The Somerville School and (the Re-Emergence of) Metaphysics

Gåvertsson, Frits

Book of abstracts

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Keynote Speaker, Practical Philosophy

Julia Driver: *Gratitude and Duty*

There is a classic puzzle surrounding gratitude and ingratitude.

(1) There is no duty of gratitude.
(2) An action is blameworthy if and only if it is wrong (barring excuses).
(3) Instances of ingratitude are blameworthy.

Each of these claims seems intuitively plausible, and yet they cannot all be true. In this paper I present arguments against (2). Support for (2) is provided by considerations of *accountability*: holding a person accountable takes what P. F. Strawson has termed a participant stance towards that person, which involves holding them to *demands*. I adopt the view that actions that are not wrong can nevertheless be blameworthy is virtue of the violation of relationship norms that are non-demanding. Thus, I argue it is apt to hold people accountable even when they have not failed to meet a demand or obligation.

Keynote Speaker, Theoretical Philosophy

Sally Haslanger: *The Materiality of the Social World: Ideology and Social Change*

On my view of social practices, agents rely on cultural tools (what I call a "cultural technē") to interpret their circumstances and coordinate in distribution things taken to have value. So social practices involve both social meanings and material resources. Within the critical theory tradition, ideology functions to distort our understanding of the social world to sustain oppression; on my view, an ideology is a flawed cultural technē that guides agency in practice. However, the material world is shaped by our agency to enhance coordination, even if it is on bad terms. So unjust systems are stabilized by both cultural and material conditions on agency, and efforts to promote social change should leverage both.

Theoria Lecture

Cristina Bicchieri: *Spontaneous inferences: variability and asymmetry in social inferences from norm information*

Providing norm information can alter baseline social expectations, and thus behavior, with negative empirical and normative expectations being particularly sensitive to such information. This implies that negative empirical information can inadvertently reinforce undesirable behaviors by leading individuals to infer collective endorsement. The study also investigates the impact of behavioral attributes like observability and perceived social consequences on norm inferences. While observability does not significantly affect inferences, perceived social consequences influence inferences drawn from empirical information, but the effect is moderated by individual costs, such as guilt and monetary costs.

Invited Section Speakers

Aesthetics Section

Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann: *What Do We Owe Beautiful Objects? A Case for Aesthetic Obligation*

This paper has two main aims. The first is to examine our normative relations to artworks and cultural artefacts where these are threatened by damage or destruction. The second aim is to develop an argument for the notion of aesthetic obligation by offering an alternative model of explanation of such relations. On the proposed approach, an aesthetic obligation is primarily directed towards the aesthetic collective or community which appreciates an artwork or artefact for the sake of its aesthetic value. Crucially, this aesthetic value, while primarily pertaining to the object, acquires its normative force from within the context of the community of appreciators. The obligation can thus be said to be grounded both in the object and its aesthetic value (although it doesn't direct the obligation solely towards that object), and in subjects and their practical identity (although it replaces the individual self with a specific socio-cultural collective to which the self belongs). It is an *aesthetic* obligation since the community to which it is directed is an *aesthetic* community, that is to say it is the *aesthetic* practices, values and traditions shared by the members of the community which unites it and makes it the specific community it is.

Applied Ethics Section

Daniela Cutas: *What do we owe our genetic relatives?*

Many people conceived with donor gametes – or otherwise raised separately from their close genetic relatives – want to know *that* they have close genetic relatives outside of their immediate family, and to know *who* these relatives are. Qualitative research with donor-conceived people testifies to their interest in knowledge of their genetic origins. In my talk, I will explore the interest to know of one's close genetic ties and the implications that it may have for what others ought to do. Should gamete donors let themselves be known by the people conceived with their gametes – and how much knowledge is needed? Do they, for example, need to relate to them in specific ways? While reflection on the significance and risks of parent/child genetic ties outside of the family has not historically been encouraged in the context of IVF, the consideration of non-parental ties has been even scarcer. How should people relate to close genetic relatives they didn't know they had, such as genetic siblings or grandparents or nieces and nephews or others? Do donor conceived people also have a claim against close genetic relatives other than the donors themselves – and if so, what claims do they have? These are the questions that I will explore in my talk.

Epistemology Section

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio: *Guidance: Reflections beyond epistemic access*

Are there norms that can always guide us? Many epistemologists think that the project of seeking perfectly guiding norms and theories fails because there are no epistemically transparent conditions, conditions such that we can always know whether or not they obtain. My aims in this talk are twofold. First, I probe the connection between guidance

and epistemic access. Second, I discuss worries about guidance that are distinct from the standard access worries.

Ethics Section

Ingmar Persson: *Modern Moral Philosophy: Inconclusive and Esoteric to the Point of Pointlessness?*

The point of moral philosophy is plausibly to produce a *rational consensus* about what is morally right and wrong in the situations life presents us with and about what the ground and meaning of this moral rightness/wrongness is. My hypothesis is that there are such deep divides in moral philosophy that the prospects of producing such a rational consensus are gloomy. In normative ethics, these divides are between (1) deontologists whose morality comprises the act-omission doctrine and/or the doctrine of the double effect, and consequentialists who reject such moralities; (2) desert or rights theorists for whom justice consists in getting what you deserve or what you have rights to, and more egalitarian theories that reject deserts and rights; (3) theorists who do, and theorists who do not, endorse a negativity bias to the effect that it is morally better to reduce what is bad by a certain amount than to increase what is good by the same amount; (4) theorists who believe we are morally permitted to be partial to ourselves and people near and dear, and those who espouse impartial moralities. In meta-ethics, there is a divide between externalists who take there to be moral reasons or values that are independent of attitudes and internalists who deny this. This means that it is futile to hope that meta-ethics could help us overcome the normative divides by firmly establishing objective reasons or values. If modern moral philosophy had not been so technical and esoteric, the disagreements raging in it might even have been harmful to public morality by undermining its authority.

History of Philosophy Section

José Filipe Da Silva: *On the nature of objects of visual perception*

Instead of thinking of objects of perception in accordance with the different sense modalities in isolation, I propose that to investigate whether and if so how medieval thinkers considered perception from a more global sense, that is from the perspective of the aims of perception, or what perception is for. Does considering perception from this holistic sense changes what the objects of perceptual experience are? By focusing on authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, namely Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and Nicole Oresme, I argue that this is the case. The result is an overview of selected theories of perception that shows the close relation between sensation and appetitive motion and sensation and intellection.

Logic Section

Valentin Goranko: *Logics for Strategic Reasoning about Socially Interacting Rational Agents*

I will discuss reasoning about strategic abilities of rational agents and groups (coalitions) of agents to guarantee achievement of their goals, while acting and interacting within a society of agents. That strategic interaction can be quite complex, as it usually involves various patterns combining cooperation and competition.

In this talk I will show how formal logic can be useful in capturing such reasoning. I will first present as a background the basic "Coalition Logic" and then I will give a brief overview of some recently introduced and studied more expressive and versatile logical systems, including:

i. the Socially Friendly Coalition Logic (SFCL), enabling formal reasoning about strategic abilities of individuals and groups to ensure achievement of their private goals while allowing for cooperation with the entire society;

ii. the Logic of Coalitional Goal Assignments (LCGA), capturing reasoning about strategic abilities of the entire society to cooperate in order to ensure achievement of the societal goals, while protecting the abilities of individuals and groups within the society to achieve their individual and group goals.

iii. the Logic for Conditional Strategic Reasoning (ConStR), formalising reasoning about agents' strategic abilities conditional on the goals of the other agents and on the actions that they are expected to take in pursuit of these goals.

In conclusion, I will take a more general perspective on a unifying logic-based framework for strategic reasoning in social context.

Metaethics & Metanormativity Section

Andrew Reisner: *The Project of De-moralisation and the Dualism of Practical Reason*

Henry Sidgwick famously opined that the profoundest problem in ethics was the apparent impossibility of reconciling the conflicting requirements of morality and self-interest. One approach to addressing conflicts of morality and self-interest is the project of de-moralisation, which aims to expunge moral concepts from serious normative theorising. The project of de-moralisation is attractive, in part because it removes (perhaps) normatively irrelevant and judgement-clouding concepts associated with anger and emotions, like blame and sentiments of moral worth, from normative theorising. The general thought is (e.g. in Crisp 2006) that if reasons do not come in different kinds – if they are just reasons of wellbeing, for example – then one can determine what the totality of reasons says that one ought to do. I wish to raise some questions about the extent to which de-moralisation can help with solving Sidgwick's dualism, in particular whether it is more difficult to make sense of our normative theorising without moral concepts than it might initially appear to be.

Metaphysics Section:

Matti Eklund: *Three kinds of alienness*

In my book *Alien Structure: Language and Reality* (OUP, 2024) I discuss the possibility of what I call alien languages and alien metaphysical structure. An alien language is a language with alien semantic structure. It is semantically different from familiar languages, in a broadly structural way, and through having kinds of resources not found in familiar languages. The world has alien metaphysical structure if its structure is best represented by an alien language. Here I illustrate what is at issue, discussing three different kinds of "alienness". I also provide crucial distinctions and clarifications, and discuss how one can argue for the possibility of alien languages of various kinds, and for the existence of alien metaphysical structure.

Philosophy of Language Section

Anders Schoubye: *Naming and Variability*

Variabilism is the view that proper names are variables (rather than constants or descriptions). This view has been defended by a number of philosophers of language throughout the past 40 years, but with very different assumptions about the nature of these variables and hence the behaviour of proper names. In this talk, I will start by providing an overview of a number of variabilist positions, but ultimately defend one particular variant. This particular version of variabilism comes with a distinct descriptive component, but I will outline why this version of variabilism is not threatened by any of Kripke's well known anti-descriptivist arguments. I will then turn to a discussion of a more recent potential problem for the variabilist view, namely a circularity worry raised by Aidan Gray and explain why this likely is not a threat to variabilism after all. Lastly, I will argue that once a variabilist analysis of proper names is adopted, one (of the many) positive upshots is that we get a clean and elegant metasemantics for names that is both more uniform and has broader empirical coverage than the standard Kripkean causal/historical chain story.

Philosophy of Mind Section:
Hedda Hassel Mørch: *Subjects within subjects? Why consciousness can't overlap*
A number of theories of consciousness, in both philosophy and neuroscience, imply or at least raise the possibility of overlapping consciousness, i.e., that some or all of the contents of one mind may also be experienced by another (where these contents are numerically rather than merely qualitatively identical). Block, for example, raises this possibility as a "trouble" for functionalism and Unger as "the mental problem of the many", which they both reject, but without much argument. Tononi's Integrated Information Theory precludes it via its *Exclusion* postulate, but without it it would imply a massive amount of it, and the postulate has been criticized as inadequately supported. The most typical version of panpsychism, constitutive panpsychism, seems to imply that human minds overlap with a vast number of microminds, and the cosmopsychist version implies that we overlap with an overarching cosmic mind. In this talk, I argue that overlapping consciousness is impossible, because, given the most plausible view of the nature of subjects (a version of the deflationary "bundle" view), it involves a straightforward contradiction. Any theory that implies it must therefore be rejected or modified to exclude it after all.

Philosophy of Science Section
Julie Zahle: *Bias and Debiasing Strategies in Qualitative Data Collection*
According to a widespread view, qualitative research in the social sciences is of poor quality because it lacks effective debiasing strategies. In this paper, I zoom in on researcher bias in qualitative data collection, that is, bias which the researcher introduces into the process of gathering her data. I start by laying out an account of researcher bias. On that basis, I argue that qualitative researchers may mitigate bias through the combined use of two strategies that capitalize on main characteristics of qualitative data collection. Also, I defend the two debiasing strategies against possible objections to their effectiveness. Thus, I conclude that researcher bias does not undermine the quality of qualitative research.

Political Philosophy Section

Lena Halldenius: *When philosophy meets the street. Lived experience as knowledge production*
How can we know what matters for justice? In political philosophy the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory has been going on for a long time. Ideal theory of justice proceeds from abstract, idealised circumstances, ostensibly to sift out whatever is regarded as philosophically irrelevant. Non-ideal theory proceeds instead from description of real circumstances, claiming that what philosophers think is irrelevant for theories of justice could be decisive factors in people's lives. Feminist philosophy – proceeding as it does from lived gendered experiences – is typically non-ideal theory. But what can methods of non-ideal theory look like? Description is not innocent. What is it that we should be describing and how can we find out? How about just asking people? In a recent project about the digital economy – where cash money is on its way out and digital literacy the new normal – my colleagues and I interviewed people who rely on cash because they are poor, have no credit, and cannot manage or afford digital technology, in order to find out what economic injustice is for them. We regard our interviewees as co-producers of knowledge that otherwise would have gone unacknowledged. In this talk, I will reflect on what philosophers can do to avoid committing epistemic injustice by not accounting for what it is like to live among the worst-off and what we understand differently about economic injustice if we proceed from lived experiences of this kind.

All other talks in alphabetical order by speaker's surname

Algander, Per: *Aesthetic Bullshit*
Thi Nguyen has recently argued that aesthetic judgments aim at correctness but that having the correct judgment isn't the "point" of forming aesthetic judgments. The point, rather, is the process of forming the judgment and Nguyen identifies this as a norm of aesthetic assertions which captures "aesthetic autonomy": the view that we value that agent's arrive at their judgments through the use of their own cognitive abilities, rather than deferring to experts. In this talk I will argue that if Nguyen is right then making aesthetic judgments is bullshit, in the Frankfurtian sense of the term. Frankfurtian bullshit is characterized by making assertions while being unconcerned with their truth. Aesthetic judgments are assertions, on Nguyen's view, but their point is not correctness. An agent who takes Nguyen's advice and forms their aesthetic judgments without a view to correctness is then being unconcerned with the truth, and is therefore bullshitting.

Andersson, Alexander: *Meritocracy: From starting gate to bottleneck*
Meritocratic distributions require a background of equal opportunity in order to be deemed deserved and legitimate. However, equality of opportunity of the kind required to make meritocratic distributions just is practically and theoretically unattainable. This places the meritocrat in a precarious position. They have to either maintain the concept of desert-sensitive merit at the cost of tolerating some degree of arbitrariness in distributions or relinquish the notion that meritocratic distributions must be desert-

sensitive to be legitimate. In this paper, I propose that the latter option, coupled with an anti-bottleneck principle, is the more desirable option for meritocrats.

Andersson, Henrik: *Committers vs. Randomizers*
In this paper, I discuss how the selection procedure in certain choice situations impacts the attribution of moral responsibility. A subjectivist view suggests that one always ought to choose the option that leads to the expected best outcome according to available evidence. If an agent fails to act accordingly, they are blameworthy. However, this view is silent on how to act when an agent cannot identify an option that is subjectively better than the others. Some argue that in such scenarios, the outcome can be left to chance by adopting a Randomizer approach, where decisions are determined by tossing a coin; we ought to be Randomizers. Others contend that this is irresponsible, especially when facing life-changing choices, advocating instead for a commitment to one of the options. We ought to put our will behind the option and be Committers. Through this commitment process, the chosen option becomes the superior one. What these strategies entail for the attribution of moral responsibility has, however, not been investigated and will thus be the focus of this paper.

By thoroughly examining various aspects of the attribution of moral responsibility, I will demonstrate that although committing to an option seems compatible with a subjective view, it can lead to the agent being morally blameworthy, even when not acting against any subjective reasons. With this new result, the paper concludes with a discussion of the merits of committing versus randomizing, whether the subjectivist view ought to be reformulated, and if this result speaks in favor of a quality of will-based view on moral responsibility rather than a reason responsiveness view.

