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The anti-corruption industry: from movement to institution

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This article describes the concept of ‘industry’, often used pejoratively in critiques of international development, and applies it to the field of anti-corruption. The characteristics of the anti-corruption industry, including anti-corruptionist discourse, resemble that which has taken place in development aid, human rights, civil society and gender equality. The anti-corruption industry thus includes key global actors, secondary actors who look for ‘signals’ and an apparatus of understandings, knowledge, statistics and measures, all of which tend to prioritise anti-corruption institutions over anti-corruption activism. It is argued that the questionable impact of anti-corruption programmes enables the anti-corruption industry to coexist along with the corruption it ostensibly is combating. Instead of viewing anti-corruption as hegemonic, we need to critically examine the consequences of the global institutionalisation of anti-corruptionist discourse and anti-corruption practice.

Keywords: corruption; anti-corruption; anti-corruptionism; anti-corruption industry

Introduction

All the articles in this issue of *Global Crime* focus on one major issue: how was an anti-corruption regime established in the emerging democracies of post-socialist Europe? As outlined in the introduction, they describe interactions between local civil society, national policy elites and international pressures. The questions, then, are several: to what degree was there a national political will to fight corruption in these countries? And, to what degree was anti-corruption imposed upon them? What incentives were offered, pressures employed or norms adopted for anti-corruption to enter the policy agenda in post-socialist Europe? What was *happening* in these countries that enabled some civil society actors to be heard, a voice which presumably led governments to prioritise corruption? Or in some cases, why did governments who were normally *not* pressured by civil society nevertheless enact anti-corruption policies?

Theories of cultural globalisation, as developed by anthropologists and others, are of relevance to these fundamental issues. Such theories try to explain why certain practices, tastes or value systems can move from one society to another; in some cases, these practices are enthusiastically accepted by local cultures (American hip-hop among European youth, Protestant evangelism in Africa), whereas in other cases they can be bitterly resisted (electoral democracy). Researchers in cultural diffusion describe various intermediate states of ‘hybridity’ or ‘creolisation’.¹ In Indonesia, for example, a study of a forest protection movement shows how external or universal discourses about ‘rights’ and ‘protecting nature’

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1. Ulf Hannerz, ‘Notes on the Global Ecumene’, *Public Culture* 1 (1989): 66–75.

are appropriated by local actors for their own local projects.² In a manner similar to that of environmental protection, anti-corruption discourse presents itself as a global movement, circulating in a rarefied space of international conventions and platforms. As a global discourse, anti-corruption can embrace local communities, national governments in North and South, international organisations, civil society and an enlightened private sector into a common project. Anti-corruption now appears as an idea whose time has come. But why this idea? And, why at this particular time? What is it that makes an otherwise diverse set of international and local actors coalesce into what seems to be a single project? *Why is anti-corruption 'hot'?*

I argue in this article that we need to view anti-corruption not simply as an idea but as a complex of resources. These resources are knowledge, people, money and symbols. Together they operate as a complex of practices that I call 'anti-corruptionism'. Today, we can identify a conglomeration of activities carried out by governments, intergovernmental organisations, private sector actors, NGOs, media and citizens, which take the form of 'campaigns' or programmes. Anti-corruption activities have now institutionalised themselves into what some scholars would call an 'anti-corruption regime'. The resources, rhetoric and organisational interests of the anti-corruption regime now lead an existence independent of the actual phenomenon of corruption itself. Anti-corruptionism now projects itself onto the global landscape as a series of policies, regulations, initiatives, conventions, training courses, monitoring activities and programmes to enhance integrity and improve public administration. In short, anti-corruption has become an 'industry'.

The purpose of this article is to describe the implications of anti-corruption as an industry. Every industry brings with it a new language, a new way of thinking about the world, a new discourse. I call this discourse 'anti-corruptionism'. Anti-corruptionism lies behind the hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of projects, and dozens of anti-corruption agencies pursuing anti-corruption agendas. Anti-corruptionism is articulated in the key international conventions, national laws, regulations, NGOs platforms, training sessions, congresses, meetings, measurement tools and statistical indicators, which comprise the anti-corruption industry.

Anti-corruptionism is a complex ideology. It is a set of postulates about what corruption is, how it emerges, why it needs to be controlled, and how to control it. Like other discourses, anti-corruptionism is not about absolute truths but about the unstated limits on questioning these truths. There are controversies, of course: anti-corruptionism is full of debates about the precise definition of corruption, and whether corruption is a cause or effect of poverty, and whether corruption is a cause or effect of state inefficiency. That corruption is a 'global issue', however, is not a subject of debate. The controversies within anti-corruptionist discourse help to consolidate the anti-corruption industry. The purpose of this paper is to outline the elements of the anti-corruption industry, and to show its implications for actually reducing corruption. The goal of 'reducing corruption', 'fighting' or 'preventing' corruption is not as clear-cut as may seem. Since corruption itself is a slippery concept, summarising a whole gamut of attitudes and practices, the concept of an 'anti-corruption intervention', may be similarly difficult. These difficulties are indicative of the main feature of the anti-corruption industry: its ongoing expansion at the same time as so few anti-corruption programmes actually reduce corruption. The anti-corruption juggernaut marches on.

2. Anna Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connections* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Why 'industry'?

The term 'industry' is normally used with respect to manufacturing or to refer to a specific branch of business (e.g. 'the advertising industry'). Used in other contexts, the term 'industry' is a pejorative. To talk about the 'anti-corruption industry', then, is to describe the institutional investment made in solving a problem. In a policy context, a successful industry expands: it maintains a problem on the policy agenda, attracting ever more attention and resources. The anti-corruption industry resembles its forerunners in the development industry, the human rights industry, the civil society/NGO industry or the 'rescue industry' that tries to save prostitutes from trafficking. As this article is being written, we are witnessing the consolidation of a 'climate change industry' (understood as those who want to 'do something' to inhibit man-made global warming).

Here I would like to take the word 'industry' seriously, discussing what features characterise such an 'industry' and how it might evolve, flourish or collapse. In economic history, our industrial society evolved out of a simpler 'craft-based' economy. Industrial society replaced agrarian society, and industrial organisation is usually considered having replaced something we call 'craft'. Many of us, when perturbed by the dysfunctions of industry, even suffer from 'craft nostalgia'.

Economic historians have endeavoured to identify the forces that gave us industrial development. In the world of anti-corruption, a world which I study as an anthropologist,³ I have tried to isolate those forces which spawned the anti-corruption industry. What made anti-corruption 'hot' over the past decade? It is this perspective that I will offer in this article, on the background of the myriad of studies of anti-corruption initiatives that have taken place in the former Soviet block countries over the last 20 years, and especially in the last decade with EU enlargement.

