of the emergence of Big Data coupled with a neoliberal push towards more cost-efficient intelligence-led policing practices (Reiner, 2007; Andrejevic, 2017; Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017). It is also often seen as part of ongoing processes of securitization and militarization of the police, in which national police agencies are granted increasingly expansive legal and technological means of surveillance, often legitimized by the “war on terror,” (Aas, 2012; Brayne, 2017; Wilcox, 2017; Wang, 2018). Importantly the increasing reliance on data fundamentally changes how we are being policed, surveilled and governed. As carceral scholar and activist Jackie Wang states: "a contemporary analysis of prisons, police, and racial domination would be incomplete without an analysis of technology and algorithmic power" (2018, pp. 34–35).

Turning a critical gaze to the technologies through which we are policed seems particularly relevant, as resistance to police brutality and repression is becoming core to protests for social justice all over the world¹. Protesters highlight how racist, violent and repressive policing practices especially target Black people, poor people, migrants and People of Colour, and calls for police defunding and abolition are gaining what seems to be unprecedented momentum (Ferguson, 2017; ACLU, 2020; Buchanan, Bui and Patel, 2020; Dumont, 2020). As a response to this “crisis of legitimacy” facing the police, some public police figures and liberal police scholars have argued that data-driven technologies hold potential to make the use of police power and violence, less biased and thus more legitimate (Ferguson, 2017). These same data-driven policing technologies have however been criticised especially by US-based anti-racist and police abolitionist activists and scholars for deepening rather than minimising racial inequality in policing and intensifying the intrusiveness and

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¹ Examples of massive protests against the police in 2020 include protests in Nigeria (Olaoluwa, 2020), Hong Kong (Tsui-Kai, 2019), France (Al Jazeera, 2020) and the Black Lives Matter protests in the United States and beyond (Buchanan, Bui and Patel, 2020; Gottbrath, 2020)
violence with which racialized and poor people are being surveilled and policed (Harcourt, 2007; Browne, 2015; Wang, 2018; Scanell, 2019). Critical race and technology scholar Ruha Benjamin thus argue that these technologies “reflect and reproduce existing inequalities but […] are promoted and perceived as more progressive and objective than the discriminatory practices of a previous era” (2019b, pp. 5–6).

In this thesis I turn to the Danish police and the data-driven policing practices enabled by the new data-analysis platform POL-INTEL, implemented in 2017. It has been promoted by the police as a “superweapon” (Holst and Kildegaard, 2017) and as “one of the most important strategic projects in the Danish Police” (Justitsministeriet, 2016a) and has led to public debates on mass-surveillance and data-privacy. However, debates on structural and racial impacts of data-driven policing have been largely absent in both public and academic debates on the POL-INTEL. This is especially unsettling in the Danish context in which migrant and racialised populations are explicitly criminalised through legal measures such as “double-punishment” for crimes in “ghettos”, state-sanctioning of over-policing of young migrant men and practices of indefinite incarceration of asylum seekers (DR2, 2018, p. 2; Suárez-Krabbe et al., 2018; Eika et al., 2019). It is at the same time unsurprising given the widespread belief that “there is no racism in the Danish police,” (Persson, 2020) as recently stated by the head of the Danish Police Union, Claus Oxfeldt.

In my analysis of POL-INTEL, I draw on Carol Bacchi’s (2009) “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR) approach to policy analysis, that rely on the notion that we are governed and made into specific kind of subjects partly through “problematisations” in policies, problematisations that draw on discursively constituted truths and assumptions about the world. Departing from this notion, I scrutinize the problematisations in the policies to acquire and implement POL-INTEL, but also, extending Bacchi’s analytical framework slightly, the problematisations inherent in the technology of POL-INTEL itself. With an aim to contribute to the understanding of how we are governed and policed through POL-INTEL, I thus ask the following questions:

1 “What problematisations and forms of subjectification are constituted in and through the policies to acquire and implement POL-INTEL in the Danish police?”

2 This and all the following translations of quotes from Danish to English in this thesis are my own unless anything else is specified
"What problematisations and forms of subjectification are constituted in and through POL-INTEL as a technology?"

I explore these questions through a WPR-inspired discourse analysis of texts from different political and institutional levels, relating to the acquisition, implementation, use and functions of POL-INTEL. Methodologically, theoretically and politically I draw on Foucauldian, feminist, post-colonial and race critical perspectives on technology, carcerality and race (Foucault, 1979; Haraway, 1988; Aas, 2012; Andrejevic, 2017; Wang, 2018; Benjamin, 2019b). While some research on the relations between data-driven policing and race have been conducted in a European and Nordic context (see e.g. Aas, 2012), these questions have most extensively been theorised from a US context (see e.g Browne, 2015; Benjamin, 2016, 2019b, 2019a; Wang, 2018; Scanell, 2019), which might be due to a strong tradition of race-critical police and prison abolitionist scholarship and activism, spearheaded by Black feminist activist-scholars such as Angela Davis (2003) and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007) as well as the fact that many data-driven policing practices were first developed in the US (Ferguson, 2017; Wang, 2018). While acknowledging that this is a very different context from the Danish in which POL-INTEL was implemented, I find the theoretical insights produced through this body of literature interesting for my research. I’m especially indebted to the work of Ruha Benjamin (2016, 2019b, 2019a) who couple black feminist and abolitionist scholarship with studies of technology, algorithms and codes to “decode the powerful assumptions and values that are embedded in the material and digital architecture of our world” (2019b, p. 2).

Reading Guide

In the first chapter, I introduce the reader to POL-INTEL and the political, legal and institutional contexts in which the system was implemented. In the second chapter I introduce the field of police research, arguing that data-driven policing in many ways is a product of the intimate entanglement between this research field, policing institutions and policies. From this, I present the existing research on data-driven policing, by critically engaging with research that asks “what works” in data-driven policing, research on how we are governed through data-driven policing and research that draw on critical race studies to explore how race is (re)produced through data-driven policing.

In the third chapter, I lay out the methodological and theoretical framework of the research project, focusing especially on Bacchi’s “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR) approach to policy analysis. I present the poststructuralist notions of discourse, power and subjects, that underpins this framework, and discuss how I use it to understand central concepts in my research questions.
including policies, problematisations and subjectification. I also discuss the understanding of technology. I use, drawing on the work of Foucault, Haraway and Benjamin, before I discuss how my research is influenced by epistemologies and ethics of feminist objectivity as situated knowledges.

Following this, I present the documents and interview material that constitute the empirical foundation for the analysis (chapter 4). The data includes documents from different stages of formulation or implementation of the policies on POL-INTEL, across different institutional contexts as well as an interview I did with two Danish police-officers who use POL-INTEL in their daily work. Drawing on a post-structuralist framework, I further present my methods for choosing, producing and making sense of this data as well as the WPR-inspired analysis tools that I subject the data to in the analysis.

This leads to chapter 5 in which I present the analysis. Aiming to uncover the problematisations and practices of subjectification that the policies and technology of POL-INTEL contain, I first present an overview of the different problems POL-INTEL is presented to address throughout the data. I then draw on critical perspectives on the militarization of policing, to analyse a notable shift over time from presenting the system as a solution to terrorism to presenting it as a solution to crime. Following this, I dive into these two dominant problematisations. I first discuss how terrorism is presented as an external and othered problem, and how this formulation of terrorism draws on and reproduces nationalist and colonial subject categories of “us” and “them”. I then go on to analyse the problematisation of crime, how crime is, much like terrorism, presented as a problem of the racialized other and as both complex and predictable. I further discuss how the problem representations of terrorism and crime in both the policies and technology of POL-INTEL draw on and legitimate logics of pre-emption, and what this means for how we are governed through the policies on and policing practices enabled by POL-INTEL.
Background

In this chapter I briefly present what POL-INTEL is before I sketch out the political, institutional and legal contexts in which the system was presented as policy and later implemented. As POL-INTEL is still relatively undescribed in an academic context, the following chapter is based on information from texts from the data material, which I later subject to a discourse analysis as well as news articles on POL-INTEL.

What is POL-INTEL?

POL-INTEL is a data analysis platform that works both as a search engine and a data analytics tool, and which enables searches and analysis across multiple different data bases, systems, police districts and institutions both external and internal to the police. Before POL-INTEL, the Danish police accessed and processed all of their data within the individual, “silod” databases in which it was registered, meaning, that cross-referencing of data was done manually. By giving access to most of these data-sources through on platform, POL-INTEL simply makes data processing faster, easier and more resource-efficient (Justitsministeriet, 2016a; Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016). In addition, the cross-linking and integration of data from multiple systems and institutional settings increases the total amount of data that can be subject to analysis. This creates new possibilities of detecting patterns and trends in the data and enables Big Data analyses. Arguably it also creates a strong incentive to keep adding to the data sources (Brayne, 2017; Egbert, 2019).

Apart from being used for investigations, the analytical functions of POL-INTEL are used for strategic and operative analyses, especially what is referred to by the police as analytical patrolling (Regeringen, 2015b; Rigspolitiet, 2015; Justitsministeriet, 2016a). With analytical patrolling, decisions of where and when to patrol and with how many units are made based on analysis of crime data. The Police initially hoped that POL-INTEL could support predictive policing (Rigspolitiet, 2015), understood in this case as algorithmic predictions of places and people constituting high risks of crime. However, they have stated that the amount of crime-data in Denmark is currently too small for these kinds of predictions, and they are thus not part of the analytical toolbox of POL-INTEL (Fribo, 2018; Justitsministeriet, 2018). Other functions in POL-INTEL, such as analytical patrolling, are however considered to be a form of predictive policing in some definitions of the term, something I will return to in the literature review.
A Short History of the Acquisition and Implementation of POL-INTEL

The political decision to buy POL-INTEL was first presented as a part of the Danish government’s response to the Copenhagen attacks on the 14th of February 2015 (Regeringen, 2015a). On this day a young man shot and killed a person at the culture house “Krudttønden” and another person by the Jewish Synagogue in Copenhagen. The shooter himself was later shot and killed by the police, and media and politicians and police quickly labelled the attack as an act of Islamic motivated terrorism (Rigspolitiet, Rigsadvokaten and Direktoratet for Kriminalforsorgen, 2015). This attack took place only a month after the attack on the magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015, where 13 people were killed (Rigspolitiet, Rigsadvokaten and Direktoratet for Kriminalforsorgen, 2015) and the discussions, discourses and affects surrounding terrorism were omnipresent and tangible at this time. A few weeks after the Copenhagen attacks, the Danish government presented the policy paper “A strong defense against terror: 12 new initiatives against terror” (Regeringen, 2015a). One of these initiatives was to invest 150 million DKK in a new common data-analysis platform for the police and intelligence service3, which later became the two platforms POL-INTEL and PET-INTEL (Rigspolitiet, 2015). With these, the police and intelligence services were argued to be able to “make better use of the considerable amounts of data that amongst other things can be targeted towards terror threats and attacks” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 4).

In 2016 the police signed a 160 million DKK contract with the Silicon Valley tech giant Palantir for the development and delivery of POL-INTEL and PET-INTEL (Rigspolitiet, 2016). Palantir is not just any tech company to deliver policing technologies for the Danish Police. The company was founded in 2003 to develop predictive software for counterterrorism operations. Today, they primarily deliver technology for defense, intelligence and more recently law enforcement agencies but also private companies, and it has an explicitly stated “mission to support Western liberal democracy and its strategic allies” (Palantir Technologies Inc., 2020, p. 86). Their software has been used by the US military in war-zones in Afghanistan and Iraq, by the US immigration services (ICE) to round up undocumented migrants for incarceration and deportation and currently Palantir is developing predictive technology for Pentagon’s drone program (Investor Alliance for Human Rights, 2020). These involvements have made Palantir target of campaigns and critique from

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3 The Danish police’s Intelligence service is called “Politets efterretningstjeneste”, abbreviated to “PET”
activists calling for the company to be accountable for the violence and human rights breaches they enable. The US-wide campaign #NoTechForIce for example have managed to get several Universities to cut their economic ties to the company (#NoTechForICE, 2020).

In the United States, policing based on the Palantir platform Gotham, have been shown to disproportionally target Black people and People of Colour and deepen the racial inequality in the carceral system (Brayne, 2017; The Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2018). This is the same system POL-INTEL is based on, although some of the features, these studies focus on, such as self-learning algorithms, are currently not enabled in the Danish version (Justitsministeriet, 2018). The Polices choice to have Palantir develop POL-INTEL did foster some criticism from, among others, Jesper Lund, head of the IT-political association [IT-politisk forening], noting that “Palantir’s systems are typically used for handling data on large groups of citizens who are not criminal suspects, in other words mass surveillance” (Gjerding and Andersen, 2016). This and other critiques have been dismissed by the Danish Police as irrelevant to the case of POL-INTEL (Gjerding and Andersen, 2016; Justitsministeriet, 2016c).

Advanced data-analysis platforms had already been on the official wish-list of the Danish Police for a couple of years, when POL-INTEL became a reality. The importance of new data platforms was emphasised in 2013 in an internal evaluation of the Danish police’s counterterrorism strategies (Poulsen, 2017; Justitsministeriet, 2020). In the years leading up to the acquisition of POL- and PET-INTEL there had been a heavy internal critique of the existing IT-solutions as being dysfunctional, outdated and getting in the way of the work rather than supporting it (Kejser and Bjørnholdt, 2015). For the Danish police, the acquisition of POL-INTEL was thus an important step towards aligning themselves with their longstanding aspiration towards more Intelligence-led policing (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldøven, 2016, p. 6), and a self-image as a modern police agency. In this light, it is not surprising that POL-INTEL was called “one of the most important strategic projects in the Danish Police” (Justitsministeriet, 2016a) and excitedly presented to the media as revolutionary and a new “super weapon” (Holst and Kildegaard, 2017; Klein, 2018; Kulager, 2018).

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4 it was in fact through the UK branch of this campaign, #NoTechForTyrants, I first got to know about Palantir and their involvement with the Danish police as I was briefly involved in their work while living in UK in 2019.
Before POL-INTEL, the legal regulation of the Danish police’s processing of personal data had been linked to the individual databases, in which the data was being processed. This meant that new legislation was needed in order to implement POL-INTEL (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016, pp. 5, 13). To provide the legal basis for this, the Law on Changing the Police law and Customs Law, in the following referred to as the POL-INTEL Law (2017) added a new paragraph, §2a, to the Police Law, stating that the police can “execute cross-analysis on the data they process” (Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2017, §1). The new paragraph also give a clear legal basis for the police to “collect and process data from open sources” (Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2017, §1) such as data from social media through the platform. Lastly, the new paragraph states that the precise uses of and data-protection measures related to cross-analysis will be specified in executive orders, thus leaving these questions out of public and parliamentary debates (Lund, 2017; Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2017, §1). While argued to be merely practical, necessary and reasonable changes, this law constitute substantial changes to the data processing practices and logics in the police.

With the political, institutional and legal contexts context of POL-INTEL laid out, I will now turn to the existing literature on POL-INTEL and other data-driven policing tools, that I argue in itself forms part of the context in which data-driven policing practices was developed.
Literature Review

POL-INTEL is still relatively undescribed in academic literature. Mette Volquartzen’s socio-legal perspectives on POL-INTEL is what comes closest to an academic discussion of how to define the system and its potentials for changing policing. She situates POL-INTEL as a part of a broader development in the Danish police towards intelligence-led policing and discuss the socio-legal consequences of the potential future use of the system for predictive policing (Volquartzen, 2018)

POL-INTEL is also briefly mentioned in David Sausdal’s ethnographic research on Danish police officers' practices of surveillance or ‘policing-at-a-distance’ (2018, 2019, 2020). Here he describes it as a “new pre-crime computer system named ‘Polintel’ with the ability to store, cross-reference, share and use big data” (Sausdal, 2020, p. 467).

