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2012

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Hylmö, A., & Wennerhag, M. (2012). *Does class matter in protests? Social class, attitudes towards inequality, and political trust in European demonstrations in a time of economic crisis*. Paper presented at 2012 SISP Conference, Rome, Italy. <http://www.protestsurvey.eu/index.php?page=publications&id=22>

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Does class matter in protests? Social class, attitudes towards inequality, and political trust in European demonstrations in a time of economic crisis

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This paper is a revised version of the paper that was presented at the 2012 SISP conference in Rome, Italy (13–15 September 2012).

Abstract:

In this paper, survey data from 60 demonstrations in 8 European countries is analyzed, to explore whether social class matters in political protest. Do different types of demonstrations mobilize different groups of employees/workers? And do social class matter for demonstrators' attitudes about social inequality, welfare privatization and political trust—or do national context and/or the issue of the demonstration primarily shape these attitudes? This paper describes and analyzes the class composition of a wide range of demonstrations. Furthermore, the paper explores different conceptualizations of social class in the analysis, in order to evaluate their different merits and applicability when analyzing political protests.

1. Introduction

In social movement research, the role of ‘the social’ for political protests has most often been downplayed in the last decades. For the theorists that first brought the social movement concept into the social sciences in the 19th century, the conflicts and divisions between social classes during capitalism were central in order to understand politics and mobilizations (e.g. von Stein 1850/1964; Sombart 1896/1968), and ‘*the* social movement’—in singular—was seen as equivalent to the Workers’ movement, and its trade unions and parties. The theories that tried to conceptualize the specificity of the ‘new social movements’ from the 1960s and onwards, pictured another development. Here, it was rather claimed that the emerging new social movements had a firm middle-class base while working-class mobilization was seen as declining (e.g. Touraine 1969/1971; Eder 1995). The question about class has however ceased to attract any broader interest within social movement studies in recent decades—a development reflecting a more general lack of interest in how the dynamics of capitalism affect protests (cf. Goodwin & Hetland 2012). Most often, social class is regarded as a factor having little explanatory value when understanding mobilization and protest, in comparison to the role of political opportunity structures, for instance.

Within contemporary research on political participation, the conclusions about how social class matter for citizens’ inclination to take part in street protests have been more diverging. On the one hand, scholars have claimed that we are witnessing a ‘normalization’ of protest today; not only in the sense that what was formerly conceived as ‘unconventional’ forms of protests have become accepted and central in many Western democracies, but also that the social composition of protesters increasingly tend to mirror the general population (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001). This has also been the message of scholars that recently have analyzed ‘political inequality’ in the light of growing economic cleavages in the US: while other forms of political participation are distinctively (and increasingly) more frequent amongst citizens with higher socio-economic status, protest participation engages roughly equal shares of all classes (Schlozman, Verba & Brady 2012: 122–124). On the other hand, despite the claims of the ‘normalization’ of protest, many still acknowledge that educational level—a social attribute that roughly mirrors social class—is still an important factor for protest participation (e.g. Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001), in the sense that university educated people are more inclined to take part in street demonstrations.

During later years, we have witnessed novel forms of mobilizations that cast new light on the role of social class for political protests. First, we have the wave of protests connected with the global justice movement during the turn of the century. These were often characterized as a blend of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements, in which the old social movements (in particular the trade unions) were often inspired and revitalized by the repertoires of the new social movements; these mobilizations can further be seen as a common response to the dominance of neo-liberal politics addressing the ‘social question’ not only nationally but also on a global scale (e.g. Waterman 2001; della Porta 2007; Wennerhag 2010). Secondly, during the last few years both the global financial crisis and the euro crisis has spurred a new wave of protests particularly aimed at national governments, their austerity measures as well as their policies on unemployment and employees’ and workers’ social rights. These protests have taken many forms—most notably the ‘*indignados*’ and the ‘Occupy’ protests—but it has also involved a significant degree of protests staged by trade unions.

If one follows Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2012: 124) and considers street protests as the foremost political ‘weapon of the weak’—thereby expressing a quite classical notion of how subordinate groups denied access to conventional political arenas can potentially achieve social change through protest activities—one can thus ask if these new types of mobilizations, addressing ‘the social question’ of our time, attract citizens belonging to the lower classes in a higher degree than other types of demonstrations. Furthermore, one can also ask whether the protesters’ attitudes towards the issues being central to these later mobilizations—resistance to economic inequality and privatizations, as well as distrust in political elites—are structured according to their own social class.

Therefore, this paper has two aims. Firstly, we will scrutinize the role of social class in contemporary Western European protests, comparing the social composition of participants in demonstrations organized by ‘new social movements’ with those organized by trade unions and the anti-austerity protests of ‘Occupy’/‘*indignados*’. For this, we will use data collected within the research program ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (CCC), which contains data from protest surveys carried out in 10 countries (Czech Republic, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) between 2009 and 2012, hitherto including data from 80 demonstrations and 15 830 demonstration participants, a dataset that has been created through a standardized sampling method (Walgrave & Verhulst 2011). In this comparison, we will explore and

analyze data from 60 of these surveyed demonstrations. Secondly, we will highlight the impact of social class on political attitudes. This will be done through an analysis of the abovementioned 60 demonstrations, focusing on political issues that have been at the forefront during the last few years' wave of protest: deepening social inequality, welfare privatization, and distrust in the political elites. Does class matter, both regarding participation in demonstrations in general and for demonstrators' attitudes towards austerity measures and economic inequality? Are the attitudes of the protesters primarily shaped by their social class, the national context in which the demonstration takes place, or by the specific theme of the mobilization in which they take part?

Social class will be measured in three different ways. Two of these measurements result from later years' developments of occupation-oriented class analysis, in which class is conceptualized according to the individual's position on the labor market. These are the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) and the Oesch scheme (developed by the Swiss political sociologist Daniel Oesch), which are both based on the British sociologist John Goldthorpe's mostly Weber-inspired class-scheme. While these first two conceptualizations of class are grounded in the 'objective' conditions of the labor market, the third is focusing on the 'subjective' side of class, measuring individuals' self-categorization in terms of class—their 'class identity'. In our analysis we will scrutinize the different merits and applicability of these three conceptualizations of class for analyzing political protests.

2. Earlier research on social class and protest participation

a. Protest participation and social class

Within research on political participation, it has been noted that since the 1960s, citizens in Western democracies have become more inclined to demonstrate in order to bring forward their opinions in the ongoing public debate over the political agenda (see for instance Norris 2002; Norris, Walgrave & Van Aelst 2005). In a time when political parties lose a lot of members, street protests have become a more 'normalized' way for citizens to express their opinions and political preferences (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001), besides their ordinary participation in general elections. At large, this 'normalization' has also been connected with a larger impact of ideas of 'participatory democracy' amongst the citizenry.

If one can talk about a ‘normalization’ of the protest activity as such, the question is if participation in demonstrations is something that only certain social groups of the population engage in. Within the research that first scrutinized this in a systematic way, using national population survey data from Western Europe and the US collected in the mid-1970s, the answer to this question was that the protesters to a larger degree were young, men, and highly educated (March & Kaase 1979). Surveys made during the 1980s and 1990s has however shown that both differences regarding gender and age have decreased amongst those partaking in demonstrations, while differences in education still do persist (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001: 466 ff.; see also Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995), which indicates that the belonging to a certain social class still matters for the individual citizen’s participation in street protests. Such conclusions do also resonate with the studies on the social composition of the ‘new social movements’ in which the new forms of protests have been regarded as expressions of a ‘middle class radicalism’ (e.g. Eder 1995). Following the conclusions of this earlier research, it thus seems reasonable to claim that a form of political participation that earlier were—at least in parts of Europe—primarily associated with the Workers’ movement and the mobilization of the working class, is carried out mostly by a well-educated middle-class today.

Studies have emphasized that the greater inclination of the well-educated to take part in street protest should be related to the fact that this group in general tends to be overrepresented in all forms of political participation, both ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). This US study from the 1990s however shows that the inclination to take part in a street protest is less affected by individuals’ level of education, compared to other forms of political participation (ibid.). In the follow-up study made in the US during the 2000s, these differences between street protests and other forms of political participation have even widened—while ‘political inequality’ in general has increased, demonstrations have come to engage equal shares of all socio-economic groups (Schlozman, Verba & Brady 2012: 122–124).¹ This recent study thus seems to indicate that the ‘normalization’ of protest has been even more generalized, today also applying to the level of education.

What is common for these earlier analyses of protest participation is however that they have mostly made their conclusions about the changing social composition of protesters by using

¹ In their recent study, Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2012) analyze the impact of ‘socio-economic status’, which is a joint measure for the individual’s educational level and family income.

educational level as a proxy for social class. Even though the individual's level of education is still a powerful determinant of her or his social class—since in most cases it qualifies the individual for certain positions on a hierarchically structured labor market—the analyses on protest participations have very rarely studied how social class *per se* affects participation in protests, or how it can account for differences in political attitudes amongst protesters (for a recent exception, see Eggert & Giugni 2012). This goes both for the 'objective' side of class—i.e. the individual's position on the labor market—and the 'subjective' side of class, i.e. the individual's own experience of belonging to a certain (or no) social class.

b. Social class and political action

For both Marx and Weber—the most influential early theorists of social class—the individual's employment situation was of central concern when they conceptualized class. For Marx, classes were to be understood in a relational way, and his prime interest was the inevitable conflict of interest between the owners of the means of production (*the capitalists*, i.e. the employers) and the owners of labor power (*the proletariat*, i.e. the employed). For Weber (1922/1978: 928), class was rather conceived as a 'market situation', conditioned by the different levels of reward and opportunity in which employment takes place, which creates common market situations for specific groups on the labor market and thus brings different classes into existence. From this perspective, Weber saw the use of education and other forms of merits as ways through which closure and access was created to specific positions on the labor market (e.g. Crompton 2010; Wright 2009)—and thus subdividing the entire class of wage laborers that Marx had seen as potentially united by their common interests vis-à-vis the employers. Overall, for Marx, the notion of class was more connected to political action, as he also saw classes as potential political actors, whereas Weber made a distinction between 'class' and 'party' when discussing social group formation, instead claiming that economic realities had to be analytically separated from political realities.

In more or less accordance with these classic definitions of social class, and their shared focus on the individual's employment situation, both researchers and statistical agencies have tried to aggregate employment data into comprehensive 'class schemes' since the mid-20th century. One of the more influential employment-based class schemes is John Goldthorpe's, which was used in empirical studies in the UK in the 1970s. This scheme is often referred to as the Eriksson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero, or EGP, scheme (Crompton 2010). The EGP scheme has since then been developed, for instance into the European Socio-economic Classification

(ESeC), a cross-nationally standardized class measure that have become more widely used the last few years (Harrison & Rose 2006).

