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Ontological Security and the Limits to a Common World: Subaltern Pasts and the Inner-Worldliness of the *Tablighi Jama'at*

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It is indisputable that there are limits to the commonalities that emerge through existing and projected forms of a shared globality. Limits that, repeatedly, coincide with what postcolonial theory teach us about subaltern pasts and the global present. And yet *the common* is, as part of global governance arrangements,[1] continuously strived for. The common *as such*: as contained within the same bounds, as mutual contemporaneity and as shared desire. It is conceived, to speak with John Agnew, as a 'surface' that stands for 'total ease of movement, timelessness, no directional bias, and an Archimedean view over the whole'.[2] Nevertheless, the common as diagnosis and aspiration—as a site for the attainment of ontological security—is constantly disrupted: by those privileged by the existing order, and by those that lay claim to its outside.

In order to interrogate the disjointed, curtailed world that the former preserves and the latter proclaims to inhabit, this article attends to the interplay between transnational expressions of religious social formations and narratives of global governance, transnationalism and national security. Empirically, it probes the relation between the commonalities provided by the revivalist movement *Tablighi Jama'at* and the concomitant perception that it hosts and nourishes radical Islamist elements. Theoretically, it explores the fractured relation between the possibility of a common world, beyond the confines of individual states, and the inherent silence of the subaltern within the parameters of the international and the global. As such, it extends postcolonial work on how the subaltern is conceptualised within this commonality and how, in the

case of the *Tablighi Jama'at,* the religious or the sacred defies such boundaries of shared mutuality.

For many theorists of global governance, the starting point is, conversely, the question of how to decide on the boundaries of the demos. How do we, in other words, decide upon functional criteria for membership and on the legitimate boundaries of demoi that are detached from individual statehood? The extant literature contains a yearning for a solution to the disintegrated, often violent political field that the global has come to represent,[3] but it fails—as we suggest in this article—to appropriately recognise the security of being that is intrinsic to considerations of membership and participation in, what Thomas Christiano refers to as, 'common worlds'.[4] Of particular importance is to examine how the religious is conceptualised within such posited 'commonality', how it relates to ontological security and what specific shape it takes within the modernist narrative of cosmopolitan rootedness.

Tablighi Jama'at is a reform movement founded in 1926 by Mohammad Ilyas in India, which today has an estimated 80 million followers. It makes claim to globality with its members travelling the world to strengthen the faith of other Muslims, being the largest Islamic group of proselytisers in the world. Its aim is to revive Islam amongst Muslims, returning them to a pristine version of Islam based upon the actions of Mohammad and the early generations of Muslims. Historical readings talk about the perceived need to provide a robust and spiritual defence to growing Hindu and Christian influences at the time of its founding and to resist the decay in Islam.[5] Since 1945, *Tablighi Jama'at* has expanded across the globe and now has a presence in most countries where Muslims live.[6] Despite this increasing diffusion of the movement around the world, little is known about its presence and meaning for narratives of global governance, transnationalism and national security—that at a time when Islamic movements are constantly debated, defied or otherwise at the attention of global security concerns.

By attending to the *Tablighi Jama'at* as an insular yet expansive movement, and to its self-induced distance from being regarded as a safe, responsible and legitimate subject or participant of global governance, we prepare the grounds for addressing the here and now, the incomplete contemporaneity,[7] of global politics. Above all, it allows us to posit narratives of religious resurgence and subaltern resistance to modernist narratives as a particular form of ontological security, in which not only security of being is at stake but also the recognition that ontological insecurity can act as an enabling force for disrupting and evading the appeal of a global and cosmopolitan common.

Echoing Dipesh Chakrabarty's theorising of 'subaltern pasts',[8] it is suggested that the identity formation made possible through the *Tablighi Jama'at* is an indication of the limits to notions and enactments of a 'common world'.[9] That is, the common world as an open-ended and inclusive, secure and intelligible globality that underpins the envisioning, legitimation and realisation of governance above or beyond the state level. A globality that, on the one hand, is grounded in notions of a 'social whole'—'a singular framework of human existence'—that is not identical to the 'territorially differentiated world of states';[10] and, on the other, is underpinned by falsely held ideas of a 'publicness' that is supposedly corresponding with 'a global public sphere'.[11]

Proceeding from an ontological security perspective, the emphasis here is on the disjuncture between ideas of a common world with 'a genuinely planetary scope'[12] and the shared cosmos, cosmology and ethos of the virtuous believers. Or, to employ the language of Sidney Tarrow,[13] on how the activist of the *Tablighi Jama'at*—even though an adherent of 'global Muslim unity'[14]—can hardly be considered a 'rooted cosmopolitan'.

To allow for the above, the paper initially discusses narratives of global governance, transnationalism and national security in relation to the idea of a common world. In doing this, we lay the groundwork for making sense of the religiosity, the posited revivalism and the social

formations that find embodiment in the *Tablighi Jama'at*, as both ontological security provider for its adherents and as a force of resistance to the notion of a common world. From there we move on to ponder the necessity to interweave explorations of notions of being together, of a possible centre to the common, in a global setting with the acknowledgment of discrete forms of boundary-drawing that displace and make certain attempts at 'story-telling' exterior to that which is deemed coterminous, equal and legitimate. In a scrutiny of the *Tablighi Jama'at*, the latter refers to the religious experience and the religious as a form of primal and given communion.

Finally, the momentous yet from the viewpoint of international institutions and academic accounts nebulous and opaque growth of the *Tablighi Jama'at* is considered. In this part, the self-asserted benign and, to the wider society, peripheral character of the movement will be counterpoised by two recent controversies that testifies to its wider significance, i.e. the contested nature of its intent to build a mosque adjacent to the site of the Olympic stadium in London and the charge that it, at its Delhi *markaz* ('headquarter') in India, has provided a domicile and safe haven for *al Qaida* members. Both, it is argued, have arisen as an outcome of the *Tablighi Jama'at*'s ostensibly indecisive straddling of the political and non-political.

Narratives of Global Governance, Transnationalism and National Security

The norm for *Tablighi Jama'at* is to remain aloof from politics in the hard sense of the word as well as a preference for remaining apart from what is seen as an immoral mainstream society. It is a Deobandi-inspired movement that prefers to be selective in terms of which parts of Islam it focuses on and it relies on stories or narratives of other-worldliness and pietism of mythical heroes. Through its self-chosen exclusion, the group distances itself from the wider society and public sphere and creates an atmosphere of spirituality, solidarity and purpose that proves extremely compelling and acts as an ontological security provider for its members. In doing

this it, constructs alternative narratives of a common world, in which dominant stories of global governance, transnationalism and national security are questioned and through which stories of politics become subordinate and insignificant.

