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**The Cultural Sector and Development in  
Mozambique: An exploration through  
depoliticization theories**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the intersection between the cultural sector and international development in Mozambique, focusing on the practical implications of the increased attention given to the sector and the depoliticization processes that have emerged. Three research questions are addressed:

*- What are the practical implications of the increased attention given to the cultural sector by international development agencies in Mozambique?*

*- How does the depoliticization of the Mozambican cultural sector manifest itself?*

*- How do these depoliticization processes reflect broader dynamics between the cultural sector and development in Mozambique?*

Qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews and document analysis, were used to analyze Mozambique's cultural sector. Macroeconomic indicators were also used to support the findings.

The findings reveal that the state has shifted from promoting the cultural sector after independence to becoming a regulator in support of the market economy at the behest of international organizations. In addition, the sector has become more dependent on foreign funding.

The depoliticization of the Mozambican cultural sector has manifested itself in a technocratic approach to governance, reduced space for social contestation contributing to a widening gap between civil society and the state, and silenced structural issues such as growing inequality.

**Keywords:** cultural sector, Mozambique, international development, creative and cultural industries, depoliticization.

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*You can't crush ideas by suppressing them. You can only crush them by ignoring them. By refusing to think, refusing to change.*

Ursula K. Le Guin

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## **List of abbreviations**

AECID - Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development

AMOCINE - Mozambican Association of Filmmakers

EU – European Union

FRELIMO - Liberation Front of Mozambique

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GDPR - General Data Protection Regulation

IFCD - International Fund for Cultural Diversity

ILO – International Labor Organization

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INICC – Mozambique’s National Institute for the Cultural and Creative Industries

IT – Information Technology

IO – International Organization

JP – Joint Program

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

MDG – F - MDG Achievement Fund

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PALOP-TL - African Countries of Portuguese Official Language and East Timor

RENAMO - Mozambican National Resistance

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

SOMAS – Mozambican Society of Authors

UN – United Nations

UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP- United Nations Development Program

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USD – United States Dollar

WB – World Bank

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## 1. Introduction

Development studies have only recently included the cultural sector as a field of research. Historically, development was considered to be comprised of a hierarchy of needs that perceived this sector as a "luxury" or part of a "later stage of development" once disposable incomes grew to allow for savings (Singh, 2019). In recent decades, however, it has received more attention, especially after being embedded in the discourse of "creative and cultural industries", which emphasizes its potential for economic growth and job creation in lower income countries (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). Despite this discursive shift, the sector remained marginalized in terms of funding, excluded from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and only timidly included as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Labadi, 2020).

Vlassis (2017: 58) argues that the sector has been a "Cinderella" in international development due to "the fragmented actions of UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the reluctance and indifference of many developed countries towards the integration of cultural industries within international development policy agenda and the lack of a broad-based, bottom-up transnational movements of art associations to give broader multilateral legitimacy to the cultural industries/development nexus". However, these arguments do not explain structurally why this has been the case.

To understand this increased attention, that which has been more discursive than financial, the case of Mozambique is analyzed. Mozambique is one of the main exponents of this shift, which came with little or intermittent funding, promoted by United Nations (UN) agencies. This attention was particularly evident after a project funded by the MDG Achievement Fund Thematic Window on Culture and Development (MDG-F, 2008) and a report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (UN, 2011), which focused on the potential of the sector for economic growth, trade diversification and job creation in the country. More recently, the European Union (EU) has included the cultural sector as a key component of its strategic interventions for job creation and development in Mozambique (EU, 2021). Moreover, the state has also adopted the slogans of the "creative economy" and the marketization of the cultural sector, which has led to the creation of the National Institute for Cultural and

Creative Industries (INICC) in 2019 (Boletim da República, 2019) and the outsourcing of the sector to foreign development agencies that increasingly do not interact with the public sector. Despite the recent interest in Mozambique's creative industries, there has not been much investment in their actual development. The public sector plays a minor role in its funding, accounting for only 0.16% of total public expenditure in 2021 (OCULTU, 2021). An analysis of the OECD (2023) data, which compiles cultural sector projects from 2002 to 2021, shows that international aid has been sporadic and limited, averaging only 0.22% of total ODA for the period.

In addition, Mozambique is a relevant case study for development studies due to its reliance on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) in its larger economy (OECD, 2023; Castel-Branco, 2022). Mozambique has also followed the changes in development strategies after its independence highlighted by the main development theories, from the state becoming the steering wheel of the economy after independence (modernization theories) to the state becoming the regulator of the economy and privatizing large parts of it (marketization approaches). This shift was also reflected in the cultural sector: after independence, the state went from promoting the cultural sector to build a national identity linked to the political party in power, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO – Portuguese acronym), to outsourcing the arts to the private sector and foreign development aid and becoming a regulator of the sector.

In order to better understand the practical implications of the international development community's increased attention to the cultural sector, this thesis employs depoliticization theories. Depoliticization is a concept that refers to the ways in which political issues and decisions are removed from the realm of political debate and contestation. This attention has led to the outsourcing of policymaking from the state to various international development agencies (notably UNESCO, UNCTAD and European donors). As a result, these agencies have turned contentious and complex issues surrounding the sector into technical problems with subsequent technical solutions, such as policies to promote copyright laws and project interventions aimed at increasing the technical capacity of workers. This, in turn, has reduced the space for political contestation and alternatives.

In an effort to understand how depoliticization has affected different spheres and actors, this paper draws primarily on Flinders and Wood's (2014) theories and concepts, namely: (i) governmental depoliticization, which occurs when politicians delegate issues to non-

governmental bodies or technocratic systems that limit discretion, (ii) societal depoliticization, which involves the transition of issues from the public to the private sphere, leading to individualized responses to collective social challenges, and (iii) discursive depoliticization, which occurs when language is used to depoliticize issues by reducing them to technical problems.

The final section of the thesis examines the ramifications of depoliticization by looking at the issues it silences: the political and economic structure of Mozambique, and political alternatives (“possibilism”) to the technical solutions proposed by international organizations.

### What is culture anyway?

The term "culture" has multiple meanings, and its interpretation depends on the perspective and theories of the observer. In this paper, culture refers specifically to the creative arts and related sectors as defined by Power and Scott (2004) and the EU (2023). The definition used is consistent with that of the Creative Europe Program, which defines the cultural and creative sectors as "all sectors whose activities are based on cultural values or artistic and other individual or collective creative expressions" (EUR-lex, 2018). These activities include the development, creation, production, dissemination, and preservation of goods and services that embody cultural, artistic, or other creative expressions. The sectors cover various fields, including architecture, archives, libraries and museums, crafts, audiovisual (including film, television, video games and multimedia), tangible and intangible cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music, literature, performing arts, books and publishing, radio, and visual arts.

However, this definition is used critically, as the cultural sector has been embedded within "creativity" to include other sectors such as video games, marketing and software, which were not originally part of the cultural sector (Oakley, 2009). Furthermore, this shift towards "creativity" and new technologies is also reflected in the categories included in the Mozambican Strategic Plan for Culture (2012-2022), which includes television as a broad category (Moucha and Dionísio, 2014).

This shift from "culture" to "creative" is a recent one. The use of the word "industries" in conjunction with "culture" and "creativity" is linked to the "convergence that is occurring in modern society between the economic order on the one hand and systems of cultural

expression on the other" (Power and Scott, 2004: 3). However, the use of the term "cultural industries" can be traced back to Adorno and Horkheimer (2002), who coined it in the late 1940s as a critique of the direction that culture had taken due to technological advances, mass production, and the entertainment industry. Later, the term "creative economy" was popularized by British media and writer John Howkins, who applied it to 15 industries, including the arts, science, and technology (UN, 2013). This process of the "economization of culture" is also explored in this paper, with reference to the case of Mozambique (Radcliffe, 2006).

Thus, this paper uses the word "sector" rather than "industries" to encompass the various institutions and individuals involved in culture. The terms "culture" and "cultural sectors" are used interchangeably to describe this amalgam of domains and practices.

### Aim of the study and research questions

The role of the cultural sector in development studies has not been widely studied, and Mozambique is no exception in this regard. Therefore, my aim is to analyze the cultural sector and its intersection with international development in Mozambique, because, although the sector has recently received attention, especially in relation to the discourse of the "potential of creative and cultural industries" for development, it has remained underfunded.

As a result, this study seeks to contribute to the literature in this area and to advance a better understanding of the role of the cultural sector in development. Specifically, it aims to shed light on the practical implications of the increased attention following the rise of the "creative and cultural industries" discourse in Mozambique. It also seeks to promote a better understanding of the manifestations of the depoliticization processes that have emerged in the sector as a result, between the Mozambican state, international development agencies, and cultural sector workers.

To achieve these goals, I focus on the following research questions:

**RQ1.** What are the practical implications of the increased attention given by international development agencies to the cultural sector in Mozambique?

**RQ2.** How does the depoliticization of the Mozambican cultural sector manifest itself?

**RQ3.** How do the processes of depoliticization of the Mozambican cultural sector reflect upon the broader dynamics between the cultural sector and development?

To answer these questions, I analyze Mozambique's cultural sector using depoliticization theories, paying particular attention to the political and economic transformation that occurred in the mid-1980s, the role of international development aid, and the recent integration of the "creative economy" into policies and projects.

### Structure of the thesis

To address the research questions, the thesis follows a structured approach. First, a historical overview is conducted to examine the main development theories and how they related to the cultural sector (modernization, marketization, culturalism and the UN agendas, the MDGs and the SDGs). This is followed by an analysis of depoliticization theories, which form the theoretical framework designed to explain the research problem.

Then, the historical contextualization of the cultural sector in Mozambique is presented, starting from its independence in 1975. Next, the depoliticization of the sector in Mozambique is explored and divided into three subsections based on Flinders and Wood's (2014) depoliticization theories (governmental, societal, and discursive).

In the final sections of the thesis, the focus shifts to the implications of depoliticization on two main issues, namely the structural dynamics of the Mozambican political economy, and the possibility of alternative solutions. The thesis concludes with closing remarks that provide answers to the research questions.

## **2. Historical overview of ideas in development vis-à-vis culture**

In this section, a historical overview of the ideas in development regarding the cultural sector are analyzed (see Table 1 at the end of the section for a summary).

### **Classical development theories**

#### *Modernization theories*

Prominent development thinkers in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Rostow (1960), emphasized the importance of economic growth and established various linear stages to achieve development through industrialization. These theories became known as "modernization theories" (Singh, 2019). The cultural sector played no role in their analysis, as they focused on industrialization and a hierarchy of needs (ibid). In this sense, culture was seen as a luxury that would come to fruition once countries reached the later stages, especially the "age of mass consumption," when people would have enough disposable income to spend on additional goods beyond basic necessities (ibid.; Myrdal et al., 1984). This thinking also followed (Ernst) Engel's law that as disposable income increases, so does the amount spent on non-essential or "luxury" items (Power and Scott, 2004). Thus, the cultural sector was understood as part of a "supplement" that countries that had not reached industrialization or "development" could not so easily enjoy (ibid.; Singh, 2019).

#### *Marketization theories*

In the 1980s, there was a shift in mainstream development economics thinking from industrialization and state planning, which was more in line with modernization theories, to one that emphasized marketization (Oman and Wignaraja, 1991). The problems identified as holding back development included a bloated state apparatus, low productivity of public enterprises, and subsidies for basic goods to prevent popular discontent (Rist, 2014). Thus, the prescriptions were deepening and widening the market (including international markets) via deregulation, privatization of state enterprises, and

"getting the prices right"<sup>1</sup> (Oman and Wignaraja, 1991). This idea of a minimalist state was promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) (Arrighi, 2002). As a result, this line of thinking became the dominant paradigm under the structural adjustment programs promoted by the WB and IMF, which tied loans to changes in policies and programs in favor of accelerating the privatization of the economy. This resulted in the hollowing out of the state and the infiltration of the market economy into many sectors of the economy, including culture as discussed in this paper (Radcliffe, 2006). However, under this paradigm, too, the cultural sector was still largely overlooked (Singh, 2019).

