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
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The State, Parliamentary Legislation and Economic Policy during the Structural Transformation of British Economy, 1700-1850

EMRAH GÜLSUNAR

LUND STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 102 | LUND UNIVERSITY



The State, Parliamentary Legislation and Economic Policy during the Structural Transformation of British Economy, 1700-1850

This thesis examines the reaction of political institutions to the structural transformation of the British economy from 1700 to 1850. The majority of the literature on the relationship between institutions and economic growth conceptualises the political institutions as a precondition to modern economic growth in the British context. Getting its inspiration from Lennart Schön's theoretical framework, this thesis, instead, focuses on the institutional adaptation to the structural transformation in Britain, assuming that the success of this reaction was ultimately decisive to make the growth long-term and sustained. To this end, it focuses on Parliament as a meta-institution to understand two types of interconnected institutional responses: what kind of legislative changes were implemented, and what kind of debates took place? The thesis uses statute volumes in the Parliamentary Archives and the volumes of parliamentary debates in the Hansard Archives as the primary first-hand historical sources. Two new databases are constructed from the sources, which are analysed using both analytical narrative and statistical analysis.

The thesis shows that increasing public legislation in Parliament during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the indicator of the growing importance of the central state in Britain, which was being gradually more friendly to the real economy. The central state also gained more fiscal and legal capacity, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, and not just the wars and urbanisation, the turnpike roads were also influential in that. The response of political institutions was also reflected in the economic policies implemented by Parliament and the state. Parliament was mostly supportive of the industrial sector as manifested in its legislation and policy toward the cotton textile industry, which was motivated by various factors peculiar to Britain. Moreover, it is possible to observe the dominance of manufacturing interests in shaping the imperial policy towards the Asian empires such as the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century, even if they were sometimes subservient to geopolitical concerns. With these findings, the thesis expands our knowledge about the relationship between institutions and economic growth using a different theoretical framework and novel data sources.



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The State, Parliamentary Legislation and Economic Policy during the Structural Transformation of British Economy, 1700-1850

Emrah Gülsunar



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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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List of Papers

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- II. Gülsunar, Emrah (2021) Carrying the Leviathan: Turnpike Roads and the Precocious Rise of State Capacity in Britain, 1700-1832. *Journal of Economic History* (under review).
- III. Gülsunar, Emrah (2021) Making Growth Sustained: British Parliament's Legislation and Policy on Cotton Textile Industry and the Motivations Behind Them During the Industrial Revolution, 1747–1815. *Unpublished manuscript*.
- IV. Gülsunar, Emrah (2021) A Fusion of Economic and Geopolitical Motives: British Policy-makers and Imperial Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1791-1848. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Study* (under review).

Introduction

Aim, Motivation and Contribution

This thesis aims to contribute to the economic history literature and the debates on the relationship between institutions and modern economic growth with its focus on the reaction of political institutions to the structural transformation of Britain economy from 1700 to 1850. The political and economic institutions and their relationship with economic growth have been one of the prominent subjects of economic history since Douglass North's contributions to the field in the 1960s. In his seminal article with Barry Weingast (1989), North argued that the Glorious Revolution and the following institutional changes were crucial for Britain to be the first industrialised country. After its publication, this article started a big debate about the role of institutions, and it has been the most cited paper in the *Journal of Economic History*. Some economic historians objected to the role and importance of institutions altogether (Clark, 2007; Allen, 2009). Others supported the idea that institutions matter for economic growth but not necessarily how North and Weingast argued (Mokyr, 2009; Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). This thesis does not share the argument that the role of institutions in economic growth is negligible. Even if they do not play a role exactly described by North and Weingast and their followers, institutions are important, and they deserve to be investigated to understand the factors behind the long-term economic growth. The sustaining significance of the debate on the relationship between institutions and economic growth in the economic history literature could be one of the most important indicators of their importance.

The majority of economic history literature on the relationship between institutions and economic growth focuses on the impact of the former on the latter. In other words, the institutions are the independent variable(s), and the economic growth is the dependent. For this reason, the institutions are mainly conceptualised as a “pre-condition” for economic growth by both the proponents and the opponents of the argument that the institutions matter for economic growth (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2005a;

Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012; Allen, 2009; Clark, 1996; 2007; Crafts, 2011; McCloskey, 2016; Mokyr and Nye, 2007; Mokyr, 2009; 2017; North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1981; O'Brien *et al.*, 1991)¹.

However, after familiarity with Lennart Schön's writings (2000; 2009; 2012a; 2012b), I noticed that this theoretical perspective might not be sufficient to explain the relationship between institutions and economic growth. Schön conceptualises the institutions as endogenous to the process of economic development. More importantly, he argues that the duty of institutions does not end after they trigger the growth and the transformation in the economy at the beginning. During the structural transformation, they should be restructured and adapted to the new conditions periodically to "enable" growth and to make it long-term and sustained. Therefore, a country's economic performance is directly related to its institutions' ongoing "good" or "bad" adaptation to the structural transformation. There is a risk that in case of poor or no institutional adaptation, caused by path-dependency, inertia, resistance or other rigidities, economic growth may stagnate or even peter out altogether in time. He proposes the liberalisation of markets in the 1850s, restructuring the labour market in the 1890s or the emergence of the "Nordic model" in the 1930s from Swedish economic history as empirical examples of this institutional adaptation (Schön, 2009: 10).

Lennart Schön's emphasis on the institutional adaptation to the new conditions to make the growth process long and sustained is shared indirectly by some other economists or economic historians in many different forms. For example, Mancur Olson points out the possibility of "institutional sclerosis", caused by long stability and the emergence of well-entrenched rent-seeking interest groups, as a key impediment to the economic performance. He tried to explain the failures in the growth performance of certain European countries in the post-WWII period with this notion (Olson, 1982; also see Moe, 2009). Similarly, Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) emphasise the dynamic relationship among political power, which is determined by political institutions and distribution of resources, economic institutions and economic performance. Their model depends on the interaction of these variables and thereby implicitly underlines the ongoing relationship between institutions and economic growth. These examples could be furthered.

Schön's and other economic historians' theoretical perspective implicates that the relationship between institutions and economic growth is not a one-way street.

¹ See the "Theory and Literature Review" part for a more detailed discussion of this literature.

There is an ongoing mutual interaction between institutions and economic growth. The institutions affect the economic growth, then they were affected by it, and then they affect it again, and so on. Once modern economic growth started, the role of institutions could not be taken for granted. The ongoing institutional adaptation to the economy's structural transformation is crucial to make the economic growth sustained and long-term. Bad institutional adaptation could easily block the development process after a while.

For this reason, to conceptualise the institutions only as a “pre-condition” for economic growth is not sufficient². This means that not just the potential impact of institutions on economic growth but also their reaction to the structural transformation also matters and deserves to be investigated as such (also see Greif, 2006). However, this aspect of the relationship between institutions and economic growth is mostly overlooked in the economic history literature³. This research gap is the starting point of this thesis. Inspired by the abovementioned theoretical perspective, this thesis aims to contribute to the empirical literature focusing on the reaction of institutions to economic growth, assuming that the quality of that reaction is ultimately decisive to make that growth long-term and sustained.

Britain is the first country to industrialise and achieve modern economic growth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this regard, it is considered a “success story” in the literature. It is plausible to think that if the reaction of institutions in Britain could be better understood, this can provide valuable insights into the characteristics of good institutions and institutional change for long-term economic growth. That is why, not surprisingly, most economic historians, including the North and Weingast, examine the relationship between institutions and economic growth first and foremost in the British context. Lennart Schön also bases his arguments about institutional adaptation on the most developed countries, including Britain. For these reasons, this thesis examines the response of institutions to the economic growth in Britain.

The motivation behind the focus on the period from 1700 to 1850 is that the main structural transformation in Britain from agricultural to an industrial economy took place during this time frame (Daunton, 1995). Since the thesis aims to understand the response of institutions to the economic growth, not the other way around, the

² On a debate about the “preconditions of economic growth”, also Gerschenkron, 1962.

³ Philip Hoffman says, “[in economic history] we still know too little about what determines the laws, regulations, and policies that states adopt” (2015: 303).

focus is not the seventeenth century like it was the case in many economic history studies, but the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century.

Following the North's distinction between formal and informal institutions (1991), the thesis mainly focuses on the state and formal institutions (constitutions and laws), similar to Schön, who also focuses on the formal institutions in his theorisation. Although informal institutions as culture, ideas and mentality could also be significant for economic growth (McCloskey, 2016; Mokyr, 2017), they are not the primary concern of the thesis. This choice is necessary to narrow down the scope of the thesis and to make it more manageable. However, in the third and fourth papers, when I tried to understand the motives behind certain legislative changes and policies, I get in touch with the role of ideas and mentality as well.

The aim to understand the change in formal institutions from 1700 to 1850 in the British context inevitably requires focusing on Parliament. After the Glorious Revolution and the following institutional changes, Parliament turned into the central political institution in Britain. With the establishment of parliamentary supremacy over all other state institutions, including the Crown and judiciary, Parliament became a "meta-institution" to change the institutions⁴ (Mokyr and Nye, 2007). That is why most of the literature on the relationship between institutions and economic growth in Britain, implicitly or explicitly, focuses on Parliament.

With a focus on Parliament's reaction to the structural transformation of the British economy, the thesis mainly aims to understand two types of interconnected institutional responses:

What kind of legislative changes were implemented?

What kind of debates took place?

To this end, the thesis uses statute books/volumes, which contain the acts of Parliament in the Parliamentary Archives and the volumes of parliamentary debates in the Hansard Archives. Exploiting these first-hand sources for such a topic is a novelty in the economic history literature and a contribution.

⁴ Notice the difference between "institution as an organisation" and "institution as a rule of the game" in this expression (North, 1990: 3-5). Parliament was an organisation with the highest authority to change the rules of the game.

Examination of the parliamentary legislation and the debates allows us to contribute to four general questions related to the response of institutions to the structural transformation of the British economy in the 1700-1850 period:

How was the central state transformed?

How was the state capacity changed?

What kind of industrial policies were implemented? And why?

What kind of foreign economic policies were implemented? And why?

Each paper of the thesis aims to contribute to answering one aspect of each question. The first paper examines the parliamentary public legislation and the change in its magnitude and content from 1747 to 1832 in connection with the Industrial Revolution. The second paper investigates how the transportation revolution in Britain, as a part of broader structural transformations in the economy, contributed to the increase in the state's fiscal and legal capacity from 1700 to 1832. The third paper explores what kind of legislation and policies were implemented by Parliament towards the cotton textile industry as the Industrial Revolution's leading sector and the motives behind those policies from 1747 to 1815. The fourth paper searches the British free trade imperialism during the nineteenth century and tries to understand to what extent economic motives played a role in the British state's imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

In the following sections, I will first analytically review the economic and political developments in Britain from 1700 to 1850 to lay the historical context of the thesis. In the next section, I will discuss the previous literature in economic history about the relationship between institutions and economic growth. This section is an extended version of the debates that I briefly mention here. I also explain what I precisely mean when I use certain concepts such as "structural transformation" or "institutional change" in this section. In the fourth section, I elucidate the research design of the thesis, that is, historical sources, databases, methodology and methods. Then, I summarise my papers with their specific research problem, the literature they address, data, methods, and findings. Finally, I conclude the thesis with a final discussion on my research problem, all the findings and their repercussion for the literature.

Historical Context: Structural Transformation and Political Institutions in Britain from 1700 to 1850

In this section, I present the historical context of the thesis. To this end, I review first the economic and then the political developments in Britain from 1700 to 1850 in an analytical way. Not all the developments but the parts of British history related to the thesis' topic is reviewed.

Industrialisation and Growth

The British economy underwent a profound structural change from 1700 to 1850, which deserves to be named “the great transformation” (Polanyi, 1944/2001). As a result of this transformation, the British economy was much bigger, more productive and more industrialised in 1850 than in 1700. The structural transformation was first and foremost the result of the Industrial Revolution. It is widely accepted that the Industrial Revolution started in the 1760s with the emergence of radical innovations and organisation methods in manufacturing production, in particular in cotton textile, iron and energy industries, and continued until the 1830s. These general-purpose technologies brought up substantial productivity growth to these leading industries. In time, they spread to other industries and sectors. The process ended up with the industrialisation of the whole economy and a substantial increase in the total economic output both in absolute and per capita terms (Freeman & Louça, 2001: 154-168; Landes, 1988: 41-123; Mokyr, 1990: 82-112⁵).

Figure 1 shows the change in the shares of three sectors -agriculture, industry and service- within the total economic output. Until the 1780s, the share of industry and agriculture did not change much. While the former fluctuated around 40%, the latter did the same around 25-30%. However, after this date, the share of industry gradually rose while the share of agriculture declined. Industrialisation was particularly pronounced in the post-1815 period when the productivity-increasing innovations such as the factory system in the leading industries started to show their impact on the whole economy. The industrial sector's share was as low as 36% in 1781, and the share of the agricultural sector was as high as 32%. However, in 1850, 66% of the total output was the production of the industrial sector, while the share

⁵ Unless the argument is specific, the page ranges are indicated broad since the paragraphs are the summary of the information in those parts of the books and articles.

of agriculture was only 13%. This change was a clear transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.




