



Project no. 290732

RurbanAfrica

African Rural-City Connections

2012-2016

SP1-Cooperation

FP7-SSH-2011-2

Deliverable No. 1.1

Title: State of the Art Report for RurbanAfrica

**Work Package 1: Agricultural Transformation in Ghana,
Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania**

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Work Package:	1
Due date, month:	01-07-2013
Date of first draft, month:	01-07-2013
Final version, month:	

Agricultural Transformation in Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADC - Agricultural Development Corporation (Ghana)

BCD - Cameroon Development Bank

CAADP - The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme

CAPBCA - Agricultural Cooperative of Bamileke Arabica Coffee Growers (Cameroon)

CEMAC - Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa

CMB - Cocoa Marketing Board (Ghana)

CPP - Convention People's Party (Ghana)

DARA - Department of Agriculture and Rural Animation (Cameroon)

EDPRS - Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Rwanda)

ERP - Economic Recovery Programme (Tanzania)

GIHOC - Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation

GSFC - Ghana State Fishing Corporation

HIPC - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

MIDAS - Managed Inputs Delivery and Agricultural Services (Ghana)

MTADP - Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (Ghana)

NLC - National Liberation Council (Ghana)

NMC - National Milling Cooperation

NORRIP - Northern Regional Rural Integrated Project (Ghana)

OFY - Operation Feed Yourself (Ghana)

OFYI - Operation Feed Your Industries (Ghana)

OPCC - *Organisation des Producteurs de Coton du Cameroun*

PRSPs - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

SAGCOT - Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor Of Tanzania

SAPs - Structural Adjustment Programmes

SFC - State Farms Corporation (Ghana)

SPAT- Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (Rwanda)

TAFSIP - Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Plan

TANU - Tanganyika African National Union

UGFC - United Ghana Farmers Council

UPC - Union of the Peoples of Cameroon

URADEP - Upper Regional Agricultural Development Programme (Ghana)

VORADEP - Volta Regional Agricultural Development programme (Ghana)

Executive Summary

This report offers a periodization of agricultural transformation in Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania. Its focus is on postcolonial attempts at generating agricultural growth but the narrative begins with the different and shifting colonial experiences of the four countries. The aim of the report is to expose continuities and changes in the main models for agricultural transformation as revealed in different development strategies, sectoral programmes and policies. There are, of course, notable differences between the countries due to their colonial past, different agro-ecological potentialities and barriers, resource endowments, social classes and ethnic groups, and many other factors. However, the report highlights quite striking temporal and substantive resemblances in the main transformative models applied to agricultural production and rural development.

Within the colonial period three approaches to agricultural transformation are identified, namely the *large-scale estate model* on leasehold/freehold land, the *peasant/smallholder production* on customary land tenure, and the *elite demonstration model*. The first model refers to the establishment of large plantations on alienated land by colonial companies that produced and exported a wide range of tropical commodities to Europe. This model heavily relied on directly or indirectly forced labour, and the establishment of railways, ports and roads. The second model focused on peasant farming and became of importance somewhat later than the *large-scale estate model*; it relied on the establishment of new marketing channels, mostly through state-run marketing boards specialising in one (export) crop. Marketing boards provided systems that to different extents covered extension, input supply, farm-gate purchases, handling, transportation, storage and exports on behalf of smallholders. The third model aimed at aimed at agricultural transformation by diffusion of techniques and technology from wealthier elite households to poorer peasants.

The first years after the take-over of state power by nationalist governments were marked by continuity of policies and regulatory mechanisms for agricultural development – with a notable exception being the mobilisation of agricultural labour via coercive mechanisms. Variations included the establishment of (independent) state-owned companies and nationalisation of foreign interests in the cases where ‘African Socialism’ was implemented during the years of independence. This period witnessed the first establishments of the *outgrower model* for agricultural

transformation where peasant farming was linked to large-scale cultivation and processing on nucleus estates. We also note the emergence of a further model: the *smallholder resettlement model* both in Rwanda and Tanzania.

Public support to peasant farming was expanded after independence although the exploitative mechanisms via state determined producer prices on export crops were not removed. The *elite demonstration model* was replaced by a concern for reaching out and incorporating far larger segments of small-scale farmers in the commercialisation of agricultural production. Crop specific (public) marketing boards (parastatals) expanded in numbers and scope, now ‘feeding’ the ambitious efforts to industrialise rapidly to such an extent that economic incentives for farming were significantly eroded. In the same breath, in most cases farmers were organised in cooperatives in a top-down manner to increase efficiency of input supply and output purchase. Integrated rural development programs strived to cushion regional inequalities in living conditions by promoting particular crops, the ultimate form being resettlement of (landless) farmers in agricultural ‘frontiers’. As a corollary, public administration at all levels developed rapidly and in a rather uncoordinated fashion with numerous opportunities for rent seeking and with favourable conditions for an unwieldy bureaucracy.

All these models experienced dramatic alterations during the 1980s and early 1990s due to the implementation of a series of national structural adjustment programs that included liberalisation, privatisation, budgetary cuts and devaluation. Former state owned companies were privatised (although the process often became protracted due to opposition from vested interests and lack of investor interest) and most of the non-market based supportive measures directed to promote commercialisation of peasant farming were rolled back: removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs (primarily fertilizers), dismantling (or partial fragmentation) of marketing boards, elimination of state determined purchasing prices, scaling down of credit facilities – all of these changes significantly affected the conditions for smallholders, positive as well as negative: inefficient and corrupt public institutions were in many cases not replaced by private businesses as the economic incentives simply were insufficient or non-existing. Of the model highlighted above, the conditionalities and reforms were aimed at providing the right incentives for dynamic *peasant/smallholder production* to contribute to both growth and equity goals, but the supply

response was often hampered by the above-mentioned institutional constraints. Other models of agricultural transformation did not feature prominently.

After more than a decade with structural adjustment programs the turn of the century marked a gradual, albeit somewhat hesitant transition to a less market-oriented policy framework in all four countries. The structural adjustment of the national economies did not ‘trickle down’ to reach the poor at the expected pace and the impact on poverty reduction was insignificant – if not directly harmful. Hence, during the first year of the 2000s, all the four countries implemented so-called Poverty Reduction Strategies that mainly addressed the social sectors (health, education) whereas agriculture only received modest attention in most strategies. To the extent they were included, agricultural policies and initiatives in the strategies mostly addressed institutional issues like different means to promote and improve the (private) distributing channels for supply of inputs (mainly seed and fertilizers), increase access to formal credit (various micro-finance schemes for farmers), and improve rural infrastructure to increase access to markets. These benefits are difficult for farmers with limited resources to capture, and components explicitly addressing poverty reduction in the agricultural sector were few. Even though the distinction between policies towards the peasant and the large-scale ‘modernized’ models became somewhat blurred in this period it is notable that two old acquaintances were re-introduced (although in redesigned wrappings): farmers’ organizations were urged and supported to take up many of the same tasks as the defunct cooperatives were supposed to do; and some crop-specific parastatals with new regulatory responsibilities saw the light of the day. If there was any concern with agriculture during this period, it was on *peasant/smallholder production*.

But the intentions of the poverty reduction strategies did not materialize and poverty was only marginally reduced. As a consequence, governments reoriented their policies towards agricultural growth as a means to reduce poverty and stimulate the national economy, influenced among other things by a common strategic program launched by the African Union. The program stressed the need to allocate a higher share of the total budget to and that policies should aim at maximizing agricultural output and productivity. The countries responded with strikingly similar large-scale investment programs based on cooperation and coordination between state, private (foreign) corporations and donors. The *large-scale estate model*, *large-scale state farms* as well as various hybrid forms through public-private partnerships have been reinstated as key drivers of agricultural

transformation, with foreign direct investments in land and agricultural production facilities very much welcomed. The commercialization of peasant farming is now to be promoted via contract farming and the *outgrower model*. State funds will prioritize commercially viable medium-sized farms, and support the capacity of farmers' organizations, the improvement of input supply systems and access to credit.

In contrast, subsistence-like smallholders and landless inhabitants are apparently envisaged to leave agriculture and find alternative employment in non-farming activities that emerge from new economic dynamics in the rural areas. It could be the case that the trend is towards integrated and state-coordinated implementation of land titling (in order to facilitate private investments and land accumulation), the consolidation of adjacent plots (owned by cooperatives), and detailed land use planning by powerful local authorities *a la Rwanda anno 2013*. This is a technocratic solution to the fragmentation of landholdings, the notorious lack of scale economies and the coordination problems related to incorporation of peasant farming in agro-business. Indeed it will mark a return to the basic models in the initial period after independence – with the notable difference that poor and landless farmers are excluded from the agricultural transformation process and relegated to frail social security measures or waged employment in speculative non-farm activities that may or may not emerge in rural areas.

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Introduction

The consensus among observers – both political and academic – on the slow pace of agricultural transformation and rural development in Africa is striking. Yet they still disagree on the necessary means and development models to change this deplorable situation (World Bank, 1981; World Bank, 2008; UNCTAD 2009). On the one hand advocates of free markets argue for liberalisation of former periods’ regulatory instruments, introduction of new land tenure systems that protect private property over land, and promotion of large-scale foreign direct investments. On the other hand proponents of a continued role for public regulation argue for the need of national and local institutions to implement a wide range of development programmes that aim to increase and diversify agricultural production while also cushioning economic marginalisation and social exclusion of particularly exposed population groups

One of the aims of the RurbanAfrica project is to examine and theorize the relationship between different types of agricultural transformation and their consequences for rural dynamics, mediated by a plethora of rural-urban connections. In policy terms these research findings will help to move the somewhat rigid debate on models and instruments beyond the sterile dichotomy between state and market and towards a contextually-informed design of appropriate policy initiatives.

This State of the Art report is the first step towards a set of theoretically informed policy initiatives. It is a literature review of the main forms of agricultural policy which have sought to transform agricultural production in Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania. The aim of the review is to highlight how key models of agricultural transformation have changed through time and how these relate to current approaches to agricultural growth and structural change. We define a model of agricultural transformation as a paradigmatic approach to rural development encapsulating both ideological, strategic and policy elements. Of particular concern when unravelling the changing approaches to transformation have been attention to land tenure, the scale of production unit, choice of crops, labour regime, market orientation and the role of the state or the private sector in delivering input and output markets. Overall, the value in conducting this review emanates from the comparative tension between the four country cases.

The report is structured in five main chapters each covering a particular period where certain models have been prevalent, despite notable variations between the four countries. The five periods

are: (i) colonial heritage; (ii) the initial postcolonial period after independence; (iii) the gradual liberalisation linked to structural adjustment; (iv) the initial Post-Washington Consensus period; and (v) finally the return to more production-oriented models of the present period. Each chapter includes a discussion of the four countries with a summary of the main findings. A conclusion winds up the report.

1. Colonial Heritage

In this first section we look at the colonial heritage in each of our four countries. This highlights particular agrarian structures (such as the creation of large plantations) which were created at this time. It also illuminates approaches to agricultural transformations which resonated, and continue to chime, with postcolonial approaches to agricultural development. As in every section, we begin with Ghana and Cameroon before moving on to Rwanda and Tanzania.

1.1 Ghana

In Ghana agricultural policies under colonial domination prioritised the needs of emerging urban elites, expatriate food importers and the colonial authorities who emphasized the production of export crops. The passing of the poll tax law at the beginning of the twentieth century compelled peasant farmers and fishermen to find wage employment or go into export crop production, mainly cocoa (Nyanteng and Asuming-Brempong, 2003). The emphasis on export production encouraged infrastructural developments that resulted in urbanization, expansion of mining industries and also encouraged internal and external market expansion and promoted commodity production. Agricultural policies pursued during the colonial period were designed to make the Gold Coast colony a source of raw materials, a protected market for metropolitan manufactures, thus making Ghana an economy which exported cash crops but imported food crops. The colonial economy led to the regionalization of the Ghanaian economy, where the labour in the southern provinces produced raw materials for export: cocoa, minerals, timber and other agricultural products, and the northern and eastern provinces supplied migrant labour to the South (Songsore, 2003).

Cocoa became Ghana's main export crop during this time. It was introduced by an African farmer in 1879 with exports starting in the mid-1880s. British trading companies controlled the trade in cocoa (Songsore, 2003), but production was mainly by smallholders with the crop spreading throughout the southern part of the colony. One important institution that was born out of British interest in the cocoa trade was the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), established in 1947 (Young *et al*, 1981). During the Second World War the British imposed full controls over the marketing of the crop. This war-time provision became permanent with establishment of the board. The CMB had the mandate to grade, export, and set producer prices. Price determination was a source of

conflict between cocoa farmers and the colonial administration, especially because world market prices for cocoa were exceptionally high in the post-war years but this was not reflected in the low producer price set by the CMB (Young *et al*, 1981). Depressed producer prices for cocoa caused a decrease in the terms of trade of the producers vis-a-vis manufactured commodities which were bought at open market prices (Songsore, 2003).

In the first elections in 1951 Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (CPP) gained a majority in the legislative assembly and in municipal seats, and the road was paved for independence which was declared in 1957. Nkrumah's election victory saw the launching of a ten-year development plan where the view was expressed that agriculture could not be modernized and adapted to the needs of an expanding economy solely through progressive improvement of the traditional subsistence system of production. Therefore large-scale farms under the public auspices were to be established to test and demonstrate the feasibility of mechanized farming. Large-scale mechanization projects of maize, groundnuts, and millet were also set in place but with no success. Diversification was set as an important goal for agricultural development to reduce the dependency of cocoa and the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was established to promote agricultural development (Agbodeka, 1992).

We can see here that agricultural policies in the latter years of colonial rule dovetailed into the early years of independence. Policies were generally influenced by the desire of the nationalist government to satisfy two major events: to please the urban youth who were in the forefront of the independence struggle but many of whom were unemployed or underemployed; and to satisfy the perception that industrialization was the most expedient way to bring about rapid structural changes, high rates of economic growth and economic independence to the country (Nyanteng & Seini, 2000).

1.2 Cameroon

From July 1884 German occupied an area slightly larger than present-day Cameroon and the Berlin Conference the following year demarcated borders with British occupation in present-day Nigeria and French occupation to the east and south (present-day Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon). German occupation, which allowed the monarchy in Doula to maintain certain privileges, stymied British and French interests in the area, led to the development of large

plantations close to the coast in southern western Cameroon and a port at Douala. Large agricultural companies such as the *West Afrikanische Pflanzungs Victoria* established large plantations for rubber, cocoa, bananas, tobacco and palm oil grown on the basis of forced labour. The establishment of a legal framework also led to the levying and collection of taxes.

After the First World War the territory was partitioned by the French and British. Despite desires to amalgamate these parts into adjacent colonies, in 1922 the League of Nations created two separate mandated territories with a British zone containing 20% of the land area and people. This area was split into northern and southern parts which were administered separately from neighbouring Nigeria (ICG, 2010). The rest of the territory fell under the jurisdiction of France.

From this point on we see a divergence in colonial policies and practices. In French East Cameroon a large colonial administration invested in public goods, partly through the use of forced labour, facilitating a rapid expansion of trade. Local leaders were supported where they recognised and financed the colonial state, and members of the local elite were encouraged open small commercial farms (ICG, 2010). For example, oil palm, coffee and cocoa production by elites and peasants were encouraged alongside food crop production (with a particular emphasis on food crops in the mid-1920s when the colonial state required supplies for workers constructing railways). It should also be noted that throughout the 1930s the colonial state weakened the power of local leaders and formalised the recruitment and regulation of accessing labour.

In the British territory a policy of divide-and-rule either buttressed or undermined local leaders. There was no plan to support indigenous agricultural development in Western Cameroon at this time. Instead, investment supported production on expropriated plantations created by the Germans (concentrated around the foothills of Mount Cameroon). Immigration from adjacent Nigeria ensured a steady supply of labour to companies such as Cameroon Development Corporation and Fyffes. Some extension and marketing of export crops was provided by the Department of Agriculture.

In comparison with Eastern Cameroon, the British neglected peasant agriculture. This changed slightly after the Second World War, with support for co-operatives to produce cocoa. The West African Produce Board was created to stabilise prices, increase production, ensure quality and to

control the participation of intermediaries. It also offered extension advice and loans to farmers and supported the expansion of cooperatives which had around 15,000 members by the end of the 1950s. Despite such attention to peasant producers, agricultural development in West Cameroon lagged far behind that of the French-speaking territory.

Eastern Cameroon after the Second World War also saw the emergence of co-operatives supporting peasant production, such as the creation of the Agricultural Cooperative of Bamileke Arabica Coffee Growers (CAPBCA). We can also see the emergence of bureaucratic planning to agricultural development through the use of four-year plans as stipulated by Paris in 1946. These had two objectives: first, to meet the needs of indigenous peoples and the general conditions most favourable to social progress; and second, to contribute to the economic development of the metropolitan Union. There was a strong regional dimension to these plans: the development of cocoa and robusta coffee in the south, arabica coffee in the west and cotton in the dry northern region. The French colonial government balanced support for peasant production with supporting plantation agriculture. For example, attempts were made to build up mechanised rice production. Numerous research institutes and extension agencies were created during this time. We can also see the creation and support of marketing boards, credit providers and the promotion of fertilisers. For example, stabilisation funds for cocoa, coffee and cotton were created in 1954/55. Tollens and Gilbert (2000) highlight how the structure of the East Cameroonian cocoa industry reflected a typical French model where private sector firms operate within the constraints of state-set and stabilised producer and export prices, leading to pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing. In contrast, Western Cameroon had a British monopoly-monopsony marketing board.

During the late 1940s and 1950s nationalist hostility to colonial rule increased with the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), led by Ruben Nyobé, voicing grievances and demands. Further parties emerged, such as the Cameroonian Democratic Bloc, which were more sympathetic to French colonial rule. The French sought alliances with more moderate politicians whilst clamping down on UPC activities and activists. When elections were conducted in 1956 the nationalists emerged triumphant and the following years were characterised by conflict between the UPC and the French colonial regime (ICG, 2010). By the end of the 1950s there were more than 17,000 French nationals in Eastern Cameroon. On the British side, both North West and South West Cameroon were

administered by, and increasingly integrated into Nigeria during the 1940s. The 1950s saw greater autonomy offered to both provinces prior to elections in 1959.

1.3 Rwanda

In the pre-colonial Rwanda, agriculture was mainly devoted to food crops to meet the food needs of local consumption (Habimana, 1967). Main crops were beans (the staple crop), sorghum, sweet potato, banana, ragi, cocoyam (taro) and peas. Livestock was prevalent among pastoralists, with milk and meat exchanged for agricultural food products (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994). Land tenure systems in pre-colonial Rwanda were based on collective (clan) ownership where chiefs distributed land rights to individual families, passed from generation to generation but subject to various customary traditions (MINITERE, 2004; Bagaye, 2001).

The colonial period resulted in many socio-cultural, political and economic disruptions to land use and land tenure systems. After the Belgian takeover of colonial administration from Germany following the First World War, they established new regulations for land use and ownership, particularly in order to guarantee land tenure security for settlers and other foreigners who wished to invest in land (MINITERE, 2004). According to a decree dated 10 January 1940, settlers and foreign investors were able to obtain free concessions up to a maximum of 500 hectares (Mugesera *et al*, 2004). Vacant land was considered as state-owned land (MINITERE, 2004).

According to Habimana and Harroy (1981), new (mandatory) food crops were introduced in order to increase and diversify agricultural production and as a preventive measure to avoid food crises. Root crops were considered particularly important: new varieties of potatoes (*Gashari*, *Annette*, *Kugar*), cassava and sweet potato were introduced (Poats, 1982). The latter two crops were particularly favoured as these crops are resilient to drought and they were not seasonally sensitive compared to most traditional crops. In particular, sweet potato was considered more advantageous as it is less demanding both in terms of climate and soil maintenance, has a relatively short growing cycle, and is a highly appreciated component in the diet (Everaerts, 1947). Moreover, the diversification of crops was expanded by the introduction of vegetables (cabbage, eggplants, tomatoes) and fruits (avocados, guavas, citrus). Despite these efforts, the colonial period was characterised by a number of serious food shortages and famines triggered by droughts or plant disease (Leurquin, 1958).