In the 1990s, public spending in the cultural sector came under severe scrutiny in Western countries such as the UK, as Lewis (1990: 1) pointed out: "An expansion of the budget for art and culture means a reduction of the budget for social services, education, housing, or some other area of public provision. Without a substantial increase in all forms of public spending, it is socially irresponsible to spend money on art and culture if it cannot be rigorously justified". This argument implied that culture was seen as a compromise between basic needs. Scarcity became part of the discourse that came into play with the paradigm shift in the 1980s towards a minimalist state (Radcliffe, 2006).<sup>2</sup>

More recently, the term "creative economy and industries", previously referred to only as "cultural industries" in UNESCO conventions and reports (UNESCO 1996; 2005), began to become ubiquitous (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). Two reports on the creative economy published by UNCTAD and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (UNCTAD, 2008; 2010) popularized the marketization paradigm.

UNCTAD's engagement with the "creative economy" began after a conference in Sao Paulo in 2004, which allowed the agency to expand its mandate to produce policy-oriented reports in this area (Labadi, 2020). The theory was that more economic activity in this sector would lead to more jobs and an increase in exports. The terminology of the

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<sup>1</sup> "Getting the prices right" refers to the concept of setting prices for goods and services at their alleged true market value (leaving it to supply and demand, and avoiding government intervention, subsidies, or monopolies).

<sup>2</sup> According to Rist (2014), the common idea that societies prioritize basic needs over higher aspirations is contradicted by anthropological evidence. He discusses how, in every society, the minimum necessary to survive is determined by a surplus designated for luxury or spiritual purposes, which sets the subsistence level. The subsistence level is determined from above, not from below. This is demonstrated by the fact that before individuals can meet their basic needs, a portion must be set aside for the gods, as evidenced by historical ruins and contemporary examples such as African immigrants in France building mosques before schools or clinics.

"creative industries" also became more inclusive, including software, as communication technologies flourished in the 1990s. This broadening of the concept also inflated its role in terms of its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in order to justify its importance, and in turn reduced the importance and funding of the arts sector (ibid.). As De Beukelaer and O'Connor (2017: 34) state, "Culture, and the particular kind of creativity associated with it, was to be promoted not as a supplement to, or modification of, GDP-led economic growth, but as a deepening of it. Culture, in the form of the creative industries, became available to local development strategies as a range of potentially profitable products and services".

Thus, under the influence of market-oriented theories that emerged in the 1980s, the cultural sector has been increasingly economized and justified in terms of its contribution to GDP, growth and job creation, and the need to strengthen management skills and sector governance (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). This trend is further highlighted by the development of indicators and statistics to capture such contributions, including UNESCO's Framework for Cultural Statistics, Culture for Development Indicators and Culture 2030 Indicators (UNESCO, 2009; 2014; 2019).

### Culturalist approach to development

A culturalist approach to development became more prominent in the 1990s following the failure of development interventions and in response to classical theories that focused solely on economic growth and perceived culture (i.e., values, beliefs, and practices) in developing countries as an obstacle to development (Yousfi, 2007). As a result, development interventions increasingly focused on how communities lived and their knowledge systems in order to incorporate their views into project design and move away from top-down and Western approaches. However, as Rist (2014) explains, the idea of a "cultural dimension" to development dates back to the colonial era.

Radcliffe (2006: 3) highlights five main reasons for what has become known as the "cultural turn" in development: the failure of previous development paradigms, which focused mainly on economic growth but not on other aspects such as the redistribution of wealth; "perceptions of globalization's threat to cultural diversity; activism around social difference (gender, ethnicity, anti-racism); the development success stories in East Asia; and the need for social cohesion".

To counter what was seen as a threat to cultural diversity from globalization, UNESCO promoted cultural policies at the interregional and global levels, which were described as an "antidote to globalization" (ibid.). Moreover, UNESCO also began to intervene in conflict resolution, with a culturalist perspective to promote "social cohesion" among different cultures in the realm of peace-making (ibid.; Rao and Walton, 2004).

In this new framework, culture in the anthropological sense (beliefs, practices, and values of distinctive groups) has also been added to the development conundrum, as previous modernization theories were criticized for being Eurocentric and insensitive to local contexts (Singh, 2019). However, the cultural sector per se is not a prominent concern, but an extension of cultural expression.

### The human development approach

The human development approach, promoted by the UNDP (1990) and influenced by Sen's (2000) capabilities approach, emerged in the 1990s. The human development approach added other indicators, such as health and education, to the previous mainstream development theories that focused on GDP growth (UNDP, 1990).

Sen's approach emphasized that the process of development should expand people's "capabilities," understood as increasing their range of choices and access to knowledge (Sen, 2000). In that sense, his definition of development encompasses "the ability of people to choose the kind of lives they "have reason to value"" (Sen, 1992 in De Beukelaer, 2015: 61). Thus, indirectly, it follows that people should have the choice to develop an artistic career and enjoy cultural activities if they wish to do so. However, even if this was a more holistic approach that integrated other aspects of well-being conceptualized as capabilities, as De Beukelaer (2015: 27) expresses, "the human development approach shows little explicit engagement with culture in general and barely any engagement with cultural expression".

In 2004, the UNDP dedicated its Human Development Report to culture. Although still with the mantra of focusing on economic growth and a culturalist approach, the report emphasized cultural expression as a development end in itself (UNDP, 2004).

More recently, in a foreword to Kabanda's (2018) book, Sen explicitly states the importance of the arts in the development sector, not only for their economic

contributions, but also for their contributions to creative processes and improving people's quality of life.

## The role of the cultural sector in the UN agendas

Influenced by the human development approach, in 1988, UNESCO<sup>3</sup> declared the World Decade for Cultural Development, linking culture and development, and in 1992, the World Commission on Culture and Development was established (Radcliffe, 2006). UNESCO's (2006) report "Our Creative Diversity" in 1996 called for a new approach to development that included culture and human development, and criticized the public defunding of the cultural sector in the 1990s. The report led to the development of new strategies and annual reports on world culture and development. This created momentum, leading to events on culture and development by UNESCO and other organizations, such as the World Bank's Culture Counts Conference (Labadi, 2020).

Another milestone was UNESCO's 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005), the first international legal treaty for the cultural sector. To date, it has been ratified by 152 parties (UNESCO, 2023). Couched in human rights language, the Convention calls for the reduction of inequalities in the sector between Western countries and the rest of the world through increased funding for the latter and the integration of culture into sustainable development frameworks. Furthermore, the Convention emphasized the importance of strengthening cultural industries in developing countries by improving their distribution and production capacities, access to global markets and their internationalization, and financing mechanisms, including ODA and the establishment of the International Fund for Cultural Diversity (IFCD) to support cultural projects (UNESCO, 2005).

Despite the "cultural turn" and the inflated definitions of the "creative economy", Labadi (2020) points out that this shift has been mostly discursive and has not led to a greater consideration or significant increases in funding for the cultural sector, as evidenced in international development agendas. The cultural sector was not included in any of the

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<sup>3</sup> However, UNESCO was not a new actor in the field of culture, as it had already become the international normative body for culture after the Second World War. The first conventions focused on creating a regulatory framework for the cultural sector for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, the protection of the world's cultural and natural heritage, and a series of recommendations, such as the Status of the Artist, to regulate and protect the figure of the artist in terms of access to social security, taxation, and mobility, among others (UNESCO, 1954; 1972; 1980).

Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2015a). It was only within the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F) that a Thematic Window on Culture and Development was created in 2006, among eight other areas (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). This window was funded by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID) with a financial allocation of 95.6 million United States dollars (USD) (Labadi, 2020). The inclusion of these cultural projects was also seen as a way to gather evidence to draw attention to the cultural sector, with a view to its inclusion in the post-MDG agenda (ibid.).

Another important source of funding came from the fund (IFCD) created as a result of the 2005 UNESCO Convention. Although the IFCD funded 105 projects in 54 countries for USD 7.56 million in the period 2010-2019, this amount is modest compared to the aid industry, which is worth billions of dollars (Labadi, 2020).

Despite this thematic window and the 2005 Convention, culture has only timidly appeared as part of the targets of larger goals in the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015b). The definition of culture used in the SDGs includes cultural diversity and tolerance, as well as a culture of peace and non-violence (target 4.7). Furthermore, only the protection of cultural heritage (11.4) and the promotion of sustainable tourism for job creation and local culture and products (targets 8.9 and 12.b) are included (ibid.). In this context, the cultural sector is understood in a narrow sense, primarily linked to other sectors (tourism).

Theories		Core development argument	Role of the cultural sector
<b>Classical</b>	<b>Modernization</b>	Focus on GDP growth Different linear stages to achieve development The state is a key actor	Only at a later stage, once disposable incomes grow beyond basic needs
	<b>Marketization</b>	Focus on GDP growth Minimalist state Key actors are markets	Late 1980s, overviewed From 2000s, rise of the potential of the creative economy
<b>Culturalist Approach</b>		Transcends the paradigm of GDP growth and top-down approaches to consider the culture (i.e. beliefs, practices, values) of local communities in development interventions	Marginal role as an extension of cultural practices
<b>Human development approach</b>		Transcends the paradigm of GDP growth to include other indicators such as health and education	Cultural sector plays a marginal role, albeit their contributions to human well-being are considered relevant and influenced UNESCO's discourse and policies
<b>Millennium Development Goals</b>		Sets different goals to measure development (health, gender inequality, education, mortality, etc.)	Cultural sector not included, only later into a Thematic Window
<b>Sustainable Development Goals</b>		Broadens the scope of the MDGs in terms of goals (especially, climate action) and countries (to include all)	Definitions of culture tied to a culturalist approach The cultural sector is included in a narrow sense, mainly tied to tourism and heritage

**TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

### 3. Theoretical grounding and key concepts

Depoliticization is a contested concept that has been studied in various fields of social science. It essentially translates to the "denial of political contingency" (Flinders and Wood, 2015: 1) from complex and contested issues. In development studies, Ferguson's (1994) research on Lesotho drew attention to the practice of depoliticization. He shed light on how the international development apparatus created an "anti-politics machine", through which issues such as poverty became technical problems to be solved through international interventions. Depoliticization theories also became a prominent field in political science and international relations studies (Fawcett et al., 2017; Linhardt and Muniesa, 2011; Hay, 2014).

One of the most important works on depoliticization is that of Flinders and Wood (2014; 2015). They describe depoliticization as a two-step change, which means that the reduction of the public sphere leads to a decrease in the public's interest in political affairs (ibid.). In fact, depoliticization becomes a misnomer, because "the politics remains but the arena or process through which decisions are taken is altered (i.e. the form of politics changes or the issue is subject to an altered governance structure)" (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296). In this sense, political decisions are obscured by making them technical issues and by outsourcing them to external bodies, as explored in this thesis.

Flinders and Wood (2014) also developed three faces to depoliticization that are relevant to Mozambique:

- ❖ **'Governmental depoliticization'** or "the transfer of issues from the governmental sphere to the public sphere through the 'delegation' of those issues by politicians to arm's-length bodies, judicial structures or technocratic rule-based systems that limit discretion" (ibid.: 165). They describe this type as "a form of statecraft" (ibid.: 158) in the context of a globalized capitalist economy that has given rise to a technocratic governance.
- ❖ **'Societal depoliticisation'**, which "involves the transition of issues from the public sphere to the private sphere and focuses on the existence of choice, capacity deliberation and the shift towards individualised responses to collective social challenges" (ibid.: 165). This face looks beyond state-centric approaches to social

deliberation and other social actors and institutions, including social movements, the media, or interest groups, among others. It also focuses on how issues are privatized and individuals are made responsible for collective problems.

- ❖ **Discursive depoliticization**, which “involves the transfer of issues from the private realm to the ‘realm of necessity’ in which ‘things just happen’ and contingency is absent. It therefore focuses on the role of language and ideas to depoliticise certain issues and through this define them as little more as elements of fate” (ibid.: 165). This last face is an analysis of the technocratization of language, the denial of choice, and the appearance of a single interpretation of a problem.

Moreover, Louis and Marterns (2021: 1) develop a framework to analyze how depoliticization processes unfold within global governance and international organizations (IOs), as they aim to "use supposedly apolitical techniques to enhance and control international cooperation" and present themselves as institutions that aim to serve others rather than exercise power through claims of universality and apolitical goals. However, a paradox arises because international agencies are embedded in the politics of international relations and states. Moreover, as the increasing development of statistics and indicators within UNESCO illustrates, IOs use these quantifications and categorizations to "silence structural and political causes while supporting their supposedly apolitical solutions" (ibid.: 28).


