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Epistemic hierarchies and historical actors

Reframing Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples

Lundberg, Christa

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LUND UNIVERSITY

PO Box 117
221 00 Lund
+46 46-222 00 00

Knowledge Actors

Revisiting Agency in
the History of Knowledge

Edited by
Johan Östling,
David Larsson Heidenblad
&
Anna Nilsson Hammar



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Epistemic hierarchies and historical actors

Reframing Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples

Christa Lundberg

Many programmatic texts about the history of knowledge propose a focus on epistemic hierarchies. They suggest we should study the boundaries and relationships between different kinds of knowledge.¹ One criticism of this plan concerns the status of individual knowers. Faced with abstract 'knowledge systems', 'orders of knowledge', and 'epistemic hierarchies', some historians suspect that the history of knowledge, or at least some versions of it, does away with the living, breathing, thinking subject of knowledge. In this essay, I consider whether attention to epistemic hierarchies excludes studies of individual knowledge actors or, conversely, enhances them.

I shall begin with two historians who both defend the value of the individual viewpoint. Suzanne Marchand argues that historians of knowledge risk abandoning the attention to individual thinkers characteristic of intellectual history. Marchand raises several important points in favour of biographically oriented studies. First, this genre invites us to contextualize authors in their political and social realities.² Biographies are more relatable to readers than histories of discourses.³ Importantly, she argues that a focus on systems of knowledge—particularly in their more Foucauldian versions—fits badly with how most people think about knowledge.⁴ As she asks, 'do we really believe that we too simply are part of a discourse whose rules dictate, more or less, what we say, and in which curiosity, creativity,

and compassion are mere illusions, while only power is real?⁵ If knowledge involves these things, we need to take individual personality and biography seriously.

Martin Mulsow raises partly different concerns in an exchange with Lorraine Daston. Daston has argued that historians of knowledge should seek to uncover an 'epistemological hierarchy (often intertwined with a social hierarchy) of which kinds of knowledge are more or less valued, by whom, and why', which 'also rank[s] knowers and the epistemic virtues they are expected to display'.⁶ In his reply, Mulsow agrees that historians of knowledge need an analytical framework, but questions whether epistemic cultures were as rigid as Daston suggests. Were many actors not simply immersed in their own practices without reference to a larger structure? Might we need to contend with 'loose conglomerates of knowledge' rather than hierarchies?⁷ Like Marchand, Mulsow thus questions whether actors operated in epistemic hierarchies and argues that this focus risks distorting our view of the past.

To interrogate this matter further, Mulsow proposes that one might study a certain category of knowers: the actor, 'who, within a given knowledge culture, understands the hierarchies and dynamics of different forms of knowledge'.⁸ Mulsow does not enlarge on how this approach might allow us to identify a historically grounded approach to epistemic hierarchies. This is where the present essay picks up the thread. I shall attempt what Mulsow suggested and consult a knowledge actor in the epistemic landscape of early sixteenth-century Paris.

My guide is Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (c.1460–1536), without doubt one of the most versatile scholars of his generation. For overlapping periods, Lefèvre was a philosophy teacher at the University of Paris, an editor of printed books, and a religious reformer. He had access to a variety of epistemic milieux, moving between academic, aristocratic, and monastic circles. Moreover, he was actively involved in reshaping philosophical and theological education. This versatility has made Lefèvre difficult to pin down in historical research—he was not quite an academic, not quite a publisher, nor a typical Reformer. This quality, however, provides excellent material for thinking about the nature

of epistemic hierarchies in early sixteenth-century Paris. Indeed, I suggest that the history of knowledge, through this analytical tool, offers something new even to our understanding of actors explored by historians of French religious thought, humanism, and ideas. To ground this argument, though, we will need a brief historiographical account.⁹

The historiography of a knowledge actor

The modern historiography of Lefèvre developed in a deeply confessional context and focused on his theological views. Reformed historians explored questions raised already during Lefèvre's lifetime. Was he secretly a Lutheran? Had he influenced John Calvin? Had his vernacular translations of the Bible contributed to the spread of reformed ideas in France? Besides the obvious confessional significance of these questions, they also expressed a nationalistic ambition of describing a distinctly *French* Reformation different from, and perhaps even the precursor of, the German one. While there was no obvious candidate for a French Luther, Lefèvre was compared to Melanchthon.¹⁰