The colonial administration also introduced a number of cash crops. German missionaries introduced coffee in the early 1900s, and it was followed by cotton in the early 1930s, pyrethrum (from 1937) and later cinchona (Nkurunziza, 1996). The first coffee plantations were established at Nyundo (North West) in 1903 and at Mibilizi (South West) in 1904. By 1920, the Belgian colonizers distributed coffee plants over the entire country and coffee cultivation slowly became accepted by the population (Twagirayezu, 1964). However, farmers responded hesitantly due to the preference for food crop cultivation on scarce land. According to Everaerts (1947), local leaders led campaigns in villages against the introduction of new crops in the country, claiming that coffee in particular would reduce production of food crops, especially bananas. Due to this resistance, the colonial authorities introduced and developed Arabica coffee by force. The administration made it compulsory by ordering the establishment of coffee plantations close to homesteads (Guichaoua, 1989). Thus, farmers often established smaller coffee plots often surrounded by larger banana plantations (Nduwayezu, 1974).

During the 1930s and after World War Two, the colonial state established agricultural research and extension stations that trained farmers in best agricultural practices, provided improved seeds or distributed the best breeds. Examples include the Rubona station (created in 1930), the Arboretum of Ruhande (1934), the centre for cattle selection of Songa (1946), and Karama Station (1959). In order to increase food production during dry seasons, the colonial administration also advocated the development of new land. Of particular interest were wetlands (swamps) located between the hills and often used for pasture in the dry seasons. Through drainage, this land could be used to grow rice, sugar cane and tea. Due to the high population density and the need to exploit new areas, the colonial administration also introduced the system of 'modern' farming communities called *paysannats* in areas not under extreme population pressure. Under this system, the colonial state distributed secure land rights to nuclear families who lived within newly established communities and 'modern' settlements. Recipient households were given two hectares each mainly for cultivating cash crops such as cotton in Bugarama (South West) and coffee in Mayaga (South East). This stimulated the expansion of cultivated land to the detriment of livestock. New institutions were also established to monitor and control erosion (an increasing problem during the colonial period). For example, farmers were forced to work on common projects like hedge planting, drainage

ditching and terracing. Another measure was to raise awareness of the storage of food products (Guichaoua, 1989).

With regard to livestock, the colonial administration tried to change the conception of cattle as a sign of prestige to a supply source of milk and proteins (Bimenyimana, 1999). Demystifying the cow within Rwandan culture and tradition resulted in increasing sales of milk and meat in administrative and mining centres. This went hand-in-hand with the introduction of the first dairies, built in Runyinya (now Nyaruguru) and Mpare (now Butarent) in 1941 (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994). Small livestock were encouraged but only adopted by wealthy and rich families. During the late colonial regime of the 1950s the administration attempted to reduce the perceived problem of cattle overstocking by improving the selection and breeding of livestock, reducing the incidence of disease, and reorganize the livestock sector. However, farmers resisted undermining strategies aimed at large-scale reduction in livestock numbers (Kageruka, 1999).

1.4 Tanzania

Imperial Germany gained control over mainland Tanzania in the 1880s and 1890s, starting with the territorial annexations made by Carl Peters and his *Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* in 1885. In 1891 the German government took control of German East Africa. From the end of the 19th century until World War I Tanganyika's economy shifted away from previous modes of trade (Ilfte, 1979). Commerce had previously centred around the central trade route through the country to Bagamoya and shipment to Zanzibar. For example, caravan exports using this route accounted for around 67% of German East African exports in 1902 (with rubber, ivory, and millet the main export products). This route became less important during German rule. Colonisation led to taxation, thereby pressuring agriculturalists to produce a surplus or to sell their labour, and also led to the establishment of plantations in the North East Region of the country, such as in Usambara. First, plantations for coffee and coconut were established, and later estates for cotton, rubber and sisal. These large-scale farms contributed substantially to the colonial economy. For example, they employed 61,211 workers in 1912 out of 172,100 people who were working for wages (*ibid.*). Sisal eventually became the main plantation crop with the estates in the North East. Colonization also brought the railway, the northern line to the plantation areas in the North East and later the central line to Lake Victoria. This latter line led to an increase in trade and commercialization of

agriculture in the western parts of the country, such as around Mwanza (leading some traditional authorities to force smallholders to grow cotton or coffee – see Curtis, 1992). It should be noted that attempts by the colonial administration to force peasants to grow cotton were met with considerable resistance, as highlighted in the Maji Maji rebellion (Ilfte, 1979). Despite the establishment of large-scale farms, and in strict contrast to adjacent Kenya, the settlement of European farmers was not extensively encouraged by the colonial government as it refused to dispossess Africans of their land. For instance, in 1913 Europeans covered only 1% of land area (Ilfte, 1979). But the creation of plantations did cause significant migration of labour, generally from low rainfall areas to high rainfall areas, especially the North East. This was especially the case through the 1900s and 1910s due to harsh environmental conditions.

The German forces surrendered to the British in November 1918, and all of German East Africa was allocated to the UK in the Treaty of Versailles. The war damaged the agricultural sector through the forcible conscription of men into the British or German forces, through pillaging and confiscation of crops and livestock. In addition, the late 1920s were characterised by outbreaks of disease and drought (Ilfte, 1979; Little, 1991). The British colonial government brought no major structural change to the agricultural sector. Cash cropping or labouring was forced through taxation as before, and British settlers took over most German plantations and properties (Ilfte, 1979). However, there was a large increase in cash cropping by peasants in the following years: cotton, coffee and tobacco all experienced a significant rise in production. One important factor here was a decrease in transportation costs via the emergence of lorries and improved railway services (*ibid.*).

During the Great Depression of the 1930s prices for key export crops fell. To ensure steady supply, the colonial government initiated a campaign forcing peasants to allocate a certain proportion of export crops on their land (Curtis, 1992). There was also an increase in compulsory measures imposed by the colonial rule on farmers both in cotton and coffee (on the former see Little, 1992, on the latter see Bowles, 1973). One example comes from the Kilimanjaro region where the colonial government brought the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association, a marketing cooperative, under government control in 1931 forcing growers to sell through it (Curtis, 1992).

During the 1940s and 1950s agriculture performance was influenced by the colonial administration's attempts to modernize agriculture through technological solutions (Coulson, 1977).

This led to the support of large scale (plantation) farms under white settler ownership with little support and investment in indigenous smallholder farming. White settlers were expected to have the necessary capital and to quickly gain the needed agricultural expertise (*ibid.*). For example, the UK government rushed into a very large-scale groundnut scheme in 1947, planning to convert 1,300,000 ha of dry bushland along the central railway in the southern province (Ilfte, 1979). The project was a massive failure due mainly to hubris and a lack of proper planning (Ilfte, 1979). The encouragement of white settlers continued until 1953 when resistance to the alienation of land, exemplified by Meru Land Case, contributed to the emergence of the nationalist movement (*ibid.*).

The shift towards large-scale projects marked a change in the colonial policy towards a more interventionist approach in the agricultural sector. A further example is the Land Improvement and Soil Conservation Scheme run by the colonial government's Department for Agriculture (Coulson, 1977). These plans sought to improve peasant agriculture and combat soil erosion (which was considered a significant problem) by investing in land improvement such as terracing and by enforcing strict regulation on farmers as to what and how they should farm. These byelaws often met resistance from peasants (*ibid.*). From 1956 the Agricultural Department shifted away from large-scale intervention and instead tried a 'focal point' approach by offering extension services to members of the rural elite, sometimes referred to as Master Farmers. The idea was that the new techniques would spread when nearby peasants realized the advantages.

It is interesting to note that despite the colonial administrations emphasis on large-scale production units and amore interventionist stance, peasant export crop production increased substantially. Between 1944 and independence in 1961, the overall exports of cotton (by volume) grew 300%, sisal 80% and coffee 70% (Bowles, 1976). This increase in mainly peasant cash crop production was accompanied by growth in producer cooperatives: from three in 1944, to 79 in 1949 and 691 societies in 1960 with over 326,000 members (Ilfte, 1979). The cooperative movement along with the antagonism towards the colonial regulations on farming, resulted in strong rural support for nationalist sentiments and contributed to the push for independence (Coulson, 1977).

1.5 Summary

The brief comparison of colonialism in Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania highlights three approaches to agricultural transformation. The first of these can be termed the *large-scale estate model* on leasehold/freehold land. As shown in coastal Cameroon and North East Tanzania, the establishment of large plantations on alienated land by colonial companies led to the production of a wide range of tropical commodities. The comparison highlights three preconditions for the maintenance of model. One main precondition was the adequate supply of labour. This was achieved in both cases either through forced labour, coercion and/or taxation. The imposition of taxes would not only increase the supply of labour from nearby areas, but would stimulate migration from low potential areas in other parts of the country or region (such as in Cameroon and Tanzania). A further vital precondition was that the plantations/estates would access export markets easier through transport infrastructure, as illustrated by coastal locations. The last precondition relates to the agronomy and agricultural potential of the region. The example of the groundnut scheme in Tanzania illustrates, above and beyond the hubris and arrogance of colonial planners, the difficulties of such large-scale plantations in a low potential location with poor transport links.

Our narrative above also illustrates the model of *peasant/smallholder production* on customary land tenure. The prime example here is Ghana with the successful expansion of cocoa production, in addition to production of cotton in Tanzania (to a lesser extent coffee and sisal), and coffee and cocoa in Cameroon (especially in Eastern Cameroon by the French). So, what factors contributed to this model of agricultural transformation? It appears the provision of marketing channels, whether through producer cooperatives or pan-territorial marketing boards, allowed some economies of scale to be achieved in packaging, transportation and processing. The form these marketing channels took varied across countries and commodities, but they were important in facilitating production across a widely-dispersed farmer population. This is not to say that colonial marketing boards were not exploitative, but that in linking peasants to global markets they led to agricultural transformation with only a small proportion of rents/surplus accruing to farmers. A further factor was extension of some kind, to provide improved techniques or inputs to peasants. Again, this varied across cases but can be clearly seen in the support of peasant production in Cameroon by both the French and British, the authoritarian interventions of the Belgians in Rwanda and the British in Tanzania through the 1930s. Although export crop production did occur in Rwanda, the use of force frequently met with resistance (as it was in Tanzania). Clearly, successful peasant

production requires ownership, control and choice. Coffee production in Rwanda also encountered severe land constraints. This brings us to the last of our contingent investments which allowed agricultural transformation (with exploitation) via peasant/smallholder production during the colonial period: namely, food security. In the one case where land constraints were severe, Rwanda, any supply response from peasant export crop production had to ensure a level of subsistence food production. In the Rwandan case this took the form of promoting root crops.

The last model we have encountered can be summarised simply as the *elite demonstration model*. As exemplified through the top-down *paysannant* system in Rwanda, the French support of rural elites in East Cameroon, and the British attempts to generate a yeoman class amongst rural elites in Tanzania in the 1950s, this is based on the assumption of the diffusion of techniques and technology from wealthier elite households to poorer peasants. In a way, it can be seen as a mix between the two first models, requiring certain preconditions and factors to support its success.

2. Independence and State *Dirigisme*

We now turn to models of agricultural transformation in the postcolonial period. Again, we offer a summary of approaches to agricultural policy but this time by the postcolonial state. Again, during this period certain agrarian structures, such as large-scale estates, were created. As we will see, there was also a great degree of direct state involvement in the agricultural sector (although the varied within and between countries). Once again, we begin with Ghana and Cameroon before finishing with Rwanda and Tanzania.

2.1 Ghana

Ghana's sectoral structure after independence was characterised by a small proportion of the population being involved in the higher-productivity formal sector, with the majority of the population in low-productivity agricultural or informal non-agricultural activities. Agriculture dominated the economy in terms of the contribution to the Gross Domestic product and employment. Ghana's export components were primary agricultural or mining products. Agriculture contributed between 40 and 50 per cent of GDP during the postcolonial period and further rose in importance during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Post-Independence Approach (1957-1968)

Ghana gained independence in 1957 and the new government under Nkrumah introduced a 'consolidated plan' to cover the interim period 1958-1959 while a new five-year plan (1959-1964) was developed. In this Five-Year Development Plan (1959-64) the Agriculture Development Corporation's role in establishing estate agriculture and leading modernization of agriculture was greatly expanded. But this plan was dropped in 1961 after Nkrumah and some government officials visited the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. Following the declaration of socialism by the ruling party as the socio-political goal of Ghana in 1961, state intervention in the agricultural sector took ideological dimensions. Small-scale farming was regarded as an obstacle to the spread of socialist ideas. The government's agriculture effort shifted almost completely to a new sector of state and co-operative agriculture, with only token recognition of small-scale farming. This led to the cutting down of investment in small-scale farming. The United Ghana Farmers

Council (UGFC) was formed and given the responsibility of organizing small farmers for mechanized agriculture through cooperatives. The State Farms Corporation (SFC) was formed to undertake large-scale mechanized farming. Moreover, the Ghana State Fishing Corporation (GSFC) was formed and organized with a fleet of fishing trawlers and cold storage facilities to undertake fishing and distribution throughout the country.

In order to build a 'socialist state' to facilitate achieving a rapid rate of economic growth, in 1964 Nkrumah's government launched a seven-year plan for national reconstruction and development (1963/64 – 1969/70). The seven-year plan sought to invest a sizeable percentage of the estimated total gross investment directly in the productive sector. The rest was to be invested in social services and infrastructure with a long-term objective of full employment and a complete diversification of the Ghanaian economy from primary exports (Hug, 1989). The plan, however, remained largely on paper as its provisions were never incorporated into the government budget statements, and ministers and various ministries acted as if there were no guidelines. The seven-year plan particularly emphasised industrialization. It envisaged an 83 percent increase in industrial output by 1970. Import substitution was an explicit policy objective. Moreover, industries were to be established to process agricultural and mining products currently exported unprocessed. In addition, the plan called for the establishment of chemical and metal industries. Finally, the plan envisaged the commencement, on a small scale, of electronic and machine tools industries (Hug, 1989). The basic policy for agricultural development under the socialist model was to concentrate on a limited number of commodities and apply to them all the available technology and expertise. These commodities were to fulfil basic nutritional requirements, like cereals and fish, or would contribute to an improvement in the negative balance of payments position, like sugar and cocoa (or better still do both, such as rice). Extension services were made an integral part of the policy geared towards large-scale agricultural growth and development. To facilitate the adoption of new farming methods, the State Farms Workers Brigade and Farmers' Co-operative were established. Agriculture was used to promote and preserve a mixed economy with private farmers and public organizations each having well-defined roles. Private farmers were encouraged to organize into co-operatives. This enabled farmers to obtain access to machinery and modern techniques which might otherwise have been beyond their reach. Indeed, such policies contributed to an increase productivity between 1963 and 1966.

Alternating Socialist-Capitalist Policies (1968-1980)

After the first coup in Ghana in February 1966, the seven-year plan (1963/64 – 1969/70) was formally dropped. The military government after Nkrumah developed and implemented a two-year development plan (mid-1968 to mid-1970). During the National Liberation Council (NLC) government, which began from 1966, the initial economic task was the stabilization of the economy. The government was committed to a market-oriented economy. Because of this objective and previous excessive government expenditure, they resorted to stringent stabilization measures which included a major reduction of domestic absorption with an immediate cut in public capital expenditures. Some state enterprises were sold to the private sector, and others reorganized under the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC), established in 1968. In 1967, the NLC government undertook further stabilization policies with the intent of liberalizing the trade system and the devaluation of the Ghanaian currency. The main emphasis was to adjust the exchange rate to enhance export activities and subsequently increase the producer price of cocoa.

The following civilian administration under Dr Busia, developed and implemented a one-year development plan (mid-1970 to mid-1971). Both the military and civilian administration aimed at pursuing liberal policies with an emphasis on private enterprise promotion and the private sector. This was in contrast to the socialist approach of the previous administration. The Busia government pushed forward with the liberalization of the economy. It relied more on price instruments for resource allocation (Sarpong, 1997). Import licensing and quantitative controls were eliminated, whilst export subsidies for non-cocoa exports were initiated. In 1971, however, a balance of payments deterioration loomed large, and, as the government was committed to economic liberalization and the use of price instruments, it undertook a major currency devaluation in December 1971. This policy move made the government unpopular. Whilst a medium term development plan was almost ready for implementation at the end of 1971, a coup in January 1972 saw an end to civilian rule.

Between 1966 and 1972 the emphasis was on private capitalist development of agriculture. Government particularly became interested in the promotion of rice farming in the northern part of Ghana as a means of increasing food production. State farms were sold to private rice farmers and the extension service was revived to offer advice to small-scale farmers throughout the country. Another feature of agricultural policy in this period was the formation of development boards for

single product such as cotton, kenaf and grains. Policymakers believed the ingenuity of peasant farmers could be successfully exploited by the establishment of development boards to offer advice, incentives and oversee the production of agricultural raw materials that were vital to newly established factories. A prime example is the case of cocoa.

The military government, which took over in January 1972 under Acheampong, initially governed without the guidance of any development plan. It was only in 1975 when a five-year development plan (1975/76 to 1979/80) was launched. The plan aimed at building an independent economy through self-reliance, with significant government participation in direct production. However, as with previous plans, this also suffered from a lack of implementation. The regime led by Acheampong, and later by Akuffo (NRC, SMC I and SMC II), sought to actively strengthen the Ghanaian cedi, and re-introduced import licensing and price controls, effectively ending the liberalization process. The regime reintroduced an import substitution strategy with all its protectionist apparatus. But there was no clear policy thrust during this period, and most policy decisions seemed to have been influenced more by political rather than economic reasons. The upsurge of interest in raising agricultural productivity (for self-sufficiency) led to the creation of the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and Operation Feed Your Industries (OFYI) programmes beyond 1972. These programmes were to spearhead the campaign to increase food production and agricultural raw materials. Among the objectives of these programmes was the belief that production would be improved when small-scale farmers are increasing their production through acreage expansion. The OFYI emphasized the production of, *inter alia*, cotton, kenaf and sugar cane. The OFY emphasized the cultivation of cereals particularly rice and maize. Indeed, Ghana became self-sufficient in rice between 1974 and 1975.

Between 1978 and 1979 there were a series of military uprisings, prior to the civilian government led by Limann being voted into power in September 1979. The Limann government prepared a five-year Government Economic Programme (1981/82 to 1985/86), which was never implemented because of a coup in December 1981. The brief period of the Limann regime (1979 to 1981) did not have time enough to pursue any well-defined policies. However, a one-year 'Action Programmes for Agricultural Production (1980-81)' was initiated to boost agricultural production.

Towards the end of 1970s (and into the 1980s), small-scale development programs were initiated to provide opportunities for small farmers. One such project was the World Bank Scheme geared towards raising incomes of the rural small farmers of the Upper Regions of Ghana - the Upper

Regional Agricultural Development Programme (URADEP). The Ghanaian-German agricultural development project was also established to assist small farmers to increase food production through effective distribution of inputs and research into developments of new technologies for farmers. The Volta Regional Agricultural Development programme (VORADEP), the Northern Regional Rural Integrated Project (NORRIP) and the Managed Inputs Delivery and Agricultural Services (MIDAS) were all established in the early 1980s with the aim of increasing agriculture production particularly of the small-scale farmers by providing agricultural inputs and services on time and on regular basis.

2.2 Cameroon

Eastern Cameroon became independent on the 1st January 1960 with English-speaking regions achieving self-determination and joining the Federal Republic of Cameroon on 1st October 1961 (with this federal structure being replaced with a more cohesive, centralised United Republic of Cameroon in 1972). The new President of Federal Cameroon in 1961 was Ahmadou Ahidjo who was supported by France and internationally. In the first nine years of office Ahidjo went about constructing a centralised political system based on allegiance to a new political party created in 1965 – the Cameroon National Union (see ICG, 2010). With control of financial resources and the state's power, Ahidjo created a neo-patrimonial system of governance where loyalty to 'The Prince' was paramount, potential rivals were co-opted, and dissent, by the armed forces or factions of the UPC or others, was not tolerated (*ibid.*).

Most commentators agree that the 1960s saw a continuation of colonial models of agricultural policy and development (Bamou and Masters, 2007; Bella, 2009; Courade, 1984; Fonjong, 2004). At independence over 80% of the population resided in rural areas and the first two five-year plans (1961-65, 1966-1970) focused mainly on agriculture. The first plan aimed to double per capita GDP within twenty years through increasing export crop production. Bamou and Masters (2007) argue this was mainly through a diffusion/modernisation model centred on peasant production. The aim of this model was to disseminate innovations in agricultural production and marketing to attempt to alter farmers' agronomic behaviour (supported partly through a subsidized National Fertilizer Programme). Further plans included linking rural infrastructure in production zones to the coast. This was financed by the Cameroon Development Bank (BCD) and facilitated by two marketing

and investment boards. The DARA (Department of Agriculture and Rural Animation) was created in 1964 under the Federal Ministry of Planning to coordinate the agricultural development efforts of the two states. It is also important to note that since independence the semi-arid North and Far North Regions received special attention and subsidies from government through food grants, price incentives for food crop production and extension support for cotton (partly due to the fact Ahidjo hailed from Garoua, a river port in the north).