They further develop three categories to understand this process: performing pragmatism or practical rationality to respond to needs and constraints, monopolizing the legitimacy of policy fields, and avoiding responsibility (ibid.). IOs use a discourse of necessity and urgency, speaking for what people need, to legitimize their actions, thereby reducing the space for political debate. Furthermore, one of the ways in which IOs avoid responsibility is by omitting from public records how internal decisions are made (ibid.).

To achieve depoliticization, buzzwords of depoliticization such as "evidence-based" policy making and "technical expertise", technicization and reliance on external expertise become paramount. In her research on international bureaucracies, including UNESCO, Littoz-Monnet (2017) examines their use of outsourced expertise as a tool to legitimize policy decisions, as most of these international organizations do not have democratic mechanisms such as direct elections. Outsourcing is a depoliticization tool used to avoid

responsibility and builds on the idea of using scientific knowledge to obscure policy choices, furthering depoliticization practices (ibid.; Louis and Martens, 2021). External consultants become a key figure in this process because their managerial and expert approaches create the illusion of common sense and consensus (Scott, 2021), neutralizing politically contentious issues.

Moreover, the term "evidence-based" becomes an integral part of their vocabulary to justify their policy choices by employing the aforementioned external experts in a recognized field (ibid.). Illustratively, the Culture 2030 Indicators developed by UNESCO (2019) relied mainly on experts and used the language of "evidence-based" practice. The words "expert" and "expertise" appear 43 times in the document. For their development, there is no mention of consultations with civil society organizations or people involved in the cultural sector, such as artists. In this sense, bureaucrats working for these IOs prefer to use "technical" words rather than political ones, making them "apolitical", and hire external experts to maintain their authority and make their decision seem rational and well-founded (Littoz-Monnet, 2017). This process is called "technicization" (Dufournet, 2014).

In the case of the cultural sector, the discourse around international aid becomes one of defining the problems as technical issues to be solved (namely the problem of "underdevelopment") and finding solutions by identifying the cultural sector as a tool and driver of development, and ultimately constructing a category of action objectives to be addressed (Labadi, 2020). As De Beukelaer (2015) illustratively discusses in his analysis of the 2005 UNESCO Convention, the focus of IOs is on technical interventions that would unlock the alleged potential of the cultural sector. Furthermore, the "potential" implies that there are obstacles and that "these obstacles can be clearly defined and ways to overcome these obstacles are readily known: through the application of modern scientific knowledge, economics and scientific production" (ibid.: 77). This requires technology transfer, capacity building and funding, as the current state of the cultural sector in so-called "developing countries" is insufficient (ibid.) (Figure 1). As De Beukelaer (2015) points out, this technical approach hides the politically contentious issues surrounding policymaking, namely the debate that exists between free trade (supported by the United States of America) and protectionism of the cultural industry (favored by countries such as France and Canada).



**FIGURE 1.** PROCESS OF DEPOLITICIZATION OF THE CULTURAL SECTOR BASED ON THE AUTHOR'S INTERPRETATION OF LABADI (2020) AND DE BEUKELAER (2015)<sup>4</sup>

Ultimately, as developed in the next section, depoliticization theories were chosen as the most appropriate to answer and analyze the research questions. As discussed in section 5, the "cultural turn" in development and Mozambique's delegation of the cultural sector to external funding, namely ODA, has not led to its improvement, but rather to a shrinking of the public space and an underfunded sector. To this end, the theoretical framework was developed by merging the three-approach model of depoliticization developed by Flinders and Wood (2014) with the concepts explored in depoliticization theories focused on international organizations, development and the cultural sector (namely the work of Louis and Martens, 2021; Littoz-Monnet, 2017; De Beukelaer, 2015; Labadi, 2020) (see section 5b). In addition, an analysis of Mozambique's political economy is conducted to examine the impact of such depoliticization practices and to shed light on the structural issues that international development organizations leave out of their analysis.

<sup>4</sup> This model is later used on the study applied to Mozambique's governmental depoliticization.

## **4. Methodology**

The research methodology for this thesis involved a combination of desk research, consultations with relevant organizations, and semi-structured interviews with key informants. Initially, a literature review was conducted on academic papers written on the cultural sector in Mozambique, policies and laws in the cultural sector, proposals and evaluation reports of ODA cultural projects. In addition, to select the most relevant projects in terms of funding, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (OECD, 2023) was consulted, which contains data on cultural and recreational projects funded by official donors from 2002 to 2021. Other academic work on the topic was also reviewed, although there currently is a lack of literature on development and culture in Mozambique.

### **Sampling method**

To select participants, I used purposive sampling as the preferred method to select individuals who met specific criteria (Boehnke et al., 2011). Each participant was selected as a key informant based on their experience in the cultural sector from a variety of actors, including the public sector, civil society, entrepreneurs, external consultants, and international development representatives. All participants had relevant experience in key policies and projects, with the exception of the entrepreneur whose book publishing business was only seven years old and was selected to provide insight into emerging trends in a growing, marketized sector. Thus, interviews were conducted with five key informants who had different views depending on their experience (Table 2). Observations were also made through attendance at cultural events and informal conversations with various artists and government officials during my time in Maputo from October 2022 to May 2023, and a visit to Beira in February 2023.

Key Informant	Date of Interview	Duration of the interview	Perception of the cultural sector
Art historian and public sector employee since 1983	2023/02/09	01:47:48	Worked in several public institutions (museums, universities...). As such, she is a supporter of the role of the public sector in promoting culture and skeptical of the creative industries discourse
Writer and owner of an independent publishing house	2023/02/09	38:49	Little interaction with the government, from which he sees no support for literature and the promotion of reading, and focuses on expanding the internal market of private consumers of literature.
UNESCO representative for Culture in Mozambique with twenty years of experience in the institution	2023/01/19	01:04:29	Proponent of increasing the technical capacity of government institutions to implement laws, which she perceives as the main problem, along with the need to increase the number of laws and regulations to

			respond to the new demands of the sector.
One of the first Mozambican filmmakers after independence and president of the civil society organization for filmmakers (AMOCINE)	2023/03/14	01:55:17	Participated in the birth of the government-sponsored Mozambican cinema and witnessed the rupture that occurred in the 1990s, leading to a dormant industry. That's why, together with other filmmakers, he founded AMOCINE in 2002. Believes that more government support is needed, but is increasingly turning to development aid (NGOs and embassies) to secure funding.
An external consultant who worked in policymaking and the design of different cultural programs in Maputo from 2011-2018	2023/02/07	01:14:71	Involved in the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Culture (2012-2022) and the design of EU programs such as PROCULTURA. She is now critical of the creative industries discourse, which she considers exaggerated, and the increasing economization of

			culture to justify interventions.
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**TABLE 2.** LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

### Qualitative interviews

Attempts were made to obtain primary data from the Ministry of Culture, but these were unfortunately unsuccessful. Instead, semi-structured interviews were conducted with five key informants (see Appendix I for questionnaires). Qualitative interviews, particularly semi-structured interviews, allow researchers to explore complex phenomena by gathering rich data through open-ended questions and discussions (Liamputtong, 2019). Semi-structured interviews are particularly useful because they provide some structure to the interview, while allowing for flexibility in the discussion. In the context of cultural research, semi-structured interviews can be used to gather insights from key informants, such as policymakers and cultural practitioners, and explore their experiences to gain insight into different perspectives on the same issues (Hammet et al., 2015), as shown on Table 2.

### Document analysis

Document analysis is a method of analyzing existing records or documents to collect data for a research study. It is often used to analyze policy documents, evaluation reports, and other written records to gain insight into the context, content, and implementation of policies or programs (Bowen, 2009). In the context of cultural research, document analysis can be used to examine cultural policies and programs to understand how they are implemented and their impact on the cultural sector.

### Data analysis

First, the OECD dataset was downloaded into several Excel spreadsheets, categorized by year, and cleaned to include only cultural projects. This data was used to create graphs and select projects. Other datasets, namely those from the Mozambican National Institute of Statistics, were used for graphs and to collect data on total per capita expenditure and per capita consumption of culture in the country, as well as descriptive statistics on the film sector.

Interviews were conducted in Spanish and Portuguese, then transcribed and translated into English for analysis. NVivo software was used to identify patterns and commonalities within the transcriptions and documents, and to identify shifts in discourse over time.

The interviews provided different perspectives on the sector and indicated where to look for data. In addition, an important part of the findings was based on the critical document analysis of the two most important cultural projects in terms of funding (selected using OECD data) (Appendix II), national policies, and strategic documents (namely, the UNCTAD report on the cultural sector in Mozambique (UN, 2011) and the EU strategy for culture in Mozambique (Farinha and Moucha, 2022)).

Despite the weaknesses of qualitative research methods, such as a small sample size and non-random selection of participants for semi-structured interviews, which may not be representative of the broader population, and the possibility that documents may be intentionally manipulated or edited to serve the interests of the organization producing them, which may skew the analysis, this was the most appropriate method for the thesis. The focus of the study was to understand the qualitative changes in the cultural sector, not to collect probabilistic samples. To overcome this, descriptive quantitative data, such as levels of funding for the cultural sector at both government and ODA levels, poverty rates, and consumption rates, among others, were used to support and triangulate the findings. Thus, through document analysis and qualitative interviews, this research aimed to provide a comprehensive view of the cultural sector in Mozambique and how it has been affected by policies and external interventions, as well as to explore the perspectives and experiences of key informants.

### Limitations and delimitations

This thesis has several limitations and delimitations that need to be acknowledged. First, the definition of the cultural sector is ambiguous and varies over time, making it difficult to define and measure. To address this, I focused primarily on artistic expression and limited the scope of the study to this area. In addition, this study focuses primarily on urban areas, particularly Maputo, where development interventions are predominantly concentrated and the market economy and reliance on wage labor are prevalent.

During the research process, I encountered two major challenges. First, the lack of transparency on the part of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and international donors

makes it difficult to obtain information about the cultural sector in Mozambique. Second, there is a lack of actual data on the sector, such as the number of people employed, their income, information on cultural institutions, and small and medium cultural enterprises. Instead, I have relied on estimates and general information from international development agency reports and OECD data to fill this gap. Moreover, this lack of information was used as evidence to support the thesis' main argument about depoliticization.

To mitigate these limitations, I also selected the most significant projects in terms of funding that happened to have public reports online. I also conducted in-depth interviews with key actors to fill in gaps found in the reports and to obtain more qualitative data.

Another limitation of this study is that all interviews were conducted in Portuguese, with the exception of one in Spanish. Therefore, the translation and interpretation of the interviews into English was done by the author, which may have introduced a degree of subjectivity or misinterpretation. To minimize this limitation, the author tried to preserve the literal meaning of the statements as much as possible (although some expressions are specific to each language), and all interviews were recorded for later reference and analysis.

Finally, it is important to note that this thesis provides a bird's eye view of the cultural sector, rather than focusing on a specific sub-sector or project. Therefore, the analysis and nuance may be limited in some areas. Furthermore, as there is limited research on development and culture in Mozambique, more studies are needed to complete the mosaic. Nonetheless, this thesis contributes to the field by examining a general trend in the cultural sector and highlighting the challenges facing cultural workers in Mozambique.

## Ethical considerations

The ethical considerations and privacy measures taken for this study are important to ensure that the privacy and confidentiality of the participants are protected and that the research is conducted in an ethical manner.

First, prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher informed all participants of the purpose of the study and obtained their verbal and written consent to participate in the research (Appendix III). The written consent form included information about the study

objectives, procedures, potential risks and benefits, and the participants' right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Second, the researcher took several measures to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the participants. First, all names and personal information were removed from the thesis. Second, the researcher ensured that the recordings were securely stored in a private folder.

Third, during some interviews, participants requested that certain portions of the interview be removed. The researcher honored these requests and deleted the identified sections from the recordings to protect the confidentiality of the participants.

