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An Exploration of Sectoral Continuity

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An Exploration of Sectoral Continuity

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | LUND UNIVERSITY, 2022

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An Exploration of Sectoral Continuity

Sarai-Anne Ikenze

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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Abstract
Between 1980 and 2000, a number of Sub-Saharan African countries entered into conditional structural adjustment lending arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to economic crisis and decline. Despite the fact that the crises had been due in part to long-term overdependence on primary sector activities, such as cash crop agriculture and natural resource extraction, many countries allegedly continued to prioritize these activities during structural adjustment. This approach of continued primary sector-oriented development despite the risks associated with such policies presents a puzzle, raising the question of whether and why borrowing African countries pursued similar sectoral policies in the structural adjustment period as they had during previous periods of development.

This dissertation investigates the above puzzle of sectoral continuity by describing and explaining cases of continuity in the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors in ten Sub-Saharan African countries between the colonial period and the structural adjustment period. Using novel data, the dissertation descriptively demonstrates that there was significant continuity over time in terms of which sectors were prioritized (i.e., sectoral level continuity) and the policy approaches used to structure economic activity within those sectors (i.e., within-sector continuity), finding strong evidence of agricultural sector continuity and isolated cases of extractive and industrial sector continuity in the ten countries.

I argue that these cases of sectoral continuity can be explained primarily by domestic interests in borrowing countries. I show that borrowing governments exercised significant influence over sectoral policy-making during structural adjsutment, and that they utilized that influence to pursue continuity in existing productive sector activities in the context of domestic political systems characterized by widespread state use of productive sector resources as a means of maintaining political power and support. I also argue, however, that borrowing states did not always exercise influence over sectoral policy choices and that, in some cases, IMF staff exercised dominant control over sectoral policy. In these cases, IMF staff used their influence to pursue policies of sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity based on prevailing economic ideas. With these findings, the dissertation makes a theoretical contribution in the form of a multi-level framework of international policy-making that takes into account which actors dominated structural adjustment policy-making processes and how those actors' preferences impacted the degree to which sectoral policy choices were geared toward continuity or change.

Key words
sectoral policy, economic reform, structural adjustment, International Monetary Fund, Africa

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1 Introduction

On March 6, 1957, the West African country of Ghana became the first African country to achieve independence from European colonial rule, beginning independence as one of the most well-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst 1993, 17). In the initial years following independence, the country used the position it had established during the colonial period as one of the world's largest cocoa producers to fuel economic development. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, declining world cocoa prices triggered a series of economic crises in the country, eventually prompting the Ghanaian government to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for lending support through a series of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. Despite the fact that the economic crisis in Ghana had been prompted at least in part by the country's overreliance on cocoa as its primary economic activity, structural adjustment measures in Ghana promoted further development of the cocoa sector as a core component of the programs. Today, Ghana remains one of the largest cocoa producers in the world and continues to be vulnerable to economic instability as a result of fluctuating cocoa prices (Tröster et al. 2019).

During the same period that Ghana was experiencing cocoa-driven processes of economic development, the Southern African country of Zambia was utilizing copper and other mineral extraction activities that had been established during the colonial period as the basis for economic growth following its independence in 1964. For over a decade following independence, Zambia was optimistically referred to as an African success story, with the revenue from mining facilitating infrastructure development, urbanization, and rapid expansion of public services such as health and education (Fraser 2010). As in Ghana, however, declining copper prices in the 1970s led to economic crisis in the country, the result of which was the participation of Zambia in IMF-led structural adjustment beginning in the 1990s. Also similar to the case of Ghana, structural adjustment in Zambia entailed significant focus on mining as the primary source of economic recovery and growth, despite the fact that volatile copper prices had been largely responsible for the country's decline in the immediate pre-adjustment period. Today, nearly 30 years after the introduction of structural adjustment in Zambia, the country remains overwhelmingly dependent on copper and other mineral resources (OEC 2021); continues to experience commodity price-induced economic volatility; and ranks among the countries with the highest levels of poverty and inequality in the world (The World Bank 2021).

Ghana and Zambia were only two of the many Sub-Saharan African countries that experienced underdevelopment, economic crisis, and structural adjustment lending between the 1980s and 2000s. During this period, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs for Sub-Saharan African countries were designed as conditional lending programs through which struggling economies received development loans in return for undertaking a series of economic reforms. The reforms outlined in these structural adjustment programs typically involved liberal macroeconomic (i.e., fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate) reform. They also involved sector-specific policies to promote growth and development in particular areas of the economy, allegedly often promoting export-led development of primary commodity sectors (Heidhues and Obare 2011). Like Ghana and Zambia, however, many economies in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to struggle after the introduction of structural adjustment programs, in some cases experiencing more acute economic crises, instability, and higher levels of poverty than before the introduction of the programs (e.g., Langan 2018, Riddell 1992, Bangura 2007, Harrigan and Mosley 1991).

Situating Ghana and Zambia within the broader context of African structural adjustment, the two countries' approaches of narrow, primary sector-oriented adjustment in the face of extreme vulnerability to commodity price shocks highlights a potential contradiction between the economic problems observed in the pre-adjustment period and the policies pursued under adjustment. More specifically, it raises the question of *why* these two countries pursued similar sectoral policies of narrow primary commodity production as they had pursued during previous (colonial and post-colonial) periods of development despite the demonstrable risks associated with such policies. The question becomes more puzzling when considered within the context of mainstream development theory, which suggests that diversification of countries away from narrow primary goods markets and into industrial markets are key processes for the successful development of countries in the long-term (e.g., Clark, Lima, and Sawyer 2016, Imbs and Wacziarg 2003, Rodrik 2004, Whitfield et al. 2015).

1.1 Research aims and questions

This thesis aims to investigate the above puzzle by describing and explaining continuity in sectoral policies in Sub-Saharan African countries from the colonial period to the structural adjustment period, answering the following questions:

1. To what degree was there continuity in the sectoral policies pursued in Sub-Saharan African countries between the colonial and structural adjustment periods?
2. What explains the observed cases of continuity in sectoral policies?

In this thesis, I use a two-part, mixed methods approach to answer the above research questions by measuring and explaining sectoral policy continuity in the ten Sub-Saharan African countries of Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. With regard to measuring sectoral continuity, I am interested in two types of sectoral continuity. The first type of continuity is sector-level continuity, which is defined as the degree to which there was continuity in which sectors (agricultural, extractive, and industrial) were prioritized or privileged as a source of economic growth, stability, or recovery over time. The second type of continuity I am interested in is within-sector continuity, defined as the degree to which the policies chosen for the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors were geared toward maintenance of the existing structures and organization of economic activity within these sectors over time.

The first empirical section of the thesis establishes the degree to which policies of sector-level continuity were pursued in each of the ten countries by quantitatively measuring and describing sector-level focus on the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors across the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The second empirical part of the thesis consists of qualitative case studies of the ten countries. In this section of the thesis, I complement the quantitative measures of sector-level continuity developed in the first empirical part of the thesis with detailed qualitative descriptions of the specific sectoral policies pursued in each country in order to capture the degree to which there was continuity within each of the productive sectors (i.e., within-sector continuity) in the ten countries. I then use process tracing of the structural adjustment policy-making process and draw on a range of theories of economic development and reform to explain why the ten case study countries pursued policies of sector-level and within-sector continuity in the structural adjustment period. In this explanatory part of the thesis, I assess four potential explanations for sectoral policy continuity: structural conditions, neo-colonialism, economic ideas, and domestic state and societal interests.

There are three points that require brief explanation with regard to the focus of this thesis. The first relates to the choice to focus on sectoral policy choices specifically, rather than focusing on other areas of policy that were central to structural adjustment programs, such as macroeconomic policy or social policy. While there is a large literature focused on structural adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, this literature has often focused on policy areas such as macroeconomic reform and social policies (e.g., Easterly 2005, Loewenson 1993) or on measuring the effects of structural adjustment (e.g., Collier and Gunning 2001, Kanbur 1987, Naiman and Watkins 1999, Summers 1993, Riddell 1992, Harrigan and Mosley 1991). This has resulted in a general lack of research on sectoral policies in structural adjustment. While the literature has not devoted much attention to these sectoral policy choices, the examples of Ghana and Zambia highlight that sectoral policies were, in fact, a significant component to structural adjustment programs and had implications for adjusting countries' economic trajectories. Given this, there is arguably a need for research that explores the nature and determinants of these sectoral policies.

The second choice that perhaps requires some justification is the focus of the thesis on cases of sectoral continuity, rather than on cases of discontinuity. My justification for this choice lies in the puzzle presented at the beginning of this chapter. More specifically, given the fact that (1) the existing sectoral policies were likely at least partly to blame for the economic crises experienced by borrowing countries at the start of structural adjustment and (2) that structural adjustment was by definition intended to be a period of widespread economic reform (i.e., policy discontinuity), sectoral policy discontinuity should arguably have been expected to occur in these countries during structural adjustment. Given this, it is cases of policy discontinuity that are theoretically puzzling and interesting to explore.

Finally, it is also worth stating that my primary focus in this thesis is the *choice* of sectoral policies in Sub-Saharan African countries and not their outcomes. While it is clear from my earlier discussion of Ghana, Zambia, and African structural adjustment more generally that sectoral policies do, in fact, have long-term implications for development, I am not interested in measuring or explaining those implications in this thesis. Instead, I am solely interested in explaining why the policies were chosen by the involved actors in the first place.

1.2 Introducing structural adjustment and sectoral policies

IMF and World Bank lending

The foundations for international financial institution (IFI) structural adjustment lending in Sub-Saharan Africa were laid with the creation of the IMF and World Bank at the close of the second World War. The purpose of these two financial institutions was to facilitate internationally coordinated development and economic recovery in the post-war period (Brown et al. 2000, Driscoll 1996). At their inception, the World Bank and the IMF were assigned distinct roles in the global economic system, with the primary tasks of the IMF being to ensure stable exchange rates at the international level and provide short-term balance of payments assistance, and the World Bank's primary responsibility being longer-term financial assistance for development projects in newly emerging economies and fragile post-war states in Europe (Brown et al. 2000).

While the initial intention was for the World Bank and the IMF to provide distinct international financial services, economic developments in the 1960s and 1970s led to expanding roles for both institutions. One such change was the expansion of the IMF in the late 1970s to include longer-term financial assistance for development in emerging economies in the face of struggling economies in the global South turning to the Fund to offset the impacts of a global economic downturn and series of oil crises (Brown et al. 2000). Beginning in the 1980s, the

World Bank and the IMF began to collaboratively design structural adjustment lending programs aimed specifically at addressing the economic problems of the global South, adopting policies of conditionality that required struggling economies to adhere to an agreed-upon reform program in order to obtain the loans needed to address economic crises and promote development. While both financial institutions had required that borrowing states meet certain economic conditions in the past, structural adjustment programs were the first to require large-scale, comprehensive reforms on the part of borrowing states (Best 2014).

When the initial, primarily macroeconomic-based, conditions of structural adjustment failed to deliver economic recovery and growth to developing countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF responded by expanding the scope of structural adjustment policy frameworks to include microeconomic issues such as domestic pricing of goods, labor market policies, and regulation of financial services (Best 2014). However, despite this expansion, a significant number of borrowing countries continued to experience economic hardship. In the final years of the 1990s, the two IFIs re-evaluated their approach in response to the persistent economic instability observed in adjusting countries. For the IMF, this led to the restructuring of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and its 1999 rebranding as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to reflect a shift from an exclusive focus on macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions to a more holistic approach focused on poverty reduction and equitable development (IMF 2001). The World Bank experienced a similar shift in its policy agenda during this period, with top officials calling for a post-Washington Consensus (PWC) lending approach focused on poverty reduction, education reform, and infrastructure development as part of a sustainable development process (Bayliss, Fine, and Van Waeyenberge 2011).

Structural adjustment in Africa

Amongst the many countries of the global South seeking IFI assistance in the 1980s were a number of Sub-Saharan African countries. IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs were first introduced in Africa in the early 1980s, and they were in effect in the region throughout the following two decades. Between 1980 and 1989, 36 Sub-Saharan African countries contracted 241 loans with the IMF and World Bank in the name of adjustment and stabilization (van de Walle 2001). Though the loan amounts varied by country, the average loan size between 1980 and 1995 was $160 million dollars (Dollar and Svensson 2000).

World Bank structural adjustment loans to African countries tended to be project-based loans focused on areas such as development of particular infrastructure or technical assistance to build knowledge around particular economic activities. The IMF, on the other hand, developed more comprehensive programs covering all areas and sectors of African economies through their specially-designated Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Between 1986 and 2000, thirty-five African countries were engaged in at least one IMF-led structural adjustment program under the SAF or ESAF (Table 1.1). These IMF programs were created in close collaboration with the World Bank, taking into account the narrower, project-based loans of the World Bank when formulating an overall policy framework for a given country.

Table 1.1 IMF programs by country

COUNTRY	YEAR OF FIRST ARRANGEMENT
Benin	1989
Burkina Faso	1991
Burundi	1986
Cameroon	1997
Central African Republic	1987
Chad	1987
Comoros	1991
Democratic Republic of Congo	1987
Republic of Congo	1996
Côte d'Ivoire	1994
Djibouti	1999
Equatorial Guinea	1988
Ethiopia	1992
The Gambia*	1986
Ghana*	1987
Guinea	1987
Guinea-Bissau	1987
Kenya*	1988
Lesotho*	1988
Madagascar	1987
Malawi*	1988
Mali	1988
Mauritania	1986
Mozambique	1987
Niger	1986
Rwanda	1991
Sao Tome & Principe	1989
Senegal	1986
Sierra Leone*	1986
Somalia	1987
Tanzania*	1987
Togo	1988
Uganda*	1987
Zambia*	1995
Zimbabwe*	1992
* Countries included in thesis.	

The stated aim of both World Bank and IMF programs in African countries during this period was to mitigate what were perceived to be Africa's key economic weaknesses. Chief among these were ineffective management of the public sector, price distortions caused by government intervention in the economy, and ineffective resource allocation through the subsidization of non-competitive domestic industries (Heidhues and Obare 2011). Most programs were characterized by a shift toward privatization, trade liberalization, and the removal of the state from the economic sphere. Often, these shifts took the form of currency devaluation, deregulation of industry, the removal of government subsidies on goods and industry, and a reduction in government expenditure on the provision of public goods such as education and health care (Riddell 1992). In the case of Africa as a region, the World Bank and the IMF also allegedly advocated for "export-led development" based on African countries' comparative advantage, which was often seen to be in primary commodity production (Heidhues and Obare 2011).

1.3 Theorizing sectoral continuity

The above literature on African structural adjustment makes clear that sectoral policy was central to reform programs in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. Other literatures provide a number of potential explanations for these sectoral policy choices in African structural adjustment. These literatures vary with regard to where they locate agency in the structural adjustment policy-making process (i.e., internationally versus domestically) and with regard to the drivers put forward to explain particular policy choices. In this thesis, I draw on these literatures to theorize (1) which actors exercised dominant influence over the sectoral policy-making process during structural adjustment and (2) what explains the policy choices of these dominant actors. In doing so, I identify and evaluate four potential explanatory factors for sectoral policy choices, namely structural conditions, neo-colonialism, economic ideas, and domestic state and societal interests. In this section, I briefly summarize this theoretical framework and present the main theoretical argument of the thesis.

Structural conditions

The first factor that must be considered in any discussion of sectoral policy choices in Sub-Saharan Africa is structural conditions. Literature on development in Sub-Saharan Africa has highlighted the inherent structural conditions of African countries as drivers of policy-making, suggesting that the geography, climate, and natural resource bases of these countries have significantly constrained the development avenues available to them. These constraints have often constituted a barrier to industrialization and diversification away from narrow cash crop agriculture, limiting many African countries to primary commodity production (Bloom et al. 1998, Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998, Ndulu et al. 2008). The above processes have the potential to be reinforced by the policy choices made by states in response to these structural constraints, with African states often choosing long-term development policies oriented around narrow areas of comparative advantage (Wood and Berge 1997), instituting protectionist policies in an attempt to shield their economies from competitors (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998), and/or relying on natural resource and primary commodity exports due to their relative robustness to institutional failures (Collier 1997).

While structural conditions literatures have not been applied to the specific case of sectoral policy continuity in African structural adjustment, these theories provide compelling evidence that static or slow-moving structural conditions had the potential to influence sectoral policy-making in Sub-Saharan African countries during the structural adjustment period. More specifically, long-term structural constraints had the potential to drive continuity in focus on the same sectoral activities over time. However, while structural conditions may have constrained the policy choices available to policy-makers, there was still arguably considerable room for various combinations of sectoral policy choices within those constraints. Given this, explaining sectoral policy choices requires moving beyond structural conditions. More specifically, explaining sectoral policy choices requires attention to which actors dominated the policy process (i.e., international actors or domestic actors) and the interests and motivations of those dominant actors. It is to these international- and domestic-level explanations that I turn now.

International factors: neo-colonialism and economic ideas

Much of the literature on international lending locates policy agency at the international level and presents policy-making processes as being dominated by actors at IFIs. Some international-level theories treat international organizations as instruments of national state interests and attribute these organizations' policy decisions to the external interests of member states, suggesting that powerful Western states have utilized IFI policy processes to advance their interests in borrowing countries (e.g., Breen 2013, Kang 2007, Stone 2004). With regard to the role of Western states in *sectoral* policy-making specifically, neo-colonial theories suggest that powerful (former colonial) states used their disproportionate influence at the IMF and World Bank to promote their economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa by advocating for policies focused on continued primary commodity extraction for world markets and the creation of import markets for manufactured goods and services from the global North (e.g., Chossudovsky 2003, Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000). The pursuit of these neo-colonial interests was arguably made possible by the fact that both formal and informal political processes at IFIs privileged these Western states and provided a number of opportunities for them to influence policy-making processes at the IMF and World Bank (Breen 2013).

Other literatures on policy-making in international organizations question the assumption that international organizations are merely instruments of the states that create them, instead arguing that international organizations exercise power and agency autonomously from their members states (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004, Chwieroth 2008). These literatures have focused on the role of economic ideas as drivers of policy preferences and choices, suggesting that economic ideas have had an independent effect on policy decisions in IFIs by creating an interpretive lens through which IMF and World Bank experts understand and approach economic policy questions and problems (Broome and Seabrooke 2007, Chwieroth 2007). The literature on economic ideas and IFIs has devoted particular attention to the role of neoliberal economic ideas around export-led, market-based growth in policy-making processes beginning in the 1980s. This literature suggests (1) that neoliberal economic ideas were a core aspect of IMF and World Bank policy approaches during the structural adjustment period and (2) that these neoliberal economic ideas were diffused to countries around the world through IMF and World Bank involvement in developing countries (Babb 2013, Mkandawire 2014, Sindzingre 2004). In the case of sectoral policy choices during African structural adjustment, neo-liberal economic ideas had the potential to serve as the interpretive lens through which IMF staff understood the economic problems of borrowing countries, potentially driving policy choices with regard to which sectors were prioritized and how economic activity was organized within those sectors.

Domestic factors: domestic state and societal interests

By locating policy-making agency primarily with international actors, the above theories largely fail to account for the possibility that borrowing governments themselves played an important role in lending program policy formulation during structural adjustment. In fact, comparative literature on the politics of economic reform suggests that IFIs have exercised only limited and contingent influence over economic reforms in borrowing countries (Wolff 2020). These literatures find that borrowing governments have tended to exercise significant influence over policy-making in lending programs, often successfully managing to negotiate for their preferred policies and opting out of programs when they have been unable to do so (van de Walle 2001, Vreeland 2003, 2007). They tie the degree of borrowing government influence over reform to geo-political factors such as a country's economic size, international relevance, and ability to secure alternative funding sources, suggesting that the IMF has tended to exercise the most influence over policy choices in geopolitically or economically unimportant countries that lack alternative financing options (e.g., Haggard 1985, Kahler 1992, Pop-Eleches 2009, Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012).

Taking these state-IFI power dynamics as a point of departure, the literature treats IFI lending programs as two-level games in which borrowing governments negotiated with external actors over reforms while simultaneously managing domestic interests and pressures (Pop-Eleches 2009, Wolff 2020). These domestic interests and pressures had the potential to stem from two sources: (1) societal interest groups and (2) the state and its elites. With regard to societal interest groups, politically influential domestic constituencies such as urban consumers, business interests, and certain regional groups had the potential to constrain and prevent the adoption of policies that would produce economic "losers" amongst these groups (Bates 1981, 2008, Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Lipton 1977, Nelson 1992, Wolff 2020). With regard to the state and its elites, the reliance of post-colonial African states on productive sector resources to facilitate intra-elite coalitions and accumulate personal wealth had the potential to influence policy choices by disincentivizing sectoral reforms that would require ruling African governments and elites to surrender the personal economic and political benefits associated with existing economic structures (Tangri 1999, van de Walle 2001).

Toward a multi-level theory of sectoral policy choice

The above theories provide a number of insights related to which actors exercised control over structural adjustment policymaking and the factors that influenced the policy choices of these different actors. Combining these insights to explain sectoral policy choices in IMF structural adjustment, I suggest that the drivers of sectoral policy continuity should be expected to have varied across countries depending on whether a borrowing government or the IMF exercised control over final policy choices. Borrowing governments should be expected to have exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices in cases in which the borrowing country was particularly important geopolitically or economically. They should also be expected to have exercised a larger degree of influence in cases in which the borrowing country was experiencing only mild economic crisis and/or had alternative options to IMF structural adjustment for correcting an economic crisis. In cases in which borrowing governments exercised control, domestic state and/or societal interests are expected to have been the primary driver of sectoral policy choices, and sectoral policies are expected to have been largely geared toward continuity and maintenance of the status quo at both the sector-level and within-sector level.

Conversely, the IMF should be expected to have exercised control over sectoral policy making in cases in which borrowing countries were geopolitically and/or economically unimportant, and in cases in which the country was in a particularly dire economic situation and/or lacked alternative financing options. In cases in which the IMF exercised control over policy choices, those policy choices are expected to have been driven by either neo-colonial Western interests or the economic ideas of IMF staff. In the event of Western state control of Fund policy and the pursuit of neo-colonial interests, sectoral policy continuity should be characterized by focus on continued extraction of primary commodities for global markets. In the event that the economic ideas of IMF staff were the driving force behind sectoral policy choices, it is likely that ideas around export-oriented, market-based, competitive development led to continuity in focus on primary sector activities (i.e., sector-level continuity). However, other neo-liberal economic ideas around privatized, deregulated economic activity likely contributed to discontinuity in policies aimed at organizing or structuring activity within the productive sectors (i.e., within-sector discontinuity).

Finally, regardless of whether borrowing governments or IMF actors dominated the policy-making process, I expect that structural conditions likely had a constraining effect on sectoral policy choices by influencing what could be produced and how efficiently. The effect of structural conditions on policy choices is expected to be weakest in countries with more favorable structural conditions and strongest in countries with less favorable structural conditions, such as resource-poor and/or landlocked countries. In countries with less favorable structural conditions, I expect that structural conditions are more likely to be an explanatory factor for primary sector continuity.

The argument in brief

Applying the above theoretical framework to the ten cases in this thesis, I argue that sectoral continuity is primarily explained by borrowing government influence in the policy-making process and the use of that influence to pursue policies based on domestic state and societal interests. I demonstrate that borrowing governments in all of the countries in the study, with the exception of Sierra Leone, exercised some degree of control over the sectoral policy-making process for at least part of the structural adjustment period. These governments used that influence over policy choices to pursue varying degrees of continuity with regard to both which sectors were prioritized (i.e., sector-level continuity) and the economic structures within the individual sectors themselves (i.e., within-sector continuity). The pursuit of sectoral continuity on the part of borrowing African governments during this period is explained primarily by domestic societal and state interests in the form of (1) pressures to appease important constituencies upon whom the state depended for political support and (2) the individual interests of state elites in continuing to utilize existing economic structures to extract political and economic resources for personal gain. With regard to pressures to appease particular constituencies, state control over the productive sectors provided states with resources that could be extracted from certain economic activities such as agriculture and redistributed to constituencies (urban, ethnic, regional, etc.) that provided crucial support for African governments.

With regard to individual elite interests, neopatrimonial state structures of clientelism and rent-seeking meant that domestic elites had entrenched economic interests in the existing sectoral structures, upon which they relied to consolidate intra-elite coalitions and accumulate personal wealth. Because of their reliance upon the above structures, African governments had a vested interest in maintaining existing productive sector structures and delaying sectoral reform during the structural adjustment period. In other words, African states pursued continuity in sectoral policies because the state and those who controlled it had much to lose from reforms that would fundamentally restructure the economy in ways that undermined both the state's ability to utilize patronage for political support and the ability of individual elites to continue to accumulate wealth through their control of lucrative economic activities. Support for this argument is found in the fact that African states were particularly adamant about avoiding or slowing processes of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of sectors to which the state and its elites were intricately tied.

While I find that borrowing government influence and domestic interests played a central role in driving sectoral policy choices, I also argue that domestic explanations fail to fully explain sectoral continuity for all of the cases, as not all borrowing governments exercised control over sectoral policy for the entirety of the structural adjustment period. I argue that, for some countries—namely, Kenya, The Gambia, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone—declining geopolitical and economic importance, acute economic crisis, and/or a lack of alternative financing sources resulted in a loss or lack of bargaining power vis-à-vis the Fund and the emergence of IMF staff as dominant policy-makers for part or all of the structural adjustment period. I demonstrate that, in cases in which IMF staff dominated sectoral policy-making, sectoral policies were geared toward sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity and argue that this combination of sectoral policy choices can be explained by economic ideas. More specifically, neoliberal economic ideas around export-oriented, market-based, competitive development led to continuity in focus on primary sector activities; while neo-liberal economic ideas around privatized, deregulated economic activity contributed to discontinuity in policies aimed at organizing or structuring activity within the productive sectors.

In addition to the above drivers of sectoral policy choices, I argue that considerations of the structural conditions of borrowing countries contributed to sector-level continuity in some countries. Structural conditions contributed to sector-level continuity primarily in the small, resource-poor, and/or landlocked countries included in the study (i.e., The Gambia, Malawi, Uganda, and Lesotho), with narrow resource bases and transport challenges contributing to the choice of both borrowing governments and IMF staff to continue to pursue agricultural production. Considerations of structural conditions also contributed to sector-level extractive sector focus in the case of resource rich Sierra Leone.

Finally, I argue that there is substantial evidence to suggest that neo-colonial trade interests on the part of Western powers were not a driving factor for sectoral policy continuity in any of the ten countries. I show that (former colonial) Western powers not only failed to push for sectoral continuity in borrowing states during this period, but were often some of the most vocal proponents of diversification away from primary commodity production in program negotiations. I also show that these Western powers' trade interests in borrowing countries appear to have been declining leading up to and during structural adjustment, supporting the conclusion that neo-colonial Western trade interests were likely not an explanatory factor for sectoral policy choices in this period.

1.4 Methods

I use a two-step, mixed methods approach to build the above argument. Here, mixed methods are defined broadly as the combination of "elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration" (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007, 123). The use of mixed methods has grown in social science research in recent decades, with scholars suggesting that combining statistical methods and case study methods has the potential to offset the limitations associated with each type of method (e.g., Bennet 2002, 5), and that the complementarities between the two types of methods can provide distinct benefits to research when combined (e.g., Lieberman 2005, 436).

Mixed methods approaches can be applied to descriptive or causal work, and they can involve different combinations and sequencing of methods. Most relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the use of quantitative methods prior to qualitative methods for the purposes of gaining both broad and detailed knowledge about a phenomenon. This approach is often valuable when certain features in a relationship of interest are possible to measure across a large number of cases and others are more difficult to measure and better suited to in-depth case analysis (Gerring 2017, 147). More generally, such sequential mixed methods approaches have been used in cases in which the aim is to describe broad patterns in the data and then explain the causal processes behind those patterns in detail (Creswell 2015).

With regard to the dual aims of this thesis to describe and explain sectoral policy, different methodological approaches are arguably better suited to each of these aims. For this reason, I have chosen a mixed methods approach involving both quantitative descriptive analysis and case study analysis. The thesis, therefore, consists of two empirical parts. The first empirical part of the thesis involves quantitative description of sector-level continuity. The second empirical part of the thesis involves qualitative descriptive analysis of within-sector continuity and qualitative explanatory analysis of cases of both sector-level and within-sector continuity. I explain each of these empirical components briefly in the following sections.

Quantitative sector-level mapping

The first empirical part of the thesis quantitatively measures continuity and discontinuity in sectoral policies at the level of the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors across the colonial and IMF structural adjustment periods in the ten country cases. For this part of the thesis, I draw on primary archival sources from the colonial and structural adjustment periods to construct measures of sector focus, with "sector focus" defined as the degree to which the policies outlined in each of the three sectors (i.e., agriculture, extraction, and industry) appear to have been focused on growth, expansion, or maintenance of the sector as a driver of economic recovery, stability, and/or growth. I construct measures of both the absolute degree of focus on each of the three sectors and the proportion of focus on a given sector relative to the other sectors. I then use these measures to describe continuity in sector-level focus across and between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The purpose of this step of the thesis is to establish the dependent variable, sectoral continuity, at the sector-level and determine the degree to which there was continuity in focus on the three sectors across periods and countries.

The empirical focus on continuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods specifically perhaps requires some justification here. This choice was driven by two theoretical considerations. First, measuring sectoral policy choices in the colonial and structural adjustment periods allows me to capture a long-run "snapshot" of continuity that covers a large part of each of these states' experiences of development, as most of these countries were only created (at least in their 'modern' forms) in the colonial period. Second, a number of the theories of sectoral continuity that I draw on in the theoretical framework link sectoral continuity to developments in the colonial period. Given this, colonial sectoral policy choices are arguably the most appropriate starting point for evaluating continuity in sectoral policies over time.

Qualitative case studies

The second empirical part of the thesis consists of case studies of all ten countries included in the quantitative mapping of sector-level continuity. These case studies do two main things. First, I use the case studies to complement the quantitative measures of sector-level continuity developed in the quantitative section with qualitative descriptions of sectoral policy. These qualitative descriptions capture not just sector-level continuity, but also instances of within-sector continuity, defined as continuity in the structures of, and approaches to, economic activity within the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors. I assess and describe these patterns of within-sector continuity using a range of archival IMF materials.

The second, and primary, aim of the case studies is to explain instances of agricultural, extractive, and industrial sector continuity in structural adjustment sectoral policies in the different countries. In order to do this, I use causal process tracing of two main case studies – Kenya and The Gambia—and eight shadow case studies to evaluate the potential explanatory factors for sectoral continuity outlined in the theoretical framework of the thesis. For this explanatory section of the thesis, I draw on a range of primary and secondary sources and use detailed tracing of the policy-making process in the case study countries to determine (1) which actors exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices in IMF structural adjustment and (2) which factors drove the policy preferences and choices of those actors with regard to the degree of sector-level and within-sector continuity pursued.

1.5 Outline of chapters

In the following chapter, Chapter Two, I outline the theoretical framework of the thesis in more detail. In this chapter, the four potential explanatory factors presented in this introductory chapter are further developed and my theoretical expectations outlined. Chapter Three establishes the dependent variable, sector-level continuity, by quantitatively describing trends in sector-level focus on the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors in the ten countries during and between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. In Chapter Four, the case study methods and materials to be used in the second empirical portion of the thesis are introduced.

Chapters Five and Six involve the use of archival and secondary material for in-depth process tracing of the sectoral policy-making process during IMF structural adjustment in Kenya and The Gambia in order to describe and explain sector-level and within-sector agricultural continuity in the two countries. In Chapters Seven and Eight, process tracing is used in shadow cases of the remaining eight countries in order to explain other cases of agricultural sector continuity in Ghana, Malawi, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and cases of extractive sector continuity in Zambia and Sierra Leone. Chapter Nine summarizes the findings and main arguments of the thesis and discusses their broader implications for existing knowledge on processes of economic reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2 Theory

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical framework of the thesis by drawing on both international relations (IR) and comparative economic reform literatures to identify a set of potential explanations for sectoral policy choices in African structural adjustment. These literatures vary with regard to where they locate agency in the structural adjustment policy-making process (i.e., internationally versus domestically) and with regard to the drivers put forward to explain the particular policy choices of various actors. The theoretical framework combines these different perspectives in order to theorize (1) which actors exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices during IMF structural adjustment and (2) what explains the choices of these actors to pursue continuity or discontinuity in sectoral policies.



Figure 2.1 A multi-level theory of sectoral policy choice

In this framework, I theorize that the drivers of sectoral policy continuity in African structural adjustment varied depending on which actors (IFIs or borrowing governments) dominated the sectoral policy-making process in a given country and lending period. I outline two potential international-level explanations for sectoral continuity, namely neo-colonialism and economic ideas; and one potential domestic-level explanation for sectoral continuity, domestic state and societal interests. I also outline one potential explanation for sectoral continuity that has the potential to operate at both levels through constraining the range of viable sectoral policy choices, which is structural conditions (Figure 2.1).

2.1 Structural conditions as a constraining factor

Geography, climate, and natural endowments

The first factor that must be considered in any discussion of sectoral policy choices in Sub-Saharan Africa is structural conditions. There is a wide body of research linking factors such as geography, climate, and natural resource endowments to the economic trajectories of Sub-Saharan African countries. In its simplest form, the argument of this literature is that geography, climate, and natural resource endowments matter for development processes because they condition what can be produced and how productively in a given country. In the case of much of Sub-Saharan Africa, climate-related factors such as irregular rainfall, extreme temperatures and poor soil have contributed to low agricultural productivity for most crops, leaving only a narrow range of suitable crops such as coffee, cocoa, and groundnuts for production (Bloom et al. 1998, 222-223, Landes 1998).

Another geographical component that has been argued to matter for development is proximity to natural resources, including water, minerals, and hydrocarbon deposits. With relation to water resources, proximity to water impacts agricultural productivity, the ability of populations to settle and develop market areas, and the ability of countries to develop the infrastructure and power needed for complex industry. Proximity to minerals, hydrocarbon deposits, and other resources can provide opportunities for industrialization, while lack of proximity to these resources can constrain industrialization opportunities (Gallup, Sachs, and

Mellinger 1998). In terms of proximity to natural resources, there is significant variation across Sub-Saharan African countries, with some countries having reasonable access to water and energy sources and others having little access. Scholars have argued that these varying endowments have resulted in different opportunities for growth across Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, Ndulu et al. (2008) group countries by natural resource endowments and location, finding three different types of countries based on these characteristics: (1) high-opportunity coastal, resource-scare countries, (2) low-opportunity landlocked, resource-scarce countries, and (3) resource-rich countries.

Another way that geography may have an effect on development processes in Sub-Saharan Africa is through isolation of Sub-Saharan African countries and populations from each other and from the global market. In short, distance from markets and transport costs for materials and inputs result in different costs for development, and particularly for industrial development. Sub-Saharan Africa is the continent with the largest proportion of its population settled inland from the coast and with the largest number of landlocked countries in the world (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998, Ndulu et al. 2008). This physical isolation means that many developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially those that are landlocked, have had limited access to ports and/or ocean-navigable rivers and have faced significant over-land transport distances for goods and materials. Poor transport infrastructure, which has been characteristic of many post-colonial Sub-Saharan African countries, compounds issues of geographical isolation.

The high transport costs that result from the above geographical factors have the potential to render certain countries non-competitive in a number of industries. This is particularly true for the light/basic manufacturing industries common in the developing world because they require engagement in intermediate stages of the manufacturing process and import of intermediate inputs (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998). The negative impact of physical isolation on the ability of countries to industrialize is evidenced by the fact that the majority of fast-growing developing countries have based their growth on labor-intensive manufacturing exports, almost all of which have been established in port cities or export zones close to ports (Bloom et al. 1998, Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998).

The above literature focuses primarily on geography and natural endowments in the context of their *direct* impact on economic growth and performance. However, there has also been some attention to the (re)enforcement effects of structural conditions on policy choices in development processes. Some argue that the low ratio of skilled labor to natural resource abundance in African countries has generated a significant comparative advantage in primary exports, resulting in development policies oriented around those sectors (e.g., Wood and Berge 1997). Others suggest that natural differences in growth potential stemming from structural conditions are often amplified by the economic policies chosen in response to those structural constraints (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998, 29). They give the example of countries that are located further from markets choosing more protectionist policies than countries located closer to markets, further constraining future growth opportunities (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998, 28). Other scholars have linked policy choices to structural conditions in more complex ways, tying the reliance of African economies on natural resource and primary commodity exports to the fact that they are more robust to institutional failures than other sectors (e.g., Collier 1997).[1]

The relationships between structural conditions and economic development in Africa that are discussed above have not been directly tied to sectoral policy choices during the period of IMF structural adjustment in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the development constraints imposed by the structural conditions of borrowing countries may provide an explanation for the sectoral policies pursued in Sub-Saharan African countries during this period, as well as continuity in these policies between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. As described above, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa face a significant number of structural impediments to long-term economic development including landlocked-ness, geographic isolation, poor agricultural environments, and limited access to natural resources and energy. These constraints have arguably placed at least some Sub-Saharan African countries at a distinct cost disadvantage for industrialization and undermined diverse agricultural development.

It is, therefore, possible that economic experts at the IMF and/or borrowing governments themselves opted for sectoral policies that accounted for these difficulties in their formulation of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, IMF experts and borrowing governments may have

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[1] Here, natural resource endowments make this approach possible, but the absence of robust institutions necessary for more diversified growth are the main explanation. Given this, this kind of explanation "straddles" the line between structural conditions and institutional explanations.

chosen sectoral policies based on a given country's available resource endowments, potential for agricultural development, and the costs associated with more complex forms of economic activity such as industrialization. For example, in the case of countries with limited natural resources, a limited range of possible agricultural activity, and high transport costs, IMF staff and borrowing governments may have chosen sectoral strategies focused on the development of narrow cash crop agriculture rather than sectoral strategies focused on more costly and institutionally-demanding processes of industrialization and diversification.

Given the potential for structural conditions to influence the range of viable sectoral policy options available to a given country, structural conditions can be understood as a constraining factor that may have influenced sectoral policy choices regardless of which actors controlled the policy formulation process. However, while structural conditions may have constrained the policy choices available to policy-makers, there was still arguably considerable room for various combinations of sectoral policy choices within those constraints; and explaining these policy choices thus requires moving beyond structural conditions. More specifically, explaining policy choices requires attention to which actors dominated the policy process (i.e., international actors or domestic actors) and the interests and motivations of those dominant actors. It is to these international- and domestic-level explanations that I turn in the following sections.

2.2 International explanations for IFI policy choice

Locating agency in IR theories of international policy-making

When theorizing policy-making in international organizations and IFIs, IR literatures have tended to locate decision-making power and agency at the international level, presenting these policy processes as being dominated by actors at international institutions. While IR theories share the fact that they focus on actors and processes at the international level, however, they differ with regard to how they conceptualize this international decision-making process. One strand of the literature suggests that international organizations are the instruments of powerful states who utilize them to pursue their national interests in the international arena. Proponents of such state-centered theories of international organizations therefore focus on the interests of individual member states when seeking to explain the behavior and policy choices of international organizations. A second strand of IR literature argues for the autonomy and agency of international organizations themselves, suggesting that international organizations act independently of the states that create them in order to pursue unique sets of organizational interests. When seeking to explain the behavior and policy choices of international organizations, these literatures then look to internal dynamics and interests at the level of international organizations themselves.

State-centered policy-making at international organizations

Beginning with state-centered theories of international organizations, a significant body of IR literature takes its inspiration from realist and liberal IR approaches and treats international organizations as instruments of the states that created them (e.g., Breen 2013, Krasner 1991, 1983). These state-centered theories suggest that states create international organizations to serve their interests in the international policy arena, and that the policy decisions of these organizations are reached through processes of political bargaining and (sometimes) conflict between states within a given international organization (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 703). By treating international organizations as a forum for the aggregation of member state preferences, these literatures largely assume a lack of agency and autonomy for international institutions themselves, instead seeing them as merely an avenue through which states can act in the international arena.

Applied to IFI lending programs, state-centered IR literatures have suggested that powerful (mostly Western) states have used IFIs as avenues through which to pursue their political and economic interests in borrowing countries in a number of ways. Some of this literature has been applied broadly to IFI lending programs across the world to demonstrate how countries that are politically or economically important for influential countries (the G5, for example) have tended to receive lending arrangements with fewer binding conditions (e.g., Breen 2013, Kang 2007) and be subjected to shorter periods of punishment in cases of noncompliance with program conditions (e.g., Stone 2004).[2] These literatures

[2] It is worth noting that, while state-centered literatures take high levels of state influence and control over international organizations as their point of departure, many of them do allow for some autonomy for the staff of international organizations as "agents" of the states (i.e., principals) that created them (e.g., Copelovitch 2010, Hawkins et al. 2006). However, this staff agency is argued to

assume, in part due to an empirical bias toward lending in European countries, that borrowing states with close ties to powerful Western states benefit from such state-centered processes at IFIs, with their importance for these powerful Western states resulting in being granted special privileges in lending arrangements.

Neo-colonial state interests as drivers of sectoral policy

However, scholars seeking to explain IFI lending programs in developing countries more specifically have suggested that Western states have used their influence at the IMF and World Bank to pursue a set of exploitative neo-colonial interests in borrowing countries in the global South. Neo-colonialism has been broadly defined as the continuing exercise of control over the political and economic spheres of post-colonial countries in the global South by former colonial powers (e.g., Nkrumah 1965, Woddis 1967, Dixon and Heffernan 1991).[3] Neo-colonial literatures have tied this continuing exercise of control by former colonial powers explicitly to international organizations, arguing that these organizations have served as avenues through which former colonial powers and other powerful Western countries have pursued their national interests in developing countries through various types of interventions including peacekeeping interventions (e.g., Lidén 2011), development and education programs (e.g., Durokifa and Ijeoma 2018, Shahjahan 2016), trade and currency agreements (e.g., Langan and Price 2020, Taylor 2019), and lending arrangements.

In the case of IFI lending particularly, scholars have argued that these lending programs represented a form of neo-colonialism through which the needs and interests of external, mostly state, actors were promoted in developing post-colonial countries. These neo-colonial theories suggest that structural adjustment programs were a concerted and deliberate attempt by former colonial powers to

be highly dependent upon the continued support of member states, suggesting an extremely limited and contingent form of agency for international organizations. These literatures also locate this limited form of agency in the individual representatives of member states at international organizations, still largely treating international organizations as merely arenas where member state interests and politics play out.

[3] Neo-colonial theory also allows for Western states to exercise neo-colonial strategies of domination outside of their historical spheres of influence. The literature suggests that traditional colonial powers (e.g., Britain and France) exercised neo-colonial influence in countries in which they had not been the colonizing power in the post-colonial period. The literature also suggests that countries that had not officially engaged in colonialism engaged in neo-colonial behavior in areas formerly belonging to traditional colonial powers in the post-colonial period.

maintain or re-claim control of post-colonial Africa through IFIs (Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000). This control was arguably made possible by an uneven distribution of economic and political power that left developing states dependent on developed states for trade, aid, and political support in the post-colonial period (Chossudovsky 2003). Of particular relevance in accounts of these processes are domestic leaders in post-colonial states who are argued to have been engaged in a "politics of survival" in which the support of external actors was vital for maintaining political power. This arguably prompted rulers to concede domestic control over economic policy to external actors in exchange for funds from IFIs in order to ensure their short-term political survival, (Langan 2018, Wong 2012).

In addition to outlining how Western powers have utilized development lending to maintain control over post-colonial African states, neo-colonial theories have suggested that Western states pursued very particular types of economic interests in the context of lending programs to African countries. They argue that Western states had a clear interest in the continuation and/or re-establishment of colonial patterns of exchange focused on extraction of valuable primary commodities from the global South and the creation of import markets for manufactured goods and services from the global North. Such a focus on primary commodity extraction served as a way of maintaining primary commodity flows from developing countries, as well as maintaining opportunities for foreign (Western) corporations to continue to exploit the natural resource bases of former colonial countries (Haag 2012). The successful pursuit of these interests was arguably characterized by an increased focus on production of cash crops and extraction of natural resources and a bias against industrialization in the lending programs put forward by Western donors and IFIs for African countries (Chossudovsky 2003, Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000). This approach is argued to have been made easier by the fact that borrowing economies had already been structured under principles of Western economic interests in the colonial period, leaving them underdeveloped industrially and dependent on primary sector production for development in the immediate post-colonial period (Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000).