Figure 1: Shares of three sectors in total economic output (as %), 1700-1850

Source: The author's calculation and production from the data in Broadberry *et al.*, 2015: 226-244.

Note: The invention of the spinning jenny in 1764 is indicated as a symbolic starting point of the Industrial Revolution.

The cotton textile was the leading industry of the Industrial Revolution. Radical innovations first emerged in this industry. During the eighteenth century, especially in the second half, the flying shuttle, the spinning jenny, the water frame and the spinning mule increased the productivity of cotton textile production substantially. Moreover, the factory system was first adopted in the cotton textile industry near the rivers with the help of water mechanisation (Freeman and Louça, 2001: 154-159; Landes, 1988: 41-42). Due to these innovations and production methods, the cotton industry grew faster than the other industries and the rest of the economy. This rapid growth can be observed in Table 2. The annual average growth rate of the cotton textile industry was already high compared to the whole industrial sector and total economy since the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, the differences in average growth rate were particularly pronounced after the 1770s with the impact of productivity-enhancing innovations (Chapman, 1989: 45-53).

Table 1: The annual average growth rate of the cotton industry, industrial sector and total economy in different periods (as %), 1700-1820

Years	Cotton	Industry	GDP
1700-1770	1.37	0.71	0.65
1771-1780	6.20	1.79	1.00
1781-1790	12.76	1.60	0.80
1791-1800	6.73	2.49	1.90
1801-1810	4.49	2.70	1.50
1811-1820	5.59	2.42	1.10

Source: The author's calculation and production from the data in Broadberry *et al.*, 2015: 226-244; Chapman, 1989: 47; Freeman and Louca, 2001: 154-156.

Starting from the late eighteenth century, the mechanisation of first the cotton, then the whole textile industry attracted strong reactions from skilled artisans and some workers. For centuries, these people worked in these industries with their hand-production skills, but now they were threatened to lose their jobs because of the labour-saving machinery. The artisans and workers used many different methods, including machine-breaking, to prevent the mechanisation of their industries. Most famously, the Luddites rioted and destroyed many spinning machines in Lancashire and environs from 1811 to 1813. Parliament enacted many laws to prevent these activities and to suppress the riots⁶. Despite the failure of the Luddites, the resistance to mechanisation continued until the early 1830s, such as the “Captain Swing” riots of agricultural workers in southern and eastern England against the threshing machines. The resistance to mechanisation had never been successful in banning the machines altogether, but it delayed their diffusion for a while (Mokyr, 2009: Chapter 17⁷).

The revolution in manufacturing processes was the most crucial part of the British economy's structural transformation from 1700 to 1850, but it was not the only one. Other parts of the economy such as agriculture, finance, commerce and transportation were also transformed substantially. The transformation in these parts of the economy preceded, even maybe caused, the Industrial Revolution (Vernon, 2017: 78-90). That is why I prefer to use the “structural transformation of the British economy” in the thesis' title, instead of simply saying “Industrial Revolution”, which spans a narrower period from the 1760s to the 1830s (Mokyr, 1990: 82).

The improvements in Britain's transportation network were a notable complementary to the Industrial Revolution during the eighteenth century. Transportation network was crucial for the economic growth because, like the good

⁶ The third paper of this thesis examines the details of these laws and the motivations behind them.

⁷ The e-book has no page numbers.

institutions, it reduced the transaction costs by allowing for market integration and specialisation (Daunton, 1995: 285-287). Starting from the early eighteenth century, the transportation infrastructure of Britain -canals, bridges, harbours and roads- started to improve. Especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, the turnpike roads and canals boomed. Canals were functional in the transportation of coal, a key raw material of the Industrial Revolution, by connecting the coalfields to the industrial regions. However, the social savings that turnpike roads created during the eighteenth century were higher than the canals (Daunton, 1995: 285-287; Vernon, 2017: 94-95).

Turnpike roads were the toll roads constructed and maintained by turnpike trusts with the authorisation of Parliament. They began to be built in the early eighteenth century but notably surged from the 1750s to the 1770s (Figure 2). There were 150 turnpike trusts running toll roads in Britain during the 1750s, but by 1830 there were more than 1000, operating more than 20,000 miles of road (Vernon, 2017: 84). The turnpike roads encouraged the movement of people and goods because the extension of the road network, the improved quality of road services and stagecoach design substantially shortened the journey times. In this way, the improvements in the transportation network facilitated market integration and economic growth. Moreover, they improved the reach of the state, its army, judges, tax collectors and postal services⁸. However, in the post-1815 period, as part of the transition to the liberal market economy, turnpike roads began to be seen as an impediment to free trade. With the emergence of railways after the 1830s, they gradually disappeared (Bogart, 2005a; Daunton, 1995: 297-314; Vernon, 2017: 10-13).

⁸ I problematise this issue in the second paper of the thesis.




Figure 2: Cumulative turnpike roads in Britain (in miles), 1700-1832

Source: The author's calculation and production from the data in Pawson, 1977: 13; Bogart, 2005a: 483.

Note: The data is interpolated from the 10-years benchmarks, indicated as orange dots in the figure.

Starting from the 1830s, a new type of general-purpose technologies emerged in the energy and transportation industries. The steam engines, which had already been invented in the late eighteenth century, diffused and replaced water mechanisation, especially in factories. With their adaptation to the ships and railways, the transportation sector was revolutionised with substantial reductions in freight costs and durations. The first inter-city railway in the world opened in 1830 between Manchester and Liverpool. Then, railway construction boomed with the “railway mania” in the 1840s and afterwards (Freeman and Louça, 2001: 188-212; Mokyr, 1990: 114-148). The thesis does not directly concern the results of this “second industrial revolution”, which continued until the end of the century (Schön, 2012a; 5-6; Vernon, 2017: 151). However, it is important to know that although the first industrial revolution ended in the 1830s, new technological revolutions furthered the structural transformation of the British economy and the long-term economic growth.

The inevitable result of industrialisation and structural transformation of the economy in Britain was economic growth. As a result of the process summarised above, Britain became the first country to break the Malthusian constraints and achieve modern economic growth. Figure 3 shows that the annual total gross domestic product (GDP) increased sixfold in Britain from 1700 to 1850. Despite the steady rise after the 1730s, the growth was more pronounced after the 1790s,

particularly in the post-1815 period. This exponential rise was related to the spread of productivity-increasing general-purpose technologies such as the steam engine, factory system or railways and their impact on the whole economy over time. The average annual rate of growth of total GDP was 0.53% in the 1700-1750, 1.30% in the 1750-1815 and 1.97% in the 1835-1850 period.

The increase in GDP was not just total but also in per capita terms. In other words, it was not just the result of the increase in population, which more than tripled during this period (Wrigley, 2004: 61 and 64), but also the growth in productivity thanks to the new technologies. Figure 3 shows that annual GDP per capita increased approximately 80% from 1700 to 1850. Similar to total GDP, the growth rate was particularly pronounced in the second half of the eighteenth century. The average annual growth rate in GDP per capita was 0.23% in the 1700-1750, 0.40% in the 1750-1815 and 0.69% in the 1835-1850 period.




Figure 3: Total GDP and GDP per capita in Britain (1700=100), 1700-1850

Source: Source: The author's calculation and production from the data in Bolt *et al.*, 2018; Broadberry *et al.*, 2015: 226-244.

The modern economic growth made Britain the leading economy and military power of the world during the nineteenth century. Other Western European countries such as France and Netherlands emulated Britain after a while and caught it up to a certain extent. However, other countries such as Qing China or Ottoman

Turkey could not do the same, and they lagged. The economic lagging of Asian empires created a huge development gap between Britain and these countries, particularly in the nineteenth century (Porter, 2009: 1-4 and 12-13). This “great divergence” between Western European countries and the Asian empires could be observed in Figure 4. Britain was already more developed than other countries during the eighteenth century, but the gap with the Asian empires was widened, especially in the nineteenth century with the acceleration of the rise in the GDP per capita. This development gap inevitably brought up changes in trade relations such that the relatively equal relations of the eighteenth century gradually became asymmetrical and even can be characterised as dependent relations in the nineteenth century. Under the notion of “free trade”, Britain swarmed the markets of underdeveloped countries with its cheap manufactured goods, production of its superior industrial sector while importing raw materials (Lynn, 2009: 103-105).




Figure 4: GDP per capita of Britain, France, Turkey and China (in 2011 US\$), 1700-1850

Source: The author’s production from the data in Bolt *et al.*, 2018.

Note: For Ottoman Empire (Turkey), there is data for only benchmark years in 1700, 1750, 1820 and 1870. The data point in 1870 was coded in 1850 to give an idea. For China, there is only for 1766, 1812, 1820, 1825, 1850. There is no data for France from 1789 to 1820. Despite this missing data, the development gap between Britain and other countries is still apparent.

Parliament and State

This thesis examines the polity called “The Kingdom of England” until 1707, “Kingdom of Great Britain” until 1800 and “United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland” until 1850 and after. Great Britain was created with the unification of England and Wales with Scotland in 1707. The United Kingdom was created with the merger of Great Britain with Ireland in 1800. Each act of union was a step to create the “British nation-state” and the identity of “Britishness” during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Colley, 2003: 1-9; Hoppit, 2003). Figure 5 shows the map of the British Isles, including the four countries of the United Kingdom (without their boundaries⁹), England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.



Figure 5: Map of the British Isles including England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland

Source: It is retrieved from the website of [historic-uk.com](https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/The-UK-Great-Britain-Whats-the-Difference/) (on 17 July 2021). URL: <https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/The-UK-Great-Britain-Whats-the-Difference/>.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 was the key political turning point in modern British history, with probably many economic repercussions. After the protracted struggle between the Parliamentarians and the Royalists during the mid-seventeenth century, including the English Civil War (1642-1651), the Protestant Whig elite successfully turned England into a constitutional monarchy. Parliament was already a part of Britain’s government system before the Glorious Revolution. However, it was gathering intermittently under the prorogation threat of the monarchs (Dimitruk, 2018). With the overthrow of the Catholic James II, the new king recognised the supremacy of Parliament’s authority over other government institutions, including the Crown and the judiciary. In this way, the balance of power

⁹ Except for the current boundary between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

between the aristocratic landowner elite, supported by other wealth-holders, and the monarch changed in favour of the elites, and the monarchs' executive authority was restrained by Parliament (Pincus, 2009: 3-10; 474-486). This formal institutional structure of the British state system continued as it was during the eighteenth century without any remarkable change.

Since Parliament is the main focus of this thesis, it is essential to know its formal organisation and members. British Parliament consisted of two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Commons was the lower chamber, and its members were elected by specific constituencies for a fixed term. The House of Lords was the upper chamber, and its members were (unelected) peers with hereditary titles. Despite its seemingly "lower" position, the Commons gradually gained *de facto* power to decide social, political, and economic matters during the eighteenth century as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation. Only Anglican men with substantial property, landowner gentry, were eligible to sit in the Commons. Roughly 3-5% of society, and 6-9% of men, had a right to vote in the elections because of the restrictions on the voting qualifications (O'Gorman, 2005: 1-26; Rogers and Walters, 2015: 18-41; Vernon, 2017: 16-17).

With the impact of parliamentary reform movements, which gained momentum in the post-1815 period, the restrictions on electing and being elected to the Commons were gradually relaxed during the nineteenth century. The Catholics were permitted to be elected in 1829. With the Reform Act of 1832, the electoral system was reformed by removing customary and irregular voting rights, abolishing many "rotten boroughs", redistributing some parliamentary seats and slightly extending the franchise. In this way, industrial cities such as Manchester gained more representation in the Commons (Evans, 1996: 399-401). Because of this crucial change in the structure of Parliament, the first two papers of the thesis end their analysis in 1832.

The aristocratic and landowner elite sitting in Parliament was divided into two loose political groupings, both of which were transformed into modern political parties in the mid-nineteenth century. The Tories traditionally defended the authority of monarch over Parliament, mercantilist economic policies, which prioritises land, not commerce, as the sources of wealth, and the imperial expansion of the British state. The Whigs, on the contrary, championed the rights of Parliament over the monarch, the promotion of commerce, minimal government and electoral reform (Vernon, 2017: 15).

Despite the leading role of Whig parliamentarians, there was a relatively more balanced power-sharing in state and Parliament between the Whigs and the Tories in the first decades following the Glorious Revolution. However, after the Hanoverian succession of George I in 1714 and the defeat of Jacobite rising in 1715, the Whigs took complete control of the state and removed the Tories from all governmental positions. “The Whig supremacy” continued until 1783. The Tories turned back to the state system only after George III’s coming to the throne in 1760, especially with the formation of the Pitt government in 1783. These new Tories were different from their predecessors with their more friendly attitude to the liberal ideas, especially in economic matters. The successive Tory governments ruled Britain until 1830. After this date, the Whigs started to be dominant again both in Parliament and state (Evans, 1996: 402-406; also see the “Source” part of Table 2). Table 2 summarises the governing party in state and Parliament from the Scottish union to the mid-nineteenth century.