In this section I will present existing literature on intelligence-led, predictive and big data or data-driven policing. I begin with a short presentation of the field of police research and its entanglements with policy and police institutions. I then go on to present the literature that have produced and discussed intelligence-led, predictive and data-driven policing tools and their impact on contemporary policing. I discuss both practice-oriented research aimed at narrow questions of “what works” in policing, literature that asks questions of how we are governed through data-driven policing and police abolitionist and critical race studies perspectives on data-driven policing. I conclude the section by situating my own research in relation to the presented literature.

Police Research, Power and Practice

Police research play a curious double role in my telling of the story of POL-INTEL as a data-driven policing tool. At one hand the research field has produced much of the existing knowledge on data-driven policing that I draw on and position my own research in relation to. At the same time the research field also works as an institutional context in which these technologies, practices and ideas have been produced. As I will discuss, the field is deeply entangled in policies, government funding schemes and the police institutions themselves, entanglements that have been important in the development of both the literature on and the very practices and technologies of data-driven policing.

Police research is generally understood as a sub-field of criminology, a field that according to Michel Foucault have always served the project of governmental power. Foucault dates the emergence of the field of criminology to the end of the 19th century, along with the prison as the primary technique of
penal punishment and as part of the broader project of disciplinary power (1979). While Foucault would argue that science is always enmeshed in power, he also specifically argued that modern criminology had remained “extremely close to the disciplinary power that shaped it” (Foucault in Garland, 1992, p. 403). Critical race scholars have added to this analysis, arguing that the technologies of prison and policing and the science that produced them, have been intimately linked to projects of racism and white supremacist capitalism (Davis, 2003; Gilmore, 2007; Browne, 2015). These critiques however in themselves point to the existence of a critical criminology, arguably nuancing Foucault’s argument that criminology is always inherently in the service of power (Garland, 1992; Reiner, 2007).

Robert Reiner dates the emergence of police research as an independent research field within criminology to the early 1960’s. He argues that the field for most of its history has been dominated by research “for” rather than “on” the police (Reiner, 2007) and especially since what he calls the 1990’s “watershed in discourse and research on policing”. In the 1990’s, governments all over Europe embraced neo-liberal economic politics focusing on resource-efficiency, evaluations and evidence-based practices in all public institutions including the police. In addition, Reiner argues, neo-liberal crime discourses of ”law and order” and effective crime-control largely displaced social and structural perspectives on crime and its causes from criminal justice policies. At the same time, the mid 1990’s saw a drop in crime-rates that – after decades of research concluding that policing had no effects on lowering crime-rates – sparked a new optimism about the potentials of policing. According to Reiner these developments sparked the emergence of a new paradigm of evidence-based policing, marked by an optimism that efficient and effective policing practices could be developed (Reiner, 2007). The imperative of evidence-based policing, summed up by one of its proponents, police researcher Lawrence Sherman, is that “police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best” (Sherman, 1998, p. 2). What follows from this, and has been argued by several high profile police researchers, is that police research in turn should

5 Research on the police have of course existed long before this. For example Michel Foucault, David Garland and Robert Reiner all discuss the polizeiwissenschaft or ‘police science’ that was influential in 18th century Europe (Garland, 1992, p. 407; Foucault, 2009; Bowling et al., 2016, p. 6; McQuade, 2019, p. 13)

6 Lawrence Sherman is himself a good example of the entanglement of research and practice encouraged by the paradigm of evidence-based policing. He started his career in the police and later turned to research. He also founded A Msc program for police pratitioners at Cambridge University.
increasingly be directed at questions of “what works” in policing – and preferably through large randomized controlled experiments mirroring other practice-oriented sciences such as medicine (Sherman, 1998; Shepherd and Pease, 2010; Bayley, 2015).

More recently, Reiner has argued that police research has moved towards an even bigger focus on crime control, intelligence-led policing and detailed crime-analysis, creating an increasing collaboration between researchers within and outside the police institutions (Davies, 2016). As a testimony to the effectivity of this paradigm, David Bayley argue that the majority of important innovations in policing the past decades comes from the field of academia, rather than the police institutions themselves (Bayley, 2015). This includes for example the idea of hot-spot policing (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995) and the first models for predictive policing (Mohler et al., 2011; Wang and Brown, 2012).

In the context of Nordic police research, Matthew Davies (2016) argues that we have now entered a phase of distinctly collaborative police research, leading to a narrow focus on policy-oriented research questions of “what works” and a possible erosion of research independence. Danish police researcher Lars Holmberg (2014) further argues that critical or independent researchers are increasingly denied access to do studies in the institutions, while police management increasingly try to direct research and control its output, resulting in a Nordic field of police research that is barely engaging with critical questions on the relation between police and society. While this might be the overall trend, exceptions count amongst others Leandro Schclarek Mulinari’s critical engagement with practices of racial profiling in Sweden (Schclarek Mulinari, 2019; Schclarek Mulinari and Keskinen, 2020), and Katja Franko’s critical research on border policing and criminalisation of migration (Aas, 2012; Aas and Gundhus, 2015; Franko, 2020).

Intelligence-led, Data-driven and Predictive Policing

From this presentation of the field, I will now dive into the literature on intelligence-led, data-driven and predictive policing, that all are relevant to understand POL-INTEL. These three concepts are often used in the same breath, but usually, predictive policing is understood as a form of data-driven policing, both of which belong to the larger paradigm of intelligence-led policing (Volquartzen, 2018; Egbert, 2019).

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7 Publishing under the names Katja Franko and Katja Franko Aas.
According to Jerry Ratcliffe (2003) the concept of Intelligence-led Policing emerged within police institutions in the UK in the 1990’s, as a response to calls for more effective policing strategies and more efficient use of resources. He defines intelligence-led policing as “the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base” (2003, p. 3). With intelligence-led policing, gathering, sharing and analysis of intelligence thus becomes increasingly central to all parts of the policing, resulting in an increasing reliance on surveillance technologies and data-analysis platforms such as POL-INTEL (Ratcliffe, 2003; Sheptycki, 2004). Intelligence-led policing share both aims and roots with the paradigm of evidence-based policing, and the two paradigms arguably work to support each other (Sherman, 1998; Ratcliffe, 2003; Davies, 2016; Sanders and Sheptycki, 2017).

One of the most cited examples of intelligence-led policing, often seen as foundational for data-driven and predictive policing tools is hot-spot policing (Bayley, 2015; Ferguson, 2017; Volquartzen, 2018). In 1995 Sherman and Weisburd argued in favour of using crime-data to identify crime “hot-spots” in which police departments should prioritise their resources. The idea was premised on the theoretical argument that crime is not randomly distributed but concentrated on a small percentage of the offenders and geographical area of a police precinct, that should thus be targeted instead of using resources on random patrols (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). With their work, keywords of targeted and proactive policing have come to define the paradigm of intelligence-led policing along with efficiency and efectivity (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Mohler et al., 2011; Davies, 2016; Gundhus and Jansen, 2020).

In 2011 Mohler et al. proposed a near-repeat model for “crime forecasting” as an improvement of “prospective hotspot maps”, a project widely recognised as the pioneering project of predictive policing (Mohler et al., 2011; Perry et al., 2013; Ferguson, 2017; Wang, 2018; Egbert and Krasmann, 2020). Mohler et al.’s project is arguably also a prime example of the entanglement of politics, research and practice. According to abolitionist carceral scholar Jackie Wang (2018), the ideas of predictive policing that had been circulating for a small decade before Mohler et al.’s project (see e.g. McCue and Parker, 2003; Bratton and Malinowski, 2008), were seen by politicians and police executives as possible solutions to both budget cuts and the “crisis of legitimacy” in the police - the dual crisis of the police’s perceived inability to reduce crime and the growing protests against racist police practices. Mohler et al.’s research project was initiated by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) that had received a research grant from the US Department of Justice specifically aimed at
developing predictive policing. LAPD reached out to researchers from University of California Jeffrey Brantingham, George Mohler, Andrea Betozzi and others, who were at the time involved in military-funded research on the use of earthquake algorithms to track insurgents and predict casualties in war zones overseas. This research was then redirected to “forecast crime” (Mohler et al., 2011; Wang, 2018).

Mohler et al.’s model draws on the same logics of proactive and targeted spatio-temporal policing as hot-spot policing. It further builds on the idea that crime-events, like earthquakes, follow a near-repeat pattern, with one background event provoking several aftershocks, which can be estimated through predictive algorithms. Based on this, Mohler et al developed a predictive algorithm that based on crime-data predict the time and place of future crimes (Mohler et al., 2011). They have later employed this model in the commercial predictive policing tool, PredPol, that marks city-maps with 500-by-500 square feet boxes in which the model predict the risk of crime-events (Wang, 2018, p. 243). Wang and others argue that the corporate interests and aggressive advertisement strategies of private companies as PredPol have been essential to the dissemination of the predictive policing models all over the world (Andrejevic, 2017; Wang, 2018).

The type of spatio-temporal predictive policing that predpol enables is what Andrew Guthrie Ferguson terms place-based predictive policing (Ferguson, 2017, p. 34). Other predictive policing models use algorithms to predict who are likely to commit (or being victims of) crime, what Fergusons categorizes as person-based predictive policing (Ferguson, 2017; Volquartzen, 2018). Palantir’s predictive software, that POL-INTEL is based on have been used for both types of predictive policing (Winston, 2018).

Despite promises of more efficient, effective and objective policing practices, several studies question the actual effectivity of predictive policing in reducing crime (Chan and Bennett Moses, 2016; Saunders, Hunt and Hollywood, 2016; Benbouzid, 2019). Mohler et al.’s self-evaluation of their near-repeat model (2015) unsurprisingly concludes a crime reduction on 7.4 % compared with the use of traditional hot-spot policing, but as Wang sardonically remarks “By scrutinizing the PR circuits that link the UCLA researchers to the police, and link Silicon Valley investors to the media, one realizes that essentially all claims about the efficacy of PredPol loop back to the company itself” (2018, p. 245). Other research attending to the effectiveness of predictive policing remain largely inconclusive (e.g. Saunders, Hunt and Hollywood, 2016), and many observers of the field point to a lack of access for researchers to the algorithms as well as the outputs of predictive policing practices.
leading to a lack of transparency about the effectiveness and effects of the practices (Perry et al., 2013; Chan and Bennett Moses, 2016; Hardyns and Rummens, 2018; Benbouzid, 2019).

Despite the wide use of the term inside and outside of academia, there is not one clear definition of predictive policing or what counts as a predictive policing tool. Often researchers define predictive policing as policing informed by algorithmic analysis of big amounts of data, used to predict the place and time, or the victim or offender of future crimes (Andrejevic, 2017, p. 883; Ferguson, 2017, p. 67; Volquartzen, 2018, p. 180; Egbert and Krasmann, 2020, p. 905). Others, however, do not see algorithms as a defining feature of the concept. For instance, Perry et al. define predictive policing as “the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical predictions” (2013, pp. 1–2). What they emphasise in their definition of predictive policing is the use of large amounts of data and the translation of data-analysis into action (Perry et al., 2013, pp. 11–15). This definition would for example include POL-INTEL as a predictive policing tool, because it enables data-based decisions on patrolling allocations.

However I will argue that a clear definition of a specific technology as a predictive policing tool or not is not essential to the research I present in this thesis, as many discussions of how predictive policing works to transform policing practices and many of the critiques of these practices are more focused on the gathering, cross-linking and general use of big amounts of data than on the specific form of analysis applied to them. These thus also apply to the broader category of data-driven policing, a term often used interchangeably with predictive policing, but that is not connected specifically to the use of algorithms (e.g. in Brayne, 2017).

Simon Egbert (2019) for example argues that predictive policing have made the police aware of the value on the data they have access to which have cleared the way for what he calls a platformisation of policing. This refers to a trend in which increasing amounts of data from different institutions, sources and systems are integrated and cross-linked through policing platforms, laying the ground for Big Data policing. Since these platforms work better the more data points they have, Egbert argues that the platformisation of police work creates incentives to produce more and more data (Egbert, 2019). Sarah Brayne also highlights the integration, cross-linking and expansion of data as the most transformative aspects of big data policing and police surveillance. She shows how the integration of databases leads to what she calls “function creep” - the use of data for other purposes than it was originally collected for, and how the use of big data effectuates a much lower threshold for what qualifies for an individual to be included in law enforcement data-bases (Brayne, 2017, p. 985).
Along with several other scholars, Egbert and Brayne points to the deepening and widening and increasing inescapability of the net of surveillance that data-driven policing is a part of, and how this surveillance increasingly takes place through monitoring, gathering and analysis of massive amounts of data from our everyday interactions (Aas, 2012; Lyon, 2014; Andrejevic, 2017; Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017; Wang, 2018; Egbert, 2019; Egbert and Krasmann, 2020).

Surveillance as Governance

A big body of literature on data-driven policing critically attends to the ways in which we are governed and made into subjects through data-driven policing and surveillance practices. Drawing on Foucauldian notions of governance, this literature tends to center concepts of risk, uncertainty, preemptiveness and different modes of power.

Long before the emergence of predictive policing, Feeley and Simon (1992) argued that a new penology, marked by actuarial discourses of risk and probability was replacing earlier Foucauldian forms of disciplinary power. While disciplinary power aimed at transforming the individual, the objective of this new penology is simply to “identify and manage unruly populations” (1992, p. 455), and for this, techniques of risk-assessment and predictions are used to “identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness” (1992, p. 452). They argue that dangerousness is attached specifically to the construction of “the underclass” and “the third world” that even in domestic settings are invoked to justify the need for social management (Feeley and Simon, 1992).

In a similar vein, Sanders and Sheptycki (2017) argue that Big Data policing constitutes a neo-liberal form of stochastic governance, driven by a new mode of production in which our everyday behavior and interactions are turned into data and monetized, producing statistic representations of worthiness, risk, and threat. They argue that “this stochastic governance use algorithmic calculation in order to privilege social, economic and political elites while simultaneously disciplining and categorizing (as ‘threatening’ and ‘risky’) the rest” (Sanders and Sheptycki, 2017, p. 11). Thus, like Feeley and Simon, they underscore the dividing and subjectification mechanisms and inequality produced through this kind of policing.

Similarly, Andrejevic (2017) argues that the predictive policing pushes beyond the aims and mechanisms of disciplinary power to constitute forms of pre-emptive power. This builds on the idea that it is possible to – through environmental surveillance especially of data - create a total representation of reality. This fosters the fantasy of pre-emption – the possibility to know the threats of the future and act on them in the present (Andrejevic, 2017). In a similar vein, Jackie Wang argues
that “predictive policing promises to remove the existential terror of not knowing what is going to happen by using data to deliver accurate knowledge about where and when crime will occur” (2018, p. 283). This existential threat that she calls a “crisis of uncertainty”, is at the same time productive for the legitimization of technologies such as predictive policing:

“Empirically, there is no basis for the belief that there is an unprecedented crime boom that threatens to unravel society, but affective investments in this worldview expand the domain of surveillance and policing and authorizes what Manuel Abreu calls “algorithmic necro-power.” The security state’s calculation of risk through data-mining techniques sanctions the targeting of “threats” for death or disappearance. Though the goal of algorithmic policing is, ostensibly, to reduce crime, if there were no social threats to manage, these companies would be out of business” (Wang, 2018, pp. 239–240).