The Goldthorpe scheme, which is foremost based on Weber's class theory, defines class positions on the basis of employment relations. First of all, a basic distinction is made between employers, the self-employed and employees. Since the vast majority of the population in most developed countries belongs to the latter category, this is further subdivided based on the form of the employment contract. There are two ideal contract types: the service contract and the labor contract; in between one can find intermediate forms. Two aspects of the employment relation create the distinction between service and labor contract: whether the work performed is easy to monitor, and the degree of specificity that characterize human assets (e.g. skills and expertise). The labor contract is characterized by low asset specificity, i.e. one worker may easily be exchanged for another, and work is easily supervised. The service contract is on the opposite side of the scale, and entails different forms of compensation like relative security and career opportunities (Goldthorpe 2000: 208). In the ESeC version of Goldthorpe's scheme, the nine classes are based on the type of employment contract, where the 'higher salariat' for example includes both large employers and higher grade professionals (see Table 1).

Table 1. ESeC class scheme

ESeC Class	Examples	Common Term
1. Large employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations	<i>Employers with 10+ employees, civil engineers, medical doctors, university teachers</i>	Higher salariat
2. Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher grade technician and supervisory occupations	<i>Secondary school teachers, journalists, specialized nurses, computer technicians</i>	Lower salariat
3. Intermediate occupations	<i>Primary school teachers, office clerks</i>	Higher grade white collar workers
4. Small employer and self-employed occupations (excluding agriculture etc.)	<i>Managers of small companies (self employed or <10 employees)</i>	Petit bourgeoisie or independents
5. Agricultural self-employed occupations	<i>Farmers</i>	Petit bourgeoisie or independents
6. Lower supervisory and lower technical occupations	<i>Shop supervisors, foremen</i>	Higher grade blue collar workers
7. Lower services, sales and clerical occupations	<i>Cashiers, assisting nurses</i>	Lower grade white collar workers
8. Lower technical occupations	<i>Electricians, construction workers</i>	Skilled workers
9. Routine occupations	<i>Machine operators, taxi drivers</i>	Semi- and non-skilled workers
(Never worked and long-term unemployed)	<i>Students, unemployed</i>	Unemployed

A further modified version of the EGP scheme have been created by Daniel Oesch (2006a; 2006b), with the ambition to take several contemporary changes in the employment structure into account. According to Oesch, three labor market trends have made the EGP scheme, which was conceptualized during high industrialism, slightly outdated. The first trend is the *sector-shift* of the economy, i.e. the expansion of the service sector on behalf of the manufacturing sector; the second is the *gender-shift*, through which women are increasingly participating in paid employment; and the third concerns the *education-shift* caused by rising education levels (Oesch 2006a: 27). According to Oesch, the result is a swelling middle class that the EGP scheme cannot handle properly. His alternative class scheme introduces a horizontal distinction between three different work logics, whereas EGP (and ESeC) only has

a single hierarchical dimension of service and labor contract. The three work logics are the *organizational*, the *technical* and the *interpersonal* work logic (Oesch 2006a: 64). The self-employed and the employers are thought of as instances of a fourth *independent* work logic. The resulting class scheme can be used in either a 17-class or 8-class version (for the 8-class version, see Table 2).

Table 2. Oesch class scheme, 8-class version

Employees			Self-employed
Interpersonal service work logic	Technical work logic	Organizational work logic	Independent work logic
Socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals <i>Medical doctors, social workers, teachers</i>	Technical professionals and semi-professionals <i>Computing professionals, architects, mechanical engineers</i>	Higher-grade and associate managers and administrators <i>Financial managers, managers in small firms, public administrators</i>	Traditional bourgeoisie (large employers and self-employed professionals) <i>Accountants, hotel owners, lawyers</i>
Service workers <i>Children's nurses, home helpers, cooks, waiters, telephone salespersons</i>	Production workers <i>Assemblers, carpenters, machinery mechanics, bus drivers</i>	Office clerks <i>Bank tellers, mail sorting clerks, secretaries, fire fighters</i>	Small business owners with less than 9 or no employees <i>Farmers, hairdressers, shopkeepers, lorry drivers</i>

If the class position is foremost seen as a position in the occupational structure, how can these categorizations of class then be connected to political attitudes and political participation? When it comes to participation in general elections, Oesch has for example used his class scheme to analyze class voting. In these analyses, his claim has been that one must take the different types of work logic that characterizes different parts of the labor market today into account, in order to understand how class still influences political preferences. Professionals whose employment is structured by an interpersonal work logic (e.g. teachers, social workers, medical doctors) do for instance show a greater support for libertarian left parties than the professionals being subject to a technical work logic (e.g. mechanical engineers, computer professionals, architects), who instead more often support conservative center-right parties (Oesch 2008a; 2008b).

In research made by other scholars on whether class voting is still structuring voting behavior, it has instead been claimed that political preferences are most of all shaped by class identity, not the position of the individual on the labor market (Cigéhn & Johansson 1997). Such research stresses that structural class position and class identity are not the same thing, and that one's subjective belonging to a certain class do not need to coincide with one's position on the labor market (Cigéhn et al. 2001; Crompton 2010). This approach is then rather focusing on the 'subjective part' of social class, but only on the level on which the individual recognize the existence of different social classes in society and feel the belonging to one of these classes, i.e. *class identity*—and thus not *class consciousness*, which express a further belief that one's own class has different and opposite interests vis-à-vis other classes (Oskarson 1994: 11–112).

With different approaches to social class it has thus been shown that both objective and subjective class matters, for political preferences and voting behavior. Whether these conceptualizations of class—ESeC, Oesch, and class identity—can also be seen as important for understanding participation in demonstrations will be scrutinized in this paper.

3. Method and data

a. Survey method and data

Our data on demonstrators is taken from surveys made during 60 European demonstrations in 8 countries between 2009 and 2011 as part of the CCC research program. Respondents were sampled using the standardized method of the CCC research program (Walgrave & Verhulst 2011). At each demonstration, potential respondents were systematically selected according to a common protocol in order to minimize sampling bias. All selected respondents were given a questionnaire with a reply-paid envelope to complete after the demonstration, and every nth respondent was additionally interviewed face-to-face, using a short, single-sheet questionnaire, to collect basic data about the demonstrators in order to enable control for non-response bias. This procedure ensures that the data is both representative for all participants taking part in the demonstrations, and that the method have been utilized the same way in all demonstrations surveyed, irrespective of country.

To highlight differences between different types of demonstrations, these are divided in sub-categories. This categorization is mainly done on the basis of the issue of the demonstrations, together with the protest organizers' belonging to a movement or a broader movement sector. The category 'new social movement demonstrations' is made up by 18 demonstrations about anti-racist, environmental, peace, and women's rights issues. The category 'trade union demonstrations' concerns 14 demonstrations in which trade unions were the principal or one of the most important organizers of the protest. The category 'May Day demonstrations' regards 12 demonstrations being held on the traditional international Workers' day, in all but two cases being primarily organized by trade unions.² The category 'Occupy/*Indignados* demonstrations' regards two demonstrations held under these banners 2011 in London and Madrid. The category 'other demonstrations' is made up of protests addressing issues such as anti-abortion, anti-austerity (i.e., the cases where trade unions were not organizing the event), anti-regionalism, regionalism, democracy, students' conditions, and Pride parades. The countries from which we use data are Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK.

b. Coding class

The CCC data has been coded according to the ESeC and Oesch class schemes. To compare with the general population, we have also used data for the relevant countries from the European Social Survey Round 5 (ESS5) from 2010. The ESS5 data has been weighted for population size (to give a mean value for all countries, which takes the different sizes of the national populations in account) and class has been coded with the ESeC and Oesch schemes.

The single most important variable in class coding is the individual's *occupation*, which is coded according to the isco88(com) standard (the standardized occupation classification used by the International Labour Organization, ILO). In the coding process, an *employment status* variable is used to separate employees from employers and the self-employed. Information about the *number of employees* is also used to make some distinctions, for example between large and small employers. In both the ESeC and Oesch schemes, respondents are treated as individuals, rather than as households. For a more detailed description of the coding process and the variables involved, see Appendix C.

² These two cases were the May Day demonstrations organized by the Left Party in Stockholm 2010 and Malmö 2011. Even though no trade unions were amongst the official organizers, a lot of trade union activists took part in these demonstrations.

Since labor market position determines class position in these class schemes, a central concern is how to treat individuals not currently in employment. In order to allocate as many of the respondents as possible, we have slightly altered the definition of the target population proposed by Oesch (2006a) and Harrison and Rose (2006). Besides those currently in employment, the ESeC scheme normally codes the unemployed and retired according to their last paid job, and so extends its population coverage (Harrison & Rose 2006: 9). The long term unemployed and those who have never worked, for example the significant group of full time students, may instead be allocated to an optional tenth class category comprising those outside the labor market. Daniel Oesch (2006a: 75) takes a somewhat stricter approach, limiting the target population to persons in ages 20–65 currently working at least 20 hours per week, in order to only derive a class position from persons properly involved in the labor market. Full time students, the retired and the unemployed are thus all left out of the Oesch class scheme.

To ensure comparability between the ESeC and Oesch schemes, while extending our population coverage, we follow the ESeC method of including everyone disregarding age or current employment status. Since the CCC data does not include information about *how long* the respondents have been unemployed, all unemployed are coded according to last paid job. Furthermore, to be able to analyze the sociologically interesting group of full time students (making up about a tenth of the CCC sample), we have constructed an extra ‘class’ of students in both our ESeC and Oesch schemes. The principle has been to allocate respondents who are at the same time students and in paid employment according to their occupation. The share of full time students that are also in paid employment is only about 14% of all students (of both the CCC and the ESS5 sample). That leaves us with a new ‘class’ of full time students, who are not also in paid employment.

4. Analysis

a. The class composition of demonstrators

What does the class composition of demonstrators look like? Applying the ESeC and Oesch class measures to our sample of Western European demonstrators gives us a first picture of its overall class structure. In Table 3 and 4, the class composition both according to ESeC and Oesch is shown, regarding the protesters of the CCC surveys. In these tables, the figures are shown for different types of demonstrations (new social movement, trade union, May Day,

Occupy/*Indignados*' and other demonstrations). For the precise ESeC and Oesch data for each of the 60 demonstrations, see Appendix B, Table 4 and 5.