Asker Svedberg, Andrea: *Oppression, Collective Contexts, and Individual Wrongful Acts*
Consider the following pair of cases:
Boyfriend S: Adam kills Beth because she tries to break up with him.
Boyfriend H: Chris kills Danny because he tries to break up with him.
There is an important difference between the killing in Boyfriend S and the killing in Boyfriend H. The difference is that the killing in Boyfriend S can be, and here we assume it is, *gendered* in the sense that it is an injustice that Beth suffers *in virtue of* her membership in the social group 'women' (Frye, 1983; Haslanger et al., 2015; Young, 2011). It is often argued that this difference is normatively significant because it entails a difference in harm to the respective victims, e.g. because a gendered killing is a greater harm than one that is not gendered (Calhoun1989; Mikkola, 2016).
I propose a supplementary account of the normatively significant difference between the types of acts exemplified in Boyfriend S and Boyfriend H respectively. I argue that, *all else equal*, Adam's act of killing Beth in Boyfriend S is morally worse than Chris's act of killing Danny in Boyfriend H, because Adam's act, together with many other acts, is constitutive of the oppression of women. That is, the act in Boyfriend S is worse than the act in Boyfriend H because the act in Boyfriend S, but not the act in Boyfriend H, is part of *a collective context*, i.e. a situation where many individual acts together bring about a morally significant outcome, but no single act makes any significant difference to the outcome. In saying that Adam's act is morally worse than Chris's, I mean that there is

additional or stronger moral reason for Adam not to kill Beth in Boyfriend S than for Chris not to kill Danny in Boyfriend H.

Baard, Patrik: *Citizen Science and Epistemic Injustices*
Citizen science (CS) is a growing research practice where non-professional participants have significant epistemic roles, in for instance data accumulation and analysis, hypothesis formation and critical discussion. CS projects are typically either 'top-down', initiated and managed by professional researchers, or 'bottom-up' driven by non-professionals, typically to address specific concerns of individuals or communities (health, environment).

We will highlight and discuss epistemic injustices in CS. In top-down CS, it has been observed that the epistemic contributions of volunteers have been made invisible in research outputs (Cooper, Shirk & Zuckerberg, 2014). This can be seen as an instance of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Herzog & Lepenies, 2022). More specifically, it might amount to treating participants as mere 'sources of information' instead of 'informants', leading to epistemic objectification (Fricker 2007: 132ff).

Fricker distinguishes two types of epistemic injustice. Testimonial injustice is when the credibility of a speaker's claims is devalued due to prejudice. Hermeneutical injustice is the obscuration of some significant area of one's social experience due to marginalization (Fricker 2007: 158). In this paper we intend to fill two gaps in the current, small literature on CS and epistemic injustice: First, we systematize different version of testimonial injustice in top-down and bottom-up CS. Second, we attempt to give an account of hermeneutical injustice in CS. Based on this, we proceed to sketch ways of institutionalizing the virtue of epistemic justice in different CS contexts, for instance through 'trust architectures' (Rasmusson 2021).

Baehni, Agnès: *Moral Duties to Past Selves*
In contemporary moral philosophy, two beliefs are widely held to be true. First, we have moral duties towards persons who are no longer present. This encompasses the duty to preserve their memory (Bluestein 2008) and the duty to honor commitments made (Brecher 2002). Second, we have moral duties towards ourselves (Schofield 2021, Muñoz 2020, Kanygina 2019). This encompasses duties like self-respect (Hill 1973, Bloomfield 2014, Superson 2010), self-knowledge (Mackenzie 2020, 2018), or refraining detrimental habits (Schofield 2021).

In this presentation, I will focus on the consequences of these two beliefs taken together. Specifically, I will delve into the question of whether we have moral duties towards our past-selves. For example, if Vincent practiced the clarinet for the past five years with the firm intention of joining the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, but then abandons this pursuit on a whim, is he committing a prejudice towards his past-selves who made all these sacrifices? While duties to present- and future-selves have received considerable attention, duties to past-selves have been largely overlooked.

The ensuing discussion comprises two distinct phases. First, I address objections against the viability of moral duties towards past-selves. These objections stem from concerns such as: (i) the potential non-existence of past-selves; (ii) our perceived inability to influence the well-being of past-selves; (iii) the supposed duty to

prioritize the interests of the present-self over past-selves; and (iv) the alleged non-binding nature of these duties. Subsequently, I adopt a more affirmative stance, advocating for the plausibility of genuine duties to past-selves with two arguments: (i') the recognition that if time-travel were possible, moral duties towards past-selves would become evident; and (ii') the observation of numerous instances where general duties extend to persons who are no longer present, making it arbitrary to exempt past-selves from such obligations.

Bedke, Matthew S.: *The Metasemantics of Relativism*
According to relativism, the truth value of some contents are relative to an interesting parameter that goes beyond world, time, or location. Contents about matters of are prototypical. Take "Cilantro is tasty". One relativist, Max Kolbel, says the truth of the content of this assertion is relative to a standard of taste. The proposition asserted is true relative to my standard of taste and false relative to my wife's. Similarly, John MacFarlane says truth is relative to the context of use and a context of assessment, where the context of assessment includes a standard of taste.

Relativists typically focus on formally modeling this sort of phenomena. They appeal to facts about language use and our sense that some discourse can feature faultless disagreement to support a formal semantics that can model these things with relative extensions and truth values. But modeling the phenomenon is not to explain how the phenomenon is generated. What is it that is generating certain patterns of language use and intuitions about faultless disagreement, which seem to support relativist modeling? To use an analogy: based on patterns of use, indexicals are modeled formally so that they have contents that vary with contexts of use. But beneath the model we need a story for how this gets encoded in cognition to generate those patterns of use. Kaplan and others often gesture at rules that we follow when using terms, rules that can encode whether a term is indexical or not.

In my paper I will develop this sort of metasemantics for relativism. I will propose that there are certain rules for using terms that are encoded in cognition, and which generate the data that support relativistic modeling, as well as the structure to enable distinctions between relativist discourse and non-relativist discourse (contextualist, objectivist).

Bengtsson, Georg: *Is Anything First in the Normative Domain?*
A common strategy in the literature on metanormativity, is to posit some normative property as *basic*, or 'first', such that all other normative properties can be analyzed in terms of this basic property. The three most popular such views are *Reasons-first*, *Value-first*, and *Fittingness-first*. Although these views disagree on what property is normatively 'first', they all agree that there must be *some* basic normative property. Considering the extensive literature for and against particular 'X-first' views, it is surprising that the assumption they are all based upon has received so little
attention.

Drawing on authors like Daniel Wodak, Selim Berker, and Andrew Reisner, I make the claim that the assumption the X-first project is based upon lacks motivation; we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there is some X that is 'first' in the normative domain. Although there is a basic level of motivation, such as the promise of

parsimonious analyses, it is not an innocent assumption to posit some normative property as metaphysically prior all others.

I begin by noting that the rich collection of counterexamples to particular X-first views suggests the conclusion that an extensionally adequate X-first view cannot be formulated, but go on to say that even if some X-first view managed to achieve extensional adequacy, this would not be sufficient motivation for us to take the X-first assumption as true. I then make the argument that the apparent inter-analyzability of certain normative properties, such as obligation and permissibility, suggests that there is no normative property that can successfully analyze every other, thereby falsifying the X-first assumption. I conclude then, that since the X-first assumption is at worst false, and lacking motivation at best, we should not be X-firsters.

Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina: *Structural Dimensions of Discrimination*
In this paper, I put forth a theory of discrimination that reveals structural dimensions of the phenomenon that are often pushed to the periphery of analysis. I outline a concept of discrimination which aims to capture what many of us are concerned with in real life cases, and explore its agential and structural forms, as well as its relation to moral wrongness and to social injustice. I propose that we should see discrimination as a bridge concept: between the personal and the political, between criteria of moral wrongness and of social (in)justice, between individualist and structural analyses of harms and inequalities. I believe that it is this bridging feature which makes the concept distinctive and particularly useful, both within philosophy and more broadly in society (politics, law, civil society).

I proceed as follows: in section 2, I propose a definition of discrimination and show how it gives rise to four distinct forms of discrimination. In section 3, I describe cases of implicit bias discrimination and epistemic injustice and argue that my definition can capture these, given a structural reading. This captures the first structural dimension of discrimination. In section 4, I give an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination, in terms of harm. I propose that this account still does not exhaustively capture what makes the phenomenon of discrimination intuitively problematic. I therefore, in section 5, explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice. This captures the second, much more foundational, structural dimension of discrimination. Section 6 concludes.

Björkholm, Stina: *Implicit Bias and Metalinguistic Stereotypes*
People who explicitly endorse progressive and egalitarian values sometimes act in prejudiced ways towards members of stigmatized groups. This is often explained by appeal to implicit biases. The thought is, roughly, that people may *explicitly* endorse anti-racist and feminist beliefs, and yet have *implicit* attitudes that contradict these beliefs. This psychological understanding of implicit bias has been criticized by those who maintain that it neglects the *structural* aspects of the phenomenon. However, a problem with structural explanations is that they are more difficult to grasp; it is unclear what the nature of structures are, how they explain behavior, and whether their existence goes beyond individuals – and if so, how? In response to this challenge, I offer a *dynamic pragmatic* structural account of implicit bias. I will understand dynamic pragmatics broadly as the study of the assumptions that interlocutors make about their communicative exchange, such as the meanings of the words they use and the purposes

of their conversation. By appeal to a influential pragmatic theory by Levinson, I argue that it is generally part of the background assumptions of conversations that interlocutors mutually accept stereotypes about a range of things, (e.g., *tomatoes are red*), and that this affects how they are disposed to behave in conversation (e.g., they would say "We need tomatoes" not "We need *red* tomatoes", because it is assumed that the object described instantiates the stereotype unless one suggests otherwise). I argue that when such meta-linguistic stereotypes are formed about groups of people who share a social identity, they often inherit *essentializing* and *normative* dimensions of generic propositions (such as, *women are submissive*, or *boys don't cry*). These kinds of stereotypes provide an important tool in giving a structural account of implicit bias since they constitute shared sociolinguistic dispositions rather than individual mental states.

Björnsson, Gunnar: *Justice, Respect, and the Distribution of Agency*
Discussions of distributive justice have concerned various patterns and goods. Familiar theories call for distributing certain goods equally, or to the greatest benefit of those worst off; goods at stake include welfare, opportunities, capabilities, resources, and rights, as well as power, authority, respect, and regard. In this talk, based on joint work with Romy Eskens, I identify an under-theorized comparative relation between individuals, and argue for its distributional importance. The relation is that of being given the right weight over time, compared to others and other values, by some other agent or group of agents.

We distribute our agency in the service of values: we use time, cognition, effort, and material and social capital in the promotion of certain ends and in acting on certain points of view. It is better, I argue, if there is a certain balance, over time, in the distribution of agency over different values, corresponding to their relative importance. For example, and other things being equal, it is better if parents direct their agency more equally over time towards each of their young children, better if two friends direct their agency more equally over time towards their respective interests and points of view, and better if larger cooperative groups distribute their agency more equally over time towards their different members. Moreover, I argue, to respect the values at stake involves caring about giving them the right comparative weight over time.

Importantly, the balance called for in these cases is not one of outcomes, but also not merely one of respect, understood as a certain practical orientation towards a value. Instead, it involves actual investments of agency in the values at stake.

After motivating and elaborating on the framework, I briefly indicate some further implications for theories of desert, obligations, normative ethics, and theories of justice.

Blomberg, Olle and Kanygina, Yuliya: *Blame guilt and fairness in collective responsibility*
Accounts of collective moral responsibility face a dilemma. In holding a group responsible for an action or an outcome, we either treat (some) individual members of that group unfairly, or we are holding each group member responsible for their own individual contribution. If the former, then we ought to reform this practice or get rid of it. If the latter, then the practice does not presuppose genuinely collective moral responsibility and becomes philosophically uninteresting.

Smith (2009) and Garcia (2022) deny the first horn. They claim that a practice of collective responsibility is no more unfair than our almost universally accepted practice of holding individuals responsible. Just as one can fear an audience without fearing any one audience member, one can blame a group without blaming any one group member. Successfully communicated blame involves the 'collateral damage' of innocent group members being harmed by blame. Furthermore, as both Smith and Garcia point out, such collateral damage can arise even in individual cases of blame. Since it typically does not render unfair our practice of holding individuals morally responsible, neither does it count against our practice of collective moral responsibility.

The unfairness objection has rarely (if ever) been spelled out in any detail. It rests on the intuitively compelling view that blame aims at getting the blamee to hold herself morally responsible by feeling guilty, as well as to acknowledge fault and to make amends. We argue that the responses of Smith and Garcia fail to address the underlying intuitive force of the unfairness objection: that blame directed at a group may call on an individual to feel guilty for something over which she is not at fault. We conclude that the unfairness objection constitutes an important challenge to collective responsibility and collective blameworthiness.

Bokros, Sofia: *Meaning Constitutive Inference and Semantic Competence*
According to inferentialism about some class of expressions C, the meanings of the expressions in C are wholly or partly constituted by inferences. That is, for each expression E in C, there are some particular inferences that are meaning-constitutive for E. There are many different philosophical motivations to embrace inferentialism, but one central motivation is that inferentialism enables us to explain why competent speakers are disposed to accept certain inferences. For instance, the proposal that the inference from *x is a vixen* to *x is a female fox* is meaning-constitutive for the expression 'vixen' purportedly explains why semantically competent speakers have the intuition that the sentence "all vixens are female" is trivially true, and the proposal that the T-schema is meaning-constitutive for 'true' can be appealed to in order to explain why we are prone to accept, and reluctant to give up, the reasoning of the Liar paradox. Nonetheless, the explanatory potential of inferentialism seems threatened by certain considerations about semantic competence. Notably, Williamson (2007) has argued that there are no particular beliefs required for semantic competence with any expressions, on the basis of a number of hypothetical cases and counterexamples. Since the considerations that motivate the postulation of meaning-constitutive inferences frequently stem from a desire to explain why speakers are disposed to make certain inferences and thereby accept certain claims, the counterexamples thus threaten to undermine such explanations. In this paper I will explore whether inferentialism can be made compatible with Williamson's counterexamples, without being deprived of its explanatory power in this regard. Firstly, I'll consider a dispositionalist view of semantic competence and I will argue that it does not succeed in safeguarding the explanatory power of inferentialism. Secondly, I'll consider a normativist proposal, which I will argue is a more promising route for the inferentialist.

Cantwell, John: *Is the mathematical conditional material?*
The natural language conditional appears to have neither the semantics nor logic of the material conditional in ordinary discourse. By contrast, the conditional one uses in

mathematical discourse would appear to share the semantic and logical properties of the material conditional. Here it is argued that this latter appearance is deceptive, and that certain mathematical conditionals do not appear to have the semantic or logical properties of the material conditional. Moreover, it is briefly indicated what an alternative semantics for the mathematical conditional would look like.

Carlshamre, Staffan: *Hegel om förstånd, förnuft och filosofins metod*
Hegels kunskapsteori rör sig i hög grad kring distinktionen mellan förstånd och förnuft. De båda leden i denna motsättning karakteriseras i termer av andra motsatspar. Förståndet är till exempel ändligt och statiskt, medan förnuftet är oändligt och dynamiskt. Vetenskapen, däribland matematiken och den formella logiken, hör, åtminstone till större delen, hemma inom förståndets domän, medan filosofin är starkt knuten till förnuftet. Den inom både äldre och nyare filosofi vanliga tanken att filosofin bör efterlikna matematikens metoder, och eftersträva precision genom axiomatisering och formalisering, är enligt Hegel fundamentalt missriktad. Jag kommer att föreslå några sätt att förstå Hegels distinktion som, förhoppningsvis, gör den intressant och begriplig. Jag kommer dessutom att knyta an till några relaterade tankegångar i samtida filosofi, till exempel Carnaps distinktion mellan inre och yttre frågor, och Derridas åtskillnad mellan différence och différance.

Chatzopoulos, Andreas: *Transformers as Science Models*
Despite being a useful tool in and of themselves, Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) have also been used as models of certain features of the brain, and have in this capacity been able to make accurate predictions about the target. An example would be Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) that can be used to predict spiking responses in the inferior temporal cortex. This is in itself not surprising, since they implement a network architecture designed to model the mammal visual system to begin with.

Transformer is the name of the architecture behind Large Language Models and applications like ChatGPT, which have proven to be successful in mimicking human language interactions. These are constructed to solve a specific problem (sequence-to-sequence tasks) while handling long-range dependencies with ease. Unlike CNNs though, they are not in any way intended as models of the brain, but as tools to accomplish certain tasks. However, a recent paper (Kozachkov et al., 2023) explores the possibility that networks of neurons and astrocytes in the brain might actually implement the core computational element of such transformers, naturally. This is intriguing, since it (if correct) seems to suggest that we accidentally seem to have stumbled upon a model of certain features of the brain without intention to do so.

