Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance

Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey

Ucarlar, Nesrin

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BETWEEN MAJORITY POWER AND MINORITY RESISTANCE: KURDISH LINGUISTIC RIGHTS IN TURKEY

Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey

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Acronyms

AKP	Justice and Welfare Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)
CHF	Republican People Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*)
CoE	Council of Europe
DDKD	Association of Revolutionary Democratic Culture (*Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneği*)
DDKOs	Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*)
DEHAP	Democratic People Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*)
DEP	Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*)
DP	Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*)
DTP	Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*)
DYP	True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*)
EBLUL	European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages
ECHR	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
HADEP	People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*)
HAK-PAR	Rights and Freedoms Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*)
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HEP	People's Labour Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*)

ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ILO	International Labour Organization
İTC	Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)
KADEP	Participatory Democracy Party (*Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi*)
KAMER	Center of Woman (*Kadın Merkezi*)
KKTC	Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women (*Kürt Kadınları Teali Cemiyeti*)
KNMD	Association for the Dissemination of Kurdish Education (*Kürt Neşr-i Maarif Derneği*)
KOMKAR	The Union of Kurdistan Associations (*Kürdistan Dernekler Birliği*)
KON-KURD	Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (*Avrupa Kürt Dernekleri Konfederasyonu*)
KTC	Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti*)
KTİC	Society for Kurdish Social Organisation (*Kürt Teşkilat-ı İçtimaiye Cemiyeti*)
KTMNC	Society for the Dissemination of Kurdish Education and Publication (*Kürt Tamim-i Maarif ve Neşriyat Cemiyeti*)
KTTC	Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (*Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)
KTTG	KTTC newspaper (*Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi*)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	Workers' Party of Kurdistan (*Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan/ Kürdistan İşçi Partisi*)

PSK/TKSP	Party of Socialist Kurdistan (*Partîya Sosyalîst a Kurdîstan/ Türkiye Kürdistanı Sosyalist Partisi*)
RTÜK	Radio and Television Supreme Council (*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*)
SHP	Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*)
TCF	Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*)
TD	Turkish Society (*Türk Derneği*)
TDK	Turkish Language Institution (*Türk Dil Kurumu*)
TİP	Worker's Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*)
TKDP	Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (*Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi*)
T-KDP	Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Turkey (*Türkiye'de Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi*)
TKP	Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*)
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*)
TTK	Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*)
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

CHAPTER ONE

Introductory Words

It is no coincidence that 'the return of the political' (Mouffe 1993) accompanies the return of the ignored, degraded, oppressed and subjugated. The 'political' that has been returning corresponds to the struggles for re-accommodating the voices of various minorities. Members of cultures, languages, religions and sexes different from those of the majorities that dominated the public sphere have started to speak not individually but collectively, transcending the private sphere to which they had been confined. The political does not only return via the encounter of minorities with the dominant discourses in the public sphere but also through what the former says and how it speaks. In this respect, they are invited to be a part of contemporary critical theories, which suggest that 'it is from those who have suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement – that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking' (Bhabha 2001: 172). Therefore, the call for the political invites those hitherto excluded to the stage, which is no more to be inhabited only by the 'professional' actors. In remembering Arendt (1998), action is the human condition of plurality, which is the *conditio per quam* (sufficient condition) of all political life. However, this sufficient condition has been deactivated through the weakening of plurality, which has undermined the basis of the political.

The political does not simply mean unique 'national' interests, a qualified majority of votes, or limited parliamentary seats. Determining state territories is not only about drawing lines on a piece of land, but also about fencing the living areas and minds of people. The minority question, in fact, simply makes the fences less invisible. This visibility helps question the dominant ontological and epistemological settings that not only re-

strict minority rights but also constrain the contemplation of majorities. As Horkheimer emphasises, 'how this dehumanization of thinking affects the very foundations of our civilization can be illustrated by analysis of the principle of majority, which is inseparable from the principle of democracy' (1974: 26). The principle of majority is embedded in the principle of democracy through the idea of the nation-state. In this respect, the return of the political can be analysed by examining the principle of the nation-state, which constructs the majority in opposition to the minority. The principle of majority becomes the operating tool of the nation-state, which uses majority power to dominate minorities.

As the most figurative asset of membership in a majority or minority and the most symbolic aspect of national authority, language is a major site of struggle for majority power and minority resistance. Therefore, the question of minority rights in general and the linguistic rights of minorities in particular constitutes one of the most appropriate frameworks within which this site of struggle can be analysed through the theoretical perspectives questioning the principles of majority and minority. For the purposes of this study, which focuses on the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey, the sites of struggle for majority power and minority resistance are as follows: the documents of international and European organisations on the linguistic rights of minorities, the impact of the modernisation and nation-state building process in Turkey on the Kurdish-speaking community and the resistance engendered by the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora and in Turkey against the majority power delimiting the Kurdish linguistic rights.

Aims of the Study

The problematisation or de-normalisation of minority rights and minority resistance constitutes the overall aim of this study. This problematisation is done in two parts, first of which includes a deconstructive analysis using three binary oppositions: the minority and the majority; the individual and community; and the public and private sphere with special reference to language, a significant component of nationalist discourse. These binary and hierarchical oppositions construct the majority, individual and the public sphere as superior to the minority, community and the private

sphere. These oppositions are intrinsic to the liberal nation-state discourse, which aims to homogenise the public sphere that is supposed to be individually inhabited by the citizens, who are, in fact, members of the majority. The critical analysis of the liberal nation-state discourse through the deconstructive movement serves the problematisation and de-normalisation of minority rights. This movement also forms the basis of the second part, which critically examines the relationship between power and resistance by the help of post-structuralist understanding of power. The post-structuralist perspective provides a tool for the analysis of transformative resistance that conceives power in a productive manner and generates emancipatory politics.

The point of departure of this analysis is the failure of the liberal nation-state project to ensure linguistic homogenisation that becomes both the cause and effect of the recent success of linguistic minorities to challenge the nation-states. However, this success is generally unable to go beyond challenging, which does not embody a resistance that transforms either the nationalist discourse itself or the prevailing operations of power and resistance. In the act of challenging, minorities do not refrain from referring to the nationalist paradigm and using nationalist tools to provide a unitary and homogeneous political object in opposition to the other, namely the majority. What differentiates the nationalism of the minority from that of the majority is the label 'ethnic' that is given by the challenged nation-states to sublimate 'state' nationalism. Although this challenge reveals the ethnic aspect inherent in all nationalisms and makes the nationalist idea assailable, it cannot undermine the prevailing conception of power and resistance on which the nationalist discourse operates. In this respect, problematisation of minority rights through the deconstruction of binary oppositions within the liberal nation-state is complemented by a post-structuralist critical analysis of minority resistance.

This two-fold theoretical perspective serves the analysis of the Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey. The deconstruction of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority in the liberal nation-state provides a critical outlook on the documents of minority rights issued by the international and European organisations, through which Turkey is in principle accountable for its minority treatment and from which the Kurdish linguistic community expects effective protection. The challenge that these minorities constitute reaches these organisations in general and the EU as a supra-national/transnational entity in particular. This is the reason why

the EU has started to seek for a new approach towards the linguistic rights of minorities. This new approach does not regard linguistic diversity as a threat to national unity and regional security but rather conceives 'unity in diversity' as something attainable and desirable.

Despite its promising features, this new approach is also subject to the problematisation of minority rights. This problematisation is done with the help of those linguistic minorities in Europe, who are eager to collaborate with or encourage the EU to challenge the principle of the majority. Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey are invited to this problematisation process with regard to the relationship among the EU, Turkey and the Kurdish community. This problematisation also goes for the Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey through the deconstruction of the oppositional relationship between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish majority[1]. It includes a critical historical analysis of the emergence of the Kurdish question in Turkey. In fact, Kurdish linguistic rights are a recently specified aspect of the Kurdish question in Turkey, which stretches from the late Ottoman period of administrative reforms to the Republican era of the Turkish modernisation and nationalisation projects. This multifaceted question has appeared in a variety of 'discourses' that unanimously kept silent on the Kurdishness of the question while describing the issue as the question of regional backwardness or banditry and terrorism (Yeğen 2006a). The rise of the linguistic rights discourse seems to challenge this silence. Besides the increasing emphasis on the Kurdish language issue asserted by Kurdish political movements, Turkey's accession process to the EU also highlights the linguistic aspect of the question. This linguistic aspect enables Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey to criticise Turkey's EU harmonisation process for being delimited by the binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere.

1 The definition of minority is one of the most controversial topics of the international and European organisations that issue documents on the protection of minority rights (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the Republic of Turkey has its own description of minority, which is found indirectly in the Lausanne Treaty, which does not treat the Kurdish community as the minority to be entitled with the minority rights (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the Kurdish community hesitates to name itself as the minority due to the negative connotations of the term within Turkey. Nevertheless, this study regard the Kurdish community as a sociological minority in Turkey in terms of the non-dominant position of the Kurdish people in political, economic, and social spheres in Turkey. Yet, the phrase 'Kurdish minority' is less preferred throughout the study than the phrases 'Kurdish community', 'Kurdish people', 'Kurdish population' or the 'Kurdish linguistic community'.

These criticisms are included in the critical analysis of the principle of majority in Turkey through the interviews conducted with Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey.

The post-structuralist understanding of power and resistance enables the study to extend the limits of critical analysis to minority resistance. The post-structuralist approach provides innovative conceptions of power that challenge the conventional equity between power and domination. In fact, power produces not only domination but also resistance. Therefore, resistance, which inherently includes power, is likely to produce domination. The dominated reproduces domination when s/he does not resist in a transformative way. In this respect, a post-structuralist conception of power leads to the emergence of novel forms of resistance such as productive, creative and transformative ones, whereof the last one is preferred in this study. The transformative aspect of this unique resistance corresponds to the aim of challenging the prevailing ontological and epistemological settings through which the binary oppositions delimit the power of resistance and the political. In this sense, transformative resistance is also deconstructive. Contrary to the conventional resistance, which internalised the dominative power, transformative resistance, which is unique in that it uses power not to dominate but to transform, has the potential for leading emancipatory politics.

The extent of this potential for the Kurdish community is analysed through the interviews conducted with Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey. Having said this, the viewpoints of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora are much more vocalised in order to analyse the effects of living in the EU territory when it comes to stimulating a distinctive, namely transformative and trans-national standpoint and resistance. Those in Europe are presumed to have a distinct approach towards the Kurdish question in Turkey due to their experiences of democracy and pluralism in the countries where they live. Moreover, the right to express oneself in Kurdish is seen as a factor that contributes to the emergence of this allegedly distinctive approach.

If and how this approach is transferred from Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora to their counterparts in Turkey is another question analysed with the help of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora

and in Turkey. This question of transfer refers to the diasporic aspect of transnationality, which indicates the transaction between minorities in 'homeland' and in diaspora. The other aspect of transnationality that is analysed in this study constitutes a kind of transformative and trans-national resistance that challenges the limits of the idea of nationality[2]. In this respect, this study tries to bring up that what has not been studied before, namely to connect the approach of Kurdish intellectuals on the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey with a critical analysis of the liberal nation-state philosophy and minority rights. The following two parts give details of this attempt by outlining the study.

Deconstructing Binary Oppositions: Minority and Majority

The theoretical thinking submitted in Chapter 2 is not merely a strictly theoretical framework that is adopted in all the remaining chapters but rather acts as a boat of principal themes, which floats alongside the discussions of the study in general, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in particular. This theoretical thinking provides a critical analysis of the idea of nation-state, which is embodied in the binary oppositions between the minority and the majority, between the individual and community, and between the public and private sphere. These binary oppositions reflect the modernist epistemology, which acknowledges the human tendency to think in terms of opposition and hierarchy, that is, to construct binary and hierarchical oppositions such as reason vs. passion, mind vs. body, inside vs. outside, self vs. other, subject vs. object, etc. As Derrida highlights, 'in a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms but a violent hierarchy' (1981: 56-7). In this respect, the movement of deconstruction tries to reveal the relation of power between the poles of oppositions in order to reverse the hierarchy. The relation between the poles, however, is not limited to the power of one over the other, but it also refers to 'difference' that serves the construction of meaning in a dialogue

2 The term 'transnational' is used in this study to denote the transaction of thoughts and experiences across the borders of nation-states, whereas 'trans-national' means thoughts and experiences themselves which go beyond the national (see Chapter 6).

with the 'Other' (Hall 2002b: 329). As a result, 'the "Other" is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects' (ibid: 330).

Therefore, a deconstructive approach does not regard the subject as the origin, arbiter, centre and the referent. Rather, such a manoeuvre rejects the 'tyranny' of Eurocentric or ethnocentric epistemology, which does not allow 'others' as the objects of science and politics to articulate their 'backward', 'unscientific', 'deceptive' narratives (Lyotard 1984). This conception of 'other' is part of a postmodern endeavour, which tries to reveal the illusions of modernism by the act of undermining its epistemology. In Bauman's words, postmodernity is 'modernity without illusions' (1993: 32). In this respect, according to Bhabha, 'the wider significance of the postmodern condition lies in the awareness that the epistemological "limits" of those ethnocentric ideas are also the enunciative boundaries of a range of other dissonant, even dissident histories and voices – women, the colonized, minority groups, the bearers of policed sexualities' (2001: 5). This study on the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey departs from an overall concern to extend the narrative boundaries of linguistic minorities by connecting their story, voice and claim to the critical theories challenging the modernist account of the minority versus majority.

Chapter 3 discusses the limitations that minorities experience even when they are legally entitled to minority rights guaranteed by national, international and European declarations. The analysis of the historical relationship between the rise of the nation-state system in Europe and the emergence of international and European protection of minority rights is helpful to understand the character of the international and European documents on minority rights. These documents are delimited by the philosophy of nation-state, which is innately in conflict with the fact of minority. In this sense, although the international and European documents on minorities constitute a progressive step in the protection of minority rights, the documents remain unsatisfactory for eliminating the binary oppositions between the minority and the majority, between the individual and community, and between the public and private sphere. Chapter 3 submits an analysis of the shortcomings of documents on the linguistic rights of minorities issued by international and European organisations such as League of Nations, United Nations, Council of Europe and the Conference on (later Organisation for) Security and Cooperation in Europe. The response of a 'supranational' or 'transnational' organisation, i.e., the European Union to the linguistic rights of minorities is also criti-

cally analysed. In order to understand what the EU means by 'unity' when it adopted the motto of 'unity in diversity', the essence behind the understanding of unity is examined. Does this essence 'refer to a general idea of humanity, an abstract concept under which all individuals are subsumed and their differences neutralised' or 'precisely to the power that singularises each individual, conferring upon him a unique destiny' (Balibar 1998: 107)? While the first one seems to correspond to the nationalism a size larger than the singular nation-state projects, the second sounds like an atomistic individualism. In order to answer the question of whether the EU meets the expectations of minorities, Chapter 3 offers a critical analysis of the EU legislation on minority rights and linguistic diversity with regard to the principle of majority. This analysis is complemented with another of the reactions of linguistic minorities in Europe to the nation-states and the EU.

Chapter 4 provides a critical examination of the historical development of the Kurdish question in Turkey with reference to the deconstructive analysis of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority[3]. While the discussion on the EU approach towards the linguistic rights of minorities might seem irrelevant to the case of the Kurdish community in Turkey, where the state does not recognise the Kurds as a minority group to be entitled with specific linguistic rights, the opposite is true. As a candidate country to the EU, Turkey is less likely to be exempt from the responsibility of adjusting its political system to an EU-style democracy, which has also been challenged by minorities. In fact, this challenge enables the EU to criticise the attitude of the Republic of Turkey (the Republic hereafter) towards the groups in Turkey that do not speak languages other than Turkish. Turkey is inhabited by a great number of communities whose mother tongue is not Turkish[4]. Among these groups, the Kurds – an autochthonous community living in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey – have become increasingly noteworthy due to their density in the

3 This critical examination includes a discussion on the nationalist history writing, which is not only employed by the Republic of Turkey but also adopted by the Kurdish historiography.

4 Ethnologue, which was founded by a distinguished linguist Richard S. Pittman as 'an encyclopedic reference work cataloging all of the world's 6,912 known living languages', reports that there are fourteen language groups and thirty-six languages in Turkey. See the URL: http://www.ethnologue.com.

region and the proportion to the total population (approx. 20 per cent)[5]. More significantly, the geographic isolation of the region, its traditional mode of production and the socio-cultural distinctiveness ensures the Kurdish community remains on the periphery of the Republic. Although the emergence of the Kurdish question was not simply a result of the establishment of the Republic, it became a chronic conflict due to the forceful implementation of modernisation, centralisation, secularisation and nationalisation projects by the Republican authority. The Kurds refused to transfer the regional, religious and cultural self-rule they enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire to the sovereign power of the new secular and unitary state of the Republic. Therefore, the history of the Kurdish question in Turkey is about Kurdish revolts against the Turkish authority. Those revolts were not simply motivated by the Kurdish nationalist discourse but also organised in the name of anti-secularism, anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism in different periods of time. The response of the Republic has also been shaped by the discourses regarding the Kurdish resistance as the opposition of pre-modernity, religiosity, banditry or terrorism.

Chapter 5 chronicles the responses by the Kurdish community to the democratisation process of Turkey that began in the 1950s, dovetailing with the implications on the Kurdish community of the establishment and consolidation of the Republic as a modern and secular nation-state. The illegal or clandestine presence of the Kurdish political movement, begun in the 1970s, has re-appeared in the 1990s in the form of pro-Kurdish political parties. Most of these political parties are closed due to the failure to distance themselves from the PKK or from the discourse that harms the 'unity and indivisibility' of the Turkish nation with its state. The emphasis that Chapter 5 puts on the PKK stems from the social and political implications of violence on the Kurdish question. The implications of Turkey's EU harmonisation process on the issue of Kurdish linguistic rights are also discussed in Chapter 5 in light of the reforms that the governments introduced in the 2000s. This discussion is conducted through the help of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey who submit their reflections on the influence of EU harmonisation process in Turkey on Kurdish linguistic rights. These reflections are analysed within the deconstructive approach towards

5 Since the question of mother tongue did not take place at the national censuses since 1965, there have only been estimates about the size and distribution of the Kurdish people in Turkey.

the binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere.

Post-Structural Understanding of Power and Resistance

In collaboration with the deconstructive endeavour mentioned above, post-structuralism helps to develop a theory that accounts for historical change by the act of reintroducing and empowering the 'other'. This reintroduction does not exempt 'other' from a critical examination. This examination is based on the argument that the world of language and discourse – which structures the subjects' or agents' sense of being and meaning – is not external to the subject or agent, as structuralism contends, but rather the subject or agent participates in the social construction of reality and identity. Such an argument not only attacks the essentialist notion of a subject or agent but also indicates the role of subjects and agents, including 'others', in the reproduction of prevailing discourses. As Hall clarifies, discourse means 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment… Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language' (2002a: 72). This definition of discourse includes a critical analysis of the relationship between knowledge and power. In this respect, a post-structuralist account introduces non-conventional conceptions of power: 'power does not radiate in a single direction – from top to bottom – and come from a specific source; power operates at every site of social life; power is not simply negative and repressive but also productive' (ibid: 77).

These new conceptions of productive power lead to innovative ideas on resistance, such as the aforementioned transformative resistance. Such resistance challenges the current limits and models of politics and social life produced and reproduced even by 'others' (e.g. minorities), mimicking the dominant discourses. This transformative resistance includes responsibility on the part of minorities for not reproducing essentialism and domination. Keeping with the argument of Bhabha:

> The language of critique is effective not because it keeps forever separate the terms of the master and the slave… but to the extent to which it overcomes the given grounds of opposition and opens up a space of translation: a place of hybridity… [because] our political referents and priorities – the people, the community, class struggle, anti-racism, gender difference, the assertion of anti-imperialist, black or third perspective – are not there in some primordial, naturalistic sense. Nor do they reflect a unitary or homogeneous political object (2001: 25-6).

This discussion is conducted in Chapter 6, which focuses on the transformative resistance and emancipatory politics that might be engendered by minorities. This possibility is especially pertinent for diasporic communities, who develop transnationality through plural political, economic and social connections, spaces, cultures and languages. In particular, the Chapter focuses on the question of if a diasporic perception of the relationship between language and identity might generate trans-nationality.

Chapters 7 and 8 reveal the possibilities of transformative resistance that the Kurdish linguistic minority might produce against majority power. Chapter 7 starts with a brief description of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora, some members of which are included in this study as interviewees. This description is followed by an analysis of the reflections of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora on the 'status planning' for the Kurdish language. These reflections, together with others on the political and cultural connotations of linguistic rights, are analysed as repercussions of power and resistance on the part of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora. This analysis is followed by a discussion of the recent developments in Kurdish linguistic resistance in Turkey in light of the theoretical outlook on the binary opposition between the minority and the majority on the one hand and the relationship between power and resistance on the other. The new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey that emerged in the 1990s and their response to the restrictions on the Kurdish language and identity through linguistic works are highlighted in comparison to the previous generations of Kurdish intellectuals and their political movements. Moreover, the relationship between the 90s generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey and Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora is discussed in terms of the impact of the latter on the former through linguistic and literary studies in Europe since the 1980s.

In order to extend this discussion and open another one on the transnationality of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora, Chapter 8

analyses whether a European-Kurdish intelligentsia has been emerging in Europe. This analysis complements another of the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora towards the relationship between language and identity. In addition to those in Chapter 7, these analyses in Chapter 8 serve to categorise the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora with special reference to the notion of trans-nationality. The interviews are interpreted according to three sub-categories: the nationalist approach, the cultural approach and the trans-national approach. The first two approaches represent the conventional standpoints that are traditionally taken by those who strictly connect language with nationalism and politics, or alternatively by others who put more emphasis on the cultural aspect of language than its political connotations. Those who take a trans-national stance linking language with a multipolitical agenda have recently developed the third approach. Notably, these general assumptions strongly tend to dominate individuals who have different historical, cultural, political and economic preferences, and to fix their position alongside the classification made above. Moreover, 'the temptation to treat as emblematic the experiences and politics' of a group of intellectuals and to tailor them to illustrate the discussion of the study should be read with caution since 'as always in the recounting of someone else's story, the storyteller transforms it into something new, giving it a meaning for others which it never possessed for those who lived it' (Houston 2001: 19). This transformation is mostly shaped by the methodological approach adopted by the study.

The Art of Hearing

Science and art have long been seen as contradictory, if not, irrelevant to each other. As a serious business, 'science is thought of as an enterprise concerned with discovering what is true' whereas art, by contrast, is not considered so sombre; it is widely believed that art, which requires talent, 'is not concerned with truth but with beauty, it is intended less to inform than to please' (Eisner and Powell 2002). However, if 'art is a particular quality of human experience that to some degree could be present in any interaction an individual had with the world' (ibid), then science is art as a form of human experience. More specifically, if 'a practice considered as an

art is a practice riddled with uncertainties, marked by surprise, motivated by the satisfactions of discovery, supportive of innovation, and prized for the experience it makes possible' (ibid), qualitative research that also includes in-depth interviews can be thought of as part of an artistic science. The instruments of this artistic science are theoretical and methodological tools that researchers employ. The product inevitably reflects the outlook that the researcher and the study has on art, science and life.

This study adopts the critical theory paradigm by following the deconstructive movement and post-structural understanding of power and resistance. The critical theory paradigm 'emphasizes the importance of discovering and rectifying societal problems', 'arguing that research should redress past oppression, bring problems to light, and help minorities, the poor, the sidelined, and the silenced' (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 25). Therefore, the critical research explicitly takes side by studying those groups facing oppression and tries to empower them. Refusing to take a value-neutral stance, the critical research further intends to serve justice in particular by addressing the underrepresented needs and interests of the powerless. The critical research tries to 'connect the everyday troubles individuals face to public issues of power, justice and democracy' (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000: 289; quoted in Rubin and Rubin ibid: 25). Further, the critical researcher does not see knowledge as something waiting to be discovered as an identical and universal truth, but rather regards the truth s/he studies as the reality of oppression (Rubin and Rubin ibid). In this respect, a critical researcher agrees with postmodern theory, which recognises knowledge as situational and conditional, that 'the researcher's view is only one among many and has no more legitimacy than the views of the people being studied' (ibid: 27).

This study is based on the critical analysis of the documents issued by the international and European organisations for the linguistic rights of minorities, the literature on the Kurdish question in Turkey and the interviews conducted with Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey. The interviews were designed in an unrestricted way that encouraged the interviewees to suggest topics, concerns and meanings that were important to them, though unrecognised by the interviewer. This design presupposes that the interview questions that the researcher intended to ask may differ from the ones, which came about in practice, when the conversation went in an unexpected but relevant direction. In this respect, the interviewing method is a semi-structured one and provides a middle

way between the one that is composed of close-ended questions and the one that is based on an open-ended interview (see Petersson 2001: 35-6; Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 25-6). This is neither 'a free-floating conversation', which risks being too informal and distorted, nor 'a strictly structured questionnaire', which is unable to discover that could be missed by the interviewer (Petersson ibid: 36). Rather, this mixed-method enables the interviewees to express themselves in a more efficient way that enriches the research that is conducted by the 'outsider'. In fact, as Rubin and Rubin argue, 'in creating a relationship with interviewees, researchers often have to cross the boundary from being an outsider to being an insider' (2005: 86). Although 'being viewed as an outsider is not necessarily bad for the research because interviewing across class, gender, or ethnic barriers produces better results in some areas', the role of insider can make the researcher seem less threatening because s/he is as bound by the rules as the interviewees (ibid: 87).

This approach does not see the interaction effects of human dialogue as a threat to validity; rather, it regards the interactions as opportunities to acquire a better understanding of the issue. In this sense, this method does not treat the interviewees as mere objects of study, but rather regards them as the subjects that take active part in the arguments developed. However, they are not regarded as 'texts' of a fully-fledged discourse analysis, which 'is a way of finding out how consequential bits of social life are done and this knowledge is relevant to the process of building knowledge and theory in the social sciences' (Wetherell *et al.* 2002: 2). In other words, this is not a study of discourse, which is 'the study of language in use' and interested in 'meaning-making' (ibid: 3). The intellectuals interviewed were invited to contribute to the development of the main arguments of study, *not* to confirm or invalidate them. The study occasionally makes use of lengthy citations in order to reflect the interviewees' stance in a more direct and clear way. The citations are complemented by short informative blurbs to explain the interviewee's membership in organisations; actions, aims, norms and values of the latter; and her/his relative social positions. Such a contextualisation settles the interviewees' approaches in a wider milieu. The interviews of this study share some characteristics of topical interviews, which include more judgements and conclusions from the researcher, who aims 'to work out a coherent explanation by piecing together what different people have said' (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 11).

Despite its interdisciplinary character and sociological outlook, this study on the political aspect of linguistic rights is mainly inspired by questions of political science and political philosophy. The focus on the relationship between language and politics directed the study to invite those who are experienced and knowledgeable in the area as the interviewees of the research, namely, Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey[6]. The term 'Kurdish intellectual' refers both to those who contribute to the development of Kurdish language and politics through their works, and to those who are leading principal political, cultural and linguistic Kurdish institutions in Europe and Turkey. Notably, while the second group overtly and directly represents those who are members or adherents to institutions/associations at issue, the first one only reflects particular standpoints within the Kurdish community in Europe and in Turkey. However, individual journalists, authors, linguists, teachers and even university students, some of whom are also leading members of Kurdish associations, have influence over a considerable number of Kurdish people in Europe and Turkey. To portray accurately the complexity of the problem, the study tried to gather contradictory or overlapping perceptions and nuanced understandings that different individuals hold. The accuracy, which 'sometimes means getting across the meaning of what interviewees have said rather than quoting them exactly', required observation and background work that is partly done before and partially after interviews (ibid: 71). The main questions of the interviews conducted for this study cover more or less the same parts of the research problem.

6 The interviews with Kurdish intellectuals in European diaspora and in Turkey were conducted in Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Cologne, Diyarbakır, Frankfurt, İstanbul, Paris and Stockholm. The author conducted thirty-two interviews whereas three of them were not included in this study due to some technical and methodological reasons. The geographical division of interviews in Europe is as follows: 9 from Sweden, 7 from Germany, 6 from Belgium, 4 from the Netherlands, and 1 from France. Due to the practical matters, such European countries as Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom that are inhabited by the Kurdish immigrants could not be included in the list. The author's visits were partly financed by the Swedish Institute, which also granted her the scholarship for studies/research work in the Department of Political Science at Lund University between October 2005 and December 2006. The author also conducted five interviews in Turkey in 2007 and 2008. One of them was conducted in both İstanbul and Diyarbakır whereas others were conducted in İstanbul. With few exceptions, interviews lasted approximately sixty minutes and were recorded in Turkish. They were thoroughly transcribed into texts, some parts of which are translated by the author and incorporated in the study. Detailed information about each interviewee is submitted in the relevant chapters.

The main questions, which were 'carefully thought through and expressed so as not to restrict or predetermine the responses but at the same time cover the research concerns' (ibid: 135-6), were prepared prior to the interview and complemented by follow-up questions. The follow-up questions addressed the comments that interviewees made during the interviews in order to obtain depth, detail, and more nuanced answers. The framework of the interviews was shaped by the following five main questions: 1. What does the term 'Kurdish language' refer to?; 2. What kind of standardisation process is 'necessary' to protect and develop the Kurdish language(s)?; 3. How could the relationship between speaking the Kurdish language(s) and being 'Kurdish' be formulated?; 4. What are the political and cultural implications of interest in learning and speaking the Kurdish language(s)?; 5. What can be said about the impact of being exile in Europe on the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora towards the question?. Together with follow-up ones, these main interview questions help to provide information to analyse the research premises.

The analysis of interviews 'entails classifying, comparing, weighing, and combining material from the interviews to extract the meaning and implications, to reveal patterns, or stitch together descriptions of events into a coherent narrative' (ibid: 201). Such an analysis deals with the concepts and themes that were either introduced by the main and follow-up questions or those that were indirectly revealed from the interviews through the comparison of interviews, examination of concepts and themes, the working on typologies and labels (ibid: 210-16). This process provides a kind of interpretation, which illuminates 'ways in which participants incorporate and engage with other texts, discourses, and ideological positions' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 26). During this interpretation that which is represented as denotation and those ideas and values that are depicted as connotation are submitted. Denotation corresponds to 'the descriptive and literal level of meaning generated by signs and shared by virtually all members of a culture' while connotation refers to meanings that are 'generated by connecting signifiers to wider cultural codes' (Barker and Galasiński 2001: 5). Therefore, the approaches of the interviewees could be de-personalised without losing their power of representation.

In fact, the power of representation is mostly delimited by the researcher, who is seen traditionally as 'a disembodied knower, transcendentally disinterested, factually objective, undisturbed by the mundane concerns of

gender, race, class, or bodily experience of the world' (Lincoln and Guba 2004: 231). This delimitation means a value-free scientific activity executed by such a researcher. However, 'the claim to value-freedom is itself a values statement … the purpose of which is to obscure the values and social locations and standpoints that lie behind the choice of a problem, the choice of a paradigm, the choice of guiding theory, the choice of research site, and the choice of methods, among other expressions of values' (ibid: 232). These choices constitute the self-awareness of the researcher, who examines her/his own biases and expectations that might influence not only the interviewee but also the results of the study. The self-consciousness of the researcher regarding the methodological and design strategies s/he employs makes value allegiance more deliberative. 'A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, a way of describing is also a way of not describing', which means, if 'life itself is not a randomly selected event representing population' (Eisner 2004: 200-1), the study cannot be either. Finally, if there is no 'truth' to be submitted by the interviewees or revealed by the researcher, then the critical stance to be taken by the latter seems to be the most reliable way to search for 'objectivity'. This study does not simply include the narratives of the Kurdish linguistic community in the critical analysis of the binary opposition between the Kurdish and Turkish languages or peoples, but also refrains from having these narratives as sources of a new centre of truth or power over other languages or peoples.

CHAPTER TWO

Linguistic Minorities in Majority Languages

A deconstructive line questioning the 'language' of nationalist discourse, the binary opposition between the minority and the majority, and the violence of law can provide a critical outlook on the linguistic rights of minorities. In light of this critical outlook, the first section of this chapter discusses both the role of language in the production of nationalist discourse and the language that reproduces that role. To analyse critically this reproduction, the second section of the chapter deconstructs the binary opposition between the minority and the majority. This deconstruction includes a discussion on justice and law, evolving into a critical analysis of the violence of law in the third section of the chapter, and directs the critical outlook to the two other binary oppositions that are inscribed in the liberal nation state in law. The first opposition shows the relationship between the individual and community, followed by the corresponding opposition between the public and private sphere. These two binary oppositions are subjected to a deconstructive analysis in four sections. The fourth and sixth sections problematise the mindset of a 'liberal nation state', a concept based first on the conception of the individual as superior to the community, and second on the separation between the public and private sphere. The fifth and seventh sections propose to re-conceptualise community and to connect public and private spheres respectively in order to step further in the process of the problematisation of the linguistic rights of minorities.

'Language' of Nationalist Discourse

The problematisation of the language of nationalist discourse partly finds its foundations in the modernist accounts of nationalism, which argue that nations and nationalism are the products of a modern era that is characterised by capitalism, industrialism, the bureaucratic state, urbanisation and secularism. Modernists reject the primordialist approach, which finds the origins and strength of nations in their antiquity and naturalness, and criticise the ethno-symbolists for sharing the argument of primordialists by the act of underlining the continuity between the pre-modern ethnic communities and the modern nations (see Özkırımlı 2000). What connects the pre-modern ethnic communities to the modern nations is the nationalist discourse itself. This connection is established with the help of 'invented traditions', which Hobsbawm defines as, 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past' (1983: 1). He further highlights three major inventions in the service of a 'new secular religion' (ibid: 270-1) e.g., nationalism, as follows: the development of primary education, the invention of public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. Gellner (1983: 27-8; 1999: 106-7) also emphasises the importance of 'generic training' in a highly specialised industrial society, which needs a high social mobility besides a 'great semantic discipline' for an uncomplicated communication among its members. This great semantic discipline also means a cultural homogenisation that must be acquired through formal schooling whereby the 'high culture' is cultivated and scattered. Therefore, modern man becomes loyal to a culture, the dissemination, maintenance and boundaries of which are protected by a state (ibid: 36, 110). This brings us to the definition of nationalism that Gellner elucidates as: 'a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1).

