Greening the EU

Power practices, resistances and agenda setting

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Ph.D. thesis

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Chapter One
Introduction

Spreading pollution and increasing environmental degradation seem to be inevitable aspects of modern life in Europe. At the same time, many pollution problems are being resolved and extensive areas cleaned up. There appears to be an increase in environmental awareness among the population and the polity, leading to more extensive and better environmental legislation on the one hand, while on the other hand, there is an ever increasing generation of wastes and toxins that are spewed into the environment. Some problems are resolved through different types of environmental measures, policies and consumer activities while new ones are created. The overarching aim in this thesis is to try to understand this paradox: why do we see new 'green' agendas emerging and 'green' organizations proliferating while pollution is simultaneously generated, with a continued environmental degradation as a result?

One example of such an environmental agenda is the environmental dimension of the European Union. My ambition is to understand the process whereby environmental concerns have been brought up on the Community[1] agenda and then, how that environmental agenda has subsequently been shaped. While this is the empirical interest pursued in the thesis, this project has some theoretical ambitions as well.

In connection with the problem formulated above it seems appropriate to pose the question: What are the analytical contributions of the social sciences that can help me understand this paradox, or in other words: What does political science have to say about environmental problem solving? While political scientists have only recently begun to be concerned with environmental problems per se, such issues as power, agenda setting and policy making have been quite extensively theorized and researched. One theoretical ambition will be to begin with these theories, subject

[1]I will be using the word Community when I speak about the European Economic Community/the European Community/the European Union in a general sense and to denote the entire period of European Community development in environmental policy, i.e., from the late 1960s until the early 1990s. EEC, EC or EU will be used when I want to specifically point out something of relevance to a particular period in Community history.

them to a critical assessment and arrive at a framework which can be instructive and useful to the discussion of the empirical findings.

While political scientists so far might not have been particularly interested in understanding environmental issues and policy making as a specific phenomenon, others have been engaged in doing precisely that. A whole range of environmentalists or 'ecocentric theorists', from the most radical to the more reform oriented have been prolific in producing historic accounts of the process of human alienation from, and exploitation of, the natural environment. They have not only critically discussed the relationship between modern societies and the deterioration of the environment, but have also produced alternatives, including visions of how societies that are ecologically sound might be organized. Such ecocentric visions of society are often quite radical and seem to require substantial changes in current practices. However, the link between the alternatives proposed and everyday political realities is often weak. This leads me to the second theoretical ambition, which is to try to put these ecocentric theories 'to work'. That is, I would like to try to use them in the analysis of the greening of the Community and see in which way they can be useful in interpreting political processes.

Such ecocentric theories are also connected to the empirical study. Ecocentric and environmentalist ideologies have not only criticized modern industrial society, but ambitiously generated alternative visions on how society could be organized, environmental consciousness raised and ecocentric behavior induced. Having said this, one would expect that such ecocentric ideologies would also be important in environmental politics and policy. One question which will be posed throughout the study is: How have ecocentric ideas been transformed in the new policies during the 25-year period of Community environmental policy making?

Greening the Agenda

One way to explore the paradox outlined above, would be to suggest that a greening process is taking place in which a new dimension of politics is being introduced and accepted in the political institutions. Simultaneously, within the same political institutions there is a certain counterforce to the greening process consisting of 'business-as-usual' behavior.

Commonly understood, greening is a broad term referring to a reform process whereby problems and issues include, and are evaluated for, their environmental implications. Illustrative examples of what would be considered greening are: transport policies including considerations for and calculations of emission levels, manufactured products which include declarations of environmental impact, and economists who include externalities in their calculations.

Greening means that there has been a degree of environmental concern introduced into political bodies, policies and social practices. What is meant by environmental concerns, as will be shown in this thesis, is subject to varying interpretations. A whole chapter is devoted to the definition of environmental problems in the Community over time. We will start from a general definition of the environment as those ecological processes and entities—'nature'—that have been construed as external, outside and distinct from societal activities. An introduction of environmental concerns, i.e., greening, would then imply a recognition of the role that these ecological processes play for people's everyday existence and societal development.

Greening is obviously a process. This suggests that it might take some time before the greening of policies and institutions result in actions resolving the most urgent problems. For approximately twenty-five years, environmental concerns have appeared on the Community agenda and have also become increasingly prominent on diverse agendas within the complex of Community institutions. The comparatively large number of directives that have come from the Commission could be a sign of this greening. However we cannot immediately conclude that environmental concerns have been introduced once and for all, and hence, would be highly prioritized in the EU. Practices contributing to environmental degradation continue in spite of these policies. As a result, environmental degradation, pollution and resource depletion remain largely unresolved problems, which have been at best slowed down.

Why the focus on the European Community?

Because many environmental problems have a transnational character, it has been necessary for national governments to cooperate and to try to reach a consensus around certain environmental questions at a supranational level. This type of international cooperation has been particularly institutionalized within the Community. It is argued that the Community has the most developed environmental regulations and norms for any supranational organization (Hildebrand 1992:13-44).

Furthermore, the EU is becoming one of the major players in the international arena. Its increasing role as an important global actor in most political fields means that decisions can be expected to have an important impact, not only inside but also outside the Community territory.

The European Economic Community was established with the Treaty of Rome of 1957. It was founded as an economic intergovernmental organization, albeit with visions of a united and peaceful Europe. Its activities have centered on economic and trade related issues. This, in itself, poses a strong challenge to greening because, according to many ecocentrics, extensive economic trade over large geographical areas has had detrimental effects on ecological systems.

As EEC cooperation expanded, so did the policy areas that came under the jurisdiction of the Community institutions. Environmental policy concerns were not introduced on its agenda until the First Action Plan of 1972. This was perhaps surprisingly early, considering that environmental issues were not on political agendas of the individual member states until about that time. However, it was not until the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 that the environment gained legal and political recognition as an EC policy area. By adding another policy area, not originally considered a Community concern, the Community seems to have become more sensitive to the contemporary political discussion of environmental issues.

Greening as a Form of Agenda Setting

Theoretically, greening could be viewed as a particular form of agenda setting. Certain issues become a matter for public and political concern while others do not. If we look at environmental problems, we notice that the general public and many policy-makers were alerted to an increasing number of pollution problems in the US and Western Europe already by the fifties and sixties, and in some cases much earlier. Beginning in the early seventies, there was an enormous increase in the level of activity in response to environmental problems. This activity was observed at all political levels: local, national, regional and international. It took different forms: as national environmental policies, international agreements and the emergence of new institutions. These institutions were set up at local, national and international levels in both non-governmental and governmental forms. Yet, the realization that environmental issues were important was not a commonly held one; hence, the

apparent will to deal with the problem by some groups in society did not automatically mean that environmental concerns became top priority.

It is possible to consider greening as a form of agenda setting, albeit agenda setting in a more strict sense, limited to environmental concerns in relationship to the political agenda. We must then determine what the Community agenda is. It is not satisfactory to say that when the concern for the environment has been brought up at an intergovernmental conference or become part of the Treaties, greening has taken place. Another criterion for greening could be to observe whether the everyday practices of the people living in the member states have become greener. However, this thesis does not consider implementation, but starts with a focus on the political and administrative organizations of the Community, implying that institutions make a difference. This research project is an attempt to understand greening and interpret why the greening has taken this particular form in the Community institutions. It will explore the process through which environmental concerns have been introduced on certain Community agendas. From this perspective we view agenda setting and greening as an ongoing process where issues are defined as political, introduced on the agenda, re-defined, rejected or re-introduced, and so on.

Things Are Not What They First Appear to Be

When I first approached the area of research which I now call Community environmental politics, I was impressed by the comparatively developed and extensive environmental policies which had evolved within the Community framework. This made me curious to ask: how was it possible and what where the processes behind this development? These were some of the initial questions that came up in my mind. Equipped with a tendency toward critical thinking I soon became convinced that to understand the environmental politics of the Community, and particularly the paradox of increasing environmental consciousness together with an increasing environmental degradation, it would be necessary to go beyond the idea of greening as microlevel processes developed in the interinstitutional dynamics of Community policy making.

A microlevel analysis would focus on the important actors, consider the alternatives that they lobby for and the ways in which they relate to each other. This type of process-tracing would only help me understand the processes of how environmental issues had gotten on the agenda in a very limited sense. It would say nothing which could help me understand the wider political implications of the problem, which I was

determined to answer. Instead, I started from an understanding of political activity as more than what first meets the eye and with an ambition to make such processes visible.

The basic assumption underlying the thesis work has been that the independent moves, strategies and activities by individual participants in policy making are important for changes in politics. However, these participants are limited in many ways: by history, institutions and the context—a context which in turn is created and reshaped by individual activity. This basic ontology resulted in an understanding of the environmental politics of the Community as both macrolevel and microlevel processes. Having said this, by necessity the thesis will look at both the contextual factors (macropolitics) that influence the possibilities of individuals to act on environmental problems as well as the activities (micropolitics) that these individuals are engaged in. From such a metatheoretical perspective the most interesting point to focus on is how change in politics is possible. To understand these dynamics it appears vital to also understand something about both the macro and the microlevel processes. The thesis presents the results of that process which started with a curiosity in the empirical material ending with the theorizing that structures the analysis here.

Power Practices and Agenda Setting:

The Macropolitics of Greening

The problem that agenda-setting perspectives try to address is why certain issues become politicized in political institutions while other issues are excluded from the agenda. The existing institutions, and the practices within these, present obstacles to the introduction of 'new' issues. The argument here will be that such obstacles to greening can be understood as different power practices that influence how the agenda is shaped. When the hegemonic power practices, i.e., those patterns of thinking and behavior that have become institutionalized, are confronted with alternative practices, either the 'new' issue will be absorbed and eventually become part of the dominant power practices—that have, as a result, been reshaped—or it will be rejected and become a non-issue and organized out.

In chapter two agenda setting will be discussed in terms of power practices and resistances. We will be concerned with exploring how power practices restrict and shape the agenda and what implications power practices have for the prospect of

greening politics. We will assess some theoretical explorations of power in relationship to the agenda. The aim of this chapter is to propose a framework for understanding agenda setting. This framework is derived from critical reflections on existing theories together with the empirical material throughout the research process. The theoretical framework presents agenda setting and agenda shaping as a process consisting of the dynamic relationship between current power practices and resistances developed in response to these practices, i.e. agenda shaping includes both macrolevel biases and micropolitical processes. The argument is that at particular points of challenge and contradiction, the agenda can be reshaped by resistances and politics re-formed.

Chapter three will closely consider important Community power practices that have relevant implications for the greening of the EU project. The power practices to be considered here are those affecting the way 'nature' is perceived. The proposition is that the EU, while consisting of institutions, staff, policies, etc., can also be viewed as a number of power practices that, in themselves, restrict the topics and matters brought up for discussion on the political agenda of the institutions. The practices considered are: economist, scientific, sovereignty and bureaucratic power practices. These constitute the dominant 'biases' which generate, restrict and shape the environmental agenda. Ecocentric theories and ideas have been particularly useful in this chapter (together with other critical perspectives), for one, as a way to single out which power practices have particular relevance for environmental politics. Secondly, they have been essential in pointing to the contradictions that such power practices embody.

Decision Making and Agenda Setting:

The Micropolitics of Greening

If we were to consider agenda setting strictly from the perspective of dominant power practices, only the obstacles to greening would become visible and there would be little scope for understanding change. Greening implies change; change in the direction toward alternative views on the wo/man/nature relationship. Ecocentric ideologies and environmentalist ideas provide such alternatives or resistances (a terminology that is further developed in chapter two). Indeed, agenda setting is also a process in which individuals in organizations make choices and decisions. The way that a chosen issue is defined by these individuals and dealt with in the political institutions can give us important clues to the understanding of how issues become

politically interesting and part of the political agenda. The choices that individuals make can be an exemplification of how power practices and resistances effect politics in specific locations. In order to see how the resistances work on dominant power practices to shape the agenda we will turn to the level of policy making in the environmental issue area. The argument is that it is actually at the level of micropolitics that resistances to the dominant power practices become most apparent.

Micropolitics concerns the relationships and resulting policy processes between institutions, organizations and policy makers. In chapter four we concentrate on important theoretical contributions in the field of political science, that can be instructive in how decisions are made in organizations. Building and elaborating on the insights from these contributions, we will generate a model that can serve as an analytical device for the more detailed evaluation of the greening of the EU. This will also provide the structure for chapters five to eight.

Feminist Epistemology and Method

The question "How do we come to know ?" has, in the social sciences, been concerned with the way scientists generalize and theorize about observed phenomena. Theory and theorizing enter into this thesis in many ways. For one, I will be relying on, as well as evaluating, previous research and theories elaborated within the field of the social sciences (mainly political science). Secondly, I am trying to put ecocentric ideas to work, to help me understand the political processes which have taken place in the environmental field in recent years. Thirdly, I have been working with those theories in order to generate an alternative framework and way to understand Community policy making.

Epistemological and methodological questions are two of the most fundamental concerns for academic scholars, and have been of particular interest to feminist scholars who have devoted much research to understanding what scientific inquiry has come to signify. The reason behind this is that a number of virtues that have been associated with 'good' science have also been virtues associated with masculinity.[2] Furthermore, this same science has also had a problematic relationship to 'nature'. Merchant (1992:41-42) argues that "...western mechanistic science and capitalism

[2]Masculinity is a number of characteristics which through historical processes have been considered as specific to males.

have viewed the earth as dead and inert, manipulable from outside, and exploitable for profits." Bacon, the father of science, was extremely explicit both regarding science as a masculine project and as a project to master nature. His imagery was even militaristic when "he called on men to unite forces against the Nature of Things, to storm and occupy her castles and strongholds, and extend the bounds of the human empire" (in Mathews 1991:33, see: Plumwood 1993:120-140; Shiva 1989:14-38; Schiebinger 1989; Keller 1985; Bleier 1984; Easlea 1981; Merchant 1980).

Theory is neither independent nor autonomous of the society in which it is created; it reflects the way of thinking within that society itself.[3] Theories attempt to simplify a complex reality. They have a reductionistic character as they aim to draw general conclusions from observed phenomena. It does not mean that theorizing is only an academic exercise; on the contrary, it is necessary for us to be able to organize our knowledges of our everyday lives. According to feminists, however, it is important that theory not be hidden in a veil of false objectivity if it should deserve to be named a good theory. Every theory is somebody's 'baby' and, as such, it is influenced by the values, interest and knowledge of the person who raised it. Most theories in political science have been elaborated by white, often middle-class, men and as such can be representative for that category of humanity. Much of feminist research has taken on the task of showing that modern-day science is not objective at all but based on a white male norm. It seems necessary to move beyond such models in order to develop a more inclusive political science that holds plurality in terms of underlying systems of norms and values, i.e. where feminist researchers also can find a home. Christine Sylvester formulates this similarly by the need to homestead.

> Recuperating 'homesteading' as a means of expanding knowledge and potential requires that homesteaders from the past and those looking to the future show willingness to cooperate in revealing the stories, identities, variables, and perceptions that were rooted out and evacuated so that some could roost where others were refused homes. It requires also a certain ability to occupy a variety of landscapes simultaneously rather than defend one homeplace as the true site of all identity (Sylvester 1994a:3).

Sylvester is concerned that knowledge claims not be universalized but that they be pluralistic. What becomes particularly important is to actively include and support knowledges developed by groups that have been previously defined outside science.

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[3]In my critical assessment of political science theories in chapter two and four, I want to illustrate this connection.

Which methods should we use to move in this direction? Audre Lorde (1983:99) warned us that "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." In other words she argues that feminists must find other methods and ways of knowing than those which have been developed by the male elites. According to her, it seems questionable to rely on theories, concepts and frameworks that have been completely blind to gender and nature, in order to study gender and nature. Many feminists have been, and are still today, engaged in finding the appropriate 'tools', or methods, for this endeavor. While I am definitively sympathetic to the feminist project, I am not convinced that androgenic theories would be completely useless to analyze gender and nature. It follows from this that my approach is not to throw out the entire tool box of the masters, but to use and refine these tools. This also explains why I take some of my starting points in rather traditional theories of the social sciences i.e. malestream theories.[4] I will build on those aspects that have relevance and are useful for understanding gender/nature biased politics and remain critical to aspects that construct and reify these biases.

Any epistemological discussion is concerned with the question of how we as researchers come to know. There is both a theoretical and a practical dimension of such a discussion. The theoretical question asks what makes knowledge possible, while the practical question asks how we go about achieving that knowledge (Keller 1985:18). One major problem with some malestream theories (and epistemologies, such as positivism) is how they have constructed the relationship between the researcher and the subject of inquiry.

The dream of a completely objective science is unattainable because "it contains precisely what it rejects: the vivid traces of a reflected self image" (Keller 1985:70). The reflection is an autonomous and objectified self. The illusion that individuals are severed from the world, and from its animate and inanimate objects, is the reflection of these individuals' own subjectivities. This self-image is based on some idea that the scientific methodology can guarantee a separation between the inquiry of science and any value-related considerations (Longino 1989:47).

Such a self-image echoes one dominant view of nature (and the view of the 'object' of inquiry) as passive with resources that are waiting to be explored. Nature is

[4]The word malestream instead of mainstream is used purposefully to accentuate that what have been the most cited and applied theories of the social sciences, also called traditional theories, have been theories developed and researched by men. The use of the word malestream makes this important fact both visible and explicit.

objectified and severed from the explorer, the active agent using and abusing nature's riches (Plumwood 1993; Merchant 1980). This is problematic because it not only severs the researcher from the subject of inquiry but also disconnects the research from the world, since it is void of a location or a point of reference from where it can be understood. A good theory should at least reflect, and at best, say something important about the world we live in.

> Theory—the seeing of patterns, showing the forest as well as the trees—theory can be a dew that rises from the earth and collects in the rain cloud and returns to earth over and over. But if it doesn't smell of the earth, it isn't good for the earth (Adrienne Rich, in Gaard 1993:1).

Since there is neither a location nor any point of reference associated with the objectified scientific vision, the researcher is made invisible and has not any clear responsibility for the research. Many researchers today would fiercely contest that this view of the scientific method is an adequate description of how scientific knowledge is actually gained. However, many agree that this is how it has been conceptualized, mainly as parables in textbooks and lessons. Since the objectivism of positivism has been proclaimed dead many times over, this point might seem redundant or as if feminists were flogging an already dead horse. It might very well be that the horse is dead but we are still left with the stinking corpse. The mantras of the objective, sex- and bodiless, distanced researcher are chanted over and over.

Feminist Standpoint

Feminist standpoint theory rejects the notion of objectivism that is based on the search for a totalizing single vision but, at the same time, also strongly rejects relativism, because relativism is objectivism's mirror image, it is a way of being everywhere equally while actually being nowhere specific.[5] By being somewhere specific means that there is a clear responsibility for the scientific inquiry (Benhabib 1992:214-216; Haraway 1991:191).

Feminist standpoint epistemology argues for a re-evaluation of objectivity but with a definite recognition of social and historical relativity and responsibility. In other

[5]This is also the major critique coming from feminists critical to postmodernists such as Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty and Foucault (such as, Diamond & Quinby 1988; Flax 1990; Nicholson 1990; Benhabib 1992; Marshall 1994).

words, every claim for knowledge must be understood as socially and historically situated and embodied (cf. Widerberg 1995:139-155). Simply put, it means that researchers are also people, who have bodies, emotions, a history and a context. That we have bodies is important because it influences (and can explain) our interest in problems, choice of theories and analytical perspectives.

> Feminist objectivity makes room for surprises and ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not in charge of the world. We just live here and try to strike up non-innocent conversations by means of our prosthetic devices.... (Haraway 1991:199).

Dynamic objectivity, as a research goal, can be obtained by recognizing relativity and viewing the goals of knowledge production as inclusionary.[6] Fox Keller describes dynamic objectivity as "not unlike empathy, a form of knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one's understanding of another in his or her own right" (1985:117). Empathy, as a method, is an honest willingness and an ability to appreciate the other's behavior. It demands more work from the researcher since it requires that we, in doing scientific research, also must carefully examine the background, i.e., the social contexts which influence both our own behavior and the behavior of others. If dynamic objectivity is to be the goal of inquiries in political science, then it means that we willingly include stories that have been left unheard and identities that have been excluded (Sylvester 1994a:96; 1994b). The more standpoints that are allowed to be expressed, the closer to objectivity we get. This is important because feminists are not arguing that "non-sexist theories, research or politics have an equal right to be recognized as legitimate or desirable alongside sexist theory...They are arguing.../that/ sexist science is morally and politically wrong...." (Harding 1986:108-109).

A feminist standpoint epistemology questions what legitimate knowledge is and claims that knowledge grounded in women's lived experiences[7] can be an important

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[6]This is Evelyn Fox Keller's terminology, Sandra Harding has a similar discussion but refers to it as "strong objectivity".

[7]What has been argued as being problematic in standpoint theory is the focusing on 'women's lives' as a privileged position for making knowledge claims. This assertion could risk undermining the feminist emancipatory project in that it reifies, essentializes and universalizes, rather than deconstructs and questions the category 'woman' (Yeatman 1994:14-26; Grewal 1994; Kaplan 1994; Hennessay 1993). The way that I resolve this is by making knowledge claims from the perspective of women's lived experiences from a particular location. This means that although women experience patriarchal oppression, the character of that oppression might contain more differences than similarities because different oppressions intersect. The view of a gender/nature biased society can be expected to be quite different from the perspective of a Swedish female academic as compared with,

contribution to provide situated 'truths'. This differs from, for example, empiricist feminist science which argues that it is not scientific norms and methods, but the researcher, who is to blame for the lack of research on and accommodation of women's lives and interests into science. A standpoint epistemology, on the other hand, challenges the norms of science and argues that they are also gendered. It asserts that the experience of women's lives can provide a more complete picture of nature and social life in it since it can compensate for existing distortions and partialities. The belief is that the experience lived by 'the other' has important contributions to make to the dominant elites' perspectives. The elites' ways of thinking fit closely with the dominant conceptual schemes and institutional patterns. Standpoint theory posits that the position of an individual within society shapes ways of knowing.[8] This position has, in turn, been shaped by power relationships, by resource distribution as well as ways of knowing (Hennessy 1993:67).

Standpoint theory sees that important knowledge is generated in the struggle that the oppressed wage against their oppressors. A feminist standpoint means that it is grounded in the struggle against sexist oppression and, as such, is part of an emancipatory project. It is feminist because it is not just any woman's experience[9] that can be considered as grounding such a standpoint; it has to come out of a conscious struggle against dominant practices. This means that while women's contribution to science is very important, it is not necessarily feminist. It is feminist if it comes out of the conscious effort to be critical of the dominant discourses that shape women's everyday lives (Haraway 1991:191; Hennessy 1993:75).

My Struggle—My Standpoint

for example, a subsistence farmer in India. Hence, the problems which I will be pointing at as regards the gendered aspects of the EU project would probably be seen in a different light and perhaps be considered trivial problems from such a different standpoint. Nevertheless, it should be an extremely important critical knowledge to be gained in the context of the EU.

[8]Feminist standpoint theory as proposed by Hartsock 1983:231-251; Smith 1987; Flax, 1990; Harding 1991; Haraway 1991; Hennessy, 1993.

[9]Hilary Rose (1994:21-36) argues that any woman can contribute with this knowledge but that it is in the particular material conditions of women (in mothering, menstruating, lactating, etc.) that this knowledge can be gained. Hartsock, on the other hand, makes a broader distinction and asserts that any conscious struggle against patriarchal oppression generates such knowledge. Her definition of standpoint is narrower in the sense that it requires that the struggle is consciously carried out. Being a woman does not automatically give you a standpoint (Hartsock 1985:231-251).

The conscious struggles[10] that have generated my standpoint are as a feminist working in an academic setting; historically and presently dominated by men: in social science research, at conferences, in the classroom and at seminars. Another 'struggle' has taken place in the confrontation with the material and the interviews. The Community has been and is male dominated. The persons who have been involved in articulating ideas about environmental problems and made subsequent decisions have for the most part been men. The gender dimension has always been present and noticeable. In addition my role, not only as a feminist academic but also as a worker, friend, daughter, wife and mother have provided experiences, generating important knowledges of gendered practices.

There are many different feminisms but they share one common object of investigation: gender. Gender can be understood as relationships of domination. Feminisms also share an emancipatory aim: to change these relationships of gender domination. The anatomical difference between male and female has led to the social creation of two gender, 'man' and 'woman'. It appears as if 'woman' and 'man' are two opposing categories, yet they are contained within their definition because 'man' is always defined against 'woman'. 'Man' has no meaning without the existence of non-man, i.e., 'woman', and vice versa. Since most societies are stratified by class, ethnicity, race, access to natural resources as well as gender there are no 'men' or 'women' standing outside these stratifications.[11] I argue that a standpoint epistemology can be particularly fruitful as it recognizes that valuable knowledge is gained from experience in a particular position or location. Standpoints can make visible other aspects of our world and contribute with partial knowledges without claiming to universally generalize. Thus a feminist analysis of Community environmental politics can provide such a perspective.

Inspired by Ecocentric Ideas

[10]This is an important type of struggle but since I am in an extremely privileged position I do not mean to belittle the struggles for every day survival and against corporal abuse, that many women in the world experience.

[11]In privileging gender there is a risk of obscuring other forms of oppressions that might be more relevant in a particular woman's life. Post-colonial feminists, Black feminists and lesbian feminists have strongly criticized the white, middle class, heterosexual women for universalizing 'woman' (hooks 1989; Spelman 1988; Moraga & Anzaldùa 1981)

I argued earlier that we need some starting point to evaluate greenness. The suggestion that followed was that we make use of ecocentric political theories, since it is mainly such ideas that have provided the criticism of industrial society and proposed many of the solutions that have now been taken up by different organizations. Ecocentric theorists have analyzed and criticized the dominant practices, particularly of the industrialized world, for their view of and relationship with 'nature'. Central to ecocentrism is the view of "...humankind as part of a global ecosystem, and subject to ecological laws" (Pepper 1993:33). This general and rather rudimentary definition will suffice and be adopted here.[12]

Environmental policy is commonly perceived as a political response to the degradation and pollution of nature. There are various explanations why Western societies have such a deteriorated environment. An ecofeminist approach[13] sees environmental degradation as the result of a detrimental relationship between man and nature. Ecofeminism claims that environmental degradation can be understood as the domination of the 'other', whether that 'other' is 'nature', 'woman', 'working class' or any other 'other'. The similarity between these forms of domination lies in the creation of a dualism that moves away from the mere differentiation of two categorizations to the acknowledgment of more value, esteem and power to one side of the dualism, such as in man/woman, white/black and culture/nature. This discussion will be further pursued in chapter two.

> ....feminism's struggle for women's freedom and ecology's struggle for planetary well-being have come together in an alliance called ecofeminism. Because of shared concerns for health and freedom, a 'we' has been formed. This we has not emerged from the prescriptions of a politically correct theory; it has resulted from ecologists and feminists combining forces in their challenges to institutions of power. (Quinby 1990:124).

While feminist movements and environmental movements have built coalitions around common concerns, against hegemonic politics, there are plenty of conflicts and contradictions between the ideas expressed by these movements, which are in no sense in themselves monolithic. Feminists within the environmental movements have reacted to the way women and men have been made invisible in the critique of modern societies. On the one hand, ecofeminism can be perceived as a development of

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[12]For a much more nuanced discussion of ecocentrism in political theory turn to Eckersley (1992).

[13]The ecofeminist literature that I rely on in the dissertation is: Salleh 1996, 1993; Warren 1994, 1991, 1990; Plumwood 1994, 1993; Gaard 1993; Mies & Shiva 1993; Diamond & Orenstein 1990; Merchant 1996, 1992, 1989, 1980; Daly 1978.

feminist theory because it argues that environmental movement politics are androcentric. On the other hand, ecofeminism can also be viewed as a development of the ecocentric theories[14] that include critiques of hierarchical and patriarchal domination but does not extend this to a full analysis (as for example Bookchin 1990:41-66). Apart from the overlapping interests and common concerns between feminists interested in environmental issues and environmentalists interested in feminist perspectives, there are also similarities in the exploitation of women and nature. As an effect of this, issues associated with women and nature have been marginalized. According to ecofeminists this is due to a dualistic logic, whereby these issues have been constructed as other, of less value. Hence, there are similarities in the way that the oppression of women and nature has been constructed. This is also why I treat them both in this dissertation. I want to point out, and this is vital, that I do not claim that women in any essential sense are closer to nature. Humans, whether male or female, are biological beings, part of ecological processes, although throughout history women have frequently been constructed as closer to nature.

The Empirical Material

I began the empirical research with a focus on the Commission's Environmental Action Programmes because these programs contain ideas that have guided specific initiatives for Community legislation. There have been five environmental Action Programmes since 1972. The Action Programmes are comprehensive frameworks aimed at guiding Community environmental policy making for five-year periods. These programs have developed over the years and their qualitative change reflects a certain sophistication of environmental thinking in the Community.

The legal status of environmental policy was confirmed with the Single European Act, in force since 1987. This was considered a substantial step forward. In the environmental sector there has been an evolution of environmental ideas and perceptions as well as the manners of dealing with environmental issues. The thesis will sketch an environmental history showing this evolution.

[14]The ecocentric theories that I have relied on in this dissertation are: Gare 1995; Murphy 1994; Zimmerman 1994; Dobson & Lucardie 1993; McLaughlin 1993; Eckersley 1992; Goodin 1992; Dobson 1990; Naess 1989; Paehlke 1989; Tokar 1987; Thompson 1987; Pepper 1986, 1993; Devall & Sessions 1985; Capra 1975, 1982; Bookchin 1974, 1990.

I have assumed from the start that the Action Programmes have had some degree of importance in the Community setting. Although some sources described these programmes as mere symbols with no practical implications, I argue that they are, nevertheless, valuable documents because they represent important discourses which reflect the societal context in which they were created (Edelman 1988:103-119). If we view the Action Programmes as a synthesis of the thinking around environmental destruction and pollution we can see how the solutions, as expressed in the Action Programmes and other Community reports, are related to the changing construction of the relationship between humans and the natural environment. If there has been a change in that relationship and the perception of that relationship over time, it should also be reflected in these programs and reports as well as in the directives.

The specific solutions that are presented in more detail in chapter six, have been singled out either from these Action Programmes or from the set of solutions presented as directives, decisions and regulations in the Community over the years. However, the whole set of directives (some 200), the Action Programmes and other special reports, form the basis for the analysis. To understand how individuals interact with each other in the process of deciding upon a policy, it has been necessary to conduct a number of interviews.[15] The interviews have been an important source in understanding the overall development as well as the specific details of the agenda setting process. Although I have tried to back up most of the information from the interviews with additional sources, they sometimes serve as the only source. This is particularly the case for the early period of Community policy making.

The Research Questions Revisited

Here follows a synthesis of what has been the major aims and ambitions of the research project presented in the thesis. The ambition has been to understand the process of environmental agenda-setting, or greening, of the Community. This

[15] In the beginning I relied on a snowballing technique to find my interview subjects. Thus, phrases like: you should also contact X Y, have been guiding the search for suitable people to interview. They come from the different EU institutions and have been active at different times during the 25-year period that I cover. I have conducted 39 semi-structured interviews lasting an average of one hour. Some of the interviews have been taped. They are all documented in written form. In order to protect the sources I have decided not to list them.

includes both how issues have been brought up as well as reshaped on that same agenda. The aim has been to address this from a feminist standpoint which is a critical approach that makes visible certain, hitherto hidden, aspects of the political process.

The theoretical ambition has been to use the critical approach together with the findings to generate a theoretical framework, or a theory, which can be used to analyze agenda setting. Another aim is to use ecocentric theories in two ways: One is to inform the critical approach since ecocentric theories have a well developed analysis of the problems in modern society and in political systems. The other is to see to what extent ecocentric ideas have been articulated in Community environmental policies and transformed in the micropolitical processes of policy making.

Chapter Two
Agenda Setting as Power and Resistance

As mentioned in the introduction, one argument why certain issues are politicized at the expense of others, is that power relationships influence the way the agenda is shaped. Different power practices can provide obstacles to the introduction of new issues as well as shape the way these issues are defined and articulated on the agenda. It follows that setting the agenda is not simply a decision whether an issue is important or not. What is important and, hence, what is politicized and what is not, must be understood against the macropolitics of society that tend to favor one issue over another.

This chapter will be addressing macropolitical aspects of agenda setting. While this chapter is concerned with developing a theoretical framework for understanding power, the following one will outline the actual power practices within the Community that have shaped environmental policy. In political science, power is one of the most central concepts and naturally, the literature and the theories which have been developed are numerous. Power is an 'essentially contested concept' (Gallie 1955) and it would be limiting to assume that there is one authoritative concept of power. In the following I have chosen to discuss the conceptualizations of power that appear to be most relevant and interesting for this particular thesis. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a conceptualization of power that can serve as a model for understanding the power practices that have shaped the Community environmental agenda.

While important understandings of power can be gained with the help of these malestream theories they are also problematic because they have made gender and nature invisible. The argument pursued is that while these theories of power have provided many important insights, for example, regarding the importance of the actual decision making situation (Dahl), as well as the importance of biases and societal practices to agenda setting situations (Bachrach & Baratz, Lukes), these malestream theories can be enriched with insights from feminist theorizing.

Ecofeminists have taken care to analyze the dualistic construction of power that has had important implications regarding the inclusion and exclusion of issues, not only on the conceptual level but in real life practices as well. Some ecofeminists claim that the logic of domination has enabled and encouraged, excused and reified the exploitation of numerous 'others' such as 'women' and 'nature'; which also explains why the abuse of nature is a concern for feminists as well as environmentalists. Gendered conceptualizations based on the sexual categories of males and females, thus, have implications that extend far beyond the immediate relations of the sexes.

Furthermore, malestream power theories are focusing on an understanding that sees power as a zero sum game—either you have power or you don't. Feminist theorists have been critical of these approaches to power, because an exclusive emphasis on power as a zero-sum game reduces those outside the power sphere to passive powerless objects. It does not consider that power can be oppression in its abuse but also possibility for change in its use.

In addition it could be argued, and perhaps rightfully so, that looking at Dahl's, Bachrach and Baratz's as well as Lukes' conceptualizations of power, gives a rather complete picture of the ways power works. Particularly useful is Lukes' inclusion of all three perspectives in his three-dimensional view of power. However, what is lacking is an elaboration on the interdependence or connections between these different dimensions of power. I will argue here that it is more helpful to imagine power as an interdependent relationship and less as a zero-sum game: because power is both "the source of oppression in its abuse and the source of emancipation in its use" (Radtke & Stam 1994:1).

Accordingly, I argue that power contains both sites of intensive and hegemonic power practices and sites of resistance. This means that individuals and groups can shape decisions where they are made, while at the same time being restricted by a number of biases embodied in institutions and in societal practices. Power practices and resistances are mutually dependent, shape outcomes and restructure politics. Greening becomes the result of the interplay between the dominant power practices and the resistances shaped in response to them.

Power in Decision Situations

Dahl regards power as *intentional* and as a process of getting the other to do what s/he would otherwise not do. Dahl suggested that influence and power be empirically tested by looking at concrete and specific decision situations. In his seminal work on influence and power in New Haven (Dahl 1961) he used this approach to look at three political issue areas. His findings were that no one group or elite monopolized the exercise of influence in the decision process. Different groups were influential in different areas of decision making. Hence, he drew the conclusion that power was widely distributed in society and fragmented between different groups and different areas of interest. Power was thus observable in situations of overt conflict over preferences.

Power in this version is understood as something that different groups can achieve, for example, through mobilization of people and resources. It presumes that anyone has the possibility to influence the agenda and that the opportunity to do so is, in principle, equal for everyone. In Dahl's version of power the interest of a group is equal to its preferences in concrete decision situations. An application of this particular notion of power would suggest that the almost total absence of 'women' in political bodies or the lack of concern for 'nature' would imply that such preferences and interests do not exist, or at least that they have nothing to do with the exercise of power.

The Mobilization of Bias

Another layer or dimension in Lukes' (1974) three-dimensional view of power is the *mobilization of bias*. The bias decides what type of issues will be dealt with at the political level. The mobilization of bias organizes some issues *in* and some issues *out* of the policy process. This bias benefits certain groups over others, and issues which challenge or do not match the values and beliefs that constitute the bias will not reach the political agenda because the dominant groups in society will systematically defend and encourage the bias, i.e., the bias is mobilized. This perspective on power was developed by Bachrach and Baratz in reaction to, and as a criticism of, Dahl's version. The criticism was not against Dahl's definition of influence in the decision process per se, but rather that Dahl's definition gave only a partial and very narrow picture of how power works in decision situations.

For Bachrach and Baratz, Dahl's conclusions about power in decision situations appeared valid and they labeled his view the first face of power, significant in situations where power operates in overt conflict over specific issues. Bachrach and

Baratz asserted, however, that relationships of power are not restricted to behavior in formal decision processes. The bias both constrains and empowers agents (Bachrach & Botwinick 1992:59). Therefore, it is necessary to go outside the immediate decision situation to see how power works in a more general sense to shape the agenda. *The second face of power* consists of a bias toward certain issues and ways of dealing with them. This bias works selectively so that certain issues are put on the agenda and other issues become non-issues and never even reach the level of decision making. The bias is defined as the dominant values, rules, rituals and institutional procedures that consistently and systematically work to benefit certain groups in society at the expense of other groups.[16] When the bias effectively prevents certain problems from developing into important issues, non-decision making takes place (Bachrach and Baratz 1963:641). The emphasis is on how power influences the conditions for decision making, rather than how power works in the actual process of decision making. They polemize against pluralist accounts of power because they emphasize that power can be exercised even in the absence of an overt conflict. The bias works to prevent issues from ever being voiced or effectively stopped before they reach any political arena where decision making takes place. The methods used to uphold and reinforce the bias vary: they can be anything from terror methods and threats used to prevent issues from being articulated in the political process; the co-optation of the opposition; the use of norms, precedents and rules that are based on the invoking of the existing bias in the political system; to the establishment of new procedural rules to prevent challenges to the existing bias (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:44f).

Bachrach and Baratz suggested that two dimensions of power determine which issues will become part of the agenda. In doing this, they also expand the understanding of political issues to include also non-issues and non-decisions. From a feminist perspective the mobilization of bias seems more accurate as a way to describe how power works, because women have definitively been a minority present at the places where 'important' decisions are made. The use of the second face of power can explain why certain issues are excluded from the agenda and are not even considered as important for political life.

[16] The term 'mobilization of bias' was originally coined by Schattschneider (1960:70).

The Third Dimension of Power

Steven Lukes expands Barach and Baratz's model further, arguing that there is an additional third dimension of power. This involves the exercise of power to shape people's preferences, to the extent that the people themselves might not be aware of their own interests (Lukes 1974:25). Lukes interprets power as working in three dimensions, each building on the previous one by developing and specifying the way that the powerful influence and retain their dominance over the powerless. Lukes' important contribution focuses attention on *latent conflict*. He then contrasts this with the previous overt and covert conflict of the first and second dimension of power. He argues that it is in the third dimension that power is working most effectively and asks:

> /I/s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes 1974:24)

The above citation resembles the way that some feminists have argued that gendered structures are maintained, because it is rooted within our very identities (Björk 1996; Bartky 1990:5). Also nature has remained external to the agenda because it has been constructed as outside and, hence, appearing as naturally not belonging to the sphere of social activity and politics. From the perspective of this study, the third dimension of power is an attractive and useful conceptualization when trying to understand how dominant discourses and practices exclude certain issues from the agenda.

Lukes holds that certain groups or individuals in society are subject to power relations whereby their 'true' or 'real' interests are oppressed, insofar as they remain concealed and do not come to the surface in any power relation, i.e., they are latent and do not become issues of conflict. Lukes' model was radical because it brought social structures into the analysis of power. However, an analysis following in Lukes' footsteps has to rely on the notion of interests (Hartsock 1983:88-89; Svärd 1982:62-64). What are these interests? As much as Lukes tries to solve the difficult methodological problem, and in this, also the discussion of interests, it is quite clear that he does not rely on a view of interests that is based on material and class

conditions. His view on interests seems to stem from a belief that it is responsible individuals who influence or should influence from the centers of power (cf. Lukes 1991; Clegg 1989:97-100). This is precarious because Lukes "fails to present an epistemology and theory of human nature on which such an attribution of objective interests must rest" (Hartsock 1983:80). It is problematic since it actually assumes that, at the core, there are universally 'true' and objective interests (Clegg 1989:92). Who is to determine what is the true interest which is being oppressed, is latent and hence, not expressed? Feminists are, in general, skeptical to projects that try to establish the universal because, in the past, such interests have usually been equated with men's interests.

Another one of the difficulties with Lukes' model is that we are increasingly moving away from explanations of power that derive their arguments from concrete and observable phenomena. Nevertheless, Crenson (1971) succeeded in doing an excellent empirical study of non-decision making on air-pollution issues, which was inspired by the second and anticipated the third dimensional view of power. Since such studies concern themselves with finding out what "power prevents people from doing, and sometimes even thinking" (Lukes 1974:48), it must rest on the opinion and value judgment of the researcher. It is up to the observer to decide whether there is a latent conflict or not. Lukes himself suggests a way to do this. He proposes that researchers look for opportunities when the dominant practices have slackened and resistances become more pronounced and visible. In this we can find evidence of 'true' interests. The focus on resistances might be one way to provide the counterpoint from which to address the practices of power. The standpoint epistemology discussed in the previous chapter does precisely that; it takes the experience from the position of the resistance, or if you will, from those outside the halls of the powerful, as providing important situated knowledges; however it does not presume that there is any such 'true' interest to be discovered.

A set of issues that has been largely excluded from political life have been issues dealing with nature and natural resources. It is more difficult to tie these types of issues to certain groups, although environmentalist and ecologist groups as well as green parties have increasingly taken on the role as representing 'the interests of nature'. Political ecologists (Naess 1989; Devall & Sessions 1985) have argued that nature has intrinsic values and certain 'interests' that can be defined outside human activities. Such intrinsic values have been virtually ignored in Western societies. Just as women's concerns have been confined to the background, been invisible or judged as particularistic or special interests, environmental issues have been marginalized in a

similar way. The development which we call greening is about giving environmental 'interests' larger visibility.

Power as a Zero-Sum Game

Bachrach and Baratz as well as Lukes have provided important contributions, showing how oppression can work outside the immediate decision situation, and have highlighted the importance of established values in agenda setting. On the other hand, Dahl has confined his work to the immediate decision situation and thus pointed in the direction of seeing power less as a hegemonic practice and more as coming from groups in society that mobilize around certain issues. These theories of power cover a wide range of possible power definitions. However, the three-dimensional view of power does not connect the three dimensions in any satisfactory way if it connects them at all. The framework proposed here will try to make that connection explicit.