Data from the European Social Survey Round 5 (ESS5) is presented in order to make it possible to compare with the corresponding class composition of the general population of the countries in question. The ESS5 data is presented as the percentage for all countries that occur in the CCC data (apart from Italy, which was not part of ESS5). For the precise ESS5 data for each country regarding ESeC and Oesch, see Appendix A, Table 1 and 2.

Looking first at the general population (the ESS5 sample), we find that in terms of ESeC (Table 3), Class 1 ('Large employers, higher managers and professionals') makes up about 11% of the population, while class 2 ('Lower managers and professionals, and higher supervisory/technicians') makes up about 20%.

Table 3. The class composition of different types of demonstrations (CCC) and in the general population (ESS5), according to the ESeC class scheme. (%)

Class: ESeC category	Demonstration type					Total All demonstrators	National populations* ESS5 (2010)
	New Social Movements	Trade union	May Day	Occupy / Indignados	Other		
1. Large employers, higher mgrs/professionals	26	23	19	27	24	24	11
2. Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	39	37	40	32	33	37	20
3. Intermediate occupations	7	11	8	8	7	8	9
4. Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	4	1	2	5	4	3	8
5. Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
6. Lower supervisors and technicians	3	5	4	2	2	3	10
7. Lower sales and service	4	7	6	5	3	5	11
8. Lower technical	1	6	5	1	1	3	6
9. Routine	2	6	5	2	2	3	16
Students, not working	13	3	11	17	23	13	8
Cases (N)	3 792	2 270	1 456	414	2 919	10 851	12 522
Demonstrations (N)	18	14	12	2	14	60	--

*The ESS5 sample is weighted for population size. The ESS5 sample does not include Italy.

If we turn to the Oesch-8 measure (Table 4), we find that the Oesch scheme's finer distinction within the top ranks gives us a very small class of 'Self-employed professionals and large employers', only 2% of the population. Next, we have the higher class of the organizational work logic, 'Associate managers and administrators', accounting for 14% of the population. The higher class characterized by the technical work logic is represented by 'Technical professionals and technicians' at about 5% of the population. The class of 'Socio-cultural semi-professionals' makes up about 11% of the ESS5 sample. Together, these higher classes of managers and professionals make up a third of the sample, corresponding quite well to ESeC classes 1 and 2. Here, as in ESeC, we find that 'Small business owners' account for 10% of the population, while full time students have a 8% share.

Table 4. The class composition of different types of demonstrations (CCC) and in the general population (ESS5), according to the Oesch-8 class scheme. (%)

Class: Oesch 8 category	Demonstration type					Total All demonstrators	National populations* ESS5 (2010)
	New Social Movements	Trade union	May Day	Occupy / Indignados	Other		
Self-employed professionals and large employers	9	2	6	7	8	7	2
Small business owners	5	1	2	4	4	4	10
Associate managers and administrators	22	35	24	19	21	25	14
Office clerks	3	6	4	3	3	4	11
Technical professionals and technicians	7	7	7	16	7	7	5
Production workers	3	12	9	3	3	6	21
Socio-cultural semi- professionals	33	27	31	24	28	30	11
Service workers	5	7	7	5	3	5	18
Students, not working	13	3	11	17	23	13	8
Cases (N)	3 799	2 272	1 458	414	2 926	10 869	12 498
Demonstrations (N)	18	14	12	2	14	60	--

*The ESS5 sample is weighted for population size. The sample does not include Italy.

If we compare our CCC data on demonstrators to these figures regarding the general population, we find that according to the ESeC scheme, classes 1 and 2 together account for about 60% of all demonstrators, while according to Oesch, the four classes of managers and professionals represent almost 70% of the demonstrators. This heavy overrepresentation of the higher classes seems to be even stronger for Class 1 than Class 2 in the ESeC scheme, suggesting that ‘Large employers and higher managers and professionals’ account for 24% of all demonstrators. Turning instead to the Oesch scheme will help us get a slightly different picture of these demonstrating managers and professionals. We now find that the classes representing professionals and managers in the organizational and socio-cultural work logic

account for about 55% of demonstrators, while the large employers and self-employed professionals only account for 7%, just like the professionals of the technical work logic. To sum up, the working class seems to be underrepresented, while professionals and managers in organizational and socio-cultural work logics seem to be heavily overrepresented among demonstrators. This is most pronounced in the new social movement demonstrations, and least pronounced in the trade union demonstrations. The latter resemble the general population slightly more with a higher, but still strongly underrepresented, share of the working class. However—as one can see in Appendix B, Table 1 and 2 (which shows the CCC data for ESeC and Oesch-8 divided by country)—there are still significant differences between countries, regarding in which degree the working class is partaking in the surveyed demonstrations.

b. The class identity of demonstrators

If the class structure seems to be shifted ‘upwards’, according to the two measures of objective class position used, what about the demonstrators’ class identity? Table 5 shows class identity for the different demonstration types. For the precise class identity data for each of the 60 demonstrations, see Appendix B, Table 6.

In order to make it possible to compare with the corresponding ‘subjective’ class composition of the general population of the countries in question, data from the World Values Survey wave four (WVS4) for four of the countries has been used as an approximation. For the precise WVS4 data for each country regarding class identity, see Appendix A, Table 3.

Table 5. The class composition of different types of demonstrations (CCC) and in the general population (WVS4), regarding class identity. (%)

Class: Class identity	Demonstration type					Total	National populations*
	New Social Movements	Trade union	May Day	Occupy / Indignados	Other	All demonstrators	WVS 4 (2005)
Upper class	1	1	0	2	3	2	2
Upper middle class	31	20	18	19	37	28	27
Lower middle class	41	33	38	33	33	36	42
Working class	15	41	36	36	19	26	21
Lower class	1	2	2	1	2	2	3
None	10	3	5	9	6	7	5
Cases (N)	4 286	2 840	1 712	472	3 270	12 580	4 378
Demonstrations (N)	18	14	12	2	14	60	--

* The WVS4 sample covers only Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

In Table 5, we find that the demonstrators in our sample resemble the general population very closely, and even seem to have a slight ‘downward’ shift, with more demonstrators identifying as working class than the WVS sample. Again, we find a marked difference between demonstrators in the new social movement and trade union protests. Not surprisingly, trade union demonstrators tend to identify as working class to a much greater extent, 41% compared to only 21% in the general population, and 12% in the new social movement demonstrations. It should also be noted that there are very strong national differences in class identity, both among demonstrators and in the WVS sample. For example, in Switzerland, over 40% identify themselves as upper middle class in the WVS sample. In Spain on the other hand, this number is only 3% (See Appendix A, Table 3). Among demonstrators, 49% in Spain, 25% in Sweden and 11% in Switzerland identify as working class (See Appendix B, Table 3).

Our analysis above shows that in terms of ‘objective class’ (ESeC and Oesch), the ‘higher’ classes seems to be more well-represented than the ‘lower’ classes amongst the demonstrators, compared to the general populations of the countries of our analysis. Regarding ‘subjective class’ (i.e., the class identity), the situation is the opposite. These

different results show the merits of not only measuring social class as positions on the labor market, but also according to the subjective dimension of class. This can be seen as particularly interesting when analyzing class in relation to political participation and protest, a context in which class is not only expressed but also ‘made’, as part of the process of political articulation (see for instance Thompson 1968/1991; Bourdieu 1987; Wacquant 1992). The differences between individuals’ labor-market related (‘objective’) class and their own (‘subjective’) conception of which class they belong to become quite obvious in Table 6, which shows the distribution of different class identities within the classes of both the ESeC and the Oesch schemes.

Table 6. The distribution of class identities within ESeC and Oesch-8 classes, data from surveyed demonstrations (CCC). (%)

Occupation-based class	Class identity						Cases (N)
	Upper class	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Working class	Lower class	None	
ESeC							
1. Large employers, higher mgrs/professionals	3	38	35	16	1	7	2 538
2. Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	1	28	42	21	1	7	3 906
3. Intermediate occupations	1	21	42	31	1	4	857
4. Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	1	31	38	21	1	8	351
5. Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)	0	10	26	36	8	21	39
6. Lower supervisors and technicians	1	14	28	51	2	4	338
7. Lower sales and service	1	13	31	49	2	4	495
8. Lower technical	0	4	17	70	4	4	281
9. Routine	1	6	23	62	4	5	364
Oesch-8							
Self-employed professionals and large employers	3	40	33	12	1	11	718
Small business owners	2	29	37	22	1	9	375
Associate managers and administrators	2	33	38	22	1	5	2 604
Office clerks	0	18	34	41	2	5	382
Technical professionals and technicians	1	27	36	27	1	8	780
Production workers	0	5	18	69	3	4	605
Socio-cultural semi-professionals	1	28	43	20	1	7	3 153
Service workers	1	12	31	48	2	5	568
Students, not working	3	38	34	15	3	8	1 401
Cases (N)	168	3 055	3 869	2 649	145	700	10 586

As one can see in the table, a high degree of the demonstrators assign themselves a class identity that corresponds to their class position on the labor market. Professionals tend to see themselves as middle class, whereas production and service workers predominantly see themselves as working class. This is however not always the case, and one can furthermore notice that different groups of professionals, employees and workers in varying degrees identify with a ‘subjective’ class more close to their ‘objective’ class (e.g., production workers tends to identify as working class in a greater extent than service workers).

With this kind of data it is of course hard to explain the class identity of protesters with their partaking in processes of political articulation connected with mobilizations or specific demonstrations. Albeit it may be difficult to claim causalities, one can still measure the correlation between individuals’ participation in specific types of protests and their class identity—and at the same time control for e.g. ‘objective’ class position and the country in which the protest was staged. In Table 7 and 8, this is done regarding those having a working class or a middle-class identity, testing for both the ESeC and the Oesch-8 class categories.³

³ For the variable ‘middle class identity’, we combined the questionnaire’s alternatives ‘upper middle class’ and ‘lower middle class’.

