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Published in:

Integration and Collaborative Imperialism in Modern Europe

DOI:

[10.5040/9781350377370.ch-002](https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350377370.ch-002)

2024

Document Version:

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Hennessey, J. L. (2024). Preacher, Trader, Soldier, Spy: Studying Transimperial Individuals through their Occupational Roles. In B. Schär, & M. Toivanen (Eds.), *Integration and Collaborative Imperialism in Modern Europe: At the Margins of Empire, 1800-1950* (pp. 17-36). Bloomsbury Academic.
<https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350377370.ch-002>

Total number of authors:

1

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Schär, Bernhard C. , and Mikko Toivanen , ed. *Integration and Collaborative Imperialism in Modern Europe: At the Margins of Empire, 1800-1950*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 22 Nov. 2024. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350377370>>.

Accessed from: www.bloomsburycollections.com

Accessed on: Fri Nov 22 2024 17:33:53 Central European Standard Time

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Preacher, trader, soldier, spy: Studying transimperial individuals through their occupational roles

John L. Hennessey

Introduction

During the second half of the nineteenth century, French-born soldier Charles LeGendre had a military career stretching halfway around the world, but not in the service of France. After his education at a French military school, LeGendre moved to the United States in time to see action as an officer in the American Civil War.¹ He subsequently moved to Japan as part of the American foreign service before switching allegiances yet again to work for the Japanese government as a military advisor. LeGendre was part of a Japanese diplomatic delegation to China and was intimately involved in planning a punitive expedition against an aboriginal group in southern Taiwan in 1874, which he hoped would allow Japan to annex part or all of the island. While not immediately accomplishing all of these goals, the expedition set an important precedent for Japan's subsequent aggressive expansionism, paving the way for the outright Japanese annexation of the Ryūkyū Kingdom in 1879 and Taiwan in 1895.² LeGendre continued his westward movement and ended his transimperial career as an advisor to the Korean government.³

How are we to best make sense of LeGendre's story and make it more broadly historically relevant? At first glance, LeGendre seems truly exceptional, but as this chapter and many others in this book demonstrate, modern colonial history is in fact filled with examples of individuals from across Europe and its settler colonies whose lives were marked by shifting loyalties and border-crossing careers. These figures have been difficult to place in larger historical narratives because of the national perspective that has long dominated the field. Is LeGendre best understood as 'French'? 'American'? 'Japanese'? As Amartya Sen has argued in a very different context, individuals always are characterized by a multiplicity of concurrent identities, but we have a tendency to view strangers through a simplifying lens that privileges one identity to the detriment of all of the others.⁴ Sen is mainly interested in combatting racial or ethnic prejudice and violence that comes about from seeing individuals as only 'Black', 'Muslim' or some other single identity, but in the framework of traditional historiography that still

has much purchase today, it is individuals' national identity that is generally treated as paramount. The identities we ascribe historical subjects in many ways reflect our perspectives and the narratives we are trying to tell; in the context of national histories, individuals like LeGendre are exceptions that are at best treated as curious anecdotes and at worst ignored. But as already mentioned, recent research, including this volume, reveals that such border-crossing individuals were in fact quite common and important to the modern colonial project around the world.

As this chapter will argue, alternative histories emerge that better explain certain developments in modern colonial history when stories like LeGendre's are examined through the lens of a different facet of their protagonist's collected identities. A similar argument has recently been made in the pioneering volume *The Global Bourgeoisie* (2019).⁵ Focusing on the many commonalities held by the modern bourgeoisie around the world, the anthology makes a strong case for using class, rather than nationality, to better understand global socioeconomic developments. Kris Manjapra's chapter on 'middle-class service professionals of imperial capitalism' focuses more specifically on 'a new kind of manpower' used by the expanding empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 'the scientific advisor and the middle manager'.⁶ Such professionals took on important roles in making colonial territories knowable and exploitable to imperial states and plugging them in to an increasingly uniform global capitalist network.⁷ While Manjapra's and other chapters in the volume provide a wealth of new insights on the development of the modern world by switching from the lens of nationality to that of class, 'bourgeoisie' is still quite broad and (like all lenses) obscures other ways of viewing history.

Writing histories of complex phenomena such as colonialism is a delicate balancing act. At what level of analysis between micro- and macro-history can we best understand such processes? While the individual stories of figures like LeGendre who traversed and transgressed imperial borders add complexity to oversimplified national and imperial histories, this chapter argues that the significance of such lives to the modern colonial project (c.1850–1914) as a whole can be more usefully analysed by considering individuals of the same occupational category, in a broad sense. While many such categories belonged to the 'global bourgeoisie' described by Manjapra and his colleagues, not all did, and the closer level of analysis of the occupation reveals important differences within broader class categories.⁸ As the following sections will demonstrate, the different occupations such as engineer, advisor or missionary that led individuals to other empires usually reflected common socioeconomic backgrounds, interests and worldviews that make it easier to understand their place in wider imperial history. At the same time, links within these occupational groups in colonial territories strengthened cooperation between citizens of different European countries and European settler colonies, while often reinforcing notions of common masculinity and 'whiteness'. As the following sections will demonstrate, whether homesteaders in the western United States or engineers in Africa, such transimperial individuals' common occupational role in another country's imperial project was arguably more significant to larger imperial history than their country of origin.

Transimperial history

In many ways, transimperial history, or the study of people, objects and ideas that crossed the borders between empires, is a natural extension of both transnational and new imperial history.⁹ Transnational history has exposed the inadequacy of history-writing that is delimited by constructed national boundaries, missing border-crossing processes. New imperial history has worked to overcome the persistent dominance of national histories in former colonial powers by decentring imperial history from historical metropolises and showing the significance of their empires in co-constructing their modern history. One strand of the latter examines the circulation of information, ideologies and individuals between different territories within the British Empire, most notably the work of David Lambert and Alan Lester.¹⁰ Lambert and Lester's important anthology *Colonial Lives across the British Empire* (2006) aimed to address the dearth of research on 'men and women who dwelt for extended periods in one colony before moving on to dwell in others,' as opposed to short-staying imperial travel writers, who have received ample scholarly attention.¹¹ Lambert and Lester emphasize the multifaceted concept of 'imperial careers' as a tool for analysing this group: the term 'career' carries the double meaning of 'life course' and 'professional course,' as well as capturing 'a sense of volition, agency and self-advancement, but also accident, chance encounter and the impact of factors beyond the control of the individual'.¹² Such a micro-level empirical focus can help to nuance macro-level generalizations, revealing the 'multiple subject positions' of individuals that undertook imperial (or anti-imperial) careers and thereby the 'multiple, and often contestatory "projects" of colonialism' that characterized all modern empires.¹³