Finally, the researcher followed the principles of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to ensure that the participants' data was protected. The GDPR sets specific requirements for the processing of personal data, including the collection, storage, and use of data. By following these guidelines, the researcher ensured that the participants' data was collected, stored, and used in an ethical and responsible manner.

## 5. Discussion and results

- a. Setting the stage: a brief history of the cultural sector in Mozambique since independence

*The state is the cultural sector: 1975 - 1992*

“Culture constitutes a weapon of great value for the revolutionary education of our People and, therefore, for the ideological struggle.”

Opening speech of Graça Machel, first Minister of Culture and Education, during the National Meeting of Culture in 1977<sup>5</sup>

Following Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1975, government elites, as in other newly created African states, instrumentalized the cultural sector in their nation-building efforts. State-sponsored patronage of the arts was intended to contribute to the construction of a unified nation (De Beukelaer, 2015; Landgraf, 2018). To this end, the Ministry of Culture was established, integrating the National Institute of Culture, the National Service of Libraries, the National Service of Educational Radio, and the National Library of Mozambique (Costa, 2013).

The economic approach of the new Mozambican state was interventionist, mirroring other countries influenced by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the early years of independence, Mozambique nationalized large sectors of the economy, including health, the judiciary, property, education, and a significant portion of businesses (Landgraf, 2018). The first president, Samora Machel, and his party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), articulated the rhetoric of liberating the people from the oppressions of colonialism and class struggle. Interestingly, the party set aside racial concerns to focus primarily on class. Under this paradigm, art was seen as serving the masses, not just as a passive object, but as an active subject in collective creation, against the idea of a "bourgeois" or "high" art perceived as serving an elite (ibid.; Costa, 2013).

The state's initial focus was to collect information on the various cultural expressions throughout the country in order to create a cultural synthesis and build a national identity. Policies also aimed to democratize culture. The Casas de Cultura (Cultural Houses) were

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<sup>5</sup> Translated by the author from the original in Portuguese “A cultura constitui uma arma de grande valor na educação revolucionária do nosso Povo e, por isso mesmo, na luta ideológica.” (Machel, 1977)

created as spaces where Mozambicans could access artistic education and places of cultural association. A National Museum was also established in Maputo (ibid.).

During this period, cinema was an important sector that flourished (Seibert, 2007). The government created the National Film Institute in 1976 and encouraged the promotion of a national film industry. More than 400 documentaries were produced between 1976 and 1992, as they were seen as a tool for spreading the state's ideology and building a national identity (ibid.; UNESCO, 2021; Landgraf, 2018). Partnerships with other governments, including Cuba, Brazil, and France, and with foreign filmmakers were encouraged to train a new generation of Mozambican filmmakers. Films were distributed through mobile cinemas to reach rural areas and a network of about one hundred cinemas (UNESCO, 2021).

However, a civil war that broke out in 1977 between the ruling party, FRELIMO, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). RENAMO was supported by the racist government of Rhodesia and, in 1980, by the apartheid regime in South Africa, leading to an escalation of the war. Faced with a growing crisis, the ruling party turned to the West between 1984 and 1986, joining the World Bank and the IMF and reaching an agreement with the South African<sup>6</sup> government to gain access to international funding (Mosca 1999; Landgraf, 2018).


Despite the rhetoric, many goals, including the democratization of the cultural sector through the Cultural Houses and National Museums, remained underfunded and ended up mostly benefiting an already professional art class (Landgraf, 2018). Moreover, this turn to the West would mean an increase in the liberalization and marketization of the economy, which would accelerate with the end of the civil war in 1992. The end of the war led to the drafting of a new constitution aimed at democratizing the country from a one-party state to multipartyism and the celebration of elections, as well as increasing the openness and privatization of the economy through structural adjustment packages promoted by the World Bank and the IMF (ibid.).

During this period, the state moved from being a producer of culture to a regulator of the sector (Landgraf, 2014). In particular, the film industry was no longer supported in the


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<sup>6</sup> The Agreement of Nkomati meant that the FRELIMO would stop supporting the African National Congress (ANC), that sought to end apartheid, and, in return, the South African government would stop supporting RENAMO (Mosca, 1999).

1990s, production was halted, and most cinemas were closed (UNESCO, 2021). As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the number of movie tickets and the capacity of cinemas plummeted as a result.



**FIGURE 2.** MOVIE TICKETS SOLD IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1991 – 2009. DATA RETRIEVED FROM INE (2023)



**FIGURE 3.** CAPACITY OF MOZAMBIKAN CINEMAS (1991-2009). DATA RETRIEVED FROM INE (2023)


*The state as regulator of culture and the growth of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the cultural and creative industries: 1992-2023*

In the 1990s, the idea of the regulatory state was reflected in the enactment of various decrees, orders, and laws on cultural heritage, education, research, and the establishment of a regulatory body for libraries and the cultural market. This also included the enactment of laws for the audiovisual sector and patronage (Landgraf, 2014). In 1997, Mozambique's first cultural policy and strategy for its implementation emphasized that cultural policy is "a tool that regulates the activities of the government in its articulation with the other parties involved in the promotion and development of culture" (ibid.: 19). The policy moved away from the notion of culture as a tool for nation-building within the framework of class struggle to a view that emphasized cultural diversity, in line with UNESCO's popular policies at the time, while preserving the narrative of nationalism and patriotism (ibid.).

However, the sectors excluded from this regulatory approach were national festivals and events, and state cultural institutions such as museums, research centers, and cultural houses, although they remained underfunded (ibid.). In addition, while copyright legislation was not a cultural policy concern in the first years of independence, as sectors such as cinema were fully funded and promoted by the state, and devices for pirating music or films were not yet cheap and mainstream, it became a policy concern in the early 2000s (ibid.; De Beukelaer, 2015; UNESCO, 2021). At the same time, heritage projects in places considered historically relevant, such as Ilha de Moçambique (also recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage site), coincided with the first Strategic Plan for the Development of Tourism in Mozambique (2004-2013) (ibid.), suggesting an economic interest underlying these policies. This growing economic perspective on culture is further emphasized in the First Plan of Culture (2006-2010/2011), which, among several guidelines, emphasizes the need to "create a favorable environment for the growth and prosperity of cultural industries" (ibid.: 22).

In addition, international aid to Mozambique increased from \$360 million in 1985 to \$1 billion in 1990. Between 1990 and 1994, Mozambique became the largest recipient of aid in sub-Saharan Africa, receiving one billion dollars annually (Hanlon, 2003). Foreign cultural centers began to appear in Maputo, and various donors began to intervene in culture. The first was the Brazilian-Mozambican Center, inaugurated in 1989 (Rede

Brasil Cultural, 2023), followed by the French-Mozambican Center in 1995 (CCFM, 2023) and the Portuguese Camões Institute in 1996 (Instituto Camões, 2023). More recently, other institutions such as the 16neto Cultural Center, funded by the Swiss Cooperation Agency, and the German-Mozambican Cultural Center were created in 2017 (Tela, 2023). Other donors, such as Norway and Spain, have also made steady contributions to culture (OECD, 2023). In addition, Sweden was a major donor from the late 1980s to early 2003, but then suspended its programming, except for a project to support the Ministry of Culture from 2006 to 2009, which amounted to US\$2.885 million (ibid.; Pehrsson, 2003) (Figure 4). More recently, the European Union has increased its spending on cultural programming. Other donor countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium are not included in the graph because their contributions have not been constant over time. Germany's spending on its cultural center in Maputo is not included in the OECD database, only smaller projects (ibid.).



**FIGURE 4.** AMOUNT OF ODA RELATED TO CULTURE IN CONSTANT PRICES (2020 USD MILLIONS) BY THE MOST RELEVANT DONOR COUNTRIES (2002-2021). DATA RETRIEVED FROM THE OECD (2023) CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM

In the 1990s and early 2000s, most projects aimed to support the budgets of public cultural institutions, restore public cultural buildings and heritage, and build the capacity of civil servants (Pehrsson, 2003; Eurosis, 2012). One of the most significant projects was a \$5 million Joint Program funded by the Thematic Window on Culture and Development of the UNDP-Spain MDG-F, implemented by various UN agencies (2008-2013) (MDG-F, 2008). The project, entitled "Strengthening cultural and creative industries and inclusive

policies in Mozambique", emphasized the need to strengthen legislation, especially copyright laws, and led to the creation of the National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries.

With the growing emphasis on markets, interest in the so-called "cultural and creative industries" in Mozambique increased, as they were viewed as having the potential to create jobs and contribute to growth, especially after a report published by UNCTAD<sup>7</sup> (UN, 2011). This shift has materialized in more recent programs, such as the Norwegian-funded UMOJA program, which focused on music festivals (2012-2014) (Lange et al., 2015), as well as European regional programs in Portuguese-speaking countries<sup>8</sup>, known as PALOP-TL, which focused on capacity building for creative industries, granting small subsidies, and improving their commercialization (PALOP-TL UE, 2023a; PALOP-TL UE, 2023b). In addition, the National Institute for the Cultural and Creative Industries was created in 2019 under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Boletim da República, 2019).

The EU's Multi-Annual Indicative Program 2021-2027 for Mozambique also illustrates the dominance of this paradigm, stating that "the EU approaches culture as a means to promote job creation and support sustainable and social economic development" (EU, 2021: 4). Culture is also seen for its potential to become a catalyst for the digital economy and innovation. As such, it aims to improve digital skills, access to investment, enhance technical capacities and overcome market constraints (ibid.).


However, despite this paradigm shift and the growing focus on cultural and creative industries as catalysts for job creation and growth, public spending on culture has stagnated at 0.16% and only 0.03% is allocated to cultural and creative industries, barely covering operating costs (OCULTU, 2021; Farinha and Moucha, 2022). According to the OECD (2023), ODA to Mozambique amounted to USD 2,238.904 million, of which USD 6,430 million was allocated to culture and recreation in 2021, or only 0.29%. The average for the period 2002-2021 is 0.22% of total ODA (Figures 5 and 6). The peaks in 2008 and 2019-2020 correspond to the MDG-F program and the EU's PROCULTURA program, which are analyzed in the following section (Figure 7).

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
<sup>7</sup> This report was commissioned as part of the multi-agency project "Strengthening the creative industries in five ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific] countries through employment and trade expansion".

<sup>8</sup> This classification includes Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor Leste.


Diagnosis after diagnosis (ibid.; Eurosis, 2012; González, 2016; D'iak et al., 2019; Guimarães and Mesquita, 2022) highlight the precarious situation of people working in this sector: meager salaries, 76% of workers estimated not to be covered by social security, and a predominance of informal small and medium enterprises. The question then arises as to why this sector, which has been recognized by both the government and donors for its economic potential, remains underfunded and in such a precarious state.



**FIGURE 5.** EVOLUTION OF ODA (BLUE LINE) AND CULTURE AND RECREATION (RED LINE) IN CONSTANT PRICES (2020 USD MILLIONS) DURING 2002-2021 IN MOZAMBIQUE. DATA RETRIEVED FROM THE OECD'S (2023) CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM.



**FIGURE 6.** EVOLUTION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF ODA ALLOCATED TO CULTURE AND RECREATION (2002-2021) IN MOZAMBIQUE. DATA RETRIEVED FROM THE OECD’S (2023) CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM



**FIGURE 7.** EVOLUTION OF THE ODA SPENT ON CULTURE AND RECREATION IN CONSTANT PRICES (2020 USD MILLION) (2002-2021) IN MOZAMBIQUE. DATA RETRIEVED FROM THE OECD’S (2023) CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM

## b. The depoliticization of the Mozambican state and its cultural sector

“Our government's action must first and foremost be driven by our politics. We must not place technical capacity above politics. [...] Our main effort must be to develop people's awareness of their destiny”.