How should we view this, philosophically? To answer this, I will take a closer look at the philosophy of so-called how-explanations (Verreault-Julien, 2019) (Glennan, 2017) to see how this phenomenon can be understood. This leads into an elaboration on how Glennan's how-roughly explanations can be used to understand transformed-based LLMs as scientific models. I will also highlight the fact that the original intention behind a model plays no role for its scientific value and explore how these insights can guide us in further endeavors to understand the brain.

Coelho Mollo, Dimitri: *Functional Ontologies for AI*

In the past few years, Artificial Intelligence has made considerable progress, especially for what regards language-processing systems, such as Large Language Models, and image- and film-generation systems. This progress is systematically investigated largely by appeal to benchmark tests, in which the performance of AI systems is measured in a variety of tasks within their domain of application. Success at these benchmarks is often taken to be indicative of human-like cognitive capacities being at least approximated by such systems. In addition to behavioural tests, there is growing interest in the nuts-and-bolts of how AI systems work, a field that has come to be known as 'mechanistic interpretability'.

In this talk, I will argue that, in order to better understand cutting-edge AI systems and their capabilities, we should take heed of methodological lessons coming from cognitive and comparative psychology. In these fields, we have not only behavioural measures—as investigated by behavioural psychology—and implementational explanations—as investigated by neurobiologists and neuroscientists. We also posit a cognitive level of explanation in between mechanism and behaviour, focused on the functional capacities that allow for behavioural success, and which can have different mechanistic implementations. The project of shedding light on what these capacities are in humans and other animals is known as 'cognitive ontology'.

I argue that something similar is needed when studying AI systems. Since it is debatable whether AI systems are cognitive, I suggest that we should look for the best *functional* ontologies for specific types of AI system. I illustrate this approach by means of a recent case study: the capacity of Large Language Models to show human-level performance in novel and invented conceptual combinations.

Coggins, Garance: *Questions of Values in News Avoidance Attitudes*

The rise of news avoiders in some countries in recent years has raised concerns among scholars in particular in journalism and media studies. From a moral perspective, it might intuitively seem that intentionally avoiding the news is wrong. It constitutes a failure to a civic duty of aiming to be an informed citizen, a necessary condition to take an active part in the political life of one's community. This in turn seems to pose a threat to a functioning liberal democracy. Besides, it constitutes a benighting act that may ground subsequent wrong actions or omissions, such as a failure to assist those in need. It also seems to betray a culpable lack of concern for the current state of the world. However, recent empirical studies point out that self-declared news avoiders actually consume as much news as others. This leads to question whether the concept of "news avoidance" is a fitting one to capture the attitudes of citizens who might actually experiment with different habits of news consumption and curation. If omissions are defined as omissions to intend, "news avoidance" might aim to capture the omission of the intention to follow the news. However, the news consumption habits of so-called news avoiders could also be described in terms of actual intentions and actions. I explore some of the formulations of these intentions and actions - for instance, the protection of one's private sphere, of one's other commitments and duties, of one's epistemic and political agency, and of one's ability to care. I argue that framing the question in this way produces a more fruitful rendition of the values that some of the attitudes currently captured by the term "news avoidance" seek to protect, and reflects differently on the moral agent.

Dahl, Niklas: *Blaming believers*

There is an emerging discussion about epistemic blame. In many ways, the topic is still in its formative stages; there's a live debate whether or not there even is such a thing as blame which is distinctly epistemic rather than moral and, if so, what distinguishes it (Kauppinen, 2018; Boult, 2021a). There has also been some recent work on translating views on moral responsibility into the epistemic setting, such as Brown (2020) on extending the belief-desire model of Sher (2006), Boult (2021b) proposing a relationship-modication account based on Scanlon (2008), and Piovarchy (2021) applying the agency-cultivation view advanced by Vargas (2013).

I propose a functionalist framework for relating kinds of blame to kinds of reasons. Building on work by Vargas (2013), McGeer (2015), Fricker (2016), and Queloz (2021), I understand the function of moral blame to be that of making the recipient better at recognising and responding to moral reasons. As Queloz (2021) notes, moral blame is distinct from mere reinforcement, which also regulates behaviour, because it aims to regulate behaviour by making the recipient more responsive to moral reasons. This view, I argue, can be fruitfully extended beyond the moral domain.

The idea is that this is the special case of a general functional schema den-ing blame as a negative reinforcement response to an agent being insu-ciently responsive to reasons with the aim of making them more so. For specically epistemic blame it is insu-cient responsiveness to epistemic reasons which we attempt to assuage. More generally, I argue, every distinct kind of reasons goes together with a distinct kind of blame. Since it would be implausible to think that moral reasons are the same as epistemic reasons, I argue that we ought to view epistemic blame as its own kind.

Damirjian, Alice: *The Social Significance of Slang*

Since around the turn of the century, *slang* has emerged as a respectable topic of research for linguists and lexicographers. It is remarkable, however, that little to no philosophical work has been written on the subject. The present paper attempts to rectify this situation by providing a philosophical analysis of one feature of slang that has enjoyed a significant amount of attention from linguists in recent years: Slang's group-identifying function. I begin by introducing the notion 'slang' and the type of lexical items it is usually taken to range over. Examples that will be discussed include: *Bussin* ('great', youth slang, 2020- now), *poggers* ('amazing', gaming slang, 2018-now), and *chinchy* ('miserly', African American slang, ca. 1650-1950). I provide an overview of how the existing literature describes slang's group-identifying function and I argue that this function is best understood when broken down into three separate but interrelated group-identifying functions. I show that these functions cannot be explained with reference to any lexically encoded content of slang words, even though such an explanation might initially strike us as intuitively plausible. Instead, I argue that these functions are best explained by the *lexical metadata* (Nunberg, 2018; Pullum, 2018) related to slang words and the things that speakers and hearers do with it. Borrowing from Khoo's (2021) *Tacit Inference Theory,* I propose that all of these functions are realized by inferences that speakers and hearers can mutually be expected to draw on the basis of the beliefs that they have about the words others use. I conclude with some reflections on the benefits of engaging philosophically with slang, as well as some recommendations for further philosophical research.

Davidsson, Ellen: *Objectification as Lack of Empathy*

In this talk, I present a new moralised definition of the concept of *objectification*. More specifically, I argue that objectification can and should be defined as a lack of empathy in situations when there are moral or epistemic reasons to empathise.

Previously, moralised definitions of (sexual) objectification have primarily been used to explain how men (sexually) subordinate women in a patriarchal social structure (MacKinnon 1987, Dworkin 1989, Haslanger, 2012). In contrast, non-moralised definitions have focused on explaining and destigmatising human sexuality and embraced objectification as a morally neutral and possibly good part of human life (Nussbaum, 1995 & Langton 2009). My definition seeks to show that these previous definitions target somewhat related, but still fundamentally different social phenomena and serve different political ends. This means that they are not in direct conflict with each other and that it is possible to unite aspects of them in a new, improved definition.

The definition I present categorises as moralised since it defines objectification as necessarily morally and epistemically problematic. It keeps the focus from previous moralised accounts on unjust social structures and social inequality, but widens the scope of the concept in at least three ways, though tightly connecting it to *social power* (see Brännmark 2019 & 2021, Burman 2023 for relevant accounts of social power):

First, from being solely about gender kinds and gender norms, the new definition allows for objectification to play a more substantial part in explaining how problematic social structures, such as those related to socially salient attributes and social kinds such as not only gender but race, age, disability or socio-economic class, are created and sustained (see Jenkins 2023 for a relevant account of social kinds). Second, by defining objectification as not only morally but epistemically problematic this definition unifies older accounts of sexual objectification and newer work in the field of epistemic injustice about *epistemic objectification* (see Haslanger 2012, McGlynn 2021). Lastly, I argue that this definition provides concrete guidance on how to go about fighting social inequality and injustice.

Eichorn, Leonie: *Epistemic Asymmetries between Blame- and Praiseworthiness*
It is often thought that, in order to be morally responsible for one's actions, one must have certain control over and awareness of what one is doing. It is also often thought (at least implicitly) that moral blame- and praiseworthiness require the same conditions. This symmetrical view has famously been challenged by Susan Wolf and Dana Nelkin with respect to the control condition. In my talk, I challenge the symmetrical view with respect to the epistemic condition—more precisely, with respect to the awareness of *non-moral* (or circumstantial) facts required by praise- and blameworthiness. In particular, I argue for two epistemic asymmetries that both implicate that praiseworthiness is epistemically more demanding than blameworthiness.

I first compare the epistemic requirements for blameworthiness for wrong actions with those for praiseworthiness for exemplary actions. On a widely shared view, to be blameworthy for a wrong action, one must be either aware of the relevant (non-moral) facts or culpably ignorant of them. I argue that the epistemic condition for praiseworthiness for exemplary actions, in contrast, is not disjunctive: awareness of the relevant (non-moral) facts is always required, and there is no equivalent to culpable ignorance when it comes to praiseworthiness.

Second, I argue that another epistemic asymmetry can be found if we allow for

blameworthiness for permissible actions and praiseworthiness for non-exemplary actions. Roughly, I contend that a false *de re* belief that one's action is wrong always makes one blameworthy while a false *de re* belief that one's action is exemplary does not always make one praiseworthy.

Ekenberg, Tomas: *Erfarenhet, Ontologi och Anselms argument*
Nuförtiden håller de flesta uttolkare med Thomas av Aquino som anser att Anselms argument för Guds existens i Proslogion är ett bristfälligt resonemang. I denna presentation undersöker jag två sätt att närma sig Anselms argument: som (1) en logisk demonstration och som (2) ett resonemang med viss retorisk kraft och övertygelseförmåga. Först följer jag Ermanno Bencivenga och argumenterar för att Anselms argument är en logisk illusion. Betraktat som logiskt bevis är Anselms argument inte helt enkelt ogiltigt, men inte heller är det helt enkelt osunt. Det vilar istället på två ömsesidigt oförenliga familjer av antaganden där båda kan betraktas som fullt rationellt försvarbara. Resultatet är ett argument som antingen är formellt giltigt eller sunt men inte både och – men ett argument som ändå under vissa omständigheter ter sig alltigenom tvingande. Jag argumenterar också, i samklang med G.E.M. Anscombe, att detta särpräglade resonemang inte bör klassificeras som ett "ontologiskt" argument. I ljuset av föregående diskussion undersöker jag sedan Anselms argumentation som ett retoriskt verktyg. Kontexten för argumentet är en bön vars nominella mottagare är Gud och vars målgrupp är Anselm själv och alla som är villiga till tro. Sett som ett de facto övertygande resonemang hänvisar Anselm till en viss erfarenhet som antyds av frasen "det än vilket inget större kan tänkas" och huvudsyftet med argumentets logiska steg tycks vara att fokusera tanken på denna möjliga erfarenhet.

Emilsson, Anton: *Indeterminate Agency and Taking Responsibility*
I provide a framework for making sense of a previously untheorized phenomenon: indeterminate agency. These are cases where there is no fact of the matter whether an agent did or did not do the thing in question. Such cases contrast to (ii) cases where the question of agency is left undetermined (where the indeterminacy is ingenuine), to (iii) cases where the agency is merely epistemically uncertain (where there is a fact of the matter but it is not a known), and, of course, to (iv) determinate agency cases (where, at the extreme, there is not even a question to be raised about whether the agent did it). While (iii) and (iv) are nodes on the same scale, indeterminate agency is categorically distinct from both, as it is also from (ii). Employing a framework of action explanations as relative to an explanatory perspective, we may capture the phenomenon of indeterminate agency cases as occurring when there is a deep ambiguity at the meta-explanatory level (i.e., the level that sets the explanatory perspective of the action explanation).

The phenomenon is previously untheorized because it is largely unrecognized. Admitting of indeterminate agency cases, however, has an interesting conceptual upshot: we can make sense of a special sense of ‘taking responsibility’. Elinor Mason’s account of taking responsibility finds room for taking responsibility in cases of “ambiguous agency”. I show that her account is ultimately untenable. The reason why it is untenable, however, may be overcome if we restrict the notion to indeterminate agency cases. I propose and explore the suggestion that agents take responsibility, in this special sense, when they take a stance on the meta-explanatory issue, despite deep ambiguity at

this level, in such a way that their act resolves or takes us beyond that ambiguity and makes the action theirs.

Fazeli, Hadi: *Dynamics of Blame over Time*
Some philosophers have argued that if an agent undergoes moral reforms and changes their heart for the better, they become less blameworthy or even blameless altogether for their past actions (e.g., Khoury & Matheson, 2018; Matheson, 2024; Parfit, 1971, 1984; Shoemaker, 2012). This argument, however, primarily concerns *perpetrators*' character and how they become less blameworthy over time. As time passes, *victims* also undergo changes: they might care *less* or *more* about what happened to them in the past, and accordingly, react to it diNerently at diNerent times. In this talk, I emphasize the changes in cares and commitments that victims undergo and explore how these changes aNect *the act of blaming*. I argue that the degree to which victims' blame is fitting at the time of blame depends on the *projects* and *interests* they have at the time. This has two immediate outcomes: If blame is irrelevant to the victim's current interests, it is fitting for them to blame the wrongdoer *less*, and if the past wrongdoing becomes too relevant to the victim's interests, it is fitting for them to blame the wrongdoer *more*. In the end, I conclude that while the degree to which a wrongdoer is blameworthy for committing a wrongdoing remains the same over time (as what is fitting in virtue of a past action remains fixed in time), the degree to which it is fitting for *the victim* to blame the wrongdoer changes over time: depending on the victims' projects and interests, the degree to which blame is fitting might *increase* or *decrease* over time. A plausible account of responsibility over time should not only incorporate the changes in the character of the perpetrator but also the changes of cares and commitments in the victim's mind. The account I defend in the end recognizes the dynamics of blame in our responsibility practices over time.

Forsberg, Lisa: *Difficulty, Achievement, and Perfectionist Value*
Climbing Mount Everest and writing a convincing philosophy paper seem like activities that constitute achievements. It is commonly thought that for such activities to qualify as achievements they must be difficult. On Gwen Bradford's influential account of the nature of achievement, an activity qualifies as difficult only when it involves the exertion of a sufficient quantity of what she calls intense effort. It is also commonly thought that achievements are themselves non-instrumentally valuable. On Bradford's perfectionist account of the value of achievement, the exertion of intense effort also explains an activity's achievement value. An achievement is valuable in part because it involves the development or exercise of the will, which is, according to this version of perfectionism, a valuable capacity. In this paper, we take issue with both Bradford's view about difficulty and her perfectionist account of the value of achievements. First, we raise doubts about the intuitive plausibility of her view that only intensely effortful activities qualify as difficult. We contend that there are cases in which an activity counts as difficult simply when and because it involves a sufficient quantity of effort. Second, we argue that on Bradford's account of difficulty it may turn out that living a life high in perfectionist value is not difficult in her sense and that therefore a life high in perfectionist value need not include many achievements in her sense. Pace Bradford, we argue that this may make perfectionism more, not less, attractive.

Franzén, Nils: *Thick Terms and Secondary Contents*

As has often been observed in the literature, utterances of sentences that contain terms like “lewd", “generous", or “cowardly" are somehow both evaluative and descriptive. Take, for instance, an utterance of a sentence like “Sarah's behavior is generous". Such an utterance conveys both a descriptive and an evaluative content: very roughly, that Sarah exhibits a certain behavior, like being willing to spend money on behalf of others, and that the pertinent behavior is good in some way. Many theorists endorse or express sympathy towards the view that the evaluative content of thick terms is not asserted with utterances of sentences containing them but rather part of their secondary content. For instance, it has been claimed that whereas “Sarah’s behaviour is generous” asserts that her behaviour instantiates the descriptive property of being willing to spend money for others, it merely *presupposes* an evaluation. This is meant to be similar to how “Sarah has stopped smoking” presupposes that Sarah used to smoke. In this article, we discuss a number of features of thick terms which speak against this view. We further argue that these features are not shared by another, recently much-discussed, class of hybrid evaluative terms, so-called slurs, and that the evaluative contents of these might thus very well be secondary.