The second five-year plan was termed the 'farmers' plan'. This aimed to increase agricultural productivity, rural incomes and construct local processing facilities. It had a greater emphasis on integrated rural development projects than the first five-year plan and led to the creation of many crop-specific and broader agricultural development initiatives.¹ Cocoa production increased steadily during this period reaching up to 100,000 MT by the end of the decade. On average, peasants planted around an extra 9,000 hectares of cocoa each year (Ndoye, 2000).

Bamou and Masters (2007) outline how the second plan contains signs of frustration with the pace of progress with peasant production, especially that increases in output in coffee and groundnuts were based on increased hectareage, not productivity gains. Dewbre and Borot de Battisti (2008) also make the same point for cereal production from the mid-1960s. The second plan also recommended expanding plantation hectareage and facilitating the provision of labour by creating rural settlement projects in low-density locations. It should be noted at this point that Cameroon has a long history of internal migration. This has often taken the form of movements from the arid north to the more fertile south and west (for example, for migrants to become sharecroppers on cocoa farms), and to the commercial centres of Douala and Yaounde. Emigration has also been prevalent in the West Region where high population pressure has led to out-migration to towns, to other agricultural zones of the country or to the plantations zones on the coast.

More broadly, agricultural policy at this time reflected Ahidjo's ideological commitment to 'planned liberalism'. In other words, that domestic and foreign investors had to act in accordance with not only a planned and *etatist* regulatory framework but compete with public and companies with mixed ownership to try to ensure the best interests of the country were met. Despite the frustration with a lack of productivity improvements on peasant holdings, the 1960s does show a robust agricultural performance. Figure 1 below shows net farm output per capita in Cameroon and

sub-Saharan Africa for both food and non-food crops. Both categories outperform the continent as a whole, in particular non-food crop production which increased, on a per capita basis, by over 50% over the ten year period.

Figure 1 - Net farm output per capita of food and non-food products in Cameroon and in Africa South of the Sahara, 1961-2005



Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

Breaking this trend down, Figure 2 below illustrates the hectareage for major crops in Cameroon, from 1961 to 2005. It shows that above and beyond a general increase in hectareage for most crops, coffee, groundnuts and roots/tubers expanded rapidly during the 1960s.


Figure 2 - Hectarage for major crops in Cameroon, 1961-2005



Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

However, when we look at yields per hectare in Figure 3, we notice yields for coffee declined during the decade whilst those for groundnuts stagnated. In contrast, yields in cotton and cocoa increased substantially (both by around 75% over the decade).

Figure 3 - Yield per hectare, major crops, Cameroon, 1961 to 2005




Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

Moreover, when we look at the export of Cameroon's crops during this period (see Figure 4), we notice only two crops contributed substantially to greater export earnings: cocoa and coffee. Thus, in addition to the increasing output of food crops per capita, the successes of the 1960s agriculture

in Cameroon can be seen to have emerged from different dynamics: hectarage expansion for coffee leading to greater export earnings; and greater yields from cocoa overcoming hectarage stagnation and low prices in the middle of the decade (Guyer, 1980).


Figure 4 - Net exports of key agricultural products, Cameroon, 1961 - 2005 (US\$ million)



Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

Figure 5 supports such an optimistic interpretation of agricultural performance in the 1960s and shows the strong performance of the sector in the end of the decade with real agricultural GDP increasing year-on-year up to 13%.

Figure 5 - Real agricultural GDP (% change on previous year) and precipitation



Source: Molua and Lambi (2007)

By the end of the 1960s, Ahidjo had created one of the most centralised, neo-patrimonial polities in sub-Saharan Africa. The inclusion of the two Anglophone regions into a unitary constitution exacerbated this process as did the appointment of loyalists to the cabinet and the increasing power of the presidential office (ICG, 2010). Loyalty was enforced by senior party members and control of the armed forces. Technocratic efficiency was subjugated to subservience and the reach of the party stretched into (and undermined) the civil and intelligence services. Despite authoritarian tendencies, Ahidjo was supported by France militarily, financially and strategically in a classic example of relegating pretensions of democracy to Cold War realpolitik (*ibid.*). The pay-off for the French was preferential market access and tax perks, leading to French companies and employees leading the private sector.

Ahidjo continued with his ‘planned liberalism’ approach to agricultural development in the 1970s through two further five-year plans. The third plan (1971-75) focused on increasing productivity particularly through the further creation of crop-specific companies. These companies tended to provide access to credit, extension and act as a marketing channel for farmers, and, initially, were supported with finance from the World Bank as this approach partly dovetailed with the prevalent Integrated Rural Development Project approach at this time.

These public companies ensured the stability of producer prices thus insulating farmers from falls in world prices (to encourage continued production) but created substantial rents when world prices

increased. For the three main export crops – cocoa, coffee and cotton – the National Office of Marketing Commodities acted as a go-between for producers and exporters, acting as a stabilisation fund. The public companies were run along private sector lines: they were administratively, technically and financially autonomous (Bamou and Masters, 2007). However, they also contained some social welfare functions, ensuring farmers' 'basic needs' were met.

The agricultural department (DARA) created in 1964 was subsumed under a new Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) in 1972 within the newly unified constitution. The main remit of the Ministry was to support peasant production outside of national development 'projects', such as outgrower schemes from plantations and single-crop marketing boards. The main model through which this would be achieved was the creation of cooperatives, supported by *Crédit Agricole* Cameroon to provide finance and encourage the adoption of innovations. More widely, state-connected banks also offered loans to try and stimulate agricultural productivity. The third plan also saw an attempt to launch a 'Green Revolution' in Cameroon through supporting integrated packages of high-yielding varieties of seed, improved inputs and, in some cases, promoting mechanisation for peasant producers (Fonjong, 2004).

Ndoye (2000) highlights how food crop production increased gradually in line with population growth through the early 1970s, in part stimulated by greater demand from rapidly growing urban centres such as Yaounde (which roughly doubled in size from 230,000 to 450,000 between 1968 and 1976). Indeed, these trends can also be discerned from Figures 1, 2 and 3, which show, respectively, that food crop output increased by close to 20% on a per capita basis over this period, that this was partly due to large increases in roots and tubers/maize/groundnuts, based on increased hectareage not an increase in yield. Ndoye (2000) also notes the limits of urban demand for food crops in meeting income needs during this period. For example, in the heavily-settled areas around Yaounde, farmers only sold one third of food crops, keeping the rest for subsistence. Moreover, three-quarters of incomes came from cocoa and only around 10% from food crop sales (see Guyer, 1980).

Non-food agricultural output declined on a per capita basis during the early 1970s with a mixed performance across crops. Cotton hectareage declined by around a quarter with yield collapsing then recovering around 1975. Coffee, one of the success stories from the 1960s, continued to see an

increase in hectareage but this was offset by a decline in yields of close to almost 50% from 1970 to 1975. Moreover, both hectareage and yields of the further main export crop, cocoa, declined. Fortunately for Cameroon, high international prices ensured foreign exchange receipts from these two key exports rose. A further notable change at this time was an increase in timber production, which doubled from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, to 1,200,000 cubic metres. This was mainly concentrated in the Littoral, South West and Central Regions.²


In addition, the early 1970s saw expansion of plantation hectareage although it is hard to say by how much. One indication comes from Ndoye (2000) who states that from 1967-1974 the Cameroon Development Corporation increased its area from 22,000 to 31,000 hectares (a time when the company switched some hectareage from palm oil and rubber to bananas). This was partly financed by the World Bank. Courade (1984) highlights how the expansion of plantations led to the development of agro-industrial complexes where inputs, production, marketing and were vertically integrated not just for plantation land but also for outgrowers in some instances. Due to the considerable capital and technical requirements, these companies were often partially owned by foreign capital. One example is palm oil production and processing by Unilever in collaboration with the state and international financiers (*ibid.*). Similar business-state-capital relationships existed with sugar cane in the Central Region, and rubber in the South Region. The state was sole owner of further agri-business enterprises such as the Cameroon Development Corporation and a palm oil parastatal. Courade (1984) further explains how foreign direct investment was only partly welcomed in Cameroon: firms such as Lipton, Cadbury and Del Monte reduced their interest in the country. Many agroindustrial investments in the 1960s and 1970s were facilitated by the National Investment Company.

Figure 6 below usefully highlights the location of key plantations, agribusinesses and cooperatives in the mid to late 1970s. One area of interest is the North and Far North. The early 1970s saw investments in cattle and pig production in this zone. It also saw the emergence of an important synergy between the state's cotton-growing industry and pastoralism: namely, the production and sale of cottonseed cakes and hulls for cattle to feed on during the dry season. Moritz (2008) highlights how this activity only provided 2% revenues but provided a vital source of nutrition for many pastoralists and semi-sedentary cattle herders.

and practices). Importantly, the legislation ensured government could convert national land into private or public land. For example, government could create plantations for an agri-business firm. Clearly, customary rights holders had insecure tenure, with the land ombudsman – the Decentralised Land Consultation Boards – not staying neutral and impartial (*ibid.*). It is also asserted the transaction costs in registering land were high and long-winded.³

Bamou and Masters (2007) argue the mixed export performance of the agricultural sector in the 1960s and 1970s suffered as a consequence of indirect and direct taxes (which benefited urban spheres and the manufacturing sector). They outline both administrative and financial reasons for the limited returns from 15 years of investment in both peasant and plantation agriculture. On the administrative side, the remits of the new public companies, development missions and wider development projects weren't co-ordinated: different projects reported to different ministries, investments weren't harmonised, creating inefficiencies and unnecessary competition between institutions and ambitious individuals. Financially, the combination of direct and implicit taxation of export crops acted as a burden on farmers and the sector more broadly.⁴ On the other hand, to ensure national food self-sufficiency, food crop production was protected from cheaper imports through quota and tariff measures (Bella, 2009). Figure 7 below shows the nominal rates of assistance to exportable and total agricultural products in Cameroon from 1961 to 2003. We can clearly see how the taxation of agricultural exports increased through the 1960s and early 1970s.

Figure 7 - Nominal rates of assistance to exportable and total agricultural products, Cameroon, 1961 to 2005




Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

A fourth five-year development plan was pursued from 1976-1980. This was supposed to prioritise investment in rural infrastructure, improve the balance of payments and support industrial development (Bella, 2009; Courade, 1984). But the story of the late 1970s focusses not on agriculture but on oil: 1977 saw the beginning of an oil boom. Revenue from offshore petroleum increased to 46% of export earnings by 1982. These resources had a profound affect on the Cameroonian economy. First, the oil boom allowed parastatals to offer growers increases in real producer prices, especially as the late 1970s saw very high international prices for coffee, cocoa and cotton. It also facilitated further government investment in palm oil and rubber plantations. Second, the inflow of dollars allowed the Cameroonian government to continue to pursue its import substitution policy based on a protectionist trade stance and favourable subsidies for infant industries, but slightly reduce the implicit and explicit taxation of export crops. Figure 7 above shows how the taxation of exportable crops peaked the year before the oil boom started – 1976 – with the levels of taxation declining up to 1981.

Higher government spending, greater demand for non-tradeables and higher real wages led to some inflationary pressures in the economy (see Figure 8). The higher real producer prices brought only temporary and limited joy to farmers as inflation eroded purchasing power and an appreciating exchange rate reduced non-oil exports (Bamou and Masters, 2007). Whilst the economy grew at more than 10% pa in the late 1970s, Figure 5 illustrates how in 1976 and 1977 poor rainfall led to decreases in real agricultural GDP, with the sector only picking up again in 1979 and the early years of the 1980s. The influence of the oil boom on the economy can be seen in agriculture's share of GDP declining from more than 80% in 1978 to less than 30% in 1985.

Figure 8 - Per capita income and inflation in Cameroon, 1961 - 2006



Source: Dewbre and de Battisti (2008)


2.3 Rwanda

The immediate post-independence period was characterized by a continuing trend towards expanded cultivation of tubers and bananas at the expense of cereals and pulses, leading to a decline in the availability of food (MINAGRI, 2004). After independence, the promotion of cash crops – initiated by the colonial administration – was continued to obtain foreign exchange to finance imports of non-agricultural products but also to increase the purchasing power of farmers. The government largely used the same policy mechanisms as the colonial administration although the enforcement of labour duties for land preservation was less prevalent. At this time, population pressure was not severe. However, efforts began to find out how to increase yields instead of a continued expansion onto unexploited land.

For the government of the First Republic, one way to deal with the imbalance between growth in population and output was to intensify the creation of ‘modern’ farming communities within the framework of *paysannat* settlements in the regions formerly unoccupied. This was not a new mechanism but rather an intensification of the colonial system. In the early 1960s, most of the new communities were established in the Kigali (rural) province because it had most unoccupied land (followed by Butare). These farming communities were financed largely by the Belgian aid agency

and the European Commission. By 1965, a total of about 53,900 ha were established in which the lion's share (29,500 ha) were allocated to coffee. Cotton was second in terms of acreage followed by tea, pyrethrum and rice (see Figure 9).


Figure 9 - Area of *paysannat* farming communities by crop (February, 1965)



Source: STEEN (1965)

The agricultural policy of the Second Republic (1973-1994) had food self-sufficiency as its main objective. Self-sufficiency was considered by the government to be the main precondition for solving the problem of malnutrition and undernourishment. In terms of specific crops, the main targets were cereals, pulses and tubers, fruits and animal products (meat, milk, eggs). Self-sufficiency in food products was envisaged to lead to the improvement of living conditions and increased purchasing power among farmers who were able to sell surplus production in the market. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, neither pulses nor cereals (mostly sorghum and maize) expanded significantly while tubers (potato, cassava, yam, etc.) and banana production – particularly in the eastern part of the country – increased substantially (see Figure 10).

Figure 10 - Trends for selected crops during the period of the Second Republic (1973-1994)



Source: Verwimp, 2003

In the period of the Second Republic, favoured cash crops were coffee and tea while other crops grown were cinchona, pyrethrum and cotton. Coffee production continued to be the main cash crop. The agro-ecological conditions in Rwanda are very favourable compared to other crops. Cultivation gradually spread to all corners of the country and the number of coffee growers increased from 420,700 farmers in 1974, to 508,311 in 1980 and 681,835 in 1987. The area also grew from 27,500 ha in 1974 to about 42,000 ha by 1987.

Coffee cultivation was heavily subsidized: seedlings could be obtained almost free of cost and some fertilizer was also distributed on the condition that it would only be used for coffee (Verwimp 2003). A comprehensive administrative system for coffee was put in place and employees were assigned both advisory and regulatory tasks (Verwimp 2003). A government agency purchased all coffee grown and a single export company monopolized sales (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009). So, in 1964, a state-run agency known as OCIR-Café was created to be in charge of buying all coffee produced by farmers. In the same year RWANDEX, a company partially owned by government, was established to be in charge of exports (Murekezi 2009).

During the 1970s and 1980s, coffee accounted between 60-80% of the country's export revenue (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009; Verwimp 2003). Although producers received less than they might have been able to gain in an open and free market, they received more from the export agency towards the end of the period than they did in the 1960s and 1970s. For its part, the government retained the difference between the world market price and the price paid to farmers.

When coffee prices tumbled on the world market in the late 1980s, the International Coffee Agreement was terminated and the global coffee market slowly started to liberalise (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009). With their income falling, farmers wanted to shift into production of other cash crops, particularly bananas, but law forbade this. Boudreaux and Ahluwalia (2009) claim that due to the extension system, local extension officers were monitoring the farmers making it difficult for them to switch. However, in the face of falling income and hunger, many farmers did uproot coffee trees and planted food crops (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009) and other more attractive cash crops (Verwimp 2003).


Tea growing in Rwanda started in 1953 from the merging of two private societies (South-West Rwanda and North Rwanda). Since its introduction, tea production has increased steadily, from 60 tons of black tea in 1958, to 1,900 tons in 1990, 14,500 tons in 2000, and reaching a peak of 17,800 tons in 2001. Tea has been produced both through big industrial estates and through small plantations within polycultural peasant farms, all connected to a tea plant which directly managed the estates. For example, small farmers were organized under cooperatives (Coopthés) or associations (Assopthé) (Chapuis et Sirven 2003). Since 1978 OCIR-Thé, a parastatal organization, was responsible for financial management of 9 of 10 plants, including research and development, input supply, processing and marketing. By the 2000s the tea plants had been privatized.

The regulation of land ownership and tenure system during the First Republic did not change significantly compared to the colonial period. About 90% of the country's arable land was governed according to customary law. The *Loi Communale* from 1963 affirmed the protection of rights relating to registered land under the customary law and supervision of the law became the responsibility of the districts (then called communes). In the early 1960s, government initiated various measures to acquire new agricultural land but during there were no legal provisions related

to land tenure, except perhaps the institution of the *paysannat* system which was initiated by the colonial administration (see above).

During the 1970s, intensive migration took place from the densely-populated western and southern region (Ruhengeri, Gisenyi Kibuye and Gikongoro) to the semi-arid savannas of the East (Umutara, Kibungo and Bugesera) in search of vacant land. During the period, government implemented a number of land reforms with the purpose of ‘rationalizing’ the occupation and use of land which was becoming more and more scarce (MINITERE, 2004). The traditional cultivation system and dispersed housing were considered as obstacles to the development of rural areas. Of particular concern was the excessive and increasing fragmentation of land into small plots motivated in large part by the legacy practice by which a man at the age of marriage was given his own home and land by his father. With the increasing population size after colonization, the fragmentation of land became a widespread obstacle to rural development (Nezehose, 1990). According to an agricultural survey in 1982/83, the average size of the farm was about 1 hectare although some regional variations occurred (see Figure 11).

Figure 11 - Size of landholdings per province (1982/83)



Source: MINAGRI, 1986.

One set of measures was concerned with the identification of unoccupied land and changes in land tenure status. New legislation was passed concerning the conditions under which land could be made the object of sale, lease, donation and expropriation. In 1976, legislation was passed on a new categorization of land, in particular classification of land under state ownership. A distinction was made between two categories (MINAGRI, 1978): land held by legal persons of public law and private land owned by individuals. The first category included national public land (tourist sites, airports, roads, military camps etc.) and national private domain (land registered in the name of the republic, expropriated land, rural land concessions from abandoned land). Land holders in the second category were given the right to use land individually for farming or construction. However, outside of this right, the landlord must follow certain rules issued by the state, such as not being able to sell or mortgage the land, nor to divide or grant the land. According to Nkulikiye (1998) the state was also handed the right to control land use on privately-owned land and determine the minimum land size for Rwandan farmers.

Another set of measures was related to the development of new agricultural land. Most new farms were established on converted marshlands but also on other unoccupied land. By 1973, a total of about 84,000 hectares were converted for agriculture (Nezehose, 1990) while the total area of converted wetlands ready for agriculture had increased to approximately 165,000 ha in 1993 (Rudasumbwa, 1993). Marshland crops were mainly rice, sugarcane and vegetables but parts were also used for traditional food crops like sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes or maize. This land was owned by the state and users had to pay rental for a time limited concession, usually five years (Rudasumbwa, 1993). Apart from the marshlands, other types of land were opened to agricultural activities (for instance, hunting reserves and parts of natural forests). It is estimated that about 65,000 hectares of these land types were converted during the period 1975-1992 (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1996).

However, despite such changes to land tenure, the state's financial sources were restricted and the annual share allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture was limited. For instance, towards the end of the Second Republic, the share decreased from 3.4% in 1988 to 1.7% in 1992 which indicates the somewhat low prioritization of the agricultural sector in the state budget (Ministry of Finance, n.d.) It should also be noted the 2nd Republic saw a political and economic change with the emergence

of an urban bourgeoisie with strong links to government and a continued obsession with project logic within international cooperation.

2.4 Tanzania

Tanganyika gained independence in 1961 after a relatively peaceful transition. The political movement for independence was led by Julius Nyerere, the leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the major political organisation in the country. He also became president in 1961. Following a revolution, Zanzibar merged with mainland Tanganyika to form the nation of Tanzania in April 1964. In the first years after independence, there were no significant changes in agricultural policy (Kjekhus, 1977). The focal point approach which focused agricultural extension services on larger agriculturalists was continued. In terms of land rights, however, the independence government changed course, in that private freehold land titles in 1963 were converted to 99 years leasehold titles in order to stop a growing tendency of accumulation (*ibid.*).