Though their work is confined to the British Empire, Lambert and Lester call for research that transcends inter-imperial boundaries to complement single-empire studies.¹⁴ Such approaches are common in early modern history, but far less so for the New Imperialism of c.1850–1950. This chapter contends that micro-historical approaches highlighting individual careers hold great potential to broaden our understanding of modern transimperial history. Individual transimperial lives can be used to reveal a complex patchwork of interests and ideologies that complicate macro-level grand narratives. Simon Potter and Jonathan Saha write that transimperial individual lives 'constituted new connections across empire and "facilitated the continual reformation of imperial discourses, practices and culture". These people were what Transnational historians would call "connectors" – "intermediaries, go-betweens and brokers"'.¹⁵ Examining such individual life trajectories problematizes the ostensibly 'national' character of individual empires or nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial projects and reveals imperial borders to be highly porous, at least to privileged, non-colonized subjects.

There are, however, as many different stories as there are individuals, and it becomes necessary to group or categorize these in some systematic way. Building on Lester and Lambert's emphasis on the 'career' as an important analytical tool, this chapter groups and analyses transimperial individuals according to their different professional roles. Besides having an appropriate double meaning in an imperial context, the term

'occupation' better captures collective similarities in groups of transimperial individuals, as opposed to the more individualistic focus of 'career'. Different occupational groups had widely diverging reasons for travelling in and between colonial territories, as well as different social statuses, resources and relationships with state authorities. Interests and outlooks of course varied within each group, but it is my contention that it is still useful to look at categories of individuals like missionaries, colonial administrators and colonists since each of these occupations was involved in the colonial project in common and distinct ways. Naturally, individuals could, and often did, play several such roles simultaneously. Nor are the categories below intended to be exhaustive, although they cover many of the most common transimperial occupations of the time. This occupational approach differs from Lambert's and Lester's in that its focus is primarily on context and identity rather than movement. Not all of the individual careers examined below brought transimperial individuals into more than one colonial territory, but they all involved a recontextualization of the actors to a new location where their identities and roles, as non-citizens of the empire in question, were more open to negotiation and manipulation.

Without taking a specific country, colony or empire as its starting point, this chapter will instead consider occupational categories present in virtually all modern empires, taking examples from a wide range of geographical locations. As individuals of a different nationality than the empire in which they lived and worked, transimperial individuals are interesting as a group of people that held a special, less self-evident place in colonial societies, regardless of *which* particular nationality they held. Though some formed communities with their compatriots, very often, they were mostly or totally alone. Nationality became but one facet of these individuals' identity, in contexts in which their occupational roles were often more significant. As such, imperial contexts frequently gave rise to close professional and social ties between individuals originating in different European countries or settler colonies. The demand for various types of colonial manpower also drew a large number of individuals from 'marginal' European countries that had small or no empires of their own, enmeshing them in the projects of 'great powers' like France and Britain. Treating one occupational category at a time, the following sections will analyse what members of these border-crossing occupational groups shared and how they strategically managed their national identity in foreign imperial spaces.

Mercenaries

Since the advent of modern nationalism and mass conscription in the nineteenth century, it has been common to project a view of 'national' armies as consisting of nationals of the belligerent country onto the more distant past. Early modern historians have contested this anachronism, pointing out, for example, the fact that the 'Swedish' army that was so effective during the Thirty Years' War was primarily composed of foreign mercenaries or the role of German 'Hessian' mercenaries in the American Revolutionary War.¹⁶ Such work has importantly problematized the 'national' character generally attributed to such warfare. Nevertheless, while the role

of colonial armies composed of troops drawn from colonized populations in both modern colonial wars and the world wars has received a fair amount of scholarly attention,¹⁷ the role of transimperial mercenaries during this period has until recently largely been overlooked.¹⁸

As the personal fief of Belgian King Leopold II rather than a colony of the state of Belgium, the Congo Free State (1885–1908) was especially noteworthy in this regard. In surveying and staking out his initial claims to the Congo, Leopold turned to the famed Anglo-American explorer Henry Morton Stanley. After securing his territorial claims with other European powers, Leopold created the *Force Publique* to ‘pacify’ the Congo and squeeze out its natural resources as cheaply as possible. The officers of this multifunction military/police force were recruited from across Europe. Belgium was insufficient as a recruiting ground given the number of men required and the high mortality rate from tropical diseases. A peaceful period in Europe encouraged adventure-seeking military men to look for combat elsewhere and leave was readily granted by national armies who saw the benefit in their soldiers gaining battle experience.¹⁹ Moreover, there was a clear economic incentive for the soldiers, who were actively recruited with promises of a generous cut of the colonial booty. As Adam Hochschild has put it, ‘To Europeans the Congo was a gold rush and the Foreign Legion combined.’²⁰

Swedes, whose homeland gave up its only overseas colony in 1878, were the third most numerous nationality working for the Congo Free State,²¹ and there is evidence that their countrymen who remained at home felt a kind of vicarious colonial pride in their work. Such sentiments extended to the highest levels of society. In a letter designed to flatter and win the support of Swedish King Oscar II for his manoeuvres in Berlin, Leopold strongly praised the quality of the Swedish officers who served in Congo. Oscar replied with obvious pride that ‘in serving Your Majesty, [the officers] know they serve the cause of humankind.’²² These feelings of pride seem to have persisted for decades. Another Swede, Eric von Otter, who had travelled to Kenya in the service of a Swedish trading firm but ended up fighting with the British during the First World War, was rewarded after the armistice by being placed in charge of an entire Kenyan province. Although he became increasingly sceptical of the colonial civilizing mission, he was praised on the cover of a biographical work published after his death with the revealing words ‘gave the Swedish name a positive ring in distant lands.’²³ Clearly, those who arranged for its publication wanted Sweden to share in the glory of British colonialism, even if von Otter himself had had mixed feelings.