It would be convenient to swiftly dismiss anti-corruptionism as a smokescreen for some kind of insidious neoliberal agenda.⁴ The sudden embrace of anti-corruptionism, by major transnational corporations, with its accompanying rhetoric of corporate social responsibility, transparency, integrity and accountability is indeed remarkable. Yet the participation of transnational corporations in anti-corruption work does not necessarily make it some kind of capitalist plot. Anti-corruption practices often make life harder for transnational corporations, and in addition, there is a genuine alarm in the private sector to do something about exorbitant amounts of bribe-taking and waste in the developing world. We are still left with the question of why the private sector has taken on corruption-fighting as a priority.

We might also explain the rise of corruption in terms of bureaucratic self-interest. In this perspective, corruption becomes yet another issue that these interest groups can use to sustain themselves. Various organisations, associations or NGOs seem to benefit in exaggerating the extent of corruption and their need for more anti-corruption programmes, in order to obtain access to funds or staff. This explanation of self-interest suffers from two weaknesses. First, it does not explain why the particular discourse of anti-corruptionism

3. Steven Sampson, 'Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Southeast Europe: Landscapes and Sites', in *Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors*, ed. Luís de Sousa, Peter Larmour, and Barry Hindess (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 168–86. Steven Sampson, 'Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anticorruption Movement in the Balkans', in *Understanding Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. Dieter Haller and Chris Shore (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 103–30.

4. Barry Hindess, 'Anti-Corruption as a Risk to Democracy: On the Unintended Consequences of International Anti-Corruption Campaigns', in *Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors*, ed. Luís de Sousa, Peter Larmour, and Barry Hindess (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 19–32.

has come to the forefront in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nor does it explain the unified character of the anti-corruption industry. The anti-corruption industry does not contain a single dominant actor, but a whole gamut of them, each with their own interests, strategies and world views. Here we concentrate on what it is that unites them. How was this unified character achieved? How were these diverse interests (states, global regimes, market actors, civil society) forged into a single anti-corruption industry?

This article will therefore constitute a preliminary attempt to sketch out the anti-corruption industry and to describe what might be called the tenets of anti-corruptionism. It applies firstly to Eastern Europe, the region that Leslie Holmes called 'rotten states'.⁵ By any measure, the post-Soviet transition countries were not the most corrupt states in the world. However, their transition from isolated, state-managed economies into democracies with uncontrolled privatisation, a history of suspicion between citizens and the state and the context of EU accession pressures gave them special characteristics that made them the birthplace of the anti-corruption industry. Hence, Eastern Europe and the Balkans constitute a fruitful point of orientation for understanding how the global anti-corruption industry has evolved.⁶ In the third world, those countries with natural resources (Africa) or major markets (China, India) or both (Russia) were less affected by pressures to conform to European anti-corruption regimes. Nevertheless, they, too, have adopted much of the rhetoric of anti-corruptionism.

In highlighting the key features of the 'anti-corruption industry', my goal here is to identify those points where anti-corruptionist discourse was created and sustained, as well as those moments when we should be critically interrogating the concept of anti-corruption.

A critical interrogation of anti-corruptionism is necessary because, like other policy issues such as global crime, anti-corruption has a fundamental problem. It is the problem of impact: deciphering whether the resources used for anti-corruption actually affect the phenomenon it is intended to reduce. Any kind of policy intervention is supposed to produce some kind of change. Anti-corruption practices are supposed to reduce corruption. The issue of impact, or of measuring impact, is common in all areas of policy formation and implementation. Insofar as policies have goals – increasing employment, reducing HIV/AIDS, achieving a cleaner environment, reducing crime, preventing corruption – this requires a whole set of practices to achieve these goals. Measuring impact requires agreement on what phenomenon is to be observed, a system of gathering data and coding observations, and an interpretation of what these observations 'mean'. Measuring the impact of a policy requires baseline data, or to use the more popular word, 'evidence'. Clearly, some impacts are easier to observe, classify and measure than others. On the other hand, some policy interventions may have unintended impacts. Anti-bribery campaigns, for example, may cause bribe transactions to become more sophisticated or hidden, without actually reducing the amount of cash that changes hands. Corruption awareness campaigns often lead to an increase in

5. Leslie Holmes, *Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism, and Neoliberalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

6. See note 3 on anti-corruption in the Balkans, as well as M. Tisne and S. Smilov, 'From the Ground Up: Assessing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance in Southeastern Europe. Budapest Center for European Police Studies', http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_pravo/wp-anticorruption.a1.pdf (accessed November 10, 2009). This paper is based on a long-term perusal of certain key sources, as well as on my own involvement with civil society development, democracy export and anti-corruption research and training. In particular I have been studying the anti-corruption movement associated with Transparency International (TI) and anti-corruptionism in Eastern Europe, where I have expertise. In Scandinavia, where I live (Denmark) and work (Sweden), I have also participated in a variety of anti-corruption and TI-related activities.

perceived corruption (according to surveys) even though actual corruption levels may not have changed. One of the features of the anti-corruption industry, therefore, is the parallel 'careers' of corrupt practices and anti-corruption measures.

Corruption and global crime

Global crime and corruption are connected. The smuggling, arms trafficking, money laundering, drug trade and other illegal entrepreneurial activities of global crime would be inconceivable without the involvement of corrupt officials at the customs checkpoints, financial agencies, contracting boards or police, any of whom may receive payments for looking the other way.

What makes anti-corruption relevant for those interested in global crime is that both crime and corruption are more than just issues of gathering data, deciphering trends and setting up units to 'coordinate' measures. Behind the issues of policy, strategy and resources lie moral projects and cultural worldviews. Anti-corruptionism connotes the idea of a global moral project to compel states to be more transparent, to keep officials honest, and to reward integrity; hence the stated need to build a 'culture of anti-corruption', a term that now yields 1.5 million hits on Google.⁷ The issue of global organised crime carries similar moral and cultural implications that go beyond the problem of preventing illegal imports or making states more secure. Policy discussions on crime and corruption take on moral overtones. Everyone – state leaders, private sector and oppositional NGOs – are against global organised crime and corruption. Even the most authoritarian states have their anti-corruption campaigns and commissions.

