

Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads¹

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ABSTRACT The idea of being civilian, military, and civilizing at the same time is undoubtedly very seductive to the armies of academics now writing on EU military force. It is tempting to think that the EU can have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too in militarizing its normative power. In contrast, in my reconsideration of normative power Europe I suggest that militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU's normative power, if the process is characterized by critical reflection rather than the pursuit of 'great power'. However, I will further argue that militarizing processes beyond the crossroads provided by the European Security Strategy are already weakening the normative claims of the EU in a post-11 September world characterized by the drive towards 'martial potency' and the growth of a Brussels-based 'military-industrial simplex'.

KEY WORDS Civilian; European Union; external action; military; normative; reflexive.

INTRODUCTION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GREAT POWER

One impression predominates in my mind over all others. It is this: unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe and consequently in the world. People, more often outside the European Community than within, are tempted to see the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the overtones this implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-century philosophy gave rise.

(Monnet 1962: 26)

How easy it is to imagine that the European Union (EU) can be both a method for introducing change in international relations and a great power. It is seductive to think that the EU can be both a post-national normative power for the twenty-first century and acquire the accoutrements of nineteenth-century state power at no extra cost. It is tempting to think that the EU can

have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too in militarizing its normative power. For the armies of academics now writing on EU military force the logic is both simple and seductive – in order to practise ‘preventative engagement’ and strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base, the EU needs to acquire a ‘full spectrum’ of crisis management capabilities. As whole special issues of journals such as *Survival*, *European Security*, *International Affairs*, and *International Peacekeeping* now attest, ‘martial potency’ is the means and the method for the EU’s new power status.

As the quote from Jean Monnet reminds us, ‘unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power’; we have built the EU precisely to escape great power mentality. As part of my contribution to this volume on the EU at a crossroads, I intend to reconsider my original normative power Europe (NPE) argument in order to reflect on the consequences and risks that the militarization of the EU beyond 2003 now poses to the Union’s normative power in world politics (see Manners 2000b, 2002). In doing so I will argue that that militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power, if critical reflection characterized the process. However, I will further argue that militarizing processes beyond the crossroads provided by the European Security Strategy are already weakening the normative claims of the EU in a post-11 September world characterized by the drive towards ‘martial potency’ and the growth of a Brussels-based ‘military-industrial simplex’.

In order to do so I shall address the theoretical and empirical questions set out in the introduction to this volume from the NPE perspective. I shall first consider theoretical accounts for the EU’s normative power, emphasizing the risks of conflating civilian and civilizing, as well as revisiting my normative power Europe argument. Next I will turn to the EU’s normative political ethos and its promotion of sustainable peace in world politics. This will involve a brief reconsideration of the historical development of EU conflict prevention policy as an empirical example of normative power shaping external actions. I will then empirically discuss some of the EU militarizing processes beyond the 2003 crossroads. Finally, I shall conclude by discussing the normative choices for the EU beyond crossroads between continued unreflexive militarization, potentially perpetuating the idea of nineteenth-century ‘great power’ or the return to sustainable peace as a central norm of EU normative power.

THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER

The issue in Europe is an historic one. The nuclear stalemate is making it possible to move away from naked force toward politics and so to *civilize* conflict in one of the centres of gravity of the balance of power. If this can be done by freeing up an empire over them, it will mark a real moment of progress in international twentieth-century society.

(Duchêne 1971: 82; emphasis added)

Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen's notion of *civilized* politics.

(Duchêne 1972: 43; emphasis added)

Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major centre of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonized victim but the exemplar of a new stage in political *civilization*.