A close reading of the texts mentioned so far reveals that the emphasis is more on power as oppression than on emancipation, and the focus is more on the 'powerful' than the 'powerless'. It is notable that, regardless if influence is held by different groups or embedded in institutionalized practices and structures, all the faces or dimensions of power rely on a dualistic categorization between the powerful and the powerless. In all three theories—the intentional view on power, the mobilization of bias and the third dimension of power—some have power and others do not. In Dahl's notion, it is A who has influence over B's behavior. According to Bachrach and Baratz, elites mobilize a bias against the voicing of opinions or demands, that run contrary to established values, beliefs and institutions. In Lukes' dimension, unconscious interests and latent conflicts never enter the realm of the political. The interests of the 'powerful' are always realized while the interests of the 'powerless' can never be realized without, it seems, a reversal in the power structure: B becomes A; elites are replaced by new elites and other interests (or 'true' interests) are realized.

Power defined mainly in terms of 'power over' means that power has been perceived more as domination, aggression and capacity to dominate, than as possibility for action. Thus, power is imagined mainly from the perspective of the subject. When the subjects have almost exclusively been 'people called men' we could suspect that this would distort the view of power. Power has, in the political and academic discussion in general, been closely related to masculine terms. It has been defined very closely to other controlling behavior such as aggression, sexuality, virility and

masculinity (Hartsock 1983:152) while, at the same time, forcefully denying, by making completely invisible, the connection to a masculine subject. A more thorough understanding of the interdependence between the included and the excluded seems necessary.

These theories have, furthermore, seemed to avoid seeing some power structures as more stable and encompassing than others, and have focused much less on *which groups*, *which elites* and *what type of values*, rules and institutional practices have benefited certain groups, issues and interests at the expense of others. Feminist researchers have charged that the exclusion of groups and issues from the political agenda is much more systematic than this suggests. 'Women' is one such group that has been confined to the private sphere and most definitively excluded from politics taking place in the public arena (Pateman 1989:118-137). There are, hence, reasons to suspect that women were a minority in, or absent from, the political life of Dahl's New Haven, Bachrach and Baratz's Baltimore, and Lukes' world; however, this has remained completely invisible in their work.[17] While virtually all feminist research has taken on the task of exposing the systematic exclusion of women from political spaces, other feminist researchers have attempted to explain why this systematic exclusion has been possible. In the following, we will rely on this body of work so we may arrive at an understanding of power that can enrich the traditional malestream theories.

Environmental issues have become part of both the institutional and political agendas of the EU although there have been very few groups, in Dahl's sense, that could be expected to take on the role as representative of 'nature's interests'. In Luke's terms such 'interests' have been concealed and oppressed and remained a latent area of conflict during the modern industrial period of Western Europe. The environmental policies which will be analyzed in this thesis could, from Lukes' perspective, be seen as the unveiling and unmasking of what was previously a latent conflict and as the effective influence of new groups in politics. In the following we will turn to a discussion that specifically deals with how dominant discourses and social practices

[17] 'Women' are completely invisible in both Bachrach & Baratz *Power and Poverty* of 1970 as well as Lukes' *Power-A Radical View* of 1974. In Power and Poverty, Barach and Baratz use the situation of the Baltimore blacks as their empirical base. Although they are aware of race as a dimension to power, gender slips by them. In their and Lukes' theoretical elaborations the 'man' is the norm. 'Woman' and 'she' is clearly not part of power politics, something which is then upheld and reified also in these scholar's work.

exclude certain groups and issues. It particularly focuses on how this exclusion is constructed with an emphasis on the orders of discourse that facilitate exclusion.

Dualistic Constructions and the 'Logic' of Domination

According to some feminists, gendering of power in conceptualization and in practice has been facilitated by dualisms. These mental constructions of domination have made sexism and naturism possible, i.e., the 'othering' and exploitation of people because of their biological sex and the exploitation and abuse of natural resources (Warren 1994; Zimmerman 1994:233-317; Mies & Shiva 1993; Gaard 1993; Merchant 1992; 1989; 1980; Diamond & Orenstein 1990).

Some ecofeminists have focused on how dualistic constructions in dominant discourses and practices effectively exclude certain persons and their concerns. In doing this they have also provided enticing ideas on how this exclusion is constructed. In dualism, dependencies are made invisible and denied. Conceptual structures are created into, for example, powerful–powerless, male–female, master–slave, mind–body, culture–nature, reason–nature, subject–object, self–other, public–private, etc. The dichotomies themselves depict a *power over* kind of situation, that is, one side of the dichotomy is inherently stronger, better and more visible than the other.

The focus is *not* on these dichotomous classifications per se, or that we distinguish between two kinds of things, but that certain specific dichotomies have been laden with values and biases. In dualistic constructions the actual or supposed qualities and values associated with one side of the dichotomy are constructed and depicted as inferior. These values and dependencies have become more or less invisible because they have been constructed as natural or given and, hence, have remained unquestioned. Dualism is an oppressive conceptual framework with a substantive value system and a logic that establishes hierarchical ranking and justifies subordination and objectification. The argument supporting an exploitation of nature is based mainly on the following dichotomies: mind-body, mental-physical, culture-nature, reason-nature and goes as follows:

(A1) Humans have the capacity to reason consciously but animals, plants and rocks do not have that capacity.

(A2) Whatever has the capacity to reason consciously is morally superior to whatever lacks this capacity.

(A3) Thus, humans are morally superior to animals, plants and rocks.

(A4) For any X or Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is morally justified in subordinating Y.

(A5) Thus, humans are morally justified in subordinating animals, plants and rocks.[18]

Women and other oppressed groups have been categorized as inferior and associated with nature, being less 'rational' and more like animals; driven by natural instinct and passion rather than reason.[19] 'Woman' has been perceived as bound and tied to natural processes, more animal-like and confined to a sphere of inferiority to man. This line of argument, that women's mental, physical and emotional capacity is inferior to man's, is based on the different roles that males and females play in the sexual-reproductive process. This myth of the more physical and sexually bound female has, in many cases, included not only women but also blacks, minorities and 'lower' classes. The argumentation that contains the 'logic' of domination and the claim that the oppression of nature, women, race and class has the same conceptual root is structured as follows:

(B1) Women are identified with nature and the physical whereas men are identified with humanness and the mental.

(B2) Whatever is identified with nature and the physical is inferior to whatever is identified with the human and the mental.

(B3) Thus women are inferior to men.

(B4) For any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in subordinating Y.

(B5) It follows that men are justified in subordinating women. (Warren 1990:130)

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[18]Adopted and modified from Warren (1990:129).

[19]Examples of this view of women has also influenced Western political thought as re searched by Susan Moller Okin (1979), Dianah Coole (1988).

Dualistic construction works on a deep structural level but is neither static nor unchangeable, instead it can be perceived in terms of a dynamic set of processes that create and maintain it. For example, the man–nature relationship has changed throughout history with 'woman' however, remaining within the category 'nature'. Before the Enlightenment, an organic view of nature prevailed and this view also included a spiritual dimension. The belief that nature consisted of mysterious forces gave way to the Enlightenment beliefs in knowledge and technology that coincided with the industrialization process. During industrialization the view was more instrumental; nature was depicted as passive, providing the resources and the raw materials for industrial processes.[20] Particularly since the 1970s, different views of nature have been constructed and these different views now coexist with one another (Bennet & Chaloupka 1993:vii-xvi; Phelan 1993).

Although the belief that nature is plastic and that the world can be technically managed is still prevalent, the changing and varied understandings of 'nature' have been brought on by the severe environmental problems of our times. Modern life has led to a critical "...confrontation with the realization that nature continues to take part in the construction of reality" (Murphy 1994:17). The high visibility of environmental issues in the Western world today has even further differentiated what 'nature' and the 'environment' means. It has lead to various interpretations as well as a wide range of social practices. Greening as a changing agenda is also a changing construction of 'nature' over time.

Similar to the culture-nature and man-nature construction, the man-woman construction has changed and been re-constructed over time. What masculinity and femininity *is* has varied over time and with place and circumstance. In most historical periods and geographical areas, femininity was defined in a way that has placed 'women' in the private space and 'men' in the public. At times 'women' were defined as wicked, luring, immoral and lusting creatures and at other times and in different locations, as fragile, sickly and weak, as for example in the Victorian period.[21] Other times, particularly during war, femininity has been defined in a way to support warfare, soldiers and keep industrial production going (Enloe 1993; 1989). The

[20]This is obviously, only an extremely simplified account of the construction of nature over historic times. For a much more detailed an interesting narratives see; Merchant (1980; 1989); Simmons (1993); Pointing (1991).

[21]Compare with research done on the construction of 'woman' in the Swedish medical context see Johannisson 1994.

construction of masculinity has similarly differed over time, as soldiers, as workers, as leaders, as providers, as fathers, etc.

There are different processes that reinforce, recreate and uphold the dualistic construction *(*Plumwood 1993:47-60). Since a dualistic construction creates a dependency within pairs, the dependency has to be denied if the one is to be viewed inferior to the other. This is done by backgrounding the inferior and making this 'other' invisible. When discussing this for gender, it is obvious that 'woman' becomes invisible when there is a universal norm based on the 'man'. The male point of view becomes universal and makes any other point of view deviant. Any admittance of dependency would heavily undermine the position achieved. The conscious or subconscious reason for backgrounding is to deny dependency, in order to maintain a dominant position by virtue of equating male with the normal, the essential and natural. This is similar to Lukes' argument (1974:24) that power practices work most effectively on the subjects when they seem natural or like having existed forever (see also: Quinby 1994:53)

Returning for a moment to the discussion of power earlier in this chapter, we can also see evidence of backgrounding in the way power has been discussed in political science. None of the power theories we have paid attention to so far, and very few other conceptualizations of power for that matter, pay attention to gender. By ignoring gender altogether, gender is confined to the background and becomes invisible. The distinctive and clearly separate spheres in a dualist pair are maintained and upheld through a distancing of the 'other'. Yvonne Hirdman (1990) makes a similar argument in her discussion of gender systems. She argues that the distancing of the spheres of men and women is necessary in order for a gender system to remain intact. It is when the distancing is broken that gendered relations become most obvious and are challenged.

Distancing is apparent in, for example, global political practices such as meetings with heads of state, militarized conflicts and trade negotiations. Here, where the gendered nature of politics ought to be most obvious due to the almost total absence of people called women, gender has become completely invisible (Peterson and Runyan 1993: 45-78). As a result, in the practice of global politics the presence of a woman at a summit meeting becomes sensational. Global politics, in terms of resource distribution, shares of labor and political representation, are no doubt gendered, (Seager 1993; Seager & Olson 1986) but it is not until the 1990s that a feminist

perspective on international relations and global politics has started to become accepted within the discipline.

A similar process of distancing which upholds dualistic constructions is when nature is labeled as resources, passively waiting to be exploited and turned into products. Both economic theory and practice have viewed natural resources and pollution as externalities, i.e., as effects external to the industrial process. This means that neither the generation of pollution nor the full cost of resource use has been calculated within economics nor included in the price of the products (Dietz & van der Straaten 1993:118; Cornes & Sandler 1986:29-47). It is equally evident in the common rhetoric in which pollution resulting from detrimental production and consumption patterns is considered as 'environmental problems'. The environment does not have problems, nor has it created problems. In the definition of what is considered a problem, the agents are excluded and, hence, become invisible. To keep the dualistic pairs distant is a way of feeding on the energy of the other (Cheney 1987:124). The self cannot have any reciprocal relation with the 'other' and thus, there is no conversation between two subjects as the 'other' is not respected but perceived as an alien object (Plumwood 1993:57; Ruether 1975:193-196).

Dualistic constructions can easily lead to instrumentalism since the underside of the dualism has no value but is only there for the subject to use, as a resource for the subject's purposes. Instrumentalism is created and maintained through objectification when the needs, wishes, rights or views of 'the other' are not considered in themselves but only in the light or relationship to the subject. 'The other' is thereby objectified and is not legitimized independently of the subject. This is the process whereby objectification has facilitated exploitation of the environment. It has provided the argument that the forests, the rivers and wildlife are there for man, to be used as he pleases. To view nature as an object that can be utilized freely both ignores that we are all part of nature and upholds a dualism between wo/men and nature (Birkeland 1993:24; Griscom 1981). Other theorists have indeed argued that instrumental reasoning is at the root of human exploitative relationship with nature but they have failed to consider the gendered dimension of this exploitation.[22]

[22]For example; Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse have argued in these terms.

A similar construction has enabled the objectification of women as sex objects,[23] continuously reproduced through advertisement and the mass media, as well as the extensive exploitation of women's loving power. Gendered relations are reproduced, according to Jónasdóttir (1991:89-115), because men exploit and feed on women's loving capabilities, which are not always reciprocated. Loving and caring can also be perceived as a form of power relations. The labor of love, hence, has both alienated and unalienated forms. It is in the alienated form that love becomes the base for exploitative relationships (Rose 1994:36-42).

In summary, the dualistic construction of power concerns the way discourses are ordered. In other words, a thought pattern has developed which has constructed nature and women in an inferior position.

The EU as a Patriarchal Project

The preceding discussion on dualistic categorizations has shown that the sexual categories of male and female which, at first sight, seem unrelated to many aspects of life do, indeed, deeply affect most societal relations (Faith 1994:45). The dualistic ordering works similarly to the third dimension of power. It shapes people's preferences to the extent that it seem natural, inevitable and unquestionable that women and men are assigned certain tasks, values and abilities. This also structures the EU project and explains why the leadership and the decision privilege is in the hands of men. However, it is not limited to the exclusion of women from the decision process. The dualistic ordering also has effectively excluded or limited the importance of issues, problems and alternatives that have to do with the lived realities of women in Europe. Some feminists have chosen to call this order patriarchy.

Patriarchy can be defined "as a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women" (Walby 1990:20). Patriarchy has indeed been the most dominant way of organizing our societies. It has survived not only historical eras of change but also contemporary political changes. Hence, he European Communities, as a part of the new world (dis)order, is no exception.

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[23]Radical feminists emphasize the importance of objectifying women's bodies as a way to create and maintain patriarchal power relations (in the liberal state, see MacKinnon 1989). The research focus of radical feminism is centered mainly on issues of sexuality, rape and pornography which are means through which the female body is subjugated (for an introduction to radical feminism see for example: Tong 1989:95-138; Jaggar 1983).

> While the dominant and changing scientific trends in thinking can be painted in broad sweeps coinciding with particular changing historical eras—the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, the Industrial Revolution—one unchanging feature of our Western history as we know it, is that all the dominant cultures have been patriarchal, whether enlightened, reformed, feudal, capitalist or socialist (Bleier 1984:2).

Patriarchy is hence both real and durable (Cockburn 1991:6), while at the same time flexible. Being a dominant power practice, it affects both men and women, albeit in significantly different ways. Hence, patriarchy is not something which men and women can easily escape. While it also leads to the exploitation and oppression among men, there is still a strong solidarity between men in relationship to women. Women are more likely to actively resist patriarchal practices because, although many men are sympathetic to feminist projects, they are extremely privileged by patriarchy, both in material and immaterial terms.

While patriarchy is similar to Lukes' third dimension of power, the second face of power at work in the EU project are the power practices outlined in the coming chapter. These power practices—economist, sovereign, scientist and bureaucratic practices—have been effected by dualistic constructions so that they are also gendered and naturist (i.e. privileging man, culture, reason over woman and nature). Not surprisingly the actors or subjects associated with these practices are for the most part men; economic experts, statesmen and diplomats, scientists and bureaucrats.

Although it was argued earlier that actors are both limited and empowered by these dimensions of power, the emphasis has been, so far, on the restrictions that such power practices impose. Adhering to a strict and static dualistic ordering fails to recognize that the dominant practices affect the individual, but at the same time, the individual entities affect and reshape these practices. Greening, as we have defined it, means that a new issue or idea is put on the political agenda, one that was previously not accepted or perceived as important, urgent or relevant by policy makers or other elites. Since this thesis argues that there has been a greening process affecting Community policies, it implies that green ideas have entered the agenda. Any attempt to change the agenda in a different direction, including new issues, is an act of resistance to prevailing power practices. It is not a passive resistance but an active power practice. Power signifies oppression and domination but it can also be a positive productive force that, in the form of resistances, can be used to change society. Resistance practices take place at the level of micropolitics because it is through individual and group strategies that politics can be changed.

We know from the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite states that it is possible for apparently solid structures of power to fall apart. This implies that power structures can only stay intact as long as they are obeyed, i.e., actively maintained. In thinking about power as a resource for change, as a positive force, it is useful to understand power as something that derives its strength from people getting together to act in resistance to prevailing practices and, in this resistance, provide alternative views and ideas (Arendt 1986:66-68).

Proceeding from this notion it is possible to agree with Dahl and other pluralists, that to look at power in decision making, or in micropolitical settings, it is important to understand how changes can be made. What appears to be lacking in the three-dimensional view of power, is the connection between the dimensions. In the following I will suggest a way to conceptualize power which pays particular attention to the connection between macro- and micropolitics which is also claimed to be the site where changes can be made.

Power and Resistance Dynamics

Evidently, change in dominant views and ideas are possible and new issues can emerge and become salient. It appears as if these dominant conceptualizations are not static but have a higher degree of flexibility and, thus, are more dynamic than the power theories discussed earlier suggest. Understanding how dualism works as an underlying thought pattern that structures social relations is important in order to understand power. However, it is too broad a category to pinpoint more precisely the actual power practices at work regarding the domination of nature and 'women'. Power relations also manifest themselves in more tangible and material practices such as institutions, organizations and legal systems. Power is accordingly "more like a continually changing grid that runs unevenly through the whole of society, creating points of intensity as well as sites of resistance" (Grosz 1990:88). This implies that we are never outside power. Power is always there, not as an omnipresent structure but rather in multiple forms being re-shaped and re-established in everyday practices and resistances (Faith 1994:37-38; Flyvbjerg 1993:103-117). We can thus look for points of intensity in these power practices. These points of intensity will be outlined in the next chapter under the rubric of Power Practices of the EU project.

It seems as if power, in a more general sense, has been visioned as episodic, as being there only when power is actually exercised, so if power is not being exercised then it

is absent (Clegg 1989:156). Such a conceptualization has made it more difficult to think of power at work even without actual visible and restraining power activities as Bachrach, Baratz and Lukes have shown us. The notion of episodic power is a remnant from the past or a figment of our imagination; that power was exercised by one sovereign such as a feudal lord, a priest, a king, does not necessarily apply to our world today where multiple levels of power relationships intersect and overlap each other (Faith 1994:38,45; Clegg 1989:157).

There is a resulting dynamic exchange between the individual entities and the power practices over time. 'Man' does not stand alone outside 'woman' nor does 'culture' or 'reason' exist independently from 'nature'. The categories are contingent on each other; it is their relationship that determines their roles. It is not a permanent institution or a structure. Entities in this relationship 'possess' power only as long as they are relationally constituted to do so. Hence, power is not possessed or captured but it is more similar to a field of force relations. The individual is situated in this force field and in the micropolitical situation both enabled and limited by macropolitical processes (Wartenberg 1990:155-157).

Power structures manifest themselves as manifold relations that permeate and constitute the social body. These power or force relations are not fleetingly connected but are both multiple and unified. Overlapping and interconnecting forms of oppressions form a sort of network (Plumwood 1994:79) which appears as structured relationships and practices in which the subject is embedded (Kerfoot & Knights 1994:69). Thus, it is possible that within each and the same subject power practices are upheld and reproduced while, simultaneously, resistance against it is being shaped.

An understanding of power as multiple relational practices that are contingent on and continuously reconstructed and constructed against each other suggests that power relations are not invariably repressive or unchangeable or inevitable (Lipman-Blumen 1994:109-111). Rather, it becomes necessary to include in the analysis both a discussion and understanding of the practices of power and the resistances to these practices since one does not exist without the other. While resistances in one way enhance prevalent power practices by polarizing and upholding dualisms, it is also through resistances that power is questioned and disrupted (Faith 1994:46-48).

Naturally, resistances challenge existing power relations, while at the same time questioning the understanding of power itself. In modern society we see increasingly

invasive power practices emerging. For example, gendered relations are not only shaped by political or economic systems but are a multiple set of oppressive relationships that effect everything from international relations (Peterson & Runyan 1993) to our very beings. "/P/sychological oppression is institutionalized and systematic; it serves to make the work of domination easier by breaking the spirit of the dominated and by rendering them incapable of understanding the nature of those agencies responsible for their subjugation" (Bartky 1990:23). The means through which the subject is obedient is through self-policing. This is an indication of how dualistic constructions work to shape identities.

Sites of Resistance

> ...there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies (Foucault 1980:142).

The greening of the EU is about changes in the EU, in its organization, its practices and its policies. The challenges that have emerged from the green movement and other grassroots movements and the subsequent changes and adaptations to those demands that have taken place in political structures all over Europe at many levels, are an indication that these movements have been able to disrupt established practices and biases and, if you will, dualistic orderings. The green ideologies that make up the core of the environmental movement deeply challenge the existing values and the established order in Western society. A major part of green theory, and definitively all ecological feminism, is critical of the consumerist and growth-oriented values that have dominated industrial societies. There is not *one* green ideology, but a continuum from the deepest green radicals to the environmentalists and conservationists who believe it is possible to save the environment with slight reform of economic growth and production. The reason it is possible to group them together is their common concern about modern society's destructive relationship with nature. Just as there is not one green ideology, there is not one coherent movement applying pressure on the political institutions regarding environmental concerns. The resistances come from various groups from different social and geographical locations. Examples of such

movements are: the deep ecology movement, the spiritual ecology movement, the social ecology movements, green politics in the form of green parties, environmental scientists, ecofeminist, bioregionalist and sustainable development movements (Merchant 1992). Also the peace movements and the feminist movements have been concerned with similar issues. Some of these movements of resistance are more institutionalized into organizations, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Others are networks such as Women's Environmental Network (WEN) and Development with Women for a New Era (DAWN) (Braidotti et al. 1994:107-122). Yet others have been organized more ad hoc. "Hysterical Housewives, Tree huggers, and Other Mad Women" exemplify resistances to hegemonic practices (Seager 1993:253-279). These activists using civil disobedience are often ridiculed and portrayed as 'mad' in the mass media, and hence not taken seriously.[24] Others use more violent tactics, as exemplified by the ecowarriors (Scarce 1990).

Resistance does not have to be heroic; more often it takes the form of everyday resistance. An example is the green consumers. Although they have made enormous impact on the production of environmentally friendly products, such as unbleached paper, phosphate free detergents etc., they are not part of a coherent movement. The green consumers are "the accumulation of individual trends that represent, in sum, shifts in collective consumption patterns" (Seager 1993:254). The green consumer is the manifestation of a resistance.

Similar to this we can also find resistances within the bureaucratic and governmental apparatus, perhaps also within industry. These individuals, networks or groups are not necessarily involved with environmental organizations or parties, yet they sympathize with ecocentric ideas. Within one and the same individual there could possibly be both sites of resistance and traces of dominant power practices (cf. Pringle 1989:168, on secretaries' resistance within male dominated organizations). We can conclude that resistances are a much broader category than social movements.

Social movements, particularly environmental movements, have been essential to the formation of environmental organizations, lobbies and green parties as well as for engaging the general public in environmental matters. There is nevertheless, nothing

[24]This was the case when the youth section: Fältbiologerna, of the Swedish Nature Conservation Society, hosted a number of acts of protest and civil disobedience against the building of the bridge between Sweden and Denmark, during the summer of 1996.

which can be defined as *the* environmental movement. There are organizations and networks that deal with the relationship between wo/man/nature. They do not present or represent a coherent formation of ideas and strategies; on the contrary, it is a conglomerate of very different organizational structures and grassroot formations. This is exemplified in Brussels by the few environmental movement organizations represented there, for example, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), WWF, Greenpeace, FoE, Worldwatch Institute and the Climate Network. They are very different as regards focus, priorities, organizational structure, lobbying strategies and membership. The variations between them are perhaps greater than their similarities, while they definitively have their environmentalist focus and their resistance politics in common. From a social movement perspective this might be considered a weakness; from a resistance politics perspective strength lies in flexibility, suggesting that there are possibilities for influencing politics in many locations (Szazs 1996; Quinby 1994:42).

Theories and studies of social movements have contributed useful insights into how people organize against hegemonic politics and try to influence politics by offering alternatives (see for example: Tarrow 1994; Morris & Mueller 1992; Eyerman & Jamison 1991). In the social movement literature there are discussions of the type of protests that movements raise, the reason people mobilize and how they mobilize, the importance of the issue they are concerned with, the role that leadership plays, just to mention a few aspects that have been quite extensively researched. The major interest of social movement theorists has started from a focus on the movements themselves, but I argue with Walker that "...it is less interesting to ask how powerful or influential social movements are, or how they fulfill established expectations of what they must be and must become, than how they contribute to the reconfiguration of the political...." (Walker 1994:674-75).

The starting point here is the reconfiguration of the political which occurs in the intersection of alternatives and dominant power practices. These alternatives often have their origin in ecocentric movements but it is individuals who bring them into the policy-making situation. In this process their ideas are shaping, and are being shaped by, the dominant power practices of the institutions.

Summary

In this chapter the argument has been that agenda setting can be viewed as power relations that "...are made up of a network consisting of both global strategies and micro level operations" (Quinby 1994:63). Although different conceptualizations of power in political science have a lot to say about power—that it is intentional, that biases work on issues and actors and that there are latent conflicts—these theories have mainly focused on power as a zero sum game, and less on power as a relationship. I have worked from these malestream theories and tried to expand on the notions of exclusion of issues and actors that both Bachrach and Baratz' as well as Lukes' work insinuate. This was done with the help of feminist theory which understands exclusion in terms of dualistic ordering of 'women' and 'nature' which gives rise to a logic of domination that facilitates exploitation.

Finally, we arrive at a notion where power is both domination and the possibility for action. This is then the starting point for the analysis of the environmental policy in the EU. In the next chapter we will look at the dominant power practices or the macropolitics that have upheld the status quo and counteracted attempts at change by different resistances. Then we will move on to the level of micropolitics where resistances are shaped and are confronting and reshaping these global strategies or macropolitics.

Discussing power and resistance in the EU project, from the perspective suggested here, implies that the third dimension of power is similar to a dualistic ordering—a construction which has excluded women and nature from the agenda. This explains how the EU is a gendered organization. The dualistic ordering, as power in the third dimension, has placed the political in the hands of men, who are the decision makers. It has also ordered the perception of problems and what problems are important and which ones are not and also the solutions that have been proposed. However also issues that have to do with most women's lived realities in Europe, mainly confined or derived from the home sphere and caring activities, have effectively been placed outside the agenda, defined as unimportant or irrelevant for the EU project.

While these power practices are hegemonic, they are neither permanent nor unchangeable. Resistances subject power practices to challenges which result in new directions of politics.

Chapter Three
Power Practices of the EU Project

> /T/he regulating system for the "rational" control of industrial devastation is about as effective as a bicycle brake on a jetliner.../Ecological/ threats are produced industrially, externalized economically, individualized juridically, legitimized scientifically and minimized politically (Beck 1995:2).

The EU consists of a set of institutions: the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, and a set of common policies, such as directives, decisions and court judgments. It is also a number of power practices: dominant practices which shape the way that issues are conceptualized, nature is perceived and, hence, the way that pollution problems and resource depletion problems are eventually resolved or left unresolved. In this chapter we want to take a closer look at how the EU can be understood as power practices, which exclude and marginalize certain issues and groups, particularly concentrating on the implications that this has had on the wo/men/nature construction. The power practices have been firmly institutionalized in the Community organizations and institutions. These power practices are the biases that are mobilized when demands for change and new policies are raised.

The focus on power practices, or the generalized biases at the macropolitics level, does not imply that they are unchangeable. As was argued in the preceding chapter: power in agenda setting is both the dominant power practices and the resistances to these practices. The agenda is shaped in the interaction between these. By grounding the analysis in a critical perspective from a feminist standpoint, inspired by alternative visions from ecocentric theory, such points of challenge become clear. In the field of macropolitics, as discussed in this chapter, the resistances work on a discursive level to expose the biases in dominant practices of the EU project. Taking a starting point in the resistance discourse we will, in this chapter, outline those power practices in a rather general and sweeping way.

Power practices thus constitute a bias, that both determines which issues are raised on the agenda and which issues are not, and second, how these issues are defined on that agenda. I will further argue that these power practices have been constructed on a dualistic logic, where specific dependencies are denied and made invisible. The

attempt here is to make visible these dependencies by focusing on how they are constructed.

The chapter is organized as follows: after a brief outline of central thoughts in modernity, we will go on to look at economism, then proceed to investigate scientific, sovereign and bureaucratic practices. The discussion will be based on observations (my own and those obtained through interviews) of EU practices. Macropolitics is a discussion of that which has remained stable, albeit far from unchallenged, and presents the most continuous aspects of the EU project.

The Dark Shadow of Modernity

Most green political thinkers agree that it was during the Enlightenment that those discursive practices emerged which allowed and enforced the exploitation of nature. It became the dominant perception of wo/man's relationship with nature (Gare 1995; Atkinson 1991; Devall & Sessions 1985; Merchant 1980). There is an important critique of modernity in many of the ecocentric theories which particularly concentrates on linear thinking and the progress ethic. Since these are rather prominent features and fundamental components of the power practices, we will begin by discussing these aspects.

Modernization was a set of changes from the traditional to rational and highly complex forms of organizing social life. Some of these changes came as a result of the abandonment of traditional authorities for the benefit of individual freedom and emancipation. The belief in reason, rationality and progress was perceived as a way to improve the human condition (Hampson 1993). If these are the positive aspects emerging from the Enlightenment era, it is mainly the negative side of modernity that has become the subject of analysis in the social sciences (Marshall 1994:8). The emergence of a different conceptualization of time and the strong belief in progress were two underlying ideas that became particularly prevalent during the period of Enlightenment .

One central aspect, particularly important for our discussion, is the new way of estimating time. Prior to modernization, time was measured spatially, that is, "when was almost universally either connected with where or identified by regular natural occurrences" (Giddens 1990:17). The disconnection of time from space coincided with the invention of the mechanical clock which made the separation of space from

place possible (Adam 1994:95-97). Due to this, relationships with absent 'others' were possible. The cyclic patterns of nature—birth-growth-maturity-death-decay and birth again—became less important. The previous view of history as cyclical was gradually replaced by a belief that society changes in a forward, linear direction. Hence, with modernization comes a linear thinking with a focus on growth and progress. Progress was envisaged positively as possibilities for personal gain and freedom from natural and social constraints (Birkeland 1993; Hampson 1993:232). Consequently, the life of human beings and their machines had different temporal characteristics from nature.

The mechanical clock became a symbol for the control of time and destiny and, in its extension, the mastery and control over the complex cycles of nature (Merchant 1992:49). Such an imagery constructs "/n/ature, society and the human body as composed of interchangeable, atomized parts that can be repaired or replaced from outside" (Merchant 1996:85). This view has been left largely unchallenged until the pollution problems associated with economic progress started to become obvious. Through the mechanical order nature can be controlled and managed. In the mechanical order the objectification of the 'other' was a necessary part in order to justify the exploitation of natural resources, colonies, women, the working class and slaves (Mies 1993b:47). Mechanical metaphors were central to the formation of early industrial society (Keller 1985:20). Thus, the construction of nature as 'the other' is not an accident but rather the response to the needs of a particular form of economic and political organization (Shiva 1993c:24). The subsistence labor conducted by women and other 'others' was necessary for capital accumulation since it reduced the demands on higher wages (Marshall 1994:48-61; cf. Wikander 1992).

Central to modernization is an optimistic view about the capacities of human beings to overcome problems. The progress ethic stems from the notion that there will always be a new solution or a new invention. The negative side of the vision of a future of endless possibilities is that it creates an illusion of infinite progress and development. It is moving away from a dependency on the cycles of nature toward a notion that wo/man can completely control his/her destiny obtainable through a set of rational decisions.

It is indeed possible to perceive of different types of growth; however, the emphasis has come to lie almost exclusively on economic and technical progress. The conflict that this thinking creates in regard to nature is particularly related to the strong, almost religious, belief in continuous economic progress in what is a finite world. Not all of

the visions and preferences of wo/men are realizable or negotiable because "/n/ature does not bargain, and the biosphere is not a marketplace" (Caldwell 1990:4).

On the contrary, economic growth is dependent on nature which is in part non-renewable; thus, constant growth is impossible. The discourses of modernity, particularly linear time and progress, are central to economism. The linear rationality of modern economies, whether capitalist or socialist, has disregarded the cyclical nature of resource generating processes (Zimmerman 1990:141). These discourses have backgrounded the dependence on a reproductive sphere and thus facilitated exploitation of nature.

Economism

Economic growth is almost universally promoted by economists and politicians in the Western world.[25] Economism is one of the most important power practices contributing to the degradation of nature and has important impacts on the relationship wo/man/nature. It is through economic activities and, more particularly, industrial production processes, that wastes, pollution and toxins are generated and resources depleted. Economic growth is one of the most important goals of the EU project and can be suspected to strongly influence agenda setting and policy making in ways discussed below.

Economism holds that economic processes and market exchange are the best and most efficient ways to reach goals of maximum utility for a maximal number of individuals. It is also the basic principle of malestream economic theory. One reason why economism has become such a dominant practice is that economism is a strong ideological force both in economic practices and within academic economic theory (Söderbaum 1993:20-22). Economics is a successful discipline, with its practitioners applying scientifically deduced principles to the world without paying much attention to the extremely high degree of abstraction that is involved in such an application (Daly & Cobb 1989:25).

[25]This can also be said for the former communist countries which were also heavily influenced by economist views but which used less successful strategies to reach material wealth and satisfy their citizens.

Does Everything Have a Price?

The subject of economic theory is the individual making a free choice. It is "the detached cogito, not the material world or real persons in the material world" that becomes the center of study (Nelson 1993:26). Accordingly, individuals move about in the world, realizing their interests by making free choices (Brown 1993:11; Reisman 1990:7). The medium through which relationships take place and exchanges are made is the price mechanism. Everything is reduced to monetary transactions. Gains and losses, hopes and aspirations are all assessed through calculation of costs and benefits (Daly & Cobb 1989:85-96). When the analyses focus solely on market relations between autonomous individuals, non-market activities, such as family relationships or exchanges between entities in ecological systems, are being excluded from consideration. These factors have only, at best, a secondary impact on utility calculations. Concerns for the environment, damages to natural resources, the evaluation of family relations, such as love, caring and reproduction, can be brought into this economism only by attaching prices to them (England 1993:45-49). Hence, nature can be embraced by the operation of economism only if it can be made compatible with it, through the price mechanism (Luhmann 1989:58).

Reducing every interaction and human activity to monetary exchange can be argued to be, perhaps an elegant, but far too simplifying a notion to have any bearing for understanding activities in the real world. Daly and Cobb maintain that the attempts at applying economic theories far beyond their limited area of relevance is a disastrous understanding and application of economics that has led to both the environmental and the social degradation that we face today (1989:25-117).

By a sole emphasis on price, there is a denial of the resource base on which pricing and monetary exchange depend. This is cleverly illustrated by the model "three layer cake with icing" originally designed by Hazel Henderson. Here we see that the price mechanism is applicable and relevant for the upper part of the cake, where financial transactions are taking place. The upper part of the cake relies and depends on the bottom part which is a fact backgrounded in economism. Economic activities are thus much more than what malestream economic theory implies (Bakker 1994:7-9).



Figure 1: Three-Layer Cake with Icing.

Looking for Profits

Another relevant and related critique levied at economism concerns its driving force: the profit motive. Although not absent from the theoretical assumptions of economics, it is most evident in actual economic practices. The profit motive relies on an ever increasing scale of production and consumption (King 1990:108). It is a problematic assumption for at least two reasons. For one, it can only fit within a discursive practice which asserts that science and technologies are progressive so that more and newer products can be sold or consumed. This indicats that "markets are addicted to economic growth" (Dryzek 1987:72) and consumers must be persuaded to buy products in ever-increasing quantities at an ever-increasing pace without giving a thought to whether the product is needed or not.[26] Secondly, this type of ever increasing growth in production and consumption is only possible in a world of

[26]Some rather significant changes have taken place regarding consumer choice. Consumers are making ethical choices of products, for example, through the guidance of ecolabels and/or by informing themselves of the product's origin. However, the moves in this direction can still be estimated to be quite limited and the dominant power practices of economism are still important.

infinite resources. It is quite obvious that, in terms of raw material, we live in a finite[27] world. Hence, continued economic growth in economic practices remains a utopic vision. The EU project can be viewed as an attempt at materializing such a vision.

The Community as an Economist Project

or For Whom is the Market Free?

> The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it
> (Treaty of Rome 1957, Part One, Article 2).

Ever since the dawning of Community cooperation, economism has been a central practice as well as an integral part of the Community discourse. Economic cooperation with the prospects for an internal market has been one of the most fundamental goals of the EU project. The initial purpose of the EEC, as well as the Coal and Steel Community and the Euratom cooperation, centered on economic cooperation. The objective was a free trade area which eventually materialized with the four freedoms of the Single European Act (1987). The SEA aimed at dissolving borders between member states to facilitate mobility of capital, goods, services and people. Of late, this has been further enhanced by the drive for a common European currency and a common European bank. The convergence criteria required for membership in the European Monetary Union are strictly confined to the upper part of the "three layer cake with icing". There have been no discussions of making environmental or social protection part of these convergence criteria.

The benefits of free trade are widely recognized but largely left unquestioned. The Single European Act was triumphant in the endeavor toward an internal free trade area. Increased transnationalization of trade, with increasing competition,

[27]Finite if we don't include the possibilities of moving into space and if we consider human time spans, oil is reproduced, but the process takes millions of years.

specialization and concentration on grand scale production builds on a belief that there are comparative advantages with such developments. The results are expected to be efficient resource use and production at the lowest possible cost (cf. Hine 1985:10-28).

Transnational trade, both within the Community and outside it, is based on trade between individuals and individual firms and not between communities. This individual is 'economic man' who acts to maximize his profits, aiming at the best return for the money invested. The notion of community and community measures which can provide the framework and direction for environmental and social protection become cumbersome in the free trade and economic discourse.

From an ecocentric point of view, the assumptions of free trade are questionable. Specialization might give comparative advantages and reduce unit cost, particularly in high technology and resource intensive production, but it also tends to favor grand scale production. This requires the use of energy to transport goods from where the specialized production takes place to where goods are consumed, as much as 13% of the total energy use of the life cycle of a product.[28] If the transported goods consist of produce or other perishables, then additional substances might be needed in order to keep them fresh for a longer period of time. The ecocentric alternative suggests that production should be as locally based as possible in order to decrease waste, the need for chemical preservatives, the need for energy intensive transportation but also in order for people to feel connected to and responsible for the place and the community in which they live (Schumacher 1973).

The *free* in free trade appears to be illusionary. Increased specialization creates interdependencies in which individuals are not free, not autonomous. On the contrary, they are dependent on producers of specialized goods and willing buyers. Specialization also means a high dependence on transportation, a working infrastructure and on the maintenance of law and order, the latter two normally not provided through the market mechanism. If free trade is free in the Community, it is definitively only free for those within the Community borders (Harrop 1989:41-61). It is likely that free trade in the Community mainly means *free* in Shiva's sense as "freedom for transnational corporations to invest, produce and trade in...commodities without restriction, regulation or responsibility" (Shiva 1993b:231), or free as in the freedom for industry and trade to operate without any public control (Skjønsberg et al. 1993:52).

[28]Swedish TV 2, E-ffect, Sunday March 17, 1996.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that transnational corporations favor free trade. The Round Table of European Industrialists fervently pushed for an internal market and influenced what was later proposed as the Single European Act.[29] In general, big industry and business have been more eager for economic integration than small and local industry within the Community. Free trade is most beneficial for large industries and businesses. They are also well organized at the European level and have set up many lobbying organizations that monitor and seek to influence the work of the Community institutions.

Free trade concerns the productive sector. When we look at some of the statistics of the Community population, it becomes clear how reproduction is backgrounded vis-à-vis production and, hence, made invisible. The population is divided into two parts: the *economically active* and the *non-active* (this is the wording used in the reports).[30]

In 1992, the Community level rate of economic activity was 44.0% for women and 67.8 % for men. It means that 44% of the women and 67.8% of the men in the 12 member states have jobs that generate an income. 56% of the Women in the countries of the Community belong to the category economically non-active. Out of this group of 'non-active' women, 46% were not working for family reasons (Eurostat 1995:134). They are most probably busy taking care of their families and the household.[31] It is most doubtful whether these are duties that the women themselves would label as inactivity, thus indicating how women's contribution to the Community is backgrounded in the economic discourse. The Common market is certainly not free for the 56% of the women who are labeled 'economically inactive'.

Furthermore, it is equally evident what stands as a model for the economically active: the full-time working male. All the 'others' are considered *atypical*. Among those women who are economically active, a third have work that is atypical, i.e., either part-time and/or temporary work. Atypical work is also becoming a more common type of work (Eurostat 1995:150) and increasingly becoming *typical* for women in the service sector, particularly in Northern Europe (Women of Europe 1992:40-41).

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[29]The Cecchini report, the lengthy report that served as the research base for the development of the internal market with the SEA, was based on interviews with 11 000 business leaders (Skjønsberg et al. 1993:50)

[30]Compare with the three layer cake on page 45.

[31]We cannot be completely sure of this because most labor force surveys do not single out non-activity as a result of family responsibility (according to Eurostat 1995:134). In itself this is an interesting observation regarding the gendered aspects of labor statistics.

The above discussion suggests that the majority of the women in the Community are more or less economically dependent on their partners, family or government funds. In addition, when women enter the economically active work force, they are most certainly going to earn less than men, regardless of which sector they enter. In the industrial sector women can expect to earn 75-80% of men's incomes and in the service sector only 65-70% of men's wages, while performing the same tasks as men do (Eurostat 1995:156-161). There are no signs of development toward more equal wages for men and women, despite the fact that ever since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the Community has worked from a principle of equal wages for women and men.[32] Furthermore, the existing social regulation in the Community focuses almost exclusively on economically active wage earners and their employers (Skjønsberg et al. 1993:212-222).

Ecology and Economism

From an ecocentric viewpoint, ecological destruction can not be satisfactorily resolved within economism because environmental degradation is the result of ever-increasing industrial production processes, consumption patterns and expanding trade relations. Processes that are held as vital for economism are highly questionable from an ecocentric perspective. Community practices are forced to reach some compromise between the competing and perhaps irreconcilable goals of economism and environmental problem solving. Since the late 1980s there is some evidence that the discourse is moving toward such a compromise. So far it appears to be, on the whole, only at the discursive level and as such has not affected the Community practices to any great extent (COM (95) 624 final 1996:3-6)[33]. The ideology of ecological modernization has been influential in the Community (Weale 1992:78). Ecological modernization views environmental degradation as market failure, that is, largely from an economist perspective. The solution to problems resulting from clashes between economic and ecological systems is to internalize what has previously been viewed as external. It has been argued that this can be done, for example, by making profit calculations related to resource use, the generation of toxic waste and pollution, i.e., by internalizing externalities (see: Pearce & Turner 1990).