Garcia, Andrés: *Neutral but Better*
Some philosophers accept that one thing could be better than another even though they both contribute neutrally to their broader context. Within the context of population axiology, the claim is that one life could be better than another even though both contribute neutrally to the value of the world. Philosophers tend to stop short of admitting that those things could be strictly neutral themselves since this would allow for hierarchies within the neutral domain. The consensus appears to be that if two items are neutral, then it is necessarily the case that they are equally good or mutually incommensurable. In the following paper, I defend the possibility of evaluative hierarchies within the neutral domain while outlining some general options for accounting for the concept of strict neutrality. In so doing, I hope to clarify the logic and patterns of fitting attitudes that underpin reasonable judgments of neutrality and to thereby highlight a gap in the ethical literature. It may seem paradoxical to suggest that among the things that do not matter, some of them matter more than others, but I do not take this to be my claim; instead, my suggestion is that to be neutral is to matter *in a certain way* and that this way of mattering admits to evaluative hierarchies. In order to capture this way of mattering, I will be appealing to the *fitting-attitudes analysis of value*, which also allows me to identify the concepts of strict neutrality available to us.

Gianinni, Giacomo: *There is No Problem of Necessary Perfect Masks*
Dispositionalism is the view that:

> (D◇) It is possible that p iff something has, had or will have an iterated potentiality for it to be the case that p

There is a massive challenge: the paradox of necessary perfect masks (Vetter & Busse 2022). A mask is perfect if it necessitates that the manifestation will not come about, and it is necessary if it cannot be removed. Let potentiality F to be such that p. By D◇, p is possible. Let q state that F is perfectly masked. Then, it is impossible that p & q. If it’s

necessarily the case that q and it is impossible that p & q, then p is impossible. Contradiction.

I offer a novel solution to the paradox, centred around the idea that potentiality comes in degrees. First, I argue that degrees of potentialities play a role in grounding modal truths: only non-zero degree potentialities ground facts of possibility. Secondly, I argue that that degree of potentialities are extrinsic second order properties— in particular, they depend on the modal status of both their disposition partners and masks. I argue that necessary perfect masks reduce the degree of a potentiality to zero, thereby preventing them from grounding a modal truth. Thus we can disarm the paradox and show that no contradiction arises. Thirdly, I show that there are zero-degree potentialities, by arguing against the principle according to which the fact that a has potentiality F to zero degree just is the fact that a does not have potentiality F.

Finally, I argue that recognising the existence of necessarily perfectly masked potentialities offer dispositionalism important expressive resources to make sense of our intuitions concerning cases of 'impossible dispositions 'and perhaps also the resources to account for the truth and falsity of some non-vacuous counter-possible and counter-nomic conditionals.

Grüne-Yanoff, Till: *The Possibilistic Interpretations in Climate Science: Model Ensembles and Storylines*

This paper examines two recent proposals to interpret climate modeling as establishing possibilities: the claim that model ensembles represent a range of possible developments (Stainforth et al. 2007, Bray & von Storch 2009, Knutti et al 2010) one the one hand and the claim that individual models represent distinct, self-consistent possible scenarios with a strong narrative element on the other. We first characterize these possibilistic interpretations (PI) and clarify how they differ from competing, non-possibilistic accounts. We then consider the differences between these approaches, and in particular focus on two related challenges: that storylines and model ensembles under the PI (i) have a merely apologetic function; and (ii) would be useless for inferential and policy-making practices currently pursued by the IPCC. We provide a conceptual basis for addressing (i), and in response to (ii) point out different potential uses of possibilistic claims established by either approach.

Gunnemyr Mattias & Wieland, Jan-Willem: *Shell's Switching Defence*

In 2019, the environmental organization Milieudefensie and co-plaintiffs took the fossil fuel company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) to court, demanding that the company achieve a 45% reduction in emissions by 2030. In defense, RDS argued that such a reduction obligation "would have no or only limited effect on global supply or CO_2 emissions reduction, as others would step in to meet demand" (RDS 2019: 46). Eventually, in 2021, The Hague District Court decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The court disliked RDS's argument because, notably, the reduction obligation will lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, more room in the carbon budget and it will serve compelling interests.

The court's motivation for disliking the argument is insufficient. If RDS is correct that the reduction obligation will not affect climate change, the court's motivation is wrong. The reduction obligation would not lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or more room in the carbon budget, and it would not serve any compelling interests.

Still, the court might have done the correct thing in disliking RDS's argument, albeit for insufficient reasons. We review two objections to RDS's argument, finding them wanting: De Bruin (2023) suggestion that RDS would violate human rights if it continues business as usual, and Christensen (2022) argument that the combined willingness of other companies to step in and fill demand exacerbates the harm to climate victims. Instead, we suggest analyzing the case's causal structure as either a *pre-emption* or *switching* case, drawing on ideas from Paul and Hall (2013), Sartorio (2005, 2016), and Touborg (2017). In pre-emption cases, the agent causing the outcome is accountable, while in switching cases, the agent is not. We argue that RDS's situation is a pre-emption case.

Gåvertsson, Frits: *The Somerville School and (the Re-Emergence of) Metaphysics*
Recently there has been a surge of interest in the so-called 'Somerville School'—a group of Oxford-based philosophers including G. E. M. Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, Mary Midgley and Philippa Foot active from the early 1950's and onwards. What has been largely overlooked in this recent surge of scholarship, however, is the group's reliance on an understanding of metaphysics as a descriptive-normative revisionary historical enterprise and the distinct form of historical, or genealogical, argumentation that this understanding results in. In this talk I provide a characterisation of this shared understanding of metaphysics as a historical science, explain how it both threatens a commonly accepted narrative concerning the re-emergence of metaphysics in analytic philosophy and gives rise to a distinct form of historical arguments. I also exemplify these more abstract historiographical and argumentative points by tracking and explicating these metaphysical concerns and their adjacent argumentative structures in a number of prominent writings of members of the Somerville School.

Hansson, Sven-Ove: *A More Realistic Account of Credences and Full Beliefs*
The relationship between credences and full beliefs is a central issue in epistemology, most notably in accounts of the lottery and preface paradoxes. It is also highly relevant for instance in discussions of epistemic encroachment and the impact of values in science. In this presentation I will propose that a more realistic treatment of these issues can be obtained if we apply important insights from psychology, such as that humans do not simultaneously have full belief and a lower-level (for instance probabilistic) belief in one and the same proposition. It is also important to replace traditional Bayesian probability models, in which an accepted proposition cannot be given up, by models that reflect our ability to give up a full belief and replace it by a lower-level belief in the same proposition. I will show how the application of these insights can provide more credible accounts of several issues studied in epistemology.

Herburger, Isabel: *Evidentialism for Radical Epistemologists*
Radical epistemologists think there are many real-world conditions of bad ideology—conditions where systems of social oppression are supported by false beliefs and, in turn, further entrench such beliefs. They ask: which theory of justification best accounts for how subjects attain justified moral and political beliefs amidst pervasive ideology? Srinivasan (2020) defends a (reliabilist) externalist position, where justification in pervasive ideological circumstances depends on subjects' beliefs being reliably & safely connected to truth. Johnson King (2022) defends a (responsibilist) internalist position,

where justification depends on subjects exercising epistemic due diligence. I share Srinivasan and Johnson King's radical commitments. I also share Johnson King's internalist leanings, and think her framework captures certain ideological cases well. But the framework also faces problems. First, due diligence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. Furthermore, due diligence counterintuitively predicts that justification always increases the harder someone tries. I bring out these problems via novel cases. Then I offer a diagnosis of where the due diligence framework goes wrong: it runs together the justification of a subject's specific beliefs and the praiseworthiness of their general epistemic character, when these two dimensions of evaluation sometimes come apart. Finally, I offer an alternative *evidentialist* account that better captures how subjects can attain specific internalistically justified beliefs given pervasive bad ideology. The guiding principle is simple: adjust your beliefs to your evidence! My view constitutes a new (and I think more viable) defense of the radical commitment that pervasive ideology is a crucial starting point for epistemological theorizing, rather than something irrelevant or too emotionally charged to be worth considering.

Hoffmann, Aviv: *Veritas in Absentia: Truth in ontological context*
Alvin Plantinga (1983) argued against a view he labeled *existentialism*: "a singular proposition is ontologically dependent upon the individuals it is directly about." Timothy Williamson (2002) modified Plantinga's argument into a much-discussed "proof" of the claim that he himself exists necessarily. The standard response to these arguments is that they involve an equivocation between what Kit Fine (1985) called *inner truth* and *outer truth* (I/O). I agree that these arguments involve an equivocation but, in this paper, my main aim is to ground the equivocation in a different (novel) distinction: I distinguish between *perspectival truth* (a notion I define) and *outer truth* (P/O). The essential difference between these distinctions is that, whereas I/O is *one-dimensional* (only one world is involved in that distinction, namely the world with respect to which a proposition is evaluated for truth), P/O is *two-dimensional* (two worlds are involved in that distinction, namely a world with respect to which a proposition is evaluated for truth and a world that affords the ontological perspective from which the evaluation is made). To support P/O, I use it to formulate concisely a distinction, proposed by Iris Einheuser (2012), between three kinds of possible worlds. Importantly, my aim is not to undermine I/O. On the contrary, I show that inner truth is a special case of perspectival truth, so I/O is a special case of P/O, and so I accept I/O. I also show that P/O itself is a special case of a (novel) distinction concerning the exemplification of relations in general. In light of the distinction concerning exemplification, I argue that the familiar principle that Plantinga has formulated and labeled *serious actualism* is not substantive. I conclude the paper by comparing and contrasting the present discussion with the discussion in Speaks 2012, where a superficially similar position is defended.

Hultsch, Silvana: *What does it mean for a society to make moral progress?*
Moral progress is a controversially discussed topic across philosophers, historians, psychologists, biologists and sociologists. There are arguably instances of significant changes in social attitudes and practices that let us think that the presence is morally much better than it would have been without those. Think of the abolition of slavery, women's rights, LGBTQ+ inclusivity, or the rise of vegetarianism in western countries out of concern for the environment and animals are often used examples. In virtue of what, if

at all, are these developments instances of moral progress? Unsurprisingly, scholars disagree about what constitutes (moral) progress across disciplines, centuries and schools of thought. In this talk, I demarcate the most influential conceptions of progress and show the problems that some of these views ran into which modern views on moral progress need to avoid. I argue that there is space for a modern conception of moral progress and that moral progress is a real possibility. In my view, rather than moving towards some predefined conception of the good, moral progress consists in moving away from moral problems on a societal scale. In doing so, I suggest that not only do changes in normative attitudes and social practices constitute moral progress, which is often assumed. Changes in social structures, such as institutions or norms, must also constitute moral progress to fully capture all paradigmatic examples of moral progress.

Hågemark, Hubert: *Intention in Gricean Intentions*
It is hard to overstate the influence of Grice (1957) in the study of communication. Roughly, he suggested that for a speaker to mean something by an utterance *x*, the speaker must utter *x* with 1) a primary intention to make the addressee produce a particular response *p*, and 2) a communicative intention to make the addressee recognize that the speaker has the primary intention. Despite the considerable attention this analysis has received, the question of how the concept of intention as such is to be understood in Gricean intentions has been largely overlooked. This is somewhat surprising, given its obvious importance for making the Gricean account as precise as possible, and thus for being able to evaluate it properly. In this talk, I will explore how different understandings of "intention" that are common in the philosophy of action literature can be applied to Gricean intentions. More specifically, I will offer different definitions of the Gricean intentions based on different understandings of "intention". The different accounts of "intention" that I will consider can be divided into two parts. The first views it as a mental state akin to either 1) a predominant desire, 2) a predominant desire plus belief, 3) an evaluative judgment, or 4) an irreducible planning state. The second sees them as non-mental phenomena reducible to either 4) some feature of intentional action, or 5) some kind of pattern recognition inspired by a Wittgensteinian approach. The discussion fills an important gap in the literature and contributes to a better understanding of Gricean intentions.

Jansson, Erik: *Is Rational Suicide Almost Always Required?*
In this talk, I present an argument against the views put forward by those who believe suicide can be rational, more precisely, rationally permitted. In short, I argue that their views have too implausible consequences to be accepted.

While different authors, such as Brandt, Battin, and Prado, have differing views on when suicide is rationally permitted, all of them agree on at lest two necessary conditions (or their views are such that they cannot, without contradiction, reject them). I argue that together with a plausible principle of rational choice those two necessary conditions imply that when suicide is rationally permitted, it is almost always rationally required. More precisely, I argue that in the situations where suicide is rationally permitted, it will almost always be the only rationally permitted choice. Some of the writers on rational suicide have said that it is possible on their views that suicide could be rationally required rationally required, but I doubt that they would agree that it so almost always when they think it is permitted.

I will show how the proponents of rational suicide can avoid this consequence by rejecting the trichotomy thesis, that two things can only relate to each other in value as better than, worse than, or equally as good as. Then they will be of the hook from my argument, but I argue that their views will still imply that rationally permitted suicide is most often rationally required, which makes their views implausible.

Johannesson, Eric: *What's Wrong with Ad Hoc Theory Modification*
Roughly, an *ad hoc* theory modification is one that accommodates a recalcitrant piece of evidence without yielding any novel predictions. By modeling science as a particular kind of guessing game, I show how to distinguish *conservative* from *radical* guessing strategies, and *successful* strategies from those that are not. I show that, whenever a successful strategy is available, some radical strategy is successful. I also show that, sometimes, no conservative strategy is successful even though some (radical) strategy is. By identifying ad hoc strategies with conservative ones, I thereby seek to explain what is wrong with ad hod theory modifications.

Karlsson, Edit: *Estetiska Uttalanden; oenighet och semantisk minimalism*
Hur ska vi förstå estiska uttalanden? Denna frågeställning har varit föremål för omfattande diskussion inom samtida filosofi, där två huvudsakliga perspektiv dominerar: kontextualism och expressivism. Kontextualister hävdar att estetiska uttalanden innehåller en dold indexikal, vilket inkorporerar talarens estetiska standarder i uttalandets semantiska struktur, medan expressivister ser dem som direkta uttryck för icke-kognitiva affektiva tillstånd. Dessa perspektiv fångar en utbredd intuition: att estetiska omdömen har sin grund i, eller åtminstone hittar en del av sin förklaring i, subjektiva affektioner. Trots detta möter båda teorierna svårigheter, särskilt när det gäller att förklara genuin oenighet kring estetiska omdömen. Ett lösningsalternativ är pragmatik. Genom att förstå estetisk oenighet i pragmatiska termer har filosofer föreslagit att oenigheten kan tolkas som metalingvistiska förhandlingar
eller som ett uttryck för en strävan efter estetisk samhörighet. På detta sätt kan både kontextualister och expressivister grunda genuiniteten i estetisk oenighet utan att kompromissa med sina semantiska teorier.

Jag föreslår dock en alternativ väg framåt. Som svar på den inledande frågan, föreslår jag att estetiska uttalanden bäst förklaras med hjälp av *semantisk minimalism*. Enligt detta synsätt bestäms det semantiska innehållet i ett uttalande som "Utsikten är vacker" enbart av språkets syntax tillsammans med de ingående termernas lexikala betydelser. Istället för att använda pragmatik för att förklara genuin oenighet, kan den istället användas för att förstå den breda variationen i användningen av estetiska uttalanden. Semantikens roll är då reserverad för att förklara uttalandens betydelse på en nivå som är tillgänglig för alla kompetenta talare av ett språk utan kännedom om uttalandets kontext.

Genom att anta semantisk minimalism undviker vi inte bara problemet med att förklara genuin estetisk oenighet, utan bidrar även med en naturlig förklaring till flera andra estetisk-filosofiska frågor, samtidigt som vi kan fånga intuitionen att estetiska omdömen är grundade i subjektiva affektioner.

