

European [Security] Union: Bordering and Governing a Secure Europe in a Better World?

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The past 20 years, since the 1992 Treaty on European Union, have seen the gradual creation of both an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and a “Common Foreign and Security Policy”. More recent is the development of a “European Neighbourhood Policy” over the past 10 years. All three of these policies involved the navigation and negotiation of security, borders and governance in and by the European Union (EU). This article analyses these practices of bordering and governance through a five-fold security framework. The article argues that a richer understanding of EU security discourses can be achieved through bringing the five dimensions to the analysis and using them to study both the interlinking and the interweaving of security, bordering and governance. Overall, the analysis presented here suggests that the five dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, practice and being can all contribute to a more expansive understanding of how EU security in the 2000s has been related to bordering and governance processes, and how these have been increasingly interwoven within the EU.

Introduction: Inserting Security in the EU

The past 20 years have seen the gradual creation of both an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ) and a “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) within the European Union (EU). While Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and CFSP were reserved as intergovernmental areas of cooperation in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, the 1990s saw a gradual emergence of consensus that member state cooperation was insufficient to meet the demands of the post-Cold War world.¹ The “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP) has developed as a response to the need to institutionalise relations with those neighbouring states who have no immediate possibility of membership. Article 8 of the 2012 Lisbon Treaty committed the EU to “develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good

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1. Ian Manners, *Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”.²

While it is possible to treat these three policy areas of AFSJ, CFSP and ENP separately, it is also clear that they intersect over the issues of security, bordering and governance in the EU. At the same time, these issues have emerged at the nexus of Europeanisation and globalisation as the “inside” and “outside” of the EU become more indivisible. The article uses the insertion of “security” in the EU as an analytical strategy to understand how policies of bordering and governance are seen and read differently through five dimensions of security. For this reason the word “security” is bracketed in the title to reflect the analytical questions and strategy of inserting security into the EU. Hence the article considers the European [security] Union at the nexus of the security, bordering and governance processes of these three policy areas.

As suggested, the insertion of security into the EU has occurred through three areas of practice involving freedom, security and justice policies; bordering and neighbouring policies; and internal governance policies and attempts to promote “good governance” and “good global governance” through external policies. The main vehicles for these attempts to secure Europe have been the practices and policies found in the AFSJ, ENP and CFSP areas. But CFSP also involves Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), while the cross-cutting EU Counter-Terrorism (EUCT) response and the Lisbon Treaty reforms both impact on all three areas. This insertion of security does not occur within a discursive vacuum; EU practices of bordering and governance all interweave regional integration and globalisation processes. These discursive practices will be analysed through a framework consisting of five dimensions of security: **broadening, deepening, thickening, practices, and being**. Within each of these dimensions, EU policy discourses will be drawn on to illustrate how each dimension has impacted on notions of bordering and governance. The method used in the article is comparative in the sense that it compares the five dimensions across the three policy areas of security, bordering and governance; broadly represented by JHA/AFSJ (including elements of counter-terrorism), ENP and CFSP/CSDP. The method uses a discourse analysis of EU policy evolution over time, looking for examples of “discursive nodal points”.³ The analysis places the starting emphasis on security, but then seeks to examine how security becomes discursively related to borders/bordering and governance/governing in EU policy agendas. These discursive relations include interlinking of discourses of security, bordering and governance where concepts and issues in one area give meaning to another. Going further, discursive relations can also include interweaving where “dis-courses are bound up with each other” and “held together by nodal points” which makes it very difficult to separate different policy agendas.⁴

The framework uses the terms **broadening** and **deepening** from Keith Krause and Michael Williams and the notion of **thickening** from Jef Huysmans to provide three dimensions.⁵ The addition of the terms **practices** (used to describe

2. “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2012/C 326/01, Vol. 55, 26 October 2012, p. 21, available <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF>.

3. Thomas Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), pp. 598–613.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 608.

practices of “securitisation” and “de-securitisation”) and *being* (meaning form and nature) to discuss subject/object and existential/ontological distinctions, provides two further dimensions with which to interrogate the EU. In each of these dimensions EU discursive strategies of security, bordering and governance will be briefly examined to illustrate the interwoven consequences of securing Europe in a better world. The article concludes with a reflection on the merits of inserting a security framework into the study of EU bordering and governance.

As the article will illustrate, EU security policies and discourses have tended to be analysed within the confines of one particular theoretical school or approach, or analysis has tended to be focused on one particular policy area. Largely missing from these accounts are attempts to draw on different schools/approaches, or longer-timescale analyses of the interlinking and interweaving of the three policy areas. The article argues that a richer understanding of EU security dis-courses can be achieved through bringing the five dimensions to the analysis and using them to study both the interlinking and interweaving of security, bordering and governance. Overall, the analysis presented here suggests that the dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, practice and being can all contribute to a more expansive understanding of how EU security in the 2000s has been related to bordering and governance processes, and how these have been increasingly interwoven within the EU.

Broadening Security

The notion of broadening the agenda of those engaged in the study of security emerged during the 1980s in response to three related but separate critiques from the “peace movement”, the “post-positivist movement” and from within the “academic community”. Growing out of the anti-nuclear, anti-war, then the anti-arms race campaigns of the 1950s to 1980s, the peace movement advanced the critique that the study of traditional or conventional security was part of the problem, not the solution.⁶ Over a similar period the post-positivist movement with its critiques of knowledge and scientism also led many to challenge the whole notion of security as being anything other than a discursive performance.⁷ Finally, parts of the academic community began to argue the need to broaden the research agenda, led by Buzan and Ullman.⁸ The trend in EU studies followed this

5. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997); Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1998), pp. 226–255.

6. Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security”, in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 319–345.

7. Timothy Luke, “‘What’s Wrong with Deterrence?’ A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy”, in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MD: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 207–229; John Mowitz, “In/Security and the Politics of Disciplinarity”, in Weldes et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 347–361.

8. Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd edition) (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security”, *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1983), pp. 129–153.

broadening in the early 1990s, with studies of migration (Huysmans), non-military security (Manners), Schengen (Anderson and Bort) and territory (Tunander et al.).⁹ This EU trend accelerated greatly in the 2000s with development of the AFSJ and CSDP aspects of CFSP.¹⁰

Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify four breadths to the broadening of security: military security; post-Cold War security; insecurity; and security performance. The traditional or conventional breadth of security is the focus on military force, as found to be dominant in the 1980s. These old conventions included the study of “national security”, “nuclear deterrence”, “security dilemmas”, and “military strategy” and are still fiercely debated in leading US journals such as *International Security*. Conversely, there has been an increasing emphasis on military force in EU studies.¹¹

The post-Cold War breadth of security was to be found in the threats and studies of international security studies which became the new conventions in the 1990s. These conventions included “. . . broadening the agenda to new threats—adding economic, societal, political and environmental risks to the classically dominant military threats”.¹² In EU studies, “the end of the Cold War division of Europe led to changes in the security environment [which] changed the way in which security was considered and Europe redefined”.¹³ The third breadth of study is that of insecurity, finding its way into “mainstream” academic thinking in the 2000s with a focus on discussions of social insecurity, the role of globalisation and development, the “rebirth” of nationalist movements, transnational terrorism, and other groups or collectivities which thrive on insecurity. In EU studies, “insecurity studies” include work by Freedman on gender and migrant women, and by Huysmans on migration and asylum.¹⁴

9. Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitising’ Societal Issues”, in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (eds.), *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 53–72; Ian Manners, *An Anatomy of Cooperation: Achieving Common Security Policy in the New Europe* (PhD Thesis, Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 1996); Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, *Schengen and EU Enlargement: Security and Cooperation at the Eastern Frontier of the European Union* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1997); Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1997).

10. For examples, see Elke Krahmman, “Conceptualizing Security Governance”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2003), pp. 5–26; Elke Krahmman (ed.), *New Threats and New Actors in International Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Mary Martin and Mary Kaldor (eds.), *The European Union and Human Security: European External Interventions and Missions* (London: Routledge, 2009); Sarah Wolff, Nicole Wichmann and Gregory Mounier (eds.), *The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the European Union?* (London: Routledge, 2009); Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2012).

11. Trevor Salmon and Alistair Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Seth Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).

12. Huysmans, “Security!”, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

13. Manners, *An Anatomy of Cooperation*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

14. Jane Freedman (ed.), *Gender and Security: Migrant Women in Europe* (London: Ashgate, 2003); Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge, 2006).

The widest breadth of security is that of arguing that security is best understood as a political performance of invoking and interpreting danger for self-benefit, as suggested by the Copenhagen School of international security studies.¹⁵ In EU studies, the works of Higashino and Karyotis use the Copenhagen School approach.¹⁶ This broadening of the agenda of threats and issues draws analytical attention to the extent to which securing, bordering and governance discourses broaden the policy agenda in these three areas. Thus, when analysing the broadening of these EU policy agendas the focus is on discourses that widen the range of threats and issues of concern beyond Cold War assumptions of “state security”.

This broadening of security is strongly reflected in the discursive practices of the EU as found, for example, in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the key-stone of subsequent EU securing, bordering and governance policies.

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice.¹⁷

The ESS links together borders and security, internal and external, freedom and prosperity, frustration and injustice. It also identifies five “key threats” of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.¹⁸ Thus the ESS mixes a post-Cold War emphasis on new threats with an emphasis on non-state threats and insecurity caused by globalisation. In this respect the ESS illustrates discursive practices that developed from the late 1990s onwards of broadening security by linking to issues of borders and governance, stating for example: “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed”.¹⁹ This last sentence also shows how, in the early 2000s, “European interest”, bordering and governance were considered important to “secure Europe in a better world”.

15. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.), *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research* (London: Routledge, 2004); Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). It is worth noting that a number of scholars do not consider the Copenhagen School to have broadened the study of security, but to have narrowed it. See discussion in Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2008), pp. 563–587.

16. Atsuko Higashino, “For the Sake of ‘Peace and Security’? The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2004), pp. 347–368; George Karyotis, “European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus”, *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1–17. See also discussion in C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2006), pp. 443–487.

17. Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World—The European Security Strategy”, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana, p. 2.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

By adopting a “broadening security” approach, it is possible to see how the 2000s have been marked by a broadening of the agenda of interrelated issues linking securing, bordering and governance in the EU. This broadening became clearer with the May 2001 Commission White Paper on Europe’s contribution to world governance, written prior to 9/11, that suggested “promoting global governance as a means of achieving the core objectives of sustainable development, security, peace and equity”.²⁰ However, while the involvement of EU member states in military interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq) as well as counter-terrorist policies became the analytical centre of attention, the broadening bordering discourses of JHA and ENP and the broadening governance discourses of CFSP and External Actions are potentially more important. This was becoming apparent by 2003 as the ESS set out how “increasingly open borders” mean that “the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”.²¹ Possibly the clearest illustration of this broadening agenda linking securing, bordering and governance was to be found in the “solidarity clause” enshrined in the 2010 Lisbon Treaty. The clause aimed to “protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack”, invoking a “spirit of solidarity” in the protection of democratic institutions—the centrepiece of member state governance.²²

What the “broadening security” approach illustrates is that the 2000s saw a period of broadening the agenda of threats and issues which linked together both internal and external concerns, as well as securing, bordering and governance. While the growth of globalisation discourses in the 1990s perhaps made such broadening inevitable, the perceived need to establish an ENP in 2003 – 2004, the terrorist attacks of 2001 – 2005 and the drive to re-establish effective multilateralism at the UN all contributed to the interweaving of EU security, borders and governance discourses and policies both internally and externally. In order to realise what this interlinking and interweaving of discourses meant for the EU, it is important to move to the second dimension of inserting and analysing security in the EU.

