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## Europeanization of Swedish Civil Society: Motives, Activities, and Perceived Consequences

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*Published in:*  
Europeanization in Sweden

2019

*Document Version:*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*  
Scaramuzzino, R., & Wennerhag, M. (2019). Europeanization of Swedish Civil Society: Motives, Activities, and Perceived Consequences. In A. Meeuwisse, & R. Scaramuzzino (Eds.), *Europeanization in Sweden: Opportunities and Challenges for Civil Society Organizations* (pp. 75-107). Berghahn Books.

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2

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## SECTION II

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## Chapter 3

# EUROPEANIZATION OF SWEDISH CIVIL SOCIETY

## MOTIVES, ACTIVITIES, AND PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES

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*Roberto Scaramuzzino and Magnus Wennerhag*

This chapter explores the extent to which Swedish civil society organizations (CSOs) Europeanize. The chapter focuses on regulatory, organizational, and financial Europeanization and on activities such as attempts to influence policy at the European level, participation in European networks, and applying for funding from EU institutions. The chapter's aim is to offer a broad picture of CSOs' Europeanization—their advocacy activities, participation in European networks, and use of EU funding—by focusing on these actors' activities, motives, and the consequences they experience from taking part in various Europeanized activities. In addition to showing the overall patterns of all CSOs we will compare different organizational types to address whether different types of CSOs working with different issues show different patterns of Europeanization. All data presented in this chapter are based on results from a national survey among CSOs conducted in 2012 as part of the EURO CIV research program.

The survey was answered by 2,791 Swedish CSOs, which makes it one of the largest civil society surveys ever conducted in Sweden.<sup>1</sup> Large quantitative studies of Swedish CSOs are rare. However, in the 1990s Sweden participated in the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, comparing civil society sectors in more than forty countries (Salamon, Sokolowski, and List 2004). This Swedish study (Lundström and Wijkström 1997) was replicated in 2002 (Wijkström and Einarsson

2006). These studies aimed at mapping the Swedish civil society sector; they focused mostly on the organizations' workforce (both paid staff and volunteers), their sources of income, and the types of activities they were involved in. A smaller survey study was also conducted in 2013 including mostly well-established local CSOs in three policy areas—disability, gender equality, and homelessness—on topics related to voice and service roles. This study involved part of the research team from the EURO CIV research project, and the questionnaire replicated some of the questions used in the EURO CIV survey (Arvidsson and Johansson 2015). Since 2012 the Swedish National Board for Youth Affairs (which in 2014 was renamed the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society [MUCF]) has conducted a yearly survey focusing on the financial conditions of CSOs and their experiences of contacts with Swedish public authorities (Ungdomsstyrelsen 2013). The most recent report had a particular focus on work with immigrants (MUCF 2016).

Previous studies about the Europeanization of Swedish CSOs have foremost been based on qualitative data (e.g., interview studies as in Olsson et al. 2009; Scaramuzzino 2012). The few quantitative studies that have been carried out have focused on specific aspects of EU policies (e.g., European Social Fund [ESF] funding in Scaramuzzino et al. 2010) and have not analyzed large samples containing a wide range of CSO types. We are in fact not aware of any survey study, neither in Sweden nor in other countries, that has addressed the Europeanization of domestic CSOs from such a broad perspective and included as many dimensions of Europeanization as we did in the EURO CIV survey.

### **Points of Departure**

Europeanization is often understood, as argued in this book's introduction, as the adding of another layer in a multilevel system of governance, and this new layer creates new political opportunities for CSOs. Swedish CSOs have traditionally been embedded in a nationally structured system whose main political levels are the local/municipal level and the national level. As will be shown in our analysis, Swedish organized civil society is mainly composed of local grassroots organizations (cf. Ungdomsstyrelsen 2013). For these local organizations, the municipal level constitutes the most important focus of their political activities and their efforts to mobilize resources. At the same time, many Swedish CSOs have over the years sought to organize themselves at the national level—through federations and umbrella organizations—for the purpose of being represented vis-à-vis the state (see Aytar 2007 for a discussion of immigrant organizations). With the adding of the European

political level, one might expect a similar need to be represented vis-à-vis the European Union (EU) (e.g., Ahrne and Brunsson 2005).

In order to properly understand the degree to which Swedish CSOs are Europeanized with regard to their efforts to influence politics, to take part in organizational networks, or to seek economic resources, one has to compare their degree of engagement in such activities with how they take part in similar activities at the local and national levels. In our questionnaire we therefore included not only questions about various CSOs' activities on the European level, but also questions about their corresponding activities on the national and local levels.

Furthermore, while Europeanization implies a form of transnationalization of CSOs' activities, it is not the only way in which they engage in transnational activities. As discussed in the introduction, Swedish EU membership dates back to 1995, but Nordic and international forms of cooperation involving Swedish CSOs were a fact long before that. Although the EU is the only supranational level of political decision-making that is really able to make binding decisions concerning many policy areas, there are other supranational levels where political decisions are taken that can be relevant for Swedish CSOs. From a Swedish perspective, this applies especially to bodies for cooperation between the Nordic countries (the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers) and on the international level (first and foremost the UN). Furthermore, many of the social movements that have had a prominent role in shaping modern Sweden were originally imported from continental Europe (e.g., the trade unions and the labor movement), or from the United States (e.g., many nonstate Lutheran churches and the temperance movement), and they were thus from the beginning part of transnational movement networks (Lundström and Wijkström 1997). Swedish CSOs' affiliations with Nordic and international umbrella organizations can in fact date back to the late nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., the Swedish Red Cross).

To better understand whether Swedish CSOs take part more or less extensively in the specific type of transnationalization that we name "Europeanization," one also has to scrutinize the degree to which they take part in other types of transnational activities. In our questionnaire we therefore asked about the CSOs' degree of engagement in networks and political activities on both the Nordic and international levels. In the analysis we consistently compared figures indicating different types of Europeanization with comparable data relating to these other supranational levels.

