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Published in:
Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame

2019

Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):
Kjellberg, A. (2019). Sweden: collective bargaining under the industry norm. In T. Müller, K. Vandaele, & J. Waddington (Eds.), *Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame* (Vol. 3, pp. 583-603). ETUI (European Trade Union Institute), Bruxelles.

Total number of authors:
1

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Chapter 28
Sweden: collective bargaining under the industry norm

Anders Kjellberg

Sweden is a small market economy, with ten million inhabitants, dominated by large export-oriented transnational companies. Between 1995 and 2018 the export share of GDP increased from 38 to 47 per cent. Sweden has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995 but is still able to run its own monetary policy as the country has not entered the euro zone. The Social Democrats have been the governing party for long periods, in 1932–1976, 1982–1990, 1994–2006 and since 2014; in the second and third periods, however, they have initiated or supported many neoliberal reforms (for instance, a substantial share of tax-financed schools, child care and elderly care are outsourced to private companies). Sweden has the most socially segregated union movement in the world, with separate blue-collar and white-collar national unions and confederations. There is a similar pattern in the other Nordic countries, but not as consistently as in Sweden. Like Denmark and Finland, two other Nordic countries with a Ghent system, Sweden has a high but declining union density (see Table 28.1). The substantial increase in union unemployment contributions in 2007–2013 partly eroded the Ghent system as an instrument for membership recruitment, particularly regarding blue-collar unions, which imposed the highest contributions. While in 2000 blue-collar union density was higher than white-collar density, the opposite has been the case since 2008. The density of employers' associations and the coverage of collective agreements remain stable at a high level.

Table 28.1 **Principal characteristics of collective bargaining in Sweden**

Key features	
Actors entitled to collective bargaining	Trade unions and employers' associations
Important bargaining levels	The workplace and the industrial level combined
Favourability principle / derogation possibilities	There is some degree of company-level discretion regarding agreements at the industry level
Collective bargaining coverage (%)	Collective bargaining coverage remains almost stable: it fell slightly from 93% in 2005 to 89% in 2017
Extension mechanism (or functional equivalent)	No extension mechanisms or functional equivalents are applied
Trade union density (%)	Union density decreased from 81% in 2000 to 68% in 2018
Employers' association rate (%)	The organisational rate of the employers' associations increased from 83% in 2000 to 88% in 2017.

Source: Kjellberg 2019a.

The Swedish system of collective bargaining based on industry-led pattern bargaining is at the same time centralised and decentralised, although not in the same way as in the classical three-tier Swedish model, in which agreements were concluded at peak, industrial and workplace levels for blue-collar and white-collar unions respectively. Thus, distinguishing the new two-tier system of industry pattern bargaining and organised decentralisation from the classical model is 'cross-collar' union coordination in manufacturing industry, which combines blue- and white-collar unions, and the corresponding coordination between their employer equivalents. Providing cross-industry wage coordination, manufacturing industry sets the industry norm. This is a benchmark that specifies a certain percentage of the upper wage increase for the whole economy. Although they do not participate in wage negotiations, however, the important coordinating role of peak organisations in the wage formation process is continued by means of the confederations' leadership in marshalling consent for the Swedish pattern of coordination and articulation in collective bargaining. All the above points refer to the centralising features of Swedish collective bargaining and industrial relations. The implementation of industry bargaining at the workplace level in local negotiations is maintained in the new model but combines centralisation (industrial bargaining) and decentralisation (workplace bargaining). This renewed Swedish model, which is based on the Industry Agreement (Industriavtalet) of 1997, has largely stabilised wage formation and promoted relative wage equality and rising real wages.

Industrial relations context and principal actors

Swedish industrial relations are distinguished by self-regulation, which means that wages and other employment conditions are largely regulated by collective bargaining (Kjellberg 2017). There are no statutory minimum wages or legal procedures for extending collective agreements and no laws regulating trade unions' internal affairs. Similarly, there are very few legal restrictions on labour conflicts. The most important constraint was introduced in 1928 when industrial action was made illegal during contract periods, except for sympathy action. In 1966 all public-sector employees acquired full bargaining and dispute rights. The non-interventionist character of the state in the early history of Swedish industrial relations forced the employers to rely on their own strength when dealing with the growing socialist blue-collar union movement. Union rights were conceded in important compromises in 1905 and 1906. By the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement between the blue-collar Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO) and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF) and the subsequent 1941 centralisation of LO, the way was paved for a long period of 'labour peace', centralised bargaining between LO and SAF and a 'solidaristic wage policy'. The Bargaining Cartel of Private Sector White-collar Workers (Privattjänstemannakartellen, PTK), founded in 1973, was also involved in peak-level bargaining. Similar cartels appeared among public sector white-collar workers.

From the 1950s up to 1990 collective bargaining took place at three levels: peak-level agreements followed by industrial agreements implemented by workplace bargaining. When the dominance of the axis LO–SAF was broken, collective bargaining became

much more complicated and inflation rose considerably. In 1990 SAF closed its bargaining unit and advocated completely decentralised bargaining. In the mid-1990s a Social Democratic government encouraged the parties to reform the wage formation process as high nominal wage increases threatened Swedish competitiveness. The signatories of the 1997 industry norm (Industriavtalet) stressed the principle that no wage increases should be higher than those in manufacturing industry. The reinforced National Mediation Office (Medlingsinstitutet, MI) established in 2000, is explicitly ordered to foster the wage-leading role of the export sector by mediating in case of conflict and actively promoting norms backing up this role. The industry norm is considered necessary by all principal labour market actors and the state in response to intensified international competition, especially with Germany and Finland, and the great Swedish dependence on exports. The Industriavtalet, which like the Saltsjöbaden Agreement contains procedures and mechanisms for conflict resolution, is generally considered a success, although some unions, especially those active in the domestic sector, hold the opinion that wages should rise by more than the industry norm. Since 1997 there have been relatively modest nominal wage increases but rising real wages. In contrast to the period 1980–1994, when the average annual increase of nominal wages was 6.8 per cent, but real wages hardly increased at all, real wages grew by 64 per cent (MI) between 1995 and 2017. Unemployment is much lower than in the 1990s, when Sweden was hit by a deep economic crisis. Almost full employment among native Swedes, however, contrasts with high unemployment among foreign-born residents.[1]

SAF's successor, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv, SN) is a strong supporter of the industry norm. Among its affiliates are the Swedish Engineering Employers' Association (Teknikföretagen), the Employers' Organisation for the Swedish Service Sector (Almega) and the Swedish Trade Federation (Svensk Handel). The Cooperative Employers' Association (Kooperationens Förhandlingsorganisation, KFO) and the Employers' Association of Swedish Banking Institutions (Bankinstitutens Arbetsgivareorganisation, BAO) are non-affiliated. The power of employers is strengthened by the growing share of employees in transnational companies with their headquarters abroad.[2] The public sector is represented by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, SKL) and the Swedish Agency for Government Employers (Arbetsgivarverket). Some employers' associations argue for increased room for downward deviation, however.

While the blue-collar confederation LO is oriented towards social democracy, there are two politically independent white-collar confederations: the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation, TCO) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation, Saco). LO and TCO currently each have 14 affiliated national unions and Saco 23 affiliates. Of six independent unions Ledarna (managers/supervisors) is the largest. In 2018, the 57 unions together had 2,971,800 active members (LO had 1,232,800, TCO 1,097,400, Saco 538,900 and the others 102,600). Men and women are equally represented

1. In 2018, 15 per cent and four per cent, respectively (labour force surveys). With the exception of Austria, Cyprus and Luxemburg, Sweden is the EU member state with the highest share of inhabitants born abroad.
2. A union report stresses that the rate of return on capital invested must not be lower in Sweden than elsewhere due to the free movement of capital (IF Metall 2008). Consequently, wage claims must be moderated.

Table 28.2 **20 largest national unions in Sweden (31 December 2018)**

Union	Members	Female share (%)	Sector	Category	Confederation	Constellation
1. Unionen (white-collar workers in manufacturing and services)	551,500	44	Private	White-collar	TCO	FI, PTK
2. Kommunal (municipal blue-collar workers)	500,200	78	Both	Blue-collar	LO	
3. IF Metall (metal, chemical, etc workers)	246,800	19	Private	Blue-collar	LO	FI
4. Lärarförbundet (teachers)	167,300	84	Both	White-collar	TCO	OFR, PTK, LS
5. Vision (municipal and private white-collar)	138,500	72	Both	White-collar	TCO	OFR
6. Handels (commercial employees)	125,000	27	Both	White-collar	Saco	FI, PTK, Saco-S
7. Sveriges Ingenjörer (graduate engineers)	123.300	63	Private	Blue-collar/ White-collar	LO	
8. Ledarna (supervisors/ managers)	94,200	32	Both	White-collar	Independent	PTK, OFR
9. Vårdförbundet (nurses)	92,100	90	Both	White-collar	TCO	OFR, PTK
10. Byggnads (building workers)	78,700	2	Private	Blue-collar	LO	6F
11. Seko (railways, post, etc employees)	72,200	25	Both	Blue-collar/ White-collar	LO	6F
12. ST (civil servants)	67,100	59	Both	White-collar	Saco	PTK, Saco-S
13. Jusek (lawyers, economists etc)	66,100	62	Public	White-collar	TCO	OFR
14. Lärarnas Riksförbund (teachers)	63,100	70	Both	White-collar	Saco	OFR, PTK, LS, Saco-S
15. Akademikerförbundet SSR (social workers, HR personnel etc)	55,800	82	Both	White-collar	Saco	OFR, PTK, Saco-S
16. Transport (transport workers)	49,800	17	Private	Blue-collar	LO	
17. GS Facket (graphical and wood workers)	38,800	18	Private	Blue-collar	LO	FI
18. Läkarförbundet (Swedish Medical Association)	37,200	52	Both	White-collar	Saco	OFR, PTK, Saco-S
19. Naturvetarna (university graduates in natural sciences)	30,700	63	Both	White-collar	Saco	PTK, Saco-S
20. Civilekonomerna (economists)	28,800	56	Both	White-collar	Saco	PTK, Saco-S

Note: Pensioners and students are excluded, the unemployed are included. FI (Unions in Manufacturing), PTK (private sector white-collar unions), OFR (Public Employees` Negotiation Council), Saco-S (bargaining cartel of government Saco unions), LS (Teachers' Collaboration Council), 6F (Trade Unions in Cooperation).
Source: Kjellberg (2019b).