After advice from the World Bank, government initiated the 'transformation approach' in 1962 designed to transform Tanzanian peasant agriculture into a more modern and effective sector. The way to do this was to resettle farmers in villages where capital investment could easier be profited from (Coulson, 1977). Thus agricultural policy at this point in time still focused on developing the export-oriented commercial agriculture via improvements in growing cash crops. Tanzanian settlements prior to the villagization campaigns was largely dominated by single homesteads spread out over the landscape (Shao, 1986). The resettlement campaign was based on voluntary resettlement of farmers to government-designated land. The resettlement scheme was officially launched in 1962, and was also included in the first five-year plan 1964-69. The campaign was unsuccessful since only 23 villages had been created when the scheme was ended in 1966 (Kjekhus, 1977). Despite the failure, the idea of resettlement was not abandoned, as illustrated in 1967 when Julius Nyerere published the Arusha Declaration outlining the principles of the socialist development in Tanzania.

Ujamaa and other interventionist policies

The Arusha declaration highlighted agriculture as the cornerstone of the country's future development (*ibid.*). In the resettlement campaign in the first years of independence, the goal was to facilitate investment for commercial peasant agriculture. But in the *ujamaa* villagization campaign, the focus changed towards self-reliance and a collective (socialist) mode of production (Kjekhus, 1977). The concept of *ujamaa* (meaning extended family in Swahili) was originally formulated by Nyerere in 1962 as meaning a socialist attitude of mind inherent in traditional African societies. The concept became the philosophical underpinning of villagization (*ibid.*). In 1969 Nyerere's 'Socialism and Rural Development' denounced rural capitalism (as represented by earlier agrarian policies, like the transformation approach) and turned *ujamaa* in to a national policy about which it was the responsibility of every rural worker to understand or encourage (Coulson, 1977). The campaign took shape in 1969 when the government created the 'Regional Development Fund' from which regional commissioners could fund projects in newly formed villages thus encouraging resettlement (*ibid.*). Resettlement by force was introduced by local administrators, but was an official policy from 1973 (Kjekhus, 1977). The campaign was originally intended to be the voluntary resettlement of peasants into designated villages but evolved into 'operations' where families in a given area were forced to move into planned villages of around 250 families. In 1976 13 million people were living in villages. It must also be noted the Arusha declaration led to the nationalisation of banks, the biggest sisal estates and the largest import/export houses (Coulson, 1977).

The villagization campaign was, in terms of improving the agricultural production, a failure (Coulson, 1977; Kjekhus, 1977; Shao, 1986). There was a decrease in cotton production and other crops were also affected (Kjekhus, 1977). The villagization campaign also coincided with a crisis in food production in the mid-1970's caused, *inter alia*, by the 1973/74 drought (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the campaign has been criticised for the lack of understanding of the ecological implications that the agricultural intensification around new villages would cause (Kjekhus, 1977; Shao, 1986). The policy was officially abandoned in 1985. Alongside the villagization campaign, the Tanzanian government pursued a parallel strategy from 1969, which was to establish and run state farms as a means of raising production. The goal in the 1969 five-year plan was to establish 40 state farms. However, only 15 were created and most of these were mismanaged (Coulson, 1969).

After independence Tanzania saw a rise in producer cooperatives. Partly as a means to reduce the power of predominately Asian traders, producer cooperatives were supported by government until 1973 and resulted in a three-tier marketing system where peasants sold their prescribed produce to a 'primary' society of which around 2300 existed in 1973. All primary societies were affiliated with a cooperative union which had the responsibility of delivering of the produce to the national marketing boards (Ellis, 1982). The state interfered only by fixing the price at which the marketing boards should buy crops from the regional cooperative union. Thus the producer price differed regionally as the regional cooperative unions had different levels of costs associated with transporting and marketing of crops to the national marketing boards (*ibid.*). This was one of the reasons why the government wanted to change the system. From 1974 the government started to replace the marketing boards with national 'crop authorities' which had much wider responsibilities. They controlled the complete marketing chain from collecting the crops from the village to selling for export or to domestic retailers (*ibid.*). This created the opportunity to support producer prices, which was especially the case for food staples following the droughts in the mid-1970s (Isinika *et al*, 2003). The crop authorities turned out to be an inefficient system which created a very large margin between producer prices and end market prices (Ellis, 1982). This led to a decrease in real prices for peasants, especially for export crops (which is shown in Figure 12). Producers responded by selling their crops through parallel markets (Isinika *et al*, 2003)

Figure 12 - Producer prices for selected crops – 1969/70 to 1979/80

Table 1. Trends in agricultural producer prices for selected crops, 1969/1970–1979/1980, money and real terms

Crop	Producer prices (T.Shs/kg)			% increase/decrease			
				1969/1970–1973/1974		1973/1974–1979/1980	
	1969/1970	1973/1974	1979/1980	Money terms	Real* terms	Money terms	Real* terms
Export crops†							
Cashew	0.91	0.91	1.74	0.0	–38.4	91.2	–24.0
Coffee	5.41	5.80	11.87	7.2	–33.9	104.7	–18.6
Cotton	1.06	1.10	2.83	3.8	–36.0	157.3	+2.3
Pyrethrum	3.00	2.75	5.51	–8.3	–43.5	100.4	–20.3
Tobacco	4.09	5.28	8.35	29.1	–20.5	58.1	–37.1
Domestic crops							
Maize	0.28	0.33	1.00	17.9	–27.4	202.9	+20.4
Paddy	0.52	0.57	1.50	9.6	–32.5	163.2	+4.6
Wheat	0.57	0.57	1.35	0.0	–38.4	136.8	–5.8
Groundnuts	0.92	1.15	4.00	25.0	–23.0	247.8	+38.3
Sunflower	0.42	0.55	1.40	31.0	–19.3	154.5	+1.2

Source: Appendix Table A2.

* Deflated by the modified NCPI given in Appendix Table A3.

† Average prices paid for all grades.

Source: Ellis (1982)

2.5 Summary

The three models for agricultural transformation during the colonial period did not vanish in the first couple of decades after independence. Actually, the first years after the take-over of state power by nationalist governments were marked by continuity of policies and regulatory mechanisms for agricultural development – with a notable exception being the mobilisation of agricultural labour via coercive mechanisms (although, surprisingly, this did continue to some extent in Rwanda). Private and primarily foreign-owned plantations continued to play an important role for the production of export crops in the coastal areas although state-owned companies gradually gained importance, in some cases via nationalisation of existing activities. This trend was most prevalent in Ghana and Tanzania, two countries that during the 1960s opted for slightly varying forms of the so-called ‘African socialism’ that attached great importance to mechanisation, state ownership of the means of production and control over resources. During the period, the initial devotion to socialism was either abruptly interrupted by a series of military coups and periodic installment of civil rule (Ghana) or gradually exhausted by inefficiency and repeated failures of public initiatives (Tanzania). State ownership was also an integral part of the ‘planned liberalism’ in Cameroon where competition between public and private plantation companies was considered to be an important means to improve efficiency and fulfilment of development objectives. In all the countries, state ownership expanded in large-scale agricultural units for food and industrial crops –

so-called state farms – and the period witnessed the establishment of outgrower schemes (notably in Cameroon, but also in Rwanda with tea) where peasant farming was linked to large-scale cultivation and processing on nucleus estates. As ownership of these estates was usually different from the earlier model, we can label this approach to agricultural transformation as *large-scale state farms*. We can also designate *outgrower schemes* as a separate model for transformation.

Public support for peasant farming continued after the end of colonial rule and was even expanded. But this was matched by the continuation or establishment of exploitative marketing mechanisms via state-determined producer prices on export crops. In terms of the three colonial models, the ‘Master Farmer’ idea was apparently toned down (apart from in Tanganyika, where it continued for a short time) and replaced by a broader concern for reaching out and incorporating far larger segments of small-scale farmers in the commercialisation of agricultural production. Integral in these efforts were crop-specific public marketing boards (parastatals) that to different degrees controlled and provided input supplies, extension services, purchasing logistics, marketing and – eventually – export of the particular crop. In some of the countries these parastatals instituted price differentials between producer and world market prices of such a magnitude that economic incentives to farmers were eroded (cf. cocoa in Ghana), the formal objective being to finance industrialisation although in practice feeding different forms of (urban) rent seeking. Another important and partly related component of the preoccupation with peasant farming was the comprehensive top-down organisation of farmers in cooperatives and farmers’ unions, particularly in Tanzania but also in Cameroon and Rwanda. These farmer organisations provided a means to improve effectiveness of purchasing operations and targeting of service provision, including access to shared mechanised equipment like tractors and subsidized fertilizers. Some of the crop specific development interventions directed towards peasant farming had a pronounced geographic focus and were embedded in integrated rural development programmes. For instance, poor semi-arid areas in the Northern Region of Ghana and Far North of Cameroon that traditionally served as labour reserves were targeted through large-scale programmes for rice and cotton, respectively. Despite the greater emphasis on supportive, ancillary investments (including producer organisations), we view this approach to the *peasant/smallholder production* discussed previously.

However, the period did witness a new model for peasant farming, namely the opening of new agricultural land coupled with resettlement of farmer households, often with the objective of promoting national self-sufficiency in food crops. This model was based on initiatives to introduce

new titling of land, in particular aiming at a transfer of customary land into state land with successive incorporation in the agricultural ‘frontier’ (as with ‘the wetlands’ in Rwanda) or into transformed land use based on large-scale cultivation by cooperatives (as with many *ujamaa* villages in Tanzania). We denote this model as *resettled peasant/smallholder production*.

The development of public institutions catering for peasant farmers and state-owned companies involved in agriculture resulted in a complex administrative structure that lacked the resources and competence to coordinate their activities efficiently. Institutional rivalry and rent-seeking behaviour by both bureaucrats and businessmen further complicated the smooth operation of the regulatory apparatus – which in the case of Cameroon became of secondary importance due to the rapid expansion of the petroleum sector and windfall gains from the oil export revenue.

3. Liberalisation

Our third period covers the gradual liberalisation of the agricultural sectors based on the principles of pricism and state minimalism. As the following narrative amply demonstrates, these principles were applied in varying degrees through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to various alterations to incentives, marketing structures and trade regimes.

3.1 Ghana

Major shocks interacted in the early 1980 to cause the complete collapse of Ghana's limping economy. A severe drought accompanied by widespread bush fires reduced agricultural output. In response to this crisis, the military government led by Rawlings, with the help of the Bretton Woods institutions, launched a four-year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) – 1983 to 1986. The ERP was vigorously implemented, and a follow-up stabilization phase of the recovery programme was launched in 1987. Various aspects of these Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) continued to be implemented into the 1990s. Under the ERP and SAPs, a number of far-reaching policies were initiated at both the macro and sectoral levels that impacted significantly on agriculture. For example, market liberalisation included the realignment of the exchange rate by moving from a fixed rate to a flexible rate. In addition, guaranteed prices (predetermined by the central government) for agricultural produce (except cocoa) were all removed, and subsidies on agricultural inputs were also scaled back (e.g. fertilizer and agro-chemicals). The subsidy removal generally raised production costs in agriculture, and reduced fertilizer use among farmers.

Early reform period (1983-1987)

The Economic Recovery Programme was introduced by the Ghanaian government in 1983 under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. The most central element of the ERP was the reform of the exchange rate (Brooks *et al*, 2007). The Ghanaian exchange rate had been held artificially high, and in order to improve the export earnings of producers in cedi, the exchange rate was nominally lowered several times in the years following 1983 (*ibid.*). This resulted in an increase in

the real exchange rate of the Cedi to the US\$ from 140 cedis in 1983 to 924 cedis in 1987 (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006).

In terms of agricultural policy, this period was dominated by the view that liberalisation of input and output markets in the agricultural economy would lead to greater availability of inputs and higher prices to farmers than the loss-making parastatal marketing organisations had provided previously (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). Before liberalising trade in fertilizers. This increased the fertilizer price for farmers. And since real prices for the major food crops (such as maize and rice) fell, farmers' incentives for using inputs and producing for the market disappeared (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). The reason why domestic prices fell in response to the depreciating real exchange rate, was that world prices fell in the same period and the government – as a liberalization measure – also reduced tariffs on agricultural imports. Thus the protection that domestic agricultural production previously had disappeared (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). The effect was that real prices for both maize and rice fell from 1983 to 1986.

Liberalization was also carried out within many commodity chains. For example, the Ghana Cotton Development Board was privatized in 1985 and many other parastatals underwent similar transformation. It should be noted that the Ghanaian state refused to allow the Cocoa Board to be privatised as it feared the loss of control over the most important economic sector (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). The anticipated increase in producer prices, which was to follow the increased competition in agricultural trade did not, however, materialize after the implementation of the reform package (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). In the cocoa sector, focus was put on increasing producer prices through more effective management of the marketing board (CMB/COCOBOD) so prices would constitute a larger share of the export price (Puplampu, 1999). The rise in input prices also affected the cocoa sector negatively. Pesticide prices increased four-fold between 1986-1989.

Mid reform period (1986-1992)

Although the reforms in the early period were mainly structural, there was increasing awareness of the need to make sector-specific policies within the agricultural sector. Subsidised agricultural credit schemes, which had been in place since the 1970s were removed, resulting in an increase in rates from 18.5% in 1985 to 23-30% in 1988. Likewise a requirement for banks to lend out at least

25% of their loans to the agricultural sector was taken away. The effect of these policies was a reduction in farmers' access to credit (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). Cocoa marketing was also partially liberalized in that many of the functions undertaken by COCOBOD were left to private initiatives, including the supply of inputs. State plantations were divested (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006). COCOBOD remained, however, as the main purchasing body of cocoa until 1993 when five commercial traders were allowed (Puplampu, 1999). Following the commencement of the ERP in 1983, the Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Programme was the first integrated intervention in the agricultural sector. The objectives were to strengthen the institutional capacity and services of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and support policy reforms involving the privatization of certain services (including fertilizer marketing, tractor services and veterinary drugs).

Late reform period (late 1990s)

By the beginning of the 1990s there was a growing understanding that structural 'market friendly' changes did not automatically benefit the poor and smallholders. This understanding led to policies that increased the focus on rural employment and agricultural production. The Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) was born out of these ideas (Oduro & Kwadzo, 2006) and was developed by the government with support from the World Bank. The objective of the MTADP was to define policy and institutional reforms, and the complementary set of investments needed to achieve higher growth in agriculture. The programmes set out in the MTADP aimed at a sustained annual growth in agricultural GDP of 4%. The policy reforms focused on the incentive framework for agriculture production, trade and processing. The MTADP proposed increased private participation in agricultural marketing, a more market-based pricing system, and the liberalization of the supply of seed, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. The freeing of trade was expected to reduce marketing costs, raise producer prices and stimulate investments in processing. On the other hand, the privatization of input supply was to improve the reliability of supply through competition. The MTADP served as a key policy document for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture during the 1990s, and from it emerged various programmes and projects (with funding from the World Bank mainly) for improving agricultural production in Ghana.

Overall, the reform period can be summarised in terms of fiscal, trade/exchange rate and monetary policy. Within fiscal policy, the reform increased government revenues, decreased the smuggling of

cocoa and hard currency and decreased government borrowing. Expenditure was reduced, particularly through public sector retrenchment, and was shifted from recurrent costs to infrastructure investments. Aid helped to bridge government deficits. It should also be noted that this fiscal restraint slipped prior to elections in 1991. Trade policy centres on the devaluation of the cedi, but also involved the reduction of import tariffs and export promotion measures (such as allowing firms to keep foreign exchange earnings and not surrender them to the Bank of Ghana). These measures reduced the gap between real and parallel foreign exchange markets, stimulated trade, but did little to diversify the economy. Monetary policy, for its part, tightened the supply of credit by raising interest rates to match inflation, reducing the supply of loans to firms and farms.

3.2 Cameroon


The early 1980s were characterised by a political transition. President Ahidjo resigned due to illness and was succeeded by a long-standing ally in the form of Paul Biya. After an initial honeymoon period, a sharp conflict emerged between the previous and new modes of governance. As we saw above, Ahidjo's regime was based on a patron-client set of relationships with many loyal civil servants and political supporters firmly embedded in these networks. Biya's premiership started to open a Pandora's box of democratic debate and egalitarian meritocracy. Unsurprisingly, elements supporting the latter model of governance were repressed by long-standing politicians reliant on the former model, a situation which lasted until the end of the decade (ICG, 2010).

The oil boom continued to have a profound effect on the Cameroonian economy in the early 1980s, with growth exceeding 5% annually until 1986. By the middle of the decade per capita GDP was close to US\$1,000 (see Figure 7). Greater government revenues led to an expansion of the public sector and urbanisation, and importantly for the purposes of our review here, a rapid expansion of investment in agriculture. For example, Bamou and Masters (2007) outline how public spending in the early 1980s increased in nominal terms by more than a factor of eight over the decade previously. Fertiliser and pesticide prices were subsidised and consumption increased at more than 10% pa between 1975 and 1985. These changes affected different crops in different ways. For example, slightly higher producer prices certainly helped cocoa growers but government benefitted more from the larger margin between this and the world price (see Figure 13). However, fertiliser

subsidies didn't assist cocoa farmers much as they didn't use large quantities (*ibid.*). As we have seen, coffee prices were high at this time, but this didn't filter down to producers to the extent it should have done due to the state increasing its rents (see Figure 14). As we have seen, the uptake of fertilisers increased rapidly in the early 1980s. This is clearly shown in Figure 15 that illustrates the correlation between the oil boom starting in 1977 and the rapid increase in fertiliser use until 1987.


Ndoye (2000) highlights that whilst cocoa hectarage expanded during the oil boom, production stayed constant and export earnings from cocoa declined slightly. Coffee at this time shows a slightly different pattern: a small increase in hectarage but a greater increase in yields (based on higher levels of fertiliser usage) leading to higher production and slightly higher export earnings. Robusta expanded rapidly in the East Region at this time due to greater logging opening up new tracts of forest for cultivation.

Figure 13 - International market price and producer price for cocoa producers, 1977 – 1999




Source: MINEFI, 2000

Figure 14 - International market price and producer price for Arabica coffee producers, 1977 – 1999



Source: MINEFI, 2000

Figure 15 - Fertilizer use in Cameroon from 1961 to 2003



Source: Bamou and Masters (2007)

The early 1980s were also characterised by a further five-year plan based now more on self-reliance due to the oil revenues. Despite attention to agriculture, and expansion of fertiliser usage, performance was very mixed at this time. Figure 1 shows how food crop production declined precipitously on a per capita basis at a faster rate than the continent as a whole. Figure 4 also shows the precipitous decline in net agricultural exports in the early 1990s, led by cocoa and coffee, but pushed further by greater imports of cereals and rice.

Ndoye (2000) argues that declines in food crop production in the 1980s can be partially explained by rapid migration to urban centres, reducing the size of the rural labour force. Whilst greater urban demand increased production in peri-urban areas around cities, changing food preferences within cities and high bulk-to-value ratios limited demand for conventional crops and increased the amount of imported foodstuffs, especially cereals. One clear example is that Cameroon moved from being a net exporter to importer of sugar in the early 1980s (*ibid.*). There are also indications that plantation hectareage increased through the 1980s. For example, the World Bank supported projects to establish over 15,000 hectares of rubber, to create 16,000 hectares of sugarcane and increase the amount of land under oil palm.

Government attempted to implement a sixth five-year plan in 1986. This aimed to support administrative devolution to allow citizens to participate and hold local institutions accountable, to expand the plantation sub sector including medium-sized farms, and to limit rural-urban migration. But this plan was interrupted by an economic crisis from late 1986 when prices for all the country's exports – oil, cocoa, coffee – fell suddenly, reducing foreign exchange earnings and government revenues (see Figures 13 and 14). With an overvalued exchange rate, a large and inefficient public sector which had increased by at least a third in the boom years, and low competitiveness and poor management of public enterprises, government struggled to limit budget deficits and debt levels.

The problems Cameroon faced can, arguably, be traced back to the management of the oil wealth in the preceding decade. Bamou and Masters (2007) argue that the oil wealth led to three distortions in the economy (based on so-called Dutch disease) which limited the ability of the country to respond to the changed external environment. First, as we've seen, during the oil boom discrimination against agricultural producers was exacerbated, especially against peasant producers.

As Figures 13 and 14 show, high world prices failed to trickle down to producers despite large government revenues from oil. Within agriculture they argue the preference for directing resources towards plantations was exacerbated, buttressing rural-urban migration.