It is important to note here that the above literatures are based on an economic conceptualization of neo-colonialism that is focused quite narrowly on the pursuit of a specific set of trade and sectoral interests by Western powers. This narrow economic conceptualization can be contrasted with other economic theories of exploitation that have focused more broadly on the imposition of global capitalism on developing countries as a structural form of neo-colonial domination (e.g., Yeros and Jha 2020, Durokifa and Ijeoma 2018). Theories of global capitalism as neo-colonialism suggest that the imposition of capitalist modes of production and exploitation by Western powers have replaced more direct forms of control over post-colonial countries (Durokifa and Ijeoma 2018, Patnaik and Patnaik 2017).[4] This process of neo-colonial capitalist expansion has been explicitly tied to IFIs, with the literature highlighting how these financial institutions have used their position of influence over borrowing countries to establish and consolidate capitalist modes of economic activity that have often benefitted developed countries at the expense of developing countries (Durokifa and Ijeoma 2018, Ogar, Nwoye, and Bassey 2019).

While it is possible that structural adjustment lending in Sub-Saharan Africa did represent an attempt to establish and consolidate capitalism in the global South on the part of Western states and IFIs, such a definition of neo-colonialism arguably does little to elucidate the drivers of sectoral policy choices in African adjustment, as capitalist economic activity is compatible with a range of sectoral policy choices. Further, by defining neo-colonialism as the imposition of capitalism, all structural adjustment programs become neo-colonialism by default, providing little analytical clarity about neo-colonialism as a process or mechanism driving particular policy choices during IMF structural adjustment. In contrast, the narrow economic definition of neo-colonialism as the pursuit of continued resource extraction and maintenance of import markets for manufactured Western goods elucidates an empirical process of economic exploitation linked directly to the sectoral activities and policies of borrowing countries, making it a more appropriate definition for this thesis.

One final, related, note with regard to the definition of neo-colonialism employed in this thesis is that this narrow economic conceptualization can also be contrasted with broader conceptualizations of neo-colonialism that are focused more widely on the pervasive exercise of dominance by Western countries over countries in the global South economically, culturally, politically, and socially. These conceptualizations treat neo-colonialism as an integrated structure and process through which former colonial countries are continuously subordinated through

[4] Patnaik and Patnaik (2016) use the term imperialism rather than neo-colonialism. However, they refer to the same forms of exploitation referred to by authors who define neo-colonialism as a form of imperialism.

the imposition of cultural, social, political, and economic values and processes by developed countries (e.g., Williams 2019). Based on such a broad conceptualization, structural adjustment can arguably be understood as inherently neo-colonial in that it involved the intervention of Western actors in the economic, political, social, and (arguably even) cultural arenas of African countries. However, this broad conceptualization of structural adjustment as inherently neo-colonial again provides little analytical leverage for understanding sectoral policy choices specifically. For this reason, I argue that a narrow economic conceptualization focused on an empirical process of economic exploitation is more appropriate for this thesis.

State interests and the policy process

While earlier neo-colonial literature (e.g., Nkrumah 1965) alludes to the fact that Western states were able to exercise influence in post-colonial countries through their positions as leaders and board members in international organizations, the literature on neo-colonialism in structural adjustment does not devote much attention to the specific processes through which Western states may have influenced IMF sectoral policies. However, the broader literature on state interests and influence in IFIs provides some theoretical insight into the possible mechanisms through which Western states may have pursued neo-colonial interests in Africa through IMF sectoral policies. Put simply, this literature suggests that both formal and informal political processes at the IMF facilitated opportunities for powerful Western states to influence the design of individual country programs in ways consistent with their own domestic interests.

With regard to formal institutional processes, the literature has highlighted the decision-making power of a handful of Western countries relative to other member states at the IMF.[5] There are several aspects of the IMF's formal institutional design that accord disproportionate power to these countries, including automatic appointment of G5 representatives to the Executive Board, an absence of term limits for those representatives once they are appointed, and a vote allocation system that provides G5 countries with veto power over most

[5] Most of the literature is focused on the G5 (the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and Japan).

Board decisions (Breen 2013).[6] Given that the Executive Board was the final forum in which structural adjustment sectoral policies were decided upon, the level of formal influence accorded to former colonial powers, such as France and the United Kingdom, suggests an obvious pathway through which neo-colonial state interests may have been pursued. However, while formal rules bestow significant voting power upon G5 countries, consensus decision-making practices on the Board have meant that program lending decisions have rarely come to a formal vote on the Executive Board (Copelovitch 2010).

Beyond formal decision-making processes, Western states have had a number of opportunities to influence IMF policy-making through informal channels. First, member states are able to influence decisions at early stages of the policy-making process by going directly to the IMF Managing Director (MD) to suggest changes to a draft policy or program at various stages prior to Executive Board approval. Prior to travelling to a borrowing country to begin negotiations, IMF staff circulate a draft program for feedback from member states and others at the Fund, providing member states an opportunity to influence the program design from the very initial stages of the process (Breen 2013, 63).

Executive Board members are also allowed constant contact with the Managing Director and his senior staff leading up to the Executive Board meetings, allowing country representatives to push for amendments to policy drafts before a formal decision is made at the Board. These opportunities are available to Executive Directors representing all member states. However, Executive Directors representing member states outside of Western Europe and North America often represent very large constituencies and groups of countries in constant need of IMF assistance, making it difficult for them to devote the time necessary to engage in detailed discussions of individual policy proposals (Breen 2013).

Given the above, it is reasonable to assume that powerful states whose Executive Directors represent only one country (i.e., the G5 and a few other countries) have been more likely to utilize such informal pathways of influence. The option of lobbying directly to the Managing Director is also potentially more valuable for Western countries than other countries given that the IMF Managing Director

[6] In contrast, all other member state representatives must stand for election in order to be appointed to the Board. Once elected, these representatives are limited to renewable two-year terms.

has always been elected from a European country.[7] It is worth highlighting that, given the consensus norm involved in formal decision-making at the Executive Board, it seems especially likely that member states wishing to influence policy would choose to exercise that influence at these earlier, more informal stages of the policy process. It is also important to note that informal channels are the more efficient pathway for representatives seeking to make substantive changes to policy drafts, as the Executive Board is a forum that only allows country representatives to approve or reject a proposal, not allowing room for amendment or conditional acceptance of a proposed program.

Departing from the above literatures on neo-colonialism and Western influence in IFIs, it is possible that the neo-colonial pursuit of Western economic interests in Sub-Saharan African countries explains continuity in sectoral policies in these countries during the structural adjustment period. If Western states did, in fact, have an economic interest in continuity in primary sector focus in these countries, it is possible that they used their influence at the IMF to push through such policies during the program negotiation process, resulting in sectoral policies centered around cash crop production and resource extraction. Neo-colonialism as an explanation for primary sector continuity relies upon two assumptions. First, it relies upon the assumption that Western (former colonial) states did, in fact, have an interest in continuing to extract primary commodities from Sub-Saharan African countries in the structural adjustment period. Second, it relies upon the assumption that the IMF did, in fact, serve as an instrument through which Western powers could successfully pursue these economic interests in developing African countries during the structural adjustment period.

International organizations as autonomous policy actors

While the above assumption about the IMF as an instrument for Western state interests is unproblematic within the state-centered IR literatures, other IR theories of international policy-making have questioned this assumption of member state dominance in international organizations. These theories have instead argued that international organizations exercise power and agency autonomously from the states that create them. Much of this literature takes

[7] The World Bank president is always an American, guaranteeing that Western powers will continue to maintain leadership positions in both the IMF and the World Bank.

constructivism-inspired approaches to understanding the behavior and policy choices of international organizations, suggesting that these organizations are more than a reflection of the preferences of the states that create them and are capable of exercising power over both agenda setting and policy-making in the international arena (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004, Chwieroth 2008).

The autonomous agency of international organizations is argued to stem from (1) the rational-legal authority accrued to international organizations as "impartial" and rule-based bureaucratic actors and (2) the control these international organizations exercise over information and expertise on key international issues, such as development and security (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 707, 2004, 20). Through this autonomy, international organizations are argued to not only influence the social world, but to actually construct it through classifying issues, fixing meanings, and articulating and diffusing new norms, ideas, and principles (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 710, 2004, 31). These processes are arguably facilitated by the creation of organizational cultures and norms that shape how staff members of international organizations interpret and respond to the problems they are tasked with solving (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Chwieroth 2008).

The role of economic ideas in sectoral policy choice

Central to the above understandings of international organizations are the concepts of expertise, knowledge, and ideas. The literature on international organizations as autonomous actors suggests that expertise and knowledge constitute one of the most important sources of authority and autonomy for international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Chwieroth 2008), suggesting that this knowledge and expertise is strongly shaped by the professional training and socialization of the experts (i.e., technocrats) employed at these organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Chwieroth 2008). This literature directly links the knowledge and expertise of experts at international organizations to ideas, suggesting a central role for ideas as drivers of policy choices in the context of policy-making processes at international organizations.

The assertion that economic ideas can have an independent effect on policy decisions is one that has gained support in literatures on both domestic and international policy-making processes. Much of the literature on the impact of ideas on policy-making focuses on the role of epistemic communities, which have been defined as "networks of knowledge-based experts [who play a role] in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems…" necessary for policy-makers to formulate policy (Haas 1992, 2). This literature suggests that political actors often face uncertainty and imperfect information constraints when faced with economic policy choices, and that their response to this uncertainty is often to rely on the ideas of economic experts in policy decisions (Haas 1992).[8] These economic experts are argued to be individuals whose technical knowledge, beliefs, and policy preferences have been profoundly shaped by their professional economics training, essentially creating an interpretive lens through which they understand and approach economic policy questions (Babb 2001, Klamer and Colander 1990, Chwieroth 2007). Further, the literature on economic ideas and economic experts has suggested that the existence of relatively small and dense international networks of economists facilitates the spread and consolidation of certain economic ideas into important policy spaces through processes of socialization (e.g., Chwieroth 2007, 2008) or contagion (e.g., Farrell and Quiggin 2011).[9]

Explanations focused on economic ideas have increasingly been applied to the diffusion of economic policies, both domestically and internationally, in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Chwieroth (2007) focuses on the effect of neo-liberal economic ideas on domestic policy decisions regarding capital account liberalization, arguing that the formation of coherent policy teams of neoliberal economists through professional training, socialization, and participation in the policy-making process was a driving factor in the adoption of liberal capital account policies in emerging markets in the latter three decades of the twentieth century. He later extends this argument to the adoption of capital account liberalization as a desirable policy goal at the level of the IMF, arguing that shifts in administrative recruitment of new staff from increasingly neoliberal economics departments and changing beliefs about the desirability of certain policy

[8] Lindvall (2009) adds nuance to this argument about the influence economic experts have on policy decisions by demonstrating that expert ideas are more influential at the level of policy instruments (the effects of which tend to be less uncertain and relatively short-reaching) than at the level of policy objectives (the effects of which are far-reaching and relatively unpredictable).
[9] The literature also emphasizes that the networks of economic experts with influence in policy circles often come from a small number of countries and academic departments, which contributes toward the development of coherent sets of economic ideas around which there is consensus in these policy communities.

instruments and goals all played a role in the development of a coherent set of organizational beliefs about capital account liberalization that went on to shape capital account policy in IMF lending programs in the mid-1990s (Chwieroth 2008).

Other scholars have focused more broadly on neoliberal "bundles" of economic ideas and their impact on policy-making through economic experts. Here, neoliberal economic ideas can be understood broadly as outward- and market-oriented policies aimed at deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of both domestic economic structures and external (trade) policies (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garret 2006, Stokes 2004). One particular bundle of neoliberal ideas, the Washington Consensus, is argued to have been a policy paradigm that was diffused around the world as the purported solution to the developing world's economic woes through a combination of reliance on expert knowledge and coercive pressure from international financial organizations throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Babb 2013, 273, Babb and Chorev 2016, 89-90).[10] More generally, IFI experts are argued to have played a key role in the diffusion of neoliberal economic ideas to the developing world through their lending program conditions and their involvement in the education and training of economic technocrats in developing countries, which allowed them to impose ideas about the undesirability of state involvement in the economy and the desirability of liberalizing reforms in the economies in question (Mkandawire 2014, Sindzingre 2004).

Taking the above literatures on the importance of economic ideas for policy-making processes as a point of departure, it is possible that mainstream economic ideas had an independent impact on the sectoral policies pursued in Sub-Saharan African countries during the structural adjustment period. Here, I want to emphasize that, while the above literature has often conceptualized economic ideas as encompassing both normative beliefs and causal beliefs, I define economic ideas more narrowly as causal beliefs about the best means to achieve a given policy goal. Here, I follow scholars who suggest that it is both possible and necessary to make an analytical distinction between causal and normative beliefs (e.g., Lindvall

[10] While she separates the 'normative' impact of expert ideas on the willingness of domestic governments to adopt Washington Consensus reforms without coercion from the imposition of these reforms by IFIs through lending programs, Babb's (2013) argument about coercive pressure from IFIs also seems to be idea-oriented in that it assumes that experts at the IMF believe these policies work and therefore imposes them upon borrowing countries.

2009) and who distinguish causal ideas as a subset of ideas that specify cause-and-effect relationships between policy choices and economic outcomes (e.g., Campbell 1998, 386). In doing so, I am not suggesting that causal ideas can be completely divorced from normative beliefs. Instead, I am arguing that, while causal economic ideas are informed by broader worldviews encompassing a range of normative beliefs and values (Woods 1995), it is narrow causal ideas about which policy instruments are likely to produce a desired economic outcome that provide the best analytical leverage for identifying the drivers of specific sectoral policy choices.

In the case of sectoral policies during African structural adjustment, economic ideas about cause-and-effect relationships between particular sectoral policy choices and economic outcomes may have been a driving factor in final sectoral policy decisions. Taking inspiration from Broome and Seabrooke's (2007) approach of "seeing like the IMF," economic ideas may have served as the lens through which the existing economic conditions of borrowing countries were understood and approached by IMF experts when formulating sectoral policy. Given the fact that mainstream neoliberal ideas about market-based, outward-oriented development and trade were pervasive in the policy-making community during this period, these ideas were likely a core component of this "lens" and are, therefore, likely to have been the ideas that influenced the sectoral policy preferences put forward by IMF experts. For example, neoliberal economic ideas around outward-oriented development based on competitive export agriculture might have led IMF staff to advocate for sectoral policies that prioritized agriculture over industry, as the industrial sectors in Sub-Saharan African countries were often not equipped to compete on the global market on a competitive basis during this period.

It is important to note here that, because IMF staff interpretations of a given country's economic problems would necessarily have taken in structural aspects such as resource endowments, geography, and transport infrastructure, economic ideas represent a potential avenue through which such structural constraints may have made their way into sectoral policy-making. In other words, economic ideas about the appropriate policies to pursue in borrowing countries *given* the constraints imposed by the geography, climate, and natural resources of those countries might have been a driving factor in the choice of sectoral policies of IMF experts during this period. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, many of which faced significant structural impediments to industrialization, interpretation of structural constraints through the lens of economic ideas about comparative advantage, competitive production, and deregulated economic activity would likely have resulted in policy decisions favoring continuity of focus at the sector level on activities such as agriculture and resource extraction.[11]

One final note is that, while prevailing economic ideas about market-based, competitive development arguably had the potential to contribute to continuity in the sectors prioritized in a given country, these same ideas also had the potential to drive *discontinuity* in particular policies within the different sectors. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, many economies were characterized by heavy state regulation and involvement in the economy at the introduction of structural adjustment, which ran directly counter to neo-liberal ideas about deregulated, liberalized, private sector-led development. Given this, it is likely that, if mainstream neoliberal economic ideas were a driver of sectoral policy choices, this resulted in policies oriented around fundamental changes to certain structures within the productive sectors.

Path dependent dynamics in IFI policy choices

One additional thing that bears mentioning with regard to IFI sectoral policy choices is the potential influence of path dependent dynamics in sectoral policy choices over time. Here, path dependence can be understood as the inability of a process or system to shake free of its history (Martin and Sunley 2006, 399), with previous events in a sequence inducing movement in the same direction over time due to the high costs associated with reversal in another direction (Pierson 2004, 21). Some theories of economic path dependence have focused on the tendency for particular technologies to become locked-in over time, despite the existence of alternative and potentially more efficient technologies (e.g., David 1985, 1986).

These theories highlight the way early, sometimes "accidental," circumstances can have long-run effects on the future path of economic technologies and systems due to factors such as technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and the sunk

[11] It is worth noting here that, while neoliberal economic ideas may explain continuity in focus at the sector-level, this does not imply that the same neoliberal economic ideas were present during the colonial period and facilitated the colonial period's sector-level focus on agriculture and resource extraction.

costs that come with switching to new technologies and areas of economic activity (Martin and Sunley 2006). Other theories focus on the effect of dynamic increasing returns (i.e., positive feedback), arguing that high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and self-reinforcing expectations can result in economic lock-in to certain paths of market development over time (e.g., Arthur 1989). While they differ slightly with regard to mechanisms, the above theories of path dependence have in common the fact that they are focused on the ways early economic decisions have the potential to create conditions and incentives that privilege or make more likely particular paths of economic development in later periods.

Theories of economic path dependence have been applied to different areas of economic development, one of which is the spatial location of production. Path dependence literatures suggest that the establishment of initial centers of economic activity can lead to specialized regional market activity over time, with early and potentially coincidental decisions to engage in an economic activity having the potential to set entire regions on a particular long-term economic path (Pierson 2000, 254). Related literature has focused on how early developments in (colonial) transport infrastructure have had persistent effects on regional development and the spatial concentration of markets in post-colonial African countries by creating lasting centers of investment and infrastructural development that have incentivized continued market concentration in the same areas over time (Jedwab and Moradi 2016, Jedwab, Moradi, and Kerby 2017, Jedwab, Kerby, and Moradi 2015). Path dependence has also been used to explain patterns of international trade, with scholars demonstrating that countries that gain an early economic lead in a particular sector are likely to consolidate that lead into a high degree of specialization over time due to path dependent processes such as set-up costs, learning, and coordination effects. Through these processes, countries with similar initial endowments can develop significantly different areas of economic (comparative) advantage over time (Pierson 2000, 255).

Given the above literatures on path dependence and development, it is possible that path dependent dynamics influenced sectoral policy choices at the level of the IMF in cases in which earlier sectoral policy choices had resulted in economic lock-in or the creation of certain patterns of comparative advantage by the time of structural adjustment. In other words, it is possible that there were economic reasons or incentives for continuing to engage in the same economic activities as had been pursued in earlier periods because previous engagement in those activities had created circumstances that favored their continuation going forward. For example, it is possible that path dependent dynamics in infrastructure development and market activity had locked in certain types of primary commodity development, making a shift away from such activities costly by the structural adjustment period.

In this case, the choice to continue to focus on primary commodity production would be characterized by path dependence because earlier infrastructural and production choices would have had an independent effect on later sectoral policy choices (i.e., a country would have continued to produce primary commodities *because* it had produced primary commodities at an earlier point in time). To be clear, I am not suggesting here that path dependence represents a distinct explanation for sectoral policies at the level of IMF decision-makers. Instead, I am suggesting that path dependence is important to acknowledge theoretically because it potentially represents a general mechanism of continuity at the level of policy choice.

2.3 Domestic explanations

Borrowing state influence in international policy processes

While the state- and international organization-centered IR theories outlined above locate power and agency in different actors (i.e., powerful member states versus international organizations themselves), both essentially assume that the policy decisions of international organizations are made by actors at the international level and imposed upon recipient countries. In doing so, these literatures largely fail to account for the role of recipient countries and actors in policy-making processes.[12] In contrast, comparative literatures on the politics of economic reform have more explicitly integrated domestic actors in the policy process when theorizing IFI policy-making. These literatures argue that IFIs have

[12] One strand of IR literature has attempted to address this gap by exploring resistance to international organizations on the part of recipient countries and other (non-state) actors, suggesting that these groups resist the policies of international organizations in a variety of ways (e.g., Hurd 2019, Daase and Deitelhoff 2019).

exercised only limited and contingent influence over policy choices in borrowing countries (Wolff 2020, 10), suggesting that borrowing governments have often successfully influenced the number and types of conditions imposed in lending agreements with IFIs (van de Walle 2001, Vreeland 2007) and chosen to opt out of programs when they found themselves unable to do so (Vreeland 2003).

However, while borrowing governments are assigned agency in the lending process, not all borrowing countries are argued to have exercised the same amount of influence over policy choices at any point in time. Instead, the amount of influence a given country has been able to exercise in IFI lending processes is argued to have been dependent upon a number of factors. One factor that has been highlighted is the geopolitical and economic importance of a borrowing country, with several scholars arguing that the strategic importance of borrowing governments to major Western states or to overall global stability has been a determining factor in how much influence that state has been able to exercise in IFI lending negotiations. According to this logic, borrowing states that have been geopolitically or economically important have been more likely to be successful at negotiating for their policy preferences during the lending process than less economically or geopolitically important countries (e.g., Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012, 32, Pop-Eleches 2009, 3).

Two additional factors that have been argued to impact the influence of borrowing governments in lending processes are the intensity of an economic crisis in the borrowing country and the availability of alternative funding sources. The argument here is that borrowing countries have had more or less ability to resist policy pressures from the IMF or World Bank depending on how desperately they have needed IFI financing. Borrowing countries are, therefore, argued to have exercised the most influence over the policy process in cases in which the economic crisis has been less acute and in which they have had alternative financing options, such as bilateral lending opportunities. Conversely, the Fund and World Bank are argued to have exercised the most leverage over borrowing countries in cases in which that country has been facing a particularly desperate economic situation and/or lacked alternative funding options (e.g., Haggard 1985, Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Kahler 1992).

The above literature highlights IFI lending processes as ones that involve negotiations between international and domestic actors over final policy choices. These negotiations have taken place in the context of what has been termed a “two-level” game in which the governments of borrowing countries have negotiated with IFI lenders about economic reform programs while simultaneously navigating domestic pressures and interests related to these reforms (Wolff 2020, 22). An implicit assumption of this two-level games conceptualization is that external lenders (i.e., IFIs) and borrowing governments have often had divergent policy preferences when negotiating a lending program, with IFIs pursuing one set of externally-derived policy goals and borrowing governments pursuing another set of domestically-derived goals.

This assumption of divergent domestic and international policy goals raises the question of which factors drove borrowing government policy preferences in structural adjustment program negotiations. The answer to this question is also to be found in literatures on the politics of economic reform. This literature begins from the assumption that economic reforms necessarily have distributional effects that create winners and losers amongst domestic populations, thus making policy choices in IFI lending programs highly contentious and politically salient in borrowing countries. Taking this insight as a point of departure, then, the policy preferences of borrowing governments in structural adjustment lending processes are argued to have been highly dependent upon domestic interests and pressures from different sets of actors seeking to tilt the distributional balance in their favor.

Domestic societal and state interests in policy-making

While there is relative consensus in the economic reform literature that domestic interests and pressures matter for government policy preferences, the literature differs with regard to exactly which domestic interests matter most for determining those preferences. One strand of the literature attributes the economic policy preferences and choices of developing states to the influence of key societal groups on policy-making processes. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, urban interest groups have been put forward as the primary societal influence on economic policy-making, with the literature arguing that their interests have tended to result in policies that cater to domestic industrial firms and urban consumers at the expense of other societal groups. More specifically, the literature suggests that pressure from relatively articulate, organized, and concentrated urban interest groups in post-colonial African countries led African governments to design agricultural and industrial policies that facilitated extraction of resources from the agricultural sector and the reallocation of those resources to urban consumers and industrial interests in order to maintain political power (Bates 1981, Lipton 1977).

This reallocation of resources (i.e., rents) from agriculture to urban constituencies arguably took place along several dimensions in post-colonial Africa. First, African governments used their control over cash crop marketing boards to depress producer prices for export crops in order to accumulate funds from the agricultural sector that could then be redistributed to the state, the manufacturing sector, and often the pockets of those on the marketing boards themselves (Bates 1981). African governments also intervened in the market for domestic food crops, using exchange rate, trade, and domestic pricing policies to drive down staple food prices for urban consumers (Bates 1981, 30). The negative effects of these policies for agricultural producers were offset for larger, elite farmers through subsidization of certain inputs and preferential pricing for crops important to large-scale farmers, who were often well-connected to the urban center and the state (Bates 1981, Lipton 1977).

With regard to industrial sector policy, the literature suggests that African governments sheltered domestic firms from competition, often distributing capital siphoned from the agricultural sector along clientelist lines to politically influential people (Bates 1981). In addition to the shifting of resources from rural agricultural producers to urban constituencies, the literature has suggested that post-colonial sectoral policies were also designed to redistribute resources between regions. This form of redistribution was characterized by the use of state control of economic sectors to extract resources from certain sectors and regions and redistribute them to other regions (Bates 2008, 193). This redistribution often took place along ethnic and/or religious divides, with governments dominated by one ethnic or religious group using economic policies to favor their own regions at the expense of other regions and groups (Bates 2008, 193).

The above interest group-based explanations for economic policy attribute continuity in policies to the entrenchment of the economic interests of powerful societal groups in the post-colonial period. They suggest that the policies chosen by African governments in the initial post-independence period created enduring patterns of advantage that made reform increasingly difficult for states dependent on certain domestic constituencies for their political survival (Bates 1981). They also suggest that the use of such policies not only allowed African governments to survive, but also enhanced their political capacity by providing resources that could be used to maintain support for these governments and their policies (Bates 1981, 7). Put simply, the argument of this literature is that interest group influence and the political benefits accrued to states through indulging such interests explain why economic reform has often failed to take place in Africa and why inefficient policies have been maintained even in the face of their high economic and social costs (Bates 1981, 2008, Lipton 1977).

While the above literature on domestic interest groups provides valuable insight into the importance of broad societal interests in domestic economic reform processes, it has been criticized for its failure to account for the role of the state as an active participant in reform and policy-making processes. Other analyses of economic reform have sought to correct this shortcoming by theorizing the state as having policy preferences and interests of its own and maneuvering within existing domestic interest group constraints in an attempt to secure those preferences (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman 1992). Theories based on state-interest group interactions follow interest-group explanations in suggesting that (1) incumbent governments are often reluctant to implement reform, particularly leading up to elections and (2) that political leaders often have strong incentives to appeal to the distributive interests of strong domestic interest groups like labor and business when making policy choices (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 35).

Also like traditional interest-group explanations, this literature suggests that there have often been strong domestic pressures against policies that would produce “losers” amongst the urban working classes and popular sectors, as these groups have traditionally been politically active, influential, and capable of destabilizing the government (Nelson 1992, 244). This argument is supported by evidence that many IMF stabilization and adjustment programs were accompanied by labor strikes and frequent urban protests (Nelson 1992) and that protests were most likely in countries with higher levels of urban social organization (Wolff 2020, 24-25). Important to note, however, is the finding in much of this literature that, while domestic opposition to programs was frequent, organized labor and other societal groups have often lacked the strength to block reform processes as a whole. Instead, they have largely found themselves able to influence only specific policy choices, such as labor policies (Wolff 2020, 28-29).

While sharing a focus on societal interest groups in economic reform processes, the above literature departs from traditional interest group explanations in that it suggests that states are not merely receptacles of the interests of these domestic interest groups, but can have varying opportunities for, and levels of success with, reform depending on factors such as the extent of an economic crisis and their ability to successfully cultivate domestic coalition groups in support of reform. The literature on state-interest group interactions also differs in that it more explicitly theorizes the particular interests of states in different areas of reform. One type of reform that has received particular attention is public enterprise reform, which has often been a central issue in developing countries, where states have often depended on public enterprise resources to maintain power (Waterbury 1992, 182). The literature suggests that the reliance of governments on state-controlled productive sector resources as a source of political power has often resulted in the formation of coalitions of beneficiaries who receive special access to public resources in return for their support of the government, creating an interdependent relationship between the state and interest groups that makes it so that states have traditionally had much to lose from public sector reform (Waterbury 1992, Hydén 2006).

While the state-interest group literature summarized above brings the state into interest group-oriented theories of reform, more recent literature has questioned the fundamental assumption that interest group pressures have been an influential factor in African economic reform processes. van de Walle (2001) argues that, in the case of African countries specifically, the literature has exaggerated the power of domestic interest groups and underestimated the autonomy of African states vis-à-vis those domestic interest groups. He argues that the existence of domestic interests has often not translated into effective interest group mobilization in African countries, suggesting that a weak private sector and lack of historical civil society activity in the region have undermined the ability of private interests to successfully lobby for their preferences (van de Walle 2001). van de Walle (2001) suggests that, given the relative weakness of domestic interest groups and significant autonomy of African states, the state and the interests of those who control it have been the main domestic determinants of African economic policy in the post-colonial period.

State-based theories of economic reform are focused primarily on the existence of a set of narrow elite interests that have largely determined the direction of policy in African countries in the post-colonial period. At the core of state-based theories of economic reform are the related concepts of clientelism and neopatrimonialism, with the literature arguing that political elites in post-colonial

Africa reinvented and adapted existing institutional structures to allow them to utilize state resources to facilitate narrow intra-elite coalitions and the accumulation of personal wealth through neopatrimonial practices (van de Walle 2001, Tangri 1999). The practice of utilizing state resources for political and economic gain coincided with the expansion of the parastatal sector in post-colonial Africa, resulting in a system of heavy state control of productive sector activities by African elites and the use of funds from those activities to dispense public benefits like jobs, credits, contracts, and subsidies to select clients and ethnic constituencies in order to build political support and consolidate power (Tangri 1999, 13, van de Walle 2001).

According to this literature, slow and uneven reform on the part of African governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s can be explained by the above state elite interests. In contrast to interest group explanations focused primarily on broadly entrenched *societal* interests, the above processes are argued to have generated narrow and entrenched *state* interests that facilitated policy continuity in African countries in the post-colonial period. These explanations suggest that lack of reform or slow reform on the part of African states was not due to their inability to reform in the face of external pressures from societal groups, but was instead due to the unwillingness of state elites to surrender the personal economic and political benefits associated with existing economic structures and the rent-seeking opportunities they provided (van de Walle 2001, 124). The particular resistance of African governments to reforms such as public enterprise privatization, liberalization of agricultural marketing systems, and liberalization of licensing and other regulatory schemes can be explained by the fact that these particular economic systems and structures were especially valuable as sources of patronage and personal wealth accumulation (Cooksey 2011, Tangri 1999, van de Walle 2001). When these reforms did finally take place, the continuing pursuit of elite interests often resulted in reform decisions and processes that favored existing elites and supporters of the regime through corrupt divestiture processes, the granting of privileges to emergent private agricultural marketing companies headed by wealthy, well-connected individuals, etc. (Cooksey 2011, Tangri 1999).

Applying the above theories about African state influence and domestic interests to the more specific case of sectoral policies during IMF structural adjustment, it is possible that (1) the sectoral policies chosen for African countries during the structural adjustment period were decided upon by African governments themselves and (2) that the policies chosen by these African governments were driven by domestic pressures and interests. Departing from the literatures about the domestic politics of economic reform, it is possible that the political and economic structures of borrowing countries created entrenched societal and/or state interests that incentivized sectoral continuity in African states over time. Put simply, there were likely strong domestic preferences against fundamental reform of the productive sectors by the time of structural adjustment in the 1980s on the part of both states and important groups in society; and it is possible that African states were successful in negotiating for these domestic preferences in their lending interactions with the IMF during the structural adjustment period.

Path dependence in domestic interests and policy preferences

While most of the above theories of domestic societal and state interests in economic reform processes are not explicitly theories of path dependence, many of them imply the presence of path dependent political and institutional dynamics. Theories focused on institutional and political path dependence suggest that political and institutional arrangements tend to persist over time due to unique features of the political institutional landscape, such as weak mechanisms for efficiency-enhancing competition and learning, relatively short time horizons for political actors, and the status-quo bias inherent in political institutions (e.g., Pierson 2004). These accounts emphasize that path dependence often occurs at the institutional system level, suggesting an inextricable relationship between political and economic institutions over time and demonstrating that political institutions matter for economic development, and vice versa (North 1990, 95, Pierson 2000, 255).

Applied more specifically to the experiences of developing countries, path dependence literatures have suggested that the persistence of early (colonial) political and economic institutions provide an explanation for the low levels of economic development observed in these countries in the contemporary period. These suboptimal sets of colonial institutions are argued to have persisted due to high switching costs and the potential gains of maintaining extractive institutions for the ruling elite, contributing to a lack of democratization and economic development for countries in the post-colonial period, in part by creating incentives for particular kinds of economic activities over others (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002, Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, Mahoney 2010). Similarly, other accounts have suggested that the exploitative political and economic institutions developed during the colonial period in order to facilitate resource extraction from colonial territories have persisted in the post-colonial period, contributing to high levels of inequality and the development of post-colonial states not designed to enhance the welfare of the majority of their citizens (van de Walle 2009).

While not applied specifically to policy choices in structural adjustment, the above literatures on institutional path dependence suggest that both political and economic development processes in post-colonial African countries have been profoundly shaped by long-term political and institutional legacies. Given that both societal interest-group and state-centered theories of economic policy choices allude to long-term processes of interest formation, consolidation, and maintenance within the prevailing political environments of post-colonial countries, it is possible that path dependence played a key role in determining domestic policy preferences and choices in structural adjustment. In the case of interest group-oriented explanations (e.g., Bates 1981, 2008) institutional legacies in the form of (1) strong urban interest groups that had traditionally benefitted from redistributive sectoral policies and (2) relatively weak states dependent on those urban interest groups for political survival had the potential to incentivize continuity in sectoral policy choices in the initial post-colonial period. The resulting strengthening of such patterns of advantage then had to potential to lock in such policies, increasingly incentivizing continuation along the same path over the post-colonial and structural adjustment periods.

In the case of state interests-oriented explanations (e.g., van de Walle 2001, Tangri 1999), path dependent dynamics may have played a role by entrenching and reinforcing neopatrimonial structures within the state over time. In fact, van de Walle (2001) explicitly alludes to such path dependent dynamics himself, suggesting (1) that the initial reliance of African states on neopatrimonial forms of rule in the immediate post-colonial period was partly the result of colonial legacies of weak state capacity and authoritarian ruling tendencies and (2) that this initial reliance on neopatrimonial modes of control served to further strengthen the relative power of neopatrimonial interests within the state, making a shift away from such forms of rule increasingly difficult over time (183). The above suggests a potential role for path dependence as a driver in the development and consolidation of particular forms of elite state interests in post-colonial African countries.

Given the focus of this thesis on long-term patterns of continuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods, the potential for path dependent dynamics as a mechanism in the formation and maintenance of domestic interests is important to acknowledge theoretically. In other words, it is important to acknowledge that domestic interests may have contributed to continuity in sectoral policies during structural adjustment not just because those domestic interests existed at the time of structural adjustment, but because those domestic interests had become deeply entrenched in borrowing countries over time through path dependent processes. In addition, the possibility that these entrenched interests had roots in colonial and initial post-colonial development processes is worth investigating to determine the extent to which sectoral continuity in the structural adjustment period may have been directly related to the political and economic developments of these earlier periods.

2.4 A multi-level theory of sectoral policy choice in African adjustment

The literatures outlined in this chapter provide a number of insights related to IFI policy-making processes. Applying these insights to the specific case of sectoral policy-making in IMF structural adjustment, explaining cases of continuity in sectoral policy choices requires (1) identifying which actors (international or domestic) exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices and (2) identifying the factors that drove those actors' specific policy choices. In this theoretical framework, I draw on the IR and comparative economic reform literatures outlined above to theorize both which actors had final control over policy choices and why these actors chose the policies they did. While this theoretical framework distinguishes between international and domestic actors and factors as drivers of sectoral policy, it is worth noting that structural adjustment policy-making itself always occurred at the international level through the IMF lending process. In other words, even in cases in which borrowing governments are expected to have exercised influence over the policy process, this influence was exercised at the international level where the actual policy choices were made.

To theorize which actors exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy formulation, I draw on the literature on borrowing government influence in lending programs to develop the following expectations regarding when borrowing governments should be expected to have exercised dominant influence and when the IMF should be expected to have exercised dominant influence. I argue that borrowing governments should be expected to have exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices in cases in which the borrowing country was particularly important geopolitically or economically at the time of structural adjustment. Borrowing governments should also be expected to have exercised a larger degree of influence over sectoral policy in cases in which the borrowing country was experiencing only mild economic crisis or had access to alternative options to IMF structural adjustment loans. Conversely, the IMF should be expected to have exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy-making in cases in which the borrowing country was geopolitically or economically unimportant, as well as in cases in which the borrowing country was experiencing acute economic crisis or lacked alternative funding sources.

Turning to potential explanatory factors for the different actors' policy preferences and choices, I argue that the drivers of sectoral policy choices can be expected to vary depending on whether a borrowing government or the IMF exercised control over final policy choices. In cases in which borrowing governments exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices, domestic state and/or societal interests are expected to have been the primary driver of sectoral policy choices, and sectoral policies are expected to have been largely geared toward continuity and maintenance of the status quo. In other words, in cases in which borrowing governments were able to successfully negotiate for their preferred sectoral policies, these policies will likely have been aimed at the continued utilization of primary sector activities and institutions (e.g., agricultural marketing boards) as a source of political power and wealth, which will be reflected in a continued focus on primary sector activities, such as agriculture and extraction, and maintenance of existing structures within the productive sectors themselves.

With regard to how I treat state and societal interests as explanations, I collapse state interests and societal interests into the single category of "state and societal interests" and expect that the balance of societal versus state interests as domestic drivers of sectoral continuity likely varied across the different countries depending on the nature of those countries' political systems. I define societal interests as those of broad societal constituencies, such as labor groups and urban populations, and define state interests as the interests of narrow constituencies comprised of political elites and their economic allies. I argue that the interests of at least some members of these two groups (i.e., societal groups and state elites) likely overlapped in the countries in question, with the interests of the state aligning with the interests of certain societal groups with regard to at least some sectoral policy choices. This overlap justifies treating the two types of interests as a larger category of domestic interests for the analysis. However, I also expect that societal interests were likely stronger in countries with more active political participation and stronger democratic systems (e.g., functioning, multi-party democracies), while state interests were likely stronger in countries with less political participation and weaker democracies (e.g., single party states).

Turning now to cases in which the IMF exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy choices, I expect sectoral policy choices in these cases to have been driven by one of two main factors: neo-colonial state interests or the economic ideas of IMF staff. Which of these factors explains the choice of sectoral policy continuity on the part of the IMF will depend, as suggested earlier, on whether powerful Western states or IMF technocrats were the primary actors in determining Fund policies. In the event of Western state control of Fund policy and the pursuit of neo-colonial interests, sectoral policy continuity should be characterized by focus on continued extraction of primary commodities for global markets. In the event that the economic ideas of IMF staff were the driving force behind sectoral policy choices, it is likely that ideas around export-oriented, market-based, competitive development led to continuity in focus on primary sector activities (i.e., sectoral-level continuity). However, other neo-liberal economic ideas around privatized, deregulated economic activity likely contributed to discontinuity in policies aimed at organizing or structuring activity within the productive sectors (i.e., within-sector discontinuity).

It is worth noting here that this theoretical framework locates economic ideas at the level of IMF staff only. It does not ascribe a role for economic ideas as drivers of sectoral policy choices on the part of borrowing governments. In taking this approach, I am not suggesting that African governments and technocrats did not have economic ideas during the structural adjustment period. I am, however, suggesting that, based on the insights in the outlined literature, economic ideas are more theoretically interesting to explore solely at the level of the IMF.

Finally, regardless of whether borrowing governments or IMF actors dominated the policy-making process, I expect that structural conditions likely had a constraining effect on sectoral policy choices in at least some countries by influencing the range of productive activities available for decision-makers to choose from. Because the African countries included in this thesis vary significantly with regard to geography, climate, and natural resource endowments, the effect of structural conditions on sectoral policy-making is also expected to vary across cases. The constraining effect of structural conditions on sectoral policy choices is expected to be smallest in "opportunity-rich" coastal countries, such as Kenya, and largest in particularly resource-poor and/or landlocked countries, such as The Gambia and Lesotho. More specifically, I expect that structural conditions are more likely to be an explanatory factor for primary sector continuity in particularly resource-poor and/or landlocked countries.

3 Mapping Sectoral Policies

This chapter maps sector-level focus on the agricultural, extractive and industrial sectors in ten Sub-Saharan African countries across the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The aim of this chapter is to measure and compare the degree to which there was continuity in focus on each of the three sectors as a source of economic growth, recovery, and/or stability in the different countries between the two periods. This comparison of sector-level focus between the colonial and structural adjustment periods provides a long view of patterns of continuity and discontinuity in the ten Sub-Saharan African countries over time and provides the basis for the explanatory section of the thesis in which cases of agricultural, extractive, and industrial sector focus are explained through qualitative case studies.

3.1 Case selection, data, and method

Before discussing the case selection, data, and method, the choice to compare continuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods, rather than comparing the post-colonial and structural adjustment periods, perhaps deserves further justification. There are a number of theoretical reasons for this decision. First, measuring sectoral policy choices in these two periods allows me to capture a "snapshot" of continuity covering a large portion of each of these states' experiences of development, as most of these countries were only created (at least in their 'modern' forms) in the colonial period. This "snapshot" of these two specific periods is particularly valuable given that the colonial and structural adjustment periods represent two critical junctures of development for Sub-Saharan African countries that are theoretically relevant to study from the perspective of continuity and change.

Second, and relatedly, the theories of policy continuity that I draw on in this thesis rely on long-term, historically-rooted processes and dynamics to explain continuity, necessitating a long-term empirical analysis on my part. More specifically, theories of neo-colonialism and domestic interests have been explicitly linked to the economic and political structures established during colonialism, with both theories suggesting that the developments of the colonial period facilitated, made possible, or incentivized the sectoral developments of the post-colonial and structural adjustment periods. Given this, colonial sectoral policies are arguably the most appropriate empirical starting point for evaluating these theories.

While the above factors justify an empirical focus on the colonial and structural adjustment periods, they do not explain why I chose the approach of comparing the two non-adjacent periods rather than including continuous sectoral policy data for the colonial period, the post-colonial period, and the structural adjustment period. The justification for not taking the continuous data approach is a purely practical one of data availability. The colonial period and the structural adjustment period are the two periods for which detailed and comparable data on sectoral policies is available and accessible. In contrast, the post-colonial period in Africa is characterized by a relative lack of data for many countries, making post-colonial sectoral policies difficult to capture for the cases in this thesis. While including such post-colonial data would have allowed for a more complete picture of sectoral policy continuity, the approach of comparing the colonial and structural adjustment periods still provides a long-term view of sectoral continuity that includes two periods of development relevant for evaluating the theories outlined in the theoretical framework.

Case selection

The specific cases chosen for this mapping of sector-level focus include ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—all of which are former British colonies. I have limited the study to (former) British colonies due to a lack of easily accessible and comparable historical data on sectoral policies and development for African countries colonized by France, Belgium, Portugal, and other European countries. I have also only included (former) British colonies for which online archival data is available for the colonial period. The ten countries included in the study represent the bulk of Sub-Saharan African countries that were both colonized by the British and underwent IMF structural adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s.

The four former British colonies of South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, and Nigeria have all been excluded due to not having undergone IMF structural adjustment. British Cameroon has been excluded because most of the territory became a French colony after WWI (after having been a German colony previously) and because there is no data available for the British colonial period. The choice to focus exclusively on British colonies only allows me to say something about long-term patterns of (dis)continuity in sectoral policies for a sub-set of Sub-Saharan African countries that share a similar colonial legacy. However, given that the ten countries represent a diverse range of countries in terms of sub-region, size, and level of development, a study of these countries is still an important step toward understanding long-term patterns of sectoral development in the Sub-Saharan African region.