Table 2: Governing fraction/party in British Parliament during different sub-periods, 1707–1851

Period	Governing Party
1707-1713	Tory
1714-1769	Whig (except 1762)
1770-1781	Tory
1782-1783	Whig
1783-1830	Tory (except 1806)
1831–1840	Whig (except 1834)
1841–1845	Conservative
1846–1851	Whig

Source: The author’s tabulation from Cook and Stevenson, 1988: 33-52 and 111-119; Cook and Stevenson, 2001: 11-25; 47-59; Cook and Keith, 1984: 1-48 and 138-141.

In the thesis, related to its key role in government, I used Parliament to identify the change in the broader state system of Britain, in particular the central state. For this reason, it is necessary to explain the historical context not just behind Parliament but also the central state. Historians have agreed that after the Glorious Revolution, a new type of state, called “fiscal-military”, emerged. This new state had (never-ending) military ambitions to conquer different parts of the world, to expand the British Empire by gaining new colonies. To this end, it was always supposed to be ready to fight with other European powers as a part of constant colonial and commercial rivalry (Brewer, 1990: 23-30). The war record of Britain from the Glorious Revolution (1688) to the Congress of Vienna (1815), shown in Table 3,

verifies the military ambitions of the fiscal-military state. During the 127 years, the British state was in a major war¹⁰ in 71 years and was in (armed) peace for 56 years.

Table 3: List of major wars involving the British “fiscal-military” state, 1688-1815

War	Period
Nine Years' War	1689-1697
War of Spanish Succession	1702-1713
War of Jenkins's Ear	1739-1748
War of Spanish Succession	1740-1748
Seven Years' War	1756-1763
American Revolutionary War	1775-1783
French Revolutionary Wars	1792-1802
Napoleonic Wars	1803-1815

Source: The author's tabulation from Clodfelter, 2000; Dincecco, 2009: 92-94.

British state's military ambitions were highly costly. The ongoing major wars required constant financing of a strong army and a navy, which was why it was not just a “military” but a “fiscal-military state”. Despite its modest population compared to other European countries, British armies and navies left the war scenes in most of the abovementioned wars with victory thanks to the enormous economic resources behind them. These resources resulted from the British state's effective tax collecting system, built during the second half of the seventeenth century with many governmental reforms. The Glorious Revolution further improved the state's fiscal capacity (Brewer, 1990: 73-93; O'Brien, 2011). Figure 6 shows that tax revenue per capita of the British state increased after the Glorious Revolution. It particularly showed a tendency to increase during the war periods, marked with the orange lines in the figure, and decline during the peace times.

¹⁰ It is considered a “major war” when the British state fought with another European power in a large-scale war. Except for the American Revolutionary War, the wars with the local powers in the colonised territories are not included.




Figure 6: Tax revenues per capita of the British State (in grams of gold), 1650-1850

Source: The author's calculation and production from the data in Dincecco, 2011: 127-137. The war periods are the same with Table 3.

The British state was not just able to collect more tax revenue after the Glorious Revolution. Thanks to a series of financial reforms following the Revolution, it could also borrow more money from the financial markets. The establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 was the most crucial of these reforms. It provided the financial mechanisms for the creditors to invest in Britain's national debt, the majority of which was spent on the wars (Harling and Mandler, 1993: 48-49). The creditors had more tendency to lend money to the state with lower interest rates after the Revolution because of the increasing credibility related to the restraining of monarchs' arbitrary power and parliamentary supervision on the state budget. In this way, the British state could borrow unprecedented levels of loans, which were later serviced by tax revenues, to finance the wars (Brewer, 1990: 93-108; North and Weingast, 1989). Figure 7 shows that similar to tax revenues, public debt per capita of the British state increased throughout the eighteenth century, particularly during the war periods.

In the post-1815 period, the British state gradually transformed in the direction of liberal principles with a series of reforms. These liberal principles can be summarised as the promotion of liberal market economy, "cheap" and representative form of government, religious and civil liberties, the rule of law (and its independence from the executive authority) and meritocracy in the civil service (Harling, 2001: 73-75; Evans, 1996: 200-205). Some historians described this

process as a transition from “fiscal-military” to a “*laissez-faire* state” (Harling and Mandler, 1993). The signs of this new type of state were already observable in the late eighteenth century, but it found the chance to flourish only after the French wars. The main feature of this state was that it was no longer predominantly occupied with major wars and their financing.




Figure 7: Net total public debt per capita of the British State (in 2016 £), 1700-1850

Source: The author’s calculation and production from the data in <https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/>. URL: https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/download_multi_year_1700_1850UKd_17c1li011mcn_G0t (retrieved on 19 July 2021). The war periods are the same with Table 3.

As can be observed from figures 6 and 7, both tax revenue and public debt per capita of the British state declined after the Napoleonic Wars. This decline resulted from the principle of “cheap government”, which depends on the idea that the state should be run cheaply, that is, as little public debt and tax burden on society as possible (Vernon, 2017: 129-131). Instead of war-financing, the British state became relatively more occupied with society’s welfare by providing public goods like health, education, and social security during the nineteenth century. I track the details of this process in the first paper of the thesis.

One of the most noticeable effects of the liberal revolution in government was the change in the British state’s economic and foreign trade doctrine. During the eighteenth century, the central economic doctrine of the state was mercantilism,

which depended on a set of ideas such as protectionist foreign trade policy with high tariffs, monopolistic companies such as East India Company to conduct overseas trade and imperial conquest of territories and their resources. This policy was best exemplified in the Navigation Acts, enacted throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, and the Corn Laws of 1815 (Daunton, 1995: 533-551). The criticism of mercantilist ideas and advocacy of free trade started in the second half of the eighteenth century, with the most notable example of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776). However, minimising duties, tariffs, and legal barriers to trade between countries became a popular political cause only after the Napoleonic Wars. The movements and organisations, such as the Manchester school and Anti-Corn Law League, supported by industrialists, merchants and some segments of the working class, pressured Parliament to repeal the restrictions on free trade. As a result, the Navigation Acts and the Corn Laws were relaxed in the 1820s and abolished altogether in the 1840s (Daunton, 1995: 551-557). So, the Victorian age of *Pax Britannica* could start.

The transition from mercantilist to liberal foreign trade policy had significant repercussions for the British Empire. Mercantilism advocated the imperial conquest and formal control of territories to benefit from their resources and expand the empire. However, this idea gradually became obsolete after the loss of American colonies in 1783. The supporters of *laissez-faire* economics argued that as long as the trade was "free" among the countries, formal political control may not be necessary (Vernon, 2017: 151-152). This means that it also may not be necessary to compete with other European powers to gain direct control of territories. The change in the British state's foreign policy in this direction proceeded hand-in-hand with the dismantling of the fiscal-military state. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the British state did not fight with any European power, except with Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, until World War I. Instead, it tended to sign many free trade treaties depending on mutual interest and benefit (O'Brien and Pigman, 1991: 108-110).

In its extreme form, it was believed that there would not be any war as long as there was free trade between countries. However, this optimism was not always the case in the nineteenth century. Not all countries, especially the less developed ones, were eager to enter into a free-trade relationship with Britain. Then, the British state forced these countries with its superior naval power to open their markets to trade. This "free trade imperialism" was imposed on Asian empires and Latin American countries with a series of free trade treaties after the 1830s. Most notably, the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty signed with the Ottoman Empire in 1838, and the Treaty of Nanking

signed with China in 1842 granted many privileges and extraterritoriality to the British merchants. With this policy, the British state created an economic and political “sphere of influences” in different parts of the world, called the “informal empire” of Britain, in addition to its formal colonial empire (Lynn, 1999: 109-112 and 117-120). In the fourth paper, I examine the details of this imperial policy by focusing on the Ottoman Empire.

Theory and Literature Review

In this section of the thesis, I discuss the previous literature in economic history, focusing on both the theoretical debates about the relationship between institutions and economic growth and the related empirical discussions regarding Britain during the 1700-1850 period. Moreover, I explain my theoretical position, point out the theoretical and empirical literature’s shortcomings and further justify why we need such a thesis. In doing this, I extend the debates that I already briefly discussed in the “Aim, Motivation and Contribution” section. I also explain certain contentious concepts as “institutions” or “structural transformation” and how I use them in the thesis.

Institutions in Theory: New Institutionalism, Douglass North and Economic History

The prominent theoretical debate about institutions and economic growth is how their relationship should be conceptualised from the beginning. The key question in this regard is that do institutions play a role in economic growth? Standard neoclassical explanations for economic growth mainly focus on capital accumulation and sometimes technology and human capital, and they leave the institutions out of the analysis since they are considered “exogenous”. It is assumed that institutions are already optimal in market relations, which equals the transaction costs to zero (Cass, 1965; Solow, 1956). New institutional economics emerged as a reaction to these unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics. The institutions are endogenous to the growth process, and economic analysis must take the institutions and the transaction costs into account (Williamson, 1975; 1985; 2000). This proposition is also the general theoretical assumption shared by this thesis.

The controversy between neoclassical and new institutional economic theories on the role of institutions in economic growth is mainly a debate in economics, not in economic history. However, Douglass North's key position both in new institutional economics and new economic history (or cliometrics) since the 1960s made the role of institutions in long-term economic growth one of the most prominent topics in economic history as well. In this way, North played a crucial role in the intertwining of new institutional economics and economic history¹¹ (for the relationship of new institutional economics and economic history, and the role of North in this, see Basu *et al.*, 1987; Galiani and Sened, 2014; La Croix, 2019; Libecap, 1997).

North became aware of the limitations of neoclassical theory after he started to examine European economic history. Neoclassical economic theory was insufficient to explain the societal change in the last 500 years with its negligence on the role of institutions, especially property rights. North proposed models that emphasise the importance of institutions for economic growth and the role of transaction costs in understanding how markets, firms and governments are organised. According to him, institutions and property rights explain the fundamental question of “why some countries are rich and others poor?” because they are the main determinant behind the economic performance of countries. Good institutions, manifested in secure property rights, reduce the transaction costs and boost economic activity. However, the bad institutions can easily drag the economic activity by increasing the transaction costs (North and Davis, 1971; North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; 1990; 1994).

North defines the institutions as “[they] are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (1991: 97). In his definition, North distinguishes “organisations” such as family, corporations, government etc. from “institutions”. The institutions are the “rules of the games” (1990: 3), not social organisations. Their main function is “to create order and reduce the uncertainty in exchange”. However, this does not mean that their effects are always beneficial. They can push “economic change toward growth, stagnation and decline” (Ibid; also Hodgson, 2006; Ogilvie, 2007). In the thesis, I mainly follow these definitions of North.

¹¹ Thereby, he also led the integration of the fields of economic history and political economy (Koyama, 2018: 729).

North and his followers further developed his earlier perspective about the importance of institutions in fostering economic growth. For instance, North, Weingast and Wallis (2009) made a distinction between “limited access order” and “open access order” societies by referring to their differences to limit violence. In limited access orders, elites control the economic and political system to extract rents, which in turn stifle economic growth. However, in open access orders, political institutions support forming new political and economic organisations to compete with the existing ones, which encourages economic growth. Later, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) put forward similar arguments with a different conceptual framework. They argued that inclusive institutions, with secure property rights, maximise the economic output for the whole society while extractive institutions only secure income for a ruling elite. This distinction is the main factor behind why some nations fail to prosper but others not, which is, for example, illustrated by the economic development gap between North and South Korea (see also Acemoğlu *et al.*, 2001; 2002; 2005a; Greif, 2006 for more on the importance of institutions for economic growth).

Northian perspective on the relationship between institutions and economic growth has also attracted much criticism in the economic history literature. Most notably, Greif (2006) criticises the North’s definition of institutions with his “institutions-as-equilibria” approach, although he still sees the institutions as fundamental to economic change (Greif and Kingston, 2011: 25; also Greif, 1993; Ogilvie, 2007). Mokyr (2017: 5-7) argues that institutions matter for the economic performance of countries, but they cannot be considered the fundamental cause. For example, the cultural changes were more influential on modern economic growth than institutions. McCloskey (2010: 296-309) argues that, despite his efforts in the opposite direction, North’s frame of analysis still embraces outdated neoclassical concepts like “profit” and “utility maximisation” and their constraints. Finally, Clark (2007: 212) contends that institutions cannot explain the last two centuries of economic growth. They are endogenously determined and mainly result from different technologies, relative prices, and consumption desires. The criticisms of the Northian perspective could be furthered (Hoppit, 2008; 347-350; 2017: 28-32). However, in any case, it is the central assumption of this thesis that institutions have been crucial for economic growth, both in general and in the emergence of modern economic growth in Britain, even if not always in the way that North and his followers described.

From Theory to Empiric: The Glorious Revolution and Its Economic Outcomes

To ground his theoretical arguments about the importance of institutions for economic growth, North (together with Weingast) used the Glorious Revolution and its impact on the Industrial Revolution as a case study (1989). In this pathbreaking article, he argued that restraining the arbitrary and confiscatory power of the executive was the key institutional change of the Glorious Revolution. In this way, public finance began to be controlled by Parliament, royal prerogative powers were curtailed, the judiciary became independent from the Crown, the supremacy of the common law courts were established, and most importantly, the property rights were secured, not just for the wealth-holder elite but for the whole society (also, North, 1991). As a result, with different mechanisms, such as lower interest rates in public borrowing thanks to the state's credibility and the development of private capital markets (Hoffman and Norberg, 1994), these new sets of political institutions paved the way for the British Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth. North and Weingast's arguments on the Glorious Revolution and its impact on the Industrial Revolution are supported by his followers, most notably by Acemoğlu *et al.* in their many studies (2005a; 2012).