Figure 28.1 **Union density and organisational rate of employers' associations in Sweden, 2000–2017 (%)**



Note: Union density among 16–64 year-olds, excluding full-time students working part-time.
Source: Kjellberg (2019a).

among Swedish trade union members. The 'cross-collar' Unions in Manufacturing (Facken inom industrin, FI), an umbrella organisation encompassing several blue- and white-collars unions active in manufacturing across the different confederations, was founded in the same year (1996) as the participating unions took the initiative to bring the 1997 Industriavtalet into being. FI is a key player in collective bargaining, although the negotiations for setting the industry norm are conducted by its individual unions (unions 1, 3, 6 and 17 in Table 28.2): Unionen, the largest Swedish union, founded in 2008 by a merger between TCO unions in manufacturing industry and private services; the Association of Graduate Engineers (Sveriges Ingenjörer, SI), the largest Saco affiliate; IF Metall, the largest private sector LO affiliate, founded in 2006 when the Metalworkers' Union and the Industry Union merged; and the LO affiliated unions GS Facket (graphical and wood workers) and Livs (food workers).

The Swedish model of self-regulation is based on a high union density, almost 70 per cent, and an even higher density of employers' associations, of almost 90 per cent, which promotes a high coverage of collective agreements (Figures 28.1 and 28.2). In 2017, employers' associations covered 82 per cent of private sector employees, but unions only 64 per cent. A dramatic change has occurred since 2000 when both union density and the organisational rate of employers' associations in the private sector was about 75 per cent. The decline in union density is largely concentrated on blue-collar workers, which in Sweden are defined more broadly than in other countries, as most retail workers are also included. The union density of blue-collar and white-collar workers both stood at 77 per cent in 2006, but this percentage had decreased to 60 and 73 per cent for blue-collar

and white-collar workers, respectively, by 2017 (Kjellberg 2019). The high Swedish union density is usually attributed to the Ghent system, implying that state-supported union unemployment funds boost the attractiveness of union membership. In 2007 the centre-right government substantially raised fund contributions by reducing state subsidies. Within two years union density fell by six percentage points (Kjellberg 2011). By linking fund contributions to the rate of unemployment within each fund blue-collar fees became much higher than white-collar fees, especially as the financial crisis had the largest impact on blue-collar employment. In January 2014 the contributions to unemployment funds were restored to about the same level as before 2007, but blue-collar density has continued to decline (Kjellberg and Ibsen 2016) and since 2017 also white-collar density.

Extent of bargaining

The coverage of collective bargaining is very high and has been stable over time, despite the absence of extension mechanisms. In general, nine out of ten employees are covered by a collective agreement (Figure 28.2). There is some industrial diversity in the coverage. In 2015 about 60 per cent of the employees in retail trade were covered by industrial collective agreements, in financial services about 90 per cent and in manufacturing 98 per cent. Substitute agreements are concluded between unions and firms not affiliated to employers' associations, implying that the industrial agreement is applied. About 80 per cent of private sector employees are covered by industrial collective agreements and another 4 per cent by substitute agreements; thus, about 16–17 per cent of the employees in the private sector are found at workplaces without a collective agreement. Some industrial agreements affect only individual companies, such as the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), not to be confused with substitute agreements between national unions and unorganised employers. Swedish collective agreements do not allow downward derogation at workplace level. In agreements without individual guarantees some people might not receive a wage increase at all. In the 2007 bargaining round, Teknikföretagen, the employers' association in engineering, argued that opening clauses would improve the terms of competition by increased flexibility and local adaptability. No opening clauses were introduced, however, as the unions rejected this, but more flexible working-hours and increased possibilities to recruit on fixed-term contracts were introduced.

The high coverage of collective agreements can be partly explained by high union density, which is boosted by the combined centralisation and decentralisation of industrial relations. These characteristics prevent fragmentary union coverage and facilitate membership recruitment by means of the extensive coverage of union workplace organisations. The existence of separate national unions and confederations for blue-collar and white-collar workers makes it easier for each social category to identify themselves with a union. Also, collective bargaining, as self-regulation in contrast to state regulation, is conducive to a high union density. While a high density certainly helps to explain the high collective bargaining coverage, the very high organisational rate of the employers' associations (88 per cent in 2017) adds to it. Moreover, the stability of this rate contributes to the steadiness of collective bargaining coverage

Figure 28.2 **Share of workers covered by collective agreements in Sweden, 2005–2017 (%)**



Note: There is a series break between 2006 and 2007 due to changes in the mode of calculation.
Source: Kjellberg (2019a).

and compensates for the decline in union density resulting from the declining blue-collar membership. In contrast to German employers (see Chapter 12), their Swedish equivalents have showed no propensity to abandon their organisations.

Since the 1997 Industriavtalet, large bargaining rounds involving almost all unions and employers' associations have occurred in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011/2012, 2013, 2016 and 2017, with the next one in 2020. The duration of agreements is thus usually three years and occasionally one year. Some agreements are valid for an indefinite period. In schools, the four-year agreement for 2012–2016, common to the two teachers' unions, was prolonged to 2018. If an agreement expires before the negotiations for a new one are finished, the old one remains in force. Furthermore, in the absence of extension mechanisms and statutory minimum wages, Swedish unions each year put pressure on about 10–30 unorganised employers by giving notice of strike action or blockades to get them to conclude a substitute agreement or join an employers' association (MI 2019: 45–56). Every year thousands of substitute agreements are signed, but few are preceded by industrial action. Only about 30–35 per cent of companies with employees have signed collective agreements, as most companies are very small. Among those with 5–19 employees almost 70 per cent have a collective agreement and among those with 20–49 employees almost 90 per cent (Kjellberg 2019a).

Security of bargaining

Security of bargaining refers to the extent of union support by the employers and the state. When concluding the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement, SAF and LO agreed on the desirability of a high density on both sides. Since then, organised employers have not opposed union membership among blue-collar workers. Initially, this spirit of cooperation did not include white-collar unions; a basic agreement between SAF and the leading private sector white-collar union was not concluded until 1958. Because of the employers' fierce resistance to negotiations with white-collar unions in manufacturing, commerce and banking, legislation on the right of association and negotiation was enacted in 1936, but it did not oblige employers to conclude collective agreements (Kjellberg 2017). Put differently, according to the principle of self-regulation Swedish unions must rely on their own strength to obtain contracts with unorganised employers. In a similar vein, neither labour law nor basic agreements contain procedures for union recognition. Nevertheless, there are several Acts ensuring the bargaining role of unions.

Thus, the Act on Union Representatives prohibits employers from preventing workplace or regional union representatives from performing their duties at workplaces with a collective agreement. Union representatives have the right to paid time for union work at their workplace, the scope and timing of which is decided in local negotiations. Also, according to the Act on Employment Protection, employers must negotiate in case of layoffs. The Act on Codetermination protects the right of the individual to join a union and provides unions with negotiating rights in three respects (Eriksson 2012). First, it guarantees codetermination negotiations when a company makes important changes in its activities or the employment conditions of individual employees are changed. The employer has the final say if the parties disagree. Second, in case of disputes over the interpretation or application of signed collective agreements, negotiations must take place first. If they fail, the matter can be brought to a court and in the last instance to the tripartite Labour Court. Industrial action may not be used in connection with such legal disputes. Strikes, lockouts, overtime bans and so on are allowed only in the case of disputes of interest. Third, the act stipulates union negotiating rights on collective agreements regarding wages and other employment conditions.

The MI may postpone conflicts for 14 days, but not in industries covered by the Industry Agreement or other negotiated agreements. Since the 1990s the SN has argued that the balance of power is tipped in favour of the trade unions because of their extensive conflict rights. Employers demand the introduction of a 'proportionality rule' and a ban on secondary action. Collective agreements apply both to union and non-union members and consequently do not function as positive incentives to join a union. Because the unions' bargaining role depends heavily on their strength, however, incentives for union membership are very important. Thus most unions provide income insurance, which provides a supplementary income to unemployed members of union unemployment funds. The Swedish Building Workers' Union (Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Byggnads) is among the exceptions: it has no income insurance because of the risk of high cost during recessions. Until July 2019 IF Metall had no income insurance. Furthermore, all unions pay conflict benefits to members locked out or on strike, as well as legal support in disputes with the employer.