Table 7. Correlation between demonstration type and Working and Middle Class identification, controlling for ESeC class, country, etc. (Binary logistic regression)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	<i>Working class identification</i>			<i>Middle class identification</i>		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>Control variables</i>						
Age (65 years and older = ref.)						
-24 years	0,17	0,14	1,18	-0,02	0,12	0,98
25-39 years	0,30 **	0,11	1,35	-0,31 ***	0,09	0,74
40-64 years	0,28 **	0,10	1,33	-0,19 *	0,08	0,83
Gender: Woman	-0,20 ***	0,06	0,82	0,15 **	0,05	1,16
University degree / study at university	-1,07 ***	0,06	0,34	0,80 ***	0,05	2,23
Unemployed or between jobs	0,10	0,11	1,11	-0,38 ***	0,10	0,68
Country of demonstration (Netherlands = ref.)						
Belgium	-0,57 ***	0,10	0,57	0,24 **	0,09	1,27
Denmark	-0,14	0,25	0,87	-0,10	0,18	0,90
Italy	-0,57 ***	0,15	0,57	0,35 **	0,13	1,42
Spain	1,88 ***	0,09	6,58	-1,36 ***	0,08	0,26
Sweden	0,04	0,13	1,04	0,04	0,11	1,04
Switzerland	-0,62 ***	0,13	0,54	0,39 ***	0,10	1,48
United Kingdom	0,90 ***	0,09	2,46	-0,97 ***	0,08	0,38
Class: ESeC scheme (Large employers, higher managers/professionals = ref.)						
Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	0,31 ***	0,08	1,36	-0,14 *	0,06	0,87
Intermediate occupations	0,59 ***	0,11	1,80	-0,27 **	0,09	0,76
Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	0,27	0,16	1,31	-0,16	0,13	0,85
Agricultural small employers and self-employed	0,57	0,40	1,76	-1,17 **	0,37	0,31
Lower supervisors and technicians	1,39 ***	0,14	4,00	-1,08 ***	0,13	0,34
Lower sales and service	1,44 ***	0,12	4,23	-1,05 ***	0,11	0,35
Lower technical	2,02 ***	0,16	7,51	-1,94 ***	0,17	0,14
Routine workers	1,85 ***	0,14	6,38	-1,61 ***	0,14	0,20
Students not working	0,15	0,13	1,16	-0,36 ***	0,11	0,70
<i>Type of demonstration (Trade Unions = ref.)</i>						
New Social Movements	-0,66 ***	0,08	0,52	0,35 ***	0,07	1,42
May Day	0,26 *	0,10	1,29	-0,23 *	0,09	0,79
Occupy/Indignados	-0,67 ***	0,14	0,51	0,37 **	0,13	1,44
Other	-1,21 ***	0,08	0,30	0,64 ***	0,07	1,90
Constant	-1,09 ***	0,13	0,34	0,69 ***	0,11	1,99
Nagelkerke's pseudo-R ²	0,326			0,223		
Observations	10 059			10 059		

Columns show beta coefficient, standard error and odds ratio. Levels of significance: *=5%, **=1%, and ***=0,1% significance.

Table 8. Correlation between demonstration type and Working and Middle Class identification, controlling for Oesch-8 class, country, etc. (Binary logistic regression)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	<i>Working class identification</i>			<i>Middle class identification</i>		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>Control variables</i>						
Age (65 years and older = ref.)						
-24 years	0,21	0,15	1,24	-0,04	0,12	0,96
25-39 years	0,32 **	0,11	1,38	-0,30 **	0,09	0,74
40-64 years	0,31 **	0,10	1,36	-0,18 *	0,08	0,84
Gender: Woman	-0,20 ***	0,06	0,82	0,15 **	0,05	1,16
University degree / study at university	-1,12 ***	0,06	0,33	0,84 ***	0,05	2,31
Unemployed or between jobs	0,13	0,11	1,13	-0,41 ***	0,10	0,66
Country of demonstration (Netherlands = ref.)						
Belgium	-0,56 ***	0,10	0,57	0,24 **	0,09	1,27
Denmark	-0,11	0,25	0,90	-0,11	0,18	0,90
Italy	-0,56 ***	0,15	0,57	0,35 **	0,13	1,42
Spain	1,90 ***	0,09	6,67	-1,37 ***	0,08	0,26
Sweden	0,04	0,13	1,04	0,06	0,11	1,07
Switzerland	-0,64 ***	0,13	0,53	0,41 ***	0,10	1,51
United Kingdom	0,90 ***	0,09	2,46	-0,96 ***	0,08	0,38
Class: Oesch-8 scheme (Associate managers and administrators = ref.)						
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0,29 *	0,14	0,75	-0,21 *	0,10	0,81
Small business owners	0,17	0,15	1,18	-0,35 **	0,13	0,70
Office clerks	0,89 ***	0,13	2,43	-0,73 ***	0,12	0,48
Technical professionals and technicians	0,20	0,11	1,22	-0,28 **	0,10	0,75
Production workers	1,80 ***	0,12	6,04	-1,88 ***	0,12	0,15
Socio-cultural semi-professionals	0,20 **	0,08	1,23	-0,20 **	0,07	0,82
Service workers	1,31 ***	0,11	3,71	-1,17 ***	0,11	0,31
Students not working	-0,02	0,13	0,98	-0,39 ***	0,11	0,68
<i>Type of demonstration (Trade Unions = ref.)</i>						
New Social Movements	-0,67 ***	0,08	0,51	0,38 ***	0,07	1,46
May Day	0,26 **	0,10	1,30	-0,22 *	0,09	0,80
Occupy/Indignados	-0,69 ***	0,14	0,50	0,42 **	0,13	1,52
Other	-1,21 ***	0,09	0,30	0,68 ***	0,07	1,97
Constant	-0,92 ***	0,12	0,40	0,67 ***	0,11	1,95
Nagelkerke's pseudo-R ²	0,323			0,225		
Observations	10 074			10 074		

Columns show beta coefficient, standard error and odds ratio. Levels of significance: *=5%, **=1%, and ***=0,1% significance.

In both the binary logistic regressions of Table 7 and 8, it is quite clear that the ‘objective’ class of individuals is strongly correlated with their class identification. Furthermore, one can also find a strong correlation between class identification and the country of demonstration. The most plausible interpretation from this is that the meaning of belonging to certain classes varies between countries, at least amongst our sample of protesters. When it comes to demonstration type, the correlations are however weaker, but one can still find some significant differences. In general, participants in ‘old social movement’ protests (trade union and May Day demonstrations) are more likely to have a working class identity and less likely to have a middle class identity, whereas one can see the opposite pattern for protesters in ‘new social movement’ and ‘occupy/*indignados*’ demonstrations. Since these regressions do control for both ‘objective’ class and country, it would be reasonable to interpret these minor differences as a correlation between class identity and demonstration type. From these data it is of course hard to tell whether the demonstration (and/or the movement context it is part of) strengthens class identification (and thus ‘makes class’)—or if those having a certain class identity simply attends protests of a specific kind in a greater degree than others—but the analysis nevertheless shows that both working class and middle class identities are correlated to the mobilizations as such (and possibly how they are articulated).

When it comes to trade union and May Day demonstrations, such a correlation should maybe be no surprise, given the fact that they frame political issues from a class perspective and are (or have historically been) staged by the Workers’ movement; in this sense they can be seen as expressions of a working class identity. The same type of explicit class articulation is however more difficult to see in the ‘new social movement’ protests, since they do not frame their protest issues as class issues. Still, the new social movements have in earlier research been seen as expressing a ‘middle class radicalism’ (e.g. Eder 1995). The role of middle class identification for ‘new social movement’ protests therefore seems to be more unintended (or maybe even unconscious).

Hitherto, we have mostly discussed the differences between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ class—and their possible connections—amongst protesters. The question is then which of these two aspects of class—the ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’—best explains differences amongst protesters in attitudes on political issues?

c. The impact of social class on attitudes and political trust

In the remaining part of this paper we analyze whether social class has an impact on political attitudes and political trust, with the focus on some of the issues that have been at the forefront during later years' wave of protest in Western Europe: social inequalities, welfare privatization and distrust in the national governments. The analysis will scrutinize if the political attitudes of demonstrators are foremost shaped by their social class (according to the ESeC and Oesch schemas, and regarding class identity), the national context in which the demonstration takes place, or by the specific theme of the mobilization in which they take part. To do this, we analyze the participants of the 60 demonstrations surveyed within the CCC research program through a linear regression analysis.

Table 9. Social class and attitudes towards social inequality (linear regression)

	Model 1 <i>Only control variables</i>	Model 2 <i>ESeC</i>	Model 3 <i>Oesch</i>	Model 4 <i>Class identification</i>
<i>Control variables</i>				
Age	,061 ***	,074 ***	,069 ***	,063 ***
Gender: Woman	-,032 ***	-,036 ***	-,040 ***	-,028 **
University degree / study at university	,044 ***	,065 ***	,055 ***	,092 ***
Unemployed or between jobs	,024 *	,012	,012	,014
Country of demonstration (Netherlands = ref.)				
Belgium	,021	,012	,007	,019
Denmark	,058 ***	,054 ***	,053 ***	,057 ***
Italy	,087 ***	,084 ***	,080 ***	,078 ***
Spain	,079 ***	,076 ***	,075 ***	,028 *
Sweden	,082 ***	,084 ***	,080 ***	,070 ***
Switzerland	,031 *	,027 *	,024 *	,028 *
United Kingdom	,149 ***	,155 ***	,149 ***	,120 ***
Type of demonstration (New Social Movements = ref.)				
Trade Unions	,037 **	,028 *	,029 *	,013
May Day	,090 ***	,085 ***	,088 ***	,071 ***
Occupy/Indignados	-,006	-,004	-,003	-,008
Other	-,162 ***	-,160 ***	-,162 ***	-,150 ***
<i>Class: ESeC scheme (Large employers, higher managers/professionals = ref.)</i>				
Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians		,072 ***		
Intermediate occupations		,036 ***		
Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)		-,012		
Agricultural small employers and self-employed		,006		
Lower supervisors and technicians		,014		
Lower sales and service		,035 **		
Lower technical		,038 ***		
Routine workers		,050 ***		
Students not working		,034 **		
<i>Class: Oesch-8 scheme (Associate managers and administrators = ref.)</i>				
Self-employed professionals and large employers			-,014	
Small business owners			-,020	
Office clerks			,021 *	
Technical professionals and technicians			-,003	
Production workers			,035 ***	
Socio-cultural semi-professionals			,074 ***	
Service workers			,033 **	
Students not working			,022	
<i>Class identity (upper middle class = ref.)</i>				
Upper class				-,027 **
Lower middle class				,091 ***
Working class				,181 ***
Lower class				,066 ***
No class identification				,018
R ²	0,080	0,091	0,092	0,104
Observations	11 976	10 069	10 086	11 759

The regression models regards responses to the statement ‘Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off’, which could be answered on a 1–5 scale, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). Columns show standardized Beta coefficients. Levels of significance: *=5%, **=1%, and ***=0,1% significance.