It is also important to consider that different types of organizations might have different motives to Europeanize, might engage in different activities relating to different types of Europeanization, and might experience different outcomes. Hence the organizations examined in this chapter

were manually categorized into ten different organizational types.<sup>2</sup> In fact, previous research has shown that organizational type is a relevant factor behind whether an actor is present and active at different geographical levels (Beyers 2004, 2008; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Johansson, Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2018). In accordance with this literature our categorization allows us to distinguish between diffuse and specific interests. Because we include a broad range of CSOs we also want to compare organizations representing different groups and active on different policy issues. Beyers and Kerremans (2012, 268) argue, “If groups face issues where the potential effects of policy changes are high, the incentive to seek recourse at other levels of government is also high.” In other words, organizations are more likely to engage at the supranational level if the policy issue they are involved in can be considered threatening, salient, and costly to that organization (at that specific level) (Beyers and Kerremans 2012).

The first six organizational types are all interest organizations that work for and represent the specific interests of particular social groups in the population. The types are (1) disability organizations, (2) temperance and drug users’ organizations, (3) trade unions, (4) victim support organizations, (5) women’s organizations, and (6) other interest organizations (e.g., pensioner; immigrant; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] organizations).<sup>3</sup> We have chosen to include both CSOs that represent client groups and those that represent trade unions. Even if the collective identity, mobilizations, and claims-making of these organizations cannot simply be reduced to being clients of welfare programs, such interest groups are closely connected to the welfare state and strive for both recognition and redistribution of resources through particular welfare programs such as programs for gender equality, disability, and elder care (Feltenius 2008, 30).

It has been argued (e.g., Feltenius 2008) that client interest groups have a weaker position vis-à-vis the state than so-called producer interest groups (employers’ organizations and trade unions). While producer interest groups can deploy strategies (e.g., lockouts or strikes) that might directly threaten the economic basis of the state, the state can ignore client interests to a greater extent because these groups are dependent on the state’s ability and willingness to recognize their claims. Lack of access at the national level might make client interest groups more eager to seek influence at the European level to compensate for their lack of domestic influence (cf. Klüver 2010, 181). However, many Swedish client groups have historically had relatively good access to policymaking. Organizations representing, for example, the disabled, pensioners, and immigrants have been able to establish long-term relationships and exert at least some influence on national policy (Aytar 2007; Feltenius 2008; Markström 2003). This corporatist tradition in the Swedish welfare state might disincentivize Swedish CSOs to Europeanize.

We also include organizations representing more diffuse interests, including (7) humanitarian organizations, (8) social service organizations, and (9) religious associations and congregations. Compared to organizations representing specific interests, humanitarian organizations do not seek to represent specific groups. While the former build on self-organization, the main task of the latter is to organize activities and perform services for others (Lundström and Svedberg 2003; Meeuwisse and Sunesson 1998). Humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross and Save the Children, often provide aid and help for vulnerable groups both in Sweden and abroad. Social service organizations instead provide specific social welfare services (e.g., social care and child care) on the basis of a nonprofit organizational logic, often on behalf of and funded by the public sector. Many of these organizations define themselves as cooperatives. These types of associations are a relatively new phenomenon in the Swedish organizational landscape, and many are a product of the deregulation of the welfare service provision system over the past two decades. Religious associations and congregations are usually engaged in social welfare issues regardless of their denomination. Since the separation of the church from the state in 2000, organizations belonging to the Church of Sweden (the state church since the Reformation) also count as CSOs. They are traditionally engaged in social welfare issues through diaconal activities (Linde 2010), but they are also present in the public debate as a critical theological voice (Bäckström 2014), for example regarding issues such as poverty, immigration, and homelessness (Linde and Scaramuzzino 2018).

The tenth and last organizational type is (10) political parties. Like the others they are membership-based and separated from the state. Parties, however, have specific functions that distinguish them from other organizations in civil society. For instance, they have a channeling function and act as a bidirectional link between citizens and decision-makers. Political parties thus not only aggregate interest, but also provide the elected assemblies with the representatives that make political decisions at different administrative levels, from the local level to the level of the EU (Dahl 2011). While many parties have originated from social movements, and some continue to entertain their bonds with specific movement constituencies, the overall tendency is that parties having such roots also increasingly become the target for various social movements' efforts to influence their strategies and decisions (della Porta and Diani 2006). In this sense, political parties can be seen as both civil society actors and as part of the institutional framework that many CSOs might try to influence.

While the representative function of political parties in the parliamentary system is seldom questioned, the role that interest organizations play in the political system is a more debated topic. The Swedish system has

developed from a classical corporative system, with formal channels for political influence by selected legitimate organizations, to a more pluralistic system in which organized interests also seek influence through advocacy and lobbying (Naurin 2001; Svallfors 2015). We argue that including political parties as an organizational type in the analysis might give interesting insights into the processes of Europeanization, especially when compared to interest organizations.

### The Organizations: An Overview

In this chapter we compare ten types of CSOs based on survey data from 1,786 CSOs. We excluded 889 cases from our original sample because they did not fall into the ten organizational types, e.g., cultural and sports associations. Even if they represent different kinds of interests, focus on different policy issues, and have different positions in the policymaking process, these organizations all have a common interest in social welfare issues. The number of organizations on which the analysis is based is presented in table 3.1.

Before addressing the Europeanization of Swedish CSOs, it is important to present some basic characteristics for the CSOs surveyed (see table 3.2). Some of these characteristics have been proven to be relevant for explaining CSOs' different degrees of Europeanization in previous research on interest organizations (e.g., Beyers 2002, 2004, 2008; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Bouwen 2002; Chalmers 2013; Dür and Mateo 2012; Klüver 2010; Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2015), including their representativeness in terms of membership base and their resources in terms of employed staff. Other characteristics that can be seen in the table are the organizations'

**Table 3.1. Ten Types of Organizations Analyzed in the Chapter**

Type of interests	Organizational type	N.
Organizations representing specific interests	Disability organizations	167
	Temperance and drug users' organizations	72
	Trade unions	110
	Victim support organizations	56
	Women's organizations	90
	Other interest organizations for social groups	148
Organizations representing diffuse interests	Humanitarian organizations	450
	Social service organizations	78
	Religious associations and congregations	533
Political parties	Political parties	82