The choice to include only countries that underwent IMF structural adjustment was driven by the theoretical ambitions of this thesis. The thesis aims to describe and explain why sectoral continuity was chosen as a policy approach at the particular juncture of IMF structural adjustment lending by focusing on the relative power and interests of the different actors involved in that specific policy-making process. Given this focus, the relevant category of cases is limited to those that underwent IMF structural adjustment, as only those cases contain the policy-making process of interest. Including countries that did not undergo structural adjustment for comparison would, therefore, add little insight into processes of and explanations for sectoral continuity in IMF structural adjustment.

The time period selected for the colonial data collection is 1920-1940. Practically, this is the period for which data is consistently available for all ten colonies. While most of the ten countries were colonized in the late 1800s, data for the period prior to 1920 is missing for many of the countries. However, theoretically speaking, the period before 1920 was not a period during which there were discernible colonial sectoral policies to measure due to a general absence of development policy on the part of the colonial administration. Prior to World War I, most British colonies in the region were relatively undeveloped and there was a lack of deliberate development policy in the territories held by the British colonial government (Constantine 1984). The lack of development in Africa during this period effectively meant an absence of sectoral policies, making the period before 1920 one that is not theoretically or empirically interesting to capture for the purposes of this thesis.[13]

For all of the ten countries, consistent colonial data is missing for the latter part of the colonial period from 1940 to independence. For the nine countries that achieved independence in the 1960s, this means that the analysis does not capture sectoral policy choices for the final 20 years of the colonial period. For the outlier country of Zimbabwe, which did not achieve independence until 1980, this means that the analysis does not capture the final 40 years of colonial sectoral policy choices. This presents a more serious limitation than the missing data for the early colonial period, as it prevents me from quantitatively capturing the "end state" of colonial sectoral policy. However, while the period from 1920 to 1940 only represents a portion of the colonial period, theoretically speaking, this period in many ways represented the height of British colonial activity and development in the region (Constantine 1984), making this the period during which many of the economic structures and sectors of post-colonial African countries were established and consolidated.

The time period selected for the structural adjustment data is 1986-1999. This period was chosen to start with the establishment of the IMF Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and to end with the replacement of structural adjustment programs with a Poverty Reduction Strategy approach in 1999. I include only countries that underwent official structural adjustment lending through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) or the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)[14] for reasons of consistency. There are two things to note with regard to this choice. First, while IMF lending programs with the official title of "structural adjustment programs" did not begin until the establishment of the SAF in 1986, the IMF disbursed a number of conditional loans to Sub-Saharan African countries in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s under the umbrella of the Trust Fund.

[13] Further, the period before 1920 was characterized by frequent border changes, and it was not until around World War I that the present-day borders of some of these countries were established (Constantine 1984). Beginning the analysis in 1920 therefore ensures that the policies being measured correspond to the same territorial unit across the two periods.

[14] The ESAF was created in 1987 and operated alongside the SAF until 1995, when the SAF ceased operations.

Similar to structural adjustment loans, these loans often required structural and macroeconomic reforms. I have not included these Trust Fund loans in the analysis, as they differed from official structural adjustment with regard to levels of conditionality and stringency, as well as the policy-formulation process itself. The second thing to note is that there were also some countries that underwent structural reform (i.e., structural adjustment) in collaboration with the IMF between 1986 and 2000 with loans obtained from facilities other than the SAF or ESAF. Nigeria, which underwent its first structural reform program in 1986 under a Stand-By Arrangement negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank, is a notable example. I have also not included these loans in the analysis for the same reasons of consistency cited above.

For the structural adjustment period, I have also chosen to focus exclusively on structural adjustment programs overseen by the IMF, excluding exclusively World Bank-administered structural adjustment loans from the analysis. This choice was made primarily for reasons of feasibility. In contrast to the IMF's broad, economy-wide policy frameworks, the World Bank tended to disburse many smaller sectoral loans for particular projects in the countries in question. Given this, it would not have been feasible to code policies for each World Bank structural adjustment loan in the borrowing countries. A related feasibility issue was that the documents for World Bank structural adjustment programs were not consistently available, nor were they standardized in a way that would have allowed me code sectoral policies consistently. However, IMF structural adjustment programs under the SAF and ESAF were designed in collaboration with the World Bank and often took into account planned and ongoing World Bank sectoral activities in borrowing countries. What this means is that the IMF-administered programs I chose for coding likely encompassed the World Bank's preferences and approaches to sectoral development in the countries concerned to at least some extent.

Variables

I have constructed two sets of variables for each of the two time periods to measure the degree of focus on the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors of the economy during the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with "sector focus" defined as the degree to which the policies outlined in each of the sectors appear to have been focused on growth, expansion, or maintenance of the sector as a driver of economic recovery, stability, and/or growth.

The first set of variables measure:

(1a) absolute agricultural sector focus

(2a) absolute extractive sector focus

(3a) absolute industrial sector focus

This first set of absolute sector variables capture raw focus on each of the sectors separately from the others, with the assumption that focus on sectors was not zero-sum and that countries could simultaneously choose to devote attention to the development of all three sectors at once. This set of variables are coded as ordinal variables ranging from 0 to 4 (0= no focus, 1= very little focus, 2= some focus, 3= significant focus, 4= large degree of focus). However, I treat these variables as interval-level scales, allowing me to take their averages.[15]

The second set of variables measure:

(1b) agricultural sector focus as a proportion of total focus on all sectors

(2b) extractive sector focus as a proportion of total focus on all sectors

(3b) industrial sector focus as a proportion of total focus on all sectors

This second set of variables measuring the degree of focus on each of the sectors as a proportion of total economic focus capture the overall balance of focus on a given sector *relative* to other sectors, providing information about whether the balance of prioritization between sectors changed between the two periods. This set of variables is included to address the possibility that it is this *relative* focus on a given sector compared to other sectors that is most important in terms of sectoral continuity. For example, it is possible that structural adjustment programs generally devoted more attention to industrial development than had been devoted to the sector during the colonial period, but that focus on industry relative to agriculture and extraction changed very little between the two periods. This set of relative focus variables range from 0 to 1 (with 0 representing a total lack of

[15] In other words, I assume that the values on the scale are evenly spaced and can be treated as continuous interval variables, which is common practice with scaled ordinal variables (Torra et al. 2006, Williams 2020).

focus on a given sector relative to the other two sectors and 1 representing exclusive focus on one sector and no focus on the other two sectors).[16]

The agricultural sector variable includes cultivation of crops, fishing, and livestock production[17]; the extractive sector variable includes mining, forestry, and oil extraction; and the industrial sector variable includes manufacturing and construction.[18] The World Bank's economic sector categories served as a starting point for constructing the three sector categories. However, my sector categorizations deviate from those of the World Bank in three ways. First, I have created a separate variable for the extractive sector rather than including extractive activities, such as mining, in the industrial sector. The justification for this is that there is a theoretical distinction between extraction of raw natural resources and industrialization as sectoral policy approaches, and distinguishing between those two policy choices is one of the aims of the thesis.

The second deviation from the World Bank categorization is the categorization of forestry as an extractive, rather than an agricultural, activity. The logic behind this choice is that forestry involves intensive extraction of a natural resource (i.e., trees) that, unlike other agricultural commodities, cannot be easily or quickly replenished. The final alteration of categories is the exclusion of development of the electricity, gas, and water sectors from the industrial sector except in cases in which it was explicitly tied to industrial or manufacturing growth. The justification for this decision is that almost all of the countries included in this study had severely underdeveloped energy and water sectors at the start of structural adjustment, necessitating some focus on their development in most structural adjustment programs. Given this, it would be problematic to consider all strategies for improvements in these sectors as an indication of focus on industrial sector growth specifically.

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[16] This 0-1 score is calculated by averaging absolute focus on a given sector over the total absolute sector focus for all three sectors combined.

[17] It is worth noting that the agricultural sector variables do not distinguish between production of cash crops for export and agricultural production for domestic consumption. This may be a theoretically relevant distinction given that agricultural production for domestic food self-sufficiency and agricultural production of primary commodity crops are likely have different logics and implications for development.

[18] I do not include a variable for the service sector (which was almost non-existent in most of these countries) or for social sectors such as health and education because I am primarily interested in sectors that directly contribute to economic growth, development, stability, and/or recovery (i.e., productive sectors).

Sources

To determine the degree of focus on a given sector during the colonial period, I have relied on two types of archival material. The first source is the annual *Colonial Blue Books,*[19] which were typically published on an annual basis by the British colonial administration.[20] These reports include data on trade, production, and the status of important national industries. Within the *Colonial Blue Books,* I have relied primarily on the *Natural Resources and Production* section, which typically outlines recent development in each of the sectors. For example, this section might include information about the extent of land and/or crop cultivation, the number of mining licenses and/or amount of mineral extraction activity that occurred during the year, or the number of industrial enterprises in operation in the country in a given year. The data in the *Colonial Blue Books* is mostly statistical, though the *Natural Resources and Production* section sometimes includes annotations explaining increases, decreases, or substantive changes in economic activity over the year.

In addition to the *Colonial Blue Books,* I have used archived data from the *Annual Departmental Reports of the Colonies* when available.[21] These reports were published by the colonial departments responsible for overseeing sectoral development (e.g., the Agricultural Department) and include qualitative data about the level of development of the different productive sectors, as well as explicitly outlined plans and strategies for future development of the sectors. I have used these reports as supplemental material to code the agricultural sector in particular, as the *Colonial Blue Books* often include only a list of crops produced in the colony, making it difficult to ascertain focus on agriculture as a policy. The annual departmental reports have also been used as a supplement to the *Blue Book* data for the mining sector when available. There are no departmental reports for the industrial sector for the time period selected, so coding for the industrial sector has been based exclusively on the data in the *Colonial Blue Books*. Finally, there

[19] I accessed this material through the "Colonial Africa in Official Statistics, 1821-1953" collection (see reference list)
[20] I used Colonial Year Books for Zimbabwe. They contain broadly similar information as the Blue Books, but in different form. They were also not published annually. Instead, they were published every few years and included information about development over longer periods of time.
[21] I accessed these reports through the "Governing Africa: British records for African countries under colonial rule" collection (see reference list).

are no annual departmental reports for Lesotho, Tanzania,[22] and Zambia, so coding for all three sectors in those countries has been based exclusively on the data in the *Colonial Blue Books*.[23]

To code the sector focus variables for the colonial period, I consider (1) stated interest in and/or stated importance of a sector; (2) stated plans for further development of a sector; (3) the stated level of development of a given sector; and (4) the volume and proportion of exports of a given sector or commodity in cases in which missing data makes explicit strategies difficult to determine. When available, I have relied on the first and second categories, as they are the most direct indicators of intentional sectoral policies on the part of the colonial administration. In cases in which that information is not available, I have relied on the stated level of development of a given sector and/or the proportion of exports of a given sector as a proxy for policies in that sector. The logic behind the use of these third and fourth categories as proxies is that the level of the development of a given sector and/or the volume of goods being produced for export from that sector was likely closely related to the amount of focus being devoted to the development of a given sector.

An example of the above strategy is the case of agricultural sector focus in Lesotho. In the *Natural Resources and Production* section of the *Colonial Blue Books*, the only data available on agriculture is an incomplete list of the crops produced in the country. However, export data for the country reveals a reliance on agricultural exports of various grains and livestock for most of the country's export revenue. Another example is the case of Kenya's industrial sector. In the *Natural Resources and Production* section of the *Colonial Blue Books*, there is no data on industrial manufacturing in the early 1920s, but it is clear from the country's export data that the Kenya did, in fact, produce and export a limited amount of manufactured goods during this period.

[22] The lack of annual departmental reports for Tanzania was slightly less problematic than the lack of annual departmental reports, as the Colonial Blue Books for Tanzania were relatively detailed and included a significant amount of qualitative information about past, ongoing, and future developments in all three of the sectors.
[23] There is some risk that the availability of source material on the agricultural sector relative to the extractive and industrial sectors resulted in an overestimation of agricultural sector focus relative to the other sectors. However, the availability of agricultural sector data itself was largely a consequence of the overwhelming focus on the sector and the prioritization of resource allocation to this sector during the colonial period, which mitigates this risk to some extent by corroborating my findings of agricultural sector predominance.

Some additional coding examples are helpful for demonstrating the overall coding process and coding decisions. The remainder of these examples will be drawn from the industrial sector, as this was the sector with the most variation between and within countries for the colonial period. The most straightforward coding choice was when to code a country as 0 (no focus) for the industrial sector. A country received a zero coding in cases in which the industrial sector and/or industrial activity were not mentioned at all in the *Colonial Blue Books* or *Annual Departmental Reports of the Colonies,* or in cases in which one or both of the above sources explicitly stated that there was no development or planned development in the sector. The latter scenario was most common across the ten countries, for which there was typically a page in the *Colonial Blue Book* that stated that there was no current and/or planned industrial manufacturing development in the colony.[24] One country for which this was the case for almost the entire colonial period was the Gambia.

Where a *Colonial Blue Book* stated that a given country had some small or fledgling domestic manufacturing industries, the country received a code of 1 (very little focus). One example of this is Ghana, which had a brewing factory, some small mineral-water and ice-making plants, and one electric bakery in the capital of Accra beginning in 1934. In the case of Ghana, the *Colonial Blue Book* explicitly stated that there were no "real" industrial manufacturing establishments in the colony before listing the above activities, which factored into the decision to code the year as very little focus and not higher.

Malawi was coded as a 2 (some focus) beginning in 1935, with two soap factories and five tobacco manufacturing factories. In the case of Malawi, the *Colonial Blue Book* stated that these establishments were considered "real" industrial manufacturing establishments. Kenya in 1938 is an example of a country that was coded as a 3 (significant focus), with a number of somewhat diverse industrial establishments including aluminum manufacturing, beer breweries, tea and tobacco factories, and soap works. Finally, Tanzania was coded as a 4 (large degree of focus) for the industrial sector beginning in 1935, due to having a diverse array of industrial establishments numbering in the hundreds beginning that year.

For the structural adjustment period, the material used for coding were archived IMF Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) authored by borrowing governments in

[24] The only country for which I had to rely upon non-mentions of a sector as an indication of no focus was Zimbabwe, and this was due to the different structure of the data on this country.

collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. These papers outlined medium-term (typically three-year) strategies for economic recovery, growth, and expansion of the economy as a whole and for individual economic sectors. To code the sector focus variables for the structural adjustment period, I considered three factors. The first factor considered was the stated interest in and/or stated importance of a sector in a given PFP. This factor was chosen simply to determine the extent to which a given policy framework explicitly and intentionally highlighted a given sector as a priority in the medium-term.

The second factor considered was the degree of specificity of approaches to the sector outlined in the policy framework (i.e., detailed, comprehensive plans vs. vague plans). This factor captures the extent to which policy frameworks devoted real, substantive attention to concrete policies in a given sector; and its inclusion addresses the potential issue of policy frameworks paying lip service to a particular sector without devoting real attention to it when outlining substantive policy actions. The third factor considered was the types of strategies outlined for a given sector, particularly whether they outlined sector-specific strategies or relied mostly on more general macroeconomic reforms that would impact several sectors of the economy at once. The inclusion of this third factor helps to identify the degree of intentionality with regard to a given sector by distinguishing between cases in which broad macroeconomic reforms aimed at the entire economy also impacted a given sector and cases in which strategies were chosen specially to facilitate particular outcomes in a given productive sector.

I will again provide some coding examples from the industrial sector for the sake of clarity. I coded a country as 0 (no focus) in cases in which there was no expressed interest in the sector in the PFP, no mention of it or attention paid to it in the outlined policies, and no stated reforms targeting the sector. An example of this is Sierra Leone in the last set of structural adjustment PFPs (1997-1999), where the industrial sector was entirely absence from the designed policy framework. I coded a country as 1 (very little focus) in cases in which the industrial sector was mentioned but not paid specific attention in outlining policy. This was the case in Sierra Leone from 1994-1996, where the PFP mentioned addressing further privatization, liquidation, or restructuring of manufacturing enterprises at one point in the document, but did not address the industrial sector further when outlining specific policies.

I coded countries as a 2 (some focus) in cases in which the policy framework included at least a small number of concrete strategies and/or actions associated with the sector. This was the case in Sierra Leone between 1990 and 1993, where the PFPs outlined the expected benefits of development in the sector and future plans to review and reassess approaches to the sector. These actions were vaguely formulated, and the discussion generally suggested that development of the industrial sector was expected to happen largely as a side effect of more general reforms in other sectors, which was one motivation for not assigning a higher code for this period.

I coded Ghana as a 3 (significant focus) from 1991 to 1994 because the PFP clearly stated that the sector was important for overall economic growth and included several concrete strategies, such as resource allocation for rehabilitation of manufacturing facilities and plans for longer-term restructuring of the sector. Finally, I coded countries as a 4 (large degree of focus) for the industrial sector when there was an explicitly stated interest in the sector and a set of comprehensive and concrete plans for development of the sector. This was the case for Kenya from 1988 to 1990, where the PFPs stated that a significant proportion of total growth was expected to come from this sector as a result of a set of comprehensive and concrete reforms including the establishment of export processing zones (EPZs), investment-friendly legislation, and a range of other structural and macroeconomic reforms.

It is worth noting here that, although it was my goal to have similar sector focus variables for the colonial and structural adjustment periods, the type and structure of the data available for the two time periods imposed some limitations. For example, while the structural adjustment PFPs explicitly outlined strategies for development, the colonial documents were often much less explicit about plans for future development of a sector, instead tending to provide information about the current level of development in a sector. Given this, I have had to rely more heavily on the output of the given sectors in the colonial period as a proxy for sectoral policies. However, I have offset this limitation whenever possible by supplementing with the *Annual Departmental Reports*, which include some explicit plans for future sectoral development. Even in cases in which these supplemental reports were not available and I had to rely heavily on output in sector as a proxy for colonial sectoral policy choices, I would argue that my method still generates comparable (if not identical) measures of the degree of focus on a given sector for the two periods. One reason for this is that the colonial period was one in which the colonial administration exercised a large degree of direct control over all economic activities in the colonies, making it likely that sectoral output during this period was closely related to the intentions of the colonial rulers with regard to sectoral policy.

It is also worth stating explicitly that I am not interested in implementation of sectoral policies, theoretically or methodologically. In other words, my coding is not designed to capture whether or not the strategies outlined in either period were actually implemented in the countries in question. This lack of attention to implementation in the measures constructed is reflective of the focus of the thesis, which is limited to policy choices and not policy implementation and/or outcomes.

3.2 Patterns of (dis)continuity

Aggregate sector focus

As a starting point, I look at patterns in average sector focus at the aggregate level over the two periods using annual averages of the sector focus variables across the ten countries. This approach provides a high-level overview of the degree to which there was overall continuity in the sectors prioritized by the ten countries over the two periods. With regard to absolute focus, only agriculture demonstrates continuity between and over the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with absolute focus on agriculture remaining persistently high at the aggregate level over time (Figure 3.1). Absolute aggregate focus on the extractive sector was significantly lower during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period, suggesting overall discontinuity in absolute extractive sector focus over time (Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1 Aggregate absolute sector focus

Conversely, absolute aggregate focus on the industrial sector was significantly higher during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period, again suggesting overall discontinuity in focus over time (Figure 3.1). However, high levels of absolute industrial sector focus only characterized the early period of IMF structural adjustment lending, declining dramatically at the aggregate level beginning in the early 1990s (Figure 3.1). It is also noteworthy that aggregate focus on both the extractive and industrial sectors fluctuated significantly more than absolute aggregate focus on the agricultural sector during both periods (Figure 3.1).

The agricultural sector is also the only sector that demonstrates continuity in terms of relative focus on the sector as a proportion of total sector focus (Figure 3.2). Aggregate relative focus on the agricultural sector was relatively high and persistent between and within the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with focus on the sector making up at least 50% of total sector focus for most of both periods (Figure 3.2). Relative extractive sector focus fluctuated significantly over the structural adjustment period, but was lower overall during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period (Figure 3.2).



Figure 3.2 Aggregate relative sector focus

In contrast, relative industrial sector focus was significantly higher during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period (Figure 3.2). However, as with absolute industrial sector focus, relative industrial sector focus declined significantly after 1990, becoming almost completely absent from overall sectoral focus by the end of the structural adjustment period (Figure 3.2).[25]

Country-level sector focus

Having established that the agricultural sector was the only sector to demonstrate continuity at the regional level, I now examine country-level patterns of sectoral (dis)continuity. There are four possible patterns for sectoral focus across the two periods at the country-level, two of which are patterns of continuity and two of which are patterns of discontinuity (Figure 3.3). The "High/High" quadrant represents a persistently high degree of focus on a given sector in both the colonial

[25] One potential explanation for the high levels of industrial focus in the very early period of structural adjustment might be that this focus was a carryover from the previous period, during which a number of Sub-Saharan African countries undertook state-led industrialization efforts (Chitonge and Lawrence 2020).

and structural adjustment periods, demonstrating continuity in sectoral policies over time.



Figure 3.3 Possible country-level patterns

The "Low/Low" quadrant represents a persistently low degree of focus on a given sector in both periods, also demonstrating continuity in sectoral policies over time. The "High/Low" quadrant represents a high degree of focus on a given sector during the colonial period and a low degree of focus on that same sector in the structural adjustment period, suggesting a lack of continuity in sectoral policies across the two periods. Finally, the "Low/High" quadrant represents a low degree of focus on a given sector during the colonial period and a high degree of focus on that same sector during the structural adjustment period, again suggesting a lack of continuity in sectoral policies across the two periods.[26]

[26] The dotted diagonal line represents the degree of continuity, with a higher degree of continuity for countries that fall closer to the line than those that fall further from the line.

Agricultural sector focus

Absolute agricultural sector focus was persistently high across the colonial and structural adjustment periods for all ten countries, with all countries falling within the upper right quadrant of agricultural sector focus (Figure 3.4). Continuity in absolute agricultural sector focus was strongest for Kenya, Malawi, Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. It was weaker for Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and it was weakest for Lesotho, which demonstrated significantly less focus on agriculture during the colonial period than the other countries and significantly less continuity between the two periods (Figure 3.4).



Figure 3.4 Absolute agricultural sector focus

It is worth noting here that the three countries that demonstrate the least continuity—Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho—are also the countries with the biggest issues in terms of data availability and consistency. There were no annual departmental reports for Tanzania and Lesotho, which made coding for the agricultural sector difficult by requiring me to rely primarily on lists of the types and quantity of crops produced in (and exported by) the two countries as a proxy for agricultural sector focus. In the case of Zimbabwe, the *Annual Year Books* produced for the country in lieu of *Colonial Blue Books* differed to some extent from the format of the data in the other countries, also making agriculture difficult to code in the same way that I coded the other countries. These data issues may play some part in these findings.



Figure 3.5 Relative agricultural sector focus

There was also a significant amount of continuity in terms of relative agricultural sector focus across the two periods (Figure 3.5). Eight of the ten countries—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe— demonstrated a significant degree of relative agricultural sector continuity across the two periods. Lesotho and The Gambia demonstrated less continuity in relative sector focus, with both countries focusing almost exclusively on agriculture in the colonial period and focusing less on agriculture relative to the other two sectors in the structural adjustment period.

Of the ten countries, only five—Zimbabwe, Malawi, The Gambia, Uganda, and Ghana—fall within the upper right quadrant of "high/high" relative agricultural sector focus in both periods. However, Kenya, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, and Zambia all fall close to the same quadrant, arguably suggesting a fairly high degree of relative focus across the two periods for these countries as well (Figure 3.5). Overall, the findings suggest that there was, in fact, significant continuity in agricultural sector focus for the ten countries across the colonial and structural adjustment periods.

Finally, while not captured by the quantitative indicators presented in this section, it is worth noting that the coding material for the colonial and structural adjustment periods highlights a striking degree of continuity in the specific agricultural commodities being produced by most of the countries across the two periods. Some of the strongest examples of this pattern are Ghana, which was focused primarily on producing cocoa for export during both periods; Malawi, whose main crops were tobacco and cotton during both periods; The Gambia, for whom groundnuts were the almost exclusive export crop in both periods; and Kenya, which produced a similar array of crops for domestic consumption and export—such as tea, coffee, and maize—in both periods. Combined with the patterns of sector-level focus on agriculture, the production of similar goods across both periods suggests a strong pattern of agricultural sector continuity across countries.

Extractive sector focus

There is a marked absence of continuity in both absolute and relative focus on the extractive sector for most of the ten countries across the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7). For five of the countries—Uganda, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana—focus on extraction was significantly higher during the colonial period than during the structural adjustment period. There is perhaps an intuitive explanation for this pattern, which is tied to the finite nature of natural resources. Metals, minerals, oil, and other natural resources cannot be replenished once they are exhausted. It therefore makes some sense that some countries that engaged heavily in natural resource extraction early in their development (i.e., during the colonial period) might have exhausted these resources by the time of structural adjustment, making it infeasible for the programs to focus on growth in the sector. There is some evidence of this pattern in the colonial data, where depletion and/or exhaustion of mineral, metal, and oil deposits were mentioned. For example, annual mining reports for Zimbabwe highlighted that the country was experiencing a decline in its mining industry due to exhaustion of some of its main mineral resources, such as gold and copper, beginning as early as 1921. There is also evidence of this pattern of natural resource depletion in the structural adjustment data, where exhaustion of natural resource bases was stated as a key challenge to economic growth in countries such as Zambia.[27]



Figure 3.6 Absolute extractive sector focus

[27] The references to resource depletion in Zambia are interesting (and potentially puzzling) given that it is the country that shows the strongest degree of continuity between the two periods, with extractive sector focus remaining extremely high across both periods.



Figure 3.7 Relative extractive sector focus

Two exceptions to the pattern of high extractive sector focus in the colonial period and low extractive sector focus in the structural adjustment period are Zambia and Sierra Leone, both of which demonstrated persistently high focus on the extractive sector during both the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7). It is worth noting that Ghana also technically falls into the upper right quadrant of persistently high focus on extraction in both periods. However, unlike Sierra Leone and Zambia, focus on extraction was significantly lower in Ghana in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period, making it a much weaker case of continuity. As in agriculture, the coding material reveals clear patterns of continuity in terms of the specific natural resources being produced by Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Ghana across the two periods. In Sierra Leone, extractive sector focus was concentrated on diamonds in both periods; in Zambia, the focus remained largely on copper between the two periods; and in Ghana, the focus was predominantly on gold mining in both periods.

A final category of countries with a different pattern in extractive sector focus are The Gambia, Lesotho, and (to a lesser extent) Malawi, all of which demonstrated persistently low degrees of focus on extraction in both the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The explanation for this pattern is simply that all of these countries are small, natural resource poor countries, with no real natural resource base to exploit. Overall, the findings suggest a lack of continuity in extractive sector focus for most countries, with the exception continuity in focus in terms of a persistently high degree of extractive sector focus for two resource rich countries (Zambia and Sierra Leone) and a persistently low degree of extractive sector focus for three resource poor countries (Malawi, Lesotho, and The Gambia).

Industrial sector focus

Overall, there was a lack of continuity in absolute industrial sector focus across the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 3.8). All countries but Tanzania demonstrated a higher degree of absolute focus on the industrial sector during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period. For countries such as The Gambia, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, and (particularly) Lesotho, absolute industrial sector focus was much higher during the structural adjustment period than the colonial period, with all five countries having a low degree of focus on industry in the colonial period and a high to very high degree of focus on industry in the structural adjustment period. For countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, absolute focus on the industrial sector was higher in the structural adjustment period, but still fairly low across both periods. In the case of both Kenya and Tanzania, absolute industrial sector focus was fairly high across both the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 3.8).

In terms of relative industrial sector focus, all countries but Lesotho fall into the bottom left quadrant of low relative industrial sector focus across both the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 3.9). Lesotho falls into the upper left quadrant of low relative industrial sector focus in the colonial period and high relative industrial sector focus in the structural adjustment period. However, while all countries but Lesotho fall in the "low/low" quadrant for relative industrial sector focus, all ten countries demonstrate significantly higher relative industrial sector focus in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period, suggesting an overall pattern of more attention to industry in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period. It is also worth noting that Tanzania stands out as a case of particularly strong continuity in relative industrial sector focus (Figure 3.9).



Figure 3.8 Absolute industrial sector focus



Figure 3.9 Relative industrial sector focus

Overall, the findings suggest a lack of real continuity in industrial sector focus across the two periods and a general trend of significantly more (absolute and relative) focus on the industrial sector in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period. This finding is perhaps not surprising in light of the broader global development trends of the 20th century and the overall acceleration of industrialization across the world in the post-colonial period. This development made industrialization a more important component to development for all countries, making it more likely that industrialization would be at least a peripheral focus of the structural adjustment period than a focus of the colonial period.

3.3 Conclusions

The above analysis of sector-level focus in the colonial and structural adjustment periods suggests that there was, in fact, a remarkable degree of continuity in focus on agriculture as a source of economic growth, recovery, and/or stability between the two periods. The strength of this agricultural sector continuity varied somewhat across countries, with some countries showing very strong patterns of continuity and others showing weaker patterns of agricultural sector continuity. In contrast to the large degree of agricultural sector continuity observed across the ten countries, persistently high levels of extractive sector focus were found in just two countries, Zambia and Sierra Leone. The remaining eight countries were characterized by discontinuity in extractive sector focus or low focus on extraction across both periods. These varying patterns in extractive sector focus highlight a significant amount of variation between countries in terms of extractive sector focus across the two periods. There was also an overall lack of continuity in industrial sector focus, with significantly more attention devoted to the sector during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period. It is also notable that the shifts in extractive and industrial sector focus between the two periods appear to mirror one another. In other words, extractive sector focus generally shifted from higher to lower levels between the two periods, while industrial sector focus generally shifted from lower to higher levels between the two periods.

4 Case Study Methods

This methodological chapter outlines the case study methods that will be used in the remaining empirical chapters of the thesis, which consist of case studies of all ten countries included in the previous chapter's quantitative mapping of sectoral policies. I do two main things in this second empirical portion of the thesis. First, I complement the quantitative measures of sector-level continuity developed in the previous chapter with qualitative descriptions of structural adjustment sectoral policies in each of the ten countries, capturing not just sector-level continuity in terms of which sectors were focused on, but also instances of within-sector continuity in the structures of the three productive sectors. Second, I use causal process tracing of the structural adjustment period in each of the ten countries to explain instances of agricultural, extractive, and industrial sector continuity in structural adjustment sectoral policies in the different countries. In this chapter, I first outline how I define and operationalize within-sector continuity at the case study level. I then spend the remainder of the chapter outlining the explanatory case study methods used to explain the observed cases of sectoral continuity in the ten case study countries.

4.1 Measuring within-sector continuity at the case study level

The previous chapter's mapping of sector-level policy continuity provided a high-level overview of patterns in which sectors were prioritized in the colonial and structural adjustment periods. However, this quantitative sector-level mapping was not designed to capture patterns of continuity in within-sector policies for the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors. In other words, the findings of the previous chapter only provide information about which sectors were focused on over time; they do not provide information about how economic activity within those sectors was structured over time. I, therefore, utilize the case study section of the thesis to address this shortcoming by including qualitative descriptions of the specific strategies and approaches employed in the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors and assessing the degree to which these strategies and approaches were characterized by continuity in the ten countries.

I define within-sector continuity as the degree to which policy choices for the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors were geared toward maintenance of the existing structures and organization of economic activity *within* these sectors over time. With regard to the specific sectoral structures and types of organization examined in the three sectors, I identify a number of within-sector policy areas that formed the core of within-sector policy choices during the structural adjustment period in the countries in question. These areas include (1) pricing policies, (2) policies around ownership and management of sectoral organizations and institutions, (3) policies for sectoral regulation and competition, and (4) policies aimed at product specialization and/or diversification. Taken together, these policy areas comprise the core policy areas that determined what kinds of economic activity took place in each of the sectors and how that activity was organized.[28]

While the above broad policy areas apply to all three of the sectors, specific policy choices related to these broader policy areas varied to some extent across the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors. In the agricultural sector, within-sector policy choices were primarily centered around agricultural pricing and marketing arrangements, ownership and management of agricultural parastatal organizations, regulation and competition in agricultural sector activities, and the balance of focus on traditional crops versus non-traditional crops. In the extractive sector, within-sector policy choices were primarily focused on decisions around ownership and management of state-owned mining enterprises and mining sector regulations and competition. In the industrial sector, within-sector policy choices were centered around degrees of competition or protection for domestic industrial activities, industrial sector regulatory frameworks, and ownership and management of industrial parastatals.

To assess the degree of within-sector (dis)continuity for each of the sectors, I make a qualitative judgement for each policy framework period regarding whether, on

[28] These policy areas overlap to a significant degree, with some policy choices relating to several of these areas at once.

the whole, the within-sector policies outlined in the countries' policy frameworks favored continuity or discontinuity in a given sector. In cases in which the outlined policies largely involved the maintenance of core structures or approaches in a given sector—such as existing marketing arrangements, state ownership of parastatals, or continued protection for domestic industry—I characterize the program period as one of within-sector continuity for the given sector. This is the case as long as the balance of policies appear to have favored these structures and approaches, even if there was some level of change in a given sector.

For example, I characterize a country as a case of within-sector agricultural continuity if the state continued to set prices for most important agricultural goods and continued to own and manage agricultural parastatals, even if that country had instituted some limited price liberalization for a number of less important agricultural goods. In cases in which the outlined policies involved substantial and fundamental changes in core structures or approaches in a given sector—such as liberalization of agricultural markets, privatization of parastatals, or the removal of domestic industrial subsidies—I characterize the program period as one of within-sector discontinuity for a given sector. Again, being characterized as a case of within-sector continuity does not require that a given policy framework involve *only* policies of discontinuity for a given sector. For example, I characterize a country as a case of within-sector discontinuity if the outlined program involved widespread shifts toward liberalization and privatization, even if some prices continued to be controlled, as these shifts suggested an overall balance of discontinuity.

4.2 Explaining sectoral continuity through causal process tracing

Case selection

As previously stated, the second aim of the case study portion of the thesis is to explain the observed cases of sector-level and within-sector continuity through explanatory case studies. These explanatory case studies include all ten countries covered in the quantitative mapping of sectoral policies, with in-depth case studies of two of the cases—Kenya and The Gambia—and shadow case studies of the remaining eight cases. This approach of combining in-depth cases with shadow cases allows me to closely trace explanations for sectoral continuity in two diverse cases, as well as to compare how these causal explanations varied systematically across a larger number of cases. The selection of cases was motivated by the outcome-oriented aim of this section of the thesis, which is to explain cases of sectoral continuity. Given this aim, my case selection approach was informed by a (causal) process tracing logic, which has been highlighted as an ideal framework for answering Y-centered research questions (George and Bennet 2005, Blatter and Haverland 2012).

Casual process tracing approaches are defined as those that seek to identify the necessary and/or sufficient conditions that lead to a specific type of outcome or that aim to identify theory-based mechanisms linking causal factors to specific outcomes (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 80). These causal process tracing approaches differ from other case study approaches, such as controlled comparisons aimed at measuring the effect of a single independent (X) variable on an outcome variable (Y), in that they assume that there are potentially several independent variables that matter for an outcome and/or that there may be more than one causal pathway to a given outcome (George and Bennet 2005, Blatter and Haverland 2012). Y-centered causal process tracing approaches also differ from other approaches in that cases are often chosen based on the outcome of interest, with the ideal case often being one in which there is a strong positive result in the outcome of interest (Blatter and Haverland 2012).

This type of selection on the dependent variable has been a topic of much controversy in methods literatures, and there is ongoing debate about the degree to which selection on the dependent variable represents a selection bias that might affect case study findings. However, while some scholars have argued that such selection leads to biased conclusions about causal relationships due to a lack of exploitable variation in variables (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, Geddes 1990), others have highlighted that there is no inherent selection bias in choosing cases that do not vary on the dependent variable (e.g., George and Bennet 2005). These authors suggest that there are often good reasons for narrowing the range of cases to those with a particular type of outcome, such as when the causes of a given outcome are expected to be limited to a specific range of case contexts or when the aim is to generate novel theoretical insights about a specific outcome (Collier and Mahoney 1996, George and Bennet 2005).

I follow this second line of thought, choosing cases with outcomes of continuity in the agricultural, extractive, and/or industrial sector between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The two cases chosen for in-depth analysis, Kenya and The Gambia, are both countries that demonstrated a large degree of agricultural sector continuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. In other words, they are cases with strong, positive outcomes in terms of sectoral continuity. I chose cases of agricultural sector continuity specifically (rather than cases of extractive or industrial sector continuity) for the in-depth case studies because agriculture was the sector that displayed the highest degree of continuity overall, making explaining continuity in this sector most theoretically interesting.

The choice of Kenya and The Gambia was also motivated by two additional principles of case selection for causal process tracing designs, which are (1) that the use of more than one case strengthens within-case findings by allowing for cross-case comparison of those findings (Bennet and Checkel 2015, George and Bennet 2005) and (2) that, when using more than one case, it is beneficial to choose cases that share an outcome, but have potentially different causal pathways or explanations (Blatter and Haverland 2012). Such cases have been referred to in the literature as "diverse" cases, which are defined as cases that maximize variance along relevant dimensions in terms of X and Y variables, in terms of a particular relationship between X/Y, or in terms of diversity in potential causal paths when a number of causal variables all have the potential to contribute independently to a given outcome (Gerring 2007, Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300-301). Choosing cases that vary along these potentially important dimensions can, therefore, help to illuminate different causal pathways and/or explanations for a single type of outcome.[29]

Kenya and The Gambia are categorized as diverse cases due to the fact that, while they share the outcome of agricultural sector continuity, they differ along key dimensions related to the potential explanatory factors outlined in the theoretical framework. Starting with the structural characteristics of the two cases, Kenya is an example of an "opportunity-rich" coastal country with weaker structural

[29] This approach to case selection is, in some ways, similar to most different systems approaches aimed at isolating the effect of one shared independent variable (X) on a shared outcome variable (Y) across two cases. However, this approach of comparing the findings of within-case analysis across cases allows for generalization while allowing for the possibility of more than one causal/explanatory factor/variable, which is more appropriate given the theoretical framework of this thesis.

constraints than most of the other case study countries, while The Gambia is an example of a “low-opportunity” resource poor country with stronger structural constraints than most of the other case study countries. This difference makes Kenya less likely to be a case in which structural conditions were a main explanatory factor for sectoral continuity and The Gambia more likely to be such a case.

The two countries also differ significantly with regard to both geopolitical and economic importance, which potentially matters for whether the borrowing government or the Fund was more likely to exercise dominant decision-making power during structural adjustment. More specifically, Kenya was a geopolitically important and relatively well-developed economy with strong ties to developed countries. In contrast, The Gambia was geopolitically unimportant and relatively underdeveloped, with relatively weak ties to developed countries. These differences make Kenya a more likely case of borrowing government influence over sectoral policy and The Gambia a less likely case of government influence and a more likely case of Fund dominance. The two countries’ domestic political characteristics also varied during the structural adjustment period. In the initial years of structural adjustment, The Gambia was one of the region’s few multiparty democracies and was characterized as one of the most stable political systems in the region, while Kenya was a one-party state characterized by political instability and violence. These differing characteristics potentially mattered for the balance of state and societal interests as drivers of sectoral policy choices.

The remaining eight countries of Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are treated as shadow cases. The purpose of these shadow cases is two-fold. The first purpose is to increase the generalizability of the findings for Kenya and The Gambia to this broader category of cases by drawing together and comparing the findings of within-case analyses for a larger number of countries (George and Bennet 2005, 179). While it was not feasible to conduct in-depth analysis of all ten cases, the use of brief shadow studies of these additional eight countries allows for this generalization. The second purpose of these shadow cases is to examine other types of sectoral continuity, namely extractive and industrial sector continuity, which were not present in the case of Kenya and The Gambia. With regard to how the eight shadow cases have been categorized, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, Zimbabwe are analyzed as cases of agricultural sector continuity; Tanzania is analyzed as a case of both agricultural and industrial sector continuity[30]; and Sierra Leone and Zambia are treated primarily as cases of extractive sector continuity, though they were also cases of agricultural sector continuity.[31]

4.3 Method

Defining and motivating process tracing

The method used to analyze the cases is causal process tracing. While there are a number of definitions and variants of process tracing, I follow Bennet and Checkel (2015) in defining process tracing as "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (7). In doing so, process tracing methods identify "the causal chain and causal mechanism… between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcomes of the dependent variable" (George and Bennet 2005, 206). Here, causal mechanisms can be understood as the intervening steps between an initial case and a final outcome, with process tracing being used to identify these intervening steps in order to infer a causal relationship between two events or outcomes (Mahoney 2012, 579).

The choice of process tracing for this thesis was motivated by several factors. First, as suggested in the previous section, process tracing as an approach allows for in-depth exploration of causal processes and provides the possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal pathways or explanations that are consistent with a given outcome, allowing for the development of theories about how, when, and why a particular outcome occurs across different cases (George and Bennet 2005, 207). Given the aim of this thesis to explain how, when, and why sectoral

[30] For organizational purposes, I place Tanzania in the chapter with other shadow cases of agricultural sector continuity in Chapter Seven. However, I analyze both agricultural and industrial sector continuity in the case study itself.

[31] The reason for this was to allow for the extension of the findings beyond the agricultural sector to encompass the extractive sector. This focus on Sierra Leone and Zambia as cases of extractive sector focus was also practically necessary given that the material for these countries was focused almost exclusively on the countries' extractive sector activities and devoted very little attention to agricultural sector policies and policy choices.

continuity occurred across African countries in structural adjustment and the fact that the theoretical framework of the thesis proposes the possibility of different causes of such continuity, process tracing is arguably the most appropriate case study method to use. Process tracing as a method is also particularly well-suited to studying policy-making processes, as it is designed not just to demonstrate a connection between independent and dependent policy variables, but is concerned with identifying and demonstrating the process through which different explanatory factors impact final policy outcomes and choices (Checkel 2015).

With regard to the specific method of causal process tracing used, the literature often distinguishes between theory-building and theory-testing approaches. Theory-building process tracing has been defined as a process tracing approach aimed at "building a theory about a causal mechanism between X and Y that can be generalized to a population of a given phenomenon, starting from a situation where we are in the dark regarding the mechanism" (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 11). Theory-building process tracing can also be understood more generally as the use of evidence from within a case to develop hypotheses that might explain the case (Bennet and Checkel 2015, 8). In contrast, theory-testing approaches involve evaluating "whether evidence shows that [a] hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y [is] present and that it function[s] as theorized" (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 11); or, more generally, examining the observable implications of the hypothesized causal mechanisms within each case to determine whether the theories on these mechanisms explain the given case (Bennet and Checkel 2015, 7-8).

I use neither a strictly theory-building nor strictly theory-testing approach. By this I mean that, while I begin with a set of plausible explanatory factors for sectoral continuity that are derived from existing theories and use process tracing to deductively assess those theories, the ultimate aim of the analysis is to further combine and develop these disparate theories into a holistic theory of when and how different explanatory factors contributed to sectoral continuity in the different cases. Given this, while my process tracing approach does involve testing existing theories, it is not aimed solely at testing these individual theories, but at further theory development (George and Bennet 2005, 217).

Outlining observable implications

Regardless of the specific approach used, causal process tracing is focused on *within-case* analysis and relies on tracing the unfolding of events or situations over time through careful and rigorous description of key steps in the process being traced (Collier 2011, 824). In determining which parts of the process to focus on and what forms of evidence and materials to use in this tracing of events over time, prior knowledge is vital. Deductive process tracing specifically requires identifying evidence that can be interpreted as support for or against a given hypothesis or causal explanation. This identification of evidence should be based on prior conceptual and empirical knowledge that informs the researcher's expectations about what observable phenomenon should be expected to coincide with a particular explanation (Collier 2011). In Chapter Two of this thesis, I developed a theoretical framework with four potential explanations for sectoral continuity: structural conditions, neo-colonialism, economic ideas, and domestic state and societal interests. In this section, I use this theoretical framework to develop a set of observable implications (i.e., diagnostic evidence) for each of these four potential explanations. These sets of observable implications are then assessed in each of the ten country cases in the following chapters in order to identify the causes of sectoral continuity in each of the cases.