North and Weingast's argument about the positive role of political institutions on economic growth is extended to the whole early modern period in Europe by van Zanden *et al.* (2012). They argued that the urbanisation rates and the activity of parliaments in the North-west European countries as England and Netherlands were correlated in the 1500-1800 period. The parliaments enhanced pre-industrial economic growth in these countries by limiting the predation of rulers and landowners over merchants and other capital owners. The political institutions, and more specifically the parliaments, explain the "little divergence" between these countries and the rest of Europe (also De Long and Shelifer, 1993; Dennison and Ogilvie, 2014; Pleijt and van Zanden, 2016 for more debate on this topic). This model aligns with North and Thomas' explanation for successful economic growth in England and the Netherlands during the early modern period compared to France and Spain (1973). In England and the Netherlands, secure property rights reduced market imperfections in capital and product markets while their non-existence depressed economic growth in France and Spain (see also Acemoğlu *et al.*, 2005b). Cox (2017) extended this argument further back to the medieval period and argued that self-governing cities and national parliaments facilitated "economic liberty" after 1200, which unleashed faster and inter-connected urban growth (see also, Epstein, 2000; Greif, 2006; Stasavage, 2011).

Some economic historians argue that the Glorious Revolution and the related institutional changes did not just contribute to the public debt and private capital markets, both of which paved the way for the Industrial Revolution, but also the transportation system of Britain with its positive impact on the transportation investment. According to Bogart, Britain had a more extensive and efficient transportation system than France, thanks to its (relatively) democratic institutions, which emerged as a result of the Glorious Revolution. The political institutions in Britain encouraged investment in turnpike roads during the eighteenth century by limiting the arbitrary power of governmental bodies to change the tolls or reduce the rights of turnpike trusts (2005a; 2005b; 2009; 2011). Bogart's explanation for the increase in transportation investment in Britain aligns with the Northian perspective's emphasis on the security of property rights for economic growth.

The Northian argument about the importance of the Glorious Revolution for the Industrial Revolution and the modern economic growth has been criticised from many different perspectives with a focus on the topics such as the essence of the conflict in the Revolution (Pincus, 2009; Pincus and Robinson, 2012; also Hoppit, 2000: 1-50), its relation with the financial revolution (Wells and Wills, 2000), interest rates, sovereign debt and credible commitment (Coffman *et al.*, 2013; Quinn, 2001; Stasavage, 2002; 2003; Sussman and Yafeh, 2006), and the role of Catholicism in the Revolution (Carruthers, 1990). Notably, Clark (1996; 2007) contested the argument that property rights were secured with the Glorious Revolution. According to him, they were already secure centuries before the Revolution (see also Allen, 2009: 4-5; Hodgson, 2017; cf. Bogart and Richardson, 2009; 2011; Cox, 2012; Dimitruk, 2018). Hoppit (2011) argued that let alone securing the property rights, the Glorious Revolution actually increased their insecurity (see also, Harris, 2004; Hodgson, 2017; McCloskey, 2010: 325-335; Ogilvie and Carus, 2017: 426-428 and 446-447 for more discussion on the property rights in Britain during this period). According to Ogilvie and Carus, historical evidence shows that, contrary to the belief of the Northian perspective, parliaments do not guarantee economic success. Many parliaments representing wealth-holders in Poland, Württemberg or even in the Netherlands did not encourage economic growth in the early modern period and the British Parliament during the eighteenth century had a mixed record in this respect (2014: 419-426; cf. Van Zanden *et al.*, 2012).

The criticism of the Northian perspective about the role of Glorious Revolution on modern economic growth is connected to a broader debate in the economic history literature, which is why the Industrial Revolution first emerged in Britain and what

was the fundamental cause. The explanations for these questions can be divided into two categories related to the main topic of this thesis: the ones that emphasise the role of non-institutional factors and the ones that underline the importance of institutional or related factors such as state and politics (also see, Crafts, 2011). The first group of economic historians point out the factors as the role of energy and coal reserves (Pomeranz, 2000; Wrigley, 2010), consumption and demand (Berg, 2007; de Vries, 2008), factor prices and high real wages (Allen, 2009) and demographic/biological factors and downward social mobility (Clark, 2007). I do not get into details of these explanations because they are out of this thesis' main topic.

The main current of the second group of economic historians explaining the fundamental cause behind the modern economic growth is the Northian perspective, which is already explained above. However, there are also the economic historians who emphasise the role of institutions and related factors but do not necessarily follow the new institutionalist tradition. For example, Parthasarathi (2011) underlines the role of state and economic policy in the rise of Europe and Britain (also Harris, 2004; Vries, 2015), in particular, the protectionist foreign trade policy to support the domestic textile industry (also, Ashworth, 2017; Bairoch, 1995; Chang, 2002). O'Brien *et al.* (1991) point out the role of interest groups, politics and lobbying in Parliament by the different branches of the textile industry in shaping these policies and legislation. O'Brien (1988; 2011) also underlines the efficient tax system and fiscal capacity of the British state that played a role in the precocious rise of Britain's commerce and industry (see also Johnson and Koyama, 2017: 8-15; cf. Ogilvie and Carus, 2014: 456-458). Mokyr (2002; 2009; 2017) argues that, despite the importance of formal institutions, the main factor behind the Industrial Revolution was culture and mentality, which laid the foundation for scientific advances and innovations. In line with this perspective, McCloskey underlines the importance of values and ideas of the bourgeoisie in the "Great Enrichment" (2010; 2015; 2016; see also Hoppit, 2017).

Institutional Adaptation: Lennart Schön and Others

The above-summarised literature in economic history mainly concerns the impact of institutions on economic growth. However, as indicated in the Aim, Motivation and Contribution section, this thesis is mainly preoccupied with the reaction of institutions, more specifically political institutions, to the economic growth with the assumption that this reaction is crucial to make the economic growth long-term and

sustained¹². This assumption comes from Lennart Schön's theoretical perspective on the institutions, which in general, even if not in detail, complements the Northian perspective. Similar to North and new institutional economics, and contrary to neoclassical economics, Schön conceptualises the institutions as endogenous to the economic growth. According to him, analysing institutions may not be necessary to understand the short-term fluctuations in the growth process, but they are crucial to comprehend the long-term economic development (Schön, 2012a: 4-6).

Inspired by Schumpeter and his concept of creative destruction (2008/1942), Schön's long-term economic growth theory assigns a decisive role to macro-innovations and new technologies, such as factory system, steam engine, railways or electricity, and their transformative capacity on the economy. When they emerge from the most developed country or countries, these new general-purpose technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Lipsey *et al.*, 2005) only affect the leading sectors at the beginning. However, with an increase in investments and new enterprises over time, they diffuse to other sectors (and other countries) and transform the whole economy by improving the overall productivity. According to Schön, developed economies enter into such a "structural transformation" process roughly every 40-50 years since the Industrial Revolution with the decline of existing technologies and the surge of new ones (Schön, 1991; 2009). These transformation periods were triggered by deep crises, not just in the financial but also in the real economy, called "structural crises" (2012a: 1-21; Ljungberg, 2016b: 7). The British Industrial Revolution from the 1760s to the 1830s/1840s refers to such a transformation phase with the emergence of new technologies and leading sectors such as textile or iron, which later made huge impacts on the whole economy (Schön, 2012b: 2-4).

What is particularly important for this thesis in Schön's theory of long-term economic growth is the role he assigns to the institutions and the perspective he suggested on the relationship between institutions and economic growth. According to Schön, during the structural transformation of an economy, institutional adaptation to the new conditions is crucial to make the growth long-term and sustained. For this reason, the structural transformation periods are also the times of institutional change and restructuring. If this restructuring to the new economic conditions is successful, then the institutions encourage economic growth, but if it is not, the growth may stagnate or even peter out in the long run. Many different

¹² Nevertheless, I give quite a space to review this literature because they are the primary debates about the relationship between institutions and economic growth in economic history.

factors such as path-dependency, inertial attitudes, socio-political conflict and resistance may create institutional rigidities and prevent or delay the necessary change in institutions and adaptation to the economic conditions (Schön, 2000; 2009; 2012a: 1-21; see also Ljungberg, 2016b: 8-9). As it can be understood, in Schön's theory, the institutions are not just a precondition but also an enabler variable.

Schön points out the liberalisation of markets both in Sweden and the developed world favouring integration at much lower costs in the 1850s, restructuring of labour markets as a result of conflict between capital and labour in the 1890s or the emergence of the "Nordic model" in the 1930s in Sweden and other Nordic countries as the empirical indicators of abovementioned institutional adaptation during the structural transformation process (Schön, 2009: 10).

As indicated in the Aim, Motivation and Contribution section, Lennart Schön's perspective on the institutions and economic growth has similarities with some other economists or economic historians. One prominent example is the theoretical framework of Acemoğlu *et al.* (2005a: 448-451) to explain the fundamental cause behind the long-term economic growth. After indicating that economic institutions are the fundamental cause behind the differences in the economic development of countries, Acemoğlu *et al.* suggest a model explaining why then economic institutions differ across them. Their model is dynamic and cyclical and implicates that the mutual relationship between institutions and economic growth is ongoing and perpetual.

According to Acemoğlu *et al.*'s theoretical model, the economic institutions are mainly decided by political power (see also Hoppit, 2008; Ogilvie, 2007 about this), and this political power is determined by both the political institutions (*de jure* political power in laws and constitutions) and the distribution of resources (*de facto* political power of wealthy). The distribution of resources changes with the impact of economic institutions, which increase the economic might and *de facto* political power of certain groups in society. Then, the groups with *de facto* political power strive for change in political institutions to turn their power from *de facto* to *de jure*. If they became successful, they would re-define the economic institutions, which may or may not encourage economic growth. They use this theoretical framework also to explain how the merchant groups in Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries strengthened their *de facto* political power with their economic gains from the Atlantic trade and use this power later to change the political institutions and secure property rights (2005b; see also Brenner, 1993; Jha, 2015).

The literature on the factors behind the growth performance of countries, their catching-up, forging ahead or falling behind (Abramovitz, 1986), especially during the post-war period, is also in line with Schön's emphasis on the good or bad adaptation of institutions to the structural transformations. Most notably, Olson (1982; 1990) puts the concept of "institutional sclerosis" at the centre of his analysis. He argues that in the absence of external adverse shocks such as wars or foreign invasions, the stability in some democratic countries creates many rent-seeking interest groups. These politically capable groups may become constraints on economic growth if they block the necessary institutional changes while trying to protect their vested interests. For instance, World War II and its aftermath significantly relaxed the constraints for some countries such as West Germany. However, welfare state-related interest groups such as the unions and the institutional rigidities or the "sclerosis" they created, played a decisive role in the poor economic performance of Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s¹³ (for more discussion on the Olson's hypothesis, Eichengreen and Ritschl, 2009; Heckelman, 2007).

Espen Moe extended Olson's analysis of "institutional sclerosis" to the different time periods starting from the Industrial Revolution (2007; 2009). According to him, the good institutional adaptation to the economy's structural transformation and demolishing the interest groups resisting this adaptation were critical in countries' forging ahead or lagging behind since the beginning of modern economic growth. For instance, the lagging of France behind Britain in the late eighteenth or forging ahead of the USA and Germany in the late nineteenth centuries were directly related to the good or bad institutional adaptation of these countries (also, Freeman and Louça, 2001: 153-219; Frey, 2019; Root, 1991). In the same vein, some economic historians explained the fading away of economic growth in China (Mokyr, 1990: 210-238) and the Islamic world (Kuran, 2011) during the medieval period, despite their good performance at the beginning, with the stifling role that institutions played, more specifically, the administrative unity and the state repression in the former and the Islamic law in the later (also see, Greif, 2006).

¹³ Olson's claims on the economic growth performance of Sweden are challenged on the ground that the structural transformation that the Swedish economy underwent during the 1970s made its impact on the growth rates only in the 1990s. This delayed impact created a false perception in the 1980s that Sweden set a bad example of institutional rigidities (Ljungberg, 2016b: 5).

Examples of Institutional Adaptation in Britain, 1700-1850

The above-mentioned theoretical perspectives show that it is necessary to go beyond the literature about “the institutional preconditions of economic growth”. It is necessary to look at the details of this institutional adaptation closer, which is the primary concern of this study.

Despite the focus of economic history literature on the institutional preconditions of economic growth, but not the institutional adaptation as a reaction to the structural transformation, of course, it is not possible to argue that there is no empirical study on Britain that examines the different aspects of formal institutions, state and politics during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although they do not necessarily approach the relationship between institutions and economic growth from the theoretical perspective that this thesis follows, there are still many studies on this subject that I also build on in the individual papers. In the rest of this section, I review these studies at a general level without taking any specific side because they are already partly or wholly discussed in the papers. Each paper of this thesis contributes to one or a few debates mentioned in this sub-section.