In this sense both Wang and Andrejevic argue that the crisis of uncertainty, logics of total knowledge and pre-emptiveness present a fundamental change in how “threats” are perceived and acted on, and are used to justify an expansion of surveillance and state violence.

Several scholars point specifically to how the development and expansion of predictive and intelligence-led policing is linked to counter-terrorism policies, securitisation and militarization (Aas, 2012; Andrejevic, 2017, pp. 888–889; Brayne, 2017, p. 981; Diderichsen, 2019). Katja Franko Aas (2012) argues that counterterrorism policies at large have blurred the lines between the security tasks belonging to the domain of the military and police and led to a militarisation of the police, granting police institutions economic and legal means of surveillance and intelligence practices that were formerly reserved for military defense operations. Wang’s account of the development of PredPol also shows the links between military research and the development of the earliest forms of predictive policing. In line with this, several scholars argue that it is not only technologies but also logics that are imported from the military to the police domain, including the idea of pre-emptiveness, that is argued to be distinctly military in its aims and logic (Aas, 2012; Andrejevic, 2017; Diderichsen, 2019; Egbert and Krasmann, 2020).

Race and Data-driven Policing

Most of the literature on data-driven policing recognises that data-driven policing reproduce or intensify racial and/or class bias in policing practices (Harcourt, 2007; Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017; Selbst, 2017; Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018; Richardson, Schultz and Crawford, 2019; see Brantingham, Valasik and Mohler, 2018 for claims of the contrary). This is despite the fact that
predictive and data-driven policing has often been presented as more objective and unbiased decision-making tools, that can work to weed out the racism produced by individual bias amongst police officers and thus lead to more police accountability and legitimacy (Ferguson, 2017; Wang, 2018).

In Against prediction: profiling, policing, and punishing in an actuarial age, Bernard Harcourt (2007) argues that the new risk-based decisions in the criminal justice systems constitutes an actuarial form of justice in which decisions are based on suspicion attached to groups rather than individuals. He further points to the confirmation bias involved in these risk-assessments. In the case of policing, a high crime risk-assessment for a group or area, will lead to more policing, reports and arrests, which will lead to more data that predicts this group to be at an even higher risk of committing crime, leading again to more policing (Harcourt, 2007). Due to systemic racism and historic racist policing practices, this mechanism, often referred to in the literature as feed-back loops (see e.g. Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017; Selbst, 2017) especially produces over-policing of Black communities and communities of Colour.

While Against Prediction was written before data-driven policing really took hold, scholars as Brayne and Ferguson document how historic and systemic oppression enter data-driven policing tools through racially biased data, leading to racist policing practices (Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017). At the same time, both of them maintain that issues of racial and class bias can be at least partly addressed through mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, and both argue that data-driven policing, if used in the right way, has the potential to lead to less discriminatory policing practices (Brayne, 2017, pp. 997, 1004; Ferguson, 2017, p. 196). Critical race and carceral scholar, Joshua Scanell, however, does not care much for the idea that it is possible for the police to “code their way out of ‘bias’” (2019, p. 107). He argues that this idea ”revolve[s] around an essentially liberal, reformist concept of policing that obscures the broader and more fundamental violence enacted by digitizing the decision-making capacities of the carceral state” (2019, pp. 107–108), arguing that racism is at the core of policing itself. This critique is also at the center of the scholarship on data-driven policing that comes from the field of critical race studies, namely the work of Simone Browne (2015) and Ruha Benjamin (2016, 2019a, 2019b), who in different ways draw attention to how carceral technologies not only produce race and racial inequality, but how racial logics and histories are at their core.

Starting from the statement that: “surveillance is nothing new to black folks” (Browne, 2015, p. 10), but has been a condition of blackness since the Atlantic slave-trade, Browne ask us to let go of
techno-determinist ideas of surveillance as something brought about by new technologies. Rather it should be seen as ongoing and continued practices of control of black bodies, thus forcing us to look at how anti-blackness and racism factor into contemporary practices of surveillance. For this purpose, she introduces the concept of *racializing surveillance* that “signals those moments when enactments of surveillance reify boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines, and where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are negatively racialized by such surveillance.” (Browne, 2015, p. 16).

In a similar vein, Ruha Benjamin (2019b) argues for combining the lenses of critical Science and Technology studies (STS) and critical race studies to understand the continuation and transformation of racism that is embedded in the carceral technologies of our world. She paraphrases Michelle Alexander’s concept of *The new Jim Crow*, that draws attention to how contemporary racist systems work to recode “black” (as well as “poor” and “migrant”) as “criminal”, masking the mass incarceration of black people, as unrelated to racism. This new form of racism thus presents itself as more legitimate than previous forms of systemic and legal racism (Benjamin, 2019b). Benjamin puts this insight in conversation with STS studies with her concept *The New Jim Code*, that she defines as “the employment of new technologies that reflect and reproduce existing inequalities, but that are promoted and perceived as more objective and progressive than the discriminatory practices of a previous era” (Benjamin, 2019b, pp. 5–6). Her emphasis on technologies as reflective and reproducing rather than simply producing inequalities, ask us to see racist technologies in continuation with earlier (and future) practices of control, segregation, exclusion. Benjamin argues that the novelty of the technology of this era is that it pretends not to see race. When race is made relevant, it is thus seen as the neutral, objective work of a computer or an algorithm. However, this veil of objectivity, work as a smokescreen for the fact that technology, data and algorithms are always produced by humans situated in specific social, racial, and institutional structures, that the technologies are not separate from but part of. When analysing the relations between race and technology, Benjamin therefor ask us not to look for racist intents in the construction of technologies, but instead turn our gaze to the social and racial structures of power in which the technology is created, and how they enter the technology (Benjamin, 2016, 2019b, 2019a).

**Situating my Research in the Field**

POL-INTEL is still relatively undescribed in academic literature, and the literature on data-driven policing in a danish contexts is in general less than comprehensive. As discussed in the literature review, Volquartsen’s socio-legal discussions of POL-INTEL (2018) and Sausdal’s research on
‘policing-at-a-distance’ (2018, 2019, 2020) are exceptions to this picture. With the research I present in this thesis, I aim to contribute to the knowledge on data-driven policing in a Danish context and more specifically on POL-INTEL.

With a post-structuralist perspective that aims at analysing the problematisations and underlying assumptions that led to the implementation of and underpin the technology of POL-INTEL, I further aim to go beyond the “what works” approach to police research that dominate the field internationally as well as in a Danish context (Reiner, 2007; Holmberg, 2014; Davies, 2016).

Lastly, I will argue that the widespread idea, as expressed by head of the police union, Claus Oxfeldt, that there is no racism in the Danish Police, also influence Danish police research to a wide extent. This does not mean that issues of race and racism are not addressed (see e.g. Holmberg, 2000; Sausdal, 2018), but the analysis tend to be limited to individual practices and intentions. By looking at racial underpinnings of the problematisations in the policies and technology of POL-INTEL, I want to add race as an analytical category that is produced through and produces specific forms of policing and governing. For this, I draw on race critical and abolitionist perspectives on policing that have mainly been developed in a US context (Wang, 2018; Benjamin, 2019b; Scanell, 2019). Acknowledging that the carceral system and race relations, which these perspectives address, are specific to this particular context, I still find them useful as a starting point to explore the ways in which race play into practices and problematisations of policing in a Danish context.

With the positioning of my research made clear, I will turn to a presentation of the methodological and theoretical framework that has shaped my research questions and the ways in which I address them.
Methodological and Theoretical Framework

My research questions draw on the idea that policies and policing technologies contain *problematisations* and that these problematisations are important to scrutinize in order to understand how we are governed and policed. For this purpose, I draw on Carol Bacchi’s (2009) post-structuralist approach to policy analysis, “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR). Bacchi suggest to study the problematisations in policies, arguing that policies “give shape to problems; they do not address them” (2009, p. x). In this chapter, I will lay out the post-structuralist ontological and epistemological framework that underpins this work, introducing Foucauldian concepts of discourse, power and subjects and Bacchi's conceptualisations of governing, problematisations and policies. I then turn to Foucauldian, feminist and race-critical lenses through which I understand POL-INTEL as a technology, before I discuss how my epistemological, ethical and political investments in this project draw on Haraways concept of feminist objectivity.

Discourse, Power and Subjects

Before going into Bacchi’s conceptualisations of problematisations, policies and governing, I want to take on step back and look at the post-structuralist and especially Foucauldian understandings of discourse, power and subjects that underpin these. *Discourses* can be thought of as knowledges or truth claims that structure what it is possible to think, see, say and do (Bacchi, 2009, p. 35; Villadsen, 2017, p. 298). Foucault describes discourses as systems of statements which rather than being just “signifying elements referring to contents or representations” are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). He underlines the function of discourses as systems of divisions that constitute categories, concepts, binaries and the relations between them through dividing practices. (Foucault, 1972, pp. 38, 47–48; Bacchi, 2009, p. 16). In this way, through forming objects (and subjects) and the divisions and relations between them, discourses structures what is possible to think, say and do about something – they work to constitute reality in specific ways.

Discourses are in this sense closely related to a Foucauldian concept of power. Foucault understands power as discursive practices, or practices upon practices that accomplish things in the world, exactly by making certain actions possible and intelligible and others unthinkable. This notion of power as
practices also present power as dynamic and as working in and from every direction and all levels of the world, rather than being possessed and centralised in a state or a government. Simultaneously, discourses are themselves produced through social and economic power relations including structures of race, gender and class. They are subject to rules of formation, the specific historical political, institutional, and economic conditions that make certain discourses possible, make certain discourses become dominant and others disappear. In his work, Foucault has especially attended to how dominant discourses are produced and disseminated through institutional practices, and work to maintain the discursive dominance of those in control of these institutions – often the government. Since discourses, just like power, are dynamic and many-directed, and since many often contradictory discourses can coexist, clash and intertwine, these dominant discourses, though they might be taken for granted as truth are never uncontested, but always subject to power struggles (Foucault, 1972, p. 38; Bacchi, 2009, p. 19,37).

One way in which power works through discourses, is through shaping subjectivities. We are made into specific kinds of subjects through discursive practices of subjectification (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 38, 41; Villadsen, 2017, p. 311). Foucault writes: “This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life, categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects” (Foucault in Gannon and Davies, 2012, pp. 83–84). In this sense there is no such thing as a pre-discursive subject. Rather, we are made into subjects through discourses and as feminist post-structuralists Gannon and Davies note: “we are always within relations of power because we are always within discourse” (Gannon and Davies, 2012, p. 84). This also means that subjecthood should not be understood as neither essential or static, but precarious, full of contradictions and constantly reconstituted through discursive practices (Bacchi, 2009; Gannon and Davies, 2012, p. 82; Villadsen, 2017, p. 311).

Post-structuralist feminist, post-colonial and race critical scholars have used these notions of discourse to investigate how we become gendered, racialised and classed subjects and placed in social positions of oppression, privilege and power through different forms of subjectification practices. Drawing on the contestability and contradictions in subjectivity, these bodies of scholarship have also looked at how resistance to dominance can play out in these power-fields of subjectivity (Sharma and Papadopoulos, 2008; Bacchi, 2009; Gannon and Davies, 2012, p. 82; Browne, 2015; Benjamin, 2019b).
Governing, Problematisations and Policies

The notions of discourse, power and subjectivity described above are at the core of Bacchi’s conceptualisations of problematisations, policies and governing (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 30–32). According to Bacchi, the study of problematisations in policies allows us to get closer to the question of how we are governed at specific historic moment (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 30–32). She understands policies (and governing) as problematisation practices, that work to problematise issues, making them legitimate ground for political intervention. Rather than addressing problems, policies work to discursively constitute problems in the very process of offering policy-solutions to them. Bacchi calls these problem representations (Bacchi, 2009, p. 32). The way a problem is represented and understood, she further argues, have real impacts in the world. It has discursive effects, since a specific understanding of a problem structure what it is possible to think, say and do about it; it has subjectification effects since a specific understanding of a problem create categories of whom something is a problem for and who are responsible the problem through dividing practices, and lastly Bacchi argues, it has lived effects as a specific understanding of a problem have real material impacts on the life and death of people affected directly and indirectly by the policy (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 15–18, 40). In this sense, we are governed through problematisations and the problem representations they contain (Bacchi, 2009, p. 32).

Further, Bacchi argues, the forms of problematisations give insight to the specific form of rule or governing rationalities at a given historic time and place (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 1–2). In his work Foucault identifies a number of different governing rationalities and their different technologies, that though they might co-exist, have been developed under specific historical conditions. Sovereign power, he argues, is aimed at asserting rule over a territory and its subjects through techniques of the law, violence and pageantry. Disciplinary power is aimed at disciplining individuals into useful and governable subjects through technologies of surveillance, normalisation and self-discipline, famously exemplified with the penentiary prison. Bio-politics is aimed at controlling the population through techniques of statistical calculations and social and economic policies. These forms of rule, it can then be argued, poses the problem, that governing is aimed at in different ways, and produce different kinds of subjects through different forms of governing techniques and technologies (Foucault, 1979; Bacchi, 2009, pp. 26–27, 2010, p. 5).

In order to study these problematisations and the problem representation contained within them, Bacchi suggests that we look at policies. Her understanding of policies draws on a Foucauldian understanding of governing and power as decentralized, dynamic and working on all levels of
societal organization. For her, policies are thus not just laws and legislation, but include levels of administration and the everyday practices of professionals through which policies are enacted (Bacchi, 2009, p. ix). To understand how we are actually governed, it is thus worth to look beyond the level of what is normally seen as the state and include the range of institutions and everyday practices of governing that shape our lives (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26).

Drawing on Bacchis’ methodological framework, I understand the policies on POL-INTEL as forms of problematisations that represent specific problem(s), that POL-INTEL is presented as a solution to. Further, I understand these problem representations to have real effects in the world. In this research, I attend specifically to the discursive and subjectification effects of the problem representations I find. It is relevant to make clear that discursive, subjectification and lived effects are intimately interlinked. When I for example in the analysis argue that the problem representations in the policies on POL-INTEL constitute all Muslims as potential terrorists, the effects on subjectivities and lived life are closely linked together. The problem representation simultaneously shape Muslim subjectivities and lays the ground for hate-based violence and job market discrimination, over-policing and incarceration of Muslims. In this sense, when I focus on the subjectification effects of the problem representations, I do also assume that these have impacts on the life and death of people. However, I also acknowledge that an in depth analysis of these lived effects would require rich and detailed data on the impacts of POL-INTEL, the lived experiences of those impacted or of the everyday practices of the police, data that is not part of the material, I subject to analysis in this thesis.

POL-INTEL as a Technology

In this research, I adapt Bacchi’s methodological framework to conceptualise – and later analyse – the problematisations not only in policies but also in technologies. Though Bacchi’s understanding of policies include the ways in which policies are acted out through technologies (Bacchi, 2009, p. 30), she does not, at least to my knowledge suggest to apply the WPR approach to the problem representations of technologies in and of themselves (see e.g. Bacchi, 2009, p. 20)\(^8\). I

\(^8\) However, in a blog post Bacchi actually mentions technologies as problematisation practices when she adds a square bracket to a quote from her own book: “a WPR approach makes the case that every policy [and indeed every program and governmental technology], by its nature, constitutes a problematisation” (Bacchi, 2018, see original quote in 2009, p. 31). This square bracket addition leads me to think that Bacchi herself would not be entirely against my use of her work to analyse POL-INTEL as a technology.
however draw on her work to conceptualise POL-INTEL as a policing technology that in itself constitutes problematisations and subjectifications. My understanding of POL-INTEL as a technology is further inspired by Foucault (1979), Donna Haraway (1988) and Ruha Benjamin (2019b).