The role of politics in the construction of such a harmony between the state and society is better emphasised in the works of Breuilly, who constructs nationalism as a political doctrine serving the objectives of obtaining and using state power (1993; 1999). Moreover, he connects nationalist politics with 'the modern state originally developed in a liberal form – that is, it involved a concentration of "public" powers into specialized

state institutions (parliaments, bureaucracies) while leaving many "private" powers under the control of non-political institutions (free market, private firms, families, et cetera)' (1999: 164). According to Breuilly, nationalism helps 'to maintain some harmony between the public interests of citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals (families)' by connecting the two conflicting ideas of the liberal nation state, namely 'a body of citizens and a cultural collectivity' (ibid: 165-6). However, the minority question is the signpost of the failure of nationalism in solving this fundamental contradiction within the liberal nation state. The public sphere is not simply separated from the private sphere, but also is designed for the protection of the privileges of the dominant group and the assimilation of the minority into the majority.

The assimilation policy of the dominant group, which Hechter (1975) calls 'internal colonialism', is also his point of departure in analysing the ethnic conflict between the core and periphery. This conflict, namely the failure of assimilation/integration of the periphery into the national core occurs 'when objective cultural differences are superimposed upon economic inequalities, leading to a cultural division of labour, and when an adequate degree of intra-group communication exists' (Hechter 1975: 43; quoted in Özkırımlı 2000: 100). Therefore, the nationalist state policy conducted by the elites of the *dominant* group inspires the nationalist movements led by the elites of the *dominated* groups. In this respect, the instrumentalist conception of nationalism regards ethnic identities as the tools of competing elites, who 'select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups' (Brass 1979; quoted in Özkırımlı 2000: 110).

Interestingly, both elites of the dominant and dominated groups perform within the same paradigm of the nationalist discourse. However, Hroch names only the movements of elites of the non-dominant ethnic groups as 'national movements', that is, 'organized endeavours to achieve all the attributes of a fully-fledged nation' (1999: 80). Hroch explains three structural phases that the national movements pursue to achieve the attributes of a fully-fledged nation as the following: Phase A, wherein activists devote their energies 'to scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes' of the group; Phase B, wherein a new group of activists emerge, 'who now sought to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to

the project of creating a future nation, by patriotic agitation to "awaken" national consciousness among them;' and Phase C wherein, 'the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity, a mass movement was formed' (ibid: 81). As he highlights, 'the modern nation-building process started with the collection of information about the history, language and customs of the non-dominant group' and this collection becomes the critical ingredient of patriotic agitation (ibid: 84). In fact, non-dominant and dominant groups alike pursue similar stages in the construction and daily reconstruction of the nation.

This construction is the concern of postmodern accounts of nationalism, which, in collaboration with the deconstructive and poststructuralist approaches towards the re-production of national identities, provide a more critical understanding of nationalism. Billig (1995), who deconstructs the meanings of nationality, argues that the patriotic agitation is not limited to the initial phases of the nation-building process but rather that 'banal nationalism' lies at the core of the daily reproduction of the established nations. As Billig explains, 'the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion: it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building' (ibid: 8). Similarly, McClintock highlights the role of 'the visible, ritual organization of fetish objects – flags, uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, national flowers, national cuisines and architectures as well as … the organization of collective fetish spectacle – in team sports, military displays, mass rallies, the myriad forms of popular culture and so on' (1996: 274; quoted in Özkırımlı 2000: 195) in the process of the reproduction of nationalism. What Billig emphasises is that the association of nationalism with 'those who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing politics' helps us to differentiate 'our' nationalism – which is not *actually* nationalism but 'beneficial', 'necessary' and natural 'patriotism' – from 'their' nationalism, which is 'dangerous, irrational, surplus and alien' (1995: 5, 55). This differentiation is a crucial part of imagining 'our' nation, which is inseparable from imagining other nations (ibid: 83).

This aspect of national imagination is what Anderson highlights when he defines nation as 'an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign' (1983: 6-7). His (ibid: 38-43) analysis of the relationship between the imagination of nation and the rise of vernacular languages together with the 'print capitalism' is very significant in a study about the linguistic rights of minorities. More specifically, his

(ibid: 40-1) emphasis on the adoption of some vernaculars as administrative languages, which created languages-of-power, is the point of departure for the further analysis of the question of linguistic rights of minorities. However, none of these theories of nationalism are directly or primarily used in this study to problematise the linguistic rights of minorities even if many of them are well suited to do so[7]. This study prefers to utilise contemporary critical theories, which emphasises on the daily reproduction of nationalist discourse through the binary oppositions between the minority and majority languages, between the individual and community, and between the public and private sphere.

The problematisation of the language of nationalist discourse is composed of a discursive and deconstructive analysis of the asymmetrical opposition between the minority and the majority in the liberal nation-state. The discursive analysis works on the 'practices' that define actions, interpretations and subjectivities operating within the discourse. Discursive practices 'delimit the range of objects that can be identified, define the perspectives that one can legitimately regard as knowledge, and constitute certain kinds of persons as agents of knowledge' (Foucault 1977: 199; Shapiro 1981: 130). These practices operate within the 'primary' (real), 'secondary' (reflexive) and 'tertiary' (discursive) relations. Primary relations may be described as relations prior to discourse, e.g., the differential relation between the communities (Shapiro ibid: 153). Those primary relations are institutionalised by the secondary relations, which are nested in the dominant theoretical and epistemological positions. The secondary relations are 'the practices and ideologies of a profession or discipline' within a particular discourse (ibid). The oppositional relation between the minority and the majority is institutionalised in such mainstream disciplines as

7 The modernist theories of nationalism help to explain the rise of Turkish nationalism and the construction of the Turkish nation-state through the modernisation, secularisation and centralisation projects carried out by the new Republic of Turkey. Although Hobsbawm's 'invented traditions', Gellner's emphasis on the 'generic training' and 'cultural homogenisation', or Breuilly's conception of nationalism as politics are not explicitly referenced, they inspired the evaluation of the instruments and institutions that the Republic utilised in the construction of the Turkish nation. Similarly, Hechter's notions of 'internal colonialism' and the failed assimilation or Hroch's analysis of the development of national movements may construct a base of the examination on the Kurdish resistance against the Turkish state-nationalism. It almost goes without saying that Anderson's concept of 'imagined community' and Billig's insight of 'banal nationalism' are most helpful in understanding the production and reproduction of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms.

international relations and political science by the positivist, realist and nationalist discourses. Finally, 'tertiary' (discursive) relations produce the rules that shape the objects and events we talk about as we speak today on the minority and the majority. Discursive relations are 'the interplay of relations that make possible and sustain the objects' of discourse (Foucault 1972: 45). Consequently, discourse 'constructs, defines and produces objects of knowledge in an intelligible way while at the same time excluding other ways of reasoning as unintelligible' (Barker and Galasiński 2001: 12). This makes discourse theory 'valuable in describing how the ideological construction of the nation aims to achieve a hegemonic rearticulation of the national "nodal point"' (Sutherland 2005). This rearticulation also corresponds to 'a constant struggle for the dominant, or hegemonic, ideology' and 'marks the moment at which an ideology triumphantly becomes "banal"' (ibid). 'Ideology's ultimate ambition is to achieve banality or "common sense"' (Hall 1998: 1062; quoted in Sutherland ibid). In this banality, both the minority and the majority become the delimited objects produced by the nationalist discourse.

The minority and the majority are delimited as unitary and homogeneous political objects in a primordial and opposite sense. Moreover, the majority is 'delimited' as practically and naturally superior to the minority. The superior is constructed as the origin, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, and therefore good, while the inferior represents the derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, and consequently evil (Culler 1983: 85-93). In this sense, the problematisation of the minority question involves a critical look on the contradictions and disruptions in the nationalist discourse, whereby existing perceptions on the minority question is de-normalised. What is socially constructed as normal is exposed to a deconstructive analysis that focuses on the allegedly abnormal. Burr regards Foucault's genealogy as a form of deconstruction, which 'concerns itself with tracing the development of present ways of understanding, of current discourses and representations of people and society, to show how current "truths" have come to be constituted, how they are maintained and what power relations are carried by them' (1995: 166). However, it is not the endeavour to find out a 'secret origin' or real cause of discourse in either searching for 'the material determinants of ideology' or uncovering 'the true meanings of texts' (Howarth 2000: 51). It is a critical approach, which indicates the strange in the familiar. Howarth proposes that only such a kind of critical approach, which 'exposes the contingency and historicity

of naturalized and sedimented practices' can reactivate and pursue different possibilities excluded by the systems of domination (ibid: 129-30).

Deconstruction of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority reveals that the asymmetrical relationship between the two is socially constructed and materially reproduced. This asymmetry does not stem merely from differences between these two communities but is produced by a system of differences, in which the majority is constructed as the norm and the minority as the exception. In linguistic terms, the majority language is constructed as the original, pure and standard whereas the minority language represents the degenerated, complicated and deteriorated[8]. The majority language is therefore postulated as superior to the minority one. The source of this superiority is legitimised by the historical advancement, or the widespread functionality, or the symbolic value of the majority language. However, the historical advancement is itself a result of the well-established institutionalisation of the language concerned, which was protected, developed, disseminated, and as a result, majoritised by the state policies. Therefore, the majority language also becomes widely functional. Additionally, the majority language that is turned into the national or official one acquires a symbolic value for national unity and state sovereignty. Language is unique among other elements of nationhood 'with its central role in the dissemination of the objective and subjective elements of nationhood among group members' (Virtanen 2003: 9).

To speak national language is made either compulsory for being a citizen of the state or attractive and beneficial for being included by the majority. The first is called assimilation, while the second is so-called integration, which is read by minorities as a subtle form of assimilation. The assimilationist ideology posits that 'the state has a right to limit the expression of certain aspects of private values, especially those of immigrants and national minorities' (Bourhis 2001: 10). The aim is 'the eventual elimination, by education or decree, of all but one language, which is to remain the national language' (Jacob and Beer 1985: 2). The integrationist approach, on the other hand, ignores the fate of the minority language on the grounds of the liberal principle of state non-intervention, through which the majority language is encouraged for the sake of integration. The integrationist policy is based on the pluralist principle that 'the state has no right to interfere with the private values of its individual citizens' (Bourhis

8 This is not valid for countries such as those, which were colonised, in which the minority has the power over the majority.

2001: 15). However, this non-intervention leads to the hegemony of the majority language over the language of the less privileged. The term 'integration' referred to by the state is translated into minorities' language as 'assimilation'. Therefore, integration is considered a gentler version of assimilation.

Both models could be exemplified in a range of degree by the language policies of both Western and Eastern types of nation-state projects[9]. In the so-called 'civic' nation-state projects, the advanced languages spoken in the national territory was selected as the national language to be cultivated and imposed on all linguistic communities living within those borders. The language that was selected became the language of the majority and the language of citizenry. In 'ethnic' nation-state projects, the language of the majority already living in the national territory was institutionally protected and developed as the national language while the speakers of other languages were forced either to adopt the national language or to renounce the rights of citizenry. Whereas the former promotes inclusion by force, the latter is arrogantly exclusive. Both try to have a unique language that is spoken by all as the national language and to defeat the threat of heterogeneity. The reaction of minorities that failed or rejected to adopt the dominant majority language is usually embodied in the counter-manifestation of lingua-nationalist movements.

On the other hand, linguistic and cultural diversity has recently become appreciated as a common heritage of humanity, and measurements encouraging linguistic diversity have gained support and prestige against policies pursuing the aim of homogeneity, or what some have termed 'linguicide'. Therefore, multiculturalist policy, which is seen as a new model to deal with cultural and linguistic minorities, does not oppress or ignore minority cultures and languages, but rather recognises them as a wealth of diversity. The worth of diversity, on the other hand, does not discount the worth of unity. The diversity that is celebrated is supposed to be the

9 According to this typology, Western nationalism is based on the notion of democratic citizenship open to everyone who voluntarily chooses to be a member of that nation, irrespective of their ethnic origin. This understanding contrasts with the Eastern definition that is more exclusive and emphasises a commonly-shared ethnicity as the prerequisite for being both a member of the nation and the citizen of the state (Kohn 1967). However, as Billig notes, 'civic nationalists' do not describe how they 'create a nation-state with its own myths; how the civic nations recruit their citizenry in wartime; how they draw their own boundaries; … how they resist; violently if necessary, those movements which seek to rearrange the boundaries' (1995: 48-9).

participationist rather than the separatist (see Gleason 1986: 239). In this sense, the magic motto of 'diversity within unity' envisions the protection of cultural diversity unless it harms social harmony and national unity. Contributing to social harmony with their languages and cultures that are limited to ceremonial existence, minorities participate in the celebration of diversity that is protected within the framework of national unity. In this envisioning, cultural diversity is the appreciation of 'pre-given cultural contents and customs' and remains to be an object of empirical knowledge (Bhabha 2001: 34). This is what makes Bhabha calling for a 'shift from the cultural as an epistemological object to culture as enactive, enunciatory site,' which 'opens up possibilities for other "times" of cultural meaning and other narrative space' (ibid: 178). He defines it as 'a process by which objectified others may be turned into subjects of their history and experience' (ibid).

However, to become subjects of their own history would not necessarily mean that the once-objectified minorities become emancipated from the prevailing discourse of nationalism. When minorities become able to write their own histories, the power that they acquired usually leads to the emergence of new minorities within their territories – and the cycle continues. Concerning language, minorities start with the standardisation of their languages that were made official and competent to demonstrate the autonomous authority over their respective territory. Language, the most impressive tool of the state against minorities, becomes the most crucial instrument of minorities at war with that state. The vicious circle of nationalism forces minorities to express themselves by imitating the nation-state and prevents them from formulating a more far-reaching approach which would be truly emancipatory and egalitarian. Minorities re-create their own minorities and build new binary oppositions between the allegedly homogeneous and unitary agents. The differences *between* entities are always constructed at the expense of repression of differences *within* entities (Johnson 1980: x-xi; quoted in Culler 1983: 241-2). Therefore, deconstructive analysis must continue to operate. As Culler reminds us, deconstruction of a binary opposition does not mean the extermination of all differences; 'it is attempt to follow the subtle, powerful effects of differences already at work within the illusion of a binary opposition' (ibid).

Deconstruction and Justice

In socio-political terms, the general model of society is visualised minority as a group of people and the majority as only a particular variant of it. Following Culler's (1983: 170-1) reading of the binary opposition between woman and man, it might be said that the majority is originally the minority, which eventually actualised the 'phallic stage', namely, acquired the state. Such a Freudian analysis also reveals what is at stake in our desire to repress the marginal – the minority (ibid: 160-1). The minority is considered either 'an object of horror and revulsion, living proof of the possibility of castration' or an 'autonomous being, with nothing to lose or gain' (ibid: 169). In both cases, the minority threatens the state and is subjected to its mastery.

This said, however, the aim of this study is not to locate the minority in a state-centric understanding, but rather to reverse the hierarchical relation between the minority and the majority. The minority, with its potentiality, is the common form of society (ibid). In this sense, arguing that the majority is a form of the minority produces a new concept of minority. In doing this, retaining the name 'minority' is required 'to maintain leverage for intervention' (see Derrida 1981: 71; Culler ibid: 140-1). More importantly, deconstructive analysis regards the opposition between the minority and the majority as a constitutive one, and also blurs the clear-cut border of this opposition. To argue that the minority constitutes the majority by being its origin and its other is to deconstruct the hierarchical opposition between the minority and the majority. The minority, then, is acknowledged as a 'constitutive outside', which reaffirms the majority. This 'constitutive' reading also makes it impossible to draw a completely clear-cut opposition between the inside and the outside (Howarth 2000: 43). Yet, in this indeterminacy, there is a clear emphasis on the marginal, the minority. Therefore, the marginal is reversed as the central. However, it does not comprehend the central here as a *new* centre against which a new marginality locates itself. Deconstruction decentralises the relationship between the minority and the majority in favour of a kind of nodality. The focus on the marginal and deconstructive reversal of marginal into central formulates a nodality, which blurs the duality of centre-periphery. The centrality of the marginal 'does not lead simply to the identification of

a new centre, […] but to a subversion of the distinctions between essential and inessential, inside and outside' (Culler 1983: 139).

This deconstruction of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority reveals that the matter is not a difference in number or traits but in power.

> The binary is a socially constructed category whose trajectory warrants investigation in terms of how it was constituted, regulated, embodied and contested, rather than taken as always already present. A bipolar construction might be addressed fruitfully and productively as an object of analysis and a tool of deconstruction; that is as a means of investigating the conditions of its formation, its implication in the inscription of hierarchies, and its power to mobilise collectivities (Brah 2003: 184).

This investigation shows that 'the relations between groups are constituted as relations of power – i.e., that each group is not only different from the others but that, in many cases, each constitutes such difference on the basis of exclusion and subordination' (Laclau 1992: 88). 'Difference in the sense of social relation may be understood as the historical and contemporary trajectories of material circumstances and cultural practices which produce the conditions for the construction of group identities' (Brah 2003: 118). In this sense, the concept of difference 'refers to the variety of ways in which specific discourses of difference are constituted, contested, reproduced, or resignified […] Therefore, it is a contextually contingent question whether difference pans out as inequity, exploitation and oppression *or as* egalitarianism, diversity and democratic forms of political agency' (ibid: 125-6). As discussed above, nationalist discourse constructs and identifies the difference between the minority and the majority in a hierarchical and oppressive way.

What deconstructive analysis reveals is the *originary violence* behind this hierarchical and oppressive identification. The originary violence as introduced by Derrida (1976: 109-12) is the disappropriation of proper names (see Beardsworth 1996: 20-5). Derrida calls disappropriation of the proper name 'death of absolutely proper naming, recognizing in a language the other as pure other' (ibid: 110). The originary violence, in this sense, is 'the suppression of the differential structure' (ibid: 21), which leads to the false impression that the other is pure other of the self rather than a different being. This delusion identifies others simply in opposition to the self. Disappropriation of the proper name is therefore the originary violence of

the self on others. 'Hence, a non-appropriative respect for others serves as the ethical limit' (Sokoloff 2005).

The originary violence, in fact, stems from the violation of this ethical limit that creates a violent classification, in which the other loses its power to identify itself and becomes an object. The originary violence is the self's treatment of the other as if it was merely an object. In criticising the objectification of the other, Derrida argues that when we relate the other as itself, rather than as pure other of ourselves 'then something incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or to the history of legal structures' (1997: 18). That 'something incalculable' that Derrida refers to here is justice. He maintains that the movement of deconstruction is 'constantly to suspect, to criticise the given determinations of culture, of legal systems [in order to] respect this relation to the other as justice' (ibid). In this respect, deconstruction is justice, or justice is deconstructive; and 'it is in the name of justice that we deconstruct' (Derrida 1992: 15; 1999). It is in the name of justice that 'we criticise and deconstruct the given systems of norms in legal systems, in politics, in ethics, in social structures and so on and so forth' (Derrida 1999). Deconstruction 'operates on the basis of an infinite "idea of justice"', which is irreducible and owed to the other (Derrida 1992: 25). In this respect, justice can be seen as 'a response to the call of the other' (Sokoloff 2005). This response cannot be given by those subjects who are certain of their identity because 'the invention of the [just] decision is simultaneously the invention of a new subject … The sovereign subject cannot make a [just] decision because its need for identity prevents it from responding to the other in ways that may necessitate its own transformation' (ibid). This is the ethical component of justice, which is based 'on a non-fixed relation between self and other. The other is neither the self's alter ego, nor its reflection or extension, nor its dialectical partner' (Douzinas and Warrington 1994: 19).

The conception of justice as 'to come' is what makes Derrida argue that 'one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say "this is just" and even less "I am just" without immediately betraying justice, if not law' (1992: 10). This is the reason why justice in itself, outside or beyond law, is undeconstructible (ibid: 14). This is also what distinguishes justice from law.

> Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences

> are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule (ibid: 16)[10].

According to Derrida (ibid), both deconstruction and the possibility of justice are infinite themselves because they require the experience of the aporia, a traversal experience, which travels towards a destination for which it finds the appropriate passage. However, it is impossible to have a full experience of aporia, that is, of something that does not allow passage. In short, as Derrida tells us, 'an aporia is a non-road' (ibid). Therefore, justice is the experience that we are not able to experience. Nevertheless, there is no justice without this experience of aporia. 'Justice is an experience of impossible' such that 'a will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn't be an experience of aporia would have no chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice' (ibid). Keeping this in mind, this study can only attempt to hear, read, and interpret a call for justice, 'to understand where it comes from, what it wants of us, knowing that it does so through singular idioms and also knowing that this justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other, despite or even because it pretends to universality' (ibid).

Such an attempt can also be conducted by tracing injustice. As Badiou reminds us, 'injustice is clear, justice is obscure. Those who have undergone injustice provide irrefutable testimony concerning the former. But who can testify for justice? … Injustice has its affect: suffering, revolt. Nothing, however, signals, justice: it presents itself neither as spectacle nor as sentiment' (2004: 69). Nevertheless, he does not think 'that injustice is to be found on the side of the perceptible, or experience, or the subjective, while justice is found on the side of the intelligible, or reason, or the objective' (ibid). Badiou defines justice as 'the qualification of an egalitarian political orientation in act' (ibid: 72). In this respect, the movement of

10 Aporia 'is a figure mobilized by Derrida to specify the fundamental irreducibility and undecidability of every concept or phenomenon that traditionally has been stabilized, fixed, subjected, represented and normalized by Western metaphysics' (Debrix 1997: 3). Aporias 'signal an absence of rules, definitive criteria, or grounds' (Sokoloff 2005). For a decision to bear the aporetic and singular aspects of justice, that is, to be just and responsible, it must 'be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and the free confirmation of its principle' (Derrida 1992: 23). In other words, 'you take a decision only in a situation when there is something undecidable' (Derrida 1999).

deconstruction focuses on the non-egalitarian political orientation of the liberal nation-state, seen in its language, in the law and in its basic premises – such as the priority of the individual and the impartiality of the public sphere – in order to problematise the injustices to which minorities are subjected. However, this deconstructive movement is not for correcting the state, which, as Badiou defines, 'has nothing to do with justice, for the State is nota, subjective and axiomatic figure… any programmatic or State definition of justice changes the latter into its contrary: justice becomes the harmonization of the interplay of interests' (ibid: 73).

This justice as 'harmonisation' is closer to the conception of justice by Rawls (1973: 11-12), who designed a set of certain distributive principles of social justice to be accepted in a purely hypothetical initial situation, 'behind a veil of ignorance', by 'free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests' in a 'well-ordered society'. The first of these principles 'requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities … are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society' (ibid: 14-15). Therefore, Rawls defines injustice as 'simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all' (ibid: 62). The equal and basic political liberties of citizenship and 'the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests' (ibid: 28) whereas social and economic rights can be bargained and calculated by those better situated, the higher expectations of whom 'are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society' (ibid: 75).

The 'difference principle' which operates on the basis of the intuitive idea is that 'the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate' (ibid). The difference principle, according to Rawls, seems to correspond to 'a natural meaning of fraternity: to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off' (ibid: 105). Complaining that the idea of fraternity is rarely highlighted by democratic theory – in comparison with liberty and equality – Rawls argues that 'a liberal democratic conception of justice also recognizes a social minimum, [without which] the basic liberties are merely formal protections and worth little to people who are impoverished and without the means to take advantage of their liberties' (Freeman 2003: 9). Therefore, the difference principle 'permits inequalities in income and

wealth in order to maximally promote the effective exercise of the equal basic liberties by the worst off' (ibid).

This is why Heller argues, 'when liberal theorists formulate their claim to *equal* distribution they are in fact supporting a specific type of *unequal* distribution', that is, they try to find 'the just limit to inequality' (1987: 183; *italics original*). The limits of social and economic equality favoured by the most fortunate are complemented by the limits on political rights that are drawn by the majority. As Rawls posits, 'liberty of conscience is limited, everyone agrees, by the common interest in public order and security' (1973: 212). In fact, it is a right of the government to maintain public order and security; 'a right which the government must have if it is to carry out its duty of *impartially* supporting the conditions necessary for everyone's pursuit of his interests and living up to his obligations as he understands them' (ibid: 213; *italics added*). 'If we ask how likely it is that the majority opinion will be correct,' as Rawls anticipates, the answer is the principles of the social justice accepted by those 'experts', who are 'rational legislators able to take an objective perspective because they are *impartial*' (ibid: 358; *italics added*). The thought that they depart widely from these principles or that they pursue a mistaken conception of justice altogether is what may make us *dissents* who do not appeal to the sense of justice of the majority (ibid: 367). That is so because 'a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of justice' and 'since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of justice is presumably stable' (ibid: 454).

The stability of this conception of justice, which is based on an impartial and objective perspective, is obtained by the veil of ignorance that was placed by Rawls in front of those free and rational people in the hypothetically initial position to deprive them any information that might advantage or disadvantage parties in their discussions and agreement. He finds that a person's gender or wealth 'is not morally relevant to agreement on principles of justice for the basic structure of society' (Freeman 2003: 11). Therefore, a decision based on the principles of justice is rendered 'ahistorical to make the decision strictly impartial with respect to people's social status, natural characteristics and abilities, and even their conceptions of the good' (ibid). As Heller rightly contends, however, 'we can never place our values, our "concepts of good", our commitments, under the "veil of ignorance"'; if we inquire as to what those people hypothetically put behind the veil of ignorance, 'we can answer this question only

by relying on *our* values, commitments, and concepts of good' (1987: 249; *italics original*).

In this respect, Rawlsian conception of justice contrasts with the deconstructive conception of justice, which regards a just decision as something that can only be taken by those unfixed subjects eager to know others and justice as something that can only emerge where singularity is acknowledged. Rawls 'constructs an image of a *stable* political society with a *neutral* state that could achieve unanimous support, or an overlapping *consensus*, on political fundamentals' (Sokoloff 2005; *italics added*). This stability-and-consensus-oriented conception of justice excludes anything that produces political conflict from the public sphere because once the principles of justice are established the political sphere is closed (ibid). Enclosing the political field 'under the terror of uniformity', Rawls 'methodically closes spaces for the types of dissent, conflict and argument that nurture democratic citizenship' (ibid). This enclosure also excludes an infinite idea of justice, which is 'irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation, without rules, without reason and without rationality' (Derrida 1992: 25). Heller regards Rawls's theory of justice as an example of complete ethico-political concept of justice, which 'becomes *concrete* because it is idealized distributive model of a particular way of life' (1987: 233; *italics original*). The price for this concreteness is a kind of fundamentalism because 'no other types of distributive patterns can claim justice' (ibid). Moreover, 'the rejection of democratic indeterminacy and the identification of the universal with a given particular' correspond to the totalitarian moment of Rawls, according to Mouffe (1996: 254). This totalitarian moment is the violence of law on minorities.

The Violence of Law

The state is conceptualised as the political unit of a community, imagined as the nation and purportedly the majority – which is superior to minorities in power, numbers or history. The state makes a national law, which is ostensibly equally valid for all citizens living in the national territory although, as was argued earlier, it is designed in compatibility only with the majority concerns. This is the reason why minorities consider the national

law deficient in meeting their needs and so feel themselves as the exception. According to Agamben, 'the exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole, in which it is always already included' (1995: 25). The fate of the exception is at the hands of the majority rule. Therefore, minorities ask for supplementary rights to protect their interests and ensure their survival. In this respect, asking for positive discrimination demands an end to the liberal, if not totalitarian, blindness which ignores the political, economic and social differences within the community that are crucial for the full and equal enjoyment of rights by all citizens.

In fact, the liberal blindness can be conceptualised as the violence of law that intends to terminate or suppress the original inequality in society. In the name of legal equality, the law treats the minority as if it is as powerful as the majority. 'This makes the violence of the law all the more violent since the law now says that its subjects are free whatever the circumstances; […] the law ratifies their concrete misrecognition' (Beardsworth 1996: 76). This misrecognition is 'the violence of what is commonly conceived as the attempt to put an end to violence – the institution of law' (ibid: 23). What makes law is its authority, which has a mystical foundation as the originary violence (see Derrida 1992: 12). It is the very moment of foundation, which consists of violence and force, which justifies law. At that moment, a 'founding violence of the law or of imposition of state law has consisted in imposing a language on national or ethnic minorities regrouped by the state' (ibid: 21). However, 'a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act' (ibid: 14). This silence corresponds to the secondary violence of law, which refers to the attempt of parliaments to forget the violence from which they are born (see Derrida ibid: 47). However, 'it is when violence is being denied that it is most insidiously at work' (Maley 1999). In this respect, the secondary violence of law reveals 'the inability of the law to suppress its "illegality" in relation to original difference' (Beardsworth 1996: 23). Those who make noise lead to a violent conflict, which is not acknowledged because violence is 'expelled as a non-civil phenomenon from the social whole' (ibid: 76). The legitimate force of the state suppresses the violent return of the misrecognised. The violence of the denial of the originary violence and the violence suppressing the violent reaction to that originary violence creates the tertiary violence of law on minorities. It is the renunciation of originary violence and the 'technicity of law that leads to "greater violence"' (Durst 2000: 683). The

technicity of law is based on 'the a priori concept of "right"', which 'empties the concept of freedom of history, formation, expression and situation, confining the idea of freedom to a question of negative limits between individuals' (Beardsworth 1996: 51). In this respect, the violence of law is 'the violence of thinking politics exclusively in terms of rights' (ibid: 53).

The acknowledgement of the violence of law also enables one to deconstruct law. The fact that law is deconstructible (and that justice is undeconstructible) provides 'a stroke of luck for politics' (Derrida 1992: 14). Insofar as justice is more than a juridical concept it opens up the recasting or refounding of law and politics. This is the responsibility for which justice and deconstruction asks. 'That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state' (ibid: 28). This idea of justice is not the indefinitely remote idea of a goal to be reached, but it is something, which, here and now, gives us orders beyond any given set of legal concepts. The 'incalculable justice *requires* us to calculate' and it requires us to 'take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on' (ibid).

In this sense, this study tries to discuss the injustice that minorities experience through the examination of two oppositions that are constructed by the basic premises of liberal nation-state law. The first binary opposition, which stems from the principle of the legal equality of individual citizens, is the one between the individual and community. The second binary opposition, which relates directly to the first one, derives from the separation between the public and private sphere as the outcome of the principle of state impartiality. The liberal state is postulated as neutral before its citizens, who, in fact, benefit from unequal opportunities and have various needs. These two underlying principles of the liberal nation-state, therefore, create the binary oppositions that delimit both the enjoyment of minority rights and the participation of minorities in politics. As a result, these oppositions reinstate the power of the state on minorities and reinforce the binary opposition between the minority and the majority.

Individual and Community

The minority question reveals a deep contradiction within the liberal discourse in relation to the notion of community. In fact, there is no place for such a notion of community in the liberal understanding of politics, except political parties, interest groups or civil institutions. Rather, they comply with the liberal emphasis on the individual, who is supposed to freely and rationally associate with these groupings. This assumption, on the other hand, involves a competitive and conflictual characteristic of human beings. 'This is a consumer-oriented conception of human nature, in which social and political relations can be understood only as goods instrumental to the achievement of individual desires, and not as intrinsic goods' (Barber 1984; quoted in Young 1990: 228). In this account, human beings are conceptualised as abstract individuals independent of their social contexts and preceding the community in which they live. However, the priority of the individual is not only unattainable but also misleading if a person's identity is constituted, in part, by his or her membership of a collectivity (Miller 1995: 100). Moreover, 'the free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture' (Taylor 1995: 44). Contrary to the liberal understanding, this argument reflects the communitarian conception of the self, which is supposed to be a part of identity shared with others. Sandel (1995: 23) criticises the liberal 'unencumbered' self in that we cannot view ourselves as independent selves untied to our attachments. Such a person lacking constitutive attachments does not mean 'an ideally free and rational agent', but 'a person wholly without character, without moral depth' (ibid).

The priority of the individual might be discussed in relation to the atomistic conception of the individual that accompanies the rise of modernity. The pre-modern individual was considered obliged to sacrifice her/his freedom and rights for the sake of common good that was traditionally and authoritatively determined by the community. Therefore, the liberal model of a modern nation-state has been designated as the guardian of freedom and rights of individual citizens. The liberal view considers individuals equally self-sufficient and free to enjoy the rights universally inscribed. In this sense, the liberal understanding sets a clear-cut opposition between rights and common good, in which the former is prioritised to the latter. Liberalists perceive the society – the nation – as governed by

principles excluding any particular conception of good because 'any other arrangement would fail to respect persons as being capable of choice; it would treat them as objects rather than subjects, as means rather than ends in themselves' (Sandel 1995: 17). However, the opposition is neither between rights and common good, but between 'different' common goods of different communities. In fact, if individual rights are easily sacrificed for national interests and the nation is always superior to the individual, there could never be a priority of the individual or rights to community and common good but rather a superiority of the majority to the minority. For the members of the majority, there is hardly a bitter confrontation between the national common good and their individual rights since they are more capable to participate in determining that common good. This is clearly not the case for minorities.