From the First World War onwards, historians of humanism took a different approach. They explored Lefèvre's role at the University of Paris, highlighting his teaching and Aristotelian commentaries. Augustin Renaudet's *Préréforme et humanisme* (1916), based on meticulous and still valuable archival research, also dived into the intellectual context of Lefèvre's religious ideas. Renaudet argues that the 'sterility' of the contemporary Faculty of Theology, especially their nominalism, explains why Lefèvre's generation sought new impulses from humanist and mystical traditions.¹¹ Renaudet's investigation of how Lefèvre's humanist perspective differed from scholastic theology prompted other historians to explore Lefèvre's views about the relationship between Aristotle and Christianity, the role of eloquence in erudition, and the interpretation of the Bible.¹² This research aspired to capture ways in which Lefèvre's approach to knowledge differed from that of his predecessors in Paris by focusing on his methodology and influences.

Contributions in recent decades have brought new perspectives on Lefèvre's collaborative and wide-ranging activities that reflect ongoing trends in intellectual history. Studies have situated Lefèvre as an agent in academic and religious networks. For example, Jonathan Reid interprets Lefèvre's contribution to religious reform in France by mapping the activities of a network whose central node was Marguerite de Navarre.¹³ Focusing on Lefèvre's earlier years at the University of Paris, Richard Oosterhoff shows how Lefèvre brought his academic network into the printing workshop and how his students underwent an apprenticeship in bookmaking. Oosterhoff's arguments resonate with the turn in intellectual history to the study of a wider range of knowledge types, particularly artisanal skill.¹⁴ Attention to practices, such as editorial techniques, is similarly a key component of my own work on the theological books produced by Lefèvre's circle.¹⁵

Recent research about Lefèvre, although conducted in the general field of intellectual history, thus fits well with the central aims of the history of knowledge to explore the circulation and mediality of knowledge. However, there has not yet been any attempt to take an approach explicitly guided by concepts from the history of knowledge. To investigate what we can add by thinking about epistemic hierarchies, I use this notion to parse Lefèvre's relationship with the University of Paris and his confusing status as an independent theologian without affiliation to the powerful institutional system of the Faculty of Theology.

Epistemic hierarchies as context

The University of Paris provides the institutional framework for the most obvious and clearly delineated epistemic hierarchy in Lefèvre's surroundings. The university arranged knowledge into categories in its curricula in arts—from logic to natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics—and in the higher faculties of medicine, canon law, and theology. This institution moreover played an important role in certifying the knowledge of students by examination. Exams mattered because degrees had legal implications: for example, a Master of

Arts was eligible for certain ecclesiastical benefices. The university provided a time-tested structure for acquiring learning that fed into wider social structures and hierarchies.

Lefèvre first encountered this structure as a student at the Faculty of Arts. We know little about this part of his life, other than that he went on to teach philosophy in Paris. Yet he must have had a somewhat complex relationship with the university. Considering his well-documented theological interests, it is puzzling that he did not at the same time pursue a degree in the Faculty of Theology, as so many teachers of philosophy did. As James Farge shows, the doctorate in theology was a long, demanding education, but one that conferred a great deal of social status and influence.¹⁶ ‘Theologian’ was a protected title and studying at the Faculty of Theology would have been the natural choice for a young man with strong religious leanings and an evident propensity for study.¹⁷

Lefèvre’s status as an outsider to the Faculty of Theology, apparently self-imposed, is a problem that the earlier historiography has done little to address. This is in part due to a lack of sources. Barring the discovery of some text in which Lefèvre credibly explains his decision, we know nothing about his personal reasons. This means we are relieved of the burden of debating with Philipp Sarasin whether Lefèvre’s state of mind, psychology, and intention are of historical interest and consequence.¹⁸ If we want to dig deeper into this as a historical problem, our only option is to follow Sarasin’s preference and investigate the ‘semiotic structures, processes, and discourses’ that help explain Lefèvre’s actions.¹⁹ To understand his rejection of academic theology, we need to look to the networks, discourses, and roles offering alternatives to a doctorate in theology.