Level of bargaining

In addition to the important role of coordinating their affiliates in bargaining rounds LO and SN, but also PTK, are involved in peak-level negotiations but only on issues other than wages (Table 28.3). The fact that Swedish industrial bargaining takes place in large bargaining rounds comprising more or less the whole labour force facilitates coordinated bargaining guided by the industry norm. In principle, the industry norm acts as a coordinating tool across industries and bargaining levels. The vertically very well-articulated Swedish unions facilitate the implementation of the industry norm and the employers on their part have no interest in conceding larger wage increases than the norm at workplace level. The declining and now almost non-existent wage drift is an indicator of that. Nevertheless, the bargaining model based on the industry norm is far from free of tensions. The ambitions of LO affiliates organising in the domestic sector to favour low-wage women-dominated groups, such as the food service industry ('horeca'), retail and other services sometimes come into conflict with the norm. During the preparations for the 2016 bargaining round LO coordination collapsed. LO and SN then eventually concluded an informal agreement requesting that the industry norm should be applied.

The most important union success in the 2007 bargaining round was a substantial rise in minimum wages. The aim was to prevent wage dumping as the *Laval* judgment

Table 28.3 **Types of multi-level bargaining in the private sector**

Level of concluding or coordinating negotiations	Important cases	
Peak-level agreements	LO–SN on occupational pensions and other insurance	PTK–SN on occupational pensions and other insurance
Bargaining rounds comprising the whole labour force	Facilitates the impact of the industry norm, in particular as manufacturing industry concludes the first agreements	
Peak-level coordination of negotiations on wages and other employment conditions	LO coordinates its affiliated unions to safeguard the industry norm but also to lift low-paid groups	SN coordinates its affiliated employers' associations to safeguard the industry norm which is given high priority
Coordination between the parties behind the Industry Agreement in the negotiations for national agreements in manufacturing industry	Coordination between the members of unions in manufacturing: 'cross-collar' coordination between LO, TCO and Saco unions in manufacturing	Coordination between the employers' associations signing the Industry Agreement
The industry norm that is supposed to be applied to all workers	The so-called 'mark': the commonly agreed wage increase expressed in a specified percentage: 6.8 per cent in the 2013–2016 three-year agreement; 2.2 per cent in the 2016–2017 one-year agreement; 6.5 per cent in the 2017–2020 three-year agreement.	
Industry agreements between national unions and employers' associations.	For example, between IF Metall and Teknikavtalet IF Metall or between Unionen/Sveriges Ingenjörer/Ledarna and the Teknikavtalet white-collar unions.	
A few company agreements	For example, between the Swedish Airline Pilots Association and SAS.	
Workplace agreements to implement industry agreements	Between workplace 'union clubs' and the employer. If there are no workplace union representatives a union official (ombudsman) from the local/regional union branch negotiates. There are also other models for local wage formation.	

Source: Author's elaboration.

gave companies with posted workers the right to pay no more than the minimum terms in Swedish collective agreements. Swedish minimum wages, aimed at young and unexperienced workers, are far below actually paid wages. Collective agreements regulate both. The rapidly deteriorating business cycle in autumn 2008 and winter 2009 resulted in massive lay-offs in the Swedish engineering industry. IF Metall signed a temporary, one-year 'Crisis Agreement' with Teknikföretagen in March 2009 in an attempt to avoid further mass redundancies and enabling unprecedented workplace-level concessions in pay and working time: local negotiations reduced monthly wage by up to 20 per cent, with a corresponding reduction of working hours. The three-year industrial agreement between IF Metall and Teknikföretagen (2007 +2.8 per cent wage increase, 2008 +2.5 per cent and 2009 +2.8 per cent) was not affected by the crisis agreement. By the end of June, every fifth employee in firms affiliated to Teknikföretagen was covered by a local crisis agreement, with an average length of six months. Besides the pressure imposed by accelerating unemployment, IF Metall was also pressed to initiate a central framework agreement to prevent local clubs making too large concessions to save jobs. Also contributing to this step taken by IF Metall was the absence of a government-financed system of severance pay in Sweden. Unionen, affiliated to TCO and the SI (Association of Graduate Engineers), affiliated to Saco, also signed crisis agreements, but only local ones, at workplace level. The 2009 crisis agreement was a parenthesis in Swedish collective bargaining as there are no opening clauses in industrial agreements. The crisis was deep but short in Sweden, with an impressive recovery already by 2010 (Bengtsson and Ryner 2017: 276). While the Teknikföretagen demand to prolong the Crisis Agreement was rejected by IF Metall in 2012, both agreed to call on the state to introduce a subsidised short-time working scheme, inspired by Germany's '*Kurzarbeit*' scheme', which was enacted by the centre-right government in 2014. This tripartite move could be considered a novelty in the collective bargaining tradition in Sweden. A government investigator, a former IF Metall president, was appointed in 2018 to suggest improvements to the Swedish short-time working (*korttidsarbete*) scheme.

Coordinated bargaining guided by the industry norm is combined with different models of decentralised wage formation. While some industrial agreements are figureless, others contain traditional wage scales or piece work (models 1 and 7 in Table 28.4). Figureless agreements are most numerous in the public sector. No blue-collar union has concluded such an agreement and there is none in manufacturing industry. If there was, no industry norm would be possible. Some agreements guarantee individuals a fixed minimum wage increase, while the remaining pay increases agreed in industrial agreements are distributed at workplace level (agreement models 3, 5, 6 and 7); others have no such guarantees. In 2018, 40 per cent of all employees had some form of individual wage guarantee (62 per cent in the private sector and 82 per cent among blue-collar private sector workers). In Model 2 there is no local wage frame and no individual guarantee but if the local parties fail to conclude an agreement, a fall-back provision regulating the size of wage increases enters into force.

There are two aspects of centralisation and decentralisation: one refers to the scope for wage agreements and the other to distribution between individuals. In the public sector, individual distribution is done only at local level, while the scope for wage increases is

Table 28.4 **Agreement models by category of workers and sector in 2018 (%)**

Agreement model	Share of employees by sector (%)		
	Private sector	Local and central government	All sectors
1. Local wage formation without nationally determined wage increase (figureless agreements)	10	47	23
– Blue-collar	0	0	0
– White-collar: unions of managers, teachers, nurses and so on	24	79	49
2. Local wage formation with a fall-back provision (stupstock) regulating the size of the wage increase	14	13	14
– Blue-collar	5	2	4
– White-collar: graduate engineers/engineering, Unionen/IT, ST, medical doctors	27	21	24
3. Local wage formation with a fall-back provision regulating the size of the wage increase and some form of individual guarantee	9	0	6
– Blue-collar: IF Metall/chemical industry	3	0	2
– White-collar: Finansförbundet (Financial Sector Union), Unionen/engineering	17	0	9
4. Local wage frame (wage pot) without an individual guarantee	14	40	24
– Blue-collar: Kommunal (LO), IF Metall/steel	13	98	37
– White-collar: Unionen/motor trade/media	17	0	9
5. Local wage frame with an individual guarantee; alternatively a fall-back provision regulating the individual guarantee	16	0	10
– Blue-collar: IF Metall/engineering	18	0	13
– White-collar: Unionen/steel/trade/staffing	14	0	8
6. General wage increase and local wage frame	23	0	15
– Blue-collar: commercial employees, hotel and restaurant workers and paper workers	39	0	28
– White-collar	0	0	0
7. General wage increase (wage tariffs or piece work)	14	1	9
– Blue-collar: building and transport workers, painters	22	0	16
– White-collar	1	1	1

Source: MI.

decided entirely at this level only for every second public sector employee (Calmfors *et al*. 2018: 13). In particular, white-collar unions, dominated by public sector employees, hope by means of figureless agreements and individualised wage setting to change relative wages by obtaining more than the industry norm. To achieve this goal the nurses' union has interchangeably used industrial action and figureless agreements, but by no means always with success. Employers desire figureless agreements and individualised wage setting to achieve greater wage differentiation, alter Sweden's very compressed

wage structure and transform wages into a management instrument. In addition, some employers' associations pursue wage increases below the industry norm.

A 2013–2014 Saco study on members shows no difference in average wage increases between agreements that do not specify pay rises (so-called 'figureless agreements') and other agreements (Granqvist and Regnér 2016). According to other statistics, pay increases for three occupations characterised by labour shortages in the municipal sector (nurses, social workers and teachers) in recent years have been above the industry norm (DN 2017-03-30). LO considers it problematic that the official wage statistics in the public sector does not differentiate between white-collar and blue-collar workers; municipal employers might thus be able to redistribute money from blue-collar to white-collar workers without it being visible and argue that the average wage increase in the municipal sector does not exceed the industry norm. According to SKL, 'figureless agreements' provide space for extra pay increases in occupations and regions with labour shortages, while other municipal employees receive lower wage increases (Ekot 2017-03-29). In 2015 the members of Vision, Vårdförbundet and Akademikerförbundet SSR (unions 5, 9 and 15 in Table 28.2) in municipalities and hospitals received increases considerably above the industry 'mark' (Arbetet 2017-02-19). Not surprisingly, Vision, SSR and SKL in 2017 signed a new three-year figureless agreement for 160,000 white-collar municipal workers. But sometimes the opposite happens. The 2011–2014 figureless agreement between the Finansförbundet (Financial Services Union) and BAO (Model 1 in Table 28.4) was cancelled by the union in 2013 due to dissatisfaction with the local outcome of the agreement. Most members had experienced good wage development, but some groups obtained no wage increase. Union representatives in banks experienced severe difficulties concluding agreements on local wage principles. Since 2015 Finansförbundet has had an agreement in accordance with the third model presented in Table 28.4. It contains both individual and collective guarantees. The latter prevent the outcome from deviating too much between banks. A study of 383 occupations between 2014 and 2017 confirms that, above all, women-dominated shortage occupations, such as nurses, assistant nurses and teachers, received more than the annual average of 2.3 per cent of the studied occupations (MI 2018). The conclusion of the Mediation Office is that this indicates that the Swedish model of wage formation does not prevent changes in the relative pay of different occupations.