The binary opposition between the individual and community, which is strictly related to the dichotomy between rights and common good, becomes a catastrophic dilemma for members of minorities. First, an abstract conception of individual citizenship fails to provide the equal participation of all citizens due to the socio-economic and political inequalities inherent in society. Members of the majority are not merely abstract individuals in that they actually enjoy their rights collectively with other members of their community. Therefore, they might protect their individual interests or compensate for their individual damages in a collective manner. On the other hand, members of the minority are entitled only with the individual expressions of the injustice they suffer as a community. However, when 'coerced into a negative, generic subject position, the oppressed individual transforms it into a positive collective one' (JanMohammed and Lloyd 1990: 8). Needless to say, a collective quest for the common interests of the minority group is already, at best, not encouraged. The boundary between the individual and community, therefore, is more severe for the members of minorities. From the viewpoint of minorities, then, the opposition is not between the individual and community but rather between individual members belonging to different communities. When the claim of minorities for collective rights challenges majority interests, the opposition turns into a clear one between the minority and the majority. If the structural inequalities of wealth and power can only be reinforced rather than eliminated, by merely formal legal procedures; minorities become marginalised when they are not entitled by positive collective rights.

According to Kymlicka, the term 'collective rights' 'fails to distinguish internal restrictions from external protections' (1995: 45) [11]. The internal restrictions refer to 'the claim of a group against its own members' whereas the external protections mean 'the claim of a group against the larger society' (ibid: 35). These two kinds of claims correspond to different sources of instability: the first is formulated against the 'destabilizing impact of *internal dissent*' while the second aims 'to protect the group from the impact of *external decisions*' (ibid). Kymlicka argues that 'liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices' (ibid: 37). In fact, the hesitant approach of liberals towards the collective rights of linguistic minorities is usually justified in the name of protecting the liberty of individuals within the minority group. However, if the liberty of individuals within the majority is not immune from the problem of internal restrictions, Kymlicka's concern for the collective rights of minorities seems irrelevant. In this respect, the liberal approach strives primarily to guarantee social (national) mobility or social (national) cohesion and deliberative democracy in a liberal nation-state (see Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 1-51).

Such reservations are relevant only if one can contend that both the social mobility of minority members and deliberative democracy are guaranteed by national linguistic convergence or that linguistic diversity is an obstacle for social mobility of minority members and deliberative democracy. The second objection, namely the antagonism of collective rights in relation to the liberty of individuals seems to be far from critical in assessing the relationship between majority individuals and minority community. In this respect, what makes 'collective rights' ambiguous is the liberal conception that places collective rights as inimical to some but not all

11 On the other hand, 'the fact that certain minority language rights are exercised by individuals has led to a large (and largely sterile) debate about whether they are really "collective rights" or not', whereas 'the question of whether the right is (or is not) collective is morally unimportant', according to Kymlicka (1995: 45). This sterility and moral irrelevance is *easily* covered by Kymlicka, who finds that collective rights can only be exercised by individuals belonging to 'national minorities' whereas immigrant groups do not deserve such collective rights. Laying aside the difference between national minorities and immigrant groups, such an easy connection between the term of national and the minority in such a distinction simply reinforces the uneasy relationship between the individual and community in the liberal nation-state discourse.

individual rights. Put differently, liberal thinkers do not oppose collective rights 'individually' enjoyed by majorities whereas they reject collective rights for minorities on the grounds that collective rights are already and actually exercised by the individual members of minorities or that collective rights violate the individual rights of minority members.

In short, although the first theories of modern liberal democracy that recognised the individual as the bearer of rights were progressive, they have become a major obstacle to democracy over time (Mouffe 1993: 13). The minority question, in this sense, is one of the bitter experiences of liberal obstacles to democracy and justice. Therefore, minorities' claims for collective rights might be read as a claim for justice and equality between the communities, not simply among individuals. In this respect, Mouffe calls for 'a concept of democratic rights: rights which, belonging to individual, can only be exercised collectively' and for 'the idea of social rights' to be understood in terms of 'collective rights' of specific communities (ibid: 19). In this sense, one must re-think the relationship between the individual and community with special reference to the concept of community.

Community Reconceptualised

If there is a need to re-conceptualise the notion of community, it cannot be limited to criticisms of the liberal emphasis on the individual, but should also be wary of the communitarian arguments. The liberal conception that prioritises individual and individual rights should not simply be replaced by the communitarian idea that gives primacy to community and common good. Indeed, the communitarian criticisms of the liberal conception of the individual reproduce the opposition between the individual and community. Furthermore, the community that is propagated by the communitarians is either a governmental community, which constitutes 'our' civic and national identities, or a local one, which is centred on family, neighbourhood and ethnicity (Friedman 1995: 109). Both models of community, in fact, are characterised by the exclusion of non-group members and highly oppressive on their own members. These conservative communitarian models therefore impose a homogeneity that usually conflicts with their claim for diversity. 'Whereas the good society of old critics [in the 1960s] was one of collective property ownership and equal political

power, the good society of the new critics [in the 1980s] is one of settled traditions and established identities' (Gutman 1995: 121).

Both individualism and communitarianism deny differences and multiplicities by positing 'the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity' and bringing 'all such separated individuals under a common measure of rights' (Young 1990: 229). In this sense, Friedman (1995: 102) calls for a new concept of 'social self', which acknowledges the role of social relationships and community in constituting self-identity while reformulating community in a cooperative and mutually interdependent way. Young (2000: 82) proposes to define community in a relational logic, rather than an essential one, that is, communities do not have identities but are fundamental for individuals to construct their identities. To define communities in a relational way leads to seeing them as historical units that exist in a particular economic, social and political structure. This is the acknowledgement of conflicts, which are not merely on cultural premises, but also over territory, resources or opportunities between different communities (ibid: 91). This historical, relational or non-essential conception of community is not a kind of multiculturalism, which promotes identity politics as a reinterpretation of cultural assets for the sake of producing solidarity (ibid: 103). The idea of multiculturalism provides a reformulation of the opposition between the individual and community. In fact, this is a misleading dilemma because 'either our identities are [seen as] independent of our ends, leaving us totally free to choose our life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us totally encumbered by socially given ends' (Gutman 1995: 130). However, the community may be regarded as grounds for self-development and self-determination of individuals, rather than a source of restriction for its members.

In this sense, 'the problem is not simply to appreciate community per se but, rather, to reconcile the conflicting claims, demands, and identity-defining influences of the variety of communities of which one is a part' (Friedman 1995: 108). This reconciliation is more crucial for individuals who have simultaneously different identities and voluntary or non-voluntary belongings to many communities. The communities of contemporary society would be 'lifestyle communities': 'networks of allegiance with which one identifies existentially, traditionally, emotionally, or spontaneously' (Rose 1996: 334; quoted in Stewart 2001: 120). To be a member multiple communities in contemporary society would be different than having a traditional commitment to a single community, as these net-

works of loyalties ask for hybrid belongings. This hybridity may lead one to recognise and scrutinise the ambiguities, oppositions and oppressions within communities. In fact, as Bhabha displays, the idea of community in contemporary world 'disturbs the grand globalising narrative of capital, displaces the emphasis on production in "class" collectivity, and disrupts the homogeneity of the imagined community of the nation' (2001: 230-1). He considers the community 'the antagonist supplement of modernity: in the metropolitan space it is the territory of the minority, threatening the claims of civility; in the transnational world it becomes the border-problem of the diasporic, the migrant, the refugee' (ibid). Therefore, 'the genealogy of the idea of community is itself a "minority" discourse' (ibid). The idea of community does not only challenge the liberal conceptualisation of the individual as an abstract identity but also rejects nationalist discourse that is based upon the opposition between the minority and the majority.

In short, the idea of community should not 'tend to look toward the future with *nostalgia*' (Gutman 1995: 135; *italics added*). It is equally unsafe to envision a *utopia* in order to criticise the current society and impose a better one. Both could be oppressive for the people, who might easily become the objects of a common imagination. The idea of community used here conceptualises community similarly to Agamben (1993), who moves beyond the discussion of exclusion and inclusion and conceives community without substance and identity. This is a critical conception of community, particularly as a mode of linguistic belonging, beyond both identity and universality:

> If instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity … then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without the incommunicable (ibid: 65).

According to Agamben, 'the era in which we live [in which we realise 'the alienation from linguistic being, the uprooting of all peoples from their vital dwelling in language'] is also that in which for the first time it is possible for humans to experience their own linguistic being – not this or that content of language, but language *itself*, not this or that true proposition, but the very fact that one speaks' (ibid: 82-3; *italics original*). 'This devastating *ex-*

perimentum linguae that all over the planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, identities and communities' (ibid; *italics original*) is itself what constitutes the contemporary politics. If it is the 'sayability' of language, as Agamben argues, that is betrayed by community rather than who we are, in other words, if it is the community, which passes on the plain fact that we can speak and hence can be open to other speakers and to the entire world, any conceptualisation of community that does not acknowledge this openness invokes an appeal to substance and betrays the idea of community (see Bos 2005).

Public and Private Spheres

As Arendt (1998: 28) notes, the separation between the public and private spheres has existed since the ancient city-state, in which the private sphere corresponded to the household and the public to the political. What we witnessed with the rise of modern age and its political form, i.e., the nation-state is 'the emergence of the social sphere, which is neither private nor public' (ibid). Arendt (ibid: 47, 52) contends that compared to the extension of the social sphere, not only has the private receded but also the public or the political has been constrained. She describes this modern society as a new phenomenon which puts 'the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-state administration of housekeeping' (ibid). Arendt's description dovetails with Foucault's (1979) argument that traditional sovereign power is replaced by a disciplinary power, which constructs subjectivity in terms of desired actions necessary for the survival of domination. This domination is based on the rise of mass society, in which 'the various social groups have suffered the same absorption into one society that expects from each of its members a certain kind of behaviour' (Arendt 1998: 40-1). In this respect, the radical feminist slogan 'the personal is political' accurately challenges this absorbing social sphere under the domination of disciplinary power, which both repelled the private sphere and constrained the political one. This originally feminist insight proclaimed 'a relation, however complex it may be, between sociality and subjectivity, between language and consciousness, or between institution and individual' (Lauretis 1986: 5).

To argue that the personal is the political also reveals that the separation between the public and private sphere is a fallacy of the liberal nation-state. Young calls this the 'ideal of impartiality', which 'generates a dichotomy between *universal* and particular, *public* and private, *reason* and passion' (1990: 97-9; *italics added*), whereby the former of each pair is seen as superior to the latter. The public reason is regarded as the universal and impartial, as opposite to the private passion that is particular and biased. The allegedly 'impartial reason' aims to adopt a transcendental 'view from nowhere' that denies the particularity and plurality of situations, feelings and desires (ibid: 100). However, it is impossible to remove the particularities of context and affiliation from moral reasoning (ibid: 97). This impossibility indicates that the ideal of impartiality 'masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify hierarchical decisionmaking structures' (Young ibid: 97). Deconstruction of the minority question discloses that the impartial public sphere is actually under the control of privileged and biased groups.

For the sake of impartial treatment, actions within the public sphere require individuals to leave at home their personal affiliations and not infrequently their mother tongues. The state, therefore, is given an impartial authority towards all citizens regardless of their particular differences, which are rendered unnoticeable. However, when the language of that impartial authority intersects with the language of a particular fragment of the society – which also constitutes the majority – minorities begin to suspect the impartiality of the state. As Bhabha reminds us, 'as a category, community enables a division between the private and the public, the civil and familial; but as a performative discourse it enacts the impossibility of drawing an objective line between the two' (2001: 230). The differences continue to exist even when they are not publicly and equally expressed. However, the liberal nation-state tries to confine the existence of these differences to the private sphere. 'Modern normative reason and its political expression in the idea of the civic [national] public, then, attain unity and coherence through the expulsion and confinement of everything that would threaten to invade the polity with differentiation' (Young 1990: 111). In this respect, 'the public sphere can be defined as the national sphere, frontiers of which are determined by the dominant ethnic relations' (Vali 2005: 97). All expressions of non-dominant/a-national political identities, which are supposed to be confined to the private sphere, are conceived of as violations of the dominant/national identity (ibid).

Gramsci argued that 'keeping the discord between the state and civil society in *statis* was objectively "subversive"', emphasising that both coercion and consent operate through a power relationship among economic, political and social factors, which, without explicit coercion, makes minorities consent to change their language (1992: 215). In fact, this is what Gramsci calls 'cultural hegemony':

> Every time that the question of the language surfaces, in one way or another, it means a series of other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the governing class, the need to establish more intimate and secure relationships between the governing groups and the national-popular mass, in other words to recognise the cultural hegemony (2000: 357).

This cultural hegemony, which serves the purpose of homogenising the nation, operates on the separation of the public and private spheres. This separation reconstructs the binary opposition between the exception, the minority, and the norm, the majority, and reproduces the hierarchy between them. The majority inhabits the public norm while minorities are confined to private exceptions. It means that there is no clear-cut public-private separation for the members of the majority, while the distinction is obvious for minorities. As Young recapitulates:

> When social group differences exist, and some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, this propensity to universalise the particular reinforces that oppression. The standpoint of the privileged, their particular experience and standards, is constructed as normal and neutral […] If oppressed groups challenge the alleged neutrality of prevailing assumptions and policies and express their own experience and perspectives, their claims are heard as those of biased, selfish special interests that deviate from the impartial general interest (1990: 116).

In this sense, to eliminate the separation between the public and private sphere means to end the rule of the privileged and to end the injustice that minorities experience, but not to abolish something allegedly impartial. Re-thinking what is impartial, then, corresponds to reworking the relationship between the public and private sphere.

Spheres Connected

The idea of an impartial public sphere both serves the assimilation of minorities into the majority and prevents the equal participation of the less privileged. This difference-blind approach is unsuccessful, inhumane and conflict producing. Minorities do not easily give up their languages, but rather they either more strongly affiliate their identity with their language in a militant way or internalise the devaluation and humiliation of their language and identity. In both cases, the possibility of dialogue decreases. A dialogue can only exist between parts that acknowledge each other as they are. When a different identity, which is also the identity of the privileged, is imposed on the less privileged as a condition for dialogue; a smooth or effective dialogue can never be accomplished. Those who are less privileged either overtly reject the imposition or always remember their identity in every attempt to forget it. Therefore, the principle of state impartiality, which is deemed as necessary for preventing conflicts that arise from differences, fails to stop the existence of unrecognised differences and, as a result, conflicts.

In this respect, publicly recognised differences may only contribute to the reconciliation of these conflicts. The 'politics of impartiality' needs to be replaced with 'a politics of difference', which highlights the necessity of different treatment for the oppressed or disadvantaged (Young 1990: 158). The politics of difference, which acknowledges the existence and inequality between different identities, might release some of the tension that lies beneath every dialogue guided by a difference-blind approach. Young calls this acknowledgement the 'communicative ethics', in which 'dialogue participants do not bracket their particular situations' (ibid). The dialogue itself makes it possible to see that the differences between the parts are not substantial but that they are relationally constructed through interactions and confrontations. This is a 'move from an expression of desire to a claim of justice' (ibid: 107).

If 'the equal treatment of the unequal' (Stewart 2001: 200) merely maintains domination, demanding politics of recognition can be seen as calling for justice rather than a simple claim for the recognition of different identities. Eliminating injustice includes not only the recognition but also the articulation of difference that the unprivileged communities enjoy. In fact, 'where there are problems of recognition of national, cultural, re-

ligious, or linguistic groups, these are usually tied to questions of control over resources, exclusion from benefits of political influence or economic participation' (Young 2000: 105). Therefore, the politics of recognition is intertwined with the self-development and self-determination of communities in order to end injustice. Self-development is defined as the ability to develop skills for communication with others whereas self-determination is defined as the capability of participating in decisions. In this sense, self-determination is conceived as detached from the nationalist claim that 'being a people entails rights to a distinct, contiguous, and bounded territory over which the group has exclusive jurisdiction' (ibid: 255).

This conception of self-determination without an exclusive jurisdiction does not refer to sovereign administrative units in terms of the nation-state. Rather, it is seen as the restitution of power back to the concerted agencies. It provides a kind of autonomy, which is not designed to be sovereign. Destroying the modern concept of sovereignty, as Foucault (1980: 108) emphasises, would be a substantial step for undermining domination as the disciplinary power. 'If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power', he argues, one should turn towards a new form of right liberated from the principle of sovereignty (ibid). In this respect, the right to autonomy is a relational rather than a substantial one. Relational autonomy can shift the principle of self-determination from independence to interdependence (Young 2000: 258). Justice does not mean irresponsibility and non-interference, but rather refers to non-domination. Relocating interference in the relational autonomy, also promotes the freedom and rights of individual members of communities. In fact, it is the relocation of interference, among others, that requires the connection of public and private sphere.

However, both spheres require redefinition prior to the connection. The public sphere should be open, accessible and non-exclusionary, 'in which persons stand forth their differences acknowledged and respected' (Young 1990: 119). The private, then should be re-conceptualised as what individuals choose to keep as private, rather than what the state excludes from the public (ibid: 120). Habermas also criticises the current 'intact public of private people dealing with each other individually' and argues for 'a public of organised private people' which participates effectively 'in a process of public communication via the channels of public spheres' (1989: 232). The redefinition of the public and private spheres, and more crucially, the connection between the two should acknowledge the inequality

of power in society in order to provide effective participation of the less privileged. This acknowledgement is similar to acknowledging difference, the ignorance of which creates injustice. In this respect, a movement for the connection of the public and private sphere seems to include inevitably the empowerment of minorities. In a more specific sense, Kabeer defines empowerment as 'the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them' (2002: 19). Empowerment is part of a 'public revenge' that can fully reciprocate a 'public humiliation' (Scott 1990: 215). This 'public revenge' is nothing more than a substantial and institutional re-organisation of the public sphere so that the rights to self-development and self-determination of communities can be recognised. It is the process of a 'self-organisation of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment' (Young 1990: 184). In this sense, Arendt's interpretation on power, community and publicity is brilliant:

> What first undermines and then kills political communities is loss of power and final impotence; and power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of violence, but exists only in actualisation. Where power is not actualised, it passes away … Power is actualised only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are not used to violate and destroy but establish relations and create new realities. Power is what keeps the public sphere, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence (1998: 200).

Stewart clarifies Arendt's position: 'this link between power and community is produced and can only be reproduced by "publicity", the sine qua non of that public space which is the context of political freedom' (2001: 41). This suggestion as well tends to replace the fictional liberal social contract with a real participatory structure, which justifies the notion of equally free individuals by the freedom that individuals enjoy equally. The alleged equality and freedom of individual citizens are simply empty words and brutal deeds that violate and destroy relations, and create injustice.

Injustice Deconstructed

While members of the majority enjoy the right to speak their mother tongue collectively with other members of their community, members of minorities are required to enjoy their linguistic rights individually. Therefore, members of the majority judge themselves the ultimate holders of linguistic rights, while members of the minority find themselves as an exception to whom linguistic rights are denied. Furthermore, minority rights are bestowed on the condition that they should be enjoyed in the private sphere because the public one is postulated as an impartial zone. Since majority rights are formulated as equal rights of individual citizens, minority rights are usually regarded as positive discrimination and confined to the private sphere of exceptional individuals. Not surprisingly, then, only members of the majority find the public sphere, in which only their language is officially used, as impartial. In fact, they need not separate their lives into public and private. On the other hand, minorities are requested to clearly differentiate between the two and forbidden to use their mother tongue in the public sphere. Immediately, the impartial public sphere becomes a strongly partial zone for minorities. Moreover, the public sphere and its official language are constructed as superior to the private sphere and the languages spoken in it.

Therefore, rethinking the impasses of individual-community and public-private is at the core of the deconstruction of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority in a liberal nation-state. The problematisation of *individuality* and *impartiality* reveals how minorities experience injustice. 'Like Derrida', Sokoloff argues, 'movements based on the identification of injustice test the limits of the liberal state' (2005). These limits, in fact, are first created by the founding violence of the state law. The first moment of transgressing these limits may be the acknowledgement of the originary violence by a political order and the second may be motivated by a conception of justice over and beyond law (ibid). This conception of justice 'is the condition of possibility for the ultimate minimization of the violence in law that repeats itself in the enforcement of law' (ibid). This violence is also perpetuated by the enforcement of the law that re-inscribes the binary oppositions between the individual and community, and between the public and private sphere in the liberal nation-state. The laws regarding minority rights that are supposedly superior

to the nation-state law and introduced by international and European organisations are analysed in the next chapter within the framework of this discussion. However, this analysis does not aim to provide a formula of justice, which is impossible, but rather it is to make injustices that minorities experience more visible through the problematisation of linguistic rights of minorities. This study reinforces Derrida's point: justice is a responsibility to the unspeakable and to the unspoken, to the silent and to the silenced, a responsibility to the absent, to the irreducibly other and to the dead (Maley 1999):

> No justice – let us not say no law and once again we are not speaking here of laws – seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism (Derrida 1994: 59-60).

CHAPTER THREE

Linguistic Rights in Inter-State Affairs

The examination of the minority rights question as a matter of inter-state affairs may be conducted with reference to five historical periods (Vieytez 2001: 5-6). The first two periods (1648-1815 and 1815-1919), in which the nation-state system was constructed, are not included in this study. Note, however, that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the first inter-state document providing guarantees for religious minorities from a secular point of view and the Congress of Vienna (1815), the first inter-state initiative to name the national minorities as citizens, are mentioned briefly in the first section of this chapter. The correlation between the rise of nation-states and the question of linguistic minorities is discussed throughout the study with reference to the significant role of language in the operation of nationalism. The third period (1919-1945), which signifies the consolidation of the nation-state system, corresponds to a new phase in the inter-state protection of minority rights. This redefinition of rights is also discussed in the first section of the chapter with special reference to the approach of the League of Nations towards the linguistic rights of minorities. The fourth and fifth periods that comprise the Cold War era (1945-1989) and the post-Cold War times, respectively, are elaborated in three sub-sections in the second section of the chapter. The discussion deals with the documents on the linguistic rights of minorities that are issued by European and international organisations, namely the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Conference on (later Organisation for) Security and Cooperation in Europe. The third section of the chapter, which discusses the response of a supranational/suprastate organisation, i.e. the European Union, to the linguistic rights of minorities, is followed by the final section of the chapter, which analyses the potential 'post-na-

tional' collaboration between the linguistic minorities in Europe and the European Union against the nation-states.

League of Nations

Until the age of nation-states, minority groups were marked by their religious identity different from that of the emperor. Religious minorities were at odds with the ecclesiastical loyalties of their sovereign and so challenged the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio* upon which the first modern international order in Europe was based (Preece 1998: 11)[12]. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) heralded the beginning of that order, which reaffirmed the principle stipulating that subjects and their king should share the same religion (Wright 2004: 27). Some legal protection for religious minorities were established through unilateral declarations or bilateral treaties signed by the sovereign emperors. In general, the mutual minority protection clauses of those treaties highlighted the good treatment by emperors of the communities whose religion or worship was different from the majority[13]. Those clauses did not imply any restriction of the indivisible sovereignty of the emperor. Rather, 'minority rights in their earliest political formulation' were simply 'freedoms of worship bestowed by the sovereign upon non-conformist religious communities in territories which were newly acquired from another prince' (Preece 1998: 66). Therefore, the guarantees of religious freedom bestowed on the minority subjects were the concessions by the emperor for the sake of peace with others. Since 'these subjects were in no way understood inalienably to possess such rights by virtue of their humanity, or natural law, etc. but only by the discretion of the sovereign' (ibid: 28), these religious guarantees or concessions cannot be called rights. The idea of 'rights' came to the fore when the main source of loyalty and identity shifted from the emperor to the nation-state, and from religion to nationhood as a result of the experiences of the English, American and French revolutions. These conflicts introduced a secular, centralised, in-

12 This principle was introduced by the Peace of Augsburg (1555), whereby princes were given the right to rule religious affairs. The principle gave way to the tenet of *cujus regio ejus natio* during the age of nationalism.

13 For the bilateral treaties of the period see Vieytez (2001: 6).

dustrialised and liberal nation-state as the standard and legitimate form of modern political organisation.

The emperor did not need a linguistically cohesive population since his decrees and orders could be handed down from the top to subjects through a small group of bilingual bureaucrats. The legitimacy introduced by modern politics, however, required two-way channels of communication 'where the people are to be consulted on matters of state and where a consensus has to be achieved on the direction these matters will take' (Wright 2004: 31). To be able to communicate with each other and to legitimise the power that governments would use on behalf of them, all citizens were expected to speak the official or national language. The right to speak the language of the authority was provided and imposed as a duty everyone in the family of the nation. 'To share a language that had previously been the preserve of the élite was a supreme act of democracy and so the principle of 'one language, one nation, one state' became the cornerstone of the new French republic' that was imitated by the most of newly emerging states in the 19th century (Judge 2000: 73). The transformation of the political system was crowned by the 'Concert of Europe', which was established by the Congress of Vienna (1815) and affirmed the sovereignty of nation-states. The Final Act of the Congress defined minorities as national groups and granted them civil and political rights as well as religious freedoms. The Act signalled that 'the political formulation of minority rights had begun to change in response to the rise of national identities as the new characteristic distinguishing insiders from outsiders and so having the potential to threaten international order' (Preece 1998: 60).

The outbreak of World War I was the affirmation of the end of the Westphalian system that was constructed on the balance of power through strategic alliances and the principle of state sovereignty. The system was spoiled by 'the war of high nationalism' (Wright 2004: 36). Nationalisms that were 'translated into political programmes meant the stockpiling of arms and the strengthening of the military forces to combat competitors in the colonial world, to guard against aggression by the nation's neighbours and to suppress rebels at home' (Tipton and Aldrich 1987: 130). Nationalism was seen as a proof of loyalty to a particular cultural and political group, which ideally had a particular common language. In this sense, the use of national language was postulated as a sign of patriotic behaviour – characterised by – solidarity, cooperation and communication in society, especially during a time of war. Therefore, it was not surprising that

'letters from French soldiers written during the trench warfare of the First World War show a rapid shift to French' (Baconnier *et al.* 1985; quoted in Wright 2004: 39). After World War I, the number of nation-states increased due to changes in border designation, which often overlapped with national groups; 'approximately half of the populations of Europe were "minorities" in 1914' while 'only one-fourth' became minorities in 1919 (Hannum 1996: 53). National groups, who could not enjoy the right to self-determination, became minorities in new or enlarged states. However, the 'minorities in avowedly "nationalist" states were perhaps even less welcomed than they had been under the empires' (ibid: 55). The question of national minorities emerged as the possible cause of international conflict between the host and kin states.

The League of Nations, which was set up to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security after World War I, was also expected to resolve disputes stemming from the dissatisfaction of minority groups and their kin-states with the newly changed territorial borders. The solution formulated by the victorious states was strengthening the relationship between the recognition of independence and the admission to the League of Nations on the one hand, and acceptance of certain national minority rights on the other[14]. The basic minority protection provisions common to all treaties were the following: the right to citizenship (as a response to the need for clarifying political membership in new or enlarged states); the right to life and liberty, and free exercise of any creed, religion, or belief in both public and private spheres; the right to equality of treatment and non-discrimination on the basis of race, *language*, or religion; the right to establish their own institutions within which they could use their own *language* and practice their own religion; the right to have public funds (conditioned upon a considerable proportion of minorities in districts) for education, religious, or charitable purposes (see Preece 1998: 74-5; Varennes 2001: 5; *italics added*).

Two categories of rights were incorporated into the treaties as well: individual rights held by all citizens irrespective of their minority or majority status; and collective rights that pertained to the membership of a minority

14 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) and Greece diverged from the principle of self-determination only by accepting the protection of minorities within their borders. Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Iraq made unilateral declarations on the protection of minorities before they were admitted to the League. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey had peace treaties imposed upon them which included minority protection clauses.

group. The first category was based on the conception that minority rights could not be realised unless fundamental rights to freedom and equality were enforced in accordance with the western notions of constitutional democracy. Such an ideal was based on respect for the individual, justice and good government whereas the collective rights of minorities implied special provisions to guarantee the equal opportunity of minorities in protecting their identity (Claude 1955: 18-19). The Permanent Court of International Justice held the understanding that minority rights were not a privilege although they were 'special in nature and scope within the canon of international human rights' (Pentassuglia 2004: 11); rather they were supposed to serve substantive equality. In the Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, the Court in 1935 mentioned two types of provisions as 'negative rights' and 'positive rights'[15]:

> These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions and were consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being a minority (quoted in Varennes 2001: 6).

The League as guarantor was also capable of receiving petitions not only from its member states and organs but also national minority groups that alleged infractions of national minority treaties.

However, the League suffered from weaknesses that caused the breakdown of the system of minority rights. Hannum (1989: 55) highlights three key factors: imposing selective obligations excluding the great powers; restricting traditional rights to religious, linguistic and cultural activities, and a lack of opportunity for a broader economic and political autonomy; and domestic incapability for including minorities into the public sphere. Moreover, the League was unable to cope with the 'pressure from the extremely nationalistic governments that wanted to consolidate their nationhood and complete the process of nation-building by including and assimilating all the territories and population groups within their jurisdiction' (Rotschild 1974: 12; quoted in Nas 2000: 116). 'There was no sense at all in which the great powers understood the national minority treaties

15 'Negative rights' include the principles of equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality whereas 'positive rights', which are also known as 'positive discrimination' or 'affirmative action', refer to the special provisions to guarantee the equality of minorities to the majority.

as establishing a system of humanitarian limits to government action that should one day be universally applied' (Preece 1998: 89).

Consequently, although 'guarantees' that were unilaterally bestowed by the sovereign now were transformed into minority 'rights' distinctive within a particular state, 'duties' continued to exist in the form of loyalty to the state. Rights were granted conditionally upon the 'will' of minorities to collaborate with the state for the national (majority) interest. Internationally, the consensus was mainly as follows: 'minorities … should do their utmost to cooperate with the Government in order to preserve the stability and good government of the State'; 'the process we [the League] should aim for … is a kind of *assimilation* which will increase the greatness of the nation'; and 'the object … was to secure for minorities that measure of protection and justice which would gradually prepare them to be merged into the national community in which they belonged' (respectively, Lord Cecil; Mr. Briand; and Sir Chamberlain; quoted in Preece 1998: 88; *italics added*)[16]. Nevertheless, the formation of the League may be seen as a milestone representing the beginning of a transformation from the conception of the international system as nation-states into an understanding of international society as both international/supranational actors and sub-national entities could take place in principle. This transformation may be considered the initial step in scrutinising the 'rights dilemma' that exists between 'bestowing', 'granting', 'ensuring', 'guaranteeing' donors and the 'protected' receivers. In this sense, Preece (ibid) argues that recent transformations of minority rights after the Cold War have roots in the period after the First World War – a period which – gave way to an international society.

International and European Organisations

When Pablo Picasso painted *Guernica* to commemorate the tragedy that a Basque hamlet experienced during the Spanish Civil War in 1937 he also mirrored the catastrophic implications of the World War II on minorities. Unlike World War I, World War II did not bring about problems of ter-

16 Preece quotes Lord Cecil (1929) in Resolutions and Extracts of the Protection of Linguistic, Racial or Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, 9; Mr Briand (1929) in League of Nations Journal; and Sir Chamberlain (1929) in Resolutions and Extracts, 51.

ritories and borders to be arranged in Europe meaning that the minority issue was not on the international agenda in terms of boundary changes between states. The pendulum swinging between sympathy and suspicion towards minorities resulted in a standpoint that was against them as groups but in favour of them as individuals (Preece 1998: 95-106). Moreover, the idea of a multilateral mechanism for the protection of minority rights was easily neglected due to the failure of the League of Nations. Consequently, the international and European organisations that were established during the Cold War emphasised *individual* human rights rather than *collective* rights of persons belonging to minorities. The end of the Cold War, which transformed the realism-oriented conduct of international politics, drew the attention to the 'fundamental questions concerning the links between community and identity, the shifting nature of social and political authority, the shifting meaning and politics of security, and the dynamic and multifaceted nature of power' (Kelstrup and Williams 2000: 3). The question of the linguistic rights of minorities has turned out to be a theme of varying sub-national, national and supra-national mechanisms. In this respect, the post-Cold War era, which has re-initiated the transformation of the international system into an international society, directed attention to the collective rights of minorities. The evolution of the linguistic rights of minorities from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War era can be observed in the documents issued by the United Nations, Council of Europe and the Conference on (later Organisation for) Security and Cooperation in Europe.

United Nations

Neither the UN Charter (1945) nor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) contains a specific clause for the linguistic rights of minorities. Article 2 (1) of the Declaration, which reads, 'everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as […] language', simply designed to protect individuals belonging to national minorities against discriminatory treatment. Linguistic and cultural genocide is described as 'forcibly transferring children of a group to another group' and/or 'prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or printing and

circulation of publications in the language of the group' by Article II (e) and (b) and Article III (1) of the 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ICPPCG). No. 107 of the 1957 Convention of the International Labour Organisation concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations acknowledges indigenous populations' right to be taught in their mother tongue. Article 5(1)(c) of 1960 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education recognises 'the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language'. Article 30 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Child (1990), reads 'in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language'.

Both the lack of a definition of 'minority' and the wide jurisdiction granted to states for the implementation of rights made these articles ineffective. In fact, the UN focused on the rights of minorities in a qualifying manner rather than defining the minority and left this part of the work to states[17]. The same goes for the only and 'most widely-accepted legally-binding provision on minorities' that the UN incorporated until 1992 (Thompson 2001: 120): the Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It states that:

> In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities *shall not be denied the right*, in community with the other

17 Although there is no commonly agreed upon definition of minority in international law, definitions mostly referred are proposed by Francesco Capotorti in 1977: 'A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed toward preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language' (Capotorti 1979: 6) and by Jules Deschenes in 1985: 'A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law' (quoted in Thornberry 1991: 7).

> members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or *to use their own language* (*italics added*).

According to Capotorti, 'it is the individual as a member of a minority group, and not just any individual, who is destined to benefit from the protection granted by Article 27' (1979; quoted in Pentassuglia 2004: 11). However, the article, which is only applicable to those states that are willing to recognise the groups in their territories as minorities (Preece 1998: 113), asks states only not to deny negative rights. For this reason, the article remained too ambiguous to be an efficient mechanism to protect minority rights.

