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Studies on Factivity, Complementation, and Propositional Attitudes

Colonna Dahlman, Roberta

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ÉTUDES ROMANES DE LUND 102

Roberta Colonna Dahlman

Studies on Factivity, Complementation, and Propositional Attitudes

Tesi di Dottorato / Doktorsavhandling



LUND UNIVERSITY

Centre for Languages and Literature
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Abstract - This dissertation is a collection of seven papers in which a number of questions are investigated regarding verbs that take a sentential complement as their direct object. These verbs are considered from different perspectives, namely from the perspective of the propositional attitude they express, or from the perspective of the syntactic construction they select, or from the point of view of the implications, semantic or pragmatic, to which they might give rise. Thus, this project led me to investigate different topics in the field of semantics, pragmatics, syntax, language acquisition, and philosophy of language.

The first paper is concerned with the double complementation system in Gallipolino, the Salentine dialect spoken in Gallipoli (Lecce). Assuming that there exists a correlation between the cognitive attitude attitudinal verbs express and the type of sentential complement that these verbs select, the Gallipolino system is accounted for by distinguishing between verbs of merely propositional attitude and verbs of desiderative propositional attitude.

The second paper investigates potential L1 attrition in bilingual speakers of Gallipolino and standard Italian who have left Gallipoli after puberty and moved to Northern Italy, where standard Italian has become the primary language of the speakers over time.

The third paper argues that, given that both *know* and *regret* are factive verbs as they both trigger the presupposition that the embedded proposition is true, a fundamental distinction has to be drawn between the factivity related to *know* and the factivity related to *regret*. The claim argued for here is that the first is a semantic phenomenon, while the second is a pragmatic phenomenon.

The fourth paper presents a critical comment on Weiner's (2006) attempt to show that conversational implicatures are not always cancellable as proposed by Grice (1989). I argue that what Weiner has shown with his examples is that a conversational implicature cannot be cancelled if the speaker, whose utterance gives rise to the implicature, does not intend to cancel it.

The fifth paper is concerned with the semantics of factive verbs and how factivity manifests itself in syntax. Given the distinction between the semantic factivity of *know* and the pragmatic factivity of *regret*, as proposed in the third paper, the claim argued for in this paper is that the traditional uniform account of *factive islands* must be revised.

The sixth paper deals with the Italian verb *sapere* 'know' as used in mental state attributions. Following the proposal of Tsohatzidis (2012) for English *know*, *sapere* is assumed to be semantically ambiguous between a factive sense and a non-factive sense. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis is provided by applying semantic tests and by considering syntactic behaviour.

The seventh paper discusses the protagonist projection hypothesis as originally formulated by Holton (1997) and argues that the hypothesis is not supported given the analysis presented here.

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*Ai miei genitori,
semprevicini.*

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List of papers

Paper I: Colonna Dahlman, R. Two Complementizers for Different Types of Propositional Attitude (ms.)*

Paper II: Colonna Dahlman, R. & T. Kupisch. Attrition at the Interfaces in Bilectal Acquisition (Italian/Gallipolino). Submitted, under review.

Paper III: Colonna Dahlman, R. Did People in the Middle Ages *Know* that the Earth Was Flat? Submitted, under review.

Paper IV: Colonna Dahlman, R. Conversational Implicatures Are Still Cancellable. *Acta Analytica*, 28(3), 321-327, 2013. Available at www.springerlink.com: DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0177-x

Paper V: Colonna Dahlman, R. The Wide Sea between *Know*-Islands and *Regret*-Islands. Submitted, under review.

Paper VI: Colonna Dahlman, R. The Ambiguity of *Sapere*. Submitted, under review.

Paper VII: Colonna Dahlman, R. The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis. Do We Need It? Submitted, under review.

* This paper is the revised version in English of an article previously published in Italian: Colonna Dahlman, R. (2011). Il sistema di doppia complementazione nel dialetto di Gallipoli (Lecce). Un'analisi semantica. *Arena Romanistica*, 8, 177-197.

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¹Russell, B. (1930), *The Conquest of Happiness*, p. 75. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

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²Russell, B. (1930), *The Conquest of Happiness*, p. 75. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd: “One of the symptoms of approaching nervous break-down is the belief that one’s work is terribly important, and that to take a holiday would bring all kinds of disaster.” La traduzione in italiano è mia.

Summary*

1 Research questions

This dissertation is a collection of seven papers that aim at investigating a number of questions related to verbs that take a sentential complement as their direct object (verbs such as *believe*, *know*, *tell*, *want*, *regret*, etc.) and to the environments in which they occur. In particular, this dissertation deals with questions relevant to the field of semantics, syntax, pragmatics, language acquisition and philosophy of language. The questions are summarized as follows:

- (i) Is there some relation between the kind of attitude a verb expresses and the type of complement construction the verb selects (Jackendoff 1985, 2007)?
- (ii) Are constructions involving sentential complementation vulnerable structures when it comes to potential effects of L1 attrition?
- (iii) How can we account for non-factive uses of *know* and *regret* in ordinary language?
- (iv) Are there cases where conversational implicatures are not cancellable (Weiner 2006)?
- (v) Is factivity a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon?
- (vi) Are *know* and *regret* factive in the same sense?
- (vii) Is the Italian verb *sapere* lexically ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense?

* This introductory summary presents the theoretical background of my research and summarizes the questions and the main claims put forward in my papers. It is intended as a separate part of this dissertation. The summary will be published in open access and made publicly available on the homepage of Lund University.

(viii) Is Holton's Protagonist Projection hypothesis (Holton 1997) a useful hypothesis?

The languages taken into consideration are Italian, Gallipolino (a Southern-Italian dialect), and English. The Italian sentences used as examples have been formulated by the author, a native speaker of Italian, and then presented to other native speakers of Italian for judgments of acceptability. The sentences in Gallipolino are translations from Italian into Gallipolino of original sentences formulated by the author that have been translated by a native speaker of Gallipolino. These Gallipolino sentences have been submitted for grammatical judgments by other native speakers of Gallipolino. The sentences in English are original sentences as well as sentences from other academic works on the topics at issue. The original sentences have been checked by native speakers of English.

2 Contents of the papers

2.1 Complementation and Propositional Attitudes

2.1.1 *The complementation system in Gallipolino*

In 2011, I published an article in Italian in *Arena Romanistica* 8 (pp. 177-197). This study, entitled "Il sistema di doppia complementazione nel dialetto di Gallipoli. Un'analisi semantica", was concerned with the complementation system in Gallipolino, the Salentine dialect spoken in Gallipoli (Lecce). In this dissertation, I present a slightly revised version in English entitled "Two Complementizers for Different Types of Propositional Attitude".

The sentences in Gallipolino have been formulated in standard Italian by the author and then translated into Gallipolino by a native speaker of the dialect. Fifteen native speakers of Gallipolino have been asked to express judgments on the acceptability of these sentences.

The aim of this study was to investigate a typical syntactic property of Gallipolino, the lack of the infinitive in embedded clauses, and to relate this property to the semantics of verbs of propositional attitude. The point of

departure was an observation by Ray Jackendoff (1985: 456, 2007: 252) that there seems to be an interesting correlation between the kind of attitude a verb expresses and the type of complement selected by the verb. The analysis was thus performed in the framework of Jackendoff's theory of verbs of *situational attitude* and verbs of *actional attitude* (Jackendoff 1985, 2007). This theoretical approach was however abandoned in favour of a new distinction between verbs of *mere propositional attitude* and verbs of *desiderative propositional attitude*.

As widely recognized in the literature, Gallipolino (Gall.), similarly to other dialects spoken in the Salentine peninsula below the Taranto-Ostuni isogloss,³ exhibits a limited usage of infinitival clauses (Rohlf's 1969, 1972; Calabrese 1993; Ledgeway 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011; Simone 2002). Instead of infinitival constructions as in standard Italian (It.) (cf. Skytte et al. 1991, Egerland 2010), we find finite constructions introduced by two different complementizers: *ka* and *ku* as shown in (1) and (2) below.⁴

- (1) a. 'U Miminu se crite ka stae bbonu. [Gall.]
 DET Miminu REFL believes ka stays fine
 b. Cosimino crede di stare bene. [It.]
 Cosimino believes PREP stay-INF well
 'Cosimino_i thinks that he_i is fine.'

³ This line (geographically known as the 'Messapic threshold') draws the linguistic boundary between Apulian dialects and Salentine dialects (Rohlf's 1937).

⁴ The following abbreviations are used in the glosses: DET: determiner; REFL: reflexive; PREP: preposition; INF: Infinitive; PRS: Present; IND: Indicative; SBJV: Subjunctive; 3SG: third person singular; COMP: complementizer; AUX: auxiliary; PST: Past; PTCP: Participle; spr: *sapere*; 1SG: first person singular; FUT: Future; IMPF: Imperfect; 3PL: third person plural; PF: Perfect.

- (2) a. 'U Miminu ole ku stae/ stescia⁵ bbonu.[Gall.]
 DET Miminu wants ku stay-PRS-IND/PRS-SBJV-3SG fine
- b. Cosimino vuole stare bene. [It.]
 Cosimino wants stay-INF well
 'Cosimino wants to be fine.'

Traditionally, the phenomenon of double complementation in Southern Italian dialects has been described in semantic-functional terms. These descriptions have highlighted the fact that the distribution of the two complementizers depends on the semantics of the matrix predicate. In particular, Rohlfs (1969: 190) distinguishes between 'declarative verbs' (verbs expressing a belief or a claim), which select *ka*, and 'volitive verbs' (verbs expressing a will or an intention), which select *ku*.

Ledgeway (2003: 94), on the other hand, refers to the traditional distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* and points out two different types of matrix predicates: (i) those that semantically select an irrealis complement clause, introduced by *ku*—in this case, the event or state as expressed by the complement clause is characterized as not yet happened at the time of utterance and can receive an interpretation only if related to the matrix' temporal specification; (ii) those that semantically select a realis complement clause, introduced by *ka*—in this case, the realization of the event or state expressed by the complement clause does not need to be situated after the time of utterance, therefore does not need to be related to the matrix' temporal specification in order to receive an interpretation.

⁵ The use of the Subjunctive mood is preferred by some informants, although it is not considered to be obligatory by any speakers. The complementizer *ku* can select both the Subjunctive and the Indicative mood, and the choice of mood does not have any influence on the semantics of the clause. The sentences were constructed with the Subjunctive after *ku* (if existing in the verbal inflection), but I would have expected no relevant differences had I used Indicative instead. On the Subjunctive forms and productivity in Salentine dialects, see Mancarella p. G.B. (a cura di, 1998:184) and Bertocci D. & F. Damonte (2007).

Given that the distribution of the two complementizers in Gallipolino might depend on the semantics of the matrix verb, I propose to analyse the matrix verbs involved in terms of the propositional attitudes they denote.

2.1.2 *Propositional attitudes and sentential complementation*

Verbs of propositional attitude are those verbs that express the way in which a person is cognitively related to a proposition *p* (Russell 1940: 65). These verbs can be distinguished at least into two categories, namely: (i) verbs that express the way in which someone is cognitively related to the actual truth of a proposition, or to the state of affairs in which a proposition is true or false, for example: *believe, doubt, imagine, assume, presume, know*, etc. ‘verbs of Believing’; (ii) verbs that express the way in which someone is cognitively related not to the actual truth of a proposition, but to its possible truth, or more precisely to the state of affairs in which a proposition might be true, for example: *intend, wish, be willing, plan*, etc. ‘verbs of Intending’.

Jackendoff (2007) redefined the distinction between verbs of Believing and verbs of Intending in terms of distinction between verbs of situational attitude (= verbs of Believing) and verbs of actional attitude (= verbs of Intending).

Syntax seems to express the distinction between the attitudes that attitudinal verbs denote by means of selection. In the framework of Jackendoff’s typology, a situational attitude is typically expressed by a finite (= tensed) *that*-clause, while the typical syntactic structure that goes with verbs of actional attitude is an infinitival verb phrase whose subject is understood to be the subject of the attitudinal verb (coreferential subjects).

Similarly, in the case of Gallipolino, we can observe that the structure that typically occurs with verbs of situational attitude is a *ka*-clause, while the structure that typically occurs with verbs of actional attitude is a *ku*-clause. Thus, tentatively, the following generalization can be formulated:

- (3) In Gallipolino, verbs of situational attitude select complement clauses introduced by *ka*; on the other hand, verbs of actional attitude select complement clauses introduced by *ku*.

The data in (1) and (2) seem to confirm the generalization in (3). This generalization, however, is not valid for all cases. In fact, on the one hand, *piacire* ‘like’ and *ulire* ‘want’ always select *ku*, even when they express a situational attitude. On the other hand, *sparare* ‘hope’ and *timire* ‘fear’ may select *ku*, even when they express a situational attitude.⁶

In order to account for these data, I therefore propose a new distinction between *merely propositional attitudes* and *desiderative propositional attitudes*. Desiderative propositional attitudes are distinguished from merely propositional attitudes because of a ‘value–feature’ involved in their semantics. The distinction can be spelled out as follows: merely propositional attitude is the attitude of evaluating the truth of *p*, that is, an attitude of believing towards the state of affairs in which *p* is true/false; on the other hand, desiderative propositional attitude is the attitude of evaluating the desirability of the truth of *p*, that is, an attitude of believing towards the state of affairs in which if *p* is/becomes true, then this has value (for someone in particular or in general). Thus, I assume that all attitudinal verbs (both verbs of Believing and verbs of Intending) are to be considered as propositional, as implying the very same attitude of believing. What distinguishes some propositional attitudes from others, I claim, is not – as Jackendoff proposes – the kind of situation towards which the attitude is addressed (situation or action), but, rather, the type of evaluation involved: some attitudes are attitudes towards the truth of a proposition; other attitudes are attitudes towards the desirability of the truth of a proposition.

This distinction seems to offer a tenable explanation of the fact that verbs like *wish*, *like*, *hope*, *fear* exhibit in Gallipolano a particular syntactic behaviour as they always select a clause introduced by the complementizer *ku* even when they express an attitude that, according to the Jackendoffian typology, is

⁶ As a matter of fact, Jackendoff himself (2007: 250) admits that “Unfortunately, verbs of situational and actional attitude cannot be reliably distinguished by their syntax. It is true that *that*-clauses typically go with situational attitudes and infinitival clauses with actional attitudes, but this is not invariably the case. For instance, *wish* and *claim* can appear with an infinitival clause and nevertheless express a situational attitude.”

situational. The explanation is simple: these verbs denote desiderative propositional attitudes. Hence, finally, the generalization in (3) is reformulated as follows:

- (4) In Gallipolino, verbs of merely propositional attitude select complement clauses introduced by *ka*; while verbs of desiderative propositional attitude select complement clauses introduced by *ku*.

The proposed distinction between verbs of merely propositional attitude and verbs of desiderative propositional attitude may remind us, on the one hand, of the traditional distinction between declarative verbs and volitive verbs (Rohlf's 1969), or, on the other hand, of the above seen distinction between verbs of Believing and verbs of Intending. I argue, however, that the distinction I propose might contribute to a more precise understanding of attitudinal verbs.