(Duchêne 1973: 19; emphasis added)

As these extracts from François Duchêne's discussions of civilian power illustrate, it is extremely easy to characterize the EU as a 'civilian power' and then take a simple step to granting it the mission of 'civilizing' international relations. The use of civil, civilian, civilianize, civilianizing, civilize, civilization, and civilizing as if they were interchangeable makes their use highly problematic. Firstly, 'civilizing' is far too encumbered a term to be used in any self-reflexive discussion of European relations with the rest of the world (see Manners 2003: 70). Postcolonial theory makes absolutely clear that the term 'civilization' is part of 'Eurocentric strategies of narrativizing history, so that Europe can congratulate itself for progress' which in contemporary terms invokes the 'culture of capitalism' (Spivak 1999: 91, 93). Secondly, 'civilian power' as a conceptual category has come to be far too related to the ontology of states, rather than a 'style of action' or 'domestication'. As I discussed in my paper on NPE, the notion of civilian power has become located in assumptions about the fixed nature of the nation state, the importance of direct physical power, and the notion of national interest (Manners 2002: 238). The EU and its actions in world politics demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what it is, does and should do.

I have used the phrase 'normative power Europe' in order to attempt to capture the movement away from Cold War (and neo-colonial) approaches to the EU. Based upon my research into the symbolic and normative discourses and practices within the European Community (EC)/EU during the 1990s, I developed the NPE approach as a response to the relative absence of normative theorizing and to promote normative approaches to the EU. As discussed above, rather than theoretically accounting for the putative existence of the EU as a civilizing power, I will focus on the EU's normative power in world politics.

EU norm diffusion is shaped by six factors – contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter (Manners 2002: 244 – 5). What has been significant in these norm diffusion factors was the relative absence of physical force in the imposition of norms. This absence of physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion led me to argue that 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is' (Manners 2002: 252). As I will now consider through an examination of the interaction of normative political ethos and the development of conflict prevention policy, EU

norms of 'sustainable peace' have been a central factor in EU external actions prior to 2003.

NORMATIVE POLITICAL ETHOS AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE EU

Always overlooked in discussions of Duchêne's civilian power was his reliance on Marion Dönhoff's ideas about transmuted technical nuclear peace into political peace (Duchêne 1972: 47; 1973: 20). Dönhoff's 'second life' after working in the German resistance movement led her to advocate civil activism and collective action based on tolerance, morality, democracy and the idea that 'resistance and moral courage are usually rooted in acts of everyday life' (Mushaben 1999: 20). It is clearly Dönhoff's work which Duchêne draws on when he advocates 'many forms of collective activity which previously had far less influence: cultural example, social movements, pressure groups, economic capacity' (Duchêne 1973: 20), and 'a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance . . . [and] the international open society' (Duchêne 1972: 47).

The emphases of Dönhoff and Duchêne on political peace, and the way in which everyday acts and cultural example help to transmute conflict into peace through civil activism and collective action, resonate with other post-war political thinkers and the impact which they had on peace movements across the world. In the European context, ideas regarding the value of the public sphere and the politics of reconciliation became crucial in the post-war rebuilding process, as well as the building of democracies and European integration. Political philosophers such as Hannah Arendt argued that the processes of reconciliation involved the ethos of the public realm (Arendt 1990: 221; 1998: 50). Catherine Guisan-Dickinson suggests that it is the Arendtian 'lost treasures' of American and French revolutionary ethics that have, and should, inform the public political philosophy of the EU (Guisan-Dickinson 2003).

If civil activism, collective action, public sphere and reconciliation are part of a political ethos which *should* inform EU external action, how were these reconcilable with the concerns for preventing violent conflicts such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda in a normative way? From 1995 to 2003, the solution came in the shape of ideas about conflict prevention circulating in the EU and the United Nations (UN) under the term *sustainable peace* (see Manners 2005). The term 'sustainable peace' emphasized the stress the EU placed on addressing the causes, rather than just the symptoms, of conflict and violence. Connie Peck has defined sustainable peace as involving both short-term problem-solving and long-term structural solutions to conflict prevention through the integration of human security concerns and the promotion of good governance (Peck 1998: 15–16). Sustainable peace is not simply about the conjunction of short- and long-term methods but, in line with Arendt, Dönhoff and Duchêne, is informed by the need to build 'indigenous capacity for resolving internal tensions before they lead to violent conflict' (Malloch Brown 2003: 142) that enable a more