Deepening Security

While the broadening of security focuses on debates over what threats and issues to study, the deepening of security is concerned with the units of analysis, as Huysmans puts it: a deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects, that is, units receiving threats—adding individuals, ecological system, community and so on to the traditional state-centric agenda.²³

Although this deepening of security is confusing because it mixes analytical units, such as objects (physical) and subjects (human), it is a discussion which proceeds in three steps. Firstly, the traditional or conventional unit of analysis was primarily the “nation state” with the focus on discussions of national security. In parallel with this were discussions of how the nation state could achieve

20. European Commission, “Report of Working Group ‘Strengthening Europe’s Contribution to World Governance’”, White Paper on Governance, Working Group No. 5, An EU Contribution to Better Governance beyond Our Borders, Pilot: R. Madelin, Rapporteurs: R.W. Ratchford, D. Juul Jørgensen, May 2001, p. 1.

21. Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

22. “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (Consolidated version 2012), Official Journal of the European Union, C 326 (26 October 2012), article 222.

23. Huysmans, “Security!”, *op. cit.*, p. 227; see discussion in Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), pp. 741–767, at p. 745.

security and order in conditions of “international anarchy”. Thus prior to the 1990s, the traditional depth of security studies was the national/international with its focus on states and the inter-state system. The increasing depth of security studies in the 1990s was to look beyond the state/state system for sources of inter-national threat. Most explicitly, the Copenhagen School introduced the idea that there were five depths to security: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, individuals.²⁴ This deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects focuses analytical attention on the extent to which security, bordering and governance discourses deepen the policy agenda in these three areas. Thus, when analysing the deepening of the EU security, bordering and governance policy agendas, the emphasis is on discourses that include more units of analysis beneath the Cold War prominence given to the state.

In EU studies, the importance of the “multilevel political system” introduced in the 1980s by Carole Webb and Brigid Laffan mirrored this concern for different depths of analysis from the EU level through member state level to regional and local levels.²⁵ To take one example, deeper analyses of security seek to go beyond state security studies to focus instead on “human security” and its concerns for economic and social issues including threats to health (such as the AIDS pandemic), food security (such as high staple costs caused by biofuels) and minimum economic wellbeing (such as poverty being the world’s greatest source of insecurity). Within the EU, the development of human security as a component of external actions has been widely advocated and discussed since the mid-1990s.²⁶ The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report introduced the “New Dimensions of Human Security” when it argued that human security equated “security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms”.²⁷ By 2005 the European Commission had placed human security at the centre of development assistance by arguing that the EU “must respond to the full range of threats afflicting the most vulnerable in societies across the world—hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity”.²⁸ The role of Javier Solana’s Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities and its 2004 report, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, as well as the work of the group’s convener Mary Kaldor, all emphasise the promotion of human security by the EU.²⁹

24. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 5–6.

25. Carole Webb, “Theoretical Perspectives and Problems”, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb (eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Community* (2nd edition) (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 1–42; Brigid Laffan, “Policy Implementation in the European Community: The European Social Fund as a Case Study”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1983), pp. 389–408.

26. See discussions in Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Cross-roads”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 182–199, at pp. 192–193; Ian Manners, “European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge”, in Cathleen Kantner, Angela Liberatore and Raffaella Del Sarto (eds.), *Security and Democracy in the European Union*, Special Issue of *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2006), pp. 405–421, at pp. 407–413.

27. United Nations Human Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: UNDP, 1995).

28. European Commission, *Annual Report 2005 on the European Community’s Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2004* (Brussels: EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2005), p. 3.

29. Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities”, presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004; Martin and Kaldor, *op. cit.*; Mary Martin, “Human Security and the Search for a Normative Narrative”, in Richard

The deepening of security is an increasingly important element of the discursive practices of the EU with examples seen in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS (RIESS) and the 2011 EU Priorities for the 66th Session of the General Assembly (GA) of the UN:

We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity
 . . . We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security.³⁰

The EU will continue to promote the concept of Human Security as a comprehensive, integrated and people centred approach in addressing inter-related threats to security, livelihood and dignity of people and vulnerable communities.³¹

Both the 2008 RIESS and the 2011 EU priorities illustrate how this deepening of security reaches down beneath the level of state concerns to address “the root causes of conflict and insecurity” with an emphasis on a “comprehensive, integrated and people centred approach”.³² This interlinking of development and conflict concerns in the human security discourses of the EU has accelerated since 2004, particularly in the context of EU relations with the UN. For example, EU priorities for the 2005 and 2009 – 2012 sessions of the UN General Assembly have all included references to the promotion of human security. This EU deepening of security involves a broadening of security discourses to include issues of poverty and inequality, livelihood and dignity of people and vulnerable communities. Such deepening also illustrates discursive practices of linking to issues of bordering and governance, for example by referring to the importance of border management and border missions, as well as good governance.³³

Adopting a “deepening security” approach makes it clear that the 2000s have been marked by a deepening of the EU’s emphasis on linking security, bordering and governance beyond the state towards new referent objects such as people rather than territories. Similar to “broadening”, the Commission’s 2001 White Paper also argued that “democracy is essential to governance” and that “the

Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 187–209; Mary Kaldor, “The EU as a New Form of Political Authority: The Example of the Common Security and Defence Policy”, *Global Policy*, Vol. 3, No. s.1 (2012), pp. 79–86. See also the survey in Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias Kettmann and Markus Möstl (eds.), *Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Problems, Policies, Potential* (London: Routledge, 2010).