This search must go beyond the academic milieu itself and locate alternative epistemic discourses and hierarchies. I shall here focus on one such alternative to which we find references in one of Lefèvre’s earliest publications: a textbook on metaphysics from 1494. Lefèvre’s textbook introduced the first six books of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, which was part of the arts curriculum. However, Lefèvre advertised metaphysics as the ‘theology of the philosophers’ and represented

Aristotle as an example of Christian piety. We shall return to Lefèvre's unusual conception of the relationship between metaphysics and theology later. For now, let us focus on the dedication of this textbook to his aristocratic patron, Germain de Ganay.

Eugene Rice shows that Lefèvre's most important patrons, such as the brothers Jean and Germain de Ganay, were recent additions to the French nobility. The patronage of humanists was part of consolidating their newly won social status.²⁰ However, the pattern of their support also reveals that members of this recently formed elite had specific intellectual interests. For example, Germain was an Italophile, being the author of a short unpublished treatise about Italy, reputedly the host of Fra Giovanni Giocondo da Verona's lectures on Vitruvius in Paris, and a correspondent of the Florentine Platonist Marsilio Ficino.²¹ In an era of heightened French political interest in Italy, aristocrats developed a keen interest in their neighbours' intellectual culture.

Lefèvre's relationship with Germain shaped his intellectual output from the early 1490s; for example, on Germain's request he wrote a treatise on natural magic.²² For his earliest patristic publication—his edition of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* from 1499—he selected a text that Germain owned and eagerly studied in Ficino's translation.²³ To return to the textbook on metaphysics, Lefèvre's paratexts clearly echoed ideas about *prisca theologia* that Germain encountered in works by Ficino—the idea that ancient philosophers had some understanding of Christian truths. Considering these overlaps, we see that Germain's network and discourses about natural magic, natural theology, and apostolic theology were important for Lefèvre in so far as they offered alternatives to university's institutionalized epistemic hierarchy.

With the textbook on metaphysics, we can take the analysis further. This publication illustrates well the phenomenon noted by Mulsow: Lefèvre was someone who was acutely aware of the priorities and values of different groups of knowers. The textbook shows how Lefèvre appealed to two audiences simultaneously, his Italophile patron and students of philosophy. The dual character of the book furthermore indicates he was not content to participate in two separate epistemic discourses but sought to integrate them. By emphasizing the theological

potential of metaphysics—an idea consistent with certain Italian trends but at odds with the official view of the university—Lefèvre made space for theology in the arts faculty.

Theorizing epistemic hierarchies

So far, I have worked with the concept of epistemic hierarchy in roughly the sense used by Daston and Mulsow. But to continue exploring the individual viewpoint, let us now turn to actor's categories. Did Lefèvre even think of knowledge as something that comes in degrees? As it happens, Lefèvre was in conversation with several traditions that promoted hierarchical perspectives. One of these emerged from Aristotle's *De anima*, which Lefèvre taught at the Collège du Cardinal Lemoine. Lefèvre embraced Aristotle's empirical model that 'all knowledge begins in the senses'. However, he was most interested in the subsequent stages of the process, when the mind develops increasingly abstract and universal notions—better knowledge, from Lefèvre's viewpoint.²⁴ Secondly, Lefèvre read Platonist authors and agreed with aspects of their teachings. He was interested in ideas about intellectual vision and contemplation, which according to this tradition represented higher forms of cognition even further removed from the material world and the senses.²⁵ For Lefèvre, this tradition of philosophical contemplation was closely related to a Christian project of gaining knowledge of God through contemplative practices. This concept of theology was largely inspired by the writings of the Platonizing theologian Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and prescribed a progression from positive theology to negative theology, to the potential *visio Dei*. If sensory knowledge was on one end of the epistemic spectrum, divine knowledge was at the other end.