Samora Machel, Mozambique's first President, 1974<sup>9</sup>

Flinders and Wood (2014; 2015) focused on Western countries and the decline in trust and political participation that has occurred in liberal democracies in recent years to formulate their theories of depoliticization. However, Mozambique's history is different from that of Europe, as it inherited structural problems from Portuguese colonization, such as a disenfranchised and impoverished population. Since independence, FRELIMO has been the only political party in power at the national level, despite concessions made for the participation of other parties and the celebration of elections after the end of the civil war in 1992 (Darch, 2018). Nevertheless, some parallels can be drawn with the situation in Western states, where dissatisfaction with political processes such as direct elections resonates.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the contextual differences, these theories are relevant to the analysis of Mozambique. The state was hollowed out during the transition to a market economy in the 1990s. An authoritarian national elite consolidated, thanks in part to large flows of FDI and ODA and the outsourcing of policymaking to international institutions such as the WB and the IMF, leaving little room for political discussion and divergent views (Castel-Branco, 2022; Hanlon, 2021). Paradoxically, when the state was supposed to democratize by allowing direct elections and the representation of other political parties, the outsourcing of public functions increased.

Regarding the cultural sector, the state has focused on regulation in the last three decades, with a meager budget for funding cultural institutions such as national museums, higher education institutions dedicated to the arts, and houses of culture (Landgraf, 2018; 2014).

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<sup>9</sup> Translated from the original in Portuguese: “A ação do nosso governo deve ser em primeiro lugar dirigida pela nossa política. Não devemos sobrepor a técnica à política. [...] Nosso esforço principal deve ser o de desenvolver a consciência do povo no seu destino” (Machel, 1974: 8).

<sup>10</sup> In the first presidential elections, 87.9% of the population voted, and since then, political participation has declined, with a slow increase in the last two elections, although it never exceeded 50% after 1999 (33.2% in 2004, 44.5% in 2009, 47.38% in 2014 and 49.26% in 2019) (IESE, 2023; De Brito, 2014; Lusa, 2019).


Most of the drafted policies mirror those of Western countries (namely copyright laws) and follow the guidelines of UNESCO, which has provided the country with technical assistance for numerous policies (ibid.; Eurosis, 2012). As a result of the public sector's retreat from cultural promotion, international development assistance projects have stepped in, most notably EU regional programs to support creative and cultural industries (ibid.; González, 2016. D'iak et al., 2019; Guimarães and Mesquita, 2022, PALOP-TL UE, 2023a, PALOP-TL UE, 2023b, ACP UE, 2023).

Given these trends of outsourcing policy and funding of culture to external agencies, the framework of Flinders and Woods (2014), combined with concepts from the literature on international organizations and culture (Louis and Martens, 2021; Littoz-Monnet, 2017; De Beukelaer, 2015; Labadi, 2020), has been adapted to the context of Mozambique (Figure 8). For governmental depoliticization, the process of dual delegation or outsourcing was added to the framework. This face was used to understand how the government outsources responsibility to technocratic bodies, but not how these technocratic bodies also outsource their responsibility to external consultants. In addition, their conceptualization of societal depoliticization was expanded to align it with the object of analysis of this dissertation. Flinders and Wood's (2015) analysis focuses on how different social groups manifest political disengagement, how they can become fomenters of it, and their lack of access to societal deliberation. In doing so, they place particular emphasis on the role of political parties. Political parties in Mozambique are not considered for this study because international development agencies have become one of the most relevant actors in depoliticizing the cultural sector and influencing both the government and society at large. In addition, with regard to civil society, the focus is on existing forms of organization to understand their level of engagement and capacity to influence policy decisions. The third group of interest is individual artists themselves, as they turn to the private and non-profit sector in its "eventized form: a type of art-in-general in the service of capitalist city marketing and event culture" (Lütticken, 2017).

Thus, this study applies Flinders and Woods' framework to Mozambique and international development studies, specifically examining the outsourcing of cultural policy and funding to foreign donor agencies. The framework is expanded to include literature on the cultural sector (Labadi, 2020; De Beukelar, 2015), adding the concept of "event culture" and the process of dual delegation. In addition, the study introduces the concept of silences using the theory of Louis and Martens (2021) to analyze the structural

dynamics of Mozambique's political economy and the possibility of alternatives and divergent views.

The three faces of depoliticization (governmental, societal and discursive) are analyzed separately to facilitate the analysis, although these processes are dynamic, blurry and interconnected.



**FIGURE 8.** THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ADAPTED TO MOZAMBIQUE’S CULTURAL SECTOR.

*Governmental depoliticization*

The first face of depoliticization explored concerns "the withdrawal of politicians from direct control over a wide range of functions and the rise of technocratic forms of governance" (Flinders and Wood, 2014: 156). In the case of Mozambique, even though independence occurred *de jure* in 1975, it did not radically change the country's insertion into the globalized economy as a commodity exporter heavily dependent on ODA and FDI (Castel-Branco, 2011; 2022). In the 1990s, with the structural adjustment programs, politics was also silenced, as economic issues were made technical to follow the recipes of marketization of international organizations such as the IMF and the WB (ibid.; Macúane and Siúta, 2021). Cultural policies were also outsourced to technocratic institutions, namely UNESCO, and external experts (Eurosis, 2012; UN, 2011). The

cultural programs implemented in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially the UN Joint Program (JP) under the MDG-F (ibid.; Pehrsson, 2003; MDG-F, 2008), mostly focused on capacity building of civil servants and strengthening laws, ignoring the simultaneous hollowing out of the Mozambican state.

Paradoxically, the increase in policies related to culture and cultural diversity, following UNESCO's recipes, did not translate into more spending. On the contrary, during this period, the Mozambican State de-responsibilized itself and most of the policies remained unimplemented (Landgraf, 2014). This shift was echoed by the art historian and public sector worker interviewed, who called for a reevaluation of public sector cultural institutions and spending.

The state, in turn, outsourced its responsibility to technocratic bodies (namely UNESCO and other international organizations such as the EU) to limit discretion (Flinders and Wood, 2015) and used technicization tactics (Dufournet, 2014) by passing technical policies without much translation in the budget or on the ground. For example, copyright laws were passed more to please the international donor community than to be enforced (González, 2016). Interestingly, a double process of outsourcing took place (Figure 9), as international development agencies then hired external consultants to draft policies and to design, implement, and evaluate projects (Eurosis, 2012; Guimarães and Mesquita, 2022; Farinha and Moucha, 2022). As discussed by Littoz-Monnet (2017) and Louis and Martens (2021), external expert consultants are used as a tool to legitimize policy choices and make them appear neutral.



**FIGURE 9.** DOUBLE PROCESS OF OUTSOURCING CULTURAL POLICYMAKING

Moreover, institutions such as UNESCO seek to monopolize legitimacy and strengthen their control over international cooperation by applying international standards that appear apolitical in the cultural field.

In an interview for this thesis, the Program Officer for Culture at UNESCO Mozambique, who described herself as “merely a technician”, described their role as policy advisors to member states that provide support in policymaking for the adoption, ratification, and

implementation of UNESCO instruments. According to her, policies can include strategies for measuring cultural production, cultural policies, strategic plans and legislation. In addition, she emphasizes that UNESCO's most important role is to provide technical assistance.

In doing so, UNESCO's position in cultural policymaking in Mozambique is portrayed as merely technical and devoid of political considerations, such as the power it has to influence and monopolize policy fields and to limit the possibilities of contestation and participation of other actors (civil society). Moreover, this perception of UNESCO is in line with Louis and Martens' (2021: 11) portrayal of international organizations as "neutral brokers" that "can resolve conflicts and eliminate controversies in order to create a "gloss of harmony through homogenized discourses, the search for compromises, global norms, technical procedures and standards".

The MDG-F Joint Program "Strengthening cultural and creative industries and inclusive policies in Mozambique" (2008-2013) is an illustrative case of governmental depoliticization (Eurosis, 2012). The project follows the depoliticization techniques of Labadi (2020) and De Beukelaer (2015) (Figure 10). First, the technical problem of underdevelopment is described<sup>11</sup> and culture is defined as a potential contributor to development. However, in order to realize its potential, the following problems need to be addressed: lack of financial resources, lack of reliable data, limited technical capacity, and weak coordination capacity (MDG-F, 2008). To achieve these goals, the expertise of various UN agencies is needed (outsourcing governance): UNESCO as program manager and in-country coordinator, providing technical expertise, best practices and training tools; the International Trade Centre for trade promotion and capacity building; and the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the area of policy recommendations for decent jobs and social security and training tools for building capacity in management and entrepreneurship. The project, apart from targeting the cultural sector, also adds to the cultural cocktail activities around forestry management, refugee camp management, and sexual and reproductive health. In this sense, culture was used in its culturalist approach, to be managed by other UN agencies (ibid.).

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<sup>11</sup> During this analysis, discursive depoliticization elements come also to the fore. As it was explained in the introductory section, the separation is for analytical purposes, but these faces are ultimately interlinked, and their separation oftentimes becomes blurry.

External consultants were hired to map and implement activities (including the creation of an information technology (IT) program to collect online data on cultural information systems, which never materialized), and to revise the monitoring and evaluation framework midway through the project because of major delays and many unimplemented activities (ibid.). The prescription for improving programming was to hire more consultants to manage the implementation of activities. In the mid-term evaluation report, the word consultant appears 45 times, words derived from "manage" (management, manage, managerial...) 136 times, and the word technical 18 times, associated with assistance, expertise, and consultant (Metwalli, 2010).



**FIGURE 10.** LABADI’S (2020) AND DE BEUKELAER (2015) MODEL ADAPTED TO THE MDG-F PROGRAM

Paradoxically, in the final evaluation of the program, one of the problems they were trying to address, coordination, became one of the major problems during implementation, as there was a complex web of interveners (six UN agencies, ten ministries, various implementing organizations, and short-term consultants) that delayed activity implementation. Further, the report recurrently highlights a weakness of the Joint Program (JP) in terms of government ownership. The lack of government involvement is attributed to a failure to engage with them from the beginning and not incorporating some of their priorities in the cultural sector. In the case of the Mozambican Cultural Management Information System project, the report mentions the feeling among government officials that the project was solely a UNESCO initiative (Eurosis, 2012).

The successful use of external (and foreign) consultants also came into question to tackle the identified problem of lack of technical capacity:

Focal points and beneficiaries spoke of good quality but insufficient amount of trainings with a lack of continuous follow-up. Focal points **suggest using cheaper local consultants who are then able to provide follow-up workshops over time. Presently, technical capacity is still lacking.** (ibid.: 88)<sup>12</sup>

In terms of financial capacity, the report concludes that the Government of Mozambique does not have the means to continue funding these activities. With regard to the copyright laws to be implemented by SOMAS (the Mozambican agency in charge), the conclusion is similar: they lack the financial capacity to implement the plan drafted during the JP (which was also prepared by external consultants) (ibid.).

Following the main discourse on "cultural industries", which would later evolve into the "creative industries", one of the main achievements mentioned was the creation of the National Directorate for the Promotion of Cultural Industries at the Ministry of Culture, stimulated by the JP (ibid.).

In the end, the problems identified were not "solved". The delegation of issues to technocratic bodies such as UN agencies and external consultants, as well as the reliance on external experts to draft policy plans and activities, such as copyright laws and IT programs to create a cultural database, led to a lack of government ownership, eliminated political contestation, and addressed symptoms rather than structural problems, such as why the Ministry of Culture lacks financial capacity.

In addition, a technique used in government depoliticization is to omit information from public records about how decisions are made (Louis and Marterns, 2021). Attempts to access more data through consultations with Ministry of Culture officials were unsuccessful. Many evaluations of development reports related to culture have no public record of how programs were designed or evaluated.


### *Societal depoliticization*

Governmental depoliticization, thus promotes a narrow and technocratic approach to policymaking that marginalizes public input and debate, leading to societal depoliticization, or the disengagement of citizens from political processes and a shift towards individualized responses (Flinders and Wood, 2015). In the case of Mozambique and the cultural sector, beyond political elites, international development agencies

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<sup>12</sup> The text in bold has been highlighted by the author.

reinforce this process through their project interventions, which rely on the existence of “choice, capacity deliberation and the shift towards individualised responses to collective social challenges” (ibid.: 165) (Figure 11).



**FIGURE 11.** SUMMARY OF SOCIETAL DEPOLITICIZATION PROCESSES

Societal depoliticization is evident in the PROCULTURA project (“Promotion of employment in income-generating activities in the cultural sector in PALOP and Timor-Leste”<sup>13</sup>) which is the largest cultural project funded to date at 19 million euros. This EU-funded project (PALOP-TL EU, 2023b), focuses on promoting employment in income-generating activities in the cultural sector in PALOP and Timor-Leste from 2019 to 2023. The project targets cultural education institutions, creators and professionals in the cultural sector, and operators in the music, performing arts and literary sectors. Notably, the government is not included in the project's focus. The main activities of PROCULTURA focus on capacity building for cultural workers, improving commercialization through project grants, and strengthening human resources through new courses in technical and management skills for the cultural sectors, student mobility, artistic residencies, and funding for small initiatives (ibid.).