In their transnational scale and spider-web penetration into the most benign areas of society, both corruption and organised crime have become global security issues. As a result of their security threats and border-crossing character, both crime and corruption are now objects of international measures that attempt to assess, control and reduce them. Incentives are offered to states or governments to take action: cheaper loans, better credit ratings and promises of entry into international organs or the EU club. There are conditionalities or even penalties for not doing something about crime or corruption. There are appeals to governments for political will, and for more trust between citizens and their governments. Citizens and governments must be made to understand that crime and corruption 'hurts everyone'. Hence, the need for 'awareness-raising' campaigns. At the national level, there is the usual complement of strategies, policies, laws, measures and establishment of independent agencies to fight crime and corruption. Bureaucratic agencies require ever more documentation: surveying, defining and assessing incidents of crime or corruption in, say, the customs service or procurement. Since measuring corruption and organised crime is notoriously difficult, both because they are illegal and because the concepts themselves are slippery, it generates political discussion about the effectiveness of anti-corruption or anti-crime campaigns. Government, political opposition, civil society groups and international donors make claims and counterclaims, so that both issues become politicised.

This scenario above provides the background for the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, and it has parallels in the 'struggle against global organised crime'. It is a trajectory of events that has occurred before, in the field of international development, human rights, environmental protection, sex trafficking, children's rights, or conflict resolution. A previously limited or esoteric problem becomes an area of public concern, moral campaigning

7. The phrase 'culture of corruption' generated 4.5 million 'hits' on google.com (accessed December 31, 2009), plus an additional 545,000 hits for a 2009 book by Michelle Malkin about the Obama administration also entitled *Culture of Corruption* (Washington: Regnery Publishers).

and policy initiatives. Coalitions are formed between previously hostile actors (grassroots NGOs, government agencies, international organs, private companies).

Both anti-corruption and global crime-fighting are 'industries'. They bring together international initiatives, governmental programmes and civil society advocacy. The goal is to get as many actors 'on board' as possible. Such industries become institutionalised policy areas, with associated organisations, conferences, conventions, secretariats, and the usual academic discussions over concepts, measurement, progress, and above all, impact.

Industrial systems produce products in what appears to be an orderly, efficient way. But behind the assembly line (or today, behind the Policy Paper or web portal) are grey zones where issues are debated and strategies ironed out. These academic discussions often revolve around basic definitions. In almost all such industries, including those of 'transnational organised crime' and 'corruption', the phenomena itself are subject to definitional debates. While discussions often bring to mind the most typical practices (bribes, money-laundering, etc.), there is invariably a dilemma of whether activity X is or is not corruption, whether this measurement tool is actually measuring 'corruption' or something else.⁸ This slippery definition can be 'hidden' as the industry emerges. In studying the anti-corruption industry, we can begin to understand how institutional actors and organisations 'combat' a phenomenon that remains difficult to define and to measure. The parallel with pornography ('you know it when you see it') comes to mind here. The slippery character and the moral aspects are what make corruption and global crime difficult policy issues. In measuring the impact of all the myriad programmes, conventions, laws, commission and projects, the irony of the anti-corruption industry is that despite the universal appeals to transparency made on government and private business, and despite the technologies of transparency, such as the Internet or the Wikileaks, 'corruption' (however defined) seems to be more prevalent than ever. If this is true, then we need to understand not only the problem of corruption, but also why the now vibrant anti-corruption industry seems to lead a life of its own. We need to understand how anti-corruptionism can persist *alongside* corruption. Perhaps the 'industry' concept can help us in this understanding.

The anti-corruption industry

The practices of corruption – bribery, nepotism, clientelism, etc. – are by nature hidden from view. They are not formally observed or officially recorded. They are, rather, disguised as 'gifts', 'facilitation fees' or 'networking'. Solutions to the problem of corruption involve not simply new laws and regulations, but a new awareness and engagement on the part of officials and citizens. Changes in attitude take longer and are difficult to identify, so it is difficult to determine whether programmes to combat corruption actually have much of an impact. Judgements about impact lead to the politics of anti-corruption. The political struggle involves inflating the severity of the problem in order to obtain more resources to combat it and publicising exaggerated success statistics to demonstrate political will. With our 'trust in numbers'⁹ as value-free, abstract measures, there is a constant problem of accurately measuring statistically slippery phenomena such as 'crime' or 'corruption', not to mention interpreting these data. In the area of corruption, the most widely used measure is the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which measures

8. See Holmes, *Rotten States?* or especially Charles Sampford, Arthur Shackock, Carmel Connors, and Frederik Galtung, eds., *Measuring Corruption* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

9. Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

experts' opinions of how much corruption they believe exists in a given country. Such opinions say little about actual corrupt practices. Other indices, for example, those which measure whether or not a country's parliament has ratified a convention, may be accurate, but irrelevant to the practice of corruption. It is instructive, therefore, to take a step back and assess what it is we are doing when we participate in industries set up to combat undesirable social phenomena such as crime or corruption.

I will begin by outlining some of the characteristics of an 'industry'. We are speaking here of the work of hundreds of specialists, embedded in a myriad of programmes, initiatives and institutions, using hundreds of millions of dollars to combat corruption. The impact of these activities is, at best, unclear. We can only observe that those European countries considered most corrupt – the South-eastern European countries – have the largest number of good governance/public administration reform/anti-corruption programmes.

Let me start with a description of the phenomenon of corruption and the efforts to define it.

What is corruption?

Robert Harris¹⁰ has emphasised the academic dilemma of researching corruption: 'We [reject] the possibility of a unitary definition of corruption: it is such a variegated activity that a single sentence could not encapsulate it, while a comprehensive definition would . . . have too many qualifications to be useful' (p. 199). Nonetheless, Harris defines corruption as the use of public position for private advantage and the subversion of the political process for personal ends. Most descriptions of corruption would typically include solicited or extorted bribery of public officials, nepotism in awarding public goods, contracts or jobs and 'borderline' practices such as inflated facilitation payments made by foreign companies to officials or misuse/embezzlement of public funds by officials. Conventional understandings of corruption tend to focus on collusion between a public official and a citizen who desires or needs a service. Virtually all definitions of corruption highlight the contrast between a public official's formal duties and their private interests or allegiances. In its most generalised form, corruption is simply a breach of any sort of public trust or mandate. Corruption can thus take place within a private company (the trust of shareholders breached by the CEO), in an NGO (members' trust breached by the NGO project manager), or an aid donor in some kind of partnership (the aid donor's trust breached by a dishonest government 'partner'). With corruption now possible in domains beyond the sphere of public administration, it means that the total amount of corruption has increased because the concept is now inflated. Corruption is now potentially possible in any organisation of entrusted power (private firms, government, NGOs, international organisations). Corruption need not be collusion, insofar as it may be the work of a single individual, as in cases of fraud or embezzlement. Purely due to this semantic inflation, then, there is simply more corruption 'out there' than previously thought. Finally, the inflation of corruption also reflects a problem of scale. Corruption is now transnational, insofar as foreign donors, Western firms, local NGOs, local governments and local firms can interact in complex transnational relations of cooperation, partnership, sub-contracting and corruption. Accountability can thus be breached at various links in this chain. Corruption is now more than just the speed payment to a corrupt traffic cop, customs official or government bureaucrat. Insofar as it also includes corrupt heads of state and secret bank accounts, its impact can

10. Robert Harris, *Political Corruption: In and Beyond the Nation State* (London: Routledge, 2003).

be measured in the billions of dollars. The problem, however, is that much corruption cannot be measured, since it consists of networking/nepotistic practices that give intangible benefits. Of importance here, however, is that these complexities of conceptualising corruption may be both a cause and an effect of the now vibrant anti-corruption industry.