Structural conditions

In the event that structural conditions, such as geography, climate, and natural resource endowments, influenced IMF sectoral policy choices, this should be reflected in how sectoral policies were discussed throughout the structural adjustment policy formulation process by members of the IMF and/or borrowing governments. More specifically, there should be explicit attention paid to the types of structural constraints outlined in the theoretical framework, such as geography, natural resource endowments, and distance from markets, in (1) IMF policy appraisals and program documents and (2) in discussions of the proposed policies during the IMF Executive Board meetings. This attention to structural constraints might involve explicitly justifying policy proposals as being necessary given a borrowing country's structural conditions. However, less explicit forms of drawing attention to structural conditions, such as highlighting them in various sections of the policy documents, might also lend some support to the idea that IMF staff or borrowing governments incorporated structural considerations into their sectoral policy decisions.

In terms of identifying specific structural considerations in the material, discussions of landlocked-ness, climate, and natural resource endowments would provide clear links to structural conditions as an explanatory factor. Broader discussions of infrastructural constraints, such as the absence of ports, rail transport, etc. might also be interpreted as providing structural justifications for the choice of particular sectoral policies over others. Relatedly, discussions of endowment-driven comparative advantage may also point to structural conditions as an explanatory factor. For example, discussions of labor and land endowments as justifications for privileging particular types of export activities over others would suggest a comparative advantage strategy designed to account for the existing structural conditions of the borrowing country.

Economic ideas

Determining whether economic ideas played a role in sectoral policy choices requires demonstrating that particular economic ideas directly influenced IMF staff approaches to formulating sectoral policies. As a first step, if mainstream economic ideas played an explanatory role in sectoral policy-making, those ideas should be reflected in final sectoral policy choices in the countries in question. For example, if prevailing economic ideas about privatization and liberalization were a driving factor in sectoral policy choices, the policy choices made during this period should be consistent with those ideas. However, observing policies consistent with prevailing economic ideas is not enough in itself to provide definitive support for economic ideas as an explanatory factor, as it does not determine whether economic ideas (and not other considerations or factors) were the reason behind these policy choices. In other words, congruence between prevailing economic ideas and sectoral policy choices is a necessary but not sufficient observation for economic ideas as a causal factor.

The evidence that would provide more definitive proof for economic ideas as an explanatory factor would be the explicit linking of policy choices to these economic ideas by IMF staff in program discussions and documents. For example, IMF staff statements about the appropriateness of agriculture sector focus due to a country's inability to produce industrial export goods competitively would provide some evidence of mainstream economic ideas as a lens through which a country's given conditions were being interpreted during the policy-making process. Other examples would include references to the inherent importance of certain policy approaches such as privatization and deregulation as the appropriate way to achieve the outlined economic objectives in the case of a given country.

Neo-colonialism

Given the fact that the literature on state interests in international organizations highlights the relative importance of informal influence over policy choices, neo-colonialism in sectoral policy formulation is most likely to be observed by looking at informal policy channels and processes at the IMF. For example, examination of correspondence between Executive Directors and Managing Directors might provide evidence of (former colonial) Western states directly impacting the formulation of sectoral policies in ways consistent with neo-colonial economic logics. For example, if former colonial powers explicitly advocated for the inclusion of sectoral strategies aimed at producing primary commodities for world markets rather than strategies aimed at diversification and industrialization, this might be interpreted as neo-colonial influence. However, empirically, informal policy-making processes at the IMF are difficult to access, making this form of empirical evidence unavailable.

Further observable evidence of neo-colonial Western interests might be found by identifying cases of Fund support for sectoral policies that are compatible with neo-colonial economic logics in the formal policy-making process. For example, an IMF Board discussion in which a former colonial (or other Western) power was especially vocal in expressing support for a program with continued concentration in agriculture and extraction and a lack of industrial development provisions might be taken as an indication of neo-colonial influence on the part of that Western state. This evidence would be stronger in cases in which other member states expressed dissenting opinions and preferences for more industrialization and/or diversification because it would provide proof that the (neo-colonial) preferences of the given Western state may have won out over other actors' preferences. Conversely, disagreement and/or disapproval of programs with strong diversification and/or industrialization strategies on the part of former colonial Western states in the Board might also signal a failed attempt at the pursuit of neo-colonial interests.

Domestic state and societal interests

In the event that domestic state and societal interests were a driving factor in sectoral policy-making, this should be reflected at the level of both IMF lending processes and at the level of domestic political and economic processes in borrowing countries. Beginning with the observable implications of domestic influence at the level of the lending process itself, one test of whether African governments were the primary actors in determining sectoral policies is to look for evidence of policy "ownership" in policy documents and program negotiations. In the event that African governments were the drivers of sectoral policy, this should be evidenced in discussions of the negotiation process and the final decisions made regarding sectoral policy. Another test of African state influence would be to look for potential areas of agreement or contention between the IMF and borrowing governments over sectoral policies in policy documents and program negotiations. In the event that African governments exercised final decision-making power, this should be reflected in the fact that it was the preferences of the African government and not the preferences of the Fund that made their way into the final program.

In the case of domestic interests as an explanation for sectoral continuity, determining African ownership over sectoral policies is only the first of two necessary steps. The second step is to find evidence of domestic pressures and interests as drivers of African states' sectoral policy choices. In the event that African states chose sectoral policies on the basis of such domestic pressures and interests, it is possible that this fact made its way into program discussions and policy documents when the viability and appropriateness of sectoral policies were discussed. For example, in the event that African states pursued sectoral policies that allowed them to maintain the support of powerful interest groups in society at the expense of other groups, it is likely that this trade-off was discussed in program discussions, particularly because these sorts of policy choices likely ran counter to those preferred by the Fund (as they were often economically inefficient). Domestic pressures and interests as drivers of sectoral policy should also be evidenced by "agreement" between the chosen policies and the particular domestic pressures and interests of a given borrowing country. For example, a government's choice of sectoral policies catering to a particular group that had traditionally provided the backbone of political support in a program negotiation immediately before an election would provide support for the domestic interests explanation.

Data and material

In order to evaluate the above observable implications, I use an array of data sources aimed at securing the appropriate diagnostic evidence for testing each of the potential explanatory factors (Bennet and Checkel 2015, 6). More specifically, I rely on a range of sources that includes histories, biographical material, archival documents, and meeting minute transcripts to provide contextual and process-related data for the different country cases. These various types of evidence have been chosen to provide information about (1) the IMF-level policy-making process and (2) domestic political and economic developments in borrowing countries throughout the process of structural adjustment.

To investigate the IMF policy process, I utilize two forms of IMF archival material: (1) IMF staff reports from consultations with borrowing governments and (2) IMF Executive Board meeting minutes. The IMF staff reports are internal organizational documents from negotiations with borrowing governments during which the structural adjustment program Policy Framework Papers (PFP) were negotiated and written. The staff reports include an assessment of previous country conditions and developments, a summary of borrowing government policy intentions for the coming years, a staff appraisal of the proposed policies, and a staff recommendation about whether the proposed program should be approved by the IMF Executive Board.

It is relevant to note that the initial staff reports written after negotiations with borrowing governments were circulated to several other IMF departments before a final revised version was submitted to the Executive Board for approval. It is only this final version of the staff report that is available in the IMF archives, which means that the staff reports analyzed in the case studies may have been altered by a number of unidentifiable IMF actors between the close of staff-government negotiations and the presentation of the report for Executive Board assessment. What this means in practice is that I do not have evidence of IMF staff and borrowing government positions and preferences for sectoral policies at earlier stages of the negotiation and drafting process. However, the final staff report usually included information about any disagreements that arose and changes that were made throughout the negotiations, arguably making it unnecessary to look directly at these earlier stages of negotiation.

It is also worth noting that, at the time of writing, these staff reports were internal IMF documents that were not available to the public. This distinguishes them from external program documents, such as press releases, in that IMF actors were operating under the assumption that external actors would not see the policy proposals or the reasons given for them. In line with the literature on evidence in process tracing, the fact that these documents were internal strengthens their value as evidence, as the opinions and positions put forward in them are less likely to have been biased than opinions and positions expressed in an external document (Bennet and Checkel 2015, 25).

The second form of archival material utilized for information about the policy-making process at the IMF is the IMF Executive Board meeting minutes. These meeting minutes are written transcripts of the meetings at which IMF Executive Directors, IMF staff representatives who involved in the program negotiations, representatives from the World Bank, and borrowing government representatives discussed the proposed policy framework and expressed their support or lack of support for the loan. It is important to note here that Board representatives for borrowing African governments were not always from the borrowing country in question, as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa often shared one representative for a number of countries.

This raises the question of whether I can interpret the statements of a Board representative from another African country as being representative of a borrowing government in another country. Given that the process at the Fund was designed so that country representatives were responsible for transmitting the views, opinions, and needs of all of borrowing governments they represented to the Board, I argue that I can in fact interpret their statements as representative of borrowing government stances. This approach is supported by the fact that statements by African country representatives were framed explicitly as the statements, opinions, and preferences of the government of the borrowing country in question, and were never presented as the opinion or preference of the representative themselves.

As with the IMF staff reports, IMF Executive Board meeting minute transcripts were internal, confidential documents at the time they were transcribed; and it was not until after the structural adjustment period that they became available to the public. Further, at the time of structural adjustment, there was no reason for participants at the Board to suspect that these documents would become public in the foreseeable future. Given this, the statements made by IMF Executive Board members, IMF staff, and borrowing government representatives are more likely to be representative of their true opinions and stances on the issues being discussed than they would be had these documents been public at the time of structural adjustment. However, given the inherently political nature of even internal Executive Board discussions between country representatives, it is still possible that Executive Board members modified their opinions or stances in these discussions.

For data and evidence on political and economic developments at the domestic level of borrowing countries, I rely primarily on secondary sources including political histories, reports from international organizations, and biographical information websites for cases in which I need detailed biographical information on individual politicians and country negotiators. When using these sources, I attempt to privilege secondary sources that provide comprehensive, descriptive overviews of political and economic developments when possible; and I avoid using sources with their own analysis of the political and economic conditions of the countries in question. This is done to avoid the problem of biased or selective secondary accounts that might have privileged certain explanations over others. In practice, it was difficult to find such 'unbiased' sources for many of the countries due to the fact that much of the literature on these countries is focused on explaining their economic and political development. However, I have attempted to offset the risk of selective secondary sources in those cases by consulting as wide a range of secondary accounts as possible. Again, this is in line with the process tracing literature on source selection, which suggests that secondary literature can suffer from selectivity bias based on the point of view or explanatory ambitions of the author (Bennet and Checkel 2015, 25).

Finally, with regard to the time frame for the analysis, I focus primarily on contextual factors and policy-making processes in the structural adjustment period itself, as this is the period during which the "outcome" of policy continuity was being decided. However, I have also drawn from historical periods, such as the colonial and initial post-colonial periods, when developments in those periods were relevant for contextualizing structural adjustment conditions and decisions. For example, I provide historical context on important economic sectors and activities, as well as political context on constellations of political alliances over time when these factors are relevant for the policy choices being made in the structural adjustment period.

5 Kenya: A Case of Agricultural Sector Continuity

This chapter describes and explains patterns of continuity in Kenyan sectoral policies during the IMF structural adjustment period from 1988 to 1999. Kenya experienced two distinct periods of sectoral policy-making. During the first period of structural adjustment from 1988 to 1991, sectoral policy-making was characterized by dominant Kenyan influence over sectoral policy choices and the use of that influence to pursue both continued focus on the agricultural sector as a whole (i.e., sector-level continuity) and maintenance of the status quo *within* the agricultural sector itself (i.e., within-sector continuity). The Kenyan government's pursuit of continuity in agricultural sector policy during this period can be explained by the domestic interests of Kenya's elites, who both relied upon and benefitted from existing sectoral structures to maintain political power and accumulate personal wealth.

During the latter period of structural adjustment from 1993 to 1998, the Kenyan government lost this influence over sectoral policy-making, and IMF staff emerged as dominant sectoral policy-makers. During this period, IMF staff used this dominance to pursue continued focus on the agricultural sector as a whole (i.e., sector-level continuity), while pursuing policies geared toward discontinuity *within* the agricultural sector itself (i.e., within-sector discontinuity). There is some limited support for economic ideas as the explanation for this policy approach of sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity on the part of IMF staff. More specifically, prevailing neo-liberal economic ideas around export-oriented and competitive growth may have prompted IMF staff to prioritize continued agricultural activity, while other neo-liberal economic ideas around market-led, private sector-oriented economic activity prompted the choice of within-sector policies aimed at deregulation, privatization, and liberalization across the productive sectors.

5.1 Patterns in Kenyan sectoral policy

Lending history and the introduction of structural adjustment

Kenya entered into its first structural adjustment lending program with the IMF upon the approval of a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) program in 1988. This first program began following over a decade of economic decline, during which oil crises, declining cash crop prices, and the collapse of the East African Common Market all contributed to shrinking growth rates, rising inflation, and growing debt for the Kenyan economy (Fahnbulleh 2006, Hornsby 2012, IMF 1988d). By the time of the 1988 SAF program, the Kenyan government had already engaged in seven IMF lending arrangements under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Standby Arrangement (SBA) between 1973 and 1985, as well as having entered into a number of lending programs with the World Bank between 1980 and 1985.[32] Kenya's initial 1988-90 SAF program was followed by an additional four structural adjustment programs under the SAF/ESAF over the following decade as the Kenyan government continued to struggle to re-establish economic stability and growth.

The economy at the start of adjustment

At the introduction of structural adjustment, agriculture was the leading sector of the Kenyan economy, generating 27 percent of GDP and employing approximately 70 percent of the country's labor force (IMF 1988d, 1). The country's main agricultural crops for export included coffee, tea, and horticultural crops, such as tropical fruits The country's main crops for the domestic market included maize (and other cereals), livestock, pulses, and sugar (IMF 1988d, 1). With regard to regional trends in agriculture, agricultural production was widespread across the country, and most of the country's main crops were produced in several different regions.

[32] These loans were disbursed from different facilities than the Structural Adjustment Facility/Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. They, therefore, did not entail the same types of structural and macroeconomic conditionality, though there were some general quantitative benchmarks to be achieved.

Central Province was one of the more important agricultural regions, producing a large variety of crops including coffee, tea, and horticultural crops for export, as well as maize and other minor crops for domestic consumption (Nyoro and Jayne 2019, 10). Another significant agricultural region was the Rift Valley, which produced primarily maize and wheat for domestic consumption, as well as coffee and tea for export. Eastern province produced coffee and horticultural goods for export and maize for domestic consumption (Nyoro and Jayne 2019, 10); while Coast province produced cashew nuts and other minor crops (Hornsby 2012, 579). The smaller provinces, Western and Nyanza, produced maize and sugar, as well as smaller amounts of coffee, tea, and horticultural goods (Nyoro and Jayne 2019, 10). The majority of agricultural production was carried out by smallholders farming small plots of land, while the remainder of agricultural production took place on large commercial farms (IMF 1988d, 1). Manufacturing contributed just 12 percent of GDP at the start of adjustment (IMF 1988d, 1), with industrial goods produced in the country including cement, shoes, and textiles (Fahnbulleh 2006).

Trends in sectoral policy

Agricultural sector continuity

Structural adjustment in Kenya was characterized by significant continuity in agricultural sector focus when compared with the colonial period, with focus on the agricultural sector as a source of economic growth, stability, and/or recovery remaining high in both the absolute and relative sense across both the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 5.1). Kenya's continued prioritization of agriculture at the sector level during the structural adjustment period was reflected in the country's policy frameworks throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Agriculture was central to the 1988-94 policy frameworks, which aimed to increase agricultural productivity and develop the agricultural sector as a source of employment, food security, and growth (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b).

The within-sector policies outlined to achieve these goals included improved farmer incentives through price reforms, reform of input supply and agricultural markets, and policies to restructure public and private involvement in the agricultural sector (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b). Notably, these within-sector policies were largely geared toward long-term, gradual reform, and they involved continued government control over producer prices and marketing boards, as well as continued government subsidization of certain agricultural goods and inputs. For example, policy frameworks during this period contained policies that allowed the government to continue to set producer prices for grains and influence the marketing of domestic and export crops (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b).



Figure 5.1 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Kenya

Agriculture remained central to the policy frameworks in the 1994-95 adjustment period in Kenya, with the program aiming to facilitate rapid recovery of agricultural production in the medium-term and the expansion of private sector agricultural output in the long-term (IMF 1994a). The within-sector policies outlined to achieve these medium- and long-term goals included institutional reorganization of the agricultural sector, price liberalization in agricultural markets, and deregulation and privatization of agricultural marketing and processing (IMF 1994a). In contrast to the previous period, which had been characterized by agricultural policies geared toward slow and gradual reform in the agricultural sector, agricultural policies in the 1994-95 period involved the complete abolition of direct price controls, complete removal of restrictions in maize markets, and more aggressive scaling back of public-sector involvement in the processing and marketing of agricultural products (IMF 1994a). This pattern continued in the final ESAF program of 1996-98, which aimed to accelerate agricultural sector growth, increase small-holder productivity, and expand rural employment through further restructuring of agricultural services; investment in rural infrastructure; more aggressive liberalization of agricultural input markets; and privatization of agricultural boards and cooperatives (IMF 1996a).

Industrial sector discontinuity

In contrast to the agricultural sector, industrial sector focus in Kenya was characterized by discontinuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with the country devoting significantly more attention to the industrial sector during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period (Figure 5.1). The high degree of focus on the industrial sector observed during the early period of structural adjustment was reflected in the 1988-93 policy frameworks, which aimed to promote exports of manufactured goods, increase investment in industry, and increase competitive, non-traditional industrial exports (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b). The within-sector policies outlined to achieve these industrial objectives included a gradual reduction of domestic protections for industrial enterprises, tax and administrative reform, the establishment of export processing zones in Nairobi and Mombasa, and restructuring and privatization of state-owned industrial enterprises (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b). Industrial sector policies during this early period of adjustment were geared toward somewhat slow and gradual reform, with policies such as gradual and progressive liberalization and long-term plans to restructure industrial public enterprises dominating the policy framework (IMF 1988d, 1989c, 1990c, 1991b).

The structural adjustment programs devoted somewhat less attention to the industrial sector over the 1994-95 program period, with the sole industrial-sector objective in these years being the further enhancement of export incentives (IMF 1994a). The industrial sector policies outlined to achieve this objective included tariff reductions, liberalization of the export licensing system, and expansion of exporter assistance schemes for manufacturers (IMF 1994a). Industrial sector focus increased again in the 1996-98 framework, with the main objective for the sector being the development and diversification of industrial exports through simplification of licensing and tax regulations and improved infrastructure (IMF 1996a). As with the agricultural sector, industrial sector policies in this latter period of adjustment from 1994 to 1998 involved more rapid and aggressive reforms than the previous period, involving abolishment of most export licensing, accelerated privatization of public enterprises, and significant tariff reform (IMF 1994a, 1996a).

One note with regard to industrial sector focus in Kenya is that the limited time period covered for the colonial period has perhaps resulted in some underestimation of the degree of continuity in industrial sector focus between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. While industrial sector focus was not particularly high in Kenya between 1920 and 1940, the country experienced a significant amount of industrial sector development during the latter period of colonialism from 1950 to 1963. By independence, Kenya's manufacturing sector accounted for 9.5 percent of GDP (Austin, Frankema, and Jerven 2017, 354), making it the fourth largest manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chitonge and Lawrence 2020, 870). Given this growth toward the end of the colonial period, it is possible that there was, in fact, a higher level of continuity between colonial industrial focus and structural adjustment industrial focus than is demonstrated here. However, given the data constraints faced, quantitatively accounting for this latter period of colonial industrial development necessarily falls outside of the scope of the thesis.

5.2 Explaining sectoral policy in Kenya

Kenyan state agency and agricultural continuity, 1988-91

The 1988 negotiations

The early period of Kenyan structural adjustment lending was characterized by a large degree of Kenyan state influence over sectoral policies and the use of that influence to pursue continuity in, and maintenance of, existing economic structures, particularly in the agricultural sector. One of the most straightforward pieces of evidence pointing to Kenyan state influence is highlighted in the 1988 Staff Report on Kenya's first SAF arrangement. In this report, IMF staff pointed out that the Kenyan parliament had approved a 1986 sessional paper "On Economic Management for Renewed Growth" that contained in-depth objectives and strategies for sectoral development, highlighting that this paper had served as the basis for the Policy Framework Paper submitted for IMF board approval (IMF 1988c, 7).

The staff report explicitly linked this sessional paper to the sectoral policies outlined in Kenya's Policy Framework Paper, stating that the "Government's economic objectives, as well as the broad policy outlines, were contained in the Sessional Paper… [and in] this context, the authorities placed great emphasis on increasing productivity in agriculture and in rural nonfarm activity, developing a dynamic informal sector, and restructuring industry to improve its export competitiveness" (IMF 1988c, 7). The report went on to highlight that the sessional paper had gained considerable support in Kenya and that it emphasized the agricultural sector and rural areas (IMF 1988c, 27). The fact that the sectoral policies put forward in the 1988 Policy Framework Paper were primarily derived from a domestically-formulated policy document suggests that the Kenyan authorities played a dominant role in deciding upon continued agricultural sectoral focus in at least the first round of structural adjustment lending.

Evidence of Kenyan state influence in driving sectoral policy in the first round of adjustment lending can be also be found in the numerous indications of discontent with the pace and content of Kenya's structural reforms by both IMF staff and Executive Board members. Indications that IMF staff had preferences for more rapid adjustment than the Kenyan authorities first appeared in the 1988 Staff Report, where IMF staff representatives stated that the government should move faster to implement structural policies where possible and be prepared to move quickly to adjust further if terms of trade changed sharply (IMF 1988c, 27). In the subsequent Executive Board meeting discussion of the 1988 Policy Framework Paper, IMF staff explicitly admitted that there had been disagreements between the IMF negotiating team and the Kenyan government due to the fact that "the authorities' and the staff's opinions differed partially on the required speed and priority of adjustment measures in certain areas" (IMF 1988h, 38). Staff representatives then went on to state that the Kenyan authorities understood that they may need to make further adjustments in order to meet the program projections for export growth (IMF 1988h, 39).

In addition to staff indications of disagreements with the Kenyan government during program negotiations, a number of Executive Board members indicated preferences for more rapid and aggressive sectoral policies than were approved in the final policy framework. The United States' Executive Director, for example, stated that she was concerned about the lack of detail included for certain policy actions and the long timetables proposed for others. She then referred more specifically to the long timeframe planned for the implementation of an export promotion program and the complete lack of timeframe put forward for action on export financing incentives (IMF 1988h, 23). The Executive Director from New Zealand had similar criticisms, stating that the program relied on reviews and studies to a disappointing degree and defined some of the program's measures in vague terms. He gave the example of the Policy Framework Paper's stated intention to "begin to rationalize tariffs" in order to promote more efficient industrial activity, stating that greater specificity would have been preferable (IMF 1988h, 21). The above comments suggest that a number of Executive Directors had preferences for more rapid diversification than was put forward, and ultimately approved, in the policy framework of the Kenyan authorities.

In defense of the proposed pace of adjustment in the Policy Framework Paper, Kenya's representative on the Executive Board explicitly linked the government's proposed sectoral policies to domestic political pressures. Early in the Board Meeting discussions, he referred to the upcoming Kenyan elections, stating that the Kenyan authorities recognized that long-term adjustment of a structural nature would be necessary and that they had therefore come to the Fund for a program despite the fact that it was an election year (IMF 1988h, 7). He again referred to the domestic political environment in response to criticisms about slow progress on import liberalization, stating that "much of the pressures against import liberalization were coming from the private sector… [and that some] multinationals were actually pressing the Government to close off Kenya to imports so that their markets could be shielded from foreign competition" (IMF 1988h, 43). He then alluded to the fact that the expansion of the private sector across economic sectors had been accompanied by perceptions of politically-engineered takeovers of Kenyan companies by foreign corporations, complicating Kenyan government efforts to pursue private sector-led development (IMF 1988h, 43). The Kenyan representative's references to domestic pressures against rapid sectoral adjustment suggest that the Kenyan government was deliberate about pushing for a slower pace of adjustment (i.e., sectoral continuity) in order to offset the potential for domestic backlash in this early period of adjustment.

Placing the above references to domestic political pressures in the context of the Kenyan political environment provides support for the interpretation that the

Kenyan government had an interest in pushing for relative continuity, or gradual change, in sectoral policies in this initial round of negotiations. By the time of the 1988 IMF negotiations, Kenya's political system was characterized primarily by patron-based politics along ethnic and regional lines. This political system had its roots in the development processes of the initial post-colonial period, during which entrenched interests were created amongst the country's elites and regions. At independence, the newly created Kenyan state was led by a coalition of African elites from the country's numerous ethnic groups (Hornsby 2012). Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was an elite from the dominant Kikuyu ethnic group who utilized state patronage in a variety of ways to consolidate his power in the initial post-colonial period (Branch 2011). This patronage-based process of consolidation was closely tied to the agricultural sector due to the sector's central role in the Kenyan economy at independence.

Agricultural sector resources served as a source of government power in post-colonial Kenya in several ways. One of these was the use of land and land resettlement programs as a means of consolidating support for the regime amongst elites and important regions. In the case of Kenya, which had been a settler colony, the exit of the majority of European farmers in the last years of the colonial period and early years of independence provided the Kenyan government with a unique opportunity to use large tracts of vacated agricultural land as a source of political patronage. Kenyatta took active advantage of this opportunity, using land allocation to consolidate Kikuyu power in Central Province and (increasingly) the Rift Valley and to placate non-Kikuyu elite allies in other regions (Branch 2011). There were two important outcomes of this approach. The first was the creation of a Kikuyu powerbase in support of the regime in important electoral regions such as Central Province. The second was the creation of large-scale African farms owned by Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu elites and producing some of the country's most valuable crops, such as maize and coffee (Branch 2011). The elite beneficiaries of such land policies included those at the very top of the political ladder, such as president Kenyatta himself and vice president Daniel arap Moi, both of whom obtained large amounts of land through resettlement programs (Branch 2011, 98-99).

Agricultural resources were also utilized as a form of patronage through Kenyatta's allocation of positions in agricultural institutions, such as the agricultural department and agricultural marketing boards, to political allies (Branch 2011).

By independence, a large number of such agricultural institutions already existed in Kenya, having been created by the colonial administration in order to control cash crop production, sale, and export (Hornsby 2012). The use of positions in agricultural organizations such as cooperatives and marketing boards in the post-colonial period served two purposes. First, it provided a way for the government to buy political support from other Kenyan elites through providing career opportunities. Second, it provided these same elites with direct access to agricultural sector resources that could be used for personal enrichment. One way that elites enriched themselves using agricultural sector resources was through obtaining agricultural commodities through marketing boards and then smuggling those goods into neighboring countries to obtain higher prices for them. This form of corruption was endemic during the Kenyatta era, with Kenyatta's family and other elites (including vice-president Moi) implicated in smuggling at several points during this period (Branch 2011).

The above processes contributed to the creation of a consolidated, entrenched set of elite interests with direct ties to agricultural production throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, vice president Daniel arap Moi assumed power, relying upon and expanding existing patronage networks to consolidate his rule. While a member of the elite from independence, Moi faced threats to his regime immediately upon election, in large part due to his belonging to the Kalenjin ethnic group of the Rift Valley rather than the historically dominant Kikuyu of Central Province. In order to consolidate his rule, Moi mobilized resources such as land, development funds, and political and economic appointments to secure a powerbase in the Rift Valley and other minority-dominated provinces, such as Western and Coast Provinces (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 27-30). He did this through both allocating important positions to elite allies and directing resources and economic protection to strategically important regions, most of which were rural agricultural areas. However, Moi also continued to rely on the backing of prominent Kikuyu elites, maintaining key Kikuyu allies in government and elsewhere in order to further strengthen his position (Branch 2011).

Moi's expanded use of patronage beginning in the late 1970s coincided with a period of economic decline and increasing scarcity. During this period, declining primary commodity prices, exhaustion of land, and a rapidly expanding population resulted in a decreasing supply of patronage and an increasing demand for it (Branch 2011, Throup and Hornsby 1998). By 1988, popular discontent with the regime had resulted in a coup attempt and several periods of protests against the government (Branch 2011). As a result of these dynamics, the Moi government found itself in a precarious position leading into the 1988 elections. Given the regime's reliance on agricultural sector patronage, comprehensive and rapid sectoral reform and diversification had the potential to upset the balance of power by reducing the number of economic opportunities available to elites willing to support Moi's government and economically disadvantaging the elites already benefitting from the existing system of state control of productive sector activities. Further, sectoral reforms that removed productive resources from the direct control of the state had the potential to undermine the ability of the administration to (re)distribute resources to different areas of the country in order to garner continued electoral support from those regions.

Finally, certain agricultural sector policies that were promoted by the Fund and resisted by the Kenyan government, such as increased producer prices for certain agricultural goods, had the potential empower groups that formed the base of opposition to the government. For example, the Kenyan government proved to be particularly resistant to implementing reforms aimed at increasing producer prices paid to coffee farmers by agricultural marketing boards because coffee farmers in Kenya were primarily made up of Kikuyu populations in Central Province that had become increasingly vocal critics of the Moi government. By this point, tensions with the Kikuyu ethnic group were high as a result of Moi's attempts to bring other ethnic groups and regions into power. While a number of key Kikuyu economic and political elite continued to work closely with, and benefit from, the Moi regime, the broader Kikuyu community had increasingly been engaged in attempts to remove Moi from power (Throup and Hornsby 1998). Given the above risks, Moi's government arguably had a number of disincentives to rapid and aggressive sector reform in the 1988 negotiations, especially given that it was an election year.

It is also worth noting that the 1988 Kenyan negotiators themselves were well-integrated, wealthy members of the domestic political elite and likely had personal interests in (1) Moi's continued rule over the country and (2) a slower pace of economic change that protected their established economic interests in the country. Kenya's Minister of Finance, George Saitoti, was one such negotiator. Saitoti was a member of KANU who had worked briefly as a mathematics professor before entering politics as an MP in 1983. He had then served as chairman of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) before being appointed Minister of Finance by Moi in 1986 (Hornsby 2012, 394). Significantly, Saitoti would become vice-president under Moi just one year after the first structural adjustment negotiations (Hornsby 2012, 462).

The second main Kenyan negotiator was CBK Governor, Philip Ndegwa, a Harvard educated Kikuyu elite who was a holdover from the Kenyatta era and who had chosen to work cooperatively with Moi upon his ascension to the presidency (Hornsby 2012, 557). Ndegwa was the owner of a number of large companies (including a number of insurance companies and Kenya Airways) and held a large property portfolio (Hornsby 2012, 655), signaling entrenched economic interests in the existing economic structures in Kenya. Interestingly, Ndegwa would resign from his position as Central Bank Governor the following year after a scandal over pro-Kikuyu hiring practices and accusations of foreign exchange abuses (Hornsby 2012, 404). Moi would replace him with Eric Kotut, a Kenyan businessman from his own ethnic group.

The 1989-90 negotiations

The patterns observed in the 1988 negotiations persisted through the 1989 and 1990 policy formation process, with the Kenyan government continuing to put forward sectoral policies aimed at slow reform and the Fund continuing to express frustration with this strategy. In both the 1989 and 1990 negotiations, Executive Board members in particular were increasingly vocal about the Kenyan government's lack of progress on sectoral reform and their suspicions that the Kenyan authorities were not committed to substantive sectoral change. In his opening statement for the 1989 Executive Board meeting, the IMF Managing Director stated that the policy framework would have been stronger with a quicker pace of planned adjustment and more specificity. He then went on to criticize delays on the removal of constraints to private investment and industrial activity and insufficient movement toward reducing the role of the state in the agricultural and industrial sectors (IMF 1989g, 3). Executive Directors from the United Kingdom and Canada echoed the Managing Director, stating explicitly that they wanted more rapid progress on liberalization and sectoral restructuring than was outlined in the program (IMF 1989g).

The Executive Director from the United States similarly expressed concern over the fact that policies geared toward restructuring and divesting public enterprises had fallen out of the program since the previous year, also expressing concern over the lack of progress on liberalization of industries such as textile manufacturing (IMF 1989g, 28). Executive Board members were again critical when further action items, such as a plan for dealing with tariff protections, were removed from the Policy Framework Paper the following year (IMF 1990g, 9). Similarly, Executive Board members criticized the fact that the policy framework did not include a comprehensive action plan for dealing with state-owned enterprises and questioned the fact that there had been no mention of privatization as a way to address the issue of poor economic performance on the part of state-owned enterprises (IMF 1990g). In discussing the above issues, Executive Board members referred to the programs as unambitious and repeatedly stated that the Kenyan authorities could do more to facilitate adjustment and diversification.

While less openly critical of the Kenyan authorities, IMF staff increasingly indicated disagreement over the pace of adjustment and concerns about the Kenyan authorities' approach. A staff representative openly admitted to disagreement with the Kenyan authorities over the pace of certain reforms in the 1989 negotiations, stating:

> The staff agreed that faster progress in a number of areas might perhaps have been advisable in the program, as some speakers had commented… The program had been developed in close consultation with the Kenyan authorities and reflected their own economic and financial priorities. Because the Kenyan authorities laid considerable emphasis upon a consensual approach to structural adjustment, they had opted for incremental, rather than rapid, progress, so as to ensure that a consensus would be secured. Such an approach made it less likely that the authorities would be forced later to go back on their commitments (IMF 1989g, 33).

The same representative went on to explain that the speed of trade liberalization specifically had slowed as the result of "comprehensive and difficult discussions" between the Kenyan authorities and staffs of the Fund and World Bank, with the authorities preferring to proceed slowly and analyze the consequences of the measures, especially in domestic industries such as textiles (IMF 1989g, 33). The fact that the textile industry was at the center of disagreements over trade liberalization is telling given the importance of the sector for agricultural and other rural constituencies such as cotton farmers, ginneries, and textile mills. From independence, the Kenyan government had engaged in deliberate strategies to facilitate textile production for the domestic market by helping cooperative societies purchase cotton ginneries, fixing prices, and investing in textile mills (Omolo 2006, 148).

This cotton policy had created backward linkages from textile production to cotton production and ginning; and by the time of adjustment, the industry represented 30% of all manufacturing employment and provided the livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of cotton farmers across the country (Gertz 2010, 7). Given these particularly strong domestic interests in the existing textiles industry, the especial reluctance of the Kenyan government to expose this industry to external competition suggests that the government may well have been catering to such interests when negotiating policies for the sector. This interpretation is perhaps strengthened even further by the fact that eventual trade liberalization did sever the backward linkages between textile production and cotton production when textile producers began to rely on cheaper imported materials to the detriment of local cotton producers and ginners in Kenya (Gertz 2010, Hornsby 2012).

Further evidence that Fund staff would have preferred more aggressive sectoral policies can be found in the fact that the staff used increasingly strong language to suggest that the Kenyan authorities take more seriously issues of diversification and public enterprise reform during the 1989 and 1990 discussions. For example, the Staff Report in 1990 highlighted that diversification of exports had become "critically important" and stated that public enterprise reform really must become more central to the adjustment effort over the medium-term (IMF 1990b). The blatant criticisms of Executive Board members and more subtle indications of contention between IMF staff and the Kenyan authorities outlined above suggest two things. First, they suggest that there was, in fact, disagreement between the Kenyan authorities and the Fund over preferred sectoral strategies. Second, they suggest that the preferences of the Kenyan authorities prevailed in this period of structural adjustment. This second conclusion is based on that fact that, despite clear discontent with the policies outlined in the Policy Framework Papers, IMF staff ultimately supported the program and the Executive Board ultimately approved it.

Interestingly, Kenya's representative on the Board increasingly responded to Executive Director and staff criticism during this period with references to structural constraints as the explanation for the Kenyan authorities' lack of substantive progress on sectoral adjustment. In the 1989 Executive Board meeting, Kenya's representative repeatedly stressed the Kenyan government's expectation that it would remain vulnerable and insufficiently diversified in the short- to medium-term due to limited access to markets and other structural constraints. He argued that the authorities were, in fact, taking liberalization measures that were both socially and politically difficult in the hopes of reorienting industry in the long-term, suggesting that little progress would be made in export diversification by the end of the program period despite these efforts. He then went on to allude to the need for developed countries to open their markets to Kenyan non-traditional goods in order for diversification to occur (IMF 1989g). The following year, the same representative referenced structural issues such as weather, terms of trade, and structural rigidities (for example, labor availability) when defending the Kenyan authorities from criticism over what the Executive Board had deemed insufficient diversification and export promotion measures (IMF 1990g).

The above suggestions that structural developments outside the control of the Kenyan government were mostly to blame for the lack of progress seem at odds with the interpretation of the majority of the Executive Board and IMF staff. In fact, Executive Board members and staff expressed the belief that it was insufficient policies chosen by the Kenyan government, and not structural constraints, that were to blame for slow reform progress. The claim that the Kenyan government was, in fact, taking difficult measures also seems at odds with both the impressions of the Fund and the realities of the policies outlined in the Policy Framework Papers themselves. During this period, the number of reforms outlined in the policy frameworks actually appears to have decreased and the action plans for these reforms become increasingly vague, suggesting a lack of ambitious reform effort on the part of the Kenyan government.

It is also notable that the Kenyan representative did not refer to the domestic political environment, which was becoming increasingly volatile during this period. The 1988 elections in Kenya had been marked by widespread electoral fraud and had resulted in the electoral defeat of a number of prominent political figures in Kenya (Hornsby 2012). This defeat prompted opponents who had previously been divided along ethnic and ideological lines to join forces in opposition to Moi; and by late 1989, Moi was facing an increasingly united group of politicians, lawyers, church officials, students, and workers who opposed his government's policies (Branch 2011). The government was also increasingly faced with disapproval from former Western allies and donors, such as the United Kingdom and United States, over issues such as poor governance and corruption.

Beginning in 1989, Kenya's previously cooperative relationship with the United States (one of its biggest donors) began to deteriorate in the face of increased corruption and refusal to transition to multi-party rule. With the winding down of the Cold War after 1989, Kenya's geopolitical importance declined significantly for the United States, further undermining the relationship between the two countries.[33] Kenya experienced similar tensions with former colonial power, the United Kingdom, during this same period, with British policy circles increasingly expressing discontent with the quality of Kenyan political processes in 1989 and 1990 (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 72-73). Kenya's reputation abroad was further damaged by the mysterious murder of foreign minister, Robert Ouko, after a period of conflict with Moi in February of 1990, as well as the use of deadly force against political protestors in July of 1990 (Branch 2011).

Conflict and breakdown in relations, 1991-93

Some of the above external disapproval appears to have made its way into discussions of Kenya's 1991 policy framework. During the Executive Board meeting discussion of this framework, the acting Managing Director pointed out a decline in aid flows to Kenya in the last year and noted that increasing those aid flows again would depend on the government's ability to show progress in the reform process. He went on to point more specifically to the need for increased transparency and participation by the government (IMF 1991g, 5). There is also some evidence to suggest that the Kenyan authorities responded to increasing external disapproval by putting forward a more ambitious program than they had the previous year. In the 1991 Staff Report, IMF staff representatives stated that they had forcefully conveyed that Kenya should adopt more ambitious objectives and policies during the negotiations and that the authorities had, in fact, formulated a strengthened policy package (IMF 1991c). The staff representatives

[33] One area of particular contention was the US military base at Mombasa, which had been of central geopolitical importance during the Cold War and Gulf War, but became less important as those conflicts ended (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 72-73).

and one Executive Director also highlighted that the policy framework was politically sensitive, referring to immediate action plans for addressing weaknesses in state-owned enterprises and shifts toward trade liberalization and price decontrols (IMF 1991c, 29, 1991g, 10).

While the above evidence suggests that the Kenyan authorities experienced a less accommodating negotiation process in the 1991 policy formation process, there is also evidence that they did continue to exercise influence over the pace and content of sectoral reform in this round of negotiations. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that, while there was clear evidence of reluctance to accept these proposals on the part of Executive Board members, the Board did ultimately approve the program put forward by the government. In criticizing the program, the Managing Director noted that the Board would have liked to see more specific schedules for the divestiture of public enterprises, as well as further opening up of agricultural marketing activities and reduction in price controls (IMF 1991g, 3-4).

The Executive Director from the United States stated that the Executive Board had increasingly gotten the sense that the objectives of the authorities had been less than ambitious, questioned the ability of the program and the authorities to deliver reform, and stated that he was only willing to support the program on the grounds that it would take Kenya to the point of external viability within the next year (IMF 1991g, 7-9). Other Executive Directors echoed these statements, suggesting that they were only reluctantly agreeing to the proposed program (IMF 1991g). Despite the above criticisms, the Executive Board approved Kenya's proposed 1991-93 policy framework in August of 1991. The fact that the Kenyan authorities managed to negotiate a program that kept in place key agricultural sector features, such as state involvement in marketing and pricing, despite Board criticisms suggests continuing Kenyan influence over final sectoral policy choices during this period.

Shortly after the 1991-93 policy framework was approved by the Executive Board, both domestic conditions and relations with the Fund deteriorated. In late August 1991, long-time opposition leader Oginga Odinga founded the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) as a rival party to Moi's KANU. The Kenyan government responded by outlawing the party and arresting its members, provoking international condemnation (LeBas 2011). In November 1991, a number of Western donors, including the United States and United Kingdom, announced that political reform in Kenya would be a precondition for continued aid flows, prompting Moi's administration to abolish the one-party system in December 1991 and schedule multi-party elections for December 1992. The 1992 elections were characterized by ethnically-motivated violence, corruption, voter intimidation, and delays by the Moi government; and they ultimately resulted in the re-election of Moi and the return of KANU as the dominant political party (Throup and Hornsby 1998). Meanwhile, tensions between the Kenyan government and the Fund over both economic and political developments culminated in a break with the Fund during the 1992-93 period, during which the Kenyan government deviated sharply from the planned reform program, engaging in practices such as import controls, price manipulation, and unbudgeted government expenditure (IMF 1993a).

The Kenyan government's use of agricultural sector resources during the elections and break with the Fund in 1992-93 are telling with regard to the strength of domestic interests and their relevance for sectoral policy during this period. Faced with the threat of being unseated through multi-party elections, Moi's government resorted to intensified appropriation and use of agricultural sector patronage as a way of ensuring political survival. During campaign visits to regions that had traditionally supported the regime, Moi promised voters additional resources and agricultural opportunities through things such as the re-opening of sugar factories and better access to agricultural land (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 185). His government used similar tactics in areas dominated by the opposition, such as authorizing payments for coffee and sugar farmers from the agricultural marketing boards immediately before the election in order to garner support amongst these groups (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 351).

Similarly, the government reimposed strict controls on movements of maize around the country, using physical control of the crop to reward regions that supported the regime and punish those that did not (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 359). Finally, there is some evidence that the government used loans from state-owned agricultural enterprises, such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation, to garner political support in certain regions with the intention of writing off a large number of these loans after the election (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 358). While these activities took place during a period in which the Fund was not active in Kenya, Moi's open reliance on agricultural sector patronage as a means of maintaining political power suggests that the agricultural sector and agricultural interests were, in fact, dominant in political processes during this early period of adjustment in Kenya. The choice of the Kenyan government to engage in such practices in the face of Fund threats to suspend lending further suggests that these domestic interests were strong enough and important enough that the Kenya government elected to relinquish Fund financial assistance rather than comply with pressures to remove agricultural sector resources from the control of the state.

Following the 1992 elections, the government continued to use patronage as a way to reconsolidate power in the new multi-party environment. For example, Moi rewarded elites who had supported his government with positions in state ministries, such as the agricultural department. Following the elections, the government also began efforts to resume lending relations with Western donors. In 1993, the Kenyan government officially returned to the Fund to negotiate a new structural adjustment program that was ultimately approved for the 1994-95 period.