One of the prominent subjects related to the adaptation of institutions to the new economic conditions in Britain is the transformation of the state and its capacity. Brewer’s study (1990) on how Britain emerged as a major international power in the eighteenth century and the role of the state, its public finances and administration, is considered as the seminal study on the emergence of “fiscal-military state” (see also, Cox, 2016; Dickson, 1967/2016; Graham and Walsh, 2016; Storrs, 2016). The fiscal-military state was able to collect more taxes per capita (O’Brien, 1988), which was the indicator of its rising capacity (Dincecco, 2009; 2011; 2015; Hoffman and Norberg, 2002; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013). The rise in Britain’s state capacity was precocious compared to other European countries, and it was influential on Britain’s commercialisation and early industrialisation. (O’Brien, 2011; cf. Ogilvie and Carus, 2014: 458-459).

The importance of state and state capacity for long-term economic growth (Besley and Persson, 2011; Hoffman, 2015) has incentivised economic historians to search for the determinants of high state capacity (Dincecco, 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2017). Political transformations as fiscal centralisation and limited government (Dincecco, 2009; 2011; Johnson and Koyama, 2014) as well as urbanisation and large-scale wars (Karaman and Pamuk, 2013) were proposed as the main factors. Related to the importance of representative institutions for state capacity, in the British case, the role of the Glorious Revolution, Parliament and the following

institutional changes that promoted the credible commitment of state are particularly pronounced as the main factors behind the rise of the British state and its fiscal capacity (Cox, 2016; Quinn, 2001; cf. Hodgson, 2017; Sussman and Yafeh, 2006).

However, compatible with the theoretical perspective of the thesis, some economic historians point out that these changes related to the Glorious Revolution did not happen immediately after 1688. Stasavage (2003; 2007) underlines the importance of *de facto* institutional changes such as the rise of the Whig party and the change in political equilibrium in the following decades of the Revolution. These *de facto* changes were essential to put the *de jure* institutional changes of the Revolution, the majority of which were related to the public finances, into practice (see also, Cox, 2011; Hoppit, 1986; MacDonald, 2013; Murphy, 2013; Pincus and Robinson, 2012; Wells and Wills, 2000 for more on the public finances and credible commitment debate after the Glorious Revolution). Bogart (2018) indicates that Whig dominance in the state system was associated with more productive infrastructure investments during the eighteenth century. Cox (2020) argues that only with the Civil List Acts of 1831, the British state's civil component, in addition to its fiscal-military component, became credible.

Directly related to the structural transformation of the British economy, Britain's fiscal-military state declined after the Napoleonic Wars. However, this transformation of the state has not attracted much attention from the cliometricians (Koyama, 2019: 746) except maybe a few studies on the extension of the franchise and the Reform Act of 1832 (for example, Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2000; 2006; Aidt and Franck, 2015). The transformation of the state in the nineteenth century has been chiefly elaborated by traditional historians¹⁴ since MacDonagh's seminal article (1958), "The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government", which interprets the new approaches and mechanisms of government as a pragmatic response to new economic and social conditions. Harling and Mandler describe this process as a transition from a "fiscal-military" to a "laissez-faire" state (1993; see also Jupp, 1990; Harling 2001).

The formal institutional changes and the transformation of the state cannot be considered separate from the interest conflict in society, as Schön, Olson, and Acemoğlu *et al.* point out in their theoretical elaborations in many different ways. It is important to remember that neither the state nor Parliament was a homogenous

¹⁴ That is why I mostly cite the traditional history literature on this subject in the first paper of the thesis.

body in Britain during this period. Instead, it mainly was a battleground for conflicting interests within the state and society. In this regard, interest group politics and rent-seeking by pressuring Parliament to get favourable economic regulation or prevent the abolishing of already favourable regulation was an integral part of British society in the eighteenth century (Ekelund and Tollison, 1981; Hoppit, 2017; 2018).

Interest group politics, as mentioned, could be harmful to economic growth if the rent-seeking groups resist change in the growth-restraining institutions to protect their vested interests. Some economic historians argue that Parliament in Britain during the eighteenth century played an important role in both the centralisation of rent-seeking activity and the curtailment of “distributional coalitions”, which in the end encouraged good institutional adaptation and economic growth (Mokyr and Nye, 2007; Root, 1991; also see Mokyr, 1998; 2002: 218-283; 2009: Chapter 4). This process could also be considered as a transition from “limited access” to “open access order” (North *et al.*, 2009; Koyama, 2019: 745). The impacts of interest group politics on the economic outcomes in Britain are examined in different case studies, such as the rent-seeking competition among the different branches of the textile industry in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its impact on the mechanisation of the cotton textile industry (O’Brien *et al.*, 1991), the Whig dominance in state and the diffusion of transportation infrastructure in the early eighteenth century (Bogart, 2018) or the repeal of Bubble Act in 1825 and the development of capital markets in the first half of the nineteenth century (Harris, 1997).

Even if it is mostly agreed in the literature that Britain was successful at eliminating rent-seeking, adapting its institutions to the new conditions and encouraging economic growth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there are also the claims that this was not always the case. According to Ogilvie and Carus, there were many counter-examples that the British state and Parliament implemented growth-encouraging legislation and policies during this period. Enforcing slave ownership and trade, certain mercantilist regulations such as the Corn Laws or pursuing constant military ambitions instead of providing public goods were the examples of these growth-restraining legislation and policies (2014: 418-426, 458-459).

The British state’s transition from mercantilism to liberal free trade policies during the nineteenth century and restructuring its imperial policy accordingly, connected to the economy’s structural transformation, is another matter of discussion, especially among the traditional historians (for a review, Bell, 2006). In particular,

free trade imperialism of the British state, whether it existed or it was just a myth, and the informal empire it aimed to create in addition to its formal empire sparked much debate (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Lynn, 2009; MacDonagh, 1962; Platt, 1973; Mclean, 1976; Semmel, 1970). Another prominent debate, connected to the first one, is about the fundamental characteristics of British imperialism (Darwin, 1997; Green, 2008; Hyam, 1999; Porter, 1990). Cain and Hopkins's seminal article about the evolution of "gentlemanly capitalism" (1986) is particularly important with its emphasis on the role of finance, instead of manufacturing, in British imperialism from 1688 to 1850. Moreover, Britain's informal empire is examined in different case studies with a focus on countries that the influence of British imperialism was overwhelmingly felt during the nineteenth century, such as China (Harris, 2018), Latina America (Markhan, 2017) or Egypt (Thornhill, 2010). Free trade treaties depending on unequal terms signed with these less developed countries with the force of the British navy to advance Britain's informal empire are also examined from many different perspectives (Kasaba, 1992; 1993; O'Brien and Pigman, 1992; Savage, 2011).

Research Design

In this section, I explain how the research is designed, in other words, how I examine the research question of the thesis. To this end, first, I briefly discuss the relationship between laws and institutions. In the second part, I give information about the historical sources that the whole thesis depends on. Then, I put forward the methodology of the thesis to elucidate how I approach the historical sources and how I exploit them. In the last part, I describe the details of the database construction process¹⁵.

Statute Laws as Formal Institutions

This thesis aims to understand the reaction of political institutions to the structural transformation and the related change in formal institutions in Britain from 1700 to 1850, as indicated in the Aim, Motivation and Contribution section. To this end, it

¹⁵ Many explanations regarding the sources, data and methodology in this section may overlap with the similar information in the individual papers. This is inevitable because every paper is designed to be sent to a journal, and since the study uses novel sources and data, this requires explaining the details of the data collection and construction process to the reader every time from the beginning.

focuses on Parliament as a meta-institution with the highest authority to change the institutions. With a focus on Parliament, the thesis mainly aims to understand two types of interconnected institutional responses: what kind of legislative changes were implemented, and what kind of debates took place? For each question, the thesis examines two bodies of first-hand historical sources: the acts of Parliament in the Parliamentary Archives and the volumes of parliamentary debates in the Hansard Archives.

The thesis mainly examines the statute laws and the legislative changes enacted by the British Parliament by following the North's definition of formal institutions, that is, "written rules such as constitutions and laws that human beings devise" (North, 1990: 4). North describes a hierarchy among the formal institutions from general to specific: constitutions, statute laws, common laws, specific bylaws and individual contracts (North, 1990: 47). It does not make much sense to focus on the constitution in the British context because Britain has never had one written codified document as a constitution but a collection of various statutes, judicial precedents, conventions, etc. Even if it had, it would still be difficult to discern the impact of structural economic transformation only over constitutions, which describes broad rules and change only occasionally. For this reason, in the thesis, I focus on the statute laws, the second most important formal rule in the hierarchy.

North clearly indicates that a law is a type of institution, and the change in laws, that is, legislative change, corresponds to a type of (formal) institutional change (North, 1990: 3-6; North, 1991: 97). Of course, there is also the "enforcement" aspect of the laws because not all the laws enacted by Parliament are enforced fully. In extreme cases, there might be written laws, which are only on paper and not implemented at all. However, this does not preclude the fact that statute law is a type of formal institution in a society, which is a humanly devised constraint that structure political, economic and social interaction (North, 1990: 46-47; North, 1991; also see Schön, 2009: 10; 2012: 5-6). The public laws in Britain, such as the Navigations Acts, Corn Laws or Poor Laws, mattered a lot for society and economics during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries even if they were not always enforced a hundred per cent, and the change in these laws corresponded to an "institutional change", which had substantial repercussions. This was the case for relatively less important laws as well.

Historical Sources

Statute laws represent the primary legislation of a legislative body, which is the Westminster Parliament in Britain. Statutes of British Parliament were recorded in volumes, called “Acts of Parliament of Great Britain” until 1801 and “Acts of Parliament of United Kingdom” after 1801. These sources are available in printed format in the Archives of Parliament of the United Kingdom, which holds and provides access to the records of the UK Parliament and other political and parliamentary collections. The Parliamentary Archives are located in the Houses of Parliament building in the Westminster borough of central London.

There is not one volume of series that includes all the acts, which would make the data collection process much easier. Instead, there are different editions of Acts of Parliament, which were collected by different editors in volumes for different time periods. In the thesis, I use,

D. Pickering (ed.), *The Statutes at Large: From the Magna Charta, to the End of the Eleventh Parliament of Great Britain* [continued to 1806] (46 volumes, London), for the 1700-1806 period.

J. Butterworth (ed.), *The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Passed in 1807-1841*, His Majesty’s Statute and Law Printers (35 volumes, London), for the 1807-1836 period.

G. W. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode (eds.), *A Collection of the Public General Statutes*, Printers to the Queen (37 volumes, London), for the 1837-1850 period and after as the historical source for examining legislative change¹⁶.

The different editions of statute volumes are consistent with each other. That is, their recording style of the acts and techniques are the same. The details such as the type size or space between the rows may differ, but this does not create any complication. The sample cover pages from each of these three sources are illustrated in Figure 8 as an example.

¹⁶ There were missing years in the Pickering (ed.) (1700-1806) in 1802 and 1805. I complemented these years from G. Eyre and A. Strahan (eds.), *The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland* (1st and 2nd volumes), Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, London.




Figure 8: Front pages of three different editions of the acts of Parliament
 Source: Pickering (1700-1806), Butterworth (1807-1836), Eyre and Spottiswoode (1837-1850)

The majority of the volumes of parliamentary acts can be found on the internet in a digital format with a Google search, thanks to the Google Book project that digitised most of them. However, the volumes are pretty dispersed to the different websites in unstructured condition, which requires effort to search, find, bring them together and create an organised and consistent data source with a correct chronology from 1700 to 1850. In doing this, in addition to the Google searches, I benefited from some specific websites. The most notable of these websites is the Statutes Project¹⁷, which aims “to put the entire corpus of British parliamentary law online, for free, in multiple and easily reusable formats”. Another important website was the UK Parliament Parliamentary Archives’ web catalogue, “Portcullis”¹⁸. In this catalogue, one paragraph summaries (the “long titles”) of the acts written by the parliament clerks when the acts were first recorded can be found, but not the whole text of the act. Whole transcripts of the acts can only be found in the abovementioned volumes.

Since I obtained the abovementioned historical sources on the internet, mostly from unofficial websites, this brings up the question of their reliability because they can easily be deformed or distorted by the people who put them to those websites (also see Putnam, 2016). To overcome this problem, I use two methods. Firstly, I matched the long titles of many acts in the sources that I obtained from the unofficial websites with the ones in the Portcullis, which is the official website of the British Parliament

¹⁷ <https://statutes.org.uk/site/>.

¹⁸ <https://archives.parliament.uk/#>, HL/PO/PU/1/1700 - HL/PO/PU/1/1850 within “Collections” (UK Parliamentary Archives, 2017-2021).

and therefore more reliable. Secondly, I visited the Parliamentary Archives in London personally in March 2020 and matched the digital sources I have with the printed ones. In any of the matchings, I did not find any problem at all. All the historical sources are authentic, genuine and reliable.