30. Javier Solana, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (RIESS)—Providing Security in a Changing World”, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 11 and 12 December 2008 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana, pp. 2, 10.

31. Council of the EU, “EU Priorities for the 66th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, GA6611-001EN, 10 June 2011, p. 7.

32. See also Council of the EU, “European Union Medium-Term Priorities at the United Nations (2012-15)”, GA12-001EN, 23 May 2012; Council of the EU, “Statement—United Nations General Assembly Plenary: Human Security”, EUUN12-045EN, 4 June 2012.

33. Solana, “RIESS”, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 6–8.

danger of privatising and therefore eroding democracy clearly exists . . . [as a] democratic risk".³⁴ This deepening of referent objects within the state, such as democracy and privatisation, also became a means of linking deeper security to democratic governance. From the terrorist attacks of 2001 – 2005 onwards, the deepening of security discourses to include "citizens" and "peoples" of the EU also identified threats to democratic societies and the need to develop an "area of freedom, security and justice".³⁵ But this deepening discourse also drew in EU security, bordering and governance relations with referent objects outside of the EU. Hence, the newly renamed "Instrument for Stability" referred to EU "technical and financial assistance in pursuit of . . . the security and safety of individuals" in a third country or countries.³⁶

Thus the "deepening security" approach illustrates how the 2000s witnessed a deepening of the EU policy agendas by introducing new referent objects which, like the "broadening" agenda, further linked together both internal and external issues, as well as security, bordering and governance. Clearly this linking of security and governance, both within EU democratic societies and within the AFSJ, is not unproblematic, as illustrated by questionable practices such as increased surveillance within and along borders. Thus, while broadening discourses interwove AFJS, ENP and CFSP from 2001 – 2003 onwards, deepening discourses moved the central referent object from EU member states to EU citizens, with all the potentially negative consequences for non-EU states and non-EU citizens. To more fully appreciate the significance of this shift, it is necessary to go beyond broadening and deepening the agenda of EU policy analysis towards the third dimension of inserting and analysing security in the EU.

Thickening Security

Although both broadening and deepening security calls into question the focus on threat and threatened, the debate over the thickening of security raises the question of the methodology of analysis. Huysmans has argued that there are three methodological thicknesses to the analysis of security, with differing qualitative results: ". . . the difference between the three approaches demonstrates that there is a growing degree of sophistication if one moves from definition to concept to thick signifier".³⁷

His first thickness is that of using a "security definition" approach synonymous with most of the study of security within the field—"[i]n a definition one attempts to sketch the general essence of a category, in this case the essentials of security".³⁸ Here EU studies generally defines European security as being either internal security associated with AFSJ or external security related to CSDP (compare

34. European Commission, "Strengthening Europe's Contribution", *op. cit.*, p. 7.

35. Council of the EU, "The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy", 14469/4/05 REV 4, Brussels, 30 November 2005, p. 6; Council of the EU, "The Stockholm Programme—An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens", 17024/09, Brussels, 2 December 2009, p. 4.

36. European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (ED) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and Council of 15 November 2006 Establishing an Instrument for Stability", *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 327/1 (24 November 2006), p. 3.

37. Huysmans, "Security!", *op. cit.*, p. 229; see also discussion in Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism", *op. cit.*, pp. 244–246.

38. Huysmans, "Security!", *op. cit.*, p. 229.

Walker or Henderson with Howorth).³⁹ A greater thickness is to be found in approaches that engage in a “conceptual analysis” involving both the study of security and the study of the field of security studies—“[i]t does not concentrate meaning in a single statement but explores more extensively what characterizes a security policy or debate”.⁴⁰ Examples in the study of the EU would include here the work of Van Ham and Medvedev; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite; and Me´rand.⁴¹ Huysmans’ thickest approach suggests that an approach which engages in an analysis of security as a “thick signifier” yields the most sophisticated and qualitatively valuable methodology—“interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an understanding of how the category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life”.⁴² Work on the EU from this perspective includes the debates over the c.a.s.e. collective Manifesto,⁴³ as well as more recent work on “critical border studies”.⁴⁴ The thickening of the method of analysis from definition to concept to thick signifier brings analytical attention to the relative emphasis placed on sketching out the essentials of security; studying the security field; or understanding how the “security” category affects wider society. Thus, when analysing the thickening of the EU security, bordering and governance policy agendas, the focus is on discourses that reflect an understanding of how the categorisation and analysis of policies affects wider society.