Narratives are commonly seen as the stories that people construct to make sense of reality and of themselves. At a collective level, narratives provide cohesion to and transmit shared beliefs of common origins and identity. They are interrelated in a network of ideas that are embedded within a specific cultural and historical context. Some narratives become dominant in such a context through processes of struggle over meaning and selective appropriation of certain elements, while others are omitted because they are considered less appropriate or cohesive. In working upon available discourses and narratives, we routinely reproduce, critique, justify, or negate social relations through our utterances and writings.[15] Thus, careful attention to narratives facilitates an understanding of how the political mind and political society come to be interwoven and mutually constitutive. If narratives collide, avoid each other or exist side by side, they are likely to rest on different discursive grounds, in temporal as well as in spatial terms.

In much ontological security work, such narratives are viewed as providing a sense of ontological security—a security of being.[16] In Anthony Giddens' terminology, the premise of ontological security is that the formation of the subject is fraught with an underlying, ineradicable anxiety. Since all social actors need a stable sense of self in order to realise a sense of agency, managing that fundamental anxiety is an ongoing project. Actors are viewed as ontologically secure when they feel they have a sense of biographical continuity and wholeness that is supported and recognised in and through their relations with others. When the relationships and understandings that actors rely on become destabilised, ontological security is threatened, and the result may be anxiety, paralysis or violence.[17] However, if actors gain ontological security through relations with others, then conflictual relations are not the sole locales where

ontological security dynamics are in play. Such security dynamics can also play a constitutive role for cooperative relationships, perhaps forming a social 'glue' enhancing the durability of cooperation;[18] similarly, ontological insecurity and anxiety can be a positive springboard for new forms of political resistance and agency[19] in a world where the state is narrated as a homogenous and omnipresent actor.

The near-to naturalised narratives surrounding national security within international politics have conceived of states as homogenous rational actors acting in an environment of uncertainty. Reducing such uncertainty has meant assigning probability to certain outcomes in order to maximise their expected utility based on rational calculations in the face of incomplete information.[20] These narratives tend to confine religion to privately held beliefs wherein religious orthodoxy, resurgence or revivalism has no place as it exists beyond the preconceptions of the ostensibly operative narrative order of society and the world. Such propensity to relegate religion to the private sphere is conventionally associated with Western modernity and related to the birth of the state following the agreements of Augsburg and Westphalia;

> [f]or the state to be born, religion had to become marginalised or privatised. The state used the invention of religion to legitimate the transfer of the ultimate loyalty of people from religion to the state as part of the consolidation of its power, which we have come to term internal sovereignty.[21]

This modernist narrative contains a wish to depart from the 'primitive Sacred' to the 'modern Secular'[22] and tends to equal religion with irrationality and superstition, often in opposition to the progress of science, secularism and the inherent rationality of the enlightenment ideals.[23] It thus rests on a rectilinear notion of time in which 'religion' as an exhaustive ground for authority, unity and organisation has been left behind, confined to the 'dark ages', as secular imaginaries have replaced it.

The modernist narrative of the state as a homogenous actor has been heavily criticised. In poststructuralist readings, for example, narratives of security rest upon and produce particular understandings of the state. These are never pre-given or predetermined, but neither are they completely in flux as they rely on historically powerful identity constructions in which discursive practices constitute something 'foreign' in relation to the self.[24] Although theoretically inconsistent, there is no denying that the modernist narrative represents a powerful source for identifying self and others, which makes the accompanying logic of an incessantly unfolding, continuous chronological order hard to contest.

A similar argument could be made in relation to narratives of transnationalism and global governance. Even if both can be traced to a growing dissatisfaction with the state-dominated models of economic and social actors and, particularly, with the failure to capture the vast increase of non-state actors and the implications of technology in a global age,[25] their varying formulations have exhibited a reluctance to diverge from a liberal temporality. Much of this literature has focused on the establishment of 'good governance' in which the proliferation of NGOs plays an important part, often recounted through localised narratives of decentralisation, local participation, self-help and partnerships. These developments are often celebrated across a broad political spectrum,

> perceived from the Right as an appropriate alternative to national governments, from the moderate left as a democratizing force promoting accountability and social rights, and from the more radical Left as a potential force for 'a counter-hegemonic project that would eventually yield revolutionary change'.[26]

The shift from government to governance has not resulted in a radical transformation of world society, however, even as the emerging governance structure is 'accompanied by polycentric

ensembles and horizontal networks of association between private, civil society and state actors'.[27]

The modernist narrative is not only rehashed in many discourses on global governance, it is often strengthened in normative, often cosmopolitan, terms and narrated through stories of 'inclusivity', 'legitimacy', 'transparency', 'accountability' and a 'global democratic order'.[28] The cosmopolitan version tends to be focused on how people are members of both bounded communities and a universal community of humankind, thus equalling world citizens—a notion that is tied to ideas about certain universal moral rights of all individuals;[29] what Véronique Pin-Fat refers to as 'foundational' cosmopolitanism.[30] This moral imperative is nowhere less evident than in assertions of global responsibility to promote peace, democracy or human dignity or to save the environment and cultural heritage. The institutional turn makes sense from this perspective as individuals find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond to such demands on their own. Instead we find moral responsibility delegated to international organisations, governmental as well as non-governmental, who are to act on the basis of a discourse of moral goodness.[31]

If religious groups are discussed, they are frequently approached at the level of 'new actors', as NGOs, who strive for similar goals of shared progression and betterment, or they are viewed as threats located outside this global order—estranged from the narratives of a common world in which all participants supposedly have an equal voice. Here the term 'religious resurgence' is either narrated as a symptom of increasing irrationality and intolerance, associated with aggression and a propensity for conflict, or it is asserted that any destabilising activities made in the name of religion are diverging from the true nature of a particular religion.[32]

With Thomas Lemke it is thus possible to argue that the shift from government to governance continues to rely on state centric narratives in which the reduction of state sovereignty is not as dramatic as sometimes implied.[33] Rather, it is about the dominance of neoliberal

government rationalities and the consolidation of new technologies of government in which new actors are included in the governing process and where new forms of action are rationalised.[34] In relation to this, current academic discourses have been concerned with the Foucauldian analytics of 'governmentality' as advanced systems for overseeing the exercise of rights and freedoms. Such systems rely upon at least three key transformations that are of importance for understanding a move from government to governance, or what Bob Jessop has described as a form of political authority that takes as its strategic objective the 'organization of self-organization'.[35]