The 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is the only UN instrument that is particular to minority rights[18]. Still, it does not define the term 'minority' with the understanding that such adjectives as national or ethnic, religious and linguistic are enough to confer minority rights. Nevertheless, it is the first international instrument exclusively devoted to national minority concerns and it goes on 'to remedy the earlier 1966 failure to specify state measures aimed at the promotion of national minority rights' (ibid: 130). The Declaration demonstrates a transition of rights from negative to positive by replacing the expression 'minorities shall not be denied the right to…' with the one 'minorities have the right to…'(Article 2). Moreover, it acknowledges that these rights could also be exercised in communities with other members of the group (Article 3(1)). While the Declaration is clear in conferring rights to persons belonging to minorities, it is not clear in guaranteeing their enjoyment, which is conditioned by the ways in which the

18 In terms of linguistic rights, the following Articles are crucial: Article 1: States shall protect the existence and the […] linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. Article 2 (1): Persons belonging to […] linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, […] and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination. Article 4 (2): States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, […] except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards (*italics added*). Article 4 (3): States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue. Article 4 (4): States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the […] language and culture of minorities existing within their territory.

states have great authority, namely the *national laws* (Article 4(2)). States still have the sole authority both to recognise individuals who are the persons belonging to minorities and to take measures for the full enjoyment of these rights. In this respect, the Declaration does not fail to emphasise the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States. Hence the conceptual structure of the UN is 'predicated on the recognition and legitimation of the sovereignty of individual states, and it is thus planted squarely within the old framework of international right defined by pacts and treaties' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 5).

Council of Europe

The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) does not contain any specific clause for the protection of minorities except the non-discrimination provision incorporated into Article 14:

> The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, *language*, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status (*italics added*).

In terms of linguistic rights, moreover, Articles 5 and 6, which outline restriction to personal liberty and fair trial, require that information be in a language understood by those who are charged with a criminal offence and an interpreter should be provided if an accused cannot understand or speak the language used in court proceedings. However, these provisions only include 'instances where an individual *cannot understand* the language used by the relevant authorities; they do not introduce any right to *choice* of language' (Nic Shuibne 2002: 224; *italics original*). Until the 1990s, moreover, all attempts to include minority rights in the Convention failed. In fact, the Belgian Linguistics Cases of 1968 ended those vain efforts whereby it was reiterated that 'the Convention does not contain any provisions that grant rights explicitly to speakers of minority languages' (ibid: 225)[19].

19 The plaintiffs were about 300 French inhabitants from towns around Brussels complaining that Belgian language legislation violated articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR on the grounds that Flemish-speaking pupils from the Flemish regions had free access to education in the communes surrounding Brussels while French-speaking ones

Nevertheless, a few progressive interpretation of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights opened the way for the adoption of two influential documents concerning minorities and minority languages.

The first legally binding document relevant to the protection of languages, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (the Charter hereafter) was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1998[20]. The Charter emphasises in the Preamble that 'the protection of the historical regional or minority languages of Europe, some of which are in danger of eventual extinction, contributes to the maintenance and development of Europe's cultural wealth and traditions'[21]. However, the Charter does not formulate a clear relationship between languages and speakers resulting that minority language speakers are not entitled with the rights that the Charter provides. The reason for protecting languages rather than the rights of their speakers is given in the explanatory report:

> The concept of language used in the charter focuses primarily on *the cultural function of language*. That is why it is not defined subjectively in such a way as to consecrate an individual right, that is right to speak 'one's own language', it being left to each individual to define that language. Nor is reliance placed on *a politico-social or ethnic definition* by describing a language as the vehicle of a particular social and ethnic group. Consequently, the charter is able to refrain from defining the concept of linguistic minorities, since its aim is not to stipulate the rights of ethnic and /or

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did not have such access. The Court held that unilingual policy measures were not discriminatory, notwithstanding the claims of minority language speakers (Series A., No. 6, 23 July 1968, 1 EHRR 252).

20 Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, European Treaty Series – No. 148. Strasbourg, 5.XI.1992. Among the members of the EU Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK are the parties of the Charter while France, Italy, Malta, and Poland are signatories. Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal have authorised no participation. Bulgaria and Turkey have remained silent to this day. URL: http://conventions.coe.int.

21 Article 1 defines (for the purposes of the Charter) 'regional or minority languages' as the languages 'traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the official language(s) of that State' and, therefore, excludes 'either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants'. Furthermore, it gives the definition of 'a given territory' as 'the geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people justifying the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures provided for in this Charter'.

> cultural minority groups, but to protect and promote regional or minority languages as such (*italics added*)[22].

The Charter 'protects members of a linguistic minority only in a rather indirect way' in that 'the protection of languages in practical terms also means that people's linguistic rights are being protected' (Oeter 2004: 132-3). This indirect form of protection, however, reflects the apolitical stance of the Charter, neglecting the idea that individuals are neither as free as they are supposed to be to define their own language nor individually they speak a language that is the vehicle of a particular social and ethnic group. Furthermore, as Nic Shuibne contends,

> [t]he cultural aspect of language policy, which is linked more to the value of *linguistic survival*, is both valid in itself and vital to the maintenance and flourishing of any language group. But bracketing language issues as an exclusively cultural concern does not [deal with] other practical difficulties faced by speakers on a daily basis that stem from the narrow domains in which they may use their languages (2002: 208; *italics added*).

The 'rights of languages' including guarantees of education and cultural concerns are relevant to the protection of *language survival* while the 'language rights' concerning daily communicative and functional interaction between and within the public and private spheres are necessary for the protection of *language security* (Green 1987). In this respect, the prioritisation of language security demands more concrete state responsibility than the Charter asks for. Granted language without political and economic dimensions is a cultural asset to be safeguarded as a historical heritage and, in fact, the 'cultural dimension' of language 'can be said to be better protected than others already' (Nic Shuibne 2002: 229). Yet language is either official representatives of the strongest political unit, the state, or an inalienable part of political and/or cultural identities of people. Unless the alleged correlation between the languages that citizens speak and the political loyalty they have to submit to their state is annulled, the Charter remains only a statute of fine words.

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (the Framework Convention, hereafter), which was opened for signature in 1995 and entered into force in 1998, is the first and, to date the most

22 Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and Explanatory Report, European Treaty Series – No. 148, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 1993: 7.

comprehensive legally binding multilateral document that is completely devoted to the protection of national minorities[23]. The most significant linguistic rights are stated in Articles 5.1 (language as one of the essential elements of identity), 6 (tolerance irrespective of linguistic identity), 9.1 (the right to hold opinions and information in the minority language), 10 (the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority language in private and public, orally and in writing), 11 (the right to display in his or her minority language signs, inscriptions to the public), 12 (education and research to foster knowledge in language) and 14 (the right to learn his or her minority language). While the Framework Convention articulates commonly agreed upon principles and objectives, it leaves the ways, conditions and circumstances of application to the signatory states. 'The word "framework" highlights the scope for states to translate this convention's provisions to their situation in a specific country through national legislation and appropriate governmental policies' (Phillips 2004: 109). Trifunovska argues that one of the most significant achievements of the Convention, rather than its direct effect, is 'the publicity given to internal/national situation(s) involving minorities as not only governmental bodies but also non-governmental organisations and bodies concerned with human rights protection feel called upon to provide information' (2001: 158). In this sense, the Framework Convention is only considerable as the sign of a post-national European society, which is supposed to replace the prevailing international system.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Final Act of Helsinki Conference in 1975 was not only significant in that it gave rise to the founding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was also the first inter-state agreement that incorporated the principle of respect for human rights alongside classi-

23 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report, H (1995)010, Strasbourg, February 1995. Being members of the EU, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK are parties and Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg are signatories of the Convention while only France authorised no participation. Turkey has kept its indifference to the Convention until today. URL: http://conventions.coe.int.

cal principles of international law such as respect for territorial integrity and non-interference. The Act could be considered a milestone in that 'human rights became a legitimate subject of dialogue and a matter of legitimate concern to all participating states' (Bakker 2001: 244). Therefore, the Conference became an important forum for discussing human rights and national minority concerns that were not handled in isolation but linked to security considerations (Preece 1998: 117). Principle VII of the Act acknowledged that 'participating States on whose territory national minorities exist' agreed to 'respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in this manner, protect their legitimate interests'. However, 'persons belonging to such minorities' could enjoy those rights as long as the states of which they were citizens recognised the group to which they were belonging as the minority. Unfortunately, the members of the Conference were not able to further their initial interest in national minority issues until the 1990s. Rather, the violation of individual human rights, particularly liberties struggled for by the human rights and democracy movements in communist states were on the agenda (Mastny 1992: 11-21; quoted in Preece 1998: 118).

The Conference, which was transformed into an Organisation in 1994, started to make more significant contributions to the protection of minority rights when the definition of security transformed to include 'low politics', namely linguistic, cultural, gender and environmental agenda after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe was seen as a sign of a 're-unified Europe' in which minorities were considered 'a rich contribution to the life of our societies'. The 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was a breakthrough in the protection of minority rights as it was the first time that states explicitly considered positive measures to be taken with respect to minorities as intentions 'to restore real and effective equality with the majority' rather than 'discriminations against the majority' (Benoit-Rohmer 1996: 25). The 1991 Report of Experts on National Minorities was also notable in acknowledging the minority question as a matter of 'legitimate international concern'. This acknowledgement led to the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in 1992. The HCNM promoted the adoption of a series of documents concerning the matters of linguistic minorities, of which the

1998 Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities is the most significant[24]. As Packer states, 'the OSCE derives its interest in language issues from the fact that choices in the use of language – especially in the public sphere of governance – directly affect the enjoyment of not only culture but also access to important public goods' (2001: 258). For this reason, language is seen as 'a personal matter closely connected with identity' and as 'an essential tool of social organisation which in many situations becomes a matter of public interest' through the Oslo Recommendations, which also imply the collective aspect of linguistic rights.

Preece argues that the protection of minority rights in the early 1990s differed from the earlier period in two key aspects: first, 'minority questions were once more legitimate subjects of international society'; second, they 'were no longer components of a balance of power system wherein the great powers of Western Europe imposed conditions upon smaller and weaker states of Central and Eastern Europe' (1998: 139). The question of minority rights started to be conceived of as relevant and critical enough not to be left to the discretion of nation-states. The contemporary world; in which the nation-states lose effective power over their citizens due to communication transcending national boundaries; in which the free market philosophy weakens the relationship between citizens and the state; in which the international courts take legal hold of states over citizens; in which the state is no longer sheltering its domestic market as the result of free international trade; and in which civil conflicts within the states rather than international wars are much more likely, a reformulation of *the concept of right* in a broader framework becomes inevitable (Scholte 2000; quoted in Wright 2004: 162). This broader framework seems to appear in a 'post-national' world where not only nation-states and individuals but also collectivities would be the targets of these reformulated rights. In this post-national world 'the basic political antagonism', as Žižek argues, takes place 'between the universalist "cosmopolitical" liberal democracy

24 Others include the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999), the Guidelines to Assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process (2001), and the Guidelines on the use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media (2003). The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note, The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 1998. URL: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents.html.

(standing for the force corroding state from above) and the new "organic" populism –communitarianism (standing for the force corroding state from below)' (1994: 2-3). More interestingly, 'this antagonism is to be conceived neither as an external opposition nor as the complementary relationship of the two poles in which one pole balances the excess of its opposite (in the sense that, when we have too much universalism, a little bit of ethnic roots gives people the feeling of belonging)', but 'each pole of the antagonism is inherent to its opposite' (ibid). This antagonism can be rather seen as 'agonism' (Mouffe 1999), in that the political does not refer to a relation taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather, to the constitution of identities themselves. This is also what makes agonism part of a deconstructive analysis of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority, which considers the former as the *constitutive outside* of the latter. As an entity engendering multilevel politics that theoretically invites both majorities and minorities to the floor, the European Union might be expected to make the greatest contribution to the evolution of such an agonistic post-national world.

European Union

Member states of the EU resist relinquishing their authority on the status and rights of linguistic minorities within their territories because linguistic policy is one of the most significant symbols of national sovereignty. In fact, the term minority has never been referred to in any of the documents composing the primary law of EU[25]. Minorities in Europe were neglected by the Union until the end of 1990s because of 'the choice for economic and no political and cultural integration', which 'was most probably both of a strategic (it seemed politically more realistic to gradually create a political union through economic interdependencies) and a substantive (there was a fear of creating a sort of super-nation-state) nature' (Toggenburg 2001: 206). Moreover, during the Cold War period, which was marked

25 Primary sources of the EU law include constitutional treaties, conventions between member states and the Union's external treaties (see Lasok and Bridge 1991: 113-25). More specifically, neither the Treaties establishing the European Community (Treaties of Rome 1957), nor the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty 1992) have mentioned a group of people as a minority.

by the domination of highly strategic national accounts, minority questions were seen as the internal affairs of member states. Finally, member states' commitments to European standards of human rights through their signatures on the documents of UN, CoE and OSCE were regarded as sufficient to protect minority rights.

Alongside those political constrains, there was also an ideological limitation that disallowed the Union to deal with minority questions. This limitation was a common understanding which views civic nationalism of the West as immune from such minority problems, and the Eastern type of ethnic nationalism as enclosed by dissident minority groups. Considering that the protection of minorities was never mentioned as clearly as in the Copenhagen Document (1993), which lists the conditions of EU membership for the Central and Eastern European Countries, this understanding seems to remain intact. It is equally striking that all the Copenhagen criteria except the one concerning minority protection were transposed by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) into the primary law (Toggenburg 2001: 225). Therefore, the protection of minorities was theoretically left to the *external competence* of the Union. Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty first created an *internal competence* of the Union on the minority protection in that the Council 'may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation'.

Language is first mentioned as the criterion on which discrimination is prohibited in the Constitution for Europe (2003) under the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article III-21). The Union's competences include no area relevant to language within the exclusive or shared competences of the Union, rather mentioning *culture* as among 'the areas for supporting, coordinating or complementary EU action'. In fact, the Union ostensibly *contributes* to 'the flowering of the cultures of the member states while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore' by Article 151 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which implicitly include matters of language[26]. The explicit references to language are always limited to such fine expressions as in Article 3 of Part I of the Constitution: 'The Union shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced' and Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 'The Union shall respect cultural, religious and

26 For a further discussion on Article 151 TEU, see Nic Shuibne (2002: 107-54).

linguistic diversity'. However, these Articles have raised a crucial question of *which* diversity is to be respected. Is it diversity between the official languages of the EU or a diversity of all languages within the EU territory? Seemingly, the EU is compelled to emphasise diversity between national languages and cultures in order to alleviate anxieties against the process of 'Europeanisation'.

Article 8 of the Constitution reads that citizens shall have 'the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman and to address the Institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Constitution's languages and to obtain a reply in the same language'. This statement reflects the fundamental democratic principle that people should be included in the policy-making process, as well as the importance of maintaining a multilingual administrative structure (Nic Shuibne 2002: 10). However, the emphasis on the Constitution's languages reproduces the unprivileged position of minority languages at the European level by indirectly forcing minorities to speak the official languages. In this sense, democratic and multilingual EU administration fails to operate efficiently for minorities. Both the Commission and the Council use only English, French and German as working languages. In the European Parliament, which holds a unique position as a body of directly elected representatives, MEPs are allowed to use their official languages[27]. The EP's significant concern for multilingualism also makes possible to use languages other than the official EU languages via an advance notice of the intention (ibid: 17). Here again, however, the minority languages that are not entitled to official status by the relevant member state cannot be heard in Parliament. The applicant can select the language of proceedings at the European Court of Justice from the official languages of the member state whereas non-official EU languages are not encouraged to appear in pleadings and documents[28]. It seems therefore that the notion of European democracy is a given for the majority communities and the EU institutions, while it must be conceived of as something to be extended to minorities.

Secondary sources of the EU law, especially the European Parliament resolutions partly compensated the shortcomings of institutions and the primary law of the EU[29]. In 1981, on the basis of a report prepared by the

27 Article 117 of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure (1999) OJ C175/95.

28 Article 18 of the European Commission Rules of Procedure (C(2000) 3614).

29 Secondary sources of the EU law are composed of obligatory acts (regulations, directives and decisions made by the Council or the Commission) and non-obligatory acts

Italian Rapporteur Gaetano Arfé, 'the Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities' was adopted by the Parliament. The Resolution required national, regional and local authorities to allow and to promote the instruction of regional languages and cultures in official curricula; to allow and to ensure sufficient access to local radio and television; and to allow the use of these languages in the field of public life and in dealings with official bodies and in the courts[30]. More importantly, the Parliament called on the Commission to review all Community legislation or practices discriminating against minority languages. In order to examine the proposals of the Resolution and to notice how best they could be implemented, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) was established in 1982 with the task of speaking and acting on behalf of the linguistic communities at European level. The term 'minority' seemingly has bad connotations such as deviance or inadequacy, and the idiom ignores that the language in question is not intrinsically minor but has been *minoritised*. Therefore, the term 'lesser-used language' is offered and used by the EBLUL (Ó Riagáin 2001: 28). However, this term fails to reflect a state-centric standpoint, for speakers of these languages do not use their mother tongue *less* than the official language unless they are forced to do so.

The 1983 second Arfé Report became the 'EP Resolution in Favour of Minority Languages and Cultures' and so highlighted the importance of the first Resolution in Europe, which inhabits some 30 million citizens speaking a regional language as their mother tongue[31]. The last EP resolution in the 1980s, which was based on the report of Rapporteur Willy Kujpers and titled the 'Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities in the European Community' (1987), acknowledged the lack of progress on the issue of minority languages and addressed member states as the responsible actors in that task[32]. The

(recommendations and opinions, without binding force), which are the law making acts of the EU organs and resemble delegated legislation, and non-treaty acts (memoranda, communications, deliberations, programmes, guidelines, and resolutions). Although, it is disputable whether a resolution, like a directive or a regulation, is a binding legislative act, it can convert a programmatic provision of the Treaty into an obligation (Lasok and Bridge 1991: 125-56). On the other hand, by the Constitution, the typology of acts is limited to six instruments; law, framework law, regulation, decision, recommendation, and opinion (Article 32).

30 EP Document No. 1981 OJ C 287.

31 EP Document No. 1983 OJ C68.

32 EP Document No. 1987 OJ C318.

Resolution suggested granting an official status to the EP Intergroup on Lesser Used Languages[33]. It was the second Kujpers Report (1995), which led to the establishment of the Mercator network on the matters of minority languages[34]. The 1994 Report prepared by Mark Killilea, an Irish Deputy, led to the adoption of what was then the most significant EP document, namely, the 'Resolution on Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the European Community'[35]. Killilea explained the motives of the Resolution as the revival of the minority issue due to the dissolution in the Central and Eastern Europe; a new Community competence included by the Maastricht Treaty in cultural affairs; and the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages adopted by the Council of Europe[36]. In this sense, the Resolution called upon member states to sign and ratify the Charter. Moreover, the Resolution referred to the supranational legal protection of minorities with regard to the Union's commitment to national and regional diversity.

In reply to EP Resolutions, the Commission issued a communication in 1995 noting that 'any activity with a political or statutory impact will be excluded', 'considering the competences of the member states and in respect of the principle of subsidiarity'[37]. However, 'the principle of subsidiarity may actually *require* rather than prevent Community action' (Nic Shuibne 2002: 268; *italics original*). Moreover, the extent of the problem is great enough to be undertaken by the Union, for forty million European citizens speak a language other than the official languages; none of the member states is 'classified as absolutely monolingual'; language issues can have cross-border implications in the context of free movement of workers and non-discrimination; and if no action is taken, a prevailing ethos of 'us'

33 The Intergroup, which had the task of placing minority issues on the agenda of all political parties, was founded in 1980 and consisted of MEPs and representatives of minority groups (Toggenburg 2001: 210).

34 The Network is coordinated by the Commission and composed of four research institutions at the University of Paris X-Nanterre (on general issues and interdisciplinary studies), at Fryske Akademy in Ljouwert/Leeuwarden, Friesland (on formation and bilingual instruction), at the University Wales in Aberystwyth (on media guide) and at CIEMEN in Barcelona (on legislation and legal sources). Name of the network is derived from a famous cartographer of the 16th century who in his maps used the respective regional languges (Toggenburg 2001: 215).

35 EP Document No. 1994 OJ C061.

36 EP Contact Bulletin 1994 11 (1) 1-4.

37 Call for Proposals for European Commission Backing involving Actions in favour of Promoting and Safeguarding Regional or Minority Languages and Cultures (EC Document No. 1995 OJ C322/34).

and 'it' in the member state/Union context will weaken 'the impetus for supranational co-operation' (ibid: 179-181).

In fact, the reluctance of the Commission to take further steps to address the problem of minority languages could be explained by Philip's 'self-censorship' thesis arguing that the Commission 'has been chastened by the difficulty of getting public approval of the [Maastricht] Treaty and is signalling that it intends to exercise its rights of initiative more modestly […] even if the scope of the Community's competence has been significantly widened' (1994: 129; quoted in Nic Shuibne, ibid: 268). This interpretation also helps to explain the reluctance of the Commission to accept the 2003 Report prepared by the MEP for South Tyrol, Michl Ebner, who called for the 'setting up of a European Agency on Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning' and the establishment of a co-legislative EU Committee of National and Ethnic Minorities[38]. Ebner submitted a new report in 2004 and urged the Commission 'to provide scientifically based criteria for a definition of a minority or regional language for the purposes of the possible programme for linguistic diversity'[39]. However, the Commission's interest in linguistic diversity is limited by an emphasis on 'multilingualism', which was created on 1 January 2007 as a separate portfolio to contribute to 'economic competitiveness, growth and better jobs, lifelong learning, and intercultural dialogue nurturing a space for European political dialogue through multilingual communication with the citizens'[40]. The protection of minority languages is not listed among the expected contributions of multilingualism portfolio of the EU. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007, 'to make the EU more democratic, meeting the European citizens' expectations for high standards of accountability, openness, transparency and participation' simply guarantees the freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and gives its provisions a binding legal force.

In light of these developments, it appears that EU legislation on the protection of minority languages is intricately tied to the concerns of nation-states to keep their sovereignty and unity. Although the endeavour

38 Report with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity (European parliament Session document A5-0271/2003).

39 Report with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity (2003/2057(INI)).

40 See the Europa Languages Portal at the URL: http://europa.eu/languages/en/home.

of the EP to force the Union to take more supranational and affirmative measurements in favour of minorities is considerable, the Commission's understanding – which is more compatible with the economic and political interests of the states – is more dominant in the Union. This state-centred reading of linguistic diversity emphasises diversity between member states and clearly differs from the Parliament's view, which highlights diversity within member states (Toggenburg 2004: 38). In this sense, the most considerable step that the Parliament took was the 1991 Resolution on Languages in the Community and the Situation of Catalan that called on the Council:

> … to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve the following objectives: the publication in Catalan of the Community's treaties and basic texts; the use of Catalan for disseminating public information concerning the European institutions in all the media; the inclusion of Catalan in the programmes set up by the Commission for learning European languages; the use of Catalan by the Commission's offices in its written and oral dealings with the public in the Autonomous communities [referring to the Balearic Islands] in question[41].

Not surprisingly, it was noted, 'it is not possible to respect the principle of equality for all the languages spoken in the countries of the Community'. The criteria that the Parliament applied for the selection of the Catalan language conform to the criteria of states when they guarantee linguistic rights of minorities within their territory[42]. The Committee of the Regions signed an agreement in 2005 with the Spanish Ambassador to the EU, approving the use of 'Spanish regional languages' in an EU institution for the first time. It is striking that Catalan, together with the Basque language, is still considered a 'Spanish regional language', which implies that a minority language could only be noticed by the Union as long as it was acknowledged by the state in question.

The EU policy towards linguistic minorities within candidate countries was also fundamentally criticised on the grounds that it was designed exclusively for European security and stability. The EU applied the in-

41 EP Document No. 1991 OJ C19.

42 The Parliament has taken into consideration that 'the Catalan language is a European language with a history going back over a thousand years, employed at all levels of education and in the media, boasting a cultural and literary tradition of major importance and actively used on a daily basis by the greater part of a population of over 10 million; having regard, furthermore, to the language's official character' when it adopted the Resolution.

strument of EU membership conditionality in order to prevent ethnic conflicts in the region (Vermeersch 2004: 7). The most significant EU step was the 1995 Stability Pact for Europe, which was initiated in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy and 'incorporated or spurred on major bilateral treaties between countries from Eastern Europe, dealing wholly or partly with minority issues' such as the treaties between Hungary and Slovakia, and Hungary and Romania (Pentassuglia 2004: 18). Although it was never mentioned in the annual reports of the European Commission up to 2002, Hungary acted as the model of cultural autonomy for the protection of minorities in its territory. According to Vermeersch (2004: 10-11), the aim of Hungary was to have a moral justification for Hungary's stance towards the Magyar minorities in the neighbouring countries. Separately, the EU requirements were not directly connected with the new law on national minorities that the Czech government introduced in 2001, and Poland did not receive from the EU any strong censure on minority protection prior to 2000 (ibid: 14-17).

In this respect, it seems that what encouraged candidate countries to meet the EU's terms is the competition among them for membership rather than the EU itself: the 'uncertain linkage between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular benefits may easily diffuse the influence of the EU' (Grabbe 2001: 1015). The lack of internal mechanism for minority protection in the EU, furthermore, implies that the candidate states have become freed from the scrutiny of the Commission when they acquired membership. In this sense, EU-level protection of minority languages would be necessary to justify that 'the protection of minority cultures is a value the Club of European Union is based upon and not just a "billet d'entrée" – the destiny of the latter species is usually to end in the paper basket after one has passed the entrance' (Toggenburg 2003a).

On the other hand, the most notable EU involvement in the issue of minority languages within the candidates has been in the protection of the Roma people. The revisions of Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian and Slovakian legislations in compliance with the EU Race Directive (2000) alongside the success stories of Slovakian and Romanian government policies on their Roma citizens are considerable (see Topidi 2004: 199)[43]. However, Vermeersch (2004: 8) argues that the EU involve-

43 The Directive prohibits direct or indirect racial discrimination, harassment and victimisation in employment, social protection, education, access to goods and services as well as cultural activities. It is significant in its scope, which also includes third

ment in the Roma communities within the Central and Eastern European countries stemmed from the increasing number of Roma arriving in the EU as asylum seekers. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the EU acknowledged that the Roma language requires more assistance to be on an equal footing with other European languages as it is traditionally unwritten and its speakers belong to the lowest socio-economic strata in Europe (see Rooker 2001: 46). Further, the need for more concern for the Roma corresponds to the need for an EU-wide linguistic policy, which is more crucial for such non-territorial languages as Roma, which lacks a 'kin-state'.

In this respect, Toggenburg argues that the establishment of a figure of an '"ambassador for minorities" in the European Parliament would raise the awareness of the protection of minorities inside the new EU system' (2003b: 280). Such a figure would not simply contribute to the rise of awareness; rather it would bring linguistic minorities to the EU stage. The 'so-called peripheral policy domains are far from peripheral to the individuals involved and affected', who 'deserve to have their priorities secured within the supranational structure that (often) governs them yet still seems too remote' (Nic Shuibne 2002: 292). The self-censorship of the EU in such sensitive issues could not easily be an excuse for leaving the matter untouched or as the internal matter of a member. The formulation of linguistic diversity in the EU as a 'constitutional value' would 'remain an academic and slightly artificial construction' as long as it is left to the self-definition and sovereignty of the member states (Toggenburg 2004: 38). The Union must transcend the prevailing system of rights, which, *inter alia*, treats minority groups as restricted citizens of separate nation-states and ignores their different social and economic conditions. The EU is expected to do better than providing 'a new forum for minority language groups to voice their demands and concerns and new institutional structures through which to pursue their objectives' (O'Reilly 2001a: 11). The fact that only a small number of minorities have benefited from the funds that the EU provides will not change otherwise. The 2004 Final Report of Interarts Foundation reads:

> Whilst organisations developing projects which promote the use of Catalan, Welsh, Irish or Basque still happen to benefit from EU grants, languages with lower demographics or a *lesser institutional footing* have more difficulty in accessing them

country nationals. Furthermore, it is one of the pillars of an anti-discrimination package, which 'is likely to have the largest impact on the protection of the rights of minorities when implemented' (see Topidi 2004: 189-192).

because they either lack the relevant resources or possess *less international visibility* and networking ability' (*italics added*)[44].

When the Galician community was asked to judge the level of tangible support those institutions give to Galicia, they justified the Report by assigning the second grade to the EU, between the first grade of the Autonomous Government of Galicia and the third of the Spanish Government (Kronenthal 2003). Many Galicians voiced their frustration over a Union that does not allow Galicia's regional autonomous political and linguistic status to be translated into a distinct voice on the European stage (ibid). However, the role that the minority group attributes to itself in its relation to the EU is also significant in determining its place in European politics. In this sense, it is less surprising to note that the Catalans 'believe they have a role to play as Catalans in the construction of a new and more egalitarian Europe' (DiGiacomo 2001: 73). If the most advanced communities are more likely to integrate into the EU politics and identify with European identity, the economic and social gap between the regions of the Union appears as an obstacle for an 'ever closer union'.

Linguistic Rights as a Non-State Affairs

'As the state historicizes only certain ranges of culture and social structure and represents them as total and authentic, so also do stateless nations invoke the past selectively, reviving "forgotten" history in a counter-hegemonic process' (DiGiacomo 2001: 57). The linguistic component of this counter-hegemonic process is called 'normalisation' by minorities, who believe that 'the minority language has to recover the ground it has lost, for social, political and historical reasons, that has contributed to making it slip into "abnormal" use' (Poggeschi 2001: 89). The most remarkable examples of this normalisation process are the 'Act for the Normalization of the Use of Basque' (1982), which lays out provisions for the use of Basque in administration, education and the media, and the 'Act for Linguistic

44 Final Report of Interarts Foundation on Ex-Post Evaluation of Activities in the Field of Regional and Minority Languages 1998-2002 for the attention of European Commission, 4 June 2004.

Normalization' (1983), which stipulates that Catalan should be the 'normal' language of education at all levels.

Policies of standardisation and the dissemination of those minority languages are initiated by minority elites, who mimic the role of majority elites in the construction of national languages. For example, Catalan linguistic nationalism creates its own minority, the Valencian speaking community, who tries to demonstrate that Valencian is not a dialect of Catalan. Valencian intellectuals argue that 'Valencian lives under the threat of the worrying advance of the Spanish and linguistic and political attacks of the Catalan'[45]. The Valencian reaction is aimed at the Catalan elites, who seek to make the Catalan language more 'like' the dominant (Castilian) language in its symbolic and practical functions (Jaffe 2001: 44). Catalan political leaders 'turned the ideological tools of the state to their own purposes in order to resist Spanish control over the mechanisms of cultural reproduction' (DiGiacomo 2001: 72). This explains why 'Catalonia seems to be representative of a new phenomenon of the post EU era', that is, 'nation building at regional level' (Wright 2004: 209). Similarly, 'the way Corsican language planners sought to raise the status and practice of Corsican in the initial phase of Corsican language revitalization was heavily influenced by French ideology and linguistic policy, as well as by the cultural and political context of Corsican ethnic nationalism' (Jaffe 2001: 40). Since the 1951 Deixonne Law declared Corsican as an Italian dialect – proving that Corsican is a distinct language with its own grammar and codification – the status of the language has been a central concern of Corsican elites (ibid: 50-1).

These counter-hegemonic efforts reproduce the allegedly direct relationship between language and identity, which is engendered by the dominant nationalist policies. As long as the disease is diglossia, on the other hand, the cure will inevitably be ambivalent[46]. Since *la langue du pain* is also the language of government, schools and public sphere, while minority languages are restricted to the private contexts of use, minority language planners struggle to make these languages official, instrumental and intellectual (Jaffe ibid). Making minority language compulsory in schools

45 See the Valencian claims at the URL: http://www.valencian.org.

46 Diglossia is a term referring to compartmentalised values and hierarchical relationship between a dominant language and minority languages. The non-existence of minority languages in economic and political spheres causes a decrease in their social prestige (see Jaffe 2001).

is seen as the sole remedy for both the survival and vitality of the language. Learning a minority language through optional courses at schools is highly limiting and seems insufficient to promote the survival of the language. Nevertheless, the linguistic community in question has the last word in the survival and vitality of that language. The example of Irish – which is the official language of the state but is spoken as a first language by only a small minority of the population – is a telling example of the role of the community in the perseverance of a minority language (Barbour 2000: 37). This example is like the language planning in Corsica, which has failed to mobilise Corsicans to take strong action in the protection of Corsican language despite 'normalisation' policies on the use of the language (Jaffe 2001: 49). Further, the existence of a vital Welsh-speaking youth culture in Wales, which was institutionally incorporated into the English state, is a considerable counter-example (ibid: 42).

More interestingly, the loss of language either caused by the state policies or as a result of technological and economic developments does not necessarily lead to the loss of culture and identity. This is the case in Brittany, where 'many Bretons have maintained a sense of themselves as a distinct people within the boundaries of the French nation-state' although 'there are virtually no Breton monolinguals remaining' (Timm 2001: 113). The Breton movement (Emsav), which initially advocated cutting off all ties with France and reinstating Breton as the national language in 1911, later seeking Breton autonomy following the WWI, has not succeeded in attracting more than a tiny percentage of the regional vote since the 1950s (ibid: 119-20). This explains why the Breton language cannot be fully identified with Breton nationalism; to the contrary, 'whereas [Breton] nationalism is in decline, the image of the language is improving' (Judge 2000: 59). The Breton identity seems 'to be based on powerful sense of attachment to a physical territory and it looks, as well as a sense of sharing […] in a way of life' (Timm 2001: 119).

