Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
No 2002:17:
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
Abstract: In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf
(1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly
divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof,
nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is
that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these
presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an
alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization
result.
Keywords: Strategy-proof; Indivisible object; Housing market; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; C78; D71; D78; (follow links to similar papers)
11 pages, June 7, 2002
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