Characteristics of the anti-corruption industry

The following list summarises the distinguishing characteristics of a generic 'industry' as defined here. By 'generic' is meant that it could apply to many kinds of moral projects or policies – development, trafficking, climate, etc. The listing of features is roughly chronological (the industry 'evolved'), but it would be more accurate to say that these characteristics tend to evolve in synergistic fashion. For each item, I then provide an example specifically from the anti-corruption industry.

- (1) There exists, initially, an articulated grassroots concern, in which a politician or media story highlights a specific case or issue. In the case of corruption it is generally something of a 'scandal', a major open breach of trust. 'Fighting corruption' emerges as a priority among several major policy actors, seemingly at the same time.
- (2) A variety of initiatives are taken and 'measures' enacted to set up a framework for dealing with the issue. These measures include (a) declarations of intent or statements of 'commitments', (b) signing of agreements and conventions, (c) efforts to enforce or monitor these commitments/agreements by governmental and non-governmental actors, and (d) setting up of civil society monitoring coalitions. In the anti-corruption field, key governmental and intergovernmental organs are the Global Compact and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and in civil society organisations such as TI, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the UNCAC coalition (an advocacy group pressing for stricter adherence to the UN Convention against Corruption).
- (3) The policy area takes on institutional autonomy, with specific organs, office and bureaus established to deal with the problem. The problem becomes its own budget line. Those organs with the largest budget lines (World Bank, UNDP, USAID, OECD, EU, the UK foreign assistance unit DFID) become the major actors. Bureaucratic interests develop to sustain or expand budgets by expanding, mainstreaming or exaggerating the definition of the problem and including ever more areas of concern. In the 'anti-corruption' field, for example, we obtain new policy areas: 'corruption and crime', 'corruption and security', 'corruption and climate', etc.
- (4) A diverse group of secondary actors emerge who seek to influence the major actors by 'pushing' certain issues or priorities. These secondary actors include Western European bilateral aid agencies, donor foundations searching for new areas of concern, major NGOs and large consulting firms seeking to expand their activities. These secondary actors are at once donors, recipients of aid funds, stewards of funds, implementers of programmes and advocates for certain priorities. Hence, they may be combining fundraising activities with project management, being ever more integrated with the major policy decision-makers.
- (5) A corpus of key texts emerges to which everyone pays reference, most especially the international or regional conventions. These declarations are invoked at international gatherings, meetings, ritual celebrations (10 years since passing of Convention X) and in formulating new initiatives. Typically, the documents are broad on principle, whereas measures for monitoring and implementation are less

clear and subject to further negotiation. What took place in the areas of human rights, development aid, women's equality and environmental protection has now been replicated in the field of anti-corruption. Key UN, OECD or European conventions are followed up by various monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Getting countries to ratify or fulfil their commitments to these conventions is now seen as a key tool for fighting corruption.

- (6) An array of tools and indicators is developed to measure, assess and evaluate the extent of the phenomenon and the effectiveness of policy measures (in this case, measuring corruption and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures). These tools and methods, called 'diagnostics', become abstract, complex, standardised and comparable across countries and sectors. Qualitative, intensive studies keyed to specific situations or countries are downgraded in favour of standardised, context-free methods. The issue of quality of baseline data (measuring corruption levels in, say, Burma or North Korea) is downgraded in favour of comparable statistical measures and rankings that can be easily 'crunched'. 'Diagnostics' becomes a branch in itself, accessible only to specialists. Various actors attempt to make their indicators the standards of the industry. In the anti-corruption industry, for example, the comprehensive World Bank Governance Indicators competes with the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the TI Bribe Payers Index, the Global Corruption Barometer, the Freedom House index, the TI CPI and the more qualitative country studies of Global Integrity.¹¹
- (7) The major players who dominate the discourse – be they governmental, multilateral, private-sector or NGO – can effectively marginalise those who question the conventional approaches, or even limiting grassroots input. These players coordinate with each other, harmonising their terminologies, statistical categories, understandings and view of appropriate solutions. Meanwhile, the initial grassroots 'movement' behind the problem evolves into more professional activities. Staff and personnel also become more professional and stable. Civil society leaders, government aid specialists and business leaders become more comfortable with each other, sharing similar perspectives, strategies and tactics. Deciphering 'donor priorities' and strategic fundraising becomes a key field of action for civil society organisations. In the anti-corruption industry, the governments within the UNCAC monitoring mechanism have succeeded in eliminating NGO input and country inspections. In the NGO sector, TI is administering its own Integrity Analysis of 27 European countries, with funds from the EU. The study is to contain the same kinds of data, gathered in the same way, from Sweden to Macedonia, from Hungary to the United Kingdom. Anti-corruption grassroots organisations, often loose affiliations of activists, now evolve into coalitions and organisations.
- (8) Knowledge about the phenomenon, its causes, consequences and remedies is systematised into knowledge regimes in which academics, specialist training, and project implementation overlap. Academic specialists move in and out of policy implementation areas, while policy specialists receive certified training in areas such as Governance, Project Management, risk assessment or CSR. A cadre of specialists emerges, whose major talent is to determine donors' priorities. In the case of anti-corruption, there is now a whole retinue of specialists, trainers, project managers,

11. See Sampford, Shackock, Connors, and Galtung, *Measuring Corruption*, for a fuller discussion of these measures.

diagnosticians, centring around foreign aid, public administration reform and private sector CSR. Anti-corruption knowledge banks have emerged, such as the U4 group of European foreign ministries, the World Bank's <http://www.fighting-corruption.org>, TI's Research and Policy unit, and the Business Anti-corruption Portal. These data banks contain risk assessments, project evaluations, and the inevitable catalogues of 'lessons learned' and 'best practices'. TI, for example, assists anti-corruption activists with its Corruption Fighters Toolkit, Global Integrity assists aid professionals with its Country Assessments, the Danish Global Advice Network, financed by several European foreign aid ministries, assists businesses with information about corruption, the OECD offers information for government actors, the U4 assists European development aid organs, and the Internet Center for Corruption Research offers anti-corruption training.