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[32]An interesting feminist analysis of equal opportunities in EU workforce can be found in Nott & Beveridge 1996.

[33]COM=Commission Document.

This strategy is popular among economists and policy makers because it does not profoundly challenge economism itself. Instead, it works with the price mechanisms of economism to give natural resources and the externalities of production a price (Dryzek 1987:72). Ecocentrism and economism are perceived as having two distinct and separate rationalities. A move toward ecological modernization implies that these two different and distinct rationalities ought to have equal influence on policy decisions (Mol 1996:309).

Scientific Practices

> /Science provides/... a knowledge which is faceless and placeless; an abstraction that carries a considerable cost: it consigns the realities of culture, power and virtue to oblivion. It offers data, but no context; it shows diagrams, but no actors; it gives calculations, but no notion of morality; it seeks stability, but disregards beauty (Sachs 1993:19).

Throughout the research it has been shown that science plays a significant role, in particular, on the perception of environmental problems in the Community. By implication, it is central to Community agenda setting. Scientific practices occupy a privileged position in modern Western societies because scientific facts are perceived as 'true'. They are legitimate and rarely questioned.[34] Science has been particularly important in the emergence of environmental policy because it has generated 'new' knowledge about natural processes and ecological systems. Science's privileged role in problem definition has provided a significant political resource for environmentalism and environmental policy making in the Community and in the member states. It has been particularly significant in the definition of problems for agendas, and in the argumentation for action on the environment. This means that environmentalists have played an ambiguous part in a power practice that has ordered, enabled and limited knowledges.

Privileged Claims on Truth

[34]Science is simultaneously suffering from a delegitimation process due to the controversies within scientific communities. This clashes with the persistent myth among the general public that science produces truth.

Scientific evidence has been and is widely used by policy makers of all political shades, environmentalists and non-environmentalists alike. Scientific information about a problem is difficult to contradict because it is generally perceived as objective and politically neutral in the public eye, and is used as such by policy makers (Collingridge & Reeve 1986:7-34). Such hegemonic claims on truth do not necessarily have any relevance within scientific communities, where contradictory and conflicting research hypotheses and results coexist. The scientist who reaches glory in the academic world is often not the same scientist who gets to define problems in the public debate (Öberg & Bäckstrand 1996). The patterns of producing such hegemonic truths seem highly complex and are, in the case of environmental problems, worked out in the nexus between policy makers, scientific experts and the media.

The privileged position of scientific truth is upheld by the participants in the Community environmental issue area, as demonstrated in the interviews. It can be illustrated with the words of an NGO activist who said that it is indeed important that there is a moral or ethical view in environmental policy, but it is politically irrelevant because what is essential is very strong science that can back up arguments.[35] All the interviews that discussed scientific information confirmed this view of science as the producer of 'objective' knowledge.

The interest in, and reliance on, science in general and environmental science in particular, was less important in the early phases of EU environmental policy, simply because there was much less data and expertise available. Problem definition was instead more speculative and more clearly political. Since the mid 1970s scientific knowledge has been, and continues to be, an extremely important resource for environmental policy makers in providing evidence that environmental conditions have deteriorated. Natural science has become a very important resource for policy makers interested in pushing for stricter environmental legislation and is used as motivations to assure or encourage Community action (Liberatore 1994:190; cf. Seager 1993:195). The importance of scientific knowledge to Community environmental policy is also shown by the fact that the first Action Programme listed this as one of its eleven principles (OJ C112, 20.12.1973:1)[36]. These principles have remained equally valid in subsequent Action Programmes.

[35]NGO representative, November 1992.

[36]OJ=Official Journal, a Community publication that lists proposals, directives, regulations, decisions, etc.

The decision to set up the European Environment Agency (EEA) (Council Regulation 1210/90) is another example of this view of science. The Agency is to provide "objective, reliable and comparable information at the European level" (EEC/1210/90 Article1.2). In the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the insufficiency of the EC institutions, in regard to information gathering and data provision, became evident. Former president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, expressed a concern to generate scientific data on the European level instead of relying on information from the member states or other extra-community sources. Furthermore, DG XI staff was at this time very frustrated because the industrial sector was explicitly questioning the proposals coming out of the environmental directorate. The accusations from industry were that proposals were not grounded in good science (Brown 1994:14).

Scientific practice has also been efficacious because the Commission staff has an 'intellectual honesty' which means that even though they are convinced of their political standing on a certain issue, they will listen to good and reasonable arguments that are based in science, and as a result, also reconsider their position.[37] The importance of science as an objective and value-free input into the Community policy process has thus been essential. The strong base in science has given environmentalists credibility and respect in the confrontation with policy makers, media and others (Yearly 1994:162-163; Adams 1990:23).

Environmentalism and Science

Indicators of the 'state of nature' have been fundamental in determining which effects social practices have on ecological processes—a type of research and data that has mainly come from the scientific community. Science has hence been momentous to the introduction of environmental issues on different agendas (Caldwell 1990:49).

The environmental scientist's position is an ambivalent one. Natural scientists have played a vital role in producing knowledge which has alerted the public to pollution and environmental degradation while, at the same time, scientific knowledge can be understood as a way of controlling nature and ensuring that it serves human purposes. Science continuously provides new scientific discoveries that are fed into the technical

[37]NGO representative, November 1992.

industrial process. It is constantly generating new inventions and new products that are needed for economist practices to generate profits. Simultaneously natural science has been of particular importance to the environmental resistances because many of the concerns expressed by environmentalists have come to our attention through science (ozone depletion, effects of toxins, pollution levels etc.) (Weale 1992:7).

Ecological science has been developed within the scientific paradigms of our times. Protests against environmentally destructive scientific practices have had to speak the language of science. The strategic choices made by environmental NGOs active in Brussels, have been to make arguments as scientifically based as possible. Hence, "/i/n order to protest one must argue even more scientifically than the scientist one is arguing against" (Beck 1995:80).

It seems to be the method and values of modern science itself which have paved the way for the critical views of which environmental science today is an example. It is the scientific method of inquiry, i.e. the seemingly insatiable search for 'truth' and 'proof', the belief in objectivity and distance and the strict adherence to methods of falsification, that has led science onto this path of self-reflection and criticism (Beck 1995:83-85,103-106). With the strict adherence to scientific rationality in the natural sciences, humans have been shown to be part of a web of ecological dependencies on which they ultimately depend for their survival.

Environmentalists have been able to profit from science's privileged position and have succeeded in claiming a "new conceptual space" based on ecological science, which has gradually been legitimized within science and in society (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:55). Through the reductionist scientific method of malestream science, the understanding of ecological complexity has emerged with, for example, biological system theories (Birch 1988), the gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 1979; 1988), but also inspired by quantum physics (Capra 1975; 1982) and chaos theory (Prigogine 1984). While these theories have been developed within the scientific community, they have by no means been generally accepted there. Their relative success has been outside the scientific community.

An interesting observation made by Ulrich Beck is that science has moved its laboratories out into the world. Here the seemingly endless stream of technical innovations and industrial production has demonstrated their own flaws in real life experiments (Beck 1995:101-110). It has had a particular impact on the agenda by engendering reactive problem definitions (these are extensively discussed in chapter

five). Cases in point are the toxic drums discovered in Seveso, Italy, and the Sandoz toxic leak into the Rhine river. Science has also shown how pollutants and toxins move in ecosystems in complex patterns and over great distances. The complexity has been verified over and over again in the world laboratory; perhaps most shockingly when the impossible happened—the radioactive clouds of the Chernobyl nuclear plant spread clear across the globe.

It has become evident in the course of this research, both in the documentation and through interviews, that science has a strong claim on problem definition of the Community. Scientific research and knowledge in general are viewed as essential, objective and unquestionable. However, as feminists and others have shown, science is integral to other societal practices, colored by them and affected by the context in which they are generated.

Power and Knowledge

If "/s/cience is politics by other means," as Sandra Harding (1991:10) argues, and if science is crucial to the provision of facts and data pointing to ecologically destructive processes, then it should invite us to critically assess science in relationship to the definition of problems. Most of the organization of scientific research follows a linear, causal model which is believed to lead to the understanding of environmental impacts and the generation of adequate policy responses when policy makers take part of information. Such a model becomes difficult because we are dealing with dynamic and continuously changing situations with outcomes and developments that are complex, cumulative, synergistic and often invisible and latent (Adam 1994). In addition, the effects of environmentally unsound activities can sometimes be observed in areas well beyond the original source.

This has been recognized by the Commission and expressed in the Task Force Report (1990:183) which states:

> With technological advances have come intensification of agriculture and a growth of specialization in industrial activities; this in turn gave rise to environmental problems which were *narrowly defined, in scientifically complex terms*. Solutions devised within this framework ran the risk of *ignoring the wider context*, and were not necessarily appropriate for overall environmental management taking account of inter-relationships at local level (my emphasis).

While science can help us define problems, it is not necessarily the best or most efficient way of assessing risks or resolving problems. The requirement of more and better science can, in relationship to problem solving, lead to "paralysis by analysis" (Boehmer-Christiansen 1992:138), i.e., it can instead be a way of delaying action. An example of this is an important EC article which states that "the Community *must take advantage of available scientific and technical data in preparing its proposals*" (Title VII, Article 130r, §2, of the SEA 1987). While the article is not controversial per se, the background for it, and its implications, certainly are. The UK representatives insisted on having this paragraph inserted in the SEA because with it, in the absence of scientific proof, no Community action could be taken. At the time, Britain was in the midst of the acid rain negotiations and UK representatives argued that there was insufficient proof that British emissions were contributing to acid depositions in other parts of Europe (Boehmer-Christiansen & Skea 1991; Krämer 1990:67). Hence, the power of the scientific discourse in Community policy making was used strategically as a political move to avoid environmental action. It shows some crucial limitations in relying on science as the sole base for environmental action and policies. It is restricting in that it can often be falsified, either by other contradictory scientific indicators or parameters (Sachs 1993:13) or, in cases of uncertainty, with the common call for more science.

Environmental science is generally believed to be necessary in order to actually show that there are problems of pollution and resource depletion. This is obviously not the whole story. It is also possible for people to recognize and understand that there are such problems in other ways, for example, through everyday experiences and by using their senses. It is quite possible to see and smell dirty air, a foul water source, a littered country side, hear that birds are singing less frequently and notice that the number of different wild animals or wild flowers are decreasing. The question then becomes: What is it that says that, for example, the knowledge gained through experimental work conducted in the laboratory has more validity and credibility than the knowledge that a simple farmer gains while tilling her/his land, or the housewife doing her everyday duties of shopping, cooking, cleaning and caring for the children?

That it is not necessary to conduct elaborate laboratory work to notice these changes can be exemplified by "the Love Canal problem". It was a non-expert and a non-scientist—a housewife—who revealed and exposed the fact that the Canal was full of chemical waste (Gibbs 1982; Hynes 1985). Similarly, women in India who were making a subsistence living off the land and the forests observed, experienced directly and exposed how extensive commercial logging affected the fragile forest ecology.

Subsequently it gave rise to the Chipko movement (Shiva 1989:55-95) that has evolved into the tree hugging strategy, frequently used in different locations also in the Western world. However, I have not been able to find any evidence of any amateur or housewife activity that has affected Community environmental policy. The understanding of environmental problems seems far removed from the realm of lived experience of the amateur (Seager 1993:195; Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995:540-548).

Consequently, the scientific discourse is the outcome of a set of power practices that determine which statement is credible and which is not. The use of scientific knowledge is a highly politicized field. "/T/he political question is the legitimation of scientific truth itself, that is to say: what is allowed to be named, counted, accepted, canonized and financed as scientifically valid" (Braidotti et al. 1994:31f).

Feminists have argued that science has a dubious history due to its normative origin in a masculinist world view—a world view which has had as its quest the control and domination of nature (Plumwood 1993:104-140; Bordo 1986; Easlea 1983:10-39, Merchant 1980). The male biases, which have affected scientific inquiry, generally have been relying and reconfirming an assumption of women's inferiority to men. Feminists who have been particularly interested in looking at the biological sciences and how male natural scientists have portrayed women in their theories (Haraway 1991: Schiebinger 1989; Tuana 1989; Bleier 1984) have demonstrated that natural science is gendered. Through extensive research and numerous examples they have shown how gender stereotypes have been and are propagated in the language of science (cf. Bäckstrand 1996). Women and nature have been defined against this scientific objectivity and rationality and have also been excluded from its practices. "/M/asculine bias is evident in both the definition of what counts as a scientific problem and in the concepts, theories, methods, and interpretations of research" (Harding 1986:82).

Moreover, the practices that science has supported have resulted in a disproportional amount of resources for the development, not only of a seemingly endless flow of new consumption goods, but also of technologies of destruction. Environmental science shares the same history and evolution as the science that has supported the construction of the tool for the ultimate destruction—the atomic bomb (Easlea 1983). Neither is it possible to ignore Western science's supportive role of both imperialism and colonialism which has had significant effects on people's lives and living conditions and, as such, has also been widely criticized (Shiva 1989; Sardar 1988;

Goonatilake 1984). The privileged place of natural science has also made it the domain of certain elites, mainly western males.

It appears as if in certain locations, a more grassroots based or "vernacular" science has started to complement the traditional and hegemonic definition privilege associated with the natural sciences (O'Riordan 1992:181). For this knowledge, everyday life can be a potent source of inspiration because it is in our personal lives and not within scientific disciplinary traditions that "we are able to relate, combine, bridge gaps and extend our concerns beyond personal and national boundaries" (Adam 1994:108-109). This knowledge seems to increasingly supplement the scientific approach to environmental problems which is more noticeable on the local and national levels where environmental policies are being implemented. Here, local knowledges based on contextualized experiences are no longer ignored and perceived as irrelevant. It is in concurrence with the post-Rio developments, which has given a clear mandate in such a direction. The Agenda 21 strategy builds on the notion that local communities are vital points where knowledge should be dispersed but where it is also generated (World Commission 1987).

Scientific knowledge has been important both for the understanding of some environmental risks and problems and for the environmental movements to become a legitimate part of politics. This is due to the privileged place and claims on truth that science has had in the Western world. Science is also affected by the power practices of our society. We can see examples of this by the reliance on scientific knowledge over other types of knowledge and in the surviving myth of science as truth, when science in practice is used by policy makers, the public or the media, to point to problem spots or to avoid seeing problem spots. Accordingly, then, in the Community science has been very important, particularly, in the definition of what counts as an environmental problem and is crucial to agenda setting.

Sovereignty Practices

The European Community and the evolution of its institutions and regulations can be viewed as a way to counter and control the increasing interdependence of global politics while, at the same time, basing this endeavor on the traditional practices of sovereignty. Hence, the EU project sets up supranational regulatory systems and institutions in order to cope with increasing globalization while, simultaneously, reinforcing sovereignty and state-centeredness. The EU project has as its aim to

integrate parts of Europe and challenges sovereignty as it dismantles the restrictions on the movement of people, goods, services and capital within the Community territory. At the same time it creates new borders and boundaries toward non-Europeans (Yeatman 1994:118). These boundaries are not static but have been subject to expansion with a number of enlargements over time.[38] The most recent developments seem to point in the direction of further enlargement involving central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states (SOU 1996:19:13-18; Reflection Group 1995: VI-VII). There is, built into the EU project, a contradiction between the practice of sovereignty and the increasing globalization of economic, ecological and security issues. Both aspects have been institutionalized in the policy-making bodies of the Community.

The most common way to conceptualize international relations is by considering states as the highest order of human collectives (Buzan 1991:67). Moreover, states are sovereign because they have been confirmed as organizational entities that have sole authority over a defined territory and a population. In the realist tradition it means that states are the supreme authorities of global relations.

The claim in this section is that this discourse on sovereign states has important implication for the Community in general and for the possibility for environmental policy in particular. At the same time as the Community takes on the challenge of an increasing globalization by issuing common legislation in an effort to control it, the practice of sovereignty is mirrored in the institutional framework. Arguments based on sovereignty—the protection of national interests and the subsidiarity argument—have more specifically limited the possibilities to raise new issues, such as environmental proposals, and to push them through the legislative process of the Community.

The Sovereignty Discourse and the Reality of Globalization

The sovereignty discourse is an affirmation of a specific account of political identity that is perceived as natural and inevitable—a political identity that has been based on the dualistic construction of inside/outside. Sovereignty is boundary maintaining but

[38] 1973: Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland, 1981: Greece, 1986: Spain and Portugal, 1995: Sweden, Finland and Austria. At this time we also have a Germany which includes both former DDR and BRD.

it is not a permanent principle of political order. That "nation-states in anarchy" convey a notion of permanence is an effect of everyday practices that affirm such continuities in international relations (Walker 1993:161-163). It has been argued by a number of critics that this is a specific modernist assumption of international politics (Walker 1995; Walker & Mendlovitz 1990; Ashley 1986).

Albeit sharing these points of criticism, feminists have brought to the forefront and made evident the gendered dimension of the construction of sovereign states, both as sovereign and as states in an anarchical international system. Tickner argues that Morgenthau's highly influential realism is based on a construction of a world without women, and hence "a socially constructed type of masculinity has been projected on the international behavior of states" (Tickner 1992:37).

In a world of 'sovereign states in anarchy' there is no room for interconnections, and the need for protection becomes acute. The sovereign state depends on men's sacrifices in battle and women's sacrifice at the home front (Enloe 1993:253; Sylvester 1992:160; Elshtain 1992:149). The protector is the male and the protected is the female. Furthermore, it instills fear and insecurity in people, who then have to rely on protection in a more or less militarized state, which in Europe, needless to say, has been and still is almost solely governed by male elites.

The EEC was undoubtedly founded out of the fear of disorder and conflict which had become real during the two world wars, leaving Europe devastated. Six states[39] decided to cooperate to secure peace in the region and to avoid further conflictual relations in the aftermath of war. The shaping of the post-war European order relies on a notion of sovereign states that are interdependent and can cooperate in a highly disorderly world system.

The insistence on the sovereignty of states means that states become black-boxed. Inside the black box is the state's unique organizational and socio-spatial characteristic. It maintains infrastructural influence which gives it a centralized power and the right to use violence to maintain that power (Connell 1994:148; Marshall 1994:122-136; Peterson 1992b:38-39; Jänicke 1990; Walby 1990:150-172). Black-boxing implies the 'othering' or the exclusion of all that is non-state, since the state apparatus assumes supreme power and orders, for example, the public-private distinction (Pateman 1988;1989).

[39]France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Due to its central node in the networks of power relations, the state has monopoly to decide what is legitimate and what is illegitimate behavior. It becomes the main organizer of gendered, environmentally destructive relations and upholds hierarchical power relations (Bookchin 1990:66-73). The Western state has upheld and reinforced the dualistic construction of public-private through state-sanctioned mechanisms, such as the mechanisms of bureaucracies and legal practices (Charlton 1989:20-29). The critique of the state's hierarchical centralizing power is fundamental among many radical environmentalists due to the failure of the state to monitor and control the practices that have led to the degradation and abuse of nature. As a result, radical environmentalists tend to sympathize with grass roots, local democracy or anarchist ideas on how society optimally ought to be organized (Pepper 1993; Goodin 1992; Naess 1989; Bookchin 1974).

It is important to note that the state is in no way essentially male or economist, but rather that it has become such through historic processes (Peterson 1992b:33-45; Runyan 1992:123-140). The Western equation between masculinity and authority has been institutionalized in the state and its bureaucracies. As a result, states are not only effectively controlled by men but they also operate with a bias towards men's interests (Connell 1994:163; Charlton 1989:32).

The idea of the sovereign state is extremely powerful, yet, it is elusive. It is elusive because the increasing interdependence,[40] integration and transnationalization of the Western world have made state borders permeable and continuously challenge the autonomy of the state (Rosenau 1990; Giddens 1990; Keohane & Nye 1977; Soroos 1986). The increasing transnationalization of capital and production has undermined the power of the institutions of the state to control production and capital flows within the state territory (Hurrell 1995:143; Murphy & Tooze 1991; Cerny 1990; Strange 1986). The character of pollution problems has contributed to the realization that states are permeable and evasive as organizers of environmental politics (Carley & Christie 1993; Sachs 1993; Ekins 1992; Thomas 1992; Porter & Brown 1991; Caldwell, 1990; World Commission 1987). Many pollution problems are regional or global and the effects of industrial production show up far from the original source. For example, the severity of SOx emissions, resulting in the acidification of forests, is determined by wind patterns and buffering capacities of the soil and, thus, state borders have little relevance. Instead, the insistence on sovereign

[40]A number of UN sanctioned Commissions (Brandt, Palme and Brundtland Commissions) start from these premises.

states as the main organizing principle leads to unwillingness on the part of the polluting state to deal with a problem that does not severely affect its own territory. Nor does the state's border-policing encourage the sharing of responsibility for what occurs on the other side of the border, or even less, for what happens in distant lands.

The increasing transnationalization of capital, coupled with the strong focus on the sovereignty-bound states' capacity to reduce environmental degradation within their borders have only grim prospects for resolving problems related to environmental degradation (Conca 1994:711). Such borders have little importance because *displacement* typically takes place *across borders,* when pollution is transported to the other side of the dividing line, *across time,* with the example of storing nuclear waste or the accumulation of toxins, and displacement *across media*, when one type of pollution is converted to another through, for example, the burning of garbage resulting in air pollution (Dryzeck 1987:10-11).

It is not only regarding economic and ecological relations that the tension within a sovereignty-bound political organization is notable. The traditional security discourse, framed within the sovereignty discourse, no longer mirrors the fears and concerns of citizens in the contemporary world (Hakala 1996; Stancich & McCulloch 1996; Stern-Petterson 1996; Tickner 1995; Bröms 1995:19-67; Buzan 1991:35-56, 112-145) nor does it correspond to a realistic understanding of security threats and the causes of conflicts (Liborakina 1996; Deudney 1992).

Contradictions Institutionalized in the Community

The conflict between the powerful sovereignty discourse and the obvious globalization of economic practices and ecological problems has been ongoing since the emergence of the EEC. In the EEC period, the way that the member states viewed regional cooperation was in terms of maintaining sovereignty within a limited frame of institutionalized intergovernmentalism. It can be exemplified by the First Environmental Action Programme of 1972 which was unquestionably about *intergovernmental* cooperation. The member states agreed that conventions dealing with common European pollution problems would be necessary but there was not one member state that was willing to support joint community action on the

environment.[41] Particularly the French argued that environmental concerns were really about land-use and planning, issues that were, and still are, strongly associated with the territorial sovereignty of the member states. The basic rights of nation states can not easily be given over to the jurisdiction of the EU.[42]

The idea of sovereign states is reflected in the fact that sole legislative power[43] lies with the Council of Ministers, composed of representatives from the member states articulating different 'national' interests. Perhaps equally important is the central role played by the purely intergovernmental fora—the European summits. It is during the summits that the future and the direction of Community activities are shaped.

The importance of sovereignty has had some detrimental effects on the possibility for the member states to cooperate and, thus, for the Community to act. Already early in the development of Community policy there were provisions for the Council of Ministers to make decisions based on qualified majority. Majority decision making was 'muddled' by the Luxembourg compromise of 1966, because it allowed member states to exercise a veto when national interests were considered violated. While the Luxembourg compromise guaranteed the sovereign rights of member states, it also stifled policy making and led to stagnation of the EU project or 'Eurosclerosis'. It affected policy making during most of the 1970s and up until the mid-1980s (Williams 1991:156-157). As a reaction, majority voting has increasingly become a more common form of decision making in the Council. It has also been introduced for an increasing number of issues. Thus, the tendency is to move away from strict sovereignty.

The Commission is also affected by sovereignty practices, most clearly because the College of Commissioners has, so far, been staffed according to national quotas.[44] The Commissioner, with attached Cabinet, is the political and decision-making part of the Commission. The remainder of this institution is composed of European civil

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[41]The First Action Programme was an agreement by representatives of member states meeting in Council and not a Community agreement. There was even a footnote which said that it was a gentlemen's agreement, implying that it was not even public law or a legal instrument.

[42]Commission official, November 1993.

[43]Over the years the policy process has changed to give more influence to the European Parliament. However, only recently in the Maastricht Treaty, has the Parliament gained some formal legislative power. It is still very limited compared to that of national parliaments.

[44]This is one of the major issues to be debated during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/97 and the current rule: that each small country appoints one Commissioner and the larger ones, two, is thought to be way to cumbersome with further enlargement.

servants. Also among the civil servants we see the effects of sovereignty, because there is a strong ambition to make sure that no one nationality dominates but that all nationalities are proportionally represented.

Although national origin is of little concern in the working climate for the Commission's Directorates General staff,[45] it regulates its personnel politics. One example of this was related by a Belgian woman with a long career in the Commission. She was not promoted because there were too many Belgians in this particular directorate already. In other words, the national quota was already filled.[46] Hence, national concerns seem to override other concerns, such as the need for representation of women or minorities.

Sovereignty Practices and Environmental Politics

One of the more recent and salient implications that the sovereignty practices have had for Community environmental policy has to do more with how subsidiarity has been interpreted and how the division of tasks between member states and the Community level have been applied in practice. Subsidiarity is a Community principle which means that action should be taken *only* at the appropriate level. What is to be considered an appropriate level is subject to varying interpretations and is highly contested. The principle of subsidiarity was first introduced for the environment with the SEA, Article 130r-t. In the Maastricht Treaty it was extended to apply to all Community policy areas. Even though environmental issues were sanctioned as EC matters with the SEA, arguments based on the subsidiarity principle can and have been used to argue that matters related to pollution, resource use and environmental protection are matters better handled by the member states on their own. The idea proposed in the most recent action programme on the environment was to take subsidiarity seriously. By doing this it could engage and encourage a dialogue between different sectors and levels of society in the Community in order that legislative or other action would be taken at the appropriate level (COM (92) 23 final: 73-74).

In a recent report, the European Environmental Bureau points out that the subsidiarity principle is used by governments and big economic interests to stifle Community

[45]All of the Commission staff that I have asked confirmed this.
[46]Commission official, January 1996.

environmental legislation (EEB 1995). It is not only in the generation of new proposals that this occurs, but also parts of the existing legislation have been approached for reconsideration and renationalization. With a base in the subsidiarity argument, existing legislation has been weakened as exemplified by the modification of the drinking water directive in 1994 (Hey & Brendle 1994:16).

Many of the policies that come out of an attempt to preserve or ameliorate the environment have to do with concerns that the member states, to varying degrees, see as their own jurisdiction or their national interests. Most nature conservation attempts, such as the conservation of biotopes, means the setting aside and, at times, the active protection of physical resources and geographical territories—something which has traditionally been the core concerns for sovereign states. Likewise, attempts at putting restrictions on industrial construction, road building etc. have to do with societal planning and, again, with traditional concerns about the national territory. Similarly, the choice and use of the energy supply is also a concern. The most recent treaty revision extended the use of majority voting in the Council, in effect a severe undermining of the autonomy of the sovereign state. Yet, unanimity remains applicable as a decision rule for certain limited areas, such as those mentioned above (Article 130s(2); Verhoeve et al. 1992:28-29).

It became clear in the course of this research that the practices of sovereignty played an overshadowing role in many different aspects of environmental policy making. Most apparent are the limits put at the decision level. The practices affect agenda setting because most policy makers, lobbyists and experts are well aware of these sovereign practices which impose restrictions on what they will propose and which ideas they will express. Policy makers anticipate these limitations and will not invest time, energy and resources, on futile attempts for legislative proposals. On the other hand, the dominant practices of sovereignty constantly clash with the globalization that is simultaneously taking place around issues that have effects on ecological systems. The Community is also trying to cope with and to build institutions and policies to manage and control this globalization.

Bureaucratic Practices

The Commission is the main administrative body of the Community. It is the formal policy initiator and is responsible for policy proposals. The Commission is also in charge of administration and implementation of the 'acquis communitare', i.e., the Community legislation to date. The Commission is an important agenda setter

because of its treaty-prescribed role as the sole policy initiator among the Community institutions.

The original organization has been directed by a rational-legal decision logic, closely resembling Weber's (1947:328) bureaucratic model. The resulting organization is a hierarchical one with functional sectors and chains of authority. The basic logic of the decision structure has remained, although the organization has grown considerably and been divided into sectors and subunits. This feature of the administrative body of the Community resembles the administrative institutions commonly found in the member states. The Commission is perceived as[47] very similar to a domestic administration and the Directorates General closely resemble national ministries both in their structures and their operating procedures.

The basic assumption underlying this type of construction is that in the government and parliament decisions are made, conflicts are resolved, and compromises reached. The bureaucracy then implements the decisions taken, through problem solving by looking for the best means to achieve a particular goal. In a Weberian model of bureaucracy, issues are organized and defined as objects of technical control and in this way administration and implementation is depoliticized (Young 1990:76).

It needs to be pointed out that this organizational model does not accurately reflect how the Commission works in every-day decision making. The bureaucratic practices are mirrored in the organizational set up, which creates limitations and restrictions on decision making and agenda setting. It sets up formal positions and formal hierarchies that often are circumvented. That bureaucratic practices often are sidestepped, and decisions made in a different way than the legal-rational hierarchical decision logic, has been shown through ample research in the field of public administration and organizational theory (Lundquist 1994; Hassard & Parker 1993; Lynn & Wildavsky 1990; March & Olsen 1989; Brunsson 1985, 1989; Morgan 1986).[48] Nevertheless, bureaucratic practices remain a very powerful ordering principle for administrations, because it both includes and excludes persons and structures issues in particular ways.

[47]In all of the interviews in which this question was raised it was answered in the affirmative.

[48]An important contribution to organization theory is an anthology by Mills & Tancred (1992) which aims at engendering organizational analysis and thus, making gender visible in the study of organizations.

In this section we will particularly focus on the Commission's initiator role in terms of bureaucratic practices exemplified by operational procedures. The procedures singled out are assumed to have important implications for the possibility of raising environmental proposals and shaping the proposals in particular ways. More specifically, we will be concerned with three major aspects: sectorization, hierarchization and the legalistic problem-solving approach—the dominant logic of bureaucratic practices which have also left a strong imprint on many public administrations in Western Europe.

Such bureaucratic practices are gendered, in so far as they reflect the hierarchical relations associated with the male sex. This is not surprising, since bureaucracies have historically "...been dominated by males, except in those jobs where the function is to support, serve, flatter, please and entertain" (Morgan 1986:211) According to Newman (1995:162), the Weberian type of bureaucracy rests on a masculine foundation (see also King 1995:88). It is important to point to the gendered character of bureaucratic practices, because keeping it invisible supports the status quo and, hence, reinforces gender biases. In the following we will assess in which way these practices influence the construction and de-construction of environmental issues in the Commission. In which way is agenda setting, or the introduction of such issues, restricted by these practices?

Sectorization versus Integration

Ecological systems are complex and interdependent. Bureaucratic systems are equipped with procedures for coordination when problems are complex. Highly complex problems are broken down to subsets of problems, and each subset becomes the responsibility of a particular section of the bureaucratic organization. For the most part, complex environmental issues have been dealt with in this manner, both in international organizations and in domestic settings (Bäckstrand et al. 1996). Ecocentrics suggest that a holistic approach is necessary in order to oversee and foresee the consequences of decisions on the environment. Whether the disaggregation of problems into subsets organized into sectors is compatible with a holistic approach is doubtful. The possibility to root a situation in a larger context is "...hampered by the fragmentation of tasks and the isolation of roles" (Ferguson 1984:117).

The Commission is indeed sectorized. It is subdivided into a number of Directorates General, for example DG VI for agriculture, DG XVI for regional policy and DG XI for the environment. These Directorates are further fragmented into different subdirectorates. The Directorate General for the Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection, presently has four sectors. These subdirectorates are further subdivided into a number of units, each with its own head.

An apparent feature of the Commission is the general growth of the organization. The possibility of coordination between sectorized units is much easier when the total number of staff is small; as it grows it becomes more difficult. However, compared to some of the member states' bureaucracies, the Commission is tiny, although it has grown considerably since 1957. An example is the embryo of today's DG XI—the Service—which started out with a handful of people and now has grown to a bureaucracy of over 350 staff members.

When complex problems are divided into small subproblems, i.e., sectored, the holistic overview risks being lost.[49] For environmental issues this could be detrimental because, as we have argued in the preceding section, displacement between media (such as air, water and waste) takes place. It suggests that policy initiation and implementation in, for example, the solid waste sector must be coordinated with other sectors to achieve the desired result and to avoid moving the problem from one medium to another. Over time it has been increasingly apparent that DG XI (for the environment) is really dealing with issues that have their origin in, or have more to do with activities generated, in other Directorates General. It is in the DGs for transport, industry, agriculture and energy that issues are raised and policies proposed that have direct and immediate effects on the environment. Subsequently, DG XI has to do something about these effects. Coordination of sectors and different DGs, thus, seems crucial. We have said that bureaucratic administrative systems are thought to be flexible to new emerging and complex problems, by reducing them through sectorization. Sectored initiatives must then be recombined and coordinated.

Hierarchization

[49]This has been known in DG XI and the Commission since at least the third Action Programme for the environment (O.J. 1983, C46/1) when integration of environmental concerns into other issue areas was called for.

Different coordination possibilities are provided within administrative systems. One such feature is the hierarchization of issues. Hierarchization is a bureaucratic practice which implies that coordination is mediated by recombining sectored solutions through chains of authority emanating from the top. Another coordination possibility is horizontally, between actors within particular sectors. Whereas both of these coordination possibilities are being used in DG XI, hierarchization is the traditional and the far most dominant form of coordination. Horizontal coordination across sectors and DGs is more recent and less common.

As long as bureaucracies are hierarchically organized in this manner, communication between sectors and from the bottom up within a sector, is less likely to occur. Hierarchization relies on the notion that it is the staff at the very top of the hierarchy that has the insight as to how problems are properly framed and subdivided, and it is at the top of the organization that the results of the different subdivisions can be coordinated into one strategy or problem-solving mechanism and communicated to the government or other societal actors. Within hierarchization lies a presumption that competence—such as environmental competence—rests with the staff in superior positions, who are assumed to be more knowledgeable than bureaucrats in subordinate positions (Ferguson 1984:22). There are at least two complications with this notion. My interviews pointed out that it is not necessarily accurate that a higher administrative position equals higher environmental competence. Normally the moves in a career are based on seniority rather than on the presence and frequency of innovative ideas.

The other, and more severe, complication is that the process is uni-directional from top down. While long term employment within a particular bureaucratic organization builds up competence, stability and predictability, it also tends to cement certain perspectives and problem-solving methods. Research in the field of public administration has pointed to the tendency for organizations to develop standard operating procedures, i.e., routinization and stock responses to problems (March & Olsen 1989:21-38). It could severely limit the possibility for ecocentric or other alternative views to be adopted. That such cementation has occurred in the EU bureaucratic setting is illustrated by one staff member who suggested that the approach and the ideas behind the Fifth Environmental Action Programme were too controversial and challenging to be accepted within the existing problem solving structure of DG XI. Instead, staff put under the direct jurisdiction of the Director General was employed to accomplish the task. This suggests that there were a set of

divergent attitudes embedded in the bureaucratic structure which would conflict with the ideas that the Fifth Action Programme proposed (Kronsell 1996).

Legalistic Problem Solving

The legalist character of Community legislation is evident. The Community relies solely on the Treaties for the definition of jurisdiction and authority, i.e., the Treaties define what type of issues may be negotiated within the EU sphere. This fact has been highly relevant when it regards the attempts at regulating polluting behavior by states or firms within the EU institutional context. The original Treaty did not provide for action regarding problems that were increasingly becoming apparent as byproducts of industrial production and free trade activities. From a legal perspective it can be argued that environmental degradation is the result of "inappropriate definition and enforcement of rights and rules" (Dryzek 1987:132).

There were no direct provisions for environmental issues until the Single European Act. Hence, any argument for environmental policy had to be proposed as some other type of problem. Since the Community is a highly legalistic system, only activities that can be argued relevant for particular treaty articles are tolerated. In the early period this meant that any attempt at environmental legislation had to be argued in terms of either article 235 or 100, or both simultaneously (Krämer 1990:31-33). For agenda setting it implied that problem formulation was limited. Article 235 concerns the possibility of introducing new issue areas for Community cooperation when perceived necessary. Article 100 is about product standardization that serves to avoid obstacles to trade and encourage competition within the Community. Individual member states' environmental legislation can distort competition, and the argument is that if all member states adopt the same or a common piece of environmental legislation, then competition is fair.

An effect of basing proposals on article 100 is, first, that it is subject to co-decision. The European Parliament would be most likely in favor of this because it has a chance to influence such proposals. Second, it is subject to majority voting in the Council. Third, if adopted it leads to a standardizing directive which means that the pollution level or limit has to be the same in all member states. On the other hand, basing environmental proposals on article 130 of the SEA means that in certain areas it requires unanimity in the Council. However, it becomes a minimum directive, and countries interested in pursuing stricter environmental legislation at home are free to

do so provided it does not distort competition. Consequently, the choice of legal base of a particular environmental initiative plays a crucial role for environmental policy making because it influences the decision process, the negotiations and the implementation.

Legalism can also be helpful for environmentalists, because once a piece of Community legislation is approved, it must be turned into national legislation. Different social actors have the opportunity to raise the issues defined in legislation at different administrative levels of the member states. They can bring cases before the court when Community legislation is not satisfactorily implemented at the member state level. If the member state is reluctant to follow the directive on its own initiative, the Commission and ultimately the Court can force member states to do so. A piece of legislation can more easily be claimed against opposing interests, since the relative values of the legal principles are greater than the specific interests of a particular group. In this way legalism can serve as a shield or facilitator for environmental groups when they are up against businesses, industry and administrative interests (Dryzek 1987:141f).

A case can also be made that is a lot more critical to legalism. From this perspective, it is necessary to point out that the legal system is of course not unaffected by the power practices in the societies where it exists. Legal systems are predictable but very rigid and inflexible. Western legal systems take as their starting point the rights of individuals. There are no provisions for the rights of natural subjects in the Community.[50] When looking at the Western legal systems in relationship to environmental protection, we often have to consider aspects that have not been protected or ever considered in legal norms. The failure to legislate has contributed to the degradation of the environment, because the most common response to environmental degradation world wide has been to do absolutely nothing (Dryzek 1987:5). Legal measures to protect natural resources and conserve biotopes were virtually non-existent until the 1970s. Instead, principles guaranteeing individual property ownership of natural areas and resources have been more prominent in Europe. The Western legal systems have privileged the right to own, use and exploit property over the right to a clean environment.

[50]Whereas there are directives which aim for the protection of wild birds, and forbid the trade of whales, seals and endangered species, this is far from recognizing that other species would have legal rights.

Furthermore, the Western legal system with its emphasis on individual rights has excluded the possibility of evaluating and examining people's lived experiences (Faith 1994:51). The fact that the Western legal systems have had to introduce or add rights for women, such as equality laws, affirmative action and maternity leave rights,[51] protection from battering in the home, etc., shows that the individual who was originally protected by the rights of this legal system was the man (Cardoso 1996:2). The absence of legal regulation concerning practices in the domestic sphere, which the Western legal system has originally considered outside the political, excluded the major part of the lived experience of women.[52]

Legalism perpetuates itself because it also indirectly governs personnel politics, insofar as a legalistic system tends to favor legal professionals as personnel more than in less legalistic systems. Lawyers have a preference for legal solutions. The focus on legal solutions means that there could be a reluctance to adopt other types of steering mechanisms.[53]

In this section we have concentrated on the bureaucratic practices of the Community and, more specifically, on sectorization, hierarchization and legal problem solving. We have concluded that the administrative organization of the Community, the Commission, is affected by bureaucratic practices, as was described by Weber. Such practices appear contradictory to an ecocentric perspective, because environmental issues are complex and suggest more holistically oriented approaches, which risk being lost when issues are subdivided and fragmented.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have been concerned with the macropolitics of the EU project. The attention has been directed to a set of power practices that have seemed continuous, stable, natural and normal, and thereby constituted a set of biases that have shaped the

[51]For a discussion on how maternity has been handled within the Community see Caracciolo di Torella 1996.

[52]Feminist legal scholars have developed some very powerful criticism of legalism. Examples are MacKinnon (1989) and Carol Smart (1992), for an excellent analysis of the EC body of law using such perspectives, see Flynn (1996).

[53]This is something of a general impression that has come out of the whole set of interviews made.

way nature has been perceived and how environmental issues have been brought up on the agenda. It has been necessary to make visible the construction of these macropolitical practices, to question the obvious, to bring to the forefront the invisible, in order to reach a deeper understanding of these power practices or, if you will, the bias that effectively excludes and includes issues, and shapes them in particular ways. Moreover, all of the power practices discussed embody contradictions. These contradictions are made evident by applying criticism from ecocentric and feminist resistances, which have been useful to challenge dominant discursive practices and make these power practices visible.

Chapter Four
Agenda Setting as Decision Making

In the preceding chapter we pointed to the most pervasive obstacles to greening by outlining some of the dominant power practices of the EU project. While such obstacles exist, environmental measures have nevertheless been introduced. Some pollution problems have been resolved and, in some locations, environmental degradation has even been reversed. In chapter two, it was argued that this is because resistances have developed in response to environmentally destructive practices—resistances which have, more or less successfully, been able to redefine political agendas to include considerations for nature. It is at the level of micropolitics that individuals interact, issues are raised and alternatives are formulated; hence, it is also here that we can expect resistances to make an impact. Micropolitics develops within and between the institutions involved in policy making. In political science much research has been devoted to the study of institutions and policy making within institutions. It seems appropriate, then, to make use of these theories to understand how micropolitics works. In the political science literature, agenda setting is perhaps more commonly associated with policy processes and decision-making theories than questions of power.

The main purpose of this chapter is to suggest a way to conceptualize the decision process in the Community. It will be argued that temporal sorting is a useful model of decision making because it is rather realistic, it handles complexity and does not take linear causality as *a priori* given. While the temporal sorting model discusses individuals as participants with multiple concerns and constraints, it does not polemicize or discuss adequately who the decision maker in the theories is and how s/he behaves, or relates to other participants. Thus, my contribution to agenda-setting theories is to elaborate on who the decision maker is in such decision models and on what her/his behavior is modeled. The ambition is to suggest some alternatives as well.