Depth of bargaining

Depth of bargaining refers to the involvement of the workplace level in the bargaining process. Swedish unions are vertically well-integrated from the national level down to the local union branch and workplace club; there are no works councils. Union workplace clubs are stronger and more numerous in manufacturing and construction than in private services, such as retail, hotels and restaurants and haulage. This corresponds to greater union influence on local wage-formation in manufacturing than in the latter sectors (Karlson *et al.* 2014: 116-124). The same applies to large enterprises compared with small ones, many of which lack union representatives. In workplaces without clubs a union official from the local or regional branch negotiates on the implementation of industrial agreements. In large engineering workplaces there is usually a union club for

each of the following: IF Metall (LO), Unionen (TCO), Sveriges Ingenjörer (Association of Graduate Engineers) (Saco) and Ledarna (independent) (blue-collar number 3 and white-collar numbers 1, 6 and 8 in Table 28.2). When industrial agreements are implemented at workplace level, and in particular if they are figureless, 'wage talks' are often held between the individual employee and their superior. In other cases, the workplace union negotiates for the individual. In both cases it works best if the union and the employer together have constructed a local wage system in which criteria for wage setting are perceived as clear and fair. In 2013 eight out of ten workers were covered by local wage systems at workplaces where the IF Metall clubs had at least 50 members. The union's aspiration is for individual wage development to be linked to development at work, as workers acquire more skills.

Decisions on industrial action are taken by national unions, not by workplace clubs or local branches. Unlike in Denmark and Norway, there are no membership ballots on wage claims, proposals from mediators or strikes, except in some white-collar unions. The TCO unions of teachers and nurses sometimes arrange advisory ballots. Consequently, it is not possible, as in Denmark and Norway, to use ballots as a centralising instrument by adding the votes from several bargaining units together into a single ballot. In this way, Swedish LO is able to circumvent protests from minority members and unions. Membership ballots were abolished in LO as a result of the 1941 centralisation (Lundh 2010: 195). The objective was to bring down the strike rate. The same argument was used in the United Kingdom to introduce balloting by legislation in the 1980s. Both unions and employers' associations have well-filled conflict funds. Combined with the high density of unions and employers' associations, this means that Swedish labour conflicts have the potential to be long and extensive. Aware of this, the negotiators on both sides are under pressure to find solutions to avoid strikes and lockouts. Consequently, the rate of labour conflicts is low in Sweden (Figure 28.3), also in comparison with other Nordic countries. Since the mid-1990s the most extensive strikes have occurred in the public sector, as is also the case in Denmark.

More than every second lost working day in the period 2005–2018 was concentrated in 2008, when almost all days lost were because of a nursing strike (MI 2009: 161–67). Discontent with both the outcome and the process of local wage formation caused the union to cancel the agreement (Ryman 2007: 58-59). By far the largest Swedish labour conflict in 2000–2018, however, occurred in 2003. Because of its dissatisfaction with wage outcomes during the first two years of a three-year agreement the Swedish Municipal Workers' Union (Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet, Kommunal) cancelled the third year (MI 2004:122-131). About 600,000 working days were lost. It might seem strange that neither the large 2003 conflict nor that of 2008 was linked to major bargaining rounds; both were triggered by unions terminating agreements in advance due to discontent with local wage formation. The third largest conflict since 2000 was between the Byggnads (Building Workers' Union) and two SN affiliates organising subcontractors in sheet metal working and plumbing. This combined strike and lockout caused 32,300 lost working days in 2012 (MI 2012: 220). Finally, notices on strikes, blockades, lockouts and so on are considerably more frequent than open industrial actions (Table 28.5). The threat of a retail strike in 2007 illustrates that a threat can exert pressure as effectively as a strike. The Commercial Employees' Union

Figure 28.3 **Labour conflicts in Sweden, 2000–2018**



Note: * Main bargaining round. For data on the number of days not worked, see Appendix A1.I. For 2007 and 2012–2014 the sum of 'legal strikes and lockouts' is somewhat higher than appears from the figure, which excludes 'mirror lockouts' (lockouts corresponding to strikes).
Source: MI.

(Handelsanställdas Förbund, Handels) (LO) reached an agreement that, according to SN, exceeded the industry norm too much. For that reason, the Svensk Handel (Swedish Trade Federation) was strongly criticised by SN. In 2017 notification of strike action was given in 15 of the 497 industrial negotiations. Industrial action was taken in one case, although no strike action was involved. In addition, MI reported nine notifications on secondary action.

Union members could influence the formulation of claims in various ways. Every IF Metall member has a right to vote and is eligible for the union bargaining council, which appoints negotiating delegates. One-day meetings are held around the country at which elected representatives and members discuss urgent issues with personnel from the union headquarters and members of the executive committee. Also, the union congress can decide on bargaining demands and send proposals to the bargaining council. The executive committee has the final decision-making power not only to cancel collective agreements and to accept or reject agreement proposals, but also on industrial action. IF Metall participates in LO coordination to prepare bargaining rounds and formulate common demands. Together with the other blue-collar and white-collar unions in manufacturing, IF Metall also elaborates a common bargaining platform for Unions in Manufacturing (Facken inom industrin, FI). Sometimes tensions appear between the roles of IF Metall in LO and in FI. It is not always easy to reconcile the industry norm with demands made within LO to raise the relative wages of women-dominated low-

Table 28.5 **Industrial action in industrial bargaining, 2000–2018**

	2000	2001*	2002	2003	2004*	2005	2006	2007*	2008
Legal strikes and lockouts, total**	0	14	4	11	7	12	6	11	5
– of which strikes**	0	12	4	9	5	11	6	10	4
Number of industrial negotiations with notifications of industrial action***	3	15	6	4	17	9	7	27	9
Cases of industrial action taken (industrial bargaining)	2	5	2	2	4	3	0	5	7
– of which strikes (industrial bargaining)	0	2	0	2	3	3	0	3	3
Number of MI mediations in industrial negotiations***	5	20	2	6	24	11	7	30	9
Expiring industrial agreements		Most	ca 65	ca 30		90		ca 500	ca 90
Sectoral agreements signed during the year		Most	ca 65	ca 30	ca 420	>80	41	ca 500	ca 90
Registered industrial agreements, total						572	572	572	

	2009	2010*	2011	2012*	2013*	2014	2015	2016*	2017*	2018
Legal strikes and lockouts, total**	3	5	2	7	8	5	3	10	3	0
– of which strikes**	3	5	2	7	8	4	2	8	2	0
Number of notifications in industrial negotiations (SN)			15	45	47	11	4	47	41	0
Number of notifications in industrial negotiations (MI)							3	40	23	0
– from unions							2	30	19	0
Number of industrial negotiations with notifications of industrial action***	4	23	9	23	19	6	2	25	15	0
Cases of industrial action taken (industrial bargaining)	1	8	4	8	7	2	1	7	1	0
– of which strikes (industrial bargaining)	0	4	0	6	4	2	0	6	0	0
Number of MI mediations in industrial negotiations***	6	27	10	23	25	5	2	20	15	0
Expiring industrial agreements		550	90	ca 500	>520	54	40	484	465	29
Sectoral agreements signed during the year	ca 30	550	153	ca 500	508	43	40	498	497	30
Registered industrial agreements, total	670	650	665	680	669	685	682	668	671	668

Note: * Main bargaining round; ** including international/political strikes and local strikes against unorganised employers; *** number of industrial negotiations with notifications of strikes, lockouts, blockades or other industrial action.
Source: MI and SN (2019).

wage groups such as retail employees. Also, the industry norm is challenged by the five male-dominated LO unions labelled 6F (among them numbers 10–11 in Table 28.2), whose members are found predominantly in domestic industries. In the 2016 bargaining round they coordinated their demands but the unions active in manufacturing and those active in the domestic industries negotiated separately as domestic industries were recovering strongly from the crisis. The two teachers' unions (numbers 4 and 14 in Table 28.2) in the Teachers' Collaboration Council (Lärarnas Samverkansråd, LS) also negotiate together (with SKL and its private sector equivalents). All Saco unions with members in central government participate in the bargaining cartel Saco-S. These examples illustrate that, in addition to the internal, vertical processes in each union, also horizontal coordination and elaboration of demands may play a significant role.