The question of thickening security is not easily identifiable within the discourses of the EU institutions and policy agendas because of its methodological implications. However, there are a multitude of examples of the need to escape from short-term, narrowly focused analysis towards more holistic or comprehensive understandings of the challenges facing the EU and other global actors, for example:

At the global level, a very high proportion of discourse reflects an assumption that the interests of each territorial actor are a self-centred given and that international relations is the advancement of these fixed and selfish interests, with others’ interests being pursued only as and when this can be key to maximising our own well-being. This sort of statement, if repeated often enough, can insert into a state’s identity, or idea of its interests, the

39. Neil Walker (ed.), *Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karen Henderson (ed.), *The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Enlarged Europe* (Basing-stoke: Palgrave, 2004); Howorth, *op. cit.*

40. Huysmans, “Security!”, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

41. Peter Van Ham and Sergei Medvedev (eds.), *Mapping European Security after Kosovo* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006); Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds.), *The European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2007); Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

42. Huysmans, “Security!”, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

43. c.a.s.e. collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe”, *op. cit.*; c.a.s.e. collective, “Europe, Knowledge, Politics—Engaging with the Limits: The C.A.S.E. Collective Responds”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 38 (2007), pp. 559–576. See also R.B.J. Walker, “Security, Critique, Europe”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 38 (2007), pp. 95–103; Andreas Behnke, “Presence and Creation: A Few (Meta-)Critical Comments on the c.a.s.e. Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 38 (2007), pp. 105–111; Mark Salter, “On Exactitude in Disciplinary Science: A Response to the Network Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 38 (2007), pp. 113–122.

44. Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror”, *Space and Polity*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2008), pp. 63–79; Noel Parker et al., “Lines in the Sand? An Agenda for Critical Border Studies”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2009), pp. 582–587.

notion of a sustained state commitment to upholding the international rule of law . . . [General incoherence in policymaking] is exacerbated by a lack of analytical tools for producing a more holistic view of the world: incoherent policies result which often work against each other.⁴⁵

This statement, and the many others referring to the need for a holistic or com-prehensive view of policy-making practices, reflect “a comprehensive or holistic approach to security” first seen in the ESS.⁴⁶ Aspects of such a move from a definitional to conceptual to signifying understanding of security can be read through the numerous references to the roots, root causes or complex causes of insecurity found in the documents. Two examples of these discursive practices can be found in discussions stating that “the most recent wave of terror-ism is global in its scope . . . [i]t arises out of complex causes”;⁴⁷ and “the phenomenon of human trafficking is especially relevant in this area. It is important to ensure that crime control/security and human rights are understood as complimentary dimensions of the same issue, and that the root causes of trafficking are also addressed”.⁴⁸ What is notable in both these examples is that the thickening of security explicitly involves bordering and governance practices, whether in addressing the complex causes of terrorism or the root causes of human trafficking. This discourse towards thickening security can be found in the most recent EU policy agenda towards the UN claiming a broad, long-term and holistic understanding of security placing prevention at the heart of the EU approach: “we understand security in a broad, holistic manner. Prevent-ing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on is at the heart of our approach”.⁴⁹

Taking a “thickening security” approach motivates inquiry into the extent to which EU policy discourses and their analysis appear to reflect the interlinkage of security, bordering and governance in a self-consciously reflexive way. Two brief examples serve to illustrate how interpreting the three areas as thick signifiers provides insight into their intertwining. The first example involves the contrasting discourses regarding humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by EU member states, particularly after the unsanctioned invasion of Iraq in April 2003.⁵⁰ Both the September 2003 Commission Communication and the December 2003 ESS centred on discourses of “effective multilateralism” in the governance of humanitarian intervention. Such discourses were strengthened in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty and the 2010 Lisbon Treaty: “The Conference . . . stresses that the European Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its Members for the maintenance of international peace and

45. European Commission, “Strengthening Europe’s Contribution”, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

46. Gerrard Quille, “The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 422–438, at p. 422.

47. Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

48. European Commission and High Representative of the EU, “Joint Communication: Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN(2012) 14 final, Brussels, 15 May 2012, p. 14.

49. Council of the EU, “European Union Medium-Term Priorities”, *op. cit.*; Council of the EU, “Statement—Human Security”, *op. cit.*

50. Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered”, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

security”.⁵¹ The second example involves the tensions inherent in the post-9/11 formulations and discourses of the ENP, particularly between “shared values” versus “stability and security”.⁵² The critical rethinking of ENP in light of the Arab uprisings of 2011 led to a discursive shift and new emphasis on civil society and sustainable democracy.⁵³

The “thickening security” approach illustrates how the 2000s can be characterised by moves from defining to conceptualising to thickening security, bordering and governance discourses. EU institutional biases are towards more comprehensive and holistic discourses, although these are clearly challenged by member state preferences in areas such as counter-terrorist security, southern European bordering and global governance. What also seems clearer is that thickening approaches bring us closer to understanding for whom and how the interweaving of these discourses will appear illegitimate, even threatening. To better understand who may be threatening or threatened by such discourses, it is necessary to adopt a fourth dimension based on the practice of security.

Practice of Security

Breadth, depth and thickness are all important, yet largely static, dimensions of the study of security. The innovation of the Copenhagen School was to introduce dynamic notions of securitisation and desecuritisation.⁵⁴ Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli and Lucarelli have taken these ideas further to suggest that security practices go beyond (de)securitisation to include security logics such as (de)politicisation.⁵⁵ What these practices of security do is to reinforce the idea that security is not an objective condition or stasis—it is a subjective process or dynamic; security in this context is a movement. The first security movement is that of “securitisation”—“meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.⁵⁶ If securitisation is a movement from normal politics to abnormal politics then “desecuritisation” is a movement in the other direction—“the

51. Council of the European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, 6655/7/08, Brussels, 12 November 2012, p. 437, Declaration 13 concerning the common foreign and security policy.

52. European Commission, Communication from the Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Policy”, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004. See discussion in Ian Manners, “As You Like It: European Union Normative Power in the European Neighbourhood Policy”, in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 29–50, at pp. 30–31.