Agenda Setting and the Garbage-can Model

The way that I have chosen to approach agenda setting as micropolitics has evolved as a reaction to attempts at understanding the high degree of complexity in most decision processes generally and in the Community in particular. What I am suggesting here is an approach from the perspective of organized anarchy, which is inspired by the garbage-can model of organizational choice, henceforth called *the temporal sorting model*. The conditions under which such a model is applicable is when the choice situations are characterized by the following:

1. The preferences in the organization are both ill-defined and inconsistent.
2. The organizational members do not fully understand the processes of the organization.
3. Those who engage in decision making do so inconsistently because the time they spend on different domains vary (Cohen et al. 1972:1).

This model comes out of an effort at understanding organizational choice in university administrations and is based on extensive empirical studies. The model has been used with interesting results on other issue areas and in other settings.[54] The conditions for organizations, which Cohen, March and Olsen postulate, are amazingly similar to the conditions under which Community decision making takes place (see also; Richardson 1996; Peterson 1995; Peters 1994:20). The EU is a very fragmented and complex organization, with a number of only loosely defined levels of agenda setting and a set of institutions that oftentimes lack coordination. "There can hardly be said to be a 'standard' or 'typical' Community policy making or decision-making process. A multiplicity of actors interact with one another via a myriad of channels" (Nugent 1989:231). There is a constant flow of events, gatherings and persons moving within and between the different Community institutions and between diverse locations—national, local, international—and in various contexts—political, bureaucratic, informal and personal. Preferences are only vaguely defined, because the citizens of the member states have such different material conditions and such

[54]Kingdon (1984) considers agendas in health and transportation in the US public administration; Levitt and Nass (1989) look at decision making in textbook publishing, Magnusson (1992) analyses the democratization of Eastern Europe with such a model; Gordenker et al. (1995) apply this approach to an analysis of the cooperation concerning the spreading of information in connection with the AIDS pandemic; Kronsell (1996) views the making of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme of the EC in the light of a garbage can inspired approach; Zahariadis (1996) applies it comparatively on privatization in oil, telecommunications and railroads in Britain and Germany.

varied political, and social backgrounds that, accordingly, the Community project has a number of different meanings.

The formal policy process has become extremely complex, particularly after the Maastricht treaty. There are around twenty different *formal* decision procedures, as well as an abundance of informal processes. Clearly it is difficult for the participants in decision situations to have a complete overview of how such an organization works. Furthermore participation is indeed fluid; decision makers are inconsistently involved and devote different amounts of energy and time to different issues. Moreover, they often move in and out of different Community institutions, for example, from the Parliament to the national representation, to the Commission, and often work a few years in each place. Hence, the criteria set out by Cohen et al. seem to be fulfilled in the micropolitics of the Community. Peterson (1995:84) contends that such a model is applicable on the multi-tiered decision making of the Community and could be advantageous in explaining institutional change, i.e., greening.

The central idea of a temporal sorting model is that consequential order is replaced by a temporal order. There is no linear causality assumed which can guide actions. Instead, a number of decision factors are *simultaneously* available. These come together at certain moments (March & Olsen 1989:12). The temporal sorting model, which March and Olson propose, is also developed by Kingdon who argues for its application because it can better explain real events (Kingdon 1984:82-88). According to Olsen (1972:45-46), the intention was that the garbage-can model be complementary to other models, such as rational choice or bargaining models, when the specific conditions outlined above where empirically verifiable. Perhaps the specific conditions are far too general in their formulation for the model to be used in a complementary way. Such conditions could apply to almost any modern organization (Rasch 1989:251-52).

What I have found particularly useful in the temporal sorting model is the lack of *a priori* determination of linear causality. This is specifically helpful for addressing micropolitics of agenda setting. By opening up to an analysis of the wide streams of participants, solutions and problems it is also more likely that we can locate resistances in the formulation of problems and alternative solutions, as well as within the participant stream. Hence, I view the temporal sorting model as an excellent heuristic device to structure the analysis, and not as a generally applicable theory about how all organizational choices are made, nevertheless realizing that this is often the way decisions are made (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 1994:33).

Temporal sorting implies that *timing* is crucial in determining when a topic gets on the agenda. The process is somewhat coincidental and gives an impression of chaos. The chaotic ingredient is less due to the actors and more to the complexity of the process. It is a decision theory which shares some common ground with chaos theories because it assumes that in the process there is ample randomness. This complexity is partly due to ambiguity, because there are various ways in which an issue can be approached and many alternative ways that it can be framed and defined (Zahariadis 1996). From this perspective on the agenda-setting process, the individual participant does not occupy a pivotal or central position. Instead, the process is viewed as:

> ...a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (Cohen et al. 1972:2).

Problems develop separately in an independent stream and solutions in another, while participants come and go and sometimes couple a problem with a solution. In other words, the four streams—choice opportunities, problems, solutions and participants—develop and operate independently of one another. When the separate streams come together, a decision is made and the agenda is set.[55] Solutions are not necessarily connected to problems. On the contrary, solutions can very well be prepared in a totally different context, waiting for the proper problem to come along with which it can be coupled. Thus, it is possible to have an environmental problem (such as a polluted river) coupled with an organizational solution (such as setting up a commission).

During the course of the research I have searched for theories that seem most suitable for describing agenda setting in the EU. During this work I have had to address some central problems of organizational choice which I argue the temporal sorting model responds to, at least partially. In the following I intend to discuss three such points of importance: *the problem of complexity, linear causality* and *the view of the policy maker*. These points are of interest because of their impact on, and conceptualization of, the way nature and the relationship wo/man/nature have been viewed. They are

[55]This does not mean that the process is un-surveyable. On the contrary, Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) give very explicit instructions on how to use computer modeling to 'control' the process and predict outcomes. This must of course be understood against the background and the times in which the article was written; in the beginning of the computer age the hopes were great that these new inventions could sort our complex realities. These beliefs and hopes did not leave theories of decision making unaffected. It remains, however, that the model is developed in a highly positivistic spirit.

aspects which are addressed, criticized by, and have particular relevance from the position of the resistances, shown in the following.

Complexity is important because, for one, it is a striking feature of Community policy making (and perhaps of organizations in the Western world in general) but it also connects to the ecocentric views of complex ecosystems that are interdependent, holistic and hence extremely difficult to completely survey or control. Complexity is, most importantly, what the temporal sorting model attempts to, if not understand, at least structure.

Linear causality merits some elaboration because the temporal sorting model addresses it, as a reaction to the extreme reliance on linear causality of many other decision models. Linear causality is, as the interviews have shown, a powerful discourse affecting not only policy researchers but also policy makers. The discourse of linear causality can be argued to be quite problematic from an ecocentric point of view, due to its connection with modernist assumptions of linear time and progress (discussed in chapter three).

Finally, the view of the individual is also discussed here. In the temporal sorting model the policy participant does not occupy a central position. My argument is that the view of the participants needs to be elaborated and the temporal model expanded accordingly. Empirical observations show that who the participants are and more particularly, how they interact, are crucial to policy making. Furthermore, most decision models have only delivered a very rudimentary and truncated view of the individual which can be argued to be both gendered and economist.

The Problem of Complexity

One important contribution of the temporal sorting model is its attentiveness to the *complexity* of the decision process. It is quite obvious that all modern organizations, unless they are very small, are very complex ones. One complicating factor is that organizations are not isolated from the political processes outside the organizational structure; on the contrary, they are highly affected by these, as was demonstrated in chapter three. Many times, agenda setting opportunities arise due to changes which take place outside the organization.

That organizations involve many staff members in different positions, as well as in different functions and roles in the policy process, is another factor that adds complexity to the decision process. In such a setting there are a number of choice opportunities, a number of problems and some solutions which each individual has on his or her mind. Not only do different streams develop, but the individual participant her/himself might take part in similar processes in different spheres. From the perspective of the EU, it might be the political or bureaucratic arena on the Community level, the domestic or local level, or it might be in the personal or social spheres. Since the individual participant is faced with a number of decision situations at a given moment—a sick child needs care, an important report must be finished, a colleague wants a chat, a political position must be aired—it further complicates any idea that the organizational decision process would be carried out in a rational goal maximizing way.

In my interviews I was often told that many issues were raised on the Community agenda haphazardly or out of coincidence. The temporal sorting model can explain such capriciousness. It views the policy process as that of parallel, independent streams with participants who experience time constraints and ambiguity of choice. At a specific moment a choice opportunity presents itself and the streams are coupled. The first step for a researcher, using a temporal sorting model to study policy processes empirically, is to deconstruct the process. Temporal sorting is a useful heuristic device for organizing empirical findings. Thus, my theoretical framework will follow the focus on the aspects or streams suggested in the temporal sorting model: choice opportunities, participants, solutions and problems.

Even though these streams are viewed independently and come together at different times, quite unpredictably and coincidentally, the streams are not autonomous, nor independent of their context. The position here is that despite of the enormous complexity of simultaneous processes, neither solutions nor problems are unaffected by the biases of the context where they are formulated, nor are the streams unaffected by each other (cf. Mucciaroni 1992; Cohen et al. 1972:3).

The temporal sorting model was originally developed as a modification and addition to the more parsimonious rational choice perspective on decision making, which is highly reductionist, adheres to linear rationality and assumes that individual rationality equals collective rationality. Hence, another factor which adds to the complexity of the agenda setting process, is the relationship between individual and collective

behavior.[56] In complex organizations, linear-rational approaches may bewilder rather than inform the researcher. In the public choice model the assumption is that 'rational' behavior of each individual in a collective, such as an organization, a bureaucratic body, a political party or a political institution, would simply add up to collective rationality. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is Kenneth Waltz's theory of international relations. Waltz builds on Adam Smith's microeconomic theory and sees the mechanisms of the international system as similar to free market mechanisms. The international system, like the market, is the result of the independent rational behavior of self-interested individuals (Waltz 1979:89-93).

It may very well be that every participant acts in a goal maximizing way as postulated by rational choice (Olson 1965). Yet, there are usually many individuals in various decision-making positions in organizations, and since these participants are involved in different spheres simultaneously, a collective decision is not the same as the individual participants' decisions. In other words, individual rationality does not automatically imply collective rationality.

Problem definitions, solutions and alternative strategies are not necessarily generated by the one and same policy maker, nor can we say that they are new and fresh at every agenda setting opportunity; often they are old ideas in new packages. Since there is a complexity of streams—choice opportunities, participants, solutions and problems—the probability and predictability of the process is low. This means that the streams can come together basically at any time and in any way. In other words, serendipity is an important aspect of agenda setting. While this is certainly true for the temporal sorting model, in the following I will argue that it is not completely true for organizations.

As originally proposed, the model did not leave room for interpreting the context or any dominant thinking influencing which choices were made. Rather, it gave the impression of decision making as chance-like and serendipitous. Over the years, March and Olsen have become inclined to consider also the organizational structure, institutional procedures and practices as to a large degree limiting and influencing the streams and their contents (March & Olsen 1989).

[56]Herbert Simon recognizes this already in this early work on administrative behavior (1945:76-77) where he discusses organizational versus personal rationality, but leaves the problem largely unresolved.

The streams have obviously been restricted and formed within the power practices of the EU project. Such power practices influence how problems are perceived and they influence the content that the solutions have. Due to this we are able to discern how power and resistance works in problem perceptions, on solutions and in the participant stream. This will be done in the chapters five, six and seven. (The final step is to see when and how the streams are brought together which will be done in chapter eight.)

Linear Causality

What I find particularly useful with a temporal sorting approach to agenda setting is that here is no *a priori* assumption that organizational choices are made in accordance with a linear causal order, i.e. first a problem is observed by an informed policy maker, then the proper solution is found and the problem resolved. In the interviews that I have conducted over the years I was often warned against assuming a simple causality between problem, policy maker and solution. This is interesting as an argument for using the temporal sorting model, but it is remarkable that many of the policy makers in question assumed that researchers look for such linear causalities. Policy makers admit that the decision process is far from linear, while there still is a strong tendency for participants in organizations to present the organization outwardly, to the public, as such. There appears to be a common insistence to present organizations as efficient goal maximizers and, in that way, reproduce a myth of how organizations operate (Brunsson 1989).

Linear thinking has led policy makers to behave as if their relationship to nature is based on a possibility to mold and reconstruct the natural environment. Murphy argues that such rationality is intimately connected to the norm of nature's plasticity and moldability (Murphy 1994:67). Rationality as linear causality has been part of a powerful discursive practice facilitating the control of nature through step by step planning and engineering of society.

Dryzek and Luhmann claim that there are different types of rationalities with more or less antagonistic logic. Public choice rationality is just one such rationality. Dryzek starts from what he calls ecological rationality, and poses it against linear rationality concretely exemplified by different types of choice mechanisms in modern Western societies. Without explicitly addressing the rationality underlying these choice mechanisms, he nevertheless points to a number of problematic contradictions between ecological rationality and these various choice mechanisms (Dryzek 1987).

In his more recent work he points more explicitly to the problematic assumptions of instrumental rationality both in everyday policy making and in the discourses of rationality (1996:27-40). Dryzek (1996:38) assumes the position that rationality can be changed and reworked within the rationality discourse itself, through critical assessments of the operation of rationality and its institutional reconstruction. Luhmann (1989) on the other hand, argues that ecological rationality is part of a system with its own logic, or type of communication, that is incompatible with other rationalities, like economic rationality. Thus, the prospects for reworking the rationality discourse to be inclusive of ecological concerns seem to be more difficult according to Luhmann.

Linear causality as an approach to understanding agenda setting is severely limited also by its assumption of goal maximizing. This assumption holds that decision making is only about finding the right means to achieve predetermined goals. If we can only access all the information[57] about both problems and solutions, then the right solution can be coupled with the problem and the goal has been reached. This is highly questionable as a picture of decision making because goals are extremely political, and for some participants very personal. Solutions, too, are political. This implies that there is no 'right' problem definition nor any 'right' solution that can solve it. I propose, instead, that we can learn a lot from looking at the way problems are defined (Rochefort & Cobb 1994; Lakoff 1987) and solutions proposed; herein we can see patterns of power practices and resistances.

The View of the Policy Maker

The question of who the decision makers and participants are, appeared at first glance to be strictly an empirical question. However, through the research process it became increasingly evident that theories of policy making had a very limited view of *who policy makers are* and *how they behave*. Since the temporal sorting model only partially deals with this lacuna in theory, I would like to address the issue in the following discussion. Empirical research has shown that policy makers very seldom exhibit the traits and the behavior that decision models reflect, nor do policy makers relate to each other in the way that such models assume they do. While one could

[57]The problem of complete access to information has been addressed within the pluralist tradition by Simon, who argues that rationality is bounded because of restrictions in the access to information by decision makers.

argue that these are only models and simplifications and, hence, have no intensions to account for all types of policy makers and policy making behavior, it nevertheless seems absurd to hold on to ideas that appear to deviate from our lived reality to such an extreme extent. Since the view of the policy maker in most of the decision models did not fit my empirical findings and what I had observed about policy makers, it made me curious to investigate who the policy maker in these models really is.

There are some models where it is explicitly stated that it is 'rational economic man' or 'self-interested individuals'. This also seems to be the most prominent view of policy makers that is found in theory. In political science a number of theorists have been deeply involved in the study of decision behavior. Both descriptive and prescriptive proposals have been made. Proceeding from Simon's ideas of bounded rationality (1945), Charles Lindblom views decision making as incremental (1959) and Etzioni (1967) as mixed scanning. These observations and theoretical elaborations have since been extensively argued and modified (Ham & Hill 1984:76-94) and continue to be contested. However, the discussions of bounded rationality, incrementalism, mixed scanning, all take rational man as a starting point, and so do theorists discussing more 'altruistic' forms of behavior, such as Elster (1989), Lewin (1988) and Axelrod (1984). The temporal sorting model, while remaining highly critical of rationalistic assumptions of organizational choice, does not make any explicit references to who the participants are. It seems to remain outside the scope of interest.

Many decision models have been inspired by the idea of rationality. Rationality is the precondition for all public choice models (Olson 1965) as well as game theoretic approaches in international relations theory. The public choice school[58] has an economic view of social interaction. It is a social and intellectual construct which reduces all human interaction to the desire for economic gain. It does not leave room for passion, ferocity or honor and as such is a very truncated and greatly impoverished view of human interaction (Hartsock 1983:48). It is the fact that decision rationality as its base has market exchange rather than, for example, friendship, that gives it its bias and limitations in explaining social and political behavior. The economist view of human interaction has become prototypic and has influenced social science theories

[58]The pioneers of this approach are: Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, Fred Hirsch. Anthony Downs is one important proponent of that model who also has developed an agenda-setting model focusing strictly on environmental issues. He suggests that how long an issue remains on the agenda depends on how much the solutions will *cost* society and its citizens (Downs 1973:69-73).

on human exchange. The individual is assumed to be egotistical since s/he always considers her/his self interest before any common interest. These assumptions of individual rational behavior have been superimposed on organizations and, in international relations theory, also on states. Public choice theory is not primarily interested in individual behavior but is a theory of collective action, based on assumptions of a self-interested individual.

My critique of the economism in the rational man model relies on Hartsock's work where she shows that economic exchange is the implicit epistemological basis in social science theories of exchange as well.[59] It can also be understood in ecofeminist terms as the atomization of the subject. Rational economic man objectifies and instrumentalizes all else surrounding him since the way to relate in economic terms is by means of objects that are being exchanged, be it money, goods, slaves, workers or women. "A community that bases itself on the self-interested passing back and forth of objects can only be an instrumental community in which exchange and competition lead directly to relations of domination" (Hartsock 1983:50). With this argument Hartsock connects and makes explicit the rational choice view of human interaction with a view of power. Privileging economic exchange as the model for human relations both reflects the relations of domination in society and maintains them. It becomes more visible if we juxtapose the rational choice view of human relationships with an alternative. Paternalistic relationships, for example, include aspects of domination and subordinance but have a transformative character. "The transformative use of power is a use of power that seeks to bring about its own obsolescence by means of the empowerment of the subordinate agent" (Wartenberg 1990:184). This is exemplified by the relationship between parent and child—a relationship where one dominates and the other is subordinate. The goal of the exchange is to empower the subordinated, i.e., the child, and do away with domination, e.g., the child matures and takes care of itself.

The model of the decision maker has been that of economic man, who is also assumed to act 'rationally'. What rationality signifies in a general context has forcefully been criticized, and there is no need to reiterate those objections here. However, it appears to be strongly connected with a masculine subject and processes of the intellect. Since the beginning of Western philosophical thought, maleness has been associated with a clear, concise and determinate way of thinking i.e., rational thinking, while femaleness

[59]Hartsock (1983) argues convincingly that social scientists such as; Blau, Homans, Lasswell, Kaplan, Parsons, Dahl and Polsby have as their epistemology market and commodity exchange.

has been associated with dark powers, unknown forces and indeterminate ways of thinking (Lloyd 1993:24).

That rationality, as it has been applied in Western philosophy, is a gendered concept has been shown by Genevieve Lloyd. It is quite clear, then, that the individual, as it is defined in most policy making models, and particularly in rational choice inspired models, is the self as developed in the male. Since the great majority of decision makers have been men, we could say that it is an empirically well-grounded model of the decision maker. However when this fact is kept hidden and invisible it becomes increasingly problematic, becase it is constructed as naturally ordained.[60]

Nancy Chodorow (1978) has demonstrated how limiting and excluding it is to universalize the self by basing it on a male norm. She argues that the self is formed differently in the male and the female due to the dualistic division of labor. Chodorow develops an object-relations theory from Freud, who argued that the formation of the self occurs in childhood as the child goes through a separation experience. Chodorow asserts that since child raising has been culturally and socially the sphere of women, this separation process takes different forms depending on whether the child is a girl or a boy. Since the boy and the mother are of different sexes, the boy has a stronger need to separate himself from the mother than the girl does. The boy's masculinity is defined by separation, individuation and objectification of anything outside his own self. The girl, on the other hand, does not have to make this strong separation as she is of the same sex as the mother and thereby learns to identify herself in relationships *with* 'the other'. As a result, the male self is based on separation and autonomy where he sees the world only in relation to himself. His individuation and his objectification of anything outside himself means that the male self is threatened by dependencies and relationships, the very qualities which define the female. On the other hand, the female self is threatened by separation (Gilligan 1982:89).

The idea that individuals act solely out of self interest is denying a dependency on a subordinated other (Plumwood 1993:116; Jaggar 1983:28-33). In such a Cartesian framework the individual is individuated to such an extent that there is no greater context perceived in which the individual can be considered a part. Ontologically speaking the individual is an island (Mathews 1991:40). Rational man becomes the

[60]Some of the fathers of 'self-interested economic man' were Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and Hobbes, who turned to the natural law tradition for inspiration in their theorizing. This tradition is committed to the view that fundamental principles of right are basic discoverable universal truths about human nature.

subject and everything around him is objectified and has no relevance except as an instrument or object towards achieving his self interest. As a consequence, man is the only species that does not have to adapt to the forces of nature.

As a result of the social construction of gender which has been reproduced in most societies, women have had a different role in society than men. They have also developed a different self as a result of their position as the other.

> No claims are made about the origins of the differences described or their distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time. Clearly, these differences arise in a social context where facts of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females and the relations between the sexes (Gilligan 1982:2).[61]

In more concrete terms this means that a male self has a tendency to deal with a decision situation in terms of rights, rules and obligations. The female self takes decisions based in the relationship itself, that is, with an attempt to understand the other's views, problems and needs in this relationship.[62] Hence, who we are and how we are positioned in society also influences our behavior. This is particularly important because the decision maker who is portrayed as selfish, autonomous and who relates to others through the exchange of objects and partakes in games with the sole purpose of hoarding as much as possible for one self, is not the decision maker who can work from environmental ethics and engage in cooperation and community building to create 'the sustainable society'.

On the other hand, the rational man model is, quite obviously, a very rough characterization of a self and so are Chodorow's and Gilligan's characterizations of male and female selves. My critique applies to the 'male' self as it is expressed in decision theories, itself a simplification which has less to do with men and women in actual relations. Although the characterization is exaggerated, it is this exaggeration that seems to be the basic assumption of the subject of 'rational man'. *The most curious thing, then, is not so much whether this has any relevance for how individuals in the world actually behave, but rather why this exaggeration has come to stand as*

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[61]Since both Chodorow and Gilligan do their research in the Western world and (I assume, as it is not explicit) on white women and the nuclear family, their results and view of the self can not automatically apply to other societies and other types of families. However, it is valuable in making gender visible in rational assumptions of organizational choice (cf. Chodorow 1995).

[62]This is one of Gilligan's main points.

such a powerful model for individuals in social science in general and for decision theories in particular.

Assuming then that the self explicitly expressed in rational man theory is the male[63] view of the self—the detached, independent and separated self—it means that the rational model is biased (Plumwood 1993:104). An alternative model could include other views of the individual, starting from, for example, the female self argued by Chodorow and Gilligan to be defined in relationship and connectedness. This is similar to the view of the self which is suggested in an ecological holistic model of society. Individuals, according to Jim Cheney (1987:142) "...exist in defining relationships to one another and cannot be intelligibly and, consistently understood...as individual bundles of interests...." Applying ecological holism on society moves away from a focus on individuals toward the relationships which define individuals in a system of relationships, emphasizing dependencies and connections (Lucardie 1993:30).

The need for a more inclusionary view of the self has indeed been elaborated in feminist analysis, but has also become evident in empirical observations of decision makers. Separating parts from the whole is not how decisions are made. Studies have shown that 'experts' make decisions by relying much more on experience, intuition and considerations of the whole context (Flyvbjerg 1993:23-39).[64]

An ecocentric view of the individual is relational; the focus is not on the individual but rather on relationships, because it is through relationships that the individual is defined. As we have suggested earlier, it is the position in a system of relationships which gives the individual entity its identity. Holism is fundamental to ecocentrism and means that we view the world as integrated relationships (Warren & Cheney 1991; Griscom 1981). The whole is always more than the sum of the parts and cannot be reduced to smaller units while still retaining its character (Naess 1989:78f; Capra 1982:268). Furthermore, the parts do not function because of their inherent qualities but rather from their position in the system, that is, from their relationship to other parts (Mathews 1991:114; Warren & Cheney 1991:184; Macy 1989). This means that *what* something is, whether a community, a person, a species or a river, is partially a function of *where* it is. Such an ecosystem approach

[63]I would argue that it is not just any male but it is based on the norms of males in dominant positions. These are most commonly white, middle and upper class males and do not necessarily reflect the 'self' of the black, colonized or impoverished male.

[64]Flyvbjerg builds on work by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986).

can contribute to our thinking about society, as it shows that societies are not just composed of individual human beings but are part of an intricate system of social and ecological relations. These relations both constrain and enable the individual nodes in the ecosystem, whether they are human beings or plants. A caveat, according to Cheney (1987), is that we be aware not to replace a model of the individual as based in rights and dualisms with a holistic notion that locates worth in some type of super individual like the ecosystem (see also Salleh 1993:229).

A holistic mode of thinking within the social sciences questions the extreme individualism which many theories are infused with. An individualistic approach views the world in discrete, logically and ontologically autonomous units. To be autonomous means that the individual could theoretically exist alone in an empty space and still have the same characteristics (Mathews 1991:710). According to Judith Plant (1989:1) "feeling the life of the 'other'...." could be a new starting point for human decision making. A similar alternative to how relationships can develop is through empathetic cooperation, as argued by Sylvester (1994b). She suggests that individuals are inclined to engage actively with others to make decisions with a contextual sensitivity to the relationship in which they are situated.

Through interviews with the participants engaged in the environmental policy process of the Community, it became quite clear that they did not act in isolation. They were driven by personally based affective, psychological aspects as well as by organizational goals. The activities of the policy participants were mostly in collectives and rarely of an individualistic nature. Hence, individuals do not normally act as autonomous independent beings, regardless of whether they are male or female. They are more likely to act within a set of relationships and are bound, as well as empowered, by these relationships. Here we have established that a model of individuals as defined in relationships is a conceptualization which better reflects ecocentric ideas and perhaps also reality.

Summary

It was suggested that the temporal sorting model can be a useful way to conceptualize the complexity of decision making and the reality of Community decision making today. The decision to use the temporal sorting model in order to understand micropolitics, and to organize the empirical material, has been based on the argument that such a model reflects agenda setting in complex situations in general and more

particularly in the Community. Added to this is the temporal sorting model's heuristic value as a tool to help me organize the material in order to analyze how power practices and resistances influence the definition of problems, the suggestion of alternatives and in which way that they are represented among the participants.

Agenda setting is a process where choice opportunities, problems, solutions and participants can be discussed separately, since they do not develop in any consequential order. Three points of discussion, important to decision making on environmental issues, were brought up; complexity, linear rationality and the identity and behavior of the policy maker. While the temporal sorting model addresses complexity and linear causality, I argue that it avoids the important question of who the decision maker is, by simply talking about participants who come and go. This is an omission which I tried to develop with the help of feminist and ecocentric perspectives. 'Rational economic man' the most widely used model of the decision maker, was critically analyzed. First, because it does not appear to be empirically verifiable. Second, the model's assumptions need to be made explicit since they are both economist and gendered. Then I suggested that an alternative view of the policy participant could be a relational one, inspired both by feminist thinkers and ecocentric ideas.

Choice Opportunities

Although anticipating some of the result of the following analysis, it is necessary to point out the crucial importance of choice opportunities to agenda setting. Choice opportunities are the moments when streams can come together, connect, and policies materialize. Cohen et al. perceived choice opportunities as a forth stream. I'm inclined to follow Kingdon who argues that there are times when policy windows are opened, or choice opportunities arise, and the streams can be coupled (Kingdon 1984:173-176). It follows that choice opportunities exist somewhat externally to the streams themselves, while influencing and being influenced by the streams. Choice opportunities, seen from a strategic point of view, are a chance to take action and an opportunity to mobilize. Choice opportunities will be discussed here when they can be connected to the definition of problems and, to a certain extent, even when they have had an impact and been decisive for the formulation of solutions.

Choice opportunities seem to be of two kinds—*recurring occasions* and *crises situations*.[65] Recurring occasions are when organizations are expected to do something and consequently have to construct an agenda. This kind of choice opportunity comes closest to what Cohen, March and Olsen meant in their original formulation of the garbage-can model: "These are occasions when an organization is expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision. Opportunities arise regularly...." (1972:3). Organizations meet on a regular basis and routinely provide agenda-setting opportunities to some categories of participants while denying access to others.

In addition, important choice opportunities arise when some type of crisis occurs that leads to a demand for action and possibilities for influencing agendas. Crises and other 'focusing events' dramatize problems and catch the attention of policy-makers (Paul 1994:51). The other side of the coin is that conditions of a more latent kind, although not necessarily less severe, have difficulties in reaching agendas. Slow processes of environmental degradation are more likely kept off or excluded from agendas, due to a lack of dramatic earthquake-like events and subsequent publicity.

There are a number of recurring occasions providing choice opportunities in the Community. Compared to other international organizations, the Community is highly institutionalized and, hence, there is a cycle of recurring and frequent meetings. The approval of the budget is one such important recurring occasion. Another one is the formulation of environmental strategies in policy plans, which has been expected to take place every five years. The shift of the EU presidency every six months is also a regular occurrence, when different member states have an opportunity to push particular issues on the agenda; usually they also take this opportunity. Other types of changes that can give rise to choice opportunities are when the Community accepts new member states and, every five years, when there is a change of Commission. The European Summit meetings are also relatively regular occurrences that can provide important choice opportunities, because the general policy direction of the Community is negotiated at these summits.

When it comes to crisis situations, it has been shown throughout the research that focusing events and crises have had important implications for environmental policy making, drawing the attention away from the planned agenda. These situations are

[65]Kingdon makes a similar observation regarding policy windows: "Sometimes, the window opens quite predictably...at other times, it happens quite unpredictably" (1984:173).

unpredictable but have been influential and will be discussed quite extensively in the following chapter.

Chapter Five
The Problem Stream

As was argued in the preceding chapter, agenda setting can be understood from a perspective of complexity by using the temporal sorting model as a way of organizing the research material. From such a starting point, problems live a life of their own and are not necessarily connected to specific solutions, nor to specific participants, although they do, of course, develop in peoples' minds. Problems get coupled with solutions in rather unpredictable ways, at unsuspected moments. For the temporal sorting model to work in practice, one of the streams needs to be fixed. In this dissertation I have chosen to start from the solution stream. Hence, the problem definitions that we will be discussing have already been coupled with particular environmental solutions.

Problems are socially constructed; how problems are defined is intimately connected with the political and societal context in which they are articulated. More particularly, problem definitions are affected by the interplay between the dominant power practices and resistances. By implication, we should be able to learn much about power and resistance if we focus on how problems have been framed.

In agenda setting, one of the crucial questions is how problems are framed. It is useful to make a distinction between a condition and a problem. We constantly endure all sorts of conditions, such as bad weather and the common cold. Only when we become convinced that something should be done about it, does a condition turn into a problem (Kingdon 1984:115,119). There are a number of institutes, organizations and governmental bodies that provide us with statistics and information about certain conditions in the world. We can call these indicators because they point to certain conditions. Indicators are things such as: disease and mortality rates, air pollution levels, product prices, car emission levels, just to mention a few. Indicators do not in any way determine if an actual problem exists or not; whether it is a problem or not is a matter of interpretation (Torgerson 1990:132). It follows that most of what we generally recognize as problems can be defined in several different ways. The process

of interpretation is often accentuated when the condition is associated with the urgency of a catastrophic event, some type of crisis or new facts, symbols or data which can focus the issue and demand attention from the public and policy makers.

To catch the attention of policy makers, some kind of 'focusing event' that dramatizes the problem is often helpful. A focusing event may be "a powerful symbol that catches on, or the personal experience of a policy maker" (Kingdon 1984:100). Catastrophic events work to further emphasize an existing condition. Accidents such as Chernobyl or incidents such as the discovery of toxins in Seveso, or the leak of toxins in the Rhine from the Sandoz incident, are dramatic ways to focus attention. In the Community context such events have had considerable influence on the way that environmental problems have been perceived. These events can then put the spotlight on a particular condition and, often through media, demand attention from the public and policy makers.

One of the most fundamental concerns in the Community is whether a particular problem, once recognized as an environmental problem, is defined as a Community problem that should be dealt with in the Commission or whether it is defined as a problem to be dealt with at the national level. In the Community context very much is determined by what the treaties say about Community jurisdiction, i.e., which problems the Treaties include within the Community framework. If a problem does not fit into the framework of the Treaties then it will become a non-issue or framed in such a way that it fits within the scope of Community policy. Until 1987 this was, on a general level, the faith of Community environmental policy because there were no provisions in the Treaty for the Community to act within the environmental issue area.

The central questions asked in this chapter are:

How have problems been perceived, constructed and articulated in the environmental issue area in the EC from the late 1960s until the mid 1990s?

What can we learn about power practices and resistances by looking at the way problems have been defined?

We can speak of three general types of problem definitions: reflective, reactive and 'non-environmental' problem definitions. The *reflective* kind of *problem definition* is comprehensive and general, concerned with environmental issues in a larger societal context. We find this expressed mainly in declarations, general reports and the Action

Programmes. They are often based on some type of learning from either previous policies and events, or from experiences with implementation.

The other type of problem definition is *reactive*. It can be either a problem definition as a reaction to an incident, a catastrophe or some extra-Community event. Some of these problem definitions are only very rudimentary definitions based on a sensation of panic or urgent sensation of risk. They can also be generated as a reaction to policies or proposals originating elsewhere, often in the Member States but also in the international setting.

It was mentioned earlier that environmental solutions have not necessarily been coupled with environmental problems, something that is also implied in the temporal sorting model. Here we will point to some problem definitions that have had more to do with the integration of the Community and less with environmental issues. In this section we will look at these *non-environmental* problem definitions as well.

Reflective Problem Definitions

The way that environmental problems have been conceptualized in the Community over time is not unique. It is largely related to the general tendencies that have been expressed both in international settings, in national environmental administrations and through the environmental movement. It is important to point out that even if ecocentric ideas have not been the explicit model for these problem definitions, they have, nevertheless, had a significant impact. Such ideas have posed challenges to other groups and interests which have felt compelled to react, define and frame problems in reaction to resistances. Furthermore, it is quite clear that ecocentric ideas, in general, have had a great influence on the way that pollution and environmental degradation have been viewed. It is particularly evident when we look at the development in definitions of environmental problems over time.

The most important change in environmental problem perception in the Community is connected to the way that the relationship between economy and ecology has been perceived. It has been important to most national and local understandings of environmental issues, but has, even to a larger extent, been central to the framing of environmental issues in the Community. A chronologically based evaluation of the definition of environmental problems reveals tendencies to a changing understanding

of environmental problems and, more particularly, the relationship between economic and ecological processes.

The Apocalyptic Approach

The discussions and activities that preceded the UN conference on the Human Environment[66], held in Stockholm 1972, together with the Club of Rome report,[67] illustrate the general thinking on problems that attracted the attention of the Commission, and influenced the view of environmental problems in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s. The Club of Rome report (Meadows et al. 1974)[68] presents a complex model of long-term trends in population, food production, pollution and resource consumption patterns. "Limits to Growth" was the result of the application of computer models to predict future developments on a global scale. Due to the advancement of computer technology, the aggregation of enormous amounts of data and complex mathematical models could generate forecasts about future risks. Most conclusions predicted very serious outcomes for wo/mankind.

We can not be sure that it was the reflection over actual environmental situations which led Altiero Spinelli[69] to introduce environmental concerns on the EEC agenda, but it appears to be the reason the other initiator, Sicco Mansholt, brought it up. Mansholt, the agricultural Commissioner, was very impressed and attracted by the Club of Rome report.[70] "It was a very dramatic report about the increasing

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[66]The UN conference was organized by Member States, whose positions at the conference "...were influenced by ecological politics at home" (Caldwell 1984:41) but also by the large number of NGOs present at the Environment Forum in Stockholm. They were also engaged as experts (many were scientists) in the preparatory committees.

[67]This report was written by an international research team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and commissioned by the Club of Rome, a club of different international elits from bussiness and education concerned with the topic: the Predicament of Mankind (Meadows et al. 1974). According to Adams (1990:29) the Club of Rome was set up with the backing of European multinational companies .

[68] The book was sold in more than 20 million copies worldwide (Weizsäcker 1994:38). That it was an important book for the post-materialists is stressed by Inglehart 1977:378, not to mention those writing on environmentalism; see for example, Pepper 1986:22-24, Dobson 1990, Caldwell 1984:26. Most literature on environmental issues makes a reference to it.

[69]Altiero Spinelli—Commissioner for Industrial Affairs and the Internal Market—was engaged in the discussion on the institutional response to environmental issues, particularly regarding trade related aspects (Johnson 1972:264).

[70]NGO representative, November 1993.

deterioration of the environment. It caught the Commission's attention but not everyone agreed with its catastrophic vision."[71] This report was read all over the Western world, left a strong impression on the Commission, and was mentioned by the majority of those interviewed as an important document for the understanding of environmental problems in the 1970s.

The Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm 1972 was the most influential in a series of international conferences in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[72] It legitimized environmental policy as a common concern among nations, and in doing so, created a place for environmental issues on many national agendas where they had previously been unrecognized (Caldwell 1984:19). The idea to establish a European Environmental group was generated at this particular conference (Lowe & Goyder 1983:164) and in 1974 the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) was formed. It also gave a reason to discuss environmental policies when the Heads of the Member States met in Paris a few months later (Com. report 1992:28)[73]. The Club of Rome report and the Stockholm conference have since achieved important symbolic value, far beyond the ecocentric resistances,[74] influential in bringing about. In the following we will look at how 'environmental problems' were framed in these contexts and continue to see how it has influenced the thinking on environmental matters in the Community. According to the interviews, the influence has been on a general level and mainly as an impetus to move environmental issues on the Community agenda.[75]

In the Club of Rome report environmental problems were viewed as a shortage of food and a shortage of resources combined with the exponential growth in people[76] to share

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[71]Commission official, November 1993.

[72]There are countless references in the environmentalist literature to this event and very few, if any books on the subject fail to mention this conference as important.

[73]Com. report = Commission report.

[74]I will argue here that although neither the scientists working on the Club or Rome report nor those who commissioned it, were radical ecocentrics, at the time they were innovative and were concerned about resource use, depletion and what would happen to 'mankind' in the future. Due to this they provided important resistances. Similarly, the Stockholm conference was initiated by Swedish policy makers, a country which, at the time, was rather progressive and pushed environmental politics internationally. Together with the NGO and scientific experts they constituted important resistances that were put into play around the Stockholm conference.

[75]An analysis of some texts and environmental directives show that there are no direct references to either the Club of Rome report or the Stockholm conference.

[76]It is even more surprising as we read on and find that the major problem is population growth, or more precisely, women and females: "If, in addition to sons, each woman has on the average two

these resources. Both in the Club of Rome report and the discussions preceding the Stockholm conference it was quite clear that population growth was perceived as the most urgent problem. In listings of problems it appears first (International Organization 1972:169-478; Meadows et al. 1974). Considering that the question of population growth had such a prominent place in the construction of the environmental predicament, it seems rather strange that the word, population does not even once appear in the First Environmental Action Programme, nor was it considered an issue during the Conference 'Towards A Community Policy on Environment,' held at the College of Europe at Bruges in 1974 (Kormoss 1974).

It is the population of 'them' rather than 'us' which appears to be the problem. There are no proposals for population control or birth control schemes suggested for Europe in any of the programmes I discuss here.[77] The European population is not a problem although Europe is more densely populated than most of the developing countries. Moreover, we consume a much higher percentage per capita out of the world's resources. "/T/he 0.6 per cent annual population growth of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries creates more ecological pressure on the Earth than the current, falling, 2.2 per cent annual population growth of the South" (Weizsäcker 1994:93).[78] Since the problem of population growth is articulated as a problem of 'the other' not concerning the Community population, it reduced the problems in the Community context to being 'shortness of resources'.

The innovative dimension in the Club of Rome report and the contemporary research in the field was the use of the latest methods that science offered. The focus on the interconnections between different known global problems which were brought together in a chilling way was also new and original (Weizsäcker 1994:39; Paehlke 1989:52-53). The reaction to the report was very significant politically, because it made a strong impact on sections of society that had previously not been aware of the limits to human exploitation of nature. The sophisticated scientific quantitative approach was accessible among policy makers who would never read any literature from the environmental movement (Naess 1989:151-52). It is an example of

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female children...and each of them grows up to have two more female children, the population will double each generation" (page 35).

[77]I also searched through the databases EU Celex and EU Scad to see if I could find any documents or referrals, over the years, that have taken up this subject. I did not find any listings on population, nor on birthcontrol, reproduction, or (human) fertility.

[78]For a more extensive feminist analysis of this aspect see: Sen et al. 1994; Corréa 1994; Mies & Shiva 1993:277-296.

how scientific power practices can be appropriated by eccentric resistances to expose, name and define environmental problems.[79]

The most obvious shortcoming of the high level of aggregation in the Club of Rome report is a number of elusive generalizations that can easily be proven wrong. Many of the critics were also able to falsify these predictions later on (Smil 1993:18). The method used, i.e., computer modeling which allows for the aggregation of huge amounts of data, reflects the view of science at the time. It was a specific use of a particular scientific method that glorified the knowledge coming out of powerful computers that were, at the time, the privileges of a few experts at a few research laboratories of the world. The definition privilege was at the forefront of technical-scientific advancement.[80] The limits that biologists and ecologists pointed to in the natural environment where in a sense accepted as limits (these limits have subsequently been questioned) whereas economic growth was taken as given (Benton 1994:35-37).

The dominant problem definitions of the early 1970s had such apocalyptic tendencies, while at the same time implicitly suggesting solutions. These included managing growth and, most importantly, managing population growth which had been defined outside the Community agenda (Meadows et al. 1974:88-128). Apocalyptic images, catastrophic visions and symbols can provide the kind of emotional drama that attracts attention and inspires mobilization in response to important conditions. However, there is also a danger in conveying doomsday visions that thrive on the creation of deep fears and widespread despair, because they can have reverse effects and lead to "a world-weary passivity" and "a paralyzing sense of futility" (Quinby 1994:xx-xxi). In this way, apocalyptic visions immobilize rather that mobilize people to change those predicted trends.[81]

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[79]Most of the ecocentric resistance in the late 1960s to the early 1970s was among natural scientists. This was the case for example in Swedish environmental policy (Lundgren 1991,1989; Jamison et al. 1990). The research team for the Club of Rome report was highly scientific, but also the work on environmental issues in the international arena and around the Stockholm conference involved to a large degree ecocentrics with a scientist's background (Caldwell 1984, see also Smith 1972).

[80] Since the report was technical and scientific it is perhaps not surprising that the solutions, insinuated by the report, were all relying on the increasing role of science and technology: more birth control, higher agricultural yield, better and more efficient resource use, as well as pollution reduction.