Second, Bamou and Masters (2007) argue the surfeit of resources from oil plastered over the deep inefficiencies in the bureaucracy, the management of public enterprises and within state-orientated institutions. As we've seen, the public sector expanded rapidly, bloated by oil rents. Third, they highlight the classic example of oil rents attracting the bulk of investment flows in the country, leaving agriculture and other non-oil industrial starved of large-scale funds, limiting innovation. In aggregate, these three problems meant Cameroon was unable to respond to the downturn in commodity prices in 1986. Figure 8 shows how this downturn lasted from 1987 through to 1994, with GDP declining by, on average, 5% per annum, pushing per capita income down to around US\$600 per head. Figure 4 shows how the value of agricultural exports for all commodities apart from bananas and cotton declined rapidly until devaluation of the Central African CFA occurred in 1994. Agricultural real GDP declined or stagnated in this period (see Figure 5) with the loss of oil and other revenues leading to a massive decline in fertiliser use (see Figure 15). Unsurprisingly, poverty worsened in Cameroon during this economic contraction, especially rural poverty. Overall, the poverty headcount increased by 29 percentage points, with rural areas contributing 24 percentage points (once the effect of rural-urban migration and remittances has been controlled for – *ibid.*). The depth and severity of rural poverty also worsened considerably, mainly in rural areas (in other words, the poverty gap and squared poverty-gap measures deteriorated).

The late 1980s brought forth a political and economic crisis to Cameroon. Taking its lead from democratic movements in Eastern Europe, a coalition of lawyers, old UPC activists started campaigning for greater democratic freedoms (ICG, 2010). This coalition clashed with groups organised by the Biya regime with the aim of stifling dissent (ICG, 2010). By the middle of 1991, Biya floated the idea of a conference with opposition and civil society groups to discuss the future shape of governance in Cameroon. This meeting lasted for over a month and took the sting and momentum out of the opposition movement (*ibid.*). Moreover, a lack of trust amongst opposition supporters led to the fragmentation of the movement as some were co-opted and others resigned. These early signs of democracy then led to a decade of greater authoritarianism with fewer press freedoms, neo-patrimonial appointments and wholesale fraud in elections (*ibid.*).

The economic crisis led to attempts to reduce public expenditure and roll-over external liabilities. But this was only successful until 1988 when government finally agreed to a package of stabilisation and adjustment reforms under the auspices of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Ndoye *et al*, 2000). The main aim of this first credit was to manage the public finances better through increasing taxes, retrenching staff and restructuring public companies. Further SAPs were agreed in late 1991 and in 1994. Government retrenched public sector workers, tried to restructure the web of state, parastatal and mixed ownership firms created in previous decades, reduced expenditures on health, education and service provision, and cut public sector salaries by more than 50% (Baye, 2005). Importantly, these early structural adjustment measures failed to include a standard prescription – currency devaluation – as the Central African CFA franc is managed with a cohort of nearby countries: Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. A mixture of very low producer prices for key crops and rapid cuts in the public sector and public services led to a worsening of human development indicators in Cameroon in the early 1990s: primary school enrolment rates fell down to 62% in 1997, and child mortality increased from 130 per thousand in 1990 to 151 per thousand in 1996 (Bamou and Masters, 2007).

Bamou and Masters (2007) highlight the sectoral-specific structural adjustment reforms in agriculture: namely, privatisation of state-owned assets and greater market liberalisation (apart from for cotton, which remained a controlled crop). Ndoye (2000) offers more details on the sequence and nature of the reforms: first, government reduced subsidies for agrochemicals in the early years of the 1990s; second, it closed the National Produce Marketing Board which had acted as a stabilisation fund and liberalised the cocoa and coffee trade; third, it closed down the cocoa parastatal SODECAO and the rural development project in the East Region. Plantation and timber industries also stagnated. For example, banana plantations were privatised and the export functions for similar plantation crops were liberalised. Turning to smallholders, Fonjong (2004) highlights how the closure of public and mixed ownership agricultural companies in the North West Region led to a collapse in production of coffee through the closure of a cocoa parastatal, and reduction in hectareage of high-yielding crop varieties through reduced uptake of numerous innovations introduced by ‘public’ sector entities (such as introduction of export-quality production of mangoes, guava and avocado). More broadly, the economic reforms drastically reduced public funding of agricultural research, education, extension and the ability of smallholders to access credit (Bamou

and Masters, 2007).

Tollens and Gilbert (2000) focus specifically on changes in cocoa marketing during this period of substantial reform. Prior to liberalisation in 1989 the national produce marketing board maintained the quality of beans both at source and export. Tollens and Gilbert (2000) illustrate not only how in 1991 official farmgate prices cocoa were reduced by 40% but that the stabilisation functions of the board were replaced with a smaller, supposedly more efficient, organisation which set a reference price (based on futures prices minus estimated transaction and processing costs) but allowed licensed exporters to purchase directly from producers. This system reduced producer prices by 12%. It also meant the old board could only maintain quality controls at the point of export, with these functions also passing to the new organisation in 1994 (and later being privatised). Whilst some argue that liberalisation reduced the quality of cocoa from Cameroon, Tollens and Gilbert (2000) suggest that the introduction of and demand for bulk transport by purchasers reduced price premiums for top grades, thus reducing overall incentives for quality bean via extended fermentation. They do concede, however, that liberalised domestic marketing facilitated greater freight volumes in country, exacerbating a mixing of beans of different quality. This is not to say, of course, that liberalisation meant that the hidden hand of the market worked to the benefit of all participants. Far from it. Bamou and Masters (2007) point out how the withdrawal of state services in rural areas left an input and marketing void which was not sufficiently filled by private sector actors fast enough.

The first years of structural adjustment in Cameroon, until 1994, saw low international cocoa and coffee prices and thus lower absolute incomes for farmers. This meant many cocoa and coffee farmers abandoned their fields. Ndoye (2000) highlights survey data from the Central Region that shows how the percentage of income from cocoa plummeted from 45% in 1991 to 15% in 1994, whilst income from food crops increased from 20% to 30% in the same period. Sunderlin *et al* (2000) also argue that a shift from cocoa and coffee to plantain and other food crops, in association with an urban-rural shift in population as urban employment opportunities dissipated, led to a much higher deforestation rates in the humid tropical zones from 1986 through to 1996. For example, they highlight a longitudinal study of a group of 38 villages which showed population growth of 0.7% pa from 1976-1987, but growth of 4.1% pa from 1987-1997.⁵

Figure 4 shows that by 1993 Cameroon's export crops had become incredibly uncompetitive on world markets, with the net value of total agricultural exports in this year equating to less than solely coffee had brought in two decades earlier. In the early 1990s cocoa and coffee hectareage and yields stagnated or declined. The only bright spot regarding export crop performance was cotton production where an increase in hectareage offset a slight reduction in yields. Finally, in early 1994 the Central African CFA was devalued by 50%, making export agriculture more competitive and leading to an immediate supply response in the following three years. In particular, widely available labour meant rapid expansion of coffee and cocoa in the South West Region and in the Littoral Region. The devaluation also stimulated timber exports (Ndoye, 2000). Figure 4 clearly shows how net exports of agricultural products jumped substantially after devaluation, with imports declining in tandem with export increasing. Figure 5 also illustrates the substantial jump in agricultural GDP after devaluation.

Food crop production per capita also started to improve slightly from the early 1990s and rose slowly but steadily through to 2005. Figures 1, 2 and 3 above shows how the early 1990s were characterized by a stable and slowly increasing food crop production and by erratic non-food crop production: maize, roots/tubers and plantains increased hectareage, with the latter two crops also maintaining yields. One channel for greater local demand for food was that imported foodstuffs became much more expensive, so urban consumers switched again to locally-grown products. This meant per capita food availability started to increase for the first time since the early 1970s. The reforms also appear to have contributed to changes to the gendered division of labour in some rural areas. For example, Fonchingong (1999) highlights how the previous strict division between food and cash crops became blurred with the return of many urban migrants to rural locations, leading to greater intercropping of cash crops within food crop fields, and greater co-operation and labour intensity within agricultural production.

We can see how agricultural policy changed fundamentally in the decade between 1985 and 2000, with the privatisation or neutering of most public sector procurement and marketing boards. Figure 7 shows how nominal assistance to agriculture was more or less eliminated during this period, with export taxes erased. Bamou and Masters (2007) highlight how by the end of the 1990s most agricultural exports were imported by the European Union and then the United States, Japan and the Canada with zero tariffs, with the greatest preference margin offered by the EU. Just as with the

worsening human development indicators and the cocoa marketing case outlined above, this is not to portray the pricism and state minimalism of the era of structural adjustment as an unmitigated success. It was clearly a mixed process with some successes, failures and a painful decade for many households. A further example comes from the restructuring of the fertiliser market. Whilst the aim of the reforms was to create a competitive market for fertiliser supply, Bamou and Masters (2007) highlight that importers might have formed an oligopoly which fixed prices to create economic rents and never facilitated a credit programme to enable farmers purchase at such inflated prices.

This improved economic performance following devaluation lasted for at least a decade, partly due to the improved stability amongst the entire Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) region. Real economic growth averaged 5% per annum through to 2003, public expenditure was trimmed, government revenues rose and external debt levels fell (Bamou and Masters, 2007). This is partly reflected in a decline in the poverty headcount index of 13 percentage points between 1996 and 2001 (Bamou and Masters, 2007), and a ten percentage point drop in the rural poverty rate during the same period (see Figure 16). Figure 16 also highlights the substantial decline in urban poverty rates over this period as well as well as the lack of progress in tackling poverty in the savannah regions of the north.

Figure 16 - Poverty incidence and dynamics – 1996 - 2001

Incidence et dynamique de la pauvreté			
	1996	2001	Variation en %
Incidence (P0)			
Rural	59,6	49,9	-9,7
Urbain	41,4	22,1	-19,3
Total	53,3	40,2	-13,1
Profondeur (P1)			
Rural	21,5	18,3	-3,2
Urbain	14,7	6,3	-8,2
Total	19,1	14,1	-5,0

Source : DSCN, Rapports ECAM I et II

Zone	1996	2001	Variation
Urbaine			
Douala	37,3	18,5	-18,8
Yaoundé	49,0	18,3	-30,7
Autres villes	36,3	26,2	-10,1
Rurale			
Forêt	72,5	55,4	-17,1
Hauts	62,9	50,7	-12,2
Plateaux			
Savane	44,4	45,7	1,3
Ensemble	53,3	40,2	-13,1

Source : DSCN, Rapports ECAM I et II

Source: Government of Cameroon, 2003

3.3 Rwanda

During the early 1980s, the Rwandan government was a donor darling considered as a role model for other developing countries (although the scope and nature of state involvement was too comprehensive for extreme neo-liberalists). This attitude towards the government and its development strategy led many bilateral donors to allocate substantial aid flows to the country. Gradually, over the decade, debt built up – loans were given without the period's usual economic and political conditions. In the late 1980s, however, Habyarimana's government met increased international and domestic pressure to end single-party rule and introduce democratic reforms. Many multilateral and bilateral donors started to link continued support via aid and loans with progress on democratization and the establishment of a multi-party system. Some institutional changes occurred: the constitution was changed in 1991 to make multiparty competition legal, a notable step in the negotiations towards a power-sharing government.

According to Storey (2001), the 1980s were marked by droughts, excessive rains and plant diseases, which aggravated the structural constraints of the chronic shortage of land and rapid population growth. In addition, 1986 saw a dramatic decline of the world market price for coffee. This had a severe impact on Rwanda's economy. As state revenue from coffee exports were no longer channelled into the state budget to the same extent, government started to build up more debt and the state budget became heavily dependent on foreign aid as a source of foreign

exchange. Coffee had become an important source of rural income during the early 1980s and the plummeting prices increased hardship. From the middle of the 1980s there were also widespread protests against the system of compulsory communal labour used to reduce erosion by setting up various soil-protective measures.

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a military force mainly comprising of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. A civil war ensued for the next four years. The assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994 precipitated the Rwandan genocide where between 500,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred. The outbreak of the civil war in 1990 added to the burden of the state budget as military expenses and other war-related costs (for instance, the displacement of about 15% of the population) increased considerably.

Whilst government had already been in talks with the World Bank since 1988 regarding the implementation of a structural adjustment programme, no proper program was signed. However, in late 1990 government devalued the currency by 40% and again by 15% in 1991. The devaluations increased inflation and a reduced the purchasing power for basic consumer goods and inputs among due to the increased cost of imports. The first structural adjustment programme was signed in 1991 and was a fully-fledged version of the 'traditional' policy package: devaluation, downscaling of the public sector and introduction of user fees for various social services, phased removal of protectionist trade measures, privatization – and directly affecting agriculture – reduced subsidies to coffee producers. It also, however, included a social 'safety net' programme to reduce the impact on the poorest – a precursor for the poverty reduction strategies of the period to come (see below).

In the early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF – and several bilateral donors – continued to support the government with loans, hoping that it would improve the economy and thereby strengthen the road to multiparty rule and democracy. Funds were, however, diverted into the purchase of weapons and military equipment. In early 1993, aid programmes were suspended as conditions were not considered as being met and the government could not account for a substantial part of the funds (World Bank, 1995). This was followed by demands from major bilateral donors (including France) forcing the ruling president to accept the so-called Arusha Accords for a power-sharing agreement.

It is debatable to what extent the policy measures of the SAP were actually implemented. The World Bank itself considered that most measures were implemented – except for the removal of coffee subsidies. But some critical observers consider the implementation to be a major reason for the economic collapse of the country and indirectly financed the state's participation in the civil war, leading to the tragic events in 1994. Others argue that only a small part of the SAP was implemented while most of the loans were channelled into other purposes. In any case, the agreement spurred renewed confidence in the government. In total about USD\$190 million in disbursements were received in support for the SAP.

As part of the reform process, in 1990 government reduced purchasing prices by 20% (Kamola, 2007). Apart from reducing farmer income even more, the decrease also spurred a massive uprooting of coffee bushes and replanting with food crops – despite severe penalties. During 1991-1992, world market coffee prices dropped again, this time by almost 50%. As coffee constituted about 50% of export revenue, the decreasing prices upset the impact of the devaluation on both volume and profitability – and the external position was further aggravated (World Bank, 1995). The drop in coffee prices was the direct reason that the government did not eliminate subsidies to the Coffee Stabilization Fund.

Through the SAPs of 1991 and a later credit in 1998, donors envisaged a new market-oriented agricultural strategy. The strategy was to emphasize export-oriented production as well as food production for import substitution. Coffee and tea were particularly targeted: coffee policies would be adapted to the new market environment by targeting quality improvements and the sector would be liberalised (notably leading to the deregulation of the collection, processing and exporting of coffee from 1991-1992 and a reduction in the subsidies enjoyed by the Coffee Stabilization Fund). Efforts would also be directed towards increasing tea production and exports in order to decrease the importance of coffee in export revenues. Studies were to examine the potential of industrial plantations and outgrower schemes, new modes of applying fertilizer and other inputs and to narrow the gap between producer prices and world market prices. A reorganization of the marketing system and production units were also on the agenda. Overall, the possibilities for greater involvement of the private sector was explored.

The final component of the new agricultural strategy under SAP was to expand export diversification by promoting non-traditional crops like fresh vegetables, fruits and flowers and to increase import substitution via higher production of sugar, wheat and rice. The strategy would target particular crops but on the premise that general economic reforms would also have a positive impact on the profitability of agricultural activities. After 1990, however, production of all crops dropped noticeably due to the war. Part of the country (the North and North East) was no longer inhabited after the massive displacement of the population. For instance, banana production dropped sharply from 3.02 million MTs in 1989 to 2.12 million MTs in 1991 and 1.49 million MTs in 1994.

3.4 Tanzania

In the late 1970s, the Tanzanian agricultural economy was suffering from years of falling real producer prices, budget deficits in national crop authorities and rising internal transportation costs. This caused a 50% decrease in per capita agricultural exports from 1970. The first steps towards meaningful reform of the economy were taken in the beginning of the 1980s when government launched the 'National Economic Survival Programme' (1981) and the 'Structural Adjustment Program' (1983). The programmes sought to improve the agricultural economy by raising producer prices, devaluating the shilling, retrenching public sector workers, and liberalizing domestic marketing and international trade (World Bank, 2000). The programmes did not, however, receive proper funding, and therefore did not have a significant impact on the system (Isinika *et al*, 2003).

By 1986, the World Bank, IMF and some major donors persuaded the Tanzanian government, which by then was without the leadership of Nyerere, to commence major structural reforms backed by support from the IMF (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993). The three year 'Economic Recovery Program' (1986-89), as it was called, focused primarily on agriculture. It aimed to reduce the fiscal deficit on one hand, and on the other to stimulate growth through increasing agricultural incentives and investments in infrastructure, primarily funded by donor support (*ibid.*). The core recommendations of a 1983 World Bank report on the agricultural sector was translated into Tanzanian agricultural policy. Recommendations included prioritizing the allocation of resources and foreign exchange to the agricultural sector, a reduction of the role of parastatals, an increase in producer prices, the devaluation of the exchange rate to raise producer prices on export crops, a reduction of parastatal

losses, and the legalization of private sector involvement in agriculture (see Ponte, 2002). The shilling, which had been held artificially high throughout the pre-SAP period, was devaluated the following years through a series of changes towards a market-based currency exchange system (OECD, 1999). From 1986 to 1993 the exchange rate rose from 33 TSh/US\$ to 425 TSh/US\$ (WB, 2000). Everything else being equal, depreciation led to higher market incentives for export crops but greatly increased prices for imported consumer and producer goods.

From 1986, the deregulation of trade in food crops began (Insinika *et al* 2003). Movement restrictions were lifted from 1987 to 1990, and regional pricing of food crops was abandoned leading to a drop in producer prices in distant areas (*ibid.*). Private traders that now were free to trade in, for example, maize, mainly concerned themselves with marketing produce from regions close to Dar es Salaam, where transport are significantly lower. The purchasing parastatal, the National Milling Cooperation (NMC), was confined to buying in more remote regions.

The ERP was followed by the 'Economic and Social Action Program' from 1989-92. This policy continued the liberalization of the agricultural sector. Reforms included: the redefinition of the role of cooperative unions and the NMC; reform of the purchasing system for the Strategic Grain Reserve; a reduction in the role of export marketing boards; giving greater autonomy to cooperatives; increasing the role of the private sector in export crop marketing; and the rehabilitation of processing and storage facilities (again see Ponte, 2002).

Subsidies on fertilizer were reduced from the late 1980s and removed in 1994 (World Bank, 2000). The rise in the cost of fertilizer reduced application and thus lowered the growth rate in production, such that there was a rural per capita decline in maize production by 16% from 1987-91 to 1992-96 (Mertens, 2000).⁶ Ponte (2002) also shows that liberalization also meant that private traders neglected distant areas. At the same time, there was a decline in credit given to cooperatives, all in all decreasing smallholders' access to inputs.

Overall, the results of the reforms on agricultural production are contested. The official view is that the reforms had very positive effects in the first years after the reforms (1987-91) but stagnated in the following years (partly due to poor weather). However, Ponte (2002) contends agricultural statistics are very inaccurate, and looking at different data sources yields different conclusions on

the successes of the reforms. Ponte (2002) asserts that according to crop production figures, agricultural growth was similar before and after the reforms.

It has been argued that discussion of the failure of neo-liberal reforms in Tanzania meant further liberalization of the agricultural sector was resisted (Cooksey, 2011). However, reforms continued throughout the 1990s. The liberalization of trade in export crops began in 1993. Now private traders could buy, process and export crops (such as coffee, cotton, tobacco and cashew), which previously had been restricted to cooperative unions and parastatal authorities (World Bank, 2000). The entry of private traders lowered the marketing cost and thus raised the producer price as a share of the export price (Isinika, 2003). Even so producer prices for many cash crops did not increase until the latter part of the 1990s (partly due to the appreciation of the shilling and changes in world market prices – World Bank, 2000). Governmental expenditure on agriculture dropped significantly through the 1990s as a consequence of fiscal savings. Much of decrease can be attributed to the reduction in subsidies for fertilizer, but budget lines were also reduced for crop and livestock development, research and development, and for the mismanaged NMC (World Bank, 2000). In 1999 agriculture only accounted for 3.5% of the state budget (*ibid.*).

3.5 Summary

Compared to the changes in the basic models between the two previous periods, the models undergo far more dramatic alterations towards the end of the millennium. The primary reason is the implementation of a series of national structural adjustment programs, initially spurred by the general debt crisis of most developing countries following the ‘petro-dollar’ instigated heavy borrowing and the monetarist policies pursued by the major industrialised countries, the latter being the prevalent economic policy treatment to cure the economic downturn in the same countries. The programs (financially backed and ideologically inspired by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – and therefor also by most bilateral donors) were all based on the same prescription including liberalisation, privatisation, budgetary cuts and devaluation. However, there are variations between the countries in the actual constellation of policy means and the timing of their execution: broadly speaking, the programmes started in the early 1980s in Ghana and Tanzania while their implementation starts towards the end of the 1980s in Rwanda (due to the ‘pet’ status in

the international donor community) and Cameroon (due to the oil revenues that cushioned the public budget deficit from externally-induced reforms).