The second historical source of the thesis is the record of the debates among parliamentarians within Parliament, which provides crucial information about the background of legislative changes. I mainly use the parliamentary debates in the thesis to understand the motivations behind certain legislation and policies of Parliament and government. The parliamentary debates give the transcript and the “substantially verbatim report of what is said in Parliament” in every session and sitting¹⁹. They are obtained from two sources: Until 1803, *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England from the Norman conquest, in 1066 to the Year 1803*, vol. I - XXXV (1806-1820²⁰), written by pamphleteer and journalist William Cobbett (1763-1835), is used. The source is accessible from Lund University's Library in digital format. After 1803, the Hansard website of the UK Parliament²¹ (2017-2021), which includes the digitised version of printed Hansard reports, is exploited. The transcripts of parliamentary debates are called “Hansard reports” because publisher Thomas Curson Hansard (1776-1833) was the first to print them. Figure 9 shows the cover page of a volume of Cobbett's collection and the home page of the Hansard website. I did not make any specific reliability check for these historical sources because they are already obtained from official websites.

¹⁹ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/about?historic=false> (retrieved on 28 July 2021).

²⁰ Published during this period.

²¹ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/>




Figure 9: Cover and home pages of two sources of the parliamentary debates
 Source: Cobbett, 1806-20; UK Parliament, 2017-2021.

Methodology

How were the historical sources exploited to address the main research question of the thesis? The answer to this question requires a short discussion to clarify the methodological underpinnings of the study. Social science methodologies can be divided into two broad categories: Interpretive methodology depends on interpreting social reality to understand it with the help of qualitative sources, such as historical texts, materials and records if the research is historical. However, naturalist or positivist methodology attempts to adopt the scientific method from the natural sciences, intensively use measurement and quantitative methods, and seek causal inference and general laws (Risjord, 2014: 7-8).

The distinction between interpretive and naturalist methodologies in the social sciences applies to economic history as well. Traditional economic history has been closer to interpretative methodology, depending on uncovering historical evidence from the archives and then interpreting it in either descriptive or analytical way. In this way, it is a type of narrative history based on qualitative research, mostly carried out by the researchers trained in history departments. However, the new economic history (or cliometrics), which emerged in the 1960s and was primarily carried out by economists, transformed the field radically using measurement and quantitative data and applying mathematical and statistical methods to test economic theories (Hauptert, 2019: 5-11). In this way, the new economic history is closer to

naturalist/positivist methodology. Both approaches have valid criticisms of each other. Very briefly, while the new economic history criticises traditional economic history to be imprecise, vague, and lack of methodological rigour; the traditional economic history blames the new economic history to be anachronistic, teleological and missing the context (Diebolt and Hauptert, 2019: vi-vii; Hauptert, 2019: 25; Hoppit: 1990: 173; 2008: 347-350; 2017: 28-32; Tosh, 2010).

This study locates at the mid-point of these two approaches with a slight leaning to the traditional economic history. It does not favour one to another since both have their strengths and weaknesses. For this reason, the thesis employs mixed methods, both qualitative and quantitative (see also Ogilvie and Carus, 2009). Apart from the principle of methodological pluralism, the nature of institutional research and the orientation of the thesis make this choice inevitable. As indicated in the previous sections, it is common in economic history to search for the impact of institutional change on economic variables, for instance, the impact of Corn Laws on the income distribution (Williamson, 1990) or the impact of the Poor Laws to the wages (Boyer, 2006). Since the economic variables are relatively easier to measure, quantitative-oriented research is more feasible for these types of studies. However, as indicated in the previous sections, this thesis is interested in institutions and institutional change per se, not their impact on the economic variables. For this reason, even if the methodological limitations of quantitative research are forgotten for a while, it is still not possible to carry out pure quantitative research because institutions or related political economy concepts are not always amenable to quantification and statistical methods like the economic variables (Koyama, 2019: 730; see also Mokyr, 1992: 337). That is why the many studies mentioned in the Literature Review on the institutions have substantial qualitative input²².

The use of mixed methods means that narrative is an integral part of the thesis. In particular, in the third and fourth papers, the parliamentary debates on a specific subject, the cotton textile industry in the former and the foreign economic policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the latter, are mostly interpreted qualitatively and analytically. This is done by, first, the search of speeches of parliamentarians related to the specific topic in every parliamentary session and recording them to a file. Then, these speeches are classified according to their subject matter. The subjects are not pre-defined but decided depending on the content of the speeches. For instance, in the third paper, the speeches of parliamentarians about the cotton textile

²² For the critics of institutionalism, this is a methodological weakness (Clark, 2019: 461).

industry are classified under categories as taxation, international trade, technological resistance, etc. related to the fact that these were the most debated subjects in Parliament, which is also a finding and the contribution of the paper as such. Then, these categorised speeches are interpreted qualitatively by using many direct quotations to address the paper's research question. This method can be considered as a type of qualitative text analysis (Kuckartz, 2014).

In recent decades, the method of analytic narrative has been popular in economic history to tackle the abovementioned problem related to the difficulty of quantifying institutions and institutional change. The analytic narratives combine the classical narrative method of history with the rational choice theory, mainly through the use of game theory (Bates *et al.*, 1998; Mongin, 2019; see also Greif, 2006; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 1-39 for more methodological debate about the research on institutional change). Although this study also uses narrative technique as indicated, it does not necessarily use rational choice or game theory. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an “analytic narrative” depending on this definition of the method. However, sometimes the analytic narrative is used with a broader meaning to define all studies that combine narrative, case study, descriptive statistics, and analytical and critical thinking, distinguishing them from descriptive and informative studies. For example, Dani Rodrik (2003), in his edited collection of “analytic narratives” on the growth performance of different countries, use the term in this broader meaning (also see Freeman and Louça, 2001: 93-122). If used in this way, this thesis can also be considered as an “analytic narrative”.

Using the narrative approach in the thesis does not mean that the historical sources are only used qualitatively. I also constructed two new (quantitative) databases from these sources, one is from parliamentary legislation and the other is from parliamentary debates, to obtain many measurements and thereby better understand the legislation and policy changes of Parliament, as well as their meaning and background.

Database Construction

In this sub-section, the details of the construction of two main databases, derived from two primary historical sources, are explained.

First database

The first database depends on the counting and classifying the acts in the statute volumes in every parliamentary session²³ with different criteria. This approach to quantify the legislative output of Parliament is mainly built on the studies of British historian Julian Hoppit in the 1990s and afterwards, which are about identifying the long-term patterns in parliamentary legislation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Hoppit *et al.*, 1994; Hoppit, 1996; 1997; 2017). The same approach is used by another prominent British historian Johanna Innes in the context of social policy and local acts (Hoppit *et al.*, 1994; Innes, 2003; 2009). Later, this approach is adopted by cliometricians Dan Bogart and Gary Richardson in their statistical analysis on the reorganisation of property rights by Parliament, focusing on estate and turnpike acts (Bogart, 2009; Bogart and Richardson, 2009; 2010; 2011, see also Dimitruk, 2018).

The classification of the acts could be about the act's "type" or the "subject". Mainly there were two types of acts passed by Parliament during a session: "public" and "private". Private acts could also be divided into two categories as "local" and "personal" acts (Thomas, 1971: 45-64). Public acts apply to every member of the nation across England/Great Britain/United Kingdom or at least one of its constituent countries (England, Wales, Scotland and, after 1801, Ireland). 1815 Corn Law, 1819 Cotton Mills and Factories Act or 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act are well-known examples of public acts. Private acts apply either to a specifically named locality (local act) or a legal person (personal act). They are promoted by particular organisations such as local authorities, private companies or individuals to give themselves power and benefit beyond, or in conflict with, the public law (Rogers and Walters, 2015: 173). Estate acts, turnpike acts, railway acts, parish, church, and cathedral acts are all different types of local acts specific to certain counties, districts, or parishes. Personal acts regulate the wills, inheritance, divorce, marriage, bankruptcy, naturalization and the name change of (mostly upper class) individuals (Hoppit, 2017: 327).

²³ In both databases, the unit of analysis is a "parliamentary session", not a "year". The year starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December. However, a parliamentary session starts some dates around November-December-January and ends in May-June-July, depending on the session. That is why many parliamentary sessions are indicated with slashes as 1751/52 or 1801/02 (see figures 10 and 12). The difference between a year and a parliamentary session may create a complication, especially in the time-series econometric analysis related to the lags. How this problem is overcome is explained in the relevant paper.

The acts in the statute volumes were already categorised by their type in their first recordings by the parliamentary clerks, but there were also some complications in the coding process. Before 1798, the parliamentary clerks registered local and personal acts together under the title of “private acts”²⁴. I distinguished the local and personal acts for the pre-1798 period and coded them separately in the database by using the above-mentioned definitions of these acts. However, a more challenging problem in classifying acts by their type was that there were many local and sometimes personal acts that the parliamentary clerks registered in the statute volumes under “public acts”. For example, many local acts about road improvement or canal construction in specific counties were registered under the “public act” during the eighteenth century. Since this situation may create inconsistency in the database, with a careful examination, I identified these acts and coded them under either “local” or “personal act”.

To give an idea about how I use the types of acts in the time-series graphs, Figure 10 shows how many public, local and personal acts were enacted by Parliament in every parliamentary session from 1747 to 1832²⁵.

²⁴ See <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/changes/chron-tables/private/intro#1> for the details (retrieved on 30 July 2021).

²⁵ The graphs given as an example in this section are not used directly in the individual papers. That is why they are selected.




Figure 10: Public, local and personal acts enacted by Parliament, 1747-1832

Source: See Figure 8.

To classify an act according to its “subject” is more complicated than its “type” because it does not depend on the pre-defined classifications of parliamentary clerks in the statute volumes²⁶. The “subject” means that what the act is about, that is the content of it. Since I am mainly interested in the central state in the thesis, I do not classify the local and personal acts in the database according to their subjects, but only the public acts. In the classification and coding, a slightly amended version of Julian Hoppit’s “Legislation Subject Scheme” in the appendix of *Britain’s Political Economies* is used²⁷ (Hoppit, 2017: 327-334; see also, Hoppit, 1997). The coding

²⁶ It is also possible to distinguish the country-specific public acts such as the ones only about Scotland or Ireland. However, I do not get into details of this categorisation because I do not use it in the papers, except partly in the first paper. This type of categorisation is mostly used to search for issues such as national identity and Britishness, which are not the subjects of this thesis (for more discussion on these issues and the country-specific categorisation of the acts, see Hoppit, 2003; 2011; Loft, 2018).

²⁷ These are the amendments implemented in the coding scheme: 0-PERSONAL is removed altogether. The 30-LAW category is divided into two sub-categories as 301-Law (Non-Econ) and 302-Law (Econ). 7-ECONOMY is renamed as 7-REAL ECONOMY. 61-LABOUR is coded under the 7-REAL ECONOMY, not 6-SOCIAL ISSUES. 70-THE LAND category is abolished, and the related acts are coded under the 71-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. 73-FOOD AND DRINK MANUFACTURES and 73-OTHER MANUFACTURES are abolished and coded under a new name, 73-MANUFACTURES. 75-INTERNAL TRADE is renumbered as “74”, and 76-EXTERNAL TRADE is renumbered as “75”. 80-COMMUNICATIONS is renamed as 80-

scheme first divides the acts into broad categories such as “Government”, “Finance”, “Real Economy”²⁸ etc. (the left side of Figure 11). Then, these broad categories are broken down into more specific categories in every step (the right side of Figure 11). The categorisation of the legislative output of Parliament in this way can be considered similar to the historical national accounts in macroeconomic history (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014; Schön and Krantz, 2012), but instead of measuring the economic activity of a nation, it measures the legislative activity with its content and sub-categories.

0- Personal	7- Real Economy
1- Government	71-Agriculture
2- Finance	72-Mines
3- Law and Order	73-Manufacture
4- Religion	731- Cotton Industry....
5- Armed Services	74-Internal Trade
6- Social Policy/Issues	75-External Trade
7- Real Economy	
8- Transportation/Communication	
9- Miscellaneous	

Figure 11: General categories and the breakdown of “Real Economy” in the Coding Scheme
 Source: Hoppit, 2017: 327-333.

As an example time-series graph derived from the subject categorisation of the acts, Figure 12 shows the change in Government- and Manufacture-related acts from 1747 to 1832.

TRANSPORTATION/COMMUNICATION. To give meaning to these changes, please check the coding scheme.

²⁸ The names of the categories are already self-explanatory but for the exact definitions of these categories, see Hoppit, 2017: 327-334; Hoppit, 1997, or the individual papers they are used.




Figure 12: Government- and Manufacture-related acts enacted by Parliament, 1747-1832
 Source: See Figure 8.

How did I decide which subject category to code any act? In every volume of the statutes, there is a “Table of Statutes” at the beginning, including a “long title” of every act, which is a short paragraph official summary written by the parliamentary clerks. These titles were often sufficient to understand which subject category the act fits in. When it was not sufficient, I read the whole act and decided accordingly.

Some complications in the coding process need to be explained here. The most important complication is that I treat an act as a unit to be coded into one category, but sometimes acts can be about more than one subject. Under these circumstances, I coded the act with the most relevant category by taking into account the whole transcript of the act, not just the long title. For example, if the act is almost all about the excise taxes, but only in one section some issues related to the army were regulated, it was coded under the “Public Finance”, not “Armed Services”.