Degree of control of collective agreements

This dimension refers to the extent to which collective agreements define the working conditions of those covered by the agreement. First, we will examine the degree to which wages at workplace level are rising more than provided for in industrial agreements. Taking the labour market as a whole, the average annual wage increase in 1998–2013 was 3.3 per cent, broken down into 2.5 percentage points at industry level and 0.8 points at workplace level (Morin 2016: 21–26). White-collar workers, due to their considerably lower unemployment and stronger market position, obtained higher wage increases at local level (1.1 points) than did blue-collar workers (0.3 points). Conversely, centrally determined wages were more important for blue-collar workers (2.9 points) than for white-collar workers (2.2 points). The total average annual pay increase during the period was 3.2 per cent for blue-collar workers and 3.3 per cent for white-collar workers. White-collar wages increased on average 0.3 per cent more per year than blue-collar wages in manufacturing industry. Regarding the whole period 1998–2013 that means four per cent higher wage increases for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Blue-collar workers in manufacturing and construction in turn received a larger share of wage increases at local (workplace) level compared with blue-collar workers in private services and municipalities, for which central agreements are more important. Union density is higher in manufacturing and construction than in, for example, retail, cleaning and hotels and restaurants (Kjellberg 2019a).

Trade union influence on local wage formation is greatest in large companies, especially in manufacturing. In retail, hotels and restaurants, transport and other private services the influence of union workplace clubs is much smaller but is partly compensated by strongly centralised industrial agreements, similar to the Danish 'normal wage sector'. Karlson *et al.* (2014) conclude that many companies consider unions a valuable ally with regard to communication and the implementation of collective agreements. The content of most agreements can be changed to some degree by local agreements, which presupposes the ability of local parties to reach agreements. Other employers are less interested in local negotiations and prefer to apply central agreements, which is more straightforward. In recent years, centrally agreed wage increases and actual wage increases have been more or less identical. Despite the economic boom no wage drift is found, except for a small amount in the municipal sector (Table 28.9). In particular,

Figure 28.4 **Overall wage drift and in different sectors, 2000–2018 (%)**



Note: The relatively few figureless agreements in the private sector are excluded. In the public sector, figureless agreements are approximated with the industry norm.
Source: MI.

construction is booming but no wage drift has appeared. Possible explanations include a growing number of building workers posted from abroad, very low inflation and increased employer discipline in not conceding wage increases more than industrial agreements. In 2008, another year of prosperity in Sweden until the financial crisis hit, wage drift was modest but centrally agreed wage increases were relatively high. In contrast, 1996 was distinguished by even higher industrial wage increases and relatively high wage drift.

Karlson *et al.* (2014) found that the industry norm has a decisive impact on wage setting in the private sector, including where central agreements contain no specific figures (Karlson *et al.* 2014: 105–106, 122–23). Most of the employers interviewed in 2011–2013 saw the industry 'mark' as a ceiling for wage increases, while a few expected small supplementary increases above it. A key conclusion was that 'the collective agreements play a very large role for wage formation and wage setting in reality' and that the industry norm 'strongly governs wage formation and wage setting in reality, irrespective of the degree of centralisation of collective agreements' (Karlson *et al.* 2014: 179;

author's translation). The high rates of bargaining coverage and employer association membership also contributed to the relatively low and stable wage inequality.

It should be observed that Figure 28.4 contains statistics only for whole sectors. Although the impact of the industry norm is great, the prospects of some groups to obtain more are not insignificant. Relative wages can be changed either by higher wage increases in industrial agreements or where there is plenty of scope for local wage formation and/or wage drift. The Municipal Workers' Union (Kommunal) in the 2016 bargaining round obtained 4.3 per cent for assistant nurses in the first year of the 2016–2017 agreement with SKL, which was almost double the industry mark at 2.2 per cent (Kommunalarbetaren 2016-04-29). But the union had to 'pay' for that with smaller increases in minimum wages. Second, the employers' options for wage differentiation improved (model 4 in Table 28.4). Compared with IF Metall, Kommunal has left more room for employers to elaborate criteria for wage setting unilaterally (Fransson and Stüber 2016: 100–108). Agreements without figures, fall-back provisions or individual guarantees increase employers' power to apply wage differentiation between occupations, individuals and regions without exceeding the industry norm. With expanded possibilities to concede extra pay to occupations with labour shortages the scope for market forces increases.

Finally, in the case of disputes about agreements central negotiations will take place if the local parties fail. As a last resort the issue may be brought to the Labour Court. The Saltsjöbadsavtalet LO-SAF/SN contains a negotiation order in case of disputes during contract periods and rules for the bipartite Labour Market Council, which deals with disputes about the interpretation of collective agreements. Industrial collective agreements contain negotiation orders, too. The labour inspectorate does not check the implementation of agreements; that is up to the unions and their local branches and workshop clubs. It is difficult for unions to supervise wages and employment conditions in companies without agreements. No law prevents unorganised employers from paying far below agreements. The Work Environment Authority (Arbetsmiljöverket) only carries out inspections of the working environment and working time.

Scope of agreements

In accordance with the Swedish model of self-regulation a wide range of issues are regulated by collective agreements. Some agreements contain benefits supplementary to what is provided by law, others are legally conditioned, such as codetermination agreements, following the Act on Codetermination. There are two basic types of agreements: substantive agreements and procedural agreements. Regarding the latter, the most prominent is the Industry Agreement (1997), revised in 2011 and 2016. The revision in 2011, labelled 'Industry Agreement 2.0', stipulates that agreements should expire simultaneously to facilitate coordination, thus strengthening horizontal coordination of bargaining, especially beyond manufacturing, while the 2016 revision, in order to ensure coordination, further reinforced the role of the 'impartial chairpersons', a kind of mediation institute within the Industriavtalet, introduced from the outset, and contained a revised negotiation procedure. The signatory parties are also supposed

to work for the implementation of the industry norm in the labour market as a whole. Together with another 13 negotiation agreements (2018), among them the Municipal Negotiating Agreement, including schools, they cover 26 per cent of all employees and about 30 per cent of those covered by collective agreements (MI 2019: 40–41). Neither banking nor retail trade are covered.

Examples of substantive agreements include the collective agreements on supplementary insurance (cf. Table 28.5), such as those concluded between SN and LO/PTK. At the peak level there are substantive agreements on work injury insurance in addition to the statutory work injury insurance (LO, PTK); parental benefit supplement in addition to statutory parental insurance (LO); sickness insurance in addition to statutory sickness insurance (LO, PTK); occupational pension (LO, PTK); group life insurance: compensation to survivors in the event of death of a wage earner or salaried employee (LO, PTK); and career readjustment insurance in the event of work shortages, including severance pay and career readjustment support (LO, since 2004, and PTK, since 1973). Since 2000, LO and the SN association Swedish Staffing Agencies (Bemanningsföretagen) have concluded agreements for staffing agencies. White-collar unions also have such agreements.

Agreements at industry level regulate pay and pay increases (some are figureless), minimum wages, overtime pay, the length and scheduling of working hours, length of period of notice (if there is no collective agreement it is regulated by the Act on Employment Protection (Lagen om anställningsskydd, LAS), extension of the period of parental benefit supplement, holiday pay supplement, in addition to the holiday pay regulated by the Annual Leave Act (Semesterlagen), the use of temporary agency workers, partial retirement pension and flexible pension (2017) and the working environment. A special variant were the 2009 crisis agreements. Industrial agreements are implemented by workplace agreements, which may also cover such issues as skills development.

Conclusions

Swedish industrial relations are distinguished by a high degree of self-regulation. There is no statutory minimum wage, but there is high coverage of collective agreements without state extension mechanisms. There are also very few legal restrictions on industrial action. The relatively new mediation office MI is equipped with more powers than its predecessors. In contrast to Norway, compulsory arbitration does not exist in Sweden. MI may resort to enforced mediation, but only in industries without negotiation agreements. The most important of them, the 1997 Industry Agreement, is based on stricter competitiveness-oriented horizontal coordination of the traditional manufacturing-led pattern-bargaining. This is implemented across the ‘collar’ line and across the whole economy by means of the norm-setting role of the ‘industry mark’. MI is supposed to work to maintain this norm. Although not without internal tensions SN and LO aspire to the articulation and coordination of their affiliates in accordance with the ‘mark’.

The balance of power between well-organised labour market parties and the awareness that conflicts can easily escalate into major trials of strength contribute to the low frequency of strikes and lockouts in Sweden. Union density is declining among blue-collar workers, above all in the private service sector, but the average rate of unionisation is still high. A growing share of employees are covered by figureless agreements; these are exclusively white-collar workers, mainly in the public sector. Also, the number of agreements without fall-back provisions or individual guarantees, or both, has increased. These developments challenge the industry-norm, which still has a major impact on Swedish wage formation. Some categories of low-paid blue-collar and white-collar employees believe that the industry norm makes it difficult to raise their wages relative to other groups, although a few have been fairly successful. Many female-dominated occupations still are paid below male-dominated occupations at a similar level of qualifications. Another challenge is that men on average are better paid than women even in the such same occupation.

The prospects for the Swedish model of wage formation, based on a high degree of self-regulation of well-organised employers and employees involved in collective bargaining at industry and workplace levels, appear relatively bright, despite several challenges, such as growing tensions between actors representing services and manufacturing industry, respectively: within the employer confederation SN between Almega (services) and Teknikföretagen (manufacturing) and within LO between 6F (building workers and so on) and unions in manufacturing such as IF Metall. Almega, calling into question the industry norm, is a strong proponent of figureless agreements. The expansion of such agreements, most of them in the public sector and exclusively among white-collar workers, might in the future challenge the industry norm if they result in higher wage increases than in manufacturing. The unions concluding such agreements aspire to obtain more than the industry norm, while employers consider them to be an instrument for increased wage differentiation without surpassing the industry norm.