As for the *large-scale estate model* and *large-scale state farms*, there was an increasing trend over the decades towards privatisation of state-owned companies, including withdrawal of state capital from joint ventures with private capital. These fundamental revisions of former efforts to control or participate in key agricultural sub-sectors are motivated by a mixture of ideological and efficiency concerns. For many reasons the privatisation process became protracted due to opposition from vested interests, lack of investor interest, hence the dismantling of state owned companies is a prevalent component in the programs throughout the period.

Components related to *peasant/smallholder production* were also repetitively addressed over the two decades. Basically, it was a question of rolling back most of the non-market based supportive measures that after independence gradually were incorporated in policies directed to promote commercialisation of peasant farming. The removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs, primarily fertilizers, is prevalent in all the programs. This had dramatic consequences in terms of increased production costs for small-scale farmers and reduced application of fertilizers, leading to a decreasing production (e.g. cocoa and coffee in Cameroon, coffee in Rwanda, maize in Tanzania). But the replacement of public service institutions by private traders and new systems of input provision did not materialize at the expected pace and farmers were often left without access to vital inputs.

Furthermore, the dismantling (or partial fragmentation) of marketing boards and the end of their monopsony power due to inefficiency and chronic budgetary deficits did, in principle, open up space for private traders downstream, but in many cases remote locations were not served: marketing channels for farmers in these areas were only maintained due to the activities of public ‘buyers of last resort’ (i.e. the remains of former parastatals, such as the National Milling Corporation in Tanzania). However, some marketing boards were maintained and only partially liberalised as they dealt with ‘protected crops’ of social and regional significance (as in the case of cotton in Cameroon) or crops of national economic importance (as in the case of cocoa in Ghana). The widespread system of guaranteed and state-determined purchasing prices administered by the marketing boards was also removed, the objective being to increase purchasing prices through

competition among private traders. These intentions were now and then eroded by decreasing world market prices and inadequate currency devaluations, resulting in lower prices of export crops offered to farmers and a shift towards domestic food crops – and back again towards export crops following currency depreciation (cf. the 1994-adjustment of the CFA Franc for Cameroon). Finally, favourable credit schemes with (relatively) low rates of interest and in some cases priority allocations of loans to the small-scale farmers were scaled down or removed – as were allocations to the public institutions for research, training and extension services. Summing up, most of the former supportive measures for commercialisation of peasant/smallholder production was abandoned leaving it to market incentives and dynamics to stimulate agricultural production.

4. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Participation

The fourth period is concerned with agricultural transformation during the so-called Post Washington Consensus dominated development policy and practices. Two key components of this approach were the production of PRSPs and greater participation by civil society in development policy processes. As always, Ghana is discussed, followed by Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania.

4.1 Ghana

The analyses of data from the Ghana Living Standards Surveys of 1991/92 and 1998/99 shows that growth in the agricultural sector stimulated higher rates of growth in the economy through forward linkage activities such as processing and transportation. Backward linkages, the provision of services to the sector, plus the additional growth engendered by the spending of incomes earned from all these productive activities, were also important. Poverty reduction was, however, limited by widening inequality. High labour absorption by the sector, as an employment avenue, is confirmed by estimates of an economy-wide multi-market model, which showed that the agricultural sector was the most labour-intensive sector of the economy (MoFA, 2007).

The heterogeneous agricultural production structure of Ghana in the 2000s manifests itself in differences in the agriculture income structure across regions. The Forest Zone generates about half its agricultural income from two of Ghana's major export goods (cocoa and timber). Including non-traditional exports and fishery, agricultural exports play an important role in total agricultural income for the Coast and Southern Savannah Zones. In contrast, 90% of agricultural income in the Northern Zone comes from staple crops and livestock. Domestic demand for many of these staple crops is income inelastic, meaning that strong growth can lead to price deterioration. Therefore, growth in agricultural sub-sectors have typically had strong region-specific income and poverty effects. At the regional level, the contribution to agricultural growth from land expansion and yield increases between 1992 and 2005 varied across crops. However, the general trend suggests that land expansion contributed more than yield increases to the growth of most crops, with the exception of cassava and yam in the Coastal Zone. In some cases, yields contracted over these years, as in the cases of maize, sorghum, and yam in the Northern Savannah, and cocoyam, plantain and yam in the

Forest Zone (FAO 2005). This is explained by the deterioration of land quality caused by over-farming and the low rates of fertilizer application.

The Accelerated Agriculture Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS)

In 1996 the Ghana government launched the Vision 2020 framework document, which aimed at stimulating economic growth and to move the country to middle-income status by the year 2020. As part of Vision 2020 the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS) was developed in 2000 as the new agricultural strategy and was programmed for implementation over a ten-year period (2001-2010). The AAGDS sought to significantly increase the production of selected products by improving access to markets. This was to be done by developing and improving access to technology for sustainable natural resource management, improving access to agricultural finance, improving the quality of agriculture-related infrastructure, and enhancing the human resource and institutional capacity in the sector. One of the strategies under AAGDS was the transformation of the agricultural sector. This was to be done under the Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP), the implementation of which commenced in 2002.

The First Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I)

In 2001 Ghana enrolled in the HIPC-programme and as a prerequisite for debt relief under HIPC, the government developed the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (GPRS). The first of Ghana's PRSP (GPRS I) was implemented over the period 2003-2006. Having recognized the importance of agriculture to the economy in terms of reducing poverty, and as a platform for growth, the sector was prioritised under the GPRS I. The agriculture programmes under the GPRS I focused on land reform, increased irrigation, increased mechanization, increased use of improved technologies, value addition to traditional crops such as cocoa, expansion of cash crop production and strengthening of support to the private sector. These strategies were consistent with existing strategic plans and subsequently translated into the strategic policy frameworks for agriculture such as the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) and the National Aquaculture Development Plan. The government also offered subsidies on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and embarked upon free mass-spraying exercises to boost cocoa production (via the prevention of

black pod and swollen shoot disease). Due to these policies, the ratio of fertilizer use to arable land increased from 2.5 to 7.5 during 2000-2002 to 2005-2007. Both the FASDEP I and AAGDS represented government's orientation towards private-sector led development in the agriculture sector. This orientation is also evident in the policies for cocoa which continues to be the most important agricultural sector. Although the permission of private companies to buy cocoa was started in 1992, the export of cocoa was only liberalized in 2000, bringing to an end COCOBOD's export monopoly (Brooks *et al*, 2007).

4.2 Cameroon

A key turning point in the improvement of Cameroon's agricultural performance was obtaining debt relief via the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in 2000 (Bella, 2009). As HIPC predicated large-scale debt relief on the completion and implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (such that HPIC can broadly be seen as a debt-for-PRSP swap) government produced this document in 2003. The PRSP outlines the national Millennium Development targets, such as to reduce by at least half the number of Cameroonians living below the poverty line in 2015. The document clearly states how HIPC debt relief should enable the targeting of resources to reduce poverty and how this should be achieved through participation of all social actors. Based on participatory consultations with citizens and stakeholders, the PRSP's priorities were to improve the supply of basic health and education services, to improve the provision of clean drinking water and to rehabilitate rural roads. The document also outlines a series of process reforms: improving transparency and accountability; strengthening the rule of law; and promoting decentralisation (Government of Cameroon, 2003).

As the PRSP was mainly concerned with the social sectors, agriculture did not feature that prominently. Indeed, there was a lack of prioritisation within a long list of measures aimed at improving agricultural performance. The PRSP did aim to particularly boost peasant production, improve processing and support peri-urban agriculture to supply urban markets with food crops, especially cereals (presumably to reduce imports of expensive food grains). In addition, conventional export crops as well as fruits, vegetables, pepper, horticultural crops and watermelon were highlighted. The main agronomic means through which this was to be achieved was via improved seeds and extension (Bella, 2009). The emphasis on extension is reflected when

comparing the proportion of agricultural aid spent on extension: this accounted for 28% in Cameroon in the early years of the decade, compared to only 10% in Ghana and 6% in Mali (Dewbre and Borot de Battisti, 2008).

Interestingly, the PRSP also contained a series of process and institutional measures to improve agricultural production (Government of Cameroon, 2003). Reflecting the increased emphasis on participatory modes of development planning, the PRSP supported the strengthening of communities via a National Participatory Development Programme and a Programme of Support to Community Development. In this respect, the withdrawal of the state in agriculture provided a certain amount of space for producer organisations to try to fill this gap. A good example of this is described by Bingen *et al* (2003), who highlight how SODECOTON in the North Region and Far North Region delegated numerous functions to the *Organisation des Producteurs de Coton du Cameroun* (OPCC). A further example comes from Bella (2009) who highlight how producer organisations supplied up to 20% of inputs to farmers after liberalisation (with the remaining actors being private sector firms, only half of whom had a licence). Whilst producer organisations might provide some way of linking farmers to markets, such associations frequently lack a sustainable source of funding leading to questions about their long-term viability.⁷

The first PRSP also contained numerous further initiatives. A new national micro-credit scheme was created along with a fund for longer-term investments in agricultural projects. It also supported vocational training in agriculture with the aim of improving the technical skills of professionals and organisations. The PRSP also restructured control over the agricultural sector by increasing the Ministry of Finance's oversight of expenditure and revenue decisions. Bella (2009) offers two examples: first, further removal of subsidies from within the agricultural sector (to lower expenditures); and second, the addition of Value Added Tax rates on agricultural inputs and equipment for livestock. The influence of the Ministry of Agriculture has also been curtailed through the dominant role of the Ministry of Commerce in trade negotiations, which sidelined any role for agricultural officials.

Turning to specific crops, Figure 1 shows how food crop production plateaued during the early 2000s, whilst export crop performance slumped and then recovered. Breaking these aggregates down, Figure 2 highlights how many food crops suffered a sharp decline in hectareage in 1999 and

struggled to make up the lost ground for the next five years (Figure 5 corroborates the sharp reduction of real agricultural GDP in this particular year). Turning to export crops, cocoa shows a stagnation of hectarage through this period, whilst coffee and cotton show sharp reductions in area. Figure 3 illustrates that the loss in cotton hectarage was compensated for by an increase in yields, this didn't occur for coffee. Cocoa yields improved. Thus, we find increasing net exports from cocoa and cotton but a decline for coffee. The early years of the 2000s also show a rapid increase in the net importation of wheat, flour, rice and cereals (see Figure 4).

Focusing just on cotton, Serra (2012) highlights how the failed attempts to privatize SODECOTON in 1997 led to a reformed parastatal which has performed well in the following decade and a half. Serra (2012) attributes the continued success of the parastatal to efficiency and a political settlement between central government and the Muslim Fulani elites in the north whereby political support for the authoritarian regime is exchanged for great autonomy in how the rents from the cotton sector are distributed. The remoteness of the North Region also gives the bureaucrats some space to run their own affairs. A wider consideration has been that any failed attempts at privatization and liberalization of the cotton sector could undermine one source of stability in the north and loosen the current, albeit imperfect, social compact between the northern regions and central government. This is not to say that the sector doesn't have problems: side-selling is common leading to defaults on loans. In 2010 government created a national cotton producer organization which would take a stake in SODECOTON if it is ever privatized.

The 2000s also saw an exacerbation of two important trends: first, an increase in the relative importance of Cameroonian food crop production as a source of supply for regional markets (due to poor agricultural performance in neighbouring countries); and second, growth of horticultural crops to feed urban demand. This second trend examined by Gockowski (2005) who, based on a survey of 300 households, reports how horticultural growers used very high levels of inputs, tended to have less land, and needed to be close to good road networks (as otherwise transportation costs became prohibitive). Gockowski (2005) also highlighted how the age of growers was much lower than non adopters and that there was a weak association between cocoa production and horticulture. Key crops included tomatoes, bananas, green maize, okra and chillis.

Reflecting the lack of concern with agriculture in the PRSP compared to the social sectors, Dewbre and Borot de Battisti (2008) which highlights how between 2001 to 2005 total donor aid directed to

agriculture was not more than 0.5% of agricultural GDP, falling to less than 0.2% in 2007. Moreover, many of these expenditures focused on institutional reforms, not productivity enhancing measures.

4.3 Rwanda

The trend of introducing and prioritizing poverty-alleviating components in the structural adjustment programmes also occurred in Rwanda. According to Ansom (2008), Rwanda entered the PRSP process in 2000 and the externally-funded reform programmes during the first decade of the new millennium changed both name and content. The first programme (PRSP-1) was implemented during 2002-2005 and was elaborated in a post-conflict environment where the main emphasis was on managing a transition from emergency relief (flowing in during the second half of the 1990s) to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The second programme (Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy – PRSP-2) was drafted in 2006 and was implemented during the 2008-2012 period (see below). International financial institutions and bilateral donors primarily financed both programmes.

The PRSPs are set within the broader framework of the government's important long-term strategy formulated in the Vision 2020 (GoR, 2000), which subsequently has served as a reference point for a series of medium-term strategic plans during the first decade of the new millennium. The Vision 2020 was the result of a national consultative process in 1998-1999 and was made official in 2000. Six main pillars serve as a strategic platform with the overall aim to transform Rwanda from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy. One of the pillars is directly related to the agricultural sector, namely to transform agriculture '...into a productive, high value, market oriented sector, with forward linkages to other sectors' (GoR, 2000, p. 3). This is considered necessary as the sector is unproductive (with little use of fertilizer) and is still dominated by subsistence production with further fragmentation of arable land and associated environmental degradation. It also encompasses about 90% of the country's labour force. Productivity growth is considered to be essential and is to be reached by institutional and legal land reforms (private ownership and land markets), expansion of rural infrastructure (including research services and financing schemes), a focus on high-value crops and livestock, and through the development of new agro-businesses.

In accordance with the Vision 2020, the PRSP-1 also included rural development and agricultural transformation as a main component for poverty reduction. Despite relatively strong aggregate economic growth, poverty only fell during the PRSP-1 period by 2.2% percentage points and more than half of the population continued to live below the consumption poverty line. Extreme poverty fell by 4.4% percentage points between 2001 and 2005, but still affected more than one third of the population. Income inequality remained high and rose from 0.47 to 0.51 measured by the Gini coefficient (MINICOFIN, 2013). Some observers (such as Ansom, 2008) argue that these rather disappointing results come to no surprise: only one of the 17 sub-programmes had a clear pro-poor character. It focused on reducing food and nutritional deficits in particular zones and increase employment for vulnerable groups through labour-intensive work. Compared to the other sub-programmes, the allocations were relatively insignificant (about 1% annually over the period). Only modest attention was paid towards the needs of the most vulnerable groups and, furthermore, the understanding of who are vulnerable is fairly restricted; for instance, near-landless farmers were not included (Ansom, 2008).


As for agriculture, high growth (starting from and gradually increasing from about 5% per year) was anticipated, first of all due to a rapid increase in the use of fertilizers. For this purpose, the World Bank's Agricultural and Rural Market Development Project was implemented. The project provided credit for farmers to buy fertilizer and advisory services related to its application, and credit to improve distribution, import and marketing systems. Nationwide results were promising, particularly for growers of Irish potatoes and maize. The project was also relatively successful in improving the private distribution system and increasing the number of private importers.

However, annual growth rates fluctuated considerably during the period and even contracted in 2003/4 primarily because of the impact of poor weather on food crop production. According to Ansom (2008) other problems included low allocations of state funding to the agricultural sector (about 2-5% of the total budget), and low absorptive capacity of the sector. More generally, the results question the potential of a growth-oriented strategy for poverty reduction in Rwanda, mostly because of the highly unequal distribution of land holdings.

New elements towards diversification were incorporated in the state's efforts to increase revenue from coffee and tea, by far the most important export crops. Coffee production experienced the

‘usual’ fluctuations due to weather conditions with 2003 being the worst year. However, prices went up during the period and (green) coffee continued to be a major foreign exchange earner (about 30% in the period) despite unstable production (see Figure 17) .

Figure 17 - Coffee production and prices in Rwanda, 2002 - 2005



Source: CAADP, 2006

The main areas for coffee cultivation are still located along Lake Kivu in the Western Province and also scattered locations in the Southern and Eastern Provinces. During this period, the estimated total coffee area was about 33,000 hectares with about 500,000 farmers involved. Unit values of exported coffee increased substantially as government started to promote quality improvement and better marketing by stimulating the establishment of more washing stations and better accessibility to specialty niche markets in high-income markets. This is part of a strategy to increase both quantity and quality of coffee production (CAADP, 2006).

Tea production did not fluctuate as much as coffee but hovered around a total of about 14,000-18,000 tons per year during the period. The main areas for tea are more or less the same as for coffee although the Northern province replaces the Eastern Province as a major area for this crop. In contrast, though, tea was still produced by state-owned estates with attached processing factories. Due to the implementation of previous initiatives under the SAPs, the privatization of the facilities continued. However, individuals or associations of growers (farmers’ groups) own nearly half (44%) of the tea estates.

Even though tea exports increased, revenue was almost constant as prices decreased correspondingly. Hence, in 2000, government introduced a premium on good quality leaves and improved the transportation to the Mombassa tea auction in order to increase unit values. Also in this sector, the strategy aims at a substantial increase of production by both improvement of yields and area expansion, particularly of so-called ‘mountain tea’ which is generally of higher quality than ‘swamp tea’.

4.4 Tanzania

Agricultural and livestock policy in the late 1990s was essentially an update of the agricultural policy of the early 1980s. The two general goals of the policy were to improve standards in rural areas through increased income generation from agriculture and livestock production, processing and marketing, and to develop and introduce new technologies which increase the productivity of labour and land. From 2000 there were attempts by government to reduce the number of cesses or levies that farmers are imposed by local authorities (URT, 2008). The practice of collecting various taxes on produce or land was seen as a disincentive to agricultural investment (WB, 2000; Isinika, 2003a).

In the beginning of the 2000s, government amended legislation regulating the marketing of export crops, especially the role of marketing boards. As explained above, in the early 1990s these boards were stripped of much of their former powers of overseeing the production, marketing and export of major export crops. Their responsibility shifted to controlling quality and licencing private traders (Cooksey, 2011). However, from 1997 to 2001 we can see a degree of back-peddling by government: crop specific Acts on coffee, tobacco and cotton were amended to increase the role of parastatal boards once again (URT, 2008). For example, the amendment of the coffee industry Act in 2001 gave the coffee board the mandate of approving and supervising the growing and production of coffee, which practically meant keeping a register of all growers (*ibid.*). In addition, the board can undertake commercial activity, and is therefore financially supported by government (Cooksey, 2011). Cooksey (2011) sees these reversals – from the gradual process of liberalisation over the previous two decades – as reflecting that the Tanzanian political elite was breaking with (or was never fully engaged with) the neo-liberal policy agenda which they officially support in donor-sponsored programs.

In 2001 Tanzania was the fourth country to receive debt relief from the IMF through HIPC (URT, 2000). The conditionalities attached to the debt relief was the implementation of the PRSP by the Tanzanian government. As the title of the program suggests, the PRSP is focused on reducing poverty measured by the UN Millennium Development Goal indicators. On agriculture, the program states that ‘the government will endeavour that the poor and the private sector in general, take the lead in developing durable mechanisms and schemes that are effective and as far as possible, market oriented’ (URT, 2000). Thus, the underlying belief in liberalisation as the right guideline in agricultural policy was still in the general policy discourse (Cooksey, 2011). Whilst the PRSP is mainly a strategic paper, other policy documents had more concrete impacts on the agricultural sector during this period.

The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and its implementation programme (ASDS/P) was a sector wide approach approved by government in 2005/6 as required in the PRSP (Cooksey 2012). It had the objective of achieving a sustained agricultural growth rate of 5% per annum largely through the commercialisation of subsistence agriculture. This transformation was to be private sector-led through an improved enabling environment for enhancing the productivity of agriculture. Specific goals included strengthening the institutional framework for managing agricultural development, creating a favourable climate for commercial activities (including improving the marketing of inputs and outputs) and improving transport and trade (see Cooksey, 2012). The program was implemented through district agricultural development plans administered by local authorities. Pre-empting the strong investments in agriculture in recent years, the agricultural share of the national budget increased from 3.8 % in 2000 to 4.6 in 2007/8 (Cooksey 2012).