- (9) A standardised, 'industrial' terminology develops in which key terms, problems and solutions are framed and understood. In the field of anti-corruption, for example, this terminology refers to types of corruption, understandings about the causes of corruption, extent, impact, the need for broad solutions and coalitions, the use of sanctions, and about the urgency of the corruption problem. One of these understandings, for example, is that it is possible to change people's corrupt practices if the right 'tools' are found. And the tools include a package of structural reforms, openness, enforcement, and raising awareness that corruption is bad, including bad for business. Among anti-corruption activists, TI has now developed a Plain Language Guide so that its members understand the phenomenon they are dealing with.
- (10) The industry produces a standardised product (of knowledge, measures, activities), which is then marketed by major actors as absolutely essential. Clients for the package – countries, municipalities, private sector associations or firms – are those seeking entry into key associations (EU, chambers of commerce), those who need credit worthiness, those who want additional foreign assistance, or those who do not want to lose these resources for lack of compliance. The anti-corruption industry, for example, produces an 'anti-corruption package', which some governments 'purchase' only reluctantly. The 'customer' (Romania prior to EU accession, for example) may lack 'political will' or may never really 'come on board', but they are compelled to accept the package anyway. The marketing of the package may be stimulated by a combination of external pressures, a trusted local 'champion', a public relations campaign ('raising awareness') and 'capacity building' among those clients who now see the value of the package (or the consequences of not accepting it). In the anti-corruption field, for example, the establishment of anti-corruption agencies and commissions, with the accompanying foreign consultants and advisors and the continuing training, is one such trajectory.¹²
- (11) Various actors attempt to expand the industry so as to overlap or include neighbouring industries. The expansion can take place by linking previously separate policy areas ('corruption and climate', 'corruption and gender', 'corruption and

12. Nicholas Charron, *Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-Corruption Agencies: A New Dataset*, <http://anorage-net.org/index.jsp?page=documents&id=82> (accessed December 14, 2009); John R. Heilbrunn, *Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?* (World Bank Institute, 2004). Stock No. 37234, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2009); 'Local Anti-Corruption Agencies: Pros and Cons', U4, <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query141.pdf> (accessed December 1, 2009).

- post-conflict aid', 'corruption and human rights') or by connecting sectors of social activity (corruption and private business, corruption and NGOs). As a result, anti-corruption initiatives that were once limited to international business and corruption in foreign aid have now expanded into issues of environment/climate, water, organised crime, security, sport, and issues of whistle blowing and access to information.
- (12) As the industry comes of age, local initiatives are increasingly tailored to the needs and donor priorities of the major industrial players. Public outreach, fundraising, branding and deciphering the donor landscape all become standard activities in the 'home office' or 'secretariat'. The problem of 'certification' becomes an issue, insofar as local governments or NGOs need to ensure the public and their donors that they are indeed doing what they say they are doing. In the anti-corruption field, based as it is on integrity in public affairs, there have been several scandals or near-scandals in connection with foreign aid to anti-corruption agencies and bogus anti-corruption NGOs. Even TI now has an entire monitoring and certification process to ensure that none of its national chapters abuse the TI brand.
 - (13) The final sign that an industry has come of age is that it spawns an *academic critique*. The critique of the industry poses questions as to its political correctness, adequacy of its programmes, its motives, effectiveness and interests. These critiques of development, humanitarian aid, of NGOs and of democracy promotion, often with a post-structuralist, discourse-analysis perspective, are well known. Yet the critiques tend to dwell on the margins of the industry and do little to substantively alter the established knowledge regimes, techniques or policies. The critique of the anti-corruption industry, for example, has centred on the misuse of the CPI, the lack of impact of anti-corruption programmes and the notion that anti-corruption policies are but a handmaiden of neoliberal capitalism.¹³ These critiques have had little impact on the evolution of the anti-corruption industry.

Today, anti-corruption has arrived. To use a term from feminist theory, anti-corruption is now 'intersectional', touching on a wide variety of issues in different manifestations. Just as feminist scholars (or environmentalists) conceive of no issue that can be free from gender (or environmental) impact or policy relevance, we are now at a stage where all policy issues must now be considered in light of their implications for transparency or potential corruption. Anti-corruption has become a burgeoning industry with hundreds of millions of dollars in project funds, hundreds of anti-corruption professionals and a continuing stream of reports, indicators, conferences, action plans, conventions and evaluations. In the space of a decade, the world has now obtained dozens of national anti-corruption agencies in even the poorest third world countries. There is now a UN Convention against Corruption, a monitoring apparatus, a World Bank anti-corruption unit, a private sector anti-corruption initiative (<http://www.fightingcorruption.org>), a USAID anti-corruption programme and generalised anti-corruption budget lines or programmes in every major West European aid agency. TI leaders are now permanent invitees to Davos and TI's chairperson, Hugette Labelle, can command op-ed pages in major newspapers. The anti-corruption industry is starting to peak.

13. See for example Hindess, 'Anti-Corruption as a Risk to Democracy' or Frederik Galtung, 'Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices' in *Measuring Corruption*, ed. Charles Sampford, Arthur Shackock, Carmel Connors, and Frederik Galtung (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 101–30, and in <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/Galtung%282005%29-boundaries.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2010).

Anti-corruptionist rhetoric, the rhetoric of integrity, accountability and transparency, is present not just in government. The discourse of transparency and openness pervades the private sector, in NGOs, and our universities. A variety of actors are all trying to make the invisible visible (transparency), trying to clarify responsibility (accountability), trying to ensure legitimacy (certification) and providing evidence of good performance (evidence-based evaluation). Anti-corruption programme managers are all trying to get higher rankings, better ratings, and more effective outputs. Like other mature industries, the anti-corruption industry has a small number of major players producing roughly the same product in different mixes: new laws, more monitoring, wider sanctions, more awareness raising, whistleblower protection, ethics management, getting everyone 'on board'. But the complexity of 'corruption' and the inadequacy of measuring short-term impact create frustration, which means that fashions and novelty approaches may suddenly enter the picture. Evaluations and documentation of past corruption initiatives tend to be filed away and overlooked, as the 'wheel' of project design, SWOT analysis¹⁴ and stakeholder analysis is reinvented by each new actor. European aid agencies, for example, are now enacting various 'zero tolerance' policies for their work in countries or aid situations where such codes of conduct may simply not be feasible. The expansion or inflation of the industry leads more actors to be invested in it, and the impetus is for the very meaning of the term 'corruption' to be inflated. Corruption becomes amalgamated with white collar crime, bad judgement, or inefficient management. In the meantime, fighting corruption itself becomes a political issue. One can now accuse opponents not just of being corrupt, but of being slack in the fight against corruption. Accusations of anti-corruption organs as themselves corrupt can now take their place on the political stage.