The French Foreign Legion is probably the best-known case in the often-overlooked history of transimperial mercenaries, but one that operated in a slightly different way than the *Force Publique*. Created in 1831 to assist in the French conquest of Algeria, the *Légion étrangère* was involved in colonial conquest and ‘pacification’ operations in nearly all segments of the French Empire, from the Middle East to Indochina to sub-Saharan Africa. A formidable tool for making use of diverse immigrants and demobilized soldiers who sought adventure or French citizenship, the Legion continued to play a major role in colonial warfare after the Second World War, when it was deeply involved in the wars of decolonization in Indochina and Algeria.²⁴ Today, the Legion continues to recruit men from around the world and has repeatedly been sent to former French

colonies in Africa, perpetuating colonial-era patterns of intervention. Interestingly, *légionnaires* serve under assumed names and, with French as the lingua franca in the corps, the original nationality of the soldiers is largely effaced. Unlike other examples of transimperial mercenaries, like those working in the Congo, the French Foreign Legion offers a kind of ‘fresh start’ for recruits rather than the promise of an episode of adventure and riches in an otherwise national military career.

In this case, transimperial individuals were (and still are) assimilated into a new, national fighting force, but as the earlier examples showed, many mercenaries retained feelings of loyalty towards or identification with their home country and merely served across imperial borders temporarily to gain experience, adventure and wealth during a time of European peace. Importantly, in all of these cases, soldiers from a variety of national backgrounds served together. Challenging oversimplified views of ‘national’ armies, such a view also raises important questions about European military cooperation and integration at an early phase. Susanne Kuss has pointed to the multinational force that invaded China in the Boxer War as a key example of European military collaboration,²⁵ but could the *Force Publique* also be seen as such an early example of European integration, foreshadowing transnational entities like Frontex? Common goals, aspirations to ‘further civilization’ and, to some extent, a common European identity among a transimperial soldiery certainly characterized many of these martial partnerships.

Engineers

During the second half of the long nineteenth century, as today, leading experts and researchers in various technical fields were in high demand globally, which often took their careers in transimperial directions. Infrastructure of various kinds was central to the modern colonial project almost everywhere, as large-scale resource extraction became an increasingly central strategic aim. As William Wheeler, a young American engineer who conducted surveys for roads and railways and designed an important bridge in the Japanese settler colony of Hokkaido, put it, ‘railroads have proved to be ... the true pioneers of colonization – the chief instrumentality in opening up vast territories in western America, South America, India and Australia.’²⁶ At this moment in time, the United States was world-leading in using railroads to facilitate settler colonialism, and many of its engineers applied their expertise in the service of other empires. This was not only the case of smaller or weaker empires like that of Japan but also the British Empire, which, among various professionals of many nationalities, employed a large number of American engineers in the construction of railroads such as the strategic Uganda Railway. In 1901, prefabricated bridge trusses, tools and rolling stock were shipped from the United States to Mombasa together with American engineers, who oversaw their assembly by workers both from the region and from British India.²⁷ British observers were often annoyed by this American ‘invasion’, but the massive consolidation of American heavy industry in the late nineteenth century and the United States’ large domestic market made possible economies of scale with which British firms could scarcely compete. The Americans also described their activities

using the language of 'invasion' and 'conquest', but to demonstrate pride in their country's superior technical prowess and contribution to the spread of 'civilization'.²⁸

This is not to say that the United States' own railroad network was only planned and operated by Americans. In another far-flung transimperial story recounted by Manjapra, several protégés of German forestry expert Dietrich Brandis, who worked for the British in Burma, later took important technical roles in American railway companies (forestry was strongly interlinked with railroad construction due to the need for vast numbers of wooden railroad ties).²⁹ As this example illustrates, transimperial careers should not be merely seen as examples of national comparative advantage, with experts from one country dominating a certain sector worldwide, but rather involved an inter-imperial competition for professionals drawn from a global pool of expertise.

Railroad construction was one of their most important activities, but transimperial engineers were also important in the establishment of colonial industries, such as German experts who built up a mechanized sugar industry in the Dutch East Indies.³⁰ As Stephen Tuffnell has shown, transimperial engineers were also major players in colonial mining operations. At this time, American mining engineers were recognized as the best in the world as a result of the emergence of a number of specialized mining colleges and the ample opportunities to gain varied mining experience in the American West.³¹ Tuffnell also argues that white American engineers capitalized on the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow to sell themselves as 'experts' in managing reluctant non-white labour gangs, sometimes even influencing local colonial policy toward 'natives'.³² Literally thousands of American mining engineers held key positions at British gold, coal and other mines in South Africa, and many subsequently went on to apply their expertise to joint Anglo-American mining ventures in Latin America. In such locations, they formed large expatriate 'colonies' where they celebrated holidays like Independence Day and Thanksgiving and arranged for the large-scale import of various American products.³³

Sometimes engineers' careers spanned many colonial territories. In the 1870s, American engineer Benjamin Smith Lyman, trained in France and Germany, worked first for the British in the Punjab and subsequently as an engineering consultant for the Japanese colonial development authority in Hokkaido. In Hokkaido, he trained a number of Japanese assistants in Western engineering techniques and surveyed coal fields that would later fuel Japan's industrialization and further imperial expansion.³⁴ In the beginning of the twentieth century, Lyman worked for a New York company in the American-controlled Philippines, capping a long and extremely transimperial career.³⁵ Unlike some categories of transimperial actors, such engineers were not escaping failure, debt or lack of opportunity back home but belonged to a powerful elite, as evidenced by the presence of future American president Herbert Hoover among their ranks. Hoover's early career included stints in Australia, Africa and East Asia, and like other self-proclaimed 'experts' on non-white labour, he produced statistics about how many workers of different 'races' supposedly equalled one white worker in productivity.³⁶

How did transimperial engineers perceive their role in other countries' colonial projects at the time? And how directly were they involved in the exploitation of local populations? The latter point varied. In certain colonial territories, like Hokkaido,

foreign engineers served mainly in an advisory role for the colonial government and the indigenous population did not provide a major source of manual labour, even though they were still adversely affected by the new infrastructure. Elsewhere, individual contractors worked autonomously on a project delegated to them by the colonial government, directly recruiting and overseeing colonized labour, whether paid or forced. Such was the case for the Scandinavian railroad contractor Joseph Stephens, who personally oversaw a large local labour force in British India in the 1860s, earning a sizeable fortune.³⁷

As for their self-image and justifications, many transimperial engineers seem to have viewed and portrayed their activities as expanding the boundaries of civilization or improving humanity as a whole.³⁸ Wheeler certainly took this point of view, excusing his prolonged absence in letters to his family in Massachusetts with the unusual opportunity he had to advance human progress on Japan's distant colonial frontier.³⁹ This tendency for transimperial engineers to depict their work in other empires in either national or universal terms (or sometimes, paradoxically, both) seems to have been especially pronounced for elites from countries with few or no formal colonies of their own. As we have already seen for mercenaries, this fascinating blend of universalism and patriotism among individuals working in another country's empire reveals the complexity of identity formation in transimperial contexts, as well as the malleable meaning and function of nationality.

