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The Ambiguous Effects of Democracy on Bureaucratic Quality

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The Ambiguous Effects of
Democracy on Bureaucratic Quality

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Abstract

Recent studies find that higher degrees of democracy are related to higher levels of bureaucratic quality. However, they only offer limited explanations for this pattern based on a unidimensional understanding of democracy. We argue that future uncertainties as perceived by the incumbent, the opposition, and voters are important for why bureaucratic reform takes place. Therefore, we expect no uniform effects of democracy but that the effect depends on the socioeconomic status of the median voter. Empirically, we examine the separate effects of three dimensions of democracy   competitive elections, legislative constraints on the executive, and suffrage. Based on a global sample of countries from 1790 to 2016 that adds historical depth and variation on bureaucratic quality and the dimensions of democracy, the results show that competitive elections and legislative constraints are connected with higher levels of bureaucratic quality. However, the third dimension of suffrage is not related to bureaucratic quality. Rather, the positive effects of competitive elections and legislative constraints seem to decrease in times of large suffrage extensions.

Introduction

Studies examining the impact of political regime attributes on bureaucratic quality have shored up in the last decade. They generally find that higher degrees of democracy are related to higher levels of bureaucratic quality. The basic argument is that democracy provides channels of vertical accountability that punish incumbents for politicizing the bureaucracy and engaging in clientelistic practices which undermine bureaucratic quality. However, these studies are largely based on a unidimensional understanding of democracy, focusing on competitive elections, and offer limited explanations for why democracy should raise bureaucratic quality (see e.g. Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011; Carbone and Memoli 2015).[1]

In line with previous research, this paper explains levels of and developments in bureaucratic quality defined as a rigorous and impartial administration, typically forged via reforms towards meritocratic recruitment of civil servants (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017) and the strengthening of pecuniary incentives and management tools. However, we specify the theoretical connection between democracy and bureaucratic quality in two ways: First, we propose a theory of bureaucratic quality that involves three central actors 1) the incumbent, 2) the parliamentary opposition, and 3) the voters and how bureaucratic reform is affected by these actors' perceptions of future uncertainties. Second, we take into account legislative constraints on the executive and suffrage as alternative dimensions of democracy. Legislative constraints and suffrage are related to competitive elections in the sense that the existence of the former two is not sufficient even for a minimalistic definition of democracy without some minimum amount of the latter (Schumpeter 1976). Nevertheless, the three dimensions are conceptually distinct.

We argue that the three dimensions of democracy have different kinds of effects on bureaucratic quality since they shape the future uncertainties

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[1] The relationship between democracy and bureaucratic quality is typically theorized and examined in less explicit terms but there are exceptions. For instance, Bäck and Hadenius (2008: 19) investigate turnout and newspaper circulation as intervening variables (see also Adserá, Boix, and Payne 2003: 475); Charron and Lapuente (2010: 462; 2011: 412) interact various regime attributes with GDP/capita and find the effect of democracy on bureaucratic quality to be positive for high levels and negative for low levels of economic development; Carbone and Memoli (2015) frame their distinction between degrees and duration of democracy as capturing different mechanisms (see also Leipziger 2016).

of the three actors and thus their incentives to engage in bureaucratic reform in different ways. Under a regime with competitive elections, the incumbent and opposition face substantial future uncertainties because political power today can be lost by the ballot tomorrow. In such uncertain conditions, supplying patronage in the form of particularistic goods and jobs in clientelist networks is an effective way of gaining votes and thus ensure political survival (see Geddes 1994). However, if the voters in such regimes are relatively wealthy and thus demand longer-term economic investments rather than short-term consumption goods, we argue that competitive elections in themselves incentivize bureaucratic reform and thus work to improve bureaucratic quality (see Charron and Lapuente 2010: 450-454). Supplying patronage will be punished by the voters, who see patronage as corrupt or particularistic practices that hinder sustainable economic development. Legislative constraints on the executive have a similar positive effect on bureaucratic quality. We specify that horizontal rather than vertical accountability drives this association because it is the parliamentary opposition that holds the incumbent accountable for introducing or preserving bureaucratic reform initiatives.

We deviate more dramatically from previous studies regarding suffrage. We argue that the removal of socioeconomic barriers to suffrage should be negatively related to bureaucratic quality since this aspect of democratization typically implies that relatively poorer strata of voters become part of the electorate. As these groups demand more short-term consumption goods, the incumbent and opposition parties perceive it necessary to use the state apparatus to channel jobs and benefits to win the next election. Thereby, suffrage extensions should lower overall bureaucratic quality (see e.g. Shefter 1977; Charron and Lapuente 2010: 450-454). The changes in the electoral dynamics further have a spillover effect on how parliamentary control works. Being accountable to new voters with stronger preferences for immediate consumption, the parliamentary opposition lessens its use of legislative controls that would otherwise punish politicization and clientelism. We thus propose that changes in suffrage that remove some socioeconomic restriction decrease the positive effect of competitive elections and legislative constraints on bureaucratic quality.

To examine these propositions, we employ disaggregated data on democracy as well as data on bureaucratic quality from a variety of sources, including the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevicius 2015), the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018a) and the now incorporated Historical V-Dem dataset (Knutsen et

al. 2018). As a proxy for bureaucratic quality,[2] we choose the measure of 'Rigorous and impartial public administration' from the V-Dem and Historical V-Dem datasets to capture bureaucratic quality more accurately and better distinguish regime- from state-effects than in previous studies.[3] We thus have much longer time series (1790 2016) than previous studies which comes with several advantages. First, including the 19th century increases variation in suffrage between and within countries by allowing cases of early democratization in Latin America and Europe where, for instance, income and property restrictions on suffrage decreased gradually.[4] As a consequence, we may better capitalize on a long list of comparative-historical analyses that find the opposite of recent large-N studies, namely that autocracy rather than democracy furthers bureaucratic quality (see e.g. Shefter 1977; Geddes 1994; Piattoni 2001; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015).[5]

Second, the data span the entire period of modern democracy, including the first wave of democratization when all three dimensions of democracy took shape and subsequent waves of democratic progression and regression (see Huntington 1991; Møller and Skaaning 2013: Ch. 5), bureaucratic reform waves in Western (see Piattoni 2001) and post-colonial states (see Evans 1995: Ch. 3), as well as different international episodes likely to have affected domestic outcomes of bureaucratic quality (see Gourevitch 1986: Chs. 3-4; Mann 2012: Chs. 8, 13). In addition, we can use these comprehensive, historical currents in our key variables to address the issue of reversed causality (see Shefter 1977; Mazzuca and Munck 2014).[6].

The paper is organized as follows: First, we revisit the arguments for why democracy should matter for bureaucratic quality and introduce our framework of three central actors and their future uncertainties, and next,

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[2] Extant studies use terms such as 'administrative capacity', 'state capacity' (e.g. Bäck and Hadenius (2008), or 'quality of government' (e.g. Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011) as denoting the effective and non-corrupted use of the state to implement decisions. In this paper, we prefer the term 'bureaucratic quality' because it refers more precisely to the characteristics of implementation processes as originating from bureaucrats rather than the more diffuse group of 'government officials/representatives.'

[3] Recent studies (e.g. Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011) rely on ICRG and/or World Bank data that are temporally restricted back to 1984 but also suffer from conceptual ambiguity and conflation with regime traits (see Hanson and Sigman 2013). Carbone and Memoli (2015) use the less demanding indicator of a 'basic administration' from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index with scores from 2006, 2008, and 2010.

[4] By employing data for the post-WWII period only, recent studies tend mostly to include cases where free and fair elections were co-introduced with universal suffrage.

[5] Ertman's (1997) study in similar ways point out European cases where absolutism aided rather than hindered the adoption of bureaucratic principles of administration.

[6] In future versions of the paper we will address this concern further by employing average regional democracy levels on a yearly basis to instrument for the overall domestic effect of democracy.

we discuss how competitive elections, legislative constraints, and suffrage extensions are related to bureaucratic quality. Then we present the research design, models, and data, which take into account standard confounders. As an addition to the statistical models of previous studies, we include a variable of 'incumbent stability' that we expect to affect future uncertainties in dictatorships and democracies alike. Third, we present the results and discuss the broader implications of our findings.

