Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
No 2005:28:
A framework for understanding inflation - with or without money
Ingemar Bengtsson ()
Abstract: This paper presents a model that pictures how inflation is
determined in a decentralized market process where prices are set in both
simultaneous and sequential contracts. Price setting is seen as a
coordination game between the price setters of sequential contracts. An
important property of the model is that inflation thus can be explained
without any reference to the quantity of money.Following up the finding
that inflation is determined in a coordination game, it is subsequently
claimed that whenever inflation does not follow a random path, people do
seem to follow some rule of thumb when predicting future price levels. In
the last section of the paper, it is finally claimed that this rule is best
understood as a focal point, and furthermore that the central banks
provides the focal point for inflation in the western world today. Central
banks could thus be shown to be able to influence inflation rates, although
the quantity of money plays no part in this process.
Keywords: Central Banking; Focal Points; Inflation; Monetary Policy; Money; Quantity Theory; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; E31; E42; E43; E44; E51; E52; E58; (follow links to similar papers)
19 pages, May 16, 2005
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