53. European Commission and High Representative of the EU, “Joint Communication”, *op. cit.*

54. Ole Wæver, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community”, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69–118; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *op. cit.*; Thomas Diez and Pertti Joenniemi, “Security and Political Identity in a Globalized Era”, paper for the workshop “Redefining Security”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, Germany, 26–31 March 1999.

55. George Christou, Stuart Croft, Michela Ceccorulli and Sonia Lucarelli, “European Union Security Governance: Putting the ‘Security’ Back in”, *European Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010), pp. 341–359, at pp. 351–352.

56. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere".⁵⁷ The absence of movement from politicisation to securitisation (or vice versa) has been described as "asecurity", which does not necessarily imply an absence of movement—"a]security can always take two forms: either it signifies the absence of securitizations . . . or it is asecurity only within a specific sector, such as the military one, and prompts the move of security into other fields".⁵⁸ Christou et al. suggest that it is also possible to consider both the politicisation and depoliticisation of security as practice beyond the limits of (de)securitisation.⁵⁹ The security practice approach focuses the analysis on an understanding of security as a subjective process characterised by dynamic movement of the political and policy agenda. Thus, when analysing the practice of EU security, bordering and governance policy agenda movements, the focus is on dis-courses that shift the debate out of or into the normal political sphere.

The 2000s saw an extraordinary growth in scholarship arguing that the EU has engaged in some form of securitisation.⁶⁰ However, recent critics of securitisation have also argued that a more informed and nuanced understanding of EU security and non-security policies is needed.⁶¹ Examples of this latter approach include the works of Stoian and Stefanova on the EU as a de-securitiser,⁶² as well as works on EU member states and (de)securitisation by Diez and Squire, and Cola's.⁶³ Despite these studies and debates, there is a working assumption in much literature that everything the EU does is securitisation, whether it is security, bordering or governance policies.

By analysing EU discursive practices in counter-terrorist, ENP, AFJS and Internal Security policy areas, it is possible to identify emergent relationships both between security and politics and between borders, security and governance. In the first respect the tense relationship of extraordinary security and normal politics can be seen between combating terrorism and respecting human rights in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy;⁶⁴ between guaranteeing security and respecting fundamental rights in the Stockholm Programme;⁶⁵ and between

57. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

58. Diez and Joenniemi, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

59. Christou et al., *op. cit.*, p. 352.

60. See discussions in Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, *op. cit.*; Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, *Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe's Future* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006); Rens van Munster, *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Oz Hassan, "Constructing Crises, (In)securitising Terror: The Punctuated Evolution of EU Counter-Terror Strategy", *European Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010), pp. 445–466.

61. See, for example, Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2007), pp. 589–610; and Andrew Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2009), pp. 333–356.

62. Carmen Stoian, "The Benefits and Limitations of European Union Membership as a Security Mechanism", *European Integration*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp. 189–207; Boyka Stefanova, *The Europeanisation of Conflict Resolutions: Regional Integration and Conflicts from the 1950s to the 21st Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).

63. Thomas Diez and Vicki Squire, "Traditions of Citizenship and the Securitisation of Migration in Germany and Britain", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2008), pp. 565–581; Alejandro Cola's, "An Exceptional Response? Security, Development and Civil Society in Spanish Policy after 11-M", *Development and Change*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2010), pp. 313–333.

64. Council of the EU, "Counter-Terrorism Strategy", *op. cit.*, p. 6.

65. Council of the EU, "Stockholm Programme", *op. cit.*, p. 4.

internal security and fundamental rights in the Internal Security Strategy.⁶⁶ Thus while many state-based securitisations took place in the 2000s including, for example, extraordinary renditions,⁶⁷ EU institutions discursively sought to maintain a balance between security and rights.

In the second respect the interlinkage between security, bordering and governance can be seen between economic development, stability and governance across the borders in the 2007 attempt to reform ENP,⁶⁸ and between democracies, economic growth and cross-border links in Catherine Ashton's "New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood".⁶⁹ While it is entirely plausible that such discursive practises are for popular consumption rather than implementation, there is a clear discursive interweaving taking place both prior to and after the Arab uprisings. But what is interesting is the discursive shift away from the emphasis on stability and security, and towards democracy support, economic issues and cross-border cooperation.

In summary, while EU discursive practices in the 2000s have contributed to securitisation of certain policy agendas, there is a question of who security is for; who is the intended audience of securitising/desecuritising speech acts? And how does securitisation link together security, borders and governance? These questions can be answered in a number of ways, taking just three examples focused on democracy, war and individuals. During the period of intense securitisation within EU member states in the early to mid-2000s, there is consistent evidence of EU dis-courses seeking to position normal democratic politics rather than securitise internal and external policies in the extraordinary realm. To illustrate, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy links security to democratic societies,⁷⁰ while the Instrument for Stability seeks to assist democracy in third countries when threatened.⁷¹ At the same time, EU institutional discourses sought to avoid the US securitising discourse of "war on terror" and "state security" by speaking of "counter-terrorism" and "safety of individuals". To illustrate, the 2006 Instrument for Security spoke of "the security and safety of individuals" outside the EU,⁷² while the 2006 Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that as a security threat, "terror-ism is criminal" rather than an act of war.⁷³ Finally, by the late 2000s, EU securitising and desecuritising discourses further shifted away from the state and towards the individual. To illustrate, both the 2008 Review of the Implementation of the ESS

66. European Commission, "The EU Internal Security Strategy: Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe", Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2010) 673 final, Brussels, 22 November 2010, p. 3.