PROCULTURA contributes to the depoliticization of society in several ways. First, the project's emphasis on capacity-building activities and improving commercialization through project grants and technical and management skills courses for cultural workers, as well as support for small initiatives and artistic residencies, are all technocratic solutions to complex problems that ultimately lead to individual responsibility. In

<sup>13</sup> PALOP-TL is an acronym from Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe) and East Timor.

addition, the exclusion of the government from the project's focus is indicative of a lack of political contestation and engagement with state authorities, leading to an erosion of political agency and a shrinking of public spaces for debate. As such, cultural workers are seen as responsible for improving the situation of the sector, and individual responses are seen as key to unlocking economic potential.

A Consultation and Analysis Report on the Implementation of the PALOP-TL/UE Cooperation Program (2012-2021) highlights this privatization of issues, as also affecting the long-term economic impact of the project:

The project's choice not to collaborate systematically with the PALOP-TL public institutions in charge of regulating and promoting the sector's activities, instead preferring to deal, in addition to training activities, with individuals and individual initiatives, reduces the possibility of achieving these savings. (Guimarães and Mesquita, 2022: 27).

The MDG-F program, while involving the government, also identified similar key challenges hindering the sector's growth potential, including: the need to improve the managerial, technical and professional skills of cultural managers, artists and producers; to enhance their competitiveness; to promote networking among practitioners and institutions; and the informal nature of most creative enterprises and the culture of over-dependence on government among cultural practitioners, among others (MDG-F, 2008).

Therefore, markets (the private sector) are seen as an important window of opportunity for artists. Improving their access to these markets by increasing their professionalism, providing small grants and improving their marketing techniques seems to be the only alternative. Other approaches to the cultural sector or factors influencing the precariousness of the sector are no longer discussed. In this way, the depoliticization of society affects not only the public's disaffection with political issues, but also the ways in which workers adapt to the limitations of public spaces.

The interview with the book publisher provided valuable insights into the issue of depoliticization in society. Our conversation revealed his sense of disconnection from the government, with his interactions mainly limited to the Maputo Book Fair, where he had to pay a tax to secure a stand. Consequently, he lacks confidence that the government prioritizes the interests of the book sector and believes that a national plan to promote

reading would be helpful, though he does not anticipate it to be a government priority. Ultimately, he sees little incentive to engage with the government.

The shift to market-oriented policies in the 1990s, which replaced the state-centered approach (Landgraf, 2014), led to a growing dependence on privatized and foreign cultural centers in Mozambique, fostering an "event culture" or the dependence of artists on occasional events (performances, temporary exhibitions, marketing spots...) to generate income, especially in urban centers (Lütticken, 2017; OECD, 2023; D'iak et al., 2019).

In this context, cultural actors are increasingly forced to rely on themselves for survival, seeking short-term project funding from foreign agencies that cater to expatriate audiences in urban areas such as Maputo (OECD, 2023). In addition, new private cultural spaces are generating income from activities such as marketing, organizing events, and providing tourist services (D'iak et al., 2019). Publicity and events have recently increased through sponsorship by private companies such as Vodacom, Mcel (phone companies), and Coca-Cola, which are using culture as a marketing tool (González, 2016).

One of the interviewees, an external consultant who worked in the design of PROCULTURA and the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Culture (2012-2022) with the Ministry of Culture, which was funded by the AECID, was critical of her work and the paradigms of development agencies that have led to the shrinking of the political space for deliberation in society. She explained that she now saw policy-making as a process of dialogue and creating spaces where people can be included in the conversation, rather than just a document to be produced. She noted that the Strategic Plan for Culture had been produced with very little consultation with different actors (especially cultural producers and audiences) and that there was a need to involve more people in the dialogue.

Regarding the logic of PROCULTURA and the small grants, she discussed the challenges faced by organizations and artists in Mozambique. She mentioned that the dependence on small grants makes it difficult for cultural associations to develop and maintain their structure, and for artists who struggle to earn a steady income without a reliable internal market and dependence on donor funding, leading to burnout.

Furthermore, the cultural sector is highly fragmented, with small associations divided along subsectoral lines, such as the Association of Filmmakers, the Association of Writers, and the Association of Musicians, which lack lobbying power and union support (González, 2016). Therefore, this fragmentation hinders the sector's ability to defend its interests and create a strong collective identity to influence the public sector, another obstacle that further depoliticizes social deliberation. The president of AMOCINE mentioned similar issues during our interview. He emphasized the difficulty of influencing the government policies, and how intermittent international development aid for the film industry had become predominant.

### *Discursive depoliticization*

In addition to the technical discourse used by international organizations explored in the section on governmental depoliticization, discursive depoliticization has been a prominent feature of cultural sector policy in Mozambique, where the promotion of the so-called "creative industries" is presented as a necessity to catalyze development. The discourse surrounding the "potential of the creative industries" has become the dominant narrative with a single interpretation (Flinders and Wood, 2015), perpetuated by international development organizations and recently adopted by Mozambique's Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The shift to a market-oriented approach to culture was influenced by the general economic shift of the 1990s, which emphasized a minimalist state in favor of the market and the private sector (Castel Branco, 2022), and a series of reports published by UNCTAD (2008; 2010), including a specific report on Mozambique for a project funded by the EU and implemented jointly by UNCTAD, UNESCO, and the ILO (UN, 2011).

The UNCTAD report highlighted the relevance of the creative economy, due to its "interface between technology, culture and economics" (UN, 2011: 11), and its potential for job creation, economic growth, and diversification of trade exports. Thus, the promotion of policies that focus on increasing the limited capacity of supply and its value chains, from creation to market (infrastructure, distribution channels, access to financial resources, training to compete in a global market, and legal frameworks to protect intellectual property), are presented as a necessary, neutral and reasonable solution to address the constraints of the sectors and unleash this untapped potential, largely overlooking structural factors of the economy.

To the rise of this grand narrative, De Beukelauer (2015: 80-81) states:

The origins of the discourse are many, yet the result is one: There is no alternative. **The rise of cultural industries is presented as the only possible solution to the problem of the unrealized potential of culture.** [...] **The message is that cultural entrepreneurs need to embrace the opportunities that exist.** It is their role and responsibility to take risk and realise the dormant potential. Culture is, in other words, subjected to a colonizing logic, as market thinking and economic value eclipse 'cultural value'.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, the discourse of the creative industries places more emphasis on the responsibility of individuals (their lack of capacity) than on structural issues, furthering the societal depoliticization. Furthermore, many reports consistently highlight the lack of skills, capacity and enforcement of intellectual property laws as the main problems, but fail to address the underlying structural issues that have contributed to these failures. They do not explain why successive projects aimed at addressing these issues have failed to achieve their goals (MDG-F, 2008; PALOP-TL EU, 2023b; Farinha and Moucha, 2022).

The UNCTAD report was not an island. As discussed in the section on governmental depoliticization, international development projects have technicalized the problems and solutions for unleashing the potential of the cultural sector, following the logic of prioritizing the economic potential of cultural industries (MDG-F, 2008). The EU, as the main donor of cultural programs in the country, has designed its strategy and projects based on this logic, as demonstrated by the case of PROCULTURA and its effects on the depoliticization of society (EU, 2021; PALOP-TL EU, 2023b). In the Strategy 2022 for a stronger engagement of the EU in the cultural sector in Mozambique, the word "potential" appears ubiquitously, linked to income-generating activities and job creation, digitalization, tourism growth, innovation generation and production of market products, as well as youth talent and human capital, among others (Farinha and Moucha, 2022). This discourse reached the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, leading to the creation of the National Institute of Cultural and Creative Industries in 2019 (Boletim da República, 2019).

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<sup>14</sup> The text in bold has been highlighted by the author.

De Beukelaer (2015: 79) challenges this discourse by highlighting the paradoxical implications around the economic potential of this sector: "Why would any government provide structural support for a sector that does not need any support to be viable?". This feeling was also echoed by the external consultant interviewed.

Moreover, beyond the creative industries, the discourse around the economic potential of culture in Mozambique has increasingly depoliticized the cultural sector by framing it primarily in terms of its potential contributions to tourism. This depoliticization can be seen in the 2015 merger of the Ministry of Culture with the Ministry of Tourism to form the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Boletim da República, 2016). The rationale for this merger was presented in largely technocratic and market-oriented terms, with an emphasis on improving coordination and resource allocation between the two ministries in order to better promote cultural attractions as a draw for tourists and generate revenue to support the preservation and promotion of cultural heritage.

This depoliticization is in line with the global discourse of linking culture and tourism as complementary industries, as reflected in the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which prioritizes the promotion of sustainable tourism through the preservation and promotion of cultural heritage (UNWTO, 2018). However, this approach tends to downplay or obscure the underlying political and social dimensions of culture, framing it primarily as an economic resource to be managed and marketed.

This discursive depoliticization is thus consistent with definitions in the literature reviewed (Flinders and Wood, 2014; 2015; De Beukelaer, 2015; Louis and Martens, 2021): the use of seemingly objective and technical language, especially economic terminology, and the claim to pursue universal or apolitical goals, such as economic development through the untapped potential of the cultural sector.

As a result, the creation of this grand narrative obscures underlying structural issues and narrows the range of options available to address the sector's policies by reducing the space for political contestation and divergent views. Two of the issues I turn to in the next section.

### c. What depoliticization silences

The depoliticization of Mozambique's cultural sector, achieved through the transfer of policy to technocratic bodies (especially international development agencies and their

army of consultants), has silenced collective and structural issues, as well as divergent and alternative views.

Regarding structural issues, the IO discourse and policy recommendations do not address the growing concentration of power among a small political elite linked to FRELIMO and the domestic private sector, as well as multinational corporations and foreign investors who have made significant investments in Mozambique's extractive economy (coal, aluminum, and gas) (Hanlon, 2004; Castel-Branco, 2022). Moreover, the projects analyzed (Eurosis, 2012; González, 2016; Farinha and Moucha, 2022; PALOP-TL EU, 2023b; OECD, 2023), which highlight the inadequate financing of the sector and the lack of policy implementation as two of the main constraints, do not mention the reason for these constraints. In particular, they are silent on the recent changes in the economic structure, namely the shift that occurred in the mid-1980s, when Mozambique began the transition from a centralized planned state to a minimalist state that regulated the economy at the behest of the Bretton Woods institutions (WB and IMF), in a process similar to that of the former Soviet Union, which Hanlon (2021) has likened to "shock therapy".

Hanlon (2021) argues that Mozambique's shift from socialism to capitalism was a "shock therapy," as state-owned enterprises were mainly privatized to an elite group of generals and FRELIMO leaders with no business experience. The privatization process resulted in the maintenance of power by government elites in the private sector, with no great redistribution of wealth or transfer of wealth to the Mozambican population at large. Additionally, this shift resulted in the creation of patron-client systems, less aid reaching the poor, and private equity and hedge funds profiting through the purchase and sale of companies. Ultimately, power and wealth became concentrated in a small, politically well-connected elite, while the majority of the population remained poor.

Moreover, since the early 2000s, following the liberalization of the economy, the country has become heavily dependent on foreign capital inflows and resource extraction, with the extractive sector experiencing the most rapid growth in the last decade (Macuane and Muianga, 2020) (Figure 12).



**FIGURE 12.** GDP AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY GROWTH (%), 2009–2019, IN MOZAMBIQUE.  
SOURCE: MACUANE AND MUIANGA, 2020

The term "minimalist" must, however, be used with caution, since the state has not withdrawn from economic activity, but rather has shifted its role to become a partner of the private sector in joint ventures, supported FDI by issuing public debt to finance large-scale extractive projects, acting as a lender of last resort, and allowed FRELIMO officials to take over private companies (Pitcher, 2009; Hanlon, 2004; Castel-Branco, 2022).

