@misc{afb14c72-42b9-48b5-9e6e-42d63f1188be,
  abstract     = {{We study school switches in which students who have already been assigned seats request<br/>reassignment. Unlike in regular school choice, stability need not be legally binding in such<br/>programs, since students’ priority-based claims have already been satisfied upstream. Effi-<br/>ciency then naturally becomes the primary design objective. To quantify the potential legal<br/>efficiency gains, we compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and<br/>an efficiency-adjusted DA (EADAM) using Swedish data. TTC and EADAM triple switch-<br/>ing rates compared to DA. This difference is driven by the absence of slack in effective<br/>capacity and shrinks rapidly when introducing additional seats.}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Lager, Nils and Kessel, Dany}},
  keywords     = {{School switch; Efficiency; Stability; Matching algorithms; Capacity slack.; C78; D47; D78}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{05}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{2026:4}},
  series       = {{Working Papers}},
  title        = {{Unlocking Legal Efficiency Gains in School Switch Programs}},
  url          = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/251348670/WP26_4.pdf}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}