Kim, Jiwon & Chalson, Shalom: *Understanding the Politics of Colour*

In this paper, we argue that the meaning of skin colour terms, like 'Black', 'Brown', and 'White', is crucial to understanding the nature of racial oppression and advancing ameliorative projects about race. We argue that colour terms are uniquely significant because they have a double-edge: they play a role both in intra-racial discrimination and inter-racial solidarity. To account for this double-edge, we need to properly consider the properties of colour terms. We begin by challenging what we call the naïve assumption. On this assumption, race and colour terms necessarily co-refer. Race refers to groups of individuals who are identified by racial classifications that are operative within a given context. Colour, on the other hand, refers to persons identified by phenotypic features salient within a given context. Analysing colour becomes imperative once the naïve assumption is challenged. Importantly, there are three further reasons to think that colour is significant independently of race. Unlike race, colour can explain the phenomena of (i) intra-racial discrimination (Robson 1990; Turner 1995; Dupree-Wilson 2021) and (ii) inter-racial solidarity. And unlike race, (iii) colour seems unmediated by social forces (Harris 2009). We explore two possible explanations for the political significance of colour: one metaphysical, and the other, linguistic. On the first, colour is a base property conferred by persons within operative social contexts (Ásta 2018). While this theory can shed light on intra-racial discrimination, it falls short of explaining how colour terms may be reclaimed in emancipatory social movements. We, therefore, consider a second explanation. We propose that speech acts containing colour terms have distinctive pragmatic features, and understanding reclamation requires appealing to the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of naming colour (Langton 1993). Accordingly, we analyse speech acts containing colour terms in terms of felicity conditions, along with convention, intent, and uptake.

Kirk-Gianni, Cameron: *How to Solve the Gender Inclusion Problem*
The *inclusion problem* for theories of gender arises when those theories inappropriately fail to include certain individuals in the gender categories to which they ought to belong. The inclusion problem affects both of the most influential traditions in feminist theorizing about gender: social-position accounts and identity accounts. I argue that the inclusion problem can be solved by adopting a *structured* theory of gender, which incorporates aspects of both social-position accounts and identity accounts. According to the theory I favor, an individual's gender is determined by their gender identity if they have one; otherwise, it is determined by their social position. My structured approach to gender offers a more direct solution to the gender inclusion problem than alternatives recently advocated by Barnes (2020), Jenkins (2023), and others. It also points the way to a simple solution to inclusion problems that arise at the level of gendered language.

Klint Jensen, Karsten: *Collective Action, Collective Harm, and Coordination*
It is well known that provision of public goods (avoidance of harm) involves collective action problems, where self-interested agents will be motivated to free-ride and thereby block the materialization of the good. Parfit suggested that moral solutions, where people become motivated not to free-ride, might be preferable to the standard political ones based on incentives. Regan perhaps more clearly than others realized that moral solutions need coordination. The aim here is, firstly, to map various possible of coordination problems, and secondly, to explore the prospects of solving them.

Many of these problems has been characterized as so-called collective harm problems: whereas a large enough group can make a difference to the outcome, no individual can make any difference regardless of what others do. As they stand, however, these assumptions are incoherent. Instead, Kagan suggested consecutive thresholds, such that an individual makes a difference only when a threshold is crossed. Regan's famous Whiff-and-Poof case is a two-person two-act case with only one threshold. But it can be generalized.

Regan also hinted at another possibility, where each individual contribution makes a difference. Imagine patterns of contributions in equilibrium with varying value, where patterns are not in equilibrium if they collectively contribute 'too little' or 'too much'. This type can likewise be generalized. The challenge is here that consequentialism becomes very demanding for an individual acting unilaterally. Coordination is needed to ensure that everyone only has to do a 'fair share'. Large scale problems appear very complicated and it may not be clear what is the optimal pattern.

Generalizing from another paper (joint with Krister Bykvist) I argue that (1) successful coordination in a self-interested environment requires that all agents become convinced to act for the morally optimal outcome, and (2) if there are 'moral transaction costs', this outcome cannot be achieved.

Krödel, Thomas: *Problems with Positive Epistemic Obligations*

In the talk, I argue against epistemic norms that state sufficient conditions for being obligated to believe something. I focus on prima facie promising norms where the sufficient conditions involve being in a position to know the proposition in question, as in (*) If S is in a position to know p, then S ought to believe p. I argue that norm (*) faces two kinds of problems.

First, a capacity problem for (*) arises from cases where S is a position to know p and in a position to know q but doesn't have the capacity to believe both propositions at once. In such cases, (*) yields that S ought to believe p and ought to believe q (in symbols, OBp ∧ OBq). By the agglomeration of obligation, it follows that S ought to both believe p and believe q (O(Bp ∧ Bq)). Thus, (*) yields an obligation to do something that by assumption S cannot do, violating the "ought implies can" principle.

Second, there is a rationality problem for (*), which arises as follows. It can be the case that S doesn't believe p, is in a position to know p, and is also in a position to know that S doesn't believe p. It follows from (*) that S ought to believe p and that S ought to believe that S doesn't believe p (OBp ∧ OB¬Bp). By the agglomeration of obligation, it follows that S ought to believe p and believe that S doesn't believe p (O(Bp ∧ B¬Bp)). By a quasi-closure principle, it follows that S is at least permitted to believe the conjunction of p and the proposition that S doesn't believe p (P(B(p ∧ ¬Bp))). But such a permission to believe a Moore-paradoxical proposition seems highly irrational.

Kyriacou, Christos: *Explanatory Indispensability, Values and the Rationality of Empirical Science*

Harman's (1977) 'argument from causal-explanatory otiosity' has attracted much critical attention, but there is an aspect of the argument that has gone largely unnoticed. Harman's (1977) argument assumes that the practice of rational empirical science is itself methodologically value-neutral, that is, it does not involve any values (although it does involve value-neutral logic and mathematics). This positivist assumption is prima

facie unsurprising (and widely held) because, according to the famous Weberian ideal, rational empirical science ought to be methodologically value-neutral (cf. Weber (1946)). That is, it must be free of any ideology, preconceptions, partialities, interests, biases and stereotypes etc. that might skew our scientific judgment in collecting and evaluating evidence (cf. John (2021)).

In this paper, I argue that when properly understood the methodological constrain of value-neutrality implies commitment to explanatorily indispensable, intertwined epistemic and moral values (vis-à-vis respective virtues). These are the values that a good, virtuous scientist should abide by when engaging in rational scientific inquiry. If this argument is to the right direction, then rational empirical science not only involves logic and mathematics but also involves epistemic and moral values and, therefore, the argument from causal-explanatory otiosity fails. It fails because explanatory indispensability for rational scientific practice indirectly justifies moral and epistemic values, just as it does with the truths of logic and mathematics.

Landström, Karl: *Epistemic Oppression and the Division of Epistemic Labor*
Our epistemic dependency on others and that we often rely on dividing up epistemic labour between different actors within and in between different epistemic communities has long been recognised in both social epistemology (Goldberg 2011) and philosophy of science (Kitcher 1990; Bird 2022). However, these divisions of epistemic labour have received relatively little explicit attention in the literature on epistemic injustice and oppression, except for in the scholarship on epistemic exploitation (Berenstain 2016; Toole 2019). This is surprising given that much of the literature on epistemic injustice and oppression is focused on the conditions under which differently situated epistemic agents are able to partake meaningfully in shared epistemic endeavours with others. In this paper I argue that how different roles and epistemic labour are distributed is an important consideration for scholarship on epistemic injustice and oppression. I depart from my doctoral research and existing scholarship in social epistemology and philosophy of science to trace how processes that determine the division of epistemic labour within a specific epistemic community, as well as the outcome of such processes can be shaped by, and reproduce, epistemic oppression. I outline a number of cases that illustrate how epistemic oppression can be reproduced and reinforced through the division of epistemic labour, as well as in the result of such processes. Following that I briefly consider examples of how individuals can resist epistemically oppressive divisions of epistemic labour. Lastly, I conclude the paper by discussing some tentative suggestions for principles that could underlie a division of epistemic labour that addresses epistemic oppression, as well as their shortcomings. In doing so this paper broadens the existing scholarship on epistemic oppression in and through the division of epistemic labour.

Leventi, Marianna: *Conversational Forgiveness*
The concept of forgiveness is an integral part of our moral and social lives. We need forgiveness to coexist in societies and interact with others. Within groups of people, miscommunications and events of harm can be an everyday phenomenon. Forgiveness helps people overcome these challenges and maintain social interactions in a peaceful manner.

Naturally, philosophers have taken a special interest in the concept of forgiveness. Although analytic philosophy has examined the role of forgiveness and its normative and descriptive status, there is still a need for further investigation. This paper aims to continue the already existing work and embellish it further.

The standard understanding of forgiveness seems to be inadequate to actually capture the nuance of how people act when they forgive and more importantly of the process that is needed to reach forgiveness. This process has not been adequately investigated in the corresponding literature, and this lacuna explains why there are often misconceptions regarding forgiveness.

Taking elements from accounts of moral repair and theories of conversational responsibility, I suggest a new paradigm of forgiveness which is focused on its being a process and not an end state. In this new understanding of the concept of forgiveness, forgiveness is an analog to a conversation. The two parties, the wrongdoer and the victim, are engaged in a conversation, where they negotiate how they can overcome the hurt that was inflicted. This happens with the two parties try to rearrange the terms of the relationship in a way that creates ground for them to reach a level of understanding that can lead their relationship to a similar one as that before the harmful event.

As a response to what we could do if forgiveness is not an option, I will suggest that we can "let it go" applying accounts that suggest that sometimes we can let go of blame. By adopting such an account, victims can move on away from the burden of harm without the wrongdoer´s acknowledgment of harming them. This is a significant theoretical advantage of such a theory, given that it is still puzzling how we can forgive the dead, people who do not apologize, people who do not understand what they did wrong, and so on. Victims can let go of blame without the perpetrator´s cooperation. Forgiveness, on the other hand, demands that the two parties communicate on how to rectify the relationship.

Lindblom, Lars: *Democratic Stability and Theories of Justice*

The topic of presentation is this idea of democratic stability in Rawls's work and its implications for theories of justice. As first step, the idea of democratic stability as a condition on theories of justice will be explained in further detail and a version of the condition will be defended. The condition will then be brought to use. The implications of the condition will first be illustrated by returning to the old debate between Rawls and Nozick, and it will be shown that the libertarianism of the latter fails the test of democratic stability. Therefore, it should be rejected as a theory of justice. The next step will be to discuss Harry Frankfurt's (1987) claim that justice should be understood as sufficiency rather than equality. This discussion will illustrate how democratic stability affects the interpretation of principles of justice, and a conclusion will be that on an interpretation that takes democratic stability into account, sufficiency views become very close to, if not indistinguishable from egalitarian positions on justice. Thereupon, Amartya Sen's (2009) view that we do not need a *theory* of justice, since we can get by very well by identifying piece-meal improvement in terms of justice, will be investigated. It will be argued that since democratic stability has to do with the long-term effects of institutions, the piece-meal approach will not do. We need theory at least for the sake of democratic stability. Finally, we will turn to the methodological debate between G.A. Cohen (2008) and Rawls. Cohen has argued that taking such conditions as democratic stability into account when presenting a principle of justice amounts to a disfigurement of justice. In

response, it will be argued that if one's account fails to both take into account the history of political philosophy and the very important human interests at stake in having a stable state, then the actual disfigurement of justice may be due to Cohen's methodology of political science. The concluding remarks outline the point that democratic stability has implications for both the choice of and interpretation of principles of justice, as well as the practical use of and methodology of theories of justice.

Livadiotis, Apollonios: *Two epistemic intuitions and epistemic conventionalism*
There is a tension between two intuitions regarding epistemic normativity. On the one hand, individuals may be deemed blameworthy for forming beliefs based on non-epistemic goals. For example, we might blame someone, as all things considered culpable, for choosing to believe in God merely based on her psychological comfort. On the other hand, there is an intuition that different norms may override epistemic considerations. In the same example, we are also tempted to say that this person is at least permissible to care more about her psychological well-being and believe badly. That would be particularly evident if the example clarified that the person in question would suffer greatly if she believed that God does not exist. Extant epistemic conventionalist accounts suggest that epistemic norms are a subset of institutional norms, serving goals such as morality or prudence. However, this leads to the unsatisfactory implication that prioritising personal goals, even weak ones, over epistemic norms is always justified. As such, epistemic conventionalism is unable to address the first intuition. I argue for a refined epistemic conventionalism, proposing an account that aligns with both intuitions. The main idea is that epistemic norms arise from our epistemic needs and evolved capabilities and are essential for coordinating the formation of true beliefs. Epistemic norms serve a fundamental need for collective coordination and have a universal application. They might be conventionally established but facilitate an essential goal in all contexts. Following epistemic norms promotes individual and collective goals, providing categorical reasons to adhere to them. This nuanced perspective accommodates the critique of someone dismissing epistemic norms in some contexts and the legitimacy of prioritising other normatively important goals in others, offering a comprehensive account of epistemic normativity.

Löw, Christian
Counterfactual accounts are the currently most popular theories of causation (Halpern and Hitchcock 2015; Gallow 2021; Lewis 2000). Standard worries about these accounts focus on sophisticated counterexamples, typically involving backup causes (Paul and Hall 2013). By contrast, I argue that the problem is more foundational. Counterfactual analyses of causation fail because counterfactuals are in principle unsuited for tracking causal structure. Consider the counterfactual "If Suzy had not thrown the stone, the window would not have shattered." It is widely assumed that for the counterfactual to track causal structure, we need to consider a scenario where Suzy did not throw but that is otherwise sufficiently similar to the actual world (Lewis 1979). There are only two plausible recipes for manufacturing such a scenario:

i. Intervening: Construct a state as much like the actual state at the time of Suzy's throw as possible, except that Suzy does not throw. Evolve this state forward in time, in accordance with the actual laws of nature. (Maudlin 2007, 21–37; Paul and Hall 2013, 47–53)

ii. Forking: Consider a world history that is (almost) exactly like the actual history until shortly before the time of Suzy's throw. At this time, history diverges, leading to Suzy not throwing, and from there unfolds again in accordance with the actual laws of nature. (Albert 2015; Dorr 2016; Lewis 1979).

I will argue that both recipes are unacceptable: Intervening leads to false causal claims due to the abrupt departure from actuality (Bennett 2003, 114:210). Forking mistakenly counts some spurious correlations as causal (Woodward 2003, 139). Both problems have been noted individually. The talk's main contribution is that together they entail that no counterfactual analysis of causation can succeed. I will extend this result to accounts that understand counterfactuals within causal models (Gallow 2021; Woodward 2003; Pearl 2013).

Lundgren, Björn: *The Right to Privacy and Informational Norms*

Helen Nissenbaum's contextual integrity (2010) is arguably one of the leading accounts of the right to privacy. On her account, privacy is a right to live in a society in which expected norms of information flow are for the most time meet. Violations, in turn, depend prima facie on whether it violates expected norms of information flow.

In this talk, I aim to undermine Nissenbaum's account in two ways. First, I will argue that norms of information cannot be a guide for neither privacy, nor privacy right violations, simply put because we can have a privacy (right) violations even when norms of information flow are not violated (because norms of information flow need not be privacy preserving).

Second, one of the potential benefits of contextual integrity is that if privacy and the right thereof is grounded in expected norms of information flow, then the account can—or so Nissenbaum argues—explain why people are angry when the (right to) privacy is violated. Simply put, they are angry because a a social norm is violated. Problematically, however, Nissenbaum's analysis of social norms depend on an old conception by Christina Bicchieri, who more recently recognizes the important empirical facts that social norms can be maintained even though most think that they are wrong (Bicchieri 2017). This means that Nissenbaum's contextual integrity either are not about social norms, or it cannot explain why people are angry (because in many cases they will, at best, pretend to be angry, in order to abide to the dominating norm)

Luzio, Hugo: *Animalism and Person Conativism*

Animalism is the view that each of us (i.e., each being of our metaphysical kind) is essentially a human organism and persists over time by virtue of some form of biological continuity. On this view, each of us is only contingently a Lockean person (i.e., a being with psychological properties) (Inwagen 1990, Olson 1997, Snowdon 2014). Most animalists are Lockeans about personhood. On this view, there is a natural, non-conventional fact of the matter as to whether a human organism is a 'person': it depends on its exhibition of complex psychological properties (e.g., consciousness and thinking) (Olson1997: 102-105). Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that persons are not best conceived as natural products, but rather conventional constructs. In this paper, I discuss the relation between animalism and the leading person conventionalist view: person conativism.