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All links were checked on 28 August 2018.

Abbreviations

6F	Fackförbund i samverkan (Trade Unions in Cooperation; the LO unions for building workers, electricians, maintenance workers, painters and service and communication workers)
BAO	Bankinstitutens Arbetsgivareorganisation (Employers' Association of Swedish Banking Institutions)
Byggnads	Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (Swedish Building Workers' Union)
FI	Facken inom industrin (Manufacturing Unions)
Handels	Handelsanställdas Förbund (Commercial Employees' Union)
IF Metall	Industrifacket Metall (Industrial Union Metal)
Kommunal	Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet (Swedish Municipal Workers' Union)
Livs	Svenska Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet (Swedish Food Workers' Union) LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige (Swedish Trade Union Confederation)
LS	Lärarnas samverkansråd (Teachers' Collaboration Council)
MI	Medlingsinstitutet (National Mediation Office)
OFR	Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd (Public Employees' Negotiation Council)
PTK	Förhandlings- och samverkansrådet, formerly: Privattjänstemannakartellen (Bargaining and Cooperation Council; formerly: Bargaining Cartel of Private Sector White-collar Workers)
Saco	Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations)
SAF	Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (Swedish Employers' Confederation)
SAS	Scandinavian Airlines System
SI	Sveriges Ingenjörer (Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers)
SKL	Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions)
SN	Svenskt Näringsliv (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise)
SPF	Svensk Pilotförening (Swedish Air Line Pilots Association)
SSR	Akademikerförbundet SSR (Union for Professionals)
ST	Fackförbundet ST (Union of Civil Servants)
TCO	Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees)

Appendix to chapter 28 (Updated November 2022)

Table 1. Union Density by Sector in Sweden, 1990-2021 (%) – see Figure 28.1 in the chapter.

Sector	1990	1993	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Private	75	78	74	72	71	68	65	65	65	65	65	65
Public	91	94	92	89	88	86	84	84	85	83	83	83
Both sectors	81	85	81	78	77	73	71	71	71	70	70	70

Sector	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Private	64	64	64	64	63	63	64	65
Public	82	81	80	79	79	79	79	80
Both sectors	70	69	69	69	68	68	69	70

Remark. Union density of employed workers aged 16-64 according to labour force surveys (annual averages) excluding full-time students working part-time.

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Table 2. Density of Employers' Associations in Sweden, 1995-2020 (%) – see Figure 28.1 in the chapter.

Sector	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Private	77	75	78	77	77	/ 80	81	80	80	81	80	82	82	82	82	83	82
Public	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
All	86	83	86	85	84	/ 87	88	87	86	87	87	88	88	88	88	90	88
SAF/SN*	65	62	64	64	64	67	68	68	67	68	67	69	70	69	69	71	69

Sector	2019	2020
Private	82	83
Public	100	100
All	88	89
SAF/SN*	69	70

Remark. Share of employees (blue-collar + white-collar workers) employed by employers affiliated to an employer organisation at the end of each year (per cent).
* Share of private sector employees. SAF = Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (Swedish Employers' Confederation); SN = Svenskt Näringsliv (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise)

Source: Own calculations from statistics provided by the Swedish Statistical Office (SCB) and employers' associations. See Anders Kjellberg (2022) *Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivarförbund och fackförbund*, (The Coverage of Collective Agreements, Union Density and Density of Employers' Associations), Department of Sociology, Lund University: Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility. Research Reports 2022:1. Appendix 3 in English. Read here: https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/kollektivavtalens-tackningsgrad-samt-organisationsgraden-hos-arbetsgivarfoerbund-och-fackfoerbund(384bb031-c144-442b-a02b-44099819d605).html

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Table 3. Share of Workers Covered by Collective Agreements in Sweden, 1995-2020 (%) – see Figure 28.2 in the chapter. Yellow = revised calculation in 2021

A.	The Coverage of Collective Agreements among workers 16-64 years											
Sector	**1995:1**	**1995:2**	**2000**	**2005**	(2005)	**2006**	(2007:1)	**2007:2**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Private	90	/ 84	81	84	(89)	83	(86)	/ 82	/ 84	85	84	84
Public	100	100	100	100	(100)	100	(100)	100	100	100	100	100
Both sectors	**94**	**/ 90**	**88**	**89**	(93)	**89**	(91)	**/ 88**	**/ 90**	**90**	**89**	**89**
B.	**The Coverage of Collective Agreements among workers 15-74 years**											
Sector							(2007:1)	**2007:2**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Private								81	/84	85	83	83
Public								100	100	100	100	100
Both sectors								**87**	**/89**	**90**	**89**	**88**

A.	The Coverage of Collective Agreements among workers 16-64 years												
Sector	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**				
Private	85	84	85	85	84	/ 83	83	85	85				
Public	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
Both sectors	**90**	**89**	**90**	**90**	**90**	**/ 89**	**90**	**90**	**90**				
B.	**The Coverage of Collective Agreements among workers 15-74 years**												
Sector	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	***2017***	***2018***	***2019***	**2020**				
Private	84	83	83	83	83	/ 82	82	83	83				
Public	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
Both sectors	**89**	**88**	**89**	**89**	**89**	**/ 88**	**88**	**89**	**89**				

Remark. The coverage of collective agreements in private sector calculated by adding the number of workers employed by members of employers' organisations and the number of workers covered by substitute agreements.

Source: *Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivarförbund och fackförbund*, (The Coverage of Collective Agreements, Union Density and Density of Employers' Associations), Department of Sociology, Lund University: Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility. Research Reports 2022:1. Appendix 3 in English. Read here: https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/kollektivavtalens-tackningsgrad-samt-organisationsgraden-hos-arbetsgivarfoerbund-och-fackfoerbund(384bb031-c144-442b-a02b-44099819d605).html

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Table 4. Share of workers covered by regular and substitute private sector collective agreements in Sweden, 2008-2020 (%)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
16-64 years												
Regular	78	79	78	77	78	78	80	80	79	79	80	81
Substitute	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	/ 4	4	4
Sum private sector	**84**	**85**	**84**	**84**	**85**	**84**	**85**	**85**	**84**	**/ 83**	**83**	**85**
15-74 years												
Regular	77	78	77	77	77	77	79	79	78	78	78	79
Substitute	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	/ 4	4	4
Sum private sector	**84**	**85**	**83**	**83**	**84**	**83**	**83**	**83**	**83**	**82**	**82**	**83**

	2019	2020
16-64 years		
Regular	81	81
Substitute	4	4
Sum private sector	**85**	**85**
15-74 years		
Regular	79	80
Substitute	4	4
Sum private sector	**83**	**83**

Remark. Because of roundings, the sum of regular and substitute agreements sometimes deviate from regular agreements added to substitute agreements. (Substitute agreement = *hängavtal* in Swedish).

Source: *Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivarförbund och fackförbund*, (The Coverage of Collective Agreements, Union Density and Density of Employers' Associations), Department of Sociology, Lund University: Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility. Research Reports 2022:1. Appendix 3 in English. Read here: https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/kollektivavtalens-tackningsgrad-samt-organisationsgraden-hos-arbetsgivarfoerbund-och-fackfoerbund(384bb031-c144-442b-a02b-44099819d605).html

Table 5. Industrial action in collective bargaining in Sweden, 1995-2020/21 – see Figure 28.3 in the chapter

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Strikes and lockouts	36 (19)	9 (5)	14 (6)	13 (7)	10 (2)	2 (2)	20 (6)	10 (6)	11 (0)	9 (2)
Legal strikes and lockouts	17	4	8	6	8	0	14	4	11	7
- of which strikes*	11	3	5	4	7	0	12	4	9	5
Employees involved	125 489	9 137	11 856	570	9 481	163	9 831	711	80 538	2 449
Lost working-days	627 291	61 348	23 579	1 677	78 735	272	11 098	838	627 541	15 282
Large bargaining round	X			X			X			X

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Strikes and lockouts	14 (2)	9 (3)	14 (4)	5 (0)	6 (3)	5 (0)	2 (0)	7 (0)	9 (1)	5 (0)
Legal strikes and lockouts	12	6	10	5	3	5	2	7	8	5
- of which strikes*	11	6	10	4	3	5	2	7	8	4
Employees involved	604	1 749	3 636	12 551	1 119	3 198	7	6 158	2 446	2 190
Lost working-days	568	1 971	13 666	106 801	1 560	28 895	254	37 072	7 084	3 450
Large bargaining round			X			X		X	X	

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019**	2020/2021
Strikes and lockouts	5 (2)	10 (0)	4(1)	1	2***	0
Legal strikes and lockouts	3	10	3	1	2***	0
- of which strikes*	2	8	2	1	2	0
Employees involved	126	3 771	320	50	1 396	0
Lost working-days	234	10 417	2 570	50	7 577	0
Large bargaining round		X	X			X

* International/political strikes and local strikes against unorganized employers included.
** In addition, a number of political strikes arranged by the syndicalist union SAC took place in 2019, resulting in about 50 lost working-days (included in the total number of 7 577 lost working-days).
*** Both labour conflicts (affecting dock workers and airplane pilots respectively) were at the same time both strike and lockout.
Remark: Illegal strikes within parenthesis. For some years (2007, 2012-2014) the sum of "legal strikes and lockouts" is somewhat higher than appears from the table which excludes "mirror lockouts" (lockouts corresponding to strikes).
Source: Swedish National Mediation Office.