Weakened Kenyan agency and within-sector discontinuity, 1993-98

Return to the Fund and IMF staff dominance, 1993-95

When the Kenyan government resumed negotiations with the Fund in 1993, it did so under very different circumstances than those of the earlier period of adjustment. In addition to facing continuing domestic political instability, the Kenyan government was facing the international fallout of a major corruption scandal involving a number of prominent politicians and financial officials engaged in illegal financial activities through the Goldberg International company between 1990 and 1993. Goldenberg International was a Kenyan company established in 1990 with the stated intention of exporting gold and diamonds under a new government scheme to encourage export industries and boost foreign currency reserves.[34] The export scheme rewarded exporters by (1) paying companies a bonus of 20% of the value of exported goods if they exchanged the foreign currency earned into Kenyan shillings and (2) providing export credits as a financial cushion for exporters in the period between exporting their goods to foreign customers and receiving payment for those goods (Branch 2011, 218).

[34] The company founders were Kenyan businessman, Kamlesh Pattni, and former head of the Special Branch, James Kanyotu (Branch 2011, 219).

However, rather than exporting gold and diamonds,[35] Goldenberg International used the business to exploit the bonus payment and export credit schemes through fraudulent claims for non-existent natural resource sales. Through these illicit financial dealings, billions of Kenyan shillings flowed from the Central Bank of Kenya to Goldenberg International between 1990 and 1993 (Branch 2011, 219).

The involvement of the Central Bank in Goldenberg's financial flows implicated Central Bank Governor, Eric Kotut, who had previously been involved in negotiating programs with the IMF.[36] Minister of Finance and vice-president, George Saitoti, who had also negotiated previous IMF programs, was also implicated through his close connection to a number of banks and financial actors involved in handling Goldenberg funds.[37] Kotut resigned as Central Bank Governor in 1993 and was replaced by the brother-in-law of Moi's personal assistant, Micah Cheserem. George Saitoti remained vice-president, but was removed from the Minister of Finance position and replaced by Wycliffe Musalia Mudavadi. Mudavadi was the son of one Moi's staunch supporters who had inherited his father's position as an MP upon his death in 1989 (Hornsby 2012).[38]

Notably, Moi's administration was resistant to replacing top officials in the wake of the scandal, only capitulating after Western donors demanded changes in the economic leadership before resumption of financial support (Hornsby 2012, 559). Also notable is the fact that, while Moi gave in to the pressure to replace Kotut and Saitoti, both of whom were close associates, he replaced them with other close associates rather than with skilled economic technocrats. Nevertheless, Executive Board members noted the changes to the economic team upon the resumption of Fund relations, with two Executive Directors stating that the change was an encouraging signal of renewed commitment to reform on the part of the Kenyan officials (IMF 1993c).

Discussions of the 1994-95 policy framework suggest that there was a transferring of control over sectoral policy-making from the Kenyan government to IMF staff

[35] In fact, Kenya had very little gold and no diamonds for the company to export (Branch 2011, 219).

[36] Kotut would eventually face criminal charges for his involvement in the corruption scandal.

[37] A number of other close associates of Moi were accused of involvement in the scandal, and there have been accusations that Moi himself was involved in the scheme.

[38] Interestingly, he was also a childhood friend of Moi's own children and had no experience when he was appointed an MP, suggesting that patronage rather than merit drove his appointment to positions of power (Hornsby 2012).

in this latter period of adjustment. In both the 1993 Staff Report and Executive Board discussions, the Fund attributed Kenya's economic troubles in large part to the failure of the Kenyan authorities to implement sound economic policy, with both IMF staff and Executive Board members repeatedly stating that the Kenyan authorities were directly responsible for the economic crisis in the country (IMF 1993c, a). IMF staff and Board Members went on to imply that extensive engagement between the Kenyan government and IMF staff had been required to formulate more appropriate policies for the 1994-95 program. For example, one Executive Director noted that the elongated period of adjustment in Kenya was due to the failure of the authorities to pursue the necessary structural reforms and stated that the staff had done a "painstaking and patient job in piecing together a package of corrective measures" in the latest Policy Framework Paper (IMF 1993c, 14). The above comments suggest that the Fund was unwilling to continue to allow the Kenyan government to pursue adjustment independently and that IMF staff played a more central role in determining the policies included in the policy framework during this round of negotiations.

This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the Kenyan authorities attempted to resume lending relations with the Fund at several points in 1992 and 1993 and were unsuccessful due to the Fund's determination that economic reform had not proceeded far enough. Throughout 1992, the Kenyan government was repeatedly unsuccessful at convincing donors that the economy had been reformed sufficiently to warrant the resumption of aid flows (Hornsby 2012, 505). In February 1993, the government implemented a number of more aggressive reforms in the areas of agricultural pricing and exchange rate policy in anticipation of an IMF visit to the country in the hopes that these reforms would facilitate a resumption of Fund lending. However, the IMF team determined that reform had not gone far enough, particularly with regard to privatization, and Fund lending remained at a standstill (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 561). This reluctance to resume aid flows to Kenya was not limited to the IMF; and in March of 1993, a larger group of donors meeting informally in London agreed that they remained unconvinced by Kenya's recent reform efforts (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 561).

By this point, the Kenyan economy was in acute crisis, with economic growth having decelerated to historic lows and the Kenyan government unable to meet its debt obligations for the first time in the country's history (IMF 1993a, 2).

Shortly after the IMF and other donors refused to resume aid flows to Kenya, Moi's government announced its intention to abandon IMF policies and reimposed a number of price controls that had been removed prior to the IMF visit in February (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 561). By April 1993, the Kenyan economy was facing imminent collapse, and Moi's government resumed both economic reform and negotiations with the IMF (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 561). In May of 1993, the Kenyan government officially adopted an economic framework to be carried out over the rest of the year under the informal monitoring of IMF staff (IMF 1993a, 1).

It was not until the Kenyan government had made significant progress under this IMF-monitored program that they were able to successfully negotiate a new ESAF policy framework with IMF staff in November 1993.[39] The fact that Kenya was repeatedly unsuccessful at returning to Fund lending during this period and was only able to successfully negotiate a new ESAF program after having completed significant reform under informal IMF supervision suggests two things. First, it suggests that that the Kenyan government lacked the influence necessary to successfully negotiate for their preferred policies during this period. Second, it suggests that IMF staff increasingly played a central role in both determining and overseeing economic reform in Kenya during this latter period of adjustment.

It is worth noting that, while control over final policy choices appears to have shifted to IMF staff during this period, the Kenyan government continued to resist certain types of reforms, and was largely unsuccessful at doing so. In 1995, Kenya's relationship with external donors deteriorated again when Kenya backpedaled on a number of agreed-upon reforms, failing to meet budgetary targets, delaying privatization actions, and reimposing import bans on products such as maize, wheat, and sugar (IMF 1996b, 2). As a result, there were a number of crisis meetings with the Fund, to which the Kenyan government responded by accusing donors of attempting to destabilize the regime. These conflicts culminated in the Fund suspending a $90 million ESAF payment to Kenya in September 1995 (Hornsby 2012, 566). Relations with the Fund did not improve until the spring of 1996, when the Kenyan government demonstrated progress on privatization and fiscal reform in the context of negotiations for a new three-year

[39] Notably, agricultural sector reforms were prominent among the liberalizing reforms undertaken as part of their efforts to resume lending relations with Western donors, with the Kenyan authorities implementing liberalizing policies of some sort in a number of agricultural sectors including rice, coffee, milk, and cotton during this period (Hornsby 2012).

ESAF program (Hornsby 2012, 566). The fact that Kenya's program deviations were met with program suspension during this period is a notable departure from the earlier period of adjustment, further strengthening the interpretation of weakened Kenyan influence at the Fund.

Under the control of IMF staff, sectoral policies in the 1994-95 period were considerably different than in the earlier period of adjustment from 1988 to 1991. While the 1994-95 program continued to involve significant focus on the agricultural sector, the specific policies outlined were more ambitious and aggressive during this period and involved the complete abolition of direct price controls, complete removal of restrictions in maize markets, more aggressive scaling back of public-sector involvement in processing and marketing of agricultural products, and more aggressive removal of disincentives for private investment and exports (IMF 1993a). This was a sharp break from the earlier period of adjustment, where the programs had emphasized slower and more gradual shifts in the structure of the agricultural and industrial sectors and been particularly slow in planning for price decontrol and movement to private agricultural marketing. Notably, the aggressive sectoral policies put forward during this period were also the same policies for which the Executive Board had been pushing in previous program years when they urged the Kenyan authorities to adopt more rapid and ambitious liberalization and privatization policies, particularly in the agricultural sector.

There is some evidence to suggest that the above sectoral policy choices were driven by the economic ideas of IMF staff. The first piece of evidence pointing toward economic ideas as an explanatory factor for sectoral policies is the fact that the policies chosen were in line with dominant neoliberal ideas about outward-oriented, private sector-led, deregulated economic activity. This was particularly true for the agricultural sector reforms, which were largely aimed at removing impediments to competition and privatizing agricultural activity, both of which were consistent with neoliberal, Washington Consensus ideas. The strong preference of both IMF staff and Executive Board members for such policies was alluded to in the staff report and Executive Board meeting discussions of the 1994-95 policy framework. For example, IMF staff highlighted public enterprise privatization and the removal of the government from the agricultural sector as some of the highest priorities of the program (IMF 1993a, 20-21), while Executive Board members repeatedly stressed the inherent importance of reducing the role of the government and expanding the role of the private sector in economic activity (IMF 1993c).

The above comments by IMF staff and Executive Board members suggest alignment between the policy preferences of the Fund, the sectoral policies actually chosen for the 1994-95 policy framework, and prevailing neo-liberal economic ideas. This alignment is a necessary condition for proving the existence of economic ideas as a driving factor in IMF staff sectoral policy choices. However, it is not a sufficient condition in that it does not causally link the choice of IMF staff to pursue these policies to the corresponding economic ideas. In order for this to happen, IMF staff and Executive Board members would have needed to justify their policy choices with explicit reference to neoliberal economic ideas, suggesting that these policy choices were the most appropriate policy instruments to achieve the stated economic goals for Kenya. This explicit acknowledgement of economic ideas was not present in the discussions for the 1994-95 program years, limiting my ability to say conclusively whether economic ideas were the driving factor behind staff sectoral policy choices during these negotiations.

Continued staff dominance, 1996-98

Policy discussions of the 1996-98 policy framework highlight a continued dynamic of limited Kenyan state influence and IMF staff ownership of policy choices. In both the 1996 Staff Report and Executive Board discussions, there was explicit acknowledgement by all parties that the Kenyan government had followed the lead of the Fund in their recent adjustment efforts and implemented policies according to the recommendations of the Executive Board and IMF staff. For example, the 1996 Staff Report stated that "economic policy [had] been implemented in line with the views of the Executive Board" since the Article IV Consultation the previous year (IMF 1996b, 3). In Executive Board discussions, several board members also noted that the policies being pursued by the Kenyan government were broadly consistent with the recent recommendations of IMF staff and Board Members (IMF 1996d). The above suggests that the Kenyan government's role was largely one of complying with the direction of the Fund in this round of adjustment, supporting the interpretation of weak Kenyan influence and dominant Fund influence over sectoral policy in this period.

Another piece of evidence pointing to strong Fund influence over policy-making during this period is the fact that IMF staff monitoring and oversight of Kenya's reform process was an increasingly central component to program discussions and design during the 1996-98 period. In the 1996 staff appraisal of the outlined policy framework, IMF staff explicitly stated that "close monitoring of the program through regular consultations with the staff, comprehensive performance criteria, frequent reports to the Executive Board, and formal reviews [provided] greater assurances that the program [would] be successfully implemented" (IMF 1996b, 23). This degree of program oversight was a departure from both earlier periods of adjustment in Kenya and from the typical structure of Fund oversight in SAF/ESAF programs, suggesting a special desire on the part of the Fund to closely monitor adjustment in Kenya. In Executive Board discussions of the program, a number of Executive Directors linked this large degree of program oversight to Kenya's poor track record, stating that they found these additional monitoring measures appropriate given the country's lending history (IMF 1996d). While these monitoring mechanisms were largely related to implementation, rather than explicitly to sectoral policy choice, they nonetheless suggest an increase in Fund control over policy in Kenya and a decline in Kenyan reform autonomy.

A final piece of evidence pointing to decreased Kenyan influence and increased Fund influence during the 1996-98 program period is the fact that domestic interests were explicitly acknowledged, but not catered to, in this round of negotiations and discussions. For example, IMF staff highlighted the risk that the upcoming elections in 1997 would generate pressures for program deviations on the part of the Kenyan government and stressed how important it was that the Kenyan authorities resist such pressures (IMF 1996b, 22). Similarly, an Executive Director on the Board pushed the government to make even more progress toward resisting political pressures to provide financial support to strategic state enterprises such as agricultural boards (IMF 1996d, 7). When the Kenyan government did, in fact, resort to misusing agricultural sector resources in the run-up to the 1997 elections, the Fund and other donors responded by suspending all ongoing lending programs indefinitely (Hornsby 2012, 599). The fact that the Fund pressured the government against catering to domestic interests and subsequently withdrew its financial support when the government failed to comply suggests two things. First, it suggests that domestic interests against certain sectoral reforms likely remained strong in Kenya. Second, it suggests that those domestic interests were increasingly unsuccessful at making their way into IMF-level sectoral policy as the Kenyan government lost their influence and control over sectoral policy choice.

As in the 1994-95 period, there is some limited support for economic ideas as an explanatory factor for IMF sectoral policy choices in the 1996-98 program period. In discussing the outlined framework, IMF staff explicitly highlighted that the development of an outward-looking and competitive productive market was a core objective of the program (IMF 1996b, 8). With this statement, IMF staff linked sectoral policy choices to the belief of the Fund that such outward-oriented development was the key to growth in the country. One Executive Director on the Board linked this approach explicitly to focus on agriculture, suggesting that the agricultural sector would necessarily need to be the main contributor to growth in the short-term and that development of the industrial sector would need to be a longer-term goal in the context of export-oriented growth (IMF 1996d, 12). With this statement, the Executive Director alluded to a belief that the agricultural sector was best suited to the desired outward-oriented, export-led development. Both the staff report and Executive Board discussions similarly highlighted privatization of the productive sectors as a core objective of the policy framework, linking such reforms to efficiency gains and growth in the economy (IMF 1996d, 8, 1996b, 21).

The above discussions suggest a role for economic ideas in two ways. First, the above discussions suggest that Fund policymakers saw outward-oriented, privatized, agriculture-oriented policies as the best policy choices for achieving economic growth in Kenya, at least in the short term. This is consistent with a definition of economic ideas as causal ideas about the appropriate policy instruments to achieve a given economic outcome. Second, the discussions suggest a prioritization or favoring of economic policies that were consistent with prevailing neoliberal economic ideas around export-led, market-based, private sector-led economic activity. They were also in line with Fund's overall policy approach to developing countries during this period, which put forward such neoliberal policies for all productive sectors as the appropriate means for promoting economic development. Taken together, the above suggests that economic ideas played a role in the choice of IMF staff to (1) continue to focus on the agricultural sector as a source of growth and (2) to pursue aggressive liberalizing and privatizing reforms within the agricultural sector.

There are three final things worth noting with regard to sectoral policy during the latter period of adjustment in Kenya. First, sectoral policies became increasingly less central to program discussions in both the staff reports and Executive Board meetings during this period. Instead, program discussions focused primarily on broader macroeconomic and structural reforms. However, while the staff and Executive Board did not devote much attention to sectoral policies in their discussion of the programs during this period, sectoral policies were still outlined in the Policy Framework Papers themselves. One potential explanation for this lack of discussion is that the more aggressive sectoral policies outlined during this period were uncontroversial to those at the Fund and were, therefore, not of interest in Board discussions. This explanation is compatible with the interpretation that IMF staff themselves were increasingly responsible for formulating the policy frameworks and that their sectoral policy choices were in line with the prevailing economic ideas of the IMF and World Bank, making it less likely for there to be disagreement around them. Another, potentially complementary, explanation is that the Fund was generally less concerned with sectoral policies in the face of Kenya's overall macroeconomic instability, therefore prioritizing discussions of stabilizing macroeconomic measures in the Board meetings.

The second thing of note is that industrial sector focus decreased during this period of increased IMF ownership over the programs, and the agricultural sector became the main focus of sectoral policy. This is perhaps counter-intuitive given the Board's criticisms about the lack of substantive industrial sector reform in the earlier period of adjustment. There are two potential explanations for this. The first explanation is that IMF staff were primarily focused on the areas of the economy that provided the most economic stability in the short- to medium-term given the generally high level of economic instability and increasingly compromised capacity of the Kenyan government to undertake reform during this period. Agriculture would have been vital at this point because of the economy's dependence on agricultural exports in the short-term and because of the increased risk to food security that arose during these latter years of economic crisis.

A second, potentially complementary, explanation is that industrial infrastructure had deteriorated over the adjustment period due to the continued economic instability, decline, and mismanagement, making focus on the sector unfeasible in the short-erm given the prevailing conditions in the country at the time of the

1994-95 and 1996-98 programs. Both of these explanations are compatible with economic ideas as the interpretive lens through which IMF staff interpreted the state of the Kenyan economy during this period; and both explanations find some support in the IMF staff reports and Executive Board meeting minutes, which referenced Kenya's relatively favorable position in agricultural production for export, while simultaneously suggesting that efforts would need to be made toward the recovery of the industrial sector in the longer-term as funds for investment became available (IMF 1993c, 1996d).

The final thing worth noting about this latter period of sectoral policy-making in Kenya is that there is no clear evidence that the Fund's sectoral policy choices were driven by path dependence. While there were choices to continue to engage in the same agricultural sector activities that had been engaged in in the past, there is no indication that these choices were due to path dependent dynamics that incentivized continuity of focus or made the choice to diversify into other activities impossible because of past choices. In other words, there is no evidence in the material that IMF staff chose to continue to focus on agriculture only because that was what had been done before.

5.3 Evaluating alternative explanations

Neo-colonialism

In contrast to domestic interests and economic ideas, economic neo-colonialism fails to provide an adequate explanation for continuity in Kenyan sectoral strategies. The neo-colonial argument that continued focus on primary commodity extraction was a deliberate strategy pursued by former colonial and other Western powers through the IMF should, in theory, be evidenced by the promotion of those extractive activities by the representatives of former colonial and/or Western countries in IMF decision-making processes. However, though there were British (and other former colonial country) representatives among both the Board members and the staff involved in the program discussions, these representatives did not appear to be actively promoting a primary commodity export strategy. In fact, in the case of Kenya, the Executive Board representatives from the United Kingdom were among the most critical of the country's failure to more aggressively pursue economic diversification and reduce reliance on a limited number of primary commodities.

In the case of Kenya, several consecutive representatives from the United Kingdom expressed disappointment with both the level of ambition and pace of diversification and industrialization throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the 1990 Executive Director responded to Kenya's proposed framework by expressing a general concern that the "objectives of the program were not very ambitious" and emphasizing the need for Kenya to do more to expand its non-traditional exports, promote trade, and undertake more rapid structural reform (IMF 1990g, 8-10). Subsequent Executive Directors from the United Kingdom expressed similar sentiments in the following program years.

The above sentiments were not limited to Board members from the United Kingdom, and there was a general consensus amongst Executive Board members that the Kenyan authorities had not made satisfactory progress in terms of sectoral diversification and development over the course of the structural adjustment period. Another notably critical country was the United States, which has often been cited as one of Kenya's close economic and political partners. This dissatisfaction with continued reliance on cash crop exports on the part of Western Executive Directors is not consistent with the neo-colonial argument that Western governments promoted those sectors in African countries in order to maintain access to cheap primary commodities in the global market. More specifically, the vocal opposition of Western representatives to an overreliance on primary sectors weakens the neo-colonial argument because it suggests that representatives from the United Kingdom and other Western countries were actively promoting policies that ran counter to those you would expect to see in the case of neo-colonial influence.

The above analysis of neo-colonial interests assumes continuity of interests in primary commodity flows on the part of the former colonial powers. However, it is possible that the United Kingdom and other Western countries had other economic interests that led them to push for Kenyan diversification in the context of an increasingly globalized economy. In other words, it is possible that the United Kingdom and other Western countries expected trade benefits from Kenyan diversification and trade liberalization, prompting them to push for diversification rather than continued primary commodity production. An assessment of trade patterns between Kenya and Western countries over time suggest that these kinds of interests were likely not at play, as Kenya was becoming increasingly less important as a trading partner for Western countries, both leading up to and during the structural adjustment period.

For the United Kingdom, trade with Kenya accounted for less than 1% of total imports and exports at the time of independence in 1965, declining to approximately 0.25% of total import and export trade by the beginning of the structural adjustment period in 1986 (Figure 5.2). For the United States, often cited as being a strong political and economic ally of Kenya, trade with Kenya was even less important, accounting for significantly less than 0.25% of total imports and exports and declining for the entirety of the post-independence period (Figure 5.3). Trade between Kenya and the broader Euro Area was similarly low and declining during this period (Figure 5.4). These trends of low and declining levels of Kenyan-Western trade after Kenyan independence suggest that trade was likely not a strong enough interest for Western countries to push for any particular sectoral strategy in Kenya, further undermining the economic neo-colonialism hypothesis.



Figure 5.2 UK-Kenya trade, 1960-2000 (Source: IMF DOTS)



Figure 5.3 US-Kenya trade, 1960-2000 (Source: IMF DOTS)



Figure 5.4 Europe-Kenya trade, 1960-2000 (Source: IMF DOTS)

Structural conditions

There is also a general lack of evidence for structural conditions as an explanatory factor for sectoral policy choices in Kenya. While structural constraints, such as weather, were mentioned in some of the staff reports and program discussions, those constraints did not appear to have any consistent impact on sectoral policy choices across program years. In earlier program discussions, structural constraints were mentioned by the Kenyan representative on the Board, who referenced them primarily as a justification for why further progress hadn't been made under the program, rather than as a justification for sectoral policy choices themselves. Structural conditions also do not appear to have been an explicit consideration for IMF staff sectoral policy choices during the latter period of adjustment. While there was one mention of agricultural sector focus being necessary during latter program discussions, this comment was not directly linked to the inherent structural constraints of the country, instead appearing to be linked to the Fund's desire to pursue export-oriented development strategies in the country (IMF 1996d, 12).

5.4 Conclusion

The evidence outlined in this chapter suggests two distinct periods of sectoral policy formulation in Kenya during the structural adjustment period. The first period of structural adjustment from 1988 to 1991 was characterized by a large degree of Kenyan influence over sectoral policy choice and the use of that influence to pursue both sector-level and within-sector continuity in the agricultural sector. This overall continuity in agricultural sector policy can be explained by domestic political and economic interests in Kenya during this period. In the context of domestic political instability, patronage-based politics, and elite control of the economy, the Kenyan government had strong interests in maintaining the status quo in the economy's most important sectors for two reasons. The first of these reasons is that Kenya's domestic elite, many of whom held key power positions in the political and economic spheres, had entrenched interests in the existing economic structures of the country, driving a preference for the status quo among the elites responsible for negotiating and formulating economic policy.

The second explanation for the Kenyan government's preference for continuity in sectoral policies is that rapid reform had the potential to upset the Moi administration's delicate hold over power by reducing its ability to utilize patronage networks as a source of political capital. This was particularly true with regard to reforms aimed at restructuring and privatizing the productive resources held by the state, such as state-owned enterprises. Positions in, and control of, these enterprises had historically been used to reward elites loyal to the administration, making it impossible for Moi to deal with issues of corruption and inefficiency in these industries without undermining his support base. Removal of these resources from state control also seriously undermined Moi's ability to funnel resources to the regions and groups that provided the electoral support necessary to keep him in power. Put simply, the risks that rapid and aggressive sectoral reform posed to the Kenyan government's hold over power incentivized the pursuit of sectoral policies geared toward maintenance of existing agricultural sectoral structures.

It is worth stating explicitly here that, in the case of Kenya, both state interests and societal interests appear to have played a role in the choice of sectoral continuity. With regard to state interests, Kenya's political elite had a clear interest in maintaining control of agricultural sector resources to maintain the existing narrow elite power coalition and continued extraction of agricultural sector resources for personal wealth. With regard to societal interests, continuity in sectoral policy was driven by the government's need to maintain the electoral support of rural agricultural constituencies that formed the core of the government's support base. In the case of Kenya, then, societal influence fell primarily along regional lines, with the government extracting agricultural resources from certain regions and redistributing them to others. However, the urban, organized labor interests often highlighted in the literature do not appear to have been particularly influential in the case of Kenya. In other words, urban interest groups seem to have been largely side-lined in Kenya during this period, with the Moi administration prioritizing rural agricultural areas in the Rift Valley and other provinces as the beneficiaries of government sectoral policies.

The latter period of structural adjustment in Kenya from 1993 to 1998 was characterized by a weakening of Kenyan government influence over sectoral policy formulation following a breakdown in Kenyan-Fund relations and deterioration of domestic economic conditions. Kenya's loss of influence over sectoral policy-making during this latter period is attributable to several factors. The first is the loss of Kenya's geopolitical importance in the 1990s. Prior to this period, Kenya had enjoyed a privileged position due to its ideal location as a US military base in the context of the Cold Wars and Gulf Wars. With the end of these conflicts in the 1990s, Kenya became significantly less important geopolitically, undermining a main source of bargaining power with external donors.

This decline in geopolitical importance was accompanied by an increased reluctance on the part of bilateral donors, such as the United States and United Kingdom, to continue to lend to Kenya in the face of its increasingly poor performance in both the political and economic arenas. Finally, both of the above processes were compounded by the fact that the 1992-93 period in Kenya was characterized by the most acute economic crisis the country had ever experienced. Taken together, the above factors created a situation in which Kenya was in particularly dire need of financing and unable to obtain that financing elsewhere, reducing its bargaining power and making it necessary for the government to concede to Fund demands in order to resume ESAF lending.

During this latter period, the evidence suggests that IMF staff became the primary drivers of sectoral policy, pursuing continued focus on the agricultural sector as a whole, but shifting toward rapid and aggressive policies to reshape the structures within the agricultural sector in ways the Kenyan government had resisted in the previous period. The IMF staff's sectoral approach of sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity appears to have been driven by economic ideas about the correct policies for Kenya given the prevailing economic state of the country. Continued focus on the agricultural sector as a source of economic recovery appears to have been driven by economic ideas about outward-oriented and export-led development, while aggressive reforms within the agricultural sector appear to have been driven by economic ideas about the desirability of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization across all sectors of the economy.

6 The Gambia: A Case of Agricultural Sector Continuity

This chapter describes and explains continuity in agricultural sector policy in The Gambia in the structural adjustment period between 1986 and 1999. Sectoral policies were formulated primarily by The Gambian government in the early period of adjustment between 1986 and 1992. During this period of dominant Gambian influence, sectoral policies were characterized by continuity in focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and some degree of continuity in policy approaches *within* the agricultural sector itself. The Gambian authorities' choice of sectoral policies during this period can be understood primarily as the consequence of domestic political interests, with the Jawara administration favoring continuity and support of the agricultural sector given (1) its importance for large segments of the population upon whom they relied for electoral success and (2) the economic linkages between the Gambian state and certain agricultural sector institutions. However, in addition to domestic interests, the particularly strong structural constraints posed by The Gambia's narrow natural resource base were also a contributing factor in the choice to continue to focus primarily on the agricultural sector during this initial period of adjustment.

As in Kenya, Gambian influence over sectoral policy formulation weakened in the latter period of structural adjustment between 1998 and 1999 in the wake of a break between the Gambian government and the Fund and a period of military rule in The Gambia. In this latter period of weakened Gambian influence, IMF staff became the dominant decision-makers in the policy-formulation process, and sectoral policy was characterized by continuity in agricultural focus as a whole and relative discontinuity in policy approaches within the agricultural sector. There is some evidence that, during this period, IMF staff formulated sectoral policies based on economic ideas around outward-oriented, market-based development that privileged continued focus on agriculture as the country's most competitive sector, as well as reform within the agricultural sector to promote private sector-led production and activity. As in the earlier period of adjustment, The Gambia's narrow productive base continued to significantly constrain available policy choices during this period, contributing to the country's continued focus on agriculture and the pursuit of limited diversification within the agricultural sector.

6.1 Patterns in Gambian sectoral policy

Lending history and the introduction of structural adjustment

The Gambia began IMF structural adjustment in 1986 following over a decade of economic decline and instability. While the country had experienced modest economic growth and relative stability in the decade following independence, The Gambia began to experience economic deterioration beginning in the mid-1970s in the wake of a number of domestic and external developments (Edie 2000). Between 1975 and 1985, declining export revenues and rising government expenditure contributed to severe shortages of foreign exchange, substantial fiscal and external accounts deficits, skyrocketing inflation, and high unemployment, prompting the country to engage heavily in domestic and external borrowing to offset the effects of the economic crisis (Edie 2000).

Between 1977 and 1982, The Gambia engaged in three standby arrangements under the IMF's SBA facility. By 1983, however, international donors had begun to withdraw from the country as the government became increasingly unable to meets its debt service obligations. In 1984, the Gambian government entered into a stand-by agreement with the IMF that was cancelled the following year when it became clear that the government would be unable to meets its obligations under the agreement (Hughes and Perfect 2006, 38). The government developed its own reform program in the wake of the withdrawn stand-by arrangement, producing a four-year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in June of 1985. The domestic ERP was endorsed by the IMF, and The Gambia subsequently entered into its first structural adjustment agreement through the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) the following year in 1986.

The economy at the start of adjustment

The agricultural sector was the largest productive sector in The Gambia at the start of structural adjustment, employing over 50 percent of the country's workforce (Hughes and Perfect 2006, 30). Most agricultural production was comprised of groundnut production for export, with groundnut exports accounting for approximately 90 percent of the value of domestic exports as late as 1984 (Hughes and Perfect 2006, 33). A number of other agricultural crops including sorghum, millet, rice, and maize were grown on a much more limited basis for domestic consumption (CSAO-CILSS 2008, 7). In addition, the country had a small fisheries sector (CSAO-CILSS 2008, 8, Hughes and Perfect 2006, 33). With regard to the industrial sector, The Gambia had a small manufacturing sector that accounted for between 5 and 7 percent of GDP (Chitonge and Lawrence 2020, 880). Finally, The Gambia had a growing tourism industry that increasingly contributed to the country's GDP and foreign exchange earnings (Hughes and Perfect 2006, 35).

Trends in sectoral policy

Agricultural sector continuity

Structural adjustment in The Gambia was characterized by significant continuity in agricultural sector focus when compared to the colonial period, with focus on the agricultural sector as a source of economic growth remaining high in both the absolute and relative sense across the colonial and structural adjustment periods (Figure 6.1). This continuity of focus on agriculture during the structural adjustment period is reflected in the structural adjustment policy frameworks for The Gambia, all of which devoted significant attention to the sector as the country's primary source of growth and recovery. From 1986 to 1995, the country's policy frameworks all aimed to utilize agricultural sector activities as a primary source of economic recovery, focusing particular attention on restoring groundnut exports to their historically high levels and increasing production of other agricultural export crops (IMF 1986a, 1987a, 1988a, 1989a, 1990a, 1992a).

While they all shared a focus on promotion of agriculture, the within-sector policies outlined to achieve agricultural sector recovery and expansion differed over the 1986 to 1995 period. In 1986, within-sector policies for agriculture included increases in producer prices to promote production of groundnuts, reforms to input distribution and output marketing systems, and steps toward restructuring the agricultural credit system (IMF 1986a). Agricultural sector policies for the 1987 and 1988 programs were aimed at rationalizing the groundnut sector through phased elimination of groundnut subsidies, liberalization of domestic groundnut marketing, and studies to identify areas for improved efficiency of agricultural parastatals such as the Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB).



Figure 6.1 Absolute and relative focus by sector, The Gambia

In contrast to the previous period, during which pricing policies had been aimed at increasing producer prices for groundnuts, policies during 1987 and 1988 were aimed at reducing producer prices in order to eliminate government subsidization of groundnuts and improve the budgetary performance of the GPMB (IMF 1987a, 1988a). However, while they differed with regard to groundnut pricing policies, the policy frameworks from 1986-1988 shared the fact that agricultural sector policies involved some degree of continuity in areas related to government involvement in the groundnut sector. For example, the government continued to exercise control over producer prices for groundnuts, the country's major export marketing board—the GPMB—remained largely state-owned, and the government continued to play a significant role in agricultural input markets and services during this period of adjustment (IMF 1986a, 1987a, 1988a).

From 1989 to 1992, agricultural sector policies were aimed at further advancing liberalization and privatization in the agricultural sector. Some of the specific policies outlined to achieve these goals included the complete elimination of budgetary subsidies from the government to the GPMB, transfering of control over groundnut producer prices from the government to the GPMB, and a number of steps toward further integration of the private sector in groundnut marketing processes. While the above policies reduced the direct role of the Gambian government in the agricultural sector to some degree, the policies remained geared toward gradual movement toward complete liberalization and privatization. For example, the government continued to own the GPMB, as well as continuing to play a key role as a lender to crop marketing institutions such as the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) during this period (IMF 1989a, 1990a).

The 1992-95 policy framework involved agricultural sector policies aimed at encouraging further increases in efficiency in groundnut production, processing, and marketing; diversification into other cash crops; and continued expansion of food crops. The specific policies outlined to achieve these aims were the creation of an action plan for strengthening research and extension services, as well as rehabilitation of the GPMB's processing facilities and the placing of the GPMB for sale on the private market (IMF 1992a). This last policy choice was notable in that it signaled a shift by the government toward total privatization of at least one major agricultural parastatal.

In contrast to the period from 1986 to 1995, the 1998-99 policy frameworks, which were formulated after a break in Gambian-Fund relations between 1994 and 1998, were characterized by a continuing, but somewhat different substantive, focus on the agricultural sector. During this period, the programs' stated aims were to utilize the agricultural sector as a means of increasing domestic rural incomes, ensuring domestic food security, and generating incremental export earnings. These objectives differed from those of the earlier period in that they focused on agriculture as a means of addressing both domestic and export needs, rather than being focused predominantly on exports, as well as placing significantly more emphasis on agricultural diversification than the previous programs.

The policies outlined to achieve the above agricultural sector objectives included continuing to implement market-based pricing policies for all agricultural inputs and outputs; strengthening local governments, community groups, farmers' organizations, and women's groups to take charge of irrigation systems and local infrastructure; promoting the production and marketing of high-value products such as fruits and vegetables for urban, tourist, and export markets; establishing a conducive environment for the development of rural financial systems; and rehabilitating the groundnut sector through maintaining producer prices, improving extension services and input access, and liquidation of the traditionally important Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) (IMF 1998a, 1999a). The above policies were somewhat more radical than those of the previous period in that they involved more intensive and widespread promotion of non-traditional agricultural activities and more aggressively targeted institutional reforms in areas such as agricultural credit.

Industrial sector discontinuity

In contrast to agriculture, the structural adjustment period in The Gambia was characterized by discontinuity of focus on the industrial sector when compared with the colonial period, with significantly more attention devoted to the industrial sector in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period (Figure 6.1). In the case of the industrial sector, focus fluctuated significantly over the structural adjustment period, with very high levels of focus on the sector between 1989 and 1991 and lower levels of focus for the remainder of the structural adjustment period (Figure 6.1). In 1986, the policy framework's industrial sector policies were aimed at promoting export-oriented industrial development as a source of employment and foreign exchange earnings through enhanced investment incentives and tariff reform (IMF 1986a). From 1987 to 1988, the policy frameworks outlined similar industrial sector policies that included revision of the investment code to stimulate further domestic and external investment in industry, government promotion of expanded industrial sector lending by commercial banks, and strengthening of institutional support systems for small-scale enterprises (IMF 1987a, 1988a).

From 1989 to 1991, the policy frameworks outlined industrial policies aimed at using industrial sector activity to diversify the productive sector and generate employment and foreign exchange earnings. The within-sector policies outlined to achieve these objectives included government promotion of joint ventures between foreign and Gambian business actors; continued involvement of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development (MEPID) and the National Investment Board (NIB) in preparing, promoting, and monitoring industrial sector projects; and government preparation of a plan for administrative action and investment promotion for an industrial estate to further stimulate industrial sector activity (IMF 1989a, 1990a). The next period's policy framework covering the 1992-95 period saw pared down sectoral policies for the industrial sector, with the program outlining a limited number of actions aimed at continuing to promote opportunities for private sector investment and entrepreneurial activities (IMF 1992a). The 1998-99 program saw the lowest focus on the industrial sector of the structural adjustment period, with the only stated industrial sector objective being to foster private investment in export-oriented activities in the context of a single industrial sector project called the Gateway project through legal and regulatory reform (IMF 1998a, 1999a).

Absence of extractive sector focus

Extractive sector focus in The Gambia was higher in the structural adjustment period than the colonial period. However, overall focus on the extractive sector remained low during the structural adjustment period, only being given a small amount of attention for part of the structural adjustment period (Figure 5.1). Extractive sector policies for The Gambia were only included in the 1989-91 policy framework, which outlined a number of ways in which extractive sector activities had the potential to contribute to further economic growth and/or recovery in The Gambia. Policies that referred to the extractive sector included allocation of funds to projects in the natural resource sector, revision of the Development Act to provide tax incentives for investments in mining and quarrying, and actions to encourage joint domestic-foreign ventures to exploit The Gambia's titaniferous sands (IMF 1989a, 1990a). Extractive sector focus fell out of the policy frameworks after the 1989-1991 program, suggesting continuing lack of focus on the extractive sector overall.

6.2 Explaining sectoral policy choices in The Gambia

Gambian state agency and agricultural sector continuity, 1986-92

The 1986-88 negotiations

The early period of structural adjustment beginning in 1986 was characterized by a significant degree of Gambian state influence over sectoral policy choice, and the use of that influence to pursue policies aimed at (1) continued prioritization of the agricultural sector as a source of economic recovery and growth and (2) continuity in certain agricultural sector areas, such as government involvement in the groundnut sector and a predominant focus on groundnut production compared to other crops. The first piece of evidence pointing to Gambian government control over the policy formation process lies in the fact that the 1986 IMF Staff Report explicitly framed the priorities of the program as those of the Gambian government and the program itself as one that was being set forward by the Gambian authorities. IMF staff specifically pointed to Gambian control over sectoral policy in this round of policy formulation, stating that the Gambian authorities attached "major importance to measures to stimulate the agricultural sector, and, in particular, the groundnut sector, in view of its key role in the growth and export earning potential of the economy" (IMF 1986b, 19). The fact that IMF staff presented the outlined sectoral policies as the priorities of the Gambian government suggests a dominant role for the Gambian authorities as sectoral policy-makers during this initial period of structural adjustment.

However, while the above suggests that the Gambian authorities were primarily responsible for formulating sectoral policies during this period, there is also evidence to suggest that the Gambian government's continued focus on the agricultural sector and plans for only limited and long-term industrialization were relatively uncontroversial for the Fund due to the structural constraints of the country. This is evidenced by the fact that the constraints imposed by the Gambia's small resource base were explicitly highlighted as a challenge and potential impediment to development by IMF staff, Gambian representatives, and a significant number of Executive Board members in the Staff Reports and Executive Board discussions. For example, in the 1986 Staff Report, IMF staff highlighted that the constraints posed by the small resource base of the economy and the uncertain prospects for rapid output growth and diversification in the short-term necessitated the use of policies to control aggregate demand as a substantial aspect of the adjustment program (IMF 1986b, 13), suggesting an belief on the part of the IMF staff that the natural resource constraints of the country were a significant impediment to rapid and extensive diversification away from groundnuts and other agricultural goods.

The role of resource constraints in driving sectoral policies is also evidenced by the fact that the sectoral policies put forward and discussed in the Staff Reports and Executive Board meetings were often discussed explicitly in terms of working within structural constraints and diversifying primarily within the agricultural and fisheries sectors. For example, in 1987, one Executive Director discussed the program's modest export expansion projections in terms of the country's structural constraints, assuming that the projections "reflected the structural constraints faced by the country" (IMF 1987g, 12). The Gambia's representative on the Board similarly framed the government's prioritization of agriculture in terms of the country's narrow productive base, stating that The Gambia was a small country whose growth prospects were constrained by a limited resource endowment before outlining the government's plans to stimulate agricultural production as the main means of economic recovery (IMF 1988m, 22). Though there was some discussion of growth in sectors such as manufacturing and tourism, it was acknowledged that the narrow resource base and current conditions of the economy meant that agriculture would remain the mainstay of the economy in the short- to medium-term and that diversification into other activities would occur mostly in the longer-term (IMF 1986b, c).

While there appears to have been relative consensus about the fact that diversification would be slow and that continued agricultural dependence would be necessary in the short to medium-term in The Gambia, there is also some evidence of divergent preferences between the Fund and the Gambian authorities over the exact pace and content of sectoral reform, particularly with regard to diversification within the agricultural sector. For example, in Executive Board discussions of the 1986 policy framework, Executive Directors pointed out that, while groundnut sector recovery was crucial, the country's narrow resource base made it necessary to promote more diversified growth into other sectors such as fisheries and tourism (IMF 1986c, 12). The following year, the Fund's Managing Director opened the program discussions by pointing out that there was a consensus among Board members that "major but cautious efforts should be made in the next few years to diversify agricultural production, for example, into horticulture, as the agricultural sector [would] remain the most important source of growth in the foreseeable future" (IMF 1987g, 4). During the Executive Board discussion that followed this opening statement, other Executive Directors highlighted that diversification of the export base would be crucial in the longer term and that they expected additional measures to diversify exports into areas like fisheries, horticulture, and tourism in the following year's program (IMF 1987g).

In 1988, several Executive Board members pointed out an absence of measures aimed at achieving the above diversification of the export base in the proposed policy framework (IMF 1988m). One Executive Director drew attention to this in relation to the need for further structural reform in the Gambian economy, stating:

> Perhaps the most important challenge facing The Gambia at the present juncture is how to promote economic diversification, particularly in agriculture. A number of significant reforms are contemplated by the authorities in this sector, but there appear to be very few measures in the program directed specifically at diversification. I would be interested to know whether the staff believes that by the end of the program period, the productive and export bases of The Gambia's economy will be significantly more diversified than they currently are (IMF 1988m, 28).

In response, IMF staff representatives suggested that the absence of concrete and direct measures in this area was due to the Gambian government's moderate diversification objectives and preference for allowing broader macroeconomic and structural reforms to indirectly facilitate development in other sectors over time, acknowledging that, even if diversification outputs were met, the economy would remain extremely vulnerable at the end of the adjustment period (IMF 1988m, 41-42). The above discussion suggests that, in at least this area, the preferences of the Gambian authorities were the deciding factor in determining both the content and speed of diversification approaches in the productive sectors.

In contrast to the Fund, who demonstrated clear preferences for diversified agricultural sector activity, the Gambian government demonstrated a clear preference for continued focus on the groundnut sector during this same period. The Gambian government's prioritization of groundnut production is most clearly evidenced by their decision to provide a large amount of direct financial support to the groundnut industry in 1986. This decision was discussed in the 1986 Staff Report and Board discussion, where it was noted that the government had subsidized the groundnut sector through large transfers to the Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) to offset the effects of declining global groundnut prices and higher producer prices domestically (IMF 1986b, 30). IMF staff noted that the authorities had deemed this action necessary given the importance of the sector, pointed out the allegedly temporary nature of the subsidy, and noted that the authorities had put forward plans to review pricing and marketing arrangements in the groundnut sector with a view towards eliminating government support in the following year (IMF 1986b, 30). These discussions around government support of the GPMB suggest a clear preference on the part of the Gambian government for continued promotion of groundnut production and continued state involvement in the groundnut sector.

The Gambian government's apparent push to support the GPMB and groundnut sector in 1986 and its demonstrated preference for slower processes of diversification overall are telling when viewed in the context of the domestic political environment of The Gambia. From its inception in the latter years of colonial rule, The Gambia's dominant political party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), had been a primarily rural party. Having begun as the Protectorate People's Party, both its leaders and its core supporters were located in rural areas of the country. In fact, The Gambia's first president, Dawda K. Jawara, was a member of the rural Mandinka elite who had been elected as leader of the PPP in order to ensure that political power wasn't transferred to the urban elite at independence (Hughes and Perfect 2008). Following independence, Jawara and the PPP made a concerted effort to bring opposition groups into the dominant party through political patronage, pursuing rural development projects and providing positions in government and state-owned enterprises to elites from other parties.