First, I present animalism and person conativism. Then, I distinguish between two forms of person conativism: substantial and phasal person conativism.

Whereas substantial person conativists hold that each of us is essentially a person and that our persistence conditions are partly determined by which conative attitudes obtain (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2004, 2020), phasal person conativists hold simply that 'being a person' (i.e., exhibiting personhood) is a partly conative property.
I argue that animalism is incompatible with the former, but not with the latter view.
Then, I develop a phasal person conativist form of animalism (PC-animalism) and argue that it has two main advantages over the more usual Lockean-animalist combo:

(i) PC-animalism is able to accommodate 'same person' talk on a person contingentist basis.

(ii) PC-animalism allows animalists to adopt a wide range of plausible positions regarding their most problematic cases (e.g., radical psychological change, brain transplant and conjoined twinning), which are unfeasible under a Lockean understanding of personhood.

Magnell, Elsa: *Apologies and Forgiveness: Solving the Paradox of Apologies*
Apologies are essential for our moral life. If you wrong or harm me, an apology holds the power to restore our moral relationship. Recently, however, Hallich (2016) has suggested that there is a *paradox of apologies*. Apologising, according to Hallich, is simply asking for forgiveness, and asking for forgiveness is asking the victim to withdraw her negative emotions after a wrong. A proper apology, however, requires understanding that one acted wrongly and so the belief that the victim's negative emotions are appropriate. A genuine offender then has no reason to apologise since she deems the victim's negative emotions appropriate.

I suggest two ways to dissolve the paradox. First, accepting an apology is not the same as forgiving. By disentangling forgiveness from the acceptance of apologies it becomes clear that accepting an apology does not necessarily mean changing all the negative emotions towards the offender. The victim who accepts an apology may still feel negative emotions, but she will change her behaviour; perhaps by withholding public blame and punishment. Thus, the offender may very well have a reason to apologise even though she deems the victim's negative emotions appropriate.

Second, Hallich confuses 'appropriate' with 'obligatory', and here I want to press on the power of apologies to dissolve the paradox. Apologies are not normatively inert interactions; they have the power to alter the normative landscape. If I step on your foot, it is appropriate to feel annoyance towards me, but if I offer a proper apology, it might be appropriate to suspend your annoyance. As such, an apology might change which reactive attitudes are appropriate. Although the negative emotions might still be appropriate, the apology can make it so that withdrawing those emotions would *also* be appropriate. Thus, a good apology might itself give me a *reason* to forgive.

Magnusson, Jenny: *Social Categories, Categorical Injustice, and Social Construction*
Ásta introduced the concept of "categorical injustice" in order to describe a type of metaphysical injustice. Categorical injustice occurs when an individual is institutionally entitled to perform an action, but their action is blocked due to their conferred social status. A mismatch is created between the action an individual is entitled to perform and the action the individual is able to perform. This mismatch is caused by stereotypes involved in the creation of certain social categories. Ásta understands categorical injustice in light of her conferralist account of social categories. According to this

account, social categories are created by being conferred a social status in a particular context. Ásta argues that the conferralist account can fulfill her social constructivist aim of providing an account of the categories that matter to our social life. However, I will argue that the conferralist account faces a dilemma between fulfilling this social constructivist aim and capturing situations of categorical injustice where this type of injustice is widespread. Failing to account for these cases of categorical injustice has the implication that the conferralist account is unable to fulfill one important desideratum for the theory, which is to be a useful tool in fighting oppression.

Maier, Felix: *Lust and Shame in Plotinus*

A fundamental law in Plotinus' metaphysics is that only ontologically higher entities like the soul can affect lower entities like the body and not vice versa. However, in appetites, emotions, and sense-perception, exactly the opposite seems to be the case: they arise from the body and affect the soul. Plotinus general strategy to avoid bottom-up causation is to distinguish between what exactly happens to the body and to the soul: the affection is on the level of the body while the soul becomes aware of it by perceiving the bodily change – and perception is considered an activity and not an affection. To defend a Platonic body-soul dualism while still being able to account for these phenomena, Plotinus introduces various levels of the soul. Plotinus' theory of sense-perception has received some attention in scholarship; however, emotions and appetites have been largely neglected. In this presentation, I will focus on two feelings which have not been described or discussed in detail in secondary literature: sexual lust and shame.

In Enneads 4.4, Plotinus discusses the bodily appetites: they arise in some part of the body and drag the soul along by means of two types of phantasia, equating one with a belief and the other with a quasi-belief; furthermore, he assumes a proto-appetite. Thereby, Plotinus focuses on hunger and only very briefly mentions lust. I will argue in comparing different passages that lust is a special case since its starting point can lie in the soul too. Hence, lust is a more complex case of appetite involving evaluations. Shame, on the other side, results from a belief in the soul but is intimately connected to the body. In analysing and comparing shame and lust, we get a better understanding of Plotinus' view on the embodied soul.

Malmqvist, Erik & Szigeti, Andras: *How Exploitation Harms*

There is a growing philosophical debate about the concept of exploitation and about potentially exploitative real-world practices, e.g., "sweatshop" employment, commercial surrogacy, and organ sale. The key challenge in this area is generally taken to be to explain what makes exploitation wrong in cases where both parties benefit and consent. One explanation appeals to distributive unfairness, another to Kantian disrespect, and yet another to domination.

In this talk we propose a shift in focus. In discussing what makes exploitation wrong, philosophers have mainly been concerned with appraising the exploiter's conduct. However, they have tended to overlook the exploitee's side of the transaction. They have asked why it is wrong to exploit somebody but not why it is bad or harmful to be exploited. Our aim is to begin filling this gap by outlining an account of how exploitation harms those who are exploited.

Our main claim is that the exploitee suffers relational harm, i.e., harm to their standing as an equal in relation to others. This is the case even when they benefit in other

ways (e.g., materially) from being exploited. We draw theoretical support for this claim from recent work on relational equality in political philosophy. Further, we illustrate the real-world relevance of the claim by considering the case of gig work, a practice that is often criticized for being exploitative but that has received scant philosophical attention.

We suggest that our account of how exploitation harms not only fills an important theoretical gap but also allows progress to be made on two further questions about exploitation. The first is whether it can be worse to exploit the needy or vulnerable than not to interact with them when the exploitation is voluntary and benefits them. The second question concerns the morality of third-party interference with exploitative transactions and relationships.

Mahdiyeh Moosavi, Seyyedeh: *Unifying Excuses*

This paper aims to explore the nature of excuses. What is it for a consideration to instantiate the property of being an excuse for a (seeming) wrongdoing? Sometimes, determining whether a consideration is an excuse is a complicated issue. The considerations to which we appeal when making excuses for our wrongdoings constitute a miscellaneous category: ignorance, tiredness, stress, duress, traumas, poverty, etc. On account of such a heterogenous collection, some have argued that it is highly unlikely that there could be a unified account of excuses (Tadros 2005; Baron 2007). In this paper, I explore the possibility of providing a unified account of excuses and their normative function. The rough idea is that agents are rationally disposed to be blameworthy for committing a moral wrong, and excuses function as maskers of such rational dispositions. The distinction between finkish and masked dispositions provide a ground for distinguishing between excuses and exemptions. Moreover, this account is poised to explain the normative power of excuses, i.e. the
idea that excuses render blame inappropriate or unfitting, without blurring the distinction between excuses and justification. Along the way, I examine two recent influential accounts of the nature of excuses, provided by Wallace (1994) and Sliwa (2019), that explicate excuses as considerations that block the inference from outward behavior to the conclusion that the agent lacks a morally adequate intention.

Minden Ribeiro, Max: *Perceptual Presence as Manifest Dependence*

It is often taken to be distinctive of the phenomenal character of ordinary perceptual experience that objects are presented as real entities actually instantiating their sensible properties, such that both the object and its properties are apparently revealed to the perceiver. Call this strand of phenomenal character *presence* (Cf. Matthen 2005, Crane 2005, O'Conaill 2017, Sethi 2020). This paper has two aims. First, I defend a new account of presence. Second, I argue that a relationalist account of the structure of perceptual experience is better placed to accommodate perceptual presence than its representationalist competitors.

According to the account of presence I defend, the phenomenal character of presence is the phenomenal character of an experience seeming to depend on its object. I outline three ways in which this apparent dependence is experienced:

1. Manifest Change Dependence: Changes in the perceptual object seem to necessitate changes in the experience.

2. Manifest Temporal Dependence: The temporal location of the experience seems to depends on, and is indistinguishable from, the temporal location of the object (Soteriou 2013)

3. Manifest Spatial Dependence: The spatial location of the experience depends on, and is positioned relative to, the spatial location of the object.

I argue that while Searle (1983) is right to appeal to object-experience dependence to explain perceptual phenomenal character, it is misguided to assume this is a causal dependence. Rather, we should think of presence as the manifest *constitutive* dependence of experience on its object.

I propose that the relationalist, in proposing that perceptual experience is a relation in which subject and object form constitutive parts, is well placed to explain manifest dependence in terms of the actual dependence of experience on its object. The representationalist by contrast, in appealing to veridicality conditions, must adopt an error theory of perceptual phenomenal character.

Nes, Anders: *The Phenomenal Roots of Perceptual Privilege*

Uncontroversially, perception has not quite the same epistemic role as such extra-perceptual cognitive capacities as memory, language comprehension, or reasoning. Moreover, the epistemic role of perception seems not just to be different from that of such cognitive capacities, but also, in some respects, to be privileged or especially authoritative. In some sense, perception has a special power to confirm or, as the case may be, disconfirm the outputs of extra-perceptual cognitive capacities. If perception has such a privileged epistemic role vis-à-vis cognition, it plausibly does so in virtue of some broadly psychological difference from the latter.

In this paper, drawing on recent debates on the nature of the perception/cognition-distinction (for reviews, see Nes et al. 2023 and Clarke & Beck 2023), I explore what the grounds of this privileged role may be. I argue the main proposed non-phenomenological contrasts between perception and cognition, viz. in cognitive architecture (notably: perception is encapsulated, cognition not), representational format (perception is iconic or nonpropositional, cognition discursive or propositional), and stimulus-dependence (perception functions to be stimulus-dependent, cognition not), offer at best partial accounts of the grounds of this privileged epistemic role. Turning to proposed phenomenological contrasts, I argue that what has been various labelled presentational phenomenology (Chudnoff 2021), or scene-immediacy (Sturgeon 2000), and that has been held to be characteristic of perceptual phenomenology, has an epistemic dimension in an epistemically elevated form of access to the scene so presented. I suggest this is at least part of the story of why perception has a distinctive, privileged epistemic role.

The paper, then, defends the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of perception via a route that is alternative to recent arguments from blindsight or zombies (cf. Smithies 2018).

Nguyen, James and Frigg, Roman: *Individuating Target Systems*

Many accounts of model-target relationship(s) include a schematic 'target system*T*'. But targets aren't readymade; modelling them requires individuation. This is a significant theoretical lacuna and leaves unrecognised how different ways of filling in the details of *T* entail (sometimes radically) different analyses of our scientific models' accuracy.

Here we fill this lacuna by (i) providing such an account, and (ii) articulating how different individuations provide different standards of accuracy.

A first stab at (i) is spatiotemporal: *T* is simply what a designated spacetime region contains. This is too anaemic. Such regions can contain all sorts of things irrelevant in a modelling context; and even if attention is (somehow) restricted to the right objects, only some of their properties and relations are of interest. What individuates a target is a *conceptualisation* of the domain.

Which gives rise to (ii): whether a model accurately represents *T* depends on how it's conceptualised in numerous ways. First, the *level* at which *T* is described. Modellers can regard micro-features (biological individuals, or particle trajectories) or macro-features (populations, thermodynamic quantities) as salient, even though both occupy the same spacetime regions. Different choices require different models. Second, even at the same level, alternative *aspects* can be targeted. A model of a system of balls that represents their colours (e.g. a decision-theoretic lottery) has different accuracy conditions to one that represents their trajectories (e.g. a mechanical model). Third, there are multiple ways of *presenting* a fixed collection of aspects. Fourth, the *specificity* at which a target's aspects are conceptualised impacts its models' accuracy: sometimes a model of a rough satellite trajectory counts as accurate, sometimes not.

This provides a (no doubt incomplete) taxonomy of different ways of conceptualising targets, where different conceptualisations yield different standards of accuracy. Without which there is no model-target relation.

Nici, Lenart: *African Philosophy's Path to Universal Philosophy*

In African Philosophy (1996) and subsequent work, Paulin J. Hountondji forcefully argued against a trend in African philosophy that he termed "ethnophilosophy". Ethnophilosophy, Hountondji argued, is really a form of anthropology (ethnology) and not philosophy "properly speaking". Hountondji's attack on "ethnophilosophy" and his defense of a "universalist" conception of philosophy has attracted criticism of being Eurocentric. This charge is interesting because Hountondji's conception of philosophy was largely influenced by his study of European philosophy. But European philosophy itself has a culturally particular understanding of philosophy, and any proclamation of a "universal philosophy" that is made from the standpoint of European philosophy is thus bound to be Eurocentric. I concede that there are, indeed, grounds for thinking that some of Hountondji's major philosophical influences – Husserl - had a Eurocentric conception of philosophy, but that (1) Husserl did ultimately not have a decisive influence on the development of Hountondji's critique of ethnophilosophical particularism, and (2) the notion of "influence" does not have to be understood as being uni-directional. In the final part of the paper, I look at some of the reasons for why Hountondji thinks that – developmentally speaking – ethnophilosophy is a dead duck. I conclude with a discussion of Hountondji's vision for a project to "decolonize" philosophy as such (i.e. not just African philosophy). I argue that this vision is comfortably situated within some of Hountondji's Althusserian commitments, and bear little influence from Husserl's legacy. Moreover, the decolonizing project that Hountondji speaks of is crucially dependent on techno-scientific development.

Nygren, Karl: *Conditional Inquisitive Logic*

Ciardelli (2016) suggests a way to lift classical semantic accounts of conditionals that assign propositions to conditional sentences to the inquisitive semantics setting. In the resulting framework, antecedents and consequents of conditional sentences may be associated with multiple alternative propositions, and a conditional sentence is taken to express that for each alternative for the antecedent, if that alternative were to obtain, then some corresponding alternative for the consequent would also obtain. This type of lifting can be used to handle issues concerning disjunctive antecedents, conditional questions and unconditionals. In this talk, I consider the conditional inquisitive logics that Ciardelli's lifting recipe gives rise to. In particular, I focus on how to construct axiom systems for inquisitive logic versions of various conditional logics.

Nyström, Johannes: *The No Miracle Argument and the Base Rate Fallacy*
Scientific realism is, roughly, the view that well-confirmed scientific theories are typically approximately true. The main argument in favor of scientific realism is the 'no miracles argument' (NMA). The core premise of the NMA asserts that the only plausible explanation of the predictive success demonstrated by science is that predictively successful scientific theories are typically approximately true. Working with a probabilistic reconstruction of the argument, Dawid and Hartmann (2016) show that the validity of the NMA is contingent on a fairly high frequency β of predictively successful theories in science. In the absence of β, the core premise of the NMA cannot control the prior probability that any given theory T is approximately true, and the NMA falls prey to the base rate fallacy (Howson 2000).

In this talk, I respond to Boge's (2020) criticism of frequency-based NMA. Boge argues that β cannot help control the prior probability of T's approximate truth in the way assumed by Dawid and Hartmann, since β does not deliver a statistical prediction about T's success chance. Hence, the frequency-based NMA is not valid. I show that Boge's criticism must turn on the claim that β and T's success are conditionally independent given some subset of T's theoretical properties. Consequently, whether or not T will be predictively successful could be determined on the basis of T's theoretical content alone. But this is fully implausible, and in any case a much more radical claim than any version of scientific realism. Therefore, the criticism is not convincing.

Finally, I discuss how information external to β about T's success chance is relevant for the frequency-based NMA. With the help of a lottery analogy, I show that in particular, identifying the frequency of successful scientific disciplines is required to establish the significance of any actual token of the argument.