As the industry matures, we observe the institutionalisation of a policy area, and its derivative regimes of knowledge, funds, organisations, specialists and problems. This creates the foundation for a discourse of anti-corruptionism. Here it is essential to emphasise that the 'industry' itself is not an actor. It does not have its own project or programme, a consolidated ideology nor even its own 'missionaries'. Rather, there are a whole set of actors who both cooperate and compete with each other at the same time. Like traditional industries (think of Big Tobacco or the Big Three Automakers in Detroit), there is cooperation and competition, subcontractors and peripheral players, creative types and cautious managers; there are the disillusioned, the critics and the wannabees. We have an institutional complex containing national and international organs, national aid programmes, ministries and EU directorates, NGOs in the North, consulting firms, donors, private industry and the CSR field, private foundations; and in the South, a set of aid-receiving ministries, erstwhile 'champions of reform' and local NGO coalitions. Dwelling along all this are the media, who can uncover periodic scandals as Northern aid is lost in the South, or can ask, 'Where was the anti-corruption agency?', a question that could not have been asked some years ago.

The development of a comprehensive anti-corruption 'industry' based on both policy and morality, is not unique. The rise of the anti-corruption industry resembles similar developments in development aid, human rights, civil society, women's (now gender) issues, and in environmental (now climate) protection. The trajectory is one where an issue which was formally marginal or unmanageable is 'boxed and packaged' so that it can 'put on the agenda'. If industries are anything, they are 'agenda setters'. Individual or sporadic activism by outsiders is gradually replaced, or enveloped by a process of institutionalisation, standardisation and by a globalised elite discourse that ensures that the issue remains on

14. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, a well-known technique for strategic planning in firms and organizations.

the agenda and obtains its own budget line, even if in revised or 'new improved' form (evidence-based anti-corruption, for instance). Coalitions must be formed so that everyone comes 'on board'. What began as a movement or campaign now becomes organised and institutionalised. Movements become projects. Projects become policies. Governmental and non-governmental actors now emphasise common interests. Additional conventions or amendments are formulated, ratified and monitoring mechanism set up at international or regional levels. Non-governmental actors – private business or NGOs – are brought in and made into 'stakeholders'. The media 'discovers' the issue, as do Hollywood celebrities or the Nobel Peace Prize committee. With new budget priorities from major actors, the secondary players – the think tanks, consulting companies, development aid strategy offices – also begin to rethink their priorities. Anti-corruption is now 'mainstreamed' into previously established programmes or made into a 'crosscutting issue' in foreign policy, competing with already established priorities. The more glamorous, new industry begins to push the other out of the way.

Is the anti-corruption industry different from other industries? Here we might cite one major difference, in that the issue of 'corruption' seems to be less clear, and therefore less amenable to measurement than issues of poverty, literacy, AIDS, environmental degradation, etc. In these other issues there are the well-known polices, commitments, budget lines, parameters, impact measures and critiques. We seem to have more reliable measures of impact: rates of measles, cases of AIDS, or BNP per capita can be measured and assessed more easily, and alternative solutions can be tried out. Assessing and measuring corruption seems to be more problematic, more akin to measuring and assessing 'the informal sector' or 'illegal migration'.

How did this happen?

The anti-corruption industry did not emerge overnight. Indeed, corruption and corruption fighting have been practices and government policies since there have been governments. In 1977, the US Government enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which penalised US corporations for corrupt behaviour in foreign transactions. Governments as diverse as Mexico and China have had anti-corruption programmes and platforms for decades, and foreign leaders in the most authoritarian states have frequently spoken out against abuse of public office or corruption. The struggle over corruption seems to transcend regime type. However, the development of a corruption industry is new. It required a general conclusion that good governance is a precondition for development and a move towards greater openness, accountability and transparency in the affairs of governments and private firms. The demands for transparency are now louder and the penalties for opacity seemingly greater. While some kinds of corruption with impunity are now eliminated, it is unclear whether this means that we have less corruption, or whether corruption has become more sophisticated (bribes could be replaced by nepotism, facilitation payments and consulting fees). What is new over the last decade is some kind of *international consensus about corruption being a major problem* for development. The full story of how this consensus was achieved has yet to be written. We can only observe that driven activists, pressured institutions, and hard-nosed businessmen seem to have come together to put anti-corruption onto the policy agenda.

Every industry has its founders and milestone events. Anti-corruption is no exception. Anti-corruption as an industry begins with two such events, and both are centred around the major institution of third world development, The World Bank. The first is the founding, in 1993 of the NGO TI by a former World Bank official, Peter Eigen, and several colleagues from international development, business and diplomacy. The second is the famous 'cancer

of corruption' speech by World Bank President James Wolfensohn in 1996, in which the agenda of economic development was tied together with the effectiveness of government, leading to new conditions of loans. Tied into these events is a third, general trend in public administration and market-based management, what academics tend to call 'neoliberalism'. The neoliberal model combines the privatisation of services and new techniques for measuring and assessing performance. In short, programmes must work effectively, and leaders, organisations and governments are responsible for establishing the mechanisms to show that that these programmes do indeed work properly. This trend takes on many labels, in which terms such as 'accountability', 'transparency', and 'openness' are the most frequent.

Let me discuss these two events and the neoliberal trend in more detail, as they inform our understanding of how the anti-corruption industry evolved. We begin with TI.