In doing so, the government was able to consolidate power throughout much of the country. However, the PPP remained largely a rural party, and the bulk of the government's opposition was found in urban areas in and around the capital of Banjul (Hughes and Perfect 2006). Given that the base of the government's support was located in rural agricultural areas, the government arguably had a strong incentive to continue to prioritize the promotion of agricultural sector activity overall. This incentive was arguably strongest in the groundnut sector, given that groundnuts were the major cash crop and accounted for the majority of cultivated land and agricultural production in the country (Hughes and Perfect 2008).

The Gambian government's strong preferences for continued agricultural (and groundnut) sector development in 1986 specifically can perhaps be explained by the particular electoral pressures faced by the government in the leadup to the 1987 elections. In 1986, two new political parties, The Gambian People's Party (GPP) and the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), emerged to challenge president Jawara and the dominant PPP. The PDOIS platform was based on a belief in heavy state involvement in economic development and the rejection of neo-liberal market reforms, and support for the party was largely confined to urban areas (Edie 2000, 165). Notably, the emergence of PDOIS was linked to discontent over the effects of structural adjustment on urban populations through measures such as civil service retrenchment and privatization of public enterprises.

In contrast to the PDOIS, the GPP's platform was more closely aligned with the PPP and appealed broadly to rural constituents in up-river areas of the country (Wiseman 1987, 286-287).[40] When PDOIS and GPP were created, they joined two existing opposition parties, The United Party (UP) and the National Convention Party (NCP), in Gambia's political arena. UP was an urban-based opposition party with limited support that was confined to the urban areas in and around Banjul (Edie 2000). The NCP was a rural party that relied upon the support of rural Mandinka communities and enjoyed significant support in certain rural areas of the country (Edie 2000).

The emergence of PDOIS and GPP in 1986 meant that the Jawara government was facing political opposition from four political parties in the leadup to the 1987 elections, which marked a significant increase in political competition when compared to previous elections. The emergence of these two parties also followed several years of increasingly vocal domestic criticism against the regime for alleged corruption and excessive use of patronage by Jawara and his administration (Hughes and Perfect 2006, 198). Opposition to the regime was strong enough during this period to result in a failed coup attempt in 1981, prompting a

[40] The GPP were, in fact, a splinter group that had left the PPP over internal disagreements.

concerted effort by Jawara to consolidate his rule, both politically and militarily, as the 1980s progressed (Edie 2000, Hughes and Perfect 2006).

Given the prevailing political conditions, The Gambia's opposition parties arguably posed a risk to Jawara and the PPP, having the potential to appeal to constituencies for whom IMF sectoral policies might have been particularly sensitive. In the case of the PDOIS's primarily urban constituency, aggressive IMF-led reform had the potential to provoke anti-interventionist and anti-neoliberal backlash. However, given that the PDOIS enjoyed only limited popularity in urban areas of the country that had never formed the base of PPP support, the influence of PDOIS on sectoral policy was likely limited. Concrete evidence of PDOIS' lack of influence is found in the fact that they won only 1.05 percent of votes in the 1987 election (Edie 2000, 166).[41]

In contrast, the GPP and NCP were competing directly with the PPP for rural votes from farmers whose livelihoods were tied to the agricultural sector, and who might have felt the effects of rapid changes to that sector. Within this context, it makes some sense that the Gambian authorities would push for continuity and continued support of the groundnut and agricultural sectors in order to continue to appeal to these rural constituencies in the face of increased competition for their votes. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that all four existing opposition parties stood against Jawara and the PPP in the 1987 elections. While Jawara was re-elected and the PPP returned as the dominant political party, the GPP and the NCP won approximately 44 percent of votes (Edie 2000, 166). Further support for this interpretation can be found in the fact that the chief Gambian negotiator for the 1986 to 1988 programs was Minister of Finance and Trade, Sheriff Sisay, who was a career politician, member of the PPP from independence, and long-time associate of Jawara, all of which incentivized policy choices that would secure the political status quo in the country (Hughes and Perfect 2006).[42]

[41] More generally, The Gambia lacked a strong organized labor movement to advocate for urban workers' interests with regard to structural adjustment policies. Given this, there was little organized opposition to structural adjustment. The limited protest to adjustment that did occur was limited to students in high schools and a teacher training college (Cooke and Hughes 1997, 102-103).

[42] Sisay was a member of the PPP, under which he held a number of government positions between 1960 and 1968 before being expelled from the party following conflict with Jawara. He was readmitted to the PPP by Jawara in 1972 and appointed Minister of Finance and Trade in 1982. He would serve in this position until his death in 1989. Sisay was from an chiefly Mandinka family of the Niamina region and an elite member of Gambian society (Hughes and Perfect 2006).

The 1989-90 negotiations

Like the 1986-1988 programs, the 1989 and 1990 IMF program reports and Executive Board discussions were characterized by Executive Board members stating their preferences for faster sectoral diversification, while simultaneously signaling acceptance of The Gambia's particularly difficult structural constraints. In the 1989 Executive Board meeting, one Executive Director pointed out that the Gambian authorities should be aware that the pace of sectoral reforms could be accelerated, going on to state that diversifying the economic base would be critical given the country's high reliance on the groundnut sector (IMF 1989k, 22). Another Executive Director expressed a similar sentiment, stating that "in view of the continued great vulnerability of the country's external position, there was a clear need for the authorities to step up their efforts to diversify production and exports" (IMF 1989k, 23). These statements were supported by other Executive Directors who suggested that efforts at diversification would need to be strengthened under the next year's arrangement, expressed concern over the lack of diversification and its destabilizing effects on the economy, and stressed the need for further government investment in the agricultural sector and more efficient use of resources given the country's dependence on agriculture and the need to diversify its structure (IMF 1989k).

In the 1990 Executive Board discussions the following year, Executive Directors explicitly questioned the extent to which the previous programs had actually resulted in diversification, and IMF staff representatives responded by acknowledging that agriculture would continue to be the economy's predominant activity despite several years of adjustment (IMF 1990j, 36). Another (unnamed) speaker noted that it would have been desirable to have a more detailed discussion of the sectoral programs in the framework for the year, as they had important bearing on the medium-term prospects of The Gambia's economy (IMF 1990j, 37). Finally, other Executive Directors urged the authorities to do more to promote export diversification through actions such as updating legislation and making faster progress in public enterprise divestiture (IMF 1990j). The above comments by Board members suggest a preference for more aggressive diversification measures than were actually pursued during this period.

While the above discussions signal some concern over diversification during this period, the 1990 Executive Board discussions were also characterized by general praise for the Gambian authorities' achievements in the face of difficult external conditions and domestic constraints, with several Executive Directors remarking that The Gambia had been relatively successful in their reform efforts overall (IMF 1990j). It is worth noting that this praise was primarily for macroeconomic achievements, with Executive Directors suggesting that those achievements would need be accompanied by more structural and sectoral reforms in the coming years (IMF 1990j). This supports the interpretation that The Gambian authorities were still driving sectoral policy in particular during this period and were moving somewhat slowly with regard to certain aspects of it, despite an absence of overt conflict over sectoral policies between the authorities and the Executive Board.

The 1990 program discussions were particularly significant because they represented the Gambia's last year of adjustment under the SAF/ESAF and the achievement of external viability in the eyes of the Fund. In 1992, The Gambian authorities sought the help of the IMF and the World Bank to extend the 1991 policy framework and requested Fund monitoring of the resulting three-year policy framework. The 1992-95 policy framework did not entail a loan disbursement from the ESAF. However, the Policy Framework Paper was developed through the same negotiation process and discussed and approved at the IMF Executive Board like previous SAF/ESAF loans. These March 1992 consultations between the IMF and Gambian authorities took place just before the April general elections, during which Jawara was again re-elected and the PPP again emerged as the dominant political party in an election marred by accusations of fraud, discriminatory voter registration practices, and vote buying (Edie 2000, 169-171).

Conflict and breakdown in relations, 1992-1995

Discussions of the 1992-95 policy framework at the Executive Board highlight some level of continued Fund discontent with the government's approach to sectoral reform and diversification. One Executive Director noted that the Gambian authorities had been quicker to deal with macroeconomic stabilization than with other reforms, referencing their slow progress on liberalization, privatization, and addressing management issues in the agricultural sector (IMF 1992c, 7-8). Another Executive Director questioned the continued existence of the Gambian Produce Marketing Board (GPMB), suggesting that it should perhaps be closed to avoid further financial support of the marketing board by the government in the future (IMF 1992c, 21-22). The IMF staff representative's response that the government would consider liquidation if they could not find a buyer (IMF 1992c, 25) suggests some reluctance on the part of the Gambian authorities to restructure existing agricultural structures, particularly in the groundnut sector.

The apparent reluctance on the part of the Gambian authorities to close the GPMB is telling given its historical significance in the country. The GPMB had been created through the restructuring of the Gambian Oil-Seed Marketing Board[43] in 1973 and exercised monopolies over both agricultural input imports and domestic crop exports for much of the post-colonial period (Akinboade 1994, 44). Through this monopoly, the Gambian government was able to exercise direct control over pricing and subsidies for agricultural goods. Because the GPMB was state-owned, the Gambian government was also able to utilize the resources of the marketing board to consolidate power through allocating funds and jobs to supporters of the regime. This process was further facilitated by the fact that the GPMB received preferential access to credit from the Central Bank, allowing it to borrow heavily to cover costs during periods of subsidization of agricultural inputs and activity (McNamara 1992, 287).

Given the central role of the GPMB in the predominantly agricultural economy of The Gambia, as well as its close links to the Gambian state, it is somewhat puzzling that the authorities agreed to privatize the marketing board in the 1992-95 policy framework. However, while privatization does not seem particularly consistent with domestic interests, the fact that the government refused liquidation and continued to be involved in the operations of the GPMB after privatization suggests that the government may have been willing to privatize only because of their expectation that they would be able to continue to utilize the GPMB in similar ways as they had in the past after it had been privatized.[44] In this context then, the authorities' resistance to complete liquidation suggests a desire to maintain existing agricultural sector institutions and the resources they offered.

Despite the above divergence in preferences for agricultural sector policies, The Gambia's overall reform progress appears to have been sufficient enough to warrant significant praise from the Executive Board during this period. This is

[43] The Gambia Oil-Seed Marketing Board was, in turn, established during the colonial period (Williams 1953).
[44] For example, the government remained a shareholder after privatization and used this position to influence prices for groundnuts (IMF 1999b).

evidenced by the fact that a number of Executive Directors stated their belief that The Gambia had been committed to reform and had been somewhat of a model performer in structural adjustment in the region. For example, one Executive Director noted that The Gambia had been successful at implementing a broad range of financial and structural reforms since the middle of the 1980s, welcomed the fact that it was not deemed necessary to continue to lend to The Gambia under the ESAF at this point, and stated that the Gambian economy had "become something of a model for the rest of West Africa" (IMF 1992c, 24). The above comments suggest an overall satisfaction with Gambian adjustment efforts, despite the differences in preferences with regard to the pace of diversification and exact content of certain agricultural sector policies.

In the year that followed these initial 1992-95 program discussions, economic conditions in The Gambia deteriorated in the face of sharply deteriorating terms of trade and rapidly declining reexports (IMF 1998b). During the same period, domestic political opposition to the Jawara government grew in response to discontent with the government's conduct in the 1992 elections and growing perceptions of government corruption. Following the election, Jawara's government was implicated in a number of corruption scandals, one of which was directly linked to agricultural sector structures. More specifically, in the period immediately following the 1992 elections, newly appointed vice-president Saihou Sabally (who had previously been Minister of Finance) and a number of other senior Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU) officials were publicly linked to the misappropriation of GCU funds for personal benefit (Saine 2009, 25). This scandal was made public in the media, and the public's reaction to the scandal was made worse by the fact that there was a lack of clear response from Jawara when the allegations were brought to light (Saine 2009, 25).

Domestic political conditions continued to deteriorate in the following years; and in July 1994, Gambian National Army soldiers led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh overthrew Jawara's government and seized control of the Gambian state in a military coup (Wiseman 1996, 918). In the following years of military rule, donor assistance to the government was suspended and IMF involvement in structural adjustment put on hold. In their negotiations with the military government, Western powers and IFIs indicated that they would not resume economic relationships with The Gambia until it had returned to democratic rule, pressuring the military government to accept a two-year timetable for a democratic transition in 1995 (Saine 2009, 32). The transition to democracy was officially completed in 1997; and in 1998, The Gambia approached the IMF with a request for another structural adjustment arrangement under the ESAF, beginning another round of negotiations and policy formulation.

Weakened Gambian influence and within-sector discontinuity, 1998-99

The conditions under which the 1998 program negotiations took place were markedly different from those that had prevailed during the initial years of structural adjustment. While the country had officially returned to democracy with a constitutional referendum and presidential election in 1996, the re-established democracy retained significant aspects of the political repression of the previous military regime. In the years following Jammeh's election as president, his government had retained military decrees that allowed for the suppression of opposition members through arbitrary arrests, detention, and harassment, drawing international condemnation and criticism in the process (Hughes 2000). The country was also facing a severe economic crisis after several years of economic instability under the post-coup government.

While acknowledging that the newly elected government had made significant progress toward restoring economic stability and establishing the foundations for further economic growth, both IMF staff and Executive Board members demonstrated considerably less confidence in the Gambian authorities' ability to commit to and achieve reform during the 1998 and 1999 discussions. This is evidenced by the fact that both IMF staff and the Executive Board devoted a significant amount of attention to ensuring a comprehensive, staff-approved program that Gambian officials at all levels had agreed to abide by. During the program discussions, Executive Board members stressed the need for full political support for the program at the domestic level, with one Executive Director stating that "he wanted to stress that an ESAF program could only succeed when it was supported at all political levels [and that] in the case of The Gambia, it should also be supported at the presidential level" (IMF 1998g, 12). IMF staff responded to these concerns by informing the Board that they had taken the deliberate step of discussing the program with the Gambian president, assuring them that "he had explicitly expressed his full support for implementing all the measures envisaged" (IMF 1998g, 14). The discussions of IMF staff and Board members around comprehensive staff-approved programs suggest significantly less influence and autonomy for the Gambian government in the lending process during this latter period of adjustment.

Reduced confidence in the ability of the Gambian government to independently pursue reform is further evidenced by statements by Executive Board members encouraging the "tough line" taken by IMF staff in response to performance setbacks in The Gambia during this period (IMF 1999e, 86). One setback that drew enormous criticism during this two-year period was the 1998 seizure of the property of a major groundnut marketing monopoly, the Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC), by the Gambian authorities (IMF 1999b, 3). The GGC was created in 1993 when the previously state-owned Gambia Oilseeds Processing and Marketing Company (GOPMAC) was purchased by a Swiss company. With the purchase, the previously government-owned monopoly for groundnut marketing was replaced by the privately-owned GGC as the main marketer of groundnuts. However, while the GGC had been privatized, there were no accompanying reforms in the sector related to agricultural marketing, and the government continued to subsidize groundnut producer prices by incurring debts to the GGC throughout the latter half of the 1990s. In 1999, the government attempted to negotiate with the GGC for use of its groundnut processing plant for a new groundnut marketing company; and when these negotiations were unsuccessful, the government seized the plant without compensating the GGC (IMF 1999b, 11).

The Fund responded to the Gambian government's seizure of GGC assets by suspending the country's midterm review, preventing them from receiving the Funds owed under the second year of the ESAF arrangement. Lending under the ESAF was not resumed until the authorities had taken a number of actions to resolve the issue with the GGC. In addition to these steps, The Gambian government was also required to take corrective actions in other areas where there had been policy slippages such as budgetary overruns (IMF 1999b). The strict disciplinary steps taken by the Fund in the face of policy slippages by the Gambian government suggest more staff control over the reform process in The Gambia than in the previous period, as well as an unwillingness on the part of the Fund to allow the Gambian government any degree of flexibility to pursue domestic interests in sectoral policy during this latter period of adjustment.

One notable pattern with regard to sectoral policy during this period is that, with the exception of the Fund's reaction to the incident with the GGC, discussions of sectoral policy were largely absent from the staff reports and Executive Board discussions during this latter period of adjustment. Sectoral policies were, however, still very much present in the Policy Framework Papers, raising the question of why they were included in the programs but not explicitly discussed by the Fund as they had been in previous years. One explanation for this lack of discussion is that there was already consensus around sectoral policies during this period, making them uncontroversial and discussion of them unnecessary. This explanation appears to be supported by the fact that, to the extent that sectoral policy was discussed in these latter program years, there seems to be little evidence of significant disagreement over it. There were brief mentions of the need for further efforts to rehabilitate the agricultural sector going forward given its importance for production and export, with Executive Directors pointing out the importance of keeping producer prices in line with world market prices and developing a commercially-managed credit system (IMF 1998g).

However, while the above comments suggest the belief that there was room for improvement in agricultural sector policies moving forward, the comments were not explicitly critical of the government's progress in agricultural adjustment, nor were they explicitly critical of the policies that had been put forward for the sector. It is likely that this lack of disagreement over policies can be attributed to declining Gambian influence in determining the programs and the stepping in of IMF staff to design sectoral policies, making them less likely to be criticized by the Board. This interpretation is supported by another notable change in this latter period of adjustment, which was a shift toward more aggressive reforms aimed at diversification and private sector development. While the policy frameworks of the late 1980s to early 1990s had included some measures for movement toward more diversified production, the measures involved under the 1998-99 programs were more ambitious and included more specific policy actions aimed at diversifying production, both within and outside of agriculture. The 1998-99 programs also involved more aggressive steps to promote private sector-based development in agricultural areas such as agricultural credit provision.

The above outward-oriented, market-based reforms were in line with the recommendations of the Fund in the earlier period of Gambian structural adjustment, during which IMF staff and Executive Board members had repeatedly pushed for private sector-based and diversified economic activity. They were also consistent with prevailing neo-liberal economic ideas, lending some support to the interpretation that IMF staff made sectoral policy decisions based on economic ideas during this period. For example, in the 1998 Staff Report, IMF staff explicitly acknowledged that outward-oriented private sector development and economic diversification were seen as core strategies for achieving economic stability and growth in the country (IMF 1998b, 13). This perhaps suggests a belief on the part of IMF staff that export-oriented, diversified (mostly agricultural) production was the appropriate way to achieve the desired economic outcomes in The Gambia.

With the exception of the discussions around the GGC and brief mentions of diversification, sectoral policy was absent from program discussions in the latter years of Gambia adjustment, making it difficult to definitively determine whether economic ideas were a driving factor in sectoral policy choice. However, a cross-case comparison with Kenya highlights similarities in policy choice that suggest an adherence to common policy instruments across the two cases on the part of IMF staff. In both countries, IMF staff and Executive Board members highlighted market-based, outward-oriented strategies as forming the core of the programs, perhaps suggesting a consistent, ideas-based approach to promoting recovery and growth in both countries. These similarities across the two cases thus provide some further support for economic ideas as a factor in IMF sectoral policy choice in the latter period of adjustment in both Kenya and The Gambia.

This interpretation is further supported by the fact that these outward-oriented, market-based policy approaches were consistent with the general policy prescriptions for African countries outlined in IMF policy briefs and working papers on the region. Fund publications on Africa during this period explicitly outlined that IMF policies in the region emphasized policies aimed at achieving greater scope for market forces (Patel 1992, 66), facilitating the opening up of African economies to the world market (Dhonte et al. 1993, 8), and promoting growth in both traditional export commodities and non-traditional agricultural and light manufactured goods through an "enabling environment" for investment and economic activity (Baban and Greene 1992, 41). The fact that the objectives of the policy frameworks outlined for The Gambia and Kenya during the latter period of adjustment directly echoed the above prescriptions in their focus on increased economic openness, facilitation of market-based and private sector-oriented activity, and diversification away from traditional exports suggests an alignment with prevailing ideas at the Fund about the appropriate policy instruments for developing African economies.

A final note on sectoral policy choices in the latter period of adjustment in The Gambia is that, as in Kenya, there is no clear evidence that path dependent dynamics played an explanatory role in IMF staff's policy choices. In this latter period of adjustment, there was an acknowledgement by IMF staff that the country would continue to engage some of the same activities (i.e., agricultural production generally and groundnut production specifically) as they had in previous periods of development. However, there is no evidence that the country's previous choice to engage in such activities had an independent impact on this decision. In fact, the focus on the existing structural constraints of the country suggests that it was those factors, and not earlier sectoral policy choices, that drove the continued focus on the agricultural sector during this period.

6.3 Neo-colonialism as an explanatory factor

There is no evidence to suggest neo-colonialism as an explanatory factor for sectoral development policies in The Gambia. As in Kenya, representatives from the United Kingdom and other Western countries were often the most critical of sectoral strategies that facilitated continued narrow dependence on The Gambia's traditional groundnut sector. They were also often the most forceful in pushing The Gambia to diversify their economic production and exports. For example, the Executive Directors from the United Kingdom and the United States were especially vocal about their preference for as rapid a diversification process as possible in the 1987 Executive Board discussions, with the Executive Director from the United States explicitly stating that she expected "implementation of additional measures to diversify The Gambia's exports in the fisheries and tourism sectors, as well as further measures to expand the agricultural sector, including horticulture" in the following year's program (IMF 1987g, 13-14). Similarly, the United Kingdom's representative stated that the Gambian government needed to continue to seek to diversify their export revenue sources and pointed out that diversification into new agricultural activities, fisheries, and tourism needed to be central to those efforts (IMF 1987g, 8).

The above policy stances in favor of more rapid diversification and expansion of the economic base are not particularly consistent with the neo-colonial hypothesis if we assume that neo-colonial interests were incompatible with any level and form of diversification. However, given that diversification in The Gambia was expected to take place primarily within the agricultural sector, it is arguably possible that this form of diversification could still serve Western interests by providing access to a broader range of primary commodities. An assessment of Gambian trade patterns over time suggests that these kinds of trade interests were likely not at play, as The Gambia was an insignificant trading partner for the United Kingdom and for developed European countries more broadly from the time of independence through the structural adjustment period.

For the United Kingdom, trade with The Gambia accounted for less than 0.05% of total import and export trade from the time of independence in 1965, declining even further to less than 0.01% of total import and export trade by the end of the structural adjustment period (Figure 6.2). For the Euro Area as a whole, trade with The Gambia accounted for less than 0.1% of total import and export trade for the entirety of the post-colonial period between 1965 and 2000 (IMF DOTS). Given the negligible amount of Gambia-United Kingdom trade specifically, and Gambia-Western trade more generally, it seems unlikely that the trade-related economic interests outlined in neo-colonial theory played any role in determining structural adjustment sectoral strategies in the country.



Figure 6.2 UK-Gambia trade, 1960-2000 (Source: IMF DOTS)

6.4 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter illustrates that policy formulation in the structural adjustment period in The Gambia was characterized by two periods during which the drivers of sectoral policy choices differed to some extent. Between 1986 and 1992, there is evidence to suggest that the Gambian government exercised significant influence over sectoral policy-making, using that influence to pursue policies geared toward continued focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and continuity in certain structures within the agricultural sector itself. The Gambian government's pursuit of agricultural sector continuity during this period can be attributed primarily to domestic political pressures in the form of an increasingly competitive and critical electoral environment.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, intensifying party opposition and public criticism of the government created incentives for long-time president Jawara and his inner circle of PPP politicians to maintain continuity in the country's all-important agricultural sector in order to maintain power. Given the dependence of The Gambia's overwhelmingly rural population on the agricultural sector generally, and the groundnut sector more specifically, rapid reform had the potential to provoke discontent among a population the Jawara government depended upon for electoral success. The evidence suggests that The Gambian government advocated for continued government support for groundnuts and agriculture during a period when emerging opposition parties provided an increasing number of alternatives for those who might become disillusioned with the Jawara government. In the case of The Gambia, then, broad societal pressures in the form of rural agricultural producers who formed the government's base of support were the primary explanatory factor for agricultural sector continuity. This pattern is consistent with the fact that The Gambia was a relatively well-functioning, multi-party democracy, which meant that the ruling party and president had much to lose from policies that disadvantaged the electorate.

The early period of Gambian state influence over sectoral policy came to a close with the 1994 coup and transition to military rule in The Gambia, and the latter period of Gambian structural adjustment from 1998 to 1999 was characterized by weakening Gambian state influence and increasing IMF staff influence in sectoral policy formulation. The erosion of Gambian state influence over the sectoral policy formulation process in this latter period was arguably due to a decline in Gambian state bargaining power in the context of two developments. The first was an increased need for financing as the economy began to experience more acute crisis following 1992. The second was the inability of The Gambian government to secure financing from alternative sources, as bilateral donors refused to lend to the non-democratic military government following the 1994 coup. Combined, the country's acute economic crisis and lack of alternative funding sources meant that The Gambian government lacked bargaining power with the Fund and found itself needing to adhere to Fund recommendations in order to obtain desperately needed financial assistance from the ESAF in 1998 and 1999.

During the period of dominant IMF staff influence over policy-making, IMF staff put forward sectoral policies characterized by continuity in focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and some degree of discontinuity in sectoral approaches within the agricultural sector itself. The continued focus on the agricultural sector appears to have been driven by the belief of IMF staff that agriculture was the most appropriate sector to focus on as a source of short- to medium-term recovery given the prevailing conditions and structural constraints of the country. The move toward outward-oriented, diversified production within the agricultural sector was consistent with prevailing ideas about the desirability of such reforms for all countries undergoing structural reform.

Finally, analysis of The Gambia suggests that, in both periods of structural adjustment lending, the country's particularly strong structural constraints influenced the choice to pursue agricultural sector continuity. In the early period of adjustment from 1986 to 1992, both the government and the Fund appeared to take the country's narrow productive base into account when discussing sectoral policy choice; and there appeared to be a consensus that this narrow productive base lent itself to continued agricultural sector focus in the short- to medium-term. In the latter period of adjustment from 1998 to 1999, IMF staff appeared to believe that outward-oriented, diversified agricultural production was one of the keys to growth in the country, suggesting that structural constraints were a consideration in formulating sectoral policy.

7 Other Cases of Agricultural Sector Continuity

In this chapter, I employ process tracing of six “shadow” case studies—Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho—to further explore explanations for agricultural sector continuity during IMF structural adjustment. The findings of this chapter lend support to the findings on Kenya and The Gambia regarding the prominent role of domestic interests as drivers of sectoral policy choices. However, the six case studies also highlight significant variation in the strength of African state influence and domestic interests across the countries over time, as well as variation in the ways in which different constellations of economic and political power at the domestic level influenced the specific policies chosen by different African government in cases in which they were able to exercise influence over sectoral policy-making. Finally, the case studies in this chapter also highlight the role of structural conditions in countries with stronger structural constraints, such as landlocked-ness and narrow natural resource bases.

7.1 Tanzania

As in Kenya and The Gambia, Tanzanian structural adjustment was characterized by two distinct periods. During the first period of adjustment from 1987 to 1992, the Tanzanian government exercised significant influence over sectoral policy choices, using this influence to pursue policies of relative sectoral continuity despite a large degree of conflict with the Fund over these policy choices. Following a break with the Fund due to non-implementation of program reforms, Tanzania returned to IMF lending in 1996 with a weakened ability to influence policy design; and the policy-making process from 1996 to 2000 was characterized by dominant Fund control of policy choices and the use of that control to implement broad and rapid liberal reforms across Tanzania's productive sectors.

Trends in sectoral focus

Tanzania is a case of agricultural and industrial sector continuity and a case of extractive sector discontinuity. Absolute agricultural sector focus was fairly high across the colonial and structural adjustment periods, though there was significant fluctuation in focus on the sector from year to year in the structural adjustment period. Relative agricultural sector focus was also high across both periods. Industrial sector focus was fairly high (compared to the other cases) across the colonial and structural adjustment periods in both the absolute and the relative sense. There was discontinuity in extractive sector focus across the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with significantly higher absolute and relative extractive sector focus in the colonial period than in the structural adjustment period (Figure 7.1).



Figure 7.1 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Tanzania

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Tanzania

Tanzania began IMF structural adjustment with the introduction of a three-year SAF program in 1987.[45] The stated sectoral aims of this 1987 program were to achieve economic growth through restoring agricultural output and improving efficiency and capacity utilization in the industrial sector. In the agricultural sector, the specific within-sector policies outlined included reform of the agricultural marketing system and pricing reforms for agricultural goods. In the industrial sector, the outlined policies included channeling resources toward productive enterprises and studies to identify and develop an action program for restructuring the sector (IMF 1987h, 1988o, 1990m).

In 1991, Tanzania entered into another three-year structural adjustment program under the ESAF. Agricultural sector policies for the 1991-94 program were focused on continued liberalization of agricultural marketing and additional pricing policy reform. In the industrial sector, policies were aimed at enabling parastatals and private industries to operate more efficiently and competitively through decontrol of prices and tariffs, assessment of tax rates, strengthening of administrative procedures, and restructuring of industrial public enterprises. In the extractive sector, the outlined policies included revision of mineral laws and regulations, reorganization of mining sector government departments, and liberalization of mineral marketing (IMF 1991i, 1992f, 1994g). Tanzania completed approximately two years of the 1991-94 program before it was suspended due to the country's failure to complete a midterm review in 1992. The program expired in 1994 without the remainder of the Funds having been disbursed.

In 1996, Tanzania entered into another three-year ESAF arrangement following a probationary period of Fund-monitored economic reform. Agricultural sector policies for the 1996-2000 program period included land reform, redirection of public expenditure to agricultural extension and infrastructure, and privatization of agricultural sector parastatals. Policies for the industrial sector included land policies to facilitate industrial land access and development of export processing zones (EPZs). In the extractive sector, policies included revision of legal

[45] Prior to beginning this program, Tanzania entered into three stand-by arrangements with the Fund between 1975 and 1986.

frameworks in the mining sector, divestiture of public mining companies, and development of a mining sector action plan (IMF 1996g, 1997c, 1999f).

Explaining sectoral policies in Tanzania

In the case of Tanzania, IMF structural adjustment policy-making was characterized by two periods. The first period of lending from 1987 to 1992 was characterized by significant conflict between the Fund and the Tanzanian authorities over the content and pace of sectoral reforms; a significant amount of Tanzanian government influence over the final policy program; and the Tanzanian government's use of that influence to pursue policies largely geared toward sector-level and within-sector continuity. The second period of IMF structural adjustment lending from 1996 to 2000 was characterized by Tanzania's loss of control over the policy-making process, the emergence of IMF staff as the dominant policy-makers, and a shift toward more rapid and aggressive within-sector reforms across all sectors on the part of IMF staff.

Evidence of significant disagreement between the Fund and the Tanzanian authorities over sectoral policy was present in the first Executive Board discussions of Tanzanian structural adjustment in 1987. In these discussions, Executive Directors expressed significant concern over both the extent and pace of reform in the agricultural sector specifically, highlighting their discontent with the fact that the program was too gradual, lacked specificity, and did not sufficiently address the underlying structural problems in the agricultural marketing and pricing systems (IMF 1987e). In response to these concerns, IMF staff suggested divergent preferences on the part of the staff and Tanzanian authorities in relation to the issue of agricultural marketing arrangements. More specifically, IMF staff representatives pointed out that the Tanzanian authorities' choice to reintroduce the system of agricultural cooperatives while keeping the marketing boards had contributed to increasing marketing costs in direct opposition to their goal of decreasing those costs (IMF 1987e, 27). IMF staff criticisms of the above policy approach and the fact that the program was approved despite these criticisms suggest (1) that IMF staff had a preference for different agricultural marketing policies than those that were ultimately presented to and approved by the Board and (2) that the Tanzanian authorities were successful at pushing through their preferred agricultural sector policies in this round of negotiations.

Notably, in these discussions of the 1987 program, IMF staff, Executive Board members, and Tanzania's representative on the Board explicitly referenced the importance of domestic political developments and dynamics for the reform process. For example, Executive Directors referred to a "still very delicate" political balance and pointed out that they understood the "very difficult political circumstances" in which reforms were taking place (IMF 1987e), while Tanzania's representative pointed out the need for reforms to reach the masses through Tanzania's existing party structure in order for the delicate process of adjustment to be successful (IMF 1987e, 28). These discussions of domestic political dynamics took placed within the context of a recent shift in power at the domestic level, with Ali Hassan Mwinyi having replaced long-time leader Julius Nyerere as president in 1985. Under Nyerere, relations with the Fund had been tense, and Nyerere had been vocally opposed to Fund programs throughout the 1970s and early part of the 1980s (van de Walle 2001).

While Mwinyi himself had a reputation as a reformer and technocrat more inclined toward liberalizing policy packages than Nyerere, a number of key political actors in the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party remained opposed to liberal reform going into the IMF structural adjustment period (van de Walle 2001, 153). With regard to sectoral policies such as agricultural marketing and cooperative society policies, many of these elites had clear interests in maintaining the existing structures, which were characterized by patronage and corruption and which privileged political and economic elites at the expense of other groups, such as poor farmers (Cooksey 2011). Taken together, Executive Board discussions about the political nature of reform, the historically high level of hostility toward World Bank and IMF programs in Tanzania, and the close ties between state-controlled sectoral institutions and Tanzanian elites suggest that structural adjustment policies were likely highly sensitive political issues and that the Tanzanian government took this into account while formulating these policies.

In the years following the initial 1987 program, Executive Board members and IMF staff continued to express the opinion that reform plans for areas such as decontrol of agricultural prices and marketing liberalization were not sufficient and to push for more rapid structural change in the agricultural sector generally (IMF 1988n, 1990f). Executive Board concerns about the content and pace of sectoral reform were increasingly compounded by concerns about non-implementation during this period. In 1988, the Executive Board expressed significant discontent over the fact that Tanzania had deliberately deviated from the agreed-upon program due to their belief that it inflicted too high an adjustment burden on groups such as the urban population, modernizing farmers, and cooperative unions (IMF 1988n, 14). By 1990, criticisms about non-implementation had become central to Executive Board discussions, with both IMF staff and Executive Directors warning the Tanzanian authorities that their implementation record would need to improve markedly in 1990 if they intended to continue to utilize IMF resources (IMF 1990f, l).

The above disagreements over program design and implementation were also characterized by an unusually high (compared to the other cases) degree of overt conflict between the Tanzanian authorities and the Fund in program negotiations and Executive Board discussions. During the 1988 Executive Board discussions, Tanzania's representative on the board pushed back strongly against criticisms about the speed and content of adjustment. With regard to the pace of adjustment, he argued that Tanzania's economy was one that required drastic changes that could not take place suddenly without severe withdrawal symptoms (IMF 1988n, 41). In responding to criticisms about the content of the policies, he pointed out that the Tanzanian authorities aimed to complement the expertise of IMF staff with their own expertise when considering and deciding upon staff policy recommendations (IMF 1988n, 41-42).

The above comments suggest three things. First, they suggest clear disagreement between the Tanzanian authorities and the Fund about how to appropriately balance the costs and benefits of the reform process when deciding on the pace of adjustment. Second, they suggest an unwillingness on the part of the Tanzanian authorities to attempt rapid reform due to what they perceived as excessively high costs. Third, they suggest an unwillingness on the part of the Tanzanian authorities to simply accept staff recommendations regarding the content of sectoral policies.

Further evidence of conflict between the Fund and the Tanzanian authorities appeared in the 1990 program discussions, where one Executive Director pointed out that the negotiations had taken an unusually long time, evidencing how difficult it had been for IMF staff and the Tanzanian authorities to reach an agreement (IMF 1990f, 9). When criticized about the content of this final agreement, Tanzania's representative on the Executive Board again defended the

Tanzanian government's choice of gradual reform by referring to the need to understand the environment within which the program was to be implemented and criticizing the Fund for focusing on individual measures rather than the overall package and its compatibility with the domestic environment (IMF 1990f, 46). He further criticized the Fund for having unrealistic expectations of an adjusting economy, stating that "it was not helpful to inform a seriously maladjusted economy that it should have adjusted twenty years before and, in effect, to specify that it should implement all possible adjustment measures at once" irrespective of the current condition of the economy in question (IMF 1990f, 46).

The overt conflict described above subsided to some degree over the 1991-92 period, during which Tanzania's implementation record improved substantially. However, while commending the authorities for their improved performance, IMF staff and Executive Board members continued to criticize (to a lesser degree) the slow pace of reforms in areas such as restructuring of agricultural marketing boards and reform of industrial parastatals. In the 1991 Staff Report, for example, IMF staff expressed concern over delays restructuring the National Milling Corporation (NM) and a lack of a clear strategy for industrial parastatal reform at the conclusion of the negotiations (IMF 1991j). Executive Board members referred to the pace of adjustment as "sluggish," questioned whether there was a sufficient sense of urgency and commitment to introducing commercial principles in the parastatals, and pushed for timetables for implementation of public enterprise reforms (IMF 1991f). The Board expressed similar criticisms the following year, with Executive Board members pushing for accelerated reforms in agricultural sector liberalization (particularly the cotton market) and more rapid industrial parastatal reform (IMF 1992e).

In 1992, Tanzania deviated from the agreed-upon program to a degree that prohibited them from completing a mandatory midterm review, resulting in non-disbursement of the remainder of funds for the three-year program. In 1994, Tanzania made an attempt to return to IMF structural adjustment, completing negotiations with IMF staff and producing a Policy Framework Paper for the 1994-1996 period. While this program was not ultimately discussed or approved by the Executive Board,[46] the 1994 Staff Report on the negotiations and policy

[46] In fact, donors froze aid to Tanzania in November 1994 due to rampant corruption under the Mwinyi administration (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002, 1).

framework suggests a significant degree of concern on the part of IMF staff with regard to the policy approach of the Tanzanian government, with staff criticizing the government's retainment of tax exemptions and recent tariff increases, among other things (IMF 1994h).

Staff criticisms of the program design and the fact that this program was not ultimately approved suggest strong enough disagreement between the Fund and the Tanzanian authorities to prevent the final approval of a lending program in 1994. Tanzania's lack of success negotiating for their preferred policies in the 1994 negotiations also suggests a loss of bargaining power and influence for the Tanzanian government vis-à-vis the IMF. This loss of influence was likely due at least in part to Tanzania's worsening economic performance during this period. During its break with the Fund, the Tanzanian economy experienced an acute economic crisis, as evidenced by the fact that the country's GDP declined by approximately 8 percent between 1991 and 1994 (Potts 2005, 7).

When Tanzania made its second, this time successful, attempt to return to the IMF in 1996, it was under very different conditions than those that had prevailed in the early 1990s. In 1995, the government introduced a wide range of measures to address both macroeconomic and structural imbalances in the economy as part of its attempts to re-establish relations with the Fund (IMF 1996h, e). Notably, a large number of these reforms, such as agricultural marketing and parastatal liberalization, were reforms the Fund had pushed for in earlier program years, suggesting weakening Tanzanian influence and IMF staff control over sectoral policy choices during this latter period of adjustment. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the conflict over sectoral policies that had characterized the earlier period of adjustment was absent over the 1996-2000 program period. Instead, the limited sectoral policy discussions that took place during this latter period were largely characterized by Executive Directors and IMF staff commending the Tanzanian authorities for their progress in areas such as liberalization and deregulation of the agricultural sector (IMF 1996e).

Further support for the interpretation of IMF staff as the dominant sectoral policy makers during this latter period can be found in the fact that there was an absence of domestic factors to explain the sudden policy shift on the part of the Tanzanian government. While the country had held its first multi-party elections in 1995, CCM continued to dominate both the political and economic spheres, as evidenced by the fact that the 1995 elections resulted in the election of CCM's

Benjamin Mkapa as president (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002). Further, post-1995 political and economic development in the country continued to be characterized by a combination of elite resistance to reform and attempts by elites to co-opt the reform that was taking place in order to receive special access to newly liberalized agricultural markets (Cooksey 2011). Given the large degree of continuity in domestic political patterns, it is unlikely that domestic interests changed sufficiently to explained the shift in sectoral policy choices during this period, leaving a shift toward IMF staff policy-making as the more likely explanation for sectoral policy choices.

As in Kenya and The Gambia, limited discussion of sectoral policy in the latter period of adjustment makes it difficult to identify the drivers of the observed sectoral policies during this period. However, the policies outlined for Tanzania during this period were consistent with both (1) the broad policy approaches and economic ideas of the IMF in relation to African countries in general during this period and (2) the policy approaches pursued in Kenya and The Gambia following their loss of influence over sectoral policy in the 1990s. More specifically, policies in Tanzania were aimed at the same approach of outward-oriented, market-based growth observed in both Kenya and The Gambia during the latter years of adjustment. This provides some limited support for economic ideas as an explanatory factor during the latter period of Tanzanian adjustment.

7.2 Ghana

Structural adjustment in Ghana was characterized by continuity in focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and continuity in cocoa sector structures specifically. This continuity in agricultural sector focus was due to the government's reliance on the use of agricultural sector policies to garner support for the regime in the face of strong and influential domestic opposition groups. Policy choices aimed at continuing government control over the cocoa sector specifically were tied to the particular importance of the cocoa sector as a source of state resources and political patronage.

Trends in sectoral focus

Ghana can be characterized as a case of continuity in agricultural sector focus and discontinuity in extractive and industrial sector focus between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. Focus on the agricultural sector was consistently high across the colonial and structural adjustment periods, in both the absolute and the relative sense.[47] Focus on the extractive sector was not similar across the two periods, with significantly higher extractive sector focus during the colonial period than during the structural adjustment period. In the case of Ghana, this shift away from extractive sector focus is likely attributable to the depletion of mineral deposits such as gold and silver in the post-colonial period.[48] There was also discontinuity in industrial sector focus between the two periods, with significantly higher industrial sector focus in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period (Figure 7.2).



Figure 7.2 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Ghana

[47] With regard to patterns in relative agricultural sector focus, it is notable that there was an abrupt increase in focus on agriculture relative to extraction and industry in the latter period of adjustment from 1993 onward.
[48] Natural resource extraction has increased in Ghana again in recent years with the increase in gold mining in the country (OEC).

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Ghana

Ghana began its first IMF structural adjustment program with a three-year arrangement under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1987.[49] Sectoral policies for the 1987-90 program were broadly aimed at promoting both growth and integration of the economy. In agriculture specifically, policies were aimed at increasing agricultural production and efficiency (especially of cocoa) through increased producer prices and reform of agricultural sector institutions (IMF 1987c). In the industrial and extractive sectors, the primary policies outlined involved credit schemes to rehabilitate existing firms and development of infrastructure (IMF 1987c). Following the first year of the above SAF program, Ghana requested a cancellation of the program and access to an arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).[50] The approved ESAF program for 1988-92 entailed objectives and policies very similar to the ones outlined above and was focused on promotion and consolidation of growth in all three sectors of the economy through liberalization, price reform, and investment (IMF 1988b, 1989b, 1991a).

Upon successful completion of the above lending program in 1992, the Ghanaian authorities requested that the Fund continue to monitor their reform process in the absence of additional lending arrangements. The Fund monitored and collaborated on structural adjustment reform with the Ghanaian government between 1992 and 1994; and in 1995, Ghana approached the Fund with a request for another three-year arrangement under the ESAF. The sectoral objectives of the 1995-99 program were centered around promoting increased output and productivity through further price reform, privatization, and the removal of government intervention in productive activities (IMF 1995a, 1998c, 1999c). In the agricultural sector, specific policies included gradual movement toward deregulation of the cocoa industry, development of agricultural infrastructure, and improvement of agricultural extension services. Extractive sector policies involved further divestiture of state-owned mining enterprises, while specific

[49] This SAF arrangement was not their first lending arrangement with the Fund. They had nine other arrangements under different facilities at the Fund between 1966 and 1987 before entering into the 1987 SAF agreement. Ghana had also engaged heavily in World Bank lending beginning in the early 1980s.

[50] Requests for conversion or movement from SAF arrangements to ESAF arrangements were not uncommon, as the ESAF offered better financing terms for lending agreements than the SAF.

industrial sector policies fell out of the policy frameworks during this period (IMF 1995a, 1998c, 1999c).