permanent 'consolidation of peace' (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 92). In contrast to humanitarian assistance and intervention, the indigenous capacity building of sustainable peace is focused on the rights of ownership of the victims of conflict, rather than charitable acts of the EU (Arendt 1979: 296 in Chandler 2003: 307). Thus, an EU normative commitment to sustainable peace increasingly involved combining short- and long-term conflict prevention with the building of civil capacity that facilitates reconciliation.

The EU sustainable peace initiative came with the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers suggesting in 1996 that 'increasingly, the need is to prevent conflicts from breaking out and to create the conditions for sustainable peace and security by democratic, political and economic means' (Hjelm-Walle'n and Halonen 1996). The EU sought to promote sustainable peace at the UN, for example, in conflict management in Macedonia and Bosnia (Ramaker 1997; Eitel 1998).² More importantly, the EU made sustainable peace the aim of its own conflict prevention policies, as seen in the Common Positions and Presidency Statements on Afghanistan, Colombia, South-East Europe, Africa, and Bosnia.³ Interestingly, both Commissioners Diamantopoulou and Patten argued that sustainable peace depended on the full and equal participation of women in all aspects of the peace-making processes (Diamantopoulou 2003; Patten 2003). The EU advocacy of the principle of sustainable peace contributed to the UN Secretary General's report of June 2001, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict', which pledged the UN to move from 'a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention' (Annan 2001: 9). A broader focus on the nature of sustainable peace and its building-blocks, such as social and economic development, good governance and democratization, the rule of law and respect for human rights, is supplementing the traditional concept of collective security.

It is worth briefly reconsidering an empirical example of the way in which normative power has shaped external actions by looking at the development of EU conflict prevention policy in the context of sustainable peace. A number of surveys of EU conflict prevention policy provide us with a means of assessing the relative consistency and success of EC attempts at preventative diplomacy in the context of short-term problem-solving (see Hill 2001; H. Smith 2002; K. Smith 2003; Kronenberger and Wouters 2004). Five cases in particular illustrate three common points regarding the EU's conflict prevention policy prior to 2003 – the Palestinian–Israeli conflict (Soetendorp 1999; Ginsberg 2001), Central America (H. Smith 1995), South Africa (Holland 1995), Eastern Europe (K. Smith 1999; Miall 2000), and South-Eastern Europe (Ginsberg 2001; Hill 2001; Björkdahl 2005).

Firstly, it is clear that the EC had a long experience of conflict prevention policy with mixed results during the period 1970–93. As suggested above, a number of authors have argued that the EU has played a positive, if not a successful, role in all five of these case studies. Secondly, it is also apparent that although the EC was able to engage in both short-term preventative diplomacy and long-term structural conflict prevention, it was clearly predisposed to and

more adept at the latter. This predisposition towards long-term structural conflict prevention clearly reflects the EC's experience in the aftermath of World War Two and was to prove important in shaping peace norms in the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and the increasing relevance and role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in potential and post-conflict situations, the EC emphasis on structural conflict prevention became far more important. These two observations were crucial in contributing to the 'transformative year' in EU conflict prevention policy – 1995. Despite agreement on the Petersburg tasks, the entry into force of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the initiation of the Balladur Pact in the latter half of 1993, the shocking events of 1994–95 were to shift the culture of conflict prevention in the EU. The combination of atrocities and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia during this period brought home to Europeans, NGOs, member states and the Commission that preventing violent conflicts must become a priority for the EU's normative power. It is this reflexive factor in the critical reinterpretation and reflection during the 1990s that has become an important characteristic of NPE and the attempts to introduce a sustainable peace policy in 1996.