The birth of TI

Frustrated by the waste of aid in East Africa, where he had worked for the World Bank, and by the Bank's failure to put more conditions on its loans to corrupt leaders, the German economist Peter Eigen brought together a network of ex-diplomats, international lawyers, businessmen and government civil servants, including some from the Third World, to form TI in 1993. With a secretariat in Berlin, Eigen's home town, TI has since expanded to form independent national chapters, which today exist in about 85 countries. Crucial in this expansion was the development of the CPI, a ranking of the most and least corrupt countries, and the closest thing TI has to an acknowledged 'brand'. Today, TI produces a Global Corruption Report, corruption assessments such as National Integrity Studies, the Bribe Payers' Index, and it organises a biannual International Anti-corruption Conference for all anti-corruption actors from government, private sector and NGOs. With a budget of 8–10 million Euros, largely from West European governments/aid agencies, TI is the major non-governmental player in the anti-corruption industry. It provides knowledge, conducts advocacy and lobbying campaigns and attends or organises meetings as a responsible member of civil society. Its activities have now evolved from simple awareness-raising – the naming and shaming' of the CPI – to include the various tools for measuring corruption and determining where anti-corruption inputs should be made. TI's members include activists, business people, former aid workers, ex-diplomats, civil servants, lawyers and journalists. TI chapters carry out country studies of potential for corruption in various sectors (customs, health, procurement) and help establish 'integrity pacts' between governments and contractors. TI is active in programmes to monitor government or private sector actions in corruption-prone sectors (extractive industries, development aid, health). Their strategy, as developed by Eigen, is called 'coalition building', which means the forging of alliances with any group who will listen. As articulated by Eigen, coalition building should be seen in contrast to confrontation or demonstration in which groups are kept outside the decision-making bodies. As such, TI has celebrated its inclusion in various UN and World Bank forums on anti-corruption, which has given it some influence on formulating policy. Concretely, TI was part of the lobbying process for a UN Convention against Corruption, now ratified by 80 countries and is presently active in advocating monitoring provisions for the Convention. TI's CPI is used in journalistic, academic and policy communities as an instrument for measuring governance performance and may even play a role in determining a country's eligibility for foreign development assistance. At local levels, TI chapters have begun to establish anti-corruption legal aid centres (ALACs) which support whistle-blowing activities. TI cooperates with governments in drafting laws or setting up programmes. Local TI chapters do not necessarily pursue individual cases, but they do try

to comment on government or non-governmental initiatives. As it receives its support largely from Western government donors, TI is constantly in dialogue with these donors in various forms of fundraising, advising and cooperation. TI has modelled itself in some ways on Amnesty International in terms of gaining influence, but without the activist or provocative image of Amnesty or Human Rights Watch.

Cancer of corruption

The second milestone event is the famous ‘cancer of corruption’ speech by James Wolfensohn when he headed the World Bank. The speech, held in 1996, also marked the acknowledgement of TI’s mission by the Bank, and set the stage for the Bank beginning to include stipulations about government effectiveness and legitimacy in its loan policies. In more general terms, the ‘cancer of corruption’ speech also marked the entry of governance criteria into World Bank lending, and spawned the engagement of the Bank in establishing various indicators of good governance by the researchers in the World Bank Institute. The key operational concept in the governance diagnostics became that of ‘state capture’, here understood as the illicit control of public policy by private actors in the form, say of undue influence or purchasing of judges or politicians. The Bank was able to develop indicators to show ‘high capture’ and ‘low capture’ societies and to tie it to corrupt behaviour under privatisation, especially in the former Soviet countries. The Bank thus began the comparative ranking of countries on various good governance scales (called ‘Governance Matters’, and published by the World Bank Institute). These indicators could now be used as a baseline on which to develop policy. The key problem however, remained that of tying anti-corruption programmes to demonstrably improved governance. To date, it has been next to impossible to demonstrate that a specific anti-corruption measure (change in public procurement, for example) has reduced the general level of corruption. On the contrary, it remains the case that those countries with the most extensive anti-corruption programmes also tend to be the most corrupt according to the existing indices (in the same manner, the country with the largest TI organisation, is Bangladesh, which constantly ranks near the bottom of the CPI).

New public management

Aside from these two milestones, the third factor in the development of the anti-corruption industry is the general change in public administration towards market orientation. Indicators of public administration performance were now developed along with an ‘audit culture’ stressing accountability, openness, transparency and unambiguous indicators.¹⁵ The slogan, or rather epithet, for this change is known as ‘neoliberalism’, in which a market mentality and market tools are applied to the gamut of public services, social welfare measures and individual careers under the influence of flexible capitalism. As such, local and national governments, and even donors, transformed themselves from providing services to purchasing them from outside contractors. This led to a new type of corruption, by which bureaucrats who previously sold direct access to government resources or embezzled aid could now profit by collecting a facilitation fee from private contractors or otherwise influence the procurement process. The movement of money in the global economy also led to a new set of anti-corruption activities, known as ‘asset recovery’, in which the hidden

15. On the concept of audit culture see especially Michael Power, *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Marilyn Strathern, ed., *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy* (London: Routledge, 2000).

foreign bank accounts of corrupt leaders were located and returned to the state treasury. In this function, anti-corruption became a new instrument for making governments more effective and introducing criteria of ethics into public life. This strategy of greater transparency could be applied both in the South and in the developed Western democracies. As a result, new target areas are developed for 'selling' the anti-corruption package. Now it is not only governments who need an anti-corruption policy, but NGOs and private companies as well. Anti-corruption became an element of risk assessment, due diligence and monitoring foreign aid abroad. It became part of controlling abuses in procurement at home, integrity in contracting, getting firms to sign on to the Global Compact's anti-corruption principle, new initiatives to support whistleblowers and combating abuse of authority within private companies or organisations. In its mature stage, the anti-corruption industry is thus coupled with other such 'industries'. Hence, conferences are now held and reports written on issues such as corruption and health, corruption and media, corruption and post-war reconstruction, corruption and human rights, corruption and extractive industries, corruption in security, corruption in the arms trade. And now, of course, corruption and climate change. This coupling would not have occurred had it not been for the general neoliberal changes in public management.

Conclusions: industry or craft? Movement or institution?

As described here, the anti-corruption industry contains key global actors with considerable resources and policy reach. It contains local NGOs who look to these global actors for signals about 'The Next Big Thing', and it includes an attractive rhetoric highlighting integrity, trust, accountability and openness. Those who are part of the industry, those who articulate the discourse of anti-corruptionism, call it a 'movement'. In reality, it is more a flexible organisation. The discourse of anti-corruptionism is sufficiently generalised so that new actors can enter the field, each with their own agenda, but appropriating the anti-corruptionist discourse. We have a marketplace of anti-corruption initiatives, organised and prioritised by actors in the anti-corruption industry, now using hundreds of millions of dollars in projects. More important, these projects now have their own, solid budget lines, sometimes coded directly as 'anti-corruption', other times subsumed under 'good governance' or 'public administration reform'. Certainly these millions of dollars are far below the kind of 'industry' we could observe in the field of security and defence, or even of global crime-fighting. The total anti-corruption budget for all Western aid agencies is far below the cost of a few fighter planes or a single Halliburton contract. And in the field of global crime, there is no anti-corruption equivalent of Interpol or the various cooperative institutions for fighting global organised crime. Nevertheless, for local and global NGOs operating within the larger framework of governance and democracy assistance, as well as the private consulting firms whose staff contain former aid workers, civil society activists and government experts, anti-corruption is now an attractive market for moral entrepreneurs. One of the reasons it is attractive is that success/impact is so difficult to measure. A drug enforcement programme, for example, might measure its success by the amount of drugs captured or arrests made. Anti-corruption has no such scale, and tends to rely on more spectacular news that this ex-leader's assets have now been recovered or this new law enacted. As a result, a well-organised programme, with many events, reports, coalitions formed and training modules conducted, with the setting up of action plans, formulation of anti-corruption strategies and self-evaluations, such a programme will be considered 'successful' even though 'reduction of corruption' itself will be next to impossible to measure over the short term. It is here that we see the emergence of group interest within the anti-corruption