Explaining sectoral focus in Ghana

The structural adjustment period in Ghana was characterized by significant Ghanaian state influence over sectoral policy formulation and the use of that influence to pursue policies geared toward continuity in focus on the agricultural sector overall and continuity within the agricultural sector itself. At the introduction of the first SAF program in 1987, both IMF staff and members of the Executive Board expressed concern over Ghana's continued dependence on agricultural exports generally and on cocoa exports more specifically, highlighting the need for diversification of the country's productive base in the medium-term (IMF 1987b, f). Both IMF staff and Executive Directors also highlighted their concern over remaining structural impediments within the agricultural sector itself, with Executive Directors criticizing the pace of within-sector reform and emphasizing the particular need for accelerated reform of the cocoa sector specifically (IMF 1987f).

The above criticisms of slow progress toward diversification and agricultural sector reform persisted in program discussions in the following years, with Executive Directors stating that diversification of the export base needed to progress at a much faster pace than the authorities had achieved thus far (IMF 1988l, 24) and voicing concerns over the program offering little in terms of specific measures for export diversification (IMF 1989j, 52). The discontent expressed by IMF staff and Board members with regard to these areas suggests that the Fund had a preference for more aggressive and rapid movement toward diversification and reform within the agricultural sector than was outlined in the programs. The fact that the proposed programs were approved despite these criticisms suggests that the Ghanaian government exercised sufficient influence over the policy-making process that their sectoral policy preferences prevailed over those of the Fund.

Interestingly, several members of the Executive Board explicitly tied the government's slow movement toward deeper structural reforms to the existence of vested political interests in maintaining the country's existing economic structures (IMF 1987f, 43-44). In fact, the agricultural sector, and particularly the cocoa sector, in Ghana had long been a sector with close ties to the state and the political sphere. In the initial independence period, during which cocoa prices were high and Ghana one of the world's largest producers, the state had utilized the sector as a primary source of government revenue, controlling cocoa prices for domestic producers through the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) and appropriating surplus export revenue for state expenditure (Herbst 1993). When cocoa prices began to fall in the 1960s, the Ghanaian state passed the price decrease on to farmers and began to reallocate the extensive reserves of the CMB to the central government to continue to fund its expenditure (Herbst 1993, 20).

During this period, the Ghanaian state used resources from the cocoa sector to fund development projects targeting certain groups and regions, a process characterized by widespread corruption and patronage-based decision-making (Herbst 1993). The exploitation of the cocoa sector by the state and political elites persisted from the initial independence period through the early 1980s, with falling real prices for Ghanaian producers beginning in the 1970s resulting in sectoral stagnation and the growth of an informal cocoa market through which Ghanaian producers sold their cocoa illegally via neighboring Côte d'Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). In addition to the reallocation of funds from the cocoa sector, the Ghanaian state used wider price controls over agricultural goods to provide subsidies for urban consumers, many of whom formed the base of support for the regime (Herbst 1993). Given the importance of agriculture and cocoa for Ghana's economy overall, as well as the close connections between the cocoa sector and the Ghanaian state and political elites, it is likely that there were, in fact, domestic interests that favored continuity in these agricultural sector structures during the structural adjustment period.

This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that politics in Ghana was generally characterized by considerable instability and the existence of a number of relatively powerful opposition groups, making the state vulnerable to defeat in instances of unpopular policy implementation. At independence, Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, won power in an environment of intense political competition and entrenched opposition from both urban (e.g., segments of the professional middle class) and rural groups (e.g., traditionally powerful chiefs in Ashanti territories) (Crook 1990). While the state managed to co-opt some members of the opposition in the initial post-independence period, these opposition groups remained both vocal and influential in the political and economic spheres. The prevalence and strength of domestic opposition in Ghana in the post-colonial period is evidenced by the fact that, by 1990, Ghana had experienced seven regime changes, two of which were elected and five of which were military; many more changes of government; and a number of attempted coups (Crook 1990, 24). The government of Jerry Rawlings, under which IMF structural adjustment was begun, survived at least six coup attempts between 1982 and 1990 alone (Crook 1990, 24).

Further, there is evidence that the various domestic opposition and civil society groups that existed in Ghana were vocal in their opposition to structural adjustment measures that disadvantaged them during this period. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, unions, businessmen, and students staged large-scale protests in response to components of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs such as rising prices for basic goods, public sector retrenchment, the removal of domestic protections for industrial enterprises, and the elimination of tuition subsidies (Asante and Helbrecht 2018, 170-171). With regard to agricultural sector measures specifically, peasant protests occurred in relation to measures to introduce fees for agricultural services such as new boreholes and wells (Asante and Helbrecht 2018, 171). Combined, the prevalence of strong domestic opposition groups and protests against structural adjustment suggest that (1) structural adjustment policy choices were extremely politically contentious in Ghana and (2) that the groups harmed by these measures had the potential to destabilize the government. The political vulnerability of the Ghanaian government and the role of the agricultural sector as a source of state power and resources to placate opposition groups was, therefore, arguably a factor in the Ghanaian government's choice to continue to focus on the agricultural sector and to maintain certain structures within the agricultural sector.

While the above analysis suggests significant contention over sectoral policies, it is worth noting that the early years of structural adjustment were also marked by a large degree of praise from the Fund for Ghana's overall progress on economic reform and adjustment. This is evidenced by statements about the impressive and generally ambitious nature of Ghana's reform program and the positioning of Ghana as a "good" reformer in relation to other African countries. For example, one Executive Director highlighted that Ghana had set something of an example in Africa (IMF EBM 1987, 37) and quoted the World Bank as having deemed Ghana's reform process "the most ambitious and long-lasting reform program in Sub-Saharan Africa" (IMF EBM 1988, 9).

The above comments suggest that, while the Fund would have preferred faster diversification and within-sector reform in some areas, they were content with Ghana's adjustment process on the whole in the early years of IMF adjustment. The Fund's overall acceptance of Ghana's performance during this period was likely due in part to the fact that Ghana was a case of substantial reform efforts in a particularly maladjusted economy. By the 1980s, Ghana was one of the most heavily controlled economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and its performance among the worst in region, despite having begun the independence period at a relative economic advantage compared to most other Sub-Saharan African countries. When reform began under the Rawlings government in the early 1980s, it involved a number of substantial steps toward fundamental readjustment of the economy compared to earlier periods (Herbst 1993), earning the praise of the international community.

In the latter years of structural adjustment in Ghana, the Fund's discontent with the pace of within-sector reform and diversification remained, while their positive impression of Ghana's overall performance began to erode. By 1995, Executive Board members were expressing some discontent with both macroeconomic and structural reforms in Ghana, with several Executive Directors pushing for aggressive movement toward the creation of a business-friendly environment in the productive sectors (IMF 1995c). By the 1998 discussions, the Executive Board was considerably less enthusiastic about Ghana's performance and future reform prospects, in part due to the fact that IMF staff had expressed strong concerns about Ghana's ability to live up to their policy commitments under the requested program (IMF 1998d, f).

Criticisms of Ghana's agricultural sector policies featured prominently in the Board's discussion of the 1998 program. Executive Directors expressed discontent with the pace and specificity of plans for reform in the cocoa market, stated that the outlined plans for liberalization of the cocoa sector seem unambitious, and criticized the government's decision to maintain the state's monopoly over cocoa exports (IMF 1998f). IMF staff representatives also explicitly stated that they had advised the government to ease or eliminate the monopoly over cocoa exports, but that the authorities had chosen to maintain the monopoly on the advice of an independent consultant (IMF 1998f, 34). The above discussions suggest a clear difference in preferences for cocoa sector policies on the part of the Fund and the Ghanaian government. The fact that this program was ultimately approved also suggests that the preferences of the Ghanaian government for maintenance of existing structures in the cocoa sector won out. The fact that cocoa sector continuity formed the core of the disagreement between the Fund and the Ghanaian authorities is again notable in the context of cocoa's particular embeddedness and importance for the Ghanaian state.

7.3 Malawi

The structural adjustment period in Malawi was characterized by strong Malawian state influence over the sectoral policy-making process and the Malawian government's pursuit of agricultural sector continuity throughout the structural adjustment period. In Malawi, sector-level continuity in agricultural appears to have been driven largely by structural conditions, with apparent consensus between the Fund and the Malawian government that the limited natural resource base and landlocked position of the country necessitated continued focus on the agricultural sector as the country's primary source of economic growth for the foreseeable future. Within-sector agricultural continuity, however, was driven by the interests of the domestic political elite, whose ability to maintain political control depended heavily on the use of agricultural sector resources to buy support through economic and political patronage.

Trends in sectoral focus

Malawi is a case of continuity in agricultural sector focus and discontinuity in extractive and industrial sector focus over time. Agricultural sector focus was consistently high between and within the colonial and structural adjustment periods in Malawi, in both absolute terms and in relative terms.[51] Focus on the extractive sector was not similar across the two periods, with significantly higher extractive sector focus in the colonial period than in the structural adjustment period. There was also discontinuity in industrial sector focus across the two periods, with significantly higher industrial sector focus in the structural adjustment period than in the colonial period. However, industrial sector focus

[51] As in Ghana, there was a sudden and rapid increase in relative agricultural sector focus in Malawi the final years of structural adjustment after 1995.

declined sharply in the latter period of structural adjustment from around 1996 onward (Figure 7.3).



Figure 7.3 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Malawi

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Malawi

Malawi began its first IMF structural adjustment program with a three-year ESAF arrangement beginning in 1988.[52] The 1988-91 program was aimed primarily at agriculture-led medium-term growth and involved policies to improve productivity and output through improved agricultural services, pricing reform, and agricultural enterprise reform (IMF 1988g, 1989e, 1990e). Upon expiration of the above arrangement, Malawi entered into another ESAF arrangement from 1991-94. This program had similar objectives as the previous program and was focused on facilitating agricultural development through service provision, appropriate producer prices, and reform of marketing and other agricultural structures (IMF 1991e, 1994b). Malawi's final ESAF program from 1995-99 was also focused on facilitating increased agricultural productivity and output and

[52] Malawi had five previous lending arrangements under other Fund facilities between 1979 and 1988 before the first ESAF arrangement.

included policies such as agricultural pricing reform, more efficient service provision, and land reform (IMF 1995b, 1996c, 1998e).

Explaining sectoral policy in Malawi

Sectoral policy-making in Malawi during the period of IMF structural adjustment was characterized by the Malawian government utilizing their influence over sectoral policy to pursue continuity in focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and within-sector continuity in the agricultural sector itself. In the case of Malawi, continuity in agricultural sector focus as a whole appeared to be relatively uncontroversial. In the discussion of the initial 1988 ESAF arrangement, Executive Directors commended the continuing emphasis on the agricultural sector; stated that the authorities were correct to concentrate efforts on agriculture, which would remain the dominant sector of the economy; and suggested that the key to growth in the country would be increasing agricultural productivity and diversifying agricultural commodities (IMF 1988j, k).

These discussions of sectoral policy were linked to the existing structural conditions of Malawi, with Executive Directors citing "very limited resources," landlocked-ness, and issues surrounding transport of goods through unstable neighboring countries as the primary challenges to expanding production and economic growth (IMF 1988j, k). The above statements suggest a preference for continued focus on the agricultural sector on the part of the both the Fund and the Malawian authorities and a belief on the part of both parties that, given Malawi's position as a relatively resource poor and landlocked country, agriculture was the sector with the most potential to promote economic recovery and growth in the short- to medium-term.

While the Fund and the Malawian authorities appeared to be in agreement about the need for continued focus on the agricultural sector, there were clear areas of contention related to within-sector agricultural reform throughout the structural adjustment period. Beginning in 1988, Executive Board members suggested a need for more rapid adjustment in areas related to agricultural pricing and marketing and the provision of credit to smallholder producers (IMF 1988j). In following program years, Executive Directors continued to express concern and discontent over the above areas, as well as beginning to push for movement toward privatization of public enterprises in the agricultural sector (IMF 1989i). Much of this discussion was focused on the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), with a number of Executive Directors pushing for more rapid reform and privatization, and the Malawian authorities remaining insistent on slow-moving reforms focused on more efficient management of ADMARC instead of privatization (IMF 1989i, 1990h). Despite the expressed discontent with the approach to ADMARC, the proposed programs during these years were ultimately approved by the Board, suggesting Malawian dominance in determining agricultural sector policy.

It is also worth noting that Board members at the Fund suggested at several points that the reluctance of the Malawian authorities to move on issues related to agricultural sector reform were related to the existence of vested domestic interests in maintaining those structures. For example, in his argument in favor of privatization of ADMARC, one Executive Director suggested that government pricing policies and overspending on maize suggested the existence of a substantial hidden subsidy to ADMARC from the government (IMF 1990h, 22). Another Executive Director pointed out that continued concentration and monopoly power in the agricultural sector was impeding efforts to improve the position of smallholder farmers, suggesting that addressing these vital issues would require taking on vested interests (IMF 1991h, 28). Both of these comments by Executive Directors suggest agricultural sector policies favoring the state and elites through continued concentration of agricultural sector wealth.

The insistence of the Malawian government on the above types of within-sector continuity in agriculture is intuitive when viewed in the context of the domestic political and economic environment of Malawi in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From independence in 1964, Malawi had been ruled by a strong one-party state under President Hastings Kamazu Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Following independence, Banda had pursued a development strategy based on selective, patronage-based promotion of (primarily) agricultural industries in a dual public-private economic system. Under this system, the government identified private partners, often from entrenched and wealthy families, to facilitate growth in specific sectors such as sugar, tea, and tobacco (Said and Singini 2014, 7). This agricultural development was pursued through the establishment of estate farms, with the state privileging large-scale agriculture through preferential access to land, investment, and credit. Having established this system, Banda's government then established firm state control over the agricultural sector through the establishment of a monopoly state marketing board (ADMARC) (Said and Singini 2014, 7).

Banda also established personal control over much of the agricultural sector's activities through the formation of his own agricultural holdings company, Press Holdings. Press Holdings dominated a number of agricultural sector activities during this period, at one point accounting for as much as one-third of Malawi's total GDP and employing ten percent of its workforce (Meredith 2006). Under this system, corruption and clientelism were rife, with access to lucrative deals and industries controlled and used by Banda as a means of political control. Given the close ties between the state and the agricultural sector, as well as President Banda's individual ties to the agricultural sector as a source of personal wealth and political capital, the Malawian government had strong disincentives for pursuing sectoral reforms that would remove agricultural sector activity from state oversight.

This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the late 1980s and early 1990s were a period during which Banda and the MCP were facing a multiplying and increasingly vocal opposition that threatened to overthrow the regime. For much of the post-independence period, Banda's regime was characterized by state repression, human rights abuses, and a complete lack of real political competition, all of which drew increasing criticism, both domestically and abroad. By the early 1990s, Banda's government was facing opposition from foreign-based political parties (led by exiled Malawians), domestic elites who had broken with the MCP, members of the Church, and members of the working class (Ihonvbere 1997).

In 1992, domestic opposition erupted into full-blown dissent when a group of Catholic bishops wrote an open letter denouncing the government's human rights abuses. Shortly after the letter was released, university students went on strike in support of the bishops and were followed by strike action by textile, tea, and tobacco workers. Protests and strike action continued into 1993, including a number of strikes at sugar factories (Federici, Caffentzis, and Alidou 2000, 187).[53] Given the increasing political instability faced by the government, as well as the fact that Banda's regime was entirely dependent on a combination of repression and patronage politics for survival, it was likely particularly important for Banda

[53] Banda's government responded to these protests with force, killing 40 protestors in 1992 and another several sugar factory workers in 1993 (Federici, Caffentzis, and Alidou 2000, 187).

and his government to retain control of important sectors of the economy that could be used to consolidate and maintain support during this period.

Despite his attempts to remain in power, opposition to Banda's government became so acute that he was forced to call a referendum on multiparty democracy in 1993. The referendum passed, and multiparty elections were held for the first time in 1994, at which point Banda and the MCP were unseated and Baili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) was elected president. While the 1994 elections appeared to mark a change in the political landscape of Malawi, in reality, the UDF was largely made up of old elites who were deeply entrenched within the existing political and economic structures. In fact, President Muluzi himself was a successful businessman who had been a prominent member of the MCP before falling out with Banda and joining the UDF (Ihonvbere 1997, 232). Under Muluzi, corruption and patronage-based politics remained a core characteristic of the Malawian state, with the regime involved in a number of scandals involving transfers of funds to individual politicians and the use of development funds for personal enrichment during the 1990s (Ihonvbere 1997).

While discussions of sectoral policy were limited during the latter years of adjustment following Malawi's transition to multi-party rule, IMF staff reports and Executive Board minutes allude to continuing underlying distortions and structural impediments in the Malawian economy, suggesting a lack of movement on core sectoral reforms during this period. During the 1995 program discussions, Executive Directors expressed concern over the continuing oligopolistic structure of state-controlled production and disappointment over what they deemed to be vague and unambitious targets for privatization and other structural reform (IMF 1995d). During the 1998 Executive Board discussions, the authorities were encouraged to target the agricultural sector with a government divestiture program due to the importance of the sector for overall economic performance and the consequent need to minimize distortions in the sector (IMF 1998i). The above comments by members of the Fund suggest that entrenched interests in the agricultural sector continued to impede structural reforms, such as agricultural sector privatization, in the latter years of adjustment.

7.4 Uganda

Uganda represents a somewhat unique case of structural adjustment sectoral policy-making in that the Ugandan government exercised significant control over sectoral policy-making and used that control to pursue a combination of policies of continuity of focus on the agricultural sector as a whole; continuity of focus on coffee production as a core agricultural sector activity; and an unusual (compared to the other cases) degree of discontinuity in certain agriculture sector structures, such as marketing and pricing arrangements. In the case of Uganda, focus on the agricultural sector as a whole can be attributed to both domestic interests and the structural conditions of the country, which limited the potential for non-agricultural activities in the short- to medium-term. Continuity in coffee production and discontinuity in marketing and pricing arrangements, however, can be attributed exclusively to the interests of the newly constructed Ugandan state following a period of civil war that had weakened existing domestic interests and created room for the Ugandan state to design agricultural sector policies conducive to rapid growth and expansion of the sector.

Trends in sectoral focus

Uganda is a case of continuity in agricultural sector focus and discontinuity in extractive sector and industrial sector focus between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. Agricultural sector focus was consistently high across both the colonial and structural adjustment periods, both in the absolute and relative sense.[54] Extractive sector focus was not similar across the two periods, with high extractive sector focus in the colonial period and very low extractive sector focus in the structural adjustment period. There was also discontinuity in industrial sector focus across the two periods, with no focus on the industrial sector during the colonial period and a relatively high degree of focus on the industrial sector during the structural adjustment period. However, this focus on the industrial sector declined sharply in the latter period of structural adjustment after 1994 (Figure 7.4).

[54] As in Ghana and Malawi, relative agricultural sector focus rose sharply in the final years of structural adjustment after 1994, suggesting more proportional focus on the sector during that period than during the early period of adjustment.



Figure 7.4 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Uganda

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Uganda

Uganda began its first IMF structural adjustment program with the adoption of an SAF arrangement in 1987.[55] The medium-term objectives of the 1987-89 SAF program were rapid economic recovery and sustained economic development through diversification of exports, promotion of efficient import-substitution activities, and better utilization of domestic resources. Some of the specific sectoral policies outlined to achieve these objectives included price liberalization, marketing reform, and rehabilitation of war-affected areas in the agricultural sector and deregulation and liberalization in the industrial sector (IMF 1987i, 1988p, 1989l).

The 1987-89 SAF arrangement was followed by three subsequent ESAF arrangements between 1989 and 2000. The 1989-94 and 1994-97 programs shared similar objectives of promoting economic recovery through expansion and diversification of exports and efficient import-substitution. The outlined sectoral

[55] Prior to beginning SAF/ESAF adjustment, Uganda entered into three different stand-by arrangements with the Fund between 1981 and 1984.

policies for these programs included continued price reforms, liberalization of productive activity, and improved service and infrastructure provision in both the agricultural and industrial sectors (IMF 1989l, 1990n, 1991k, 1992g, 1994i, 1995h, 1996i, 1997d). The objectives of the final ESAF structural adjustment program from 1997-2000 included sustained economic growth and increased economic activity through improved domestic and international market access, increased domestic competition, and improved research and extension in the agricultural sector (IMF 1997d, 1998j, 1999g).

Explaining sectoral policies in Uganda

Structural adjustment in Uganda was characterized by a significant amount of Ugandan state influence over the policy formulation process and the use of that influence to pursue (1) continuity in focus on the agricultural sector as a whole and (2) discontinuity in certain agricultural sector policies during the initial years of structural adjustment. The first piece of evidence pointing to Ugandan government control over sectoral policy choices is the fact that IMF staff explicitly stated that the Ugandan government had been responsible for formulating the policies contained in the country's first SAF policy framework (IMF 1987j, 9). IMF staff also highlighted that the Ugandan authorities attached major importance to policies aimed at stimulating the agricultural sector in particular (IMF 1987j, 12), suggesting a clear preference for agricultural sector focus on the part of the Ugandan authorities.

However, while the above suggests that the Ugandan authorities formulated the sectoral policies outlined in the 1987 program, Executive Board discussions of the program also suggest that the government's focus on agriculture was considered appropriate by both IMF staff and Executive Board members. This is evidenced by the fact that a number of Executive Board members agreed that recovery of the agricultural sector would be vital for the overall recovery of the economy, while others highlighted the favorable prospects offered for diversified and expanded agricultural production given the country's resource base (IMF 1987d). These comments suggest that continued focus on the agricultural sector was relatively uncontroversial in the case of Uganda and was largely driven by structural considerations.

While there appears to have been consensus about the need for continued focus on agriculture as a source of economic recovery and growth, there was also evidence of some areas of disagreement between the Executive Board and the Ugandan authorities over the exact nature and pace of adjustment within the agricultural sector. Between 1987 and 1991, Executive Board discussions of Uganda's proposed policy frameworks were characterized by Board members expressing discontent with the pace of certain adjustments in the agricultural sector, particularly in the areas of pricing, marketing liberalization, and crop diversification (IMF 1987d, 1989f). In the area of agricultural market liberalization, for example, members of the Executive Board pushed for more forceful and comprehensive measures aimed at eliminating price and profit controls and dismantling pervasive licensing practices in agricultural sector marketing arrangements (IMF 1987d, 11).

In the area of crop diversification, Executive Board members expressed concern over dependence on coffee and pushed for more aggressive measures aimed at crop diversification. The issue of coffee dependence arose repeatedly between 1987 and 1990, with Executive Directors stressing their belief that more needed to be done to diversify agricultural exports more rapidly and Uganda's representative on the board explicitly stating that the country would remain dependent on coffee for the foreseeable future and should not be asked to scale back production (IMF 1990i, 42). The above criticisms of agricultural sector policy from the Executive Board and Uganda's stated intention to continue to produce coffee despite these criticisms suggest divergent preferences with regard to within-sector agricultural policies on the part of the IMF and the Ugandan authorities. The fact that each of the proposed programs was approved despite these disagreements suggests the winning out of Ugandan preferences for continuity in those policies.

The Ugandan government's preference for continuity in focus on agriculture generally, and coffee production particularly, can be understood by reference to the prevailing domestic environment in Uganda. At the start of Uganda's first IMF program in 1987, the country was coming out of a six-year period of civil conflict that had devastated the country's infrastructure and economy (Tripp 2010). Given the country's lack of infrastructure and the fact that the economy had traditionally been agriculture-dependent, agricultural production generally, and coffee production particularly, represented the country's most accessible opportunity for promoting rapid economic stabilization and recovery. This stabilization and recovery was particularly important in the context of ongoing insurgencies and instability in parts of the country during the early years (and consolidation) of newly appointed president, Yoweri Museveni's, regime (Tripp 2010). Given this, it is likely that the Ugandan government had a strong incentive to promote continued agricultural production during this period.

While the continued focus on agriculture as a source of growth and recovery is intuitive, what is perhaps more difficult to explain in the case of Uganda is the government's relative willingness to implement a number of policies of discontinuity within agriculture, particularly with regard to structural changes to historically-important sectors such as coffee, tea, and cotton. While IMF staff and Executive Board members criticized the government's slow movement toward diversification and other agricultural sector reform during this period, they also praised the government's substantial progress in certain areas of agricultural sector market liberalization, particularly in 1989 (IMF 1989f). The liberalizing reforms being praised during this period included the abolishment of export monopolies for tea and the elimination of monopolies on internal cotton trade (IMF 1989l, 14). Given that the monopolies being dismantled had traditionally had close ties to the state, the government's choice to abolish them is somewhat puzzling.

However, the unique political conditions created by the protracted conflict in Uganda arguably created an environment in which these particular reforms were in the best interest of the state to implement during this period. In addition to destroying infrastructure and hindering economic activity, the conflict in Uganda arguably caused a deterioration of existing political structures (Tripp 2010), weakening existing networks of influence and creating the space for Museveni's government to pursue policies of discontinuity in areas that suited the new regime. In the case of the Museveni regime, the main priority during these early years of adjustment was the promotion of rapid economic recovery, and certain reforms within agriculture allowed that recovery to occur by promoting increased production and investment in the sector. Given this, it perhaps makes some sense that the regime pursued certain policies of within-sector discontinuity during this period.

While the early years of adjustment were characterized by a relatively high level of satisfaction with Uganda's adjustment performance overall, beginning in 1990, a number of Executive Directors began to express a larger degree of discontent with the country's performance, with several Executive Directors stating that they were reluctant to continue supporting adjustment efforts given the performance slippages of the Ugandan government (IMF 1990i, 1992e). Much of the Executive Board's criticism of Uganda's performance during these years was related to macroeconomic slippages and unresolved issues with the country's high debt burden. Discussions of sectoral policy were mixed during this period, with members of the Executive Board continuing to praise the country's performance in areas such as the elimination of state monopolies in agricultural marketing and exporting (IMF 1992e), while also continuing to express concern over the pace of diversification (IMF 1994e).

Interestingly, this latter period was also the period during which discussions of the political sensitivity of certain sectoral reforms, such as taxation of coffee and privatization of state-owned enterprises, began to enter into Board discussions of the reform program, with IMF staff and Uganda's representative on the Board highlighting that these particular reforms were facing difficulties domestically due to the existence of domestic opposition and interests (IMF 1994e). This perhaps suggests the formation and entrenchment of domestic interests and their increasing ability to influence the policy-making process as the ruling coalition and domestic political arena continued to develop in the post-conflict period. There is some support for this interpretation in the fact that Museveni increasingly began to build support for his regime through patronage networks as he worked to consolidate his regime throughout the 1990s (Tripp 2010).

Following 1994, Fund discussions of sectoral policy were limited, with the Executive Board spending the bulk of its time discussing macroeconomic policies and Uganda's status as a high debt country. When sectoral policy was discussed, a notable theme was the continuing centrality of coffee for the economy. In 1995 and 1996, the Executive Board commended Uganda for its policy response to a global boom in coffee prices, while simultaneously expressing concern about the need to continue to diversify the economy to offset any negative impacts of falling coffee prices in the future (IMF 1995e, 1996f). In 1997, members of the Board explicitly asked about the degree to which the country remained dependent on coffee, and IMF staff responded that, despite growth in non-traditional exports, the country had, in fact, remained heavily dependent on coffee exports, with coffee production actually increasing in recent years in response to government reforms in the sector (IMF 1997a). The above discussions suggest persistent disagreement between the Ugandan authorities and the Fund regarding coffee dependence and the winning out of Ugandan preferences for continued focus on coffee as a core component of agricultural sector activity.

Another notable pattern during this period was the increasing concern of the Fund over issues of state spending, corruption, and smuggling in the country. In 1997, several Executive Directors expressed concern over what they perceived as irresponsible government spending on items such as cars for members of Parliament (IMF 1997a). Several other Executive Directors and IMF staff representatives warned the Ugandan government against their proposal of establishing export processing zones, arguing that it would open up new opportunities for tax evasion and smuggling, which were already a problem in the country (IMF 1997a). In 1998, concerns over corruption and smuggling continued, while the additional issue of Parliamentary interference and delays in privatization was added to the discussion (IMF 1998h).

However, even with the above criticisms, the Executive Board continued to express a positive opinion of Uganda's performance overall, commending their progress on growth and liberalization and supporting their efforts to receive debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This support continued despite the fact that Museveni's government was not democratic and was engaged in increasingly repressive behaviors over the course of the 1990s. The fact that the Fund remained willing to allow Uganda leeway to formulate policy despite the government's clear domestic governance issues appears to have been driven by the fact that Uganda was a relatively successful case of economic recovery compared to other cases such as Kenya. This finding suggests that Uganda's more favorable economic position throughout the 1980s and 1990s granted it enough bargaining power to allow the Ugandan government to successfully pursue many of its policy preferences for the agricultural sector.

7.5 Zimbabwe

In the case of Zimbabwe, there is evidence to suggest that the Zimbabwean government exercised some influence over sectoral policy choices and that they used that influence to pursue continuity in focus on agriculture. While the drivers of agricultural sector policy choices are difficult to ascertain definitively given the limited data available for Zimbabwe, agricultural sector continuity appears to have been driven by the existence of strong domestic agricultural interest groups and the embeddedness of political elites within those interest groups. More specifically, the entrenchment of commercial farmer interests in the country in the pre-adjustment period appears to have created strong domestic pressures against agricultural sector reform and incentivized relative continuity (or gradual reform) on the part of the Zimbabwean state. In addition, there is some evidence that structural conditions may have contributed to the choice of sector-level agricultural continuity.

Trends in sectoral policy

Zimbabwe is a case of agricultural sector continuity and extractive and industrial sector discontinuity. Agricultural sector focus in Zimbabwe remained fairly high across the colonial and the structural adjustment periods, both in the absolute and the relative sense. In contrast, focus on the extractive sector was high in the colonial period and completely absent during the structural adjustment period. Industrial sector focus was higher during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period, but overall focus on the sector remained fairly low during both periods (Figure 7.5).



Figure 7.5 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Zimbabwe

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe began its first structural adjustment program with the Fund upon entering into a three-year ESAF arrangement in 1992.[56] The 1992-95 program objectives were to achieve higher economic growth and improved living conditions by transitioning from a highly regulated economy to a more competitive and productive market-based economy. The sectoral policies outlined to achieve these goals were mostly limited to the agricultural sector and were focused on promotion of agricultural production through pricing policies and improved service provision (IMF 1992h, 1994j). The 1992-95 ESAF arrangement was Zimbabwe's only arrangement under the SAF/ESAF, and the country went on to borrow using Stand-By Arrangements with the Fund after 1995.

Explaining sectoral policies in Zimbabwe

Explaining sectoral policy in Zimbabwean structural adjustment is challenging for two reasons. The first is that the Executive Board only discussed the 1992-1995 program on two occasions, once in 1992 and once in 1994, which limits the material for analysis. The second reason is that discussion of sectoral policy specifically was limited in the program discussions that did occur in 1992 and 1994. To the extent that it occurred, discussion of sectoral policy in Zimbabwe suggests that focus on the agricultural sector was uncontroversial, with the Zimbabwean authorities, IMF Staff, and IMF Executive Board members explicitly stating that the agricultural sector would continue to play a vital role in development and attaching great importance to its recovery as a source of economic stability and growth going forward (IMF 1992d).

While the Zimbabwean authorities and the Fund appear to have shared similar preferences for focus on the agricultural sector, there was little discussion of why this focus was appropriate in program discussions. However, strong statements about agriculture's importance for the economy and the relative absence of discussions around diversification away from agriculture suggest that agriculture was considered the obvious sector to prioritize given the existing conditions of the country. This is perhaps not surprising given the fact that Zimbabwean

[56] Zimbabwe had four lending arrangements under different Fund facilities between 1981 and 1992 before beginning its first ESAF arrangement.

agriculture was relatively well-developed along commercial lines, particularly compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries, and had traditionally performed well as a source of economic growth for the country (Palmer 1990).

While Executive Board discussions suggest relative consensus in terms of focus on the agricultural sector, there is some evidence of divergent preferences on the part of the Zimbabwean authorities and the Fund with relation to the pace of reform within the agricultural sector, particularly with regard to liberalization of prices and restructuring of public sector enterprises. In the 1992 program discussions, for example, Executive Directors expressed concern over the fact that price deregulation had been slow and that movement toward introducing private sector involvement in agricultural enterprises was missing from the program (IMF 1992d). Executive Directors expressed similar concerns with regard to the reduction of government involvement in public enterprises during the 1994 program discussions, suggesting that large-scale government involvement continued to undermine efforts to promote private investment and market-based activity (IMF 1994c). The above criticisms suggest some level of disagreement over within-sector policy; and the fact that these programs were ultimately approved despite the discontent of the Fund with the above policies suggests that the Zimbabwean authorities might have been successful at influencing sectoral reform on some level.

The Zimbabwean authorities' pursuit of sector- and within-sector level continuity in agriculture is intuitive when viewed in the context of the interests and influence of certain groups of farmers and elites during this period. Unlike the other cases in this study, Zimbabwe was a settler colony that retained a large proportion of its white settler farmers upon independence in 1980. At independence, president Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU(PF) party pursued a policy of national reconciliation that allowed white settlers to retain their agricultural property and provided opportunities for members of the indigenous population to resettle into agricultural lands previously unavailable to them (Palmer 1990). As a result of this policy, the period between independence in 1980 and the introduction of IMF structural adjustment in 1992 was characterized by the emergence and consolidation of a minority group of farmers and farmers' organizations that both benefitted from the existing policies of the government and exercised significant lobbying power when it came to advocating for their preferred agricultural sector policies (Thomas 2003, Palmer 1990). Two areas in which this influence was strongest were land allocation policies and producer pricing policies, with the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) slowing processes of land resettlement that would have threatened their control over large swaths of farmland and negotiating high producer prices for the agricultural goods produced by its members (Palmer 1990).

Importantly, members of the political elite were also increasingly embedded within the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe during this period. Beginning in the post-independence period, members of both the old and new elite became increasingly involved in agricultural sector activity through both membership in agricultural organizations and acquisition of farmlands via government schemes that allocated agricultural estates to wealthy members of the emerging black elite (Palmer 1990, Thomas 2003). Given (1) the relatively strong lobbying power of farmers and farmers' organizations in Zimbabwe and (2) the fact that the agricultural industry was closely tied to the economic fortunes of a number of elites, it is possible that the government favored policies of relative continuity in relation to the sector during the structural adjustment period.

7.6 Lesotho

Structural adjustment in Lesotho was characterized by the Lesotho government exercising some degree of influence over sectoral policy choices and using that influence to pursue agricultural sector continuity. In the case of Lesotho, focus on the agricultural sector was uncontroversial, with the borrowing government and the Fund appearing to agree that agricultural sector focus was necessary given the country's particularly strong structural constraints in the form of landlocked-ness, a narrow natural resource base, and vulnerability to neighboring South Africa's economy. However, there was some level of disagreement between the Fund and Lesotho's government regarding land reform; and the evidence suggests that the Lesotho government utilized their influence over policy choice to pursue continuity in this particular area of agricultural sector policy in opposition to the preferences of the Fund.

Trends in sectoral policy

Lesotho can be characterized as a weak case of agricultural sector continuity and a case of industrial and extractive sector discontinuity (Figure 7.6). At first glance, focus on the agricultural sector varied significantly between the colonial and structural adjustment periods in both the absolute and relative sense, suggesting discontinuity in agricultural sector focus across the two periods. However, agriculture was arguably a core sectoral strategy in both periods of development. In other words, if Lesotho had a colonial strategy, that strategy was one focused on agriculture, while its structural adjustment strategy was one focused on a combination of agriculture and industry. Given this, I characterize Lesotho as a case of agricultural sector continuity, albeit a weak one.

Industrial sector focus, in contrast, was characterized by discontinuity between the two periods. The colonial period was characterized by no industrial sector focus, while the structural adjustment period was characterized by a large degree of both absolute and relative industrial sector focus. With regard to the extractive sector, there was very little focus on extraction during the colonial period and no focus at all on the sector during the structural adjustment period (Figure 7.6).



Figure 7.6 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Lesotho

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Lesotho

Lesotho entered into its first structural adjustment program under the IMF when they requested a three-year arrangement under the SAF in 1988.[57] The 1988-91 program involved agricultural sector policies aimed at raising production through improved land management, reform of marketing and distribution structures, and promotion of appropriate crops and agricultural activities. In the industrial sector, policies during this period were aimed at promoting export-oriented manufactured products and other industrial projects stimulated by the new Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) (IMF 1988e, 1989d, 1990d).

Upon completion of the SAF arrangement in 1991, Lesotho entered into another three-year ESAF arrangement. The 1991-94 agriculture sector objectives aimed to promote increased agricultural productivity through improved agricultural services, better land management, and development of suitable high-value crops. In the industrial sector, policies were aimed at using institutional reform, deregulation, and pricing policies to continue to promote export-oriented manufactured production and other industrial projects related to the LHWP (IMF 1991d, 1992b, 1993b). It is worth noting that Lesotho was an unusual case of IMF structural adjustment in that the economy was relatively stable compared to other countries engaged in IMF structural adjustment during the same period. In fact, Lesotho's economy was stable enough that there was debate within the Executive Board about whether the SAF/ESAF were the appropriate facilities through which to lend to the country.

Explaining sectoral policy in Lesotho

In the case of Lesotho, focus on the agricultural and industrial sectors during the structural adjustment period appears to have been driven primarily by considerations of structural conditions on the part of IMF staff, the Executive Board, and the government of Lesotho. At the introduction of the first SAF arrangement in 1988, IMF staff and Executive Board members highlighted the particularly constrained position of Lesotho due to factors such as landlocked-ness, an extremely narrow resource base, and an unusually high level of

[57] Lesotho was an unusual case in that this first SAF loan was, in fact, the first lending arrangement Lesotho entered into with the Fund. Lesotho had not used Fund resources at any point prior to this 1988 arrangement.

dependence on South Africa's economy due to being an enclave within South Africa's territory (IMF 1988f, i). Executive Board members and IMF staff linked these structural constraints to the outlined sectoral policies, and there appears to have been agreement that promotion of the agricultural and industrial sectors in Lesotho was the appropriate approach to stabilization and growth given these constraints (IMF 1988i).

For example, one Executive Director pointed out the program's considerable emphasis on promotion of agriculture and industry for GDP growth and domestic employment expansion, stating that this emphasis was "understandable since the root of Lesotho's structural weakness is the narrow production base which compels more than half of the labor force to seek employment outside the country, remitting back incomes which are as large as GDP but which are beyond the authorities' control" (IMF 1988i, 14). Importantly, the staff reports and Executive Board discussions suggest that the government of Lesotho shared the Fund's view about the country's structural constraints and the appropriateness of utilizing agricultural and industrial sector policies to address them. This is evidenced by the fact that both IMF staff and Lesotho's representative on the Board pointed out the authorities' belief that these sectors would be the most important source of growth and stability as the economy continued to develop (IMF 1988i, 1989h). Statements highlighting Lesotho's structural constraints and expressing support for focus on the agricultural and industrial sectors as the solution to economic growth within those structural constraints were present in program discussions throughout the entire period of structural adjustment in Lesotho, and they suggest that consideration of structural conditions was a primary driver of sectoral policy choices in Lesotho.

Continuity in focus on agriculture and increased focus on industrialization in Lesotho are intuitive when viewed in the context of the prevailing conditions within Lesotho, the Southern African region, and the global economy going into the structural adjustment period. As a geographically small, landlocked, and resource poor country, Lesotho had historically depended primarily on migrant remittances from miners in South Africa, dividends from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and aid flows as its main sources of revenue (Matlosa and Sello 2005, 5). While agriculture had played some role in the economy, the above external revenue sources had served as a way to offset the structural constraints of the country in productive sector activities, making sectoral policy in Lesotho a less central aspect of development than in other sub-Saharan African countries for much of the country's development. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, the country was suffering from the retrenchment of miners in South Africa, declining revenues from SACU, and decreased aid flows (Matlosa and Sello 2005). Given these developments, Lesotho was required to pursue a development strategy based on internal sector development for the first time, leading to the formulation of more aggressive agricultural and industrial sector policies than had been seen in the past.

In other words, developments in the 1980s and 1990s forced a transition in Lesotho from what was largely an absence of sectoral policy to the formulation of a more aggressive and comprehensive set of sectoral policies. For agriculture, this meant continuity in the sense that agriculture as a sector was focused on as a source of internal revenue production and growth, but an increase in overall focus on the sector compared to earlier periods such as the colonial period. For the industrial sector, this meant an increased focus on development of industrial manufacturing in areas for which there was room for Lesotho to produce competitively. In terms of the ability and willingness of the state to implement such sectoral policies, there are two things to note. The first is that the relative absence of sectoral development and policies for much of the country's history likely meant fewer entrenched interests in the productive sectors at the introduction of structural adjustment, allowing the government of Lesotho to implement policies geared toward discontinuity in relation to certain sectors such as industry. The second thing to note is that Lesotho was a military dictatorship until the final year of the IMF structural adjustment period[58], making it an unusual case in the sense that the state was not vulnerable to being removed through elections and was perhaps less vulnerable to domestic pressures as a result (Matlosa and Sello 2005).

While there appears to have been consensus about the need for a large degree of focus on the agricultural and industrial sectors overall, sectoral policy formulation in Lesotho was also characterized by one clear area of contention in relation to within-sector agricultural reform, namely land reform. Beginning in 1989, members of the Executive Board and IMF staff began to express significant discontent with the very slow and gradual approach to land reform being taken by the government of Lesotho, with several Executive Directors emphasizing the

[58] Elections were held in March of 1993 and the newly elected democratic government took power in April of 1993 (Matlosa 1997).

importance of rapid completion of the land reform process (IMF 1989h). In response to these pressures, Lesotho's representative on the Board stated that the government was working toward land reform but found it necessary to proceed with caution due to the sensitivity of the issue in a country with a history of communal land ownership and a large segment of the population that relied on agriculture for their livelihoods (IMF 1989h, 43). Lesotho's representative went on to point out the need to take the political, economic, and social context of the country into account when formulating the adjustment program (IMF 1989h, 59).

A number of Executive Directors expressed sympathy over the social difficulties involved in such reforms, but concluded that the reforms needed to occur despite these difficulties in order to promote continued development (IMF 1989h). Similar discussions around land reform aspects of the program occurred in every subsequent program discussion for Lesotho from 1989 to 1992, with Fund staff and Executive Board members continuing to push for more rapid and comprehensive reform and the government of Lesotho continuing to opt for slow and gradual reform. Despite the increasing frustration of the Fund with the government's refusal to move on land reform issues, Lesotho was successful in obtaining Fund approval of all of its requested arrangements, suggesting significant influence over agricultural sector policy.

The fact that the question of land reform was the key area of both continuity and contention within the agricultural sector is notable when considered in the context of the historical importance of land tenure systems for the country's largely rural population and the powerful role of rural chiefs in that system. The land tenure system in Lesotho was based on a communal system of ownership in which land was "owned" by the nation, administered by rural chiefs, and made available to the rural population for farming and grazing (Thahane 1998). Though land legislation following independence weakened this traditional system of communal land tenure to some extent, communal systems of land management persisted in the post-colonial period, with rural chiefs continuing to exercise significant influence over the allocation and management of land in rural Lesotho and rural populations continuing to depend on this system for access to farmland and livestock grazing (Thahane 1998). Given the fact that land tenure arrangements were intricately tied to one of the few historically powerful groups in Lesotho, as well as the fact that land tenure arrangements were a particularly sensitive political issue in Lesotho, it is possible that the government's choice to pursue continuity in this one area of agricultural sector policy was due to domestic political pressures against reform.

7.7 Conclusion

The above analysis of the six country cases provides strong support for domestic state and societal interests as driving factors in agricultural sector continuity in IMF structural adjustment. This is evidenced by the fact that all six countries demonstrated some degree of African state influence over the policy-making process for at least part of the structural adjustment period, as well as the fact that all of the six countries appear to have used this influence to pursue some level of continuity in the agricultural sector. However, the six case studies also highlight important differences with regard to African influence over structural adjustment sectoral policy-making. First, only Tanzania follows the "two-phase" pattern observed in Kenya and The Gambia. In other words, Tanzania is the only country of the six in this chapter whose government lost its influence over sectoral policy-making in the latter period of adjustment and was replaced by IMF staff as the dominant policy-makers.