Merchants

Trade is perhaps the oldest and most common border-crossing enterprise. There is an enormous body of research on colonial trade during the early modern period, during which debates over mercantilism and free trade were among the most important fault lines in European politics. Scholarship on colonial trade during the era of the New Imperialism is unfortunately considerably smaller and less mainstream, but has the potential to tell us much about transimperial mobility.⁴⁰

As with other transimperial individuals, merchants often capitalized on their nationality in business and politics, even though their objectives were of course usually more closely aligned with private enterprise than national interests. When only a few individuals or a small merchant community of a particular nationality existed in a given location, they could be called on to serve as translators or formal or informal links to their home country. As Aryo Makko has shown, it was common practice for Western countries during this period to designate prominent businessmen in various colonial locations as honorary, typically unpaid, consuls. Makko argues that such consuls played a central role in informal imperial expansion around the world, enabling even European countries with small or non-existent empires to share in the spoils of the Age of Empire.⁴¹ Consuls during this period had wide-ranging powers and duties, including promoting trade and assisting nationals of the represented country abroad but even conducting diplomatic agreements and serving as magistrates, especially in countries where gunboat diplomacy had led to extraterritorial privileges. But as with other transimperial individuals, consuls' nationalities could be employed flexibly and,

like their commission itself, were no guarantee of political loyalty. Some consuls were content with the profit and prestige that derived from their official relationship with their home countries and their trading interests, while others abused their authority and distance from their home country or even directly defrauded it.⁴² Interestingly, late nineteenth-century consuls were very frequently of another nationality than the country that they were commissioned to represent. Sweden-Norway engaged consuls from America, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and other countries in the 1870s and 1880s, for example. In especially distant locations, it was not uncommon for one individual consul to represent multiple countries. Switzer George Henry Ruckert, operating out of Akyab, Burma, was at one point simultaneously the consul of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden-Norway, for example.⁴³

The mercantile occupation was perhaps among the most porous of the categories examined in this chapter, and its ranks could easily be joined by enterprising individuals who first moved to another empire and worked in a different capacity and then spied a business opportunity. In a fascinating example, Per Högselius and Yunwei Song have scrutinized the career of Johan Gunnar Andersson, a Swedish geologist and advisor to the Chinese government in the early years of the twentieth century. Andersson, entranced by China's mineral wealth, capitalized on his nationality to argue for a strong partnership between China and Sweden, which he deliberately portrayed as a benign small power that could help China resist further imperial encroachment from Britain, France, the United States and Japan. In fact, Andersson secretly met with a group of Sweden's leading bankers and industrialists and plotted to secure control of mineral finds for his home country, also establishing contact with a Swedish trading firm in Japan that could be of assistance. Andersson seems to have had some success in convincing the fledgling Republican Chinese government of Sweden's ostensibly anti-imperialist, magnanimous intentions, but his schemes were ultimately derailed by complications arising from the First World War and the untimely death of Yuan Shikai, with whom he had nurtured strong connections.⁴⁴ Andersson's story reveals how transimperial individuals could easily draw on national networks to take advantage of business opportunities in remote locations. Even citizenship in a small and militarily weak European country could be turned to an advantage.

Expert advisors

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, colonial powers increasingly began to view colonization as an 'art' that required specialized theories and techniques. Specialty schools were set up in imperial metropolises to train functionaries for service in the empire and 'colonial studies' emerged as an academic field.⁴⁵ In this context, it should hardly be surprising that expert advisors on colonial matters were hired across imperial boundaries, just like engineers. These individuals' fields of expertise included everything from colonial and international law to tropical medicine to trade matters.

The most well-known employer of foreign advisors was Meiji Japan (1868–1912). There were more than 3,000 Western advisors in government service during the first part of this period, in addition to individuals hired by the private sector.⁴⁶ Advisors were

hired to Westernize almost every conceivable aspect of Japanese society and formed a diverse group, ranging from military experts to seismologists to dairy farmers. One of the most important kinds of foreign advisors were legal experts. As Alexis Dudden has shown, international law was a key discourse underpinning nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperialism. Although referred to in universal terms and as 'law', Dudden more accurately describes international law as a 'belief system' used by Western nations (and soon Japan) to subjugate and exploit other nations that lacked the military might necessary to contest this unscrupulous discursive system. According to international law, only 'civilized' countries had the right to act as full subjects of the law, with countries deemed 'uncivilized' unfit to represent themselves. The Japanese government quickly recognized that adroitness with international law was essential to maintaining Japan's nominal independence. In the decades following Japan's 'opening' to Western trade, Japanese leaders deftly used international law both to successfully call for the revision of unequal treaties between the West and Japan *and* to meddle in Korea's internal affairs and block Koreans' right to represent their country internationally.⁴⁷

Hired foreigners were essential in Japan's quest to master the language of international law. Tellingly, many of the foremost foreign lawyers hired by the Meiji government both helped to reform domestic laws *and* served as colonial consultants. For example, celebrated French legal scholar Gustave Émile Boissonade de Fontarabie was employed by the Japanese Justice Ministry as a top government advisor from 1873 to 1895.⁴⁸ Besides advising the Japanese Cabinet and recruiting law instructors for Japanese universities, Boissonade was responsible for revising Japan's legal codes according to Western models (he unsurprisingly chose the Napoleonic Code as a model), earning him the epithet 'the father of modern Japanese law'.⁴⁹ These codes, along with his strong insistence that the Japanese legal system officially renounce torture, played a major role in Japan's eventual reversal of Western nations' extraterritoriality privileges.⁵⁰

As Dudden has described, however, Boissonade also played a crucial, though far less well remembered, role in the gradual Japanese takeover of Korea. Japanese leaders felt threatened by Korea's centuries-long close tributary relationship to China and sought to sever that bond and increase their influence over the Korean government by means of international law. Boissonade was involved in Japan's 1875 attempt at gunboat diplomacy to 'open' Korea (imitating earlier American treatment of Japan). He also provided crucial advice on what demands to make of the Korean government in an unequal treaty of Japan's own.⁵¹ Boissonade's teachings on the respective status of 'unequal states' according to international law also helped the Japanese to formulate a response to an 1882 uprising in Seoul against Japanese encroachment.⁵²