However, sometimes the weights of different subjects within the act were not that nonproportional to decide easily. In particular, it was challenging to decide the acts about custom duties and whether to code them in “Public Finances” or “External Trade” because they technically belong to both categories. In these situations, in addition to reading the whole transcript of the act to decide which subject is more dominant, I also checked the official short title of the acts, if there is any, given by the parliamentary acts in the late nineteenth century (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892:

13-267; 1896: 14-248). If it is mentioned as “Importation act”, I coded it as “External Trade”, if it is mentioned as “Custom Duties” or “Taxation”, I coded it as “Public Finance. Nevertheless, it is always more plausible to think of Public Finance and External Trade categories together because of the blurred line between them even if I categorise them separately in the study for analytical purposes (see also Hoppit, 2017: 79-89 for this discussion). Also, if it was impossible to fit an act into any category whatsoever, I coded it as “miscellaneous”²⁹.

Another complication in the categorisation and coding of the acts was that acts have different importance levels. Not every act has the same impact on the economy and society. As the Corn Laws or the Factory acts, some acts were highly decisive and impactful, but others were trivial and mostly slight amendments to the previous acts. However, in our categorisation, all acts are always counted inevitably as one. This is the same problem faced in the construction of historical national accounts. In the calculation of a GDP of a country, not just the quantities but also the market prices of goods and services are taken into account because not all goods and services have the same economic value or importance level (Blanchard, 2017: 22-25 and Appendix 1). However, unfortunately, there is no “market price” for different acts to weigh them according to their importance levels.

One solution to this problem could be to measure the “total page length of acts” in statute volumes instead of the “number of acts” in every parliamentary session³⁰. The assumption here is that if an act takes more space, measured by its page length, in the statute books, that act is more important for the society and economy³¹. However, as shown in Figure 13, the number of acts and the number of pages are already highly correlated. Their correlation coefficient, r , is 0.82. This means that when there was an increase in the number of acts, the number of pages also increased almost in the same proportion. For this reason, it is better to use the “number of acts” as an indicator of change in legislation because it gives the change in the importance level of the acts as well (for more debate on the complications during

²⁹ For the categorisation of the acts, I also contacted Julian Hoppit personally. With his advice, I got in touch with another doctoral student, James Smith, in York University’s History Department, who also uses the same method in his doctoral thesis. We discuss the categorisation of the acts with him many times as a double-check to make our databases consistent.

³⁰ In doing this, it is necessary to make different editions of statute volumes as consistent as possible regarding their type style, size and spaces between rows to avoid any bias in the measurement.

³¹ So, the page length’ function here is the same as the market prices of commodities in the GDP calculation.

the categorisation of the acts, including the different importance levels, see Hoppit *et al.*, 1994: 316; Hoppit, 2012: 315; 2017: 38-65; Innes and Styles, 1986: 422-430).




Figure 13: Scatter diagram for the number of acts and the number of pages, 1747-1868

Source: See Figure 8.

The absence of any standard or parameter to weigh different acts according to their importance levels can also be another justification to complement quantitative data with qualitative interpretation in the study. We may know from the literature that there are many qualitatively crucial acts in British history, such as Navigation Acts or Corn Laws. These acts should be counted as one in the quantification and do not necessarily have long page lengths. For example, the well-known 1815 Corn Laws took 2.5 pages in the statute books (Butterworth, 1815: 93-96). Then, it is mandatory to discuss these notable acts qualitatively to complement the quantitative indicators. That is why I have another, a third, database that I record the qualitatively important acts in the 1700-1850 period, such as the 1765 Duties on American Colonies Act, 1773 Tea Act, 1802 Factories Act or 1815 Importation Act (that is, the Corn Laws), which I frequently come across in the secondary sources on British history. I use this qualitative database particularly in the third paper of the thesis

Second database

The second database used in the thesis focuses on both parliamentary debates and legislation. It does not count the acts but the particular keywords in the texts in every parliamentary session. It can be considered as a basic type of quantitative text analysis (Krippendorff, 2014; Neuendorf, 2002), a novelty in economic history. The keywords to search in the texts are decided according to the research problem of every paper. For example, in the third paper, “cotton” and in the fourth paper “, Ottoman Empire” or “Turkey” were the main keywords related to the focus on the industrial policy towards the cotton textile industry in the former and the imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the latter paper. How many times that keyword was mentioned in the parliamentary debates in a session is interpreted as an indicator of what extent that keyword related subject was on the agenda of Parliament, which may have many different implications depending on the historical context. The same logic applies to parliamentary legislation as well. For example, Figure 14 shows how many times the keywords “iron” and “engine” were mentioned in the statute volumes in every parliamentary session. The more that keyword is mentioned in the statute books, it means the more legislation and regulation implemented by Parliament on that industry.




Figure 14: Mentions of “iron” and “engine” in the parliamentary legislation, 1750-1850

Source: See Figure 8.

The construction of this database did not create as many complications as the first database. It is already not very difficult to find the keywords with the Ctrl+F function of the keyword. However, to do this, the texts must have optimal character recognition (OCR) quality. Unfortunately, almost none of the statute volumes had this feature, which would make the text analysis impossible. Therefore, I first converted all the material into OCR format, which required quite a time and effort. The searching for keywords was relatively more straightforward for the parliamentary debates than parliamentary legislation because there are already search engines for both historical sources, Cobbett's volumes in the Lund University's digital library and the website of the Hansard Archives.

The study also uses data for various economic variables from many different secondary sources. I already explain them in the relevant sections of the papers, but I want to mention four of these sources here since I use them intensively almost in every paper: B. R Mitchell's *British Historical Statistics* (1988) is used for a wide range of economic data. Stephen Broadberry *et al.*'s *British Economic Growth, 1270–1870* (2015) is used chiefly for the gross domestic product of Britain and its sub-components. *Maddison Historical Statistics*, obtained from the website of Groningen Growth and Development Centre³², is mainly used for GDP per capita data (see also, Bolt *et al.*, 2018). Finally, Mark Dincecco's *Political Transformations and Public Finances in Europe, 1650-1913* (2011), is exploited for tax revenue statistics of the British state.

How do I exploit these databases in the individual papers? As already indicated, qualitative interpretation and narrative are an integral part of this thesis. However, this, of course, does not mean that it is the only approach. In every paper, I use quantitative data in varying degrees, the examples of which is indicated above, in the formats of descriptive statistics, time-series graphs, tables and sometimes correlation diagrams. The quantitative data are interpreted qualitatively in an analytical way to capture the historical context and meaning in the identified trends and patterns in the quantitative data, with the help of other qualitative evidence and secondary literature. This mixed-method is employed in the first, third and fourth papers. In the second paper, related to the paper's research question about the determinants of fiscal and legal capacity of the British state, I worked as a cliometrician, not as a traditional historian, which is compatible with the methodological pluralist position of the thesis. In this paper, I use time-series

³² <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/?lang=en>

econometrics and regression analysis, the details of which are explained in the paper.

Summary of the Papers

The thesis is comprised of four papers in total. The papers are partly independent of each other, but they are also integrated such that each of them sheds light on one aspect of the main topic of the thesis. This section gives an extended summary of the papers together with their research question(s), data and methods, and most importantly, findings. I discuss how these findings together address the thesis's main question in the subsequent Discussion and Conclusion section.

Paper I: The Patterns of Parliamentary Public Legislation and the Transformation of the State in Britain, 1747-1832

The first paper of the thesis examines the patterns of the British Parliament's public legislation and its characteristics from the mid-eighteenth century to the Reform Act of 1832. The legislative output of Parliament started to increase in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688 and particularly surged in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, although many studies investigated the "legislative revolution" after 1688 (Hoppit *et al.*, 1994; Hoppit, 1996; 2017; see also Graham, 2018; Loft, 2018), its progress after 1800 has not yet been explored. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature with a focus on public legislation. Although the exploration of parliamentary public legislation is intriguing as such, it is also expected that knowing the details of it in Britain sheds light on the transformation of state during this period related to three key developments: rise and decline of the fiscal-military state, institutional impacts of Industrial Revolution, and the unification with Ireland.

The study depends on "the first database" of the thesis discussed above. From this database, many descriptive statistics are derived, and time-series graphs and tables are created in connection to the main research question of the paper. Then, this quantitative data, identifying the long-term trends in the parliamentary legislation, is interpreted qualitatively in an analytical way by taking into account the historical context. The study takes a stepwise approach, begins with an analysis of the total parliamentary legislation and proceeds by gradually dividing it into various sub-categories with a focus on public acts. It starts the analysis with the inauguration of

the tenth Parliament of Great Britain in 1747 because the mid-eighteenth century was when the massive rise in parliamentary legislation started. It ends with the tenth Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1832, which is the date of the Reform Act.

The paper demonstrates that the volume of parliamentary legislation continued to surge in the early nineteenth century, which deserves to be named “second legislative revolution”, proceeding hand in hand with the growing importance of public acts. These were the indicators of the growing importance of Parliament as a governmental body representing nation-level interests (cf. Hoppit, 2003) and the centralisation of the state during this period. Parliament was mostly concerned with economic and, more specifically, public finance and external trade matters as a part of the fiscal-military characteristics of the central state during the second half of the eighteenth century. However, from the early nineteenth century on, with the gradual transition from agricultural and commercial to the industrial economy, Parliament became gradually more interested in the real (industrial) economy as well as administrative and welfare issues. This change, which is also called a transition from fiscal-military to *laissez-faire* state, was manifested in the decline of acts related to public finance, external trade and armed services as a share in total, and the rise of acts concerning manufacturing, labour, internal trade, infrastructure, transportation, government, social order, religion. This second group of acts was related to the state's public goods provisioning, an indicator of being more interested and friendly to economic and industrial growth (cf. Ogilvie and Carus, 2014: 457-459).

Paper II: Carrying the Leviathan: Turnpike Roads and the Precocious Rise of State Capacity in Britain, 1700-1832

The second paper complements the first one by examining the precocious rise of state capacity in Britain compared to other European countries during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The tax revenues per capita measures show that Britain's state capacity rose decades before other European countries in the eighteenth century, especially in the second half. The legal capacity indicators as public law-making also complement this picture. The literature attributes this early rise to factors like political institutions (representative regime and limited government), early urbanisation and the pressure of major wars (Dincecco, 2009; 2015; Hoffman, 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2017; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; O'Brien, 2011). This study does not object to the impact of these factors but argues that they are not sufficient because the majority of these factors already showed their impact in the first half of the eighteenth century, but the actual rise in state capacity

happened in the second half. The study proposes the transportation revolution, particularly the turnpike roads, as a notable factor behind the early rise of Britain's fiscal and legal capacity during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

To test this proposition, the study uses time-series data collected from both first and second-hand sources. It focuses on the period from 1700, roughly a decade after the Glorious Revolution, to the Reform Act of 1832. Since the study is not interested in the short-term impacts of turnpike roads, which would also be implausible, it builds two single equation error-correction models to estimate the long-term impact of turnpikes roads on the indicators of fiscal and legal capacity. The fiscal capacity is measured by tax revenues per capita, and the legal capacity is proxied by the number of public acts enacted by Parliament, the latter of which is a novelty in the literature. The data for the number of acts in every parliamentary session comes from the first database of the thesis. The control variables (war pressure, urbanisation, economic growth and others) are included in the model considering the existing literature. With many checks and statistical tests, both models are robust to any kind of statistical complication.

The estimations of the models show that, together with war pressure and partly urbanisation, the turnpike roads made a statistically significant long-term impact on Britain's fiscal and legal capacity. Every 1000 miles increase of turnpike roads increased the tax revenues per capita of the state by 4.3%, and the number of public acts of Parliament by 8.9%. These results show that the improvements in the transportation infrastructure of Britain during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries increased the reach of the state and its tax-collecting and law-enforcement abilities. We already had known the impact of major wars and urbanisation on the state capacity from the existing literature. This study shows that turnpike roads were also influential, which was peculiar to Britain because no other European country had them during this period (Bogart, 2019: 1470-1471). However, this impact of turnpike roads, which makes transportation infrastructure necessary to be included as a determinant of state capacity in other studies, should not be considered separate from other factors as representative institutions and geographical compactness in the British context.

Paper III: Making Growth Sustained: British Parliament's Legislation and Policy on Cotton Textile Industry and the Motivations Behind Them During the Industrial Revolution, 1747–1815

The third paper diverts the attention of the thesis from the transformation of the state and its capacity to the industrial policy of Parliament. The paper examines the legislation on the cotton textile industry and the motivations behind it during the Industrial Revolution in Britain. Contrary to the literature focusing on the “preconditions” of modern economic growth and the role of political institutions (Clark, 1996; North and Weingast, 1989; O'Brien *et al.*, 1991, Mokyr and Nye, 2007; Ogilvie and Carus, 2014), this paper investigates the reaction of Parliament to the industrial growth, which aligns with the theoretical framework of the thesis. In this context, the paper asks that if Britain was the first country to achieve modern economic growth, and the political institutions and state policy were somehow part of this process, then what was the role of Parliament, apart from helping to provide suitable preconditions? When the Industrial Revolution started in the 1760s, how did Parliament react to this development? Was it supportive or not? Most importantly, what were the motivations behind the (un)supportive legislation and policies?