In reconciling Aristotelian, Platonist, and Christian approaches to knowledge, Lefèvre was part of an already venerable late antique and medieval philosophical tradition. More original than his ideas were perhaps the ways in which he forged these separate approaches together. One example is a compendium that weaves together Aristotelian psychology with the pursuit of divine knowledge through

analogy. Aristotle often proposed analogies involving eyes and vision to explain human cognition. In his compendium, Lefèvre argued that the analogies from *De anima* were not only useful for understanding cognition, but also for gaining an understanding of God.²⁶ This bewilderingly self-referential work highlights the parallels between sensory and divine knowledge and the harmony between Aristotelian and Christian perspectives.

This very brief summary of Lefèvre's epistemology suggests striking discrepancies with how Daston and other historians of knowledge conceptualize epistemic hierarchies. Lefèvre's version notably has nothing to say about the relationship between different knowledge systems. For Lefèvre, the very core of knowledge is its universality. Yet the religious worldview underlying his notion of knowledge and its distribution is of some genealogical interest. The conceptual history of 'hierarchy' is closely related to the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whose theology so Lefèvre enthusiastically defended. For Pseudo-Dionysius, 'hierarchy' described the structures through which knowledge of God emanates and spreads to humans through ranks of angels and church officials. According to this perspective, each level of the hierarchy strives to know God, but does so in a different way depending on its capacity.²⁷

While Lefèvre's ideas about knowledge are not directly aligned with Daston's epistemic hierarchy, bringing their perspectives together is productive. I discussed above how Lefèvre brought theological themes into his teaching at the Faculty of Arts in a way that challenged contemporary practice. In theorizing knowledge and particularly the continuity between philosophy and theology, he justified this move. In this way, Lefèvre's theorizing about knowledge was directly related to his position at the University of Paris. This was especially clear in another of his textbooks, in which Lefèvre outlined a seamless transition between Aristotelian studies and theological ones, as students gradually developed the intellectual and moral capacity for the latter type of understanding. After studying natural philosophy and metaphysics, students could move on to reading Scripture and patristics, developing the reverence and virtuous living essential to

intellectual progress. The end point, for Lefèvre, was theological contemplation.²⁸ According to this way of thinking about knowledge, the division between the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology was an artificial one.

Another connection between both notions of epistemic hierarchy relates to Lefèvre's critique of scholastic methods in philosophy. He suggested that the scholastic philosophers, by focusing exclusively on rational argument, remained limited to a lower cognitive level. Lefèvre promoted a turn from *rational* to *intellectual* philosophy. The latter would be a more intuitive and supposedly more excellent practice, which inched closer to religious insight.²⁹ We thus see that Lefèvre's theorizing about knowledge was bound up with polemic against the reigning epistemic system. His way of thinking about degrees of knowledge, which combined Aristotelian empiricism with explanations for the emanation of divine knowledge, was only superficially consistent with the epistemic hierarchy embraced by the University of Paris.

Manipulating epistemic hierarchies

I have argued that Lefèvre's textbook on metaphysics and, more generally, his effort to introduce theological themes at the Faculty of Arts can be characterized as attempts to influence or change existing epistemic hierarchies. Next, I shall turn to Lefèvre's most significant mode of acting on epistemic hierarchies—as an editor of printed books. Lefèvre's case, I shall suggest, is helpful for exploring, with Philipp Sarasin, under what conditions, how, and through what relationship to the self (*Selbstverhältnis*) this role was shaped.³⁰

The professional editor came to prominence with the development of printing workshops in fifteenth-century Europe, when textual correction became a commercial concern. Printing required someone to pay attention to the condition of texts and fix old or new mistakes, since blatant errors diminished the value of the printed output—particularly when it came to scholarly books. As Anthony Grafton shows, editors approached this task in different ways depending on

their skill and willingness to interfere with the text. Yet they generally shared the aim of making books attractive and marketable—which was why printers employed students and scholars.³¹ Although there is no indication that Lefèvre asked to be paid for his work, some of his students were paid or at least housed by printers in return for their services as correctors at the press.³²

Contemporary evidence suggests that some saw Lefèvre as a corrector of the kind just described: someone who played a limited albeit important role in improving texts. A bio-bibliographical handbook printed in Paris in 1512 described Lefèvre as a ‘great ornament and help’ to theologians. His editions, commentaries, and translations ‘made the implicit explicit, illuminated the obscure, and repaired mangled and mutilated passages’.³³ According to the anonymous author of this note, Lefèvre’s efforts awarded him a status as an assistant to theologians—a capable and celebrated corrector.