Other advisors to the Japanese government, like American Durham Stevens, developed an unswerving loyalty to Japan and were used in a variety of roles. After several years of service, the Japanese government began to send Stevens on secret missions to lobby the American Congress on Japan's behalf and counter negative publicity in the American press. As a white American man, Stevens's glowing accounts of Japan's colonial endeavours in Korea were doubtless more credible to a white American public than those of more obviously nationally biased, and 'racially'

other, Japanese and Koreans. At the end of his career, Stevens was appointed as an advisor to the Korean foreign ministry, ostensibly without any connection to Japan, but in fact at the bidding and in the employ of the Japanese government. Taking advantage of the greater trust that many Koreans had for Americans, Japan used Stevens to spy on Korean diplomatic plans (mainly calls for aid from other powers against Japanese machinations) and exercise a measure of control over Korean foreign policy.⁵³

Japan was not alone in employing such expert advisors, even if it probably did so to a greater extent than any other empire. Responding to similar external and internal pressures, the Ottoman Empire also engaged a number of European advisors in various fields starting in the Tanzimat era (1839–76). As in Japan, some of the most important of these were hired in order to modernize the Ottoman armed forces, with British advisors working with the navy, Germans with the army and French with the *gendarmérie*, based on perceptions of national aptitudes.⁵⁴ British experts were even entrusted with the post of inspector general at the Ottoman Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs as well as with the reform of the important customs service in Istanbul.⁵⁵ In addition, foreign merchants were even appointed to a special civic council and granted sweeping powers to Westernize municipal services in the foreign quarter of Istanbul in the mid-nineteenth century.⁵⁶ Siam, the Qing Empire, Persia, Russia and various countries in South America similarly engaged foreign advisors during this period.⁵⁷

Though in the employ of another empire, these transimperial experts varied in their degree of loyalty to their hosts. At one end of the spectrum were devoted ‘converts’ like Durham Stevens, while at the other were individuals who actively advanced the interests of their home country at the expense of their employer. In most cases, they had to strike a balance between their loyalties and could sometimes capitalize on their position to serve as useful intermediaries, like French businessman Antoine Alléon, who was close to the Ottoman sultan but also performed favours for the French Embassy in Istanbul.⁵⁸ Hired experts were also entrusted with various degrees of autonomy; some were appointed to government posts directly, while others were advisors in both name and actuality. Though paying its advisors handsomely, Japan was especially jealous of its sovereignty and developed elaborate contracts with which to keep its hired foreigners in a purely advisory role.⁵⁹ In almost all cases, the nationality of top-level advisors could become a thorny political issue. Both Japan and Ottoman Empire endeavoured to balance the nationality of their advisors so that no one country would gain too much influence and to avoid accusations of partiality by potentially hostile rival empires.⁶⁰ As a result, many of these transimperial individuals operated in a particularly cosmopolitan environment and worked and made close friends with experts of other nationalities. Such figures with a suitable professional background capitalized on their hosts’ perceptions of the national strengths of their home countries (such as British naval expertise) and opportunities to serve as intermediaries with their countrymen in various situations, but nevertheless operated in a context in which cooperation across national lines in service of a common occupation was essential.

Colonists

The very term 'settler' implies *immobility*, but among colonists, too, there was a great deal of transimperial movement during the modern Age of Empire. After making one long move, colonists became more likely to engage in additional moves to other colonial territories. A significant proportion of the settlers in French Indochina came from France's Indian Ocean colonies of Réunion and French India, for example, despite their small size.⁶¹ But far from all colonists remained within their own empire. In a common discourse among colonial elites at the time, settler colonies were viewed as an outlet for 'excess population' that was causing social problems in the metropole.⁶² Simultaneously, the leaders of countries who lacked colonies of their own or whose colonies did not provide enough attraction to emigrants often fretted about this 'loss' of human resources to other countries or empires.⁶³ While considered burdensome at home, these individuals could spread their national culture and contribute to national development if provided with land and opportunities abroad. The increasing centrality of mass mobilization in the cataclysmic wars of the twentieth century only inflamed these sentiments. Despite great efforts on the part of the emigrants' home countries, the frequency with which fears of population 'loss' to other empires or countries continued to be voiced indicate that it was often difficult to keep members of the 'excess population' within one's own empire.

Such was the case for France's most (in)famous modern settler colony: Algeria. Starting shortly after the initial French conquest of 1830, large numbers of non-French European settlers poured into the territory, primarily from adjacent Mediterranean countries like Italy, Malta and Spain (in particular, the Balearic Islands).⁶⁴ In these early years, France and the French colonial state had an ambivalent relationship with these foreigners. French leaders had high hopes for Algeria as a model French colony, but were disappointed by the dearth of interest in emigration among their compatriots. In the colony, European Mediterranean migrants performed important, largely unskilled, labour (the Muslim population of Algeria was considered too unreliable according to widespread French prejudice), but were still only tolerated rather than welcomed into Algerian colonial society. Dreaming of hardworking yeomen farmers and influenced by the national stereotypes of the day, French officials tried to redirect northern European emigration to Algeria instead of America, actively recruiting Germans, Belgians and Swiss, but these never came close to the number of southern Europeans, whom they generally reviled for their destitution and supposed laziness.⁶⁵ In fact, non-French Europeans outnumbered French settlers throughout almost the entire first fifty years of the colony's existence, constituting just over half of the European population.⁶⁶ As the years went on and it became increasingly clear that French dreams of a colony predominantly populated by French and northern Europeans would never be realized, southern Europeans were increasingly accepted, until all of their children born in Algeria were automatically naturalized as French citizens in 1889. As a result of the concurrent advent of Jules Ferry's 'secular, free [of charge] and obligatory' public school system, by the 1920s the descendants of southern European immigrants were fully assimilated into colonial French society.⁶⁷

Other settler colonies that pursued a less radical assimilatory programme achieved similar results through a more inclusive (for Europeans and their descendants) conception of 'whiteness'. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have demonstrated, an increasingly hegemonic and highly simplified white-non-white binary developed transimperial around the turn of the twentieth century in South Africa, Australia, the western United States and elsewhere. Perhaps most spectacularly, this allowed for the rapid reconciliation and close cooperation of the Boers and the English in South Africa only a handful of years after they were bitterly at war. A common white identity was forged, pitting them against the Black majority population.⁶⁸