**Table 3.2. Some Basic Characteristics of the CSOs Included in the Analysis (in Percentages)**

<i>Some basic characteristics for the CSOs (%)</i>	Organizations representing specific interests						Organizations representing diffuse interests						Total (%)	Cramer's V
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties				
Organizational level														
Local	67	77	77	86	80	85	96	96	90	88	84	.238 ***		
Regional	22	18	16	0	0	6	1	4	4	10	9	.246 ***		
National	10	5	7	14	17	10	3	0	5	3	7	.135 ***		
Supranational	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	n.s.		
Membership base														
Meta-organization	4	10	2	0	0	3	6	10	3	1	3	n.s.		
1–99 individuals	42	63	26	67	79	24	52	71	49	58	44	.302 ***		
100–999 individuals	49	19	45	33	10	62	39	19	22	33	38	.324 ***		
1,000+ individuals	5	8	27	0	10	11	3	5	27	7	14	.272 ***		
No. of paid staff														
No paid staff	78	73	68	50	54	87	78	50	49	76	70	.306 ***		
Fewer than 5	19	15	18	33	46	10	15	35	28	22	20	.198 ***		
5 or more	4	12	14	14	0	3	7	13	23	3	10	.275 ***		
No. of volunteers														
No volunteers	89	85	99	50	78	86	68	58	63	93	81	.336 ***		
Fewer than 10	5	12	0	0	4	6	15	29	11	3	8	.208 ***		
10 or more	5	3	1	50	19	8	17	13	27	4	12	.307 ***		
No. of elected representatives														
Fewer than 10	73	80	34	67	96	54	72	95	53	48	59	.313 ***		
10 or more	27	20	66	33	4	46	28	5	47	52	41	.313 ***		
Org. in large city (>200,000 inhabitants)	10	19	19	0	23	32	11	21	7	8	16	.263 ***		
Total (N)	155–67	60–72	99–112	52–56	80–90	134–48	387–450	66–78	481–533	71–82	1,595–786			

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROCIV survey.

geographic level (i.e., the geographic level that the CSO claims is its primary area for members and activities) and whether the organization is registered in a large city. The table also gives an idea of the scope of individual members, staff, volunteers, and elected representatives who are involved in these organizations.

Most of the CSOs that are analyzed are locally based (84 percent). This is particularly true for humanitarian, social service, and religious organizations. Some types of organizations representing specific interests often have the regional level as their primary geographic domain (especially trade unions and temperance and disability organizations). Other types of CSOs have a somewhat larger share of organizations primarily working at the national level (especially victim support and women's organizations). Table 3.2 also shows that most of the organizations included are individual-membership based, and meta-organizations or umbrella organizations represent only 3 percent of the CSOs. More than half of the organizations have one hundred members or more, and the membership bases of the different CSO types differ significantly. In particular it is notable that trade unions and religious organizations include a large share (28 percent) of associations with one thousand or more members. Most organizations (70 percent) are not professionalized and lack employed staff. The types of CSOs that most often have employed staff are women's, victim support, and social service organizations together with religious associations and congregations. Most CSOs (81 percent) do not have any nonmembers as volunteers. Here we find that victim support and the three types of organizations representing diffuse interests tend to have more volunteers than the rest. A majority of the CSOs (59 percent) have fewer than ten elected representatives, and almost all women's and social service organizations have few elected representatives. Finally, a small share of the organizations (16 percent) are registered in large cities with more than two hundred thousand inhabitants, which is consistent with the share of the national population that lives in the three Swedish cities that have that many inhabitants (18 percent). Some of the characteristics presented here are consistent with the results of previous survey studies of Swedish organized civil society. In particular, the relatively large individual membership base and the low level of professionalization have been highlighted in cross-national comparative studies of civil society (Salamon et al. 2004).

These differences should be kept in mind as we proceed with the analysis of the data because they might provide explanations for some of the differences that will be presented in the bivariate analysis. Chapter 4 will assess whether some of these factors actually influence the level of Europeanization of Swedish CSOs.

## What Motives Do Swedish CSOs Have to Europeanize?

This section deals with CSOs' motives to Europeanize and with the perceived challenges and obstacles connected with Europeanization.

Influencing policy is an important driving factor behind CSOs addressing the European level. However, organizations might have many potential motives for influencing the EU or influencing policies involving the European level. And even though all might use the structures of the EU, the intended targets for the CSOs' claims and pressures might differ. It does not even need to be the EU itself that is the final addressee of the CSOs' efforts; the EU can also be used as a vehicle for getting specific member states to change their policies, which can include the CSOs' own countries.

In table 3.3 we highlight some motives that correspond to these different approaches to using the EU for changing policies. They all refer to the regulatory functions of the EU. The figures show to what degree CSOs see different types of EU-related influence as very or somewhat important for their own organizations.

The table suggests that there is no overall trade-off between the different motives to Europeanize, and certain types of CSOs (e.g., trade unions) are more likely to deem all four motives as important compared to other types of CSOs (e.g., humanitarian organizations), which are less likely to deem all four motives as important (see Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag 2018). Among the different reasons for seeking to influence the EU level, the one that most CSOs perceived as important is to influence the policies of the EU itself (23 percent) followed by influencing other countries to adopt Swedish policies within the interest areas of the organization (21 percent). Almost as common (16 percent) is that the CSOs want the EU to put pressure on Sweden in order to change policies within the organization's main interest areas.