Democracy, future uncertainties, and bureaucratic quality

A core feature of the modernization of states is the creation of an effective and impartial state bureaucracy. However, such successful bureaucratization has far from progressed in a linear fashion. Rather, bureaucratic quality has experienced ups and downs and remains weak in both autocracies and democracies of mostly but not exclusively developing countries. Scholars traditionally connected bureaucratization with war, the size of the economy, and the availability of natural resources and human capital (Geddes 1994: 16; Ertman 1997; Rauch and Evans 2000). Political regime entered as an explanatory factor with Max Weber who famously identified bureaucracy as originating in 17th to 19th century Prussia, a country that underwent various forms of authoritarianism and thus testifies to the different functional logics between bureaucracy and democracy. However, Weber himself (1978: 1002) suggested that democracy could also underpin bureaucracy. Thus, the relationship between democracy and bureaucracy became the object of considerable debate within comparative politics and public administration research (e.g. Etzioni-Halevey 1985: Chs. 1-2; Fukuyama 2014: Ch. 3).

Two strands of research have taken up this debate. A group of large-N studies finds that democracy is positively related to bureaucratic quality because democracy entails greater levels of electoral competition that move political incentives towards supporting bureaucratic reform and forces politicians to abstain from corruption and clientelism. The assumption is that the majority of any large electorate serves the collectively rational goal of impartial and clean administration (e.g. Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Keefer 2007; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011; Carbone and Memoli 2015; Leipziger

2016).[7] By contrast, classic comparative-historical analyses find an autocratic advantage in forging bureaucratic reform and thus that democracy is to some extent negatively related to bureaucratic quality. Some of these analyses (e.g. Geddes 1994; Grindle 2012) share the focus on electoral competition while others attribute specific importance to suffrage (e.g. Shefter 1977; Piattoni 2001).

We set out to explain why, as shown in some studies, democracy may sometimes hamper bureaucratic quality, while the opposite is most often the case in large N-studies. On a par with previous research, we explain levels of and developments in bureaucratic quality as a political choice between bureaucratic reform on the one hand and reverting to clientelism on the other. The latter implies that particularistic goods and services, like contracts, allowances, and jobs are provided to favor clients in exchange for political support (Hicken 2011; D'Arcy and Cornell 2016: 251; see also Stokes et al. 2013). The former most notably involves changes towards meritocratic recruitment of civil servants but also the introduction or strengthening of pecuniary incentives and management tools. Such combination of ex-ante and ex-post control of bureaucratic agents has been argued to breed lower levels of corruption and higher levels of effectiveness and impartiality in implementation (Rothstein 2011; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).

By focusing on competitive elections as the defining feature of democracy, the theories of the recent large-N studies tend to boil down to the dichotomy contrasting the existence of vertical accountability under democracy as opposed to its absence under autocracy. By contrast, we seek to clarify how three different dimensions of democracy   competitive elections, legislative constraints on the executive, and suffrage   may affect key actors' future uncertainties in case of bureaucratic reforms. These three dimensions are essential for the concept of democracy in classic democratic theories (e.g. Dahl 1989).

Uncertainties around the distribution of resources in the future is a relevant parameter for considering bureaucratic reform but typically theorized in less clear terms in previous research.[8] The clearest

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[7] Bäck and Hadenius' large-N study (2008) takes a mediating position between democracy and autocracy as the more effective promoter of bureaucratic quality. They find a J-shaped relationship that, however, speaks to the advantage of democracy: Levels of bureaucratic quality are relatively high in full autocracies, low in semi-democratic or democratizing countries, and highest in full democracies.

[8] The recent large-N studies theoretically assume that the positive effect of democracy on bureaucratic quality is static – democracy works in the short as well as the long run. Some studies (e.g. Keefer 2007; Carbone and Memoli 2015; Leipziger 2016) suggest the stock of democracy to be particularly, or exclusively, connected to

theorization is arguably found in Barbara Geddes' (1994) Politician's Dilemma, studying Latin American bureaucratic reforms, where the initiation of reforms involves a collective action problem. Incumbents and opposition parties may initially favor bureaucratic reform. They know that if they could agree on nurturing bureaucratic reform, this would be the rational choice as it would nurture economic development for the benefit of society at large. However, their individual interests in gaining votes and ensuring success in the next election make them all defect from this potential reform coalition. Instead, they engage in clientelism whereby the spoils of political office and bureaucratic control are distributed between political opponents or brutally competed for. More simply put, the incumbents and oppositions in democracies eventually favor short-term vote-buying over long-term economic development since they find the latter consideration to be riskier for winning popularity among voters. In turn, democracies on average end up with lower levels of bureaucratic quality than autocracies (Geddes 1994: 17-18).

Our propositions

As will be explained, we do not find it convincing that competitive elections in themselves should undermine bureaucratic quality but Geddes' model nevertheless provides a fruitful starting point for a theory of regime effects on bureaucratic quality. We thus agree that any effect of democracy ultimately channels through three actors: 1) the incumbent,[9] 2) the parliamentary opposition, and 3) the voters. Bureaucrats are of course also important actors given their interest in preserving institutional and organizational privileges and, often extensive, powers to pursue these interests (Nordlinger 1981). However, in our framework that is set to explain regime effects on bureaucratic quality, we assume that politicians' incentives for bureaucratic reform affect bureaucratic quality. [10]

While we level autocratic with democratic politicians' goal of political survival, we acknowledge that incumbents and oppositions in democracies, as opposed to autocracies, have a short-term incentive to pursue policies that maximize their vote shares in the next election. Since

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improvements in bureaucratic quality. However, this does not imply that democracy is negative for bureaucratic quality in the short run.

[9] This includes the head of government such as the president and the cabinet.
[10] As mentioned in footnote 6, we will address this concern further in future versions of the paper.

competitive elections are evidently forthcoming in democracies, incumbents and oppositions fundamentally lack information about their political destiny. This introduces substantial uncertainties into their calculations and thus determines their willingness to engage in bureaucratic reforms or, by contrast, nurture clientelist relations via delivery of patronage (Geddes 1994: 14-18).

However, as some studies point out (Charron and Lapuente 2010: 450-454; see also Piattoni 2001), one should also take account of the demand for patronage, as determined by the preferences of the voters. Thus, voter uncertainty is not a constant but may vary over time and in space. Most importantly, as we contend, voters' personal income level may affect whether they discount the future more or less and thus their preference for short-term consumption goods relative to long-term, society-level economic investments (see Charron and Lapuente 2010: 450). In sum, we contend that any theory of the effect of democracy on bureaucratic quality should explain how the characteristics of democracy affect future uncertainties and thus make incumbents, oppositions, and voters strive for bureaucratic reform.

Besides the tendency of comparative-historical studies to incorporate future uncertainties more explicitly than recent large-N studies, it is particularly striking that these two sets of literature focus on different dimensions of democracy. The large-N studies tend to lump together all three dimensions of democracy when using measures from Polity and Freedom House, while their theoretical arguments are focused on competitive elections only (see e.g. Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011; Carbone and Memoli 2015). By contrast, comparative-historical work points to other dimensions, most notably suffrage. In Shefter's (1977) study, for instance, regulated uncertainty around the election of the executive is assumed, but the driver of clientelism is extensions of suffrage against a background of low initial levels of bureaucratic quality. More generally, we extend the number of dimensions of democracy to incorporate legislative constraints on the executive and suffrage besides competitive elections. These three dimensions have developed according to their own logic and have formed the core of democracy in modern times. It is impossible to understand the early development of democracy in Europe and Latin America without accounting for the pressure to include the masses in political participation and the power of parliaments to control monarchs and presidents (Lauth 2015). We therefore hold that each dimension profoundly shapes the

future uncertainties of incumbents, oppositions, and voters in separate ways.

In setting up our hypotheses, we nevertheless emphasize the direct effect of competitive elections and treat legislative constraints and suffrage extensions as moderators. This is because legislative constraints and suffrage make little difference for democracy if the executive is not elected by popular vote in the first place.