One is a shift in the *spatiality of power*, which includes a move from forms of governance privileging particular institutional sites of power to open networks of power governed by the market. Second, there is a shift in dominant narratives of *social order* based on new forms of communications and information technologies in which narratives of self-governance and self-organisation prevail. Third, and finally, there is a shift in the assumptions about the *subject of power*, including what might be termed the subject-effects of strategies of governance. This refers to the effects of changes in spatiality of power as well as shifts in the social order and puts into focus what Gilles Deleuze has termed 'dividuals' as a particular strategy of social division.[36] In Nicolas Rose's terminology,[37] dividuals refers to the cumulative production of abject populations, i.e. those either abandoned or forcibly placed outside the idea of a common world. These populations are excluded but simultaneously included in a world order in which transnationalism and global governance have materialised. The emphasis on dividuals not only accentuates the effects of governmentality, it also brings into focus sites of resistance to such deployments of technological advancements.[38] Everyday practices of narrative reordering thus include resistance beyond mass mobilisation involving, for instance, dis-identification from state practices at a global level,[39] as well as a refusal to become part of or cooperate with these new forms of governance.

This implies that the state is not the only centre and origin of sovereignty. Neither is it the only source of ontological security. Rather, the state is constantly confronted by other forms of sovereign bodies, which attempt to assert control over the governed subject. Thus, the very invocation and attempted reassertion of transnational communities, sovereign powers and state apparatuses is evidence of bids for securitisation not merely on the part of majorities, but also minorities. Hence, we must think of dividuals in terms of bottom-up approaches allowing for subjectification and re-appropriation of alternative narratives that can resist and subvert hegemonic dominance. At heart is the challenge to sovereign power from those at the margins of knowledge production. This is where the concept of ontological (in)security comes into play, as both a provider of security and as a source of discontent—as limiting as well as enabling agency, action and resistance. Such resistance is psychological as well as structural, and is grounded in an emotional basis of apathy, resentment, defiance and anger that can reframe hegemonic narratives. This is the politics of the subaltern in search of ontological security,[40] in which past struggles and resistances are enmeshed with the present in a non-linear fashion and where the ambiguous nature of what is held in common is made evident.

The reasoning above suggests that narrative (and discursive) hegemony is always sustained by emotional investments of desire through the social construction of subjectivity. If understood in this way, much work on ontological insecurity emphasising uncertainty is consonant with Lacan's conception of the *Real* (the unconscious direct experience) as it refers to a state in which we can never fully know either the past or the future.[41] To overcome uncertainty, or *lack* in Lacan's terminology, the subject engages in fantasies and imaginations. Here fantasy refers to a structure through which the subject is set to capture the promise 'perceived-to-be-lost (though never achieved) sense of wholeness'.[42] Understanding the psychological (and emotional) consequences of this kind of structural disordering and securitising moves is fundamental for appreciating how ontological insecurity and existential anxiety can result in the search

for one stable identity—*the securitisation of subjectivity*—regardless of any actual existence of such an identity.[43] It, moreover, identifies ontological security as being a condition of both possibility and impossibility, of both opening up and closing down, of both creativity and monological closure[44].

The Absent Presence of the *Tablighi Jama'at*

To allow for the above ambiguous nature of the positing of a common world to more fully transpire, the notion of subaltern pasts is employed to make sense of those 'life-worlds' that are 'subordinated by the "major" narratives of the dominant institutions'.[45] Chakrabarty's rejection of a singularity to the now of history writing, and by extension world politics, is in this section combined with Pheng Cheah's reasoning on 'spectral nationality' and its implications for identity formation.[46] To facilitate recognition of the subordinated life-worlds while considering our global present, it is necessary to move away from viewing the religious in terms of 'human relationships that are in themselves secular and worldly'[47] or, as Sanjay Seth writes, 'engage in a form of conceptual translation' that reduces 'ghosts, gods, and spirits' to '*manifestations* of some other, intelligible phenomena'.[48] It is also essential to acknowledge that the subaltern past—which is not really past, but rather a disrupting remnant that 'reminds us of other ways of being human'[49]—is impossible to fully accommodate in academic writing.[50] It only enters the hegemonic field in the form of 'stubborn knots', i.e. knots 'that […] break up' the ostensibly 'evenly woven surface of the fabric [of 'modern historical narratives']'.[51] Yet, it has and exhibits its presence—to express it in Charlotte Epstein's terms—as part of the 'symbolic order', if understood as 'the conditions of possibility of organized life' and of 'politics itself'.[52]

This epistemic disjunction, which does not unfold along a neat separation between Europe and that which is not,[53] is assumed to be what conditions the lack of congruence between representations of a common world that belong to narratives of transnationalism and global

governance and the 'inner-worldly' world conjured in and through the workings of the *Tablighi Jama'at*. This 'inner-worldiness' brings us back to a focus on ontological (in)security. Ontological security provides a tool for investigating the cognitive and affective reasons why individuals, groups and even states experience ontological insecurity and existential anxiety as well as the emotional responses to these feelings. But it is also focused on the intersubjective ordering of relations—how individuals, groups and states define themselves in relation to others based on their structural basis of power.[54] It is furthermore concerned with the inner life of human beings by seeing individuals as linked not only structurally, but also through their reasoning and perceptions, their scripts, schemas and heuristics as well as through their emotional intersubjectivity, in which they continually receive and give emotional messages—often unconsciously.[55] The emphasis is on how discursively constructed subject positions are taken up by concrete persons through cognitive choice and fantasy identification/emotional 'investments',[56] and on how this—especially in the case of religion—is seen as addressing the constant lack of the split self.