The transformation of EU conflict prevention policy during 1995 was largely the result of dialogue between the Commission and NGOs with respect to Africa and development policy, as well as south-eastern Europe and post-conflict rebuilding in Bosnia after Dayton. Following the genocide in Rwanda between April and June 1994, the General Affairs Council and Essen European Council in November and December 1994 agreed to a Belgian government suggestion for intensive dialogue with the Organization of African Unity (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000). In June 1995 a French Member of the European Parliament, Michel Rocard, following ideas developed in the European Parliament's Forum for the Active Prevention of Conflicts during 1994, proposed that the Commission should establish a 'European Union Analysis Centre for Active Crisis Prevention', an initiative which was to be realized as the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) in January 1997 (Conflict Prevention Network 2001).⁴ These initiatives led to a 'comprehensive policy framework for conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa and beyond' developed in the 'landmark document' on 'Preventative Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa' agreed at the General Affairs Council in December 1995 (McLean and Lilly 2000: 10).

This landmark document on conflict prevention coincided with the agreement on the use of 'conditionality clauses' stating that human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law were 'essential elements' of EU aid and political agreements with third countries. The conditionality clause introduced into the mid-term review of the Lomé IV agreement in 1995 reflected the peace norms developed in relations with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), in particular the conditionality clauses in co-operation and association agreements since 1992 and the Copenhagen criteria since 1993 (Cremona 1998; K. Smith 1998; Hilpold 2002). Thus, during 1996 both the

Commission and NGOs built on the 1995 shift in conflict prevention norms by developing proposals that explicitly acknowledged the relationships between the structural causes of instability and violence and the need to link both aid and foreign policy together in conflict prevention (European Commission 1996a, 1996b; Rummel 1996a, 1996b). These three years of intensive dialogue and rethinking of conflict prevention finally materialized following leadership from the Netherlands Presidency of the EU in the first half of 1997. The linkage between NGOs and the Dutch government was most clearly demonstrated at the European Conference on Conflict Prevention – a large public gathering of NGOs and national officials held in Amsterdam in February 1997 hosted by the Dutch National Commission for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development in cooperation with the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the EU. The output of the conference became ‘The Amsterdam Appeal: an Action Plan for European Leaders’, with the subsequent creation of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT) in September 1997.

This combination of the shift of thinking in the Commission, the Dutch government, the Amsterdam Appeal, and the CPN under the directorship of Reinhardt Rummel, was finally to lead to the Council Common Position on ‘Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa’ and the Resolution on ‘Coherence of the EC’s Development Co-operation with its Other Policies’ from the Amsterdam European Council, both in June 1997. This combination of factors, together with the events in Kosovo during 1999, was to lead to the two crucial reports arguing for the consolidation of the EU’s conflict prevention policy – the EPCPT’s *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, and Javier Solana and Christopher Patten’s *Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention*, both in December 2000 (McLean and Lilly 2000; Björkdahl 2002; Eavis and Kefford 2002).

This brief examination of the way in which EU conflict prevention policy has evolved illustrates the extent to which the close interaction of NGOs, the Commission and Parliament, and reform-minded EU member states led to an emphasis on long-term conflict prevention and transformation, as well as demands for institutional coherence in development aid and external action as part of sustainable peace between 1995 and 2003.

MILITARIZING PROCESSES BEYOND THE CROSSROADS

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

(European Security Strategy 2003: 17)

Like the defence components of the Treaty on European Union of 1991, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) stands as a symbolic signpost at the crossroads of the militarization of the EU. By symbolic signpost, I mean that the processes discussed in this volume have already passed beyond the crossroads of other directions, as such symbols actively constitute our social reality (Manners 2000a: 263). As Gerard Quille argued in his discussion of 'Europe at a crossroads': 'the ESS may be an important first step along the road to an EU strategic culture' (Quille 2004: 429–30). Although many commentators have disagreed about the precise direction of the road marked 'strategic culture', it is clear to me that since the end of 2003 the EU has taken a sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention, as the ESS (above) suggests (see also Duke 2004; Toje 2005).