Competitive elections and legislative constraints on the executive
According to Geddes, competitive elections hamper bureaucratic reforms. The uncertainty that follows (minimally competitive) elections makes the incumbent and opposition perceive that there are political opponents of significant strength and that the power owned today can be lost tomorrow by the ballot. This makes the incumbent as well as opposition parties abstain from reforms. The incumbent wants to be able to use patronage and other types of clientelism now to ensure political survival in the immediate election and swift implementation of its policies, and the opposition wants clientelism to be an option whenever it wins the incumbent seat (Geddes 1994: 18; Katz and Mair 1995: 16; see also Piattoni 2001). By contrast in an autocratic setting without truly competitive elections, the incumbent (the dictator or regime elite) can initiate top-down pressure on central and local agencies to employ more meritocratic forms of hiring while at the same time micro-managing bureaucratic behavior (Geddes 1994: 12; see also Huntington 1968; Grindle 2012).

The argument that competitive elections and the constant threat of future electoral losses involve short-term incentives for patronage payments that autocracies avoid is compelling as it rests on a key difference between democracies and autocracies. However, as is rightfully suggested by the recent large-N studies, voters do not always reward clientelism such as pecuniary payments or job opportunities. Voters are under some circumstances more likely to discard of future uncertainties and demand society-wide economic development that needs longer-term investments. As a consequence, voters may judge patronage payments as 'symptom treatment' for deeper problems in their own and the state's economy. In turn, they may push the politicians and parties to disclose the use of patronage as corruption and change the state's hiring procedures and corruption controls to improve bureaucratic quality more permanently (Charron and Lapuente 2010: 450-454; Mazzuca and Munck 2014: 1236; see also Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

Given that incumbents are ultimately dependent on electoral support for political survival, we expect incumbents to incorporate the voters' demand for bureaucratic reform. This essentially means that the incumbents adopt the widened time horizon of the voters and thus discount the future less than if voters demanded more short-term consumption. These incumbent incentives are further strengthened by changes in the dynamics of party competition between incumbent and opposition parties. To capture the majority of the votes, the opposition parties have the same incentive to facilitate bureaucratic reform. Instead of competing on the issue of bureaucratic reforms or not, incumbents and oppositions would both support the initiation of reforms. Such a strategy could credibly hinder the opposition from losing vital vote shares to the incumbent.[11] It would also secure the incumbent from becoming victims of reversed cycles of bureaucratic discrimination in the future as incumbent power shifts (see Lapuente and Rothstein 2014).

In sum, our first hypothesis echoes recent studies that competitive elections directly improve bureaucratic quality:

Hypothesis 1: Competitive elections are positively related to bureaucratic quality

Incumbents, however, are also threatened by uncertainty from other agents than voters and thus fight for political survival in other ways. Even though political competition in elections transforms votes into parliamentary seats and thus as such constitutes the power configuration between incumbent and opposition parties, there are formal and informal rules in parliaments that provide a separate set of control functions. The commonality of these rules is that they are legislative constraints on the executive by which the parliamentary opposition monitors and sanctions incumbent actions. Legislative constraints do not work vertically between voters and representatives but horizontally between elected representatives (see e.g. Lauth 2015).

Therefore, given meaningful contestation, legislative constraints may yield a separate effect on bureaucratic quality. In Latin American regimes in the first decades after independence where multiple balanced elite groups contested for political power, consensus around state-building

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[11] This of course depends on the saliency of the issue in the minds of the voters. There is, however, evidence that voters care much about the quality of government, including bureaucratic quality, in itself as well as a way of furthering economic development (Rothstein 2011).

sometimes emerged. Alternatively, where these elites were fragmented or regionally-based, local elites strengthened their clientelist strongholds to survive mass elections (Kurtz 2013; see also Soifer 2015). Similar dynamics exist in liberal democracies in the form of political parties and parliamentary rules that streamline oppositional control of the executive (Folke, Hirano, and Snyder Jr. 2011; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012: 3). Over time, as incumbents are voted in and out and some oppositional control is preserved between elections, systems for controlling the executive are likely to expand across more policy sectors and intensify into ever-more fine-grained webs of committees, oversight bodies, and rules on budgetary discipline and dissemination of information to parliament. This raises the opportunities for monitoring and sanctioning from occasional and temporary to all-encompassing and permanent (see e.g. Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Kurtz 2013; Mazzuca and Munck 2014; Soifer 2015).

Thus, the effects of competitive elections and legislative constraints on bureaucratic quality work through different mechanisms. Nevertheless, they ultimately have the same effect: that of punishing incumbents for engaging in clientelist practices. To see this, note that meritocratic reform and ex-post controls on bureaucratic behavior strengthen the guarantee that opposition actors will not be illegally discriminated. For instance, a study of the origins and effects of the rule of law in early modern Europe shows that constitutional guarantees are insufficient to control the executive power. Instead, the creation of a permanent administrative staff de facto may constrain rulers (González de Lara, Greif, and Jha 2008). Specifically, such constraining power is likely to be inherent to meritocratic and impartial administrations (Rothstein 2011). It is therefore likely that forging and protecting meritocratic and impartial administration becomes the rational strategy of incumbents to hinder a vote of no confidence or an early election in the short term but also to prevent their own destruction in the future when incumbent power may have shifted. This requires a degree of trust between the incumbent and opposition that typically does not rise from substantial agreement. Rather, bureaucratic reform coalitions form gradually as political opponents move in and out of office, develop tools to control the arbitrary use of power, and thus finally reconcile with the interests of one another.

Conversely, clientelism often emerges where control functions have not developed. Lack of legislative control makes political elites mistrust the intentions of one another thus incentivizing clientelistic strategies

beyond any foreseeable future to safeguard their political survival (Weingast 1997; Cornell and Lapuente 2014).

In sum, legislative control of the executive should reinforce the effects of competitive elections. However, as is clear from these arguments, parliamentary control functions are to a large extent products of repeated electoral competition. Likewise, the usage of these control functions is likely much more credible when the opposition and the incumbent are ultimately accountable to a larger electorate. Therefore, we contend that legislative constraints are only important when there is some degree of electoral competition. We therefore expect the following:

Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of legislative constraints are positively related with bureaucratic quality in regimes with meaningful electoral contestation.

Suffrage

Democracy means more than competition for control of the executive. It crucially implies the empowerment of 'the people' i.e., the enfranchisement of the population at large, give or take rules that condition the enjoyment of the franchise (Dahl 1989; Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008). Our argument regards the kind of suffrage rules that restrict voting rights based on a citizen's socioeconomic situation, for example, rules restricting voting rights based on property, economic dependence, gross income, or tax payments. These were the typical kinds of suffrage extensions in 19th century Europe. United Kingdom is perhaps the most famous example of a gradual extension of suffrage to include in political participation the economic dependent and those without property or certain requirements through reforms in 1832 (e.g. the lowering of property requirements), 1867 (e.g. working class householders in the cities), and 1884 (e.g. working class householders in the cities) (Heater 2006). But very similar patterns are seen in the rest of Western Europe (Przeworski 2009: 295-297), including Germany where a three-class voting system managed access to the Reichstag until 1918 (Koch 1984: 80-81). Even in the United States, where male suffrage was originally close to universal, poor white males in some states were barred from suffrage way into the 20th century (Kousser 1974). In the Southern Cone countries of Latin America, party oligarchies ruled in the 19th century through excluding most segments of the poor populations, but these rules were lifted in reforms of the early 20th century (Rock 1987: Chs. 5-6). Thus, suffrage without socioeconomic restrictions was the historical rule rather

than the exception. Likewise, large and sudden extensions from very low to very high levels of suffrage were relatively rare. Only the later democratizations in postcolonial Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe have tended to be more abrupt with the immediate installation of universal suffrage (Przeworski 2009).

There are other kinds of suffrage restrictions such as on gender, region, religion, or race. These latter categories may of course work as proxies for excluding poorer strata from political participation, but they do not by definition discriminate on socioeconomic status. These suffrage extensions on identity typically occurred later than on income and emerged under different political dynamics (Przeworski 2009).