Private international capital inflows led to increased public debt and the financialization of the state, as public policy became subordinated to financial market interests. The government's FDI attraction strategy relies on tax incentives, the promotion of public-private partnerships and investment in infrastructure projects around the extractive economy, and guaranteeing public debt, which forced the government to borrow from capital markets. As a result, foreign private capital inflows account for 76% of private investment and are responsible for 70% of public commercial sovereign debt. (Castel-Branco, 2022)

This trend has created a speculative domestic financial system that is unable to support national productive capacity<sup>15</sup>, instead focusing on large multinational extractive projects and the financialization of real assets by large corporations (ibid.). The government's

<sup>15</sup> And, also, basic service provision (education, health, social security, water and electricity) which have become increasingly privatized (Castel-Branco, 2022).

reliance on treasury bills, coupled with a highly speculative financial market, creates pressure to increase commercial interest rates, making it difficult to expand credit to a diversified economy (Macuane and Muianga, 2020). As a result, this concentration of funding on the extractive economy and related sectors<sup>16</sup> has reduced and crowded out resources for other sectors of the economy (ibid.).

This economic shift has steered the country away from structural transformation, with the country experiencing a decline in the number of manufacturing firms, labor force, and turnover between 2011 and 2017, as well as premature deindustrialization (ibid.). Furthermore, Mozambique's weak industrial base makes it difficult to establish productive linkages with significant private investment, leaving domestic capital with few options (Castel-Branco, 2016; 2022).

Yet, as illustrated in the previous section, international development agencies fail to recognize these power dynamics, including their own power to influence policy not only around the cultural sector but the entire structure of the economy (as shown in the case of the Bretton Woods institutions), and policy decisions that have heavily favored the extractive sector, resulting in the downgrading and inadequate public and private funding of other economic sectors with strong links to the cultural sector, such as services and manufacturing. In addition, the issue of inadequate enforcement of laws, particularly copyright laws, is ubiquitous in the reports of international development organizations. However, they often fail to acknowledge that this is symptomatic of broader structural issues, where the state prioritizes funding the extractive economy, mainly through debt servicing and tax incentives, resulting in a depletion of resources available for law enforcement<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, given this economic and political framework, the growth of the supply side of the cultural sector, as highlighted in the UNCTAD report (UN, 2011), remains constrained because most firms in the sector are SMEs that cannot access loans due to high interest rates<sup>18</sup> (Figure 13) (ibid.; González, 2016), resulting in 75% of SMEs being financially

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
<sup>16</sup> The financial sector has diverted resources into financing infrastructure that supports the extractive core of the economy, public debt issuance, consumption of durable goods (housing and automobiles), and real estate with speculative prices. (Castel-Branco, 2022)

<sup>17</sup> A low tax base and high public debt mean that public sector compensation and debt service alone consume about 90% of tax revenues. (World Bank, 2023)

<sup>18</sup> Since the 1990s, tight monetary policies have limited credit access for Mozambican firms. More recently, commercial bank credit to the private sector has decreased, while lending to the government has risen. This,

excluded (World Bank, 2023). With most financing focused on the extractive sector, labor in the service sector remains largely informal and precarious (90% of service firms are informal) (ibid.).

Real interest rate (2021)



**FIGURE 13.** REAL INTEREST RATES IN 2021 IN DIFFERENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES, HIGHLIGHTING MOZAMBIQUE’S HIGHER RATES COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES. SOURCE: WORLD BANK, 2023

In addition, de-industrialization and the lack of diversification in the manufacturing sector<sup>19</sup> have severely affected domestic production for this sector, as it relies on foreign imports to access cheaper goods and services (ibid.). However, as mentioned by the entrepreneur interviewed, access to international markets can be beneficial to purchase cheaper goods for book publishing, such as in South Africa, which are expensive in Mozambique, consistent with data on high import rates (UN, 2011). The preferential treatment of trade imports has also meant that musical instruments from the EU and the


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along with high public financing needs, has resulted in higher real lending rates and shorter loan maturities, compared to other countries. (World Bank, 2023)

<sup>19</sup> Mozambique's manufacturing sector has become increasingly narrow and less diversified over the past two decades. The industrial output of just six sectors, accounting for 90% of total output, is concentrated on only four or fewer products, most of which require basic processing. Since the 1960s, Mozambique has introduced only a few new products with statistical significance, such as aluminum, coal, natural gas, minerals, and tobacco, making up about 80% of the total industrial output. (Castel-Branco, 2022)

South African Development Community <sup>20</sup> are not taxed <sup>21</sup> (González, 2016). Nevertheless, this has implications for Mozambique's integration into the international economy as an importer of manufactured goods, to the benefit of the West and its southern neighbor.

Furthermore, the "creative economy" discourse focuses too much on supply, as the UNCTAD report shows (UN, 2011), and largely overlooks domestic demand and wealth distribution. Mozambique's recent economic growth has been pro-rich, with the top quintile experiencing consumption growth three times faster than the bottom 40 percent, resulting in rising inequality (World Bank, 2018). As of 2014/15, more than 70 percent of the population was poor or deprived (ibid.) (Figure 14). In this classification, a household is considered "deprived" if it lacks access to at least three of the following eight indicators: “education (no household member completed primary schooling, at least one school-age child in the household is out of school), access to services (no access to electricity, improved water and improved sanitation); housing conditions (poor quality dwelling), asset ownership (no ownership of at least two of the following assets: fridge, TV, phone, bicycle, car or motorcycle) and the prevalence of monetary poverty (household’s consumption per capita is below the poverty line).” (World Bank, 2018: 19)




**FIGURE 14.** WELFARE GROUPS CLASSIFIED BY THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OF LIVING CONDITIONS), COLLECTED BY THE NATIONAL STATISTICS INSTITUTE OF MOZAMBIQUE (2014/2015). SOURCE: WORLD BANK, 2023

<sup>20</sup> The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is comprised of Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

<sup>21</sup> The tax tariff, approved by Law 6/2009 of March 10, establishes that musical instruments coming from SADC or the EU are exempt from tax (González, 2016).

In this context, most people have barely enough income to meet their basic needs, so that without public support for the cultural sector, and in the absence of a significant middle class able to consume culture, demand for the cultural sector remains low at the macroeconomic level. As shown in Figure 15, where each quintile represents 20% of the population divided by income categories (with quintile 1 being the lowest income category and 5 the highest), income distribution is a relevant factor in understanding higher income spending on culture.




**FIGURE 15.** PERCENTAGE OF PER CAPITA MONTHLY EXPENDITURE ON LEISURE, RECREATION AND CULTURE, ACCORDING TO POPULATION QUINTILES. MOZAMBIQUE, 2019/20. SOURCE: INE, 2021

A comparative analysis of total monthly expenditure per capita and monthly expenditure on leisure, culture and recreation also shows that the higher the income, the higher the total expenditure on culture, recreation and leisure (Figure 16 and Table 3).<sup>22</sup> Illustratively, the price of a new book of literature in a bookstore in the capital city can range from 500 to 2,000 meticaís (Mabuko, 2023), which is more than twice the total monthly expenditure per capita of Quintile 1.

<sup>22</sup> Illustratively, the price of a new book of literature in a bookstore in the capital city can range from 500 meticaís to 2,000 (Mabuko, 2023), more than doubling the total expenditure per capita of Quintile 1.

Quintiles	Expenditure on culture, leisure and recreation (in meticaïs)	Total expenditure (in meticaïs)	Expenditure on culture, leisure and recreation in USD	Total expenditure in USD
Quintile 1	0.672	224	0.01	3.54150198
Quintile 2	1.755	585	0.03	9.24901186
Quintile 3	6.93	990	0.11	15.6521739
Quintile 4	16.55	1655	0.26	26.1660079
Quintile 5	100.44	5022	1.59	79.3992095


**TABLE 3.** TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENDITURE AND EXPENDITURE ON CULTURE, LEISURE AND RECREATION PER CAPITA (IN METICAIS AND USD). MOZAMBIQUE 2019/2020. SOURCE: INE, 2021



**FIGURE 16.** TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENDITURE (ORANGE) AND EXPENDITURE ON CULTURE, LEISURE AND RECREATION (BLUE) PER CAPITA IN METICAIS. MOZAMBIQUE 2019/2020.

SOURCE: INE, 2021

Compared to European countries, especially the Nordic countries, the percentage of household income spent on culture also correlates with higher per capita income, as in the case of Sweden (5%), Norway (4%), and Denmark (4.6%) (Figure 17).



**FIGURE 17.** MEAN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON CULTURAL GOODS AND SERVICES AS A SHARE OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2015). SOURCE: EUROSTAT, 2023

Given the widespread poverty in the country, copyright laws are often ineffective because a significant portion of the population cannot afford to frequently purchase cultural products such as music compact discs, subscriptions to online platforms, or movie tickets. As a result, enforcement of these laws can lead to criminalization and exclusion of the poor from access to cultural products, furthering the de-democratization of culture.

Regarding the link between culture and tourism, according to INE data (2021), spending on domestic cultural services remains the lowest type of spending, or 0% of total spending (only 814,454 out of a total expenditure of 3,117,309,602 meticais).

No data was found to support that internationalization efforts promoted by development projects are a means of creating demand in Mozambique.

Moreover, the problem with the cultural sector's increasing dependence on international development aid is that it is based on short-term projects, as shown by OECD data (2023); the distribution of small funds to cultural SMEs, as in the case of PROCULTURA (PALOP-TL UE, 2023b); or the funding of occasional events in foreign cultural centers. The small grants and the focus on event-based culture, combined with weak local demand at the macroeconomic level due to high levels of poverty and the financial exclusion of most businesses, mean that cultural workers are unable to sustain themselves in the long term.

Given the scarcity of financial resources, the "lack of skills" often highlighted in these projects responds to collective problems rather than individual shortcomings. The logic of individualizing the lack of "professionalization" is also questioned by the external consultant interviewed, who suggests that the lack of high demand prevents cultural agents from professionalizing their work due to the lack of stability and income, as most artists are part-time workers who also work elsewhere to make ends meet.

Furthermore, the rhetoric that the creative economy has great potential for growth and income-generating activities creates a paradox, implying that the sector does not need funding (De Beukelaer, 2015). However, this is a fallacy in cases like Mozambique, because how can one even know if this is true? As much as IOs preach about "evidence-based" policymaking, it is difficult to know the answer to this question because there is currently no data to support these claims, so this grand narrative extrapolates data from the Global North<sup>23</sup> without any evidence from the local context. International development programs also fail to address the number, quality and types of jobs created, as evaluations of these projects do not provide any analysis and largely point to the precarious nature of the sector (González, 2016; Farinha and Moucha, 2022).

Finally, depoliticization creates the illusion of a "no alternative" path for the sector. This hides the political choices made as a result of following the prescriptions and ideological positions of international organizations, such as UN (2011) agencies, and silences alternatives that were previously promoted after independence, with a more significant role for the Mozambican state as a promoter of culture, rather than just a regulator. The author of this paper does not advocate a return to an interventionist approach by the state, instrumentalizing culture to build a unified national identity that follows the ideological premises of the political party in power (in this case, FRELIMO). Instead, I suggest that there are other policy options in low-income countries like Mozambique. As Cramer, Sender and Oqubay (2020) suggest in their "possibilism" approach to development, while acknowledging that African countries face challenges and constraints due to their

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<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the cultural sector also suffers from precarity in European countries: "Statistical data confirm the continued rise in the contribution of culture and art to the economy and employment in the EU and worldwide. An analysis of labour market data for culture and arts professionals provides an insight into the nature of the employment and livelihood which the sector provides. **However, it points to frequent incidence of short-term contracts, part-time jobs and seasonal employment, two or more parallel jobs for people with university diplomas, and this employment situation is frequently qualified as precarious.**" (Pasikowska-Schnass, 2019: 1) The text in bold has been highlighted by the author of this paper.

incorporation into a global economic system that often works against their interests, there is room for policy options that differ from those proposed by international organizations. Most importantly, this "possibilism" also entails the possibility of opening policy debates that involve broader social deliberation, including cultural sector workers, rather than being limited to powerful actors.