67. European Parliament, "The Results of Inquiries into the CIA's Programme of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Prisons in European States in Light of the New Legal Framework Following the Lisbon Treaty", authors Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, João Soares da Silva and Anja Wiesbrock, Policy Department C—Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 462.456, Brussels, 15 May 2012. See discussion in Manners, "European Union 'Normative Power'", *op. cit.*, p. 411.

68. European Commission, Communication from the Commission, "A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy", COM(2007) 774 final, Brussels, 5 December 2007, p. 3.

69. European Commission and High Representative of the EU, "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy", Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 303 final, Brussels, 25 May 2011, p. 1.

70. Council of the EU, "Counter-Terrorism Strategy", *op. cit.*, p. 6.

71. European Parliament and Council, "Establishing an Instrument for Stability", *op. cit.*, p. 3.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

73. Council of the EU, "Counter-Terrorism Strategy", *op. cit.*, p. 6.

and the 2009 Stockholm Programme suggested that security must “meet the expectations of our citizens” and “respond to a central concern of the peoples”.⁷⁴ These discursive practices suggest that both securitising and desecuritising moves are present in the EU, and also serve the function of linking security discourses to those of bordering third countries and governing democracy.

“Being” Secure

The fifth security dimension is that of “being”—whether we are discussing a form of life (i.e. a person) or an organisation of life (i.e. a state) and whether we are talking about the existence (i.e. life/death) or nature (i.e. understanding of life) of being. This discussion of “being security” is not as metaphysical as we might think, for it involves distinguishing between the subjects or objects of security, as well as the type of security these subjects/objects experience. In terms of the subject/object distinction, studies in international relations tend refer to “referent objects” understood as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”.⁷⁵ In contrast, socio-logical studies prefer to refer to “referent subjects” understood as “the human individual, who is the proper focus, and can be the only subject, of security policy”.⁷⁶ This distinction is important because of the role of subjectivity and objectification in the study of security, as Ken Booth and Lene Hansen have made clear.⁷⁷

Secondly, in terms of existential/ontological distinction, studies in international relations tend to refer to “existential security” understood as the survival of “a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)”.⁷⁸ Again in contrast, sociological studies refer to “ontological security” understood as “confidence or trust that the natural worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity”.⁷⁹ This distinction is important because although the existential security of referent subjects/objects may be achieved, the “forces of liberalisation and modernisation [may] produce social and economic dislocation as well as personal uncertainty and insecurity” which could threaten ontological security thereby motivating violence and conflict.⁸⁰ Thus “being secure” involves the achievement of ontological security, whether amongst conflict groups,⁸¹ or

74. Solana, “RIESS”, *op. cit.*, p. 2; Council of the EU, “Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

75. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

76. Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 87.

77. Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17 (1991), pp. 319–320; and Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

78. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

79. Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 50, 375.

80. Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalizing Identity: Knowledge, Self and Power in Transition”, presented at the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), 22nd Annual Scientific Meeting, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 18–21 July 1999.

81. Catarina Kinnvall, “Nationalism, Religion and the Search for Chosen Traumas: Comparing Sikh and Hindu Identity Constructions”, *Ethnicities*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), pp. 79–102; Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism”, *op. cit.*; Catarina Kinnvall, *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security* (London: Routledge, 2009).

amongst European diplomats.⁸² The “being secure” approach draws analytical attention to the extent to which it is possible to distinguish between subjective/ objective and existential experiences in the security, bordering and governance discourses in the EU. Thus, when analysing the “being” discourses of these three EU policy agendas, the focus is on discourses that suggest subjectivity or objectification, and/or existential or ontological experiences.

This final dimension of analysis presents a central challenge for the EU to achieve security in a sustainable fashion, which ensures peace rather than securitisation, and highlights the need to ensure ontological security among those implicated in European integration. A number of scholars have examined onto-logical security in Europe, including work on the EU (Manners), peace studies (Roe), security communities (Adler and Greve), and on political psychology (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking).⁸³ Since 2003, existential and ontological concerns have increasingly co-existed alongside each other in the discourses of the EU’s external actions. The European Commission’s 2003 *The EU and the UN: The Choice of Multilateralism* suggested that both EU and UN multilateralism should address issues at the “intersection of the development and security agendas”.⁸⁴ In parallel, Javier Solana’s 2003 ESS stated that “security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda”.⁸⁵ These two examples illustrate the discursive construction of EU existential and ontological security concerns lying at the intersection or nexus of development and security policies. Interestingly, a similar discourse was to be found in the UN Secretary General’s 2005 report, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All”: “we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed”.⁸⁶

Following these EU and UN discourses, the 2005 “European Consensus on Development” further wove together existential and ontological concerns by saying that “without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable

82. Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2006), pp. 341–370; Jennifer Mitzen, “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 270–285.

83. Ian Manners, *European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 5/2002; Paul Roe, “The Value of Positive Security”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2008), pp. 777–794; Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, “When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, No. s.1 (2009), pp. 59–84; Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, *The Political Psychology of Globalization: Muslims in the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

84. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism”, COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003, p. 13.

85. Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

86. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All”, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, A/59/2005, New York, 21 March 2005, p. 6.

peace will occur”.⁸⁷ Similarly, in humanitarian crisis assistance, the 2006 “Instrument for Stability” sets out how stable conditions for human and economic development, and peace, security and stability co-exist as both ontological and existential concerns. The Council conclusions of the November 2007 Meeting on Security and Development reiterate this discursive linking to the level of a mantra: “the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2005 European Consensus on Development acknowledge that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace”.⁸⁸

By the time of the 2008 review of the ESS, EU discourse linking the security and development nexus in this way had become almost standardised, following exactly the language of the European Consensus: “As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace”.⁸⁹ The Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 2009 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development identified this discourse: “no one questions anymore the importance of security for development and the role that development plays for pre-venting conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and for accompanying crisis management through protective, confidence-building and crisis-alleviating measures. The security development nexus has been firmly established in the EU’s political priorities”.⁹⁰ Finally, the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU in 2010 reinforced the discourse: “the Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustain-able development”.⁹¹

In sum, the “being secure” approach illustrates how the 2000s have seen the discursive interlinkage strengthen between existential and ontological concerns found at the nexus of development and security issues. Equally important, the approach encourages asking subjective/objective questions about who or what is being secured, bordered or governed. As some of these brief illustrations of EU external actions show, the security – development nexus is also important in terms of existential – ontological “being”. Furthermore, the discursive construction

87. European Consensus, Joint Declaration by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the Development Policy of the European Union entitled “The European Consensus”, 20 December 2005, *Official Journal of the EU*, C 46 (24 February 2006), p. 14. See discussions of “sustainable peace” in Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered”, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–195; Manners, “European Union ‘Normative Power’”, *op. cit.*, pp. 414–417; and Ian Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Strategy for Sustainable Peace”, in Volker Rittberger and Martina Fischer (eds.), *Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organisations, States and Non-State Actors* (Stuttgart: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2008), pp. 130–151.

88. Council of the EU, Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council of 20 November 2007 (doc. 15097/07), p. 2.

89. Solana, “RIESS”, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

90. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report from the Commission to the Council, EU 2009 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, SEC (2009) 1137 final, p. 78.

91. ACP-EU Ministerial Meeting, Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement—Consolidated Agreed Texts, Brussels, 11 March 2010, article 11.

of the security – development nexus has implications for the bordering and governance of targeted third countries. While the security – development nexus discourse is primarily targeted at ACP states, as we have seen over the past decade of ENP, there are also bordering implications for neighbouring third countries. Thirteen neighbouring states are recipients of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) development assistance, the largest being Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine. Similarly, seven Mediterranean ENP states are also recipients of OECD-DAC development assistance, the largest being Palestine, Egypt and Morocco. During 2000 – 2005, development assistance to most of these neighbouring countries had shifted from the economic to the social sector, primarily focused on government and civil society.⁹² Hence by 2005 the EU security – development nexus discourse was likely to be having a direct consequence through the development assistance strategies targeted at government and civil society in the EU's 20 neighbouring countries—an illustration of the interweaving of existential and ontological experiences in the security, bordering and governance of third countries.

Conclusion: Security, Bordering and Governance

The article has developed five dimensions of security in order to offer differing perspectives capable of making sense of EU security, bordering and governance. Each of the five dimensions included a conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dimension, as well as a brief reflection on the EU's discursive practices and what they mean for the interactions between security, bordering and governance. The analytical focus of each discussion was on the discursive agendas and techniques intended to secure the EU from regional and global concerns as they emerged throughout the 2000s.

Although each dimension was only able to briefly capture and illustrate small aspects of much larger undercurrents of EU strategies and policies, they do provide a means of inserting security analysis into the study of the EU which is increasingly compartmentalised in highly specific policy fields such as JHA/ AFSJ, ENP or CFSP/CSDP. The discussion of broadening security looked at the widening of the EU agenda of what threats and issues to study. What that analysis showed was the way in which the post-Cold War agenda of globalisation in the 1990s became interrelated with that of post-9/11 concerns with terrorism in JHA/AFSJ, as well as post-2004 issues of ENP relations with the EU's neighbour-hood. The discussion of deepening security looked at the development of the EU agenda of new referent objects to study. In this analysis the 2000s witnessed the development of the concept of human security as a means of moving the focus of concern beyond the state and towards more human concerns.

The discussion of thickening security looked at the consequences of moving the method of EU policy analysis from definition to concept to thick signifier. In this third illustrative analysis, the 2000s were characterised by an increasing thickening of both the EU understanding of the policy agenda and the method of analysing this agenda, leading to a broader, more long-term and more holistic understanding of EU security, bordering and governance discourses. The

92. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Aid Statistics 2012, available: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/>. (accessed 17 March 2013).

discussion of the practice of security identified the consequences of understanding security as a more dynamic, subject process than had previously been assumed. Here the analysis looked at the tensions between securitising and desecuritising dynamics and discourse of EU policies in the age of the US “war on terror”. Finally, the discussion of “being secure” looked at ways of distinguishing between subject/object and existential/ontological EU policy experiences. In this final illustrative analysis, discourses of sustainable peace at the security – development nexus were briefly considered in order to understand how EU security, bordering and governance processes were constructed in both the neighbour-hood and in relations with developing countries.

These five analyses suggest that the dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, practice and being can all contribute to a more expansive understanding of how EU security in the 2000s has been related to bordering and governance processes, and how these have been increasingly interwoven within the EU. Furthermore, the five dimensions illustrate how security, bordering and governance have been increasingly interwoven by the EU in multilateral settings. The five dimensions thus provide a means of understanding and rethinking the complex and multilayered EU policy agenda in the interstices of globalising, multilateralising and multipolarising international policy processes. However, what these lines of reasoning also suggest is that for those implicated in the EU, the discursive practices of security, bordering and governance are both interrelated and contingent on the context of neighbouring peoples, freeing mobilities and global struggle, as seen in the Arab uprisings. In this sense the analytical approach of this European [security] Union situates security, bordering and governance in a deeply interdependent global context. Here then lie the many potential contradictions of the deeply interdependent patterns of security, bordering and governance at the nexus of this European [security] Union.