In virtually every example of modern settler colonialism, settlers have unsurprisingly been the staunchest defenders of the unequal colonial order, whether in the form of segregation, harsh punitive laws or even genocidal militia warfare against colonized peoples.⁶⁹ Settler lobbies often fiercely resisted humanitarian reforms issued by the metropole and resented other metropolitan interference in colonial affairs.⁷⁰ This dynamic may have been exacerbated as transimperial settlers attempted to assimilate into the majority settler culture. As James McDougall writes of Algeria, 'As the divisions between communities and individuals of different European origins became blurred and tended to dissipate, so the line demarcating Europeans en bloc from [Muslim] Algerians ... became harder, remaining as the primary focus of social and political antagonism.'⁷¹ In this way, the most vulnerable segment of colonial societies, the indigenous population, could thus come to bear the brunt of transimperial settlers' desire for inclusion as they sought to differentiate themselves from such subalterns.

Missionaries

As members of a worldwide movement with universalist aspirations that in most cases was separate from the colonial state, Christian missionaries represent a special category of actors in the colonial situation. Unlike many other transimperial occupations, which were monopolized by white men and closely related to notions of masculinity, missionary work involved a great many women. Missionaries worked in nearly all of the world's colonial territories throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but had an ambiguous relationship with the colonial state and colonial settlers that has given rise to intense debate. 'Were missionaries colonizers?', asks Karen Vallgård in an important article that summarizes the discussion. Vallgård concludes that it oversimplifies the situation of missionaries in colonial territories to merely relegate them to one or the other of the simplistic binary categories of 'colonizer' and 'colonized', necessitating closer microstudies.⁷²

On the one hand, missionaries were bearers of the same kinds of racist, exoticizing colonial discourses that underpinned state expansionism and often treated both actual and potential local converts accordingly. Missionaries also frequently worked together with the colonial state in various ways. On the other hand, missionaries could take the side of the colonized against other foreign actors in colonial territories. Saving souls was work that usually involved forging a closer relationship with colonized subjects than any of the interactions undertaken by the colonial state, and missionaries were

often far better versed in local languages and customs than any other outsiders, not infrequently leading to increased sympathy for colonized peoples. These sympathies could lead missionaries to clash with the colonial state and especially settlers, who generally were more inclined to view the colonized as a source of cheap labour or a security threat that needed to be brutally repressed than as individuals in need of spiritual salvation.⁷³ It was not uncommon for missionaries to criticize colonial governments on moral and humanitarian grounds, but as with nearly all other Western humanitarian critiques of colonialism at the time, these tended to advocate reform rather than challenging the legitimacy of colonialism itself.⁷⁴ In Vallgård's words, 'The peculiar combination of Christian universalism and racialized thinking constituted one of the greatest paradoxes in colonial society.'⁷⁵

In addition to these special attributes, a great many missionaries exemplified transimperial careers. An excellent example is the Swedish evangelical mission in Congo. Studying their letters and other writings, Simon Larsson argues that although Swedish missionaries were sometimes powerful critics of colonial violence in Leopold II's Congo Free State, they were also supportive of the state for strategic and ideological reasons.⁷⁶ Missionaries were practically dependent on the colonial state for protection in a region where many local residents believed (often correctly) that they had to fight for their lives against any arriving white people.

On a deeper ideological level, however, the goals of the Swedish mission in many ways required and were consistent with a strong colonial state. Larsson argues that Swedish missionaries aimed for nothing less than remaking Congolese society from the ground up, creating a European-style individualistic Christian nation with its basis in the nuclear family. The missionaries clearly understood that undertaking such changes would require a powerful state apparatus. On the other hand, the government of the Congo Free State was uninterested in implementing such sweeping changes to Congolese society, preferring to adopt the most straightforward approach to resource extraction. Missionaries complained at the state's unwillingness to shoulder the burden of educating the local population. By undertaking this task themselves, Swedish missionaries assisted the colonial state, but they resented the lack of state support and the diversion of their resources from proselytizing. In these ways, the colonial state and the Swedish mission had separate aims that sometimes converged and sometimes diverged, leading them to an uneasy partial cooperation. The fact that the Scandinavian missionaries were not Belgian or Catholic added a level of distrust and uncertainty that ironically tempered the Swedes' harshest criticism of colonial violence, for fear of expulsion.⁷⁷ Vallgård describes the Danish mission in South India in comparable terms: 'A shifting mixture of mutual animosity and admiration, skepticism and support characterized their relationship with the British colonial government.'⁷⁸ As imperial 'careerists', missionaries were especially flexible and often overlapped with the other occupational categories described in this chapter.

Conclusion

He is an Englishman!
For he himself has said it,

And it's greatly to his credit,
That he is an Englishman!

...

For he might have been a Roosian,
A French, or Turk, or Proosian,
Or perhaps Italian!

...

But in spite of all temptations
To belong to other nations,
He remains an Englishman!⁷⁹

Ever the masters of political satire in Britain at the height of its empire, Gilbert and Sullivan point out the absurdity of nationalism in this bracing, celebratory song from their operetta *HMS Pinafore*. But in spite of our tendency to view modern imperialism through a national lens and take it for granted that one's nationality is not a choice, it was in fact far more common than has been generally recognized for individuals of all stripes 'to belong to other nations' or empires during this period, as this chapter has shown. Both globally valued professional skills and nationality were malleable resources that could be strategically deployed by transimperial individuals in a wide variety of geographical and occupational contexts. Taking up the call by historians like Potter and Saha to write modern 'connected histories of empire' using such transimperially active individuals, this chapter has presented a myriad of examples of how men and women in different occupational categories worked for other empires than those of their birth country and thereby forged important transimperial linkages during the modern Age of Empire, c.1850–1914.

While individual lives can reveal much about the diversity of motives or circumstances that drove people to cross imperial boundaries, this chapter has contended that occupational categories can serve as a useful analytical category midway between micro- and macro-history. Members of these different occupational groups often had much in common, whether in terms of political views, economic power, social status or attitudes towards race and the imperial project itself. These commonalities with others of the same occupation, broadly construed, were often far more significant in colonial contexts than the individuals' particular country of origin. They also permit a closer and more specific analysis than broader class categories, even though these can also be useful when telling larger stories of social and economic development.