Here I will consider the way in which the events of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004, together with the transatlantic crises created by the US invasion of Iraq, diverted the EU on a road towards militarization led by 'martial potency' and driven by the growth of a Brussels-based military-industrial simplex. I shall discuss EU militarization by briefly considering institutional prioritization, short- and long-term military missions, the Brussels-based trans-national policy 'network', the diverting of the human security agenda both in Brussels and at the UN, all culminating in the development of a military-industrial simplex. I should note that most informed observers identify the most pervasive and corrosive militarization (and securitization) to be occurring in areas other than those considered here, in particular the Commission's security research programme, the militarization of space policy, and the securitization of justice and home affairs, amongst many other areas.

Despite the widespread expectation that 'civilian ESDP missions are more likely than military ones', and that five out of six ongoing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions are non-military (EUPM, EUPOL Proxima, EUJUST Themis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUJUST Lex), the extent of institutional prioritization of military structures and frameworks is apparent (see Sangiovanni 2003: 200-1; Keane 2004: 493–4; ICG 2005: 30–2). This prioritization includes the emphasis given to identifying and achieving military capabilities ahead of civilian capabilities, as the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference implicitly recognized in November 2004 when it acknowledged that 'shortcomings on issues such as mission and planning support, adequate financing, the ability of the EU to deploy at short notice and procurement needed to be addressed urgently' (Netherlands Presidency 2004: point 19). Prioritization also includes the way in which all aspects of civilian crisis management are framed in terms of subservience to ESDP, such as defining the five non-military missions as ESDP missions, or referring generally to the 'civilian aspects of ESDP'. Similarly, attempts by NGOs and the European Parliament to develop civilian organizations parallel to those in the military sector (such as a European Peacebuilding Agency or a European Civil Peace Corps) are ignored in the drive towards militarization (see Gourlay 2004a;

ICG 2005: 31 – 2). As the opening quote from the ESS illustrates, in a strategic culture favouring robust intervention, civilian activities appear to be useful only in as far as they are needed to counter new dynamic threats, thus subverting the normative approach of sustainable peace.

Although there has been very little experience of military intervention, it is still possible to take away some lessons from two of the EU's missions – the short-term operation Artemis and the long-term operation EUFOR Althea. In an unfortunate choice of words (mirroring those of George W. Bush just three months earlier) the French Defence Minister Michele Alliot-Marie declared 'mission accomplished' for the EU military operation Artemis in Bunia, Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 2003. As many critics have suggested, 'Artemis was probably possible only *because* its scope was so restricted' which 'merely pushed the problem of violent aggression against civilians beyond the environs of the town, where atrocities continued' (ICG 2005: 46; United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004: 14). It was probably the case that Alliot-Marie could have announced the mission successful prior to its deployment given the limited mandate that was bound to succeed. Prior to deployment in June 2003, observers both inside and outside the EU had argued that the operation was too limited to achieve even demilitarization in Bunia. Most observers agree, including the EU's advisory agency (the EU-ISS), that Artemis was unable to secure all of Bunia. It allowed massacres to continue in the rest of Ituri province and it also 'skewed the military balance in Ituri', with fighting between armed groups returning to the province in July 2004 (Amnesty International 2003; Faria 2004: 44; ICG 2004: 11; Ulriksen *et al.* 2004: 522). The UN was particularly critical of the fixed nature of Artemis which ensured that the EU 'signalled clearly to all, including the armed belligerents, the transitory nature of the force' and 'risked failure in establishing such a strict exit date' (United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004: 14, 16). In conclusion, it was the prioritizing of military over civilian operations in Artemis that ultimately undermined any short-term benefits it might have brought: 'the benefits of military efforts may prove to be short lived if they are not immediately accompanied by other complementary measures', such as an integrated police force, urgent reform of the judicial system and support for the Ituri administration (Faria 2004: 51).