In Table 9, it shows that when it comes to attitudes towards social inequality (more precisely whether the government should redistribute income to counteract such inequalities), the demonstrators' belonging to a certain social class seems to have impact. Irrespective if we are dealing with ESeC, Oesch or class identity, the 'lower' classes in general favor economic redistribution to a greater degree than the 'higher' classes. If one compares the different impact of the three measures of class, it is obvious that class identity has more impact for attitudes on this issue and especially those identifying as 'working class' do favor more state redistribution. Regarding the 'objective' class measures ESeC and Oesch, it is however interesting to note that it is not necessarily the lower classes that favors more redistribution; in fact, according to the ESeC measure, the class most favorable to this is 'lower managers and professionals', and according to the Oesch measure, it is the 'socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals'.

The country of the demonstrations seems to have less impact than class for attitudes on this issue. However, apart from the impact of class identity, the issue of the demonstration is still what accounts for most differences. In particular the participants of May Day demonstrations, but also trade union and new social movement demonstrations, do in a greater degree than participants of other protests favor more income redistribution. What is noteworthy is however that the protesters of Occupy/'*Indignados*' demonstrations are less in favor of redistribution than the protesters of not only trade union and May Day demonstrations but also less than new social movement protesters.

The same patterns can be seen in Table 10, which shows the corresponding regression analysis for attitudes towards privatization of public welfare and state-owned enterprises. Also here, the issue of the demonstration seems to be the most important.

Table 10. Social class and attitudes towards privatizations (linear regression)

	Model 1 <i>Only control variables</i>	Model 2 <i>ESeC</i>	Model 3 <i>Oesch</i>	Model 4 <i>Class identification</i>
<i>Control variables</i>				
Age	,012	,013	,012	,016
Gender: Woman	,013	-,001	-,001	,016
University degree / study at university	,106 ***	,105 ***	,095 ***	,134 ***
Unemployed or between jobs	,010	,012	,012	,007
Country of demonstration (Netherlands = ref.)				
Belgium	-,007	-,022	-,027 *	-,012
Denmark	,039 ***	,034 ***	,035 ***	,037 ***
Italy	-,017	-,019	-,021 *	-,024 *
Spain	-,059 ***	-,078 ***	-,080 ***	-,095 ***
Sweden	,073 ***	,069 ***	,067 ***	,062 ***
Switzerland	,087 ***	,085 ***	,082 ***	,085 ***
United Kingdom	,117 ***	,119 ***	,112 ***	,094 ***
Type of demonstration (New Social Movements = ref.)				
Trade Unions	,054 ***	,048 ***	,049 ***	,040 ***
May Day	,063 ***	,067 ***	,070 ***	,054 ***
Occupy/Indignados	,057 ***	,067 ***	,067 ***	,057 ***
Other	-,148 ***	-,136 ***	-,137 ***	-,141 ***
<i>Class: ESeC scheme (Large employers, higher managers/professionals = ref.)</i>				
Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians		,091 ***		
Intermediate occupations		,032 **		
Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)		-,002		
Agricultural small employers and self-employed		,018		
Lower supervisors and technicians		-,021 *		
Lower sales and service		,022 *		
Lower technical		,008		
Routine workers		,024 *		
Students not working		,033 *		
<i>Class: Oesch-8 scheme (Associate managers and administrators = ref.)</i>				
Self-employed professionals and large employers			-,026 *	
Small business owners			,001	
Office clerks			,024 *	
Technical professionals and technicians			,011	
Production workers			-,012	
Socio-cultural semi-professionals			,078 ***	
Service workers			-,005	
Students not working			,018	
<i>Class identity (upper middle class = ref.)</i>				
Upper class				-,012
Lower middle class				,048 ***
Working class				,117 ***
Lower class				,016
No class identification				,037 ***
R ²	0,089	0,099	0,100	0,099
Observations	11 937	10 042	10 058	11 719

The regression models regards *the reversed values* of the responses to the statement ‘Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private enterprises’, which could be answered on a 1–5 scale, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). This means that a high value express a negative stance towards privatizations. Columns show standardized Beta coefficients. Levels of significance: *=5%, **=1%, and ***=0,1% significance.

When it comes to political trust, one can however notice a different pattern. As can be seen in Table 11, there are still differences between social classes regarding the degree of trust in the national government. In general, the 'higher' classes have higher trust in the national government than the 'lower' classes. However, the Oesch measure show that the 'lower' classes' distrust for the national government is also shared by parts of the 'higher classes', most notably the 'socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals' and 'self-employed professionals and large employers'. It should be noted that the latter category breaks down into about 80% self-employed professionals and 20% large employers in the CCC protest survey data. With the flourishing of insecure and short-term contracts among many professionals today, this is possibly a too heterogeneous class in the Oesch-8 scheme to be treated as a single class (in Oesch's version with 17 classes, the two groups are however separated).

Regarding the matter of political trust, there are furthermore fewer cases of significant differences that can be attributed to the issues of the different demonstrations. Most significant here are the protesters of Occupy/'*Indignados*' demonstrations, which in general have less confidence in their national governments than other protesters.

The most important factor affecting the level of trust in the national government is however the country of demonstration, where one can see very big differences. Here, especially the protesters in demonstrations in southern Europe (Italy and Spain) show low levels of trust in the national government.

Table 11. Social class and trust in the national government (linear regression)

	Model 1 <i>Only control variables</i>	Model 2 <i>ESeC</i>	Model 3 <i>Oesch</i>	Model 4 <i>Class identification</i>
<i>Control variables</i>				
Age	-,012	-,003	-,004	-,016
Gender: Woman	,012	,010	,015	,008
University degree / study at university	,072 ***	,059 ***	,065 ***	,032 ***
Unemployed or between jobs	-,030 ***	-,016	-,019 *	-,023 **
Country of demonstration (Netherlands = ref.)				
Belgium	,052 ***	,054 ***	,055 ***	,057 ***
Denmark	-,038 ***	-,043 ***	-,039 ***	-,034 ***
Italy	-,277 ***	-,261 ***	-,259 ***	-,266 ***
Spain	-,196 ***	-,213 ***	-,213 ***	-,156 ***
Sweden	-,050 ***	-,051 ***	-,046 ***	-,038 ***
Switzerland	,142 ***	,143 ***	,147 ***	,147 ***
United Kingdom	-,115 ***	-,123 ***	-,119 ***	-,081 ***
Type of demonstration (New Social Movements = ref.)				
Trade Unions	-,034 **	-,028 *	-,034 **	-,019
May Day	-,033 ***	-,026 *	-,029 **	-,020 *
Occupy/Indignados	-,041 ***	-,036 ***	-,037 ***	-,039 ***
Other	-,013	-,002	-,002	-,025 *
<i>Class: ESeC scheme (Large employers, higher managers/professionals = ref.)</i>				
Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians		-,011		
Intermediate occupations		-,005		
Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)		-,022 *		
Agricultural small employers and self-employed		-,008		
Lower supervisors and technicians		-,005		
Lower sales and service		-,031 **		
Lower technical		-,035 ***		
Routine workers		-,039 ***		
Students not working		,007		
<i>Class: Oesch-8 scheme (Associate managers and administrators = ref.)</i>				
Self-employed professionals and large employers			-,049 ***	
Small business owners			-,034 ***	
Office clerks			-,035 ***	
Technical professionals and technicians			-,016	
Production workers			-,051 ***	
Socio-cultural semi-professionals			-,052 ***	
Service workers			-,050 ***	
Students not working			-,016	
<i>Class identity (upper middle class = ref.)</i>				
Upper class				,012
Lower middle class				-,085 ***
Working class				-,147 ***
Lower class				-,066 ***
No class identification				-,070 ***
R ²	0,162	0,165	0,168	0,179
Observations	11 955	10 053	10 070	11 747

The regression models regards responses to a question about how much the respondent trusted in ‘the national government’, which could be answered on a 1–5 scale, ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 5 (‘very much’). Columns show standardized Beta coefficients. Levels of significance: *=5%, **=1%, and ***=0,1% significance.

In general, these three regressions can be interpreted as that social class matters more than nationality, but foremost when it comes to political issues connected to the socio-economic cleavage (i.e., income redistribution and whether the state should provide welfare services and own enterprises). Issues regarding ‘the political’ seem to be more affected by the national context, if trust in the national government can be seen as an adequate measure for this.

When it comes to the relative merits of the different measures of class, the regressions shows that class identity in general has the greatest impact on these political attitudes. However, the analysis using the ESeC and Oesch measures shows that ‘objective class’—i.e. the individual’s position in a hierarchically structured labor market—still has impact on the individual’s political attitudes. Furthermore, these attitudes are not always necessarily structured according to the class hierarchy, placing the working class at one side of the continuum and the class of professionals at the other, since certain groups of professionals is closer to the working class than other groups of professionals. These divisions amongst the higher classes of professionals becomes more discernible in the Oesch scheme than in the ESeC scheme, where the former scheme can show that in particular the ‘socio-cultural professionals’ (having employments characterized by the ‘interpersonal’ work logic) and ‘self-employed professionals and large employers’ (having occupations characterized by an ‘independent’ work logic) tends to have political attitudes closer to the working class.

Furthermore, this analysis shows that the issue of the demonstration is slightly more important than social class, at least when it comes to the socio-economic political issues. It should probably not come as a surprise that the mobilizing issue of a protest affects which individuals that decide to take part in it, neither that demonstrations addressing socio-economic issues from a leftist perspective (such as trade union and May Day demonstrations) in a higher degree mobilize protesters being more favorable to income redistribution and more negative to welfare privatization. However, this must still be interpreted in the light of the fact that social class still matters for these attitudes, also when controlling for the issues of the demonstrations.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have analyzed the role of social class for participation in political street protests, using survey data from 60 recent Western European demonstrations. Demonstrations were subdivided according to the issue of the demonstration, and class was measured both as occupationally based class position, and as subjective class identity. Two class measures developed during the last decade constructed around occupation were used: The ESeC scheme, which is a recent standardization of the classical EGP class scheme gaining ground in studies on class today, and the alternative Oesch class scheme, made with the intention to better map post-industrial developments by taking a division between differing work logics into account.