The pattern of gradual suffrage extensions lifting requirements on income in various forms is probably more important for democracy's effects on bureaucratic quality than hitherto assumed. When suffrage is extended downwards through the income distribution of society, the future uncertainties of incumbents and oppositions change. As shown by Charron and Lapuente (2010: 450-454), the positive effect of competitive elections is larger in richer countries where voters are on average more affluent. This means that they become more willing to relinquish patronage goods and instead demand long-term investments in human capital (education and health care as facilitated by society-wide economic development). This gives incentives for politicians to make an effort to increase bureaucratic quality that can bring about such outcomes. By contrast, poorer voters are more uncertain about their own future, which makes them demand goods for immediate consumption such as jobs and social benefits, or more fundamentally, food and shelter, thus incentivizing the supply of patronage (see also Welzel and Inglehart 2008).

The conditional effects of voters' income level are thus not about the moral virtues of voters, suggesting that more affluent voters have higher moral standards for the distribution of economic goods. They are about economic necessities. Poorer people are of course also interested in long-term economic development   especially as their tax obligations grow. However, the argument is that poorer people, all else equal, are more likely to substitute away from society-wide economic investments to ripe short-term economic benefits that may secure their immediate income, indeed sometimes their survival. Conversely, affluent people are more likely to punish incumbents for clientelist practices because clientelism redistributes resources away from public goods that are relatively more beneficial for middle-class constituents than are targeted goods. Since public goods demand more long-term economic investments, affluent

people to greater extent support such investments (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

While we adopt the basic idea of the importance of income for voter preferences for bureaucratic reform, we contend that focusing on income levels or growth alone does not do justice to the significance of suffrage. Indeed, whether the masses are rich or poor has little effect on the preferences of the political elite if the masses are not enfranchised. Rather, it is the expansion of the electorate to a larger segment of poor people that determines voter demands for bureaucratic reform and, in turn, the supply of it by elected leaders. In addition, clientelist linkages between citizens and politicians are likely to become path-dependent as poorer voters gradually come to rely on clientelism to solve everyday problems, and politicians come to rely on the continued support of these clienteles to be reelected.

We stress that it is not the level of suffrage at one point in time but the scale of the expansion that matters. When suffrage is extended, incumbent and opposition deem it necessary to use the state apparatus to reach the masses and distribute the spoils of office to maximize votes in the next election. Only the state has the means and authority to redistribute goods at such speed and reach the lower classes and the periphery with jobs in and favors from the public sector (Shefter 1977; Geddes 1994: 12). Accordingly, large suffrage extensions should matter more than smaller ones because the push for clientelism is stronger and more enduring.

Summing up, the removal of socioeconomic restrictions on suffrage should entail considerable incentives to initiate clientelism on the part of the incumbent as well as opposition. This logic of course only kicks in if the votes casted actually determine the composition of parliament and executive. When suffrage extensions are absent or small, such as in 19th century competitive regimes with very restricted suffrage or in many present-day democracies with universal suffrage, no new demands for patronage are thrown upon the political system. By contrast, when suffrage extensions are substantial elections communicate the demands for patronage and thus contribute to lower bureaucratic quality. We therefore propose the following:

Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between competitive elections and bureaucratic quality is weakened with larger (socioeconomic) suffrage extensions

Given some degree of electoral competition, the effect of legislative constraints should be moderated similarly under suffrage extensions. Since both incumbents and oppositions face incentives to capture the new and poorer voters by paying patronage, the incumbents face no, if only relatively manageable, sanctions as new parliaments are formed post-election. We thus expect the following:

Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between legislative constraints and bureaucratic quality is weakened with larger (socioeconomic) suffrage extensions in regimes with meaningful electoral contestation

The next section presents the statistical models and data that we use to examine our hypotheses.

Research design and data

We employ country fixed effects with country-clustered standard errors and lag all independent variables one year. Since we have a long time period from 1800s and onwards, we run models with different time periods. Most importantly, we perform analyses with the periods before and after 1945. This controls for separate dynamics of the postcolonial era when democratization came suddenly with universal suffrage. We also run models with a sample limited to the countries for which we have data for the 19th century (we report these models in the Appendix).[12] As a general control for time trends in the data, we use year dummies in all models.

Bureaucratic quality
To measure bureaucratic quality, new data from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2018a) enables us to alleviate the problems of existing data sources which are limited in spatial or temporal coverage (e.g. the 'Weberianness Scale' developed by Rauch and Evans 2000) or suffer from serious validity issues (e.g. the bureaucratic quality measure from the Political Risk Services Group 2014   for reviews, see Hanson and Sigman

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[12] In later version of the paper we will also run a number of other models based on different time periods before and after 1900 to check for data trends when merging the ordinary and Historical V-Dem datasets and to control for the era of mercantilism, respectively. By being a model for state engagement in the economy, mercantilism likely shaped the behaviour and organization of state apparatuses and has been forwarded as a macro-institutional explanation for the outbreak of World War I.

2013; Saylor 2013). In any case, these measures cover only countries back to 1984, and even with Hanson and Sigman's possible extensions back in time to the 1960s, we are left with insufficient variation, exclusively after World War II.

By contrast, the V-Dem project's indicator of 'Rigorous and impartial public administration', which has been extended to the 19th century in the Historical V-Dem (Knutsen et al. 2018) is a time varying, cross-national, continuous indicator that covers our analytical time period. The variable scores countries from 0 to 4 by asking: "are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?" It is thus consistent with the manifestations of bureaucratic quality as we expect them to rise from bureaucratic reforms (see Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012). This definition also resembles the core understanding of bureaucratic quality in recent and classic studies alike (e.g. Shefter 1977; Geddes 1994; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Fukuyama 2014).

The coding of 'Rigorous and impartial public administration' is expert-based, and the ordinal-level scores are subject to significant reliability and measurement biases. The V-Dem team has mitigated these biases by assigning five experts (1 expert in the historical version of the dataset) to code each country and then aggregate coding decisions into point-estimates employing Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modelling techniques, which they assume to be latently interval. In consequence, inter-coder reliability checks and uncertainties are used to convert the ordinal into an interval scale (see Coppedge et al. 2018b: 32-33). Figure 1 illustrates how our proxy for bureaucratic quality, 'Rigorous and impartial public administration, varies over time in three countries, Angola, Germany, Argentina. These countries represent some typical cases in the data. Angola represents the typical postcolonial state where clientelism has dominated the political system and bureaucratic quality levels, in turn, have been constantly low. Germany represents a trajectory with relatively low levels of bureaucratic quality before World War II that sharply increased and stabilized at a high level after World War II. Argentina illustrates cases where bureaucratic quality fluctuates dramatically over shorter time intervals.

Figure 1. Bureaucratic quality over time in three countries

Graphs by Country name

Competitive elections and legislative constraints

In order to measure competitive elections, we use two indicators: the indicator of competitive elections from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevicius 2015) and 'Elections multiparty' from the V-Dem dataset. From the Lexical Index, we use the category measuring minimally competitive elections coded as a dummy. To measure legislative constraints, we use the index of legislative constraints on the executive from V-Dem.

Figure 2. Competitive elections and bureaucratic quality over time

To get a blunt impression of empirical associations, Figure 2 shows yearly world averages on the variables of bureaucratic quality and our two proxies for competitive elections. First, we see that for competitive elections from the Lexical Index, the two lines follow one another quite neatly after 1946 but not before 1946, although the overall trend points in the same direction. There is thus reason to believe that the post-1946 period is special. World War II not only delegitimized fascism and inspired a new wave of democratization and decolonization. It also renewed focus on civil rights and the rule of law issuing a new era of rule-bound, impartial administration. Second, zooming in on year-to-year trends, it is clear that bureaucratic quality and competitive elections (proxied with the dummy from the Lexical Index) far from co-varies perfectly. On many occasions, most pronounced in the 19th century, increases in bureaucratic quality coincided with decreases or stagnation in competitive elections and vice versa.[13]

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[13] The pattern for the 1800s for the multiparty elections variable is more unclear.