The subsumption of the many voices of being human into the singular narrative of religious revivalism as a particular form of ontological security is, accordingly, a key facet of our exposition on the *Tablighi Jama'at*. As such, it hopes to abide by an acknowledgement of the presence of a 'plurality of temporalities' in each attempt at 'theorising world politics'.[57] It is, with Chakrabarty, hence proposed that the relation 'between the nonmodern and the modern' is one of being coterminous rather than sequential, i.e. it is indicative of 'a shared and constant "now"'.[58] In the present case, this means that imaginings of a religious resurgence and desires to spawn a global Muslim unity—both observable in the activities of the *Tablighi Jama'at*—should not be thought of as 'anachronistic' or 'reactionary'.[59] On the contrary, it is a reminder of 'the constitutive violence entailed in the limits of representation' and the extrinsic qualities ascribed to those groups or individuals 'that', through appealing to alternate sources or

narratives of ontological security in order to fulfil the longing for wholeness, 'appear to haunt and endanger' the often taken-for-granted common world.[60]

A second tenet of the conceptualising of *Tablighi Jama'at* activities is derived from Cheah's rendering of the postcolonial nation.[61] It is assumed that part of the reason why the activities of the *Tablighi Jama'at* become interpreted as exterior both to narratives of national security and to those of a secure globality is the movement's peripheral position in relation to the continuing centrality of the nation within the trans*national*. Cheah pertinently suggests that 'nationalist discourse' typically corresponds to 'a secularized version of a traditional religious discourse of finitude', one that legitimises and ascribes significance to the notion of 'finite existence' on the basis of a 'faith in the infinite'.[62] It is a proposition that indicates how, '[i]n a secularized world', infinitude often becomes projected onto and seen as embodied by 'the political community of the nation'.[63] In the case of the *Tablighi Jama'at*, there is no immediately corresponding idea of and desire for political community. It thereby risks being subjected to narratives that inscribe a hegemonic set of cultural values upon territories and populations in order to control, know and domesticate certain groups of people residing in national space.

Following John R. Bowen's reasoning on 'transnational Islamic space', it might also be argued that the transnational expanse of the movement is not 'post-national' in terms of transcending 'an earlier space bounded by state boundaries',[64] as the *Tablighi Jama'at* both rejects nationhood as its origin or foundation and makes use of the inherently cosmopolitan infrastructure of Islam for the diffusion of ideas and practices. Such an argument is akin to Peter Mandaville's claim that 'the Tablighis dwell in a translocality that challenges the spatial confines of political community'.[65] In ontological security terms, the *Tablighi Jama'at* is thus able to provide securitising ontological narratives that go beyond current conceptual narratives focused on the nation or the state as security providers and instead conjures images of a particular kind of Islamic collectiveness that transcends hegemonic boundaries.

Expanding a Subaltern Past

It is here maintained that the *Tablighi Jama'at* is most properly grasped if considered through the above conceptual lens. One productive consequence is that we initiate a conversation on the movement as equivalent to and reflective of a subaltern past. However, let us attend to a description of the movement before considering what it seems to afford us in terms of theorising narratives of a common world. First, it might be stated that the *Tablighi Jama'at* is foremost concerned with 'Islamic revival' and that much of its self-depiction and public profile has been shaped by its own insistence on being 'apolitical'.[66] The latter is, of course, something that Sikand is rightly sceptical of.[67] The movement is, for example, deemed to be present in most states with a Muslim population and, among Islamic movements, it is transnationally the most extensive.[68] Also, it is not evident how a movement working towards 'the moral reform of individuals'[69] and a 'process of self-transformation'—even if this does not entail an endeavour to effectuate the emergence of an Islamic state—might be conceived as not acting politically.[70]

As Anindita Chakrabarti observes, the view of transformation that runs through *Tablighi Jama'at* activities is one of professing that the world is only alterable on the basis of individual change—a self-transformation that occurs through the fulfilment of religious obligations in the 'corporeal' and 'everyday'.[71] Barbara D. Metcalf has referred to the *Tablighi Jama'at* as 'a movement of encapsulation' due to its claim to be distant to 'explicit concerns about public life'[72] and its devotion to making already existing Muslims 'better Muslims'[73] or, as Peter van der Veer writes, '"born-again" Muslim[s]'.[74] Marcia Hermansen, moreover, points to how the *Tablighi Jama'at* brings forth both 'a democratization of authority and a non-hierarchical approach to organization',[75] while Farish A. Noor attributes the movement's effective enlargement to its strong advocacy of 'the egalitarian ethos of Islam'.[76]

Despite the movement's principal objective of 'inculcating correct and devoted religious practice',[77] any act attending to the alteration of current orders—whether institutional or related

to subjecthood—will here be deemed political. Such reordering is evident in how the movement facilitates an alteration of individuals' relations, which in turn generates patterns of identification that upset notions of belonging closely linked to kinship and family.[78] It is a change that finds resonance in how the movement enables life as a righteous Muslim in a 'secular state by personalizing Islam', i.e. by positing a separation of 'religion and politics'.[79] It, in addition, brings about responses in the form of antagonistic or competing movements, such as the Dawat-e Islami,[80] and local opposition to its attempt at replacing and renegotiating traditionally held beliefs[81] and to its propagation of a 'normative Islam' shaped by the organisation's South Asian roots.[82]

For the present discussion, it is necessary to outline the manner in which the *Tablighi Jama'at* achieves a reordering of its adherents' life-world that supplies an alternative sense of ontological security. Its work, according to Sikand, does not stem from a vision of an ideal 'political community', as found in the enunciations and labour of certain Islamist outfits.[83] Rather, the model for the movement's daily and overall transactions is the life of the prophet, and the emphasis especially lies on preaching. There is, in addition, no space given for 'ijtihad or the use of independent reasoning' in the way that the *Tablighi Jama'at* envisions its own role in the reformation of individual morality[84] or for the syncretic version of Islam conventionally associated with South Asia.[85] Instead, the undertaken project is to, through a certain ordering of the everyday, 'internalize the written/heard texts' in order for them to 'ideally *become*, in a sense, "living hadith"'.[86] Drawing on Metcalf, it ought to be noted that the mode by which certain texts are placed at the centre of the movement's activities and ('ritualised') undertakings contains a tendency to mute other possible textual and 'oral' interpretations.[87] This, in turn, brings with it a certain projection both of 'community' and of what might be said to constitute 'responsibility', 'loyalty' and a desirable 'behaviour' for individuals.[88]

In the case of *Tablighi Jama'at*, ontological security is hence expressed in ideas of immortality, in the ordering of the everyday and in literal interpretations of certain texts that re-appropriate alternative narratives as a means to resist and subvert hegemonic dominance. This raises the important question of whether the concept of ontological security mainly sustains the idea of security being the greatest social value; that individuals and, by means of extrapolation, collectives and even the state are at heart security seekers? As argued by Maria Mälksoo, '[o]ntological security reaffirms the categorical preeminence of survival as the ontological drive to protect oneself and surpass the other, if necessary'.[89] Implicit in this criticism is the idea that the notion of insecurity in ontological security theories is viewed as purely disabling—that being insecure makes us long for secure identities in response to existential anxiety.