[81]A contrast and a reaction to such apocalyptic tendencies is the initiative to announce The European Year of the Environment in 1987. It was an initiative at the European Council of March 1985 that clearly shows an anti-apocalyptic problem perception. It emphasizes that environmental problems are something that *can be* tackled, everyone has a part to play and *can do* something (Council resolution 86/C63/01, OJ C63,18.3.1986:1, OJ C 68,24.3.1986).

Also the principles which were agreed upon at the Stockholm conference are illustrative of the environmental thinking at the time. There was a predominance of natural science views and less discussion of the economic and political aspects of polluting practices. The notion was that ecological problems were apolitical and mainly scientific and technical (Adams 1990:39), indicating how environmental politics of the 1970s made use of and benefited from the privileged position of scientific information. By piggy-backing on science, ecocentric resistances could define the agenda of the day. They were able to do this because they often had a scientific background themselves.

The 'limits to growth' report clearly lies within a modernist, economist perspective. It is modernist in the sense that it does not question 'growth' directly; on the contrary, the many models presuppose that growth and development are determined developments that are confronted with limits in nature. It is economist in the sense that it does not question economic growth more than indirectly, by being critical to its effects. This was also the case in the Community. When the Heads of the EC Member States and governments gathered at the Paris summit in 1972 after the Stockholm conference, they concluded that "economic expansion also should result in the improvement of the quality of life" and that particular attention should be given to the environment. The statement reflects that economic growth was in itself not challenged.

Environmental Problems Defined as Side Effects

The picture that emerges from studying various community documents is that the environmental deterioration of Western Europe of the early 1970s was perceived as *isolated* and *unfortunate* side effects of industrial processes. They were defined as isolated because they were considered to be restricted to a particular area, sector or medium, hence, also quite detectable and easily controlled. Environmental problems were also very unfortunate effects, not only for health and esthetic reasons, but mainly because pollution was considered something disruptive to economic growth and industrial development in general. Pollution prevention was considered a burden and a hindrance to economic development because of its cost (Task Force Report 1990:14; Council Resolution 87/C328/01 19.10.1987). Hence, the relationship between economic processes and ecological dynamics was perceived as conflictual.

As years went by, the apocalyptic vision expressed in the Limits to Growth report was verified with the oil crisis which fulfilled the predicted lack of resources. At the same time it was falsified, in parts, by more nuanced data, new scientific discoveries and new models. Simultaneously, however, there was ample activity in environmental legislation, both in the Community and in the Member States.

Although the initial problem perception dominated much through the 1970s and the early 1980s, toward the mid 1980s changes in perception slowly emerged (cf. Hull 1994:146). Environmental problems were no longer perceived as isolated phenomena in dispersed and disparate areas but, since displacement effects had become increasingly obvious, the complexity of pollution and environmental destruction also became increasingly evident. Pollution that had been successfully restricted in one medium, such as water, had the effects that environmental pressures increased in another media (cf. Council Resolution 87/C328/01,1987 Annex, 3.2.3).

Furthermore, there was an emerging realization that many of the problems which were considered environmental came from practices in diverse sectors, such as industry, agriculture and energy. These new definitions were based on the reactions to, and the experiences of, the earlier Community directives and legislation in the Member States as well as from the growing number of environmental NGOs.[82] That is, policy makers were learning from experiences that were generated in 'the scientific laboratories of the world' (Beck 1995:101-110).

Environmental Problems Defined as Interdependent and Complex

This thinking began to change in the 1980s, and the year 1985 marks a turning point. Until then, economic growth was perceived as a necessary condition for the development of environmental politics, since environmental legislation was considered a burden. This year the European Council declared that *environmental policy could contribute to improved economic growth and job creation*. The Fourth Environmental Action Programme (Council resolution 87/C 328/01 1987) stressed that environmental standards can actually improve the competitive position and increase the world market share of the Community industry. The demand for products

[82]In 1961 there were 34 International Environmental Organizations (IEO), which in 1971 had increased to 58 IEOs, in 1981 to 183 IEOs and by 1991 to 248 IEOs (Source: Yearbook of International Organizations 1960/61, 1970/71, 1981, 1990/91).

with high environmental standards would create new markets and provide opportunities for development of new technology and new businesses (Annex 2.4.6.), thus, generating further economic activity. Also the task report (1990:8,14) stressed the importance of such a re-conceptualization of the relationship between economic and environmental concerns. Throughout the 289 page report there is an urgency to re-frame the ideas around environmental problems, toward a less conflictual and contradictory relationship.

From 1985, we see a new perception emerging that views environmental problems and economic issues as interdependent. It was based on the arguments that something could be gained from environmental standards, through new markets, new industries, new products, new technology and jobs in these new sectors (Fourth Action Programme, Annex). The reframing was partially inspired by *Our Common Future,* a report from the UN Commission headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland (Task Force Report 1990:30).

The Brundtland report (World Commission 1987) became very important in as much as it provided a document that re-conceptualized and introduced a more in-depth understanding of environmental problems in the world. It most definitively pointed to the interdependencies between nations,[83] both economically and ecologically, but perhaps most importantly, it pointed to the interdependency of economy and ecology (Porter & Brown 1991:30-32). It marked a change also because it did not rely mainly on elaborated scientific data, nor was it apocalyptic. Rather, it introduced a long-term view, focusing on the possibilities to repair the damages and re-consolidate the different social, economic and political practices which had earlier been perceived as contradictory. This was not the first time that such a vision or understanding was expressed. A similar strategy had sprung from the ecocentric resistances and been proposed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN 1980). The Brundtland report was much more successful than the IUCN strategy, because it had political prestige and was presented in an accessible way that was not offensive to skeptics.[84]

[83]This report has a particular heritage in that it came as one in a series of Commission reports. The others were the Brandt Programme for Survival and Common crisis and the Palme Commission on Common Security. These all put an emphasis on the interdependence of nations, on multilateralism and cooperative solutions (Adams 1990:57-58).

[84]NGO representative, November 1992.

As a result, the relationship between environmental and economic concerns was reframed. Environmental problems were no longer exclusively viewed as unpleasant and devastating side effects of industrial processes but also ways to generate new technology, income and growth. The arguments proposed were that environmental products can compete over non-environmental ones; tourism in nature preserves is an income for less industrialized countries of the Community; there is much to gain economically from the research and production of newer emission techniques, from more efficient extraction of energy, and from new production techniques. It is a perception that defines environmental protection as a new area of income generation for the Community, with plenty of possibilities for further economic growth.

Thus, the earlier problem definition as unfortunate and costly side effects of industrial production was a definition fitting within an economist practice that reduces environmental issues to costs and benefits. On the other hand, in the new definition, there is evidence that ecocentric resistance politics is arguing within the economic discourse, arguing for environmental protection by saying that it can also generate income. In an effort to mobilize support from a wider range of people and policy makers, what had earlier been a serious conflict, gets turned around,, and becomes re-framed as a solution. It became one solution to economic stagnation in the EC context.

This type of understanding of environmental problems puts economic and ecological priorities on an equal footing and recognizes the interdependence between the two. It is illustrated by the following statement from the Fourth Action Programme:

> Whilst it is true that there can be no sound environmental policy unless, at the same time, there is progress on the economic and social front, it is equally true that there can be no lasting economic and social progress unless environmental considerations are taken into account and are indeed seen as an essential part of economic and social development (Annex,2.3.1.).

It is then left to each policy maker, politician or industrialist to make the decision which of the two goals to prioritize. This type of statement does not provide any guidelines what to prioritize; it simply says that they are equally important. Since economic concerns have traditionally been the most prioritized, one would expect that they would continue to be so.

Policy makers in the Community were influenced by the Brundtland report and particularly by the re-conceptualization of environmental problems in economic terms. However, some other aspects of that report were lost on the way. One such aspect was

the issue of equity—equity for future generations, for poorer countries, for disadvantaged groups, and equity in resource use—none of which had an impact on the definition of environmental problems in the EC at the time.

Globalization—Environmental Problems are Everywhere and Nowhere

"Some of these problems are, by their very nature, international (or even global) in character" (Com. report 1992:117). While this can be claimed to be, by now, a truism, the term global is ambiguous. Today it is obvious that pollution affects many areas of the world; in that, the problems are global. However, they do not have a global origin. They have mainly been generated due to the lifestyles of the industrialized world (McLaughlin 1993:63-82).

The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio is considered a milestone in articulating and shaping the most recent problem definitions. The Brundtland report had brought up and introduced the idea of equity in the environmental debate. UNCED included representatives from the 'South' who were anxious to introduce questions about responsibility and justice on the environment and development agenda. The representatives from the industrialized 'North' were more interested in discussing nature conservation issues (Sachs 1993:6).

How the responsible subjects: organizations—groups of people, particular states or firms—were made partly invisible at UNCED, is exemplified by what was *not* brought up for discussion. During the conference, delegates were provided with materials that dealt with biodiversity but did not discuss agribusiness.[85] The material dealt with climate change problems but not with the extensive use of cars and trucks. Agenda 21, the strategy which came out of the process, had a section on women but lacked one on men. It had a section on enabling the poor to achieve sustainable livelihoods but nothing demanding the rich[86] to do so (Hildyard 1993:22-23).

The most recent trend is to perceive environmental problems as very complex and dispersed. They are being generated in many sectors—industry, agriculture, tourism—in many different processes of production and consumption, in different

[85]In 1990 the agribusiness sector of the EC consumed 57% of the Community Budget (Com. report 1992:79-80,130-134).

[86]Recall that the American President George Bush stated at the UNCED conference that the American lifestyle was not up for discussion.

geographical locations, by individuals, collectives, companies and nation-states. Environmental problems seem to be everywhere. At the same time they are nowhere, because in this perception there is no clearly defined culprit. No one person, group, state, bureaucracy or firm is pointed out as responsible. The idea of responsibility is quite weak in the current debate in the Community and in the Western world in general, in contrast to the early understanding of pollution as point-source, when it was rather easy to point to particular actors as responsible.

In the Community we see evidence of this in the Task Force Report of 1990. It is beyond doubt that the completion of the internal market leads to the increase of transport and traffic. These sectors are major contributors to CO_2 emissions (but also NO_X and SO_X) that cause major environmental problems, often known as climate change, eutrophication and acidification. These emissions come almost exclusively from the burning of fossil fuels, be it in industry, transportation or agriculture. It is recognized as a problem for the expanding Community:

> /The/ supply and demand effects will together lead to an increase in traffic which will in turn tend to increase harmful emissions...and also energy consumption...The liberalization of the skies over Europe..will tend to increase flights on the already most crowded airspace in the world (Task Force Report 1990:74, 99).

However, the problem is framed as the lack of technical advancement to reduce pollution, rather than a problem of lifestyles or the extensive use of cars, trucks or airplanes.

In the Community report to UNCED of 1992, the problem of burning of fossil fuels is framed as having to do with lack of technology or appropriate technology, and still very little if anything to do with matters of lifestyle or consumption (Com. report 1992:37,50,51,58,62). Hence, the problem is framed within a modernist discourse. Environmental degradation can be controlled, managed and resolved, if we only wait for science to come up with new technical discoveries.

The Commission report to UNCED naturally discusses global environmental issues as well as the Communities' relationship with less developed countries. The report is self-congratulatory, i.e., it states how much has been done towards these countries in terms of aid, transfer of technology, etc. It does not in any way convey that the industrial countries have a particular responsibility. Yet, the same report explicitly states that the Community is dependent on extra-community sources for 45% of its energy and almost 75% of its raw materials (Com. report 1992:110). According to an

ecocentric problem definition, it is the use of energy, or the burning of fossil fuels and the resulting emissions that is responsible for global warming; and it is the overuse of raw materials that leads to resource depletion. In the Commission's report to UNCED, the general message is that the Western industrialized countries are more conscious and respectful of the environment. There is no recognition that the industrialized countries have caused most of the problems. Around 80% of the world's resources are being used by 20% of the world's population in the industrialized world (Banuri 1993:50-51).

Ecocentric resistance politics, while informing the problem definitions of the Community, are only selectively adopted. The issue of equity and responsibility, or which groups ought to bear the biggest burden due to their rather obvious role in environmental degradation and resource depletion, is still kept hidden and invisible.

Current Economic, Political and Administrative Practices as the Problem

Through a careful analysis of the Commission report of 1992 to UNCED, it is possible to see the beginning of a change in direction in the framing of environmental problems. In this report the view on pollution from transportation has changed. Previously, it was seen as a lack of the appropriate emission technology. In 1992 it is instead the modes of transportation in our society, i.e., cars, trucks and airplanes, that generate pollution. It is however, expressed in very cryptic terms: "The basic choice of mode of transport needs to be supplemented by the appropriate measures to reduce...the impact of the chosen mode on the environment" (Com. report 1992:90). The cryptic formulation in an otherwise quite accessible text, suggests that at the time, the issue was either yet not fully understood or a very sensitive topic.

While the Commission report to UNCED presented the view of environmental problems in the Community, related to global context, the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (Council resolution 93/C 138/01) is a policy declaration and a strategy aimed at the Community and the Member States internally. The Fifth Environmental Action Programme should be perceived as a major change in the way problems are perceived. The change in problem definition is explicitly stated: "/T/he real problems which cause environmental loss and damage, are the current patterns of human consumption and behavior" (COM (92) 23 final-vol.II, 27.03.92:5).

This programme is also self-critical, in that it views the almost exclusive reliance on legislative measures coming from an authoritative elite at the top as a major administrative flaw. This elitism has excluded other societal actors who have felt alienated from the discussion. Furthermore, it has contributed to the conflictual and contradictory thinking around economic and ecological concerns, expressed in the Programme in the following way: "there has been a tendency to view industrialization or economic development and environmental concern as being mutually hostile" (ibid., 28). We see here an explicit challenge to economist practices and to the bureaucratic practices, or traditional administrative features, which have not adequately addressed these problems in the past.

In the Fifth Environmental Action Programme the view is that economic goals and environmental goals are not competing or equally important; instead, a clean environment and the access to resources are necessary for industrial practices (ibid., 28-29). The perception expressed here is that environmentally sound practices are essential to industrial development, because the access to resources is the base for industrial activities. When it comes to energy, the problem is that the energy sector has not borne its full cost, which has led to excessive and wasteful uses of energy (ibid., 329). Ecocentric ideas have been influential in the argument to place access to resources and nature as the prime concerns, as the basis for economic and industrial activity. It has been possible because of the way that participants have argued with the industrial sector of Europe. They have used economic terminology, models and calculations, hence, they have discussed environmental issues within the economist discourse.[87] In this way ecocentric resistance have challenged economism, but within its own logic.

Moreover, the Fifth Environmental Action programme recognizes, and clearly states, that transportation is a major source of pollution: "Emissions of transport—primarily road and air traffic—represent a very high share of the overall emissions...80%/of the/ emissions arise from road transport and more than 55% from the private car alone" (ibid., 33). The problem in the agricultural sector is expressed as being to a large degree the result of the Community's own policy on agriculture (CAP). Its goals have been short-term economic gains, and the mechanisms proposed and used have led to over-intensification, "overexploitation and the degradation of the natural resources on which agriculture ultimately depends: soil, water and air" (ibid., 35). Thus, the

[87]Commission official, November 1992 and 1993.

criticism of Western lifestyles, prominent in ecocentric arguments, had also affected the discussions of the Community by the mid 1990s.

In this section we have shown how different ideas, as expressed in the international context, have been important to the definition of problems in the Community context. The 'Limits to Growth' report, the Stockholm conference, the Brundtland Commission and the UNCED process have been discussed. The ideas expressed here have served to raise problem awareness and as an encouragement for Community agenda setting. The thoughts in these texts have only partly been embraced. Different reports coming from the Commission show similar problem definitions. However, they have been adapted to a Western context where aspects of population control, responsibility, resource use and 'northern' lifestyles have been largely non-issues in the Community. The Fifth Environmental Action Programme marks a turning point in the way that it imagines the relationship between ecology and economy, since it locates the problems within Western lifestyles and Western economic, administrative and political systems. In this way it arguably embodies some important ecocentric ideas.

Reactive Problem Framing

In general, environmental catastrophes lead to an awareness that renders breaking points and the recoil effect of nature more visible (Murphy 1994:25). Along with catastrophes, events can put the spotlight on an issue and, often through the media, attract attention from policy makers and the public. Re-active politics are often framed in risky, immediate and urgent terms. There is more emphasis on the urgency to act rather than on the definition of what the problem is.

Focusing Events

Different events and catastrophes have been important when it comes to the introduction of specific initiatives and have had a catalytic effect on Community environmental policy. In discussing the importance of catastrophes and events to the setting of the EC agenda, I only account for those events and catastrophes which have had an impact on problem perception to the degree that they have eventually been recognized in some type of Community action or policy. In the following I will describe a number of such focusing events.

The oil crisis (1973-74) was one such important event that was felt all over the Western world. Since the oil crisis coincided with the sudden flowering of concern for 'limits to growth,' as had been predicted in the Club of Rome report, it was naturally associated with general concerns for resource depletion.[88]

Very salient and visible was the stinking, dirty, brown foam that covered the surface of many European rivers in the early 1970s. It attracted considerable attention from policy participants and eventually led to the directive 73/404 regulating detergents in water (Haigh 1990:30-31). The foam was just one visible aspect of river pollution. A few years later, the severe pollution of major European rivers such as the Rhine, the Scheldt and the Themes was becoming increasingly obvious and extensively publicized, and could no longer be completely ignored.[89]

Another example is the presence of 'red mud' in the Mediterranean sea that had originated from emissions of titanium dioxide into the same water. The emissions that were particularly noticeable came from the Montedison factory in Scarlino, Italy, and became such a focusing event. The presence of this red mud led to violent protest on Corsica in 1972 and to Greenpeace activities both in Germany and in the UK.[90] This is an example of how resistance groups can mobilize around such an event and influence politics.

A blowout at the Ekofisk oil field in Norway and perhaps most importantly, the Amoco Cadiz wreck and oil spill off the Brittany coast of France in March 1978 attracted the attention of the Commission (Com. report 1992:56) which rather rapidly produced a resolution on a programme to reduce oil pollution at sea (OJ C162 8.7.78). Furthermore, the Amoco Cadiz accident turned out to be a great push for water legislation, according to a Commission staff member.[91]

A fire broke out in the Sandoz warehouse in Basel in 1987. It led to the leak of tons of highly toxic chemicals into the upper reaches of the Rhine River and made it apparent that it was not exclusively sea water that could be affected by toxic emissions. This

[88]In a reaction to the oil crises the Community decided to undertake a series of audits of the major energy consuming industries. It set up the international energy cooperation programme which encouraged technology transfers, research and training with Latin America, Asia, the Southern Mediterranean and more recently, Eastern and Central Europe (Com. report 1992:93,96).

[89]It led to the directive 76/464 on dangerous substances in water (Haigh 1990:71-72).

[90]Eventually there was an EC directive: 78/176 on the emission of titanium dioxide in water (Haigh 1990:112).

[91]Commission official, November 1993.

encouraged the inclusion of inland waters in legislation as well as the regulation of the emission of chemicals into water in general (Com. report 1992:35; Haigh 1990:263,377).[92]

There was a major accident in Italy in July 1976, when dioxin escaped from a factory in Seveso (Strigini 1983:16-21). There had also been other incidents in Flixborough, UK in 1974 and another one in Beek in the Netherlands in 1975. These accidents showed that existing control mechanisms on industrial activities were insufficient and also prompted EC to legislate. The most publicized and often cited incident was the Seveso accident, which led to what is commonly called the Seveso directive (82/501) on controls of hazardous industrial installations (von Moltke 1983:14-16; Com. report 1992:35; Haigh 1990:254-263).

The directive 84/631 on the trans-frontier shipment of toxic waste and its subsequent amendments were preceded by various well publicized events. For example, forty-one drums containing toxic waste from the Seveso plant were lost in transit from Italy to France. In addition to this, a UK company was caught while importing toxic waste from the Netherlands.

A very dramatic catastrophe was the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986. This accident had important impacts on policy making in the EC and in the Member States. Indirectly, it influenced Europeans on the grassroot level, providing an impetus and electoral base for green parties both in national parliaments and in the European parliament. More directly, it pointed out the lack of facilities for monitoring and gathering data on the environment, since there were no provisions to collect and monitor such data within the European institutions (Brown 1994:30).[93] The problem in connection with the Chernobyl accident was thus perceived in DG XI as having to do with the lack of monitoring capacity and did not lead to a direct questioning of the use of nuclear energy in Europe.[94]

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[92]Directive 88/610 (Com. report 1992:35; Haigh 1990:263,377).

[93]As a way to resolve that problem a decision was taken in the Council to set up a European Environmental Agency (regulation 1210/90).

[94]In a communication to the Council on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, the Commission announced its intention to develop a proposal for a coherent policy aimed at the protection of workers, the public and the environment (COM (86) 327 final). It culminated in a Commission document: Assurance of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants of 1989. There was also a regulation adopted in 1988 which sets maximum radioactive levels permitted in certain foods (Com. report, 1992:42-43). Following the accident the Commission launched ten multinational projects for assessing the consequences of the accident (EUR-OP News 1996, vol 5, no 1, p 5).

Animal welfare issues are often considered part of the environmental agenda; that is also the case in the Community. There was general public disquiet with the annual hunting of migratory birds, a tradition that was very common in the southern part of Europe. Discontent grew in 1971 when the hunting of migratory birds was perceived as slaughter rather than hunting. The European Parliament received a petition from an international animal protection organization, Save the Migratory Birds.[95]

Likewise there was a widespread repugnance at the annual killing of seal pups, which had been highly publicized in connection with Greenpeace campaigns to protect the seals (Wapner 1996:66). That this was an important concern among the population of Europe was reflected in a petition with three million signatures handed to the European Parliament. It affected the Commission which drafted proposals that resulted in two directives 83/129 and 85/444 banning the import of skins from seal pups.

Different incidents and catastrophic events of high visibility have been shown to have an important impact on the Community agenda. The definitions associated with these events seem to be more on an urgency to act, rather than developed and well thought through perceptions of environmental problems. There is no evidence that these catastrophes have led to any significant re-framing of environmental problems. Perhaps an exception was the Bhopal catastrophe.[96] A staff member suggested that Bhopal had led to a general understanding that practices in the Western world can have implications far beyond the borders.

These incidents come as a result of everyday practices in society, when there are flaws in the management of these practices. In this sense catastrophes and other focusing events challenge the core of modernist as well as scientific practices, because they expose that the world cannot be controlled, predicted and managed (McLaughlin 1993:83-98). Paradoxically, it is often that same science which monitors and reveals the flaws. Media play a critical role to the publicity of such events and to the ecocentric resistances. Media seem to be a critical instrument for attitude formation. Although media are far from an unbiased vehicle for communication, since events are picked and reported according to specific requirements regarding both form and content, there seems to be no way to actually predict whether a publicized event

[95]This eventually led to EEC action with the approval of the directive 79/409 on the conservation of wild birds.

[96]The leak of methylisocyanate from the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India, spurned the regulation of chemical emission with the directive 85/572.

will lead to mobilization among the viewers or not (Szasz 1994:42-56). Media appear to play an important role in focusing attention on a particular event or incident. The ecocentric resistances can then formulate a problem definition around such a focus point, or even organize themselves to make a protest or sign a petition. It also seems that the more organized resistances, such as Greenpeace and other Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs), are well aware of the attitude transforming power of media and make use of them to mobilize support and define problems for political agendas. However, as it appears from the research results, there is no apparent change in overall politics regarding the environment as an effect of this type of reactive politics.

National Legislation and International Conventions

While catastrophic events and incidents have shown to be very influential in problem framing, national legislation can also aid in focusing attention to a particular problem definition. Commission staff has claimed that international agreements, as well as national legislation in different countries, can be such events that trigger EC legislative activities.

Although legislation in the US and other non-member countries has given rise to reactions within EC institutions, Member States' draft legislation is the most prominent contributor to this type of problem definition. National legislation can be defined as a problem when it creates obstacles to trade and inhibits free competition between Member States. In 1983 there was a Council directive—the standstill directive—which required that Member States introducing new legislation that could possibly effect the common market, must notify the Commission which should be given time to react and decide whether Community action would be more appropriate (Directive 83/189). A similar agreement of 1973 regarded the notification to the Commission in cases that individual Member States were approving environmental legislation that could effect the other Member States and the working of the common market (OJ C9, 15.3.1973:1;OJ C86, 20.7.1974:2). In a sense we can say that the provision for reactive policies, regarding Member State legislation, has been institutionalized through these agreements and directives.[97]

[97]This also applies to the preparation of technical regulations in Member States (directive 88/182).

A specific example of this was when the French had formulated a decree on surface water for drinking. This inspired the Commission to make a proposal on the same subject (Haigh 1990:35).[98] Similarly, the framework directive (75/442) on waste was inspired by a piece of German legislation on waste, together with the Bill for the Control of Pollution Act, discussed in the UK. The French were also at the time considering a draft on waste disposal (Haigh 1990:134).

The problem of storing, treating and handling toxic and dangerous waste was on the agenda of several states in the early 1970s. There was a Belgian law from 1974, regulating toxic waste, a French one of 1975 and the UK Control of Pollution Act (Haigh 1990:137). Legislation in Member States encouraged the Commission to discuss joint EEC action on toxic waste.[99] Similarly, the directive 75/439 on the disposal of waste oils came as a reaction to the German law of 1968, a Dutch legislative proposal as well as a piece of French draft legislation. Furthermore, the directive 85/339 on containers for liquids was inspired by the bottle bill in Oregon, USA in 1972, and more importantly, the Danish government's proposal to introduce legislation on bottles (Haigh 1990:166).

When we are considering this type of environmental politics as reactive, we are looking at it strictly from the perspective of the Community institutions. In the domestic setting these draft proposals or pieces of legislation have been preceded by extensive negotiations, conflicts and compromises between different groups.

International agreements have had similar effects. Since the Member States are signatory parts to international conventions, agreements have to be implemented on the national level. How such conventions are implemented in national legislation is entirely up to the signatory states themselves.[100] Hence, international agreements can become a problem for the Community, as it seeks to anticipate and prevent separate and conflicting individual state legislation that can interfere with the internal market.

The Paris, Rhine and Strasbourg conventions regulate the emission of dangerous substances in water. The Member States were negotiating parties to these

[98]Approved by the Council as directive 75/440.

[99]Resulting in the directive 78/319.

[100]The development of the external powers of the EC has been mainly through court decisions by the European Court of Justice (Case 22/70, ECR 1971 263) which ruled that when there are binding EC measures in a particular field then the Community automatically gets the powers to act externally in that field (DG XI official, January 1996).

conventions. Since international agreements are to be implemented on the national level by the contracting parties, the EEC directive 76/464 was proposed and adopted as a way of anticipating and avoiding individual and different legislation in the individual Member States. Later, but again inspired by the Rhine and Paris conventions, was the directive 83/513 on the emission of cadmium in water.

Sweden initiated a discussion of the acid rain problem in OECD in 1967. The debate on the gravity of acidification and its possible effects has been continuing in OECD since that time, in the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and in various other arenas. In June 1982 there was an important ministerial conference in Stockholm on acidification. At this time, acid rain had been understood as the problem causing the death of forests in Germany. Hence, Germany submitted a memorandum on the topic to the Council (Lundgren 1991:195-197). Against this background the Commission felt encouraged to regulate the emissions from industrial plants and to propose air quality standards for NO_X (cf. Com. report 1992:60).[101]

A protocol to the Vienna Convention was adopted in Montreal 1987. The EC had decision competence, together with the individual Member States, in a so-called mixed agreement[102] that was ratified by EC in December of 1988. According to this convention, the Council passed issued Regulation 3322/88 requiring manufacturers to cut CFC[103] production by 50% by the end of the century (Haigh 1990:377). The EU, together with the Member States, is a signatory part to the convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) of 1982. It gave rise to no less than eleven different regulations to assure uniform application of the regulation and licensing for the trade in endangered species (Haigh 1990:307-308)

OECD issued recommendations in 1974 on the environmental effects of chemicals. In EEC there was a directive dating back to 1967 which concerned the classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous substances. The directive, which had been amended five times, was not strictly an environmental directive since it regulated chemicals to protect "man in the workplace". The sixth amendment of 79/83 introduced an environmental aspect to this piece of EEC legislation. The perception of

[101]These suggestions were eventually adopted in directive 84/360 and 85/203, later also in directive 88/609 regulating air emissions from large combustion plants.

[102]It is called a mixed agreements and is the most common form of agreement in the relationship between EC and international environmental agreements. In other areas of external policies EC has sole competency for the particular issue (Haigh 1991:173).

[103]CFC = chlorofluorocarbons.

the problem in EEC at the time, was not solely based on an increasing concern for the environmental effects of the use of chemicals. There also appeared to be a problem related to OECD recommendations, since they could provide a potential impetus to the Member States to take action on chemical regulation on their own. Instead, EEC acted early to avoid conflicting legal constraints which could appear with individual legislation in Member States.

There was an intergovernmental meeting in Munich in 1978 which recommended precautionary methods to reduce CFCs. This discussion was the precursor to the directive 80/372 and a number of subsequent directives regulating chlorofluorocarbons in the environment. The fact that a global convention on the protection of the ozone layer was being drafted by UNEP in 1982 gave the Commission incentive to propose a directive (82/795) on the consolidation of precautionary measures on CFCs.[104]

When ECE developed regulation on the emissions from motor vehicles, it led to a fear that Member States, following those recommendations, would adopt more stringent measures that would create barriers to trade. Hence, the Council approved the directive 70/220 against air pollution by petrol engines.

Reactive problem definitions are very rudimentary, ad hoc ways of tackling often urgent events and protests, exogenous to the political institutions. Reactive politics accentuates the sense of risk, chaos and the lack of control of society and nature. Most dramatic, of course, are hazardous events and public uproar. Less so is the threat of Member State policies and international treaties, which might interfere with free trade and competition, the working of the internal market and ultimately, endanger the process of integration in the Community. Community responses and reactions to Member States' legislation and international agreements are in many ways a preventive or anticipatory measure to further integration.

Environmental resistances in the form of NGOs and green parties have used reactive politics as a venue for mobilization, both in being visible at these events and in exploring incidents to further their cause. Also national legislation and the implementation of international convention can be, and have been, used by Member States to push the political agenda in a particular direction and pressure the

[104]There is much more to the role of EC in international negotiations on ozone protection, see for example Jachtenfuchs 1990.

Commission to propose similar legislation at the EU level. The Member States with the most progressive or developed environmental policies domestically have been known to do so in the past and can be suspected to continue to do so in the future (Andersen & Liefferink 1997).

Non-environmental Problem Definitions

Environmental solutions in the Community have not necessarily been based on problem definitions that put resource depletion and environmental degradation in focus. Such non-environmental problem definitions are particularly noticeable in the early stages of environmental policy making in the Community. In other words, environmental strategies or solutions were coupled with problems that did not have much, or anything, to do with a specific environmental condition or problem formulation. Thus, this part of the research supports the temporal sorting model's view, that problems and solutions are coupled in unpredictable ways.

Problems with Integration

During the Community's foundational period from 1958 to the mid 1970s (Weiler 1991; Sands 1991) problem perception and framing were related to the general EEC developments. In 1967 the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied for membership and there was an urgency and a willingness to show that EEC was actually active in important policy areas, especially since the negotiations with Britain were difficult and Denmark was interested the social dimensions of EEC policy. At this point there was no general environmental problem awareness to speak about nor any EEC environmental legislation.[105] There were a few local organizations in the Member States and some isolated environmental policies, but there was no wide consensus among the Member States or other European states about an urgent problem.

[105]The directive (67/548/EEC) regulating the classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous substances, has only with the sixth amendment (79/831/EEC) become a directive with intentions to directly protect the environment. The initial directive and its amendments were geared toward protecting 'man' (wording in the directive) in the workplace (Haigh 1990:235).

In the late sixties the Italian Commissioner for DG III, Altiero Spinelli, communicated to his fellow commissioners that the environment was a question which should be considered at the EEC level.[106] Whether Spinelli perceived environmental problems as increasingly urgent to deal with per se, or whether he saw this in the light of Community action, is not clear. One suggestion has been that he foresaw a problem with the stagnation in the European integration process.[107] Spinelli's federalist vision contained the notion of crisis exploitation. This strategy meant that the Community, in moments of tension, could rely on a collective European political will and hence could make opportunist progress by jumping forward at exceptional moments (Burgess 1989:56,73,134). The integration process of the Community had come to some sort of standstill, and there was a need to show that EEC was an active organization. The Community project had from its beginning clear ambitions to tie the previously bellicose states in Europe closer to each other by continuously extending the areas of cooperation.

There was also an organizational problem because with the addition of three new Member States in 1973, there had to be some positions and tasks for the representatives from these new Member States who had to be accommodated within the EEC institutional framework. The problem arose again when Greece became a member in 1981, and was then coupled with the creation of a new Directorate General for the Environment out of the existing Service. With the addition of new members—Spain and Portugal—and later—Austria, Finland and Sweden—the same need to create new staff position within the Commission gave rise to new areas of concern, resulting in more issues on the agenda of DG XI.

Obstacles to Trade

In 1967 there was a discussion in the Commission, very much inspired by reports that had come from OECD. The suggestion was that the national environmental policies that were being legislated and implemented in the Western world, for example in the US, in Sweden and Denmark, could create barriers to free trade. It raised fears and attracted the attention of some key individuals within the EEC institutions who realized that such environmental policies could indeed create obstacles to open

[106]DG XI official, November 1993.
[107]DG XI official, November 1993.

exchanges and free trade, intended to flourish between the EEC countries. This problem definition certainly attracted attention since one main purpose of the EEC was to integrate the Member States economically by removing trade barriers and not by the creation of new ones.

Since environmental concerns were not expressed in the Treaties, there were no provisions that EEC could act on such matters, i.e., it was difficult to argue for environmental policy as another field of EEC activities. All proposals must be based on the Treaties. Were it not for the idea proposed originally in OECD that environmental measures in individual Member States could create obstacles to free trade within EEC, then there would have been little opportunity to bring the issue on the EEC agenda. Yet such a definition of the problems had its limitations, since only those issues that could convincingly be related to trade could be considered. In any case, this opened up a back door allowing for environmental policy to enter the Community. It was also used strategically in this way.

These problem definitions were present in the different EEC circles during the foundational period. Other definitions of the problem naturally coexisted with these.

Expansion of the Internal Market

Much later, at the initiative of the environmental ministers in the Council in October 1988, a task force was set up with the duty "to identify and consider the implications of the environmental issues arising from the completion of the Internal Market" (Task Force Report 1990:V). Being a Council initiative, it takes a self-reflecting stance by analyzing inter-community developments while putting the goals and ideas of the internal market under scrutiny. In the Task Force Report, the problem which had been identified was the expansion of the internal market, particularly as envisioned and understood through the Cecchini report.[108] The Task Force Report starts form the Cecchini predictions regarding the internal market. It considers both the static effects—such as the removal of border controls, technical standards, regulations and fiscal provisions[109] and the dynamic effects—the possibilities and opportunities that

[108]The Cecchini Report is the popular name for the Commission report "The Economics of 1992" published in *European Economy*, no. 35, March 1988. It analyzed and forecasted the future trends of the expansion of the markets.

[109]The use of borders to control, for example, the movements of hazardous wastes and endangered species are important. Standards and regulations have been used to ensure that products fulfill

the internal market creates, and the spatial effects that have to do with the relationships between the regions within the Community. The expansion of the internal market is the problem which is explicitly defined, framed and argued in the Task Force Report.

A close reading of the text confuses the picture somewhat. From the way that the arguments are posed it seems as if there is another underlying problem. This is the fear that important economic interests of the Community are feeling threatened by environmental restrictions. Rather than actually criticizing the effects of increasing movements of goods within the Community, which the report sets as its task, the emphasis in the text is on convincing and conveying the message that environmental regulations will not interfere with the completion of the internal market, but can instead create new opportunities for growth. Hence, the most important problem perception seems to be what is also stated as a central issue regarding environmental policies: "the linkage between economic growth and environmental impacts" (Task Force Report 1990:8). Despite the rather modest aim, the report was never officially recognized or accepted by the Commission.

Concluding Discussion

We have seen so far that it is possible to perceive of different and evolving definitions of environmental problems. The various definitions of environmental problems range from a lack of resources, unfortunate side effects of industrial processes, lack of management of technology to being the effects of economic, social and political practices of the industrialized age. Economist practices, in the Community articulated as a preoccupation with free trade, economic growth and the internal market have put the relationship between economic and environmental concerns at the center of problem definition. Some substantial changes in the problem definition, as framed from this perspective, have taken place. It seems as if ecocentric resistances have slowly, by working within the economist logic, influenced the balance of priorities in the way economy and environment is perceived.

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environmental standards which have been considered acceptable in a particular member country. Fiscal provisions have been used by Member States to encourage as well as discourage environmentally acceptable production processes and consumption patterns, such as reduced taxes on cars with catalytic converters.

Perhaps most surprising in this project is the revelation of how extremely important catastrophic events and accidents can be in generating policy responses. The environmental politics in the Community has been of a reactive kind to a surprising extent. Many of the directives and regulations have either come as a result of catastrophes and incidents or as a reaction to individual Member State legislation and, in some cases, to international conventions that have been signed by Member States. It has been a matter for the Commission, the Council and even the European Parliament to react to the Member States' environmental legislation or to anticipate legislation that might interfere with the Community objectives: i.e., increasing trade and economic growth and eliminate trade barriers or obstacles to trade.

It is quite evident that the ecocentric resistances have also more indirectly, by way of the Club of Rome report, Stockholm conference, the Brundtland Commission and the UNCTAD process, influenced the reflective type of problem framing by providing important conceptualizations of what an environmental problem is. Even though we cannot say that ecocentric ideas have dominated the Community when it comes to the understanding the problems of the wo/man/nature relationship, it has stimulated the thinking on environmental problems.

Regarding reactive politics, resistances have been influential insofar that their strategies, at least the late 1980s until today, have relied heavily on media coverage and on the focus and mobilization on particular problem spots, challenging the idea that modern societies are able to manage and control their industrial processes and their relationships to the environment.

Chapter Six
The Solution Stream

According to the temporal sorting model, solutions flow in an independent stream and only now and then get hooked to problems and participants. Just as we have indicators pointing to a great number of potential problems in the world, in Europe and in the member states, we also find ready solutions floating around in the context in which policy making takes place. In the Community context there are a large number of solutions coming from a range of different policy-generating settings.

One aim in this chapter is to discuss some of the most important solutions that have been generated as environmental policies in the Community since the early 1970s until the mid 1990s. The following threefold categorization of these solutions is proposed: Environmental approaches and principles, organizational strategies and steering mechanisms.

Approaches and principles are the categories of solutions that embody the more general perspective on how environmental problems can be resolved. Here we can also see a development over time, to a great extent based on policy learning and reflection over previous strategies. It is in this category we also find symbolic politics. There are many pious declarations and principles which have not yet been implemented. Whether they remain symbolic depends on the relationship between power practices and resistances. Another ambition in this chapter is to analyze the relationships and contradictions between resistance politics and power practices that are reflected in these solutions.

Organizational strategies represent a category of solutions that is of an introspective kind. It concerns the organization of the administrative levels, looking at how the organization can support (or defeat) the environmental approaches and principles. Finally, the *steering mechanisms* have to do with the different means proposed to carry out environmental goals.

This chapter will, thus, present and analyze a number of solutions that have been adopted in the Community. They will be presented in such a way that it is possible to see the progress of environmental strategies over time.

Environmental Approaches and Principles

By the early 1970s it was clear that some environmental objectives and principles, on which actions could be based, were needed. This was particularly important since the Treaty had no provisions for environmental policy making in the Community context. The UN conference on the human environment had taken place in Stockholm in 1972 and was important because it provided a framework for environmental policies and proposed certain strategies. These principles[110] were discussed at the intergovernmental meeting in Bonn a few months later and subsequently became the principles of the First Environmental Action Programme. The political will of the Community to act in the environmental field was confirmed at the Paris Summit, in the fall of 1972. It naturally gave a push to the ongoing negotiations of the First Environmental Action Programme. The principles suggested in the First Action Programme were rather straightforward common-sense principles. This was the purpose; to show those who were skeptical that any proposals coming out of the Commission would be based on common sense.[111]

At the time, environmental issues were contested in the Community context for basically two reasons: legalistically, because it had no mention in the Treaties; and due to sovereignty practices, because the member states were not convinced that this was a matter apt for Community legislation. More or less all could agree that cooperation was needed to resolve some of the pollution problems. However, the Member States' positions were that the environment could best be served by intergovernmental, rather

[110]The principles were: pollution should be prevented at source, effects on the environment should be taken into account at the earliest possible stage, the polluter should pay, exploitation of nature must be avoided, the standard of scientific and technical knowledge should be improved, activities in one state must not cause any degradation of the environment in another state, environment policy must take into account the interests of the developing countries, effectiveness internationally will be improved by long term European environmental policy, the protection of the environment is a matter for all the Community, in each category of pollution it is necessary to establish the level of action, major aspects of environmental policy in individual countries must no longer be planned in isolation (O.J. 1973, C112/2).

[111]Commission official, November 1993.

than community policy.[112] The tendency to prefer intergovernmental cooperation to Community cooperation stemmed from the prevalent view of environmental issues as associated with nature conservation. Nature conservation is about resource management and land use which have traditionally been considered important territorial interests under the sovereign states' sole jurisdiction.

Environmental Action Programmes as Strategic Documents

The Action Programmes are strategic documents with general guidelines that propose a set of long-term solutions and, hence, a direction to Community environmental policy making. For various reasons, practical politics have taken legislation into other areas, and proposals have been initiated which have no mention in these programs. One reason for this is that the Action Programmes could not foresee future developments in terms of crises, catastrophes or other events when the Community was expected to act. Action Programmes were initiated "in the spirit of the 1960s when there was a sense that society could be created, arranged and developed."[113] This faith in planning and control was also reflected in the thinking of the environmentalism of the time (Adams 1990:39). The idea behind Action Programmes comes out of rationalist notions of society as organizable.

Once the first Action Programme had been drafted, it became a routine matter to continue to do so: new ones were produced out of habit.[114] As we have discussed in the preceding chapter, environmental problems have been defined in a reactive way. Many of the directives that have been proposed, outside the visions of the Action Programmes, are often responses to such unpredictable challenges.

On the other hand, the reason why some of the solutions proposed in the Action Programmes have not been turned into directives, or carried out in policy, is often that the political motivation is lacking among member states and policy participants. This has been possible because Action Programmes are only recommendations and not binding documents.[115]

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[112]Commission official, November 1993.
[113]NGO representative, November 1992.
[114]Commission official, November 1993.
[115]Commission official, November 1993.