Foucault’s conceptualization of technologies refers not so much to machines, computers or industrial innovations, but rather to the technologies and techniques through which power is practiced, and through which we are governed (Behrent, 2013, p. 55). In Discipline and Punish, he attends to surveillance as technologies specific to disciplinary power and he highlights the examination, the many forms of measurements, writings and classifications of individuals and of individual difference as central in these technologies (Foucault, 1979, p. 185). Through these practices, that in a sense is the same as collecting and processing of data, the individual becomes describable and calculable – in a sense made visible – and constituted as a subject that can be disciplined and controlled. At the same time the accumulation and comparison of these “writings of the individual” makes it possible to fix norms, to categorize, describe and characterize groups, making visible the population as a whole and its divisions and hierarchies (Foucault, 1979, p. 190; Behrent, 2013, p. 85). In this sense, the collecting and processing of data are central to both the projects of disciplinary and bio-power, to disciplining individuals and controlling groups and populations. I use these notions to understand POL-INTEL as a technology of power, that through accumulations of categorisations of individuals work to constitute subjects and groups and subject them to discipline and control.

In understanding POL-INTEL as a technology of power, I also find Donna Haraway’s work on feminist objectivity, technology and vision valuable. In her work, she rejects traditional claims of disembodied objectivity, in which the subject is understood as separate and distant from the object that they see or study. Against these claims she insists that one can always only see from “somewhere”, and that the gaze from nowhere or everywhere, is in fact a gaze from the unmarked positions of power, of whiteness and maleness, a gaze that can “claim the power to see and not to be seen” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). She calls this illusion of the disembodied gaze the god-trick (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). Haraway further argues that the rapid growth in visualizing technologies within sciences tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism and male supremacy – which arguably include data-driven policing tools such as POL-INTEL – have intensified the meaning and myth of disembodied and infinite vision: “Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice. And like the god trick, this eye fucks the world to make techno-
monsters” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). With this quote, Haraway underlines the violence enacted and legitimized through technological god-tricks that claim infinite, disembodied vision. Like all other visions, these technologically mediated visions are situated, embodied and operating from places of and in the interest of power. Thinking with Haraway, I assert that POL-INTEL as all visualizing technologies constitutes a gaze from “somewhere”. The knowledge it produces is partial and situated, and all allusions to POL-INTEL as objective, unbiased and able to see “everything from nowhere”, allusions that in many ways are at the core of the entire paradigm of intelligence-led policing (see e.g. Ratcliffe, 2003) is a god-trick, that works to hide its relation to power.

The oppression inherent in the claims of technological objectivity is also a central point in Ruha Benjamin’s concept of the New Jim Code: “the employment of new technologies that reflect and reproduce existing inequalities, but that are promoted and perceived as more objective and progressive than the discriminatory practices of a previous era” (Benjamin, 2019b, pp. 5–6). With a focus on the racism reflected and reproduced particularly through data-driven technologies, Benjamin insists that these technologies are not separate from neither the humans that produce them, nor the power structures they are produced in. In this light, illusions of technological objectivity merely work to mask and legitimize the racial difference and discriminatory practices reproduced through these technologies. Benjamin emphasises, that this form of discrimination is rarely intentional. When analysing the racial impacts of technologies, Benjamin asks us to stop looking for racist intents in the building of the software, but instead turn our gaze to racial structures of power and the ways in which they enter technologies (Benjamin, 2019b, p. 24). When looking for the effects produced by POL-INTEL, I am similarly not interested in intents, but turn my attention to the situatedness of the production of the data the system uses, it’s functions and the often implicit, yet specific types of problems the system is asked to solve.

Feminist Epistemologies, Ethics and Politics

The poststructural insight that the subject is constituted within and never “outside” discourses and power relations, necessitates critical reflections on how we as knowledge producers understand our relation to the knowledge we produce and its political potentials (Gannon and Davies, 2012). Once again, I draw on Donna Haraway’s influential discussions on feminist objectivity, that not only provides useful metaphors for understanding technologies, but are useful for thinking about the relation between myself as a knowledge producer, the knowledge I produce, and the politics and ethics of this knowledge production.
Haraway’s insistence that one can always only see from “somewhere”, that all vision is embodied and situated leads her to a formulation of “feminist objectivity,” which as she writes “means quite simply situated knowledges” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). She argues that naming the knowledge we produce as situated and partial, is how we can begin to produce better, more objective accounts of the world. It also “allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583). In this sense, Haraway underlines that what makes feminist objectivity ethical is not a subscription to innocence, on the contrary it is in a commitment to accountability for the knowledge produced and its non-innocence, through acknowledging and making visible its situatedness and partiality.

With a commitment to feminist objectivity, accountability and non-innocence, I aim to make visible my own tools of vision and the position from which I see. In the previous and following sections of the thesis, I do this by describing the conceptual, methodological and analytical tools I use to see the object of my research with. Not only my theoretical situatedness, but also my gendered and raced position as a white woman is relevant for the knowledge I produce, because it is a position in which I am at very low risk of being specifically targeted by the data driven policing practices I study. The perspectives possible from this position are different from the perspectives of those who are at higher risk of being targeted by the system and by policing practices in general. I also acknowledge that I come to this research from a (non-innocent) position as an activist. My activist engagement with POL-INTEL started through campaigns against Palantir in Cambridge in 2019, and have continued through collective activist knowledge projects about the Danish Police while I have been writing this thesis. Political ideas and visions of anti-capitalism, anti-racism, feminism and abolitionism shared and discussed in these activist projects have informed my ways of thinking about this research and my background research for this thesis have informed the projects I am engaged in. While I acknowledge that a commitment to these visions reach far beyond the production of the knowledge I present here, one of the ways in which I invest in these visions with this work, is by questioning the taken for granted truths of data driven policing, and how power operates through these and thus contributing to the abolitionist work of opening up possibilities of other truths and other forms of justice (Browne, 2015; Benjamin, 2019b). In this, Gannon and Davies argue, lies the transformative potential of poststructuralist analysis: “By drawing attention to discourse and its constitutive force, its capacity to normalize and naturalize the subordination of some and the dominance of others, it enables us to transform how we think, making what seemed obvious and unquestionable no longer acceptable, no longer desirable, no longer thinkable. It thus opens us up to the not yet known, and to what Bergson (1911/1998) calls creative evolution.” (Gannon and Davies, 2012, pp. 84–85).
Methods and Data

My data material includes documents from different stages of formulation or implementation of the policies on POL-INTEL, across different institutional contexts as well as an interview, I did with two Danish police-officers who use POL-INTEL in their daily work. Before I present the data I will briefly describe how the different types of data material relate to the research questions and to each other. I will then the documents that are part of my data material and my method for collecting and understanding them as inspired by foucaults concepts of an archive of practical texts. I then go on to present the interview included in the data material and my the poststructuralist inspired methods for producing and understanding it, before I present my WPR-inspired strategy for analysing the data material.

As I will discuss, Bacchi specifically suggest to use practical texts such as pieces of legislation, regulations or policy-papers from different institutional levels as the starting point of the analysis problematisations in policies (and in my extension of her framework, also technologies) (Bacchi, 2009, p. 20). In line with this, the documents I analyse are used as data on the POL-INTEL policies across different institutional settings and stages of implementation. In addition, the documents outline specific functions, regulations and categorisations at work in POL-INTEL, and as such, they are also used as data on how the system itself constitute practices of problematisation. I depart slightly from the WPR approach by also adding an interview to the data material. At the same time, Bacchi emphasises that the ways in which policies are implemented and acted out in everyday practices are important parts of the policies, and the interview adds this aspect of the policies to the data, why I choose to include it as well (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26). The interview can be seen as a discursive event that produce accounts of the everyday policing practices that POL-INTEL enables, and that further activates some of the discourses and problematisations that are part of constituting these practices in the everyday work of the interview participants.

In combining different forms of data material, it can be argued that this research project has a mixed methods design, where different forms of qualitative data material work to complement each other in order to get a complex and multi-layered understanding of the studied issue (Frederiksen, 2017, p. 201). In the following, I will argue not to see the documents as separate entities, and likewise the interview should not be seen as separate from the rest of the data, but as part of the same discursive network that refers to the discursive object of POL-INTEL (Foucault, 1972, p. 130; Gannon and
In this sense, the different forms of data do not have different status in terms of their use in addressing the research questions. Instead, different strands of data material provide the empirical foundation for looking at the problematisations that surface in different levels and stages of the policy making and implementation process and practices related to POL-INTEL.

**Practical Texts on POL-INTEL**

In the process of finding and selecting data for this project I have gathered and read a vast amount of texts from legal, parliamentary and administrative levels of the acquisition and implementation of POL-INTEL. From this material I have chosen 11 core texts published in the period from 2015-2020, in total around 100 pages of written text that I consider my data-material together with the interview, and that my analysis is based on. In the next section, I will describe my methods for finding and choosing these texts, drawing on Foucauldian ideas of *practical texts* and the archive, but first I will give a short presentation of each text.

**Presentation of the texts**

The first text in my data material is the policy-paper “*A Strong Defense Against Terror*” (Regeringen, 2015a) in which POL-INTEL was for the first time presented as a policy-solution. It was published by the Danish Government, at that time a coalition led by the Social Democrats [Socialdemokratiet], in February 2015 and, as described in the background section, it was published in the specific context of and explicitly as a response the attacks on Krudttønden and the synagogue in Copenhagen few weeks earlier. The paper contains twelve policy-solutions to fight or prevent terrorism in Denmark. These are primarily aimed at the Danish police, military and intelligence services. These initiatives have a total cost of 970 million DKK, and in addition they require a number of legislative changes. One of these initiatives is to invest 150 million DKK in the “IT and analysis capacity” of the police and intelligence services: “*The government will invest in a new and advanced IT-system. This is intended to give the police and intelligence services a common data analysis platform, so they can make better use of the considerable amounts of data, that amongst other things can be targeted against terror threats and attacks*” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 4). This later became the two data analysis platforms PET-INTEL and POL-INTEL.

The next text in the data is another policy paper from 2015: “*A Strengthened Police – A Safer Denmark: Agreement on the Economy of the Police and Prosecution Service 2016-2019*” (Regeringen, 2015b) This is a broad political agreement between the government, at this point in
time led by the liberal party [Venstre] and a number of parliamentary parties. It sets out the economic framework for the police for the following four years. With this paper the initiatives aimed at the police form “A Strong Defense Against Terror”, including the decision to invest in data analysis platforms get the political economical foundation it needs.

In order to implement POL-INTEL, the system needed not only an economic, but also a legal basis, as the system enabled new data processing practices which the former legislation on the police’s handling of personal data did not address - namely cross-referencing and -analysis of data. This legal basis was created with the Law on change of the law on the police’s enterprise and the custom law (The Police’s use of data-driven analysis tools and access to information on flight passengers)\(^9\) (Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2017). In the following, I will refer to it as the POL-INTEL law. This law implements a new paragraph in the Law on the Police enterprise. This new §2a stipulates that the police can cross-reference data and collect and process data from publicly accessible sources – also called open-source data. This paragraph also states that further rules on the processing on data including for what purposes data can be processed and the data security measures required will be stated by the minister of Justice in executive orders. I have included the POL-INTEL Law in my data material together with the written motivation (Poulsen, 2017) and 33 pages of remarks (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016) by the Ministry of Justice, that accompanied the proposal for the law when it was presented in 2016.

In 2016 the Danish police signed a contract for the development, delivery and maintenance of POL-INTEL with the private tech company Palantir. This contract and the public tender for the contract are also part of the data material (Rigspolitiet, 2015, 2016). Apart from detailed descriptions of the technological capacities sought after in the system, these texts also present and constitute the relations between profit-driven enterprises and state-institutions through which POL-INTEL is produced.

Finally, the data material includes answers to parliamentary questions regarding POL-INTEL. In the Danish parliament, members of the parliamentary committees can submit “committee questions” [udvalgsspørgsmål] and all members of parliament can pose so called §20 questions to the minister

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\(^9\) The law also provides the legal basis for the police’s access to data on airplane passengers - another one of the initiatives in “A Strong Defense Against Terror”.
of a certain resort area, that the minister is expected to answer. These questions as well as the answers, often referred to as “minister’s replies” [ministersvar], are publicly available. The questions that refer to POL-INTEL are all posed to the Minister of Justice, and the replies have largely been obtained by the ministry from the National Police. In total, I found 29 six minister’s replies related to POL-INTEL. Of these I found six minister’s replies about POL-INTEL from the period 2016-2020 that I found relevant to include in my data material, because they give insights to data sources (Justitsministeriet, 2019, 2020), the purpose and functions of the system (Justitsministeriet, 2016a, 2018), the choice of contractor (Justitsministeriet, 2016c) and the legal basis for obtaining data through the system (Justitsministeriet, 2016b).

In the analysis chapter, I will only reference the data sources if I do not mention them specifically along the names listed in this section.

Building an Archive of Practical Texts

My understanding and method of constructing this specific collection of texts have been inspired by Foucault’s concept of the archive. Foucault use the term archive to describe the “system of the formation and transformation of statements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 130), statements here referring to the actual discursive events that are part of a specific discourse. The archive can thus be seen as the collection of statements through which we can study a discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 131; Villadsen, 2017). POL-INTEL is not in itself a discourse, but rather a discursive object (Foucault, 1972, p. 48), but the archive is still a useful image for seeing how the texts referring to this object are related to each other and to POL-INTEL. In seeing the texts as part of an archive, I understand them not as separate entities, but as points in a discursive structure, inseparable from the other texts in this structure (including texts that are not part of the data material), and inseparable from the institutional practices that they produce and are produced through and the power relations they are embedded in (Foucault, 1972, p. 130). Kasper Villadsen (2017) proposes that a useful archive for analysing a specific discursive object can be constructed by following implicit and explicit references within the texts that refer to this object. When the texts starts to display a form of circularity of internal references, Villadsen argues, a useful archive for discourse analysis starts to take form (2017, pp. 304-305). In constructing my archive, I have followed what Villadsen would call implicit references within the texts, more specifically all references I could find on POL-INTEL across practically all genres of texts through searches on different online databases of academic, parliamentary, legal and journalistic texts, as well as generic search engines. I have also followed the explicit references between texts on POL-INTEL. For example, the different pieces of legislation on POL-INTEL refer
to each other, as the description above shows, and they refer explicitly to the policy-papers included in the data. This process has led me to collect a vast number of texts with an enormous amount of internal and external references. From this, I have chosen 11 practical texts that have been part of the political processes, acquisition processes and implementation processes of the policies on POL-INTEL.

Practical texts are according to Foucault texts that offer “rules, opinions or advice on how to behave” (Foucault in Bacchi, 2009, p. 34), texts that tell us what to do and direct certain practice. As Bacchi argues, directions for what to do are always linked to specific ways of representing the problem that action is directed at and are directions are therefore useful points of entry to study problematisations (Bacchi, 2009, p. 34; see also Villadsen, 2017, p. 305). The policy-papers, legislation and contracts described above are all practical texts that very explicitly direct action. I also argue that minister’s replies are practical texts that direct the practices of the institutions that need to provide answers to the questions, in this case the Ministry of Justice and the National Police. Apart from answering, these institutions are also held accountable for their practices through the questioning process. What all these practical texts have in common is that the practices they direct work to constitute POL-INTEL as policy and policing technology. For these reasons, I see them as useful material through which to study the problematisations within the POL-INTEL policies and technology across different institutional settings.