To answer these questions, the study focuses on the cotton textile industry, the leading industry of the Industrial Revolution, as a case study. The study's time frame is the 1747-1815 period, from the inauguration of the tenth Parliament of Great Britain in 1747, also a few decades before the starting of the Industrial Revolution, to the end of the Napoleonic Wars 1815. This was when the main structural transformation of the economy and the critical legislation on the cotton industry took place. The study mainly benefits from the second database of the thesis, exploiting the parliamentary debates and acts, with a focus on the cotton textile industry. After indicating a few quantitative indicators to understand the magnitude of Parliament's interest in the industry, the study mainly takes a qualitative approach and analytically discuss the parliamentary legislation about the cotton industry and the related parliamentary debates to understand the motivations of parliamentarians to enact that legislation.

The paper finds that the cotton industry was not within the British political elite's agenda until its growth started in the 1760s. After this point, it rapidly became one of the essential subjects in Parliament. The parliamentarians were mainly concerned with external trade matters when they legislated about the cotton textile industry. The findings show that the British Parliament was mostly supportive of the

development of the cotton industry with its protectionist policies, avoiding over-taxation and struggling with technologically resistant groups. The main motivations behind these policies were improving the tax base, avoiding social unrest, sustaining the international competition power of Britain, interest group politics and rent-seeking, and the political elite's "enlightened" mindset. Among these five motivations, notably the last three played a crucial role, the impacts of which on the parliamentarians were easily observable in the parliamentary debates. These findings implicitly suggest that the state and Parliament played a role in making the economic growth sustained in Britain more than just securing property rights.

Paper IV: A Fusion of Economic and Geopolitical Motives: British Policy-makers and Imperial Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1791-1848

The fourth paper pursues the thesis' concentration on the economic policy of state and Parliament, focusing on the British Empire and its foreign policy. It examines the motives and perceptions of British policy-makers regarding their imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire from the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century. As a consequence of the Great Divergence, the economic development and military power gap between Britain and traditional Asian empires widened enormously. As a part of this process, the British government started to pay more attention to the Ottoman Empire, and it became one of the cornerstones of the government's foreign policy in the 1830s. Despite the importance of the Ottoman Empire for British imperial policy during this period, the main motivations of British policy-makers have not yet been fully explored in the literature. While most historians have emphasised the policy of protecting the routes to India as behind this process, others have prioritised free trade imperialism and informal empire. However, we still do not know the extent to which economic motives played a role or their importance compared to geopolitical ones.

To fill this gap in the literature, the study focuses on Parliament as the centre of policy-making in this period. It is possible to conduct such research by focusing on other state institutions, such as the Foreign Office or the Board of Trade. However, Parliament already encompasses the representatives of all these institutions, in addition to ministers and MPs. With a focus on parliamentary debates in the Hansard Archives, which is a novelty in the literature on the imperial history of Britain, the study tries to understand the motives behind the British state's imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire. To this end, all the speeches of parliamentarians

related to this theme are scrutinised in detail for every parliamentary session from 1750 to 1850. These speeches are then analysed and interpreted both quantitatively and qualitatively to understand the motivations and perceptions of British policy-makers. The study gives weight to the post-1830 period, especially to Viscount Palmerston, the key policy-maker as the foreign secretary for most of this period. The statute volumes are also examined to understand the foreign trade legislation related to Turkey. Secondary sources are used chiefly for economic data.

The study shows that there were two turning points in the British imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire during the 1750-1850 period: one in the 1790s and the other in the 1820s. Both quantitative data and qualitative examination show that until the 1790s, the low level of interest of the British state in the Ottoman territory was mainly related to the commercial rivalry with France. However, with the French wars, the main concerns became geopolitical, against both Russia and France and their aims to gain power in the Middle East. From the French wars to the mid-1830s, economic concerns did not much affect the British state's foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. However, after 1835, it is possible to observe the free trade imperialism of the British state, with the push of manufacturing interests inside, which was closely intertwined with geopolitical concerns as a result of the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty. These findings show that the British government's imperial policy towards the Ottoman Empire was mostly geopolitics-oriented, and although the significance of economic motives, they were generally subservient to geopolitical concerns.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this section, I discuss the empirical findings of the thesis, explain how they answer to the main research problem of the study and, in particular, their contributions to and meaning for the broader literature, theoretically and empirically.

It is indicated in the Aim, Motivation and Contribution section that the examination of the parliamentary legislation and the debates allow us to contribute to one aspect of four general questions related to the response of political institutions to the structural transformation of the British economy from 1700 to 1850. These questions are,

How was the central state transformed?

How was the state capacity changed?

What kind of industrial policies were implemented? And why?

What kind of foreign economic policies were implemented? And why?

The thesis' empirical findings show that parliamentary public legislation increased substantially in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This surge was the indicator of the growing importance of Parliament and the central state in Britain, which was also a reaction and adaptation to the structural changes in the economy. We understand this adaptation from the change in the subject content of the public acts enacted by Parliament. The newly emerging "laissez-faire" state, manifested in the public laws, was more involved with the real economy. Moreover, it was more encouraging to it with public good provisioning. This involvement and encouragement were only possible with a high capacity to increase the state's revenues and enforce its proliferating public acts. The study's empirical findings show that the British state gained more fiscal and legal capacity, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, making the name "laissez-faire" actually a misnomer. In addition to representative institutions, large-scale wars and urbanisation, the turnpike roads were also influential in the rising capacity of the British state, which clearly shows how the structural transformation of the economy impacted the institutional changes during this period.

The response of political institutions was not just reflected in the transformation of the central state mechanism but also the policies implemented by it. A clear indicator of Parliament's supportive role to the industrial sector was its legislation and policies towards the cotton textile industry. It was striking that Parliament was highly responsive to the demands of the cotton textile industry during this period with the impact of many different factors, most notably the international competition, interest group politics and enlightened mindset of the political elite. The structural changes in the economy also impacted the imperial policy of the British state. Free trade imperialism became the cornerstone of British foreign policy during the nineteenth century. It is possible to observe the dominance of manufacturing interests in shaping this policy towards the Ottoman Empire, even if they were sometimes subservient to geopolitical concerns. Each empirical finding of the thesis is a different example of the characteristics of political institutions' reaction to the economy's structural transformation in Britain, which manifested itself in the state, parliamentary legislation, and economic policy.

What are the implications of these findings for the broader literature? First of all, none of the empirical findings of the thesis challenges its main theoretical assumptions or propositions. It is still plausible to argue that institutions matter for economic growth. Contrary to the critics of institutionalism such as Robert Allen or Gregory Clark, as Douglas North and Lennart Schön suggest, institutions must be taken into account in the analysis of long-term economic growth. Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was one prominent example of this. As Clark suggests (2007: 212), the institutions are endogenously determined, and they were the result of other factors such as technology, relative prices and consumption desires. This thesis does not object to this argument, even building the thesis on this perspective, which was particularly the case in the second paper. However, this does not mean they cannot be decisive on the growth performances of countries in return. (also see Hoffman, 2019: 714-715).

The empirical findings show that it is essential to go beyond the “institutional preconditions of economic growth” perspective to understand the relationship between these two phenomena better. Institutions and economic growth *co-evolve*. The causality is not in one direction. In other words, it is not a one-way street. The change in institutions is as significant as the change in the economy, and their mutual relationship is ongoing and perpetual. The duty of institutions does not end after they first stimulate growth. Instead, they continue to affect the economic performance of countries and are affected by it during the economic development process (cf. Acemoğlu *et al.* 2005a). For this reason, in the case of Britain, it is misleading to take the positive role of institutions as granted for the period during the Industrial Revolution despite the growth-encouraging institutional changes after the Glorious Revolution. In particular, the second paper shows the dialectical relationship between institutions and the economy very well. It finds that the turnpike roads, the proliferation of which was affected by Parliament, impacted the rise of state capacity, which contributed to the economic growth in return.

Although the thesis’ primary purpose is not to measure the impact of institutions, or any specific institutional change, on the economic growth, it can still be argued that without the institutional changes that the study identified (transformation of the state, its rising fiscal and legal capacity, implemented industrial and foreign economic policies) the modern economic growth could be sustained or even survived (cf. Kuznets, 1973). Even if it may seem unlikely when we look at it retrospectively today, there was still a chance of restraining economic growth in Britain if the institutions were not adapted properly during the eighteenth and maybe

even in the nineteenth century. However, this did not happen, and Britain became the first country to achieve modern economic growth. This achievement shows that the political institutions in Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries responded well, if not perfectly, to the new conditions that emerged as a consequence of the structural transformation of the economy. The economic growth did not stagnate, as was the case in France during the eighteenth century, or it did not peter out over time like it was the case in China or the Islamic world during the medieval period. Arguably, the institutions, and more specifically the response of political institutions, played a role in that. This theoretical conclusion of the thesis aligns with North's argument that institutions are not optimal and can push "economic change toward growth, stagnation and decline" (1990: 3).

It may not be meaningful to enter into one of the central debates of economic history literature regarding the fundamental cause behind the Industrial Revolution and why Britain was first. Apparently, many factors, both institutional and non-institutional, played a role. However, it is possible to argue that the reaction of political institutions, the transformation of the state and the implemented policies were among those factors. This argument is aligned with Olson (1982) and Moe (2009), as well as Schön (2009), and can be considered an extension of their theoretical propositions to the British case during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Despite the examples of growth-restraining institutions during the 1700-1850 period, the thesis' empirical findings show no "institutional sclerosis", which would gravely harm the long-term economic growth and lag Britain behind other countries.

Some findings of the thesis are in line with the Northian perspective on the relations between institutions and economic growth. It is possible to conceive the reaction of political institutions in Britain to the structural transformation of the economy during this period as a transition from "limited access" to "open access" order (or, similarly, gradually having more "inclusive institutions"). The clearest indicator of this is that, as the first and third papers find, Parliament was mostly, if not always, supportive of the economy. As a particular example, the attitudes of parliamentarians to the cotton industry show that despite the existence of "Old Corruption", the political institutions of Britain were relatively "inclusive". The political elite was not only pursuing its narrow class interests. It was open to the demands of other societal groups. Of course, Parliament and state were controlled mainly by the aristocratic elite during the long eighteenth century, and as Ogilvie and Carus argue (2014), this elite sometimes took growth-restraining decisions such as pursuing slavery or enacting Corn Laws. However, it should not be forgotten that all these growth-restraining institutions were abolished again by Parliament's itself

over time. This reality corroborates the main empirical argument of the thesis: the political institutions in Britain adapted well, if not perfectly, to the new conditions in the economy.

However, there are also the findings of the thesis that distinguish it from the Northian perspective. One notable point is the overemphasis of North and his followers on property rights in their analysis of the relationship between institutions and economic growth. The security of property rights for economic growth was crucial for sure, but the role of institutions cannot be reduced only to the safety of wealth (cf. Hoffman, 2019: 719). The state's public goods provisioning, its capacity, industrial and foreign policies can be as important as the security of property rights. Think about the thesis' findings of how Parliament encouraged the cotton textile industry or how the state shaped its foreign policy by the needs of the manufacturing sector (cf. Parhasarathi, 2001). These should have also been as important as the security of the property rights for sustained economic growth. Therefore, one implicit contribution of the thesis to the economic history literature might be its emphasis on the multifaceted approach to the relationship between institutions and economic development.

Going beyond the security of property rights in explaining the relationship between institutions and economic growth can also be an answer to Gregory Clark's question about why the Glorious Revolution waited so long to make its impact on the emergence of the Industrial Revolution (2007; 2019: 453-454). It was because it was not just about securing the property rights in one night. There were many other institutions, need to be changed and adapted during the following decades and even centuries (such as the Civil List Act in 1831, Cox, 2020) to make the economic growth long-term and sustained. This also means that the institutions mattered for the modern economic growth, but not always in the way North and his followers suggested. The role of the state, its capacity, parliamentary legislation and economic policy *during* the economic development process, the significance of which are not denied by the Northian perspective but relatively neglected, were essential to making the growth sustained in Britain.

As a result, the thesis contributes to the economic history literature, both "traditional" and "new", as it has been aimed at from the beginning, with its empirical findings and theoretical implications. Moreover, the historical sources and the constructed databases are also notable contributions since they are used for the first time for such a search topic in this manner. The thesis broadens our knowledge about the relationship between institutions and economic growth theoretically and

empirically. It is also a contribution to the field of British studies and history. Philip Hoffman says, “[in economic history] we still know too little about what determines the laws, regulations, and policies that states adopt. Worse yet, we do not really understand how states arise in the first place” (2015: 303). With this thesis, we know more.

Furthermore, as a historical and social scientific research, the thesis provides a piece of evidence regarding the potential conducive institutional setting for the long-term sustained economic development of all countries. The world is constantly changing with the impact of new technologies, and finding suitable institutional settings to enable long-term economic growth and improve people's wealth and living conditions is always a matter of debate. This thesis can be considered to be a modest contribution to that debate as well.

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