However, the Action Programmes can be, and have been, used by various actors at different times to verify the relevance of an initiative or to show that the Council previously has committed itself, for example, to integration or to a sustainability approach. This has made it more difficult for the Council to refute a proposal. Since the Action Programmes are agreed-upon basic principles, participants turn to the Action Programmes to prepare for a resolution in the Council.[116] In this sense they can be used as a bargaining tool in the political process.

Perhaps more important is the fact that Action Programmes present a way to relate specific directives to a general plan. This gives more of a comprehensive perspective to the fragmentary nature of every-day policy making. The Action Programmes set the scene for the overall policy and are more strategic than operational programmes.[117]

The Polluter Pays Principle

The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) of the First Action Programme, became a guiding principle,[118] ever since it was brought up in the OECD in the late 1960s. It was later discussed among the environmental ministers at a conference in Bonn when the aim was to try to establish principles that could guide environmental proposals.[119] The PPP is a principle which deals with responsibility for pollution and resource depletion. The principle establishes that it is the polluter who is responsible and should pay for any damages to the natural environment.[120] It is thus a way to accentuate the responsibility of pollution generating activities—an important idea from a resistance perspective.

Alternatively, it can be understood as a way to internalize certain costs, i.e., that the polluter should bear costs of compliance with environmental regulations. Although still an important principle of environmental politics in general, it represents, in retrospect, a somewhat naive assumption that it is actually possible to clearly specify,

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[116]National representative, November 1993.

[117]National representative, November 1993.

[118]It is part of the Article 130r, § 2 of the Single European Act and of the Maastricht Treaty Article 130r, § 2.

[119]Commission official, November 1993.

[120]For an extensive discussion on the legal interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle in Community law, see Krämer 1992:244-264.

define and trace who the polluter is (cf. Krämer 1990:63)—quite a modernist assumption that does not consider the displacement effects of pollution, or pollution from diffuse sources,[121] which lead to very complicated investigations on culpability. Somehow it is also limited by economist practices, since it assumes that payments will do away with the problem. Despite these difficulties, the PPP approach continues to be an influential idea and an important vision about responsibility and liability for pollution. Furthermore, to use economic incentives to control the polluter has been shown to be an effective steering mechanism.

Sector Approaches

A sector approach to environmental problems is based on the early understanding of environmental problems as pipe-end problems; isolated and restricted phenomena. This approach is not unique for the Community, but clearly reflects the general environmental strategies of the time (cf. Weizsäcker 1994; Weale 1992; Lundqvist 1980). The first environmental legislation in the industrialized world began with regulation in the media water and air. This also applied to the Community where the majority of the proposals which have been accepted as Community legislation of some kind, i.e., mainly directives, have either regulated different types of water, different substances emitted into water or specific production processes affecting water.

Even though we can say that the Community has been very successful in regulating the water sector,[122] with a closer look we note that the regulation approved has been extremely isolated to particular substances and production processes. Again, this is not a phenomenon which is unique for the Community. Similar approaches were used in other Western European countries (Weizsäcker 1994:13-22). The innovative solutions of the 1970s came with administrative legislation within the media water and air. This was followed by the control of chemicals and waste. A sector approach fits well with the bureaucratic practices of sectorization, where complex problems are

[121]Examples of diffuse sources are consumption in the household, use of private cars, use of fertilizers in agriculture, while PPP applies mainly to pollution from one or a few sources, such as a paper-pulp factory.

[122]Successful means that a number of directives have been approved by the Council and is not related to whether it has been implemented or whether water pollution has been reduced.

segmented into parts to be resolved within an administrative organization and believed to be disaggregable into such parts.

The Preventive Approach

The limits of the media-specific approaches were recognized rather early, perhaps more in parlance than in practice. Prevention and precaution are based on ecocentric views that all of our actions effect the environment. Hence, we need to consider what these effects might be, *before* we go ahead with an activity, instead of waiting until the damage has already been done. It is really not until the mid 1980s that we see the development of solutions of a preventive kind (Weale 1992:96). This is exemplified by a number of directives and decisions that focus on monitoring and information gathering and exchange.[123]

Most typical of a preventive approach is Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA strategy requires that public authorities and developers investigate what likely consequences their activities have on the environment. The idea of such a directive was mentioned already in the Second Environmental Action Programme (1977), but the EIA proposal did not pass through the Council until 1985 (Dir. 85/337). It was clearly inspired by the US approach to environmental management and built on the EIA of the US National Environmental Policy Plan of 1969. At this time, there were no similar approaches in the legislation of the Member States to build on, but there was a considerable amount of internal discussions on the matter prior to the Commission's first proposal for a directive in 1980 (Westerlund 1991:58-62; Haigh 1990:352).

The long process of negotiations, which followed the initial proposal and the rather watered-down final directive of 1985, was due to a reluctance to give up sovereignty, and the effect of unanimity as a voting rule in the Council. None of my interview subjects within the environmental sector have been very eager to talk about this directive. It is probably due to its rather weak nature and the drawn-out policy process which preceded it. Furthermore, it seems bleak in comparison with EIA's relative

[123]Directive 90/313 on freedom to access of information. Directives D85/338 on information on the state of environment (CORINE), D77/795 on exchange of information on water, and resolution R3528/86 on the monitoring of forest damage.

success in the US[124] and with the experience in some of the member states with similar types of legislation.

The original proposals for an EIA, as expressed in the Second Action Programme, appeared as a trend breaker from the general pattern of reactive environmental policies of the seventies to a preventive and even anticipatory approach (Krämer 1990:16). As a general strategy, the objective of an EIA is to provide "decision makers with an indication of the likely consequences of their actions." Its greatest contribution may be the reduction of "adverse impacts before proposals come through to the authorization phase" (Wathern 1988:6). Such a strategy should identify and assess the environmental consequences of development projects, such as dams, highways and power stations. In the final version of the EIA directive of 1985, two obligations are imposed on the member states. One obligation is to undertake environmental impact assessments for all projects which are likely to have a significant effect on the environment; the other obligation is to consider the results of the EIA, paying particularly attention to the reactions with the public and competent environmental authorities (Com. report 1992:74). The projects which are subject to assessment are projects such as oil refineries, nuclear power stations, iron and steel works and construction of highways and airports.[125]

Although member states, according to the EC directive, are required to produce EIA reports, it still remains a minimum directive. This means that the member states can freely determine how this is to be implemented at the national level. They also have the possibility to exempt projects from the provisions of the directives. The UK representatives profited from this option and moved the Channel Tunnel proposal out of the established development control procedures, hence managing to avoid an EIA (Wathern 1988:208).

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[124]The EC version of EIA it is not identical to the US version since the US EIA applies to federal agencies only and requires that these agencies produce the report. In the EC the responsibility of reporting rests with the developers of these grand scale projects subject to EIA, who are required to produce information and do the assessment (Haigh 1990:352). One of the reasons for this is the difference in US/EC political and administrative systems. The constitutional and legal system in the US provides the opportunities to challenge and overturn administrative decisions (Weale 1992:172-175). EIA in the European context could not rely on such systems of litigation and, thus, after almost a decade of discussions, the EC EIA became the responsibility of the developers.

[125]A complete list would include: large thermal power stations, installations for storage or disposal of radioactive waste, installations for extracting and processing asbestos, integrated chemical installations, construction of railway lines, trading ports and inland waterways as well as installations for incineration, treatment or landfill of hazardous waste (O.J. L175, 28.5.85, Annex I).

EIA is strongly linked to physical planning, the physical territory and the natural resources of the member states. This means that member states that are not willing to give up sovereignty are also reluctant to an EIA that is sanctioned by the Community.[126] The Danish representatives were against the EIA during Council deliberations, because they argued that it would undermine the power of the Danish parliament to approve or disapprove development projects (Wathern 1988:200).

EIA is a tool in showing how costly projects are, in terms of environmental damage, health effects and resource depletion, at an early stage of the development process. While the EIA strategy moves in the direction of a more integrated and preventive strategy, it is only a small step, because if we look at the projects which are subject to EIA, they are extremely environmentally hazardous to start with.

EIA is a way to anticipate the side effects of modern life and make some small remedies along the way to 'progress'. These types of grand-scale projects and installations are taken for granted or as a necessary evil. As long as EIA does not apply more broadly to the assessment of even smaller-scale land-use projects, such as urban planning, it is merely a band-aid solution. EIA is in this way a technocratic approach, which involves instrumental and managerial resource-use planning of nature and has not moved much in the direction of questioning the need for these types of large projects, in the first place (Jackson 1994:117). Thus, from an ecocentric perspective EIA is more a demonstration of business as usual than a radical change of politics. Accordingly, discussions ought to be concerned with ways of reducing the environmental effects of old plants and industries of this kind before thinking about building new ones.

The development and discussion of the preventive approach continues in the Commission with the amendment of the EIA in the spring of 1996 and with the focus on Strategic Environmental Assessment. This strategy suggests that an environmental assessment be made at the decision-making level rather than at the project level. It refers to a "formalized, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the environmental impacts of a policy, plan or programme and its alternatives" (Wilson 1994:1). As such, it seems to be more of an actual prevention effort, since it also allows for the questioning of the projects themselves.

[126]NGO representative, November 1993.

The Inclusion of Approaches in the Treaty

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 was, for a number of reasons, very important for the development of environmental politics within the Community. Most importantly, environmental concerns were given a legal standing. The SEA Article 130r-t was introduced to the Treaty together with the new cooperation procedure with the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council. Tightly coupled with the changes in the Treaty was the completion of the internal market, one of the main ambitions of the SEA (cf. Haigh & Baldock 1989:12).[127]

The following principles achieved legal standing with article 130r of the Single European Act: the polluter should pay, preventive action should be taken, and environmental protection requirements should be a component of the Community's other policies. These principles had been used in the work of the Community prior the SEA which, thus, introduced some principles to the Treaty, that had already been guiding the environmental sector. The difference was that these principles now received a legal standing. The principle that we will consider in the following deals with the integrative approach, i.e., the notion that environmental protection should be a component of other policies in the Community. It is illustrative of the general development of environmental solutions in the Western world. It is one of the most important requirements of an ecocentric approach to environmental policy making, and it "must be considered the most important provision in the entire section on the environment" (Krämer 1990:65).

The Integrative Approach

The integrative approach is not new with the SEA but had been discussed as far back as 1980 in a communication to the Council (COM (80) 222). In the Third Action Programme of 1983 it was declared as one of the top priorities: "...the Community should seek to *integrate* concern for the environment into the policy and development of certain economic activities as much as possible..."(my emphasis, O.J. C46, 17.2.83). It was discussed in the European Council in 1985 (Krämer 1990:64).

[127] The high priority given in the SEA to the integration of the internal market had important effects on the possibility of environmental policy and were perceived as threats to Community environmental goals and as such have been discussed in the previous chapter on problems. The Task Report was an attempt at dealing with these problems.

This was followed up with a complete section in the Fourth Action Programme and a listing of the areas into which the environmental section was to be integrated (Council Resolution 87/C 328/1.10.87 section 2.3). It was then strengthened in the SEA, in the Maastricht Treaty, but also in the Fifth Action Programme, where it has become a fundamental approach of the entire programme.

Naturally, it is not only because integration now is a legal requirement that it has become important for environmental policy. It is also a way to resolve contradictions and internal inconsistencies that come as a result of the fact that many environmental problems facing the Community are generated in other policy sectors, such as transport, industry, energy and agriculture. Integration is an attempt at coordinating a large range of measures in different sectors in order to tackle what is considered as cross-sectional problems. The practical implication of this is that there must be some type of reconciliation between the objectives pursued in different policy fields and environmental objectives. This is also what has proved to be extremely challenging and difficult.

The strong emphasis on integration was supported by the member states in general. The reason for this was that they had suffered from an exclusively environmental Directorate which did not include other sectors and did not consider the problems that the member states had in implementing directives. As the proposals were nearly always the product of DG XI, the member states have often come into a confrontational or difficult relationship with regional or national industries when implementing directives.

Sustainability

Sustainability is the main approach in the Fifth Action Programme *Toward Sustainability*. Sustainable development is based on the realization that the earth's resources can not be exploited indefinitely in accordance with the dominant economic practices of this century. Sustainable development charges that development should be consistent with present as well as future needs (World Commission 1987). Thus, growth and development should occur within the carrying capacity of the natural and human environment.

The EC, represented by the Heads of State and Government, committed itself to the principle of sustainable development at the Dublin Summit in June of 1990 by declaring:

> We undertake to intensify our efforts to protect and enhance the natural environment of the Community itself and the world of which it is part. We intend that action by the Community and its Member States will be developed on a coordinated basis and on the principles of *sustainable development* (my emphasis).

The idea of sustainable development was not an innovation of the Brundtland report, although the report is often cited in this context.[128] As an effect of a number of developments within environmentalism, leading up to the Brundtland Commission and the UNCED process, sustainable development has become the most common strategy of the 1990s in regard to environmental protection. It is a strategy which suggests radical changes while being general enough not to force anyone to specific action. In order to understand this concept it is helpful to realize that it comes from attempts to join the two debates on environment and development (in non-Western areas).[129] In this discourse the industrial developed world stands as the ideal example of development, with progress and growth in a capitalist system as underlying assumptions (cf. Sachs 1993; Adams 1990:42-62).

The Brundtland Commission does, nevertheless, define sustainable development in a rather political way, seeing it as achievements of certain social and economic objectives. It divides sustainable development into two concepts: basic needs as a recognition of rights for the poor to develop, and environmental limits set by technology and social organization rather than ecological systems (Adams 1990:59).

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[128] The Fifth Environmental Action Programme cites it and uses the Brundtland definition of sustainable development. The original idea came in the International Union for Conservation of Nature's (IUCN) World Conservation Strategy, 8 years prior to the Brundtland Commission report. At the time of the Brundtland report of (i.e., World Commission 1988) sustainability had been discussed among NGOs for a long time. It was the culmination of more than 20 years of thinking by conservationists concerned with the global dimension of environmental problems (McCormick 1989: ch. 8).

[129] The World Conservation Strategy originated from a number of IUCN Conferences held in Africa in the 1960s, with the central concern being development and conservation of natural resources in the less developed countries. In this context it was also necessary to consider the human condition and human needs. Some IUCN ecologists proceeded in the attempt to link development with improvement of the human condition, as well as with resource and wildlife protection. The final result was, however, rather superficial in that it did not question the fundamental institutional impediments to ecological development on a global basis (O'Riordan 1988:29-39). It did not provide any 'new' thinking but was "just conservation dressed up in new clothes" (Adams 1990:49).

In the strategies proposed there are no real fundamental challenges to economist practices; on the contrary, rapid economic growth is seen as absolutely necessary in order to tackle the environmental problems of our times (World Commission 1987:49, 89).

That same thinking underlies sustainable development in the EU, as exemplified by the view on trade: "Trade can and should help achieve the goals of sustainable development since it generates additional resources through growth..." (Com. report, 1992:113). There can be no doubt that in the EU context sustainability is to be carried out within the existing economic system. Environmental measures are seen as additional measures, albeit of increasing importance, that do not challenge the fundamental contradiction between environmentalism and the modern growth ethic. This is again evident in the declaration of the European Council: "Completion of the internal market in 1992 will provide a major impetus to economic development in the Community. There must be a corresponding acceleration of the effort to ensure that this is sustainable and environmentally sound."[130]

Sustainable development is also a reflection of a changing strategy of the environmental movement. Some early ecocentrics turned away from the economic and social values of the Western mass consumption society, looking for solutions outside the established institutions. Many ecocenrics of this decade have turned to a strategy of compromise and mediation. They have proposed solutions which work to incorporate new values into the policies of existing institutions. Sustainability is such a strategy. It is the vagueness and all-embracing nature of the concept sustainability that has made it acceptable to a broad political spectrum (Baker et al. 1996; McManus 1996:48-73). Nevertheless, it has been developed from ecocentric thinking and, depending on interpretations and resulting implementation, it could mean fundamental changes in Western Europe. However, there is a wide chasm between the liberal economic reformism of *Our Common Future* and more radical suggestions on how to solve environmental problems.

The sustainable development strategy has matured since Brundtland and it has been extensively discussed. It has moved from a globalized and vague focus to a more specific and concentrated effort at changing practices where industrial countries can no longer deny their responsibility for environmental degradation. This has also been facilitated through the ideas of ecological modernization which a number of elites in

[130]The June 1990 Dublin Council declaration.

the Community sympathize with (EEB 1994; Weale & Williams 1992:47,51). Ecological modernization can be interpreted as very close to the ideas of sustainable development, but in the industrialized countries' context. The Fifth Action Programme concentrates almost exclusively on what can be done within the Community.

The many different views expressed in reaction to the Fifth Environmental Action Programme are in themselves examples of the ambiguity and contradictory nature of sustainable development. Many voices considered it too optimistic, too radical, not legitimate and, hence, difficult to realize. An NGO representative says that the Fifth Action Programme "has a kind of philosophy which is not underwritten even inside DG XI itself."[131] This thought is further explored by another NGO representative: "I think that the influence of environmentalism is there in general terms but...if you would ask some Commissioners about it, they would not know what you mean." Some governments see this as a Commission document and, therefore, do not feel that they have to implement it.[132] "The influence of the Fifth Action Programme will depend on what the stake holders will do with it. I am not very fond of it. It remains a list of wishful thinking."[133] One national delegate's reaction is that DG XI comes forth with ideas that are unrealistic and that it has an environmentalist, activist, almost evangelical aspect to it.[134] These different reactions were also voiced inside DG XI where the Fifth Action Programme was drafted. Although many view it in optimistic and positive terms, one staff member was more frustrated and saw the Fifth Action Programme as very wide in scope and said that in the Action Programme it seems like everything has to do with the environment, when such problems are really very narrow ones.[135]

On the other hand, it is precisely because of the ambiguity and vagueness of the strategy that it has been successful and appealing to a broad range of actors. It has consolidated and synthesized two or more of what were previously conflicting ideas.

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[131]NGO representative, November 1993.

[132]Indeed, when it was approved by the Council it was approved as a Commission document. However, there is no indication that this has been used as an argument against pursuing it further.

[133]NGO representative, November 1993.

[134]National representative, November 1993.

[135]Commission official, November 1993.

Environmental Strategies in the Maastricht Treaty

By the time the preparations and negotiations for the intergovernmental conference at Maastricht were taking place, the approach to the sustainable development strategy had changed. The resulting Treaty speaks about sustainable progress (Article B) and sustainable growth (Article 2), but sustainable development (Article 130u) only when it has to do with relations with developing countries. The established concept has been given a number of new meanings which are not further specified in the Treaty. This certainly adds some unwanted confusion to what was already vague and ambiguous. This might be less significant, however, since the most important contribution that the Maastricht Treaty makes to environmental protection, on a conceptual level, is the placement of environmental protection on an equal footing with economic concerns (Verhoeve et al. 1992:15). In defining the tasks of the Community it states:

> The Community shall have as its task...to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment...(Article 2).

In Maastricht another principle upon which Community action should be based—the precautionary principle—was added to Article 130r. Since the Treaty does not explain what this principle means or how it is related to the preventive approach, it is also hard to predict what implications it will have. Verhoeve et al. (1992) argue that it can at least be expected to change the debate from whether precautionary action should be taken at all, to a focus on how it should be taken, which measures should be used, and when they should be used.

Organizational Strategies

Whereas it might be quite easy to introduce ecocentric approaches and principles in declarations and programmes that are neither binding nor operational, it seems more difficult to change organizational practices and steering mechanisms, because here the principles have to be put into practice.

Sectorization: Creating the Service

The first organizational solution was the creation of the Service for the Environment and Consumer Protection in 1973. At the time it seemed quite obvious that in order to develop strategies for environmental protection and pollution control, the first thing to do was to create an administrative unit responsible for the issue. It was set up as a Service responsible for both environmental issues and consumer concerns. This reflected the view of the time in the Commission, that those areas were both dealing with citizens' concerns. It was actually a first attempt to look at citizens' questions.[136] There had previously been a subunit that dealt with these issues within the Directorate General for industry, technology and the internal market.

The idea of a separate body dealing with a new policy area was in line with the traditional administrative routine of the Community: the sector approach. Accordingly, issues such as industrial affairs, agriculture and transport are dealt with in separate sectors, i.e., directorates. A service had, however, a different status within the Commission and was viewed within the administration itself with suspicion and ambivalence. It was compared with the existing Service—the Legal Service—which was not a part of the hierarchy of DGs. Instead, its legal advisory function fed into all sectors of Commission activities simultaneously.[137] There was skepticism against this type of arrangement both among those who were particularly against a Community environmental policy and among those who supported such a policy, but for different reasons. Some were skeptics because they believed that horizontal organizations have a tendency to assume power and become super administrations; yet others perceived it as a toothless arrangement, because a Service—like the Legal Service—would have no right to draft legislation. Generally speaking, it was assumed that an Environmental Service would refrain from drafting legislation and act more as an advisory Service on environmental and consumer matters.[138] The central concern of the Community project—to further integration by increasing trade and economic development—put environmental concerns on the margins, and also marginalized the administrative unit dealing with the issue.

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[136]Commission official, November 1993.

[137]With an evaluation of what we have learned now about the problems of sectored politics, this must be seen as a rather innovative approach. A horizontal organizational solution would seem a more appropriate administrative model from an ecocentric perspective.

[138]The Service, and subsequently DG XI, was assigned the responsible for environmental issues and consumer protection. I will only consider the environmental dimension of this, as this is what interests me the most; furthermore it is by far the most influential and largest part of this Service and DG.

The skepticism and resistance from the existing administration toward the new unit paint the background against which we can understand the role that the Service came to play. It did venture to draft its own legislation, but did not succeed in being a horizontal organization at all; nor did it have a clear responsibility for what could be described as an environmental issue area, since such provisions did not exist in the EEC Treaty. Instead, the solutions that came out of the Service occupied only a small niche that was enlarged successively. It was not until 1981 that the Service became a Directorate General (DG XI) and hence gained a more independent status.

Niche Legislation

In the late 1960s there were no provisions at all for environmental action on the Community level. Strictly limited by the legalist practices of the EEC, any solutions or directives proposed in the Community had to be strongly motivated on the basis of two articles in the Rome treaty. One article related to the harmonization of trade and the other article allowed for new policies if necessary,[139] or according to a DG XI official: Environmental policy walked on two legs; environmental concerns and free trade.[140] In practice, the Service on Environment and Consumer protection had very limited jurisdiction, because it could only propose legislation on matters relating to the general subject area of the internal market. Additionally, it could only propose solutions and draft legislation which were not the concern of other sectors. The first piece of legislation under the First Environmental Action Programme was a good example of this: the directive on waste oils.[141]

Due to this, the Service, and later DG XI, remained a rather marginalized small sector, working mainly in its own sphere, and was not readily consulted or approached by other Directorates. It was ostracized and dependent on the support of the EP environmental committee, the environmental NGOs and the general public to enhance its status in the Commission as a whole. In such a sectored administrative system, environmental issues became a minor sector with niche legislation. Nevertheless, the Service managed to draft environmental legislation and expand its role. The activities of the Service, in alliance with the EP and the NGOs, can be described as a resistance

[139]Articles 100A + 235 or both simultaneously.
[140]Commission official, January 1996.
[141]Commission officials, November 1993.

politics against both bureaucratic, legalist practices and economist practices, which marginalized environmental issues. These resistance activities were quite successful (if we count success in numbers of directives), because the major part of the Community environmental legislation was passed prior to the SEA.[142]

Integrating the Commission

Sectorization was a particular concern, first for the Service but mainly for DG XI, because they were increasingly trying to impose restrictions that had to do with politics and policies generated in other sectors. There was a move away from the centralized sectored politics of administrative rule toward two new and partly parallel processes of organization: *integration* and *subsidiarity*. With the need to move beyond sector politics, which had started to become a problem in the Commission and for the member states, there was an increased emphasis on integration. The organizational strategy from the Commission was to open up two types of dialogues, one was horizontal—integration between sectors—and the other was vertical—between different levels of society and different actors in society.

Integration has been an uphill battle for DG XI and the Community as a whole. I would argue that this was due to the bureaucratic practices of sectorization and hierarchization, which was challenged by the ideas to integrate environmental concerns into other policy areas. The official discussion started already back in 1980 but has since then intensified. Most forceful and explicit in this line of argumentation is article 130r(2) of the Maastricht Treaty: "environmental protection requirements *must be integrated* into the definition and implementation of other Community policies" (my emphasis).

In the environmental sphere integration means a reconciliation of the different sector policies with environmental objectives (Baldock et al. 1992:5). Administrative and bureaucratic measures have been introduced to ensure this, exemplified by networks for cooperation and negotiation, environmental units within sectors (particularly the target sectors as set out in the Fifth Action Programme), a requirement that each sector

[142]188 environmental directives, decisions and resolutions were approved by 1987, when the Single European Act came into force and environment became a Community sanctioned area of activity.

policy should be looked at for its environmental impact as well as the preparations of annual reports.[143]

As of 1992 seven out of eight directorates, which had been targeted as policy areas that affect the environment, had also set up special units to deal with environmental aspects of sector politics (Baldock et al. 1992:10). Most impressive was DG VII for Transport. In 1992 it had three subdirectorates that each had a unit to deal with environmental aspects. A further re-organization came in 1995. This was due to the many discussions on global problems that concern transport policies, such as climate change. The new subunit, responsible for global environmental aspects of transportation, is also in charge of coordination of the environmental aspects of transport policies that are being dealt with in the different subsections.[144] The transportation directorate also produced a green paper on the impact of transport on the environment in 1992, which became the Community strategy for sustainable mobility (Com. (92) 46 final)[145]. Similar papers have been produced by the Directorates for agriculture, industry/internal market and energy.

Although a number of policy papers on the environmental dimension have been issued within different directorates, it seems to have only minimal effects on actual projects and legislation. The large project establishing a trans-European infrastructure is one such example. This project is expansive in its efforts to link Europe through more and efficient transportation systems. It does this without re-evaluating the increase in traffic and roads, and their impact on the environment (Hey & Brendle 1994:19-21).

Directorate VI for Agriculture started out with a small unit within the rural development sector which was to deal with environmental aspects.[146] Lately this has been expanded with a unit that is more of a think tank on agri-environmental issues. In the hierarchy of DG VI, the latter has been placed directly under the directorate general, facilitating a general overview of the integration of environmental aspects into agricultural policies.[147] The re-organization is very similar to the one which has taken place in DG VI.

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[143]Commission official, February 1996.

[144]Commission official, January 1996.

[145]For a critical analysis of this White paper see Bail 1993.

[146] The reason why environmental issues came to be placed in the section for rural development was because some legislation related to environmental concerns had been initiated in this area, exemplified by directive 75/268 and its amendments on countryside protection in agriculturally less favored areas.

[147]Commission official, January 1996.

Interviews in 1996 indicated that cooperation and negotiation between the staff responsible for environmental issues, in the different sectors (DGs) and their equivalents in DG XI, have been working surprisingly smoothly. Negotiations and cooperation between sectors have been successful at the level of environmental experts, because common interests seem to evolve during the course of negotiation. The great difficulty has been in involving the traditional policy makers, within the sectors, in such discussions and awareness raising. The difficulties seem to reside with the staff of traditional sector directorates where there appear to be no shared environmental concerns.[148] Inside the sector directorates the tendency is that, for example, agricultural aspects are a priority and environmental concerns included, only when they can back up and reinforce the agricultural argument. In practice, integration has been shown to be easier where the same objectives might be shared by a number of different directorates, as in the case of the carbon/energy tax, and more conflicting in other areas, as for example with transport and environment (Baldock et al. 1992:1-8). Another reflection is that the environmental units were initially placed low in the hierarchy[149] of each Directorate, which made coordination difficult. The response to these early attempts at integration has been to put environmental concerns higher up in the hierarchies of the organization, as exemplified both in DG VI and DG VII.

Even inside DG XI (for the environment) organizational integration has been slow. Prior to 1990 the organization was mainly of a vertical kind, organized according to media: air, water and waste. It was not until September of 1990 that a change took place in the organizational structure in order to reflect the integration approach. It was designed to look at the horizontal level as well, particularly within subdirectorate C on environmental instruments. In addition, the new organizational set-up included (in directorate B) two units responsible for tourism and agriculture respectively. Prior to this organizational re-arrangement, a majority of the relations with other policy sectors where handled within one specific unit.[150] Within DG XI there are ongoing

[148]Commission officials, January 1996.

[149]In the case of one sector DG the staff member was also brought in from outside and very young. It could be assumed that he had not acquired the knowledge of the organizational routines nor a wide support from colleges.

[150]This is based on the origanogram of the organization, verified by interviews. The division of responsibilities in everyday politics corresponds to it. The source of this information is the Directory of the Commission, which is published biannually.

discussions on how to optimally set up the organization in order to better cope with the challenges both of integration and subsidiarity/shared responsibility.[151]

Negotiation and cooperation appear to be increasingly important for the move from centralized and sectored administrative rule to a new type of organizational strategy based on the principle of integration. The negotiation that is needed is both of a horizontal kind, between sectors, but perhaps more importantly, as a way to raise awareness within traditional sectors. The importance of negotiation and cooperation skills has been pointed out by DG XI, as a reflection on previous experience with integrative efforts.

The bureaucratic practices of sectorization is particularly challenged by the integrative approach. Hence, there has been considerable difficulties in implementing the ecocentric principle that views environmental problems as closely connected to sector politics; nevertheless, the attempts at doing so appear to be serious. Integrative concerns have been supported in the sustainable development strategy of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, which requires that all sectors of society be aware of the effects of their activities on the environment. From an organizational perspective it could be argued that sustainable development, articulated as subsidiarity and shared responsibility, is the same as effective integration.

Subsidiarity and Shared Responsibility

The subsidiarity principle is a legal principle applying to all Community activities. According to it, the focus should not be on a strict separation of competencies between the Community and the member states. Instead, subsidiarity seems to suggest an initial focus on the issue and then a consideration of which level and form of cooperation may be appropriate to deal with this particular issue (Verhoeve et al. 1992:12-14). It moves away from centralized administrative rule by allowing for a dialogue between different levels and different social actors as to where it is appropriate to take action. This interpretation remains a speculation because subsidiarity is vaguely defined in the Treaties and can be interpreted in a number of different ways. The Fifth Action Programme has explicitly attempted to "translate the principle of subsidiarity into operational terms" (COM (1992) 23:73). The program

[151]Commission official, Interview, Brussels, February, 1996.

argues that shared responsibility is a way to redefine what subsidiarity means; it is not a matter of the division of competence between the Community level and member state level but rather according to the appropriate level of action.[152] A problem here is, of course, who will decide which the appropriate level is.

European environmental organizations, along with MEPs and DG XI staff, are very critical of the recent emphasis on subsidiarity in the Community as a whole. They fear that it will undermine EU's environmental jurisdiction. Hey and Brendle (1994:4, 16) argue that the subsidiarity principle has been used to attack existing legislation in order to weaken it and deregulate, rather than to reshape future policies. They exemplify this with proceedings around the drinking water directive, the pesticide directive and Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control. Similarly the EEB criticizes the Molitor Group Report for its attack on what it perceives as a "restrictive European legislative straightjacket" (EEB 1995). Subsidiarity, hence, both challenges sovereignty and reinforces it, depending on how it is interpreted.

Subsidiarity, in the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, does not only concern the move away from the Community as the central administrative unit toward national or local administrations, but is broader in its scope. It is also turning toward different societal groups. In the program this ambition is stated as a need to "focus on the agents and activities which damage the environment and deplete the natural resource stock rather than wait, as has been the tendency in the past, for problems to emerge" (COM (92) 23:19). The focus on agents and activities has in practice meant that certain target areas have been announced. Industry, energy, transport, agriculture and tourism have been especially targeted. In line with the integration approach, the various actors involved within target areas are encouraged to consider the environmental impact of their activities.

The criticism against this approach comes from DG XI and from NGOs, where some participants fear that environmental policy is being coopted by industry, agriculture, transport and energy that are, in proportion to DG XI, large administrations with immense budgets. The fact that they employ a so-called environmental expert does in no way guarantee sustainable policies, or even that the expert is consulted. The fear is that these developments will lead to the creation of separate environmental policy

[152]The EEB has a slightly different approach. The EEB does not contest this interpretation of subsidiarity but strongly argue that subsidiarity "cannot be dissociated from solidarity and the respect of equal rights to a sound environment for all Union citizens" (EEB 1996:8).

concerns and priorities coming from the various directorates, policies which can claim to be environmental, but fit nicely with the general goals of each Directorate.

There are also many positive sentiments, from the NGO side, regarding the possibility of engaging societal actors according to the Fifth Action Programme. There are some very optimistic thoughts:

> The Fifth Action Programme is much different than the other ones. I think because it is not so much based on norms and limitations, but it gives more the political tools, trying to encourage people and also industry, through eco-labeling, through auditing systems, etc. I think it is more trying to motivate people to take their own initiative and then collaborate toward a better environment together with all the other social sectors" (NGO representative, Interview, Brussels, November, 1993)

Thus, within the ecocentric resistances, there are a set of diverging and even contradictory ideas on which organizational strategies most adequately could resolve environmental problems.

The shared responsibility strategy was launched partly because integration of environmental concerns in other policy areas had been difficult and too slow in the past. Shared responsibility is somewhat similar to integrative problem solving but it is moved out of the administrative and political spheres into the sectors of society where the problems are generated. There has been a recognition that environmental degradation can only be reversed by significant changes in human consumption and behavior patterns. Such life style issues have been a central concern of most environmental resistances.

There is a tendency to leave environmental "command and control" policies (Com. report 1992:15) that are generated and imposed by EU or national authorities, in favor of a participatory process. This means that efforts are geared toward *engaging* societal actors rather than imposing measures on them through national governments or the EU Council. Different sectors are encouraged to take their responsibility through consultations and voluntary activities. The importance of participation and grassroots based politics has been stressed in the ecocentric perspectives (Goodin 1992:123-131) The shared responsibility approach was practiced already in the consultations which took place prior to the Council approval of the Fifth

Environmental Action Programme and is to continue in the implementation and enforcement of the Programme.[153]

Also the environmental organizations put a lot of hope in this solution and say:

> We (the EEB) have our own strategies and our ideas and proposals so; we want to be recognized as experts and included from the very beginning, and that is why the Fifth Action Programme is really important for us. It is one of the tools for working....Important for us is also the partnership principle. This was suggested for the first time in the Fifth Action Programme which means that from the very beginning we have different social sectors around the table to discuss things and to define a common basis. This means that you have got industry, trade unions, politicians and NGOs around the table to discuss what is happening and what is going to happen. We want to be integrated in policy making from the very beginning. (NGO representative, Interview, Brussels, November, 1993)

In practice this approach is to be carried out through the involvement of business and industry in a dialogue which should result in voluntary agreements and self-regulations. In this strategy participation is important. These types of agreements are built on a relationship between economy and ecology that is consensus seeking and less conflictual. Shared responsibility, the way it has been conceptualized in the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, has many elements similar to strategies supported by ecocentric resistances. However, what it entails—the movement away from traditional bureaucratic practices and administrative rule—also fits within economic practices. This way economic actors have a chance to discuss and influence environmental regulation, rather than simply adopting to administrative regulation.

Steering Mechanisms

The command and control policies[154] were almost the exclusive means used to stop environmental degradation and reduce pollution in the Western world of the 1970s.

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[153] This is done through a consultative forum, an implementation network and an environment policy review group (COM (1992):75). Reliance on networks was an important element in creating the Fifth Action Programme, but the networks are also important in the present phase. In order to build real partnership it is important to build confidence and trust, according to a DG XI official (November, 1993). However, the partnership and the dialogue, which the Commission official speaks so warmly of, involve the target sectors and industry particularly; they do not include the NGOs explicitly, except in the consultative forum.

[154] There is a legislative norm setting standards to be controlled by administrative units.

The steering mechanisms used came from the central administrative level in the form of legal norms. These legal norms were both output-oriented and, initially, directed exclusively toward the media air and water. This seems to reflect not only the situation in the Community context but a general phenomena of the industrialized world.

Specific Legal Norms

Examples of such specific solutions in the Community are the directives on the quality of bathing water (Dir. 76/160), drinking water (Dir. 75/440, Dir. 80/778), water standards for freshwater fish (Dir. 78/659) and water standards for shellfish waters (Dir. 79/923). Similarly a number of solutions regarding the regulation of particular substances emitted into water were approved. A set of directives regulate the emissions of different types of detergents into water (the first one being the Dir. 73/404). Another directive is intended to limit or reduce the pollution of all types of waters by specific and listed substances (Dir. 76/464).

A number of daughter directives regulated different specific substances such as mercury (Dir. 84/156), cadmium (Dir. 83/513) and lindane[155] (Dir. 84/491). The most extreme example of such specific legislation is within the regulation of the medium water. Directive 82/176 regulates the discharge of mercury through the electrolysis of alkali chlorides. Here we see an attempt at very specific control: a norm is approved that regulates a specific substance (mercury), discharged in a specific production process (electrolysis of alkali chlorides) into the specific medium water.

The other sector, in which early Community strategies were developed, was the medium air. Here again we note that the solutions are aimed at reducing pollution in a very specific sense. There is regulation on air quality in respect to certain substances. In one air quality directive (Dir. 80/779), limits are set for the ground level concentration of sulphur dioxide and smoke; another air quality directive sets standards for nitrogen dioxide (Dir. 85/203), and another one for lead (Dir. 82/884). Another type of approach, but still very restricted, was used within the air sector, to

[155]Lindane (hexachlorocyclohexane) is used in agriculture as a pesticide (Haigh 1990:103)

regulate certain specific products such as the sulphur content of gas oil[156] (Dir. 75/716) and lead in petrol (Dir. 85/210).

Another type of strategy within the air sector is to formulate requirements to limit emissions from certain industrial activities (Dir. 84/360). This solution is of a later date and exemplifies another, slowly emerging, type of strategy which moves beyond the extremely specific pipe-end or output-oriented solutions.

Framework Directives

In the Community context we see a move toward framework regulations. In this context framework means a type of directive that has a more general scope and where substances, production processes etc. might be targeted, but in a listing. Hence there is a possibility to add more substances, as it becomes evident that they need to be controlled. This reflects a change in perception of what environmental problems are—much less predictable and manageable—compared to the previous specific legislation. It is also a reaction to the experience with the specific kind of administrative regulation, which in no way could keep up with the 'discoveries' of new problem spots, since the legislative context was extremely lengthy and time consuming.

One example of this change is a directive that applies to industrial plants in general, as compared to the earlier approach to specific production processes. It includes the energy industry, metal production, the chemical industry, waste disposal and paper pulp production—as well as a range of substances. It lists eight categories of substances, among which NO_X, SO_X, heavy metals and asbestos are examples. Since it is a framework directive it also includes the possibility for introducing new limits and substances.

Avoiding Barriers to Trade

[156]Gas oil is used mainly for domestic heating and cooking and differs from heavier oils that are used for industrial heating and power stations which are termed 'fuel oils'. There was a proposal to regulate also the sulphur content of fuel oil in 1975 which was never agreed upon by member states (Haigh 1990:177,184).

As was suggested earlier, environmental politics within the Community has (at least until the SEA) been approached from two angles, one being the need to introduce environmental concerns and the other the harmonization of the internal market. A number of legal norms have been approved regarding particular products.

This can be exemplified by the product regulation that evolved with the setting of standards on engines of motor vehicles (Dir. 70/222). This directive was primarily geared toward the prevention of trade barriers, in order that the Member States legislation on engine standards would be harmonized. However, it opened up the possibility for amendments and has later been modified to permit stricter standards, hence moving away from the market harmonization approach toward regulation in response to environmental concerns (Haigh 1990:220).

Similarly, Community policy in the sector of chemicals has mainly been geared toward the harmonization of specific products. Community legislation concerning chemicals aimed for the market to function by limiting barriers to trade, at the same time as it expressed a concern for human health (Westerlund 1991:115-121). The framework directive regulating the classification, labeling and packaging of dangerous chemicals (Dir. 67/548) was not originally concerned with protecting the environment but aspired to a unified Community system for the classification of chemicals. It did, nevertheless, have unintended positive effects on the environment. It was not until the sixth amendment that there was a new and specific classification category added: chemicals that were considered dangerous to the environment (Dir. 79/831).

Control by administrative rule has been and still is the most common form of steering mechanism in the environmental field of policy making. It has been suggested, from experience, that there are some disadvantages with this mechanism. Administrative steering offers only limited incentives for technical progress; it involves unnecessarily high administrative overheads and inflexibility; it is often not cost-efficient and leaves rather generous room for bargaining (Kågeson 1993:10). These disadvantages are particularly accentuated when the legal norms are output-oriented and of the kind that applies only to a specific medium, substance or production process.

Financial and Economic Instruments

There are a whole range of economic instruments that have been and can be used as an alternative to administrative rule, for example, funds, subsidies, taxes and charges,[157] deposit-systems and emission trading. The idea behind these types of measures is that human behavior will change through the market mechanism—by regulating the price of a product. Furthermore, it reflects the polluter pays idea, implying that production (and consumption) should internalize environmental costs. It has also been shown to be a very successful way to change, for example, car fuel consumption (see, e.g., Taschner 1992).

A proper ecological economic instrument should include a directional aspect. This implies that such a tax would be used as a replacement for other taxes, for example, by increasing taxes on resources and lowering taxes on labor. With such a direction the instrument would also clearly indicate political priorities (cf. Europe Documents 1995; Weizsäcker 1994:131-133; Kågeson, 1993; Prior 1993:73-82). There is no general consensus on how such instruments should be viewed, nor on which instruments to use, or whether some are more efficient than others. However, in the Progress report from the Commission (COM (95) 624 final:4) it is stated that "market-based instruments are seen as the most important group of tools available for future action."

Another way to encourage such changes in behavioral patterns is through the introduction of particular *funds or subsidies*. Examples of these are the following programmes: SAVE I and II,[158] ALTERNER,[159] JOULE-THERMIE,[160] LEADER[161] which have the ambition to encourage activities mainly in the field of energy efficiency and CO_2 reduction, but also in sustainable development. Another, but

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[157]The Commission (1990) has argued that the difference between taxes and charges should be determined by how the resulting revenues are located. If they are added to the public budget they should be called taxes if they are used for financing environmental measures they should be labeled charges. This is neither an un-controversial nor a particularly logical distinction as argued by Kågeson (1993:20-22).

[158]The SAVE programmes launched in 1991 aim at reducing CO_2 emissions mainly through energy efficiency. SAVE II runs from 1996 to year 2000 and foresees a budget of 150 million ECU for this period (COM (95) 624 final:20).

[159]The ALTENER programme supports pilot actions in the field of renewable energy resources.

[160]The programme should contribute to reducing the negative environmental impacts associated with the production and use of energy, ensuring lasting and reliable energy sources at affordable costs and strengthening the technological basis of European industry. Its budget for 1995-1999 is one billion ECU.

