@misc{5e2789d4-c54c-4456-ae22-c4b0206e1842,
  abstract     = {{We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can<br/>evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the<br/>decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and<br/>evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective prefer-<br/>ence for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not tak-<br/>ing it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking<br/>the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference<br/>strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are<br/>typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences<br/>that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can<br/>evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases. The results extend in an<br/>intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be<br/>used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooper-<br/>ation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of<br/>material incentives and social organisation.}},
  author       = {{Mohlin, Erik and Rigos, Alexandros}},
  keywords     = {{Preference evolution; Bounded rationality; Culture; Cooperation; Cogni- tive economics; Logit choice; Monotone comparative statics; Supermodular games; C72; C73; D01; D91}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{2026:8}},
  series       = {{Working Papers}},
  title        = {{Preferences as Heuristics}},
  url          = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/260381868/WP26_8_cover_combined.pdf}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}