However as the case of *Tablighi Jama'at* implies, this is not the only way in which to read ontological security. We can also read it in terms of the potential alternative imaginations have for a different, more ambiguous notion of self, one that is both disabling and enabling at the same time and one that provides a more holistic framework of analysis. By exposing how the world is represented through postcolonial performativity we allow for postcolonial subjectivities to talk back: for those at the margins of the narrative of authenticity and universal community to challenge normalised discursive space and temporality.

Biographical Continuity and its Security Implications

A core practice of the members of the *Tablighi Jama'at* is the actual *tabligh* (in Hermansen's translation,[90] 'proclaiming Islamic teachings'), which comprises three rudiments.[91] First, those partaking in the *tabligh* are supposed to pay for themselves. Second, those involved are prescribed to find shelter in a 'local mosque'. Third, it is expected that they prepare their own food and that they bring with them their own bedclothes. The methods have essentially remained consistent since the *Tablighi Jama'at*'s embryonic stage in the princely state of Mewar and

until today's transnational, highly expansive organisation.[92] As the nucleus and engine of these methods, we find the journey—a journeying that occurs within and through 'networks' that both incorporate and incarnate the 'local, regional and global' and which, as Chakrabarti notes, is entwined with the acquisition of membership.[93] Jan A. Ali similarly refers to how the 'notion of tour' is interwoven with the induction of members.[94] It is worth pointing this out, considering the ambiguities concerning what counts as 'formal' membership in the movement. Other noteworthy aspects of the journeying—which ostensibly amounts to a 'permanent hajj'[95]—is that it adjoins 'spaces inside and outside the mosque' and that it brings 'local Muslims' into 'global' relations.[96]

Its extraordinary expansion is an essential aspect of the transnational extension of the *Tablighi Jama'at*. According to one estimate, the movement has around 80 million followers[97] and it is said to be present in at least 150 states.[98] It is a remarkable growth considering the seeming absence of 'formal organization' and the dependence on 'grass-roots jama'ats [groups]'.[99] Such co-presence of a 'highly decentralized, voluntary' arrangement and a lack of 'offices' and 'archives' indicate the limitations involved in assimilating the movement's activities into conventional forms of governance and policy-making.[100] Another noteworthy trait is its successful and thus contradictory expanse in South Asia, if we take into consideration the problematic inter-state relations that recurrently strain regional cooperation and accord. Its transgression of the expected limiting function of state borders in the region is most aptly illustrated with the yearly large-scale gatherings (*ijtema*)—that respectively brings together approximately 2 million people—in Raiwind in Pakistan and Tungi in Bangladesh.[101] After *hajj*, these are the largest assemblies of Muslims around the world.[102] They are of a size that, in these contexts, disrupts a neat separation between religion and day-to-day politics. As Sikand writes apropos the congregation in Tungi, the scale of the event draws in the state as an active agent in 'providing basic amenities for the participants'.[103]

The above description provides two rationales for placing the *Tablighi Jama'at* in the category of subaltern pasts: first, it does not regard the employment of 'reason and science' as part of undertakings that are religious in character;[104] and, second, it does not relate to the past—as it is portrayed through 'the standard set in hadith'—as necessarily 'distant', as not possible to be 'relived'.[105] In this sense it differs from most work on ontological insecurity focusing on insecurity as a state of disruption, where individuals and collectives of individuals have lost their stabilising anchor, their ability to sustain a linear narrative through which they can answer questions about doing, acting and being. Recreating a past, in terms of a singular, and often linear, reading of the nation, history, culture and people, is here viewed as a particular solution to ontological insecurity which is believed to seriously impede our ability to move beyond securitised subjectivities, i.e. the illusion of consistent, unitary identities and selfhood in which nationhood and other single identifications can supply a narrative anchorage.[106] However, the *Tablighi Jama'at* does not subscribe to such linear temporality—it does attempt to recapture a lost past but not in the undeviating terms often assumed by modernist historiography. Instead the movement is part of a seemingly anachronistic time, which is accessible only on the basis of an acceptance of the possibility 'to make the past live' within the daily, inner-worldly and insular workings of the *Tablighi Jama'at*.[107]

Along similar lines, Francis Robinson points to a 'this-worldly piety' while referring to a shift during the last two centuries towards 'a valuing of a faith in which Muslims were increasingly aware that it was they, and only they, who could act to fashion an Islamic society on earth'.[108] In Robinson's view, we ought to place the *Tablighi Jama'at* in this fold of groups that base their faith-oriented activities on a 'sense of personal responsibility' and a perceived 'need to act on earth'.[109] In his work on the *Tablighi Jama'at*, Zacharias P. Pieri tries to capture this by employing the parallel expression 'worldly unworldliness', which is meant to indicate how its activities—'traditionally disengaged' from the 'wider society'—both depend on the

adherents' assumption of responsibility for 'disseminating the message' and rest on a conception of the present as 'a fleeting moment' in which 'all efforts' ought to be directed 'at attaining entry to the hereafter'.[110]

By combining this attempt to, as Metcalf writes,[111] opt 'out of the linear story' with a seeming distance from the language of statism and from a notion of the world as either (already) international or global, an incompatibility arises between the movement's practices and narratives of global governance. The stress on 'the realms of the spirit and rituals',[112] and the organisation's long-standing disinterest in producing and disseminating 'written material', does not however—as established above—make the movement apolitical. It rather points to the validity and reinforcement of what Chakrabarty refers to as 'constant fragmentariness'[113] —in our case, the broken-up, non-cohesive and pulsating now of global politics. It is hence not only a matter of displacement and opposition. It is, moreover, reflecting the absence of common discursive ground as a condition for dialogue and mutual engagements. It is an ontological insecurity that resists the narratives of the common by seeking security through everyday practice without necessarily adhering to narratives of homogenous past or singular notions of bordered communities. Accordingly, we now briefly turn to two controversies that have enveloped the public imagery of the *Tablighi Jama'at* in the UK and India respectively. The first revolves around the planned and subsequently abandoned construction of a mosque of considerable size near the Olympic stadium in East London and the second is entangled with the possible overlap between *Tablighi Jama'at*'s focus on the inner-worldly and Islamist concerns about desirable forms of statehood.