[161]This programme had a budget of 442 million ECU during 1992-1995 and aimed at the active involvement of local populations, businesses, associations and local authorities in sustainable development initiatives (COM (95) 624:37).

extremely important type of funding, comes out of a re-direction of traditional and major funding sources of the Community, such as the inclusion of environmental criteria in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in the Structural funds. Both take up a substantial share of the Community budget; the cost of the CAP is around 50% and the structural funds around 25% of the EU budget .

Product charges are one type of economic instruments widely used in Europe. They are generally understood as charges levied on substances (such as nitrogen) or products (for example batteries, non-returnable bottles) that are harmful to the environment. The use of product charges is an efficient way to reduce the consumption of an undesired substance or product. Since such product charges, so far, have been set mainly on the national level, and not coordinated between EU member states, they are apt to create obstacles to the establishment of a single market. From an environmentalist point of view, such charges ought to be harmonized at the Community level as soon as possible, so that there will be no risk of increasing the consumption of these products (Kågeson 1993:44). Environmentalists, the Commission and industry have a common interest here, since harmonization is also a way to remove obstacles to trade. Ecocentric resistances see economic instruments as but one strategy, if not an optimal one, to reduce pollution. Such a strategy can work within economist practices and 'put a price on polluting'.

The European standardization organizations (CEN/CENELEC) have become increasingly active in standardization at the European level. This could be desirable from an ecocentric perspective, because it forces stricter standards also on those states that have a less developed environmental legislation. One major problem with CEN/CENELEC is that standardization has shifted from the Community level to private institutions, where there is no representation of ecocentric resistances or European citizens (Hey & Brendle 1994:27-8).

Taxation represents a steering mechanism which is very complicated in the Community context, as was shown by the prolonged and difficult negotiations for a common CO_2 tax.[162] Taxation, or the right to raise revenue, has been the well-guarded domain of the sovereign states and an area not subject to Community measures. The unanimity rule in Council decision making applies to fiscal measures. Sovereignty practices have made taxation an impossible strategy in the Community so

[162]Commission official, February, 1996.

far. Obviously, this does not exclude the option that directives on taxation be approved in the future.

Voluntary Agreements

Voluntary agreements as steering mechanisms are based on the idea that behavior can change through some type of environmental consciousness raising. This is a process where relevant actors learn and become aware of the effect of their behavior in, at best, a wider ecological context. This suggests a belief in ecocentric ethics as the basis for action.

The Commission states: "Changing attitudes has proved the most difficult task...The work of ensuring acceptance of environmental policies and sustainable development involves more than getting instruments to work. It is also changing the way we live." (COM (95) 624:5).

The ethical dimension is important, not only regarding environmental consciousness, but also in the way that such agreements are to be enforced. The assumption is that when a firm, organization or individual has agreed to a certain arrangement, this agreement will not be violated. This also seems to be the view of a Commission official working with voluntary agreements. He is very optimistic about the possibility to change behavior through voluntary agreements, because voluntary agreements come as a result of the sense of responsibility which is developed during the consultation and negotiation that precede it. This is excellent because, in comparison to legal norms, these agreements *are* implemented.[163]

The Commission states that "voluntary agreements can achieve similar results to legislation by implementing the desired objectives more speedily and with more flexibility provided that they can be effectively enforced" (COM (92) 1986 final). Voluntary agreements were launched in the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, but there had been some experience with such agreements in the Community prior to this.

There is no precise meaning of what voluntary agreements are. Normally a private actor makes a commitment which it is not legally enforceable; nevertheless it has a

[163]Commission official, November 1993.

formal status (Jørgensen 1994:4). One type of voluntary agreement has been the 'gentleman's agreements' of different types of Commission resolutions, such as the First Environmental Action Programme. More specific voluntary agreements have had to do with the implementation of the Montreal Protocol on substances to deplete the ozone layer[164] and on the development of technical standards on products.[165]

Another example is the Council regulation (880/92) establishing Community-wide rules for eco-labels. Eco-labeling challenges industry to apply certain environmental standards to products and production processes, because consumers will make ethical and informed choices. Another voluntary approach, which is directed solely at industry, is EMAS, an eco-management and auditing scheme (1836/93). Participation is entirely voluntary, but if a company decides to be part of the scheme the rules are precise (Jørgensen 1994:5-7).

Jørgensen is somewhat skeptical of the use of voluntary agreements because, for one, it could interfere with the workings of the internal market, since it is not so easy to control and coordinate at a central level; secondly, it could become very cumbersome because the decision process requires long negotiations with a whole range of different actors, in order to reach agreements.

It is quite clear that voluntary agreements, based on ethical motivations, challenge traditional bureaucratic practices in all aspects, since they move both decision making and implementation from the bureaucratic top to different societal actors. The idea behind voluntary agreements is similar to a resistance approach in that the idea builds on participation and environmental awareness among individuals which lead them to make responsible and ethical choices. At the same time, such agreements fit in some respects quite neatly within economist practices, which view market based solutions and 'free' choices as desirable.

Concluding Discussion

[164]Commission recommendations: 89/349 on the reduction of chloroflurocarbons by the aerosol industry, 90/437 on the reduction of chloroflurocarbons used by the EC foam plastics industry and 90/438 on the reduction of chloroflurocarbons used by the EC refrigeration industry.

[165]The European standardization organization develops technical standards which are voluntary. Council resolution 85/C136/01.

The focus in this chapter has been on the solution stream, and a threefold characterization of such solutions was proposed. The first category discussed was *environmental approaches and principles*. These approaches and principles are not unique for the Community but follow a pattern seen in most parts of the industrialized world, where there have been attempts at dealing with pollution and environmental degradation. This development comes through an extensive exchange and learning both from previous strategies and from experiences in other countries and settings. These approaches and principles, which originate among ecocentric resistances, have had an important influence on the environmental discourse in the Community, as evidenced by the inclusion of these concepts in the Treaty texts and the Environmental Action Programmes. However, when these principles are confronted with everyday politics they are not easily incorporated, but extensively contested, modified, watered-down and/or reinterpreted. We have seen, however, that the principles and approaches have not remained symbolic acts, only visible in the texts, but have had influence on the organizational strategies as well as in the choice of steering mechanisms.

The *organizational strategies* were concerned with the Community institutions themselves and how ecocentric ideas have influenced the organizational structure. The organizational development is a sign of resistance to central bureaucratic power practices: sectorization, hierarchization and legalism.

In the 1970s new organizations were set up but, following traditional organizational strategies, environmental issues became confined to a special policy sector. Furthermore, the legalistic power practices severely limited what could be done within the Community to combat pollution problems; the output was legislation severely restricted by both sectorization and legalism. Only issues that no other sector had as its jurisdiction could become the concern of the environmental Service, and this made it a very marginalized sector. Resistances evolved over the years, as the need to integrate environmental concerns with other issues became increasingly apparent. Organizational changes took place with the establishment of environmental units in different sector policies. This challenged the strong hierarchical practices of the Commission by establishing cross-sector partnerships and dialogues. This was further emphasized in the focus on subsidiarity and shared responsibility, where the belief in the centralized administration as the best means for problem solving was challenged, and the attempt was to move policy making outside administrations to the societal sectors, including and creating dialogues between these sectors and the administration.

It was apparent that these changes can generate organizational dilemmas. While sectorization, hierarchization and legalism generate particular obstacles for environmental problem solving, the move toward more integration and some decentralization gives rise to other problems. Particularly evident is the problem of accountability in an organization with diffuse responsibility. Another problem is to determine what is a green perspective, when all sectors are to make green policy themselves. This could lead to the use of green ideas opportunistically, that is, only at times when it fits with the dominant strategies and arguments of a particular sector. These organizational dilemmas might be further accentuated in the more recent move toward negotiated orders, where the administrative organizations have less power over decision making. Policy making is increasingly being moved outside the Community organizations. It was argued that these changes were facilitated, because economist practices could accommodate such changes, or were not directly contradictory to them.

The third category of solutions discussed here are the *steering mechanisms*. Steering mechanisms are the means which are used or proposed as a way to resolve environmental problems; in this they are more or less connected to environmental approaches and principles. The most common steering mechanism proposed in the Community has been legal norms issued by the central administration, proposed by the Commission and approved by the Council. There has been some resistance to this. In the early period this had to do less with legalism but more with the extreme specific nature that these legal norms had. It was an ineffective and cumbersome process of environmental problem solving. Economic instruments of various kinds have been supported by some ecocentric resistances and also discussed and proposed in the Community. While these types of steering mechanisms work well with the economist practices, sovereign practices have been posing problems, particularly regarding taxation, hitherto the exclusive domain of member states.

The legal norms of the early period were so-called command and control policies. Embedded in these are assumptions that the best way to change behavior is through centralized decisions, i.e., top-down. Economic instruments, on the other hand, build on the idea that prices can regulate production and consumption behavior. The most recent steering mechanisms, voluntary agreements, build on ethics as a base for changing behavior. Behavior can be modified by raising environmental consciousness, through communicative means; information, education and persuasion. The idea of voluntary agreements have another ethical dimension; it assume that negotiated agreements will be adhered to.

Chapter Seven
The Participant Stream

So far we have left actors out of the picture and talked about how problems have been defined and which solutions have been formulated in the Community context. It is obvious, however, that it is always actors who do the defining of problems and the articulation of strategies. Actors are the ones who produce behavior. In this chapter we are interested in looking at the actors who have been involved in environmental policy making in the Community. In addition to finding out *who they are*, we are also interested in understanding *how they relate* to, and interact with, each other. The focus will be on those actors who pursue environmental policies and thereby can be considered as representing ecocentric ideas.

In the Community there are a set of institutions that play important and distinct roles in the policy process; the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the Court and the European interest groups. Apart from the Court, these institutions have important and immediate effects on policy making. The Court will not be discussed here because it intervenes in a post-policy stage;[166] its impact is indirect but, nevertheless, quite pronounced in the legalistic practices of the Community, discussed elsewhere at length. In this chapter we will discuss these Community institutions as the participants both on an institutional and an individual level. Most importantly, we will aim to understand how they are related to each other in the policy process.

The Community has been designed in such a way that these institutional actors all have different roles to play. The *Commission* is to represent the 'European interest' and has the sole power to initiate proposals. It also has general administrative functions and is responsible for overseeing implementation of policies. It is a typical, bureaucratic organization, divided into different sectors—Directorate Generals (DGs)—that are hierarchically structured (see for example: Nicoll & Salmon 1990:52-

[166]However, as Burley and Mattli (1993) have pointed out, the European Court has a pronounced and active role in the general integration process of Europe, as compared to the court systems of the Member States.

55; Ludlow 1991:85-132). Here, we are mainly concerned with the initiator role of the Commission and specifically concerned with DG XI which deals with environmental issues.

The *European Parliament* (EP) is an institution that is directly elected by the citizens of the Community Member States. Its role has become increasingly important over the years. Initially it was an appointed assembly but has been directly elected since 1979. Its earlier function was as an advisory and supervisory body; however, with the different Treaty changes, its legislative powers have increased.[167] Its structure mirrors the Commission, i.e., it is organized into different Committees that closely correspond to the different Directorate Generals. Here we are mainly concerned with Committee XI which deals with environmental issues and consumer protection. This committee has become known as a very active one, hosting lively debates, expressing strong criticism against the other institutions on environmental matters, as well as initiating their own reports and hearings on issues of specific interest (Jacobs et al. 1995).

The *Council* is the Community decision-making body. The Member States are represented in the Council and in its working groups: COREPER. Initially the Council was a classic intergovernmental institution where each member state was represented as sovereign; hence, the decision process relied on consensus. This has changed considerably over the years, with the move from consensus decisions to majority decisions on an increasing number of issues. Hence, it has become increasingly important to negotiate with other Member States in order to build coalitions for majorities (Wessels 1991:133-154).

Finally, the *Eurogroups* are important actors in the policy process and their role is mainly advisory. Many different types of Eurogroups are involved when it comes to proposals for environmental regulation. The Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGO) at the European level, cooperate with DG XI and the EP and try also to monitor policies coming from other DGs.[168] The strategies of integration and shared responsibility, which have become important of late, also mean that other

[167]Co-decision procedures were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, but applies only to limited areas of legislation. The EP's role as a legislative body has increased first informally and then with the introduction of the co-operation procedure of the Single European Act and, most recently, with the Maastricht Treaty. Its legislative powers can be expected to change and perhaps increase during the intergovernmental conference and Treaty revisions of 1996/97.

[168]Between 1974 and 1986 the EEB was the only environmental interest group active at the European level (NGO representative, November, 1992).

Eurogroups are increasingly becoming involved in environmental legislation. For example, the industrial lobby is active when legislation relates to the standardization of products or the regulation of industrial processes or activities. Below follows a simplified model of these four organizations and how they relate to each other. It can serve as a starting point and roughly conveys the *formal* process of policy making. This is also similar to the picture of the policy process that often is conveyed to the public outside the Community institutions.



Figure: 2 The formal Community policy process.

Although it is important to understand these institutions' formal roles and relationships in the policy process, empirical research has shown that these roles might be well-defined in the Treaties, but in practice the tasks they perform, and the way they relate to each other, are quite different. There are a number of reasons for this: The Community is a *sui generis* organization because its institutional competence, general membership, areas of interest and the policy making process are continuously evolving. Due to this fluidity, no apparent standard operating procedures, similar to those which can be observed in national settings, are observable in the Community (Mazey & Richardson 1992:109-128).

In addition to this, there is a set of institutional actors, each one in itself an organization with hierarchical structures and a number of individual staff members each with a set of tasks, competencies and perhaps, strategies and goals. Each organization is composed of a large number of individuals.[169] There is need for a high degree of coordination. This is difficult in an organization where the agenda-setting power is highly dispersed and where the decision process is not only fragmentary but also extremely complex (Peters 1994:15-16).[170] Whereas the formal restrictions and regulations of roles and responsibilities for Community institutions structures the policy process, informal procedures that go beyond the formal model introduce additional complexity to the process. This means that the policy process becomes largely incomprehensible, as illustrated by the model below. This model combines the formal procedures with empirical findings on how the participants relate to each other in decision making situations. This does not mean that every issue involves all the relationships illustrated below.

[169]In the case of the Commission around 20,000 staff members, divided into different DGs of varying size.

[170]Peters argues that it is the lack of a party government in the Community that makes it difficult to co-ordinate policy because the different national policy styles are reflected in the Commission.



Figure 3: Complex relationships of the Community policy process

The dispersed agenda-setting power and the complexity and fragmentation of the policy process, coupled with the fact that the Community is very dependent on input from outside the Community institutions, make EU not only a set of loosely coupled institutions but also quite open for participants who are ambitious and engaged with a particular concern. The Commission is not a closed institution but, rather, a very open one. "If one talks to the right people it is possible to push opinions on documents."[171] Peters (1994:21) argues that agenda-setting in the Community creates opportunities for individual action because in this type of policy system there are ample occasions for policy entrepreneurs to push for their pet policies. Perhaps it needs to be pointed out that while such a complex policy process might create opportunities for agenda setting, the process is still not open for just anybody. The possibility to push for 'pet proposals' applies only to those individual participants who have a place within the institutions.

[171]Commission official, November 1992.

In a policy process so complex, affected by the dominant practices of bureaucratization (hierarchization/sectorization) and sovereignty, one type of resistance, which has developed to counteract these dominant practices, is network formation. Networks supersede constructed boundaries and can contribute stability, predictability and familiarity. Hence, the argument here is that the creation of networks is normal in any policy process, but becomes crucial when the policy process is characterized by fragmentation and complexity.

The Relationships between Institutional Actors

A network approach can look at the interdependencies between organizations.[172] Organizations are considered as entities, and individuals come into focus only to the extent that they are 'boundary role occupants' (Gordenker et al. 1995:19). In such a function they provide the important link between the organization's environment and the staff of the organization.[173]

One aspect which is often discussed in the network literature regarding the relationships between organizations is resource dependencies (Jordan 1990; Rhodes 1990; Benson 1982). Benson, for one, defines a network as "...a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies" (Benson 1982:148). This dependency is the base for the exchange which takes place between the participants as representatives of organizations (Wright 1988:606). In the Community environmental issue area the resource

[172]Interdependence theory (Keohane & Nye 1977) suggests that international politics take place in a setting where states and national organizations are subject to complex patterns of mutual dependence. Community politics are both regional (restricted to member states in the Western European region), international (because they both effect politics globally and involves commitments and engagements at the international level) and national (Community decisions have to be legislated into national law and implemented nationally). Hence, EU itself is part of a complex pattern of interdependencies. This has been particularly evident in the environmental issue area when problem definitions and solutions were discussed. The network approach is based on these assumptions and used to guide analysis and assist in understanding the relations within issue-areas which "transcend national boundaries and require participation by national as well as international organizations" (Jönsson 1986:41).

[173]The staff of the organization are almost always sexless and genderless in organization theory, that is; "organization theory fail to give even the most basic information on gender division within the organizations studied, let alone analyze the implication of such division" (Hearn & Parkin 1992:64-65).

dependencies which enhance mutual relationships between involved participants can be labeled as economic, integrational and informational.

Economic Resource Dependencies

The Commission itself, the Council and the European Parliament are ultimately depending on the Member States for the financing of activities. Parts of the efforts are hence geared toward convincing Member States of the needs and benefits of EU as a whole, in order to assure continued financing, legitimation and prosperity of the organization. In the Community case this does not seem to be a problematic relationship for the time being.[174]

The EP can play a particular role in economic matters since it shares budgetary authority[175] with the Council (Nicoll & Salmon 1990:65). Apart from the resources channeled through the general Community budget, the Commission's DG XI for the environment is dependent on national inputs for its expertise. National experts work in DG XI for a three-year period. These positions are financed by the Member States, and it is up to the individual Member States how many and which type of specialists they want to finance. It implies that if a particular member state's government is interested in furthering EU environmental policy making or a particular environmental issue, it is possible to assist DG XI by financing such expertise. This is a significant input: the national expertise share of the entire DG XI staff has been known to be up to half the staff[176] (normally it is around 25% of the staff—quite a large share nevertheless).

Environmental groups do not have the same financial resource base as sector interests, such as business, industry and agriculture. The lack of economic resources is a problem for the environmental organizations in Brussels. The ENGOs' activities depend on financing from the Commission. Greenpeace has a philosophy not to depend financially on political bodies and is an exception to the rule. The European

[174]The Community White Paper on the internal market can be seen in this light, as a re-launching of the idea of Europe in order to legitimize Community policy and continued Community activities in expanding issue areas.

[175]This was established in Treaty revisions in 1970 and 1975. Budget authority for the EP means that it can amend the budget proposals with a majority vote (Nicoll & Salmon 1990:65,99).

[176]This was the case in DG XI in 1991 according to a Commission official, November 1992.

Environmental Bureau was set up by and is partly financed by the Commission.[177] This is nothing unique for environmental groups. Generally the Eurogroups take financial contributions from the Commission. These contributions vary in size and do not include all groups.[178] It was pointed out to me that, at least on one occasion, this economic dependency was used by the Commission to try to control the activities of the EEB, albeit without success. It was during the negotiations for the Vienna protocol on ozone depletion.[179]

If the environmental interest groups are to carry out their work satisfactorily, they have to monitor the whole range of policies coming out of the Commission and cannot sit back and wait for initiatives from DG XI only. ENGOs have to be multidisciplinary and highly efficient in observing all sectors where there are Commission proposals. It is similar to detective work.[180] In contrast, the chemical lobby can remain passive until a proposal, which has to do with chemical products, is introduced.[181] Then it can put all its resources into mobilizing support or arguing against one single Commission initiative. This is less resource intensive.

Political Resources and Integration

ENGOs and other Eurogroups are a significant force in the European integration process.[182] The neo-functional approach assumes that the citizens of the Member States will carry the integration process forward in the form of organized interest articulation at the Community level. In the integration process the Commission can increase its powers by showing that it reconciles and mediates competing interests in a

[177]NGO representative, November 1992.

[178]It is not completely clear what philosophy the Commission has in regard to what groups to finance, other than that they have to be Eurogroups. Some favoring of interests has been noted, for example, concerning the special relationship between the agricultural producers organization COPA and DG for agriculture, especially during the early periods of EC interest group relations (Gray 1990; Averyt 1977)

[179]NGO representative, November 1992.

[180]NGO representatives, November 1992, 1993.

[181]According to Leveque (1994), this is also how the industrial sector in general reacts to proposals for environmental regulation, coming out of the Commission. They have a reactive, rather than anticipatory or policy-generating style, of lobbying.

[182]As proposed by neo-functionalist theory (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970; Haas 1958).

policy area which cannot be resolved by the Member States alone.[183] The strong emphasis on interest group intermediation in the integration process, both as suggested by neo-functionalist strategy and as practiced by the Commission, has also led to the characterization of the Community as a neo-corporatist body (see: Streeck & Schmitter 1991:133-164; Greenwood et al. 1992).

If neo-functionalist ideas have been important in the integration process, then the environmental groups in the Community should have an advantage, as the articulators of the environmental consciousness of the Community publics. The ENGOs' strength in this respect, is that they do not compete with each other for market shares, as business or industrial groups do. Although the various groups concentrate on different environmental areas, such as nuclear energy, marine pollution or wildlife protection, they share the belief that environmental problems are transnational. As a result there is no interest in distributing environmental costs or problems from one country to another. National borders and sovereign states have importance only as cumbersome and problematic administrative and political entities. Environmental groups have reached a comparatively high level of Europeanization and have accepted ideals of European integration.[184] The political resources that environmental ENGOs possess have been increasing with the increase in the public's awareness of ecological distress and the environmental consciousness which emerges as a result of this.[185]

The European Parliament stresses its role as the only democratic body in the Community. Democracy is a major concern of ecocentric resistances, emphasizing particularly grassroot and participatory democratic ideas (cf. Goodin 1992:124-131,139-143; Tokar 1987:97-113). The strength of the EP, like the ENGOs, is based on the public opinion in the diverse Member States. The European Parliament

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[183]For a discussion showing this, based on empirical research of the technology interest groups and the Commission, see: Peterson 1992:245.

[184]These are not necessarily the same ideas as those of the founding fathers, but the transnational nature of environmentalism allows for cooperation at the supranational level (Mazey & Richardson 1992). The European green parties' conception of Europe is different from the neo-functionalist approach and based on a Europe of the Regions with grassroots control, ecological sustainability, decentralization and non-violence as important principles (Bomberg 1992:160-185). The director of the Danish Naturfredningsforening, which is an EEB member organization, says that if EC did not exist we would have to invent it. This is basically because, he argues, EC directives are legally binding—a rather unique arrangement for international organizations (Rehling 1990). The Swedish environmentalist party (Miljöpartiet), for example, is clearly against European integration in EU (Burchell 1996:332-338); on the other hand, the Swedish environmental organizations are divided on the issue.

[185]NGO representative, November 1993.

demands increasing legislative powers. In these attempts, the EP has had some success, as it has moved, over the years, from an assembly to a consultative forum, to co-operation in legislation with the SEA and now to co-decisional powers with the Maastricht Treaty. The EP and the Commission are allies in relationship to the Council, since they are both supra-national bodies acting in favor of continued European integration. Although this applies generally for the Commission and the European Parliament, the EP's environmental committee has had a somewhat exceptional relationship with DG XI, because they share an "interinstitutional ethos" based on some broadly defined environmental values, according to David Judge (1992:199). DG XI actively pursues this role, and this has set DG XI apart form other Directorates General. "DG XI is very liberal—liberal meaning open—at least as compared to the other DGs. It is in close contact with ENGOs and tries to have an open voluntary dialogue with concerned parties."[186]

The fact that environmental groups and environmental issues fit into the ideas of European integration can be one explanation why the European Parliament is very active when it comes to these types of issues. It is in this field that European legislation can be easily motivated, since environmental problems do not recognize national boundaries and are an important concern for the European publics.[187] Since the 1980s the transnational and global dimension of pollution and resource depletion has also made it more difficult to argue convincingly for subsidiarity regarding environmental issues.[188] The EP's involvement in environmental issues takes up quite a large part of the work of the parliament and is not at all proportional to the total activities of the Community.[189]

Information Interdependency

In the public eye, the Commission is often pictured as a giant bureaucracy. However, it is not very large when one considers the territory and the number of people it administers (Mazey & Richardson 1992:115). The Commission is, thus, highly

[186]NGO representative, November 1992.

[187]Eurobarometer data elaborated in Huelshoff and Down 1994:figure 1.

[188]The British have been criticized for trying to re-patriate environmental decisions during their last presidency (EEB 1992:2).

[189]In a personal communication (Sept. 2 1991), the President of the EP committee on the environment, Ken Collins, claims that his committee was responsible for around 40% of the total output of the European Parliament.

dependent on outside sources to gather information and get expertise in preparation for proposals. The Commission does this through independent consultants, by consulting interest groups, by participating at the European parliamentary debates, reading the EP's own initiative reports, or by listening to lobbyists' expertise and advice. It is clear that the access to information from the outside to the Commission is an essential part of policy making (Leveque 1994). However, the entire consultation process is closed to the public[190] and internal working papers are kept within the Commission. Neither is information about the sources of expertise for proposals made known.

Four organizations—the EEB, the WWF, FoEEurope and Greenpeace—are accepted as negotiation partners and sources of expertise by the Commission (Boons 1992:101; Mazey & Richardson 1992:115; Lowe & Goyder 1983:163-176). These four groups have informal meetings with DG XI three to four times a year. Sometimes the environmental groups have meetings with other DGs as well.[191] The relationship between the Commission and the ENGOs regarding the access to, and the sharing of, information does not appear to be very institutionalized. Sometimes the participants claim that DG XI is very open and hands out information freely.[192] Other times, the story is quite different. The relationship has varied over the years. Between 1984 and 1988 the Commission had more of a closed-door policy toward ENGOs. The feeling was that industry got the red carpet treatment, even in DG XI.[193]

The ENGOs provide some of the expertise necessary for the work of DG XI. In the early period of Community policy making the scientific expertise of the ENGOs was vital both in providing critical scientific views, in pointing to the degrading state of the environment and in providing the public with the necessary information to understand environmental problems. In the early 1970s scientific evidence was significant because it pointed to trouble spots by providing the actual indicators for problems, by monitoring pollution in air and water. For example, in the mid 1980s scientific evidence played a critical role in pointing out the ozone problem of Western Europe

[190]The issue of increased transparency is one of current interest. It is likely that the policy process will be more open to the interest groups and the public in the future. The Danish government has encouraged this for some time, and the Swedish government is also pressuring for greater transparency during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/97.

[191]NGO representative, November 1992.

[192]NGO representative, November 1992.

[193]NGO representative, November 1992.

(Jachtenfuchs 1990:272). In turn, Brussel-based ENGOs mainly rely on expertise coming from the national level and within local branches of the organizations.[194]

In the research process it has been rather obvious that between the different Community institutions there are interdependencies relating to the resources described. These interdependencies provide opportunities to build alliances across institutions. Resource dependencies between institutions do not adequately or fully describe the process of network creation and alliance building. Instead, it appears necessary to move from the collective level of network formation, where there are interdependencies between organizations, to the relationships between individuals who take part of different organizations and occupy certain roles.

Participants as Individual Actors in Network Relationships

When we talk about networks we are really looking at a limited set of individuals who participate in an issue area. These participants are individuals as representatives of states, interest groups, bureaucracies and social movements. Exchanges always take place between individuals, who represent the organization of which they are a member and assume a role within that organization. Boundaries between these Community institutions often become blurred because a fairly high degree of exchange of participants between these organizations takes place. This occurs as the individual participants move in and out of different organizations. Commission representatives come from positions within the national representation, environmental interest groups, national bureaucracies or parliamentary work in the EP. The participants move in and out of these different bodies, creating network links in the process. Such interaction and exchange extend to involve the Council and the national environmental ministries, although the intensity of the exchange varies depending on which Member States are involved and with which participants we deal. Some individuals who take a liking to living in Brussels, might try to stay on even after their contracted time runs out. This can be achieved by taking a job in a different institutions, where the acquired skills from the previous position can be highly valuable.

A typical example of such a career is that of Mr Carlo Ripa di Meana. He was the Commissioner for environmental issues in 1989-1992, he then worked as

[194]ibid.

environmental minister in the Italian government; subsequently, he became the spokesman for the Italian federation of Greens, and is now a MEP and a member of the Green group. I am not aware whether he has chosen to use these different positions in order to build network and further ecocentric ideas; however, it is clear that plenty of other participants have chosen to do so. Quite obviously the possibility to build alliances, which are based on loyalties and friendships created in different context, increases when participants move in and out of different organizational settings in this manner.

The complex structure of the Community policy process that emerges, if one takes empirical findings seriously, is the background against which personal participation can be understood. In such a structure, network building between individual participants becomes almost a practical necessity. On the other hand, it is not possible for just any individual to become a member of a network at any time. The individual participant is subject to certain access rules which determine *who* the participants in the network are.

In the network, personal factors interact with organizational factors to influence decisions. It is the extensive interactions between participants that characterize a network. The frequency of interaction and the degree of cohesion vary between networks. The denser the network, the lower the risk that the agenda shifts back and forth. This naturally has implications for policy outcomes. In a highly integrated network it is rather unlikely that an idea, which runs contrary to the general ideology or interest of the network, is accepted. Kingdon suggests that well integrated networks "...are a bit like academic disciplines, each with their own theories, ideas, preoccupations, and fads" (Kingdon 1984:134).[195] He stresses that the issues which manage to reach the agenda fit the values that the specialists in the network have. These specialists often perceive the world in similar ways and concert as to which problems and solutions should be considered important (Kingdon 1984:140-145).

In very tight networks the agendas are stable and not likely to shift very much. The problems and solutions focused upon will be in line with mainstream thinking within the network. Thus it would be difficult for any issues, running contrary to the world view of a well integrated network, to reach that agenda. Hence, networks between ecocentric sympathizers in different institutions could give rise to strong alliances important for environmental agenda setting and policy making. At the same time,

[195]He uses the concept policy communities rather than networks.

networks based on other factors could create obstacles to environmental policy making. It seems important, then, to go beyond 'networks' as a metaphor to studying what factors networks are based on. The network approach is a useful tool for analyzing how the individual participants relate to each other. W*ho* the participants in a network are, is an important question to start with.

The first and perhaps most obvious answer to the question is that they are mostly men. The dualistic construction of public/private that has historically confined men to the public and women to the private sphere, has apparently also affected the institutions of the Community.

The systematic exclusion of certain 'people called women'[196] becomes rather obvious when we look at political institutions. In the Commission, the central administrative organization of the Community, well over two thirds of the Commission staff of around 20, 000 are men. Of the lowest paid, 70% are women and there are less than 5% women in positions of high ranking, such as directors or directors general (Skjønsberg et al. 1993:30). Even though the development since the Treaty of Rome of 1957 generally has been to actively include more women on the staff of the institutions,[197] women are underrepresented as compared with their percentage of the population.[198] This is also the case in other international organizations (Peterson & Runyan 1993:56), as for example the UN (Beigbeder 1995).

Regardless which Community institution we look at, the people who work there as decision makers are predominantly men. Furthermore, it is a segregated workplace: men occupy the head of unit, director and director general positions, while women are at the lower levels or work as secretaries. Turning for a moment to the Commission's Directorate General for the Environment, the findings are that out of 36 top positions only four (as of February 1996)[199] are occupied by women. Although this is more women than ever before, these figures are still somewhat surprising since the

[196]An expression used by Christine Sylvester to highlight that person's with female anatomy are socially constructed and through this process confined to certain places and given certain names.

[197]A special office was set up in 1988 with the particular task of trying to encourage and recruit more qualified women particularly to top positions within the Commission.

[198]Of the total EU population and the 3 new members (at the time EFTA countries) 49% are men and 51% women (Eurostat 1995:10).

[199]They are Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard; Reinhilde Lambert, Head of Unit, Directorate A for Interinstitutional relations; Margaret Brusasco, Head of Unit, Directorate A for International matters; and Suzanne Frigren, Director of Directorate C for Nuclear Safety.

environmental issue area has been considered among the 'soft' and 'new' topics where participation by women would be expected to be higher.

Table 1: The male or (f)emale employees in top positions in the Service and DG XI.

Year	Commissioner	Director	Top Positions total	(f)	Women in top in %
1975	Mugnozza	Carpentier	10	1	10%
1979	Natali	Carpentier	13	0	0
1984	Narjés	Andreopoulos	16	0	0
1986	Davis	Fairclough	21	0	0
1988	Davis	Brinkhorst	20	1	5%
1990	Ripa di Meana	Brinkhorst	21	2	9,5%
1992	Ripa di Meana	Brinkhorst	29	3	10%
1994	Paleokrassis	Enthoven	36	3	8%
1996	Bjerregaard (f)	Enthoven	36	4	11%

(Source: Directory of the Commission, semiannual)

Turning to the Council and the different Member States' representations we note the same exclusion of women. As of the fall of 1995, only 23% of all the representatives are women. The national representatives normally come from the foreign ministries in each member country, and are part of the diplomatic corps. Diplomatic relations have been shown to be gendered. This is reflected in the employment policies of the diplomatic establishment which has as its basis the heterosexual nuclear family. In other words, the foreign department has long depended on the wife's unpaid labor to "grease the wheels of man-to-man negotiations" (Enloe 1989:123). This is also evident in the Community.

Among the interest groups, women's representation is also extremely low (Women of Europe 1992:35-37). That women's representation in the European lobby is considered inadequate has been officially recognized by the Commission, which has financed a women's lobby group since the late 1980s.

The best record for women's representation is held by the European Parliament. After the enlargement of 1995, 172 out of 626 MEPs were women. This leaves us with 27% women in the EP. The trend is that the share of women among MEPs has steadily increased with every election, and particularly so with the addition of the three new Member States in January 1995. If we break down the 172 women into the different party groups, it is evident that women representation varies much between party groups.

Table 2: The percentages MEPs per party group categorized by sex

EP Party Group 1995	Men	Women
Non-attached Group	87%	13%
Union for Europe	84%	16%
European People's Party	76%	24%
Europe of Nations	74%	26%
European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party	71%	29%
European Radical Alliance	68%	32%
European Socialist Group	68%	32%
European United Left/ European Green Left	65%	35%
The Green Group	52%	48%

(EP 1995; Commission Statistics 1995)

It is interesting to note that only in one party group, the European Green group, do women have a share of the MEP seats which comes closest to their percentage of the population. Perhaps this result is not surprising since the greens, in general, have been very critical of hierarchical and patriarchal societal structures and also included such critique in their political programmes (Bookchin 1990:41-73; Goodin 1992:138-146,198).[200]

A close look at the division between men and women in the institutions of the Community, shows that women are only marginally represented at the seats of influence and power, where agenda setting and decision making take place.

Who are the Participants in the Commission?

[200]These figures do not say anything about the division of men/women in the electorate, it could very well be the case that the Green group had a larger percentage of women among the electorate.

When it comes to EC institutions, membership is regulated by a set of criteria. The Commission staff is employed after the assurance of certain required qualifications as well as written standard testing, accompanied by interviews. The Commission has two types of staff: regular Commission staff and national experts. Even though one of the tasks of the Commission is to further the European interest, there is still an effort to balance the Commission so its staff will not be dominated by any one of the Member States. However, national differences are noticeable.[201]

When the Service for the environment was set up in the Commission in 1972, some staff was taken from the nuclear research program. At the time, there was a need to reorganize the staff because the Euratom organization (dealing with nuclear energy research) and the EEC were consolidated within, basically one bureaucracy.[202] A few directors of units have worked in DG XI since the very beginning when there were only seven in the staff: one lawyer, one general engineer and the rest nuclear engineers.[203] One might wonder what nuclear engineers know about environmental issues, but it should be recalled that, at the end of the 1960s, there were hardly any experts in the environmental field, and if environmental problems were perceived at all, they were seen as technical and management problems. Another aspect is that, during the fifties, there was an enormous enthusiasm, hope and belief in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the people who went into that profession where the most brilliant of the time.[204]

It seemed like the early staff took their task in the Service very seriously. It was an obvious challenge for them to try to introduce a largely unknown, underexplored policy area. They were quite young and took on the challenge with enthusiasm.[205] Thus, I argue that they were also part of the ecocentric resistance of the time, although for different reasons and with a different epistemic base than the ENGOs.

Over the years, many staff members have also been appointed on a political basis rather than on their competence in the environmental sciences. Many of the original

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[201]National Representative, November 1992.

[202]This happened with the Fusion Treaty, signed in 1965, which took some time to implement (Nicoll & Salmon 1990:25). The various geographical locations of the different Community institutions stem from this fusion of the executives of the three Communities: EEC, Coal and Steel and Euratom.

[203]Commission official, November 1992.

[204]NGO representative, November 1992 and 1993.

[205]At least this is what came out of the interviews. There might be a certain tendency to glamorize the past among the participants, but at the same time they do not deny the difficulty they had as young, new and not so knowledgeable about the issue.

staff members remain in the Directorate today, in advanced positions and as heads of sub-directorates, and due to such positions can be expected to still play an important role. The staff has subsequently been increased with environmental lawyers, and natural scientists. The tendency in the Commission has been to hire specialists. This led to an apparent lack of 'generalists'. At the end of the 1980s, when it was time to draw up the Fifth Action Programme, people with a general competence in economics and politics as well as environmental issues were required, but there were none.[206]

Most of the younger staff are environmentally conscious[207] and have worked with similar issues elsewhere; however, this does not mean that they are recruited from environmental NGOs.[208] Many of the most active staff have had connections with the environmental movement, often on the local or regional level, while not necessarily being active members. The staff of DG XI represent ecocentric resistance in their concern for environmental issues and their dedication as well as interest in resolving environmental problems. Through the interviews it became quite evident that such common ecocentric concerns were shared among the participants in the environmental issue area, regardless of what Community institutions they were a part of.[209]

From the perspective of the Commission it still appears to be true today. From the perspectives of NGOs and the EP, on the other hand, the view of DG XI has changed toward a more antagonistic relationship. My speculation is that it is a result of the environmental issues being increasingly legitimized as a part of politics. Environmental legislation has become more extensive, varied and complex; hence, it is less likely that something like the consensus of the earlier period of policy making can form between all the Community institutions involved in environmental issues. On the other hand, when the tendency is, as of late, to re-nationalize environmental policy, this might encourage new and stronger alliances between ecocentrics in different Community institutions. This might also include ecocentric resistances within sector politics, such as transport, agriculture or industry.

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[206]Commission official and national representative, November 1992.

[207]It was the expression used in the interview and should be interpreted as meaning, somebody with a particular concern for and interest in issues that deal with nature and nature degradation.

[208]Commission official, November 1992.

[209]With the exception of the national representatives in COREPER, where only the forerunner representatives can definitively be considered ecocentric. In an interview (1996) which such a representative, it was pointed out to me that among the environmental attachés, there is a particular enjoyable atmosphere, due to the concern for the environmental issue, which differs from the other COREPER working groups.

Who Gets to Participate in Council Work?

In the Council and in its working groups,[210] where Commission proposals are discussed and legislated, the participants are restricted to national representatives who are appointed to these positions by the Member States themselves. The work in the Council is closed to participation by others than the participants themselves and one representative from the Commission.[211] Since there is no transparency in the Council, this means that the officials attending are not *formally* permitted to convey information to other bodies or groups. One national representative said that he was expecting five or six calls, asking about the morning's meeting, during the course of an interview. He would have to answer these questions since it is the duty of a national representative to inform industry and business at home of what happens in the Community.[212] *In practice* it is commonplace that informal drafts are conveyed to European and national interest groups and the EP. Since it is unofficial, only a selected group will get information, at the discretion of the national representative her/himself.

The national representatives are to varying extents restricted by the mandate from national governments. This means that they have to take account of what is often defined as national interests—a vague concept that has often come to mean the interest of the major industrial and economic sectors within the member state. As a consequence, environmental ministers meeting in the Council have been accused, particularly by the EP and the ENGOs, of not trying to force stricter environmental standards and going against environmental interests.[213] However, if we look only at the 'forerunner'[214] countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany (and of late

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[210]All the preparatory work for the Council takes place in the Permanent Representatives' body, COREPER.

[211] Due to the lack of transparency, together with the fact that it is only the Commission and not the EP that participates in the Council proceedings, the EP does not know the position(s) in the Council. This lack of coordination and communication wastes time because the different institutions, as a result, may were well be working on quite different initiatives, according to Commission representative (Interview, November, 1992).

[212]National representative, November 1993.

[213]Commission official, November 1993.

[214]Forerunner and reactionary countries refer to a relative position of the different member states concerning environmental regulations. There are different reasons why some countries oppose and others propose Community environmental legislation. Those who oppose have generally less developed environmental policies in the domestic setting. Forerunner is also commonly used in

Sweden, Finland and Austria), at times the environmental interests have been pronounced as a 'national interest', particularly when confronted by 'national interests' of the other Member States. Moreover, these different countries are more keen on certain environmental issues and less keen on pushing for others. Car emissions has been a particular concern for the Dutch and the Germans, while the British have been interested in environmental problems related to agriculture.[215]

When it comes to the environmental issue area, the representatives in COREPER are the environmental attachés from the permanent national delegations in Brussels. The environmental attachés come from different backgrounds. The traditional approach has been that the national delegation is composed of diplomats from the foreign ministries. This has been the case for representatives sitting in the environmental Council working groups. As the issue area has expanded, some countries have decided to send representatives with more expert knowledge coming from national environmental ministries instead. At the end of 1993 the environmental Council working groups were composed of a mix, with representatives from, for example, UK, Ireland, Netherlands coming from the home foreign ministry, and the German and Danish representatives coming from the environmental ministry. This makes a big difference since diplomats from the foreign office have a different type of knowledge, interest and approach to the issue than environmental scientific expertise.[216] Of late, the Netherlands, for example, has again sent representatives from the foreign ministry. Their argument is that environment has become such a highly political issue that it is necessary to go beyond specific expertise in order for opinions to be consolidated at the national level.

When final decisions are taken in the Council, it is usually the environmental ministers who meet. However, the great majority of the issues have already been negotiated and decided upon in COREPER. According to the Treaties, the Council is an institution which emphasizes the different Member States' interests. The individuals who represent nation states in the working groups of the Council are also representatives of the national ministries or agencies which they originally come from, and often have developed contacts and loyalties in that setting. Normally they only stay on as

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Community parlance to mean those countries supporting stricter and more extensive (environmental) legislation at Community level (Andersen & Liefferink 1997; Liefferink & Andersen 1996).

[215]NGO representative, November 1992.

[216]National representatives, November 1993.

national representatives in Brussels for three or four years, after which they usually return home to their respective ministry.

