@article{a6ab20e3-c42f-41ac-afef-6492162bd062,
  abstract     = {{<p>A central debate in conspiracy theory research concerns how to conceptualise conspiracy theories in a way that advances our understanding of the phenomena themselves as well as of those who believe in them. This debate remains unresolved, with researchers adopting widely different positions: while some argue for a purely descriptive understanding, others are strongly committed to the view that conspiracy theories are, or can be shown to be, inherently irrational. This paper reconstructs the controversy, arguing that it stems from two distinct scholarly motives: to attain objective knowledge of the phenomena in question versus to defend beliefs and norms that are part of the researcher’s own cultural context. By examining the epistemological and methodological challenges in this field, I highlight how competing frameworks—normative cultural biases versus objective scientific inquiry—shape our understanding of rational belief. When cultural biases influence research, they risk narrowing its scope and undermining the development of a comprehensive understanding of conspiracy theories. Ultimately, even proponents of normative cultural approaches can acknowledge that such perspectives fail to capture the full complexity and significance of these phenomena.</p>}},
  author       = {{Tsapos, Melina}},
  issn         = {{0269-1728}},
  keywords     = {{Conspiracy theory; epistemic rationality; ideological biases; naturalistic fallacy; objectivity}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{09}},
  publisher    = {{Routledge}},
  series       = {{Social Epistemology}},
  title        = {{What Is Interesting About Conspiracy Theories?}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2025.2566131}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/02691728.2025.2566131}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}