Doing Interviews in the Danish Police

The data material I subject to analysis also includes an interview with two Danish police officers who use POL-INTEL in their daily work. Initially, I hoped to include several research interviews, in order to include a wide range of accounts of the every-day policing practices shaped by POL-INTEL in the data. However, access to interviews in the police proved difficult, something I will discuss later in this section. While a broader interview material would have given richer material on the discourses and problematisations from different positions and contexts within the police, the interview I include still gives access to accounts of the everyday use of POL-INTEL in policing practices and the discourses that constitute them.

Interview Guide and Situation

I used a semi-structured interview guide (see appendix A) for the interview, creating a framework of themes, questions and exercises that could shape the direction and content of our conversations towards my research questions, while leaving space to follow unexpected perspectives brought up by
the interview participants themselves (Brinkmann and Tanggaard, 2015, p. 37). In the first part of the interview, I tried to get close to the problematisations as well as the subject positions they produce by asking for concrete practices of using the tools, inviting the participants to tell stories of what is done by whom and to whom. In order to get closer to ideas of what problem(s) POL-INTEL is seen to address, I also asked about more general reflections on police work and how it is affected by new technologies like POL-INTEL (Højgaard, 2010). Even though the participants were invited to engage with each other’s responses, this part of the interview guide created an interview form close to that of individual research interviews, where the main interaction is structured through questions asked by the researcher and responses given by the participants (Halkier, 2015, p. 139). In the last part of the interview, I presented an opinion piece on racial profiling practices in the Danish police (Appendix B), and asked the interview participants to talk about this text in relation to their work as data analysts. In this sense this part of the interview situation was arguably more alike to a focus group where the intention is to facilitate interaction between the interview participants. The interaction between the two participants became more apparent, with more explicit negotiations of racism, responsibility and the role of technology as well as more explicit positionings within their relations (Halkier, 2015, p. 143). During the interview I recorded what was said, and I have later transcribed this recording. In order to secure the anonymity, I used pseudonyms for both the participants and for other identifiable persons and places in the transcriptions. To secure confidentiality, I used a recorder without access to the internet and the interview recordings as well as the transcriptions have only been stored on a secure hard drive (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017).

Drawing on poststructuralist epistemologies, I understand the interview material as a co-production between me and the two police officers. This co-production is inseparable from the specific situational context of the research interview, the specific institutional contexts of the police institution and the specific historical political, social, cultural and economic context with its gendered, racial and classed structures of power (Gannon and Davies, 2012). My own role as coproducer of the material is evident in my framing of the interview and construction of the interview guide (Højgaard, 2010, p. 13). In addition, the participants asked to my opinions and my intentions with framing the interview in certain ways. According to Bente Halkier, in focus group interviews, where you want to study the discourses circulating in a certain group or institution, the researcher should function as a moderator, taking a step back from discussions as they unfold (Halkier, 2015, p. 144). However, I found it more fruitful to engage in these discussions as an active participant myself, acknowledging my role as coproducer of the material, and subjecting myself to
feminist methodological ethics by being transparent about how I was situated in relation to the
interview participants, topic and situation (Gannon and Davies, 2012).

The interview participants were explicitly interviewed in their function as police officers, a
positioning that was activated through our initial communication, that went through the police
institution as I describe below. By interviewing the two officers together and thus bringing their
relation as co-workers and shared institutional discourses into the interview situation, their
positioning as part of the police institution was probably even more present in the interview than if I
would have interviewed the two officers individually (Halkier, 2015, p. 141). In addition, the
interview was physically situated in the workplace of the two officers, making the police institution
present as context for the interview in very concrete ways.

Establishing Contact with the Police

In order to produce interview material containing accounts of the everyday use of POL-INTEL, my
criteria for interview participants was simply that they had to be police officers within the Danish
Police who used POL-INTEL in their daily work (Halkier, 2015, p. 140). My recruiting strategy
involved using both official channels of communication with the police and to try and reach potential
participants through my own network (Karpatschof, 2015). Most of my advances resulted in non-
replies or polite declines, often stating that the time was too strained and meeting impossible, due to
the current Covid-19 pandemic.

Before I started contacting the police for recruitment, I had informal talks with people who work
within the police, and who therefore had an insight to what I could expect as a researcher
approaching this institution (Raudaskoski, 2017, p. 102). These contacts were generally sceptical to
whether I would manage to establish any contact, and as such, though the lack of success of getting
access was disappointing, it did not come as a surprise. In fact, the difficulties of getting access to
interviews and field work with police workers is a reoccurring theme within the literature on Nordic
police research (Holmberg, 2014; Davies, 2016). Davies (2016) describes a trend where more
research is conducted either within or in close collaboration with the police institutions themselves.
While providing easier access to data for the researchers who are enmeshed in the police institutions,
it results in growing difficulties for and unwillingness towards researchers placed outside of and with
no links to police institutions, that Davies terms outsider outsiders, especially if their research is not
aimed at narrow questions of “what works” in the police (Davies, 2016). Holmberg (2014) echoes
this concern and describes an increase in the general suspicion towards police researchers, that has
at times resulted in concrete attempts from Danish police institutions to control research designs and results, in order to protect the public narrative about the police. As a student researcher with no critical publications on my CV, I might not be seen as a threat to the public image of the police. However, it is reasonable to assume that the general environment of suspicion toward researchers and especially towards those who in Davies’ terms can be described as outsider outsiders, played a role in my limited success with gaining to access the field (2016).

In any case, one of my efforts of calling local police stations, ended up establishing contact to my two interview participants. They were two men, who were colleagues and working on the same team in a data-analysis unit in a local department of the Danish police. The contact went through two other people in the police institution, who had more authority in the institution than the interview participants and who functioned as gate-keepers in the recruitment process (Karpatschof, 2015). Apart from the initial project description that I sent to the gatekeepers, I was asked to forward the interview questions for approval by the legal advisors of the police department due to issues of confidentiality regarding the workings and strategies of policing tools. Rather than specific questions, I forwarded broad interview topics that ended up being approved. The fact that my interview guide in this sense had to be approved, not only by the legal department, but also by the gatekeepers, did shape my choices of what to include in it, and even if I did not commit to following it exactly, it did affect the content of the interview. For example, I knew that questions about the use of specific types of data would not be approved by the legal department. As this list of topics was also sent to the interview participants, it also worked as a framing of the interview for both me and the participants by already before the interview took place, shaping what was deemed relevant knowledge and thus what it is possible and meaningful to say in the interview itself (Højgaard, 2010, p. 13). This exemplifies how the production of the interview material is deeply embedded in the context and practices of the police institution, and that these shape the interview material in a myriad of different ways (Højgaard, 2010).

Apart from the list of topics, the interview participants also received a quite detailed description of the research project and information that I wanted to interview them as part of a master thesis project on Lund University. In addition, I also sent the interview participants information on the terms of participating in the interview, that the interview was voluntary, that consent to participate could be withdrawn at any point in the process, that they would remain anonymous and that the interviews would be recorded and transcribed (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017).
In the beginning of the interview, it became clear that the interview participants had an understanding, that I was studying criminology, not gender and migration studies. I had mentioned my field of study in the initial phone conversations used to establish the contact, but I had not been clear about it in my letter to the interview participants. Though I did not mean to hide this fact, my awareness of the possible suspicion against me as a researcher have probably played a role in the fact that I down-played my institutional entanglements, knowing that gender and migration studies are disciplines that are often associated with radical leftist politics and critique of governmental institutions. While there are definitely ethical implications of not being more transparent about my academic positioning (Haraway, 1988; Vetenskapsrådet, 2017), it also backfired in terms of building trust. The sense that I had downplayed my situatedness in a field that is assumably critical towards the institution the interview participants belong to is likely to have seemed a bit suspicious to the interview participants, and we started off on a bit of an awkward note. I tried to rebuild trust by later on in the interview engaging honestly and openly in conversations about my own reasons for asking specific questions, especially when talking about difficult topics such as racial profiling. By making my critical approach clear when asked, I made clear that I was genuinely curious about their thoughts and practices on this topic, rather than setting up a trap for them to say something that could be used against them. At the same time, I made myself open for their critic and corrections of my assumptions about their work as police officers.

Analysing the Data: What’s the Problem Represented to be?

The data material described above provides the empirical foundation for addressing my research questions: “What problematisations and forms of subjectifications are constituted in and through the policies to acquire and implement POL-INTEL in the Danish Police?” and “What problematisations and forms of subjectifications are constituted in and through the technologies of POL-INTEL?”. In the formulation of these questions and in the analysis of the data that I use to address them, I am inspired by Bacchi’s (2009) “What’s the problem represented to be?” approach to policy analysis. This consists of the following six analytical questions, and directions for how to apply them:

1. “What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy?”
2. “What presuppositions or underlying assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?”
3. “How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?”
4. “What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought of differently?”
5. “What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?”
6. “How/where has this representation of the problem been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 2)

I use these questions to ask not only about the problem representations and problematisations in policies, but also about the problem representations in POL-INTEL as a policing technology. Rather than following the questions systematically, I use them as part of an integrated analysis of my research questions. The formulation of my research questions draws heavily on question 1, 2 and 5 above, and these questions are therefore centered in the analysis, but when relevant I also draw on other of the questions.

In my analytical work, I have started by asking what the problem is represented to be in the policies and later in the technology (Question 1) in order to clarify what actually can be read from the policies and technology about what problem POL-INTEL is presented to address – in my analysis for example “terrorism” and “crime” – and how these problems are represented. When looking at how these problems are more specifically represented, Bacchi suggests looking at the policy-solutions and how they work to formulate and present the problem, something I return to all through the analysis. In an attempt to apply this same logic to the problem representations in POL-INTEL as a policing technology, I look at the specific forms of data, categorisations, regulations and forms of processing in the system and how they work to formulate and present the problem.

In the analysis, I then use Question 2: “What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’” to go further in understanding the problematisations in the POL-INTEL policies and technology. This question brings attention the discursive structures or conceptual logics that the problem representations draw on to make them intelligible and legitimate political interventions. In other words, I ask about the taken-for-granted truths implicit in the problem representations. In addressing this question I follow Bacchi’s suggestion to focus on concepts, binaries and categories in the texts (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 7–9).

I pay attention to the Concepts that are evoked in the texts, as they can be seen as grounds for discursive battles, giving access to see the discourses at play through their inconsistencies and contradictions. Bacchi describes concepts as relatively open-ended, meaning that they can hold very different and often contradictory meanings that promote different interests. At the same time the open-endedness is relative in the sense that the meanings of concepts are often deeply rooted in
historical institutional practices (Bacchi, 2009, p. 8). This is for example the case with the concept of “Terror” that is central in my analysis.

I further pay attention to binaries, because they can be seen as an analytical window into the conceptual logics of a policy. Binaries are in themselves a form of assumption, and what they assume is that something is different from and excluded from something else. They also almost always imply a hierarchy, and thus binaries produce relations of not only difference but also of privilege and power (Bacchi, 2009, p. 7). This is for example the case in the binary “us” and “them” that is very present in the policy-papers, and defined through racializing nationalist and western discourses, and also taken-for-granted binaries like “criminal” and “non-criminal”.

Like binaries, categories constitute and are constituted through definitions of something as different and separate from something else or dividing practices. Bacchi especially focus on people-categories or subject categories and what they say about how a problem is understood, who it is understood to effect and who is responsible for it (Bacchi, 2009, p. 9). In relation to POL-INTEL this includes categories such as “terrorist” and “criminal”. Categories of crime are also interesting to look at in order to understand how a problem is presented and discursively underpinned. In line with this, Benjamin focuses on how categories of race and crime are often discursively linked and how race itself is produced through categorization or dividing practices – for example through data driven technologies (2019b).

My research questions specifically ask to the forms of subjectification produced through POL-INTEL policies and policing technologies. Here I draw on Q5: “What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?”. This question implies an understanding that specific ways of presenting a problem in policies has specific discursive effects, subjectification effects, and lived effects, and that these effects affect different people in different, inequal and often harmful ways (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 15–18). In the analysis I attend specifically to the subjectification effects, by looking at how subject categories not only shape how a problem is understood, but also how they work to produce subjects. Looking at the subjectification effects of the POL-INTEL policies and technologies means looking at the subject categories they make available, how they are racialized, gendered and classed, but also looking at the technologies and dividing practices that work to produce and subject individuals to these subject positions (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 16–17).

I see the relations between the texts and the contexts within which they are produced a part of the material I analyse. In practice, this means that I have mapped the relationship between the texts and
the institutional settings in which they are produced, but also that I attend to the social, political and economic power-relations in which the texts are embedded. In this I am assisted by a theoretical framework that makes visible the racial, economic and political power structures that enable and shape the implementations and uses of data-driven policing (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 20–21; Villadsen, 2017).

Before subjecting the documents and interview transcript to this form of analysis, I have coded the data material through the qualitative coding software Nvivo. For this, I created a code-tree based on the dominant concepts in the data such as “intelligence-led policing”, “safety and security” and “democracy”, as well as dominant categories and binaries in the data including categories of crime and different people categories. I also coded for places where explicit problem representations could be read off of the texts (Kristiansen, 2015, p. 485). The code-tree can be found in appendix C.
Analysis

In the beginning of this thesis, I set out to uncover the problematisations and forms of subjectification constituted in and through the policies to acquire and implement POL-INTEL in the Danish police and as well as through POL-INTEL as a technology. To address these questions, I start this chapter with a presentation of the different problems POL-INTEL is presented to address in the policies. I then draw on critical perspectives on the militarization of policing, to analyse a notable shift in the policies over time from a presentation of the system as a solution to terrorism to a solution to crime. Following this, I dive into these two dominant problematisations and the forms of subjectification they entail. I first discuss how terrorism is presented as an external and othered problem, and how this formulation of terrorism draws on and reproduces nationalist and colonial subject categories of “us” and “them”. I then go on to analyse the problematisation of crime and discuss the presentation of crime as a problem of the racialized other and as both complex and predictable. I further discuss how the problem representations of terrorism and crime in both the policies and technology of POL-INTEL draw on and legitimate logics of pre-emption, and what this means for how we are governed through POL-INTEL.

POL-INTEL: From Urgent Response to Terrorism to Everyday Crime Control

To address my research questions, I start asking the very first question in the WPR approach: what are the problems represented to be in the policies on POL-INTEL?. More precisely, what I am interested in is what problems POL-INTEL are presented to solve throughout the texts in the data material. Bacchi notes that one policy often contains more than one problem representation (Bacchi, 2009, p. 4), and throughout the different texts, that I use as data for the policies on POL-INTEL, POL-INTEL is unsurprisingly presented as a solution to a number of different problems.

The decision to buy POL-INTEL was first presented as one of the 12 initiatives in the policy-paper “A Strong Defense against Terror”. This policy-paper was explicitly formulated as a response to the Copenhagen Shootings in February 2015, and the title of this paper quickly present the problem that the policy-solutions in the paper address as a problem of terrorism. In this paper, the proposed platforms that later will become POL-INTEL and PET-INTEL are argued to make the police and intelligence services able to “identify and localise potential perpetrators before a terror attack or other severe acts of crime are committed,” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 5). Crime is in this way mentioned...
as a secondary purpose for which the systems can be used. However, in this paper it is the problem of terrorism that works to make POL-INTEL understandable as a necessary and legitimate policy intervention. The political agreement on the police’s economy 2016-2019, “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark”, presented few months later, secures the economic foundation for POL-INTEL. In this paper, terrorism is presented as the first of a list of areas of special priority for the police in the following four years, and along with other initiatives, POL-INTEL is once again presented specifically as a policy-solution to the problem of terrorism.