The representatives of COREPER build relationships and loyalties among themselves, which give rise to networks and links that bridge national boundaries. This has been encouraged by institutional changes after majority voting was introduced in the Council. The environmental attachés, particularly of the 'forerunner' countries, meet regularly to discuss strategy and coalition building in this respect. Coalitions have to be built between states on particular issues, in order for initiatives to get pushed through as Community legislation. This was the case with the Fifth Action Programme, as illustrated an involved participant, who said that already from January of 1986 when the Dutch were running the environmental presidency they were working on Spain, Portugal and Greece, to make sure they would play along.[217]

Who are the Members of the European Parliament?

The European Parliament is a political body which reflects the political interest of the electorate in the Member States. Individual membership is based on activities in the national political parties and depends ultimately on the electorate in the European elections. The individual Member of the European Parliament (MEP) is guided in parliamentary work by party ideology. As such, the role of the MEP differs very little from national parliamentary roles. MEPs come together in political groupings along ideological lines rather than national ones. This forces the individual MEPs to adjust national party ideology to a Community level compromise.

The special characteristics of the European Parliament, as compared to a national parliament, also affect networks and outcomes. As is well known, the EP has limited legislative powers. Many MEPs want to decrease the democratic deficiency of the EU project by, for example, increasing the legislatory power of the EP. Democratic deficiency also includes concerns that fit with ecocentric strategies viewing democracy, transparency and citizen participation as fundamental for a sustainable society. Negative as it might seem from a democratic point of view, the EP's limited role as a legislative forum gives the individual MEP a freedom of opinion and action which is not found on the national level.[218] Due to the complicated and multifaceted

[217]Commission official, Brussels, November 1992.
[218]MEP in the Environmental Committee, November 1992.

legislative process, it is extremely difficult for the electorate at the local level to follow what a single MEP is doing and hold him or her accountable for it. This has allowed for certain MEPs with a particular burning interest in environmental issues to become very active on this matter in EP, despite coming from environmentally 'reactionary countries'.[219] This has been facilitated by the Environmental Committee which has been performing a special role within EC, as the promoter of ecocentric ideas. It has been characterized as more of an activist body than a traditional parliamentary committee, because it normally tries to go a little further than what appears feasible (Judges 1992:186-212). In other words, the environmental committee puts forward proposals and amendments that go a little above and beyond what the most conservative groups could accept.[220]

There is a shared recognition of the importance of environmental issues in Committee XI, which extends beyond party lines.[221] Some MEPs said that they were not interested in, or would not want to work in, any other committee than the Environmental Committee. We see here that the formal restrictions on membership or access to the EP are overcome and certain MEPs act according to epistemic and personal factors which are not determined by party ideology. Some of these active MEPs have been, and still are, members of environmental organizations at local, national or international levels. We can thus conclude that membership of the EP's Environmental Committee is guided by political party affiliation and career opportunities at the national level, the national electorate in the European elections and, perhaps more importantly, by personal ecocentric ambitions.

Apart from Committee XI, the Green group is another ecocentric resistance within the Community institutions. When the Greens first entered the EP they worked mainly as representatives of the social movements in Europe and, thus, in clear opposition to the whole EU project. The new Green group of 1989, with 28 MEPs, had a much more positive view of integration and particularly EP's role as the only democratic EC institution. They were more concerned with ecological topics than the previous Green group and took an active part in EP politics. The third and current group, formed in 1995, has 27 members and is a mix of the two earlier tendencies, but is in addition highly individualistic. Every MEP works on his or her project, and some decide to act as trouble makers to undermine the EU project, while others try to pursue ecocentric

[219]On the meaning of reactionary here, see footnote 214.
[220]Assistant to MEP, November 1992.
[221]Interviews with MEPs in the environmental committee, November 1992.

politics within the framework of European integration. To a greater extent than earlier, Greens exploit the available EP resources in order to change politics in an ecocentric direction, although they do not refrain from more provocative protest activities as well (Bowles & Farrell 1992; Carter 1994; Burchell 1996; Bomberg 1992; 1996).

Participants in the European Environmental Organizations

The representatives of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) often have some specialist qualifications in the biological or ecological field, some experience with similar work at other levels and, perhaps most importantly, a strong dedication to the promotion of ecocentrism, although in diverse shapes and forms.

Which individual becomes the participant on the European level also depends on the type of ENGOs we are dealing with. The four main environmental organizations at the EC level—EEB, WWF, FoEEurope and Greenpeace—have very different organizational structures. The EEB has a board, a Secretary General and a staff in Brussels which can act rather freely from the around 130 national and local organizations which they represent. Although the organization has some problems coordinating the various wishes and interests of these 130 organizations, it seems that the representatives in Brussels can act rather independently to pursue policy change and recommendations in the Commission and the EP. Good lobbying skills and abilities to get information from experts for arguments to the Commission are some of the necessary qualities of EEB staff.[222]

Friends of the Earth's European office is only a coordinating unit since the FoE is a grassroots organization. Accordingly, every initiative and every decision must be generated from each local FoE body, and FoEEurope can only monitor and convey information about EC environmental action to the local organizations. The requirement for representatives at the EC level seems to be first and foremost, a strong dedication to the environmental cause. The organization works with small financial resources and a small staff in a Brussels attic apartment some distance from the main

[222]NGO representative, November, 1992.

EC institutions.[223] Greenpeace, by contrast, is an elite organization not subject to democratic or grassroots procedures. It seems as if the staff includes mainly people who have, apart from dedication to ecocentric ideas, good lobbying skills.

Over some 20 years of environmental policy formation in the Community as well as nationally and locally, these ENGOs have developed and become much more politically skilled and politically accepted, particularly those of the Northern European countries.[224] They have moved into regular lobbying activities and work in close contact with national governments. This phenomenon has had implications for the relationship with the grassroots level and the degree of democracy and representation within the big environmental organizations. The fact that mainstream environmentalism during the 1980s moved from grassroots confrontation to a higher degree of institutionalization has had great effects on representation.

The ENGOs have become more 'professionalized'; hence, academic degrees and political skills have also become increasingly important. They are increasingly employing environmental lawyers and environmental economists, professions that are innovative within their fields of law and economy,[225] but that can be expected to be constrained by the predominant practices of those disciplines. Typically, environmental lawyers will argue fervently for more legislation and litigation rights, while economists will insist that the use of different financial instruments is the best environmental strategy. The grassroots dimension of the ENGOs in Brussels has diminished over the years.

The big ENGOs are predominantly represented by white males (Seager 1993:167-121; Merchant 1992:157-162). Like in most other organizations all the directors of the EEB have been men. It is difficult to say what effect this has on environmental politics and lobbying, because we have no examples, where organizations are dominated by women, to compare with. However, the way that some of these larger environmental organizations work is closer to the way that their 'opponents' work

[223]Based on interviews with the directors of FoEE and WWF, November 1992. The WWF seem to be in a somewhat similar predicament, perhaps slightly better off financially. FoEE was seat up in 1985 and WWF in 1989. Prior to this, local WWF and FoEE organizations were members of the EEB.

[224]A good example of this is the Netherlands' biggest environmental organization: Stichting Natuur und Miljö and the Nature conservation society (Naturskyddsföreningen) in Sweden.

[225]The Task Force report on the environment (1990) was developed by a group, consisting of exclusively environmental economists.

than to the grassroots movements.[226] To exemplify, when I observed an NGO meeting with the Commission about transparency, the well-establish organizations, represented by white males, acted and discussed much in the same way as the Commission representative. The other groups attending, many represented by women, were not able to enter into the debate at all. Hence, these ENGOs seem to have adapted to the patriarchal behavior patterns. While they might strongly adhere to ecocentric principles, they do not necessarily apply such principles to their own political behavior, but instead adopt a traditional lobbying style.

Network Formation and Alliance Building

What has been discussed is a number of formal as well as informal processes that determine whether participants have access to these Community institutions. Besides the formal rules and qualification procedures, there is also an informal side. I would emphasize that informal networks are of great importance due to the fragmentary and complex organizational structure and decision process of the Community, discussed earlier.

It was quite evident that networking has been used as an explicit strategy within the environmental issue area of the Community, ever since the early 1970s. Carpentier—the director general of the Service until 1981—realized this importance and encouraged cooperation not only between the institutions but also between the environmental ministers (or equivalent) of the Member States.

So far we have looked at which institutions, and parts thereof, are involved in ecocentric networks or alliances, as well as who the individual participants are. The third and final step in this chapter is to see which factors have been shown to be conducive to networks and alliance building. In the discussion which follows we will concern ourselves with what keeps these individual participants in the network linked together more or less tightly, giving rise to more or less integrated networks.

[226]NGO representative, November, 1992.

Epistemic Factors

Epistemic factors, such as knowledge and associated values, have been highlighted in a recent discussion on international regimes.[227] The proposition is that intellectual input makes a difference to decision processes and outcomes. Research in this area shows that the sharing of common knowledge helps cooperation and network building. Sometimes this shared knowledge can give rise to networks which are bound by the same intellectual interpretation of problems and solution. Ernst Haas uses the concept epistemic community to denote a knowledge-based network and sets it apart from other types of groups involved in political processes. An epistemic community shares the same world views and enjoys a high degree of cohesion, but it is not static; instead it is open to new knowledge and "the constant reexamination of prevailing beliefs about cause and effect, ends and means" (Haas 1990:41). The epistemic community is, according to Peter Haas, a combination of analytic and normative values, a common knowledge base and a common interest (Haas 1992:18). The epistemic community approach suggests flexibility and more openness toward new issues, since the learning and reevaluation of the consensual knowledge within this group is ongoing.[228] This approach is, in this sense, more dynamic than the common notion of policy communities (Rhodes & Marsh 1992), since it suggests that change of the policy direction in international organizations is possible and more likely. It is suggested to be more likely in situations of crisis when traditional problem-solving methods seem inadequate.

My point in bringing the epistemic community idea into the discussion, is to emphasize that such factors can be important for network relations and formation.

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[227]See the work of Peter Haas, Ernst Haas and the Special Issue on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, vol. 46, No 1 of *International Organization*. For a slightly different approach see: Caldwell 1990 and Porter & Brown 1991. For a more particular discussion on the development of EC environmental policy as an international regime see: Hildebrand 1992:13-44 and Mol & Liefferink 1993:17-35, 99-113.

[228]Similar discussions on the role of knowledge in networks and how it affects policy change can be found in the policy literature. For an overview of various approaches see: Bennett & Howlett 1992:275-294. See also: Rose 1991:3-30; Sabatier 1988:129-168; Etheredge 1981; Heclo 1978.

Knowledge and common values can contribute to the cohesion of networks and eventually to the change of policy direction.

It was argued in chapter three that the environmental sector, in general, is very expert dependent. Important strategies for environmental protection are built on scientific knowledge and technical solutions coming from the scientific community. These scientific experts have through their schooling achieved a pool of common knowledge along with a scientific method where hypotheses are constantly questioned, modified and restated.[229] Alongside this, the expert concerned with the environmental issue area has a particular interest in the field, sometimes with an involvement in the environmental movement.[230]

DG XI officials have an 'intellectual honesty', which means that they might very well have their minds set on a certain issue, but they will listen to reason and good arguments. This applies generally to Commission officials, but I can illustrate it with an example: One Commission official was pro-nuclear energy but became convinced of the contrary by an energy officer of the FoE. The energy officer managed this because he had very convincing and scientifically based arguments about how nuclear energy was not energy efficient. Such hard evidence is difficult to ignore if you are an intellectual human being.[231] This is an example of the constant reexamination of data and information which seems characteristic of epistemic communities. The normative values which the approach emphasizes can also be traced in the Community as the ideology of ecological modernization.[232] Weale and Williams argue that among the main policy makers in Europe, EC environmental policy makers (particularly those in DG XI) have been the main contributors of ecological modernization ideas, as is also reflected by the proposals issued by the Commission over the years (Weale & Williams 1992:47-49).

How important these intellectual factors are in a network is also determined by how many participants are joined in a common knowledge and value base. The epistemic

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[229]This does not mean that everything is questioned, since there is a bias which persists in the scientific method and the Western view of science. This was extensively discussed in chapter three.

[230]This has been shown in work down by Haas and Caldwell.

[231]According to an NGO representative, November 1992.

[232]Ecological modernization has to do with a reevaluation of the relationship between economy and environment. If the 'cost' of environmental protections is avoided, it means that the damage and the cost are only postponed to the future and increased. Since natural resources are essential for industrial production, environmental protection, according to this view, is not seen as a burden but rather as a potential for growth. According to: Weale 1992:75-79.

community approach suggests that all of the participants share this common knowledge. A more realistic notion is perhaps that only some participants share this knowledge and value base. The degree to which the outcome is influenced by intellectual factors thus depends on how many of the participants share common knowledge.[233]

One explanation as to why alliance and networking have been quite successful around the environmental issue area of the Community is that the ecocentric resistance participants, although present in different contexts, have a common base in such epistemic values. There is such an epistemic base in the ENGOs but also in large parts of the European Parliament, particularly in the Committee for the environment, extensively in DG XI and to a certain extent among some of the national representatives, or environmental attachés in the Council. These participants can and do form links and alliances that cross institutional and national boundaries.

Personal Factors

> That is how the whole /EU/ system works—with personal contacts.
> (National representative, 1993)

> It is hard to influence the Commission; it is only possible with personal contacts...
> (NGO representative, 1992)

In addition to epistemic factors, different types of personal factors relating to the individual participants appear to be of importance for network relationships and certainly for policy making. These have to do with the participants' previous personal history and background, her/his institutional history, or a combination of these. Institutional history has been briefly touched upon earlier, when we discussed the common case of individuals moving in and out of different organizations.[234] In each one of these organizational locations, individual participants generate friendships relations, based on affective values that can create lasting loyalties and trust. One national representative expressed this in the following way: "In the COREPER working groups the atmosphere is good. The attachés know each other very well—

[233]This is also suggested by Higgott & Stone 1992:8.
[234]National representative, November 1993.

they are personal friends."[235] These affective links then can become personal resources, beneficial in creating and maintaining contacts that can be used in the professional life as well.[236]

The Commission's regular staff has developed contacts with Brussels-based expertise in the interest organizations. In the Commission there are at times national experts or staff which come from previous work in the Council working groups. These participants in the Council working groups often develop links which are not nation-based but cut across national boundaries and extend into ministries of other European countries. This type of contacts can be used to pressure different national participants when it comes time to reach an agreement. This was illustrated in the example of the Fifth Action Programme network, where the participants were able to get documents from various national ministries, which even their own minister had not seen. These documents could then be used in the negotiation process as an extra resource in order to know the position of a particular government, its weak spots and how far it was willing to go.[237]

I propose that affective aspects of network building are significant since they create network links based on trust and friendship. In connection with the development of the fifth Action Programme one Commission official said:

> The fact that we had been in and out of the Commission and the Council for many years was essential. A network is extremely important because a certain friendship relationship develops...A goodwill develops with mutual respect and integrity...Spain was one of the most difficult countries. But the Director General of Environment was one of the ex-colleagues. This personal relationship helps, since it saves time and people are up front and there is not so much showtalk (Commission official 1992).

Another example of how such aspects can affect outcomes in the Community is the emissions directive proceedings. It was a long and drawn out process[238] since there were strong coalitions against such a directive. In 1983 the EP invited Jacques Delors, the president of the Commission, for a study visit to the Black Forest in Germany. The EP wanted to show the Commission the effects of car emissions. The delegation

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[235]National representative, November 1993.

[236]National representative, November, 1993.

[237]Commission official, Interview November 1992.

[238]It was initiated in the European Parliament in 1982 and in 1992 it came into effect. (Dietz et al. 1991:62-78).

went to the Black Forest and the expert, who was responsible for the presentation and argumentation on location, happened to be an old schoolmate of Delors'. This was a person whom Delors had respected very much during his school years. Thus, it was impossible for Delors not to take this man seriously and, according to a MEP, it proved to be a turning point for the issue. It was really a coincidence. Who knows if we would have an emissions directive now had it not been for an old friend of Delors'?[239]

Personal relationships and affective values are not only created in different Community institutions but extend to the domestic levels as well. The staff responsible for a particular initiative often use their national or personal network to get necessary expertise. "The network I had within the Netherlands I used to test the ideas of the Fifth Action Programme."[240] National experts who work in the Commission on a limited time basis are more apt to turn to national ministries and national experts for information on a proposal. That is where they know how to find reliable information quickly.

While these personal factors are important for network formation because they give rise to trust, loyalties, familiarity and predictability, we must recognize that they also are based on a dualistic distinction between us and them. It is possible that these personal factors contribute to the exclusion of certain groups. The importance of personal factors for network formation also entails that divisions based on class, ethnicity, gender, etc., could be upheld through such effects. At the domestic level such network building are often based on long-term development of personal relations. These are not only cultivated in professional life but through education, the military service and private associations as well. For the British, the private schools are important institutions where such personal links and relationships are fostered. Similarly, in France the civil service and in Germany the Churches seem to fill this function.[241] Different environmental organizations can serve a similar function.[242]

If these associations are important personal assets also in political and administrative life, as has been suggested here, it is problematic from a gender perspective. Since a majority of these associations are either implicitly or explicitly for men, this presents a disadvantage to those who can not build on the personal resources that these

[239]Half a year later the Commission initiated a Scientific Conference on the Black Forest and Pollution (MEP, November 1992).
[240]Commission official, November 1992.
[241]NGO representative, November 1993.
[242]Commission officials, November 1992.

associations give rise to. The historic exclusion of women from these private associations, so crucial for the public scene, fosters a homosociability, i.e., the seeking, enjoyment and/or preference for the company of the same sex (Matthis 1995; Cockburn 1991:188-190; Lipman-Blumen 1976:16), which means that women will have a constant disadvantage in the policy process because they do not have these personal relations to rely on. Furthermore, when such networks builds on old organizational structures, the chances are that the participants would support dominant practices rather than resistances.

Time and Dedication

Time is another important factor in the policy process of the Community from the perspective of temporal sorting. Every participant is subject to competitive claims on her/his time, because s/he plays more roles than as a representative of an EU institution. S/he has other obligations as a family member, in a group of friends or in the local or national community. How much time s/he can dedicate to the network depends largely on demands in other areas (Olsen 1976:82-139).

This means that it is necessary for the individual to set priorities. What is prioritized in a certain instance depends on what the individual will value as the most urgent issue to deal with both within the field of work but also in private life. The process of setting such priorities is highly subjective and individual. This subjectivity is also evident when we look at how much time and energy different participants in a particular network invest in it. This varies considerably, because of different priorities and obligations, but also because participants have varying degrees of dedication to the issue.[243]

Some participants are willing to dedicate more time and energy to a particular concern.[244] They are more ambitious and engaged than other participants and take on a leadership role. They might do this for ideological reasons, for personal satisfaction or economic gains. In the history of Community environmental policies there are a few such individuals. In connection with the latest developments it is appropriate to mention Former Commissioner Ripa di Meana, Secretary General Laurens Brinkhorst of DG XI as well as President Ken Collins of the EP's environmental committee.

[243]MEP, November 1992.

[244]Kingdon calls these participants policy entrepreneurs (1984:129-130; 188-193).

Michele Carpentier, the director of the Environment Service until 1981, was a motivator, a leader and a strong driving force behind early environmental policy. Stanley Johnson has also been a keen enthusiast for the environmental cause, both as a Commission staff and as an MEP. Ludwig Krämer is another driven individual who has promoted environmental concerns from the beginning in the Service and later in the name of the Commission. These are but a few examples of individual participants who have been willing to dedicate much time and energy in trying to introduce, establish and integrate environmental issues on the Community agenda over the years.

My research has shown that such participants, willing to dedicate time and energy have been crucial in bringing, and maintaining, environmental issues on the Community agenda.

Networks in a Wider Context

The problem one faces when taking a closer look at one particular policy network is that it excludes an analysis of the context in which that network exists. Focusing on one network, in a sense, precludes the existence of other networks which can interfere with or inhibit the activities of the network under study. We must recognize that it is probable that one specific participant will belong to more than one network. In the case of the Community we can see that transnational networks develop, but individual participants have connections on their respective national levels. This is not unimportant since positions taken in one network can very well be influenced by the participants' place and dedication in another network.[245]

Networks obviously exist in a broader setting and are influenced by this, as the distribution of power in society is also reflected in emerging networks. This means that to a certain degree the network favors the status quo and maintains the existing balance of interest. According to Marsh and Rhodes, networks *cannot* be "ascribed a passive role in the process of change" (1992:260). The networks constrain the agenda and shape policy outcomes; well-integrated networks are most efficient at this. But networks are also affected by changes in the surrounding environment. Whether these external changes have an impact on the network depends on the type of links there are between participants and how strong these are.

[245]A similar discussion is conducted by Boons (1992:84-105) who looks at the formulation of the EC Directive concerning the control of chemicals.

Networks are a form of elite collectives for decision making. They exclude the general public and favor certain interests over others (cf. Lowi 1969). This means that certain groups in society are going to be closed to this form of participation. Women experience difficulties in entering male dominated elites and may find it difficult to develop the informal relations that usually go along with elite membership (Fuchs Epstein 1981:3-15). When ENGOs become more professional, their connection with the grassroots level becomes less developed, because they develop independent skills and resources and do not depend on the grassroots. When they gain political acceptance and status they also get more resources which encourages this development.

The selection process takes place during the formation of links between participants and is based on the factors discussed in this paper so far: resource dependencies, access possibilities, epistemic and personal factors, time and dedication. Networks do not necessarily have to be elitist, if the connections include the grassroots level, diverse groups and in that sense the public of Europe then they can also be representative. Transparency and easy access to both information and membership seem to be important concerns here.

Concluding Discussion

The power practices of the EU project that have been most pertinent in influencing the participant stream are patriarchal, bureaucratic, and sovereign practices. These have led to a set of formal rules determining the different roles that the Community institutions play, as well as their mutual relationships. The institutions considered were the Commission (DG XI), the European Parliament (the Green Group and Committee XI), the Council (COREPER) and the European environmental interest groups. They are interdependent in the agenda-setting process because they have different resource dependencies. These resources are economic, integrational and informational, and resource dependencies encourage alliances in the environmental issue area. Such alliances became particularly strong when ecocentric goals could accommodate other goals as well. Examples here were ecocentric resistance and the European parliament's concern with the democratic deficit of the Community. Similarly the Commission's interest in accommodating interest groups, thereby mediating conflicting interest, has benefited the ENGOs.

In order to understand more precisely how ecocentric resistances have contributed to agenda setting in the Community, it was necessary to move beyond the alliance between collectives or institutions, to look at the way policy participants interact to create such networks as individual participants. The study looked more closely at who the participants were in the different institutions. The third part of the chapter analyzed the factors that were beneficial to network creation between individuals, and conducive to network formation to put and maintain environmental issues on the agenda. Important were epistemic and personal factors as well as time and dedication. Epistemic factors seemed to be particular important for the creation of ecocentric networks and alliances, due to the common value base in different ecocentric ideas. The other factors, indicated as important, can perhaps be more generally applicable to networks, and not necessarily only significant for environmental agenda setting.

Ecocentric values are articulated by natural scientists, environmental lawyers and environmental economists. These participants appear in different positions in all of the institutions involved. This wide-spread presence is a recent phenomena and the result of different resistances working in various location to increase political legitimation, participation and acceptance of environmental concerns. This work of the resistances has, hence, been accepted politically, legitimized and to some extent become part of a new type dominant power practices, exemplified here by the professionalization of the environmental movement and the distance that this creates to the public and the grassroots. Participants with environmentalist values have managed to enter into the different Community institutions, it was suggested, because there were no established elites in connection to this issue which left room for individual enthusiastic participants to generate support for environmental concerns.

The power practices of bureaucratization, here particularly in the form of hierarchization and sectorization together with sovereignty practices, are reflected in models of the formal policy process. We have seen that this leads to enormous complexity in actual policy making. In practice and as a reaction to this, resistances are formed in the shape of informal network building. Network building represents resistance because it falsifies central ideas in traditional decision models that are based on a notion of independent, rational and disconnected individuals as policy makers.

Finally, we have also critically assessed network building and shown that networks build on connections, but also on exclusions. Certain participants, who do not have a common epistemic base, time to invest, personal or institutional relationships that

network formation relies on, will have more difficulty in accessing the decision making process.

Chapter Eight

Bringing the Streams Together

The purpose of this chapter is to show how the streams come together. This will be done in the following ways: First, three small case studies will show how the streams, discussed in chapters five, six and seven come together at a particular moment. This is followed by a general discussion of the application of the temporal sorting model, centering on what the different uses of the model tells us about agenda setting and the likelihood that streams be coupled. Finally, some conclusions drawn from the analysis of the empirical material will be summarized.

Three Cases of Temporal Sorting

The following three selected cases describe the process whereby the streams—choice opportunities, problems, solutions and participants—have come together. It builds on the material discussed in the earlier chapter, but is in this way put together from a different perspective. The ambition is to draw some conclusions regarding factors which might be conducive to agenda formation.

The First Time Environment was on the EEC Agenda

The *choice opportunity* was the October 1972 Paris Summit headed by the French government in its function as the EEC presidency.

There were at least *three different problem perceptions* at the time of the Paris Summit with which the environmental solution subsequently was coupled. The French government found itself in difficulty in the EEC because it had no message and no new item to put on the agenda. Second, the accession negotiations with Ireland, Denmark and the UK were in progress (1970-1972), and the fact that social issues had not been dealt with became in this light a sort of embarrassment for the Community which

needed to show some results of European integration. Third, the river pollution problems were becoming increasingly evident, and particularly serious was the pollution of the Rhine river. At the same time the Club of Rome report had been published and made an impression on many people. This report, and river pollution in particular, constituted the type of environmental problem awareness at the time.

The *solution* was to put environmental concerns on the agenda of the Summit by asking for a program for the environment to be drafted by the Commission, not surprisingly, since such a solution had already been prepared. Already in 1967 environmental issues were discussed in a small unit within the directorate for industry, technology and the internal market. At the time, pollution was a non-issue within the rest of the Commission. The work, which was headed by Carpentier, was in its initial stages and consisted of some loose ideas, a few objectives and an action plan. The central discussion within this unit was focused on how environmental concerns could be included in, or related to, other objectives of the Community. There was a particular need to prepare an argument that would convince member states that community measures rather than intergovernmental measures would be necessary in the environmental issue area. This resulted in a communication from the Commission to the Council in 1971. Hence, at the time of the Paris Summit there was already a solution available. This was in the shape of a rudimentary First Environmental Action Programme that could be coupled with the three sets of problems discussed above.

In the late 1960s there were *a few participants* high up in the Community decision structure who had taken note of the changes in the interest toward quality of life issues among the Europeans. President Georges Pompidou is one example of a man who was influenced by the 1968 upheavals and paid attention to the quality of life issues, brought up in that context. He followed up on those thoughts to promote human aspects of the EEC as to avoid the sole emphasis on free trade. The Italian Commissioner Spinelli had initiated a conference to discuss environmental problems with colleagues in the Commission; hence, they were generally aware of the problems. In addition, Commissioner Mansholt had been alarmed by the work of the Club of Rome. Furthermore, inside the Commission there were officials who were very keen on getting new things on the agenda because they were concerned for their careers. Spinelli appointed a small unit within his DG with some highly educated engineers. The reason why the unit was staffed with this type of personnel was that the European Joint Nuclear Research Center at Ispra, Italy, faced re-organization and budget cuts. This was partly due to the fusion of the three Communities together with the re-nationalization of nuclear power research (Rose 1996). This meant that there were

Community employees who were well paid, highly skilled, but had little to do at the nuclear research center and could be put to work with this new task.

The Environment and Consumer Protection Service

The *choice opportunity* was provided by the fact that the agenda of the Paris Summit had called for an action program on the environment which had to be realized somehow, together with the addition of three new countries.

Having agreed that environmental concerns would be matters to be discussed in the Community context also meant that these questions had to be practically organized somewhere. However, the most important *problem* seemed to be the three new Member countries. As of the first of January 1973, there were three new Member States with four new Commissioners and, hence, tasks and positions that needed to be created, shared or re-shuffled.

Setting up the Environment and Consumer Protection Service was then such a response or *solution*. This was a very innovative initial idea from the new Commission, because the Service would affect all DGs of Community policy rather than serve as a separate policy initiator, thus anticipating an integrative approach. In retrospect it appears as if the solution was acceptable because only a few people really believed that environmental issues were important concerns, and only a few felt threatened by such a Service. Environment and consumer protection were organized into the same unit, because they both dealt with aspects perceived as citizens' concerns.

The *participants* working in the Service, were mainly engineers because they were 'leftovers' from the nuclear energy research sector. However, they were highly qualified and furthermore one of the more visionary professional groups of the time. They were looking for new possibilities, and perceived it as a challenge to try to impose new ideas and a new way of thinking within the Commission. The small unit which preceded the Service was composed of these individuals, who were young, ambitious, and rather good friends as well.

The Fifth Environmental Action Programme

The Fifth Environmental Action Programme was adopted by the Council in February 1993. The programme is entitled "Toward Sustainability" and will guide EU environmental legislation into the next century. This program differs radically from previous ones because it is substantially more detailed and spans more issue areas.

The environmental action programmes have been policy recommendations coming every five years beginning in 1972. We can thus say that every five years the Commission or, more precisely, DG XI was expected to come up with a new programme, with some innovative ideas. Recall that we have discussed two general types of *choice opportunities* in chapter four, namely recurring occasions and crisis situations. This was a recurring occasion and it was expected of DG XI to produce some such Action Programme. This happened even though after 1987 and the SEA there appeared to be less of a need for this, since the treaty was amended to include environmental issues. Nevertheless, the will to continue this tradition was confirmed at the Dublin Summit of June 1990 where the member states had also committed themselves to sustainable development.

There was at the time some type of problem awareness. The Community had produced a "state of the environment" report showing rather serious environmental problems in the Member States, despite the environmental politics carried out since the First Action Programme. The report from June 1992 became part of the scientific base for the drafting of the fifth program. The *problem* that the Fifth Environmental Action Programme became coupled with was a problem formulated through the experience with earlier programs, particularly the insight that one small DG XI could not realistically be expected to solve problems that were created both in other sectors and had to do with policies generated (or not generated) in other DGs. Hence, the Fifth Action Programme could be seen as a response both to the frustration with earlier programs and the actual environmental state of Europe.

One thing that can be said for *solutions* in general is that Member States' national policies can provide important inspirations for Commission initiatives. They are valuable because the have been tried elsewhere and they are close at hand. If such a national policy has stricter environmental legislation than other Member States, accepting such a policy as Community policy would anticipate and avoid barriers to trade that differentiated legislation among Member States can create. The Dutch Environmental Policy Plan was a clear precursor of the Fifth Action Programme.

Furthermore it was the only complete model aimed at sustainable development which existed in the member states. The two plans are very similar in their thematic approach, the focus on target groups, and in the expression of short, middle and long-term goals. Even if the two plans, the Dutch one and the Community one, are similar in their approach, they are not identical. According to the drafter of the Community plan, had this been the case it would have been politically impossible to introduce it as a Community program.

The Dutch environmental plan was well known to DG XI because the Director General Brinkhorst was Dutch, and it was particularly known to the core group which drafted the Fifth Action Programme. Not surprisingly, one of the drafters was Dutch and the other Irish. Although new among the staff of DG XI, they were part of a network of individuals (as far as I know, only men) who had been working together in COREPER working groups, and already begun there to argue for such an approach. This network involved representatives from all the institutions of the Community and it was a successful policy network because *the participants* had been in and out of the Commission and the Council for many years. In the process they had built up trust and friendship. Although there were some particularly active Dutch participants, the success of the program as a Commission programme, accepted in the Council, depended on the involvement in the network of national representatives from countries that were perceived as obstinate, in this case Portugal, Spain and Greece. The network participants provided resistances partly based on ecocentric ideas. They were not necessarily active in the environmental movement organizations but had different types of links to such organizations, had a background in environmental studies, or had developed an affection for nature since childhood. They were also dedicated, enthusiastic and driven individuals who found much pleasure in their work and were prepared to spend much time and energy on it.

When Can the Streams be Coupled?

What has been shown above is that the temporal sorting model is not only a heuristic model but can also describe the reality of agenda setting. Given the character of the temporal sorting/garbage can model of organizational choice, is it possible to predict when the streams come together, or when coupling is most likely? My argument is that some general propositions about how the streams are coupled can be made from my research, and from the examples above.

The most obvious conclusion is that we need a choice opportunity. This can be in the form of a recurring event. When the choice opportunity is a recurring event, it allows for participants connected to the process to prepare themselves, if they wish, by producing a solution or a problem articulation, or both. They have to carefully time these efforts to the choice opportunity. However, timing is very difficult when the choice opportunity comes suddenly and unexpectedly, as in the case of the Seveso incident.[246] Such preparations are not possible and the coupling of problems, solutions and participants becomes even less predictable. At the same time, choice opportunities of a sudden surprising kind tend to take everybody off guard, suggesting that it would be possible to take advantage of such propitious events, that is, if a participant is in 'the right place at the right time'. Hence, it is probable that the participants close to the decision structures more likely can take advantage of choice opportunities that occur either more or less regularly or as the result of some kind of event.

Notable is also that if a number of problems can be coupled with one single solution, then it seems more probable that such a solution will be put on the agenda. By introducing environmental issues on the EEC agenda at the Paris Summit, three problems were resolved.

Finally, it is quite evident that when many participants support a particular solution it is more likely to be accepted. It is important that these participants have access to the policy making structures and are in key positions. In addition if they have built alliances across institutions or are in some type of networks—where influence can be exerted through a number of different channels simultaneously—the more likely it is that an issue be put on the agenda. Crucial is also that individual participants will work most fervently toward issues that they feel an enthusiasm for, and with people whom they like or share common ideas with. In the earlier period there were some such individuals who were inspired by the challenge of a new issue area, while the participants later on seem to have been driven by a concern for environmental issues and ecocentric ideas. Overall, the participants in the environmental issue area have been enthusiastic and, at times, even activist in their approach. This is something that has also paid off, at least in terms of relative policy output.

[246]I wanted to include Seveso as one minicase but since my information about the streams was incomplete I have to leave it for future research.

So far in this chapter, the discussion of the temporal sorting model does not differ much from March and Olsen's original garbage can model, and thus this thesis can be said to support their view of the policy process. At the same time the application of their model, as in the three cases, is a very strict and narrow view of the decision process, because it looks only at the minute details of particular decision moments. The exercise carried out here reveals that without knowing something about the context in which these choice opportunities have occurred it is difficult to discern any general pattern in the process. Naturally micropolitics—as a process of taking decisions on what to include on the agenda—is important. However, it is impossible to understand environmental agenda setting without contextualizing problems, solutions and participants, as these examples have hopefully illustrated. We need to relate these micropolitical moves to the power practices of the macropolitics level. This means that it would be difficult for us to understand why sustainable development became a Community strategy, endorsed at the Dublin Summit, had it not been for a historic account of the way environmental problems have been perceived within economist practices. I will suggest that the temporal sorting model ought to be applied not only to single specific cases, which can be illustrative of how decisions are taken and agenda setting is made in one particular moment. By organizing the whole flow of problems, solutions and participants over a period of time, we can, in addition, say important things about the context in which these solutions and problems appear. We arrive at a more complete understanding of how power practices in confrontation with resistances constrict, shape and reform agendas. Solutions might bubble up or suddenly appear, but they come from somewhere and hence have a context.

For future research I would argue that the temporal sorting model may be used more extensively than only when other decision models prove inadequate. Its use ought not to be restricted to understanding single decisions in complex and chaotic agenda-setting contexts. It can also be a way to relate those decisions to societal practices, visible over a longer time period. Applied in this way, the temporal sorting model reveals how patterns of power shape the agenda through the structuring of the problem, solution and participant streams, as well as how decisions are taken at a particular moment.

In Which Way has the EU Agenda Become Green?

The paradox outlined in the beginning pointed to an increase in environmental policies, products, environmental conscious consumers and producers, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, environmental degradation continues simultaneously. While there are certainly innovative ideas among the population and the policy makers, this does not automatically mean that the EU is green. The argument in this thesis was that environmental politics is much wider a problem than what it might first appear to be, implying that greening is a much more complex process than adding a label or a word.

The feminist standpoint epistemology has provided me with the critical eye, and made it possible to go beyond that which is most tangible about the Community—institutions, actors and directives. During the research process I have come to understand that the Community's environmental policy is much more than this. I have aspired to make visible those power practices which both constrain and make environmental politics possible. I have stressed the importance of making these practices visible, because they are sometimes perceived as natural, as given and as if they have nothing to do with the EU. By grounding my critique in feminism I have been able to understand how EU is gendered in a number of ways. Based on the male as the norm in policy making, the EU project also reveals its gendered nature in economic, sovereign, scientific and bureaucratic practices. A feminist critique becomes important, because it exposes and makes visible their biases. In this thesis I have used feminist theories in an eclectic way, mainly as a critical approach particularly relevant for pointing out the character of power practices and certain points of challenges. My argument has been that it is here changes in politics are made.

The theory, which I develop in this thesis regarding agenda setting, is based on the notion that historic patterns of behavior are institutionalized and, thus, shape activities in the present. This becomes the context in which action can take place, actors make demands and changes in politics occur. The view of power includes both dominant power practices and the resistances shaped against these practices. It builds on ideas both from Lukes and feminism. The empirical base of the research is the Treaties, the Action Programms, selected Community documents, reports and directives from the period 1970-1995, together with 39 elite interviews.

In the Community context there are a number of power practices; economist, bureaucratic, scientist and sovereignty practices, which not only have caused environmental degradation in the past but also have restricted and shaped the topics of the environmental agenda of the present, and will possibly do so in the future. These power practices are extremely influential in the shaping of institutions, ideas and in the exclusion/inclusion of participants. Furthermore they structure what is considered important and what is not and, hence, what should be put on the agenda of politics. Dominant power practices also give rise to resistances that work against them. This is particularly evident at certain points where tangible events challenge these dominant practices.

Resistances form alternative interpretations of conditions, their origins, severity as well as ways of solving them. One such type of resistance are ecocentric resistances which focus on ecological processes and wo/man's place in these processes. These resistances form an important part of politics not limited to social movements, green parties or other organized forces. The term resistance, as it is used here, takes a broader view of how alternative politics are shaped. It is not restricted to a focus on, in this case, environmental movement organizations and their impact on the agenda of the Community. Resistance does not have to come in highly organized forms with ideological coherence from the margins of society. It can come in highly dispersed and diverse forms and in unexpected locations, hence, also from within institutions. The main contribution to the Community agenda in terms of environmental ideas have come by way of everyday resistances within the Community institutions, from individuals and groups that are only connected to the environmentalist movements indirectly or through their similar thoughts on, concern for and interest in nature and in resolving environment problems.

One of the general conclusions that can be drawn is that in all three streams there is evidence of resistances. It is possible to see an evolution of ideas when it comes to both problems and solutions. The way that environmental problems have been defined has been highly influenced by ecocentric thoughts, transmitted through the Club of Rome report, the IUCN strategy, the Brundtland Commission and the Rio process. These reports have provided an important impetus to the generation of ideas concerning environmental problems. These reports and the ideas generated from them are *reflective* definitions of environmental problems. The process of framing environmental problems has, in the Community, been strikingly similar to the way problems have been defined in the Western world in general. What is particularly pertinent for problem formulation in the Community is the prominent place of

economist practices and resistances. In the reflective definition of problems, the major emphasis is on the relationship between economist practices and ecocentric ideas. The way problems have been defined is a reflection of this rather dynamic process, where environmental problems have been defined first as costly impediments to economic practices; later as a possible source of income and new markets; and finally as the basis of economic activities. It is in reflective problem framing that most changes toward greening have been taken place. This has been done in declarations, programs or reports but perhaps less so in practical politics.

One of the more striking results coming out of this research is the great number of problem definitions that have come as a reaction to outside events or incidents. Since they are sudden and immediate, oftentimes the problem definitions by necessity takes place after these choice opportunities have occurred, or not at all. These types of problem definitions are called reactive problem framing in the thesis and have occurred either as a response to focusing events, public opinion or as a response to national legislation or international conventions. The reactive problem definitions challenge scientific power practices, insofar as they contradict the belief in control, management and predictability that such practices hold as 'truths'.

Also a number of problem definitions that have had nothing to do with nature or the environment, but have nevertheless been coupled with an environmental solution, have been discussed.

The analysis of the solution stream introduces three categories of solutions or strategies that have been discussed and proposed in the Community: *environmental approaches and principles*, *organizational strategies* and *steering mechanisms*. As with the problem definitions, a certain evolution of strategies has taken place over the 25-year period under study. We see evidence of ecocentric ideas influencing these three categories but it is most evident among approaches and principles. Ecocentric ideas have inspired and influenced the solutions and strategies suggested.

When it comes to organizational strategies and steering mechanisms, only the strategies of the most recent period have been influenced by ecocentric ideas. The organizational strategies that have been adopted—integration and shared responsibility—resemble or at least do not clearly contradict dominant power practices. In other words, they contain ecocentric ideas and challenge bureaucratic practices while at the same time fitting with both economist and sovereignty practices.

Similarly, among the steering mechanisms, environmental taxes are quite clearly inspired by ecocentric notions. The idea of using prices to change behavior can fit neatly with economist practices. On the other hand, it runs counter to sovereignty practices and more particularly to the Member States' rights to decide over revenue. Furthermore, voluntary agreements are in some way supported by the ecocentric resistances. Ecolabels, can for example, provide important information to consumers wanting to change their consumption pattern. Voluntary measures can arguably also be seen within an economist practice of free market and consumer behavior, while challenging bureaucratic practices of legalism and administrative problem solving.

In the stream of *participants,* what is most salient is the lack of women in decision making positions. That gendered practices effectively exclude women from most parts of the Community institutions, except from the service functions of secretaries and interpreters, is quite evident. Patriarchy works in subtle ways in the participant stream, by structuring long work hours, career rules, particular working conditions and networks based on men's traditional relations. Some of these practices are evident in the formal institutions and others in the informal networks.

Quite strong resistance is shaped against the bureaucratic practices and sovereignty practices of the Community, which order and organize a particular formal decision structure. The response to these practices is the creation of networks that bridge institutional and national boundaries and create links between participants, based less on formal positions and more on personal and epistemic factors. It is also in such networks that individual representatives of resistances come together in alliances, which was shown to be very important. However, it should be stressed that although networks are important as a way to supersede the formal structures, only individual participants who have been assigned roles in the formal structure can really make a significant, if any, impact through informal networks.

While it is quite evident that the EU has evolved into a much greener organization than it was in the late sixties, it is neither the kind nor the extent of greening that would satisfy ecocentrics. Ecocentric ideas have most certainly influenced the framing of environmental problems and the strategies proposed. Such ideas have, nevertheless, only selectively been adopted and have been extensively reshaped within the power practices of the EU project. This also means that the power practices have been reshaped by these resistances to include consideration for nature. Whether this is sufficient for the sustainable society to materialize is doubtful; however, it might be one step in the right direction.