The classic distinction between declarative verbs and volitive verbs does not take into account the difference between verbs of propositional attitude and verbs of communication (cf. Partee 1973: 325). When considering attitudinal verbs, we should not assume that verbs of communication are attitudinal verbs. Crucially, Jackendoff (1985, 2007: 250) commits this mistake when he mentions *claim* as a verb of situational attitude; furthermore, *promise* is regarded as a verb of actional attitude (Jackendoff 1985: 456), while *persuade* and *convince* are considered as verbs of situational attitude when followed by a *that*-clause, or as verbs of actional attitude when followed by an infinitival (Jackendoff 2007: 252). These verbs, I argue, are not verbs denoting an attitude, they are verbs of communication. Verbs of communication can be roughly defined as predicates that denote the communication of a propositional content by the performing of a speech act. So, for instance, *claim* is a typical verb of communication that expresses the communication of a propositional content by the performance of an assertion. Claiming that *p* typically implies that the subject of this act is committed to the truth of the said/claimed proposition, but this is no necessary condition for the act of claiming (in this sense, see Tsohatzidis 1994: 224). In other words, to believe that *p* might be considered as one of the conditions for the felicitous performance of an act of

claiming (the so called sincerity condition: cf. Austin 1962: 16); however, to believe that p is not a truth condition for claiming that p .

2.2 Vulnerability of structures involving sentential complementation

In the second paper, “Attrition at the Interfaces in Bilectal Acquisition (Italian /Gallipolino)” (co-authored with Tanja Kupisch)⁷, the same *kulka*-constructions in Gallipolino are considered from the perspective of language acquisition research. In particular, the aim of this paper is to explore potential L1 attrition in bilectal speakers of Gallipolino and standard Italian who have left Gallipoli after puberty and moved to Northern Italy, where standard Italian has become the primary language of the speakers over time. By ‘attrition’, broadly defined by Freed (1982: 1) as “loss of any language or any portion of a language by an individual or a speech community”, we mean a change in the L1 caused by a second language that has become the primary, that is, the most frequently used language.

Language attrition has been studied predominantly as second language (L2)-induced first language (L1) attrition, that is, L1 attrition in (late) L2 environments due to migration to another country (expatriation). In the paper, language attrition is investigated in a *bilectal* context, where the dialect can be considered the L1 and the standard variety another L1 or an early L2. Specifically, we refer to native speakers of Gallipolino and standard Italian as ‘simultaneous bicultals’ if the age of onset in Italian happened before the age of three years, and as ‘sequential bicultals’ if the age of onset in Italian happened after the age of three years. The purpose of the study was to ascertain whether bilectal speakers are affected by attrition in the same way as has been claimed for (late bilingual) L2 speakers, and, moreover, whether simultaneous and sequential bilectal speakers are affected differently.

⁷ Colonna Dahlman has written sections 2 and 3, all other sections have been jointly discussed and written by both authors.

Potential effects of attrition have been investigated with respect to the lack of the infinitive in clauses embedded under the complementizers *ku* and *ka* in contexts where standard Italian allows infinitival clauses. Given existing differences between Gallipolino and standard Italian, this phenomenon can be expected to be problematic for proficient speakers of both varieties. As noted by Köpcke (2004: 17), language influence is the most likely cause for attrition in bilingual settings: “L1 is replaced by L2 in most communication domains, and L2 is thus generally thought to strongly influence the attrition process.” Moreover, the theoretical literature has associated subordinate clauses introduced by *ku/ka* with the left periphery of the clause (CP), specifically the COMP position (Calabrese 1993: 42), and, according to current thinking, the CP is a particularly vulnerable domain in bilingual populations because it links syntax and discourse (e.g. Hulk & Müller 2000, Platzack 2001, Sorace 2011).

The relationship between syntactic choices that are delimited by the discourse context has been investigated for decades in language acquisition research, especially based on the null subject parameter (e.g. Sorace 2004, Sorace & Serratrice 2009). It is by now clear from a large body of research across all groups of language acquirers that the syntax-discourse/pragmatics interface conveys difficulties and delays across all learner groups, more than other interfaces, a position which is formally argued for by the so called *Interface Hypothesis* (Sorace & Serratrice 2009, Sorace 2011). According to the Interface Hypothesis, bilingualism results in an increased processing burden that differentially affects interfaces. External interfaces are more affected by the managing of more than one linguistic system since the relevant integration of information obtains between one (or more) linguistic sub-module(s) and a system that is not domain-specifically linguistic. Our conception of the locus of syntax-discourse/pragmatics interface follows a proposal of Platzack (2001), who postulated a generalized vulnerability of the C-domain. Our study is thus relevant to the generalization that linguistic phenomena at particular interfaces show a major tendency to undergo attrition, as “interfaces between syntax and other cognitive systems (that is, discourse, lexical semantics) exhibit more developmental instability than narrow syntax” (Sorace 2004: 143).

The hypothesis is that the selection of the complementizers *ku* and *ka* may exhibit *emergent optionality*. The phenomenon of syntactic optionality is defined

by Sorace (2000: 93) as “the coexistence within an individual grammar of two or more variants of a given construction, which: (i) make use of the same lexical resources; (ii) express the same meaning.” In the present case, properties of the primary language (here: Italian) might be adopted in the secondary language (here: Gallipolino), leading to an L1-grammar that is divergent from native norms. The hypothesis is that post-puberty migrant speakers of Gallipolino will not judge sentences in Gallipolino as do speakers of Gallipolino who have never left Gallipoli. If so, this can be taken as evidence that they are influenced by standard Italian which has become their primary language.

The hypothesis was tested by means of an experiment (a grammaticality judgment task with 40 sentences). Migrant bilectals’ performance was significantly different to that of the non-migrant controls with respect to *ku*- and *ka*-clauses, which can be associated with the interfaces between syntax and discourse/pragmatics. They did not show any differences in performance between the two types of sentential complementation at issue, that is, *ku*- and *ka*-clauses, although the former pattern differently from Italian complement clauses, while the latter have equivalent Italian constructions. This outcome has implications with regard to current theories on the occurrence of *cross-linguistic influence*. For developing bilinguals, Hulk & Müller (2000) proposed two necessary conditions for the occurrence of cross-linguistic influence: (i) a phenomenon has to be at the interface between syntax and pragmatics; (ii) there has to be partial structural overlap between the two languages. Our results show that migrant participants performed similarly with respect to *ku*- and *ka*-sentences, although the latter but not the former show structural overlap with Italian. This suggests that overlap cannot be a necessary condition for the occurrence of optionality in adult bilectal grammars.

2.3 Factivity

2.3.1 *Factive verbs*

Among verbs that take a sentential complement as their object, *factive verbs* constitute a special category. *Factivity* is the term used to denote the relation between a sentence containing factive verbs and the truth of the embedded

proposition. Kiparsky and Kiparsky introduced the notion of factivity in their seminal work from 1970 by distinguishing between two types of predicates which take sentences as their complements, namely “factive ” (for example *know/be aware* (of), *ignore*, *comprehend*, *learn*, *realize*, *discover*, *regret*, *resent*, *deplore*, etc.) and “non-factive” (for example *believe*, *assume*, *suppose*, *claim*, *conclude*, etc.). They argued that the choice of complement type is especially predictable from the “PRESUPPOSITION by the speaker that the complement of the sentence expresses a true proposition” (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970: 143).

With the third paper, “Did People in the Middle Ages *Know* that the Earth Was Flat?”, I began research that I am still conducting in works currently in progress. The phenomenon at issue is the complementation under factive predicates, with a special consideration of *know* and *regret*. The analysis was performed on authentic English sentences, as reported by Allan Hazlett (2010), and original Italian sentences formulated by the author. Other fifteen native speaker informants of Italian were asked to express their judgment on the acceptability or unacceptability of the Italian sentences.

The study has been inspired by a recent debate on how the factivity of *know* should be intended (Hazlett 2009, 2010, 2012, Turri 2011, Tsohatzidis 2012, Buckwalter 2014).

It is a well-known fact in the literature that factive verbs trigger the presupposition that the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is true (for an overview of different presupposition triggers, see Levinson 1983: 181 ff.; Beaver 2001: 10 ff.).

However, the examples in (5) show clearly that a speaker, although using *know*, *learn* (the inchoative of *know*, that is, *come to know*), and *regret*, may not imply that *p* is true:

(5) a. Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. (Hazlett 2010: 501, example (1))

b. In school we learned that World War I was a war to “make the world safe for democracy,” when it was really a war to make the world safe for the Western imperial powers. (Hazlett 2010: 501, example (3))

c. Falsely believing that he had inflicted a fatal wound, Oedipus regretted killing the stranger on the road to Thebes. (Klein 1975: B12, example (26))

Hazlett proposes giving a Gricean explanation of non-factive uses of *know*. According to him, *know* does not entail, but *pragmatically implies* the proposition expressed by the embedded clause. In particular, Hazlett (2009: 605) claims that what ‘knows’ implicates in language use is a Gricean *conversational implicature*, while Hazlett (2010: 507 ff.) generally claims that ‘knows’ *typically implies* the truth of *p*. In his latest work (Hazlett 2012), he suggests that factivity is a matter of *pragmatic presupposition* (with reference to the Stalnakerian notion of pragmatic presupposition: cf. Stalnaker 1972, 1973, 1974, 1999, 2002).

By contrast, against this claim, I present arguments that show how a purely pragmatic approach to factivity cannot tell the whole story regarding the meaning of *know*. Moreover, I argue that, by assuming a pragmatic account of factivity, we are unable to see a fundamental distinction namely the distinction between *know*, that is semantically factive, and *regret*, that is pragmatically factive.

This investigation led me to explore two very extensive topics in linguistics and philosophy of language: *presuppositions* and implications in general, and in particular the presupposition of *factivity*.

2.3.2 *Presupposition between semantics and pragmatics*

2.3.2.1 *A controversial notion*

Presupposition is surely one of the most debated notions in the linguistic literature.⁸ And, I would like to add, one of the most confused notions. The

⁸ For an overview of different theories on presupposition, see Kryk 1979, Levinson 1983, Soames 1989, Huang 2007, Delogu 2010, Beaver & Geurts 2013, Simons 2013.

reason for this confusion lies in the fact that the term presupposition has been used to refer to very different phenomena (Taylor 1998: 347). As Lycan (1984: 81) correctly puts it,

“Presupposition” is an ill-conceived umbrella word that is used to cover any number of importantly distinct and largely unrelated notions (from formal semantics, the theory of conversation, speech-act theory, the theory of speaker meaning, and the psychology of inference, and more). A single term devised to comprehend all these notions, or probably even two or more of them, would figure in no interesting (and true) linguistic generalizations.

There are two main theoretical approaches on presuppositions. According to the first one, the *semantic view*, presuppositions are semantic implications, that is, truth-conditional relations between propositions. On the second approach, the *pragmatic view*, presuppositions are not properties of sentences but rather properties of speakers or of linguistic performances given a certain context of utterance. On the semantic view, a presupposed proposition is a necessary condition for the truth of the presupposing proposition; while on the pragmatic view, a presupposed proposition is a condition for the felicitous utterance of the presupposing statement in a given context.

Thus, we need both semantics and pragmatics in order to understand presupposition. Traditionally, a sharp distinction is drawn between semantics and pragmatics: semantics is concerned with the relation between words and things, while pragmatics is concerned with the relation between words, things and the actors of a communicative situation (cf. Taylor 1998: 81-82; Casalegno 1998: 18-19). In the following subsections, I present the main claims put forward in the above mentioned frameworks. It is not my goal, however, to give an exhaustive survey of all theories that have been developed.

2.3.2.2 The semantic view

In linguistic theory as well as in philosophy of language, it is traditionally stated that propositions give rise to different kinds of implications. Initially, presuppositions were assumed to be truth-conditional hence semantic implications. The notion of presupposition was introduced into linguistic

theory and philosophy of language by the logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege. In *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* (1892; Eng. translation 1948), he wrote:

[..] when we say “the moon”, we do not intend to speak of our conception of the moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense alone, but we *presuppose* a referent. (Frege 1948: 214; emphasis mine)

And further on:

If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound proper names used have referents. If one therefore asserts “Kepler died in misery,” there is a presupposition that the name “Kepler” designates something; but it does not follow that the sense of the sentence “Kepler died in misery” contains the thought that the name “Kepler” designates something. [..] That the name “Kepler” designates something is just as much a presupposition for the assertion

Kepler died in misery

as for the contrary assertion. (Frege 1948: 221-222)

Following Frege, Peter F. Strawson (1950; 1952: 175 ff.) defined presupposition as a relation of truth dependence between statements (that is, uses of sentences).⁹ This view shifted to the definition of *semantic presupposition* as relation between statements that can be true or false, hence can express *propositions*: if the presupposing proposition is true, then the presupposed proposition must also be true (i); if the presupposed proposition is false, then it is *meaningless* to express the presupposing proposition (ii).

(6) *The Fregean/Strawsonian notion of semantic presupposition*

S *presupposes* P iff:

(i) if S then it *must* be the case that P (= P is a truth condition of S);

⁹ On the distinction between statements and sentences, see Hintikka (1962: 6): “[..] a statement is the act of uttering, writing, or otherwise expressing a declarative sentence. A sentence is the form of words which is uttered or written when a statement is made.”

(ii) if $\neg P$ then S has *no truth-value* (i.e. S is neither true nor false).¹⁰

As I understand it, this definition offers a notion of presupposition that is both semantic and pragmatic: on the one hand, the relation between S and P is described as a truth-conditional relation (if S then P); on the other hand, the truth of P is considered as a condition on the assertability (“meaningfulness of use”) of S : if P is false, it is meaningless to assert S because the question whether S does not arise at all (Strawson 1952: 174).

As a next step, presupposition was described in purely semantic terms. According to van Fraassen (1968: 137),

The explicit characterization of presupposes is therefore given by

1. A presupposes B if and only if A is neither true nor false unless B is true.

This is equivalent to

2. A presupposes B if and only if

(a) if A is true then B is true,

(b) if A is false then B is true.

Under this view, Keenan (1971: 45) defined a *logical presupposition* as follows:

¹⁰ This is the point on which Strawson (1950) famously criticized Russell’s theory of denoting phrases (Russell 1905). According to Russell, a sentence such as “The present King of France is bald” is simply false, as there is no King of France; while, in Strawson’s line of reasoning, the same sentence has no truth-value—it’s neither true nor false. On the truth-value gap theory, see also Quine 1960, Austin 1962. Later on, Strawson (1964) claimed that whether S is false or truth-value-lacking is a matter of *topicality*: if presupposition failure affects the topic of the statement (what the statement is about, as in “The king of France is bald”), then S is neither true nor false; while, otherwise, if presupposition failure does not affect the topic of the statement, but merely affects what purports to be information about its topic (as in “The exhibition was visited by the king of France”, which answers the question “Who visited the exhibition?”), then S can be said to be false (as the statement is misinformative about its topic). In this sense, see also Reinhart (1981: 69-70), Erteschik-Shir (1997: 16). For an alternative view, see von Stechow (2004) who claims that “All the sentences referring to the present king of France should equally fail to assign a truth-value to our world.” (p. 326).

A sentence S logically presupposes a sentence S' just in case S logically implies S' and the negation of S, $\neg S$, also logically implies S'. In other words, the truth of S' is a necessary condition on the truth or falsity of S.

Eventually, the semantic notion of presupposition was represented in the following terms:

(7) *The semantic notion of presupposition*

S presupposes P iff:

- (i) if S then P (= P is a truth condition of S);
- (ii) if $\neg S$ then P (= P is a truth condition of $\neg S$).

In his William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in 1955, John L. Austin presented the famous idea that not all statements are true or false descriptions, but rather some utterances must be considered as acts – *speech acts* – instantiated by means of performative sentences (Austin 1962: 5 ff.). In the framework of his new theory, Austin proposed that statements also are to be considered as speech acts and that presuppositions are *felicity conditions* for statements: if these conditions are not met, hence if some presupposition is false, the presupposing statement results in an act that, although fully performed, is “void” (Austin 1962: 20; 48).

(8) *The Austinian notion of presupposition*

S presupposes P iff:

- (i) if S then P (= P is a truth condition of S);
- (ii) if $\neg P$ then #S (if P is false, S results in a ‘void’ speech act).

This notion was still close to the Frege-Strawsonian definition. However, the Austinian proposal marked the beginning of a pragmatic turn.

2.3.2.3 *The pragmatic view*

Since the 1970s, presuppositions have received a pragmatic account in linguistic theory and have been treated as phenomena mainly related to the felicity

conditions of the utterance or to the speaker's subjectivity, not to the truth-conditional content of the uttered sentence. The traditional semantic notion of presupposition founded on the idea that presuppositions are truth conditions for statements was replaced by a pragmatic notion grounded on the idea that presuppositions are conditions on the context of utterance (meaning that they must be met in the context of utterance, in order for a sentence to be appropriately uttered). In particular, this pragmatic notion has been developed by Lauri Karttunen (1970, 1971, 1973, 1974) and by Robert Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1999, 2002).

According to Karttunen (1974: 181), presupposition is a relation between a sentence and the class of contexts in which the sentence could be felicitously uttered. Under this view, a sentence can be felicitously uttered only in contexts that entail all of its presuppositions.¹¹ A conversational context is considered as a set of logical forms that specifies what can be taken for granted in making the next speech act:

In a fully explicit discourse, the presuppositions of the next sentence uttered are satisfied by the current context. [...] Once the new sentence has been uttered, the context will be incremented to include the new shared information. Viewed in this light, a theory of presuppositions amounts to a theory of a rational order of contexts from smaller to larger sets of shared information. At each step along the way that a fully explicit discourse proceeds, the current context satisfies the presuppositions of the next sentence that in turn increments it to a new context. (Karttunen 1974: 190)

The Karttunenian notion of presupposition might be represented as follows:

(9) *The Karttunenian notion of pragmatic presupposition*

S presupposes P iff:

P is entailed by all contexts in which S could be felicitously uttered.

¹¹ The Karttunenian notion has received a formalistic elaboration and has been developed in the framework of Context Change Semantics employed by Irene Heim (1992).

According to Stalnaker, presupposition should be defined as a relation *between speakers and propositions*. As Stalnaker puts it, it is speakers who presuppose, not sentences or propositions:

The notion I will discuss is a pragmatic notion, as opposed to a purely semantic one. This means that the presupposition relation cannot be explained solely in terms of the meaning or content of sentences, but must be explained partly in terms of facts about users of sentences: their beliefs, intentions and expectations. [...] the basic presupposition relation is not between propositions or sentences, but between a person and a proposition. (Stalnaker 1973: 447)

Following this same line of reasoning, Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970) introduced the notion of factivity in linguistic theory as the “PRESUPPOSITION *by the speaker* that the complement of the sentence expresses a true proposition” (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970: 143; emphasis mine). In other words, by her utterance that “S FACTV *p*”, the speaker presupposes that *p* is true.

(10) *The Stalnakerian notion of pragmatic presupposition as relation between speakers and propositions*

S presupposes P iff:

The speaker of S, in uttering S, assumes or acts as if she assumes that P is true and that the truth of P is part of the *common ground* of information shared with her interlocutor(s).

Regarding the Stalnakerian view, a crucial point needs to be clarified. Under this view, the term ‘presupposition’ is used to denote two different things. On the one hand, Stalnaker, unlike Karttunen, defines presupposition as a *propositional attitude*, a mental state of the speaker: “According to the *pragmatic* conception, presupposition is a propositional attitude, not a semantic relation” (Stalnaker 1972: 387). Presuppositions, as Stalnaker says, constitute the background of knowledge or beliefs against which statements and requests are made, questions are asked, proclamations and commands issued (Stalnaker 1973: 448). Moreover, he explicitly underlines that presupposing is not a

mental attitude like believing, but rather “a linguistic disposition—a disposition to behave in one’s use of language as if one had certain beliefs, or were making certain assumptions” (Stalnaker 1974: 202; 1999).¹² As I understand it, according to this view, to presuppose is an act of the speaker namely her act of taking the truth of a proposition for granted, that is, the speaker’s act of taking the truth of a proposition as part of the conversational common ground at the time of her utterance which may or may not be justified by the speaker’s own belief, depending on whether the speaker herself believes that the presupposed proposition is entailed by the common ground or not (in this latter case, she is just acting *as if* the presupposed proposition were part of the common ground).

On the other hand, Stalnaker follows Karttunen’s account and uses the term presupposition to indicate the *proposition* whose truth is taken for granted: “A person’s presuppositions are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted, often unconsciously, in a conversation, an inquiry, or a deliberation.” (Stalnaker 1973: 447). In this sense, presuppositions are those propositions (corresponding to Karttunen’s “logical forms”) that constitute the common ground of information shared by speakers and hearers (corresponding to Karttunen’s “linguistic context of an utterance”). Hence they are the *background of information* against which assertions are made.¹³

(11) *The Stalnakerian notion of pragmatic presupposition as backgrounded information*

S *presupposes* P iff:

In uttering S, P is not asserted but backgrounded information, as already belonging to the common ground shared by speakers and hearers.

¹² Stalnaker defines this disposition in terms of *acceptance*: “To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason.” (Stalnaker 2002: 716). The Stalnakerian notion of acceptance was introduced in Stalnaker 1973: “[...]it is clear that presupposition is a propositional attitude. More specifically, it is an attitude of accepting something to be true.” (p. 450). On this notion, see also Stalnaker 1984.

¹³ For arguments against Stalnaker’s common ground theory of presupposition, see Abbott (2000, 2008), Simons (2001, 2005, 2006).

The pragmatic notion of presupposition as developed by Karttunen (1970, 1971, 1974) and by Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1999, 2002) is the notion currently dominant in the linguistic literature.

2.3.3 *Factivity and cancellability*

The traditional semantic notion of presupposition founded on the idea that presuppositions are truth conditions for statements was replaced by the pragmatic notion grounded on the idea that presuppositions are conditions on the context of utterance.

A classical argument in favour of the pragmatic view of presuppositions is the observation that presuppositions are defeasible, “cancellable”, in some contexts, without contradiction (Gazdar 1979b). In fact, it is argued that this is a property by which presuppositions are distinguished from entailments that are indefeasible. Karttunen (1971) pointed out, for instance, that factive presuppositions may vanish, instead of being constant, in some environments, despite the assumption that “Whatever a sentence with a factive predicate presupposes, *the presupposition ought to remain* no matter whether the main sentence is a negative assertion, an interrogative sentence, or the antecedent of a conditional construction” (Karttunen 1971: 62-63; emphasis mine). The following examples are all taken from Karttunen 1971 (pp. 63-64):¹⁴

(12) John didn't regret that he had not told the truth. How could he have done that when he knew that what he had said was true?

(13) Did you discover that you had not told the truth?

(14) If I realize later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.

¹⁴ Example (12) corresponds to example (23), (13) to (24c), (14) to (25b) and (15) to (26b) in Karttunen (1971: 63-64).

(15) It is possible that I will realize later that I have not told the truth.

In these cases, Karttunen argues, it is evident that the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is not necessarily presupposed to be true, even though the embedding occurs under a factive verb (*regret* and the inchoatives of *know*, that is, *discover* and *realize*). So the following question arises: Why is it that factive verbs embed propositions that are not necessarily presupposed to be true?

If the semantic notion of presupposition as formulated in (7) were right, it is argued, then the negation of the sentence should imply the presupposed proposition ($\neg S \Rightarrow P$), which is not always the case. Presuppositions *tend* to project in embedded environments (unlike entailments), but they do not always do it as sometimes they are cancelled.¹⁵ Hence, it seems that a pragmatic notion of presupposition be more apt to explain empirical data and should be preferred.

Following this reasoning, non-factive uses of *know* and *regret* could be explained as cases of cancellation of the pragmatic presupposition of factivity.

A crucial consequence of a purely pragmatic view of the presupposition of factivity and of its cancellability is the claim that factivity is a merely conversational phenomenon, which implies, with respect to *know* and *regret*, that factivity is not a semantic feature attached to the lexical items ‘knows’ and ‘regrets’, but originates conversationally (in this sense, Simons 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007a, b, 2013). As Simons (2007b: 1044) observes,

If presuppositions are part of the conventional content of expressions, then they should be constant: if an expression is presuppositional, then it should always be presuppositional. On the other hand, if presupposition is grounded in conversational norms, then the presuppositionality of a sentence might well be affected by the conversational role it plays.

¹⁵ Following Gazdar (1979a, 1979b), Huang (2007: 81) claims that “what a presupposition trigger engenders is merely a potential presupposition. *A potential presupposition will become an actual one, unless it is defeated.*” (emphasis mine).

This seems to be the account followed by Hazlett (2010: 521) when he rules out a semantic account of the factivity of *know* and suggests a pragmatic explanation instead.

Contrary to this account, I maintain that the presupposition of factivity engendered by *know* is conventional, that is, attached to the conventional meaning of the lexical item 'knows'. So, in order to explain non-factive uses of *know*, I follow the hypothesis presented by Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2012: 452) that 'knows' is semantically ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense hence between a sense in which it entails *p* and a sense in which it does not entail *p*. If we assume that 'knows' is ambiguous, we simply accept the fact that this lexical item sometimes occurs as a non-factive predicate, that is, without involving any presupposition of factivity, and sometimes it occurs in its factive sense. In this latter case, *know* is semantically factive, meaning that a sentence such as *X knows that p* entails *p*. This relation is not cancellable.

On the other hand, I argue that the presupposition of factivity triggered by *regret* is not a semantic but a conversational phenomenon. As a matter of fact, *regret* can be used non-factively without any effect on its meaning, while *know* cannot be used non-factively without change in meaning, from *know* to *something other than know*. In other words, and put very simply, we can say that someone really regrets that *p* even though *p* is not true, hence, a sentence such as *X regrets that p* does not entail *p*; whereas we cannot say that someone really knows that *p* if *p* is not true. In fact, when we use *know* non-factively, we actually mean something else than attributing knowledge.

In this sense, I claim that *know* is semantically factive while *regret* is pragmatically factive. Crucially, this fundamental distinction between *know* and *regret* cannot be seen if we consider factivity as a purely pragmatic phenomenon. Admittedly, a sentence such as *X knows that p* pragmatically presupposes *p*: uttering this sentence would be an infelicitous act if *p* does not belong to the common ground of information shared between speaker and interlocutors. However, my claim is that this pragmatic implication is only a consequence of the fact that *know* entails *p* because of its conventional meaning.

On a pragmatic level of analysis, both *know* and *regret* pragmatically presuppose *p*. Therefore, we need to shift to a semantic level of analysis in order

to see that *know*, but not *regret*, entails *p*. Further arguments in favour of the semantic distinction between *know* and *regret* are presented in my fifth paper.

2.4 Pragmatic implications and cancellability

The Gricean theory of cancellation of pragmatic implications constituted the ground for the argument developed in my fourth paper, “Conversational Implicatures Are Still Cancellable”, published in *Acta Analytica*, 28(3), 321-327, 2013. This study presents an argument against Weiner’s (2006) claim that conversational implicatures not always are cancellable (in this sense, see also Blome-Tillmann 2008 and Hazlett 2012).

In his William James lectures at Harvard University in 1967,¹⁶ Grice introduced the notion of *implicature*. He distinguished between conventional and conversational implicatures (Grice 1989: 25-26). *Conventional implicatures* occur when the conventional meaning of the words used determines what is implicated. Hence, they are semantic inferences (see, in this sense, Davis 2010). On the other hand, *conversational implicatures* are not connected to the conventional meaning of a lexical item, but only with certain general features of the conversational situation. My paper focuses on conversational implicatures only.

Conversational implicatures can arise from either strictly observing or ostentatiously flouting the Gricean Cooperative Principle and its maxims of conversation.¹⁷ They are non-logical, non-truth-conditional (hence non-semantic), pragmatic inferences which are part of the message that the speaker intends to convey without being part of what is literally said.¹⁸ It is important to

¹⁶ Some of these lectures have been collected and published in Grice 1989.

¹⁷ For an overview of the Cooperative Principle and its conversational maxims, as defined by Grice, see Grice (1989: 26 ff.)

¹⁸ For the notion of conversational implicature, as characterized by Grice, see Grice (1989: 31): “A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows: ‘He has said that *p*; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that *q*; he

keep in mind that an implicature is part of the meaning that the speaker intends to convey with her utterance. To implicate is intentional. As Davis (2010) observes, implicating is what Searle (1975: 60) called an indirect speech act, an illocutionary speech act that is performed indirectly by way of performing another (direct speech act): we convey the meaning we want to convey by saying something that strictly has another meaning.

According to Grice, all conversational implicatures are cancellable. A conversational implicature may be explicitly cancelled, “by the addition of a clause that states or implies that the speaker has opted out”, or it may be contextually cancelled, “if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out.” (Grice 1989: 39). Grice’s Cancellability Hypothesis is distinctly expressed in the following words:

[..] a putative conversational implicature that *p* is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that *p*, it is admissible to add *but not p*, or *I do not mean to imply that p*, and it is contextually cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature. (Grice 1989: 44)

In some recent works (Weiner 2006, followed by Blome-Tillmann 2008 and by Hazlett 2012), the property of cancellability that, according to Grice (1989: 39 and 44), conversational implicatures *must* possess has been called into question. My fourth paper argues that the cases which Weiner builds his argument on do not really suffice to endanger Grice’s Cancellability Hypothesis. I argue that what Weiner has shown with his examples is that a conversational implicature cannot be cancelled if the speaker whose utterance gives rise to the implicature does not intend to cancel it. To implicate is an intentional act and therefore

knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that *q* is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that *q*; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that *q*; and so he has implicated that *q*’.”

cancelling an implicature must also be intentional and must be performed by the same speaker whose utterance gives rise to the putative implicature.

2.5 The semantics of factive verbs and extraction phenomena

My fifth paper, “The Wide Sea between *Know*-Islands and *Regret*-Islands”, explores factive verbs and their semantics. In particular, this study argues against a uniform account of factivity with respect to the predicates *know* and *regret*, as I claim that factivity must be intended in two different senses in these two cases, a semantic sense and a pragmatic sense.

The sentences analyzed were original sentences checked with English native speakers in addition to sentences taken from other scholars’ works on this topic (e.g. Wilson 1972, Rosenberg 1975, Klein 1975, Schlenker 2005, Égré 2009).

For *know*, I show that the relation between the sentence containing ‘knows’ (S) and the embedded proposition (*p*) is a truth-conditional relation: if S then necessarily *p* hence *p* is a truth-condition of S. On the other hand, in the case of *regret*, the relation between S and *p* is not truth-conditional as S can be true even though *p* is false (hence *p* is not a truth-condition of S). This is because one cannot have knowledge of something false, while it is perfectly possible to have a regret founded on a false belief. Consider the examples in (16):

(16) a. Back in the Middle Ages they knew that the Earth was flat.
(Adapted from Turri 2011: 147)

b. Oedipus regretted killing the stranger on the road to Thebes, but he didn’t know that he had not inflicted a fatal wound. (Adapted from Klein 1975: B12)

In these cases, we can deduce the following distinction: if the speaker uses ‘knows’ non-factively, in a context where it is evident that *p* is not true, then ‘knows’ cannot be interpreted as a *knowledge* attribution. The proposition in

(16a) is not true unless we interpret ‘(they) knew’ as ‘(they) thought they knew’ (in this sense, Turri 2011: 147; see Buckwalter 2014 for experimental evidence), or as ‘they were convinced’. In other words, by saying “X knows that *p*”, in these contexts, the speaker does not mean to assert that X *really* knows that *p*, but she means to attribute a mental state other than knowledge.

By contrast, the proposition in (16b) can be true although *p* is false: if the speaker uses ‘regrets’ non-factively, then this lexical item has still to be interpreted as denoting a regret ascription. That is, the absence of factivity, in this case, does not affect the meaning of ‘regrets’.

The claim defended in my fifth paper is that *know* is semantically factive—it entails the truth of the embedded proposition; when *know* is used non-factively, it means something other than having knowledge. As argued by Tsohatzidis (2012), I propose that ‘knows’ is semantically ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense. On the other hand, *regret* is pragmatically factive, as it does not entail the truth of its embedded proposition (partly following Simons 2001, 2006, 2007). In this case, that *regret* might be used non-factively is explained by the fact that we are dealing with a pragmatic, context-dependent implication that can be cancelled.

‘Factivity’ being an ambiguous term between a semantic and a pragmatic sense, the paper argues against a uniform account of so-called *factive islands*. In several languages, it is a well-known fact that complement clauses embedded under factive verbs are considered to be islands to some extraction phenomena¹⁹ (on *islandhood*, see Ross 1967). Argument extraction is possible (17a), while adjunct extraction is not allowed (17b):²⁰

¹⁹ In mainstream generative grammar (Chomsky 1981), *extraction* is a case of movement of a constituent: the constituent moves leftward to a non-canonical position in the tree, and leaves a trace (t). *Wh*-extraction, for instance, is a case of extraction:

- (i) What_t did you eat t_i?
- (ii) Why_t did she leave t_i?

(i) is an instance of argument extraction; (ii) is an instance of adjunct extraction.

²⁰ Following the framework sketched by Chomsky 1986, Cinque (1990: 31) proposes that the CP complement of factive verbs is a *barrier* for extraction. The fact that arguments are freely extractable is explained by suggesting that we are dealing with so called *weak* islands. Strong

- (17) a. What_i does she regret John bought t_i?
 b. *Why_i does she regret John bought that car t_i?

On the other hand, non-factive predicates such as *think*, *believe*, *say* are so called *bridge verbs* (Erteschik-Shir 1973: 83), that is, they allow extraction of both arguments and adjuncts from their complement clause:

- (18) a. What_i does she think that John bought t_i?
 b. Why_i does she think that John bought that car t_i?

If *know* is lexically ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense, and if non-factive *know* means something other than *really know*, for instance, it may mean *believe to know*, the prediction would be that non-factive *know* may behave like a bridge verb with respect to extraction, and hence both arguments and adjuncts can be extracted out of its complement.

This prediction is borne out in Italian, where *sapere* ‘know’ behaves exactly like *pensare* ‘think’, a bridge verb. In the following examples, the answer by A

islands are barriers to all movements, because they are cases of maximal projections that are neither L(exically)-marked nor \mathcal{Q} -marked by a [+V] element. However, weak islands are barriers only to adjunct-movement, but not to argument-movement, because they are \mathcal{Q} -marked maximal projections. In fact, Cinque (1990: 30) argues, CP complements of factive verbs are presumably \mathcal{Q} -marked by these verbs as internal argument, under VP, and empirical evidence for this claim is provided by the fact that their infinitival complements in Italian are obligatorily introduced by the complementizer *di*’ (litt.) of:

- (i) a. Marco rimpiange di non essere venuto alla festa.
 Marco regrets COMP not AUX come-PST-PTCP to.the party
 ‘Marco regrets that he didn’t come to the party.’
 b. *Marco rimpiange non essere venuto alla festa.
 (ii) a. Sara sa di avere molta fortuna.
 Sara knows COMP have-INF much luck
 ‘Sara knows that she has got much luck.’
 b. *Sara sa avere molta fortuna.

makes clear that the *wh*-element has scope over the complement clause introduced by *sapere* and by *pensare*:

(19) A: – Ho sentito Gianni e ha detto che forse Marco è
AUX hear-PST-PTCP Gianni and AUX say-PST-PTCP that maybe Marco is
a New York.

PREP New York

‘I heard Gianni and he said that Marco may be in New York.’

B: – Perché Gianni sa che Marco è andato a New York?

Why Gianni *sa* that Marco AUX go-PST-PTCP PREP New York

‘Why does Gianni think that Marco went to New York?’

A: – Per vedere gli Yankees.

PREP see-INF the Yankees

‘To see the Yankees.’

(20) A: – Ho sentito Gianni e ha detto che forse Marco è
AUX hear-PST-PTCP Gianni and AUX say-PST-PTCP that maybe Marco is
a New York.

PREP New York

‘I heard Gianni and he said that Marco may be in New York.’

B: – Perché Gianni pensa che Marco sia andato a New York?

Why Gianni thinks that Marco AUX go-PST-PTCP PREP New York

‘Why does Gianni think that Marco went to New York?’

A: – Per vedere gli Yankees.

PREP see-INF the Yankees

‘To see the Yankees.’

English *know*, however, behaves differently, and A’s answer in (21) – from which it is clear that the adjunct element ‘Why’ has scope over the complement clause, not over the matrix verb – is judged as odd:

(21) A: – Lucy told us that Bill went to New York.

B: – *Why_i does she know he went to New York t_i?

A: – ??To see the Yankees.

Non-factive *know* in English seems to have an extension other than that of non-factive *sapere* in Italian. Non-factive *sapere* might mean *believe to know* or simply *believe/think*, while it seems that non-factive *know* cannot mean simply *believe/think*. Arguably, the reason for the oddity of A's answer in (21) might be related to the fact that, typically, English non-factive *know* denotes subjective certainty, meaning *be convinced*, and a predicate like *be convinced* does not allow extraction either as shown in (22).

(22) A: – Lucy told us that Bill went to New York. She seemed pretty sure.

B: – *Why_i was she convinced that he went to New York t_i?

A: –#To see the Yankees.

Now, consider *regret*. If *regret* is not semantically factive, the prediction would be that this verb might behave like a bridge verb with respect to extraction phenomena depending on the context of utterance, given that the island constraint is due to its factivity. This prediction is not borne out, as adjuncts can never be extracted out of complements embedded under *regret*. A's answer in (23) is strongly inappropriate, in fact even more inappropriate than A's answer in (21):

(23) A: – Lucy told us that regrettably Bill went to New York.

B: – *Why_i does she regret he went to New York t_i?

A: –#To see the Yankees.

Adjunct extraction does not work with Italian *dispiacere* 'regret' either:

(24) A: – Gianni ha detto che purtroppo Marco è a New York.

Gianni AUX say-PST-PTCP that regrettably Marco is PREP New York

'Gianni said that regrettably Marco is in New York.'

B: – *Perché_i a Gianni dispiace che Marco sia andato a

Why PREP Gianni regrets that Marco AUX go-PST-PTCP PREP

New York t_i?

New York

‘Why does Gianni regret that Marco went to New York?’

A: – #Per vedere gli Yankees.

PREP see-INF the Yankees

‘To see the Yankees.’

Here, the crucial thing is that we cannot say that the explanation for the constraint on adjunct extraction lies in the factivity of the predicate, as *regret* is not semantically factive: factivity, in the case of *regret*, is not a semantic feature accounting for a special structure. The explanation for this island constraint has to be found elsewhere. The proposal I make is that the island constraint is determined by the semantic complexity of the predicate,²¹ in particular that the complement clause introduced by *regret* is under the scope of a *counterfactual operator* (see, in this sense, Klein 1975: C6, Schlenker 2005) that works as a barrier for adjunct extraction.

2.6 *Sapere*: testing the ambiguity hypothesis on Italian data

The sixth paper, “The Ambiguity of *Sapere*”, discusses occurrences of Italian *sapere* ‘know’ in mental state (third person) attributions (*sa*: *sapere*-3SG-PRS-IND). The analysis is performed on original sentences formulated by the author. Other native speakers of Italian have been asked to express their judgment on the acceptability of these sentences.

Following the proposal of Tsahatzidis (2012) for ‘knows’, the hypothesis put forward in this study is that *sa*, when used in mental state attributions, is ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense: when *sa* is used in its factive sense, a sentence such as *X sa che p* ‘X SA that *p*’ entails *p*, whereas, when

²¹ This hypothesis follows a proposal of Erteschik-Shir (1973) who pointed out that the semantic complexity of the matrix verb affects extraction phenomena. Erteschik-Shir’s (1973: 51-52) argument concerns *verbs of saying* in English: extraction is more acceptable when the verb of saying is semantically less complex and does not imply much about the manner of saying.

sa is used in its non-factive sense, a sentence having the same surface form does not entail *p*.

In Italian, it is possible to utter the sentence in (25) without contradiction, and the sentence in (26) without redundancy:²²

(25) Gianni *sa* che Laura abita in Svezia, ma non è vero.
Gianni spr-3SG-PRS-IND that Laura lives in Sweden but not is true
'Gianni SA that Laura lives in Sweden, but this is not true.'

(26) Gianni *sa* che Laura abita in Svezia, ed è proprio così.
Gianni spr-3SG-PRS-IND that Laura lives in Sweden and is really so
'Gianni SA that Laura lives in Sweden, and it is really so.'

Arguably, if it is possible to say, without contradiction, that *X sa che p, ma p non è vero* 'X SA that *p*, but *p* is not true', and furthermore it is possible to say, without redundancy, that *X sa che p, ed è proprio così* 'X SA che *p*, and *p* is really the case', this means that there are cases, at least in Italian, where the condition of truth does not seem to be a necessary condition for the truth of a sentence such as *X sa che p*. The hypothesis is that *sapere*, in these cases, can be paraphrased into *credere/pensare/dire* 'believe/think/say'. In other words, the mental state ascription by *sa* denotes, in these cases, attribution of a mental state other than knowledge, supposedly attribution of simple belief.

In this non-factive sense, Italian *sapere* may function, for instance, as an evidential, as in (27):

(27) [Q: Dov' è Maria?]
where is Maria
'Where is Maria?'

²² Note that the Italian sentences have been translated into English, except for the verb at issue *sapere* (spr in the glosses, SA in the translations), as I do not want to commit myself to any idiomatic translation in English. In fact, my study is about Italian data and does not investigate cross-linguistic relations in any depth.

Gianni sa che è andata al cinema.
 Gianni spr-3SG-PRS-IND that AUX go-PST-PTCP to.the cinema
 ‘Gianni SA that she went to the movies.’

In this case, the item *sa* is a functional element that refers to some source of information, and its use indicates an epistemic state of uncertainty or unexpressed commitment held by the speaker (cf. Chafe and Nichols 1986, Rooryck 2001a, 2001b, Speas 2004). In fact, the question *Dov'è Maria?* ‘Where is Maria?’ could have been answered as follows:

(28) Non so. Gianni sa che è andata
 Not know-1SG-PRS-IND Gianni spr-3SG-PRS-IND that AUX go-PST-PTCP
 al cinema.
 to.the cinema
 ‘I don’t know. Gianni SA that she went to the movies.’

Hence the declarative sentence in (27)-(28) (*Gianni sa che è andata al cinema*) does not entail *p*.

In other cases, *sapere* just denotes the matrix subject’s epistemic state of subjective certainty about something,²³ for instance something that is going to happen:²⁴

(29) a. Maria sa che Gianni le risponderà domani.
 Maria spr-3SG-PRS-IND that Gianni to.her answer-3SG-FUT tomorrow
 ‘Maria SA that Gianni will answer her tomorrow.’

²³ On the distinction between epistemic certainty (= *p* is certain) and subjective certainty (= someone is certain that *p*), see Stanley (2008). Cf. Hintikka (1975: 23).

²⁴ If *p* denotes a future event or situation, I argue that *p* cannot be evaluated either as true or as false. In this sense, see Austin (1961: 69): “And further, it is overlooked that the conditions which must be satisfied if I am to show that a thing is within my cognizance or within my power are conditions, not about the future, but about *the present and the past*: it is not demanded that I do more than *believe* about the future.”

b. Maria sapeva che Gianni sarebbe tornato il
 Maria spr-3SG-IMPF-IND that Gianni AUX come.back-PST-PTCP the
 giorno dopo.
 day after
 ‘Maria SA that Gianni would come back the next day.’

One necessary condition under which mental ascriptions by non-factive *sapere* are true is, so it seems, that X believes that *p*. Besides, *p* may be true or false hence *p* is not entailed. As *p* may be true or false, it is possible to deny *p* (explicitly (30a-d) or implicitly (30e)) without contradiction:

(30) a. Maria sa che Gianni le risponderà domani,
 Maria spr-3SG-PRS-IND that Gianni to.her answer-3SG-FUT tomorrow
 ma Gianni ha cambiato idea e non lo farà.
 but Gianni AUX change-PST-PTCP idea and not it do-3SG-FUT
 ‘Maria SA that Gianni will answer her tomorrow, but Gianni has
 changed his mind and will not do it.’

b. Maria sapeva che Gianni sarebbe tornato il
 Maria spr-3SG-IMPF-IND that Gianni AUX come.back-PST-PTCP the
 giorno dopo. Invece Gianni non tornò più.
 day after but Gianni not come.back-3SG-PST-PF more
 ‘Maria SA that Gianni would come back the next day, but Gianni
 never came back.’

c. Gianni sa che il seminario comincerà alle 14.00.
 Gianni spr-3SG-PRS-IND that the seminar start-3SG-FUT at.the 14.00
 Non si è accorto che l’orario d’inizio è stato anticipato.
 not REFL AUX notice-PST-PTCP that the time PREP start AUX move.up-PST-PTCP
 ‘Gianni SA that the seminar will start at 2 p.m.. He didn’t notice
 that the start time was moved up.’

d. Tutti sapevano che lo stress causava l’ulcera, prima che
 Everyone spr-3PL-IMPF-IND that the stress caused the ulcer before that

due medici australiani, nei primi anni '80 dimostrarono che l'ulcera, in
two doctors Australian in.the first years '80 proved that the ulcer in
realtà, è causata da un'infezione batterica.²⁵
reality AUX cause-PST-PTCP by an infection bacterial

'Everyone SA that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian
doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial
infection.'

e. Nel Medioevo sapevano che la Terra era piatta.²⁶
In.the Middle-Ages spr-3PL-IMPF-IND that the Earth was flat
'In the Middle Ages they SA that the Earth was flat.'

These sentences cannot be true unless *p* is false. That is, *sapere* denotes in these cases a mental state of false belief or false belief of knowledge. If these data were a matter of pragmatics, we would explain them by simply assuming that the speaker, by uttering these sentences, cancels the presupposition of factivity: in other words, she uses a factive item non-factively. By contrast, in this paper, it is argued that the explanation lies in the lexical semantics of *sapere*, not in its non-factive use by the speaker. The hypothesis is that *sapere* is lexically ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense, hence between a sense that entails *p*, and a sense that does not entail *p*.

This hypothesis is tested and seems to be confirmed by three tests traditionally used to ascertain cases of lexical ambiguity: the *conjunction reduction* test (Zwicky & Sadock 1975), the *contradiction* test (Quine 1960,

²⁵ This example is the translation from English of an authentic example presented by Hazlett (2010: 501, example (1)).

²⁶ This example is an adapted translation of a similar example presented by Turri (2011: 147, example K4). Note that I am not considering this example as a case of ironic statement. As pointed out by Grice (1989: 34), irony generally gives rise to the conversational implicature that the intended proposition is exactly the opposite of the uttered one. In the case of (30e), the utterance of the sentence does not necessarily convey the opposite meaning. On irony, see also Grice 1978: 123-125.

Zwicky & Sadock 1975, Gillon 1990, 2004), and the *endophoric reference* test (Gillon 2004).²⁷

According to the first test, if a word is ambiguous, it cannot be used with different meanings in the same sentence (if the sentence is not a joke). Thus, if two conjunct predications refer to the same word, there cannot be a ‘crossed’ reading, that is, the word cannot be interpreted in a sense with respect to one predication, and in another sense with respect to the other. This test suggests that, if *sapere* is lexically ambiguous, it cannot be used factively and non-factively in the same sentence as crossed understandings of *sapere*, between factive and non-factive sense, are not allowed in the same sentence. This prediction is borne out.

The contradiction test consists in predicating contradictory properties to the same referent, by means of the same lexical item. The test is grounded on the idea that, if a word is ambiguous between readings that denote *privative opposites* (where one semantic representation is more specific than the other), then it should be possible, without contradiction, to assert the general while denying the specific. In the case of SA, we can assume that factivity makes one semantic representation more specific than the other. The contradiction test confirms the ambiguity of *sapere*.

According to the endophoric reference test, since the denotation of an endophoric expression is determined by its antecedent or precedent in the context, meaning that the endophoric expression and its antecedent/precedent have the same sense, the prediction is that it is possible to utter a true sentence by using *credere/pensare/dire* ‘believe/think/say’ as an endophoric expression whose denotation is determined by non-factive SA. This prediction is borne out.

Moreover, it is shown that there are syntactic environments where only one of the two readings is allowed, which also seems to confirm the hypothesis that there are two different instances of SA, a factive one and a non-factive one. In particular, it is shown that SA is unambiguously factive: (i) when it introduces a *wh*-complement; (ii) when it is modified by *benissimo*; (iii) in the

²⁷ On these and other ambiguity tests, see also Channell 1994 and Zhang 1998.

case of cataphoric clitic pronominalization of the subordinate clause; (iv) in the case of definite nominalization of the subordinate clause. On the other hand, SA proves to be unambiguously non-factive: (i) in the case of indefinite nominalization of the subordinate clause; (ii) in the case of adjunct extraction out of the complement clause; (iii) in the case of evidential use.

2.7 The protagonist projection hypothesis

Finally, the seventh paper, “The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis. Do We Need It?”, is concerned with the protagonist projection hypothesis as originally formulated by Holton (1997) in order to account for cases where predicates that are allegedly factive, in particular *tell+wh* and *know*, are used non-factively, that is, without entailing the truth of the proposition (*p*) expressed by the embedded clause (the complement clause introduced by the *wh*- element, in the case of *tell*, or by the complementizer *that*, in the case of *know*). This is illustrated in the following examples:²⁸

(31) Old John told us whom he saw in the fog, but it turned out that he was mistaken.

(32) She knew that he would never let her down, but, like all the others, he did.

The paper refers to original English sentences, on which the judgment of native speakers of English has been provided, and to sentences taken from Holton (1997) and from Tsohatzidis (1993, 1997).

The paper distinguishes between three different sentence-types that have been classified as examples of protagonist projection in the literature: (i) sentences with factive verbs (in particular, *tell+wh* and *know*), (ii) sentences that

²⁸ Sentence (31) is sentence (4) in Holton (1997: 625), and is taken from Tsohatzidis (1993: 272). Sentence (32) is sentence (8) in Holton (1997: 626).

realize so called Free Indirect Discourse, and (iii) other sentences that do not realize Free Indirect Discourse, but are still assumed to be instances of speaking from someone else's perspective.

Regarding the sentences in (i), I argue, following Tsohatzidis (1993, 1997, 2012), that neither *tell+wh* nor *know* must be considered as factive predicates in these cases. Protagonist projection need not to be invoked to account for cases where *tell+wh* or *know* are used non-factively. In fact, I claim that *tell+wh* is not a factive predicate, while *know* is ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense hence may be factive or non-factive. Thus, in order to explain cases in which *tell+wh* and *know* do not entail the truth of the embedded *p*, we do not need to assume that protagonist projection takes place as on the one hand *tell+wh*, being non-factive, never entails the truth of *p*, and on the other hand *know*, being ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense, may not entail the truth of *p*.

As for the sentences of type (ii), I conclude that Free Indirect Discourse may be considered as an instance of protagonist projection, hence the two notions overlap.

By contrast, I propose that the sentences of type (iii) that are not instances of free indirect discourse but are still assumed to realize the speaker's speaking from someone else's point of view may be accounted for as cases of utterances whose syntactic structure is partially unpronounced: the phonologically unrealized material is an NP which corresponds to *something that/someone who seems/seemed to be x*. This solution applies to all examples that allegedly involve protagonist projection and has the advantage of offering a plausible linguistic explanation of the cases at issue, without involving any mechanism of projection into someone else's mind.

3 Summary of claims

In this dissertation, I give plausible solutions to several questions: questions that are related to verbs that take a sentential complement as their direct object. These verbs are considered from different perspectives, for example from the perspective of the propositional attitude they express, or from that of the syntactic construction they select, or from the point of view of the implications, semantic or pragmatic, to which they might give rise. This project led me to investigate different topics in the field of semantics, pragmatics, syntax, language acquisition and philosophy of language. The main claims put forward in this dissertation are summarized in the following.

(i) The first paper is concerned with the double complementation system in Gallipolino, the Salentine dialect spoken in Gallipoli (Lecce): instead of infinitival constructions as in standard Italian, Gallipolino requires finite constructions introduced by two different complementizers, *ka* and *ku*. Following Jackendoff (1985, 2007), I argue that there is an interesting correlation between the kind of attitude a verb expresses and the type of complement the verb selects. Thus, in my work, the double complementation system in Gallipolino is accounted for by distinguishing between verbs of *merely propositional attitude* and verbs of *desiderative propositional attitude*: the former select *ka*-clauses, while the latter select *ku*-clauses. Due to this distinction, all attitudinal verbs are considered as propositional, namely as verbs of believing. In this sense, even a verb such as *want* is regarded as a verb of believing: according to this account, one necessary condition under which a sentence such as *X wants to do y* is true would be the fact that X believes that if he/she will do y, this will be *good* for him/her.

(ii) The second paper investigates potential L1 attrition in bilingual speakers of Gallipolino and standard Italian who have left Gallipoli after puberty and moved to Northern Italy, where standard Italian has become the primary language over time. It is argued that the choice between *ku*-sentences and *ka*-

sentences in Gallipolino is a phenomenon that involves several interfaces. Hence, under the theoretical assumption known as the *Interface Hypothesis*, the hypothesis of this study is that this phenomenon might be sensitive to attrition effects. When tested on their competence in Gallipolino, bilingual participants displayed a significant difference with respect to controls. The experiment presented in paper II, however, also showed that participants had not lost their grammatical competence because they accepted *ka-* and *ku-*clauses when these occurred in grammatical sentences.

(iii) The third paper argues that, given that both *know* and *regret* are factive verbs as they both trigger the presupposition that the embedded proposition is true, a fundamental distinction has to be drawn between the factivity related to *know* and the factivity related to *regret*. The claim is that the first is a semantic phenomenon, while the second is a pragmatic phenomenon.

(iv) The fourth paper presents a critical comment on Weiner's attempt to show that conversational implicatures are not always cancellable. I argue that what Weiner has shown with his examples is that a conversational implicature cannot be cancelled if the speaker, whose utterance gives rise to the implicature, does not intend to cancel it. To implicate is an intentional act and, therefore, cancelling an implicature must also be intentional and must be performed by the same speaker whose utterance gives rise to the putative implicature. Therefore, the validity of Grice's Cancellability Hypothesis is confirmed in this dissertation.

(v) The fifth paper is concerned with the semantics of factive verbs and how factivity manifests itself in syntax. Given the distinction between the semantic factivity of *know* and the pragmatic factivity of *regret*, as proposed in paper III, the claim in paper V is that the traditional uniform account of *factive islands* must be revised. In the case of *regret*, I argue that islandhood is not related to factivity, which is just a pragmatic phenomenon, but to the semantic complexity of the predicate. The proposal put forward in this paper is that the complement clause introduced by *regret* is under the scope of a counterfactual operator that works as a barrier for adjunct extraction.

(vi) The sixth paper deals with the Italian verb *sapere* 'know', used in mental state attributions. Following the proposal of Tsohatzidis (2012) for English *know*, *sapere* is assumed to be semantically ambiguous between a factive

sense and a non-factive sense. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis is provided by applying semantic tests and by considering syntactic behaviour.

(vii) The seventh paper is concerned with the protagonist projection hypothesis as originally formulated by Holton (1997) in order to account for cases where predicates that are allegedly factive, in particular *tell+wh* and *know*, are used non-factively. The paper discusses this hypothesis by considering various examples and argues that there is no theoretical need thereof.

4 Future research

A doctoral dissertation needs to be finished, they say. This dissertation needed to be finished as well. The end of a doctoral dissertation, however, might be the starting point for new projects. There are several issues still worth exploring, issues that could not find a place in this dissertation.

In particular, paper VI gives rise to a number of interesting questions. The hypothesis that *sapere* is ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive sense might be tested experimentally. A pilot study has already been conducted, jointly with Joost van de Weijer (Colonna Dahlman & van de Weijer, ms.). However, further data need to be collected. A second task left for future research is an investigation aimed at ascertaining whether a sentence such as *X sa che p* 'X SA that *p*' displays different intonational patterns, as mirroring two different logical forms, a factive and a non-factive one. As a third issue, considering the construction in which *sapere* embeds a *wh*-complement, a distinction has to be drawn between those cases where matrix and complement are not co-referential and those cases where they are. Interestingly, this semantic factor seems to affect the meaning of these structures in a way that, as far as I know, has not yet been studied. It would be worthwhile, I think, to explore and describe this distinction in more precise terms. As a fourth issue, it would be interesting to investigate cross-linguistic relations, between Italian and other languages, with regard to the complex meaning of *sapere* and its equivalent item in other languages.

In the field of language acquisition research, an interesting research task would be to investigate how children acquire factivity. In this field of research, there is a growing interest in looking at interfaces and at how grammar interacts with other cognitive modules (see, for instance, Dudley et al. 2015). A new work on the acquisition of factivity would offer a contribution in this direction.

So this is not the end.

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Sommario

1 Oggetto della ricerca

La presente tesi consta di sette articoli aventi per oggetto alcune ipotesi su verbi che reggono frasi complete (verbi come *credere*, *sapere*, *dire*, *volere*, *dispiacere*, etc.), nonché sui contesti linguistici in cui essi ricorrono. In particolare, il presente lavoro si propone di cercare una risposta alle seguenti domande di ricerca:

(i) Esiste una relazione tra il tipo di attitudine cognitiva espressa da un verbo e il tipo di costruzione da cui il verbo stesso è completato?

(ii) Le costruzioni complete sono strutture vulnerabili, particolarmente a rischio di *attrito*?

(iii) Se è vero che sia *know* ‘sapere’ che *regret* ‘dispiacere’, tradizionalmente considerati verbi fattivi, possono essere usati non fattivamente nel linguaggio ordinario, come spiegare questo dato di fatto?

(iv) Le cosiddette implicature conversazionali sono sempre cancellabili, come ipotizzato da Grice (1989)?

(v) La fattività di certi verbi è un fenomeno semantico o pragmatico?

(vi) *Know* ‘sapere’ e *regret* ‘dispiacere’ sono fattivi nello stesso senso?

(vii) Il verbo *sapere*, in attribuzioni di stato mentale epistemico, è lessicalmente ambiguo tra un senso fattivo e un senso non fattivo?

(viii) Qual è l’utilità della cosiddetta ipotesi di proiezione nel protagonista, come formulata da Holton (1997)?

Le lingue prese in considerazione sono l’Italiano, il Gallipolino (dialetto di Gallipoli, provincia di Lecce), e l’Inglese. Gli esempi in Italiano sono frasi originali formulate dall’autrice, parlante nativa dell’Italiano, successivamente sottoposte al giudizio di accettabilità di altri parlanti nativi d’Italiano. Le frasi in Gallipolino sono traduzioni di frasi originariamente formulate in Italiano dall’autrice e poi tradotte in Gallipolino da un parlante nativo di Gallipolino, e

successivamente sottoposte al giudizio di accettabilità di altri parlanti nativi di Gallipolino. Infine, gli esempi in Inglese sono sia frasi originali formulate dall'autrice, sia frasi citate da altri lavori sugli argomenti trattati. L'accettabilità delle frasi originali è stata controllata da parlanti nativi di lingua inglese.

2 Contenuti

2.1 Paper I

Il sistema di complementazione in Gallipolino, il dialetto salentino parlato a Gallipoli (Lecce), ha costituito l'oggetto della mia prima ricerca. Questo studio è sfociato in un articolo, *“Il sistema di doppia complementazione nel dialetto di Gallipoli. Un'analisi semantica”*, pubblicato sulla rivista 'Arena Romanistica' (8, pp. 177-197, 2011). In questa tesi ne viene presentata una versione leggermente rivisitata, in lingua inglese, dal titolo *“Two Complementizers for Different Types of Propositional Attitude”* (trad.: Due complementatori per diversi tipi di attitudine proposizionale).

Il lavoro è dedicato ad un tratto sintattico tipico del dialetto Gallipolino: come gli altri dialetti parlati in Salento, al di sotto della linea Taranto-Ostuni, il Gallipolino presenta un uso limitato dell'infinito. Al posto delle costruzioni infinitive dell'Italiano standard, in Gallipolino ricorrono costruzioni di forma finita introdotte da due diversi complementatori: *ka* e *ku*. Per esempio:

- | | |
|--|---------|
| (1) a. 'U Miminu se crite ka stae bbonu. | [Gall.] |
| b. Cosimino crede di stare bene. | [It.] |
| (2) a. 'U Miminu ole ku stae/stescia bbonu. | [Gall.] |
| b. Cosimino vuole stare bene. | [It.] |

Tradizionalmente, il sistema di doppia complementazione dei dialetti italiani meridionali è stato illustrato in chiave semantico-funzionale, mettendo cioè in evidenza come la distribuzione dei due complementatori dipenda, in ultima

analisi, da ciò che il verbo della matrice denota (cf. Rohlfs 1969, Ledgeway 2003). Nel mio lavoro propongo un'analisi semantica dei verbi in questione dal punto di vista dell'attitudine che essi esprimono verso la verità di una proposizione (vale a dire, verso il contenuto che una frase dichiarativa, suscettibile di essere valutata come vera o falsa, esprime). L'ipotesi è che la distribuzione dei complementatori in Gallipolino rifletta diversi tipi di *attitudine proposizionale* (espressione che risale a Bertrand Russell (1940: 65; 1956: 227)). Quest'ipotesi nasce da un'osservazione di Ray Jackendoff (1985, 2007), secondo il quale sembra esserci un'interessante correlazione fra il tipo di attitudine che un verbo esprime e il tipo di frase completiva da cui il verbo stesso è completato.

Il lavoro è inquadrato, in primo luogo, nell'ambito delle proposte teoriche presentate da Jackendoff (2007), il quale distingue tra *verbi di attitudine situazionale* e *verbi di attitudine azionale*. In secondo luogo, il lavoro, dopo aver dimostrato che né la suddivisione proposta da Jackendoff, né le classificazioni tradizionali sono in grado di spiegare compiutamente il meccanismo che regola la selezione dei complementatori in Gallipolino, indica una nuova proposta di analisi dei verbi di attitudine proposizionale, prospettando la distinzione tra *verbi di attitudine meramente proposizionale* e *verbi di attitudine proposizionale desiderativa*. Verbi di attitudine meramente proposizionale sono quei verbi che denotano l'attitudine cognitiva di un soggetto verso la verità di una proposizione; verbi di attitudine proposizionale desiderativa sono quei verbi che denotano l'attitudine cognitiva di un soggetto verso la desiderabilità della verità di una proposizione. Alla luce di questa nuova distinzione, è possibile formulare la seguente generalizzazione: i verbi di attitudine meramente proposizionale selezionano frasi introdotte da *ka*; i verbi di attitudine proposizionale desiderativa selezionano frasi introdotte da *ku*.

2.2 Paper II

Nel secondo lavoro, "*Attrition at the Interfaces in Bilectal Acquisition (Italian/Gallipolino)*" (trad.: Attrito alle interfacce in acquisizione bilingue Italiano/Gallipolino), scritto insieme a Tanja Kupisch, le stesse costruzioni

complete del Gallipolino sono considerate nel quadro teorico della ricerca sull'acquisizione del linguaggio. In particolare, il lavoro costituisce un'indagine su potenziali effetti di *attrito* in parlanti di Gallipolino e Italiano standard, che hanno lasciato Gallipoli in età post-pubertale, trasferendosi in Italia settentrionale, dove l'Italiano standard è divenuto lingua dominante.

Con la parola 'attrito' intendiamo il cambiamento subito dalla L1 a causa di una seconda lingua divenuta dominante, vale a dire di uso prevalente. La ricerca è stata compiuta al fine di verificare potenziali effetti di attrito rispetto al tratto tipico del dialetto gallipolino dell'assenza dell'infinito in frasi complete. Infatti, data la differenza tra Gallipolino e Italiano standard, era legittimo aspettarsi che questo tratto creasse difficoltà in parlanti di entrambe le varietà, quando la seconda varietà fosse divenuta dominante a scapito della prima. Per verificare la validità di questa ipotesi, un test su giudizi di grammaticalità è stato somministrato a 14 partecipanti. In particolare, sono state formulate 40 frasi, 20 grammaticali e 20 agrammaticali (in 15 delle quali l'agrammaticalità consisteva nell'aver sostituito il verbo finito con un infinito). Le frasi sono state inserite in una presentazione Power Point e sono state registrate da una parlante nativa di Gallipolino. Ai partecipanti è stato chiesto di ascoltare le frasi e di ripeterle così come le avevano sentite, se ritenevano che fossero grammaticalmente corrette, oppure di proporre la versione corretta, quando ritenevano che fossero agrammaticali. Secondo quanto atteso, i partecipanti migranti (n = 9) hanno riportato risultati significativamente differenti rispetto al gruppo di controllo (n = 5) nel dare giudizi di grammaticalità su frasi complete in Gallipolino.

2.3 Paper III

Il terzo lavoro, "*Did People in the Middle Ages Know that the Earth Was Flat?*" (trad.: Nel Medioevo sapevano che la Terra era piatta?), ha rappresentato l'inizio di una ricerca che mi ha sollecitato ad esplorare alcuni dei temi più dibattuti in linguistica e filosofia del linguaggio: *presupposizioni* e implicazioni in generale, e, in particolare, la presupposizione di *fattività*.

Tra i verbi di attitudine proposizionale a complementazione sentenziale, i *verbi fattivi* costituiscono una categoria speciale. Esempi di verbi fattivi sono: *sapere, ricordare, accorgersi, dispiacere/rammaricarsi, essere felice*, ecc. *Fattività* è il termine usato per indicare l'esistenza di una particolare relazione tra la frase matrice contenente il verbo fattivo e la verità della proposizione espressa dalla frase subordinata. Se il verbo è fattivo, la frase *presuppone* la verità della proposizione subordinata. Tradizionalmente, questa relazione è intesa come relazione necessaria: se $X \text{ fact} V$ che p , p deve essere vera.

Nel lavoro in questione, l'attenzione è rivolta prevalentemente a *know* 'sapere' e, in secondo luogo, a *regret* 'dispiacere'. L'indagine è stata ispirata da un recente dibattito in ambito linguistico-filosofico su come intendere la fattività di *know* (Hazlett 2009, 2010, 2012, Turri 2011, Tsohatzidis 2012, Buckwalter 2014). Gli esempi seguenti dimostrano chiaramente che un parlante, pur usando *know* e *regret*, non implica necessariamente che p è vera:

(3) Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. (Hazlett 2010: 501, esempio (1))

‘Tutti sapevano che lo stress causava l'ulcera, prima che due medici australiani, nei primi anni '80, dimostrassero che l'ulcera, in realtà, è causata da un'infezione batterica.’

(4) Falsely believing that he had inflicted a fatal wound, Oedipus regretted killing the stranger on the road to Thebes. (Klein 1975: B12, esempio (26))

‘Credendo erroneamente di aver inflitto una ferita mortale, Edipo si rammaricò di aver ucciso lo straniero sulla via per Tebe.’

Come spiegare l'uso non fattivo di verbi fattivi? Le posizioni discusse nel terzo articolo di questa tesi sono due. Da un lato, la proposta di Hazlett (2009, 2010, 2012) è che *know* non implichi necessariamente, ma solo tipicamente, la verità della proposizione subordinata. In altre parole, secondo Hazlett, la relazione tra una frase come $X \text{ knows that } p$ 'X sa che p ' e p non sarebbe una relazione necessaria, cioè semantica o vero-condizionale (nel senso che la frase non può

essere vera se p è falsa), ma piuttosto una relazione che esiste tipicamente (nella maggior parte dei casi), ma non necessariamente, quindi una relazione pragmatica, non vero-condizionale (nel senso che una frase come *X knows that p* può essere vera anche se p è falsa).

Dall'altro lato, è stato obiettato ad Hazlett che l'uso non fattivo di *know* semplicemente rivela la possibilità che la parola *know* abbia più significati. In particolare, la proposta di Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2012) è che *know* sia una parola ambigua tra un senso fattivo ed un senso non fattivo: quando il verbo *know* ricorre in senso non fattivo, esso non implica la verità di p ; quando invece *know* ricorre in senso fattivo, esso implica necessariamente la verità di p .

Questa seconda proposta è la posizione assunta nel presente lavoro: l'ipotesi è che l'uso non fattivo di *know* non sia un fenomeno di natura meramente pragmatica (vale a dire un fenomeno spiegabile come uso peculiare da parte del parlante, un uso tale da sospendere la presupposizione di fattività), ma piuttosto un fenomeno spiegabile attraverso la considerazione della semantica lessicale del verbo. Si ritiene, infatti, che un approccio puramente pragmatico alla fattività di *know* non consenta di comprendere il significato di questo predicato, né di scorgere la distinzione fondamentale tra *know* e *regret*. *Know* e *regret* non sono fattivi nello stesso senso, perché *know* è semanticamente fattivo, mentre *regret* è pragmaticamente fattivo. Nel caso di *know*, l'uso non fattivo di questo predicato è spiegato ipotizzandone l'ambiguità tra un senso fattivo e un senso non fattivo. Presumendo che 'knows' sia una parola ambigua, possiamo semplicemente accettare il fatto che questa parola ricorra a volte come verbo non fattivo, e altre volte come predicato fattivo. In quest'ultimo caso, *know* è semanticamente fattivo, nel senso che una frase come *X knows that p* implica p necessariamente.

Dall'altro lato, si può ammettere che la presupposizione di fattività attivata da *regret* non sia convenzionale, ma conversazionale, cioè non sia legata alla semantica lessicale del verbo, ma dipenda dall'uso che se ne fa nel contesto conversazionale. Questa proposta si fonda sulla semplice osservazione che *regret* può essere usato non fattivamente senza subire effetto alcuno sul significato; *know*, invece, non può essere usato non fattivamente senza cambiare significato. In altre parole, possiamo affermare che a qualcuno dispiaccia veramente che p sia il caso, anche quando p è falsa, pertanto una frase come *X regrets that p* 'A X

dispiace che p' non implica necessariamente la verità di p ; diversamente, non possiamo affermare che qualcuno sappia veramente che p è il caso, se p è falsa.

2.4 Paper IV

Il quarto lavoro, “*Conversational Implicatures Are Still Cancellable*” (trad.: Le implicature conversazionali sono ancora cancellabili), pubblicato su *Acta Analytica* 28(3) (pp. 321-327, 2013), è dedicato alla teoria griceana della cancellazione delle implicazioni di natura pragmatica chiamate *implicature conversazionali*. Paul Grice (1989) introdusse la nozione di implicatura, distinguendo tra implicature convenzionali e implicature conversazionali. Secondo Grice, le implicature conversazionali sono sempre cancellabili da parte del parlante, a differenza di quelle convenzionali che non possono svanire in quanto dipendenti dal significato convenzionale delle parole usate. Per esempio, l’enunciato in (5a), dato il contesto nel quale viene proferito, fa nascere l’implicatura conversazionale in (5b); mentre l’enunciato in (6a), indipendentemente dal contesto conversazionale nel quale viene espresso, fa nascere l’implicatura convenzionale in (6b):

(5) a. Brrrr! Che freddo!

[Detto in un contesto in cui la finestra è aperta]

b. Per favore, chiudi la finestra!

(6) a. La madre di Marco è una famosa pianista, quindi Marco sa suonare il piano.

b. Marco sa suonare il piano perché sua madre è una famosa pianista.

L’implicatura conversazionale in (5b) può essere cancellata dal parlante, mentre quella convenzionale in (6b) no (il simbolo ‘#’ indica anomalia semantica):

(7) Brr! Che freddo! E con questo non intendo chiederti di chiudere la finestra.

(8) #La madre di Marco è una famosa pianista, quindi Marco sa suonare il piano. Con questo però non intendo dire che Marco sa suonare il piano perché sua madre è una famosa pianista.

L'ipotesi della cancellabilità delle implicature conversazionali è stata messa in questione da Matthew Weiner (2006), secondo il quale le implicature conversazionali non sono sempre cancellabili. Nel presente lavoro, si sostiene che gli esempi su cui Weiner ha fondato la propria proposta non bastano a criticare seriamente l'ipotesi griceana della cancellabilità. Ciò che Weiner ha dimostrato con i suoi esempi, infatti, è semplicemente che un'implicatura conversazionale non può essere cancellata se il parlante, il cui atto linguistico fa nascere l'implicatura, non intende cancellarla. Implicare conversazionalmente è un atto intenzionale e, allo stesso modo, la cancellazione di un'implicatura dev'essere altresì un atto intenzionale posto in essere dallo stesso parlante il cui atto linguistico ha generato (o avrebbe potuto generare) l'implicatura.

2.5 Paper V

Il quinto lavoro, "*The Wide Sea between Know-Islands and Regret-Islands*" (trad.: Il vasto mare tra isole-know e isole-regret), riprende l'ipotesi dell'ambiguità di *know* tra senso fattivo e senso non fattivo e della distinzione semantica tra *know* e *regret*: una frase come *X knows that p* non può essere vera se *p* è falsa, quindi *know* implica *p* necessariamente; una frase come *X regrets that p* può essere vera anche se *p* è falsa, quindi *regret* implica *p* non necessariamente, ma solo tipicamente. In questo lavoro, si sostiene che la fattività è stata erroneamente considerata come un fenomeno unitario nella tradizione linguistico-filosofica. Si propone pertanto la distinzione tra fattività in senso semantico, la fattività di *know*, e fattività in senso pragmatico, la fattività di *regret*. Quest'ipotesi è verificata facendo riferimento alla sintassi, in particolare al fenomeno dell'estrazione.

Tradizionalmente, si ritiene che tutti i verbi fattivi introducano frasi che rappresentano *isole deboli* a fenomeni di estrazione: è consentito estrarre argomenti (9a), ma non aggiunti (9b).

- (9) a. *What_i does she regret John bought t_i?*
 ‘Che cosa le dispiace che John abbia comprato?’
 b. **Why_i does she regret John bought that car t_i?*
 ‘Perché le dispiace che John abbia comprato quella macchina?’

Dall’altro lato, verbi non fattivi come *credere, pensare, dire*, sono cosiddetti *verbi ponte* (Erteschik-Shir 1973: 83), perché consentono l’estrazione sia di argomenti (10a) che di aggiunti (10b) fuori dalle proprie frasi complementive:

- (10) a. *What_i does she think that John bought t_i?*
 ‘Che cosa pensa che John abbia comprato?’
 b. *Why_i does she think that John bought that car t_i?*
 ‘Perché pensa che John abbia comprato quella macchina?’

Se *know* è ambiguo tra un senso fattivo e un senso non fattivo, la predizione sarebbe che il *know* non fattivo possa comportarsi come un verbo ponte, consentendo l’estrazione di argomenti e aggiunti al di fuori della propria frase complementiva. Questa predizione trova conferma in Italiano, dove *sapere* si comporta esattamente come *pensare*, tipico verbo ponte. Negli esempi seguenti, possiamo constatare, dalla risposta di A, che l’interrogativo ‘perché’ può avere portata sulla frase complementiva introdotta da *sapere* e da *pensare*:

- (11) A: – Ho sentito Gianni e ha detto che forse Marco è a New York.
 B: – Perché Gianni sa che Marco è andato a New York?
 A: – Per vedere gli Yankees.

- (12) A: – Ho sentito Gianni e ha detto che forse Marco è a New York.
 B: – Perché Gianni pensa che Marco sia andato a New York?
 A: – Per vedere gli Yankees.

L’inglese *know*, però, si comporta diversamente. Infatti, la risposta di A in (13), dalla quale è evidente che l’aggiunto ‘Why’ avrebbe portata sulla frase complementiva non sul verbo della matrice, non è considerata accettabile:

- (13) A: – Lucy told us that Bill went to New York.
 ‘Lucy ci ha detto che Bill è andato a New York.’
 B: – *Why_i does she know he went to New York t_i?
 ‘Perché sa che è andato a New York?’
 A: – ??To see the Yankees.
 ‘Per vedere gli Yankees.’

Sembra che *know*, nel senso non fattivo, abbia un'estensione diversa, più limitata, rispetto al *sapere* non fattivo in italiano. *Sapere* non fattivo può significare *credere di sapere* o semplicemente *credere/pensare*. E' probabile che il motivo dell'inaccettabilità della risposta di A in (13) sia legato al fatto che *know* non fattivo denota tipicamente certezza soggettiva, nel senso di *be convinced* 'essere convinto', e un predicato come *be convinced* non consente estrazione di aggiunti, come indicato da (14):

- (14) A: – Lucy told us that Bill went to New York. She seemed pretty sure.
 ‘Lucy ci ha detto che Bill è andato a New York. Sembrava abbastanza sicura.’
 B: – *Why_i was she convinced that he went to New York t_i?
 ‘Perché era convinta che sia andato a New York?’
 A: – #To see the Yankees.
 ‘Per vedere gli Yankees.’

Considerando adesso *regret*, se questo verbo, a differenza di *know*, non è semanticamente fattivo, la predizione sarebbe che, a seconda del contesto conversazionale, esso possa comportarsi come un verbo ponte rispetto a fenomeni di estrazione, se è vero che l'insularità della frase completiva dipende dalla fattività del predicato. Questa predizione non trova conferma, perché non è mai consentito estrarre aggiunti fuori da frasi completive introdotte da *regret*. La risposta di A in (15) è decisamente inappropriata (per la verità, anche più inappropriata di quella in (13)):

- (15) A: – Lucy told us that regrettably Bill went to New York.

- ‘Lucy ci ha detto che purtroppo Bill è andato a New York.’
 B: – *Why_i does she regret he went to New York t_i?
 ‘Perché le dispiace che sia andato a New York?’
 A: – #To see the Yankees.
 ‘Per vedere gli Yankees.’

L'estrazione di aggiunti non è consentita neppure in Italiano con *dispiacere*:

- (16) A: – Gianni ha detto che purtroppo Marco è a New York.
 B: – *Perché_i a Gianni dispiace che Marco sia andato a New York t_i?
 A: - #Per vedere gli Yankees.

In questo caso, non si può affermare che l'insulazione sotto *regret* sia da attribuire alla fattività di questo predicato, perché la fattività di *regret* non è un tratto semantico che va ad incidere sulla struttura della frase, ma un fenomeno di natura meramente pragmatica. Pertanto, la proposta avanzata nel presente lavoro è che l'isola sotto *regret* sia dovuta alla complessità semantica di questo verbo. In particolare, l'idea sarebbe che la frase completiva introdotta da *regret* sia sotto la portata di un operatore *contrafattuale* (in questo senso, v. anche Klein 1975: C6, Schlenker 2005) che funzionerebbe come barriera a fenomeni di estrazione.

2.6 Paper VI

Il sesto articolo, “*The Ambiguity of Sapere*” (trad.: L'ambiguità di *sapere*), ha per oggetto istanze di *sapere* in attribuzioni linguistiche di stato mentale epistemico. Sulla stessa linea di pensiero tracciata da Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2012) per ‘knows’, l'ipotesi di questo lavoro è che la parola ‘sa’ sia lessicalmente ambigua tra un senso fattivo e un senso non fattivo: quando ‘sa’ ricorre in senso fattivo, una frase come *X sa che p* implica necessariamente *p*; invece, quando ‘sa’ ricorre in senso non fattivo, una frase, espressa nella stessa forma grafica, non implica necessariamente *p*.

In Italiano, è possibile enunciare la frase in (17) senza incorrere in contraddizione, e la frase in (18) senza incorrere in ridondanza:

(17) Gianni sa che Laura abita in Svezia, ma non è vero.

(18) Gianni sa che Laura abita in Svezia, ed è proprio così.

Evidentemente, se è possibile affermare, senza contraddizione, che *X sa che p*, ma *p non è vera*, e, senza ridondanza, che *X sa che p*, ed è proprio così, ciò sembra indicare l'esistenza di casi, almeno in Italiano, nei quali la verità di *p* non sembra essere una condizione necessaria per la verità di una frase come *X sa che p*. L'ipotesi è che *sapere*, in questi casi, possa essere parafrasato con *credere/pensare/dire*. In altri termini, l'attribuzione di stato mentale, nei casi in esame, denoterebbe l'ascrizione di uno stato mentale diverso dalla conoscenza, probabilmente l'attribuzione di una semplice credenza.

In questo senso non fattivo, *sapere* può funzionare, per esempio, come un evidenziale, come indicato in (19):

(19) [Q: Dov'è Maria?]

Gianni sa che è andata al cinema.

In questo esempio, la parola *sa* costituisce un elemento funzionale che fa riferimento ad una fonte d'informazione, e il suo uso indica nel parlante uno stato epistemico d'incertezza o di credenza inespressa (cf. Chafe and Nichols 1986, Rooryck 2001a, 2001b, Speas 2004). Infatti, la domanda *Dov'è Maria?* potrebbe ricevere la seguente risposta:

(20) Non so. Gianni sa che è andata al cinema.

Pertanto, l'enunciato dichiarativo proferito in questi esempi (*Gianni sa che è andata al cinema*) non implica *p* necessariamente.

In altri casi, *sapere* denota, nell'individuo a cui il soggetto grammaticale della matrice fa riferimento, uno stato di certezza soggettiva su qualcosa, per esempio un evento che accadrà o una situazione che si realizzerà in futuro:

(21) a. Maria sa che Gianni le risponderà domani.

b. Maria sapeva che Gianni sarebbe tornato il giorno dopo.

Che X creda che p sembra essere una condizione necessaria di verità per tutte le ascrizioni di stato mentale espresse con il 'sa' non fattivo. Che p sia vera, invece, non è una condizione di verità. In altri termini, la verità di p non è implicata necessariamente, e p può essere vera o falsa. Che la proposizione subordinata possa essere vera o falsa è dimostrato dal fatto che è possibile negarla (esplicitamente (22a-d) o implicitamente (22e)) senza incorrere in contraddizione:

(22) a. Maria sa che Gianni le risponderà domani, ma Gianni ha cambiato idea e non lo farà.

b. Maria sapeva che Gianni sarebbe tornato il giorno dopo. Invece Gianni non tornò più.

c. Gianni sa che il seminario comincerà alle 14.00. Non si è accorto che l'orario d'inizio è stato anticipato.

d. Tutti sapevano che lo stress causava l'ulcera, prima che due medici australiani, nei primi anni '80 dimostrassero che l'ulcera, in realtà, è causata da un'infezione batterica.²⁹

e. Nel Medioevo sapevano che la Terra era piatta.³⁰

Queste frasi non possono essere vere, a meno che p sia falsa: *sapere* denota in questi casi uno stato mentale di falsa credenza o falsa credenza di sapere. L'ipotesi del presente lavoro è che la spiegazione di questi dati non sia di natura

²⁹ Questo esempio è la traduzione dall'Inglese di un esempio autentico presentato da Hazlett (2010: 501, esempio (1)).

³⁰ Questo esempio è una traduzione adattata dall'Inglese di un esempio proposto da Turri (2011: 147, esempio K4).

pragmatica, ma risiede nella semantica lessicale del verbo *sapere*. In altri termini, quando *sapere* ricorra in senso non fattivo, questo fenomeno non rappresenterebbe l'uso non fattivo di un verbo fattivo per scelta del parlante, ma sarebbe l'istanza non fattiva di un verbo lessicalmente ambiguo. Secondo questa linea di pensiero, esisterebbero due 'sa' per attribuzioni di stato mentale epistemico: un 'sa' fattivo che implica *p* necessariamente, e un 'sa' non fattivo che non implica *p*. L'ipotesi è stata verificata e confermata sia attraverso il ricorso a tre test semantici, il test di riduzione della congiunzione (Zwicky & Sadock 1975), il test di contraddizione (Quine 1960, Zwicky & Sadock 1975, Gillon 1990, 2004), e il test endoforico (Gillon 2004), sia attraverso l'osservazione della sintassi. Infatti, l'esistenza di costruzioni sintattiche nelle quali è ammesso solo uno dei due sensi sembra costituire un argomento a favore dell'ipotesi prospettata nel presente lavoro. In particolare, 'sa' è sempre fattivo: (i) quando seleziona una completiva interrogativa; (ii) quando è modificato da *benissimo*; (iii) nel caso di pronominalizzazione clitica e cataforica della frase subordinata; (iv) nel caso di nominalizzazione definita della frase subordinata. Dall'altro lato, 'sa' è sempre non fattivo: (i) in caso di nominalizzazione indefinita della frase subordinata; (ii) nel caso di estrazione di aggiunto dalla frase completiva; (iii) in caso di uso evidenziale.

2.7 Paper VII

L'ultimo lavoro, dal titolo "*The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis. Do We Need It?*" (trad.: L'ipotesi della proiezione nel protagonista. Ne abbiamo bisogno?), è dedicato all'ipotesi della "proiezione nel protagonista", originariamente formulata da Richard Holton (1997) per giustificare casi in cui il parlante sembra esprimersi in modo contraddittorio. In particolare, si tratta di casi in cui il parlante ricorre all'uso di verbi ritenuti fattivi (*tell* + complemento introdotto

da *wh*; *know*) senza che la verità della proposizione espressa dalla subordinata sia implicata. Come, per esempio, nelle frasi (23) e (24):³¹

(23) Old John told us whom he saw in the fog, but it turned out that he was mistaken.

‘Il vecchio John ci ha detto chi ha visto nella nebbia, ma poi si è saputo che si è sbagliato.’

(24) She knew that he would never let her down, but, like all the others, he did.

‘Sapeva che lui non l’avrebbe mai delusa, invece, lo fece, come tutti gli altri.’

Le frasi in (23) e (24) sono perfettamente accettabili. Se supponiamo, seguendo Holton, che *tell+wh* e *know* siano verbi fattivi, nel senso di implicare necessariamente la verità della proposizione subordinata, è evidente che le frasi in (23) e (24) pongono un problema: quello della possibilità di giudicare come accettabili due frasi apparentemente contraddittorie.

Secondo Holton (1997: 627), per poter spiegare casi in cui verbi fattivi non implicano la verità di *p*, senza per questo dover rinunciare alla loro fattività, abbiamo bisogno di un’ipotesi come quella della “proiezione nel protagonista”. Dati gli enunciati congiunti in (23) e (24), l’idea sarebbe che, nel proferire il primo congiunto, il parlante semplicemente si proietta nella mente di qualcun altro (il ‘protagonista’), e, assumendone il punto di vista, parla usando quelle parole che il protagonista stesso avrebbe usato se gli fosse stato chiesto di descrivere la situazione in questione.

In senso contrario a Holton, nel presente lavoro si segue l’orientamento di Tsohatzidis (1993, 1997, 2012), secondo il quale non sussiste alcun bisogno di ricorrere ad un meccanismo di proiezione nel protagonista al fine di spiegare casi in cui *tell+wh* o *know* vengano usati non fattivamente. Infatti, si afferma

³¹ L’esempio (23) è l’esempio (4) nel testo di Holton, ed è tratto da Tsohatzidis (1993: 272). L’esempio (24) corrisponde all’esempio (8) nel testo di Holton.

che da un lato *tell+wh* non è un verbo fattivo, dall'altro che *know* è ambiguo tra un senso fattivo ed un senso non fattivo, pertanto può ricorrere come verbo fattivo o come verbo non fattivo. In altre parole, non serve invocare un fenomeno di proiezione nel protagonista per spiegare i casi in cui *tell+wh* e *know* non implicano la verità della proposizione subordinata, perché, da una parte, *tell+wh*, non essendo fattivo, non implica necessariamente la verità di *p*, e, dall'altra parte, *know*, essendo ambiguo tra un senso fattivo ed un senso non fattivo, può ricorrere in istanze che non implicano la verità di *p*.

Infine, sono presentati altri casi recentemente discussi come esempi di proiezione nel protagonista (Stokke 2013). Nel presente lavoro, si sostiene che alcuni di questi casi possono essere considerati come istanze di *discorso indiretto libero*: seguendo Stokke (2013: 216), si può ritenere che il discorso indiretto libero rappresenti un caso di proiezione nel protagonista. Tuttavia, altri casi, che non sono riconducibili al discorso indiretto libero, e che, secondo Stokke, costituirebbero esempi di proiezione, sono invece descritti come esempi di enunciati la cui struttura sintattica è parzialmente non pronunciata: la parte di struttura non realizzata fonologicamente sarebbe un NP che corrisponde a *qualcosa/qualcuno che sembra/sembrava essere x*. Questa soluzione si adatta a tutti gli esempi di cosiddetta proiezione nel protagonista, con il vantaggio di offrire una spiegazione linguistica plausibile ai casi in questione, senza bisogno di ipotizzare un meccanismo psicologico di proiezione nella mente di qualcun altro.

3 Sommario dei risultati

Le proposte avanzate negli articoli della presente tesi sono riassunte nei punti seguenti.

(i) Il primo articolo si occupa del sistema di doppia complementazione del dialetto gallipolino, il dialetto salentino parlato a Gallipoli (Lecce): al posto delle costruzioni infinitive in uso nell'Italiano standard, il Gallipolino ricorre a costruzioni finite introdotte da due diversi complementatori, *ka* e *ku*. Secondo quanto prospettato da Jackendoff (1985, 2007), sembra esserci un'interessante

correlazione fra il tipo di attitudine cognitiva che un verbo esprime e il tipo di complemento da cui il verbo stesso è completato. Nel presente lavoro, il sistema di doppia complementazione del dialetto gallipolino viene illustrato alla luce di una nuova distinzione tra verbi di attitudine meramente proposizionale e verbi di attitudine proposizionale desiderativa. In particolare, la generalizzazione proposta è che i primi selezionano frasi introdotte da *ka*, mentre i secondi selezionano frasi introdotte da *ku*. In base a questa distinzione, tutti i verbi che esprimono un'attitudine cognitiva sarebbero verbi proposizionali, vale a dire verbi che denotano una credenza. Pertanto, anche un verbo come *volere* è considerato un verbo di credenza: infatti, secondo questa linea di pensiero, una delle condizioni che deve necessariamente realizzarsi perché una frase come *X vuole fare y* sia vera, è il fatto che *X crede* che se lei/lui farà *y*, ciò sarà un bene per lei/lui.

(ii) Il secondo articolo si occupa delle stesse costruzioni complete del dialetto gallipolino, considerandole nell'ottica della ricerca sull'acquisizione del linguaggio. In particolare, il lavoro è un'indagine che intende dare risposta al seguente quesito: sono rinvenibili effetti di attrito in parlanti di Gallipolino e Italiano standard che hanno lasciato Gallipoli in età post-pubertale e si sono trasferiti in Italia settentrionale, dove l'Italiano standard è diventato lingua primaria? La premessa teorica su cui si fonda il lavoro è che la scelta tra i due complementatori in Gallipolino sia un fenomeno grammaticale che coinvolge diverse interfacce, e che pertanto, se si assume la validità della cosiddetta *Interface Hypothesis*, dovrebbe rivelarsi sensibile ad attrito. Questa ipotesi sembra confermata dagli esiti dell'esperimento condotto nel presente studio, i cui partecipanti hanno riportato risultati significativamente differenti rispetto al gruppo di controllo.

(iii) Il terzo articolo ha segnato l'inizio di una ricerca che mi ha portato ad approfondire due temi centrali della linguistica e della filosofia del linguaggio: presupposizioni e fattività. In questo articolo, si propone l'idea che una distinzione debba essere tracciata tra la fattività di *know* 'sapere' e quella di *regret* 'dispiacere', entrambi tradizionalmente considerati verbi fattivi, vale a dire verbi che attivano la presupposizione che la proposizione espressa dalla frase subordinata sia vera. In particolare, la proposta è che la fattività di *know* sia un

fenomeno di natura semantica, mentre quella di *regret* sarebbe un fenomeno di natura puramente pragmatica.

(iv) Il quarto articolo presenta un commento critico al tentativo di Weiner di dimostrare che le implicature conversazionali, contrariamente a quanto affermato da Grice, non sono sempre cancellabili. In questo articolo, si sostiene che ciò che gli esempi invocati da Weiner dimostrano, lungi dal costituire un argomento contrario all'ipotesi griceana della cancellabilità, rivelano semplicemente che un'implicatura conversazionale non può essere cancellata se il parlante, il cui enunciato ha fatto nascere l'implicatura, non intende cancellarla. Implicare attraverso un enunciato è un atto compiuto intenzionalmente da un parlante e, pertanto, cancellare un'implicatura dev'essere un atto altrettanto intenzionale dello stesso parlante il cui enunciato ha dato origine (o avrebbe potuto dare origine) all'implicatura.

(v) Il quinto articolo concerne la semantica dei verbi fattivi e il modo in cui la fattività può manifestarsi in sintassi. Data la distinzione ipotizzata nel terzo articolo tra la fattività semantica di *know* e quella pragmatica di *regret*, in questo articolo si sostiene che la teoria sulle cosiddette isole fattive avrebbe bisogno di una revisione. Infatti, nel caso di *regret*, si afferma che l'insularità del complemento non dipende dalla fattività del predicato, che è un fenomeno di natura meramente pragmatica, ma dalla sua complessità semantica. In particolare, si formula l'ipotesi che la frase completiva introdotta da *regret* sia sotto la portata di un operatore contrafattuale che funziona come barriera all'estrazione di aggiunti.

(vi) L'oggetto d'indagine del sesto articolo è il verbo italiano *sapere*, usato in attribuzioni di stato mentale epistemico. In questo lavoro, sulle tracce di quanto proposto da Tsohatzidis (2012) per il verbo inglese *know*, si asserisce che *sapere* è semanticamente ambiguo tra un senso fattivo ed un senso non fattivo. Quest'ipotesi è confermata attraverso il ricorso a test semantici, nonché attraverso l'osservazione di fenomeni sintattici.

(vii) Il settimo articolo prende in considerazione la cosiddetta ipotesi di proiezione nel protagonista, originariamente formulata da Holton (1997) al fine di spiegare casi in cui predicati asseritamente fattivi, in particolare *tell+wh* e *know*, ricorrono in esempi in cui è evidente che la verità della proposizione espressa dalla subordinata non è presupposta. Dopo la discussione di vari casi in

cui si è ipotizzata la presenza di una proiezione nel protagonista, l'articolo propone una soluzione alternativa che ha il vantaggio di offrire una spiegazione linguistica ai casi in esame senza bisogno di invocare un meccanismo psicologico di proiezione nella mente di qualcun altro.

Sammanfattning

1 Bakgrund

Denna avhandling handlar om verb som styr kompletiva bisatser, s.k. att-satser (verb som *tro*, *veta*, *säga*, *vilja*, *hoppas*, *beklaga*, *vara ledsen*, etc.). Avhandlingen består av sju artiklar som för fram ett antal hypoteser om dessa verb och de kontexter i vilka de förekommer. Kompletiva bisatser uttrycker ett innehåll som inom språkfilosofi och lingvistik kallas *proposition*. En proposition är ett påstående som kan vara sant eller falskt. Ett påstående är sant när det som beskrivs av påståendet är fallet. Verb som uttrycker en individs kognitiva inställning till en propositions sanningsvärde kallas *verb som uttrycker propositionell attityd* (ett uttryck som infördes av Bertrand Russell, 1940). Typiska exempel på verb som uttrycker propositionell attityd är *tro*, *veta*, *vilja*, etc., d.v.s. verb som styr kompletiva bisatser.

Bland verb som uttrycker propositionell attityd finns en skara av verb som kallas *faktiva verb*. *Faktivitet* är den term som betecknar relationen mellan en sats som innehåller ett faktivt verb (factV) och sanningsvärdet hos den proposition som uttrycks av den underordnade kompletiva bisatsen (p): en sats som *X factV att p* förutsätter att p är en sann proposition. Om påståendet *X vet att p* är sant så måste p vara sann. Denna förutsättningsrelation kallas *presupposition*. Presupposition är en typ av implikation som har debatterats länge i den vetenskapliga litteraturen. När vi talar förmedlar vi mer än vad vi säger. Våra yttranden ger upphov till olika slags *implikationer*. Man skiljer mellan semantiska och pragmatiska implikationer. Semantiska implikationer är de som nödvändigtvis följer av ett uttalande: om jag säger att "Beatrix dödade Bill", innebär mitt uttalande med nödvändighet att 'Bill är död.' Satsen 'Bill är död' är ett sanningsvillkor för satsen 'Beatrix dödade Bill': om satsen 'Bill är död' är falsk, då kan mitt uttalande inte vara sant. Därför utgör satsen 'Bill är död' en semantisk implikation av uttalandet "Beatrix dödade Bill." Pragmatiska

implikationer, å andra sidan, är implikationer som inte nödvändigtvis följer av ett uttalande, utan enbart beror på kontexten i vilken uttalandet yttras. I detta fall är det uttalandet i en viss situation, och på grund av kontexten, som ger upphov till implikationen. Om jag säger ”Oj! Vad kallt!” och vänder mig till någon som sitter bredvid ett öppet fönster, så förmedlar mitt uttalande ett önskemål ’Snälla, stäng fönstret!’ Denna implikation är ingenting som med nödvändighet följer av mitt uttalande, och faktum är att jag skulle kunna upphäva den genom att tillägga ”Men jag menar inte att du skall stänga fönstret!” På engelska kallas semantiska implikationer *entailments*, och pragmatiska implikationer kallas *implicatures*. Bland de sistnämnda skiljer man mellan konversationella och konventionella implikaturer. Enligt Grice, är *konversationella implikaturer* en typ av implikation som alltid kan upphävas av talaren. Presuppositioner utgör en sort implikationer. Inom litteraturen har de beskrivits både som semantiska och som pragmatiska implikationer. Detta har lett till en viss förvirring, vilket uppmärksammas i denna avhandling i förhållande till faktiva verb.

2 Frågeställning och material

Avhandlingens syfte är att besvara följande forskningsfrågor:

(i) Finns det ett samband mellan typen av kognitiv attityd som ett verb uttrycker och typen av konstruktion med vilken verbet kompletteras?

(ii) Är förmågan att välja mellan olika kompletiva konstruktioner speciellt utsatt för L1-förlust (s.k. *attrition*), i kontexter där ett modersmål inte längre används på grund av migration och ersätts av ett annat språk?

(iii) Engelskans *know* ’veta’ och *regret* ’beklaga, vara ledsen’ betraktas som typiska exempel på faktiva verb. Hur kan det förklaras att dessa verb används icke-faktivt, d.v.s. utan att satsen i vilken de förekommer förutsätter att propositionen som uttrycks av den underordnade satsen är sann? Som, t.ex., när man säger ”På medeltiden visste man att jorden var platt.”

(iv) Finns det fall där konversationella implikaturer inte kan upphävas?

(v) Är *know* och *regret* faktiva på samma sätt?

(vi) Är det italienska verbet *sapere* 'veta' tvetydigt, med en faktiv och en icke-faktiv betydelse?

(vii) Är hypotesen om s.k. *protagonist projection* (Holton 1997) en adekvat hypotes?

Undersökningens data är på italienska, gallipolino (en dialekt från Gallipoli, i Apulien), och engelska. Italienska data består av originalsatser som har formulerats av författaren, som är modersmålstalare i italienska, och sedan har bedömts som korrekta av andra modersmålstalare i italienska. Gallipolinska data är originalsatser som har formulerats av författaren på italienska, översatts till gallipolino av en modersmålstalare i gallipolino, och sedan har bedömts som korrekta av andra modersmålstalare i gallipolino. Engelska data består både av originalsatser som har formulerats av författaren och bedömts som korrekta av modersmålstalare i engelska, och satser som har tagits från andra vetenskapliga verk som behandlar samma forskningsfrågor.

3 Resultat

Avhandlingens huvudresultat kan sammanfattas i följande punkter.

(i) Hypotesen att det skulle finnas ett samband mellan typen av propositionell attityd som ett verb uttrycker och typen av konstruktion med vilken verbet kompletteras (se Jackendoff 1985, 2007) vinner stöd av datan på gallipolino. Gallipolino kännetecknas av ett särskilt syntaktiskt drag när det gäller kompletiva bisatser. Till skillnad från italienska tillåter gallipolino inga infinitiva att-satser. Alla kompletiva satser har finit form och inleds av två olika komplementatorer, *ka* och *ku*. I avhandlingens första artikel (*Two Complementizers for Different Types of Propositional Attitude*) undersöks sambandet mellan dessa komplementatorer och olika typer av propositionella attityder uttryckta av huvud verbet. En ny distinktion lanseras mellan verb som uttrycker en *helt och hållet propositionell attityd* och verb som uttrycker en *värderande propositionell attityd*. De första styr en *ka*-sats, de andra en *ku*-sats.

(ii) Enligt *The Interface Hypothesis* (Sorace & Serratrice 2009, Sorace 2011) är språkliga fenomen som involverar olika, sinsemellan interagerande

kognitiva domäner mer utsatta för L1-förlust (*attrition*) än andra fenomen som endast är syntaktiska. Valet mellan *ku*-sats och *ka*-sats i gallipolino involverar interaktion mellan syntax och semantik, och det kan därför förväntas att förmågan att göra detta val korrekt är utsatt för L1-förlust om man slutar använda gallipolino, och gallipolino ersätts av ett annat språk. Avhandlingens andra artikel (*Attrition at the Interfaces in Bilectal Acquisition (Italian /Gallipolino)*), skriven tillsammans med Tanja Kupisch) behandlar ett experiment med 14 deltagare, varav nio flyttade från Gallipoli till Norra Italien efter puberteten (*targets*), och de andra fem är personer som har bott kvar i Gallipoli hela livet (*controls*). Resultaten bekräftar att *targets* visar en signifikativt försämrad förmåga jämfört med *controls* när det gäller användning av att-satser på gallipolino.

(iii) Både *know* och *regret* är faktiva verb, d.v.s. satsen som tillskriver *knowledge* eller *regret* förutsätter att propositionen som uttrycks av den underordnade satsen är sann. Avhandlingen driver tesen att det finns en fundamental skillnad mellan den faktiviteten som förknippas med *know* och den faktiviteten som förknippas med *regret* (se avhandlingens tredje artikel: *Did People in the Middle Ages Know that the Earth Was Flat?*). Den förra är ett semantiskt fenomen, som beror på den konventionella meningen hos verbet *know*, medan den senare är ett pragmatiskt fenomen, som enbart beror på kontextuella faktorer.

(iv) Enligt Grice (1989) kan konversationella implikaturer alltid upphävas. Denna hypotes bekräftar av den undersökning som genomförs i avhandlingens fjärde artikel (*Conversational Implicatures Are Still Cancellable*, publicerad i *Acta Analytica*, 28(3), 321-327, 2013). Här visas att de fall som nyligen har presenterats som motexempel till Grices hypotes (Weiner 2006) inte falsifierar hypotesen, utan endast visar att en konversationell implikatur inte kan upphävas om inte talaren vill det.

(v) Skillnaden mellan semantisk faktivitet, som förknippas med *know*, och pragmatisk faktivitet, som förknippas med *regret*, innebär att den traditionella uniforma skildringen av s.k. faktiva öar (*factive islands*) måste revideras. Detta visas i avhandlingens femte artikel (*The Wide Sea between Know-Islands and Regret-Islands*). 'Ö-effekten' (*islandhood*) som den har definierats av Ross (1967) utgör en restriktion till extraktionsfenomenet. Traditionellt behandlas kompletiva

bisatser underordnade faktiva verb som 'svaga öar' (*weak islands*): argument får extraheras, men inte adjungerade element. Avhandlingen hävdar att, när det gäller *regret*, beror ö-effekten på verbets semantiska komplexitet, inte på faktiviteten. Mer specifikt, föreslås att den kompletiva bisatsen som introduceras av *regret* skall förstås som en bisats som omfattas av en kontrafaktisk operator som utgör ett hinder för extraktion.

(vi) Avhandlingen hävdar att italienskans *sapere*, på samma sätt som engelskans *know*, är tvetydigt, med en faktiv och en icke-faktiv betydelse. Stöd för denna hypotes förs fram i avhandlingens sjätte artikel (*The Ambiguity of Sapere*) med hjälp av semantiska test och observation av syntaktiskt beteende.

(vii) Hypotesen om s.k. *Protagonist Projection* lanserades av Holton (1997) för att förklara fall där vissa verb som Holton betraktar som semantiskt faktiva (*tell+wh* och *know*) används icke-faktivt. Avhandlingens sjunde artikel (*The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis. Do We Need It?*) hävdar att Holtons hypotes är obehövlig och förespråkar alternativa sätt för att förklara de diskuterade fallen.