Compared to data for the general populations of the Western European countries of our study, it seems clear that the occupational class structure of the demonstrators surveyed have a clear ‘upward shift’, with an underrepresentation of working class occupational groups. This is most marked in new social movement demonstrations, and less so in trade union demonstrations. However, when it comes to class identity, demonstrators resemble the general population, and demonstrators even tend to show a ‘downward shift’ and to a slightly higher degree identify themselves as working class. There are very marked differences between countries and between the types of issues that the demonstrations articulate. Our analysis also indicates that class is ‘made’ through political mobilization, especially when class-issues are at the forefront of the mobilizations. Such events do most probably contribute to the strengthening and/or forging of class-identity (or even class-consciousness), which is a subjective (and sometimes politically articulated) orientation of the individual that does not necessarily coincide with her or his class according to an occupational-based class scheme. For instance, even though trade union demonstrations—as one would expect—contains a higher degree of protesters with working class occupations than other demonstrations, they contain an even higher degree of protesters identifying themselves as working class.

Using a linear regression analysis, we also show in the paper that social class still is an important factor for explaining differences in protesters’ political attitudes. Comparing the impact of the different measures of class with theme of demonstration and national context on protesters’ attitudes towards social inequality, privatizations and trust in the national government, we manage to show that class still matters. In comparison, class identity is the most important factor, but still ‘objective class’ has an impact on political attitudes. In

general, lower classes are more in favor of redistribution and are more against privatization, but the Oesch class scheme also shows that these attitudinal differences do not only depend on a vertical class division but also on the work logic characterizing different classes. For instance, among the higher classes the ‘socio-cultural professionals’ are many times close to the working class in political attitudes regarding socio-economic issues.

This analysis shows that one of the aspects only highlighted in the Oesch class schema, the occupational sector (characterized according to an analytical division between production-, administration- and social interaction-oriented occupations), creates significant differences when it comes to attitudes amongst protesters. As have earlier been shown in Oesch’s own analysis of class voting (e.g. Oesch 2008a; 2008b), we can here see patterns that are not only structured by the hierarchical division of the labor market (and the degree of security that different groups of employees and workers enjoy); also the type of work that is being done have effect on political attitudes towards socio-economic issues amongst protesters.

If earlier analyses of political participation have been analyzing class using foremost the educational level of individuals as a proxy for social class, our analysis shows the merits of also including occupational-based and identity-focused class schemes when scrutinizing whether social class impacts the composition of protesters and their political attitudes. Our analysis further shows that education can be both less and more important than objective or subjective class, when it comes to explaining variation in protesters’ political attitudes.

The proposed long-term ‘normalization of protest’, with a development towards street protesters mirroring the general population in social composition, may be a tendency but as regards of social class, our demonstration survey data indicate that class still matters for which groups that do engage in protests. To take part in street protest seems primarily still be a form of political mobilization of the middle class. But there are striking differences between demonstrators. If the new social movements (as well as the recent *Occupy/Indignados* protests) represent a ‘middle class radicalism’, the old social movements still mobilize the working class for their trade union demonstrations and May Day marches. The differences in social composition between types of demonstrations, but also between European countries, deserve further exploration. Furthermore, the relation between ‘objective’ class position and class identity and its connection to the political attitudes of demonstrators should be of

interest to analyze further for anyone concerned with the political articulation of class in today's Europe.

Appendix A.

Class distribution amongst general populations in 7 European countries, according to the ESeC and Oesch class schemas, and regarding class identity.

Data taken from European Social Survey 2010 (ESS5) and World Values Survey 2005–2006 (WVS4).

Table 1. ESeC class composition (%), shown by country

Class: ESeC category	National populations (ESS5 2010)							Total*
	Belgium	Denmark	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1. Large employers, higher managers/professionals	10,0	13,6	7,0	12,5	12,6	14,3	12,3	10,9
2. Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	24,3	20,7	13,3	21,2	22,7	29,6	20,3	19,7
3. Intermediate occupations	9,0	9,4	9,0	10,4	11,7	9,6	8,3	9,0
4. Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	7,5	4,9	11,1	6,6	5,5	7,3	7,8	8,4
5. Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)	0,7	1,1	1,6	1,3	2,1	0,5	0,6	1,0
6. Lower supervisors and technicians	9,4	8,5	8,2	6,5	11,7	11,3	10,2	9,5
7. Lower sales and service	6,0	10,9	8,7	13,7	8,4	9,9	13,8	11,0
8. Lower technical	6,0	6,0	10,4	5,5	7,6	4,0	4,3	6,4
9. Routine	16,9	13,8	19,6	10,9	9,8	9,2	16,7	16,0
Students, not working	10,2	11,1	11,0	11,4	8,0	4,3	5,5	8,0
Cases (N)	844	449	3 552	769	634	1 309	4 965	12 522

*The ESS5 sample is weighted for population size. The sample does not include Italy.

Table 2. Oesch-8 class composition (%), shown by country

Class: Oesch 8 category	National populations (ESS5 2010)							Total*
	Belgium	Denmark	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	
Self-employed professionals and large employers	1,9	2,5	2,3	2,7	3,5	3,4	2,0	2,4
Small business owners	8,4	6,5	13,0	8,5	8,4	8,1	8,9	9,8
Associate managers and administrators	14,1	16,1	7,5	16,1	16,6	24,8	15,4	14,2
Office clerks	12,3	6,3	10,4	6,8	8,9	11,9	13,0	11,3
Technical professionals and technicians	5,2	6,7	4,3	7,5	8,1	5,0	4,1	4,8
Production workers	21,0	18,6	24,6	18,1	19,6	13,7	20,8	20,8
Socio-cultural semi-professionals	14,0	14,5	7,5	13,1	13,5	16,5	10,6	11,0
Service workers	12,9	17,7	19,3	15,7	13,2	12,2	19,8	17,7
Students, not working	10,2	11,2	11,0	11,4	8,1	4,3	5,5	8,0
Cases (N)	844	447	3 552	769	628	1 301	4 959	12 500

*The ESS5 sample is weighted for population size. The sample does not include Italy.

Table 3. Class identity composition (%), shown by country

National populations (WVS 4 2005)					
Class: Class identity	Italy	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Total*
Upper class	0,7	1,0	1,8	3,3	1,8
Upper middle class	27,1	2,9	33,9	43,6	27,2
Lower middle class	28,3	64,3	33,4	39,1	42,1
Working class	34,7	26,7	14,6	10,9	21,1
Lower class	4,6	3,6	4,3	1,3	3,3
None	4,5	1,5	12,1	1,7	4,5
Cases (N)	974	1 191	1 003	1 210	4 378

* The WVS sample covers Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Appendix B.

Class distribution amongst demonstrators in 8 European countries, according to the ESeC and Oesch class schemas, and regarding class identity.

Data taken from the CCC research program dataset.

Table 1. ESeC class composition (%), shown by country

Class: ESeC category	Demonstrators in all types of demonstrations (CCC)								Total
	Belgium	Denmark	Italy	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1. Large employers, higher managers/professionals	20,8	20,5	20,7	21,1	14,2	22,2	27,1	32,6	24,0
2. Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	38,4	35,7	43,6	41,6	38,9	44,5	30,7	31,6	37,0
3. Intermediate occupations	11,8	3,8	6,7	10,1	5,1	8,8	7,0	6,2	8,1
4. Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	2,7	1,4	2,6	3,8	1,8	4,2	3,2	4,1	3,3
5. Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)	0,0	1,0	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,7	0,3	0,8	0,4
6. Lower supervisors and technicians	3,9	1,0	5,7	3,1	4,1	2,6	2,6	2,8	3,2
7. Lower sales and service	6,9	3,8	6,9	3,6	7,2	2,6	4,3	4,1	4,7
8. Lower technical	3,7	1,9	3,2	3,7	3,9	1,5	2,8	0,7	2,6
9. Routine	4,8	2,9	2,0	3,1	3,2	2,4	4,6	2,5	3,4
Students, not working	6,9	28,1	8,3	9,6	21,4	10,5	17,3	14,8	13,3
Cases (N)	1 522	210	493	2 042	952	1 266	2 376	1 990	10 851
Demonstrations (N)	9	1	4	11	6	7	11	11	60

Table 2. Oesch-8 class composition (%), shown by country

Class: Oesch 8 category	Demonstrators in all types of demonstrations (CCC)								Total
	Belgium	Denmark	Italy	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	All demonstrator
Self-employed professionals and large employers	3,7	11,4	5,7	4,8	6,0	9,6	7,2	9,6	6,9
Small business owners	2,2	2,4	1,8	3,7	2,3	5,1	3,5	4,7	3,6
Associate managers and administrators	26,7	11,8	25,5	25,5	14,6	21,5	30,7	22,1	24,5
Office clerks	5,4	1,9	4,0	3,2	4,1	2,9	3,6	2,9	3,6
Technical professionals and technicians	6,7	9,5	6,3	11,2	4,8	6,7	5,4	7,7	7,3
Production workers	8,1	2,8	6,3	7,0	6,6	3,9	6,5	2,4	5,7
Socio-cultural semi-professionals	33,5	28,0	34,7	31,6	31,0	35,8	20,7	30,9	29,8
Service workers	6,8	4,3	7,5	3,3	9,2	4,0	5,1	5,0	5,3
Students, not working	6,9	28,0	8,3	9,6	21,4	10,5	17,3	14,8	13,3
Cases (N)	1 523	211	495	2 046	953	1 267	2 381	1 990	10 866
Demonstrations (N)	9	1	4	11	6	7	11	11	60

Table 3. Class identity composition (%), shown by country

Class: Class identity	Demonstrators in all types of demonstrations (CCC)								Total
	Belgium	Denmark	Italy	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	All demonstrators
Upper class	2,0	1,3	0,1	0,6	0,4	1,0	4,4	0,4	1,6
Upper middle class	28,9	34,3	14,8	18,8	22,8	33,2	45,6	19,2	28,1
Lower middle class	41,5	38,6	55,5	26,3	44,8	44,4	26,1	40,1	36,4
Working class	19,4	13,6	19,3	49,4	24,8	11,2	20,3	24,4	25,7
Lower class	0,8	0,8	3,1	0,7	1,0	1,2	3,0	1,1	1,5
None	7,4	11,4	7,1	4,1	6,2	8,9	0,6	14,8	6,7
Cases (N)	1 886	236	714	2 483	1 017	1 456	2 641	2 147	12 580
Demonstrations (N)	9	1	4	11	6	7	11	11	60