Transimperial individuals occasionally outnumbered nationals of the colonizing country in imperial territories, as non-French European colonists in Algeria, but frequently, they were a small minority, exceptions to the rule. What, then, can we learn about modern imperialism from their stories, beyond their value as interesting anecdotes? A focus on individuals from comparatively small countries, or countries without empires, demonstrates the relevance of colonial history to all parts of Europe. Moreover, the stories of transimperial individuals reveal the complexity of the social hierarchy in nearly all colonial territories. Describing missionaries, Vallgård writes that 'relations of power are rarely dichotomous, and certainly not in colonial

situations.⁸⁰ Indeed, as the examples presented above reveal, colonial hierarchies were often less a sandwich than a *mille-feuille* pastry. Colonial Hokkaido saw the interaction of high Japanese officials, destitute Honshu colonists, dispossessed and forcibly relocated indigenous Ainu, American technical advisors and British missionaries. Nineteenth-century Algerians, themselves highly heterogeneous, were confronted with Swiss mercenary soldiers, Spanish, Italian and Maltese migrant labourers, German agricultural colonists and French land magnates. Indians had to contend with British administrators, Scandinavian railroad contractors, American engineers and Danish missionaries, while building their own transimperial anti-colonial networks overseas. These messy social amalgamations could both strengthen and undermine colonial rule and provided ample room for different groups to exert agency over their situation and jockey for power.

The stories of transimperial careerists also challenge the seemingly self-evident connections between nation and empire. Just how 'British' was India or how 'French' was Algeria? Many of the individuals described earlier reveal a high degree of European integration within various social classes or occupational groups overseas. The stories of transimperial individuals and groups complicate and challenge the use of national labels in imperial territories, but in some cases, paradoxically, 'the national was not undermined by transimperial connections but heightened by them', as Tuffnell argues with regard to American engineers in the British Empire.⁸¹ As we have seen, such individuals could feel national pride in what they felt was their role in advancing 'civilization', in universal terms, rather than merely extending the reach of the empire for or in which they were working. In these ways, studying transimperial history through individual careers and occupational groups further complicates existing understandings of how national, imperial and universalist identities intersected in colonial contexts. Clearly, the examples above are only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, and future studies of transimperial careerists will help us to better understand our contemporary, hyper-globalized world, in which such connections are more the rule than the exception.

Notes

1. 'Gen. LeGendre Dead', *New York Times*, 3 September 1899.
2. Matthew Fraleigh, 'Japan's First War Reporter: Kishida Ginkō and the Taiwan Expedition', *Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (2010): 43–66; Sandra Caruthers, 'Charles LeGendre, American Diplomacy, and Expansionism in Meiji Japan' (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 1966), chapter 5.
3. 'Gen. LeGendre Dead'.
4. Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence* (London: Penguin, 2015).
5. Christof Dejung, David Motadel and Jürgen Osthammel, eds, *The Global Bourgeoisie: The Rise of the Middle Classes in the Age of Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
6. Kris Manjappa, 'The Semiperipheral Hand: Middle-Class Service Professionals of Imperial Capitalism', in Dejung et al., *The Global Bourgeoisie*, 189.
7. Ibid.

8. Missionaries, for example, often came from more humble backgrounds than the colonial managers described by Manjapra, and settlers often came from the lower classes, to some extent explaining their frequent conflicts with colonial authorities.
9. For important theoretical texts in the subfield of transimperial history, see Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski, eds, *Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870–1930* (Basingstoke: Bloomsbury, 2015); Simon Potter and Jonathan Saha, 'Global History, Imperial History and Connected Histories of Empire', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16, no. 1 (2015): n.p.; John L. Hennessey, 'Rule by Association: Japan in the Global Trans-imperial Culture, 1868–1912' (PhD diss., Linnaeus University, 2018); Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé, 'Transimperial History: Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition', *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (2018): 429–52; Bernhard Schär, 'From Batticaloa via Basel to Berlin: Transimperial Science in Ceylon and Beyond around 1900', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 48, no. 2 (2020): 230–62.
10. Alan Lester, 'British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire', *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (2002): 24–48; David Lambert and Alan Lester, 'Introduction: Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects', in *Colonial Lives across the British Empire*, ed. Lambert and Lester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–31. In both instances, Lester refers to this *intra*-imperial historiography as 'transimperial', but the term has since come to be used for the history of *inter*-imperial circulations. See Mizutani Satoshi, 'Introduction to "Beyond Comparison: Japanese Colonialism in Transimperial Relations"', *Cross-Currents* 32 (2019): 7–8 for a discussion of terminology.
11. Lambert and Lester, 'Introduction', 1.
12. *Ibid.*, 21–2.
13. *Ibid.*, 2, 6. The latter position is inspired by Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
14. Lambert and Lester, 'Introduction', 31.
15. Potter and Saha, 'Global History', citing Lambert and Lester, 'Introduction', 2, and Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Bloomsbury, 2013), 36.
16. Geoff Mortimer, ed., 'War by Contract, Credit and Contribution: The Thirty Years War', in *Early Modern Military History, 1450–1815* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 102; Charles Ingrao, '“Barbarous Strangers”: Hessian State and Society during the American Revolution', *American Historical Review* 87, no. 4 (1982): 954–76.
17. See, e.g., Ronald Lamothe, *Slaves of Fortune: Sudanese Soldiers and the River War, 1896–1898* (London: Currey, 2011); Christian Koller, 'The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and Their Deployment in Europe during the First World War', *Immigrants & Minorities* 26, nos. 1–2 (2008): 111–33; Richard Fogarty, *Race and War in France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
18. See, e.g., Bernhard Schär, 'Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies: Towards a New Imperial History of Europe, c.1770–1850', *Past & Present* 257, no. 1 (2022): 134–67; Peter Forsgren, 'I den europeiska civilisationens tjänst' (In the Service of European Civilization), *Historisk tidskrift* 140, no. 3 (2020): 444–75.
19. Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (New York: Mariner, 1999), 123–39.
20. *Ibid.*, 138–9.
21. David Nilsson, *Sweden-Norway at the Berlin Conference 1884–85* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2013), 5.