Editing could be about more than correction, however. Lefèvre told an origin story of his career in publishing that emphasized its religious significance. It was after encountering the work of the contemplative theologian Ramon Lull in 1491 that Lefèvre first considered joining a monastery but then settled on becoming an editor. His mission was to publish books that ‘shape souls for piety’.³⁴ For Lefèvre, publishing the right texts was an important part of improving the state of religion. As this story suggests, Lefèvre took the curatorial function of editing seriously. Working with various printers in Paris, he contributed to the publication of a large number of titles in philosophy and theology. Besides publishing his own writings and those of his students, he also located manuscripts through correspondence or by travelling to libraries.

Lefèvre also wrote introductions to many editions, advocating for authors he valued and providing guidance on how to read them. Besides promoting pious books to a general, learned audience, he also published titles that could be used at the Faculty of Theology. This is especially clear in his translation of *De fide orthodoxa* by John of Damascus: in an introduction to the edition, Lefèvre suggested that the faculty might use this as a textbook. In suggesting that the

theologians study John of Damascus instead of Peter the Lombard, Lefèvre promoted Greek over Latin theology and more ancient texts over recent ones.³⁵

Lefèvre's editorial activities were thus connected with an epistemic agenda beyond improving the state of individual texts. He grasped that the medium of print offered opportunities for disrupting the curriculum, which had long developed according to the conditions of manuscript transmission. The printing workshop—small, commercial, and unregulated—could change an institution like the University of Paris. Even if this did not happen through the simple substitution of texts suggested by Lefèvre, his impulse is significant. Editors were not simply improvers of texts but agents promoting specific kinds of knowledge.

Curators of knowledge

The present volume provides ample evidence that historians of knowledge are willing to make space for knowers in their studies. Yet one may ask whether this interest does not primarily extend to groups, such as networks, and relevant professions or roles. This essay set out to investigate how a history of knowledge focused on identifying structures—such as hierarchies, systems, and cartographies—squares with the study of individual knowers. I suggested that a productive strategy for combining these perspectives is to explore epistemic hierarchies from an individual viewpoint by focusing on the historical actors who navigated and reshaped such systems.

The case of Lefèvre illustrates how this approach can help us to reframe inaccurate labels used in the earlier historiography, such as 'theologian' or 'educational reformer'. Those functions, as we have seen, must be qualified against the background of Lefèvre's oppositional relationship with parts of the University of Paris. By mapping epistemic hierarchies in connection with the university, we can follow in Lefèvre's footsteps and explore options to the academic system and the professional roles that allowed him to promote an alternative approach to theological knowledge.

Analysing Lefèvre's contributions to printing, I have touched on the underappreciated curatorial function of editors, who not only correct but also select and introduce texts. Curatorship, more generally, sums up key aspects of Mulsow's proposal that we study actors who understand the 'hierarchies and dynamics of different forms of knowledge'.³⁶ Such overview is an essential feature of curatorship, with its traditional function being to care for repositories of knowledge, including museums and libraries. Curators select and present knowledge—interacting with the epistemic hierarchies they serve. Editors, librarians, and bibliographers all work this way. So do teachers when selecting how to interpret and convey a set curriculum, and healthcare workers when advising patients, the public, or policymakers.³⁷ The concept of 'curators of knowledge' thus highlights the capacity of a variety of individuals to actively engage with epistemic systems.

Studies of curators of knowledge reveal the contours of epistemic hierarchies as they appeared in people's lives and thoughts. By taking this dimension into account, we can promote an approach to epistemic hierarchies truer to our own experiences as knowledge actors. This approach moreover incorporates the insights that such structures differ from one another, for example by being more or less formalized, and that individual historical actors relate to them in more or less involved ways. The study of curators of knowledge therefore has the potential to play an important complementary function in relation to large-scale cartographic projects in the history of knowledge.

Notes

* I am grateful to Abraham de Maupeou and the editors of this volume for their comments. Helge Ax:son Johnsons Stiftelse generously supported my work on this essay.