The background to 'the expanding controversy' surrounding the *Tablighi Jama'at*'s intention to construct a mosque that could cater to 40,000 people and 'with tent-like extensions' up to 70,000,[114] is traceable to the acquisition of a piece of land in Newham, East London in 1996. Even after an assurance from the movement in 2007 that the finalised mosque would only have

room for 12,000, the completed edifice would still be larger than other religious buildings in the UK.[115] At the time of the procurement, the chosen location was in an area deemed to be 'out of the public eye' and in a part of East London that was not considered overly attractive to 'commercial developers'.[116] The negative media attention directed towards the construction of the mosque began in November 2005.[117] The dual focus of the critique against the project—which received a final rejection by the Newham Council in December 2012[118]—was, on the one hand, directed at its cost and considerable size and, on the other, towards the planned proximity to the now completed Olympic stadium. It, however, also encompassed the voicing of unease with the mosque possibly being funded through foreign investment and its potential function as a shelter for '"radical Islam"'.[119]

The second controversial representation that has surfaced in recent years is the accusation that affiliates of radical Islamist groups have been staying at the *Tablighi Jama'at*'s Islami Markaz in Delhi—which, according to Shail Mayaram's, functions as 'the radial centre, training jama'ats and organizing their tours all over India and the world'.[120] There is, she writes, an unceasing 'inflow and outflow from the Markaz'.[121] One such flow, according to media reports after Wikileaks' release of the so-called 'Guantanamo files', has been—as an article published in the *Indian Express* puts it—the utilising by 'Al-Qaeda operatives' of 'JT's facilities […] for shelter and travel documents'.[122] It is a perception of the *Tablighi Jama'at* as a facilitating infrastructure for extremism that finds an apt representation in Praveen Swami's depiction of the movement as 'a launch pad' for the activities of a number of 'jihadist groups'.[123] Swami claims that, even though the organisation is 'pietist' and 'eschews politics', followers of the *Tablighi Jama'at* have been involved in a range of 'terrorist operations linked to South Asia'. The latter is an account that partly iterates Jane Perlez' account of the movement as being regarded, 'by Western intelligence agencies', as a possible 'recruiting ground for jihadists'.[124] What we find in both instances of controversy is the inevitable tension between the constant fragmentariness

of the now and the inscription of the major narratives of national security and globality upon what the *Tablighi Jama'at* claims as a world apart. Of importance is how they both display an increasingly ontological insecure world in which the movement is portrayed as an ontological threat to a common past, present and future and in which any disruption to this narrative can only be read through already established categorical assumptions.

Conclusion

Subaltern pasts should here, as stressed above, not be understood as being past, as being part of that which has come to pass. They are, conversely, synchronous. They are constitutive of our now. The *Tablighi Jama'at* is, consequently, able to provide ontological security in ways that differ from most other transnational movements while ontological insecurity on behalf of its members simultaneously creates a novel form of agency, of resistance, to current hegemonic structures—both spatially and temporarily. The seemingly impossible effort to make the 'greater and truer' perception of time in the *Tablighi Jama'at*'s alternate 'story' part of the 'metanarratives of nationalism or immigration'[125] brings to attention the disunities and partial nature of the former *as well as* the latter. The same applies to dominant narratives on the ordering principles of the acceptable, sanctioned and legitimate—and, of the people and the *polis*—in a transnational context.

The disjuncture between the practices of the *Tablighi Jama'at* in terms of a shared cosmos and the linear narratives of governance relating to a common world and national security deserves some further discussion. At one level the *Tablighi Jama'at* seems to adhere to this notion of a true religion in which a shared cosmos fuse a particular cosmology with the ethos of the virtuous believer. Acts committed outside this narrative order may consequently be condemned. However, in comparison to the modernist narrative underpinning a common world, *Tablighi Jama'at* diverges both in terms of spatiality and temporality. It is a world that is neither state-

centric nor global. It rather consists of the bridging of spaces beyond the local, national and the global in which the self, the source of ontological security, is turned into a ‘floating space’.

It is also a world defined by an ostensibly non-linear conception of past, present and future, where these temporalities are merged through everyday activities of journeying and the conduction of a ‘permanent hajj’. Worldly time becomes a non-issue in this regard, existing somewhere between the modern and the non-modern and imagined through an infinite lens of a ‘global Muslim unity’. The controversies referred to above, the building of a mosque in East London and the perception in India of the *Tablighi Jama’at* as a facilitating infrastructure for extremism, are however interpreted through a discursive linear narrative within the parameters of modernity and neo-liberal rationality. In both instances the national seems to be (re)inserted in the form of an adherence to liberal values and ideas, such as reason, rationality and secularism, as a substantial way of life to recreate inclusion into and exclusion from the national body.

This security narrative is dominant in both controversies, as religious resurgence or revivalism is framed in terms of discursive threats that rely upon a static and unified religious identity in line with the conception that religion and religious belonging is something that cannot be divided. Through its persistent confrontation with modernity, religion has come to be seen as a distinct entity that is clearly distinguishable from less religious existential spheres. This narrative of distinctiveness has consequences for the mosque controversy as it is confronted with a nationalist narrative of Britain as, if not secular, then at least projecting religion as belonging to the private sphere. Hence, the alternate spatial and temporal qualities of the *Tablighi Jama’at* contest the modernist narrative of unity, intelligibility and secularism, while its ‘apolitical’ politics defies the idea of good governance.

It is in this latter sense that the Indian controversy must be understood. Not only is the *Tablighi Jama’at* construed as a security threat within the logic of rational governance. It is also predominantly viewed as eroding and threatening the borders of the political through its

insistence on its apolitical nature. Apolitical politics defies the idea of good governance as a normative project due to its inability to take responsibility for the realisation of a common world; or, to speak with Upendra Baxi,[126] its inability to act responsibly in relation to 'some inherent virtues of solidary global public citizenship'. It thus eschews the normative foundation of contemporary international and global politics and becomes an exteriority that simultaneously avoids and endangers the naturalness implied in such a world of commonalities.

From an ontological security perspective, both controversies were, finally, clearly interpreted in line with a colonial perception of the errant, risky and liminal subject in which contemporary narratives of national security and globality provide securitising rationales for the control and domestication of the *Tablighi Jama'at.* At the same time, the controversies reveal attempts, by and on behalf of the movements' followers, at alternative imaginings and at seeking out new foundations in a creative desire to live in novel ways. These are, as demonstrated above, derived from a refusal to accept linear temporality and notions of a common world as equalling a singular and all-encompassing framework of human existence.

Notes

[1] With Thomas G. Weiss defined as 'collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve; it reflects the capacity of the international system at any moment in time to provide government-like services in the absence of world government' ('What Happened to the Idea of World Government?', *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2), 2009, pp 253-271, p 257.).

[2] John Agnew, 'Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics', *International Political Sociology* 1(2), 2007, pp 138-148, p 140.

[3] See e.g. Sofia Näsström, 'What Globalization Overshadows', *Political Theory* 31(6), 2003, pp 808-834; Sofia Näsström, 'The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle', *Political Studies* 59(1), 2011, pp 116-134; Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, 'Can there be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38(1), 2010, pp 76-110.