Like both Kenya and The Gambia, Tanzania's loss of influence over sectoral policy followed a break with the Fund and a period of acute economic crisis that resulted in a particularly strong need for external financing upon returning to the Fund. Also similar to the cases of Kenya and The Gambia was the fact that Tanzania's economic crisis occurred during a period in which other donors were suspending aid to the country over corruption and governance issues. Taken together, these things suggest that, like the other two countries, Tanzania's bargaining position at the Fund was sufficiently weakened as to prevent the Tanzanian government from successfully negotiating for its preferred policies in the latter rounds of structural adjustment. The Tanzanian case, therefore, provides further support for the arguments made in the previous chapters about African countries' bargaining power and influence being determined by factors such as geopolitical influence, acuteness of economic crisis, and ability to secure alternative financing.

Another notable finding of this chapter is that structural conditions often played a role as a driver of sector-level agricultural continuity, as illustrated in the cases of Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and (perhaps) Zimbabwe. It is notable that all of these countries are landlocked countries and that Lesotho and Malawi in particular are characterized by extremely narrow natural resource bases. This pattern provides support for theories around structural conditions as a driver of policy choices regarding which sectors to prioritize as a source of economic development or growth. However, the cases of Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and Zimbabwe also highlight that, while structural constraints impacted which sectors could be productively focused on in the given countries, within-sector policies in the agricultural sector appear to have been largely driven by domestic interests, with each of the borrowing governments pursuing within-sector policies based on domestic pressures and interests.

8 Extractive Sector Continuity in Sierra Leone and Zambia

In this chapter, I explore Zambia and Sierra Leone as cases of extractive sector continuity. The findings in the case of Zambia suggest that African state influence and domestic interests were drivers of extractive sector continuity during the structural adjustment period. In doing so, the case highlights similar dynamics of entrenched domestic interests and pressures creating disincentives for extractive sector reforms on the part of the borrowing government as were observed in the previous cases of agricultural sector continuity. The case of Sierra Leone, on the other hand, is a case of lack of borrowing state influence over sectoral policy choice, supporting the findings in previous cases about the role of acute economic crisis and poor relationships with donors as factors that undermined the bargaining power of certain African governments during structural adjustment. The case of Sierra Leone also highlights the role of structural conditions as an explanatory factor for the prioritization of extractive sector activity.

8.1 Zambia

Zambian structural adjustment was characterized by dominant Zambian government influence over sectoral policy-making and the use of that influence to pursue continuity of focus on extraction as the country's primary productive activity, as well as some level of continuity in the structures within the extractive sector itself. This pursuit of extractive sector continuity is attributed to domestic state and societal interests. More specifically, continuity in extraction is explained by (1) the historically important role of state-owned mining companies as a source of government revenue and patronage and (2) the existence of strong domestic interest groups opposed to mining sector privatization.

Trends in sectoral focus

Zambia can be characterized as a case of agricultural and extractive sector continuity and industrial sector discontinuity. Focus on the extractive and agricultural sectors remained consistently high across both the colonial and the structural adjustment periods, in both the absolute and relative sense. There was discontinuity in industrial sector focus between the colonial and structural adjustment periods, with no focus on the industrial sector during the colonial period and a significant amount of focus on the industrial sector in the structural adjustment period (Figure 8.1).



Figure 8.1 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Zambia

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Zambia

Zambia entered into its first IMF structural adjustment arrangement when they began a three-year SAF/ESAF program in 1995.[59] The 1995-98 program included

[59] Prior to the adoption of the 1995 SAF/ESAF arrangement, Zambia participated in seven lending arrangements under other Fund facilities between 1973 and 1987. They were declared ineligible to borrow from the Fund in 1987 as a result of overdue financial obligations and subsequently

the promotion of efficient private sector agricultural production; restructuring of the manufacturing sector for increased efficiency and competition; and the introduction of a comprehensive mining and minerals development policy aimed at private-sector-based and environmentally sustainable development of the mining sector (IMF 1995i). Upon expiration of the 1995-98 program, Zambia entered into a second three-year ESAF program from 1999-2001. The 1999-2001 program was aimed at facilitating increased output and non-traditional exports in agriculture and increased mining activity through reforms to mining licensing structures and initiatives to improve government services in the mining sector (IMF 1999h).

Explaining sectoral policies in Zambia

Structural adjustment in Zambia was characterized by Zambian state influence over sectoral policy formulation and the use of that influence to pursue sector-level and within-sector continuity in the extractive sector. While Zambian structural adjustment also entailed continued focus on agriculture, agricultural sector policies were largely ignored in program discussions, and the extractive sector was at the center of discussions around sectoral policy choices. These discussions of extractive sector policy were characterized by contention between the Zambian authorities and the Fund over issues such as diversification away from mining, structural reforms within the mining sector more generally, and reform of the country's largest mining enterprise, Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), more specifically.

For example, in the 1995 program discussions, a number of Executive Board members expressed disappointment over delays in privatization of public enterprises, including ZCCM; stated that they would have preferred the inclusion of explicit structural benchmarks and/or binding decisions on restructuring and privatization of ZCCM in the proposed program; and urged the authorities to accelerate the process of extractive sector reform going forward, again referencing the copper sector specifically (IMF 1995f). Board members also linked their criticisms of excessive state involvement in the sector to governance issues such as corruption and lack of transparency, with at least one Executive Director

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participated in a rights accumulation program to become eligible for continued borrowing between 1991 and 1994.

expressing reservations about the program due to deep-seated, unresolved domestic problems and the troubling direction of political developments with regard to governance, corruption, and transparency (IMF 1995f).

Despite the heavy criticisms described above, the Executive Board ultimately approved Zambia's 1995 program. The approval of the program suggests that the Zambian government was successful in pursuing policies of continued state control of ZCCM and the extractive sector more broadly despite strong resistance from the Board. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that a number of Board members stated that they were approving the program only reluctantly, and that their approval was primarily based Zambia having officially met all of the requirements of the rights accumulation program they had recently completed (IMF 1995f). These comments suggest that Zambia's program approval in 1995 was at least partly based on the perception of the Board that approval was the procedurally "correct" decision, rather than being based on Board member agreement with the policies outlined in the Policy Framework Papers.

While Zambia appears to have been successful at pushing through its extractive sector policies in 1995, failure to meet a number of the required program targets (including implementation of a survival plan for ZCCM) in 1996 resulted in the Fund being unable to disburse the second-year funds for the program. From 1996 to 1998, Zambia struggled to meet the requirements of the agreed-upon ESAF arrangement, and Fund oversight of their efforts was characterized by pressure for the Zambian authorities to achieve stronger and more sustained policy implementation in both macroeconomic and structural areas. In 1998, Zambia's three-year program expired without the authorities having received disbursement of funds for the second and third years of the program.

When Zambia resumed normal relations with the Fund through another ESAF arrangement in 1999, similar conflicts over ZCCM reform arose once again. In contrast to the 1995 program, Zambia's 1999 program involved significant steps toward privatization of ZCCM, and Executive Board members commended the authorities for this progress (IMF 1999d). However, last-minute modifications delaying the privatization date of ZCCM and failure to provide an updated timeline generated concern and discontent among Board members, prompting some Executive Directors to express reluctance over the program's approval (IMF 1999d). In expressing their hesitation, several Board members highlighted that the Zambian authorities had avoided the issue of privatization in the past and had demonstrated enough hesitation throughout the structural adjustment period to raise concerns about further delays in the future (IMF 1999d). However, as with the 1995 program, the proposed program for 1999 was approved despite these concerns, suggesting continued Zambian state dominance of sectoral policy formulation.[60]

The pursuit of continuity in certain areas of the mining sector, and the government's resistance to privatization of ZCCM particularly, makes sense when viewed in the context of the mining sector's political relevance in Zambia at the time of adjustment. Mining had been the backbone of the Zambian economy from the colonial period; and, by independence in 1964, both the state and a number of well-established unions had entrenched interests in the sector (Fraser 2010). State interests in the mining sector were further consolidated with the nationalization of the country's two major mining companies in 1969 (Fraser 2010, 8) and their subsequent consolidation into the state-owned ZCCM in 1982 (Larmer 2010, 41). Within this context of state control of mining as the predominant economic activity, struggles over the distribution of profits from the mining sector were at the core of post-independence politics in Zambia.

Early in the independence period, Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) catered to politically active mining unions through the provision of subsidized housing and food, education, and infrastructure in mining areas. When copper prices declined in the late 1970s, the government turned to using the ZCCM as a source of funds for the state, simultaneously eliminating sector investment and new mining activity (Fraser 2010, 9). Beginning in the 1970s, the country's economic decline and the decreasing ability of the state to meet the demands of mining unions led to the emergence of organized trade union opposition; and in 1991 Frederick Chiluba succeeded Kaunda at the head of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) following the country's first multi-party elections (Fraser 2010).

While the MMD had promoted some level of liberalization and privatization in the name of rehabilitating the mining sector during their political campaign, many members of the party openly opposed the privatization of ZCCM specifically. They were joined in this opposition by the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), and other groups in

[60] Privatization of ZCCM was, in fact, finalized in 2000.

Zambian society (Fraser 2010, 12). The strength of domestic opposition to mining sector privatization, the close ties between domestic opposition groups and the Zambian government, and the historical importance of state-owned mining companies as a source of government revenue likely all played a role in the government's attempts to slow and/or delay privatization reforms during Zambian structural adjustment.[61]

8.2 Sierra Leone

IMF structural adjustment in Sierra Leone was characterized by Fund dominance and a lack of Sierra Leonean government influence over sectoral policy choices. Sierra Leone's inability to exercise influence over sectoral policy choices is attributed to the country's poor relationship with the Fund and other donors, as well as the particularly dire state of its economy going into the adjustment period. In the context of IMF staff dominance, sectoral policies in Sierra Leone were geared toward continuity of focus on agriculture and mining and discontinuity in policies within the agricultural and extractive sectors. The IMF's choice to prioritize extraction and agriculture is attributed to the structural conditions of the country, which privileged these activities. The pursuit of within-sector discontinuity is attributed to economic ideas privileging liberalization and market-based productive sector activity.

Trends in sectoral focus

Sierra Leone is a case of agricultural and extractive sector continuity and industrial sector discontinuity between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. Both absolute and relative focus on the agricultural sector were high across both periods. At first glance, extractive sector focus does not appear to be consistently high between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. However, extractive

[61] Further evidence of the influence of domestic mining groups over government policy choices can be found in the fact that these groups had historically been successful at halting economic reform efforts undertaken in collaboration with the IMF and World Bank. For example, in 1987, the Zambian government suspended a structural adjustment program it had just implemented in response to riots in northern copper mining districts over food price increases (Caffentzis and Federici 2001).

sector focus increased significantly beginning in 1930 and remained consistently high for the remainder of the colonial period and for all of the structural adjustment period. Given that natural resources were discovered in Sierra Leone in the late 1920s, I characterize this pattern of consistently high levels of focus beginning in 1930 as continuity in extractive sector focus. Finally, industrial sector focus was significantly higher during the structural adjustment period than during the colonial period, but was fairly low across both periods (Figure 8.2).



Figure 8.2 Absolute and relative focus by sector, Sierra Leone

Structural adjustment lending and sectoral policies in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone began its first three-year structural adjustment arrangement with the IMF under the SAF in 1986.[62] The objectives of the 1986 program were stabilization of the economy and sustained growth through a market-oriented economic program. The sectoral policies outlined to achieve these objectives included pricing policy reforms, reform of public enterprises, and infrastructure

[62] The 1986 SAF program was not Sierra Leone's first lending arrangement from the IMF. The country had in fact engaged in eight previous arrangements with the Fund under different facilities between 1966 and 1986 before pursuing a structural adjustment program under the SAF.

development to promote increased production and efficiency in both the agricultural and mining sectors (IMF 1986e). The government of Sierra Leone completed the first two years of the SAF program before being declared ineligible to borrow additional Fund resources in 1988 due to overdue financial obligations.

Sierra Leone continued to undertake the policy reforms outlined in the Policy Framework Papers with the assistance of the Fund between 1989 and 1992 before officially beginning a rights accumulation program to re-establish access to Fund financial resources in 1992. During this period, reforms continued to be aimed at market-oriented policies to facilitate growth and increased efficiency in the agricultural and mining sectors (IMF 1990k).[63] In 1994, Sierra Leone completed the rights accumulation program, cleared their overdue obligations to the Fund, and the government requested a new three-year structural adjustment arrangement under the ESAF. The 1994-96 program was again focused on facilitating economic growth through rehabilitation of infrastructure and the promotion of competitive and liberalized agricultural and mining sector activity (IMF 1994f, 1995g). Sierra Leone completed the 1994-96 ESAF program before requesting a final three-year ESAF arrangement for 1997-99. Sectoral policy in this program was focused on facilitating increased activity in mining, agriculture, and manufacturing through limiting government involvement in the economy and providing an enabling market-oriented environment for productive sector activity (IMF 1997b).

Explaining sectoral policy in Sierra Leone

Consideration of structural conditions on the part of IMF staff, the Executive Board, and the Sierra Leonean authorities was a primary driver of agricultural and mining sector continuity in Sierra Leone during the structural adjustment period. From the introduction of the first SAF program in 1986, there appears to have been consensus among all the parties that focus on agriculture and mining was appropriate for Sierra Leone given the country's natural resource base and potential in these areas. In the Staff Report for the 1986 program, for example, staff members highlighted the significant potential for Sierra Leone to exploit its

[63] It was also during this period that a civil war broke out in Sierra Leone. The conflict began in March 1991 and would continue over a decade before a lasting ceasefire and peace agreement were reached in 2002.

considerable natural resource base to generate sustained growth (IMF 1986f, 38). In the Executive Board discussion of the program, several Executive Board members explicitly stated that the focus on agriculture and mining was appropriate given Sierra Leone's wealth of natural resources, with one Executive Director stating that Sierra Leone "unlike many other countries, enjoys a considerable resource base, which combined with appropriate economic management, should enable it to achieve a good growth performance" (IMF 1986d, 14). The above discussions suggest that focus on the agricultural and mining sectors in Sierra Leone was uncontroversial given the natural resource endowments of the country.

The strength of structural conditions in driving focus on mining in particular is further evidenced by the persistent focus on mining even in the face of the challenges posed by the civil war in Sierra Leone after 1991. The conflict was characterized by struggles between the government of Sierra Leone and rebel groups over control of mineral-rich areas, resulting in disruptions to mining activity and devastation of infrastructure in mining areas. Despite the above challenges introduced by the conflict, Sierra Leone's structural adjustment programs continued to devote a significant amount of attention to mining as a source of economic recovery and growth. In the 1994 Staff Report and Board meetings, both IMF staff and Executive Board members attached significant importance to the resumption of mining activities in the areas most affected by the conflict, with both staff members and Executive Board members stating that it was necessary to rely on resumption of mining activities to achieve the short- and medium-term growth objectives of the program, while simultaneously acknowledging that this reliance posed a considerable risk to the success of the program in the event that hostilities resumed (IMF 1994d). Continued focus on mining despite the associated risks suggests a perceived absence of alternative sectoral options, such as industrial development, on the part of the Fund and the Sierra Leonean government.

While there appears to have been relative consensus among the Fund and the Sierra Leonean authorities about agricultural and mining sector focus overall, both the staff reports and the Executive Board meeting minutes suggest that the bulk of the policies pursued within the individual sectors themselves were the preferred policies of the IMF staff and Executive Board and were geared toward within-sector discontinuity in the agricultural and extractive sectors. This is evidenced by the fact that the 1986 Staff Report and Executive Board meeting minutes both explicitly highlighted that the policies contained in the proposed policy framework paper were a sharp departure from policies pursued by Sierra Leone in the past and were in line with the policies proposed by the Fund for Sierra Leone in previous policy discussions (IMF 1986f, d). For example, the 1986 Staff Report stated that the reforms outlined by Sierra Leone encompassed a number of substantive policy actions that were consistent with the views and recommendations of the Fund at the country's previous Article IV consultation in 1985 (IMF 1986f, 36). This suggests that the sectoral policy preferences of the Fund dominated sectoral policy formulation.

The above interpretation that IMF staff were driving sectoral policy formulation during this period is consistent when viewed in the context of Sierra Leone's relationship with the Fund and the particularly dire state of their economy at the start of IMF adjustment in 1986. By this time, Sierra Leone's economy was at the point of near collapse following decades of rampant corruption and mismanagement by the state. Heavily dependent on mining, the country's economy from the 1970s had increasingly been characterized by sharply declining formal sector activity and the emergence of illegal markets through which elites (many of whom were government officials) exported diamonds and other resources for their own personal enrichment while formal productive sector development remained at a standstill (Harris 2012). The results of this approach were plummeting official diamond and mineral exports; sharp decreases in GDP; and rapid decreases in foreign capital investment in diamond mining and other industries (Zack-Williams 1999).

By the late 1970s, the Sierra Leonean government was facing economic collapse and turned to the IMF for assistance through a series of Stand-By Arrangements. Sierra Leone's performance under these arrangements was poor, with the programs facing difficulties with implementation almost immediately due to the government's inability and unwillingness to meet loan conditions related to exchange rate policy, agricultural pricing, commodity subsidies, public expenditure, and foreign-exchange earnings surrenders to the central bank (Luke and Riley 1989, 137). Sierra Leone's reputation and record with the Fund continued to deteriorate going into the 1980s; and in 1986, just a few months before the first structural adjustment program was approved, the Executive Board decided that the country would become ineligible to continue to use Fund resources if they failed to become current in their overdue obligations within a specified period of time (IMF 1986f, 2). While the newly established government of President Joseph Momoh was successful at meeting these overdue obligations and securing lending in 1986, the country entered the structural adjustment period with a lack of credibility with the Fund. Given the state of near collapse of the economy at the start of adjustment, it is therefore likely that the government of Sierra Leone was in a position of desperately needing the funds that would accompany adjustment, while having little leverage when it came to determining the conditions of that adjustment.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that there was explicit acknowledgement in Fund discussions that the approved adjustment programs would impose a significant burden on the domestic population and present a political challenge for the Momoh government to maintain (IMF 1986d). It is also notable that the discussions of the burden of adjustment referred to the fact that it was the urban populations, which were generally better integrated and more influential in Sierra Leonean politics and economics, who would be most negatively affected by the proposed policies, while poor rural populations might be expected to benefit through reforms in areas such as agricultural pricing reform (IMF 1986d). The above discussions suggest that the sectoral policies put forward during this period did not cater to traditionally strong domestic interests in Sierra Leone, supporting the interpretation that the policies were externally derived by the Fund. A final piece of supporting evidence for this argument is the fact that Momoh did, in fact, face massive opposition to his attempts to implement reform during this period, with members of the "old elite" who had maintained positions in government and congress actively working to prevent the implementation of the agreed-upon reform program (Vidler 1993). In the end, Momoh was unsuccessful at pushing through reform, and he was removed in a military coup in 1992.

8.3 Conclusion

Analysis of extractive sector continuity in Sierra Leone and Zambia contributes three relevant findings when placed in the context of the other cases studies. The first important finding, which emerges from the case of Zambia, is that African state influence and domestic interests were also a driving factor for extractive sector continuity during this period. This is evidenced by the fact that the Zambian government was able to successfully exercise influence over policy-formulation throughout the structural adjustment period and that they used this influence to continue to pursue continued reliance on mining for economic growth and state control over mining sector activity.

The second important finding of this chapter is that, as with cases of agricultural sector continuity, structural conditions also played a role in extractive sector continuity during this period. This is evidenced by the case of Sierra Leone, whose rich natural resource base and competitive advantage in mining were repeatedly cited as justifying continuing reliance on the sector even in the face of the challenges posed by the country's civil war. The final finding also emerges from the case of Sierra Leone and is related to the determinants of borrowing state influence at the Fund. Similar to the cases of Kenya, The Gambia, and Tanzania, Sierra Leone's poor relationship with donors and particularly acute need for financing appears to have resulted in a lack of bargaining power over sectoral policy choices in the structural adjustment period. What is notable in the case of Sierra Leone, however, is that its government began the structural adjustment in a poor bargaining position, resulting in a failure to exercise influence over sectoral policy from the very first program.

9 Conclusion

This dissertation began with the puzzle of Ghana and Zambia's marked persistence in focus on export-oriented primary commodity production in the structural adjustment period despite the demonstrable risks and consequences associated with such an approach. Departing from this puzzle, this thesis has addressed the questions of whether and why Sub-Saharan African countries pursued similar sectoral development policies in the structural adjustment period as they had during previous (colonial and post-colonial) periods of development. To answer this question, I have both described and explained cases of continuity in sectoral policy in ten Sub-Saharan African countries over time, with a particular focus on continuity in sectoral policies between the colonial period and the period of International Monetary Fund structural adjustment lending. In doing so, I have descriptively demonstrated that there was, in fact, significant continuity in which sectors were focused on (i.e., sector-level continuity) and the policy approaches used within the given sectors themselves (i.e., within-sector continuity) between the colonial and structural adjustment periods in the countries studied.

I have explained this observed continuity in sectoral focus as being driven primarily by domestic state and societal interests in borrowing countries, showing (1) that almost all of the ten borrowing states exercised significant control over sectoral policy during structural adjustment and (2) that borrowing governments used this control to pursue policies of continuity in the interest of maintaining power in political systems characterized by widespread state use of productive sector resources as a source of political power, support, and personal wealth. I have also found, however, that borrowing states did not always exercise influence over sectoral policy choices and that, in some cases, IMF staff exercised dominant control over sectoral policy. In these cases, IMF staff used their influence to pursue policies of sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity based on prevailing economic ideas.

Finally, I have found that structural conditions influenced both borrowing government and Fund policy choices with regard to sector-level focus in certain countries. In the following section, I summarize these main findings and arguments of the thesis. I then conclude the chapter with a discussion of the implications of these findings for broader knowledge about long-term economic reform and development processes in Sub-Saharan Africa, putting forward sectoral policy choices as an under researched and fruitful lens through which to explore the puzzle of under-industrialization and lack of economic transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

9.1 Findings and argument

Descriptive findings

The first empirical chapter of the thesis, Chapter Three, quantitatively illustrated that sector-level continuity was, in fact, an empirical reality in (former) British colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. Sector-level continuity was strongest in the agricultural sector, with all countries showing some level of continuity in focus on the agricultural sector between the colonial and structural adjustment periods. The chapter also showed variation in the level of agricultural sector continuity across countries, with particularly pronounced agricultural sector continuity in Kenya, Ghana, The Gambia, Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Sierra Leone and less pronounced continuity in Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

While sector-level continuity was most pronounced in the agricultural sector, Chapter Three also revealed cases of extractive and industrial sector continuity across the colonial and structural adjustment periods. Sierra Leone and Zambia emerged as clear cases of strong extractive sector focus across the two periods, while Tanzania emerged as a clear case of strong industrial sector focus across the two periods. One important finding of this chapter was that some degree of sector-level continuity persisted in most countries throughout the entirety of the structural adjustment period, with countries continuing to prioritize the same sectors not just between the colonial and structural adjustment periods, but throughout the structural adjustment period from 1986 to 2000 as well.

The qualitative case studies in Chapters Five through Eight revealed another form of sectoral continuity at the level of policy choices within the three sectors, i.e., within-sector continuity. In addition to continuity in which sectors were focused on as the primary drivers of economic growth and development, most of the countries studied also exhibited some degree of continuity in the policies and approaches used within the agricultural, extractive, and industrial sectors themselves. Again, this pattern of continuity was most pronounced in the agricultural sector, with most countries showing significant continuity in the structures and approaches used within the agricultural sector.

Within-sector continuity was also found in the case of Zambia's extractive sector and in the case of Tanzania's industrial sector. A key finding in these chapters was that within-sector continuity weakened over the structural adjustment period for most countries, with shifts toward at least some limited within-sector reforms taking place at some point in the 1990s for most of the countries studied. This was in stark contrast to sector-level continuity, which remained high for most countries throughout the structural adjustment period. This finding perhaps suggests that sector-level continuity was stronger over the long-term in these countries than within-sector continuity.

Explanatory findings

In addition to describing within-sector continuity in policy approaches, Chapters Five through Eight drew on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two to provide explanations for sectoral continuity in the ten countries. These chapters showed that explanations for sectoral policy continuity did, in fact, vary across countries and time depending on which actor (i.e., borrowing governments or the Fund) exercised dominant influence over the policy-making process. In cases in which borrowing governments exercised dominant influence, domestic state and societal interests were the primary drivers of sectoral policy continuity. In contrast, in cases in which the IMF exercised dominant influence over sectoral policy, economic ideas were the primary driver of sectoral policy choices. Finally, regardless of which actor dominated sectoral policy choice, structural constraints played a role in sector-level policy choices in certain countries.

Borrowing government influence and domestic interests

Beginning with the role of borrowing government influence and domestic interests in driving sectoral continuity, all borrowing countries but Sierra Leone exercised significant influence over the sectoral policy-making process for at least part of the structural adjustment period. These borrowing governments used that influence to pursue varying levels of continuity in both which sectors were focused on (i.e., sector-level continuity) and the structures within the individual sectors themselves (i.e., within-sector continuity). This pursuit of sectoral continuity on the part of borrowing African governments is explained primarily by domestic societal and state interests in the form of (1) pressures to appease important constituencies upon whom the state depended for political support and (2) the individual interests of state elites in continuing to utilize existing economic structures to extract political and economic resources for personal gain.

These processes were illustrated at length in the in-depth analyses of structural adjustment policy-making in Kenya and The Gambia in Chapters Five and Six. In the case of Kenya, agricultural sector continuity was linked to domestic political instability, patronage-based politics, and elite control of the economy, with the chapter highlighting the ways in which the Kenyan government had strong incentives for maintaining the sectoral status quo as a means of maintaining political power and access to resources for personal enrichment during the structural adjustment period. The case of Kenya was, therefore, a case of strong state *and* societal interests as drivers of sectoral continuity. In the case of The Gambia, the government's choice of agricultural sector continuity was linked to the importance of rural voters and an increasingly competitive electoral environment during the structural adjustment period, with the government's continued support of the agricultural sector attributed in large part to their reliance on an overwhelmingly rural and increasingly critical population for electoral success. In contrast to Kenya, then, The Gambia was a case of dominant societal interests as the primary drivers of sector-level and within-sector agricultural sector continuity.

A briefer examination of structural adjustment policy-making processes in the remaining eight countries in Chapters Seven and Eight provided additional support for borrowing African governments as drivers of sectoral continuity. Chapter Seven highlighted significant government influence driving varying levels of sector-level and within-sector continuity in agriculture in Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. Chapter Eight showed similar patterns of government influence driving continuity in focus on the extractive sector in Zambia, with the Zambian government pursuing continuity in focus on and within the extractive sector. Notably, Chapter Eight revealed a different pattern in the case of Sierra Leone, with the Sierra Leonean government failing to exercise any influence over sectoral policy making and IMF staff using their control of the policy-making process to pursue continuity in focus on the extractive sector as a whole, but discontinuity in policies within the extractive sector itself. This finding was explained by the fact that Sierra Leone was in a particularly weak bargaining position at the start of the structural adjustment period relative to the other countries due to its prior relations and poor reputation with the Fund and its especially dire economic position.

The above empirical chapters also highlighted the fact that the domestic interests that drove African government preferences for sectoral continuity were deeply entrenched as a result of long-term processes of post-colonial development through which state leaders adapted and expanded state control over existing markets and patronage networks in order to consolidate political power. By the introduction of structural adjustment in the 1980s, these structures of state resource control and patronage had become embedded and most of the African governments in question were entirely dependent upon them for maintaining political power, stability, and personal wealth. There was evidence in the case studies that it was this dependence on the above structures that created such strong interests in maintaining the status quo and delaying sectoral reform. In other words, I found that African states pursued continuity in sectoral policies because the state and those who controlled it had much to lose from reforms that would fundamentally restructure the economy in ways that undermined the state's ability to utilize patronage for political support and the ability of individual elites to continue to accumulate wealth through their control of lucrative economic activities.

Support for this argument was found in the fact that African states were particularly adamant about avoiding or slowing processes of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of sectors to which the state and its elites were most intricately tied. Clear examples of this were found in both the agricultural and extractive sectors. In agriculture, examples included Ghana's refusal to relinquish the state's monopoly on cocoa, the country's oldest and most lucrative export sector; as well as the Malawian government's refusal to privatize the country's longstanding agricultural marketing board, which had close economic and political ties to the elite-based, ruling one-party state. The clearest example in the extractive sector was Zambia's persistent battle over privatization of the country's copper industry, which was both the most valuable and the most entrenched industry in the country. In all of these cases, borrowing governments favored maintenance of structures and institutions in sectors that were well-established (with roots in the colonial period), lucrative, and had strong ties to the state and its elites.

The long-term, entrenched nature of domestic state and societal interests in the case study countries suggests a potential role for colonialism in shaping domestic preferences for sectoral continuity over time. More specifically, sectoral developments in the colonial period appear to have influenced the policy incentives and opportunities of the state and its elites in the post-colonial period in ways that may have privileged sectoral continuity going forward. This is evidenced by the fact that the economic activities and structures (e.g., agricultural marketing boards) relied upon by post-colonial states in both the initial post-colonial period and the structural adjustment period had been developed in the colonial period and served as the most accessible avenues for consolidating and maintaining power after independence. It is worth stating explicitly that this potential role for colonialism differs from the neo-colonial explanation theorized in Chapter Two. While neo-colonial theories suggest that it was the *ongoing* pursuit of Western extractive interests during structural adjustment that explains sectoral continuity, the findings above instead suggest that colonial legacies may have impacted sectoral development in the post-colonial period by having persistent effects on domestic state and societal interests.

The above pattern of entrenched domestic interests also points to the potential role of path dependence in the creation, consolidation, and maintenance of the domestic interests that drove sectoral continuity in the structural adjustment period. In the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, I highlighted the fact that theories of domestic state and societal interests allude to path dependent dynamics as a possible mechanism through which interest group influence and/or neopatrimonial tendencies might have incentivized continuation along a particular sectoral path over time in post-colonial African states. The central role of inherited market structures, activities, and networks as sources of political and economic power for states and elites over time in the case study countries suggests that such path dependent dynamics may, in fact, have played a role in sectoral continuity.

In other words, the fact that the existing political and institutional environment appears to have provided a strong incentive for sectoral continuity on the part of African states leading up to and during structural adjustment suggests that domestic interests may have contributed to continuity in sectoral policies not just because those domestic interests existed at the time of structural adjustment, but because those domestic interests had become deeply entrenched in borrowing countries over time through path dependent processes. In acknowledging this potential role for path dependence, I am not suggesting that path dependence constitutes an alternative explanation or explanatory factor for sectoral continuity. Instead, I am suggesting that path dependent dynamics may have operated through the explanatory factor of domestic interests by reinforcing those interests over time in ways that contributed to sectoral continuity.

IMF dominance and economic ideas

While Chapters Five through Eight illustrated a prominent role for borrowing government influence and domestic interests as drivers of sectoral continuity across most of the cases, they also highlighted that not all borrowing governments were able to successfully exercise influence over the policy-making process for the entirety of the structural adjustment period. The governments of Ghana, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Uganda, and Zimbabwe successfully exercised influence over sectoral policy for the entirety of the structural adjustment period. In these countries, African state influence and domestic interests played some role in policy continuity throughout the structural adjustment period.

However, Sierra Leone failed to exercise influence over the sectoral policy-making process throughout the entirety of the structural adjustment period, while Kenya, The Gambia, and Tanzania all experienced a loss of influence over policy-making in the latter years of adjustment. These four countries' inability to influence sectoral policy was attributed to their loss of bargaining power at the Fund in the face of particularly acute economic crises and increased difficulty securing funding due to their increasingly poor political and economic records. In the case of Kenya, specifically, the country's declining geopolitical importance in the context of the end of the Cold War also contributed to declining influence at the Fund in the latter period of adjustment.

In the above countries in which the Fund exercised dominant decision-making power over sectoral policy, sectoral policy choices were arguably driven primarily by the economic ideas of IMF staff. In Sierra Leone, Kenya, The Gambia, and Tanzania, IMF staff used their control over sectoral policy to design policies geared toward sector-level continuity. However, within this broader approach of sector-level continuity, staff policies during this period were aimed at fundamental changes to the economic structures within the productive sectors. This approach of sector-level continuity and within-sector discontinuity was explained by the influence of economic ideas about the appropriate economic policies for the countries in question. In the case of Sierra Leone, Kenya, The Gambia, and Tanzania, sector-level continuity in this latter period was attributed to predominant economic ideas around outward-oriented, competitive, economic activity. Policies geared toward discontinuity within the productive sectors in these countries were also linked to neoliberal economic ideas, this time ideas about the need for liberalization, deregulation, and privatization across all sectors of the economy.

Structural conditions

Regardless of whether borrowing governments or the Fund exercised dominant influence over policy-making, structural conditions were found to have played a role in driving preferences for sector-level continuity in some countries. In The Gambia, Malawi, Uganda, and Lesotho, there was clear evidence of structural constraints being a consideration for both borrowing governments and the Fund when deciding to continue to focus on the agricultural sector as the primary source of economic growth and recovery. In the case of these four countries, the emphasis on structural conditions as a driver of sectoral continuity is in line with the existing literature on structural conditions and development, as all four countries are comparatively resource poor and three out of four are landlocked, limiting their range of options for productive activities outside of agriculture. Structural conditions were also a driving factor in the Fund's decision to prioritize extractive sector activity in the case of Sierra Leone. In contrast to the other four countries listed above, this choice of sector-level continuity appears to have been driven by the country's wealth of natural resource rather than a lack of resources. Importantly, the effect of structural conditions in all cases appears to have been mostly limited to constraining sector-level policy, failing to explain much of the variation in sectoral policy choices across the different countries and highlighting the limited utility of structural conditions as a primary explanation for sectoral policy choices in structural adjustment.

Neo-colonial interests

Finally, the case studies in Chapters Five through Eight showed a lack of empirical support for neo-colonialism as an explanation for sectoral continuity. Contrary to the claims of neo-colonial theories that (former colonial) Western powers deliberately pursued policies of primary commodity extraction from borrowing countries, Western powers did not appear to actively promote primary commodity export strategies in structural adjustment. In fact, these Western powers were among the most critical of borrowing countries' choices to privilege agriculture and extraction at the expense of industrialization, often pushing borrowing governments to more aggressively pursue diversification and reduce reliance on a limited number of primary commodities. In the in-depth cases of Kenya and The Gambia, examination of trade patterns provided further evidence against the neo-colonial hypothesis by illustrating that trade with these countries was increasingly less important for Western powers leading up to and throughout structural adjustment. Taken together, the above findings suggest that neo-colonial trade interests were not an explanatory factor for sectoral continuity in the countries in question. However, in focusing on a narrow definition of neo-colonialism centered around neo-colonial trade interests, I have explored only one potential avenue through which Western interests and actions may have impacted sectoral policy choices during structural adjustment. In other words, it is possible that neo-colonial dynamics were present in IMF sectoral policy-making in ways not captured by the analysis done in this thesis.

9.2 Contributions

With the findings outlined above, this thesis has contributed a multi-level theory of international policy-making that combines theoretical insights from comparative politics and IR to develop a more accurate account of policy-making at international financial institutions. As discussed previously, existing IR literatures have tended to have a myopic focus on international-level factors when seeking to explain policy choices at international institutions. In doing so, these literatures have located decision-making power and agency exclusively at the international level and presented policy choices as being dominated by actors at international institutions. As a result, IR explanations for policy choices at international institutions have been focused on factors such as the interests of Western member states (e.g., Breen 2013, Kang 2007, Stone 2004), including neo-colonial trade interests (Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000), and the economic ideas of staff at IFIs (e.g., Babb 2013, Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Chwieroth 2008).

The explanatory case studies in this dissertation have shown that the above theories are insufficient for explaining policy choices at the level of IFIs and have highlighted the importance of accounting for domestic factors in borrowing countries when explaining policy choices at the international level. More specifically, the case studies have demonstrated the value of incorporating theories on domestic state and societal interests into IR theories of policy-making at international institutions. These theories on domestic state and societal interests focus on the pivotal role of the entrenched interests of both societal groups (e.g., Bates 1981, 2008, Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Lipton 1977, Nelson 1992, Wolff 2020) and the state and its elites (e.g., Tangri 1999, van de Walle 2001) in driving domestic preferences for policy continuity at the national level over time. By accounting for the impact of these entrenched domestic interests on structural adjustment policy-making, I have shown that domestic factors can, and have, influenced policy choices at the level of IFIs. In fact, domestic interests were not just one important factor, but the *primary* explanatory factor for sectoral policy choices during IMF structural adjustment in the countries in question. These striking findings regarding the primacy of domestic factors in driving sectoral policy choices speak to the value of bringing comparative theories of domestic reform into IR theories on international policy-making.

The centrality of domestic interests as an explanatory factor also contributes to updating existing knowledge about the role of African agency in international lending processes. Much of the existing literature on structural adjustment in Africa has tended to treat African governments as powerless and passive actors in structural adjustment processes. This is true of the broad literature on the impacts of structural adjustment (Riddell 1992, Bangura 2007, Harrigan and Mosley 1991), the literature on neo-colonialism (e.g., Chossudovsky 2003, Langan 2018, Osabu-Kle 2000), and the literature on economic ideas (e.g., Babb 2013, Mkandawire 2014, Sindzingre 2004), all of which assume the external imposition of lending policies on African governments with little power to resist them. In theorizing and empirically demonstrating the strength of domestic interests as a primary explanatory factor for sectoral policy continuity in these ten African countries, I have challenged this conventional wisdom by showing that borrowing African governments often exercised a large degree of agency in determining the policies pursued under structural adjustment. In doing so, I have highlighted the need for a re-evaluation of the power relations between borrowing African governments and the IMF and greater attention to the varied nature of these power relations across cases and time when attempting to explain policy choices in international lending programs.

The above findings related to African agency have not only contributed to the literature on international lending programs, but have also contributed to a growing literature focused more broadly on African agency in international relations. This literature questions the assumption that African states have been marginalized in international relations in the post-colonial period, instead arguing that these states have actually exercised a significant degree of agency and influence in different areas such as diplomacy, security, trade, and finance, both historically and in the contemporary period (e.g., Brown and Harman 2013, Chipaike and Knowledge 2018, Brown 2012). This thesis has contributed valuable insights to this broader literature by theoretically and empirically highlighting African agency in a particular period and context (i.e., structural adjustment lending) in which African states have traditionally been assumed to have exercised very little influence and power.

The final contribution of this thesis stems from its specific focus on sectoral policy choices. This focus on sectoral policy in African structural adjustment has filled a gap in the structural adjustment and international lending literatures by addressing an area of policy-making that has been understudied in comparison to other areas of lending program policies. While there is an immense literature on structural adjustment policies and their determinants, this literature has often focused on policy areas such as macroeconomic reform and social policies (e.g., Easterly 2005, Loewenson 1993), or on measuring the effects of structural adjustment (e.g., Collier and Gunning 2001, Kanbur 1987, Naiman and Watkins 1999, Summers 1993, Riddell 1992, Harrigan and Mosley 1991). As a result, sectoral policies and their determinants have been relatively understudied. The exclusive focus on sectoral policies in this project has contributed to remedying this gap by expanding the existing body of knowledge about structural adjustment policy choices to include theories of, and empirical knowledge about, sectoral policy choice specifically.

9.3 Broader implications and future research

While this project has thus far been limited to explaining policy choices and not policy outcomes, the findings outlined with regard to sectoral policy choices have potentially important implications for broader processes of sectoral development, diversification, and industrialization in the region. Literature on development in Sub-Saharan Africa has increasingly focused on the region's lack of economic transformation (e.g., Amatsu 2021, Carmignani and Mandeville 2014, de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2013), highlighting the fact that African countries have largely failed to achieve industrialization and diversification away from a narrow range of primary commodities since independence in the 1960s (Whitfield et al. 2015). The literature links this lack of economic transformation to broader developmental outcomes, suggesting that the failure of African economies to transform has been a key factor in their failure to raise standards of living and income to the levels enjoyed by other developing regions (Whitfield et al. 2015).

These literatures also explicitly acknowledge the long-term nature of such sectoral development processes, suggesting that the contemporary experiences of African countries in the areas of economic transformation and industrialization are rooted in historical experiences of sectoral development and growth (e.g., Kohli 2004, Rekiso 2017, Stein 2000, Whitfield et al. 2015). Within this context, the choice of primary sector continuity in the structural adjustment period arguably had the potential to impact the future development prospects and outcomes of the African countries studied in this thesis, influencing not just future sectoral development, but also broader development outcomes. Addressing the long-term effects of sectoral policy choices lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth noting that all ten of the countries studied remain largely dependent on primary commodity sectors and have failed to achieve significant levels of diversification and industrialization.

This continued dependence on primary commodities is evidenced by the fact that all ten countries continue to rely on primary commodities as their top sources of export income, many producing the same crops and natural resources as were produced at independence and during structural adjustment. For example, Ghana continues to rely heavily on cocoa exports; Malawi continues to produce primarily tobacco, tea, and sugar; and Zambia continues to rely almost entirely on various natural resource commodities for export revenue (Table 9.1). This continued dependence on primary commodities has been accompanied by a lack of industrialization, as evidenced by the fact that all ten countries have experienced very low to negative manufacturing sector growth since the end of structural adjustment (Table 9.1). Finally, all ten countries also remain relatively underdeveloped, ranking amongst the world's least developed countries in terms of income, education, and life expectancy (United Nations 2020).

Combined with the overall findings of the thesis, these patterns in the ten case study countries also raise interesting questions about the potential role of sectoral policy choices themselves as an explanation for the African region's lack of economic transformation. Explanations for the lack of diversification and industrialization observed in African countries since independence are diverse and include factors such as structural constraints, excessive levels of external dependence, global market constraints, and a lack of expertise and human capital development (Rekiso 2017, Stein 2000, Whitfield et al. 2015). These explanations have in common the fact that they tend to treat the absence of economic transformation in the region as being a consequence of policy failures and a lack of transformation opportunities for African states. Put more simply, existing explanations assume that the primary reason that African states have not industrialized and diversified their economies is that they have been *unable* to do so.

Table 9.1 Post-adjustment industrialization and diversification

Country	Manufacturing Share of GDP, 2000	Manufacturing Share of GDP, 2017	Top Export Commodities, 2019
The Gambia	6.8	4.5	Wood
			Nuts
Ghana	9.0	10.9	Gold
			Petroleum
			Cocoa
Kenya	10.3	8.1	Tea
			Flowers
			Petroleum
Lesotho	13.6	13.7	Diamonds
			Textiles
Malawi	11.6	9.0	Tobacco
			Tea
			Sugar
Sierra Leone	3.3	2.0	Titanium
			Wood
			Diamonds
Tanzania	9.4	7.7	Gold
			Tobacco
			Nuts
Uganda	7.1	8.6	Gold
			Coffee
			Milk
Zambia	9.5	8.1	Copper
			Gold
			Precious Stones
Zimbabwe	13.4	10.8	Gold
			Tobacco
			Alloy Metals

Source: World Development Indicators and The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC)

However, the findings in this thesis have arguably provided an alternative explanation for Africa's lack of economic transformation in the form of sectoral policy choices. As outlined previously, I have found that primary sector continuity in the structural adjustment period in these ten countries was not the result of sectoral policy failures, but was instead a deliberate choice made by policy actors based on their policy preferences. This finding highlights the possibility that sectoral policy choices themselves provide an explanation for the persistently low levels of industrialization and diversification observed in post-colonial African countries. While measuring the impact of these sectoral policy choices on sectoral outcomes is again beyond the scope of this project, it represents a promising avenue for future research that explores the role of policy preferences and choices in broader processes of economic transformation in the region. This future research might involve investigating whether policy choices have privileged primary sector focus in other periods of African development, such as the immediate post-colonial and post-adjustment periods; exploring whether policy choices have privileged primary sector focus across a larger sample of African countries, including countries that did not undergo structural adjustment; and measuring the effects of such policy choices on sectoral outcomes over time across African countries.

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