1 Lorraine Daston, 'The History of Science and the History of Knowledge', *Know: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge* 1/1 (2017); Sven Dupré & Geert Somsen, 'The History of Knowledge and the Future of Knowledge Societies', *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 42/2–3 (2019); Lukas M. Verburgt, 'The History of Knowledge and the Future History of Ignorance', *KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge* 4/1 (2020).

- 2 Suzanne Marchand, 'Weighing Context and Practices: Theodor Mommsen and the Many Dimensions of Nineteenth-Century Humanistic Knowledge', *History & Theory* 59/4 (2020).
- 3 Marchand, 'Weighing Context', 166.
- 4 Suzanne Marchand, 'How Much Knowledge Is Worth Knowing? An American Intellectual Historian's Thoughts on the *Geschichte des Wissens*', *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 42/2–3 (2019), 129. For a fuller and very effective response to Michel Foucault's notion of episteme, see Ian Maclean, 'Foucault's Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian Counterblast', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59/1 (1998). For the argument in favour of developing the history of knowledge with inspiration from Foucault's theories, see Philipp Sarasin, 'More Than Just Another Specialty: On the Prospects for the History of Knowledge', *Journal for the History of Knowledge* 1/1 (2020).
- 5 Marchand, 'How Much Knowledge', 143. Intellectual historians continue to wrestle with the question of authorial agency, see Annabel Brett, 'What Is Intellectual History Now?' in David Cannadine (ed.), *What Is History Now?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 120–4.
- 6 Lorraine Daston, 'Comment', in Marek Tamm & Peter Burke (eds.), *Debating New Approaches to History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 176; see also Daston, 'History of Science'.
- 7 Martin Mulsow, 'Response', in Tamm & Burke, *Debating New Approaches*, 180–1.
- 8 Ibid. 180.
- 9 I cannot agree with Philipp Sarasin, 'Was ist Wissensgeschichte?' *Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur (IASL)* 36/1 (2011), 169 that the tradition of 'älteren geistesgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen zu Gelehrten und Intellektuellen' should be passed over in a historiography of knowledge actors.
- 10 For this historiography, see Christoph Schönau, *Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples und die Reformation* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2017), 26–37.
- 11 Augustin Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie (1494–1517)* (Paris: E. Champion, 1916). The arguments against the focus on a 'French Reformation' are best summed up by Renaudet's friend and colleague Lucien Febvre in his 'Une question mal posée: Les origines de la réforme française et le problème général des causes de la réforme', *Revue Historique* 161/1 (1929).
- 12 Most important are Eugene F. Rice, 'The Humanist Idea of Christian Antiquity: Lefèvre d'Étaples and his Circle', *Studies in the Renaissance* 9 (1962); Eugene F. Rice (ed.), *The Prefatory Epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Related Texts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); and Guy Bedouelle, *Lefèvre d'Étaples et l'intelligence des Écritures* (Geneva: Droz, 1976).
- 13 Jonathan A. Reid, *King's Sister, Queen of Dissent: Marguerite of Navarre (1492–1549) and Her Evangelical Network* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
- 14 Richard J. Oosterhoff, *Making Mathematical Culture: University and Print in the Circle of Lefèvre d'Étaples* (Oxford: OUP, 2018); Richard J. Oosterhoff, 'Apprenticeship in the Renaissance University: Student Authorship and Craft Knowledge', *Science in Context* 32/2 (2019). These studies are excellent examples of how the history of craftsmen's skills and the history of erudition can be closely related and are not 'incompatible research programs', see Daston, 'History of Science', 143.