Figure 3. Legislative constraints on the executive and bureaucratic quality over time in countries with electoral competition

As seen in Figure 3, much the same can be said of the association between legislative constraints and bureaucratic quality although the discrepancy in development trends is less dramatic and exists in a shorter period, the latter half of the 19th century.

Suffrage extensions

For changes in suffrage we use a variable collected by researchers in the V-Dem team based on secondary sources. Suffrage is measured as the percentage in the voting age population that has the legal right to vote. As we are interested in the change in suffrage, we calculate the percentage change in suffrage extensions. We only take into account suffrage extensions and code all retractions in suffrage as 0. Moreover, as we think that suffrage changes are not only events happening in one year with effects in that year only, the variable is first coded as the suffrage change in the corresponding year. For the years following the change, we then calculate a depreciation rate of 1% of the percentage change in suffrage.

The depreciation rate starts all over whenever there is a new extension in suffrage and stops whenever there is a retraction in suffrage rates (coded as 0). However, this data does not take into account whether the extension in suffrage is due to abolishment of socioeconomic restrictions. Therefore, we also use suffrage data from Bilinski, which differentiates between male and female suffrage. By only including extensions for male suffrage we get rid of all extensions that are due to gender and thus not necessarily attached to the socioeconomic situation. The results for the Bilinski data are reported in the Appendix.

Figure 4 illustrates the empirical association between yearly world average suffrage extensions (% depreciated changes) and bureaucratic quality. As expected, we see sharp increases in suffrage rights after World War II, coinciding with decolonization in Asia and Africa and democratizations in Latin America. From an overall perspective, there may be a negative association across the whole period but zooming in on yearly variation often reveals the opposite, such as from the early to mid-19th century or the late 20th century.

Figure 4. Suffrage extensions and bureaucratic quality

Control variables

We include a measure of 'incumbent stability', i.e. the typical period of incumbent survival in prior years. The inclusion of such a variable is not often the case in large-N studies on the topic but is central in many comparative-historical studies as moderating the effect of competitive elections. Since autocratic and democratically elected leaders alike care for political survival, they should also weigh in the history of incumbent stability in the relevant country when approximating future uncertainties. The connection between competitive elections and incumbent instability is less clear-cut. On the one hand, for incumbents that are normally more unstable the prospect of a future election only adds uncertainty. This could make the incumbent back down on bureaucratic reform or engage in politicization to secure his political survival (Geddes 1994: 15, 132-133). On the other hand, prior incumbent stability could bolster the incumbent's confidence that elections do not work effectively to control and vote out the executive, thus making it safe to continue the undermining of bureaucratic quality.

Our measure of incumbent stability uses the V-Dem data on heads of state and heads of government. We construct a variable that calculates the number of years governed by the same head of government, or alternatively, in the cases in which the head of state has more power than the head of government, the variable indicates the number of years governed by the same head of state.

The analyses also include the most important potential confounders pointed out in previous studies, namely economic development measured with GDP/capita (logged) based on the Maddison data (Fariss et al. 2017), the instance of inter- and intrastate wars as well as extra-state wars (wars between a state and a non-state actor) from the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the level of human capital measured by the average years of education for persons above 15 years from Clio Infra (van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari 2018), and the degree of resource dependence (Miller 2015).

Results

The first hypothesis is that competitive elections are positively related to bureaucratic quality. In order to test this we perform analyses with two different measures of competitive elections, multiparty elections (that multiple parties participate in meaningfully contested elections) and the dummy for competitive elections. Table 1 shows the results. Irrespective of model specification there is a significant and positive relationship between contestation and bureaucratic quality. The results also hold if we instead examine only the sample of countries for which we have data for the 19th Century (See Table A1 in the Appendix). In sum, there seems to be quite strong support for the hypothesis that competitive elections are positively related to bureaucratic quality. Examining the control variables we see that economic development is significant in most models and as expected positively related to bureaucratic quality. Civil war is negatively related to bureaucratic quality, but only significant in the models with the whole period and the models for the period after 1945. For the other control variables there is no consistent pattern.

Table 1. Competitive elections and bureaucratic quility

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Multiparty elections (t-1)	0.222***		0.174**		0.270***	
	(0.0356)		(0.0522)		(0.0400)	
Competitive elections (t-1)		0.688***		0.363**		0.957***
		(0.0973)		(0.125)		(0.114)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00164	-0.00353	0.00624	-0.00766	-0.00304	-0.00246
	(0.00397)	(0.00399)	(0.00608)	(0.0108)	(0.00410)	(0.00403)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.397***	0.424***	0.167	0.285*	0.551***	0.466***
	(0.115)	(0.0982)	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.139)	(0.121)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00491	-0.00110	-0.0362*	0.00470	-0.00309	-0.00292
	(0.00351)	(0.00306)	(0.0143)	(0.0219)	(0.00307)	(0.00223)
Education (t-1)	-0.0265	-0.120	-0.0238	-0.191	-0.000447	0.00911
	(0.0702)	(0.0618)	(0.0963)	(0.105)	(0.0782)	(0.0650)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.117*	-0.121***	-0.129	-0.0686	-0.0694	-0.108
	(0.0588)	(0.0338)	(0.0758)	(0.0649)	(0.0855)	(0.0590)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0743	-0.0573	-0.0656	-0.0237	-0.150	-0.0853
	(0.0874)	(0.0537)	(0.0854)	(0.0685)	(0.104)	(0.0630)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.246**	-0.196**	-0.0434	-0.115	-0.283***	-0.165*
	(0.0746)	(0.0655)	(0.0503)	(0.0913)	(0.0738)	(0.0696)
Constant	-3.719***	-3.912***	-1.934*	-2.954**	-4.013***	-3.668***
	(0.805)	(0.693)	(0.809)	(0.908)	(1.028)	(0.829)
N (country years)	2489	9156	839	2820	1650	6336
R^2	0.401	0.359	0.269	0.227	0.317	0.319
adj. R^2	0.357	0.345	0.161	0.189	0.287	0.312

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Next, we proceed to test hypothesis 2, whether legislative constraints on the executive are positively related to bureaucratic quality in regimes with meaningful electoral contestation. In order to test hypothesis 2 we narrow the sample to country years with competitive elections (competitive elections = 1). Table 2 shows that legislative constraints are positively related to bureaucratic quality in the sub-sample of countries with competitive elections. Moreover, when narrowing the sample to the countries for which we have data for the 19th century, legislative constraints are still significant and positively related to bureaucratic quality in the sub-sample of country years with competitive elections (see Appendix Table A2). Regarding the control variables, civil war is significant and negatively related to bureaucratic quality in the period after 1945 (albeit not significant in the historical sample, see Appendix Table

A2) and education is positively related to bureaucratic quality, but only in the period before 1946.

Table 2. Legislative constraints and bureaucratic quality in regimes with meaningful electoral contestation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	The whole period	Before 1946	After 1945
Legislative constraints (t-1)	1.688***	1.410*	1.823***
	(0.383)	(0.601)	(0.421)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00547	0.00368	0.00328
	(0.00476)	(0.00576)	(0.00406)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.359*	0.0871	0.326
	(0.149)	(0.174)	(0.184)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00182	0.0126	-0.000633
	(0.00442)	(0.00729)	(0.00361)
Education (t-1)	0.0446	0.352***	0.0274
	(0.0826)	(0.0487)	(0.0656)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.0638	-0.00763	-0.111
	(0.0451)	(0.0392)	(0.0732)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.00613	0.0851	-0.00604
	(0.0723)	(0.0608)	(0.0727)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.177	0.0703	-0.250**
	(0.110)	(0.0721)	(0.0941)
Constant	-3.776***	-1.837	-3.077*
	(1.055)	(1.381)	(1.316)
N (country years)	3570	836	2734
R^2	0.519	0.528	0.296
adj. R^2	0.493	0.448	0.278

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Hypothesis 3 proposes that the positive relationship between competitive elections and bureaucratic quality is weakened by larger suffrage extensions. In order to test this hypothesis, we proceed to interact interaction suffrage extensions with the two different measures of competitive elections. Table 3 shows that Hypothesis 3 is supported in the period prior to 1945 with the indicator of multiparty elections (see model 4). Note also that in this period suffrage extensions are negatively related to bureaucratic quality (model 3), but in the later period suffrage extensions are positively related to bureaucratic quality (model 5). Next, we proceed to test the same relationship with the dummy variable for competitive elections. No interaction is significant in these models but the signs are in the expected direction (see Appendix Table A3).