If Artemis was 'mission accomplished', then EUFOR Althea may well become 'mission unaccomplishable' as the EU and its Special Representative (Paddy Ashdown) in Bosnia and Herzegovina increasingly deprive local administrations of their political functions (Osland 2004: 556 – 8; Chandler 2005; ICG 2005: 49– 52). From the appointment of Ashdown as the EU Special Representative in March 2002 (as well as the international community's High Representative in May 2002), through the launching of the EU Police Mission in January 2003, to the taking over of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) by EUFOR in December 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska have been increasingly 'Europeanized'. This Europeanization has involved the EU in state-building the two entities in the direction of a Stabilization and

Association Agreement, and eventual EU membership, without conceding ownership of the process. The prioritization of military objectives over local capacity- building is not without consequences as most independent observers agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina is now characterized by dependency, helplessness and disillusionment (Osland 2004: 556; ICG 2005: 49). Even the EU-ISS advisory agency has been forced to admit that 'this system of illiberal democracy under international supervision has now become the most serious constraint on the development of an effective state' (Knaus and Cox 2004: 55). These processes of disempowerment by the EU and Ashdown, together with the use of robust force (EUFOR), mean that 'it may already be too late to ensure an owner- driven process', while the EU still 'must prove it can coordinate complex civil and military matters' (Osland 2004: 557; ICG 2005: 52).

These three examples of prioritization of military affairs must be set within the broader context of the role of a Brussels-based transnational policy 'network' which has sought to direct EU militarization beyond the crossroads of 2003 towards a military doctrine of 'preventative engagement', including the '*second pillarization*' of civilian crisis management (Bono 2004; Gourlay 2004b: 413; Leonard and Gowan 2004). A number of scholars have identified the ways in which the EU has developed a strategic-cultural discourse of militarization (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Rynning 2003; Bono 2004), but Jocelyn Mawdsley has gone furthest in identifying the 'unusual prevalence of trans-governmentalism within ESDP' (Mawdsley 2005: 15). Mawdsley has closely scrutinized the way in which the limited equipment needs of the Rapid Reaction Force have been quickly expanded into a quantitatively different arms dynamic by the activism of a Brussels-based transnational policy network (Mawdsley and Quille 2003; Mawdsley 2004; also Mawdsley *et al.* 2004). What seems clear from Mawdsley's scrutiny is the way in which the pre-2001 agreements on the Petersberg tasks and a Rapid Reaction Force were rapidly altered into post-2003 military arrangements for 'preventative engagement' (European Security Strategy 2003: 18) by those who sought to gain from such a sharp turn at the crossroads. In particular, transnational policy institutes themselves see militarization as an opportunity to empower their political role, as well as achieving deeper security and political integration. In this respect, the EU's advisory agency, the EU-ISS, has led the way towards militarization, in particular through encouraging Brussels-based policy centres to see the potential of inter- related security, economic and political logics.

Taken together, such institutes have reached an uneasy agreement on the need to advocate 'preventative engagement' as a European alternative to the US military strategy of 'pre-emptive engagement' – despite the ambiguous nature of the differences between preventative and pre-emptive (Leonard and Gowan 2004: 12 – 13; Mawdsley 2005: 2). Examples of the transnational networks and policy centres involved in advocacy include the 'Forum Europe' of the New Defence Agenda (NDA), and the joint 'European Security Forum' of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and International Institute for Security Studies (sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United

States and the US Mission to the European Union). A series of reoccurring names constantly appear at the heart of this transnational policy network, including Javier Solana, Robert Cooper, Chris Patten, Fraser Cameron, Giles Merritt, Nicole Gnesotto, and Burkard Schmitt. The impact of this transnational advocacy appears to be the '*second pillarization*' of EU civilian crisis management where normative practices historically centred on the Commission, with democratic oversight from the Parliament, have been diverted into the Council activities making it 'extremely difficult for national parliaments and European assemblies to scrutinize and influence the policy-making process' (Bono 2004: 451; Gourlay 2004b: 413; Wagner 2006).