Table 6. Industrial action in sectoral bargaining, 2000-2020/2021 – see Table 28.5 in the chapter.

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Legal strikes and lockouts in all*	0	14	4	11	7	12	6	11	5	3	5
- of which strikes*	0	12	4	9	5	11	6	10	4	3	5
Number of sectoral negotiations with notices on industrial action**	3	15	6	4	17	9	7	27	9	4	23
Cases of industrial action taken (sectoral bargaining)	2	5	2	2	4	3	0	5	7	1	8
- of which strikes (sectoral bargaining)	0	2	0	2	3	3	0	3	3	0	4
Number of MI mediations in sectoral negotiations**	5	20	2	6	24	11	7	30	9	6	27
Expiring sectoral agreements		Most	ca 65	ca 30		90		ca 500	ca 90		550
During the year signed sectoral agreements		Most	ca 65	ca 30	420	>80	41	ca 500	ca 90	ca 30	550
Registered sectoral agreements in all						572	572	572		670	650
Large bargaining round		X			X			X			X

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020/21[1]
Legal strikes and lockouts in all*	2	7	8	5	3	10	3	1	2****	0
- of which strikes*	2	7	8	4	2	8	2	1	2****	0
Number of notices in sectoral negotiations (SN)	15	46	47	11	4	47	41	0	2	20
Number of notices in sectoral negotiations (MI)					3	40	23	0	2**	10
- of which from unions					2	30	19	0	2	10
Number of sectoral negotiations with notices on industrial action**	9	23	19	6	2	25	15	0	2	10
Cases of industrial action taken (sectoral bargaining)	4	8	7	2	1	7	1	0	2	0
- of which strikes (sectoral bargaining)	0	6	4	2	0	6	0	0	2	0
Number of MI mediations in sectoral negotiations **	10	23	25	5	2	20	15	0	2	10[2]
Expiring sectoral agreements	90	ca 500	>520	54	40	484	465	29	ca 30	ca 500
During the year signed sectoral agreements	153	ca 500	508	43	40	498	497	30	21	577
Registered sectoral agreements in all	665	680	669	685	682	668	671	668	683	744
Large bargaining round		X	X			X	X			X

Remark: Number of notices in sectoral negotiations excluding sympathy conflicts.
* International/political strikes and local strikes against unorganized employers included.
** Number of sectoral negotiations with notices on strikes, lockouts, blockades or other industrial action.
*** If the conflict between the Swedish Dock Workers' Union (Svenska Hamnarbetarförbundet) and the Ports of Sweden (Sveriges Hamnar) is included, then the total number of notices in sectoral/company negotiations was no less than 206 of which 83 were announced by the employers. Of the 204 notices in the latter conflict, 86 were withdrawn. MI Yearbook 2019, p. 53.
**** Both labour conflicts (affecting dock workers and airplane pilots respectively) meant at the same time both strike and lockout.
Source: MI and *Varsel om stridsåtgärder på svensk arbetsmarknad 2019*. Stockholm: Svenskt Näringsliv 2020, p. 11 (figure 2).
Varsel om stridsåtgärder på svensk arbetsmarknad 2020. Stockholm: Svenskt Näringsliv 2021, p. 7 (figure 1).

[1] Due to the covid-19 pandemic was the 2020 bargaining round delayed and extended into the beginning of 2021.
[2] Seven mediations in 2020 and another two in 2021 + one mediation about prolongation of collective agreement = in all 10 mediations in sectoral bargaining in 2020/21 the bargaining round (MI Yearbook 2020 (MI 2021) p. 40)

Table 7. Actual versus centrally agreed wage increases and wage drift (%) – see Figure 28.4 in the chapter.

	All sectors			Private sector									Local govern.			Central govern.		
	All			All			Blue-collar			White-collar			All			All		
Year	WI	CA	WD	WI	CA	WD	WI	CA	WD	WI	CA	WD	WI	CA	WD	WI	CA	WD
1995	3,3	2,3	1,0	4,1	3,0	1,1	4,7	2,8	1,9	3,5	2,9	0,6	1,5	0,9	0,6	2,5	1,0	1,5
1996	6,0	4,5	2,5	5,9	4,2	1,7	5,4	4,3	1,1	6,4	3,5	2,9	5,8	5,3	0,5	7,4	5,0	2,4
1997	4,5	3,8	0,7	4,5	3,6	0,9	4,7	3,8	0,9	4,2	3,0	1,2	4,8	4,7	0,1	4,4	3,5	0,9
1998	3,7	2,8	0,9	4,0	3,1	0,9	3,4	3,3	0,1	4,7	2,7	2,0	3,2	2,3	0,9	2,3	1,9	0,5
1999	3,4	2,5	0,9	3,1	2,5	0,6	2,6	2,3	0,3	3,7	2,4	1,3	3,8	2,7	1,1	4,6	2,5	2,1
2000	3,7	2,7	1,0	3,7	2,6	1,1	3,3	2,7	0,6	4,1	2,1	2,0	3,6	3,3	0,3	4,8	2,5	2,4
2001	4,4	3,0	1,4	4,2	2,8	1,4	3,8	2,9	0,9	4,5	2,8	1,7	4,9	3,3	1,6	4,2	2,6	1,6
2002	4,1	2,8	1,3	3,9	2,8	1,1	3,6	3,1	0,5	4,1	2,6	1,5	4,5	2,9	1,6	4,3	2,9	1,4
2003	3,5	2,7	0,8	3,3	2,7	0,6	3,1	3,0	0,1	3,3	2,5	0,8	3,8	2,8	1,0	4,2	2,5	1,6
2004	3,3	2,2	1,1	3,0	2,1	0,9	2,6	2,4	0,2	3,2	1,9	1,3	4,2	2,6	1,6	2,9	2,0	1,0
2005	3,1	2,3	0,8	3,2	2,2	1,0	2,8	2,4	0,4	3,5	2,1	1,4	2,8	2,4	0,4	3,3	2,4	0,8
2006	3,1	2,4	0,7	3,1	2,5	0,6	3,1	2,8	0,3	3,1	2,3	0,8	2,8	2,3	0,5	3,4	2,4	1,0
2007	3,3	3,0	0,3	3,4	3,1	0,3	3,6	3,1	0,5	3,3	3,1	0,2	3,0	3,0	0,0	3,8	2,6	1,2
2008	4,3	3,6	0,7	4,0	3,4	0,6	4,2	3,5	0,7	3,9	3,3	0,6	5,0	4,4	0,6	3,9	2,8	1,1
2009	3,4	3,1	0,3	3,2	3,2	0,0	2,9	3,5	-0,6	3,4	3,0	0,4	3,9	3,1	0,8	3,9	2,8	1,1
2010	2,6	2,0	0,6	2,5	1,7	0,8	2,7	2,1	0,6	2,4	1,5	0,9	2,7	2,4	0,3	3,2	3,6	-0,5
2011	2,4	1,8	0,6	2,5	1,8	0,7	2,4	1,9	0,5	2,6	1,8	0,8	2,3	1,8	0,5	1,9	1,8	0,1
2012	3,0	2,8	0,2	3,2	2,9	0,3	3,1	2,8	0,3	3,3	2,9	0,4	2,7	2,7	0,0	2,1	2,0	0,1
2013	2,5	2,2	0,3	2,3	2,1	0,2	2,4	2,1	0,3	2,3	2,1	0,2	2,9	2,5	0,4	2,6	2,5	0,1
2014	2,8	2,2	0,6	2,9	2,1	0,8	2,8	2,2	0,6	2,9	2,1	0,8	2,8	2,3	0,5	2,3	2,2	0,1
2015	2,4	2,3	0,1	2,3	2,3	0,0	1,8	2,3	-0,5	2,6	2,3	0,3	2,7	2,3	0,4	2,6	2,3	0,2
2016	2,4	2,3	0,1	2,3	2,2	0,1	2,4	2,3	0,1	2,2	2,2	0,0	2,7	2,4	0,4	2,4	2,3	0,0
2017	2,3	2,1	0,2	2,0	2,1	-0,1	1,6	2,1	-0,5	2,3	2,1	0,3	3,1	2,3	0,8	2,3	2,2	0,1
2018	2,6	2,1	0,5	2,5	2,0	0,5	2,5	2,1	0,4	2,5	2,0	0,5	2,7	2,3	0,4	2,8	2,2	0,6
2019	2,6	2,1	0,4	2,5	2,1	0,4	2,1	2,1	0,0	2,7	2,1	0,6	2,8	2,3	0,5	2,8	2,1	0,7
2020	2,1	1,2	0,9	2,0	1,0	1,1	1,4	1,0	0,3	2,4	1,0	1,5	2,3	1,6	0,6	2,3	2,1	0,1
2021	2,6	2,4	0,3	2,8	2,4	0,4	2,3	2,3	0,0	3,0	2,5	0,6	2,5	2,5	0,1	1,4	1,8	-0,4

Remark 1. WI ("Wage increase") = *actual yearly wage growth* by calendar year according to short-term statistics of wages and salaries.
CA ("Central agreements") = yearly wage growth by calendar year *according to central (sectoral) agreements.*
WD ("Wage drift") = yearly *wage drift* by calendar year.