We also find interesting differences among the different CSO types. While temperance and drug users' organizations and trade unions find it most important to convince other countries to adopt the same policies as Sweden's, disability organizations see it as just as important to convince the EU to put pressure on Sweden. Such differences clearly illustrate that the agendas of different CSO types can be more or less close to their own national government's political agenda. Trade unions and temperance organizations have long been central coactors in shaping the dominant Swedish policies in their own areas of interest; it seems logical that these organizations see the Swedish government as the prime vehicle for spreading their policies to other EU member states. Some organizations might in fact have larger stakes in EU policies for the purpose of maintaining and/or exporting a particular

**Table 3.3. Perceived Importance of Various Forms of EU-related Influence (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests						Organizations representing diffuse interests				Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties			
How important (very, or somewhat) the CSOs believe the following forms of EU-related influence are for their own organizations													
To influence EU policies	26	36	31	20	35	23	13	4	5	49	23	.336 ***	
To influence the policies of EU countries other than Sweden	19	13	28	20	32	17	10	0	4	24	15	.250 ***	
To influence other countries to adopt Swedish policies within the interest areas of one's organization	25	38	33	20	27	20	11	4	4	39	21	.318 ***	
To make the EU put pressure on Sweden within the interest areas of one's organization	26	25	19	20	27	16	11	4	4	22	16	.229 ***	
Total (N)	138-42	65-67	95-102	46-49	79-82	123-25	359-63	72-74	488-91	74-76	1,552-59		

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.

Source: EUROCIV survey.

model for interpreting and solving issues such as workers' rights or alcohol and drugs that they have developed domestically. Behind this might be a concern that EU harmonization might lead to a loosening of the specific Swedish model. This is consistent with Beyers and Kerremans' (2012) argument that the issue-specific context in which interest groups develop their political strategies can be an incentive to address other levels of government than the domestic level, particularly for groups that organize around issues that will be significantly affected by policy changes (see also Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag 2018).

### *Obstacles for Organizing and Acting at the EU Level*

Being present and active at the EU level is often achieved through membership in networks at the European level, as shown by Johansson and Kalm in chapter 2 of this volume. While offering certain opportunities, organizational Europeanization can also create challenges for CSOs. Table 3.4 shows the CSOs' perceived problems of being a member of a European network.

A majority of the organizations that are members of networks at the European level state that they lack the time and resources that are needed to be engaged at their preferred level (66 percent) and that EU-level issues are too complex (61 percent). This shows that both organizational resources and knowledge are required to Europeanize through meta-organizations and networks. Lack of interest among the CSOs' members is also stated by almost half of the organizations (46 percent) as a problem when being a member of a network at the European level. More than one in three organizations also state that the EU does not directly affect the issues that the organizations deal with. The control exercised by the EU is stated by one in four CSOs as a problem connected with membership in European networks, suggesting a risk of becoming more of an object to than a subject in Europeanization. Obstacles are most strongly perceived among political parties, followed by organizations representing specific interests and by organizations representing diffuse interests. The fact that political parties and to some extent also organizations representing specific interest are more voice oriented (compared to humanitarian and service organizations) might explain why they to a larger extent question both the relevance of the EU and the ideology and values propagated by other organizations. A perceived clash between Swedish CSOs' norms and values with those propagated by other organizations from other national contexts, for instance on drug use or prostitution (see chapter 9), are in fact more likely for these organizations.

One possible obstacle for Europeanizing suggested above might be that Swedish CSOs do not perceive the European level as relevant and might

**Table 3.4. Perceived Problems of Being a Member of a European Network (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests	Organizations representing diffuse interests	Political parties	Total (%)	Total (N)
Degree of agreement (very, or somewhat) to statements about problems with being a member a European network (for the CSOs having this experience)					
Our organization lacks the time and resources that would make it possible to be engaged at a preferred level.	69	50	81	66	259
EU-level issues are too complex.	64	44	73	61	242
Our members show low support for working with EU issues.	47	36	55	46	243
The EU does not directly affect the issues that our organization deals with.	34	31	44	35	266
There are too large ideological differences between the participating organizations.	35	13	58	33	234
Participants speak different languages.	36	18	24	29	267
The EU tries to control our organization in a way that does not suit us.	29	6	46	26	266
Other organizations within the network do not share our values.	16	6	40	18	232

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROCIV survey.

hence lack the motives to “go European” (cf. Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2015). To investigate this further, we will turn our gaze to the CSOs’ general perception of the relevance of the European level for the problems and issues with which they work. We can understand such statements as expressions of the perceived political opportunities that the EU offers and hence as expressions of regulatory Europeanization.

Table 3.5 presents (in the first part) the degree to which Swedish CSOs think that the European level is important for solving the issues and problems that they work with and (in the second part) the perceived relevance of other geographic/administrative levels. The second part of the table presents the percentages of organizations that perceive the level as at all relevant, thus including those that deem it very, somewhat, and not very important (excluding those deeming it not at all important).

Table 3.5 shows that only one in ten organizations perceives the European level as very important, while 65 percent deem the European level as not at all important. Compared to other geographical levels, the European level is seen as one of the least relevant. While a large majority of the CSOs perceive the domestic (local and national) levels as important, only one in three organizations considers the three supranational levels (Nordic, European, and international) as relevant. The fact that the Nordic, European, and international levels are regarded important by only a minority of CSOs also indicates that the EU level is merely perceived as one among other supranational levels of decision-making. Given the fact that the EU has far more political power than Nordic and international decision-making bodies, this finding can be seen as a bit surprising and might mirror a general Swedish skepticism toward the EU, as described in the introductory chapter.

## **How Do Swedish CSOs Europeanize?**

Swedish CSOs might Europeanize in different ways. In this section we address three types of Europeanization: regulatory, organizational, and financial. Regulatory Europeanization is understood as an expression of political activity at the European level, organizational as membership in European networks and umbrella organizations, and financial as economic support from EU institutions.

### *Regulatory Europeanization*

The extent to which CSOs have tried to influence politicians or officials at the European level of decision-making regarding issues that are central for

**Table 3.5. Perceived Political Importance of the European Level (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests					Organizations representing diffuse interests					Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties			
How important the CSOs deem the European level of political decision-making for solving the problems/issues that they work with													
Very	13	12	13	0	22	10	9	0	2	17	10	.210	***
Somewhat	12	22	13	0	22	6	9	0	2	15	9		
Not very	10	15	31	33	13	10	14	10	17	21	16		
Not at all	65	51	43	67	43	74	69	90	79	47	65		
Total (N)	150	66	101	50	75	127	376	71	481	78	1,575		
Whether the CSOs at all (very, somewhat, or not very) deem various political levels as important for solving the problems/issues that they work with													
Local or municipal level	90	95	81	100	78	88	70	83	74	97	84	.248	***
National level	77	76	82	67	70	62	65	43	57	76	67	.209	***
Nordic level	38	47	53	33	61	25	30	14	20	42	33	.262	***
European level	34	49	57	33	58	26	31	14	21	53	35	.293	***
International level	34	47	47	33	67	22	42	14	25	48	34	.252	***
Total (N)	150-63	65-71	101-7	49-54	75-88	127-38	372-407	71-77	480-97	77-80	1,570-681		

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROCIV survey.



the organization is used as a measure of regulatory Europeanization. These results are presented in table 3.6, which shows whether the organizations had often, sometimes, rarely, or never tried to influence politicians and officials on the European level. In the second part of the table we compare the extent to which the CSOs have at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) addressed the European level compared with the local, national, Nordic, and international levels.