This changes in the following texts in the data - the legislative texts, the contract and tender for POL-INTEL, the ministry answers and the interview – in which the problem of terrorism is almost imperceptible. Instead, POL-INTEL is primarily presented as a solution to different problems of crime. Curiously, even though POL-INTEL was only mentioned under the headline of terrorism in “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark”, the exact same issues that this paper lists as other priorities are often presented as the specific problems that POL-INTEL is first and foremost intended to address, and often with explicit reference to the policy-paper (see e.g. Rigspolitiet, 2015, p. 6; Justitsministeriet, 2016a). These issues include border-crossing crime, organised gang crime, crime and disorder in “vulnerable neighbourhoods”¹⁰ and cybercrime (Regeringen, 2015b). Through these issues, POL-INTEL is predominantly presented as a solution to a problem of crime.

This problem is closely linked to two other problems also highlighted in “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark” and referred to throughout the data. First of all, a problem of scarce resources, formulated mainly through the aspiration to “modernise the police” through resource-efficiency including more intelligence-led policing and other technology-based solutions such as POL-INTEL, that can help allocate police resources more efficiently. Second of all a problem of migration, formulated through the presentation of POL a -INTEL as a solution to border-control, illegal immigration and border-crossing crime (Regeringen, 2015b).

The presentation of and remarks to the proposal for the POL-INTEL law from 2016 examplify these problem formulations. Here, the law is first and foremost presented as addressing “a more complex crime picture” (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016, p. 4), characterised by an increase in IT-based crime, organized and cross-border crime and gang crime.

¹⁰ I have translated “vulnerable neighborhoods” from the Danish term “særligt udsatte boligområder” or “SUB-områder”. These are areas that the police designate as in need of extra police attention, based on crime statistics.
The police’s success with fighting these types of crime, it is further argued, is dependent on complex data-analysis through systems such as POL-INTEL, and by extension a legal framework that supports these forms of analysis. In addition, it is argued that the increasing amount of police tasks outside the criminal justice area, will also be made easier by the crosslinking of data and use of open-source data proposed in the law. These tasks include “unwarned incidents” – a term that throughout the data mostly seem to refer to terrorist threats, as well as “targeted immigration control” and “public order” (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016, p. 4).

With the reference to unwarned incidents, as well as a swift reference back to the initiation of POL-INTEL in “A Strong Defense against Terror”, the problem of terrorism is not completely absent from this text, but it is significantly downplayed, and replaced (and to some extent merged), with the problem of crime. This is a pattern that I have also observed in the contract and tender for POL-INTEL, the ministry answers and the interview. I thus find that the policies on POL-INTEL initially presented POL-INTEL as a solution to terrorism, but over time increasingly presents the system as a solution to crime.

**Terrorism as a State of Exception**

In critical discussions of surveillance, it is often pointed out that terrorism is routinely used as an argument for implementing invasive techniques of surveillance and legislations limiting data privacy rights, that are then employed for a wide range of everyday law enforcement and governance purposes. Jasbir Puar (2017) for example points to how “the war on terror” instigated by the Bush-administration after 9/11 have presented the threat of especially Muslim and Sikh terrorists as constituting what Giorgio Agamben calls a “state of exception”. This can be understood as state crisis used to justify extreme and violent measures of the state “in the name of the preservation of a way of life and those privileged to live it” (Puar, 2017, p. 9). Expanding on this point, Puar further argues: “The temporality of exception is one that seeks to conceal itself: the frenzied mode of emergency is an alibi for the quiet certitude of a slowly normativized working paradigm of liberal democratic government, an alibi necessary to disavow its linkages to totalitarian governments” (2017, p. 9). Arguably, this temporality of exception can be seen in the timing of the presentation of “A Strong Defense against Terror”. The paper was presented only few weeks after the Copenhagen attacks and in what can easily be seen as a “frenzied mode of emergency”. The fact that POL-INTEL at this point had been on the wish list of the police for several years suggests that this timing worked to effectively legitimise and normalise it as a response to crime and security issues in a Danish context. The opening lines of “A Strong Defense Against Terror” also invoke the sense of urgency and exception constituted by the problem of terrorism:
"We live in a world in which violent forces aim to attack our democracy and our liberty. We saw this in the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, and in the attack in Copenhagen last weekend.

The Government will at all times defend Denmark and secure the safety of the citizens. We will defend our society and our values.

*Therefore, the authorities that guard our safety, should have access to the tools and resources, that are necessary*” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 1).

With this presentation of “violent forces” as an urgent and exceptional existential threat to the Danish nation, the “tools and resources” presented in the paper, are discursively constituted as more “necessary” and more adequate and legitimate than they might have if the timing and context had been different.

**Military Technologies and Pre-emptive Logics in Policing**

When POL-INTEL later in the process of implementation is no longer presented as a response to the urgent state of exception that terrorism constitutes, but rather as a tool to police crime more broadly, it can be argued to be an expression of what many scholars argue is a tendency towards a militarisation of the police, characterized by a blurring between the domains, discourses and technologies of the military and the police (Aas, 2012; Gilmore and Gilmore, 2016). Katja Franko Aas links this tendency specifically to the phenomenon of terrorism: "*As a phenomenon, terrorism inhabits the increasingly blurred terrain between internal and external security, crime and warfare and the police and military domains,* "(Aas, 2012, p. 244). The statements and policy-solutions in “A Strong Defense against Terror” and “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark” work to formulate terrorism as an attack on the nation, and thus as a problem of external security which would traditionally be the domain of the military. At the same time the terrorism is clearly presented to be under the domain of the police and PET, institutions that are traditionally responsible for the preservation of law, order and security within the borders of the nation. This blurring of domains can also be read from the allocation of resourced proposed in “A Strong Defense against Terror” where 497 million DKK are directed to the police and PET, and 415 millions to the military, while the last 59 million are directed to the foreign ministry for different diplomatic initiatives (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 13). In addition I wil argue that several of the policy-solutions to terrorism in “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark”, also work to blur the domains of the military and the police, when they include better shooting training, better protection gear and an upgrade of weapons for the police (Regeringen, 2015b, pp. 4–5). Through the policy-solutions in these two papers, terrorism is thus presented as a
problem of national security largely under the domain of the police, while the police is presented as more akin to the military in tasks, skills and equipment. Arguably then this representation of terrorism blurs the boundaries between the military and police domains, discourses and technologies and make the way for a militarisation of the police.

It is interesting to look at the technology of POL-INTEL from this perspective. According to Aas, criminal justice and military thinking have in the last decades been shaped by an actuarial form of surveillance that sanctions “preventive action” or “the expanding right to engage against emerging threats” (Aas, 2012, p. 245). Aas illustrates this logic with the use of drones to surveil, target and kill subjects that based on predictions are defined as threats. Predictive drone technologies were initially developed for military use and have later been employed for purposes of urban crime-control (Aas, 2012). As I describe in the second chapter of this thesis, the pioneering predictive policing tool PredPol, similarly built on research that was intended to assist the military in monitoring and tracking insurgents, and Palantir’s platforms, including the platform Gotham, were also initially built for military operations. Gotham is the platform that POL-INTEL is based on, and while it has been widely deployed and further developed for policing purposes, the marketing of this platform, still presents it in distinctly military terms using images and language primarily from the military domain (Palantir, no date). Looking at POL-INTEL’s technological history and the way the technology is used to direct “preventive action” based on data-analysis and risk calculations, it can therefore be argued that POL-INTEL embodies this “expanding right to engage against emerging threats” that Aas describes a logic that is argued to stem from the military sphere. I will explore this specific rationality, that Andrejevic with a different term calls a preemptive logic of power (2017) further in the following sections of the analysis.

Coming back to the shift from the problematisation of terrorism to the problematisation of crime, I conclude this section by arguing that POL-INTEL can be seen as an example of the “insidious application of militarized systems and rationalities to domestic territories and populations,” (Gat in Aas, 2012, p. 245), that marks the development towards a militarization of the police.

The Problem of Terrorism

I will now turn my gaze to the specific ways in which the problem of terrorism is represented in the policies on POL-INTEL and the ways in which POL-INTEL is presented to address this problem. To begin with I want to note that the concept of terrorism, what is counted as terrorism and what is not, has been critically scrutinized through critical, feminist and post-colonial studies. Feminist scholars,
such as Judith Butler have for example questioned the taken-for-grantedness with which non-state actors are defined as terrorists and states as counter-terrorism for the same or similar behavior (Butler, 2016). Others feminists have criticized the failure to conceptualise domestic and wartime sexual violence as acts of terrorism (Johnson, 1995; Card, 1996), and post-colonial and intersectional feminists have examined the intersections of gendered, racialized and imperialist underpinnings and weaponisations of the concept of terrorism (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015; Puar, 2017). With this work in mind, I understand the concept of terrorism and its delineations as contested, and as constituted through gendered, racialized and colonial discourses of power. In the above I argued that the policies on POL-INTEL represented the problem of terrorism as a state of exception. In this section, I analyse the ways in which terrorism is more specifically represented in the policy-papers “A Strong Defense against Terror” and “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark”. Here, I especially focus on how the problem representation constitute a binary of we under threat and a them that is external and other to this we and who constitute the threat against it. I begin this by exploring how the we under threat is formulated in the texts.

The Western, Danish Nation-State under Threat

To explore this we, I will once again use the opening lines of “A Strong Defense against Terror”. The first two lines of the paper reads: “We live in a world in which violent forces aim to attack our democracy and our liberty. We saw this in the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, and in the attack in Copenhagen last weekend,” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 1). I will argue that the we presented in these here is constructed as distinctly Western. It transgresses national borders and binds together places such as Copenhagen and Paris, both placed in European nation-states, through what is presented as shared values of democracy and liberty, concepts that are often linked to the construction of the West as progressive and enlightened (El-Tayeb, 2012). In fact, the words “other western countries” appear only few lines later, making explicit the construction of this we as specifically Western. Manuela Boatcă describes how the relationship between West and its Others is understood from a decolonial perspective: “Occidentalism as “the expression of a constitutive relationship between Western representations of cultural difference and worldwide Western dominance” (Coronil 1996: 57) does not represent the counterpart of Orientalism, but its precondition, a discourse from and about the West that sets the stage for discourses about the West’s Other(s) – i.e., for Orientalism, but also for anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, racism, and sexism,” (Boatcă, 2016, p. 82). Occidentalism further works to constitute the West as linked to whiteness, Europeaness, Christianity, civilisation and enlightenment and as supreme to it’s Others (Boatcă,
2016, p. 82). The Western we presented in the opening lines draws on these notions of Westernness and works as a precondition to the representation of terrorism as other.

In the next two lines, the we refers more directly to the Danish nation-state: “The Government will at all times defend Denmark and secure the safety of the citizens. We will defend our society and our values” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 1). On one hand, this national we seem to refer to a sovereign state associated with territory, citizens, government and defense. At the same time, the we seems to refer to a community of value (Anderson, 2013, p. 2), to which belonging is based on shared values and culture. Interestingly, the invocations of sovereignty and a national community of value, seem in no way at odds with the belonging to a Western we. The Danish nation state is in this way presented as a distinctly Western nation-state with Western values. Any attack from “violent forces” on this Western we, and its values can therefore simultaneously be understood as an attack on the Danish nation-state and community of value.

**Terrorism as External, Racialised and Othered**

The policy-solutions in the “A Strong Defense against Terror” and “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark” work to represent terrorism as a problem that is external, other and a threat to this national and western we, and several of them distinctly present the problem of terrorism as spatially located outside the borders of the Danish nation state. This is for example the case for the suggestions of “preventive initiatives in the Middle-east and North Africa and other places” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 9) and automatic registration of data on airplane passengers. It can also be read from the extension of resources and rights for the police and military to obtain intelligence from abroad, including on Danish foreign fighters. Through these policy-solutions, terrorism is presented as a problem that is produced outside of the Danish nation-state and imported through the movement of bodies across borders. This problem representation is also reflected in the two phenomenon that “A Strong Defense against Terror” presents as responsible for what is argued to be a rising threat of terrorism against Denmark and the West. The first of these is foreign fighters, described in the paper as people travelling from Denmark to Syria and Iraq to fight primarily for ISIL, and who return “radicalized” and with “skills and readiness making them equipped to execute terrorist attacks in Denmark,” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 3). The second phenomenon is that of solo-terrorists, described as people living in Western countries, who have been radicalised through social-media by militant extremists and who commit acts of terrorism alone and with simple means of violence. In this way terrorism is represented as a threat that is produced outside of the nation-state but increasingly threaten to
permeate its borders through global flows of people, but also ideas and information through global information technologies.

In the policy-papers, the problem of terrorism is also represented as external and Other to the Western/national we through the dominating, almost total representation of terrorism as caused by Islamist extremism. All six references to terrorist attacks in the papers refer to attacks in western countries, that have been presented in the media as motivated by radical Islamist extremism. In addition, all the places presented as sites of production of terrorism in “A Strong Defense against Terror” are coded as Muslim: Predominantly Muslim Middle-Eastern and North African regions and countries are mentioned several times, and many of the policy-solutions aimed at spaces within (but also outside) the borders of the Danish nation-state are aimed at detecting or preventing radicalisation. This concept, though it technically could refer to radicalisation into a wide range of ideological and religious beliefs has been discursively coded as referring to specifically Islamist radicalisation (see fx footnote 23 in El-Tayeb, 2012, p. 93). As I touched on in the previous section, Occidentalism works to present Islam as Other to the west. Jasbir Puar draws attention to the often invoked, but uninterrogated binary West/Islam, that presents the two as mutually exclusive (Puar, 2017, p. 7) and in line withthis Fatima-El-Tayeb argues that Europe’s internal “racial Others” including Muslims are left out of both historical and contemporary discourse on European (Western) identity, that draws on notions of whiteness, secularism and universalism. In fact, Muslims in Europe, whether recent migrants or not, are often constructed specifically as threats to European or western values (El-Tayeb, 2012, pp. 80, 91; see also: Boatcă, 2016). The opening lines of “A Strong Defense against Terror” in which the values of both Denmark and the West were presented as threatened, can be seen as an example of this tendency. Historically, racialisation practices have been used to create a distance between the white, Western, colonial subject, perceived as fully human and the racialised other that is perceived as less-than human and often dangerous, legitimising forms of control and violence that would otherwise not be deemed legitimate (Miles, 2009). When the policies represent the problem of terrorism as rooted in Islamist extremism, it arguably works to racialise and other the problem, and present it as an existential threat to Danish and Western values and identities. It further works to produce the subject position of Muslims as potential terrorists and legitimate suspects and to legitimise invasive and repressive policy-solutions targeting muslim populations within and outside the Danish nation-state.