The interplay between institutional prioritization, military missions, and a transnational policy network have all contributed to the misdirection of the normative concerns of the human security agenda away from sustainable peace. The focus of all human security concerns has been people-centred freedom from fear and want, which is precisely what the normative principle of sustainable peace has sought to address (Peck 1998: 205 – 6). Prior to 2003 discussions within the EU on human security, particularly within the context of meeting the UN's Millennium Development Goals, had been focused on the understanding of people-centred freedom from fear and want (see Grimm 2004; Leen 2004).

Despite sixty-three years of development and recognition of the understanding of human development to include freedom from want, Javier Solana's 'study group' on Europe's security capabilities announced in September 2004 that 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe' refers only to 'freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations' which provide 'seven principles for operations', including 'the appropriate use of force' (Barcelona Report 2004: 5). Prior to Barcelona, in May 2004 Mary Kaldor (group convenor) made clear that 'the Study Group's focus is on physical security, or freedom from fear, more than freedom from want' (Berlin Report 2004: 2). However, the Barcelona Report makes clear that the new European security doctrine prioritizes the appropriate use of force over both freedom from fear and want. This separation of security and development in favour of human rights interventionism is problematic, as Keith Krause argues that 'ideas of security and development cannot be so easily separated, and because the development– security link was not one way' (Krause 2004: 45). Such a turn away from common understandings of human security and the causes of conflict, and towards legitimizing the use of force as part of a responsibility to protect human rights seems a logical strategic direction, but must be understood as part of a broader legitimizing move coming from outside the EU. As critics such as Mirjam van Reisen, Simon Stocker, and Florent Sebban put it: 'the increasing emphasis on security issues, the fight against terrorism and concerns over weapons of mass destruction threaten to overshadow all European foreign policy, leaving little or no room for policies geared towards human security' (2004: 36). The emphasis on human security as a responsibility to protect human rights must be understood within the EU doctrines of 'preventative engagement' and 'effective multilateralism' of the ESS, together with the

EU support for reform of the UN in line with the report of the High Level Panel on 'Threats, Challenges, and Changes' (United Nations High Level Panel 2004; Bono 2005). Led by the ideas of Gareth Evans (former Australian Foreign Minister), as well as Lloyd Axworthy (former Canadian Foreign Minister), the turn from human security towards humanitarian intervention is an attempt to overcome the crisis of the UN caused by the US invasion of Iraq. Whether a doctrine of pre-emption or prevention, after the crossroads of 2003 the EU aim has been to change the UN Charter to allow preventative military intervention under Chapter VII 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace' (see Leonard and Gowan 2004: 28-9; Bono 2005).

These five examples of militarization cannot be fully understood without the final factor which turned the EU away from the path of sustainable peace and towards an emphasis on 'martial potency' in 2003 – the role of a European 'military-industrial simplex'. A number of scholars have analysed the way in which the defence industries of EU member states have slowly used European integration as a means and a rationale for armaments co-operation (see Mørrth 2003; Mawdsley *et al.* 2004). I use the phrase 'military-industrial simplex' to capture the way in which both the military-armaments lobby and the technology-industrial lobby have worked at the EU level to create a simple but compelling relationship between the need for forces capable of 'robust intervention', the technological and industrial benefits of defence and aerospace research, and the Western European Armaments Group's 1998 'Masterplan for the European Armaments Agency' leading to the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2005 (see Mawdsley 2005). This military-industrial simplex was clarified by the Joint Action of the Council of Ministers in July 2004 when it stated that 'the agency will aim at developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments co-operation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market' (Council of the European Union 2004).

CONCLUSION: GREAT POWER OR NORMATIVE POWER BEYOND THE CROSSROADS

Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of building a bigger and better state – a European Union, without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of interstate politics precisely where they were.