Eighty percent of Swedish CSOs state that they have never tried to influence politicians or officials at the European level of decision-making, while fewer than 10 percent of the organizations claim to have done so sometimes or often. In contrast, 80 percent of the CSOs say that they have tried to influence decision-makers at the local level, and half have attempted to have an influence on the national level. The organizations are thus not only primarily locally based (as was shown in table 3.2), but they also foremost try to influence local politics.

The number of CSOs that have tried to influence politicians and officials at the supranational levels (Nordic, European, or international) are quite small, and involves between 18 and 20 percent of the organizations. There does not seem to be any trade-off between the CSOs' efforts to address different levels of political decision-making. Instead, the types of organizations that are more active on one level are also more active on other levels. Political parties in particular stand out as being most active at all political levels. It is also notable that organizations representing specific interests in general are more active at most political levels unlike organizations representing diffuse interests. This confirms political parties' and specific interest organizations' stronger voice orientation, as mentioned above.

These results also show that CSOs do not restrict themselves to the European level when it comes to influencing supranational forms of political decision-making, but also try to influence the Nordic and the international levels. However, the degree to which they try to influence these levels is quite small.

There are also other strategies that CSOs can use if they want to influence EU policies. These involve not only direct contacts with the representatives of the political system, but also include using one's transnational CSO networks, engaging external consultants (e.g., public relations bureaus), or staging demonstrations. Two distinct approaches that are often used by CSOs are externalization, which implies targeting EU institutions to put pressure on the national government, and domestication, which means targeting one's own national government to engage in negotiations at the European level in order to provide better opportunities for the country or to make general changes in EU policies (della Porta 2013). Table 3.7 shows the degree to which the CSOs have used different strategies to influence EU

**Table 3.6. Influencing Politicians and Officials at the European Level (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests				Organizations representing diffuse interests				Total (%)	Cramer's V		
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.			Religious associations and congregations	Political parties
How often the CSOs try to influence politicians or officials at the European level of decision-making												
Often	1	5	3	0	0	4	3	0	0	7	3	.188 ***
Sometimes	2	4	10	0	15	5	2	0	1	7	4	
Rarely	14	13	13	0	15	4	10	0	10	29	12	
Never	83	79	74	100	69	87	84	100	89	56	81	
Total (N)	154	65	104	51	86	134	398	77	493	78	1,640	
Whether the CSOs at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) try to influence politicians or officials at various levels of decision-making												
Local or municipal level	88	90	80	100	80	88	62	76	64	96	80	.306 ***
National level	49	56	70	50	53	49	33	17	37	75	50	.292 ***
Nordic level	23	23	29	17	33	13	15	4	12	35	20	.216 ***
European level	17	21	26	0	33	13	16	4	11	44	19	.268 ***
International level	16	18	21	0	30	12	18	4	14	35	18	.198 ***
Total (N)	154-63	64-69	102-8	51-55	86-90	134-43	398-428	77-78	492-503	78-79	1,637-715	

Note: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.

Source: EURO CIV survey.

policies, ranging from direct contacts with representatives of institutionalized politics to using extra-parliamentary repertoires of action such as demonstrations.

Table 3.7 indicates that the most common strategy to influence EU policies is to contact Swedish authorities or Swedish political parties. This strategy is adopted by 36 percent of the CSOs, while only half as many (18 percent) have contacted members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This also illustrates that what della Porta (2013) labels as domestication is the most common strategy used for influencing EU policies. CSOs' demands for political or regulatory changes in EU policies are thus usually mediated by domestic actors of one's own country (see also Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag 2018).

Apart from the use of domestic politicians and authorities, table 3.7 shows that demonstrations, international umbrella organizations, and direct contacts with MEPs have been used by around 20 percent of the CSOs as a means to influence EU policies. The staging of demonstrations is most common among trade unions and political parties. The use of both international and European umbrella organizations for the purpose of influencing EU policies furthermore suggests that internationalization and Europeanization are closely interlinked and that these processes might in fact strengthen each other.

The types of CSOs that are known to be more politically active (political parties and organizations representing specific interests, as shown in table 3.6) also use all types of strategies to a greater degree than organizations representing diffuse interests. These results suggest that there is no direct trade-off between different types of strategies such as access, information, and protest (see Beyers 2004 for a typology), which our analysis of political strategies at the national level also showed (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015; Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2013).

All in all, regulatory Europeanization seems to involve a minority of Swedish CSOs when we look at their activities at the European level. However, when we include the use of channels for political influence at the national level for the purpose of influencing EU policy (domestication), we find that more than a third of Swedish CSOs have Europeanized to some extent. Political parties in particular are active in this sense, but it is also notable that almost half of the trade unions and temperance organizations have contacted national politicians in an attempt to influence EU policies.

In order to better understand the figures of table 3.7, we also need to look at what strategies are used for influencing politics in Sweden. These are shown in table 3.8.