[4] Thomas Christiano, 'A Democratic Theory of Territory and Some Puzzles about Global Democracy', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37(1), 2006, pp 81-107.

[5] See Zacharias P. Pieri, *The Contentious Politics of Socio-Political Engagement: The Transformation of the Tablighi Jamaat in London*, Exeter: The University of Exeter [unpublished thesis.], 2012.

[6] For details, see Zacharias P. Pieri, *Tablighi Jamaat and the Quest for the London Mega Mosque: Continuity and Change*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp 49-63.

[7] Incomplete in the sense of a failure to recognise the now or presence of certain life-worlds and community making, and—as a result—incomplete since only 'on the basis of the present' can we conceive of the actuality of these (see Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p 38). Not the present as 'pure becoming, always outside itself' (Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, New York: Zone Books, 1999, p 55), nor as that which 'is not', that which is '*composed* of nonbeings' (Derrida, *Margins*, p 39), but as the spurious dividing line between what is and what has been. That which, as Barry Hindess writes, provides the grounds for regarding 'some of our contemporaries […] as also and more properly belonging to the past' ('The Past is Another Culture', *International Political Sociology* 1(4), 2007, pp 325-338, p 336). In the contemporaneity of global politics, in its here and now, it might be said that 'the form of the present' and the '"extraordinary right" of the present' (Derrida, *Margins*, p 38) make certain expressions of being and being-together past yet present, antiquated yet animate.

[8] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008[2000], pp 97-113.

[9] The article, thereby, parallels and supplements Matthew C. Watson's reading ('Cosmopolitics and the Subaltern: Problematizing Latour's Idea of the Commons', *Theory, Culture & Society* 28(3), 2011, pp 55-79) of the imperfect and fractured relation between the possibility of a common world and the intrinsic silence of the subaltern within the realm of the international and the global (cf. Susanne Soederberg, *Global Governance in Question: Empire, Class and the New Common Sense in Managing North-South Relations*, London: Pluto Press, 2006, pp 157-162).

[10] Jens Bartelson, 'The Social Construction of Globality', *International Political Sociology* 4(3), 2010, pp 219-235, pp 221-222.

[11] Stein Sundstol Eriksen and Ole Jacob Sending, 'There is no Global Public: The Idea of the Public and the Legitimation of Governance', *International Theory* 5(2), 2013, pp 213-237, p 215.

[12] Bartelson, 'The Social Construction', p 232.

[13] Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[14] Yoginder Sikand, 'The Tablighi Jama'at and Politics', *ISIM Newsletter* 13, 2003, pp 42-43, p 42.

[15] Molly Andrews, Catarina Kinnvall and Kristen Monroe, 'Narratives of (In)Security; Nationhood, Religion, Gender and Culture', *Political Psychology* 36(2), 2015, pp 141-149.

[16] Catarina Kinnvall, 'Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security', *Political Psychology,* 25(5), 2004, pp 741-767; Jennifer Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), 2006, pp 341-370; Brent Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State*, London: Routledge, 2008.

[17] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

[18] Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, 'Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', *Cooperation and Conflict* 52(1), 2017, pp 3-11; Chris Browning and Pertii Joenniemi, 'From Fratricide to Security Community: Re-theorising Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16(4), 2013, pp 483-513.

[19] Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2007; see also Chris Rossdale, 'Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological Security', *International Political Sociology* 9(4), 2015, pp 369-386.

[20] Mitzen, 'Ontological Security'.

[21] Scott M. Thomas, 'Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformations of International Society', *Millennium*: *Journal of International Studies* 29(3), 2000, pp 815-841, p 823.

[22] José Casanova, 'Public Religions Revisited', in *Religion: Beyond the Concept*, Hent de Vries (ed), New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.

[23] Peter L. Berger (ed), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999; Jeff Haynes (ed), *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1999.

[24] Lene Hansen, 'Poststructuralism', in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992[1998].

[25] Thomas G. Weiss, 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges', in *The Global Governance Reader*, Rorden Wilkinson (ed), London: Routledge, 2005.

[26] Quoted in Patricia Kennett, 'Introduction: Governance, the State and Public Policy in a Global Age', in *Governance, Globalization and Public Policy*, Patricia Kennett (ed), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 8.

[27] Kenneth, 'Introduction', p 5.

[28] See Eva Erman and Anders Uhlin (eds), *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-Examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011; Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito and Christer Jönsson, *The Opening Up of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[29] Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, 'Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(1), 2000, pp 1-15; R.B.J. Walker, 'The Hierarchicalization of Political Community', *Review of International Studies* 25(1), 1999, pp 151-156.

[30] Véronique Pin-Fat, 'Cosmopolitanism and the End of Humanity: A Grammatical Reading of Posthumanism', *International Political Sociology* 7(3), 2013, pp 241-257.

[31] Toni Erskine, 'Making Sense of "Responsibility" in International Relations: Key Questions and Concepts', in *Can Institutions have Responsibility: Collective Moral Agency and International Relations*, Toni Erskine (ed), London: Palgrave, 2003.

[32] Scott R. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

[33] Thomas Lemke, 'Foucault, Governmentality and Critique', *Rethinking Marxism* 14(3), 2002, pp 49-64; see also Bob Jessop, 'On the Limits of *The Limits to Capital'*, *Antipode* 36(3), 2004, pp 480-496.

[34] For example, see Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds), *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*, London: Routledge, 2004; Giorgio Shani and David Chandler, 'Assessing the Impact of Foucault on International Relations', *International Political Sociology* 4(3), 2010, pp 196-197.

[35] Bob Jessop, 'The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development', *International Social Science Journal* 50(155), 1998, pp 29-45, p 43.

[36] Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', *October* 59 (Winter), 1992, pp 3-7.

[37] Nicolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p 253.

[38] For example, see Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat, 'Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence', *Millennium*: *Journal of International Studies* 34(1), 2005, pp 1-24; Mark B. Salter (ed), *Politics at the Airport*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008; Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.

[39] See Claudia Aradau, 'Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7(4), 2004, pp 388-413.

[40] Gayatri C Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), London: Longman, 1993; cf. Chetan Bhatt, *Liberation and Purity: Race, New Religious Movements and the Ethics of Postmodernity*, London: UCL Press, 1997.

[41] Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.

[42] Ty Solomon, *The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015, p 37.

[43] Kinnvall, 'Globalization and Religious Nationalism'.

[44] Mikhail Bakhtin, in *The Bakhtin Reader*. Pam Morris (ed), London: Arnold, 2001.