Similarly, northern Italian identity is not built on linguistic nationalism, but rather on an attachment to cultural symbols. The Lombard League dropped the question of language because it was alienating potential supporters who considered themselves Lombardian but did not speak the language (Billig 1995: 35). The League 'could not appeal to a distinct language as a marker of identification, because northern Italy includes provinces speaking very different dialects' (Stacul 2001: 131). In this respect, it turned into the Northern League, which adopted Europeanism as

one of its basic policies (ibid). In South Tyrol, where the German language was central to the South Tyrolean identity until the 1990s, the provincial government has recently acknowledged that anybody who lives in South Tyrol is South Tyrolean, irrespective of the ethnic group s/he belongs to (ibid: 133). Personal declarations of belonging to one of the three linguistic groups (Italian, German and Ladin) is asked 'no longer for an ethnic or linguistic confession, but only for an indication to which linguistic group a citizen would like to be counted when taking advantage of rights connected with the proportional system' (Rainer 2002: 97). The principle that 'languages have to be used together, one *beside* the other and not one *before* the other' shapes the composition of provincial governments that are based on the balance of linguistic groups in the region (ibid: 98-9; *italics original*). This balance decreases the tension between languages while releasing the political burden on linguistic identities.

The traditional responses of linguistic minorities towards the relations among language, politics and identity are aptly classified by O'Reilly (2001b: 88-96) when she was examining the question of the Irish language in Northern Ireland. 'De-colonizing discourse', which has been associated with the republican political party Sinn Féin, explicitly connects a person's nationalist political development with her/his interest in the language. Speaking Irish is seen as a political act, a weapon in an anti-colonial struggle to achieve independence, and a powerful expression of the Irish identity. On the other hand, there is 'cultural discourse', which regards the importance of language as something that lies in its beauty and cultural worth, and sees speaking Irish as a cultural, not political aspect of identity. Cultural discourse asserts that Irish language and politics should be kept separate, whereas it has a definite political agenda, strongly against republicanism (ibid: 90). These two traditional discourses can be transferred to every minority group struggling for linguistic rights. A comparatively recent and unusual approach to language, politics and identity is the 'rights discourse', which proposes to break the political/apolitical dichotomy in favour of associating Irish language with politics in a wider sense. It is not a depoliticised but rather a 'multipoliticised' one (ibid). It implies a reconnection of politics with economics on the one hand and theory with praxis on the other. Rights discourse highlights simple solutions for practical matters that could not be handled without a multidimensional approach. More importantly, rights discourse seems capable of taking the issue of

linguistic rights to a multilevel field of politics that the European Union has introduced.

In this respect, the collaboration between minorities and the Union within the framework of multilevel politics could also release the 'ever closer union' from the chains of the nation-states system. In fact, there are some signs of such collaborations in the linguistic policies of minorities. Recent language planning strategies that were undertaken by Corsican language planners have been influenced by the notion of Europe, which creates new cultural and economic networks and relationships (Jaffe 2001: 51-4). Likewise in Ireland, 'there has been a turning away from a focus on the idealized nation-state toward Europe', in which a linguistic and cultural mosaic is supposed to ensure that 'Irish may well fare better' (O'Reilly 2001b: 97). 'People often talk about Irish as a minority language within Europe, sometimes with a sense of pride at their status as minority language speakers' (ibid: 98). Bretons seem to 'have no interest in seeking independence from France; but support achieving greater regional autonomy within the state' as they 'incontestably feel part of the greater European complex of nations and regions' (Timm 2001: 121-2). This feeling was embodied in the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty, which was favoured by about 60 per cent of Bretons while rejected by the French majority (ibid). In fact, this 'greater European complex of nations and regions' corresponds to the idea of 'a Europe of regions', which might lead to a polity of a dual regional and European identity and release the tension on identity politics (Petersson 2003: 247). As Stacul argues, 'at the beginning of the millennium the ethnolinguistic community may not be a frame of identification in opposition to the nation-state'; 'identities may be created anew as a consequence of "Europeanization" or "globalisation"' (2001: 144).

The principle of subsidiarity, which 'requires decisions to be taken as close to the citizens concerned as possible', enables minority groups to act at the regional level (see Wright: 2004: 195; Nic Shuibne 2002: 173-84). The Autonomous European Region (*Euregio*) in northern Italy, which blurs the significance of the national boundaries of the Italian state, designed such a regional act (Stacul 2001: 133-4). The idea of 'a Europe of regions', which emphasises the principles of autonomy, co-operation and subsidiarity (Llobera 1997: 52-3), underscores a more interdependent and multidimensional governance *vis à vis* the idea of sovereign statehood. In this respect, the Roma 'claim to non-territorial nation status' sounds more promising than the aim of traditional minorities to acquire their

own-nation-state within the multilevel politics of the EU[47]. What is to be understood from 'the claim to non-territorial nation status' is 'the claim to recognition' of Roma people as equal to other 'nations' at the international level (Goodwin 2004: 54-6). This claim corresponds to the right to self-determination, which means 'the right to negotiate their status and rights with those around them': 'it is the place at the table not the institutions themselves that constitute self-determination' (ibid: 63). In 'this late- or post-sovereign era in which a wide variety of non-territorial entities are laying claim to the ultimate authority to determine the boundaries of their own legal personality without deference to and alongside states' (ibid: 64), the EU seems to be the most relevant playground for minority groups. What is necessary to activate this playground is a 'popular collective will' to be formed by 'a more thorough process of reciprocal change throughout civil society, an interaction among various ways of understanding the world, institutions and languages of different subaltern groups' (Ives 2001: 125).

The Occitan trans-national project seems to represent such an interaction that challenges the given terms of minority, territory and sovereignty. The aim of the project, which both favours a renaissance of Occitan and seeks to avoid backward looking, is to link a regional language with the outside world (Judge 2000: 65)[48]. An emphasis on the fundamental characteristics common to all Roman languages (Latinitas) enable students to learn Occitan, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Catalan quickly and at the same time. This project undermines the argument that striving to revitalize a minority language is both conservative and useless in comparison to linguistic policies that favour the learning of dominant languages. The most promising feature of the project, in fact, is the opportunity for a language policy detached from nationalism. Not only does it build a more integrative relationship between the kin-languages that were separated from each other by the nation-state boundaries, but also it transcends the vicious circle between linguistic rights and nationalist discourse, in which most linguistic minorities are imprisoned.

47 It was first articulated in the "Declaration of Nation" produced at the Fifth Romani World Congress held in Prague in 2000 (see Goodwin 2004: 54)

48 Judge (2000: 65) notes that there, though less advanced, is a similar plan for Celtic languages. The information about the Celtic, Regional and Minority Languages Abroad Project can be found at URL: http://www.cramlap.org.

Languages 'new to Europe', moreover, seem not only challenging but also enriching the traditional linguistic debate because 'global migration has turned the notion of autochthony into a politically and morally suspect notion' (Cheesman 2001: 153). This suspicion might initiate innovative policies promoting the 'languages without states' and weaken the link between nationalism and language. The understanding behind the 1996 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights finds 'language communities and not states as its point of departure', and refers to any group of persons who share the same language, irrespective of their territorial or historical antecedents, but not to the strictly exclusive concept of 'linguistic minorities'[49]. This understanding is significant in breaking the vicious circle that directs 'old' linguistic minorities to 'advance their interests by mimicking nationalism on a smaller scale' (ibid).

In fact, under an umbrella of political and economic power greater than the nation-state, i.e. the EU, 'we are all minorities in the sense that there is no one group dominates; we are all minority speakers in the sense that there is no one majority linguistic group' (Wright 2001). The list of endangered languages extends to the national languages that hold a subservient position to English. In this respect, the language use of linguistic communities of the twenty-first century have some parallels to medieval language communities in that 'those who participate in any way in the global networks, flows and exchanges use the *lingua franca* of those domains, English', whereas 'there is an increasing desire to maintain or revive traditional languages that have been eclipsed and for sub-state or sub-national groups to use them in their public space' (Wright 2004: 246-7). In this respect, the most substantial initiative that the EU might take would be to formulate more inclusive political mechanisms that transform minorities into the 'majority'. All communities must partake equally in order to invalidate the opposition between the minority and the majority.

49 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was drafted by International PEN and CIEMEN Mercator (Barcelona) and co-signed by representatives of about a hundred NGOs. URL: http://www.linguistic –declaration.org.

The Fallacy of Law

Differences between communities are nurtured by a series of discriminative policies which underlie the idea of nation-building. Paradoxically and synchronously, universal and difference-blind laws legally ignore these differences. Even when the deficit is allegedly corrected by declarations special to minority rights, the problem of the objectification of minorities prevents the effective implementation of those texts. The common problem of all the texts designed for minority rights is the misperception of minority. The minority, either as a threat or as a wealth, is perceived as an epistemological object to be operated upon by the dominant power. Those who stand at power treat the less powerful as if they were mere objects. Minorities are conceived of either as a statistical question or as an authentic good to be held by states in relation to national interests. The minority, in this sense, 'loses its power to signify, to negate, to initiate its historic desire, to establish its own institutional and oppositional discourse' and it becomes 'the good object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that reproduces a relation of domination' (Bhabha 2001: 31).

The fallacy within documents on minority rights refers to two intertwined problems. Firstly, minorities are excluded from the inscription and formulation of minority rights and become the objects of intra and/or inter-state policies. Secondly, the enjoyment of these rights is rigorously restricted by the criteria set by states, who act as the origins of the minority question. These restrictions are closely related to the binary oppositions between the individual and community on the one hand, and between the public and private sphere on the other. The excuses for restrictions, if states do not refer to the territorial integrity and national unity, usually originate from so-called rational calculations in favour of the majority. These calculations refer to an insubstantial number of people belonging to minorities, an insufficient amount of time of inhabitation, the lack of a request corresponding to a real need or scarce state resources to afford the implementation of these policies. These excuses are almost unexceptionally mentioned in national and international documents, immediately following the articles granting minority rights.

Nevertheless, several international and European organisations and particularly the EU as a supranational power, considerably strengthen the mechanisms for the protection of minority rights in that they challenge the

principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign nation-states. However, they address the minority question in terms of security concerns, market sensitivity or cultural wealth. Guaranteeing minority rights, in this sense, remains an instrument for extrinsic goods. The systematic exclusion of minorities makes those documents either null and void or unsatisfactory. The exclusion of minorities from the law-making process does not simply constitute a reason for the fallacy of those documents; rather it refers to a mindset behind the minority question, which needs to be problematised. To be excluded, one should first be degraded and neglected and exclusion is the *process* of degrading and neglecting. This is why another declaration of linguistic rights or a new resolution on minority languages is the last thing that linguistic minorities need.

The violence of law operates when linguistic minorities are not included in the process of inscription and implementation of documents and resolutions. The binary oppositions between the minority and the majority, between the individual and community, and between the public and private sphere are reinforced, not annulled, in every document, issued and executed by the international and European organisations ruled by the nation-states. What differentiates the EU from other organisations is the Union's enforcement power, which stems from the national sovereignties it pools. Membership means more than being part of a common policy or signing a declaration, which simply restores universal and abstract values. Praxis, surely, makes sense. Praxis could also make the EU as dynamic as its components, which need not necessarily be only the nation-states. This switch would require envisioning the EU as transnational or intercommunal rather than simply a supranational entity. The supranationality implies an authoritarian super-state, while the transnationality or intercommunality means a kind of governance, in which participation and negotiation is the norm. This situation is not only desirable but also vital, for otherwise the EU will continue to serve the fallacy of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority, which reproduce domination. Minorities that try to protect and revitalise their languages by mimicking nation-state policies also produce domination over their own minorities. Therefore, the idea of a transnational EU would serve to eliminate the epistemological and ontological limits that both the majority and the minority has. On the other hand, the idea of trans-nationality may be the basis on which the EU and minorities can work together in order to weaken the philosophy of nation-state. This trans-national base can only be enlarged by minori-

ties and diasporas of Europe, one of which is the Kurdish community in Turkey and Europe.

CHAPTER FOUR

Kurdish Language as a Reproof of Turkish Nationalism

The task of providing a historical background to any question is a challenging one due to the narrative and causal aspects of history writing. This challenge is amplified when it comes to tracing the remnants of a minority question in a national history. National history is written primarily from the viewpoint of the majority by a group of state-oriented authors. The counter-national history writing by minorities, on the other hand, is never immune from the involvement of nationalist paradigm. However, with the aim of providing a wide-ranging understanding of the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey, this and the following chapters inevitably but critically apply the examples of national and counter-national history writing. This can be regarded as part of a critical historical analysis, which tries to demonstrate how the Kurdish minority is socially constructed and materially produced in Turkey. This analysis includes a brief critical discussion on nationalist history writing in general and the nationalist Kurdish historiography in particular, which constitutes the first section of this chapter. The second section deals with the situation of the Kurdish community until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, while the third section discusses the implications of the Turkish state-building processes on the Kurdish community. Reflections on the impact of the Turkish modernisation project on the Kurdish community are discussed in the final section.

Nationalist History Writing

> Historians have generally seen nationalism as a doctrine or principle or argument [which] has often been regarded as an *idée fixe*, a motive force that remains constant beneath its many disguises … nationalism is also profoundly "historicist" in its character: it sees the world as a product of the interplay of various communities, each possessing a unique character and history, and each the result of specific origins and developments (Smith 1999: 176; *emphasis original*).

Historicist nationalism is internalised by the authors who write national histories, which are composed of the narration of epic struggles and wars, national antiquity, misery and destiny, and hostile neighbours and oppressors. Özkırımlı lists the 'recurrent themes in every nationalist narrative' as follows: the theme of antiquity, the theme of a golden age, the theme of the superiority of the national culture, the theme of periods of recess and the theme of national heroes (2000: 67). This narration takes place within the borders of historical territory, which connects the national history to national cartography. Therefore, the nationalist narrative creates a reflection of continuity that facilitates the imagination of genealogies, belongings and historical and geographical origins (Tekeli 1998). Moreover, the narrative style of history writing, which presents the chronological order of events in a sort of causality, has a romantic character that easily reaches people's emotions. Therefore, national history writing inevitably includes pseudo-historical explanations, anachronisms and contradictions. To this end, Kurdish history writing, which is mostly composed of memoirs and defences of political leaders, is not an exception[50]. Aksoy (1996: 59-63) criticises some Kurdish historians for placing the nation-oriented approach at the centre of their analyses, which also puts the Kurds at the centre of world history. This populism and romanticism prevents Kurdish historians from differentiating history from myth, which makes Kurdish history writing contradictory, reactionary, eclectic, biased, political and lacking of a scientific methodology (ibid).

50 Nevertheless, the book of Mehrdad R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise History and Fact Book* (*Kürtler: Bir El Kitabı*), which was firstly published by Taylor & Francis in English in 1992 and later by Doz in Turkish in 2004 and 2007, is frequently referred as one of the most reliable and comprehensive study on the history of Kurds that was made by a Kurdish scholar. On the other hand, there are several books on the Kurdish history written by non-Kurdish scholars, many of which are available in the list of references of this study.

According to Gündoğan (1994: 183-95), the reactionary feature of Kurdish history writing practices, – departing from the Kemalist historiography rather than referring to the original boarding points of the Kurdish history – stems from three problems. Firstly, the destructive policies of the state result in a scarcity of materials on the Kurdish history to be utilised by Kurdish authors. This means that Kurdish authors who use the same materials of Kemalist historiography try to reach different conclusions than those that the Kemalist authors expose. This methodological question, in fact, leads to the politicisation of Kurdish history writing, which becomes similar to the highly political narratives of Kemalist historiography. Such politicisation could also be explained by the fact that Kurdish history was written by Kurdish authors who engaged with the Kurdish political movements and lacked the intellectual accumulation necessary to create an innovative historiography. This also corresponds with the third problem, namely the lack of research and analysis on the methodology of Kurdish history writing. In summary, Gündoğan (ibid) notes that Kurdish historiography has developed since the 1970s in the hands of those who lacked academic training and who could not read in different languages, not excluding Kurdish. This is one of the reasons why he believes that Kurdish historiography is in the 'childhood phase', which uses the methods of imitation and negation.

Gündoğan proposes that Kurdish historiography should be completely ruptured from the Kemalist historiography and construct its own references by rejecting the framework imposed on it by the latter (ibid). However, 'own references' of Kurdish history writing have already been appropriated by Turkish nationalist history writing, as it is the ambivalences within the latter's narrative let the former emerge (see Bhabha 1990: 292). Furthermore, such 'reference points' might not allow the Kurdish history writing to acquire a less contradictory and a-nationalist character. Bozarslan (2005: 41) argues that nationalist history writing has no concern for maintaining consistency and keeping integrity, as it is the internal contradictions, which construct a common conceptual framework keeping the group as a single body. Therefore, nationalist history writing, which has a limited autonomy, is only functional when it is part of a political process (ibid). Nationalist history writing is dependent on the inferences drawn by the political elites and masses from what has been written about Kurdish history (ibid). It means that such inferences are not fixed and a-historical, but rather open to new interpretations of new generations.

Bozarslan analyses Kurdish history writing in Turkey in five periods, the first of which was between 1919 and 1923 and embodied in the romantic and symbolic works of Kurdish intellectuals in İstanbul (ibid: 43-62). The second period was between 1923 and 1938, in which the political and military leaders, who also organised the Kurdish revolts, produced the Kurdish ideological and political discourse. According to Bozarslan (ibid), the failure of these revolts directed the attention of leaders and intellectuals to the Kurdish language and culture from the Kurdish history writing. The third period during the 1940s and 50s was a period of silence because the Kurdish political and military movement was de-activated. Bozarslan argues that Kurdish history writing in this period, which was executed in highly imaginary ways by Kurdish intellectuals in exile, replaced the political and military battlefield of the Kurdish nation project. The fourth period between the 1960s and 1980s represented the renovation of Kurdish history writing by Kurdish nationalists and Marxist activists. The nationalist conception of Kurdish history included not only the Kurdish revolts of the 19th century, but also the neighbouring countries in which the Kurds live. The last period of the Kurdish history writing, which Bozarslan does not analyse, started in the 1980s with the PKK movement and continues until this day. The 1980s were based primarily on the military agenda set by the PKK movement, which has taken a more nationalist and contradictory stance in the 1990s (discussed in the next chapter). On the other hand, this 'latest' period evolves into a new one in the late 1990s, which is led by the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey, who will take the floor in the following chapters.

Throughout this chapter, one must remember that 'the [historical] facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context' (Carr 1961: 11). Carr describes the 'objective' historian as one who 'has a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own situation in society and history' (ibid: 123). Moreover, the 'objective' historian is a 'serious' one 'who recognizes the historically conditioned character of all values, not the one who claims for his own values an objectivity beyond history' (ibid: 78). Keeping this in mind and not daring to take the role of a historian, let alone an objective one, the author tries to take a critical eye to the lesser-known pieces of Kurdish history that are presented here with the aim of giving voice to the minority. This critical standpoint is complemented by other works, which examine the Kurdish nationalist history writing.

The Rule of the Ottoman Empire

Under the Ottoman rule, every community had the opportunity to enjoy its culture, religion and language within the framework of *millet* system, a product of an imperial power that had no interest in the private lives of its subjects. As Karpat notes, 'the *millet* system emerged gradually as an answer to the efforts of the Ottoman administration to take into account the organization and culture of the various religious-ethnic groups it ruled' (1982: 141). The term *millet* corresponded to the religious communities of the Ottoman Empire, and the *millet* system referred to a structure that was based on culturally self-ruling religious communities such as the Greek-Orthodox *millet*, the Armenian *millet*, the Jewish *millet* and the Muslim *millet.* One of the repercussions of *millet* system was that the Turkish language did not disseminate among non-Muslim subjects, whereas it was the second language of the non-Turkish Muslim elites (Sadoğlu 2003: 61). In the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire of 1876 (*Kanun-i Esasi*), Turkish was merely mentioned as the official language, which should be spoken by the officials and the deputies (ibid: 99). Therefore, except for their religious or tribal chiefs, Kurds were not largely familiar with the Turkish language during the Ottoman rule.

The Kurds were organised largely into a hierarchy of territorial tribes and tribal confederations that were quasi-autonomous, thanks to the hostility between the Ottoman and Persian empires on the one hand, and to the heterogeneous, partly de-centralised administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire on the other. The end of the enmity between the empires in 1514 resulted in an agreement between the Ottoman emperor and the Kurdish chiefs, who supported the Ottoman ruler over the Persian one (Sasuni 1992: 25). Through the agreement, the Kurdish chiefs agreed to provide military protection of Ottoman borders in return for officially recognised autonomy[51]. Despite the political disunity within the Kurdish community, this period was called the Golden Age of Kurdish literature and arts (Nezan 1992: 36)[52]. Kurdish nationalists regarded the works of

51 The agreement was initiated by İdris-i Bitlisî, a religious Kurdish leader and savant who was one of the advisors of Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Ottoman emperor. İdris-i Bitlisî (145?-1520) wrote a book in 1505 titled Heşt Behişt (Eight Heavens) in Persian on the history of Ottoman Empire, particularly about the first eight Ottoman sultans.

52 The most significant names of the period were the Kurdish prince Şeref Han (1543-1604), who was the author of *Şerefname* of 1597 (the first book on the history of

poets Xanî and Koyî as expressions of the Kurdish national awakening. Hassanpour (2005a: 646) argues that both poets called for an independent and united Kurdish state, and believed that the Kurds needed both pen (literature) and sword (political and military force) as the founding pillars of independence. He (ibid: 157-8) identifies that the works on linguistic nationalism by Xanî corresponded to the literary and linguistic dynamism in Europe. Shakely (1992: 35) similarly stresses that Xanî attached great importance to the Kurdish language and regarded its development as a patriotic task. In his legendary epic *Mem û Zîn* (1694), Xanî indicated that the misery and backwardness of the Kurdish people stemmed from their subjugation by the Ottoman and Persian empires, and that the only way to liberation was an independent Kurdish rule (ibid: 94-5). Referring to the long past of a Kurdish nation, Xanî's epic constituted the groundwork of the primordialist/ethnosymbolist conception of Kurdish nationalism, which argues that the Kurdish nation and national struggle have existed since time immemorial, though particularly emergent in the 17th century.

Hassanpour (2005a: 127) argues that the anachronistic emergence of the idea of 'nation' in Kurdistan in the 17th century can be termed 'feudal nationalism', a reaction of the Kurdish feudal elites to the foreign invasion over the region[53]. However, Bruinessen (2005: 64-70) contends that Xanî wrote simply for a limited number of literate persons on his sorrow about the disintegration of Kurdish tribal chiefs that caused the subjection of Kurdish people. Vali (2005: 118-20) also criticises the nationalist conception of Xanî, who, as he argues, was merely seeking a Kurdish *sultan* rather than specifying the Kurdish public or nation as the principal actor of gaining Kurdish independence from the foreign dominion. The critical approach towards the primordialist/ethnosymbolist thought of Xanî is in compliance with this study's conception of nationalism, which would argue that if the oxymoronic expression of feudal nationalism is not used as a rhetorical figure highlighting the error in a nationalist chronology, it is clearly part of a nationalist discourse, which itself builds up a connection that has not been existed hitherto between the past and present.

On the other hand, Koyî, who provided the calligraphy of *Mem û Zîn* to his student Mikdat Mithat Bedirhan to publish it in the first Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan* (1898), can be less problematically accepted as the

Kurds), and poets Eli Heriri (1425-1490), Melayê Cıziri (1570-1640), Feqiyê Teyran (1590-1640), Ehmedê Xanî (1650-1706) and Hacî Qadirî Koyî (1817-1897).

53 For the criticism of the notion of 'feudal nationalism' see Vali (2005: 119-20).

first figure of a romantic and idealistic Kurdish nationalism (Bruinessen 2005: 74). Vali (2005: 121) regards Koyî, who was aware of the Serbian and Greek nationalist movements and referred to the Kurdish people as the subjects of a political and social change for a modern Kurdish state, as the leader of *Kurdayetî*, a secular Kurdish nationalism seeking for an independent state. Hassanpour (2005b: 163-5) contends that the only difference between Xanî and Koyî is the latter's secular and modern standpoint that seemingly originated from his stay in İstanbul. However, this difference implies political, economic and social transformation in the mid-19th century, which was the age of nationalism throughout Europe.

In the early 19th century, administrative and territorial reforms of the Ottoman Empire favoured a more centralised administration and started to threaten the Kurdish chiefs' authority. Thus, the Kurdish chiefs led uprisings in order not to lose their control over the territory. The chief of Cezire-Botan principality, Bedir Han, whose dynasty was also known for keeping Xanî's manuscripts and following his and Koyî's thoughts, led the most remarkable of those uprisings (see Sasuni 1992: 73; Safrastian 1948: 54-60). Following Bedir Han's defeat by the Ottoman military in 1847, a new district, namely Kurdistan was established by the unification of Diyarbakır, Van, Muş, Hakkari, Cezire, Botan and Mardin (Hakan 2007: 254). Bedir Han's defeat and the establishment of the Kurdistan district signified the end of autonomy that the Kurdish chiefs had enjoyed for nearly three centuries. The role of the Kurdish chiefs was replaced by the Kurdish religious leaders (sheikhs) and aghas, who became the new political elite of the late 19th century (Sasuni 1992: 90). Gündoğan notes that the Kurdish sheikhs were capable of influencing more than one tribe and this 'gave a more massive character to the Kurdish revolts of the late 19th century' (1994: 11). This explains why the uprising of 1880, which was led by Sheikh Ubeydullah, was considered the first rebellion that had a nationalistic character (Bozarslan 2002: 841; Bruinessen 1993: 90; Olson 1992: 17; Nikitin 2002: 334; Safrastian 1948: 63; Sasuni 1992: 111). Despite its highly religious aspect, the rebellion's nationalistic overtones originated from the Sheikh's vision of Kurdishness transcending the imperial borders. When the Sheikh directed his armed forces to Iran in order to save Iranian Kurds, who were religiously attached to his authority and mistreated by Iran, the Ottoman military encircled him and defeated his forces.

The nationalist character of Bedir Han and Sheikh Ubeydullah uprisings is highly disputable because, as Özdoğan highlights, neither 'the political philosophy of the French revolution and the concept of a political nation' nor 'a German-type cultural revivalist movement' had yet reached the 'Ottoman Kurdish population of Anatolia' (1999). Indeed, those who were seen as prominent Kurdish nationalist leaders were the educated sons of sheiks and aghas in İstanbul in the early 20th century. Tribal schools (*Aşiret Mektepleri*), which were opened in İstanbul by Sultan Abdülhamid and served between 1892 and 1907 to educate and assimilate both the sons of Kurdish chiefs and sheikhs and the children of Arabic and Albanian families, were notable in that they cultivated young and dissident Kurdish intellectuals (Celil 2000: 19-20). The teaching of Kurdish language was forbidden 'as being a "barbarian" language' at those schools where the medium of education was Turkish (Safrastian 1948: 63).

However, Özoğlu (2005: 102) argues that the Kurdish associations that were established by those intellectuals in İstanbul during the first decade of the 20th century more served the Kurdish cultural revival than putting a nationalist idea on the agenda. Some Kurdish elites, who led those associations and published Kurdish magazines, supported the constitutional reform and representative government in order to prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Abdurrahman Bedirhan, who was the director of newspaper *Kurdistan* and the Kurdish delegate at the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, İTC) in Paris in 1902, expressed his frustration about the language that was used at the Congress as follows: 'although all delegations were Ottoman, negotiations were held in French rather than in *our official language of Turkish* on the pretext that some Armenian could not speak Turkish' (quoted in Kıran: 2002: 7; *italics added*). Although *Kurdistan* had a clear agenda of Kurdishness and the Kurdish literature and language, it supported the Young Turks, who argued for a constitutional monarchy and Ottomanism (Celil 2000: 35-7)[54].

In 1908 after the declaration of the Constitution by the İTC, Kurdish intellectuals in exile returned to İstanbul and supported the İTC in return for certain guarantees (Elphinston 1946: 94). In the same year, they estab-

54 *Kurdistan* was the first Kurdish newspaper, which was firstly published by Mikdat Mithat Bedirhan in Cairo in 1898; by Abdurrahman Bedirhan in Geneva, London and Folkstone (with the help of Young Turks) until 1902; and finally by Süreyya Bedirhan in İstanbul from 1908 until the First World War (see [note of Bayrak in] Cemil Paşa 1991: 248).

lished the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (*Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, KTTC) in İstanbul and subsequently opened branches in Kurdistan (Malmîsanij 1999: 45-52). The aims of the KTTC were laid down in the first issue of the KTTC newspaper (*Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi,* KTTG): defending the Constitution; safeguarding the Ottoman state; prohibiting discrimination among the Ottoman peoples; promoting friendship between Kurds and Armenians; supporting decentralisation; and developing Kurdish language and education (ibid: 20). The KTTG published articles in Kurdish and Turkish that highlighted the importance of Kurdish language and education[55]. This emphasis on the Kurdish language was also a reaction to the declaration of the official status of Turkish, which was made compulsory at schools by Sultan Abdülhamid (see Sadoğlu 2003: 89-90)[56]. In this respect, Article 5 of the statute, which reads, 'in order to be a member of the board of directors… one should be literate in Turkish and Kurdish. If s/he does not speak Kurdish, s/he should speak another foreign language' sounds contradictory (Malmîsanij 1999: 30). Nevertheless, Article 11, which notes that the KTTC aimed to publish Kurdish linguistic books and dictionaries in order to facilitate primary education in Kurdish, and Article 14, which called for collecting and publishing all Kurdish literary work produced until that day and for preparing a book on the history of Kurdish literature, reflect the emphasis on the Kurdish language and literature exerted by the KTTC (ibid: 31). The KTTC established an Association for the Dissemination of Kurdish Education (*Kürd Neşr-i Maarif Derneği*, KNMD) and two members of the KTTC started a Kurdish printing house (Malmîsanij 2007: 34)[57].

Despite its support for the Ottoman Constitution, KTTC is seen as the first venture by Kurdish elites to have a modern organisation independent of their Turkish colleagues[58]. However, the KTTG lacked for ideas

55 The Article of İsmail Hakkı Babanzade, who explained the importance of Kurdish language for the prosperity of Kurds, was the most remarkable one (see Malmîsanij 1999: 136-9; Celil 2000: 63; Safrastian 1948: 70-1).

56 Despite this declaration, as Celil (2000: 22) notes, a Kurdish book of Yusuf Ziyaeddin Paşa Xalıdi, *Hamid'e Kürt Dilinde Hediye*, (*Present for Hamid in Kurdish Language*) was published in 1892. Although introduction of the book spoke in flattering terms of Abdülhamid, the rest was devoted to the significance and value of Kurdish language (ibid).

57 Celil (2000: 69) notes that the KNMD opened a school for the education of Kurdish children in Istanbul in 1910.

58 Cemil Paşa (1991: 31) notes that Diyarbakırlı Fikri Efendi established the first Kurdish organisation, *Kurdistan Azm-i Kavi Cemiyeti* in 1900.

for an independent Kurdish state. The articles on Kurdish language can be seen as motives for the idea of a united and well-educated Kurdish people (Sasuni 1992: 151-3). According to Klein, nationalism was only seen as 'a means for Ottomans in general to become strong through the education and modernisation of each of their constituent elements' by the KTTC members in İstanbul, who also tried to counter the negative image of Kurds as a backward entity (2007: 137). The affiliates of KTTC branches in the provinces advocated the notion of 'Kurdishness' as a means to protect the 'rights of the Kurds', namely 'the vast privileges enjoyed by tribal chiefs under the patronage of Sultan Abdüllhamid II' (ibid). Indeed, the Kurdish nationalist and 'non-nationalist Kurdist' movements 'emerged and merged as one of several *responses* to the threatened state and the final break-up of the Ottoman Empire' in the years following the World War I (ibid: 138; *italics original*). Kurdish nationalism remained in the cultural framework until 1914 when its cultural component turned into a political one, which accompanied the transition from the imperial tradition to the model of nation-state (Bozarslan 2002: 841). Cultural nationalism meant making the Kurdish identity visible in an attempt to awaken the Kurds to become more civilised (ibid: 845-6). Özoğlu similarly argues that the KTTC 'was a sociocultural organisation that exhibited the characteristics of the "protonationalist" evolution of many ethnic groups in Europe and the Middle East' (2005: 104).

One of those groups was the Turkish one, which was led by the Turkish Society (*Türk Derneği*, TD) that was founded in 1908 by those who would become prominent Turkist ideologues in the following decades. Similar to the KTTG, the magazine of TD was mainly composed of articles on the Turkish language, literature and history, while it emphasised the role of Turkish as the language unifying all the Ottoman elements (Üstel 2004: 28-32, 39). The relationship between language and nationalism was studied in the journal of *Young Pens* (*Genç Kalemler*), which led the movement of linguistic Turkism (Üstel 2002: 263). Finally, most of the members of TD became the members of Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*), which was established in 1911 and owned the linguistic nationalist movement (Sadoğlu 2003: 134). Turkish Hearths were regarded as the cultural organisations of the Republican People Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*, CHF) and were integrated into the CHF in 1931. At the same time, membership in the CHF became conditional upon speaking Turkish and assimilating into the Turkish culture (Tunçay 1989: 430). In passing, it is striking to note that Bedirhan

wrote to Mustafa Kemal in 1933 that 'the Turkish Hearths were cultivating Kurdists for us as far as they trained Turkists for you' (1992: 22).