(Wight 1966 in Diez 1997: 287)

Painfully few scholars have heeded Martin Wight's 1966 warning of the consequences of building a bigger and better state (Thomas Diez and Karen Smith are rare exceptions). Yet the conceptual and theoretical consequences for NPE are now more serious than they were forty years ago, as Monnet's warning regarding the temptations of turning the EU into a nineteenth-century great power

reminds us. Clearly, the acquisition of better policies, such as martial potency and preventative engagement, like those of great powers, risks making the EU more like bigger states. Thus the militarization of the EU risks making it more like bigger and better great powers, whilst leaving the problems of interstate politics *precisely* where they were. Militarizing the EU does not implicitly increase its power in interstate politics, and, as I have discussed, is increasingly risking its normative power. As the two most obvious expressions of EU normative power have demonstrated in 2004, the willingness of states and societies such as those of Turkey and Russia to accept norms such as 'equality' and 'sustainable development' in the cases of constitutional law and the Kyoto Protocol will change as the EU becomes more like a great power (China, India and the USA, for example). It is unfeasible that either Turkey or Russia would be as receptive to norm diffusion if they believed that EU battlegroups or combat forces would soon be peace-making in Kurdish areas or Chechnya. This is not to say that the acquisition of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction capacities are a bad thing in the abstract, simply that given the prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation, I have little doubt that normative conceptions of the EU are being undermined.

There are a number of factors that lead me to argue that the EU's normative power is being undermined by the unreflexive militarization of the past two years. Firstly, as I have discussed in the previous section, the balances between short-term problem-solving and long-term structural solutions, as well as between freedom from fear and freedom from want, found in the normative policies of sustainable peace, have been lost. Beyond these immediate concerns, the use of military missions in conjunction with civilian ones could present serious future problems for the EU. As the EU acquires more military capability it could become more tempted to use short-term military responses instead of its traditional reliance on long-term structural conflict prevention and transformation. Similarly, the use of EU military personnel in peace-keeping tasks will always run the risk of mission slide into peace-making tasks, particularly where combatants use guerrilla or terrorist tactics. Thirdly, as the recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, in situations where the EU may be seeking to shape post-conflict reconstruction, the mixing of military, political, civilian, and humanitarian agenda is both guaranteed and dangerous. Ultimately, the introduction of EU military forces in theatres and settings where only EU civilian staff once worked risks undermining the EU's peaceful normative power in favour of a more robust, and potentially violent, presence in the lives and minds of receiving populations.

As I suggested at the outset, it is tempting to think that the EU can have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too in militarizing its normative power. But the route to nineteenth-century great power status is not one that need be taken any further if EU military capability is acquired, deployed and analysed in a more reflexive manner. Such reflexivity must involve both reflexive research characterized by interpretation and reflection, and an understanding of the monitored

character of social life in order to provide a means of returning to the normative path of sustainable peace as the central norm that guides the external actions of the EU. Within such a broader sustainable peace approach, it is entirely plausible that the EU can engage in most of the Article III-309 tasks ('joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks') under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution. However, as I have discussed above, the military tasks ('tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization') should only be attempted under a UN mandate, in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis. Without such fundamental reflection on militarization it is likely that, like Arendt's 'lost treasures', the normative power of the EU will be lost.

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NOTES

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- 2 Jaap Ramaker was Ambassador of the Netherlands to the UN and Tono Eitel was Ambassador of Germany to the UN.
- 3 Common Position on Objectives Towards Afghanistan, 1998/108/CFSP; Presidency Statement on Peace Talks in Colombia, 6 January 1999; Common Position Concerning the Process on Stability and Good-neighbourliness in South-East Europe, 98/633/CFSP; Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, 2004/85/CFSP; Presidency Statement in Response to the Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 February 2005.
- 4 European Parliament Resolution A4-0135/1995, 14 June 1995.

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