[45] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p 101.

[46] Pheng Cheah, 'Spectral Nationality: The Living on [sur-vie] of the Postcolonial Nation in Neocolonial Globalization', *Boundary 2* 26(3), 1999, pp 225-252.

[47] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p 103.

[48] Sanjay Seth, '"Once was Blind but now Can See": Modernity and the Social Sciences', *International Political Sociology* 7(2), 2013, pp 136-151, italics in original, p 137.

[49] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p 94.

[50] Ibid. p 105.

[51] Ibid. p 106.

[52] Charlotte Epstein, 'Theorizing Agency in Hobbes's Wake: The Rational Actor, the Self, or the Speaking Subject', *International Organization* 67(2), 2013, pp 287-316, pp 301, 304.

[53] For a critique of 'monochromatic' conceptions of Eurocentrism, see Martin Hall and John M. Hobson. 'Liberal International Theory: Eurocentric but not always Imperialist?', *International Theory* 2(2), 2010, pp 210-245.

[54] Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London: Routledge, 2006.

[55] Ian Craib, *Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: The Limits of Sociology*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012; Ian Craib, *The Importance of Disappointment*, London: Routledge, 1994; Caroline Vogler, 'Social Identity and Emotion: The Meeting of Psychoanalysis and Sociology', *Sociological Review* 48(1), 2000, pp 19-43.

[56] See Catarina Kinnvall, 'European Trauma: Governance and the Psychological Moment', *Alternatives* 27(3), 2012, pp 266-281; Ayse Zarakol, 'Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan', *International Relations* 24(3), 2010, pp 3-23.

[57] Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008, p 164.

[58] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p 112.

[59] See ibid. p 253.

[60] See Watson, 'Cosmopolitics', pp 72-73.

[61] Cheah, 'Spectral Nationality'.

[62] Ibid. p 242.

[63] Ibid. p 242.

[64] John R. Bowen, 'Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30(5), 2004, pp 879-894, p 891.

[65] Peter Mandaville, 'Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 28(3), 1999, 653-673, p 671.

[66] Yoginder Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi-Jama'at (1920-2000): A Cross-Country Comparative Study*, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2002, p 1.

[67] Sikand, 'The Tablighi Jama'at', pp 42-43. While considering such self-projection of 'political aloofness', it seems valid to, as Sikand does, stress the conditions for Muslim politics in the wake of the partitioning of British India and the limited acceptance of an articulation of a distinct and separate 'Muslim' position in the varying

contexts to which the movement was initially, and eventually, exported (*The Origins,* pp 106-107). As such, its present-day configuration appears to be 'moulded largely by the social context of early twentieth-century Mewat', where it first came into being (ibid. p 109; for more on the historical background, see Shail Mayaram, *Resisting Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of a Muslim Identity*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, Chapter 7). Evidently, this does not explain its appeal to individuals across the world (see ibid.) or its proclivity to abide by and operate through 'a transnational orientation' (see Farzana Shaikh, 'From Islamisation to Shariatisation: Cultural Transnationalism in Pakistan', *Third World Quarterly* 29(3), 2008, pp 593-609, p 598).

[68] Sikand, *The Origins,* pp 1-2.

[69] Ibid. p 2.

[70] Aninidita Chakrabarti, 'Soteriological Journeys and Discourses of Self-Transformation. The Tablighi Jamaat and Svahyaya in Gujarat', *South Asian History and Culture* 1(4), 2010, pp 597-614, p 598. Chakrabarti, for example, draws attention to the organisation's involvement in 'relief and rehabilitation work' during and after the large-scale communal violence between Hindus and Muslims that took place in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 (ibid.) and Mohammad Talib has argued that its activities ought to be understood as enacting 'a moral struggle against the established order by living out a blueprint of an ideal life' ('Construction and Reconstruction of the World in the Tablighi Ideology', in *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal*, Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed), Leiden: Brill, 2000, p 74).

[71] Chakrabarti, 'Soteriological', p 601.

[72] Barbara D. Metcalf, 'Travelers' Tales in the Tablighi Jama'at', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 588, 2003, pp 136-148, p 137.

[73] Yoginder Sikand, 'The Tablighi Jama'at in Bangladesh', *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 22(1), 1999, pp 101-123, p 102; Farish A. Noor, *Islam on the Move: The Tablighi Jama'at in Southern Asia*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, p 28.

[74] Peter van der Veer, 'Transnational Religion: Hindu and Muslim Movements', *Global Networks* 2(2), 2002, pp 95-109.

[75] Marcia Hermansen, 'Said Nursi and Maulana Ilyas: Examples of Pietistic Spirituality among Twentieth-Century Islamic Movements', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 19(1), 2008, pp 73-88.

[76] Farish A. Noor, 'Pathans to the East! The Development of the Tablighi Jama'at Movement in Northern Malaysia and Southern Thailand', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27(1), 2007, pp 7-25, p 7.

[77] Barbara D. Metcalf, 'Living Hadith in the Tablighi Jama'at', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 52 (3), 1993, pp 584-608, p 584.

[78] Ibid. p 596.

[79] Sikand, 'The Tablighi Jama'at', p 42.

[80] Thomas K. Gugler, 'Making Muslims Fit for Faiz (God's Grace): Spiritual and Not-so-Spiritual Transactions inside the Islamic Missionary Movement Dawat-e Islami', *Social Compass* 58(3), 2011, pp 339-345.

[81] Alexander Horstmann, 'The Tablighi Jama'at, Transnational Islam, and the Transformation of the Self between Southern Thailand and South Asia', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27(1), 2007, pp 26-40.

[82] Noor, 'Pathans', p 23.

[83] Sikand, *The Origins,* pp 3, 68.

[84] Ibid. p 3.

[85] See Sikand, 'The Tablighi Jama'at in Bangladesh', p 103; Mayaram, *Resisting Regimes,* Chapter 7.

[86] Metcalf, 'Living Hadith', p 585.

[87] Ibid. pp 585, 600-601.

[88] See ibid. p 595; Metcalf, 'Travelers' Tales', p 145.

[89] Maria Mälksoo, '"Memory Must be Defended": Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security', *Security Dialogue* 46(3), 2015, pp 221-237, p 224.
[90] Hermansen, 'Said Nursi', p 75; see also Pieri, *Tablighi Jamaat,* pp 41-42.
[91] Sikand, *The Origins*, p 70.
[92] Ibid. p 245; see also Noor, 'Islam', p 29.
[93] Chakrabarti, 'Soteriological', pp 597, 603.
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