The ex-members of the KTTC supported the foundation of the Kurdish Student Hope Society (*Kürd Talebe Hêvî Cemiyeti*, *Hêvî*) in İstanbul in 1912 (Cemil Paşa 1991: 34; Malmîsanij 2002: 68)[59]. The aims of *Hêvî* were listed in the Article 2 of its statute as follows: ensuring relationship and brotherhood between Kurdish students; publishing in Kurdish language and literature; and striving for the scientific and societal improvement of Kurds (Malmîsanij 2002: 61). Cemil Paşa (1991: 33) argued that *Hêvî* was similar to other student organisations that were established by Ottoman Muslim components, namely *Müntediü'l-Edebi* (by Arabs) and *Başkim* (by Albanians), in that they all were inoffensive to the Turkist politics of the İTC and served the expansion of nationalist feelings among the non-Turkish communities[60]. Dersimi (1997a: 31) similarly stated that the Kurdish students at universities were troubled by the Turkish nationalism of the İTC, and wrote slogans such as 'Long Live Kurdish and Kurdistan' on the blackboard as a reaction to similar Turkish slogans. Cemil Paşa (1991: 33) further noted that the word 'Kurdish' was abolished when Hüseyin Cahit, editorial writer of *Tanin* (newspaper of the İTC) started to use the phrase of '*Vilayet-i Şarkiye*' (Eastern Province) instead of Kurdistan[61]. Moreover, Süleyman Nazif, who was born into a Kurdish family in Diyarbakır and was a well known author of Turkish literature, wrote articles in the newspaper *Hak* on the Kurdish language, which, he argued, was not a language but a kind of nasty patois of the Persian language (Malmîsanij 2002: 17)[62].

This could be one of the reasons why the journals *Hêvî* published, namely *Rojî Kurd*, *Yekbûn* and *Hetawî Kurd*, concentrated on the Kurdish language, literature, history and the question of Kurdishness (ibid: 101). Halil Hayali's article in the third issue of *Rojî Kurd* (1913) is notable be-

59 KTTC was closed by the İTC in 1909.

60 Cemil Paşa (1991: 35) noted that he established a branch of *Hevî* in Lausanne in 1913.

61 Nazmi Sevgen (1992: 22), who was a military official in the Turkish army, noted that the Ottoman archive unfortunately titled the relevant notebooks with Kurdistan until 1890 and that it was the responsibility of the Ottoman administration to name the region, which was inhabited by the Turks, as Kurdistan, a false, nominal and divisive name.

62 Süleyman Nazif also founded the Society for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces (*Vilayet-i Şarkıyye Müdafaa-i Hukuk-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) in 1918 in order to curb the rise of Kurdish nationalist awakening (see Alakom 1995: 61-2).

cause of the list of demands it made for the needs of the Kurds. It enumerated a new alphabet in order to facilitate learning Kurdish, a dictionary, a catechism in Kurdish, a history of Kurdish ancestors, an examination of Kurdish traditions, a book of maths, biographies of Kurdish elders, authors and poets (ibid: 103). *Hetawî Kurd* published letters from the Kurdish people (Kurdistan letters), some of which claimed that the Kurdish names of some villages were changed into Turkish (ibid: 155). *Hêvî* published a booklet titled 'Language Guidebook for Those Who Want to Learn Kurdish' in 1921 (ibid: 183)[63]. In short, as Özdoğan recapitulates, 'the aim of the Kurdish intelligentsia up to World War I was confined to publication in Kurdish, increasing solidarity among Kurds and their awareness in Kurdish history and geography, and elevation of the Kurdish culture', whereas 'what was in print in Kurdish could not suffice the constitution of an "imagined community"' (1999).

The most important Kurdish organisation established in İstanbul in the second decade of the 20th century was the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti*, KTC 1918)[64]. Its journal *Jîn*, which championed civilisation as the guarantee of nationhood and regarded the creation of a national history as the most important aim of Kurdish nationalism, portrayed the nationalist character of the KTC (see Özoğlu 2005: 108; Bozarslan 2002: 847). One of the members of the KTC, Kürdiye Bitlisi, wrote in *Jîn* that the Kurdish language should be standardised for common use and that the various Kurdish dialects were not an obstacle, but rather a great treasure for such an aim (Göldaş 1991: 75). Although the activities of the KTC remained limited to the creation of national myths and symbols (Bozarslan 2005: 47-8), the goal of independence, or the least autonomy for the Kurds, was declared through articles published in *Jîn*[65]. According to Özoğlu (2005: 110), these declarations characterised the KTC as the first Kurdish nationalist organisation.

63 *Hêvî* stopped its activities in 1914 due to the First World War, whereby some of its members were recruited while the others were sued. However, *Hêvî* was re-established in 1919.

64 Some other organisations were the *Kürdistan Muhibban Cemiyeti* (1912) and *Kürdistan Teşrik-i Mesai Cemiyeti* (1912).

65 Following the signature of the Mondros Armistice Agreement (1918), which symbolised the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the leaders of the KTC met the representatives of the Allies in order to acquire the independence that the Wilson Principles guaranteed for the Kurdish people (Cemil Paşa 1991: 57; Göldaş 1991: 139).

Two more organisations were established in 1919, namely the Society for the Dissemination of Kurdish Education and Publication (*Kürd Tamim-i Maarif ve Neşriyat Cemiyeti*, KTMNC) and the Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women (*Kürd Kadınları Teali Cemiyeti*, KKTC). Encüm Yamulki, the head of the KKTC, declared their objective of providing help for Kurdish women and children in need, and mobilising women who were able to serve as teachers for Kurdish orphans at the schools that the KKTC would open (Göldaş 1991: 78-9). The program of the KTMNC was also composed of several aims concerning the Kurdish language: to prepare a Kurdish dictionary; to open primary schools in Kurdistan for the education in Kurdish; to publish school texts in Kurdish; to open Kurdish art schools; to publish Kurdish classics; and to open a school for the education of Kurdish teachers (ibid: 72-3). However, the first and last important work of the KTMNC was the publication of *Mem û Zîn* in 1919 (ibid: 77). In this way, *Mem û Zîn*, which has been converted into the most significant national symbol of Kurdish movements since the late 19th century, was re-discovered as one of the fundamental works of Kurdish nationalism (see Bozarslan 2005: 47; Bruinessen 2005: 74-8).

In 1919, the KTC was dissolved into two camps. Firstly were those who argued for Kurdish autonomy but not independence, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdülkadir, who was also the head of the council of state (*Şura-yı Devlet*) (Cemil Paşa 1991: 60). Secondly were those who established a new Kurdish organisation, the Society for Kurdish Social Organisation (*Kürd Teşkilat-ı İçtimaiye Cemiyeti*, KTİC) in 1920, which was mainly composed of Bedirhans collaborating with the families of Cemilpaşa and Babanzade (Göldaş 1991: 196-7). Together with the Kurdish National Party (*Kürd Milli Fırkası*), which was established in 1919, the KTİC overtly strived for a united and independent Kurdistan (Cemil Paşa 1991: 62)[66]. The reasons for this ideological difference between the two camps stemmed from the sociological background of the members of groups. Those who lacked a clear agenda of Kurdish independence were educated by religious leaders and were more oriented to the unity of Islam, while others who graduated from modern schools in Istanbul or Europe and were aware of nationalist

66 Göldaş (1991: 206) also notes that the first Kurdish flag was determined by the KTİC.

movements in the Balkans, were supportive of the unity of the Kurdish people with the state of their own (Özoğlu 2005: 151-2)[67].

In this respect, the nationalist character of the KTC is disputable partly because some of its members, who were loaded with Islamic elements and did not carry the characteristics of a middle-class, were short of a well-built nationalist political idea (see Göldaş 1991: 50). However, the members of both groups within the KTC were unable to formulate a Kurdish style of thought, which would be completely independent of the Ottoman way of thinking, according to Göldaş (ibid: 204). The tribal organisation of the Kurdish community was another factor that disallowed the blossoming of effective Kurdish nationalism (Grigoriadis 2006: 448). Therefore, the KTC could not reach the Kurdish people and organise a national struggle in Kurdistan[68]. Bozarslan (2006: 95) argues that Kurdish nationalism not only failed to grasp the masses for a national movement, but also lost credit among Kurdish intellectuals. Referring to the model of Hroch (1999) discussed before, Bozarslan (ibid) argues that the Kurdish national movement was not able to succeed in the second phase (during which activists sought to win the support of the ethnic group through patriotic agitation to awaken national consciousness among them) and to pass to the last phase (the major part of the population participates in the mass movement). In this

67 This split reflects on the two main sources of the Kurdish nationalism during the Republican Era; namely the Kurdish tribal and religious strata who were against the state not because it was Turkish, but because it disavowed the Ottoman tradition; and secondly the Kurdish intelligentsia who did not reject a modern state itself but was opposed to a 'Turkish state' (Bozarslan 2002: 848).

68 Mehmed Emin Bozarslan argues that Mustafa Kemal worked and consolidated his power in Kurdistan while the Kurdish elites were waiting in İstanbul for the results of the Paris Peace Conference; so, 'the Kurdistan Association was left over without Kurdistan' (1989: 32; quoted in Göldaş 1991 152). General Şerif Paşa, who was the ex-Ambassador of the Ottoman Empire in Stockholm, led a delegation in Paris in 1919-1920 to observe the Sèvres Peace Conference and get help for the Kurdish cause, although many Anatolian Kurds declined his capacity to represent the Kurdish interests (Sasuni 1992: 176; Alakom 1995: 84-8). General Şerif Paşa and Boğos Nubar Paşa, who was the President of the Armenian National Delegation, collectively sent a letter to the Conference expressing the demands of Kurdish and Armenian peoples for their own independent states (Sasuni 1992: 177). The Articles 62-64 of the Treaty of Sèvres were devoted to the issue of a Kurdish national state, which was loosely bordered and strictly conditioned by a series of requirements. Göldaş (1991: 162) argues that the Treaty of Sèvres was not welcomed by the Kurdish elites due to its ambiguous statements, although the Treaty was important in that the Kurdish question was firstly and clearly mentioned at an international conference. The Treaty of Sèvres became null and void because it was not ratified by the Ottoman Parliament, which was abolished in 1920 by the (Turkish) Grand National Assembly.

sense, it seems irrelevant to speak about well-organised Kurdish nationalism in the early 1900s since the national awakening that emerged among the political elites of a society was not shared by the substratum of the Kurdish society. As Özdoğan sums up, there was 'no coherent idea of political unity and cohesive, credible leadership', which could form a political Kurdish entity in Anatolia (1999).

State-Building in Turkey

Many Kurdish chiefs supported Turkey's war for national independence and willingly helped Mustafa Kemal in his task 'in the belief that they were fighting for the Muslim Patrimony in which they had a share' (McDowall 1992: 18; see also Safrastian 1948: 75-6). Mustafa Kemal sent letters to prominent Kurdish chiefs in order to inform them about the declaration of Erzurum Congress, which called on all Muslims to protect the Caliphate and resist the Armenian attacks, inviting them to attend the Sivas Congress – one of the cornerstone meetings for the war for national independence (Beşikçi 1991a: 163; 1992: 266-8). For maintaining the autonomy they enjoyed, most of the Kurdish chiefs attended the Sivas Congress that was held in September 1919. Kirişçi and Winrow (2002: 83) argue that Islam and 'Ottoman patriotism' constituted an important common tie between the Kurds and other delegates. Furthermore, during the Amasya Meetings in October 1919, the autonomy to be granted to the Kurds was negotiated, and it was declared in Amasya Protocol that the Ottoman country was the territory of both Turks and Kurds (Beşikçi 1992: 381-2). In fact, in his public speeches and declarations on the Republic, Mustafa Kemal referred to the Kurds as one of the peoples of Turkey (see Oran 1996: 210-11; Özoğlu 2005: 205-6). Kurdish tribal leaders took seats in the Turkish parliaments of 1920-22 as representatives of Kurds (see Kirişçi and Winrow 2002: 84; Olson 1991; Watts 1999: 634).

On the other hand, the government reacted harshly to the demands of the leaders of 1920-21 Koçgiri rebellion in Dersim which sought the recognition of Kurdish autonomy by the Ankara government and the withdrawal of all Turkish officials and forces from the Koçgiri region (see Dersimi 1997b: 141-65; McDowall 2004: 185; Olson 1992: 54-61).

Following the Koçgiri rebellion, the government delegated a committee to prepare a report on the question and to submit a resolution concerning the administration of Dersim (Olson ibid: 68-72). The resolution, which proposed among other things an autonomous Kurdish administration and freedom of Kurdish instruction at schools, was discussed in the Turkish parliament in 1922 but never came into force (Mesut 1992: 138-9). In 1922, Gökalp (1992: 115-8) wrote that the Kurdish uprisings should not be seen as revolts against the government or as a struggle to control the region, but rather that they could be considered troubles stemming from the tribal structure of Kurdish society[69].

Kurdish 'troubles' persisted in more severe ways during the 1920s and 1930s, whereas the most remarkable ones were the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Ağrı Revolt (1927-30) and the Dersim Revolt (1937-1938)[70]. The nationalist character of those revolts is disputable because of their connections to the reactions of Kurdish religious leaders to the reforms initiated by the state for the economic modernisation and secularisation of the society (Özoğlu 2005; Keskin 1996; Oran 1993; 1996). According to Oran (1993: 216), on the other hand, the most important confrontation between the state and the Kurdish leaders was about Kurdish political authority over the region since the state had never led a radical reform that aimed to change the economic structure of the region. In addition, Saatci argues, 'the Kurds were facing not only restrictions on religious practices, but also cultural extinction' (2002: 557). Thus, the revolts could be seen as a Kurdish reaction to the Republic's ambition not only to modernise and secularise, but also to homogenise the nation (Bozarslan 1992: 103).

Olson (1992: 233) argues that the Sheikh Said Rebellion, which was primarily organised by the Society for Kurdish Independence, *Azadî* (Freedom) that was established in Erzurum in 1921, was the prototype of Kurdish nationalist revolts[71]. *Azadî* was composed of urbanised elites who

69 Ziya Gökalp was born into a Kurdish family in Diyarbakır and became one of the leading sociologists and theorists that shaped the Turkish nationalist ideology. In passing, it is interesting to note that Gökalp emphasised that 'the Turk who does not love the Kurds is not a Turk while the Kurd who does not love the Turks is not a Kurd' (1992: 118). He also highlighted the support that the Kurdish people gave to the Turks during the Ottoman period, especially during the war for national independence.

70 Gündoğan (1994: 12) notes that official Turkish documents report at least 18 revolts that took place between 1924 and 1938.

71 Nazmi Sevgen defines the Rebellion as 'political underneath religious character' (1992: 24). On the other hand, according to Kalafat (2003: 40), if one comes up with that the Sheikh Said Rebellion had an ethnic character, the ethnicity would be Zaza rather than

not only took political and military leadership, but also created a political and ideological discourse of Kurdish nationalism (Bozarslan 2005: 49). *Azadî* 'marked the real arrival of Kurdish nationalism [which was hitherto confined to the educated notable class in İstanbul] in Turkish Kurdistan' (McDowall 2004: 192). Some of the reasons of the Rebellion were listed by *Azadî* as follows: the deportation of the Kurds to the western parts of Anatolia in exchange of the Turks who were settled in the eastern provinces; the abolishment of the Caliphate; the prohibition of education in Kurdish through the closure of religious schools (*medrese*) and establishment of Turkish-only schools; the change of the geographical names from Kurdish to Turkish; the appointment of exclusively Turkish officials to all high-level administrative posts in the region; the increase in taxes that were not re-invested in the region; and the interference of the government in the political elections in the region (Olson 1992: 74-5; Serdî 1994: 187-9). As McDowall notes, the abolishment of the caliphate 'cut the last ideological tie Kurds felt with Turks' and 'the closure of the religious schools […] removed the last remaining source of education for most Kurds' (2004: 192).

When the Rebellion was repressed and its leaders found themselves faced with the death penalty, the judge accused them of striving for the establishment of Kurdistan (Cemil Paşa 1991: 101; Sasuni 1992: 191). Yeğen (2006a: 131) argues that the speech of the judge represented the construction of the Kurdish identity as the 'other' in the Republic. The Kurdish rebellion was seen as an image representing the Caliphate and the Sultanate that were abolished by the Republic. In fact, the Sheikh himself never accepted the accusation of the court and described his aim as protecting the Sheri'a (Mumcu 1991: 123-30; Gündoğan 2007: 148). According to Maraşlı (1992: 257), the Sheikh's statement clearly indicated the abolition of the agreement between the Kurdish feudalities and the Kemalists, who asked for the support of the former during the First World War in order to protect the Caliphate. McDowall also describes Sheikh Said's idea of Kurdishness as something 'based less on ethnicity *per se* than on Kurdish *religious* particularism' (2004: 198; *italics original*). As Abdülmelik Fırat, grandson of Sheikh Said, points out, 'nationalism and religion could not be isolated from each other in this case' (see Mumcu 1991: 175).

Kurdish since Zazas mostly led the Rebellion. Zaza nationalists, two of whom were interviewed by the author, also share his opinion.

Regardless of its character, the impacts of the Rebellion on the relationship between the Kurds and the Republic were far-reaching. Bozarslan (2006: 116-7) emphasises that the severity of means used to repress the Rebellion signalled the end of the period that Mardin calls an 'implicit agreement' between the core and the periphery (1991: 108). According to Mardin (ibid), rebellions played a role in negotiating the new rules of the power politics between the core and the periphery. However, by using harsh and long-term methods to repress the ideas behind the Rebellion, the Republic eliminated negotiations with the Kurdish leaders and instead sought the direct attachment of Kurdish people to the core by the way of absolute obedience. As Ahmad (2006: 106) notes, 'the Kurdish rebellion' also resulted in the formation of an autocracy while determining the end of the first experiment of multi-party politics – namely the immediate closure of the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, TCF), which was established by the dissidents of Kemalist politics. In passing, it is interesting to note that the program of the TCF, which, in opposition to that of the CHF, emphasised the sovereignty of the people but not of the Turkish nation, indicated that the CHF style of politics was not the only way to be pursued during the establishment period of the Republic (Yeğen 2006a: 125).

Following the Rebellion, the 1925 Eastern Reform Plan (*Şark Islahat Planı*) formulated a law on the deportation of more than a thousand of families to the western provinces in 1927 (see Ülker 2007). Articles 14 and 17 of the Plan penalised speaking in any language other than Turkish and prohibited the use of Kurdish while ensuring Turkish education for the Kurdish women (Bayrak 1993: 486-7)[72]. Some Kurdish elites and military leaders took refuge in Syria and founded a new organisation, the Kurdistan Committee of Independence (*Xoybun)* in Beirut in 1927. *Xoybun* aimed to establish Kurdish national unity and an independent state, and the group organised the Ağrı Revolt in 1927 led by İhsan Nuri Paşa, who had served in the Turkish army during the national independence war (see Sasuni 1992: 200-7; İhsan Nuri Paşa 1992: 29). The Revolt lasted until 1930 when the government blockaded the Kurdish forces with the help of Iranian and Russian states (İhsan Nuri Paşa ibid: 92). İhsan Nuri Paşa (ibid: 110) argues that the Ağrı victory encouraged Turkish nationalists to pursue a harsher assimilation policy towards the Kurds.

72 See also Anter (2007: 31-5) for the troubles that the Kurdish people experienced due to the prohibition of Kurdish in the 1920s.

Kurdish elites continued to work for the Kurdish cause in Syria by publishing the journals *Hawar* (1932-1947) and *Ronahî* (1942-1947). Celadet Ali Bedirhan adjusted Kurdish to the Latin alphabet and published it in *Hawar*[73]. Bozarslan (2002: 850) contends that the adjustment of Kurdish to the Latin alphabet was a sign of the aspiration of Kurdish ex-pat elites to keep alive relations with the Kurds in Turkey and to emulate the Western style of Kemalist Turkish nationalism through the Kurdish nationalist movement[74]. He (2005: 50) further argues that the failure of the Ağrı Revolt led the Kurdish nationalist elite to give priority to the protection and development of Kurdish language and culture. According to Elphinston, although the Kurds asked for an independent Kurdistan, they 'would probably be well content if they … were allowed to live as Kurds, speak Kurdish, use Kurdish as the official language in their primary schools and publish books and newspapers in Kurdish' (1946: 102).

After the Ağrı Revolt, the Turkish government decided to finalise the 'eastern question' through an internal exchange of population between the Kurds and immigrant Turkish-speaking people. The Law on Settlement (*İskan Kanunu*) of 1934 divided the country into four zones: the first zone which included the regions to be intensified by those who had Turkish culture; the second zone which included the regions to be populated by those who had to be assimilated into Turkish culture; the third zone which included the regions to be inhabited by immigrants who had Turkish culture; and the fourth one which included the regions that were forbidden to settle in due to sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and disciplinary reasons (see Bedirhan 1997: 22-4). Except for the second, all zones indicated regions that were already populated by the Kurds, while the second referred to the regions where the Kurds were to be deported (ibid). The Law also prevented those whose mother tongue was not Turkish from establishing villages, districts or artisan/worker groups in their newly-settled areas (ibid: 28). With the task of the Turkification of Kurds, the Law worked to displace the Kurds from Kurdistan and disperse them among the Turks while settling more Turks in Kurdistan (Bedirhan 1992: 83). The Law indirectly served to aid in the collapse of the traditional social

73 The Kurdish Latin alphabet is almost the same as the Turkish Latin alphabet, including the extra letters, 'q, x and w'.

74 However, Ahmadzadeh argues that 'there is some evidence indicating that the idea of using Latin alphabet for Kurdish writing had occurred to Celadet Bedirxan even earlier' through the influence of Major Noel who met Bedirhan in 1919 (2003: 145).

structure of Kurdish society, which was based on the tribal authority and so in rival with the central one (Şahin 2006: 131).

Moreover, those who lived in the mountainous areas of Dersim were deported to Elazığ plain in order 'to transfer the unreliable elements from the places that were hard to control to the areas that were easier to exercise authority upon' by two ministerial decrees in 1930 and 1931 (Ülker 2007). In 1930, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak submitted a report to the government and argued that the dissemination of Turkish language all over the region was necessary in order to prevent the Kurdification of Alevi villages (Kalman 1995: 141-2). Similarly, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya prepared a report on Dersim in 1931, whereby he recommended urgently the opening of schools in the region to ensure Turkish in Dersim and to have Dersim people learn that they were originally Turkish (ibid: 166). The Law on Tunceli in 1935 changed the name of Dersim to Tunceli and reorganised its administration to be governed by a general inspector, Abdullah Alpdoğan, who was entitled with a great military and administrative authority. Alpdoğan reported that the Kurds were actually 'mountain Turks' and the language they spoke was 'the mountain Turkish' (Mumcu 2003: 105). The construction of police stations, the establishment of Turkish schools and the initiation of infrastructure by the inspector in order to control the region were countered by Seyid Rıza and his compatriots, the leaders of the Dersim Revolt (1937-38), with their own demands: opening schools instructing in Kurdish; appointing Kurdish officials to the region; and protecting their traditional social structure (Dersimi 1997: 204; Kalman 1995: 129).

In June 1937 *The Times* reported the statement of Prime Minister İsmet İnönü that 'there was hostility in Tunceli to the introduction of compulsory education' (McDowall 2004: 209). After the revolt was repressed in a highly brutal way in 1938, the report that was submitted to the Parliament by Abidin Özmen, general inspector of Diyarbakır, strongly advised the establishment of boarding schools in the region, whereby Kurdish children could be completely assimilated into Turkish culture, and the prohibition of the Kurdish language at state offices and public houses to oblige the Kurdish people to learn Turkish (Cemil Paşa 1991: 131). Sıdıka Avar, who served as Turkish teacher and manager in boarding schools for girls in Elazığ for twenty years, became one of the symbols of Turkification of Kurds in Dersim (Kalman 1995: 442-51).

The Modernisation Project of Turkey

The Kurdish revolts 'fuelled fears of a division of the republic along the lines of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which promised Kurds a separate state, and therefore encouraged the institutionalisation of authoritarian nationalism' (Watts 1999: 634). In fact, the newly established Republic of Turkey predominantly re-constructed the Kurdish resistance as a question inherited from the Ottoman past. Yeğen (2006a: 140) contends that the primary motive behind the repressive politics of the state during the 1920s and 1930s was the question of the centralisation and consolidation of state power. The policies also defined the Kurdish question as a resistance of tribes or bandits, free from any ethno-political significance. It was the discourse of westernisation/modernisation that led the Republic to perceive the Kurdish resistance as a resistance of pre-modernity and brigands (Yeğen 1999: 563).

This corruptive perception of the Kurdish question was closely connected to the devaluation and marginalisation of the Kurdish people, the physical existence of which was rejected by the Turkish state-discourse until the 1990s. As Yeğen notes, 'whenever the Turkish state spoke on the Kurdish question, it did so without pronouncing the name of "Kurds"' and kept silent on the 'Kurdishness of the Kurdish question' (ibid: 560). Celadet Ali Bedirhan (1992: 19) emphasised this fallacy in his letter to Mustafa Kemal in 1932 when he wrote, '… you always confess this [Kurdistan] question without mentioning this word [Kurdistan]; [although] you give an important place to it in your internal and external politics'[75]. He added that the 'Kurdistan question' was connected in different ways to the understanding and imagination of each period, and appeared in a feudal, sectarian or tribal way; however, 'today's form is a clearly national one, which is the greatest characteristics of our age' (ibid: 20). In this letter, Bedirhan also provided an explanation of the structure and nature of the Kurdish language in order to prove to Mustafa Kemal that Kurdish was a distinct language.

After 1923, Mustafa Kemal started to use the term 'Turkish nation' rather than referring to the 'nation of Turkey', as during the War of Independence (McDowall 2004: 190; Oran 1993: 211). Political, economic and social reforms that were initiated during the first decades of the Republic started

75 For a brief study on this letter, see Gündoğan (2007: 157-9).

to transform radically the traditional structure of society in favour of modernisation and centralisation. This transformation was based on fundamental Kemalist principles such as nationalism, secularism and westernisation (civilisation). The idea of westernisation, in fact, was inherited from Ottoman intellectuals, bureaucrats and military officials, who associated westernisation with civilisation. In this sense, the Kemalist conception of modernisation was part of a previously-initiated project of westernisation in Turkey. What was particular to the Kemalist nation-state project was the reconciliation of territoriality with national identity. In so doing, this project promoted the idea of modern political citizenship, which could not co-exist within the confines of previous allegiances (Grigoriadis 2006: 450). When the new Republic abolished the Caliphate and declared the secular identity of the state, a novel type of political citizenship was created through the rejection of the religious link between the state and its subjects. The political transition from the Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of the Republic brought a transformation of identity from one that was based on the religious definition of *millet* into one that was based on ethnic origins and a state of belonging for the Turkish nation (Özdoğan 2002: 55). Indeed, Kemalist nationalism aimed to shift the loyalty of the people away from the religious figure and motif of the Sultan (Caliph) and his lower level representatives, towards a secular and central national authority. What the Republic did was to 'separate the political from the social and religious' (Grigoriadis 2006: 450). In short, the Kemalist project attempted to replace a backward, religious and heterogeneous empire with a modern, secular and homogeneous nation-state. Thus the most important barriers to the success of westernised, centralised and secularised nation-state were traditionalism, decentralism and Islam (Yeğen 1999: 559).

This modernist, centralist and secularist project challenged directly the authority of religious and tribal Kurdish chiefs, who became anxious about losing their regional, economic and political power. Powerfully, the religious and tribal Kurdish chiefs were political figures representing Kurdishness. More particularly, as the main milieu of autonomous social situations, the tribe was a public sphere where Kurdishness was constructed and resisted (Yeğen 2006a: 244). In this sense, the resistance of the Kurdish religious and tribal chiefs gained an ethno-political nature (ibid). Beyond the Kurdish chiefs, therefore, it was the Kurdish identity which became 'one of the victims of the political project of building a modern, central, and secular nation-state, the necessary condition of which

was the exclusion of religion, tradition and the periphery' (Yeğen 1999: 567). Therefore, what made Kurdishness the 'other' of Turkishness was the incompatibility of Kurdish sociality, which clashed directly with the fundamental elements and aims of the Turkish modernisation project (Şahin 2006: 125). One of the most important sites of socialisation for the Kurds, namely the religious schools teaching the Kurdish language as a medium, was targeted by the Turkish modernisation (secularism, centralism and nationalism) project, which sought to undermine the consciousness of Kurdishness itself (see Gündoğan 2009). Yet Kurdishness was not delimited by the reference points that were in opposition to the Turkish modernisation and nationalisation. Put simply, Kurdishness was not simply composed of religiosity and traditionalism (see Gündoğan ibid). It would be too unsophisticated to think that the problem for the Kurds was modernisation itself. As Bedirhan (quoted in Bayrak 1994: 68) stated, the Kurds had never accepted such modernisation, which sought the assimilation and abolishment of Kurds through cruel methods. The modernisation project included the nationalist policies of the Republic, which ambitiously postulated Turkishness as a shared identity of solidarity.

In fact, the word 'Turk' did not refer to any superior political or social attribute in the stratification of the Ottoman society until the late 1800s (Saatci 2002: 554). As Özdoğan clarifies, '"Turk" generally meant the Turkish-speaking Muslims within the borders of the Empire' and the Ottoman elite used the term, which was alluding to illiterate peasants, in derogatory terms (2002: 55-6). 'Turk' was not the subject of a common identity in the Ottoman society (ibid). Turkism as a political movement emerged during the last ten years of the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to both the irredentist nationalisms of various ethnic groups within the territories of the Empire, and the loss of territories that limited the Empire to Anatolia (ibid: 40). The idea of Turkishness that was nourished from studies of history, culture and language of Turkic peoples was disseminated among the intelligentsia and served the Republic to create the Turkish nation and national identity. The criterion of Turkish ethnic identity excluded not only such many Muslim non-Turkish speaking communities such as the Laz and Kurds, but also non-Turkish-speaking Muslim migrants, who came from the ex-Ottoman territories, like the Cherkesians (ibid: 82)[76].

76 As Oran (1993: 209) explains, although the Cherkesians, Laz, and the Kurds are common in speaking different languages other than Turkish, the former two have never

This multi-ethnic structure of the Anatolian territory, on the other hand, did not allow the State to refer exclusively to the Turkish ethnic identity, but rather obliged it to put an emphasis upon a cultural identity. Moreover, the diversity of languages in Anatolia was an obstacle to the construction of a homogeneous cultural identity that would become the basis of a national one. Thus, the imposition of Turkish language became the most significant instrument of the state for creating a Turkish national identity. The new link between the state, its citizens and the national identity was enforced by the obligation of Turkish as the national language, whose alphabet replaced Arabic letters with the Latin script in November 1928. The Latin script was introduced not only to undermine the power of religious leaders in the society, but also to break ties with the Ottoman past in order to accelerate the reforms in favour of westernisation (Oran 1993: 201). Furthermore, the expected increase of literacy was supposed to serve the construction and spread of the concept of nation (ibid). In this respect, the alphabet reform was both one of the most important symbols of the modern and secular Kemalist project, as well as a political sign of the significance of language in building a new Turkish nation. Atatürk emphasised the importance of Turkish as follows: 'The Turkish language is also a sacred treasure for the Turkish nation because the Turkish nation knows that its moral values, customs, memories, interests, in short, everything that makes it a nation was preserved through its language despite the endless catastrophes it has experienced' (quoted in Virtanen 2003: 13). He clearly highlighted the connection between language and nation when he stated: 'The one who says I am belonging to the Turkish nation should firstly and necessarily speak Turkish. If the one who does not speak Turkish asserts her/his commitment to the Turkish culture, community, it is not much correct to believe in her/him' (quoted in Oran 1993: 203). This statement, among others, marked the status of non-Turkish speakers as potential foes in the service of external enemies (Bozarslan 2006: 107).

During the nation-building process of the 1930s, ethnic and linguistic studies were also institutionalised by the state. In 1931, the Society for the Study of Turkish History (*Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*) was established, and morphed into the Turkish Historical Foundation (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*, TTK) in 1935. The aim of the TTK was to systematise the previous romantic and pragmatic writings of Turkish history in order to ensure

seen as a problem for the national unity because they were highly incorporated to the economic system of the Empire.

a national education in the service of political aims (Ersanlı 2006: 113-5). After the second congress on Turkish history in 1937, scholars consolidated the basic premise of the official history thesis, arguing that the Turks – as a racially superior people and as the ancestors of all brachycephalic nations – had succeeded in establishing all great civilisations of human history (Ersanlı ibid: 143-5, 225-9; Çağaptay 2002: 246). Ersanlı (ibid: 231) argues that the official thesis on Turkish history became a means for the political power to achieve its short-term objectives, one of which was to build a homogeneous nation that had a common and undisputed history. Languages other than Turkish were seen as elements blocking the 'creation and dissemination of a hegemonic historiography' (Öktem 2004). Therefore, in 1932 the Society for the Study of Turkish Language (*Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*) was founded and changed into the Turkish Language Institution (*Türk Dil Kurumu*, TDK) in 1936. The aim of the TDK was to reveal the genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language and to promote it to the high position it deserved among the languages of world (Çağaptay 2002: 250). The Sun Language Theory, which put forward the idea that the Turkish language was the source of all world languages, was the peak of such endeavours. Moreover, the Turkish language was purified from the Arabic and Persian words that represented the Islamic and 'backward' Ottoman past.

The 1930 report of Hasan Reşit Tankut, one of the founders of the TDK and an MP until 1960, is useful to understand the role of Turkish language in nation-building in Turkey (Bayrak 1994: 218-20). Tankut drew attention to the potential of 'the moths that corroded the linguistic unity' to be assimilated into the Turkish language when he emphasised that those Kurds who live in rural areas were stubborn to keep their language while children of those Kurds 'who came to *our country* and settled in cities' completely became Turkish speakers (quoted in Bayrak ibid: 209; *italics added*). The campaign of 'Citizen, Speak Turkish', which was led by the Union of Turkish National Students (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) in İstanbul and disseminated all over the country in 1935 is also noteworthy (Çağaptay 2002: 260)[77].