Table 4. ESeC class composition (%), shown by demonstration

Demonstration	Country	Demotype	1. Large employers, higher mgrs/professionals	2. Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians	3. Intermediate occupations	4. Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)	5. Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)	6. Lower supervisors and technicians	7. Lower sales and service	8. Lower technical	9. Routine	Students, not working	Cases (N)
Climate Change (Brussels)	BE	NSM	25	43	12	3	0	1	2	3	2	10	265
Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam)	NL	TU	21	26	12	1	0	6	8	10	15	1	252
Climate March (Copenhagen)	DK	NSM	20	36	4	1	1	1	4	2	3	28	210
March for Work (Brussels)	BE	TU	12	29	10	1	0	13	12	8	14	1	84
Demonstration Against Abortion (Madrid)	ES	Other	38	33	7	5	0	2	1	1	2	11	235
World March of Women (Bern)	CH	NSM	17	46	14	1	0	2	1	0	2	17	123
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona)	ES	TU	17	37	8	0	0	3	8	8	19	63	
National Climate March (London)	UK	NSM	34	36	8	7	1	2	3	0	0	8	218
May Day Labour March (London)	UK	1MAY	27	37	8	3	0	2	4	3	5	11	160
Climate demo (Utrecht)	NL	NSM	30	35	8	5	0	1	4	1	3	12	223
Take Back Parliament (London)	UK	Other	40	30	4	5	0	3	4	1	1	14	311
Student demo 1 (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	2	7	2	0	0	0	6	0	4	78	143
1st of May March (Antwerp)	BE	1MAY	20	40	6	3	0	7	8	5	8	5	172
May 1st Demonstration (Zurich)	CH	1MAY	29	43	4	1	1	3	1	4	4	13	112
May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm)	SE	1MAY	17	44	6	2	0	3	3	2	5	18	158
Self-determination is democracy (Barcelona)	ES	Other	25	38	14	5	1	3	3	3	1	6	270
Demonstration against language decree (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	Other	8	65	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	17	268
Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	TU	7	31	21	1	0	11	5	12	11	0	98
We are a nation, we decide (Barcelona)	ES	Other	24	44	11	7	0	3	2	1	2	6	254
No to Austerity (Brussels)	BE	TU	19	31	15	0	0	8	7	14	5	1	96
1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona)	ES	1MAY	16	42	17	2	0	2	4	5	5	7	131
Against Labor Law (Madrid)	ES	TU	21	43	13	2	0	3	5	3	3	6	242
No to Hate Crime Vigil (London)	UK	NSM	35	32	7	5	1	6	3	0	3	8	143
Unite Against Fascism National Demo (London)	UK	NSM	21	38	8	3	1	5	5	1	5	14	175
Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (London)	UK	Other	22	8	6	1	0	1	2	0	2	58	125
National Climate March 2010 (London)	UK	NSM	38	31	6	6	2	3	5	1	1	9	327
Second Student National Demo (London)	UK	Other	28	11	2	4	0	0	1	0	2	52	83
No Government, Great Country (Brussels)	BE	Other	32	35	10	5	0	2	2	1	1	11	303
Against racist politics (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	7	26	5	4	0	4	9	2	4	38	167
Million Women Rise (London)	UK	NSM	28	40	9	3	1	3	7	0	3	7	151
Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	27	46	7	6	0	3	1	0	0	11	160
Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht)	NL	Other	33	42	7	6	0	1	2	0	1	8	154
Together strong for public work (The Hague)	NL	TU	29	46	9	0	1	3	4	3	4	1	288
Student demo 2 (The Hague)	NL	Other	8	3	3	2	0	2	4	0	3	73	267
TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London)	UK	TU	35	41	8	0	1	4	5	1	4	2	184
Not in Our Name (Brussels)	BE	Other	24	41	8	3	0	2	4	5	9	5	170
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm)	SE	1MAY	16	45	6	0	1	4	8	9	3	8	170
Euromayday (Milan)	IT	1MAY	20	31	8	4	0	6	7	4	6	13	83
May Day (Florence)	IT	1MAY	23	35	11	3	0	3	14	8	3	2	66
General Strike (Florence)	IT	TU	13	53	5	1	0	10	7	5	1	6	154
Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels)	BE	TU	4	43	20	1	0	5	20	3	4	1	172
Anti-nuclear demonstration (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	18	42	3	1	0	4	7	1	2	21	239
May Day (Left Party) (Malmö)	SE	1MAY	14	40	4	2	0	4	7	2	2	25	132
May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö)	SE	1MAY	9	30	7	2	0	8	12	10	5	16	86
Anti Nuclear demo (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	28	38	7	6	0	2	5	3	3	7	386
Stop racism and exclusion (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	40	28	7	7	0	1	4	2	7	5	107
Military demo (The Hague)	NL	TU	78	14	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	1	160
Celebration May Day (Vigo)	ES	1MAY	22	37	6	0	0	8	8	8	10	2	51
Real Democracy Now! (Madrid)	ES	OCC/IND	24	34	10	5	0	2	6	2	1	16	301
For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (Vigo)	ES	TU	12	40	5	4	1	7	7	12	5	9	129
Marcia Perugia-Assisi (Assisi)	IT	NSM	26	45	6	4	1	3	4	1	1	10	190
Stop budget cuts (care and welfare) (The Hague)	NL	TU	19	41	10	3	0	4	6	6	9	3	236
We have alternatives (Brussels)	BE	TU	13	36	19	0	0	7	14	4	6	1	112
Occupy London (London)	UK	OCC/IND	35	27	2	5	1	2	4	0	4	20	113
Anti Nuclear Manifestation (Beznau)	CH	NSM	26	44	5	6	1	2	3	2	2	9	410
Gay Pride Geneva (Geneva)	CH	Other	19	36	15	3	0	4	4	1	3	15	176
Women demonstration Geneva (Geneva)	CH	NSM	16	50	11	4	0	2	3	2	3	9	184
May 1st demonstration 2011 (Geneva)	CH	1MAY	19	48	11	4	0	2	3	2	3	7	135
Fukushima never again (Brussels)	BE	NSM	20	41	12	4	0	1	3	1	2	16	148
Anti-nuclear (Mühleberg)	CH	NSM	25	47	7	5	2	4	2	0	1	7	126

Demotype: NSM=New Social Movement; TU=Trade union; 1MAY=May Day; OCC/IND=Occupy/Indignados

Table 5. Oesch-8 class composition (%), shown by demonstration

Demonstration	Country	Demotype	Self-employed professionals and large employers	Small business owners	Associate managers and administrators	Office clerks	Technical professionals and technicians	Production workers	Socio-cultural semi-professionals	Service workers	Students, not working	Cases (N)
Climate Change (Brussels)	BE	NSM	3	2	23	3	8	4	44	3	10	264
Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam)	NL	TU	4	1	25	4	8	26	22	10	1	253
Climate March (Copenhagen)	DK	NSM	11	2	12	2	9	3	28	4	28	211
March for Work (Brussels)	BE	TU	1	0	24	17	7	25	18	7	1	84
Demonstration Against Abortion (Madrid)	ES	Other	11	5	32	4	10	3	23	0	11	237
World March of Women (Bern)	CH	NSM	6	1	24	4	6	1	39	3	17	123
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona)	ES	TU	6	0	22	2	11	10	22	8	19	63
National Climate March (London)	UK	NSM	10	6	25	3	8	2	35	3	8	219
May Day Labour March (London)	UK	IMAY	8	3	22	4	8	4	36	4	11	160
Climate demo (Utrecht)	NL	NSM	8	6	30	3	9	2	25	5	12	224
Take Back Parliament (London)	UK	Other	12	6	22	2	13	1	25	4	13	312
Student demo 1 (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	1	1	5	1	0	1	4	8	78	143
1st of May March (Antwerp)	BE	IMAY	2	1	37	7	8	14	20	7	5	172
May 1st Demonstration (Zurich)	CH	IMAY	15	2	11	2	8	5	40	5	13	112
May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm)	SE	IMAY	9	2	12	2	6	4	40	6	18	158
Self-determination is democracy (Barcelona)	ES	Other	7	6	32	3	14	6	25	1	6	271
Demonstration against language decree (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	Other	2	3	9	1	3	3	61	1	17	268
Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	TU	0	1	38	11	7	20	14	8	0	98
We are a nation, we decide (Barcelona)	ES	Other	8	7	27	1	13	4	32	3	6	254
No to Austerity (Brussels)	BE	TU	1	0	30	10	9	19	24	5	1	96
1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona)	ES	IMAY	2	2	30	1	13	10	30	5	7	132
Against Labor Law (Madrid)	ES	TU	2	2	25	6	12	6	38	3	6	242
No to Hate Crime Vigil (London)	UK	NSM	12	8	33	4	6	1	22	7	8	143
Unite Against Fascism National Demo (London)	UK	NSM	5	3	16	6	5	6	42	4	14	175
Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (London)	UK	Other	2	1	8	2	1	0	24	5	58	125
National Climate March 2010 (London)	UK	NSM	12	6	23	2	11	3	29	3	9	327
Second Student National Demo (London)	UK	Other	11	1	8	0	1	0	23	4	52	83
No Government, Great Country (Brussels)	BE	Other	10	6	33	3	7	2	26	3	11	304
Against racist politics (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	3	4	7	5	4	5	24	11	38	167
Million Women Rise (London)	UK	NSM	11	5	32	2	4	1	29	9	7	151
Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	24	6	24	2	5	1	27	1	11	160
Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht)	NL	Other	17	7	21	3	5	1	38	1	8	155
Together strong for public work (The Hague)	NL	TU	1	0	63	3	6	8	14	3	1	288
Student demo 2 (The Hague)	NL	Other	2	2	3	5	1	1	8	4	73	267
TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London)	UK	TU	7	1	24	4	5	3	47	8	2	184
Not in Our Name (Brussels)	BE	Other	3	2	31	4	6	11	33	6	5	171
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm)	SE	IMAY	3	0	35	5	6	12	21	10	8	170
Euromayday (Milan)	IT	IMAY	8	4	17	4	5	7	28	14	13	83
May Day (Florence)	IT	IMAY	3	1	37	6	4	9	27	10	1	67
General Strike (Florence)	IT	TU	3	1	23	5	6	8	42	7	6	154
Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels)	BE	TU	0	1	7	3	2	8	58	22	1	172
Anti-nuclear demonstration (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	8	3	13	3	5	3	35	9	21	240
May Day (Left Party) (Malmö)	SE	IMAY	8	3	6	4	4	5	37	8	25	132
May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö)	SE	IMAY	3	2	10	7	2	19	27	13	16	86
Anti Nuclear demo (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	10	6	23	4	6	5	31	7	7	386
Stop racism and exclusion (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	12	6	24	3	6	6	32	6	5	108
Military demo (The Hague)	NL	TU	2	0	82	1	7	1	4	3	1	160
Celebration May Day (Vigo)	ES	IMAY	0	0	33	2	6	22	25	10	2	51
Real Democracy Now! (Madrid)	ES	OCC/IND	5	4	20	4	18	4	26	4	16	301
For employment, not capital reforms. (Vigo)	ES	TU	1	2	29	3	8	22	22	5	9	129
Marcia Perugia-Assisi (Assisi)	IT	NSM	7	2	27	3	8	4	35	4	10	191
Stop budget cuts (care and welfare) (The Hague)	NL	TU	5	3	38	7	4	12	22	6	3	237
We have alternatives (Brussels)	BE	TU	0	0	31	13	6	10	29	10	1	112
Occupy London (London)	UK	OCC/IND	13	5	18	2	11	2	21	8	20	113
Anti Nuclear Manifestation (Beznau)	CH	NSM	15	8	19	2	6	4	33	4	9	412
Gay Pride Geneva (Geneva)	CH	Other	3	3	27	7	8	4	28	4	15	176
Women demonstration Geneva (Geneva)	CH	NSM	5	4	26	2	5	5	40	5	9	184
May 1st demonstration 2011 (Geneva)	CH	IMAY	7	2	31	2	7	5	36	4	7	135
Fukushima never again (Brussels)	BE	NSM	5	3	23	1	9	2	38	3	16	148
Anti-nuclear (Mühleberg)	CH	NSM	10	8	14	3	10	3	42	2	7	126