Table 3. Multiparty elections, suffrage extensions, and bureaucratic quality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Multiparty elections (t-1)	0.222***	0.238***	0.209***	0.191***	0.272***	0.286***
	(0.0356)	(0.0389)	(0.0493)	(0.0523)	(0.0395)	(0.0447)
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.00000925	0.00000822	-0.000112***	-0.0000641	0.000104*	0.0000873*
	(0.0000263)	(0.0000240)	(0.0000300)	(0.0000350)	(0.0000463)	(0.0000438)
Multiparty elections (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.0000171		-0.0000617*		-0.0000119
		(0.0000125)		(0.0000273)		(0.0000132)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00164	-0.00128	0.00262	0.00551	-0.00255	-0.00230
	(0.00397)	(0.00396)	(0.00665)	(0.00595)	(0.00405)	(0.00403)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.397***	0.398***	0.270*	0.149	0.579***	0.578***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.113)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00492	-0.00528	-0.0328*	-0.0355*	-0.00364	-0.00378
	(0.00351)	(0.00358)	(0.0130)	(0.0141)	(0.00305)	(0.00311)
Education (t-1)	-0.0259	-0.0219	-0.146	-0.0349	0.00419	0.00694
	(0.0705)	(0.0716)	(0.103)	(0.0969)	(0.0778)	(0.0791)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.116*	-0.106	-0.0969	-0.133	-0.0374	-0.0308
	(0.0579)	(0.0572)	(0.0664)	(0.0739)	(0.0816)	(0.0834)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0757	-0.0755	-0.0608	-0.0700	-0.160	-0.159
	(0.0878)	(0.0879)	(0.0722)	(0.0842)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.246**	-0.245**	-0.0339	-0.0449	-0.292***	-0.290***
	(0.0747)	(0.0752)	(0.0489)	(0.0521)	(0.0740)	(0.0742)
Constant	-3.724***	-3.709***	-2.768***	-1.787*	-4.419***	-4.384***
	(0.803)	(0.805)	(0.781)	(0.815)	(1.028)	(1.038)
N (country years)	2489	2489	803	839	1650	1650
R^2	0.401	0.403	0.334	0.288	0.324	0.326
adj. R^2	0.357	0.359	0.231	0.182	0.294	0.295

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 5 illustrates the conditional marginal effects of competitive elections measured as multiparty elections at different levels of suffrage extensions. We can clearly see how the interaction is strongest for the period before 1945 as shown in Table 3. In this model, competitive elections are not significantly related to bureaucratic quality at suffrage extensions higher than 2000 %. Although the effect is less clear for the

other models the slope is negative in all of them. This is also the case for our other operationalization of competitive elections using a dummy variable. Here we can see that having competitive elections is positively related to bureaucratic quality at almost all levels of suffrage extensions, but not at the very highest levels of extensions (see Figure A3). Moreover, when only including the sub-sample of countries included for the whole period, the interactions are not significant but the slopes are in the expected directed (see Appendix Tables A4 and A5). When only examining male suffrage extensions employing the Bilinski data and competitive elections measured with multiparty elections for the period before 1945, there is a clear interaction. However, similar to the other results, the interaction effect is not significant for the period after 1945, nor when competitive elections are measured with the dummy for competitive elections (see Appendix Tables A6 and A7). In sum, it seems that there is some support for H3, that the relationship between competitive elections and bureaucratic quality is conditioned on suffrage extensions. Large depreciated % changes in suffrage extensions decrease the strength of the relationship.

Figure 5. Conditional marginal effects of multiparty elections

In order to test H4, stipulating that the relationship between legislative constraints and bureaucratic quality is weakened with large suffrage extensions in regimes with electoral contestation, we perform models with an interaction between legislative constraints and suffrage extensions in the sub-sample of country years that have competitive elections. The results from these analyses show that there is a significant interaction in the whole period and in the period after 1946 (see Table 4, Models 1 and 3).

Table 4. Legislative constraints, suffrage extensions, and bureaucratic quality in regimes with meaningful electoral contestation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	The whole period	Before 1946	After 1945
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.000166[*]	-0.0000988	0.000208[**]
	(0.0000681)	(0.0000698)	(0.0000728)
Legislative constraints on the executive (t-1)	1.967[***]	1.097[*]	2.150[***]
	(0.420)	(0.516)	(0.465)
Legislative constraints on the executive (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	-0.000246[**]	0.00000823	-0.000244[**]
	(0.0000933)	(0.000206)	(0.0000812)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00534	0.00258	0.00309
	(0.00472)	(0.00543)	(0.00398)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.389[**]	0.0950	0.407[*]
	(0.143)	(0.150)	(0.161)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00227	0.0111	-0.00183
	(0.00433)	(0.00748)	(0.00342)
Education (t-1)	0.0492	0.352[***]	0.0270
	(0.0835)	(0.0546)	(0.0646)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.0636	-0.00705	-0.102
	(0.0446)	(0.0407)	(0.0718)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.00470	0.0781	-0.00152
	(0.0717)	(0.0603)	(0.0721)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.163	0.0674	-0.234[*]
	(0.107)	(0.0677)	(0.0909)
Constant	-4.172[***]	-1.622	-3.978[***]
	(1.017)	(1.265)	(1.145)
N (country years)	3570	836	2734
R^2	0.526	0.540	0.313
adj. R^2	0.501	0.461	0.294

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Figure 6 shows the conditional marginal effects of legislative constraints at different levels of suffrage extensions. We can see that legislative

constraints are insignificant at higher levels of suffrage extensions. The results are similar if we employ a narrower sample of countries (See Appendix Table A8). However, the results are not supported with the Bilinski data on male suffrage only (see Appendix Table A9).

Figure 6. Conditional marginal effects of legislative constraints (in regimes with competitive elections=1)

Conclusion

In this paper, we have critically reviewed the growing literature of regime effects on bureaucratic quality. Using classic studies as a stepping-stone, we theorized the future uncertainties of three groups of actors (the incumbent, the opposition, and the voters) and proposed how three different dimensions of democracy (competitive elections, legislative constraints on the executive, and suffrage) affect these uncertainties and thus the prospects of bureaucratic reform in different ways. With the use of new, disaggregate data on democracy as well as the indicator of a rigorous and impartial public administration from the V-Dem and

Historical V-Dem projects, we have reassessed the impact of the three dimensions of democracy on bureaucratic quality from 1790 until today.

Our theoretical argument and empirical results contribute more generally to the literature about regime effects on bureaucratic quality by showing that regime change away from autocracy toward democracy is not just important because of the introduction of competition over incumbent power. The positive effects of legislative constraints and competitive elections are both restricted by extensions of suffrage. The effects of democracy are therefore ambiguous. They suggest that we distinguish sharply between democratization as competition for political power and empowerment of the masses in forging bureaucratic quality.