Olson, Jonas and Moberger, Victor*: J. L. Mackie on Justice and Rights*
At the time of his death in 1981, J. L. Mackie left behind a number of unpublished manuscripts. Several of these were published posthumously in two volumes in 1985 (*Logic and Knowledge* and *Persons and Values*). Mackie also left behind a book-length manuscript on political philosophy, entitled *Theories of Justice and Rights*, which is now forthcoming with OUP (edited by Victor Moberger and myself). In the manuscript, which was written in the late 1970s and/or early 1980s, Mackie puts forward a unique right-based approach to political philosophy, while also criticizing rival views, especially those of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin. Interestingly, Mackie's arguments often draw heavily on the metaethical conclusions from his earlier book *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. In the talk I will outline Mackie's right-based view and then zoom in on

his critique of Rawls. Due to Rawls's explicit adoption of the method of reflective equilibrium, Mackie finds in *A Theory of Justice* two basic lines of argument: a 'forward argument' and a 'backward argument'. The forward argument moves from highly theoretical considerations concerning fairness and the shape of the original position to Rawls's two principles of justice, and then on to more specific conclusions about societal institutions. The backward argument moves in the opposite direction, from more specific claims about a just society to the two principles, and then all the way back to the original position. Mackie argues that both of these arguments fail. I will focus specifically on the forward argument, where Mackie's critique can be summarized as follows: (i) The 'main idea' of a hypothetical contract agreed to from behind a veil of ignorance is not a reliable guide to justice. (ii) Contrary to Rawls's intention, this 'main idea' supports and justifies adoption of a principle of average utilitarianism, rather than of the two principles of justice. (iii) The priority of basic liberties, as Rawls developed it, is neither plausible in itself nor supported by Rawls's arguments.

Olsson, Jesper: *Challenging Khoo's Argument Against Ambiguous Dog Whistles*
The carefully crafted language used by politicians often involves expressions known as *dogwhistles*. Dogwhistles are expressions that convey two messages: one that is neutral and one that is controversial or norm-violating, and where the latter is designed to appeal to specific subsets of the speaker's audience while remaining unnoticed by others. In this paper, I argue against Khoo's (2017) argument that dogwhistles cannot be ambiguous expressions, an argument which many have used in order to develop fully pragmatic theories of how dogwhistles work.

Khoo (2017) argues that dogwhistles cannot be ambiguous because they fail tests for ambiguity such as *the contradiction test*. However, polysemes, which are ambiguous expressions with two related meanings, are known to fail tests for ambiguity (Viebahn 2018; Geeraerts 1993 and Gillon 2004). I show that dogwhistles with related meanings, like polysemes, systematically fail the contradiction test whereas dogwhistles with unrelated meanings, not considered by Khoo, actually pass the test. I also show that expressions exhibiting other kinds of semantic variability, such as context sensitivity and indeterminacy, may pass the test. What we end up with are highly variable predictions, and the conclusion I draw is that the test underlying Khoo's argument are unreliable, and that we ought to remain open to the possibility dogwhistles may work via ambiguity. Drawing from empirical studies on ambiguity and recent studies by Boholm & Sayeed (2023), I will end by providing a sketch of how a tangible ambiguity view may look like.

Palmqvist, Carl-Johan: *Don't Blame the Victims*
In contemporary society, the proliferation of disinformation like fake news and propaganda is an increasing problem. Philosophers working with the issue standardly presuppose that disinformation's main function is to spreads false beliefs. Many employ the perspective of vice epistemology, which concerns flawed thinking and irresponsible epistemic behaviour. They assume that disinformed subjects have in some important way failed to be rational, critical thinkers, which has led to the formation of false beliefs (Cassam 2016; 2019; Pritchard 2021).

Arguing that we have strong reasons to reject the vice epistemological perspective, I develop a contrasting, non-doxastic understanding. In my view (for which there is substantial empirical evidence, see for example Erlich & Garner 2023; Meyer et.

al. 2021), disinformation does not function by spreading false beliefs, but by introducing epistemic possibilities which contrasts with the subject's beliefs. It creates an epistemic context of doubt and uncertainty. In such a context, it is not belief but non-doxastic attitudes such as hope, faith, fear or precaution which are proper epistemic responses.

A non-doxastic perspective allows us to understand the victims of disinformation as rational subjects, doing their best in what Noaves & de Ridder (2021) calls a "polluted" epistemic environment. From this perspective, the vice epistemological insistence on explaining the workings of disinformation by the epistemic misbehaviour of disinformed subjects can only be understood as victim blaming.

I will end by addressing possible measures against disinformation. Vice epistemologists often suggest that disinformed subjects need to foster epistemic virtues like critical thinking (Cassam 2019; Pritchard 2021). However, in epistemic uncertainty, an increase in critical thinking can easily make things worse. A non-doxastic perspective suggests other measures, either preventative to combat the rise and spread of "polluted" epistemic environments, or interventions aimed at guiding subjects out of these harmful contexts.

Powers, Audrey: *Non-naturalist Moral Causation*

In a way it seems just obvious that moral facts are causally efficacious. Furthermore, it seems that they can cause natural, non-moral facts. When my friend breaks her promise to pick me up at the airport after my flight gets in – when she acts morally wrongly in this manner – I feel that something morally bad went on as I stand in the parking lot. Perhaps the moral fact that it was wrong of her to break her promise caused the natural fact that I felt that something morally bad went on. Not everyone thinks this – perhaps something else is doing the causing here – but let's say we think it is the moral that's causally efficacious.

Now, if we are moral realists interested in explaining this as a case of moral causation, it is assumed that we had better go in for moral natural- ism over non-naturalism, as naturalism lets us posit moral causation while non-naturalism doesn't. I argue that this assumption is false. According to widely-accepted difference-making frameworks for causation and mod- ifications to these frameworks meant to capture higher-level causal claims correctly, moral facts may be causally efficacious on non-naturalist views. So non-naturalists are in a better position than we might expect when it comes to positing moral causation. Furthermore, naturalists will find it surprisingly difficult to posit moral causation unless they use the same tools as the non-naturalist. So naturalists are in a worse position than we might expect when it comes to positing moral causation. The upshot is that moral causation is not a good reason to choose naturalism over non-naturalism, or vice versa.

Renbo Olsen, August: *You May Do Either*

The ethics of defensive harming aims at identifying when it is permissible to harm someone in defense of yourself or in defense of others. Philosophers widely agree that it is permissible to defensively harm someone only if the harm meets the necessity condition. The necessity determines whether one of my defensive options becomes impermissible in virtue of me having a morally better alternative available. E.g., if I can save my life either by inflicting a painful death on the aggressor or by fleeing, killing the aggressor is impermissible because I have the alternative of fleeing. One of the most

prominent interpretations of the necessity condition is Trade-off Necessity, endorsed by Seth Lazar and Jeff McMahan. The trade-off necessity condition roughly states that one of the defending agent's options, o1, is necessary if and only if she does not have another option, o2, which has a better trade-off between the harms it averts and inflicts than o1. When exploring the necessity condition, philosophers have traditionally focused on cases where only a single option should be necessary. But actual cases of self-defense typically involve co-necessity, i.e., multiple options which should meet the necessity condition. Thus, if our necessity condition cannot allow for co-necessity, our moral theory of defensive harm becomes implausibly restrictive. This paper poses and explores the following challenge: can Trade-off Necessity capture our intuitions about cases where the defending agent has multiple options which, despite not having equally good trade-offs, should intuitively meet the necessity condition? I show that it depends on how we interpret Trade-off Necessity: if we accept an objectivistic interpretation of Trade-off Necessity, we cannot meet the challenge; whereas if we endorse what I call a 'reasonability-relative' interpretation of Trade-off Necessity, we can meet the challenge, but only at the cost of our theory renouncing objectivism.

Ribeiro Mota, Hugo: *Power Structures and Oppression within Deep Disagreement*
There is a gap in the deep disagreement literature (Pritchard 2021; 2023; Siegel 2019; Lynch 2010; Johnson 2022; Patterson 2014; Shields 2021; Cartlidge 2022) which stems from the inappropriate prioritization of the epistemic and an unfruitful focus on rational resolution. In order to address this gap, we should also analyze other aspects of the disagreement beyond the epistemic. This has traction in the political deep disagreement literature (Lagewaard 2021; Aberdein 2020; Kloster 2021; de Ridder 2021); their overall approach, which I have named the symptomatic view, consists of expanding the definition of deep disagreement by considering more symptoms of the conflict. I consider that simply expanding the definition of deep disagreements is not enough. The process of expanding the definition of deep disagreement without questioning the assumptions from the traditional theories leads to shortcomings. Thus, I propose that we must go further and reconceptualize deep disagreement as a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon. By especially considering the interconnected cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions (Longino 1996), we are able to understand and analyze deep disagreements across several of its layers. This allows us to correct the flow of investigation from solely looking into propositions and beliefs towards also looking at perspectives (Camp 2019; Yumuşak 2022), attention (Watzl 2022), salience biases (Munton 2021; Whiteley 2022), and values (Mason 2023). One of the main benefits of this move is being able to use the concept of deep disagreement more adequately to account for conflicts involving power structures and oppression, which can in turn lead to a better understanding of these complex cases. Understanding and potentially addressing the challenges brought to the surface by them requires us to review our current models of argumentation. I suggest that Dutilh Novaes' (2020) three-tiered model of epistemic exchanges is the best available, and conclude by proposing the addition of a non-argumentative form of communication that could further improve the model.

Rydehn, Henrik: *Two Varieties of Metaphysical Dependence*
In the wake of the recent interest in *metaphysical grounding* – the *in-virtue-of* relation between facts – philosophers have debated the connection between grounding

and *ontological dependence* (see e.g. Tahko & Lowe 2020; Schnieder 2020; Rydéhn 2021; Casey 2022). Are they two entirely distinct relations, are they connected somehow, can one be reduced to the other, or are grounding and ontological dependence in fact even one and the same? In this talk, I will sketch an account according to which grounding and ontological dependence are distinct relations that play importantly different roles in our metaphysical theorizing. At the same time, this account outlines how grounding and ontological dependence are both connected with a number of the same central metaphysical phenomena, although in different ways. The account thus not only provides support for distinguishing the two relations, but also explains why they have been prone to be confused with one another, and why, despite the differences, they both still deserve to be categorized as varieties of metaphysical dependence.

Sandberg, Joakim: *Carbon Footprints and Moral Mathematics*
For all individuals and companies that want to reduce their negative impact on the environment, it is important to have some idea about how to measure their "carbon footprint". For instance, if I want to reduce the climate impact of my consumption, I need to understand the carbon footprint of different goods and services. If I want to reduce the climate impact caused by my investment, I need to understand the carbon footprint of different companies producing those goods and services. There are currently a number of suggestions on how to measure such carbon footprints that seek to use our best natural-scientific understandings of which types of activities that generate which type of emissions. However, in this talk I argue that these measurements implicitly rest on controversial philosophical assumptions about how to understand causality and how to distribute moral blame. Given the complexity of modern economies, almost all of our emissions are due to a dynamic interplay between consumers, producers, investors, and regulators. This means that, on the one hand, there is a sense in which my individual consumption and investment has no impact at all on the environment – since I seldom cause any emissions directly, and I typically have very little influence over what other agents are doing. On the other hand, we may also want to hold each other responsible for the role that we play in collective activities and therefore distribute some of the moral blame for collective outcomes to individuals. The talk draws from recent research on so-called moral mathematics to highlight different ways in which we can calculate the "moral carbon footprint" of consumption and investment.

Sjöberg, Martin: *Contractualism, Limited Aggregation and the Clean Break Objection*
Among those who want to limit aggregation, opinion is divided on when and how this should be done. Scanlon (1998) has suggested that certain harms are relevant to other, more severe, harms. Although it would be impermissible to save someone from some less severe harm when one could save someone from drowning, one could be permitted or even required to save some very large group of people from the less severe harm, even if that meant not saving a drowning person. Norcross (2002; 2009) has argued that any such view faces the dilemma of either having to introduce a clean break between two adjoining harms, such that the latter is not relevant to former, or deny transitivity. I call this the Clean Break Objection. Dorsey (2009) suggests that the only way for contractualism to avoid the Clean Break Objection is by adopting an indexical pluralism, according to which harms can be divided into two groups: those that affect ones "global plans and projects", and those that do not. Dorsey claims that these are ordered on two separate indexes, and that

harms of the second type are never relevant to those of the first kind. I will argue that indexical pluralism is itself vulnerable to something like the Clean Break Objection. I do so by drawing attention to how the indexes relate to each other. Further, I argue that the Clean Break Objection is based on a misunderstanding of Scanlon's view of the relevance relation.

Stenseke, Jakob: *The Value of Life Over and Beyond Consciousness*
Many philosophers assume that consciousness, in a variety of ways, is systematically connected to value, even if it remains an open question what consciousness is. This paper describes a biological view on consciousness (BC), which centers on the deep continuity between mental phenomena and life-sustaining processes. If one accepts BC, this paper argues, then consciousness-centric intuitions about value need to better reconcile with life-centric values, as the former cannot be explained in isolation from the latter. More precisely, I argue that the value of life is over consciousness, since consciousness is best viewed as being of instrumental value to the life-processes it supports; and the value of life is beyond consciousness, since there are crucial ways in which life values life without consciousness. I then discuss how life-centrism can serve as a preliminary response to the normative challenges facing materialism (e.g., illusionism and eliminativism) about consciousness, just as it points in favor of a desire-satisfaction account on well-being. The paper further discusses the mind-life continuity in light of four debates on the value of consciousness and argues for a general shift of focus from the value of consciousness to the value of life. Finally, the paper briefly explores what that focus could look like and some hard problems it leads to.

Sundström, Pär: *Acquaintance Requirements: For Humans Only?*
It is often maintained that our aesthetic judgments must be based on first-hand experiences of their objects, or that this is a rule with at most a narrow range of exceptions (see for example Kant 1790, Sibley 1965, Tomey 1973, Wollheim 1980, Hopkins 2000, Gorodeisky and Marcus 2018, and Schellekens 2019). On this view, you cannot, or cannot appropriately, judge that Citizen Kane is a masterpiece unless you have seen the movie. It is similarly often maintained that our aesthetic assertions – like the assertion that Citizen Kane is a masterpiece – must be based on first-hand experiences of the relevant objects (see for example Mothersill 1994, Blackburn 1998, Ninan 2014, and Franzén 2018). I shall here take for granted that these views are correct. My main question concerns their status; in particular, whether the relevant "acquaintance requirements" apply only to subjects with certain limitations, like us, or are more absolute. I shall argue that the former alternative is the correct one. There are possible subjects who could appropriately judge and assert that Citizen Kane is a masterpiece even if they have not seen the movie. I shall also outline what I take to be a more absolute requirement of judging or asserting that Citizen Kane is a masterpiece. To a first approximation, the view to be promoted is that one must understand the movie well enough, and one must appreciate its aesthetic qualities. But it's in principle possible to satisfy this requirement without experiencing the movie or having done so.

Taylor, Isaac: *Just War Error Theory, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Pacifism*

In light of ongoing armed conflicts across the globe, appealing to widely-held principles governing actors' conduct in war has had a central place in the ethical debates. When criticism of actors in war takes place, it normally takes the form of attempting to demonstrate that their conduct fails to follow one or more principles associated with the just war tradition. Among these principles are: the principle of just cause (which rules out aggressive wars), the principle of the moral equality of combatants (which grants the same rights and immunities to members of the armed forces irrespective of whether they fight for a just cause or not), and the principle of non-combatant immunity (which prohibits the targeting of civilians).

These principles form the basis of international law, and also match up with many people's intuitions about the scope of morally permitted combat within war. Yet, as a number of philosophers have argued, they do not appear to be based on any more fundamental moral principles regarding self- and other-defense. Nonetheless, these "revisionist" scholars claim, we should maintain these rules as useful conventions that, if followed by all sides, tend to reduce the horrors of war and ensure morally valuable ends.