Table 3.8 indicates that by far the most-used strategies to influence politics in Sweden are to contact politicians (45 percent) or public officials (37

**Table 3.7. Use of Various Forms of Advocacy to Influence EU Policies (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests						Organizations representing diffuse interests					Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties				
Whether the CSOs at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) have used the following strategies to influence EU policies														
Used European networks or umbrella organizations	14	28	27	0	29	10	5	4	4	33	14	.304	***	
Used other international networks or umbrella organizations	13	21	33	0	36	17	10	4	14	31	19	.215	***	
Contacted key persons working with influencing EU institutions	9	25	24	0	29	12	7	8	5	46	16	.362	***	
Contacted Swedish authorities or Swedish political parties	35	44	49	20	38	36	22	17	20	69	36	.323	***	
Contacted members of parliament or groups within the European Parliament	13	23	28	0	29	12	9	4	8	57	18	.406	***	
Contacted other EU institutions (the Commission, Court of Justice of the EU, etc.)	7	11	19	0	10	8	2	4	4	22	9	.220	***	
Used consultants (PR bureaus, etc.)	7	2	9	0	5	7	2	4	4	11	6	n.s.		
Staged demonstrations	12	19	37	0	21	21	7	0	12	46	20	.316	***	
Total (N)	138-45	54-58	89-96	45-49	74-80	121-25	347-60	76-77	468-82	70-74	1,492-539			

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.

Source: EUROCIV survey.

**Table 3.8. Use of Various Forms of Advocacy to Influence Swedish Politics (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests					Organizations representing diffuse interests					Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties			
Whether the CSOs at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) have used the following strategies to influence Swedish politics													
Contacted politicians working at the national level	35	58	54	40	36	46	28	17	30	86	45	.364 ***	
Contacted public officials working at the national level	35	46	47	40	36	36	26	26	29	55	37	.189 ***	
Contacted EU institutions	9	12	22	0	15	10	8	4	12	32	14	.219 ***	
Used consultants (PR bureaus, etc.)	10	13	17	17	11	12	9	4	10	28	13	.175 ***	
Staged demonstrations	27	45	61	17	35	39	20	4	21	73	37	.387 ***	
Total (N)	144–53	61–64	98–106	50–53	84–88	131–41	369–85	75–77	477–89	78–80	1,567–634		

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROClV survey.

percent) working at the national level and to stage demonstrations (37 percent). Only 14 percent of the CSOs say that they have contacted EU institutions in order to influence Swedish politics. This externalization strategy (della Porta 2013) is most common among trade unions (22 percent) and political parties (32 percent), but women's organizations also use it to some extent (15 percent). Demonstrations as a way to influence Swedish politics are in particular used by political parties and trade unions and to some degree also by temperance and drug users' organizations. Most types of CSOs seem to favor inside lobbying.

When comparing the results shown in table 3.7 and table 3.8, one finds that the share of CSOs that have tried to influence EU policies in general is lower (between 6 and 36 percent depending on the strategy) than the share that have tried to influence Swedish politics (between 13 and 45 percent). This difference should, however, not be overemphasized. Even if only around 20 percent of the CSOs have tried to influence MEPs, it is still no more than 45 percent that have tried to influence Swedish politicians working on the national level. In both cases the majority has not tried to influence politics at all. These results are consistent with the data presented in table 3.6.

### *Organizational Europeanization*

Organizational Europeanization was measured by asking which networks, federations, or umbrella organizations at different levels the organizations were direct members of; the results are shown in table 3.9.

Considering the high percentage of locally based organizations in our sample, it is remarkable that 12 percent of the Swedish CSOs are members of networks or umbrella organizations at the European level, and hence are Europeanized from an organizational point of view. The CSOs that are the most Europeanized in this sense are trade unions, temperance and drug users' organizations, and political parties. But compared to other geographical levels, affiliations at the European and international levels are much rarer. An exception to the rule is humanitarian organizations that quite often are members of international federations and networks; those memberships are likely connected to their activities concerning international aid.

By far the most common level when it comes to affiliation is the national level, which is perhaps not that surprising considering that 84 percent of the organizations in our sample are local organizations. The Swedish corporative structure has in fact encouraged interest groups to organize at the national level through federations for representational purposes and for participation in consultative bodies such as forums and councils, e.g., where CSOs have been invited by public authorities to, among other things, comment on

**Table 3.9. Membership in Networks, Federations, or Umbrella Organizations (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests						Organizations representing diffuse interests				Total (%)	Cramer's V
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties		
Whether the CSOs are direct members of networks, federations, or umbrella organizations at the following levels												
Local	57	71	58	67	74	54	51	63	53	75	59	.164 **
National	75	77	80	67	52	67	74	57	76	77	74	.140 *
Nordic	11	23	30	0	15	4	12	4	12	22	14	.239 ***
EU level / European level	8	21	27	0	4	6	12	4	9	18	12	.214 ***
International level (other than European)	8	11	8	0	22	6	46	4	23	7	15	.339 ***
Total (N)	150-56	60-65	95-104	50-54	85-88	126-34	393-412	74-75	472-502	67-77	1,585-660	

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROCIV survey.

relevant legislative proposals, e.g., in disability policy and integration policy (cf. Aytar 2007; Feltenius 2008).

More than half of the organizations are also members of meta-organizations or networks at the local level, which shows that also on the local level there is a need for coordination between CSOs.

### *Financial Europeanization*

Financial Europeanization was measured by addressing the importance of different sources of income for the budget of the organization. The sources covered funding from EU institutions (European social funds, European regional funds, etc.) and other sources of funding, both public and private. Table 3.10 shows the share of the organizations that responded that these sources of income are at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) relevant, and leaves out those explicitly stating that the specific source is not a source of funding for them.

Public funding is far from being relevant for all Swedish CSOs despite the fact that the Swedish public sector has an extensive system of funding targeting CSOs and includes funding at the municipal, regional, and national levels based on both organizational grants and project-based grants (cf. Danielson, Zetterberg, and Amnå 2009). Support from local municipalities seems in fact to be relevant just for half of the CSOs, and support from the state for one in four. However, while trade unions are in principle not at all dependent on public funding, other organizations representing specific interests—such as victim support, women’s, temperance, and disability organizations—are to a much greater degree dependent on public funding (mostly from the local municipalities, and in some cases also from the state). Political parties are also highly dependent on public funding.

Overall, funding through members’ fees is by far the most frequently mentioned (83 percent) source of income, followed by private donations and sales of goods and services. Funding from EU institutions seems to be relevant only for a small minority of the organizations (8 percent). One can thus conclude that financial Europeanization is not a widespread phenomenon among CSOs in Sweden. Victim support organizations stand out as the exception: 17 percent of them deem EU funding as relevant for their organizations’ budget.