Çağaptay (ibid: 258) argues that language, not race, was at the centre of nationalist policies of the state in the 1930s because the ethnic diversity of the country could not be unified otherwise. On the other hand,

77 In fact, the Society of Law Students in İstanbul initiated the campaign in 1928, especially against non-Muslim groups (see Sadoğlu 2003: 283).

Sadoğlu (2003: 278) contends that Kemalist nationalism was not a linguistic nationalism, but rather considered language the most effective means of nationalisation. He (ibid: 275) notes that the 1924 Constitution kept the understanding of 1876 Constitution, wherein the Turkish language was mentioned only two times, namely, as the official language of the state (Article 2) and as a requirement to be elected for the parliament (Article 12). As Yeğen (2006a: 120) rightly argues, however, Article 12 actually closed the Parliament to the Kurds, who would resist forgetting, delaying or cancelling their identity and language. In fact, Sadoğlu (2003: 276) acknowledges that Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, which called everyone in Turkey Turk without consideration of religion and race with regard to citizenship, was already indifferent and intolerant to languages other than Turkish[78]. The exception, of course, was for languages of non-Muslims, whose linguistic rights were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (1923).

The articles of the founding treaty of the Republic, namely the Lausanne Treaty, are significant to understand the approach of the Republic towards the minority issue. In the third section entitled 'Protection of Minorities' (Articles 37-44), the rights of non-Muslim minorities were particularly regulated, while Articles 38, 39 and 40 were devoted to non-Turkish Muslim groups[79]. Bedirhan (quoted in Bayrak 1994: 94) wrote in 1930 that the

78 Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution reads, 'The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion' (see Earle 1925: 98).

79 Article 38: The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

Article 39: Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries. No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given

Kurds had the right to enjoy their rights guaranteed by these Articles of the Lausanne Treaty. However, the Treaty lacked clear wording that easily served the interests of such non-Turkish Muslim minorities as the Kurds. Moreover, Lazarev (1989: 260-9) argues that the Lausanne Conference delegates discussed the situation of the Kurds in Iraq but not in Turkey due to the English interest in the Mosul question. Indeed, the attendance to the Lausanne Conference of a Kurdish delegate, Hamit Zülfü Tigrel (who represented the desire of Kurdish people to live together with Turks), made it difficult to argue that the Treaty dealt with the rights of the Kurds in Turkey (see Ekinci 2000: 141). The records of Parliament include telegrams from Kurdish tribal chiefs, who declared that there was no question of Kurdistan and that the Kurds only accepted the Ankara Government as their representative at the Conference of London in 1921 (Gülmez 1992: 230-4). The Turkish delegation stated that they were representing not only the Turks but also the Kurds, who were the founding elements of Turkey and did not need special rights[80]. Therefore, the efforts of reinterpreting the Treaty in favour of the Kurds are irrelevant today, whereas the Republic's attempt to deny the linguistic rights of the Kurds based on the 'founding' Treaty conflicts with the understanding of contemporary minority rights.

On the grounds of the Treaty, the Republic sets interpretative declarations or reservations on the relevant articles of international documents it signed, which made these articles void (Oran 2004: 64)[81]. The basis behind the Republic's conception of 'minority' was the distinction between

to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

Article 40: Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. URL: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne [26 September 2007]. However, none of the Articles of the third section was properly implemented by the Republic (see Oran 2004: 61-80).

80 For the records of the sub-commission on minorities, see Meray (1970: 178-340).

81 Lausanne Treaty has always been mentioned in the Regular Reports of the European Commission on Turkey as an obstacle to the progress in the protection of minority rights. For example 2002 Regular Report reads: 'When ratifying the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Turkey issued a reservation to Article 27… this reservation provides that this right [the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language] … will be interpreted and applied in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Turkish Constitution and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne'.

Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the Treaty. This distinction may be perceived as a kind of *millet* system in the sense that Muslim and Turkish identities were intertwined against the non-Muslim identity, which could not be assimilated into 'Turkishness'. The non-Turkish Muslim groups were accepted as communities that could be assimilated into Turkishness on the basis of common cultural and religious values. While the Republic rejected the religious link between the state and citizens, it preferred to invoke religion as a factor constituting Turkish identity (Özbudun 1998: 154). Ironically, the Republic, which attempted to build a nation free from religious identities, inherited the Ottoman understanding of minority (Özoğlu 2003: 209). This heritage inevitably clashed with the secular and modern character of the Republic. This clash mostly reflected on the Kurds: the religious aspect of Kurdishness was included, while its linguistic and cultural, or 'ethnic', aspects were excluded from Turkish national identity.

Ahmad (2006: 100) argues that the Kemalist understanding of nationalism has never been ethnic because Turkish citizenship is premised on living within the state whose borders were set by the National Pact of 1920. Although the Kemalist project seemed not to emphasise the ethnic aspect of Turkishness in the beginning, the aim of cultural homogenisation created a common sense of Turkish citizenship, which lost its civic character over time. As Özdoğan notes, the civic departure of the Republic, which was based on 'a non-exclusionary principle of territorially defined citizenship', was undermined by its emphasis on a Muslim and primarily Turkish identity (1999). The understanding of citizenship acquired a nationalist character by a systematic acculturation policy of the Republic (Üstel 1996: 31). In short, as Ergil recapitulates, the nation-building project of the Republic 'calls for standardizing the citizenry to make them Turkish in language and nationality, secular in orientation, and obedient to the state' (2000: 123). Such rigid attempts to reshape the country are the characteristics of an authoritarian-based modernism led by progressive but non-democratic elites (Scott 1998: 7; quoted in Watts 1999: 633-4). The Kurdish question could be defined as the question set by non-democratic elites of the republican Turkey, who both excluded any kind of identity and belonging other than Turkishness and included only Turkishness in history, culture and education, prohibiting the symbolic resources of other groups (Bozarslan 2002: 841).

Nationalism as Statecraft

The most important instrument that the non-democratic Turkish state elites had acquired during the establishment of the Republic was idea of nationalism, which required the consolidation and dissemination of a society homogenised through modernisation, secularisation, westernisation and industrialisation. Those requirements, however, were directly at odds with the Kurdish agricultural community led by a traditional group of chiefs and religious leaders. In this respect, the Kurdish revolts reflect the struggle between Turkish and Kurdish elites for the hegemony over the Kurdish people (Gündoğan 2009). However, every attempt by the Turkish elite to eliminate the hegemony of the Kurdish elite over the Kurdish people also aimed to destroy the political, economic and social elements of Kurdishness, as well as the consciousness of Kurdishness among the people. These elements implicitly composed the state discourse, which utilised the notions of modernism, secularism and civilisation (westernisation) as the weapons of war to gain control over the Kurdish people. These weapons were also used in the 'national' war against tradition, feudalism, religion and backwardness, which were represented by Kurdishness. It is not so striking that the Kurdish language, the most easily detectable aspect of Kurdishness, was subject to the 'non-democratic' policies of the state, which put Turkish language (the strongest symbol of national identity and state authority) in the service of nation and state building.

In this respect, language constituted one of the sites of struggle between the majority and the minority during the establishment of the Republic. The more the Republic became Turkish, the more the Kurdish language (and culture) was marginalised. This marginalisation has been seen as the 'question' to be solved by the violence of law, and is therefore kept at the periphery. The centre, the public sphere of individual citizens and the private sphere of majorities are closed to the periphery (i.e. the public and private sphere of minority communities). These constructed binary oppositions curtain the penetration of the periphery into the centre which is never as limited as it ought to be, or, which is sometimes less limited than it is planned to be. What is relevant for Kurds in Turkey, especially since the 1960s, is the combination of the two.

CHAPTER FIVE

Dilemma of Being Kurdish in the Political Life of Turkey

The previous chapter examined the historical and political background of Kurdish linguistic rights within the framework of Turkish nationalism as statecraft. In this chapter, the examination is continued in light of the response of the Kurdish community to the democratisation process in Turkey, which started in the 1950s. The first section examines the democratisation process in Turkey between the 1960s and 1990s with special reference to the Kurdish presence in mainstream political parties and clandestine Kurdish political movements in Turkey. The problematic existence of Kurdish political parties in Turkish political life since the 1990s is discussed in the second section. The new parameter, namely, Turkey's accession process to the EU, is added to the discussion through an examination of Turkey's EU harmonisation process with regard to the Kurdish linguistic rights in the third section. Finally, the fourth section analyses the reflections of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey on the impact of Turkey's EU harmonisation process on the Kurdish linguistic rights. This analysis also includes the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals to the binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere that are constructed by the nationalist discourse in Turkey.

Democratisation in Turkey

The regions that were inhabited by the Kurds remained economically underdeveloped, while western parts of Turkey were rapidly industrialised due to the national policy of economic consolidation during the 1950s. The state policies of economic consolidation in the 1950s transformed the Turkish state discourse into one that explains the Kurdish question as a question of regional 'backwardness' and the non-integration of the region to the national market (Yeğen 1999: 564). The discourse of economic backwardness, in fact, was similar to the discourse of 'pre-modern and outlaw community', in that both were 'silent on the ethno-political aspect of the Kurdish question' (ibid: 565). What remained intact was the exclusion of the Kurdish identity from the definition of the question. In this respect, it is not surprising that Kurdish economic and political elites (namely the aghas), who were less interested in Kurdishness, were incorporated into the mainstream social structure in the 1950s by 'the reconciliatory and inclusive policies of the Democrat Party [DP] as a part of its liberal economic agenda' (Saatci: 2002: 558). On the other hand, fifty Kurdish students and intellectuals in İstanbul and Ankara were arrested in 1959 and convicted of threatening the unity of the state. *49'lar* never admitted establishing an organisation, though they defended the Kurdish cause during the hearings (Gündoğan 2007: 160-3)[82]. *49'lar* case signalled a new period in the history of Kurdish movement that would be led by a 'new group of intelligentsia, rejecting to be integrated into the existing political system' (Aksoy 2006: 188; Kutlay 2006: 159; Özdoğan 1999). In this period, Bozarslan (2005: 55) argues, 'Kurdish history writing' became the milieu for constructing a Kurdish nation and having a Kurdish state, and started to replace the political and military struggles of the previous period. In the subsequent periods, however, both pen and sword would be used simultaneously.

Following the military coup of 1960, which overthrew the DP government, fifty-five Kurdish aghas who had supported the government were exiled to the western parts of the country. The military regime in 1961 systematically started to change Kurdish place names into Turkish and establish regional boarding schools in order to assimilate the Kurdish population[83].

82 One of them, Emin Batu died in prison and the case was called the *49'lar*.

83 As Öktem notes, 'while by 1968, some 12,000 out of a total of approximately 40,000 village names had been changed to Turkish, the Ministry of the Interior published a

Hasan Reşit Tankut underlined in his 1961 report that 'eastern and south-eastern question today is as delicate as it was in 1913-14' (Bayrak 1994: 218-20). On the other hand, the 1961 Constitution provided a relatively democratic base for political expressions all over the country, and Kurds found an opportunity to increase their voice by establishing associations. This exceptional period was a reflection in Turkey of actions of the leftist and youth movements in the world. The Kurdish movements diversified when socialist Kurdish leaders emulated some of those movements that had been led mainly by traditional chiefs until that time.

During the 1960s, therefore, a clear ideological division emerged among politically active Kurds, whereby 'a Marxist wing cooperated with ideological brethren of Turkish origin … while a more traditionally nationalistic wing identified closely with Barzani's KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq]' (Cornell 2001: 38). The traditional wing was represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey, (*Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi*, TKDP), founded in 1965 by 'the urbanized members of the traditional upper classes', who wrote in the party programme that the Party would struggle in a 'peaceful, democratic, humanitarian and republican way' within the territorial integrity of the state (Gündoğan 2002: 29, 22; Epözdemir 2005: 17-18)[84]. The TKDP was closed in 1968 and its members were charged with plotting an independent state of Kurdistan in collaboration with administers of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq and Syria (Epözdemir ibid: 93). The TKDP was also accused of demanding a 'Federal Republic of Kurdistan' because of a letter written by Mustafa Remzi Bucak to the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1963[85]. In this letter, Bucak (1991) made a comparison between the rights of the Turkish-speaking community in Cyprus and the Kurds in Turkey, and proposed a federative administration for the Kurdish region in which education would be in Kurdish.

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guide with 1,819 new topographic names, which had been Turkified between 1965 and 1975' (2004). He adds that these 'toponymical strategies of renaming' were justified in the official publications 'that "foreign" place names have to be abrogated, as it was considered inappropriate to maintain these names on "Turkish soil"' (ibid).

84 The TKDP is often confused with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Turkey (*Türkiye'de Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi*, T-KDP), which was founded in Iraq in 1969 by Sait Kızıltoprak (Dr. Şivan) as a reaction to the inefficiency of the TKDP.

85 Mustafa Remzi Bucak was the uncle of Faik Bucak, who was the first president of the Party.

Cornell (2001: 38) argues that the Kurdish socialists did better than the right-wing Kurdish nationalists due to the intellectual and numerical power of the socialists in the large cities of Turkey. Indeed, the Kurdish left that collaborated with the Turkish socialists, especially with the Worker's Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) found many more opportunities to express their demands, including the economic and social improvement of the 'eastern Anatolia'[86]. The socialist Kurdish members of TİP, namely the Group of Easterners (*Doğulular Grubu*), were more active than the 'patriots' led by the traditionalist TKDP during the populist demonstrations in 1967, called 'Eastern Meetings (*Doğu Mitingleri*). The demonstrations against the economic and social backwardness of the region and the discrimination of the Kurdish people became the first mass protest movements since the last Kurdish resistance in 1938[87]. The demonstrations also 'signalled the critical shift in social mobilization away from the aghas and semi-tribal peasantry toward urban-based, modestly educated students and young professionals', who 'formed the basis of a bourgeois intellectual leadership, largely of mildly leftist inclination, for growing Kurdish national feeling' (McDowall 2004: 410). In fact, the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism 'did not begin among the rural Kurds who had been relatively little assimilated, but precisely among the most assimilated and integrated of the Kurds, the most highly educated. Ironically, it may have been their Turkish nationalist education that turned them into Kurdish nationalists' (Bruinessen 1997b).

This resurgence was embodied in the Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*, DDKOs) that were founded in 1969 by the Kurdish university students[88]. The DDKOs marked a shift in the leadership of the struggle for Kurdish identity, from traditional cadres to modern and secular ones (Kutlay 2002: 569-70). Moreover, the emergence of the DDKOs corresponded to the beginning of a separation

86 The TİP was closed immediately when it acknowledged the Kurdish question in its fourth congress in 1970.

87 Demonstrations were organised in order to protest the commando corps that were suspected of torture and oppression in the region during their operations against villages that were accused of involvement with smuggling or of aiding the Barzani movement in Iraq (Bozarslan 1992: 104). Those who attended the meetings further noted that the articles published in Turkish nationalist journals, namely *Ötüken* and *Milli Yol*, also agitated the Kurdish young and fuelled the meetings (Şemikanlı 2006: 79; Karadoğan 2006: 261-73).

88 The DDKOs were established in İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Silvan, Ergani, Kozluk and Batman (Kutlay 2002: 569-80).

of the Kurdish left from its Turkish counterpart, which degraded nationalist tendencies and disallowed the Kurdish socialists to have a separate organisation for defending the rights of the Kurdish people (Beşikçi 2006: 112-3; Kutschera 1994: 13; Bozarslan 1992: 101; Şemikanli 2006: 85)[89]. Finally, the Kurdish movement in Turkey, which was previously limited to the Kurdish intelligentsia and local leaders, entered into a new stage by the 1960s, when for the first time it expanded over mass base in towns and adopted a Leftist discourse (Özdoğan 1999). The modernist leftist Kurdish leadership struggled to organise and to politicise the illiterate masses in favour of a radical change in the social structure (Hassanpour 2005a: 137)[90]. Therefore, the discourses of modernism, nationalism and socialism in the late 1960s and early 1970s served to weaken the traditional and religious social structure of the Kurdish community (Gündoğan 1999: 9).

The military memorandum/coup of 1971 interrupted the democratic period enjoyed by the Kurdish and socialist fractions. The members of the DDKOs, like many Turkish leftists, were jailed on charges of betraying the state and dividing the nation. Indictments by military prosecutors stated that the Kurdish language was merely a primitive dialect of Turkish language, and that the Kurds were originally Turkish (Kotan 2007: 62). When Mehdi Zana insisted on speaking Kurdish in court, he was seen to be speaking in a language that could not be understood, even though the language he spoke had been considered previously a dialect of Turkish (Beşikçi 1991b: 138)[91]. Similarly, Mehmed Uzun (2001: 74-5) tells of when he suddenly started to speak Kurdish at the court in 1976 in order to persuade the judge that the Kurdish language was a distinct language

89 The only exception to this dominant approach was Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, a member of the Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP) in the 1930s, who recognised the Kurds as a distinct nation and Kurdistan as a unique colony, and suggested the establishment of a communist party of Kurdistan to be guided by the TKP (Güneyli 1999; Kayaoğlu 2006).

90 Hassanpour (2005a: 138) argues that in the 1960s, modern Kurdish nationalism metamorphosed into a coherent system of thought, *Kurdayetî*, which implies a secular nationalist struggle for the elimination of the oppression of the Kurds and the unification of all the parts of Kurdistan under an independent Kurdish state. *Kurdayetî* could be seen, in Bozarslan's (2002: 843) words, as a type of nationalism divided in practice but unified in imagination, because all Kurdish movements perceived Kurdishness in a similar modern way via a common map, a common founding myth (Kawa), a common national day (Newroz), a common national anthem (Ey Reqib) and a common history (ibid).

91 Mehdi Zana was the former mayor of Diyarbakır and imprisoned for speaking Kurdish with his staff.

but not a dialect of Turkish. In reply to the arguments and charges of military prosecutors, some defendants of the DDKOs pleaded their case with two independent texts that were read during the tribunals. Both focused on the status and structure of the Kurdish language, as well as works of Kurdish literature that proved the existence of a Kurdish language distinctive in grammar and vocabulary from the Turkish language (Kutlay 2002: 572-3). The texts were taken from prisons by lawyers and distributed to the groups who would then play an important role in subsequent Kurdish movements (Gündoğan 2007: 193). The Kurdish people were constructed as historical subjects of the Kurdish social movement in the texts, and so the latter fuelled the imagination of a Kurdish nation (ibid: 195). In this respect, the texts could be seen as a discourse of history writing that was deliberately prepared by the Kurdish nationalist elites (Bozarslan 2005: 59). On the other hand, Bozarslan argues that until 1970, Kurdish demands were mostly concerned with integration and civic and social rights rather than separation and 'the recognition of a specific national identity' (1992: 99-100). Indeed, the DDKO defendants who insisted on their socialist identities preferred to use the term Kurdish 'people' but not 'nation' in their defences (Gündoğan 2007: 200). Nevertheless, as the first collective defence, the DDKO's defence played a significant role not only in the establishment of Kurdish movements in the mid-1970s, but also in the construction of a Kurdish identity (ibid: 190-1).

When the Kurdish socialists were finally released through the general amnesty in 1974, many had become more ruptured from the Turkish political left in favour of a more nationalised Kurdish socialism (Gündoğan 2002: 33). Members of the Turkish left argued that a separate Kurdish movement was disruptive and detrimental to the commitment of socialists to a revolution that would undermine the source of such 'national' questions[92]. In response, Kurdish socialists accused their Turkish counterparts of being prisoners of the nationalist ideology of Kemalism. On the other hand, Bruinessen (2000a: 93-4) argues that the Kurdish organisations of the 1960s and 1970s (except for the TKDP) were also strongly influenced by Kemalist thought. It seems, however, that what separated the Kurdish socialists from their Turkish counterparts was partly the anti-Kemalist stance that the former started to take. In this respect, 'the post-Kemalist

92 The only exception to this general understanding was *Kurtuluş*, which recognised the Kurds as a separate nation having the right to self-determination (see Bruinessen 1993: 347).

Kurdish movements' (Bozarslan 1992: 101), most of which were subsets of the DDKOs frustrated in big cities and appealed to the Kurdish workers and peasants in rural areas during the mid-1970s[93]. The commonality of all these movements was their understanding of the Kurdish problem as a shift from an issue of regional underdevelopment to 'a national (later colonial) problem in which a "policeman of global imperialism" dominated an oppressed nation with the aid of local collaborators' (ibid).

The most significant movement, which was not directly derived from the DDKOs, was the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, PKK), which emerged under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. PKK described itself as a revolutionary, national socialist liberation movement who rejected any compromise with both Turkish and Kurdish political groups and the then-prevailing political regime. Therefore, the most striking struggle of the PKK was that against the Kurdish tribal and religious chiefs – those who had collaborated with the right-wing Turkish political parties since the 1950s. The PKK used the argument that Kurdish chiefs in parliament were committed to the mainstream policies of their political parties rather than the struggle for the interests of Kurdish people. This rhetoric was used to organise the Kurdish people against both the Republic and the Kurdish chiefs[94].

The military coup of 1980 re-established control over the country and, unlike earlier interventions, was determined not only to restore the state authority, but also to restructure the political and economic system (Kılıç 1998: 92)[95]. Repressing all democratic expressions, particularly the socialist

93 Besides the conservative TKDP that re-emerged, socialist Kurdish movements were mainly comprised of the Association of Revolutionary Democratic Culture (*Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneği*, DDKD); the Party of Socialist Kurdistan (PSK)/the Road of Liberation (*Partîya Sosyalîst a Kurdîstan*/*Türkiye Kürdistanı Sosyalist Partisi* (TKSP)/*Özgürlük Yolu*); Liberation (*Rızgari*; also the name of the journal published in the Kurdish language); The Flag of Liberation (*Ala Rızgari*); *Kawa* (a legendary blacksmith's name in Kurdish); *Dengê Kawa* (the voice of Kawa); *Tekoflin* (the Struggle) and the National Liberators of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluş*, KUK; separated from the TKDP in 1977), all which were abolished by the military coup of 1980 (see Gündoğan 2002: 3).

94 On the other hand, 'the PKK operated with fine calculation, exploiting blood feuds where they existed, helping to create them where they did not' rather than attacking the tribal chiefs as a whole (McDowall 2004: 421). The PKK's 'revolutionary violence' was not limited to Kurdish tribal leaders, but rather included other leftist Kurdish groups seeking to gain the control of Kurdish movement (Kılıç 1998: 103).

95 Furthermore, the military utilised Islam in order to achieve a national unity that was damaged by the social fractions before the coup (see Kılıç 1998: 102).

and Kurdish ones, the military administration (1980-3) banned strictly the use of Kurdish language through Law No. 2932 (dated 1983) concerning Publications and Broadcasts in Languages other than Turkish (*Türkçe'den Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayın Hakkında Kanun*). The law prohibited 'the declaration, circulation and publication of ideas in a language which is not the first official language of a State recognised by Turkey', and remained in force until 1991. The assimilation of Kurdish children into the Turkish language was fostered through the dissemination of compulsory schooling[96]. The Kurdish names of villages that remained intact after the changes of the 1960s were adjusted into Turkish. Kurdish families were forced to give Turkish names to their children. As a result, unrest increased within the Kurdish community and became more unified as a nationalist cause centring around the PKK (Oran 1996: 33-46).

The wholesale repression of the democratic elements of the Kurdish movement resulted in the survival of the PKK as the only organisation capable of organising the Kurds (Bozarslan 2002: 860; Bruinessen 2000a: 98). The military coup eliminated 'the more intellectual, urban, and educated members of the Kurdish independence movement', giving the floor to 'younger, inexperienced, resentful, and adventurist rural cadres' who were more responsive to the use of violence (Ergil 2000: 126). Using the strengths of those social and military conditions, the PKK declared armed struggle against the Republic in 1984 with its first armed assault on Turkish armed forces. The army retaliated, and the conflict turned into a spiral of violence between the two. Some Kurdish 'village guards' were recruited as auxiliaries of the army, who were attacked by the PKK as collaborators of the state. The PKK's brutality was not limited to the village guards, but also included those who did not support the PKK's activities. Kurdish civilians were the primary victims of the mushrooming violence because they were caught between the PKK and the Turkish military, both of whom penalised those who did not side with them (Ergil 2000: 128). As a result, the PKK directed violence towards the people for whom it was struggling[97].

İçduygu *et al.* (1999: 999) explain this brutality as 'a strategic interest in promoting an environment of insecurity', which provided the politicisa-

96 In fact, the number of regional boarding schools remarkably increased during the 1960s and 1970s (Rohat 1992; Günel 2006: 329-36).

97 For details of the brutality toward Kurdish civilians and within the PKK against its internal dissidents, see Radu (2001: 50-1).

tion of identity by increasing the polarisation and resentment against the state. This explains why support for the PKK continued despite the disappointment of the Kurdish people with the PKK. PKK activism grew rapidly in size and popularity, gaining both physical and psychological tools and boosting the Kurdish community's sense of political identity and nationalism throughout the early 1990s. The counter-brutality of state forces, particularly the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and torture, increased the cooperation between the Kurds and the PKK in the eastern parts of Turkey (McDowall 1992: 20). The Republic tended to equate all expressions of Kurdishness with support for the PKK movement. Therefore, the militarily bi-polarised structure increasingly eliminated the civil sphere and marginalised both Kurdish and Turkish moderate standpoints during the 1990s[98].

Kurdish Political Parties

The 1990s were also notable in that legal Kurdish political movements appeared in 'Turkish' politics. In 1990, the People's Labour Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*, HEP) was established as a Kurdish political party by eleven members of Parliament who were expelled from or left the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*, SHP). The SHP expelled seven Kurdish deputies because of their participation in the first international conference on the Kurdish issue in Paris in 1989. The HEP, which had difficulty maintaining the 10% electoral threshold for winning seats at the parliament, and the SHP, which lost considerable support in the southeast after expelling its Kurdish deputies, made an electoral pact during the 1991 national election[99]. When the deputies of the HEP took the oath of office in Kurdish, they were accused of inciting separatist prop-

98 In passing, it is interesting to note the role of the inscription of nationalist symbols, 'which places the geography firmly in the temporal order of the nation-state', in the rise of polarisation: 'Throughout the republican era, hills were inscribed with the crescent and star, the symbol of the Turkish nation, and slogans such as "Happy, who calls himself a Turk" (*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*). During the Kurdish conflict of the1980s, hundreds of such inscriptions and signs were installed all over the Southeast, especially in areas which were considered non-loyal to the state' (Öktem 2004).

99 Although the Kurdish political parties obtained the majority of the votes in the southeastern Turkey, the votes could not reach the Parliament because of this national electoral barrier.

aganda and of being fellows of the PKK. In expectation of the closure of the HEP, which was banned in 1993, a new pro-Kurdish political party, the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*, DEP) was founded in the same year. According to Barkey (1998: 130), the HEP, whose first president was a Turkish politician (Fehmi Işıklar), made an effort to work beyond ethnicities whereas the DEP, especially after the failure of the 1993 PKK ceasefire, became increasingly more outspoken[100]. Moreover, members of the DEP were critical of attempts to establish moderate Kurdish political parties because they were seen to damage the unity of Kurdish public opinion (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 153).

Finally, the Turkish government saw the DEP as an extension of the PKK, and as a result, parliament revoked the legislative immunity of some of its MPs, many leading figures of whom were jailed in 1994[101]. Some senior officers of the DEP established the Kurdistan Parliament-in-Exile in Brussels in 1994, which was also accused of being a PKK-dominated organisation. Shortly before the interdiction of the DEP in 1994, the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, HADEP) was established, though it received only 4.2 percent of the national vote cast, failing to win any seat at the Parliament in the national election in December 1995. According to Yavuz, most Kurds in western cities did not vote for the HADEP because 'the Kurds ha[d] developed multiple loyalties and "Kurdishness" ha[d] not been the only identity that shape[ed] their conduct' (1998: 19). Grigoriadis (2006: 451) argues that Kurdish migrants who benefited from the economic prosperity in the big cities tended to follow voting patterns of the Turkish majority. On the other hand, the Kurdish votes for mainstream Turkish political parties decreased in the 1995 election due to the radicalisation of the Kurdish question (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 146-52). Therefore, the HADEP won 37 municipalities in south-eastern cities in 1999, including the office of mayor in metro-

100 When the PKK declared ceasefire in 1993, Öcalan listed their demands as the cultural freedom of Kurds and broadcasting in Kurdish; the abolishment of village guards system and emergency legislation in the region; and the recognition of the political rights of Kurdish organisations (McDowall 2004: 437). However, these demands were not taken into account seriously by the government, who interpreted the ceasefire as a sign of weakness of the organisation. To the contrary, the PKK increased its attacks in metropolises and took the absolute control of some parts in the southeast region throughout 1994. The PKK repeated ceasefires in 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2006.

101 Following the decision of the state, in accordance with the decision of ECtHR, to recognise their right to re-trial, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, Selim Sadak and Leyla Zana were released after a 10 years imprisonment.

politan Diyarbakır. However, three mayors were accused of having links to the PKK and imprisoned in 2000, and the Constitutional Court banned the HADEP in 2003.

Barkey argues that although the Turkish public and media equally sentenced all three parties to the failure of being critical to the PKK, there were differences among them in their approaches towards the PKK, noting 'it was also difficult for any of these parties to distance themselves too much from the PKK given the extensive support for the organization within the politicised Kurdish population of Turkey' (1998: 130). Because of the long-standing conflict between the state and the PKK, 'many HADEP supporters have family members who have either joined the PKK or are in jail for supporting the PKK' (ibid: 136). In short, as Ergil (2000: 129) notes, all three Kurdish parties were inevitably subjected to the PKK's influence because of their same popular base. This interpretation also holds true for the Democratic People Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, DEHAP), which was established in 1997, and which became the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP) in 2005. In the general elections of July 2007, twenty independent deputies were able to win seats and re-establish a group under the DTP banner in the Parliament. Following the General Assembly in August 2007, the DTP criticised its own failures, citing a lack of democracy within the party and an incapability to represent all the oppressed groups, working classes and the democrats in Turkey[102]. In fact, the DTP was stuck between the claim of being a party of Turkey and the aim of defending the democratic national values of Kurdish people. In this respect, it is significant to note that Kurdish political parties, who attempt to break the hegemonic power of the PKK over Kurdish politics, do not have Turkish political parties as their allies because no Turkish political party has a particular standing policy on the Kurdish is-

102 See the full text on the official website of Baskın Oran, who ran as one of the independent candidates (İstanbul) in the elections 2007, though he did not win a seat. URL: http://baskinoran.net/public/default.aspx?id=3615 [11 August 2007]. During the same year, the DTP proposed a democratic solution, which was mainly based on democratic self-administration of all 'diversities' to be represented by their symbols (see *Özgür Gündem*, 7 October 2007. URL: http://www.ozgurgundem.net/haber.asp?haberid=45115 [7 October 2007]). Ethnic or territorial autonomy was rejected in favour of the free expression and democratic participation of cultural diversities within the regional or local structures. Furthermore, it was declared at the Democratic Society Congress in 2007 that the operational language of DTP would be Kurdish. *Özgür Gündem*, 30 October 2007. URL: http://www.ozgurgundem.org/haber.asp?HaberId=43371 [30 October 2007].

sue (see Ekinci 2000: 205-21). The political parties have been imprisoned largely by the Turkish military: 'Turkish governments have never initiated policies towards Kurdistan; they [policies] are [traditionally] formulated by the state authorities, security councils and intelligence services' (Beşikçi 1991b: 33). This militarist perspective of Turkish political elites reinforces the political role of the Turkish army (Kılıç 1998: 105). Within this perspective, the state is postulated as a holy entity to be protected from the destructive activities of citizens (ibid: 94). In this respect, Turkish politicians contact their Kurdish colleagues on the condition that the latter does not support the activities of the PKK.

However, the non-pluralist mindset of the state suffocates civil society by equating every Kurdish expression with separatism. This mindset does not serve to diversify the social bases that both the Kurdish political parties and the PKK share[103]. Moreover, the state authority has shown reluctance to protect the linguistic rights of the Kurds on the grounds that a provision of the Kurdish linguistic rights prior to the defeat of the PKK was seen as 'a weakness on the part of the Turkish state' (ibid: 111). This position does not help the Kurds to diversify and clarify their stance. If the state does not regard all the Kurds as PKK supporters, then it needs not to wait for the PKK to put down its weapons in order to initiate Kurdish linguistic rights. If the state articulates its struggle with the PKK as a struggle against terrorism but not war, then ordinary Kurdish people should not be included in the struggle. The question turns into a vicious circle when the state makes the introduction of linguistic rights conditional on the destruction of the PKK, for the Kurds would not (and could not) disown the PKK until the state ensures their linguistic rights.

This line of reasoning problematises Grigoriadis's argument that the failure of the Kurds to denounce the PKK 'provided ammunition to those who identified the Kurdish human rights movement with terrorism and separatist nationalism' (2006: 453). Grigoriadis argues that Kurdish intellectuals who could not unconditionally disown the PKK failed to respond to the process of democratic consolidation in Turkey and to 'defend

103 Selahattin Demirtaş, MP for the DTP, emphasises that the DTP is not like other political parties who have constructed their own constituencies in a period of time: 'The DTP is not the representative of the PKK, but makes politics on the basis that was constructed by the PKK in a 30 years period of time' (Demirtaş' speech at the session of 'Political Representation and Democratic Participation', the conference on 'Kurds in Turkey: Main Requirements for a Peace Process' 29-30 September 2007, Diyarbakır).

Kurdish minority rights effectively at the political level' (ibid). However, as discussed above, democracy is not consolidated enough for the Kurds to diversify and express their variant stances at the political level. Moreover, Grigoriadis misrepresents that a Kurdish party which repudiates political violence 'would be able to address the Kurdish issue as an aspect of Turkey's general democratic deficit, and campaign for Turkey's democratic consolidation together with like-minded Turks' (ibid: 457). The ignorant attitude of the Turkish elites towards the anti-violence stance of the Kurdish political parties and organisations makes the processes of democratisation challenging[104].

