@article{50802b97-47fb-499a-ace8-bc690f918f6f,
  abstract     = {{How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.}},
  author       = {{Gneezy, Uri and Saccardo, Silvia and van Veldhuizen, Roel}},
  issn         = {{1573-6938}},
  keywords     = {{bribery; communication; corruption; lobbying; D73; C91; K42}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{04}},
  number       = {{3}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Experimental Economics}},
  title        = {{An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.5}},
  doi          = {{10.1017/eec.2024.5}},
  volume       = {{28}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}