### *Participating in Activities at the European Level*

Participating in activities at the European level can also be an expression of Europeanization, which might be linked to each of the types of



**Table 3.10. Importance of Different Sources of Funding (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests					Organizations representing diffuse interests					Total (%)	Cramer's V
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties		
Overall sources of funding (being very, somewhat, or not very important) for the CSOs												
<i>Public funding</i>												
Local municipalities	73	71	15	83	52	73	29	57	29	69	51	.454 ***
The state	27	32	11	71	52	21	16	21	31	25	25	.202 ***
EU institutions	12	10	7	17	0	4	6	4	9	12	8	n.s.
<i>Other types of funding</i>												
Members' fees	99	81	91	83	87	92	78	63	64	93	83	.352 ***
Sales of goods and services	47	69	10	17	53	53	65	54	47	30	46	.316 ***
Company sponsorship	31	35	19	67	41	26	42	35	17	9	25	.241 ***
Private donations	51	47	6	50	70	32	65	39	82	31	49	.483 ***
Total (N)	161–66	64–71	104–7	54–56	82–89	139–46	429–40	76–78	518–30	79–81	1,709–65	

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.

Source: EUROCIV survey.

Europeanization described above. It might be part of the CSOs' political activities, their membership in a network, or an EU-funded project. It might also relate to more than one type of Europeanization. Table 3.11 shows the extent to which Swedish CSOs state that they at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) have participated in different activities at the European level.

The most common activity is to participate in meetings and conferences held by organizations that are active at the EU level. The fact that as many as 28 percent of Swedish CSOs state that they at all participate in such meetings shows that the level of participation in such activities is much higher (more than double) than the level of affiliation to European networks (12 percent). Participation in campaigns led by organizations that are active abroad is also a relatively common activity (which could include contacts with organizations principally active at the EU level). The types of organizations reporting this type of activity are in most cases those that are affiliated with EU-level networks to a high degree (political parties, trade unions, and temperance and drug users' organizations). Even though they showed a low level of affiliation in European networks, women's organizations also reported a rather high level of participation in such campaigns. The women's organizations also seem to participate in other types of network-based activities at the EU level more often than many other organizations.

## **Perceived Consequences of Europeanization**

### *Political Influence*

While one can assume that CSOs that try to influence decision-making want these efforts to result in actual changes in policies and political decisions, it is not obvious to what degree this desired outcome is obtained. In order to get a better picture of the perceived effectiveness of the CSOs' efforts to influence politics at the European level, we will discuss the extent to which the organizations perceive that their efforts have led to concrete changes. We understand this as the perceived consequences of regulatory Europeanization; the results are presented in table 3.12.

The presented results are based only on the CSOs that responded positively to the previous questions about whether they have tried to influence politics at the European level. Only 20 percent of these CSOs often or sometimes had experienced that their efforts led to concrete changes, but a more positive interpretation is that more than half of the organizations (62 percent) reported some kind of political impact, even if it happened rarely. It can be relevant to compare these figures for the European level with the answers to the same question regarding other administrative levels (figures

**Table 3.1.1. Participation in Network-Based Activities at the EU Level (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests						Organizations representing diffuse interests				Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug abusers' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties			
Whether the CSOs at all (often, sometimes, or rarely) have taken part in various forms of network-based activities at the EU level													
Meetings/conferences held by organizations active at the EU level.	24	41	41	20	33	25	19	13	19	44	28	.220 ***	
EU-financed projects together with other European organizations.	17	12	16	20	23	14	10	8	9	26	14	.160 **	
Campaigns led by organizations active abroad.	18	31	31	20	23	19	24	4	23	29	23	n.s.	
Campaigns led by organizations in Brussels.	8	23	20	0	17	12	5	0	4	23	11	.235 ***	
Contribute with information, such as reports that are sent to organizations active at the EU level.	17	13	22	0	20	16	7	4	6	17	13	.176 ***	
Total (N)	145-51	59-65	94-99	46-49	84-86	127-33	372-88	77-78	482-93	75-79	1,573-615		

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Source: EUROCIV survey.

**Table 3.12. Political Impact When Influencing Politicians and Officials at the European Level (in Percentages)**

	Organizations representing specific interests	Organizations representing diffuse interests	Political parties	Total (%)	Cramer's V
How often the CSOs have managed to influence politicians or officials at the European level of decision-making (only of those who have tried to have an influence)					
Often	2	0	2	2	n.s.
Sometimes	21	16	15	18	
Rarely	44	42	37	42	
Never	32	42	46	38	
Total (N)	100	110	37	247	

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.  
Source: EUROCIIV survey.

not presented in the table). A large majority (87 percent) of the CSOs stated that they had achieved some influence at the local level. At the national level, the corresponding figure was 76 percent, and for both the Nordic and the international levels the corresponding figure was 62 percent. These results show that Swedish CSOs are not only more active in influencing decision-making at the domestic levels (local and national), but they are also more likely to perceive that they wield some influence on these levels compared to the European level. Given the fact that it is perceived as more effective for the CSOs to address the national level instead of the European level, it seems reasonable that those CSOs more often address the national level for influencing EU policies (as shown above). These results suggest, however, that even if CSOs are active at the European level to a lesser degree than they are at the domestic levels, their efforts in addressing the European level in most cases are perceived as producing at least some effects in terms of political influence.

### *Effects of Organizational Affiliations*

We would also like to address the perceived results or outcomes from being affiliated with a network, federation, or umbrella organization at the European level (N = 271–93). The most common answer concerning the results of such affiliations was that the organizations thought that they had enabled them to be well informed about EU policies (38 percent). This is most evident for political parties (71 percent), but quite a high share of the organizations representing specific interests also mentioned this (40 percent). The perceived complexity of EU-level issues, while being perceived as an obstacle for Europeanize as shown above (see table 3.3), is thus also partly overcome through membership in networks or organizations at the EU level. The fact that some organizations found that membership in European networks and umbrella organizations helped them to keep well informed about EU policies suggests that, once the complexity threshold is overcome, membership can actually be an important source of information about what is going on in Brussels. Twenty-eight percent also reported that their organizations' credibility toward public actors and other organizations had been strengthened by these affiliations. Increased legitimacy thus seems to be one of the outcomes of membership in European umbrella organizations and networks.

When it comes to organizational Europeanization, a larger share of CSOs highlight the challenges of participating compared to those reporting positive effects or outcomes of membership. It seems therefore that active participation among CSOs that are formal members of networks and umbrella organizations at the European level is rare, which suggests a more passive

membership. Thus the CSOs in our sample tend to become more objects to than subjects in organizational Europeanization.

### *Mobilizing Resources*

To be able to access financial resources at the European level, CSOs often have to apply for funding from one of the many EU programs (see, e.g., the discussion on the ESF council in chapter 6). Table 3.13 shows the percentages of organizations that answered that they had often, sometimes, rarely, or never applied for EU funding.

Only 10 percent of the organizations had applied for EU funding, and among these victim support, women's, and social service organizations stand out. The relatively low degree of public funding among Swedish CSOs should, however, be kept in mind. Our survey furthermore shows a quite high level of success among the CSOs that had applied for funding. Only 29 percent of the organizations stated that they had never received the funding they had applied for (N = 201).

The consequences of this financial Europeanization also need to be addressed. A large majority (87 percent) of the CSOs that had applied for funding (N = 196–200) reported that applying for funding required a lot of resources such as knowledge, time, and staff. This shows a high threshold for accessing EU resources, which also has been suggested in previous research about EU funding of Swedish CSOs (Scaramuzzino et al. 2010; Scaramuzzino 2012; see also chapter 6 of this volume). The results also show that half of the CSOs that had applied for EU funding adapted their activities to increase the possibilities of accessing such funds. This seems to imply that EU funding influences organizational behavior, thus making Swedish CSOs more object to than subject in financial Europeanization. But even though many organizations acknowledge that they had adapted their activities to increase their chances of getting funding, only 8 percent perceived that the funding had led to changes in the goals of the organization. A possible interpretation is that such adaptations were merely cosmetic and did not involve the mission or core values of the organizations.

One in three CSOs stated that EU funding had made it possible for them to initiate new projects and activities that they otherwise would not have been able to start. This suggests that EU funding represents an alternative to other sources of funding, which opens up new opportunities. However, the fact that only 6 percent stated that EU funding had made them less dependent on economic support from the state and the local municipality suggests that such funding is more a complement than an alternative to domestic public funding. The results also show that not only applying for EU funding

**Table 3.13. Application for EU Funding (in Percentages)**

	Interest organizations for social groups							Other social welfare organizations				Total (%)	Cramer's V	
	Disability org.	Temperance and drug users' org.	Trade unions	Victim support org.	Women's org.	Other interest org. for social groups	Humanitarian org.	Social service org.	Religious associations and congregations	Political parties				
Whether the CSOs have applied for EU funding														
Often	0	0	1	0	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.166 ***
Sometimes	5	2	0	0	10	1	1	4	1	3	2	2	2	
Rarely	7	10	3	17	3	5	3	17	10	9	7	7	7	
Never	88	88	96	83	77	93	96	79	89	89	90	90	90	
Total (N)	159	65	105	52	90	133	420	77	518	80	1,699	1,699	1,699	

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant.  
Source: EUROCIV survey.

requires a lot of resources, but also the administration of received funds requires significant resources, which is something that more than half of the CSOs stated. About a third of the CSOs furthermore claimed that the EU funding has led to a more bureaucratic organization (see chapter 6).

In summary, only a small share of Swedish CSOs are financially Europeanized. Generally low dependency on public funding and good access to such funding at the national level seem to contribute to a low perceived relevance of EU funding. Furthermore, the fact that quite a large share of the CSOs see EU funding as involving high costs in terms of resources—both for applying for and administering such funding—is also a possible explanation for the low degree of financial Europeanization among Swedish CSOs. When it comes to mission drift and co-optation by means of EU funding, our results suggest certain adaptations but not anything involving changes in the core goals of the organization.

## Conclusions

Using descriptive data from a large survey, this chapter has given a picture of the extent to which Swedish CSOs are Europeanized, the motives they state for addressing the European level, the ways in which they Europeanize, and the perceived outcomes of Europeanization. It suggests that Europeanization involves a minority of Swedish CSOs, which partly mirrors the fact that a large majority of the organizations involved in the survey are locally based. Political parties and interest organizations seem to be Europeanized to a larger extent than organizations representing diffuse interests, regardless of the type of Europeanization considered.

Regulatory Europeanization is mostly achieved through contacts with—and intermediation of—domestic actors. While the political importance of the EU is in general perceived as low, Swedish CSOs seem to be quite successful in influencing policy at this level.

Organizational Europeanization seems to be a challenge for many organizations, at least when it comes to participation in activities. The complexity of the issues at the EU level is one of the major explanations. Participation can, however, give some positive outcomes such as remaining informed of what is happening in Brussels.

Financial Europeanization also presents certain challenges. It takes resources to apply for funding and to administrate the funds. The level of control and adaptation to EU requirements might be relevant but does not seem to apply for the organizations' central goals and mission.

All in all, Swedish CSOs seem to be well embedded in their national context when it comes to political influence, organizational affiliation, and



funding. Our results suggest that the European level is more of a complement than an alternative to the domestic level for these organizations. To advance our understanding of these processes, the chapter 4 will deepen the analysis by addressing the factors behind and the interplay between different forms of Europeanization.

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## Notes

1. For a methodological discussion about the survey and the dataset, see Appendix A; for the precise wording of all survey questions, their subitems, and the response alternatives, see Appendix C).
2. For a description of the principles guiding this categorization, see appendix A; for an overview of the specific types of organizations included in each type, see appendix B.
3. The organizational type “Other interest organizations for social groups” includes seventy-nine pensioners, thirty-nine immigrant, ten parents, six LGBT, and six student organizations, in addition to eleven organizations representing other specific group interests. A list of the organizations included in each type of CSO is presented in appendix B.

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