Remark 2, WI (Wage increase) refers to the increased wage and not to increased labour cost (which can include e.g. shortened working-time, improved occupational pensions and professional development/reskilling).

Remark 3. The WI (Wage increase) and WD (Wage drift) of blue-collar and white-collar workers is influenced by changes in the composition of blue-collar and white-collar workers respectively. For example, an increasing share of white-collar workers with university degree can raise the average

white-collar wage (reflected in in the table) without a wage increase of the individuals making up the white-collar collectivity. Consequently, a higher wage drift among white-collar workers compared to blue-collar workers may at least in part be caused by a growing share of white-collar workers with higher education.

Remark 4. The relatively few figureless agreements in the private sector are excluded. In the public sector wage increases in figureless agreements are approximated with the industry norm percentage. The statistic for the year 2021 is still preliminary. The 2019 statistics is corrected in some columns corrected as the previous figures were preliminary.

Remark 5. The absence of wage statistics broken down by blue-collar and white-collar workers in the public sector is related to public sector employers' reluctance to include that in the paragraphs on wage statistics in public sector collective agreements, and white-collar unions' reluctance to disclose their statistics. The Swedish National Mediation Office (MI) is dependent on cooperation with the labour market parties that provide MI with wage statistics.

Remark 6. Observe that the 2000 bargaining round was extended into 2021, due to the covid-19 pandemic, prolonging the old agreements for seven months without any wage compensation.

Source: Swedish National Mediation Office (Medlingsinstitutet, MI).

Table 8. Agreement models by category of workers and sector in 2021 (%) – see Table 28.4 in the chapter.

	Share of employees by sector (%)		
Agreement model	**Private Sector**	**Local and central government**	**All sectors**
1. Local wage formation without nationally determined wage increase (figureless agreements)	11%	52%	28%
- Blue-collar	0%	0%	0%
- White-collar: unions of managers, teachers, nurses, bank employees, and so on	28%	81%	56%
2. Local wage formation with a fall-back provision (*stupstock*) regulating the size of the wage increase	13%	12%	12%
- Blue-collar	2%	2%	2%
- White-collar: graduate engineers/engineering (*teknikavtal*), *Unionen*/*IT*, *ST*, medical doctors	28%	18%	23%
3. Local wage formation with a fall-back provision regulating the size of the wage increase and some form of individual guarantee	7%	0%	4%
- Blue-collar: *IF Metall*/chemical industry	3%	0%	2%
- White-collar: *Unionen*/engineering (*teknikavtal*) *Unionen* /chemical industry and food industry	12%	0%	6%
4. Local wage frame (wage pot) without an individual guarantee	15%	35%	23%
- Blue-collar: *Kommunal* (*LO*), *IF Metall*/steel	15%	98%	39%
- White-collar: *Unionen*/motor trade/media	16%	0%	8%
5. Local wage frame with an individual guarantee; alternatively a fall-back provision regulating the individual guarantee	15%	0%	9%
- Blue-collar: *IF Metall*/engineering (*teknikavtal*)	16%	0%	12%
- White-collar: *Unionen*/steel/trade/staffing/building/hotel & restaurants	14%	0%	7%
6. General wage increase and local wage frame	25%	0%	15%
- Blue-collar: commercial employees, hotel and restaurant workers and paper workers	41%	0%	29%
- White-collar	0%	0%	0%
7. General wage increase (wage tariffs or piece work)	14%	1%	8%
- Blue-collar: building and transport workers, painters	22%	0%	16%
- White-collar: air pilots, *Unionen*/cabin crews	1%	1%	1%
Number of agreements by sector	669*	25**	694
Number of employees covered by collective agreements (thousands)	2 214	1 480	3 694

* Of which 368 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (*Svenskt Näringsliv*, SN, 1 926 900 employees) and 301 other employers' associations (287 200 employees).

** Of which 3 in central government (*staten: Arbetsgivarverket, 268 000 employees*) and 22 in local government (*kommuner och regioner: Sveriges Kommuner och Regioner,* SKR, 1 212 400 employees).

Remark. Blue-collar workers are defined as employees covered by agreements concluded by LO unions.

Source: *Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen 2020. Medlingsinstitutets årsrappor*t. Stockholm: Swedish National Mediation Office *(Medlingsinstitutet*) 2021, pp. 246-247. (Observe that the year 2020 in the table on page 247 should be 2021.

Table 9. The industry norm, the so-called mark (%) by bargaining rounds since 1998 – see Table 28.3 in the chapter.

Industry Agreement by bargaining round	Duration	Industry norm or 'mark' (wage + other costs)	Average 'mark' by 12 months periods (not by calendar year)
March 1998 – January 2001	Three years[3]	6.9%[4]	2,4%
February 2001 – March 2004	Three years[5]	8.5% (7.0%), 7.3% (5.8%)[6]	ca 2,7%, ca 2,3%
April 2004 – March 2007	Three years	7.3% (6.9%, 5.7%)[7]	2.4%
April 2007 – March 2010	Three years	10.2% (8.1%)[8]	3.4%
White-collar: April 2010 – September 2011/January 2012	18 months	2.6%	1.75%
Blue-collar: April 2010 – January 2012	22 months	3.2%	1.75%
February 2012 – March 2013	14 months	3.0%	2.6%
April 2013 – March 2016	Three years	6.8%	2.3%
April 2016 – March 2017	One year	2.2%	2.2%
April 2017 – March 2020	Three years	6.5%	2.2%
April 2020 – October 2020	7 months*	0.0%	-
November 2020 – March 2023	29 months	5.4%	2.2%

Note: *Prolongation for seven months due to the covid-19 pandemic *without wage compensation*.
Sources: Yearbooks of the Swedish National Mediation Office, Danielsson Öberg & Öberg 2017:154-155 (*Vem ska bestämma på lönemarknaden?* Stockholm: Premiss).

Remark about the 2009 Crisis Agreement

As regards opening clauses in Swedish industrial agreements, there has been none. The March 2009 one-year Crisis Agremeent between IF Metall and Teknikföretagen opened up for local agreements on reduced working time and the corresponding wage decrease, at maximum 20%. Far from all workplaces did apply the agreement. It should be observed that the crisis agreement did not result in zero-rate wage increases in any industrial agreement.

The industry wage agreements were concluded already in 2007 and were not revised during their three-year duration. For example the IF Metall industry agreement with the engineering employers (*Teknikföretagen*) concluded in 15 March 2007 with a length of three years (36 months up to March 2010) was intact (wage increases 2,8% the first year, 2,5% the second year

[3] 35 months.
[4] The agreement Metall – Association of Engineering Employers (wage increase 5.7%, shortened working-time 1.2%).
[5] 36-38 months (in engineering 38 months).
[6] Blue-collar 7.0% wage increase (2.5%+2.3%+2.2%) + 1,5% shortened working-time (0.55%+0.4%+0.55%) = 8.5% cost increase (2.8% per 12 months); white-collar 5.8% wage increase (2.2%+1.9%+1.7%) + 1,5% shortened working-time (0.55%+0.4%+0.55%) = 7.3% cost increase (2,4% per 12 months).
[7] Blue-collar 6.9% wage increase + 0.5% shortened working-time = 7.4 cost increase; white-collar 5.7% + 0.5% shortened working-time = 6.2% cost increase.
[8] Of which wage increases in engineering 8.1% (2.8% first year +2.5% second year + 2.8% third year) to which came increased costs for pensions and other things.

and 2,8% the third year). Also at workplaces applying the crisis agreement did the employers have to follow the 2007-2010 industry agreement and pay the stipulated wage increases.

The workers at workplaces concluding local crisis agreements got lower wages just because of the reduced working-time and not due to any opening clauses. When calling a union officer at the IF Metall headquarters he said that at a few workplaces did the local union club temporarily abstain from the regular wage increase (given in the central agreement), but just *temporarily* as the payment was postponed one year. Consequently, the employer in such cases one year later had to pay that money to the workers plus interest.

A minority of the IF Metall members (about 60 000) in 2009 was covered by local crisis agreements. At such workplaces working-time was reduced by 17% in average while wages decreased by 12%. That means, that that wages at several workplaces were reduced less that working-time. The wage per hour consequently was raised for many workers.

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About the four volumes of *Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame (eds.* Torsten Müller & Kurt Vandaele & Jeremy Waddington). European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) Brussels 2019.

Link to the Swedish chapter in volume III (pp. 583-604 + Appendix):
https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/sv/publications/sweden-collective-bargaining-under-the-industry-norm(11510a6d-057c-4a81-b69b-a82670685caa).html

Website ETUI: https://www.etui.org/
For information about all the 28 country chapters (+ Introduction and statistical appendix) and for downloading them, see Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame. Volume I, II, III and IV | etui

These four volumes document how the institutions of collective bargaining have been removed, fundamentally altered, or markedly narrowed in scope in all 28 EU Member States. However, there are also positive examples to be found. Some collective bargaining systems have proven more resilient than others in maintaining multi-employer bargaining arrangements. Based on the evidence presented in the country-focused chapters, the key policy issue addressed in this book is how the reduction of the importance of collective bargaining as a tool to jointly regulate

the employment relationship can be reversed. The struggle to fend off the neoliberal assault on collective bargaining in Europe is moving towards an endgame. The outcome is still open.