## 6. Conclusion

This dissertation sought to explore the practical implications of the increased attention given by international development agencies to the cultural sector in Mozambique. The research used the concept of depoliticization to examine the processes that unfolded as this attention and level of intervention increased. In answering the research questions, this thesis has also shed light on the current situation of the cultural sector in Mozambique and its role in development.

In terms of the practical implications of the increased attention given to the cultural sector by international development agencies (**RQ1**), the cultural sector's shift towards international development assistance has led to a greater reliance on foreign funding, replacing previous government funding, and the emergence of a technocratic approach to governance. Furthermore, the discursive shift towards emphasizing the economic potential of the cultural and creative industries has had paradoxical implications, raising the question of why a sector that is said to have so much potential needs structural support. This increased attention to the sector without corresponding substantial funding is evident in the case of Mozambique, as shown by OECD (2023) data.

In addition, the Mozambican economy has faced a larger trend of low public funding for the cultural sector, with most public resources being directed towards the extractive economy and attracting foreign direct investment around this sector. This has resulted in a lack of attention to sectors related to the cultural sector, namely manufacturing and services, limiting its ability to improve its supply capacity.

The depoliticization of the Mozambican cultural sector has manifested itself and affected all areas of the sector and its main actors (**RQ2**), namely by outsourcing policy to technocratic bodies such as UNESCO and its army of consultants, and by reducing the space for social contestation of a market approach to culture promoted by international development agencies. These processes of depoliticization have also silenced the structural dynamics of the country, including the growing inequality in the country.

Mozambique's recent economic growth has largely benefited the rich, leaving the majority of the population at or below the poverty line. This has led to a situation where the majority of the population cannot afford basic needs, which in turn has led to low

demand per capita for cultural products and services. Therefore, without addressing the unequal distribution of wealth and investment in the country, supply and demand are likely to remain low. Thus, it is not simply a matter of promoting industrialization, as modernization theories suggest, or simply expanding markets and economic growth, but also of addressing the unequal distribution of wealth within Mozambique.

In addition, the thesis explored the broader implications of the depoliticization of the cultural sector in relation to development in Mozambique (**RQ3**). This research revealed how market approaches to the cultural sector, supported by the creative economy narrative, have become dominant. The thesis also shed light on how the state, at the behest of international organizations, has shifted from promoting culture to becoming a regulator in support of the market economy, including the introduction of copyright laws and the creation of a National Institute of Cultural and Creative Industries aimed at improving market outcomes. Despite these efforts, a lack of funding has weakened the state's ability to enforce policies and effectively regulate the cultural sector. In addition, these trends have contributed to a widening gap between civil society and the state. As artists increasingly seek funding from international development agencies and event culture, this gap is likely to widen. Such a shift in funding sources not only weakens the state's capacity to support cultural development, but also raises questions about the financial sustainability of culture in Mozambique.

These findings merit the question posed by Alden (2001),

“With donor money servicing the debt, international consultants designing government policies, international NGOs or private firms providing personnel to oversee the implementation of policies, international development agencies providing cash to run the national elections and, finally, everyone from foreign investors and tourists to a tiny local elite as the primary beneficiaries of these developments, one is left to wonder what is the role for ordinary Mozambicans in their own country?” (99)

## Further research

This paper has focused on the process of depoliticization of the cultural sector in Mozambique. While various factors contributing to depoliticization have been analyzed, there is a need for further research to promote a better understanding of attempts at repoliticization. This could be achieved by exploring the strategies that different actors, namely cultural sector workers, use to bring political issues back into the public sphere and how they respond to depoliticization through different methods, such as counter-narratives and protests. Overall, research in this area could contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of depoliticization in Mozambique and inform strategies for promoting repoliticization and greater political engagement.

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## Appendixes

### Appendix I – Interviewer guides

*Interview guide: UNESCO representative*

#### **BASIC INFORMATION**

<b>Date</b>	
<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Role</b>	
<b>Years of experience in that role</b>	
<b>Programs implemented in the realm of Culture by the organization</b>	

1. How has UNESCO's role in culture evolved since the 1990s?
2. What have been the main achievements in terms of public policy in the country?
3. What have been the main challenges for the public sector?
4. What is the role of the private sector in relation to culture in the country, given the increasing discussion about creative industries?
5. In the context of the last year of the PEC 2012-2022, what can we expect for the next period of politics and the public sector in Mozambique?
6. How does the idea of creating a status of artist come about in Mozambique?
7. How is it being implemented? What are its main aspects?
8. Which public institutions intervene in this process?
9. Have there been consultations with artists or civil society? If so, please explain?
10. How can artists be integrated into social security systems? What could be the main challenges?
11. What about aspects such as the dignity of work, employment protection (written contracts, etc.) and the establishment of a minimum wage for artists?
12. What is the current situation of artistic freedom in the country? Would this aspect be included in the status of the artist?

13. What about the tax policy and the formalization of companies working in this sector?
14. In general, what do you think would be the main challenges in its implementation?

*Interview guide: external consultant*

<b>Date</b>	
<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Role</b>	
<b>Years of experience in that role</b>	
<b>Programs implemented in the realm of Culture by the organization</b>	

1. How long have you worked in the cultural field?
2. What was your experience in Mozambique? What roles have you played?
3. What was your role in cultural policy making in Mozambique? What were your main observations?
4. In your opinion, what are the main challenges for the public cultural sector?
5. What could the international community/organizations improve in terms of cultural programming/support for cultural policy-making?
6. What is your assessment of the cultural sector? Book publishing, film production, theatre, painting, music production, etc.
7. How was the process of implementing the strategic plan for culture? Was there any follow-up? Consultations with civil society? What would you have changed in this process?
8. In your opinion, what are the main challenges for artists?

*Interview guide: filmmaker and civil society representative*

<b>Date</b>	
<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Role</b>	
<b>Years of experience in that role</b>	
<b>Programs implemented in the realm of Culture by the organization</b>	

1. AMOCINE was founded in 2002. How many members are there at the moment? How has the organization developed? Changes in priorities?
2. What has the law of 2017 done, especially in the framework of production and distribution of films and access to the public? For example, the law says that "national works should occupy at least ¼ of the airtime on national television networks", is this being implemented?
3. How is the law enforced?
4. Is it a good strategy to internationalize films in international film festivals? How is it possible to export Mozambican films?
5. How has the government support changed? And from international cooperation? How is it to finance Mozambican cinema today? And to get training?
6. How does international cooperation condition creative freedom?
7. Regarding film equipment, is everything imported? Do you have to pay duties?
8. Within the framework of associativism, what is the relationship with the government? Is there room for political interaction?
9. The years after independence were considered the "golden age of cinema", with a film industry dependent on the state and initiatives such as Kuxa Kanema. What is the current state of Mozambican cinema?
10. What is it like to make films outside the capital?
11. What are the main challenges facing Mozambican cinema today?

*Interview guide: writer and publishing house owner*

<b>Date</b>	
<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Role</b>	
<b>Years of experience in that role</b>	

1. How did you start your career in publishing?
2. When was [publisher name] born?
3. What capital/investment did you use to start it?
4. Have you ever received public funding?
5. How do you select the books you publish?
6. Where do you get most of your revenue (physical bookstore sales or online sales)? What is your largest consumer base (what socio-economic profile)?
7. What are the main challenges of working in this sector, both in terms of publishing and having a physical bookstore?
8. What is it like to have a cultural enterprise in Mozambique? What are the main obstacles? Is it easy to register a company? What about taxation?
9. Are you included in any social security system?
10. How many employees do you currently have?
11. Is this publishing house your main source of income?
12. How many books do you normally print per edition?
13. Do you distribute books in parts of the country other than Maputo?
14. Are books usually re-edited?

*Interview guide: art historian and former government worker*

<b>Date</b>	
<b>Interviewee</b>	
<b>Role</b>	
<b>Years of experience in that role</b>	

1. When did you start working in the field of art/art history?
2. What was your role in the public sector?
3. What was it like to work in the cultural sector in the 1980s/1990s, the first years of independence?
4. How has the cultural sector developed since then?
5. In a recent interview you said that art is seen primarily as entertainment, why is that?
6. In your opinion, how does the Mozambican government view the arts?
7. Does Mozambique have a foreign cultural policy? What is the situation of culture and arts internationally?
8. What is the level of associativism in the country? Unionization?
9. How do you evaluate the cultural plans of the government? What about their implementation?
10. What should be the role of the state in the arts and culture sector?
11. How do you evaluate the situation of cultural spaces in the country (such as theaters, libraries, museums...)?
12. In the same interview you also talk about the resources invested after independence. In your opinion, has there been a growing precariousness of the sector? If so, why?
13. There are those who say that "developing countries should concentrate on basic necessities", what do you think about this? Is culture a luxury for countries like Mozambique?

## Appendix II – Description of the two largest cultural sector development projects implemented in Mozambique

Title of the project	Donor	Main objective	Years of Implementation	Amount
The Joint Program on Strengthening Cultural and Creative Industries and Inclusive Policies in Mozambique.	Funded by the Spanish Government; implemented by six UN agencies, and ten Government of Mozambique Ministries	Aimed to support policy elaboration and revision of Legislative frameworks for creative industries, development of community-based cultural tourism, strengthening of the capacity for management of cultural assets, and of cultural entrepreneur's skills in business management and marketing; and support the integration of traditional knowledge systems and culture into development interventions, building on inclusive policies, strengthening the development of data management systems and the elaboration of a national language policy.	2008-2012	5,000,000 USD
Promotion of employment in income-generating activities in the cultural sector in PALOP and East Timor (PROCULTUR A)	European Union, Portugal's Camoes Institute, and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation	Contribute to increase employment and income-generating activities in the PALOP and East Timor through an increase in human resources employed with differentiated creative and technical skills for the cultural sectors, through the creation of new courses in technical and management skills for the cultural sector, support for student mobility, hosting artistic residencies and financing small initiatives; greater dissemination of music and performing arts from the PALOP-TL and improvement of commercialization opportunities in national, regional and international markets through the financing of regional and international projects and the international campaign "Cultura PALOP-TL"; and financial and technical support for the creation, publication and dissemination of PALOP-TL children's literature at national and regional level.	2019-2023	19,040,000 EUR

## Appendix III – Informed consent form

### **Informed consent to participate in the study**

#### **“Culture as a Public Good? Analyzing cultural public policies in Mozambique”**

I was invited to participate in a research study conducted by Clara Pavón Estradé, within the scope of her thesis project “Culture as a Public Good? Analyzing cultural public policies in Mozambique” for Lund University (Sweden). My participation is voluntary.

#### **OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS**

The objective of the thesis is to make a diagnosis of the situation of the cultural sector and its institutions in Mozambique. The collected information will be used exclusively for Clara Pavón's thesis at Lund University.

#### **PROCEDURE**

If you want to volunteer in the study, the session will be recorded and written notes will be taken. The recordings and notes will be used only for the purpose of analyzing the participant's opinions and will only serve as informative material to tell the life stories in the aforementioned thesis project.

#### **DATA PROCESSING**

The treatment of the data obtained guarantees the anonymity of the participants if they so indicate. No data will be made public without the prior consent of the interested parties. Clara Pavón Estradé, author of the research, ensures that any publication, including publication on the Internet, neither directly nor indirectly, will lead to a violation of the agreed confidentiality.

#### **CONFIDENTIALITY**

Any information obtained as part of this study will not be disclosed without your prior permission.

Measures will be taken to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, disclosure or unauthorized access. Data will be hosted on secure servers and housed in physically secure server rooms. As part of a risk mitigation policy, data backup and disaster recovery procedures will be implemented to protect the data collected.

#### **REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE**

It is entirely voluntary to participate or not in this study. If you volunteer to participate in the study, you are free to withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You are also free to refuse to answer any question or to participate in a specific activity.

#### **POTENTIAL RISKS**

The study does not involve any potential risk, whether social, legal or financial.

#### **CONTEXT OF THE STUDY**

This study is being undertaken in the context of a thesis project for the Master's in International Development and Management (LUMID) at Lund University.

**IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCHER**

If you have any questions or doubts about this study, you can contact: Clara Pavón Estradé through the email: [REDACTED]

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I agree to participate in this study. I was given a copy of this form.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant Name

\_\_\_\_\_  
Researcher

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature