@article{24cdc2ba-a06b-420d-8b8c-764262925f8a,
  abstract     = {{This paper sets out to extend the epistemic semantics presented in Dahl (2023) to<br/>modal and conditional logics. To do so, I extend the notion of belief expansion sys-<br/>tems, inspired by the AGM-model of belief change, to include belief revision, and<br/>use the resulting structures as models for both conditional and modal logic. In the<br/>first case, this applies the well-known approach to conditionals initiated by Gärden-<br/>fors (1978), but in a weaker setting which doesn’t assume an underlying logic. As<br/>such, we get semantics for both classical conditional logic and the intuitionistic<br/>conditionals studied by Weiss (2019). For modal logics, I use the condition that<br/>φ is accepted if and only if φ is accepted under every belief revision. As a result<br/>of this system of semantics, we get soundness and completeness theorems for both<br/>classical and non-classical systems of modal and conditional logic on the basis of<br/>a single type of structure. Finally, I briefly discuss how models based on belief<br/>change can still be thought to explain the semantics of objective modal claims.}},
  author       = {{Dahl, Niklas}},
  issn         = {{0031-8116}},
  keywords     = {{Belief revision; Modal logic; Conditional logic; Epistemic semantics; Ramsey test}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{05}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Philosophical Studies}},
  title        = {{From belief change to modality : Epistemic semantics for modal and conditional logic}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02459-w}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11098-025-02459-w}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}