4.5 Summary

After more than a decade with structural adjustment programs the turn of the century marked a gradual, albeit somewhat hesitant, transition to a less market-oriented policy framework in all four countries. Stabilisation and adjustment of national economies did not ‘trickle down’ to reach the poor at the expected pace and the impact on poverty reduction was insignificant – if not directly harmful: privatization and reduction of public expenditures resulted in massive layoffs with consequent loss of aggregate domestic demand and negative multiplier effects. In addition, external

public debt was not substantially liquidated and continued to be a heavy burden for state budgets eroding expenditures for social development in sectors like health and education. The response from the international donor community was to organize and offer debt relief for national poverty reduction strategies within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).

Hence, during the first year of the 2000s, all four countries implemented so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that were initiated, discussed and drafted in the final years of the former century. For many reasons the attention towards social sectors was overwhelming and agriculture received only modest interest (and financial allocations) in the strategies. This was reflected in a more prominent role for finance ministries and a pronounced ‘sidelining’ of the agricultural sector expertise in the implementation of the PRSPs, particular prevalent in the case of Cameroon. Policies and initiatives towards the agricultural sector in the PRSPs mostly addressed institutional issues like means to promote and improve the (private) distributing channels for supply of inputs (mainly seed and fertilizers), increase access to formal credit (various micro-finance schemes for farmers), and improve rural infrastructure to increase access to markets. A common feature of these initiatives is that even though they potentially include peasant/smallholder production (to stimulate commercialization) the benefits are difficult to capture for farmers with limited resources (particularly land and capital). In any case, the components in the PRSPs that explicitly address poverty reduction were limited, as revealed in the debate on the poverty reduction impact of the first PRSP in Rwanda.

The distinction between peasant farming and large-scale ‘modernized’ farming become somewhat blurred in the PRSPs. This is also the case in the period’s official agricultural strategy papers. They are all somewhat related to the PRSP but not particularly poverty directed as priority is put on support to institutional improvements and, albeit to a lesser extent, various technical solutions to increase productivity. The attention to value added activities are maintained (as, for instance, capturing the new opportunities for simple cocoa processing in Ghana) but now also including increasing attention to quality issues for unprocessed crops (e.g. coffee and tea exports from Rwanda).

Two interesting phenomena – or rather revivals of institutions from earlier periods – are the new role and importance attached by the state (cf. in Cameroon) to various types of farmer organizations

and parastatals. The former is considered to be an efficient ‘tool’ to strengthen community cohesion, organize input supplies, establish savings and credit groups, and disseminate ‘best practice’ and cooperation potentials among farmers. The latter is particularly visible in the case of Tanzania, where a number of crop boards (for coffee, sugar, tobacco and cotton) were re-designed, not to their former position as active participants in specific value chains but to take up new regulatory roles concerning cultivation practices, quality and licensing.

5. Growth and structural change

Our final period concerns the most recent policy initiatives aimed at agricultural transformation. As these are on-going initiatives, many of which will continue for years or decades to come, it has not been possible to evaluate their success or efficacy. Instead, we outline the broad sets of measures included in these policy frameworks, starting with Ghana, Cameroon and finishing with Rwanda and Tanzania.

5.1 Ghana

Ghana's overall performance in terms of agricultural production and productivity can be considered as inadequate, simply because it has failed to make a serious dent on food security. That notwithstanding, we note that overall production of roots and tubers, cereals, legumes and cash crops have generally increased (see Table 1 and Table 2). Commercial food imports and food aid constituted about 4.7% of food needs in the last fifteen years.

Table 1 - Average Production Rates of Selected Crops in Ghana, 1999 - 2001

CROP	1999-2001	2002-2004	2005-2007	2008-2010
Root & Tubers				
Cassava	8306.0	9902.8	9807.7	12361.9
Cocoyam	1673.3	1793.5	1678.6	1515.7
Yam	3386.2	3868.4	4195.6	5544.4
Plantain	2017.6	2329.4	2975.1	3479.3
Cereals				
Maize	988.4	1282.2	1193.3	1653.8
Millet	154.5	159.6	144.2	219.4
Sorghum	287.2	313.7	256.3	335.3
Rice Paddy	225.9	253.6	223.9	395.0
Legumes				
Groundnuts	247.7	449.5	413.9	495.4
Beans	62.5	142.3	143.2	201.3

Source: MoFA Facts and Figures 2010

Table 2 - Production of Industrial Crops (MTs)


Year	Cocoa	Coffee	Rubber	Sheanut	Oil Palm
1997	322490	2880	n.a.	21504	955505
1998	409360	8370	n.a.	34886	1022010
1999	397675	3965	n.a.	17465	1031919
2000	436634	1956	11080	30771	1066426
2001	389591	1379	9784	19882	1586500
2002	340562	1464	10240	27160	1612700
2003	496846	338	10924	n.a	1640100
2004	736975	477	12347	n.a	1686800
2005	599318	270	13619	n.a	1712600
2006	740458	164	13618	n.a	1737900
2007	614532	304	15318	n.a	1684500
2008	680800	2024	14132	698	1896760
2009	710738	516	19134	31386	2103600
2010	903646	n.a	n.a.	n.a	2004300

Source: MoFA Facts and Figures 2010

In spite of the slow growth, the contribution of Ghana's agricultural sector to the economy continues to be very significant. Agriculture provides employment to large numbers of the population in addition to contributing significantly to foreign exchange earnings. In 2011, the agriculture sector continued to contribute significantly despite Ghana's oil find. The potential of agriculture in reducing poverty in Ghana cannot be downplayed. It has been shown that growth led by the agricultural sector will be effective in reducing poverty both at the national level and in the poor regions because of strong income and consumption linkages. Also, although past growth and poverty reduction was stimulated through support for export crops, support to increase productivity in staple crops, by virtue of the broad-based nature of their production, can generate faster growth and poverty reduction (Breisinger *et al*, 2008).

A rebasing exercise undertaken in the year 2006 adjusted the agriculture share of GDP slightly downward to about 30 percent between the years 2006 and 2009 (Figure 18). However employment continues to be dominated by agriculture (see Table 3). Indeed, even these employment statistics may have a large variance as agricultural production is often not a full-time job and so small-scale self-employment in non-agricultural activities is unlikely to be covered by employment statistics.

Figure 18 - GDP by sector, Ghana, 1965-2012



Source: 2012 World Development Indicators

Table 3 - Employment by sector, Ghana, 1992, 1999 and 2006

Sector	1992	1999	2006
Agriculture	52	55	57.2
Industry	10.1	14	13.6
Services	27.9	31.1	29.1

Source: World Development Indicators 2012


Ghana continues to have a food deficit, mainly in cereals, meat, fish and fats and oils. The production of root and tubers, fruits and vegetables have shown improvement in supply over the past years. As we've seen, the importation of cereals and food aid continue to feature in the total food supply (FAO, 2012). In terms of cash crop production, the country still has great potential. For instance Ghana is the second leading producer of cocoa in the world and could potentially become the world number one with proper measures in place. Cocoa production occurs in the forested area of the country – Ashanti Region, Brong Ahafo Region, Central Region, Eastern Region, Western Region and the Volta Region. Other industrial crops are: palm oil, cotton, rubber, sugar cane, tobacco, kenaf and shea. None of these crops apart from cocoa, has received serious attention

despite their strategic importance to the local industries and export market. Shea for instance remains a wild crop today with just about 50% of the total production harvested in a year due to inadequate measures. Shea has the potential of reducing the poverty gap between the Northern and Southern Ghana, and contribute significantly to the nation, just as cocoa is doing (FAO, 2005). Livestock production also plays a pivotal role in Ghana's agriculture and contributes largely towards meeting food needs, providing draught power, manure to maintain soil fertility and cash income, particularly for farmers in the northern part of the country. The livestock sector contributes about 7 percent to Ghana's GDP. The Forest Zone remains the major agricultural producer, accounting for 43 percent of agricultural GDP, compared to about 10 percent in the Coastal Zone, and 26.5 and 20.5 percent in the Southern and Northern Savannah Zones, respectively. The Northern Savannah zone is the main producer of cereals and livestock. More than 70 percent of the country's sorghum, millet, cowpeas, groundnuts, beef and soybeans come from the Northern Zone, while the Forest Zone supplies a large share of higher-value products, such as cocoa and livestock, mainly commercial poultry (IFPRI, 2008). The main policy framework that has and continues to guide agriculture policy in Ghana over the last few years is the second phase of the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II).

The Second Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II)

FASDEP II derives from the national vision in the GPRS II, and NEPAD's CAADP and aims to contribute to the first MDG - halving poverty by 2015. FASDEP II objectives are to improve food security, increase income, and improve market access. It seeks to do this by allocating at least 10% of annual government expenditure to the agricultural sector, targeting the poor appropriately and working towards gender equity. The target agricultural GDP growth under the FASDEPII is at least 6% per annum to support national growth (see Figure 19). FASDEP II outlines six objective areas to address the goals for the sector. These objective areas therefore form the basis of programmes and activities in the sector plan, which in turn serves as the operational framework of investment programmes for the period 2009 to 2015. The first two programmes are on food security and growth in incomes. Three other programme areas are on market access, environmental sustainability and science and technology support the commodity interventions. A final programme on institutional coordination supports the framework for all interventions.

Figure 19 - Agricultural Growth, Ghana, 2007-2012



Source: 2012 World Development Indicators

The corresponding investment plan for the achievement of goals under the FASDEP II is the Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan (METASIP). METASIP (2011 – 2015) was adopted in September 2010 as the strategic plan for implementation of FASDEP II. The major agriculture initiatives under the METASIP include the following: the establishment of an Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund to provide appropriate and adequate funding to operators for production, processing and value addition; the establishment of the National Food Buffer Stock Company, Ghana Commodities Exchange and Warehouse Receipt System to enhance the marketing of agricultural produce, guarantee minimum prices to farmers, stabilize food prices and improve incomes of farmers; and the provision of subsidies for inputs.

FASDEP II emphasizes the importance of graduating from a subsistence-based smallholder system to a sector characterized by a stronger market-based orientation based on a combination of productive smallholders alongside larger commercial enterprises engaged in agricultural production, agro-processing and other activities along the value chain. To maximize the impacts of private investment in agriculture on development, a particular focus is to facilitate smallholder linkages with other commercial businesses through, for instance, contract farming and outgrower schemes. The major thrust of this policy therefore is to enhance the role of commercial agriculture and strengthen agricultural value chains. This is premised on the belief that innovative institutional arrangements between larger scale investors and smallholders in agriculture can generate mutual benefits and provide effective mechanisms for bolstering small-holder productivity.

5.2 Cameroon

In 2007 government started the process for updating its development strategy and presented this in November 2009 (Government of Cameroon, 2009). The new policy document was termed the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) and summarises the limited improvements made in reducing poverty under the previous PRSP: the national headcount poverty rate only decreased from 40.2% in 2003 to 39.9 in 2007 (with a drop in the poverty gap index from 12.8% to 12.3%). Indeed, little visible progress is noticeable on a number of important Millennium Development Goal targets: net primary school enrolment only declined by 0.3 percentage points; infant mortality declined slightly from 150.7 to 144 per thousand live births; maternal mortality actually increased from 430 to 669 per 100 000 live births. One bright spark was an improvement in the enrollment of girls in primary education from 0.83 to 0.89 between 2001 and 2007. A further small consolation was the inequality declined slightly nationally, and within urban and rural spheres (see Table 4).

Table 4 - Gini coefficient 1996, 2001, 2007

	1996	2001	2007
National	0.416	0.404	0.390
Urban	0.419	0.407	0.352
Rural	0.344	0.332	0.322

Source: Government of Cameroon (2009)

The GESP also clearly highlights spatial dimensions to the changes in poverty rates. For example, poverty rates did drop in urban locations (especially Douala and Yaounde) whilst they increased in rural areas (especially in the north). This meant that by 2007 over half the population in rural areas in 2007 were poor whilst the urban rate was only 12.7%. A further telling statistic is that 94% of the extreme poor (the poorest quintile of the population) lived in rural areas. The changing poverty levels between 2001 and 2007 are shown in Figure X. Reflecting the emphasis on the social sectors in the first PRSP, the GESP highlights a 4 percentage point improvement in literacy between 2001 and 2007.⁸

Table 5 - Poverty rates (P0, P1, P2) in 2001 and 2007

	2001			2007		
	P0	P1	P2	P0	P1	P2
National	40.2	12.8	5.6	39.9	12.3	5.0
Area of residence						
Urban	17.9	4.3	1.6	12.2	2.8	1.0
Rural	52.1	17.3	7.7	55.0	17.5	7.2
Region						
Douala	10.9	2.1	0.7	5.5	0.9	0.2
	13.3	2.7	0.9	5.9	1.0	0.2
Adamawa	48.4	15.4	6.4	53.0	14.5	5.4
Centre	48.2	15.0	6.6	41.2	9.5	3.1
East	44.0	15.4	6.7	50.4	15.7	6.2
Far North	56.3	18.8	8.2	65.9	24.6	11.2
Littoral	35.5	10.1	4.2	31.1	7.7	2.7
North	50.1	15.5	6.4	63.7	21.0	8.6
North-West	52.5	20.9	10.7	51.0	16.6	6.8
West	40.3	11.1	4.2	28.9	6.6	2.3
South	31.5	7.4	2.4	29.3	7.4	2.7
South-West	33.8	10.5	4.5	27.5	6.9	2.5

Source: Government of Cameroon (2009) ⁹

As stated above, the PRSP process facilitated the realization of debt relief. Cameroon saw its national debt declined from around five to two trillion CFAF by the end of 2006. It had declined by a further 500 billion CFAF by the end of 2008, in both cases due to debt forgiveness by foreign creditors. But despite this considerable improvement in external liabilities, Cameroon didn't record particularly impressive growth rates during the period 2003-2007: 3.3% per annum which was lower than the early part of the decade, and not much above the population growth rate. The GESP fully recognises how this poor performance was partly due to poor agricultural output and infrastructure. The strategy aims to intensify agriculture to ensure food self-sufficiency, increase domestic processing and improve the balance of trade. Table 6 illustrates both the poor performance of agriculture in the early 2000s (as described above) and the projected forecasts for 2015.

Table 6 - Agricultural production figures, estimates and projections - 2001, 2005 and 2015

Production	2001	2005 Estimates	2015 Forecasts
Cereals	1341	1686	3294
Roots and tubers	3517	3836	6319
Leguminous plants	263	300	538
Oilseeds	209	239	430
Vegetables	1278	1405	2400
Fruits	2019	2282	4076
Palm oil	140	177	350
Cacao	123	140	280
Arabica Coffee	10	10	15
Robusta Coffee	50	50	93
Cotton	220	270	400

Source: Government of Cameroon, 2009

It will be of little surprise to the reader that the strategy to achieve this switches back to medium- and large-scale farms and plantations, infrastructure, as well as by supporting producer organisations and a whole raft of wider and commonly cited interventions (such as better input supply and credit). The GESp also outlines a plan to resuscitate rice production on large-scale farms to reduce dependence on imports, and to revamp the production of conventional export crops: cocoa, coffee, cotton as well as banana. For example, SODECAO aim to distribute 6 million cocoa seedlings each year to support the expansion of 5,000 new hectares per annum. SOCAPALM will be recapitalized to revive production and support will be given to plantations and outgrower schemes. Banana exports are expected to increase through an improved partnership agreement with the EU. The strategy also highlights a large number of further crops which government will seek to support: maize, cassava, plantain, sugar, sorghum, palm oil, potatoes and horticultural crops. One clear example of the government's lurch back to supporting large-scale production is a 20-year deal with India to cultivate 5,000 hectares of rice and 5,000 hectares of maize.

One important development in the GESp is government's aim to increase the amount of public expenditure on agriculture, and to prioritise large-scale investments. Part of these extra funds will come from flows of development assistance. For example, the GESp outlines how at least 70% of development assistance will be channelled towards road infrastructure to support agricultural production, as well as social service infrastructure. A specific aim is to double the size of the tarred road network per 1000 people from 0.27 to 0.34 by 2020. Overall, government is aiming for 5.3% growth in the agricultural sector between 2010 and 2020, to underpin economic growth rate of 5.5% during this period. It is expected this will reduce the headcount poverty rate to 28.7% by 2020.

It is interesting to note that in response to the GESp, the IMF (2010) specifically notes the failure of the first PRSP to engage with agriculture and highlights how an emphasis on decentralization and local capacity development, *inter alia*, in the GESp should led to more concrete results. However, the IMF also has some concerns over the lack of prioritization and lack of co-ordination with the agricultural sectors. It urges the government to place more emphasis on market access, irrigation, improving the capacity of producer organisations and supporting commercial agriculture through contract farming in areas of high potential. More detail on recent Cameroonian agricultural policy can also be gleaned from the current Agriculture Sector Programme. This highlights the lack of

progress in reducing poverty in the late 2000s and how high food prices and concomitant riots forced food security back onto the policy table. It outlines how public spending on agriculture will increase to reach the ambition outlined in the Maputo Declaration (see Table 7).

Table 7 - Projected volume and % of state budget for agriculture and livestock, 2009-2015

(en milliards de CFA)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Agriculture	55,8	65,9	67,6	76	84,2	91,7	100,2
Elevage	15,7	16,7	17,2	19,5	21,8	23,9	26,3
Total secteur A/E	71,5	82,6	84,8	95,5	106	115,6	126,5
Budget de l'Etat (total)	1 467	1 583	1 695	1 824	1 953	2 090	2 242
% du secteur A/E sur le budget	4,9%	5,2%	5,0%	5,2%	5,4%	5,5%	5,6%


Source: Government of Cameroon, 2009

Moreover, a final document that sheds some light on the current and future direction of Cameroonian agricultural policy is the Common Agricultural Strategy of the member states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). This strategy tries to outline measures to support agricultural growth to ensure food security in the region. It tries to do so through harmonizing the countries' macro-economic frameworks, and by upgrading regional agricultural research, technologies, infrastructure, and supporting decentralization and producer organisations.

5.3 Rwanda

During the recent period, agriculture contributed 32-34% of GDP and contributed 27% of total growth (see Figure 5). Annual agricultural growth was about 6% first of all sustained by higher than expected expansion of food production, particularly roots and tubers. Growth was a result of a combination of yield increases and expansion into land previously not used for agriculture (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; MINICOFIN, 2013).

Figure 20 - Agriculture sector share (%) in the GDP (in Rwandan Francs)



Source: MINICOFIN, 2013

Some observers argue that the recent success in terms of positive, sustained and solid growth rates reflect that the new agricultural policies had become far better thought out and adequately based on experience from practice than previous policies – that agricultural policies have ‘turned a corner’ since the mid-2000s (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

The successor of PRSP-1, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (2008-12) marked a distinct change in the approach to development as it became much more oriented towards production and economic growth as a means for poverty reduction. Two frameworks served as blueprints for the elaboration of the EDPRS policy. The main elements of the period’s National Agricultural Policy (NAP) for agricultural transformation was elaborated and operationalized in the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT-1) from 2004, later to be upgraded into SPAT-2 covering the period 2009-2012. The SPAT-1 covered the period 2005-2007 and focused on four inter-related programmes, which again are sub-divided into 17 sub-programmes (GoR, 2004). SPAT-2 (GoR, 2009) maintained the same programme structure although the prioritization in terms of budgetary allocations were somewhat changed after initial experiences. The most important programme (in terms of relative budget allocation) aims at an intensification and development of sustainable production systems, primarily by increasing the supply and use of fertilizers and mechanization. Secondly, a programme on institutional development is particularly focusing on management capability and organizational reforms within

the Ministry of Agriculture and its supportive institutions. Thirdly, support in order to promote the professionalization of producers, first of all through support to agricultural research but also to promote farmers' organisations and producers' capacity. Finally, the programme with the smallest allocation is envisaged to promote horticultural commodity chains and develop new agri-businesses by increasing competitiveness. Overall, SPAT-1 prioritizes maximum output growth specifically hinged on export potential and domestic market development. According to Ansom (2008), SPAT-1 is tailor-made for large commercial farmers who are able to invest in new, high-potential production systems while little attention is devoted to the needs of small-scale farmers and the barriers to access capital and modern farming techniques. The omission reflected the general aim of Vision 2020 to reduce the share of the agriculture-dependent share of the population to about 50% and create better conditions for secondary and tertiary activities in rural areas to cater for employment needs.