22. Oskar II to Leopold II (draft), 1 April 1885, quoted and translated in Nilsson, *Sweden-Norway at the Berlin Conference*, 26.
23. Forsgren, 'I den europeiska civilisationens tjänst', 462–70, quote 464, my translation.
24. Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion* (New York: Skyhorse, 2010).
25. Susanne Kuss, 'Co-operation between German and French Troops during the Boxer War', in Barth and Cvetkovski, *Imperial Cooperation and Transfer*, 197–218.
26. William Wheeler, 'Report on Transportation Routes between Sapporo & Tide-Water', in *First Annual Report of Sapporo Agricultural College* (Tokei: Kaitakushi, 1877), 106.
27. Stephen Tuffnell, 'Crossing the Rift: American Steel and Colonial Labor in Britain's East Africa Protectorate', in *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain*, ed. Kristin Hoganson and Jay Sexton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 46–65.
28. *Ibid.*, 58–60.
29. Manjapra, 'Semiperipheral Hand', 201–2.
30. *Ibid.*, 195.
31. Stephen Tuffnell, 'Engineering Inter-imperialism: American Miners and the Transformation of Global Mining, 1871–1910', *Journal of Global History* 10, no. 1 (2015): 57, 67.
32. *Ibid.*, 65, 76; Tuffnell, 'Crossing the Rift', 56.
33. Tuffnell, 'Engineering Inter-imperialism', 59, 70.
34. 'Benjamin Smith Lyman Papers: Finding Aid', University of Massachusetts, Amherst Special Collections and University Archives, accessed September 27, 2020, <http://findingaids.library.umass.edu/ead/mums190>; Michele Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan* (New York: Springer, 2012), 129.
35. 'Benjamin Smith Lyman Papers: Finding Aid'.
36. Tuffnell, 'Engineering Inter-imperialism', 68, 76.
37. Alex Bubbs, 'Class, Cotton and "Woddaries": A Scandinavian Railway Contractor in Western India, 1860–69', *Modern Asian Studies* 51, no. 5 (2017): 1369–93; Radhika Krishnan, 'Contracting and Sub-contracting in British India', in *India: Research on Cultural Encounters and Representations at Linnaeus University*, ed. Kristina Myrvold and Soniya Billore (Halmstad: Macadam, 2017), 50–73.
38. Tuffnell, 'Engineering Inter-imperialism', 61.
39. Hennessey, 'Rule by Association', 89–91.
40. An important exception is the work of Christof Dejung. See, e.g., Christof Dejung, *Commodity Trading, Globalization and the Colonial World* (London: Routledge, 2018); Dejung, 'Cosmopolitan Capitalists and Colonial Rule', *Modern Asian Studies* 56, no. 1 (2022): 427–70.
41. Aryo Makko, *European Small States and the Role of Consuls in the Age of Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2019). See also Makko's chapter in this volume.
42. See, e.g., Makko, *European Small States*, 90.
43. *Ibid.*, 80.
44. Per Högselius and Yunwei Song, 'Extractive Visions: Sweden's Quest for China's Natural Resources, 1913–1917', *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 69, no. 2 (2021): 158–76.
45. David Long and Brian Schmidt, eds, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York: SUNY Press, 2005).
46. Hazel Jones, *Live Machines: Hired Foreigners and Meiji Japan* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), xv.

47. Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).
48. Jones, *Live Machines*, 40.
49. Ibid., 8–9; Dudden, *Japan's Colonization*, 105–9.
50. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization*, 107–9.
51. Ibid., 48–52.
52. Alexis Dudden, 'Japan's Engagement with International Terms', in *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, ed. Lydia H. Liu (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 176–7.
53. Andrew Nahm, 'Durham White Stevens and the Japanese Annexation of Korea', in *The United States and Korea*, ed. Nahm (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1979), 110–36.
54. Mika Suonpää, 'Foreign Advisers and Modernisation before the First World War', *International History Review* 37, no. 2 (2015): 388.
55. Ibid., 391.
56. Steven Rosenthal, 'Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul: 1855–1865', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 2 (1980): 227–45.
57. Suonpää, 'Foreign Advisers', 387; Jones, *Live Machines*, 27.
58. Rosenthal, 'Foreigners and Municipal Reform', 231–2.
59. Jones, *Live Machines*.
60. Suonpää, 'Foreign Advisers', 388; Rosenthal, 'Foreigners and Municipal Reform', 234; Jones, *Live Machines*.
61. Gilles de Gantès, 'Migration to Indochina: Proof of the Popularity of Colonial Empire?' in *Promoting the Colonial Idea*, ed. Amanda Sackur and Tony Chafer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 15–28.
62. Giuseppe Finaldi, '"The Peasants Did Not Think of Africa": Empire and the Italian State's Pursuit of Legitimacy, 1871–1945', in *European Empires and the People*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 200–1; Sebastian Conrad, *German Colonialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19.
63. See, e.g., Hennessey, 'Rule by Association', 127; Finaldi, 'The Peasants Did Not Think of Africa'.
64. Jennifer Sessions, '"L'Algérie devenue française": The Naturalization of Non-French Colonists in French Algeria, 1830–1849', *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History* 30 (2002): 165–77.
65. Ibid.; Émile Temime, 'La migration européenne en Algérie au XIX^e siècle: Migration organisée ou migration tolérée?' *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 43 (1987): 31–45; Claude Lützelschwab, *La Compagnie genevoise des colonies suisses de Sétif (1853–1956)* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006).
66. For population statistics, see Sessions, 'L'Algérie devenue française', 167, 170.
67. James McDougall, *A History of Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 107.
68. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
69. See, e.g., the discussion of the disputes between the Colonial Office and the Australian government and the US federal government and the state of California in *ibid.*
70. Lester, 'British Settler Discourse'.
71. McDougall, *History of Algeria*, 107.

72. Vallgård, 'Were Christian Missionaries Colonizers?' *Interventions* 18, no. 6 (2016): 865–85.
73. Lester, 'British Settler Discourse'.
74. Jonathan Derrick, 'The Dissenters: Anti-colonialism in France, c. 1900–40', in *Promoting the Colonial Idea*, 54–6; Raoul Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962* (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1979), 216.
75. Vallgård, 'Christian Missionaries', 873.
76. Simon Larsson, 'Att Bygga ett samhälle vid tidens slut' (Building a Society at the End of Time) (PhD diss., Gothenburg University, 2016).
77. *Ibid.*, chapter 10.
78. Vallgård, 'Christian Missionaries', 870.
79. W. S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, *The H.M.S. Pinafore; or, the Lass that Loved a Sailor* (1878), Act II.
80. Vallgård, 'Christian Missionaries', 877.
81. Tuffnell, 'Crossing the Rift', 60.

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