industry, even though the actors are also in competition with each other for donor funds. International gatherings such as the (governmental) Global Forum or the (non-governmental) International Anti-corruption Conference attempt to iron out these differences. It is in such fora that diverse actors are forged into 'industries'.

It is instructive to compare this 'industry' with what came before it. In this sense, we might see industry as the opposite of 'craft'. Craftsmen work with a limited set of tools, are sensitive to local variation and adapt their work to local conditions. A crafted product lasts longer and feels more authentic than an imposed, standardised industrial product. Craftsmen pass on their knowledge in a traditional, practice-oriented form, improvising as they go along, and they are often so passionate about their work that it is almost a passion rather than occupation. They figure things out locally, in their context. Craftsmen are therefore the opposite of the 'industry' approach. The handicrafts scene is varied; innovative local, adaptable, passionate enthusiasts pass on oral, flexible traditions. It resembles a 'movement' in the sense of being less hierarchical, less codified into texts, with fewer formalised instructions and guidelines. Industry, on the other hand, is standardised, global, elitist and codified. Industry now contains 'training' or 'project' or 'strategic planning' specialists who in fact have no specific 'craft', but who can move from one policy domain to another. These people are experts in 'project management', in 'programme development' or fundraising, no matter whether the goal in question is humanitarian aid, anti-corruption, or children's rights. They move from one industry to another, committed not to the cause as such (the craft), but to their own career within whatever industry offers opportunities. In this sense, they are the opposite of a movement. The anti-corruption *industry* is full of anti-corruption assessments, programmes and projects. The industry is overshadowing the anti-corruption *movement*, with its limited number of activists and mobilisation. Entry into this movement, in fact, is now increasingly limited to those who can articulate anti-corruptionist discourse. Aside from the conventions, training programmes and diagnostics, however, there are also courageous local activists exposing brutal corruption in their home countries; individuals and groups who are harassed, jailed, and even murdered for exposing corruption in their local environments. Such people speak and act in a manner that is wholly foreign to the everyday activities of actors in the anti-corruption industry. They act as symbolic beacons for the 'movement', but symbolic only because they are celebrated in ritual gatherings. When the rituals are concluded, the budget negotiations and fundraising overtures start up again.

The 'industry' concept has often been used in cynical or pejorative terms. Yet the rise of the anti-corruption industry is not to be condemned as such. The generalised skills found in industries are not to be devalued. We all want to see efficient organisations achieving their goals. My point here is to examine the price we pay when such activities become codified as the *only* way to reach such goals, when a global discourse and standardisation, under the rubric of 'coalition building' and the number crunching of 'diagnostics', an approach that stigmatises other approaches as 'confrontational' or 'unprofessional', begins to dominate. What is the price we pay when international anti-corruption forums, conventions and EU programmes swallow up those very grassroots initiatives that can shed light on ineffective government and bring down dishonest officials?

Industries do not last forever. Insofar as they refuse to innovate, lose touch with their customer base or fail to adapt to new conditions, any industry can become a dinosaur. The American rust belt and the European shipyards are evidence of industries that declined. In the world of development and international assistance, the emergence of new policy priorities can also lead to 'policy evaporation', as the exigencies of poverty alleviation and development are now absorbed into the climate change industry. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), intended to 'harmonise' foreign aid, would seem to present a pressure

towards more such standardisation. In the meantime, major players and donors can suddenly gravitate to new, fashionable priorities. One can only speculate what will happen to 'integrity' and 'anti-corruption' as the climate change juggernaut takes over.

There is a long tradition in social science to study movements and protests. But it is equally important to study what happens when the movement and protest that moves individual 'believers' become institutionalised. The struggle against corruption, which has always involved courageous activists, whistle-blowing civil servants and enterprising journalists, has now become mainstreamed, projectified and 'organised'. This is what happened to human rights some two decades ago. It happened to civil society and the NGO sector over the past decade. And it is happening now with anti-corruption, which is itself part of a general trend towards 'good governance', and 'global integrity'. In this process, the object of the movement, corruption itself, recedes into the background as anti-corruptionism obtains its own rhetorical influence and budget lines.

One of the most famous studies in industrial sociology is called the Hawthorne experiment. In this series of experiments, conducted in the 1930s at an American plant making telephone parts, a group of researchers instituted various improvements in the working environment on the factory floor. The researchers noticed that regardless of what change they instituted – increasing the light, decreasing the light, changing work breaks, revamping pay schedules – that workers' productivity increased. What began as a test of improving productivity ended up showing that people react positively to researchers who pay attention to them. For the workers, it was not about improving output but feeling good. Anti-corruption, I submit, has this feel-good character. Like other moral projects, anti-corruptionism has its own set of career-oriented actors with personal or institutional vested interests. The message conveyed is that 'we are doing something', rather than the more critical, 'Is what we are doing any good?' Examining the EU measures for anti-corruption, and others elsewhere, we find two parallel universes: one where anti-corruption measures are increasingly systematised and institutionalised into the anti-corruption industry; the other where corruption, increasingly more sophisticated, thrives unabated, even within some anti-corruption units. We need, therefore, to study not just the concrete ways in which we can reduce corruption. *We need to study how anti-corruption has been making us feel so good over the past decade.* Anti-corruption, like so many other industries in the sphere of development, might just be another therapeutic, feel-good industry. Hence, we need to ask whether the anti-corruption industry is really a kind of Hawthorne experiment, a feel-good pill, a kind of policy-Prozac that we take while we examine the latest corruption rankings and recite the tenets of anti-corruptionism. There are indeed 'rotten states' out there, and there is a thriving anti-corruption industry. But it is not clear that anti-corruption is having any effect on them.

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