In the policy-papers, there are no examples of terrorism that are not presented as rooted in Islamist extremism. Following Bacchi’s suggestion to look at the silences in specific representations of the
problems, this is quite interesting, as it leaves out presentations of other forms of political violence as irrelevant to the problem of terrorism. In the police’s own evaluation of the Copenhagen attacks – which many of the texts in the data refers to – the threat of terrorism is described as follows: “The primary threat on the international scene comes from militant Islamism. However, the terrorist threat can also come from people sharing an extremist political ideology, as in the terrorist attacks in Norway the 22nd of July 2011,” (Rigspolitiet, Rigsadvokaten and Direktoratet for Kriminalforsorgen, 2015, p. 28). Later, the evaluation concludes that in a Danish context, the terrorist threat is mainly constituted by militant Islamism, while the threat from political extremism “is considered to be limited” (Rigspolitiet, Rigsadvokaten and Direktoratet for Kriminalforsorgen, 2015, p. 31). This assessment creates a peculiar binary by singling out militant Islamism as the only defined form of extremism, while all other relevant forms of extremisms fit the category of political extremism. This makes it possible to silence the fact that the attack on Utøya in Norway in 2011, in which 69 people were killed, was an act of a very specific form of political extremism, rooted in white-supremacist, fascist and nationalist ideologies. This attack was one of numerous attacks in Europe, the US and Australia around the same period of time that was motivated specifically by racist, fascist and nationalist ideologies, often enacted by white men, often targeting mosques and racialized people, and in many cases labelled as terrorist attacks by mainstream media (Koehler, 2016). This form of violence, however, is silenced through the representation of terrorism as a problem almost entirely of Islamist extremism in the policies on POL-INTEL, and this silence upholds the construction of terrorism as distinctly external and other to the Danish nation-state. In fact, the only place in the material where white right-wing extremism is explicitly mentioned as a potential threat, although only as a side note, is in the interview. I conducted this interview in the fall of 2020, making it the most recent document in the data, and the quote in which white right-wing extremism is mentioned, suggest that it is on the rise. Together with president Joe Biden’s recent framing of domestic terrorism as one of the biggest threats to the United States of America (Cooke, 2021), this might point to a discursive shift where acts of violence rooted in white right-wing extremism are increasingly perceived as a threat to neo-liberal capitalist western nation states, and thus relevant as forms of terrorism in another way than at the time when POL-INTEL was first presented as a counter-terrorism policy.

When the policy-solutions in the two papers aim at spaces within the borders of the Danish nation-state, I will argue, that the problem of terrorism is further represented as socially external or marginal to the Danish society and community of value. These policy-solutions are specifically aimed at Muslim communities, migrant and working-class communities and criminal environments. For
examples the initiatives against radicalisation are aimed at “vulnerable neighbourhoods”, a term that in Danish political discourse refer to areas with big populations of migrants and poor people and is used interchangeably with “ghettos” and “parallel societies” and (Transport- og Boligministeriet, 2020; Indenrigs- og Boligministeriet, 2021). The anti-radicalisation initiatives are also aimed specifically at prisons, and the aim of an initiative in “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark” is to “strengthen PET’s sourcecovering in relation to gang environments, that can be influenced by militant Islamism (cross-over)” (Regeringen, 2015b, p. 5). The spatialities of these policy-solutions work not only to formulate terrorism as a Muslim problem, but more broadly as a problem of “internal others” to society in terms of both religion, migrant status, class and crime. At the same time, by presenting the terrorism as a distinctly ideological problem, its root causes are individualised, and not seen as the responsibility of the society.

Based on these findings, I argue that through the policies on POL-INTEL, the problem of terrorism is formulated as territorially, ideologically, racially and socially external to the Danish nation-state. In this way terrorism is presented as a problem that is distinctly not caused by or produced within the Western Danish nation-state. This representation of the problem draws parallels to the concept of anti-terrorism formulated by Grégoire Chamayou: “antiterrorism, which is both moralizing and Manichean, abandons any real analysis of the roots of hostility and its own effects upon it. The binary nature of good and evil is no longer just a rhetorical ploy but is imposed as an analytical category, to the detriment of any consideration of the complexity of strategic relations,” (Chamayou, 2015, p. 69). Thinking with Chamayou, I argue that the othering and externalisation in the representation of the problem of terrorism works to let the policy-makers and the police “abandon any real analysis of the roots of hostility and its own effects upon it”. Global and national structures of power – racial, economic, cultural and social - are thus absent as co-productive of the problem of terrorism. The police and military practices and discourses against terrorism is similarly not seen as co-productive of the problem.

Policing terror with Intelligence

A large proportion of the policy-solutions presented to target terror in “A Strong Defense against Terror” and “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark” focus on the gathering, monitoring and analysis of data. This is especially true for the decision to acquire POL-INTEL and PET-INTEL. Arguably, this represents the problem of terrorism as what Wang would call a “crisis of uncertainty”(Wang, 2018), or as a problem of incomplete knowledge (Andrejevic, 2017). The descriptions of the rising threats of both “foreign fighters” and “solo-terrorists”, support this representation by focusing on the use
of encrypted communication, advanced technologies and simple means of violence that make these subjects hard to monitor and track (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 3). Bacchi emphasises that specific representations of a problem also work to formulate specific policy interventions as intelligible and legitimate. What seems to be intelligible and legitimate responses to untraceable and diffuse threats and to a crisis of uncertainty are intelligence-led and data-driven policing, that aim at creating as close as possible to total knowledge of reality through expanded surveillance and all-encompassing data. The aspiration to erase uncertainty through intelligence can for example be read in the following statement from “A Strong Defense against Terror”: “According to the police and Intelligence services, these new IT- and analysis tools will result in a significant strengthening of the possibilities to identify and localise potential perpetrators before a terror attack or other severe acts of crime are committed,” (Regeringen, 2015a, p. 5). Similarly, in a ministry answer, the National Police further states that the purpose of POL-INTEL is that the individual police officer will “know what the police knows”. In Jackie Wang’s formulation, “Predictive policing promises to remove the existential terror of not knowing what is going to happen by using data to deliver accurate knowledge about where and when crime will occur” (Wang, 2018, p. 283). This total surveillance and reliance on risk-calculations, she argues, simultaneously “sanctions the targeting of “threats” for death or disappearance”. Wang’s argumentation here is very much in line with Andrejevic’. He similarly argues that the idea that it is possible to create a total representation of reality, through total surveillance, constitutes a fantasy of preemption – an idea that it is possible to know the threats of the future and an imperative to act on them in the present. This logic, that underpins what Andrejevic calls preemptive power also has distinct subjectification effects. It represents the threat as imminent, and in this way, the subject that embodies this threat is represented as unrefordable, inherently threatening and irrational. Unlike disciplinary power that aims at disciplining its subject, preemptive power does not assume subjecthood. Andrejevic further argues that it is not a coincidence that this mode of power has been developed and used especially in antiterrorism operations and policies, as “the paradigmatic representative of a nonnarrativizable, ubiquitous threat is the terrorist” (2017, p. 887).

I will argue that it is exactly through the externalization, othering and racialization of the problem of terrorism and those represented as responsible for it, that the representation of the terrorist as non-narrativisable is possible. The preemptive logics of power that these representations draw on are both constituted through and works to constitute data-driven forms of policing as necessary and legitimate responses to the problem of terrorism.
The Problem of Crime

In the texts in the data-material that is produced after the two policy-papers, POL-INTEL is predominantly represented as a tool to address crime – or more specifically to address what is represented as an increasingly complex crime picture. In this section, I use the ministers’ replies, legal documents, the contract and tender for POL-INTEL and the interview material to look at how the problem of crime is more specifically represented, both through the policies on POL-INTEL, and more explicitly than in the previous sections, also through the technology of POL-INTEL itself. As Bacchi emphasises, technologies play an important role in the implementation of policies and the two cannot be entirely separated (Bacchi, 2009, p. 30). Similarly, in this section, several of the texts are used as data to look at the problem representations in both the policies and in the technology and the problem representations sometimes overlap and even seem to merge. However, I attempt to make it clear when I specifically address either the policies or technology of POL-INTEL. Inspired by Ruha Benjamins encouragement to “decode the powerful assumptions and values that are embedded in the material and digital architecture of our world” (2019b, p. 2), I find it analytically valuable to not only see the technology of POL-INTEL as part of the policies, but to also turn attention to how specific representations of a problem enter and are reproduced through the technology itself.

The Racialization of Crime

A striking tendency across the data is that the problem of crime to a large extent – much like the problem of terrorism – is represented to be a problem of the racialised other. Apart from cybercrime, the types of crime that are most often mentioned across the data is cross-border crime and gang crime. Policing of vulnerable neighborhoods is also often mentioned, and the same goes for migration control which, even though it is a task outside of the criminal law area, is explicitly represented as a form of crime control operation in “A Stronger Police, a Safer Denmark”. All of these phenomena are discursively constituted as racialized and othered in different ways. Border crossing crime is represented as a problem of migration - and migration as a problem of crime. Gang crime is in a Danish context most often associated with young racialised men with migrant background and strongly associated with the earlier mentioned designated “vulnerable
neighboorhoods” or “ghettos”. The policies on POL-INTEL thus arguably have discursive and subjectification effects that work to racialise crime and criminalise migrants, racialized people and especially young racialised men and present them as legitimately and permanently under suspicion. Katja Franko (2020) call this subject construction “the crimmigrant other”, a figure that she writes is often imagined as “violent Muslim men from the suburbs” (Franko, 2020, p. 197).

Several things in the data suggests that this problem representation and these subjectification practices are also produced through the functions and practices of the technology of POL-INTEL. The system draws on data from POLSAS - the police’s case handling system, the criminal registry and PED - the police’s investigation database. The data in all of these databases are produced through police encounters in some way or another. Official statistics from 2014 show that the risk of being arrested without later being found guilty is a 86-88 per cent higher if you are a migrant or have migrant background (DR2, 2018). Looking at these numbers alone, the data POL-INTEL draws on has likely been produced through racist policing practices, something that is supported by accounts of experiences by many black and brown people (DR2, 2018). In Denmark, this issue is under-researched, but Lars Holmberg’s study on police discretion from 2000 for example points to longstanding discriminatory policing practices in the Danish Police (Holmberg, 2000).

In the interview with the two police officers, I asked about how and where analyses were put into action, and to this, one of the interview participants mentioned how the data was used to point out “vulnerable neighborhoods”. More specifically, he said, that they look at: “*where there is most crime, where does the criminals live, and of course, who are these specific persons who commit the crime, so that the police, the prison and probation service and the municipalities can target these people. This is not so much patrolling, as it is community policing efforts by the local police*” (Interview). Later in the interview, he returns to vulnerable neighborhoods in a discussion on how racial bias might affect policing: “*These are areas where the local police typically will be more present, therefore they will also register more people there, and when they register more people there will be a tendency that more people will be charged for something than in the areas where they are*

11 In Danish the term used is often “rocker- og bandekriminalitet” roughly translated to “biker gang and gang crime”. While the biker gangs are often associated with white danish men, the term “gang” when used alone in general refer to gangs of men with migrant background.
then not present this could of course create a bias if the vulnerable neighborhood house a minority or what is it called, a population with other origin than Danish” (Interview).

These quotes very well illustrate the mechanism of feed-back loops widely described in the literature on racial bias in data-driven policing (Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2017; Volquartzen, 2018). The data is used to designate certain neighborhoods as vulnerable and direct, targeted policing efforts to these areas. The intensified policing then produces more registrations and thus more crime data on the people living there than on people living other places, data that will feed back into the analysis that likely will direct even more policing to the same area. Practices of analytical patrolling, though they are not the topic in this quote, are likely to produce similar mechanisms. This suggests that the practices of POL-INTEL are both productive of statistics that subject young black and brown men to subject categories of criminals and criminal suspects, and productive of policing practices that produce this criminalization.

The last part of the quote also makes explicit the racial coding of the concept “vulnerable neighbourhoods”. These areas tend to house big populations of migrants and racialized people as well as many poor and working-class people. In a US context, Joshua Scanell argues that the concept of “community” often works as a euphemism for black and brown places. This seemingly race-neutral way of describing areas works to legitimize the over-policing, surveillance and control of the black and brown people in this area (Scanell, 2019; see also: Alexander, 2012; Browne, 2015). In the same way, the extended surveillance and policing in vulnerable neighbourhoods in fact works specifically to surveil and police racialized and poor people, but, most of the time without explicitly evoking categories of race and class. Without having to invoke any data category of race or ethnicity, this kind of policing, that is enabled by POL-INTEL thus work to reproduce the problem representation of crime as racialized.

Importantly this is not recognized as racism by the two interview participants:

“If you for example have an area with some criminal activity, committed by two gangs where 90-95 % have immigrant background. The police are then asked to patrol this area, and keep an eye on these gangs. They cannot see, in these big dark cars, who is a gang members and who is a regular person, who have just borrowed dad’s car. And he will then be part of the statistics for having been stopped. I think it’s hard to avoid, because it doesn’t have a trace of racism in it, it’s just based on the facts, that you have these groups fighting and randomly they have this skin colour. And as Martin says it could also be Hells Angels, ” (Interview).
Ruha Benjamin, however argues, that looking for racist intentions when scrutinizing technologies, stops us from seeing the racism inherent in and produced by these systems (Benjamin, 2019b). And while the two interview participants with the reference to Hells Angels imply that they and their colleagues might also racially profile based on whiteness, the interview participants’ own accounts as well as the accounts of people at the other end of policing suggest that it is mostly black and brown young men who being targeted based on race. While this is not conceptualized as racism by the interview participants, none of them deny that what might also exist is in their eyes actual racist policing practices, where someone is targeted solely based on race and with no other reasons for suspicion. This, it is argued, is however becoming less possible with the analytical patrolling practices, leaving the police patrols with very little time to follow their own, possibly racist policing strategies. The objectivity and neutrality that is here ascribed to the system is exactly what Benjamin draws attention to with her concept of the New Jim Code as technologies “promoted and perceived as more objective and progressive than the discriminatory practices of a previous era” (Benjamin, 2019b, pp. 5–6). Thus, when directions for patrols are seen as just facts about how things really are, it hides the insight that even the interview participants at least at some points in the interview acknowledges – that the policing practices through which this data is produced is very likely to produce racially biased data which will be the foundation for data-based directions for policing.

A more complex crime picture

Another way in which the problem of crime is represented in the data is as increasingly complex. The remarks to the proposal for the POL-INTEL Law for example describe the crime picture as follows: “The past years decline in the general crime rate, coincides with a notable increase in the more advanced, often technology-assisted crime, such as hacker attacks, identity theft, travelling criminals, organised enrichment crime, and sexual violations on the internet, as well as organised border-crossing crime, including gang crime,” (Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016, p. 4). The types of crimes highlighted here are echoed other places in the data as especially relevant to address with POL-INTEL (Justitsministeriet, 2016a; Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016; Poulsen, 2017). These forms of crime are seen as especially complex due to their cross-border spatialities, the number of links to other cases and to the amount of people involved in these cases. The data complexity of the police’s tasks, it is further argued, has also been exacerbated by the increase in the data production in society in general.
The representation of crime as increasingly complex to solve, is also formulated through the concrete demands for POL-INTEL’s functions presented in the National Police’s tender for the contract for POL-INTEL. According to this text, the police require the platform to be able to integrate data from different systems in PET, The National Police and the police districts, as well as external institutions and international collaborators. There is also a demand for software that can find patterns in big amounts of data, for example through hot-spot analysis, AI-analysis or social network analysis and another demand that the platform should offer tools to visualise the data (Rigspolitiet, 2015, pp. 2–3). These requirements work to represent the problem of crime as too complex to solve without the aid of a big enough amount of data and processing power. At the same time these requirements for the system represent crime as predictable given the right technological tools.