The grand vision for agricultural transformation is also visible in the new land policies and land law. The latter was adopted in 2005. It aims to formalize land rights through official titling (Pottiers, 2006; Ansoms, 2008). Customary rights are accepted as a legitimate basis for acquiring official rights to land but the owner needs to have the land formally registered with the local authorities. Future land arrangements will be regulated by formal legal procedures. Hence, land transfers according to customary tradition and related informal land rights are not accepted any longer – title to land can only be acquired via formal registration documented by ownership certificates. A major purpose of expanding the scope of secure official land titles is to create a market for land and to promote private investments in land

Also targeted in the land law is the problem of land fragmentation and unproductive use of land. In contrast to the previous legislation from 1976 (see above) there is no upper limit for the buyer's total landholding – even though this restriction basically did not have any impact on informal land transfers (Pottier, 2006; Pritchard, 2013). In the 2005 legislation, no land parcel of one hectare or less can be divided and for land holdings between one and five hectares, the owner must apply to the local land commission for authorization to sell. Hence, smallholders with less than one hectare of land can no longer sell portions of their land in periods where cash is desperately needed and buy it back later in better times – they have to sell it all with a high risk of becoming permanently landless. As the average landholding for rural households was about 0.75 in 2000 (Pottiers, 2006)

on an average of four plots (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012) this may lead to the loss of land by many smallholders.

Furthermore, the local authorities may also confiscate land if it not adequately conserved or utilized properly for three consecutive years. The land can then be entrusted to others in need or those who are able to document that they are able to manage it as prescribed. It is up to the discretionary and subjective decision of local authorities as there are no fixed criteria for judging a person's abilities. Also, local authorities are obliged to secure consolidation of small plots into landholdings suitable for efficient land management and production. Large consolidated plots under single ownership are promoted in order to ensure economies of scale of farming units ready for modern intensive techniques and better equipped to team up with agri-business.

Consolidation of small landholdings is a crucial element of the NAP as an integral part of a strategy for 'crop specialization'. Essentially, smallholders in the same local area are asked to plant the same crop selected according to an evaluation by the Ministry of Agriculture of the most suitable crops for the particular bioclimatic zone. The Ministry selects the crops according to three categories of commodities namely export products, domestic (food) products, and new industry products. Hence, the crop specialization is the preferred means to ensure efficiency and comparative advantage within the national territory. The crop specialization is taking place at the same time as land registration and farmers are required to join cooperatives, buy approved seeds and fertilizer, and cultivate the approved crop in adjacent fields. The rigid and rapid implementation of the strategy puts subsistence farmers at risk as they lose control over land tenure rights and becomes more vulnerable in terms of food security (Pritchard, 2013).

With the support of the international donor community and the involvement of coffee cooperatives and private sector entrepreneurs, the coffee industry was liberalized towards the end of the decade (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009). The reforms in the sector included the privatisation of the state-owned coffee export company (RWANDEX) in 2006 with the subsequent establishment of a large number of new private domestic and international coffee exporters in Rwanda. OCIR-Café still provides technical assistance to coffee growers and processors (MINAGRI 2008). The institution works closely with producer cooperatives that are responsible for buying and milling of parchment coffee. OCIR-Café license producers, monitor quality control and upgrading, and regulate exports.

It is also responsible for inputs along the coffee chain (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, materials for harvests storages, transport to auctions etc.). Hence, OCIR-Café basically coordinates and regulates the production systems by acting as an intermediary between local producers and global traders. As reported by Boudreaux and Sacks (2007), part of OCIR-Café duties is to elaborate policy and strategy for the Rwandan coffee sector, including establishing quality norms, classification systems and issuing certificates of origin in order to brand Rwandan coffee for the high-price segment. Of particular importance in this strategy has been the rapid expansion of the number of coffee washing stations.

5.4 Tanzania

The operationalization program of the ASDS, as described in the previous section, is the ASDP. After a difficult political process between the Tanzanian political system and the donor community who are partly funding the program, the ASDP was finally launched in 2006. The main controversies between the donor community and the Tanzanian government were around the role of the state vs. private actors in the implementation of agricultural investments (Therkildsen, 2011). The ASDP has two components:

“a local component which provides grants to local governments for community and farmer group investments in infrastructure (in particular irrigation) or productive activities, agricultural services (primarily agricultural extension), and capacity building and empowerment for farmer groups, local government and the private sector; and a national component, which finances agricultural research and extension service activities, development of irrigation policy and national level infrastructure, policy development and planning, capacity building for food security interventions, market development activities and programme coordination” (Cooksey 2012, p. 9).

To the donor community’s discontent, the ASDP included a significant focus on irrigation (an unrealistic target of 1 million additional irrigated hectares in 5 years from 264,000 in 2006), following the involvement of the newly inaugurated president Jakaya Kikwete very late in the drafting process (Therkildsen, 2011). This ambition of this target can be seen when between 2006 to 2010 the irrigated area increased by only 17,000 hectares per year, according to an ASDP review (Cooksey, 2012).


A further development in agricultural policy is the formulation of *Kwilimo Kwanza* (Agriculture First) which follows a very different direction than the ASDP (Cooksey, 2013). The *Kwilimo Kwanza* is not a concrete policy, but a 'vision' of an agricultural transformation led by large-scale commercial agriculture, and it represents in that sense a very different political stance than the ASDP (*ibid.*). *Kwilimo Kwanza* was developed by the Tanzanian Business Council, and not the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, who usually develops agricultural policy. *Kilimo Kwanza* encourages large-scale farming in Tanzania by Tanzanians in association with foreign investors (Cooksey, 2013). *Kilimo Kwanza*'s focus on bringing in large-scale agribusiness investments on Tanzanian soil is also reflected in more recent policies which are elaborated below.

The ASDP has its origins in an African Union initiative - The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), launched in 2003 when African Heads of State agreed on a partnership for agricultural development, committing themselves, *inter alia*, to allocate 10% of the national budget to agricultural development and assuring a 6% annual increase in agricultural GDP (URT, 2011). The programme rests on four pillars: land & water management; market access; food supply and hunger; and agricultural research. The Tanzanian government originally wanted to implement CAADP through its own ASDP but was persuaded to make a new programme, as the ASDP wasn't seen to be compliant with the partnership (Cooksey, 2013). This new Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Plan (TAFSIP) was published in 2011. It focuses on state-led investments, and is therefore more in line with the statist ASDP than with the market-oriented *Kilimo Kwanza* (*ibid.*) The TAFSIP is a five-year programme and hopes for financing of US\$5.3 billion mostly from the donor community (URT, 2011). Seventy one percent of the budget goes to 'productivity and rural commercialisation', which includes better market infrastructure: investments in rural roads, capacity building for commercial farmers' organizations, better market information; support for harvest management and agro processing; diversification and introduction of new crops (URT, 2011). All in all the TAFSIPs main focus is on smallholder commercial agriculture.

Another programme, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor Of Tanzania (SAGCOT) also has an international background. It was launched during the World Economic Forum on Africa summit in Dar es Salaam, and it follows the economic logic of *Kilimo Kwanza*, that is, to increase agricultural production through market oriented and large-scale private sector development.

SAGCOT is a public private partnership in which the Tanzanian government and donors are to sponsor roughly a third, and private companies the rest.

Figure 21 - Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania



Source: SAGCOT, 2011

The southern growth corridor refers to roughly a third of the country surrounding the Tazara rail-line from Dar es Salaam to Zambia and crosses the regions of Morogoro, Iringa, Ruvuma, Mbeya and Rukwa. This area has often been referred to as the ‘bread basket’ of Tanzania. SAGCOT envisions a combination of large-farm development and increased smallholder production (e.g. through outgrower schemes), backed by investment in infrastructure, as seen in the map above from the project’s ‘investment blueprint’. The goal is to triple the agricultural production in the corridor and lift 2 million people out of poverty (SAGCOT, 2011). The partnership is very high profile and has the personal involvement of the Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete. The question of

allocating land for agribusiness development is controversial and NGOs have already voiced their fear of land grabbing as a consequence of SAGCOT (Cooksey 2013).

Lastly, in mid-2012, through an announcement by Barack Obama, the US/G8 has committed to channel funds to the TAFSIP and SAGCOT programmes. Several large private companies have made investment commitments, and, in turn, the Tanzanian government has made some commitments on key policy changes. For example, the reduction or removal of pre-profit taxes at the farmgate on crops (cesses); the demarcation and certification of land rights for smallholders in SAGCOT areas; the identification of public institutions to effectively allocate SAGCOT land for investors; and the implementation of policy alternatives to food export bans (the Tanzanian government has kept that policy since Nyerere in the fear of food shortages during droughts) (G8, 2012)

Overall, we can see that agricultural policy in Tanzania is currently moving in two parallel directions. One direction, as exemplified by the ASDP and TAFSIP, is focusing on the statist, smallholder-focused agricultural support, such as through the fertilizer subsidy. The second direction is influenced by international institutions and global capital – exemplified by the G8 initiative, Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT – and believes in market and business-led development.

5.5 Summary

Despite the intentions in the series of poverty reduction strategies implemented by the four national governments and approved by the international donor community, the expected results did not materialize to any significant extent. In most cases poverty and inequality were only marginally reduced at the national level and some places poverty even increased in rural areas (e.g. Cameroon). Moreover, growth of agricultural production was modest except for Rwanda. As a result, governments increasingly reoriented their policies towards agricultural growth as a means to reduce poverty and stimulate the national economy.

This new belief in agriculture as a main pillar for economic growth was reflected by the decision of the member states of the African Union to launch the so-called Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). According to the CAADP, member states committed

themselves to allocate 10% of the annual budget to agricultural development, primarily targeting management of land and water, research and extension, market access, and food security. In the second half of the decade, the CAADP ideas gradually percolated into national strategies for agricultural development all with an overarching emphasis on maximizing output in the short term. The strategies were followed up by strikingly similar large-scale investment programs with a heavy bias towards donor financing embedded within new ideas of ‘public-private partnership’ (PPP), i.e. investment cooperation and coordination between state, private (foreign) corporations and donors.

From a relatively humble position in the previous period, large-scale estate and even large-scale state farms have been reinstated as the main drivers of agricultural transformation, and foreign direct investments in land and agricultural production facilities are again welcomed. Moreover, large-scale agriculture is considered to take the lead for the commercialization of peasant/smallholder commercialization, such as through the establishment of contract farming and the *outgrower model*. In addition to this segment, the bulk of state-induced resources into agriculture will be directed towards commercially viable, medium-sized farms, particularly by supporting farmers’ organizations, improvement of input supply systems and access to credit. In some of the countries these efforts are intensified in territorially confined high-potential areas such as the Southern Growth Corridor in Tanzania where the government has promised to increase administrative efficiency and flexibility of existing regulatory measures.

Subsistence-like smallholders and landless inhabitants are apparently envisaged to – in the long term – leave agriculture and find alternative employment in non-farming activities that emerge from new economic dynamics in the rural areas. This is explicitly mentioned as an objective in Rwanda’s long-term strategy (Vision 2020) and it has been backed by recent initiatives towards the creation of land markets, measures against fragmentation of land holdings, and consolidation of adjacent plots (owned by cooperatives) with approved (similar) crops. These measures are introduced in order to generate economies of scale in peasant farming and thereby make it more attractive for incorporation in different forms of agro-businesses. A final notable feature of the period is the increasing role and power of local authorities (cf. in Tanzania). Again it is most prevalent in the case of Rwanda, where they have been given the discretionary rights to confiscate land if not properly cultivated and to push for land consolidation and crop specialization.

6. Conclusion

This report has offered a periodization of agricultural transformation in Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda and Tanzania. Its focus has been on postcolonial attempts at generating agricultural growth but the narrative began with the different and shifting colonial experiences of the four countries. The aim of the report has been to expose continuities and changes in the main models for agricultural transformation as revealed in different development strategies, sectoral programmes and policies. There are, of course, notable differences between the countries due to their colonial past, different agro-ecological potentialities and barriers, resource endowments, social classes and ethnic groups, and many other factors. However, the report has highlighted quite striking temporal and substantive resemblances in the main transformative models applied to agricultural production and rural development.

Within the colonial period three approaches to agricultural transformation are identified, namely the *large-scale estate model* on leasehold/freehold land, the *peasant/smallholder production* on customary land tenure, and the *elite demonstration model*. The first model refers to the establishment of large plantations on alienated land by colonial companies that produced and exported a wide range of tropical commodities to Europe. This model heavily relied on directly or indirectly forced labour, and the establishment of railways, ports and roads. The second model focused on peasant farming and became of importance somewhat later than the *large-scale estate model*; it relied on the establishment of new marketing channels, mostly through state-run marketing boards specialising in one (export) crop. Marketing boards provided systems that to different extents covered extension, input supply, farm-gate purchases, handling, transportation, storage and exports on behalf of smallholders. The third model aimed at aimed at agricultural transformation by diffusion of techniques and technology from wealthier elite households to poorer peasants.

The first years after the take-over of state power by nationalist governments were marked by continuity of policies and regulatory mechanisms for agricultural development – with a notable exception being the mobilisation of agricultural labour via coercive mechanisms. Variations included the establishment of (independent) state-owned companies and nationalisation of foreign interests in the cases where ‘African Socialism’ was implemented during the years of independence. This period witnessed the first establishments of the *outgrower model* for agricultural

transformation where peasant farming was linked to large-scale cultivation and processing on nucleus estates. We also note the emergence of a further model: the *smallholder resettlement model* both in Rwanda and Tanzania.

Public support to peasant farming was expanded after independence although the exploitative mechanisms via state determined producer prices on export crops were not removed. The *elite demonstration model* was replaced by a concern for reaching out and incorporating far larger segments of small-scale farmers in the commercialisation of agricultural production. Crop specific (public) marketing boards (parastatals) expanded in numbers and scope, now ‘feeding’ the ambitious efforts to industrialise rapidly to such an extent that economic incentives for farming were significantly eroded. In the same breath, in most cases farmers were organised in cooperatives in a top-down manner to increase efficiency of input supply and output purchase. Integrated rural development programs strived to cushion regional inequalities in living conditions by promoting particular crops, the ultimate form being resettlement of (landless) farmers in agricultural ‘frontiers’. As a corollary, public administration at all levels developed rapidly and in a rather uncoordinated fashion with numerous opportunities for rent seeking and with favourable conditions for an unwieldy bureaucracy.

All these models experienced dramatic alterations during the 1980s and early 1990s due to the implementation of a series of national structural adjustment programs that included liberalisation, privatisation, budgetary cuts and devaluation. Former state owned companies were privatised (although the process often became protracted due to opposition from vested interests and lack of investor interest) and most of the non-market based supportive measures directed to promote commercialisation of peasant farming were rolled back: removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs (primarily fertilizers), dismantling (or partial fragmentation) of marketing boards, elimination of state determined purchasing prices, scaling down of credit facilities – all of these changes significantly affected the conditions for smallholders, positive as well as negative: inefficient and corrupt public institutions were in many cases not replaced by private businesses as the economic incentives simply were insufficient or non-existing. Of the model highlighted above, the conditionalities and reforms were aimed at providing the right incentives for dynamic *peasant/smallholder production* to contribute to both growth and equity goals, but the supply

response was often hampered by the above-mentioned institutional constraints. Other models of agricultural transformation did not feature prominently.

After more than a decade with structural adjustment programs the turn of the century marked a gradual, albeit somewhat hesitant transition to a less market-oriented policy framework in all four countries. The structural adjustment of the national economies did not ‘trickle down’ to reach the poor at the expected pace and the impact on poverty reduction was insignificant – if not directly harmful. Hence, during the first year of the 2000s, all the four countries implemented so-called Poverty Reduction Strategies that mainly addressed the social sectors (health, education) whereas agriculture only received modest attention in most strategies. To the extent they were included, agricultural policies and initiatives in the strategies mostly addressed institutional issues like different means to promote and improve the (private) distributing channels for supply of inputs (mainly seed and fertilizers), increase access to formal credit (various micro-finance schemes for farmers), and improve rural infrastructure to increase access to markets. These benefits are difficult for farmers with limited resources to capture, and components explicitly addressing poverty reduction in the agricultural sector were few. Even though the distinction between policies towards the peasant and the large-scale ‘modernized’ models became somewhat blurred in this period it is notable that two old acquaintances were re-introduced (although in redesigned wrappings): farmers’ organizations were urged and supported to take up many of the same tasks as the defunct cooperatives were supposed to do; and some crop-specific parastatals with new regulatory responsibilities saw the light of the day. If there was any concern with agriculture during this period, it was on *peasant/smallholder production*.

But the intentions of the poverty reduction strategies did not materialize and poverty was only marginally reduced. As a consequence, governments reoriented their policies towards agricultural growth as a means to reduce poverty and stimulate the national economy, influenced among other things by a common strategic program launched by the African Union. The program stressed the need to allocate a higher share of the total budget to and that policies should aim at maximizing agricultural output and productivity. The countries responded with strikingly similar large-scale investment programs based on cooperation and coordination between state, private (foreign) corporations and donors. The *large-scale estate model*, *large-scale state farms* as well as various hybrid forms through public-private partnerships have been reinstated as key drivers of agricultural

transformation, with foreign direct investments in land and agricultural production facilities very much welcomed. The commercialization of peasant farming is now to be promoted via contract farming and the *outgrower model*. State funds will prioritize commercially viable medium-sized farms, and support the capacity of farmers' organizations, the improvement of input supply systems and access to credit.

In contrast, subsistence-like smallholders and landless inhabitants are apparently envisaged to leave agriculture and find alternative employment in non-farming activities that emerge from new economic dynamics in the rural areas. It could be the case that the trend is towards integrated and state-coordinated implementation of land titling (in order to facilitate private investments and land accumulation), the consolidation of adjacent plots (owned by cooperatives), and detailed land use planning by powerful local authorities *a la Rwanda anno 2013*. This is a technocratic solution to the fragmentation of landholdings, the notorious lack of scale economies and the coordination problems related to incorporation of peasant farming in agro-business. Indeed it will mark a return to the basic models in the initial period after independence – with the notable difference that poor and landless farmers are excluded from the agricultural transformation process and relegated to frail social security measures or waged employment in speculative non-farm activities that may or may not emerge in rural areas.

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¹ One particular feature of ‘planned liberalism’, especially noticeable in the early 1970s, was the creation of crop-specific or sector-wide public companies to try to support productivity gains and the development of agro-industry (Bella, 2009). A further set of institutions – named development missions – had a geographical focus with a remit to invest in and facilitate development efforts in a particular locality. For example, the Wum Area Development Authority or the Mission Development Upper Noun Valley.

² Timber extraction in the East Region increased through the 1970s with the construction of the railway line to Belabo.

³ Private land usually confers full titled ownership of land, and is most commonly held in urban areas and by plantations. It is usually held on a freehold basis, but leasehold rights can also be given by the state or by a freeholder. Customary land dwellers have usufruct rights over land, but this is, of course, not formally registered. They also have the rights to use products and hunt animals on unoccupied national land. Inheritance of customary rights is mainly patrilineal. The sale of rights is allowed in some locations but constrained in others. In addition, certain crops may be prohibited by customary leaders in certain areas, for example the planting of tree crops.

⁴ For example, Bamou and Masters (2003) highlight how the implicit taxation of tree crops led to producer prices that reflected only the cost of harvesting produce, not reinvesting in new fields and saplings.

⁵ Sunderlin *et al* (2000) explain how the shift towards plantain increases deforestation as they are more land extensive and require more sunlight for photosynthesis

⁶ On the other hand, Cooksey (2011) argues that the fall in fertilizer use did not significantly impact maize production.

⁷ Moupou and Mbanga (2008) usefully differentiate between two main types of associative groups in Cameroon. First, traditional local associations. These are based on community and/or clan, and their function varies by region. In the North Region and Far North Region, they conduct community work where participants are paid in kind through food or beer. In the West and North West Regions, local communities are grouped together to conduct roof repairs and other tasks which require many hands. In the Centre, South and East, community groups help to prepare fields and pack products. In the South West and along the coastline, the development of plantations and alienation of people from the land has imbued people with a more individual work ethic. That said, there are still some communal activities. All these conventional forms of communal work build relationships of belonging and solidarity. Moupou and Mbanga (2008) also highlight three kinds of the second main type of communal groups: cooperatives, common group initiatives and development committees. First, cooperatives. These include producer groups and savings and credit groups. Some larger co-operatives have fulfilled wider development functions such as the provision of public goods: for example, the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives in the West (UCCAO) and the North West Cooperative Union. Many smaller co-operatives only exist for a short time before disbanding. Second, they highlight the role of groups of joint initiatives (GICs): these function as cooperatives but are often a formalized version of a conventional local association as described above. Third, development committees: these combine the skills and expertise of different actors within a local area to lever in and implement development projects.

⁸ A further and very interesting aspect of the GESP is the unexplained assertion that “41.6 per cent of households headed by a man are poor as compared to only 33.4 per cent of those headed by a woman” (p.38, paragraph 47)

⁹ The poverty line in 2007 stood at CFA 269 443 F per adult equivalent and per year as against 232 547 in 2001