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Appendix

Table A1. Historical sample (H1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945	The whole period	The whole period
Multiparty elections (t-1)	0.167**		0.338***		0.233***	
	(0.0526)		(0.0542)		(0.0477)	
Competitive elections (t-1)		0.364**		1.154***		0.671***
		(0.127)		(0.133)		(0.113)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00419	-0.00800	-0.00731	-0.00998	-0.00156	-0.0100
	(0.00611)	(0.0109)	(0.00687)	(0.00523)	(0.00672)	(0.00550)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.181	0.299*	-0.0138	0.189	0.277	0.332*
	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.206)	(0.217)	(0.147)	(0.128)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.0372*	0.00450	0.0114	0.00608	-0.00628	0.0114
	(0.0142)	(0.0220)	(0.00948)	(0.00529)	(0.0122)	(0.00987)
Education (t-1)	-0.0234	-0.195	0.149	0.0267	-0.00705	-0.165*
	(0.0959)	(0.106)	(0.0918)	(0.0983)	(0.0906)	(0.0789)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.132	-0.0691	-0.0254	-0.0517	-0.121	-0.110**
	(0.0756)	(0.0647)	(0.101)	(0.0887)	(0.0614)	(0.0359)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0710	-0.0219	-0.259*	-0.0848	-0.0374	-0.0293
	(0.0854)	(0.0691)	(0.128)	(0.106)	(0.0931)	(0.0668)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.0369	-0.116	-0.273*	-0.231*	-0.220	-0.232*
	(0.0514)	(0.0921)	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.0921)
Constant	-1.989*	-3.051**	-0.296	-1.714	-2.730*	-3.117**
	(0.802)	(0.924)	(1.477)	(1.555)	(1.083)	(0.925)
N (country years)	813	2752	817	2834	1630	5586
R^2	0.284	0.232	0.517	0.523	0.511	0.472
adj. R^2	0.175	0.193	0.472	0.511	0.454	0.453

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2. Historical sample (H2)

	(1)	(2)	(1)
	The whole period	Before 1946	After 1945
Legislative constraints (t-1)	1.251**	0.929*	1.239***
	(0.384)	(0.431)	(0.318)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00798	-0.000236	0.00638
	(0.00651)	(0.00498)	(0.00480)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.328	0.117	0.244
	(0.199)	(0.195)	(0.259)
Resource dependence (t-1)	0.00286	0.0128	0.00656
	(0.00744)	(0.00796)	(0.00638)
Education (t-1)	0.0601	0.351***	0.0765
	(0.117)	(0.0562)	(0.123)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.0390	-0.00599	-0.0810
	(0.0430)	(0.0376)	(0.0880)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0214	0.0893	-0.0626
	(0.0829)	(0.0650)	(0.0786)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.0835	0.0581	-0.213
	(0.153)	(0.0776)	(0.138)
Constant	-3.196*	-1.643	-2.172
	(1.493)	(1.554)	(2.075)
N (country years)	2507	808	1699
R^2	0.575	0.544	0.302
adj. R^2	0.541	0.464	0.272

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p <$ 0.05, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Contestation and participation: competitive elections (H3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Competitive elections (t-1)	0.686***	0.696***	0.363**	0.383**	1.156***	1.194***
	(0.0973)	(0.109)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.140)
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.0000277	0.0000309	-0.0000612	-0.0000567	0.0000608	0.0000493
	(0.0000192)	(0.0000232)	(0.0000520)	(0.0000510)	(0.0000316)	(0.0000360)
Competitive elections (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.0000106		-0.0000356		-0.0000675
		(0.0000313)		(0.0000290)		(0.0000427)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00368	-0.00366	-0.00854	-0.00847	-0.0104*	-0.0101
	(0.00391)	(0.00391)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)	(0.00512)	(0.00514)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.420***	0.421***	0.286*	0.284*	0.209	0.205
	(0.0991)	(0.0992)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.221)	(0.220)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00109	-0.00111	0.00472	0.00505	0.00583	0.00573
	(0.00309)	(0.00309)	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.00531)	(0.00522)
Education (t-1)	-0.115	-0.114	-0.199	-0.199	0.0378	0.0551
	(0.0625)	(0.0632)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.0982)	(0.0987)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.120***	-0.119***	-0.0675	-0.0681	-0.0508	-0.0414
	(0.0335)	(0.0333)	(0.0641)	(0.0643)	(0.0885)	(0.0904)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0613	-0.0618	-0.0145	-0.0118	-0.0759	-0.0879
	(0.0534)	(0.0534)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.104)	(0.102)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.197**	-0.197**	-0.108	-0.109	-0.232*	-0.232*
	(0.0654)	(0.0654)	(0.0900)	(0.0901)	(0.107)	(0.109)
Constant	-3.916***	-3.910***	-2.918**	-2.889**	-1.967	-1.987
	(0.692)	(0.694)	(0.905)	(0.911)	(1.614)	(1.612)
N (country years)	9156	9156	2820	2820	2834	2834
R^2	0.360	0.360	0.233	0.234	0.524	0.527
adj. R^2	0.346	0.346	0.195	0.196	0.512	0.515

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

A4. Historical sample (H3)(Multiparty elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Multiparty elections (t-1)	0.233***	0.243***	0.163**	0.184**	0.338***	0.362***
	(0.0479)	(0.0506)	(0.0526)	(0.0527)	(0.0529)	(0.0546)
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	-0.0000184	-0.0000125	-0.0000427	-0.0000630	0.0000224	-0.0000496
	(0.0000327)	(0.0000376)	(0.0000471)	(0.0000488)	(0.000102)	(0.000114)
Multiparty elections (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.0000151		-0.0000624		-0.0000278
		(0.0000102)		(0.0000338)		(0.0000161)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00154	-0.00126	0.00397	0.00364	-0.00852	-0.00788
	(0.00671)	(0.00673)	(0.00620)	(0.00601)	(0.00666)	(0.00666)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.277	0.275	0.181	0.163	-0.0317	-0.0633
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.213)	(0.211)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00639	-0.00692	-0.0372*	-0.0366*	0.0102	0.0103
	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0142)	(0.0138)	(0.00969)	(0.00978)
Education (t-1)	-0.00755	-0.00259	-0.0234	-0.0351	0.149	0.173
	(0.0906)	(0.0926)	(0.0970)	(0.0961)	(0.0928)	(0.0947)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.122	-0.115	-0.136	-0.137	-0.0254	-0.00730
	(0.0616)	(0.0622)	(0.0758)	(0.0745)	(0.0999)	(0.106)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0345	-0.0381	-0.0661	-0.0761	-0.288*	-0.305*
	(0.0941)	(0.0957)	(0.0817)	(0.0839)	(0.133)	(0.140)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.219	-0.220	-0.0392	-0.0393	-0.282*	-0.282*
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.0525)	(0.0531)	(0.121)	(0.121)
Constant	-2.720*	-2.702*	-1.977*	-1.857*	0.0847	0.275
	(1.077)	(1.078)	(0.810)	(0.817)	(1.551)	(1.529)
N (country years)	1630	1630	813	813	803	803
R^2	0.511	0.512	0.285	0.294	0.515	0.521
adj. R^2	0.454	0.455	0.175	0.184	0.470	0.475

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

A5. Historical sample (H3) (competitive elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Competitive elections (t-1)	0.671***	0.686***	0.365**	0.376**	1.174***	1.215***
	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.142)
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.00000572	0.0000142	-0.0000504	-0.0000486	0.0000611	0.0000487
	(0.0000161)	(0.0000204)	(0.0000503)	(0.0000500)	(0.0000317)	(0.0000358)
Competitive elections (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.0000229		-0.0000238		-0.0000710
		(0.0000286)		(0.0000244)		(0.0000428)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.0101	-0.0100	-0.00869	-0.00866	-0.0104*	-0.0102
	(0.00548)	(0.00548)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.00514)	(0.00516)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.331*	0.332*	0.299*	0.298*	0.202	0.200
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.227)	(0.225)
Resource dependence (t-1)	0.0115	0.0114	0.00454	0.00471	0.00534	0.00522
	(0.00992)	(0.00995)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.00525)	(0.00516)
Education (t-1)	-0.164*	-0.160	-0.202	-0.202	0.0331	0.0514
	(0.0801)	(0.0817)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.0984)	(0.0988)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.111**	-0.110**	-0.0680	-0.0684	-0.0491	-0.0389
	(0.0357)	(0.0359)	(0.0642)	(0.0643)	(0.0892)	(0.0911)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0301	-0.0307	-0.0145	-0.0127	-0.0672	-0.0801
	(0.0666)	(0.0664)	(0.0680)	(0.0680)	(0.107)	(0.105)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.232*	-0.233*	-0.110	-0.110	-0.237*	-0.237*
	(0.0924)	(0.0919)	(0.0907)	(0.0908)	(0.108)	(0.110)
Constant	-3.116**	-3.113**	-3.013**	-2.997**	-2.030	-2.073
	(0.927)	(0.926)	(0.923)	(0.927)	(1.684)	(1.685)
N (country years)	5586	5586	2752	2752	2795	2795
R^2	0.472	0.473	0.236	0.236	0.529	0.531
adj. R^2	0.453	0.453	0.197	0.197	0.517	0.519