- 15 I am currently preparing a book based on my PhD thesis, Christa Lundberg, 'Apostolic Theology and Humanism in the University of Paris, 1490–1540' (University of Cambridge, 2022).
- 16 James K. Farge, *Orthodoxy and Reform in Early Reformation France: The Faculty of Theology of Paris, 1500–1543* (Leiden: Brill, 1985).
- 17 In a very different context, this exemplifies the usefulness of thinking about knowledge actors by distinguishing between their educational status, professions, and roles, see Johan Östling, Anton Jansson & Ragni Svensson Stringberg, *Humanister i offentligheten: Kunskapens aktörer och arenor under efterkrigstiden* (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2022). For students with humanist interests and skills at the Faculty of Theology, see Christa Lundberg, 'Humanists and Scholastics in Early Sixteenth-Century Paris: New Sources from the Faculty of Theology', *Intellectual History Review* (published online and in press).
- 18 Sarasin, 'Was ist Wissensgeschichte?', 164 argues that the subjective state of consciousness is a historical *explanandum* rather than an *explanans*.
- 19 Ibid. 164.
- 20 Eugene F. Rice, 'The Patrons of French Humanism, 1490–1520', in Anthony Molho & John A. Tedeschi (eds.), *Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Hans Baron* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971).
- 21 Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, 20. Ganay's short treatise about Italy survives in a Latin translation, see Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek (Thuringian University and State Library), Jena, Ms.Bud.q.58. For Giocondo's lectures, see Oosterhoff, *Making Mathematical Culture*, 224; see also Sebastiano Gentile, 'Giano Lascaris, Germain de Ganay e la "prisca theologia" in Francia', *Rinascimento* 26 (1986).
- 22 Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, *La magie naturelle*, i: *L'Influence des astres*, tr. Jean-Marc Mandosio (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2018).
- 23 Stéphane Toussaint, 'L'influence de Ficin à Paris et le Pseudo-Denys des humanistes: Traversari, Cusain, Lefèvre d'Étaples: Suivi d'un passage inédit de Marsile Ficin', *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 5/2 (1999).
- 24 Spruit Leen, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, ii (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 38–41. For degrees of certainty in Aristotle and his Renaissance commentators, see also Maclean, 'Foucault's Renaissance', 161.
- 25 For Lefèvre's complex relationship with Platonist philosophy, see Richard J. Oosterhoff, 'Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Charles de Bovelles on Platonism, Theurgy, and Intellectual Difficulty', in Stephen H. Gersh (ed.), *Plotinus' Legacy: The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era* (Cambridge: CUP, 2019).
- 26 Bibliothèque humaniste (Humanist Library), Sélestat, ms 58, fols. 206v–216v, 'Iacobi Fabri Stapulensis De libros de Anima: analogiarum Compendium'. For Lefèvre's notion of analogy, see Oosterhoff, *Making Mathematical Culture*, 78–85.
- 27 For the role of Pseudo-Dionysius in the conceptual history of hierarchy (from Gr. ἱεράρχης, high priest) see Joseph Stiglmayr, 'Über die Termini Hierarch und Hierarchie', *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 22/1 (1898), 180–7; Dimitrios A. Vasilakis, 'On the Meaning of Hierarchy in Dionysius the Areopagite', in Panagiotis G. Pavlos, Lars Fredrik Janby, Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson & Torstein Theodor Tollefsen (eds.), *Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity* (London: Routledge, 2019).

- 28 For this summary of Lefèvre's ideas about the curriculum and moral development, see Aristotle, *Politicorum libri octo*, ed. Lefèvre d'Étaples (Paris: Henri Estienne, 1506), 123v–124, translation cited in Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, xvi.
- 29 For rational and intellectual philosophy, see Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, 94–6. For different levels of theology, see *ibid.* 224–7.
- 30 Sarasin, 'Was ist Wissensgeschichte?', 170; see also Östling et al., *Humanister i offentligheten*, 305–307.
- 31 Anthony Grafton, *The Culture of Correction in Renaissance Europe* (London: British Library, 2011).
- 32 Oosterhoff, 'Apprenticeship'.
- 33 The entry is edited in Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, 287–90.
- 34 Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, 142: 'Quapropter ad priores artes revolutus ... libenter emissioni librorum (qui ad pietatem formant animos) operam do'.
- 35 Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*, 161–3.
- 36 Mulsow, 'Response', 180.
- 37 In a modern context, the potential benefits of reconceptualizing healthcare workers as 'curators of knowledge' are discussed in Nigel Crisp et al., 'Health Workers as Agents of Change and Curators of Knowledge', *The Lancet* 400/10350 (2022), 417–18.