This paper reconsiders the revisionists' optimism on this front. Drawing from both international relations and recent metaethical debates about the positive effects that morality might have even if there are no objective moral values, it argues that appeal to constructed ethical principles like the ones canvassed above may cause more harm than good. On the basis of this, it argues for a novel theory of pacifism: one which appeals to the instrumental effects of prohibiting violence at the level of institutions.

Tiozzo, Marco: *Dualism about Undercutting Defeat*
Most philosophers agree that the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters is sound. A rebutting defeater attacks the target proposition, while an undercutting defeater attacks the connection between the source of justification and the target proposition. Recently, however, there has been much debate over the nature of and relationship between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. Among the things that have been argued about is whether undercutting defeat, in contrast to rebutting defeat, requires higher-order commitment, i.e., a belief regarding the link between the source of justification and the target proposition. In the talk, I argue that whether or not undercutting defeaters require higher-order commitments to this effect depends on the relevant defeatee at issue. A belief might fail to be rational in at least two ways — either by failing to correctly respond to one's reasons or by failing to be coherent with one's other attitudes. According to dualism about rationality these failings reflect two genuine and distinct kinds of rationality: substantive and structural rationality. In line with this view, I suggest that we should make a parallel distinction between substantive and structural undercutting defeaters. An advantage of classifying undercutting defeaters in this way is that it helps to disentangle the current debate. Another interesting result is that it gives dualism about rationality an explanatory advantage over its monistic competitors.

Torres, Eduardo: *Strawson on Criticism*
This paper delves into Peter Strawson's exploration of art criticism, particularly focusing on his seminal work "Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art" (1966) and his 1954 review of Osborne's "A Theory of Beauty". It not only elucidates Strawson's perspectives on metacriticism, the ontological nature of artworks, and their aesthetic character as rooted

in contemplation but also emphasizes the relational aspect inherent in the work of art. Departing from advocating for a "science of aesthetics," Strawson champions the autonomy of criticism as a discipline in its own right, devoid of scientific criteria, while acknowledging the relational dynamics between the artwork, the critic, and the audience. The paper argues that while Strawson's approach has often been overlooked, it resonates with contemporary voices in art criticism, echoing sentiments found in the works of scholars like Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, and Toril Moi. By highlighting Strawson's insights and their relevance to current discourse, this paper underscores the enduring impact of his ideas on the philosophy of art and criticism.

Tschögl, Markus: *Does foundationalism collapse into coherentism?*
Philosophers and Moral Psychologists alike have produced increasing amounts of arguments as well as empirical evidence that cast doubt on the reliability of moral intuitions, and thus, on approaches that rely on them as input for moral justification. In particular, this seems to pose a problem for moral coherentism and its method of reflective equilibrium, which, at least on the face of it, cannot be performed without intuitions. An obvious solution might, thus, be to leave the sinking ship while we still can and opt for a different, supposedly more reliable, approach: foundationalism. In this paper, I want to criticise this solution. I will review some of the arguments against reflective equilibrium together with some defences, before arguing that, whatever criticism might be levelled against reflective equilibrium, will hold for foundationalist methods as well, because, if properly understood, foundationalism essentially collapses into coherentism. I will then try to support the claim that any remaining difference one might find between the two approaches actually speaks in favour of adopting a coherentist point of view, not a foundationalist one.

Tuominen, Miira: *Porphyry's Account of Justice in* On Abstinence
In this talk, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry's (c. 235-305CE) argument for justice in his treatise *On Abstinence*. I aim to show that, in the treatise, Porphyry develops an original view among ancient and late ancient philosophers in which (i) justice is not merely analysed as the inner order of a tripartite soul as in Plato's influential account in *Republic*book 4. In *On Abstinence*, (ii) Porphyry ascribes justice is to external actions as well and (iii) takes justice of actions to consist in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. I also argue that, in *On Abstinence*, the relevant harm that justice requires us to avoid consists in taking lives of living creatures (including animals and plants) and taking products from them by force or without care. Therefore, my analysis accommodates those scholarly views according to which Porphyry extends moral concern to animals on the basis of animal suffering. However, Porphyry's account is broader and includes violations of the integrity of living creatures in general, since killing plants and taking products from them by force are argued to harm them and we must avoid causing harm to harmless living creatures for the sake of justice. Contrary to what some scholars have claimed, I contend that we should not take Porphyry to subordinate moral concern for others to inner virtues of purity and theoretical contemplation. In fact, the only criterion in his account of how we can obtain the highest goal of human life in a life of godlikeness is how widely justice as abstinence from harming others is extended. On the highest level of the hierarchy justice thus understood extends even to plants.

Valek, Marlene: *Authority, Standing, and Silencing*

One condition for performing a speech act in a certain conversation is that the speaker actually is part of the conversation. Exclusion from conversation can happen based on who the speaker is, and sometimes even based on who they are taken to be. What governs a person's ability to join (and stay in) a conversation is commonly called their *standing* (Hesni 2018; Dowell 2022; McGowan 2019; Picazo 2021). In what follows, my main aim is to discuss the importance of a person's standing for their ability perform speech acts.

I contrast a person's standing with their *authority* and argue that this distinction is useful for understanding different ways in which people can be unjustly prevented from performing (certain) speech acts. Non-hierarchical relationships between people as well as other social facts can enable someone to enter or be excluded from a conversation, regardless of their authority. Combining failures of either standing or authority into one category will run the risk of conflating different phenomena and therefore needs a clearer delineation.

Lastly, I want to argue that lack of standing can constitute *silencing*. Similarly to instances in which a speaker cannot obtain the necessary uptake (Langton 1993; Hornsby and Langton 1998; Caponetto 2021) or authority (McGowan 2017; Langton 2018; Caponetto 2021) for their speech act, a person can be systematically prevented from joining certain types of conversations in virtue of their social group membership. Judgements about a person's standing – whether they are the right kind of person to contribute to a conversation – can be based on discriminatory stereotypes and deny marginalised group access to the environment necessary to perform actions with their speech. Exploring this possibility promises to not only grant further insight into difficulties that speakers can face, but also might show us ways to tackle them.

Van der Rijt, Jan-Willem: *Moral Entanglement and the Paradox of Exploitation*

This paper proposes a novel, broadly Kantian solution to what is known as 'the paradox of exploitation'.

The paradox of exploitation is centered on the fact that an exploitative contract – a contract that is Pareto-improving and voluntarily entered into, yet unfair – appears both permissible and impermissible at the same time. Since the default-option of not-contracting is permissible, it appears that bringing about a situation where everyone is voluntarily made better-off, must be permissible too. But from unfairness it seems to follow that an exploitative contract cannot be permissible.

The paper argues that existing attempts to handle the paradox fail because they take one of the underlying values involved in exploitation – fairness, wellbeing, freedom/voluntariness – as fundamental, outweighing the others. In contrast, we maintain that *each* of these values should be regarded as *derivative*, rather than fundamental values, and that doing so makes it possible to defuse the paradox.

We demonstrate this through a Kantian analysis of exploitation, according to which the moral importance of fairness, welfare, and consent is each derived from an overarching value: the dignity of moral agents. Using the Kantian distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue and taking cues from Barbara Herman's analysis of the notion of moral entanglements, we argue that the act of contracting itself generates strict duties of virtue that remain absent in the case of not-contracting. Moreover, these duties

are violated by exploitation. The paradox of exploitation can thus be recast as a case where duties of virtue are violated, even though all duties of right are observed.
Lastly, we extend our analysis to shed light on two hitherto under-analyzed issues: the moral (in)acceptability of allowing oneself to be exploited and the question whether exploitation always involves a wrong, or only in specific cases.

Vaassen, Bram: *Narrative Therefore*
It is widely agreed that `therefore' can be used both narratively and argumentatively (e.g., Jenkins 2008, Vaassen and Sandgren 2021, Pavese 2022). Argumentative uses convey a relation of evidential support. For example, 'I think therefore I am' conveys that the fact that I think is good evidence for my existing. Narrative uses convey how events came about. For example, 'John pushed Max. And therefore Max fell' conveys that Max's falling is due to John's pushing. I argue that narrative uses of 'therefore' do not sit well with the standard picture of the asserted content of 'therefore' claims, according to which such claims merely assert the conjunction of the antecedent and the consequent, and any further relation is conveyed by projective content (Grice 1975, Potts 2005, Pavese 2017, 2022, Stokke 2017, Kocurek and Pavese 2020). Building on well-established work on the metaphysics of causation and grounding, I demonstrate that the 'due to' relation conveyed with narrative 'therefore' uses is particularly ill-suited to be carried by projective content. I consider several strategies for dealing with this tension such that the standard picture can be maintained and argue that none of them work. The upshot is that the standard picture is either incorrect, or only applicable to argumentative uses of 'therefore'.

Werkmäster, Jakob: *Pro-, Con-, and Non-valenced responses*
In this talk, I ask how we should interpret the response component of the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value (FA analysis). On the FA analysis, for an object to be good (rather than bad) is for it to be fitting to have a pro-response towards it (rather than a con-response). But what is it to be a pro-response rather than a con-response (or a non-valenced response)? Precisely how to capture what makes a pro-response pro or a con-response con is, as of yet, embarrassingly understudied. As it currently stands, we are given inadequate appeals to hedonic tone, circular appeals to value, or an intuitive list where it is assumed that the reader has an inherent understanding of what makes a response pro, con, or non-valenced. For instance, Ewing (1947: 149) gives us the following list: "Pro-attitude is intended to cover any favorable attitude towards something. It covers, for instance, choice, desire, liking, pursuit, approval, admiration". What unifies the items on the list as being "pro" is not specified. Given the varied types of responses that are supposed to be fitting, for example, attitudes such as liking, approving, and awe, and acts such as choosing, defending, and promoting, and complex responses that come both in the guise of an act and of an attitude, such as love, blame, and admiring the hope of going beyond intuitive lists might seem bleak. In this talk, I argue why prior attempts fail and that if there is to be any hope of capturing the distinction between pro- and con-responses the FA analysis needs to be restricted to attitudes. I also show the restriction's apparent drawbacks, in terms of potential loss of extensional adequacy and shared methodology of analyzing values, can be mitigated.

Wolf, Thilde: *Can Social Constructions Be Real?*

The notion of 'social construction' is invoked in a vast variety of disciplines and is applied to a diverse range of objects including emotions, gender, race, mental illness, technology, quarks, facts, reality, and truth. Yet the metaphysics that underpins social constructions remains, as Ron Mallon (2019: §1.3) puts it, "obscure". To the extent that we can identify a core idea behind claims about social construction, it is that entity *x* is constituted, at least partly, by social rather that natural factors. Prima facie, this indicates that the grounds of social constructions are not natural or fundamental, and consequently not inevitable. On the contrary: if someone is doing the construction these entities are, in some sense, within our control. This, in turn, is often taken to indicate anti-realism about social constructions. Elizabeth Barnes (2014: 337) puts the point thus: "there's nothing intrinsically privileged about the way we in fact organize ourselves."

This should worry the realist. Paradigmatically, constructivist accounts are united in their opposition to certain kinds of realism, namely those accounts that claim that some entity *x* exists independently of us. Constructivists can agree that *x* exists but deny that *x* does so independently of us. With such a canonical assumption as a backdrop, a live question is: do constructivists have to be anti-realists? And if so, what can be said about the relationship between social constructions and reality? The main questions, then, are whether we can save realist intuition and reconcile the idea of objective facts in social reality with the way we view objectivity in the natural sciences; if the goal is to save realism, how can we modify our notions of 'social construction' and 'realism' such that they are not opposed?

Zeman, Dan-Cristian: *Gender Terms as Assessment-Sensitive* CANCELLED

Gender terms play a crucial role in our lives, in that they allow us to categorize ourselves and others as of a certain gender, which in turn has important social, moral and legal implications. One recent issue in the semantics of gender terms has been to allow trans people (and their allies) to use the gender terms of their choice to refer to themselves (call this "the inclusion problem"). This has been a pressing issue within both descriptive and ameliorative projects in the philosophy of language.

In this talk, I explore the application of a well-known semantic framework (*relativism*, based on the idea that the denotations of certain expressions depend on features not only of the context of utterance, but of that of assessment, too) to gender terms as a possible way to solve the inclusion problem. The framework is familiar from the literature on perspectival expressions (predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc.), where it has been one of the main contenders. I argue, first, that an orthodox relativist framework is suited from a descriptive point of view, capturing how both trans people and their allies, as well as transphobes, use gender terms. Second, I show that the very same framework won't help the inclusion problem in an ameliorative setting. To make progress in that area, I propose a flexible version of relativism – the move to which is independently motivated by various considerations in the literature on perspectival expressions (e.g., problematic cases of truth-assessment, data about retraction, etc.). I thus put forward a specific form of flexible relativism based on the notion of *importance* (in a context of assessment) and show how it can help with the inclusion problem. Finally, I compare the view proposed with other recent views, such as subject-contexualism and self-identificatory invariantism.

Zendejas Medina, Pablo: *A Limit for Decision Theoretic Representability*

Orthodox decision theory says to maximize expected utility. This looks like teleological advice: it seems to tell us to promote some goal as encoded in a utility function. As such, decision theory is sometimes thought to be inconsistent with many familiar normative principles, from deontological ethics to dining etiquette, which don't require the promotion of any goal at all. Yet other principles require the pursuit of goals to be guided by an aversion to risk, which is also commonly thought to be inconsistent with expected utility maximization.

Perhaps these tensions could be resolved, though; it could be that for every subjective normative principle, at least — that is, for every principle whose recommendations depend only on one's beliefs — one can find some utility function whose expectation is always maximized by following the rule.

In my talk I'll argue that this can't always be done: there are limits to decision-theoretic representability. Importantly, my argument doesn't appeal, as similar arguments do, to any constraint on how outcomes — the objects of utility — are individuated. Instead, it relies on a connection between representability and higher-order uncertainty: uncertainty about what one believes, and thus also about what subjective principles require. Nonetheless, I also show there's a qualified sense in which representation always succeeds: if we interpret the probability function as standing for the beliefs of an epistemically rational agent, a plausible version of the idea that one should defer to epistemic rationality entails the representability of every subjective principle. Whether the conflict can always be resolved thus depends on whether we want our normative theories to apply to non-ideal, epistemically irrational agents.

Åkerlund, Erik: *Rodrigo de Arriagas substanstrialism*
Enligt Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) så är form respektive materia entydigt substanser, var och en för sig. I sitt verk *Cursus Philosophicus* (”Filosofisk kurs”) från 1632 beskriver han sedan hur dessa tillsammans med föreningen av de två utgör det sammansatta hela som är ett materiellt ting. Föreningen av materia och form är ett ”modus”, som tillhör såväl materian som formen. Helheten utgör också i sig en substans. Vi har alltså ett slags ”substanstrialism”. I föredraget tecknad Arriagas filosofi på området, också som en bakgrund till René Descartes (1596–1650) senare behandling av frågan om själens förening med kroppen.

Österblom, Fredrik: *History of Conceptual Engineering*
The term 'conceptual engineering' was introduced by Richard Creath in 1990 to describe Rudolf Carnap's conception of philosophy after 1932. According to Creath, it was with Carnap's adoption of the Principle of Tolerance that he began to view philosophy as a form of conceptual engineering (Creath 2009). For contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering, Herman Cappelens's *Fixing Language* (2018) is of outstanding importance. In the book, Cappelen traces a tradition of conceptual engineering back to Frege's *Begriffschrift* (1879):

> *Roughly, there's a pretty straight intellectual line from Frege (e.g. of the Begriffschrift) and Carnap, on the one hand, to a cluster of contemporary work that isn't typically seen as closely related: much work on gender and race, revisionism about truth, revisionists about moral language, and revisionists in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (Cappelen 2018, ix).*

On the one hand, we have the broader view advocated by Cappelen, that revisionism is at core of conceptual engineering and that its history in philosophy begins with Frege, and on the other hand we have the narrower view of Creath that the combination of conventionalism and pragmatism is at the core of conceptual engineering, and that is history begins with Carnap's Principle of Tolerance. There are benefits and drawbacks with both conceptions, and I will discuss and compare these benefits and drawbacks with each other.

An ironical consequence of Cappelen's view is that on his view the term 'conceptual engineering' cannot be used for the purpose for which it was originally intended, namely to label Carnap's conception of philosophy after 1932.