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A6. Contestation and participation: multiparty elections (H3) (Bilinski)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Multiparty elections (t-1)	0.222***	0.234***	0.175**	0.217**	0.270***	0.252**
	(0.0357)	(0.0507)	(0.0517)	(0.0645)	(0.0401)	(0.0764)
Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	-0.00000176	-0.00000189	-0.0000138	-0.0000191	0.0000179	0.0000187
	(0.0000111)	(0.0000110)	(0.0000158)	(0.0000168)	(0.0000141)	(0.0000140)
Multiparty elections (t-1)* Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.00000229		-0.0000218*		0.00000276
		(0.00000663)		(0.00000859)		(0.00000981)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00162	-0.00172	0.00623	0.00820	-0.00227	-0.00219
	(0.00401)	(0.00397)	(0.00613)	(0.00589)	(0.00419)	(0.00419)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.396**	0.398***	0.130	0.191	0.599***	0.596***
	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.137)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00503	-0.00503	-0.0369*	-0.0360**	-0.00326	-0.00326
	(0.00354)	(0.00352)	(0.0142)	(0.0133)	(0.00311)	(0.00315)
Education (t-1)	-0.0255	-0.0253	-0.0234	0.00577	-0.00504	-0.00548
	(0.0698)	(0.0698)	(0.0961)	(0.0970)	(0.0762)	(0.0763)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.118*	-0.117*	-0.128	-0.123	-0.0587	-0.0617
	(0.0587)	(0.0585)	(0.0756)	(0.0700)	(0.0905)	(0.0901)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0728	-0.0738	-0.0703	-0.0578	-0.147	-0.144
	(0.0873)	(0.0870)	(0.0895)	(0.0796)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.245**	-0.244**	-0.0418	-0.0182	-0.283***	-0.283***
	(0.0749)	(0.0745)	(0.0523)	(0.0538)	(0.0735)	(0.0741)
Constant	-3.704***	-3.716***	-1.635	-2.046*	-4.492***	-4.479***
	(0.834)	(0.826)	(0.864)	(0.854)	(1.044)	(1.038)
N (country years)	2486	2486	838	838	1648	1648
R^2	0.400	0.400	0.273	0.293	0.322	0.322
adj. R^2	0.356	0.356	0.165	0.187	0.292	0.291

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.0$

Table A7. Contestation and participation: competitive elections (H3) (Bilinski)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The whole period	The whole period	Before 1946	Before 1946	After 1945	After 1945
Competitive elections (t-1)	0.675***	0.676***	0.361**	0.520**	0.943***	0.905***
	(0.0948)	(0.110)	(0.134)	(0.186)	(0.112)	(0.173)
Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.00000688	0.00000692	0.00000689	0.0000105	0.00000911	0.00000806
	(0.00000888)	(0.00000916)	(0.0000133)	(0.0000124)	(0.0000110)	(0.0000108)
Competitive elections (t-1)* Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)		-0.000000129		-0.0000398		0.00000577
		(0.0000153)		(0.0000217)		(0.0000236)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	-0.00361	-0.00361	-0.00770	-0.00639	-0.00267	-0.00262
	(0.00399)	(0.00398)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.00407)	(0.00407)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.430***	0.430***	0.303*	0.266	0.478***	0.479***
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00121	-0.00121	0.00497	0.00662	-0.00307	-0.00306
	(0.00304)	(0.00305)	(0.0223)	(0.0226)	(0.00223)	(0.00223)
Education (t-1)	-0.121	-0.121	-0.188	-0.183	0.00665	0.00605
	(0.0625)	(0.0625)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.0656)	(0.0659)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.0692	-0.0697	-0.104	-0.105
	(0.0344)	(0.0344)	(0.0645)	(0.0656)	(0.0617)	(0.0623)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0481	-0.0481	-0.00401	-0.0000473	-0.0784	-0.0776
	(0.0519)	(0.0518)	(0.0626)	(0.0613)	(0.0632)	(0.0635)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.196**	-0.196**	-0.114	-0.118	-0.166*	-0.166*
	(0.0654)	(0.0654)	(0.0910)	(0.0900)	(0.0693)	(0.0695)
Constant	-3.975***	-3.975***	-3.090**	-2.724*	-3.846***	-3.844***
	(0.711)	(0.717)	(1.008)	(1.051)	(0.838)	(0.836)
N (country years)	9148	9148	2746	2814	6293	6293
R^2	0.359	0.359	0.232	0.234	0.321	0.321
adj. R^2	0.345	0.345	0.193	0.196	0.313	0.313

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8. Legislative constraints, suffrage extensions and bureaucratic quality in regimes with electoral competition (Historical sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	The whole period	Before 1946	After 1945
Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.000281***	0.000356	0.000276***
	(0.0000672)	(0.000279)	(0.0000548)
Legislative constraints (t-1)	1.572***	1.241*	1.601***
	(0.392)	(0.525)	(0.262)
Legislative constraints (t-1)* Suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	-0.000434***	-0.000607	-0.000259*
	(0.000106)	(0.000374)	(0.0000981)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00840	-0.000500	0.00677
	(0.00644)	(0.00503)	(0.00470)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.387	0.0780	0.398
	(0.196)	(0.170)	(0.248)
Resource dependence (t-1)	0.000935	0.0126	0.00339
	(0.00739)	(0.00811)	(0.00613)
Education (t-1)	0.0615	0.353***	0.0615
	(0.116)	(0.0577)	(0.122)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.0397	-0.00756	-0.0791
	(0.0406)	(0.0407)	(0.0812)
Inter-state war (t-1)	-0.0184	0.0908	-0.0539
	(0.0808)	(0.0669)	(0.0793)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.0717	0.0609	-0.195
	(0.152)	(0.0763)	(0.136)
Constant	-3.863*	-1.599	-3.673
	(1.490)	(1.477)	(1.931)
N (country years)	2507	808	1699
R^2	0.586	0.550	0.324
adj. R^2	0.554	0.470	0.295

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A9. Legislative constraints, suffrage extensions and bureaucratic quality in regimes with electoral competition (Bilinski)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	The whole period	Before 1946	After 1945
Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	0.00000512	-0.0000345	0.0000375
	(0.0000594)	(0.0000935)	(0.0000657)
Legislative constraints (t-1)	1.884**	1.622***	2.071*
	(0.712)	(0.438)	(0.977)
Legislative constraints (t-1) (t-1)* Male suffrage extensions (depreciated % change) (t-1)	-0.0000336	-0.0000532	-0.0000465
	(0.0000883)	(0.000144)	(0.000118)
Incumbent stability (t-1)	0.00500	0.00367	0.00329
	(0.00468)	(0.00587)	(0.00416)
Log (economic development) (t-1)	0.334*	0.0373	0.361
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.194)
Resource dependence (t-1)	-0.00107	0.0162*	-0.000961
	(0.00445)	(0.00748)	(0.00359)
Education (t-1)	0.0530	0.333***	0.0165
	(0.0787)	(0.0421)	(0.0754)
Extra-state war (t-1)	-0.0573	-0.00583	-0.113
	(0.0460)	(0.0388)	(0.0758)
Inter-state war (t-1)	0.00132	0.0944	0.000269
	(0.0695)	(0.0613)	(0.0734)
Civil war (t-1)	-0.176	0.0685	-0.247**
	(0.108)	(0.0695)	(0.0928)
Constant	-3.683**	-1.430	-3.565**
	(1.137)	(1.126)	(1.340)
N (country years)	3568	836	2732
R^2	0.524	0.542	0.300
adj. R^2	0.498	0.464	0.282

Note: All models include country fixed effects and year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p <$ 0.05, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A3. Conditional marginal effects of competitive elections