**Platform and Big Data policing**

The actual technology of POL-INTEL does not live up to all the demands and hopes in the tender for the contract. For example, it does not provide AI-analysis, but as the minister’s reply and legislation make clear, it does enable the integration of data and automatic pattern finding. Throughout the texts, the integration of data is represented as POL-INTEL’s most central feature of. It is for example this feature that required new legislation in the shape of the POL-INTEL Law. As the government and the police emphasise several places in the data, POL-INTEL does not technically give the police access to more data. Yet, the ongoing integration of more and more existing sources to the platform, work to continuously increase the amount of data that is practically available for policing and this again enables Big Data analysis. (Justitsministeriet, 2016a, 2016b; Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016). This integration of data characterises what Egbert calls the platformisation of policing. He argues that the past decades’ obsessions with predictive policing has made police aware of the epistemic potential in the data to which they have access. With platform policing, the data is not only being used for operative analysis, such as analytical patrolling, but increasingly also for investigation, preventive initiatives and in all levels of the police organisation.

According to a minister’s reply from May 2020, POL-INTEL integrates data from 11 different sources, including the police’s case filing system, the Danish crime register, the CPR-register12, 

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12 The CPR-registry holds data on all Danish citizens and residents who are identified with a unique CPR-number. This number shows the birth date and assigned gender of the person and is in the register also attached to data on
databases of photos, vehicle registrations, and a number of other Danish registries as well as Interpol, data on airplane passengers and data on border-crossings form the Schengen information system (Justitsministeriet, 2020). The police are also working on integrating other sources in the system, including phone data and data from automatic number plate registrations (Justitsministeriet, 2020). Looking at the initial wishes for POL-INTEL, open-source data could also very well be integrated in the system in the future (Rigspolitiet, 2015). In addition, and maybe coincidentally, many of the policy-solutions presented together with POL-INTEL in “A Strong Defense Against Terror” does in fact provide the police with access to new data. This is for example the case for the proposal to grant the police automatic access to data on all airplane passengers. The legal basis for this was implemented as part of the POL-INTEL Law and the data on airplane passengers is now integrated in the platform. The interview material also points to how the platformisation of policing affects the data production within the police institution. One of the interview participants thus describe that part of their job is to “equip our patrols to register and gather information and so on, that in the end can feed in to our investigations”. This is especially interesting given Egbert’s assessment that the platformisation of policing, “ultimately amplifies the “ceaseless thirst . . . to incorporate data fragments from diverse public and private sources” (Wilson 2018a: 123) in policing and, hence, significantly enhances its surveillance potential, as these police data analysis platforms work better when they have more data and can connect with each other,” (Egbert, 2019, p. 84).

The argument that POL-INTEL is intended to help the police make better use of the data they have is echoed all through the data material. However, a similar but slightly tweaked argument is also made: that the new complex and data-heavy forms of crime necessitates the use of data and data-analysis to be solved (see fx.: Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om politiets virksomhed og toldloven, 2016, pp. 4–5). In this circular logic, the production of more and more data through our everyday interactions in itself constitutes an imperative for using the data. And as Egbert argues, this use of data tends to create incentives for the production of even more data. It is further interesting that the big amounts of data are used as argument for using data-driven policing, at the same time as the police needs to drop the plans of policing based on algorithmic predictions, because the amount of crime data is too small for this kind of analysis (Fribo, 2018).

birthplace, nationality and the CPR-numbers of parents and children. Further, the cpr number is listed in most other public registrations of a person, thus linking all data on a person together easily.
Crime as Predictable and Pre-emptive Policing

The integration and aggregation of data for analysis is closely related to the problem representation of crime as predictable. The underlying logics for this representation of the problem can be traced in the way POL-INTEL is presented in the tender for the contract for the system: “the analysis platform is anticipated to give the Danish police a whole new capacity to work proactively, efficiently, effectively and integrated, with crime prevention, investigation and monitoring, also known as intelligence-led policing” (Rigspolitiet, 2015, p. 6). As I discussed in the literature review, the ideas of proactiveness, efficiency and effectivity that underpin the intelligence-led policing paradigm draw on the notion that crime is not random, but predictable, and thus controllable. This is not to be conflated with the easily dismissible idea that future crime events can be accurately and precisely predicted, an idea that is often circulated in literature on predictive policing, but that no one really subscribes to (Scanell, 2019). Instead, the reliance on risk calculations and estimates for policing decisions based on big amounts of data in its own way constitute the individual crime events as predictable within a certain margin of error and thus as expectable. Such a problem representation presents situational crime control, that intervenes proactively, effectively and efficiently, a logical response to crime (Ratcliffe, 2003, p. 4; Chan and Bennett Moses, 2016, p. 28). Simultaneously, social and structural factors as well as the effects of policing are left irrelevant as co-producers of crime in this representation of the problem and can at best be used as variables for predicting it.

David Sausdal also draws attention to how ‘policing at a distance’ through technologically mediated surveillance produces a distance between the police and the policed, often exacerbated by the fact that many of those who are surveilled and policed don’t speak the same language as the police officers and have come from cultural and social contexts that the police officers know nothing about (Sausdal, 2019). In this way, while the data complexity increases, the reliance on data and predictions simultaneously limit the possibilities for narrative complexity to enter the police work.

This brings us back to Andrejevic’s discussions on the preemptive logics that while they might stem from the military sphere are at the core of data-driven policing and that strips the target of their subjecthood, terrorists and criminals alike (Andrejevic, 2017; Diderichsen, 2019). Rapping thus argues that the figure of the criminal and the terrorist have much in common: “Like the terrorist, the criminalized other is an alien, an outsider, who poses a threat because they do not conform to our norms. Terrorists are irrational, inscrutable, and inherently violent. . . . And they cannot be ‘reformed’ or ‘rehabilitated’ according to traditional correctional methods because they neither recognize nor respect the codes to which such measures apply” (Rapping in Andrejevic, 2017, p. 887). This is again closely linked to the racialisation of crime that works to legitimise the reduction
of criminals and suspects to the data points available on them, and make it possible to represent them as non-narrativisable threats, that it is legitimate to act on in the present for the sake of future safety.
Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined the problematisations and practices of subjectifications that have paved the way for the implementation of POL-INTEL in the Danish police. I was driven by a curiosity about the readiness with which POL-INTEL and the new practices of data processing and policing it enabled was accepted in Denmark, and what it means for how we are policed. With this in mind, I set out to answer the two research questions: “What problematisations and forms of subjectifications are constituted in and through the policies to acquire and implement POL-INTEL in the Danish Police?” and “What problematisations and forms of subjectifications are constituted in and through POL-INTEL as a technology?”. Drawing on Bacchi’s post-structuralist approach to policy-analysis I have looked at these problematisations through a data material consisting of documents from different stages of formulation or implementation of the policies on POL-INTEL, across different institutional contexts as well as an interview I did with two Danish police officers who use POL-INTEL in their daily work.

Through my analysis, I found that there is a notable shift in the problematisations used to legitimize POL-INTEL throughout the policies. In the initial policy-documents, POL-INTEL is predominantly represented as a solution to terrorism and in later texts, it is predominantly represented as a solution to crime. I argue that the solutions to the problem of terrorism in the policy papers, including POL-INTEL itself, draw on military technologies, aims and logics. Based on this, I argue that the implementation of POL-INTEL as a tool to police crime presents a shift towards more militarized technologies and logics within the Danish police.

Taking a closer look at the problematisation of terrorism in the policies, I argue that terrorism is represented to be a problem that is external and other to the West and the Danish nation-state. This representation draws on colonial and nationalist constructs of us and them, where the we is represented as belonging to the West and to the Danish Nation-state and community of value, and as under threat from them in this case the terrorist other. Terrorism is represented as a threat that is produced outside of the nation-state but increasingly threatens to permeate its borders through global flows of people and information. It is further represented as a problem caused specifically by militant Islamism, a representation that works to racialise and other the problem from the Western and Danish we. Even when located within the Danish borders, the threat of terrorism is to some extent presented as external to the Danish society and community of value by being placed in prisons,
criminal environments and “vulnerable neighborhoods”. I argue that the racialisation and othering of terrorism works to subject Muslims, migrants and People of Colour to subject positions as potential terrorists, while simultaneously legitimising responses to the problem that might otherwise have been considered ill informed. Finally, I argue that the problem of terrorism is represented as a crisis of uncertainty or of incomplete knowledge through both the policies and technology of POL-INTEL. I argue that the proposal of Intelligence-led and especially data-driven policing responses as effective responses to this uncertainty draws on pre-emptive logics of power through which the threat of terrorism is represented as predictable and imminent. At the same time, the racialized terrorist subject that embody this threat is represented as unreformable, inherently threatening and irrational.

Throughout the policies on POL-INTEL, crime is also largely represented as a problem caused by the racialized other. I suggest that this problem representation is reproduced through the technology of POL-INTEL and the policing practices it enables. Both statistics and the accounts from the interview participants suggest that the data, which the system draws on, is produced through racially biased policing practices, and the forms of policing it enables such as analytical patrolling tend to exacerbate these biases through feedback loops. At the same time as this works to racialize crime, it also work to criminalise migrants, racialized people and especially young racialised men and present them as legitimately and permanently under suspicion.

Moreover, the policies and the technology of POL-INTEL work to represent crime as a problem that is simultaneously complex and predictable. The increasing amounts of data, the police have access to are being used as an argument that data-driven policing tools as POL-INTEL are necessary for the police to solve their tasks. I argue that the platformisation of policing, that POL-INTEL constitutes at the same time, works to create Big Data through the integration of sources, and increase the incentives for gathering and producing new data. The increasing amounts of data work to rfurther sustain the representation of crime as increasingly complex. At the same time t the policies and technology of POL-INTEL represent crime as predictable. This logic does not imply that crime can be accurately predicted. Nonetheless, the very idea of shaping policing practices around calculations of risk based on data work to represent crime as reducible to calculable risk factors that can be known through data-points. At the same time as the data complexity increases, the reliance on data and predictions thus denies possibilities for narrative complexity to enter into the police work. This brings us back to the logics of preemption that works to represent not only terrorists, but also criminals as imminent threats, stripped of subjecthood.
I will argue that these representations of terrorism and crime, terrorists and criminals, suggest a rise in preemptive logics of power that shapes the ways in which we are governed and policed. Though we are all surveilled through POL-INTEL, the findings also suggest that migrants and racialized people are particularly targeted by these forms of policing, and I will further argue that these logics are premised on and legitimised through a racialisation of the problems of crime and terror. A more thorough analysis of how this logic of power is enacted in practice and on whom would be interesting terrain for future research on POL-INTEL and other data-driven policing practices in a Danish context.
Bibliography

Data Material Analysed in the Thesis


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Academic Literature, news sources and reports


## Appendix A: Interview Guide (in Danish)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tema for interview-del</th>
<th>Forslag til spørgsmål</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Praktisk</strong></td>
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<td>- Optagelse</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Præsentation af mig selv</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Brug af teknologi i det daglige arbejde</strong></td>
<td>Vil du ikke starte med at fortælle hvad du laver i løbet af en almindelig arbejdsdag?</td>
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<td>Hvilke forskellige teknologiske policing værktøjer bruger du (pol-intel)?</td>
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<td>Kan du beskrive hvordan patruljearbejde planlægges – eksempel fra en arbejdsdag?</td>
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<td>Hvad gør POL-INTEL?</td>
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<td>Hvem/hvor bliver udvalgt til patrulje af systemerne?</td>
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<td>Patruljerer du selv? Møder med borgere?</td>
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<td>Hvordan kommunikerer i med betjente der patruljerer på baggrund af analyserne?</td>
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<td>Hvem stopper de typisk i løbet af en patrulje – har analyserne en indflydelse på det?</td>
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<td>Er der eksempler på uenigheder ift. hvor der skal sættes ekstra ind?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hvad er godt politiarbejde/analyse arbejde – eksempel</td>
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<td>Hvad er dårligt? Hvad kan gå galt – eksempel?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POL-INTEL og andre værktøjers indflydelse på politiarbejde</strong></td>
<td>Hvordan har politiarbejde ændret sig i forhold til før man brugte pol-intel? I forhold til den teknologiske udvikling generelt?</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Kan bruges både som opfølgende og afrundende spørgsmål)</td>
<td>Hvilke potentialer ligger der i teknologierne, hvordan forbedrer det politiarbejdet?</td>
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<td>Hvilke udfordringer skaber det?</td>
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<td><strong>Over-policing?</strong></td>
<td>Debatindlæg af Elvir Abaz om etnisk profilering i politiet</td>
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<td>Overstregning 1+2: Sikandar saddiques oplevelse af profilering og statistik på profilering</td>
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<td>Først spørg åbent, hvad tænker du om det?</td>
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<td>Ift analyser?</td>
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<td>Overstregning 2: specifikt omkring patruljering i ghettoer</td>
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<td>Ekstra spørgsmål hvis det ikke er dækket:</td>
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<td>Hvad gør i konkret for at forhindre diskrimination når i laver analyser?</td>
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|                        | Hvordan forholder brugen af teknologi sig til risici for over-policing og under-policing af forskellige samfundsgrupper? Teknologi som hjælp/udfordring?
Dansk politi er anderledes end det amerikanske, men alligevel gør de danske betjente, deres ledelse og Politiforbundet klogt i at tage etnisk profilering alvorligt og tænke nøjere over, hvor afgængig man er af befolkningens tillid. Også minoriteternes.

**Kronik**

**ELVIR ARAB**
Politisk SCN

**Begivenhederne i USA, hvor afroamerikanske George Floyd blev knækket af politi, er ikke kun ført til demonstratio- ner i hjemlandet, men har også skabt en fornyet debat i Danmark om racisme og dansk politis negativa forskelshandligning af borgere på baggrund af hudfarve og etnicitet.

Et af kravene for, at et socialistisk udsatte område skal også det stigmatiserede stempel af hård ghet- toer, er at det er mere end 50 pct. af bebo- erne i området af et ikke-levende baggrund. At man gør etnisk og herkommelighed til et kriterium for, om der er ledighed til et område, og om man ivrigt fælles med et masser af tilfældige og racisteriske profileringsforskere.

Eget hvad det sidste lille sted i Danmark på Facebook-skrever de forskere, at politiet engang havde koldt dem for "skaftet" og "problematiserede" samtidig Politiforbundet. De fulgte deres på Facebook, når det var politiets "skaftet" og deres "problematiserede" forsigtighedsmoder.

**Kronik**

**ELVIR ARAB**
Politisk SCN

Dansk politi er mere professionistisk, neutral og bedre uddannet end det amerikanske, som også har haft andre og mere alvorlige udfor- deringer. Dette er en skønne idé om, hvordan situationen kan være.

Ifølge en ny rapport, som er udgivet af Politiet, er der en række tilfælde, hvor det er vigtigt at have en klar og konkret forståelse af situationen.

**KRONIK**

**ELVIR ARAB**
Politisk SCN

Amtet er bosat i Danmark og tilgængelig til at tage politi- et i forbindelse med den kriminaliti- t, de observerer eller er vidende om. For at optage større tilfælde hos de lovlydige borgere af anden etnisk herkomst er politiet nødt til at være endnu bedre til at afdekke de kriminelle og de lovlydige borgere.

**Politiet er afhængigt af borgernes tillid og tilgængelighed til at tage politiet i forbindelse med den kriminalit- et, de observerer eller er vidende om. For at optage større tilfælde hos de lovlydige borgere af anden etnisk herkomst er politiet nødt til at være endnu bedre til at afdekke de kriminelle og de lovlydige borgere.**

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Ifølge en ny rapport, som er udgivet af Politiet, er der en række tilfælde, hvor det er vigtigt at have en klar og konkret forståelse af situationen.
## Appendix C: Code Tree

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