Demotype: NSM=New Social Movement; TU=Trade union; IMAY=May Day; OCC/IND=Occupy/Indignados

Table 6. Class identity composition (%), shown by demonstration

Demonstration	Country	Demotype	Upper class	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Working class	Lower class	None	Cases (N)
Climate Change (Brussels)	BE	NSM	1	39	42	7	0	10	329
Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam)	NL	TU	1	28	23	45	2	0	285
Climate March (Copenhagen)	DK	NSM	1	34	39	14	1	11	236
March for Work (Brussels)	BE	TU	2	13	31	50	2	2	125
Demonstration Against Abortion (Madrid)	ES	Other	2	45	25	21	1	6	289
World March of Women (Bern)	CH	NSM	2	33	46	11	0	7	148
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona)	ES	TU	0	16	19	53	1	11	75
National Climate March (London)	UK	NSM	1	24	46	11	1	17	234
May Day Labour March (London)	UK	IMAY	1	11	20	57	1	9	167
Climate demo (Utrecht)	NL	NSM	5	63	19	12	1	0	259
Take Back Parliament (London)	UK	Other	0	25	46	9	1	19	330
Student demo 1 (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	10	50	23	10	7	0	153
1st of May March (Antwerp)	BE	IMAY	0	13	41	35	2	9	211
May 1st Demonstration (Zurich)	CH	IMAY	1	20	41	23	4	11	132
May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm)	SE	IMAY	0	20	53	20	1	6	162
Self-determination is democracy (Barcelona)	ES	Other	0	19	43	34	1	4	291
Demonstration against language decree (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	Other	0	19	23	53	1	4	318
Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela)	ES	TU	0	4	10	84	1	1	166
We are a nation, we decide (Barcelona)	ES	Other	1	27	41	28	1	2	303
No to Austerity (Brussels)	BE	TU	0	20	46	33	0	1	127
1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona)	ES	IMAY	0	5	17	77	1	1	173
Against Labor Law (Madrid)	ES	TU	0	12	26	58	0	5	300
No to Hate Crime Vigil (London)	UK	NSM	0	23	39	25	1	11	158
Unite Against Fascism National Demo (London)	UK	NSM	0	4	26	60	2	9	183
Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (London)	UK	Other	1	20	39	27	3	10	142
National Climate March 2010 (London)	UK	NSM	0	26	42	12	0	19	342
Second Student National Demo (London)	UK	Other	0	20	55	13	2	10	93
No Government, Great Country (Brussels)	BE	Other	6	52	29	4	0	8	354
Against racist politics (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	1	20	44	27	2	6	186
Million Women Rise (London)	UK	NSM	0	12	48	21	1	18	165
Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam)	NL	Other	7	57	26	9	1	1	168
Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht)	NL	Other	4	62	18	10	1	5	163
Together strong for public work (The Hague)	NL	TU	2	39	33	26	0	0	333
Student demo 2 (The Hague)	NL	Other	10	56	24	5	4	1	276
TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London)	UK	TU	0	15	36	35	0	15	199
Not in Our Name (Brussels)	BE	Other	1	31	41	18	4	5	195
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm)	SE	IMAY	0	26	42	29	0	3	168
Euromayday (Milan)	IT	IMAY	0	25	49	14	7	5	124
May Day (Florence)	IT	IMAY	0	12	58	24	1	5	106
General Strike (Florence)	IT	TU	0	12	50	29	4	4	226
Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels)	BE	TU	0	11	59	26	0	5	193
Anti-nuclear demonstration (Stockholm)	SE	NSM	1	31	43	13	1	11	268
May Day (Left Party) (Malmö)	SE	IMAY	0	17	49	30	1	2	138
May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö)	SE	IMAY	0	13	38	43	1	5	95
Anti Nuclear demo (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	5	48	26	17	4	1	407
Stop racism and exclusion (Amsterdam)	NL	NSM	4	40	28	23	4	1	118
Military demo (The Hague)	NL	TU	0	34	43	23	0	0	201
Celebration May Day (Vigo)	ES	IMAY	0	9	14	73	3	0	64
Real Democracy Now! (Madrid)	ES	OCC/IND	2	20	29	41	0	7	338
For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (Vigo)	ES	TU	1	2	11	84	1	1	166
Marcia Perugia-Assisi (Assisi)	IT	NSM	0	13	62	12	1	12	258
Stop budget cuts (care and welfare) (The Hague)	NL	TU	2	35	24	31	8	0	278
We have alternatives (Brussels)	BE	TU	1	18	48	29	0	4	166
Occupy London (London)	UK	OCC/IND	2	18	43	22	1	13	134
Anti Nuclear Manifestation (Beznau)	CH	NSM	0	32	51	9	1	8	460
Gay Pride Geneva (Geneva)	CH	Other	3	38	37	8	2	12	195
Women demonstration Geneva (Geneva)	CH	NSM	1	39	42	8	1	9	202
May 1ste demonstration 2011 (Geneva)	CH	IMAY	0	42	33	18	1	6	172
Fukushima never again (Brussels)	BE	NSM	2	29	44	10	1	14	186
Anti-nuclear (Mühleberg)	CH	NSM	0	27	52	8	1	12	147

Demotype: NSM=New Social Movement; TU=Trade union; IMAY=May Day; OCC/IND=Occupy/Indignados

Appendix C.

Data, coding of class schemes and variables used.

1. Datasets used

More information about the CCC project and the dataset can be found on the project's webpage www.protestsurvey.eu. Demonstrations were surveyed in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK.

The European Social Survey Round 5 dataset is available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>. Data for Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK was used, and the data was weighted for population size using the *pweight* variable.

The World Values Survey wave 4 data is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Data for Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland was used.

2. Coding of class schemes

The coding of the ESeC class scheme has been done using the official ESeC SPSS Syntax, available at www.iser.essex.ac.uk/archives/esec/matrices-and-syntax. The Syntax is written for ESS datasets, and has been adapted for use with the CCC dataset. The coding of the Oesch class scheme has been done using an SPSS syntax provided by Daniel Oesch, adapted by us for use with the ESS5 and CCC datasets.

Both class schemes have been modified for both datasets to include full-time students not in paid employment as an extra class.

The adapted SPSS Syntax files are available from the authors upon request.

3. Variables used

The construction of the ESeC and Oesch class scheme utilizes the following variables:

a. Employment status

Information on employment status is used to separate employers and the self-employed from the larger category of employees. In CCC this variable is also used to construct the Student category. In CCC the range of *sdempl* variables are used, in ESS5 the *emplrel* variable.

The *sdempl* question in the CCC questionnaire:

What is your employment situation? (Check as many as apply)

- I work fulltime (including maternity leave or other temporary absence).
- I work part-time (including maternity leave or other temporary absence).
- I am freelance/self-employed (without employed staff)
- I am self-employed with employed staff
- I study fulltime → *Go to question XII*
- I am unemployed/between jobs.
- I am (early) retired.
- I am a housewife / househusband
- Other:

b. Number of employees

This information is used to separate large (10+ employees) from small employers (1–9 employees) and the self-employed without employees. In ESS5 this variable is called *emplno*. It should be noted that the ESeC User Guide (Harrison & Rose 2006) bases its distinction on *size of local establishment* rather than number of employees. However, we have followed the official ESeC SPSS syntax, using the number of employees' variable. The CCC dataset does not have this variable; instead information from the supervisory status variable is used.

c. Supervisory status

This variable is used to separate employees from supervisors. In ESS5 this variable is called *jbspv*. In CCC, the variable is called *sdemplsup* and contains information not only on supervision, but on the number of employees under supervision. This information is used in place of the number of employees to distinguish large from small employers in the CCC data.

The *sdemplsup* question in the CCC questionnaire:

In your main job, do/did you have any responsibility for supervising the work of other (or your own) employees?

- No
- Yes, for 1 to 9 persons
- Yes, for 10 persons or more

d. Occupation

Occupation is used coded to the *isco88(com)* standard. In ESS5 this variable is called *iscoco*. For CCC, the *isco88* variable was manually coded based upon the respondent's occupation variable *sdoccup*, and in some cases with the aid of information about union membership. The construction, coding and use of the *isco(88)* classification is covered by Elias (1997).

The *sdoccup* question in the CCC questionnaire:

What is your occupation, or what was your last occupation? [open question]

e. Education level (Oesch only)

The Oesch scheme also uses information on highest education level to distinguish between skilled and unskilled occupations in the full 16-class scheme. The variable used in ESS5 is *edulvlb* and in CCC *optseduc*.

The *sdeduc* question in the CCC questionnaire: In the questionnaires, country-specific alternatives for different educational levels were used, but then recoded into a common standard as shown below:

What is the highest level of education that you completed? If you are a student, at what level are you studying?

- None, did not complete primary education
- Primary or first stage of basic
- Lower secondary or second stage of basic
- Upper secondary
- Post secondary, non-tertiary
- First stage of tertiary
- Second stage of tertiary
- Post tertiary (PhD)

f. Class identity

The CCC dataset uses the *sdsbjcl* variable, while the WVS4 uses the *x045* variable.

The *sdsbjcl* question in the CCC questionnaire:

People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the...?

- Upper class
- Upper middle class
- Lower middle class
- Working class
- Lower class
- None

g. Activity Last week

To construct the category of full time students not in paid employment, two questions in ESS5 about activity in paid work and education during the last week are used. The variables are *pdwrk* and *edctn*.

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