The Kurdish political presence in Turkish politics since the 1990s has provided pro-Kurdish politicians 'a small but legitimised space' to act in mainstream politics (Watts 1999: 650). In addition, as Watts (ibid) argues, a Kurdish political presence has worked to prevent the Republic from imposing its repressive policies towards the Kurdish political identity. Although this argument is partly true, it seems that the state needs to be more innovative than leaving behind the repressive policies that have become practically impossible and ethically unacceptable in this century. Moreover, 'the existence of a large underprivileged Kurdish underclass, its minimal chances of social mobility even further impeded by ethnic discrimination, may constitute a greater danger for Turkey's future than the secessionist guerrilla movement in the southeast' (Bruinessen 2000a: 106). In fact, there has been a large increase of Kurdish migrants and exiles in large cities, and 'the social and economic gap between the Kurds and "the others" became more obvious' during the mid-1990s (Çelik 2005: 981)[105]. Particularly Kurds who live in the slum areas of big cities and lack

104 Sertaç Bucak, the president of Rights and Freedoms Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*, HAK-PAR), which was established in 11 February 2002, defines their politics as the politics those of democratic priorities, which imply the fundamental rights and freedoms inscribed in the EU documents. The Party is strongly critical of the PKK and advocates democratic and civil resolution of the Kurdish issue through a Kurdish federation in Turkey. The president of Participatory Democracy Party (*Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi*, KADEP), Şerafettin Elçi, strongly criticises the PKK as a source of despair. He maintains the anti-violent stance of his party, which proposes a Kurdish federation within the current borders of Turkey.

105 Regarding the displacement of Kurds in Turkey, see the 2005 Report of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (*Türkiye Sosyal ve Ekonomik Etüdler Vakfı*, TESEV) on 'The Problem of Internal Displacement in Turkey: Assessment and Policy Proposals' on the website at URL: http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/TESEVIDPReport-October2005.pdf. TESEV is an independent non-governmental organisation. See also Taş (2007) and Bruinessen (1995) for reports, articles and

proficiency in Turkish, feel alienation and experience a deep sense of non-material, namely psychological insecurity[106]. As İçduygu *et al.* state, 'a poor socio-economic environment may not directly contribute to ethnic revival, but rather to greater insecurity and political instability in which ethnic markers often gain increasing importance' (1999: 1). Moreover, the PKK 'turned back to the essentials' by the 1990s (Gündoğan (2007: 277) in order to maintain and strengthen its influence on the Kurdish population in large cities. The fall of the communist bloc forced the PKK to revise its Marxist-Leninist ideology (which was never fully embraced by Kurdish society) towards a more nationalist tune (Cornell 2001: 39).

The PKK's nationalism was comprised of violence and sacrifice, and was strictly shaped by the authoritarian state discourse – which became a discipline for its radical dissidents, who were also educated by the same language of slogans, symbols and political culture at Turkish schools (Bozarslan 2002: 862). In this respect, Bozarslan (ibid) argues that the success of the PKK stems from its ability to 'Kurdify' the Kemalist symbols. Similar to the Turkish historical myths and sacred struggle for the motherland and civilisation that were portrayed by the figure of deified Mustafa Kemal, Abdullah Öcalan was materialised in the form of sun, which eternally shines over the sublime Kurdish nation to be saved from the slavery, even by force (ibid: 863-4). The spokespersons of the Kurdish movements were those who most integrated into the Turkish culture; those who had studied Turkish textbooks and those who 'had at one stage in their lives been admirers of Atatürk' (Bruinessen 2000a: 98). Indeed Öcalan's 'earlier fascination with Atatürk' (ibid) was seen as continuing when he praised the latter during his tribunals following his capture in 1999[107]. Throughout the tribunal, he referred to the Kurds' share in the foundation of the Republic, noting for the first time that one of the most important sources of Kurdish uprisings was the ban on the language[108].

witnesses of the forced evacuations, destructions of and embargos against the villages of Dersim in 1994.

106 For a comprehensive analysis of both material and non-material insecurity that the Kurds experience in large cities in Turkey, see İçduygu *et al.* (1999).

107 Öcalan was sentenced to death in 1999 but the sentence was commuted into the life-long imprisonment. Since then, he has tried to publicise himself through his lawyers who transfer his messages to the newspaper *Özgür Gündem*, which is often banned due to its connection with the PKK.

108 For the records of Öcalan's trial, see the URL at http://www.belgenet.com/dava/dava.html. For an analysis of Öcalan's call for democracy and peace during his defence, see Gunter (2000: 855-9).

Leaving aside the aim of an independent Kurdish state, in 2003, Öcalan (2003: 99, 118, 121) proposed a new program, the Democratic Ecological Society Coordination[109]. In the image of 'Mustafa Kemal's philosophy', he required the state to recognise the Kurds as one of the founding elements of the Republic. The requirements of Öcalan's solution concerning the language are as follows: the elimination of the barriers against the Kurdish language and the freedom and equality of all languages; elimination of the obstacles to Kurdish publishing and the promotion of works of culture and arts as well as research on Kurdish history (Şafak 2005: 241). Among the decisions of the 2005 Congress on the reconstruction of the PKK, many were formulated for the advancement of the Kurdish language: the promotion of the Kurdish grammar and the strengthening of the Kurdish language in terms of orthography and education; the dissemination of Kurdish language in the society; the promotion of Kurdish publishing; the translation of party materials into the Kurdish language and the establishment of Kurdish institutions for studies of Kurdish language and history (ibid: 280).

In 2006, the PKK issued a declaration outlining the conditions of a democratic solution of the Kurdish question as well as surrendering its weapons. The conditions included such demands as the recognition of the Kurdish identity in the Constitution under the framework of an 'overarching identity' ('*Türkiyelilik*'), the recognition of the right to education in mother tongue and the acceptance of the official status of Kurdish language in the region. Öcalan stated that a Kurdish Language Institute should be founded, and pointed out that the first thing that Atatürk had done during his rule was to found the Turkish Language Institution[110]. It is interesting that a military organisation such as the PKK as well as legal Kurdish political parties have started to emphasise language as one of the pillars of their agenda. The unstable but persistent opening of the streets to the Kurdish language, in addition to the opening of the doors of Turkish Parliament to Kurdish political parties since the 1990s, has changed the nature of the Kurdish question to a non-violent but demanding one. This change

109 The proposition is called Democratic Confederalism and is based on a stateless, democratic-ecological society free from restrictions on gender with public councils as the main local units of democratic participation (Şafak 2005: 236-43).

110 *Özgür Gündem* 18 November 2006. URL: http://www.ozgurgundem.net/haber.asp?haberid=45235 [18 November 2006]. The PKK was also renamed as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and later as the Peoples' Congress (Kongra-Gel).

has also been motivated and facilitated by the EU, which has placed the Kurdish language and Kurdish linguistic rights on the Turkish political agenda.

Turkey's EU Expedition

While the Republic's public denial and repression of the Kurdish language and identity continued until the new millennium, the ban on the use of non-Turkish languages *in private* was abolished in 1991. In practice, however, this exceptional step simply legalised what was already happening – Kurdish was spoken at home and on the streets, and Kurdish music cassettes were available to some extent. On the other hand, the potentially-progressive implications of this exception were undermined in the same year by the introduction of a new Anti-Terror Law[111]. Article 8 of this Law made it possible to regard a speech or publication in Kurdish a threat to the state (Pierse 1997: 333; Yıldız 2004: 29-30; Malmîsanij 2007: 18). In this respect, the exception did not signify a change in Turkey's policy, but rather was an attempt to secure the Republic when it became apparent that the Kemalist project would not succeed in assimilating the Kurds into the majority culture (Hassanpour 2005a: 236-7). In reality, lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish in private was designed not only to settle the radical dissident Kurds in Turkey, but also to satisfy European leaders who were against Turkey's EU membership due to its failure to uphold minority rights (ibid). Therefore, the relaxation of the ban on Kurdish may be considered the first in a series of legal regulations that Turkey would have made for the sake of EU membership.

Turkey renewed its application for full EU membership in 1987 on the basis of its geopolitical importance, which was considered essential to European security throughout the Cold War. The government was also mainly interested in the economic benefits of EU membership. Indeed, until the 1990s, the EU was primarily an economic unity of sovereign states, which were restricted by the Cold War security paradigm. From this period onwards, however, the Union initiated a policy of an 'ever closer union' in political terms. Moreover, the 'reunification of Europe' led the

111 The Anti-Terror Law became more flexible when some of its Articles were amended and some were abolished in 2003 in order to harmonise Turkish law with the EU.

Union to take action in such political issues as democracy and respect for human rights within the candidate countries. In this sense, since the 1990s Turkey increasingly faced the huge political agenda of the EU that focused on its deficits in minority rights. The increasing presence of Kurdish political refugees in Europe since the military coup of 1980 also 'helped to create a large body of anti-Turkish opinion in the liberal states of Europe' (Robins 1993: 662). On the other hand, Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate state in 1999. In the same year, the intensity of armed struggle between the military and the PKK decreased due to the capture of the PKK's leader. Both developments provided the flourishing of democratic means and non-violent political discourses in Turkey, and allowed the EU to acquire substantial tools to address the Kurdish question (Çelik and Rumelili 2006: 214). In this sense, the 2000 Regular Report of the European Commission on Turkey clearly illuminated the shortcomings in Turkey's language policy:

> Regardless of whether or not Turkey is willing to consider any ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions as 'national minorities', members of such groups are clearly still largely denied certain basic rights. Cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin, such as the right to broadcast in their mother tongue, to learn their mother tongue or to receive instruction in their mother tongue, are not guaranteed.

As Soykan aptly argues, 'cultural rights' should be understood as the linguistic rights of minorities found in other international documents (2003: 74). The Commission implies that the Kurds, whatever status they are ascribed, should be entitled to those linguistic rights. In order to comply with the short-term objectives of the Accession Partnership (2001), the government made some legal regulations in 2001, as well as designing harmonisation packages to enhance the freedom of expression, broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish in 2002[112]. The Law Amending Several Articles of the Constitution (No. 4709, dated 3 October 2001) deleted the following sentences: 'no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought' (Article 26) and

112 The Accession Partnership (AP) is the main EU document regarding pre-accession strategy. It identifies short- and medium-term priorities and objectives of the candidate states. In response to the AP, candidate states prepare National Programmes for the adoption of reforms. Harmonisation packages are legal arrangements designed to amend more than one law at a time. At the time of writing, Turkey has issued eight packages and is set to continue to make further reforms.

'publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law' (Article 28). On 3 August 2002, the Parliament passed Law No. 4771, Article 8 of which amended Law 3984 on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels (1994) and proposes that 'there may be broadcasts in the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives'. Moreover, Article 11 of the same law, which amended the Law No. 2923 on the Foreign Language Education and Teaching (1983), allowed the opening of private courses for 'the learning of different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives'.

The 2002 Regular Report of the Commission welcomed the progress made by Turkey, though noting that the lack of improvement in practice limited the ability of members of ethnic groups to express their linguistic and cultural identity. The additional harmonisation packages that were issued in 2003 facilitated the foundation of associations to protect or develop languages or cultures other than Turkish, as well as abolishing the prohibition on the use of languages and scriptures other than Turkish in the meetings, banners, placards, records, audio and visual recordings, brochures and bulletins of associations. The harmonisation packages also lifted the restrictions on giving non-Turkish names to children by removing the reference to 'national culture, customs, traditions' as a criteria for naming standards. However, a Circular issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003 restricted the registration of Kurdish names which include the letters 'q, x or w'. Moreover, Article 2 of the 1949 Law on Provincial Administration, which changed Kurdish names of places into Turkish, remains intact.

The Regulation on the Learning of Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives (*Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik*) entered into force on 20 September 2002. The Regulation regulates the establishment, operation and supervision of the private language courses. In 2004, after a number of failed attempts, eight Kurdish private language courses were finally opened in Kurdish-populated cities of the southeast, namely Adana, Batman, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Van and also in İstanbul. However, these courses closed their doors in 2005 due to the lack of demand for learning Kurdish. Some Turkish elites explained this lack of demand as evidence of apathy on the part of the Kurdish community.

However, Malmîsanij argues that the 'higher sales of alphabet books, dictionaries and grammar books in Kurdish reveals the interest in learning to read and write in the language' (2007: 82). On the other hand, as major Kurdish publishing houses report, there is a tendency of anti-readership among the Kurds or inertia of Kurdish readers, who lack the habit of reading[113]. The owner of the *Belki* publishing house, Rênas Jiyan, argues that this anti-readership is a result of the internalisation of the oppression of Kurdish language by the Kurds[114]. Malmîsanij calls the problem the 'fear of the book', that is, 'many Kurds have not realized yet that the ban on Kurdish books has been lifted because they have lived through or have witnessed oppression against speaking, reading and writing in this language for many years' (ibid: 89). This might explain the lack of interest in the Kurdish language courses. Indeed, according to Sami Tan, director of the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, 'the lack of interest mostly stems from the assimilation and oppression policies of the state, which led to the belief among the Kurds that learning Kurdish is either dangerous or useless'[115].

Moreover, Kurdish elites accuse the state of complicating the implementation of the Regulation in order to discourage the opening and functioning of Kurdish language courses. This claim hold merit because of the logistical pitfalls the Regulation institutes: for example, only those who are

113 The major publishing houses reported that between 1000 and 2000 books in Kurdish are published (see the interviews conducted with the owners or directors of *Avesta*, *Doz*, *Pêrî* and *Nûbihar* in April and June 2005 at URL: http://www.xelkedondurma.com/yayin_evleri [7 February 2008]). The books in Kurdish constitute around 40 percent of total books listed by these publishing houses, and predominantly include classical and modern literary works. The number of dictionaries and linguistic works in Kurdish is also greater than political and historical studies published in Turkish. On the other hand, the owner of *Avesta* argues that there is no proportional relationship between the interest in Kurdish linguistic works and the reading rate of books in Kurdish, noting that children's books in Kurdish are never read. The owners or directors of these publishing houses describe their readers as university students.

114 *Özgür Politika*, "Kürt diline sahip çık" 17 August 2004.

115 Sami Tan worked as the chief editor of the newspaper *Welat* in the 1990s and published a book on Kurdish grammar. He has served as the director of the Kurdish Institute in İstanbul since 2005. The Istanbul Kurdish Institute was established on 18 April 1992 by Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals. The aim of the Institute is to provide research on Kurdish language, literature and history, and to contribute to the standardisation of the Kurdish language. For more information about the Institute, see its official website at URL: http://www.enstituyakurdi.org. The author conducted an interview with Sami Tan in Turkish in İstanbul on 25 January 2008. All statements of Tan that are submitted throughout this study are extracted from the interview, unless otherwise specified.

older than 18, those who graduated from 8 years primary education and those who know Turkish can be the attendees of the courses. Persons to be employed by the private language courses are expected to be certified language teachers, even though there are no institutions or departments of universities in Turkey that educate Kurdish language teachers. In addition, the state was criticised for refraining to take financial responsibility to ensure the survival of Kurdish language courses. Kurdish elites argued that the cost of courses was unaffordable for Kurds, who are one of the least economically developed groups in the country.

According to Fehim Işık, a member of the board of the Kurdish Foundation for Culture and Research (*Kürt Kültür ve Araştırma Vakfı*, *Kürt-Kav*), the license given to open courses was a symbolic act which did not challenge the current restrictions on Kurdish in all fields of life[116]. As Sami Tan notes, 'the owners of such courses declared that they closed their doors in order not to serve the state, which behaves as if it has solved the Kurdish question by allowing the opening of Kurdish courses'. Kawa Nemir, Kurdish poet and translator, further argues, 'some Kurds politically rejected to attend such courses in order to protest the superficiality of the reform'[117]. In short, as Şefik Beyaz (2006: 108), the head of the İstanbul Kurdish Institute between 1993 and 2006, states, the disinterest of the Kurds in private language courses is in fact a reaction by the Kurds to the limitation on the right to education in or of Kurdish.

116 *Kürt-Kav* was established in 1996 with the purpose of 'carrying out research on fundamental rights and freedoms, research and investigation in the areas of the Kurdish language, culture, and history, and activities contributing to the solution of health problems and the development of sports' (Article 3 of the status of *Kürt-Kav*). See the interview conducted with Fehim Işık in 2006 at URL: http://www.kusca.com/modules.php?name=News&op=NEArticle&sid=3089 [9 February 2008].

117 Kawa Nemir was the owner of the *Bajar* publishing house (2000-2004), which was known for publishing translations of English literature, especially poems, into Kurdish. Nemir himself translated poems of William Butler Yeats, Walt Whitman, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, T. E. Hulme, Emily Dickinson, Amy Lowell, Gertrude Stein, Sylvia Plath, Ted Hudges, William Blake, Seamus Heaney, William Shakespeare, Oscar Wilde, Patrick Kavanagh, Marianne Moore, Anne Sexton, Elizabeth Bishop, Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, Dylan Thomas, Stevie Smith, Simon Armitage, Ernest Hemingway, William Wordsworth, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Edgar Allan Poe, Ralph Waldo Emerson into Kurdish. He also served as the chief editor to Kurdish magazines *Rewşen* and *Jiyana Rewşen* between 1995 and 2003. The author conducted an interview with Kawa Nemir in Turkish in İstanbul on 27 January 2008. All statements of Nemir that are submitted throughout this study are extracted from the interview, unless otherwise specified.

Indeed, the designation of 'education *of* Kurdish' in private language courses but not at public schools is criticised by Kurdish elites in addition to that 'education *in* Kurdish' is never taken to the agenda by the state. While the 'education *of* Kurdish' refers to the learning of the Kurdish language at private language courses or in extra-curricular hours at public schools, 'education *in* Kurdish' refers to an education in the Kurdish language of the conventional national school curriculum. On this matter, the Kurdish community has expressed a desire to be equal with the Turkish majority, who has the right to receive instruction in their mother tongue at public schools without paying any extra costs. Muhsin Kızılkaya, author and interpreter, argues that the state should open Kurdish language courses not for the Kurds but for the Turks, especially for the public servants in the regions populated by the Kurds[118]. He points out additionally that Kurds need public schools giving education in Kurdish.

The state justifies its policy through Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads, 'No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training and education'. On the grounds of this law, some of the students and parents who petitioned in 2002 for the opening of elective Kurdish courses at schools and universities were either detained or imprisoned, while other students were dismissed from the universities (Yıldız and Düzgören 2002: 15). Turkish authorities regarded the campaign as a pro-PKK action and the campaigners as PKK sympathisers. The Dean of the Law Faculty of Dokuz Eylül University stated that the freedom of science could be limited if such activities were opposing the unity and indivisibility of the state and the nation (Günel 2006: 381-4). His perspective formulates the Kurdish question 'as a conflict between the sovereignty rights of the state vs. human rights of individuals [and/or minority rights]' (Kılıç 1998: 109).

In fact, a compulsory schooling system only in one official language can be considered linguistic and cultural genocide committed by 'causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the [minority] group' and 'forcibly transferring children of the [minority] group to another [majority] group' (Article II of the 1948 UN ICPPC). This is the 'submersion education', which also leads to 'intellectual genocide' – studies prove that

118 Kızılkaya is best known for his translations of novels in Kurdish into Turkish. The author conducted an interview with Muhsin Kızılkaya in Turkish in İstanbul on 28 April 2008. All statements of Kızılkaya that are submitted throughout this study are extracted from the interview, unless otherwise specified.

the success of children who have the education in the medium of dominant language is less than the children who are taught through their mother tongue[119]. The term 'submersion education' is defined by Skutnabb-Kangas (2002: 4) as the process through which children are taught through a medium of dominant language from grade 1 onward, and study their mother tongue only as a subject. This education unsurprisingly interrupts the transmission of the language and culture of a group by transferring its children into the dominant group. For this reason, learning a dominant language is seen to be additional (in addition to mother tongue) rather than subtractive (at the cost of mother tongue). In this respect, it would be valid to argue that the Regulation on the Learning of Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives cannot ensure the most fundamental right of Kurdish children to learn their mother tongue. Even stronger, the Regulation could not reverse the process of linguicide.

The Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives (*Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik*) was drafted by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*, RTÜK) and entered into force on 25 January 2004. The Regulation was composed of procedures related to broadcasts carried out by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*, TRT) in different languages and dialects. Strikingly, the TRT appealed to the Council of State to annul the Regulation on the grounds that an autonomous state institution could not be obliged to broadcast in minority languages. Following the relevant amendments made by the government on the concerns of the TRT, the latter started broadcasting TV and radio in Bosnian, Arabic, Cherkesian and Kurdish (in two Kurdish dialects or languages, namely Kurmanji and Kırmancki/Zazaki) on 7 June 2004. TV broadcasting is in channel TRT3 from Monday to Friday at 7.30 to 8.00 a.m. while radio broadcasting is in *Radyo 1* on same days at 6.10 to 6.45 a.m. Both in TV and Radio, the common name of programmes in Bosnian, Arabic, Kurmanji, Cherkesian and Kırmancki is 'Our Cultural Wealth' (*Kültürel Zenginliğimiz*). The official website of TRT describes the aims of the programmes as follows: 'to raise the consciousness of people as the citizens who know their duties and

119 For various examples of these studies see Skutnabb-Kangas 2002.

responsibilities to the Republic of Turkey which is a democratic, secular and social state that is respectful to human rights and the rule of law… to reinforce people's trust on and the respect for the State… to prevent the exploitation of religious, linguistic, cultural, racial differences… to settle the idea that the Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity… to ensure correct information against various [disinformative] broadcasting and publication of other countries, especially neighbouring ones, towards our citizens at home and abroad'[120].

Ironically, the name of the TRT's programme refers to minorities as the wealth of 'us', while the aims of the programme imply that minorities constitute a threat to 'us'. Even more ironically, this understanding permeated amongst minority groups who refrained from carrying 'the negative baggage' of the term minority 'that had been identified with non-Muslims, lack of patriotism, second-class citizen status and collaboration with foreign powers' (Grigoriadis 2006: 456). The Bosnian and Arabic communities expressed their frustrations with the broadcasts on the grounds that they were not minorities and thus did not want to be given such special rights as the 'separatists' demand (Aksamaz 2005: 18-20)[121].

In fact, the Regulation did not offer either freedom or equality for non-Turkish speakers in national public and private broadcasting, whereas local private TV and radio channels were not able to broadcast regularly in non-Turkish languages until 2006. Article 11 of the Regulation stated that until a survey about traditionally-used languages was completed, regular broadcasting in minority languages could only be submitted by the TRT and the national private channels. Thus, the RTÜK first asked the Diyarbakır governorship which languages were spoken in the region and then accepted the applications of local private channels for broadcasting in Kurdish[122]. Article 5 (3) of the Regulation defines the content of TV

120 Translated into English by the author. See the original text at URL: http://www.trt.net.tr/wwwtrt/progdetay.aspx?kimlikid=248&tur=RD&saat=06:10&kanaladi=RADYO1&gunu= [07.01.2008]. Actually, the mindset of the Republic in the 2000s is not so different than that of the 1960s. In his speech to the General Staff in 1969, retired military officer Sevgen (1992: 43) had advocated a pirated radio channel to broadcast in Kurdish in order to protect the Kurdish people, who did not understand the Diyarbakır branch of the TRT and listened to the Kurdish programs broadcasted in the radio of Yerevan, from the Soviet propaganda.

121 On the other hand, the Laz and Roma communities declared that they felt frustrated by the TRT's ignorance of their languages.

122 In March 2006 *Gün* TV and *Söz* TV in Diyarbakır and *Medya* FM in Urfa started to broadcast regularly in Kurdish, while in March 2007, *Çağrı* FM in Diyarbakır and in

broadcasts as 'for adults on news, music and culture' and prohibits the broadcasting of programmes targeting children or 'towards the teaching of these languages and dialects'. Turkish subtitles on TV and Turkish translation on radio is also obligatory. For this reason, private TV and radio channels are required to send periodically the RTÜK a copy in Turkish of the content and schedule of their Kurdish programmes. Furthermore, the Article stipulates, 'The duration of radio broadcasts in these languages and dialects shall not exceed sixty minutes per day and a total of five hours per week. TV broadcasts shall not exceed forty-five minutes per day and a total of four hours per week'. Finally, Article 8 (2) states that the studio design for other programmes should be kept the same during such broadcasts in non-Turkish language, and that the reporters should be dressed in modern style (not in traditional costumes). In passing, it is striking to note that many TV or radio stations were prosecuted because they violated not the rules of the Regulation on broadcasting in non-Turkish languages, but the basic principles of Turkish law[123].

Because of these onerous restrictions, the Regulation was criticised by Kurdish elites for being cosmetic and unsatisfactory. Like the private language courses, the broadcasting reforms exemplify the unilateral and authoritarian structure of the Republic that fails to take into account the demands of minorities who, in fact, are the addressees of the reforms. According to Sami Tan and Zana Farqini, 'the Kurds do not watch TRT broadcasting in Kurdish because it does not address the Kurds in its content and language'[124]. Fehim Işık criticises that 'the state could not discharge its duty through broadcasting a thirty minutes Kurdish program in one of

2008 *Muş* FM received authorisation to broadcast in Kurmanji and Kırmancki/Zazaki within the limits of the Regulation. *Gün TV* broadcasts a 45 minutes programme named "*Derguşa Çande*" (Cradle of Culture) two times a week in Kurmanji.

123 More specifically, the 2002 Regular Report of the EC noted that owner of Gün TV was indicted for having broadcast a Kurdish song, and charged under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law ('disseminating separatist propaganda'). The 2004 Regular Report condemned the closure for 30 days of *ART* TV in Diyarbakır, on the grounds that it had violated 'the principle of the indivisible unity of the state' when it broadcasted two Kurdish love songs. See Kaya and Baldwin (2004: 21) for the list of TV and radio channels that were temporarily suspended for broadcasting.

124 Zana Farqini is a member of the board of the İstanbul Kurdish Institute. He prepares dictionaries from Turkish to Kurdish and from Kurdish to Turkish. He also served on the newspaper *Welat* in the 1990s. The author conducted an interview with Zana Farqini in Turkish in İstanbul on 25 January 2008. All statements of Farqini that are submitted throughout this study are extracted from the interview, unless otherwise specified.

its less watched channel at an unearthly hour', and his words appear to be heard by the political authorities[125]. The government has recently assigned a TV channel on the TRT for 24-hour broadcasting in Kurdish. TRT 6 (TRT Şeş) started to broadcast on 1 January 2009, and was welcomed by most of Kurdish intellectuals, except those who are cautious of superficial characteristic of previous reforms initiated by the government[126]. MPs for DTP declared that TRT Şeş is a great success in the struggle led by the Kurdish people[127]. Indeed, TRT Şeş signifies a change in the mainstream Turkish policy that sees the freedom for the Kurdish language as a threat to national unity.

On the other hand, the aforementioned regulations emphasised that linguistic freedoms could not be enjoyed in lieu of the fundamental principles of the Turkish Constitution, which states in its 'untouchable' Article 3 that: 'The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish'. When the language of the state, which is indivisible with its nation, is stipulated as Turkish, then the interpretation of the Article is clear: Turkish is the language of all citizens. Comparing the Article with the relevant articles of previous constitutions also allows this interpretation. Article 2 of the Constitution of 1921 reads, 'The *official language* of the Turkish state is Turkish' while Article 2 of the Constitution of 1924 was as follows: 'The *state language* is Turkish'. In the 1961 Constitution, Article 3 reads, 'The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. The *official language* is Turkish' (*italics added*). In contrast to previous constitutions, which clearly mentioned the status of Turkish as the official language of the state, the Constitution of 1982 imposes Turkish as the language of the nation. Therefore, languages other than Turkish cannot be used at schools, by public authorities and at courts due to the exclusive position of the official language[128].

Besides the rights to education, broadcasting and administrative and judicial proceedings in one's mother tongue, the right to political partici-

125 See the interview with Fehim Işık in 2006 at URL: http://www.kusca.com/modules.php?name=News&op=NEArticle&sid=3089 [9 February 2008].

126 "100 Ünlü Kürt TRT Şeş Devrimini Alkışladı", http://www.stargazete.com/politika/100-unlu-kurt-trt-ses-devrimini-alkisladi-159569.htm

127 http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/24881.htm.

128 While Article 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure guarantees the use of languages other than Turkish if the accused does not understand Turkish, the use of such languages is restricted. The accused must use an interpreter, who shall inform the accused of the results of final accusations and defence of the public prosecutor.

pation has been considered one of the essential components of linguistics rights of minorities. However, Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties is still in force and prohibits political parties from using a language other than Turkish 'in writing and printing party statutes or programmes; at congresses; at meetings in open air or indoor gatherings; at meetings and in propaganda; in placards, picture, phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements'[129]. The Article prevents political parties from claiming that there are national, religious, racial or linguistic minorities in Turkey, and from protecting or disseminating languages or cultures other than Turkish. In fact, the Article implies that a claim to linguistic rights for minorities would lead to the creation of linguistic minorities in Turkey. On the grounds of this Article, a number of Kurdish political parties have been banned since the 1970s, especially in the 1990s, as discussed above (see Oran 2004: 93-9). In 2004, thirteen executive board members of the HAK-PAR were investigated because they spoke in Kurdish during the party congress and used Kurdish in the invitation cards[130]. In 2009, the co-president of DTP, Ahmet Türk was accused of violating Article 81 because he gave a speech in Kurdish at the meeting of his party in Parliament, in celebration of UNESCO's International Mother Language Day (21st of February)[131]. In short, the Article implies that there are no limitations for only those Kurds who abandon their Kurdishness and 'enter the political arena as Turks' (Grigoriadis 2006: 452).

The 2005 Regular Report of the European Commission drew attention to the downturn of the reform process, noting that 'Turkey continues to adopt a restrictive approach to minorities and cultural rights'. This restrictive approach is detailed in the 2006 Regular Report, which highlights that 'there are no possibilities to learn Kurdish today in the public or private schooling system' and that 'there are no measures taken to facilitate access to public services for those who do not speak Turkish'[132]. The EU has seemed to abandon its non-demanding position that it took during the

129 In addition, Article 58 of the Law on General Provisions concerning Elections and Electoral Registration prevents candidates from using a language other than Turkish in all their propaganda, including radio and TV broadcasting.

130 The trial on 'speaking in Kurdish' is continuing.

131 However, the prosecutors declared that they will not launch an investigation of him. http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/28590.htm.

132 The 2006 Regular Report of the Commission highlights that 'a Kurdish association was ordered to close by a Court in Diyarbakır on the grounds that its statute included the objectives of setting up a Kurdish archive, museum and library and that its activities would be carried out also in the Kurdish language'.

first years of Turkey's candidacy, moving to a more sceptical standpoint about further linguistic reforms in Turkey[133]. In this respect, the process of EU membership, namely the improvement of democracy, civil society and human rights, would facilitate the cause of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey. Benhabib and Isiksel argue that the Republic is experiencing a transition from 'equality as sameness' to 'equality in diversity' (2006: 231). The second concept needs the formulation of positive rights for communities that are different from, but not equal with, the Turkish majority. However, the EU does not require that the Republic officially recognise the Kurds as a minority and grant them positive rights, but is satisfied with the acknowledgement of negative rights that prohibit the discrimination of Kurds (see Oran 2004: 180). The Republic as well seems satisfied with this EU policy. The most important question is if the Kurdish people are satisfied with this 'tacit agreement' on the solution of the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey.

'Kurdish' Perceptions of the EU

The Republic argues that all Turkish citizens are equal under the law. Article 10 of the Constitution reads, 'All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour,

133 The 2007 Regular Report notes the difficulties in implementing the linguistic rights of the Kurdish community, and further mentions the case against the municipality of Sur in June 2007, in addition to several investigations and court cases that have been opened against the officials and executives of DTP and HAK-PAR for alleged infringements of Article 81 (c) of the Law on Political Parties. In June 2007, Abdullah Demirbaş, the mayor of Sur, Diyarbakır, was dismissed by the council of state because of a multilingual service in Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic and Armenian that he initiated in his municipality. The case is now before the ECtHR. In fact, this case was not the first in which mayors and MPs of the DTP have been investigated due to speeches they made and the brochures or placards they published in Kurdish (For the list of investigations see *Özgür Gündem*, 6 October 2007 at URL: http://www.ozgurgundem.net/haber.asp?haberid=45079 [6 October 2007]. See the common declaration of the mayors of the DTP on the official website of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality at URL: http://www.diyarbakir-bld.gov.tr/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1036 [16 June 2007]). The 2008 Regular Report notes that the Court sentenced 53 DTP mayors to 2 months and 15 days imprisonment, which was commuted to a fine, for sending a letter to the Danish Prime Minister requesting that *Roj* TV not be closed.

sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations … No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class'. Moreover, the Article adds, 'State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings'[134]. However, the Constitution lacks an article prohibiting discrimination. In fact, the Republic reads positive discrimination as inequality in law and anti-discrimination as unnecessary. Thus, when state organs act in compliance with the principle of non-discrimination it does not mean equality. In this sense, although it is true that there is no official or social segregation that may lead to ethnic mobilisation in society, it is clear that the state's interpretation of 'equality as sameness' rather than 'equality in differences' leads to discrimination. Moreover, freedoms that all citizens of Turkey should be free and equal to enjoy cannot be used by any group 'to define its identity *differently*, which the state fears would lead to the destabilization of Turkey' (Kılıç 1998: 108; *italics added*). The state's fear of destabilisation, therefore, nourishes the fear of people to be free and different.

On the grounds of Article 10, some intellectuals and politicians argue that the Kurdish people are free and able to acquire every kind of political and economic status in equal terms with the Turks. This statement would be true, if this so-called freedom and equality did not depend on the silence of Kurdish people about their identity. In other words, 'as members of the Turkish nation, the Kurds have equal rights in all aspects; however, the right to care for and develop their ethnicity, culture and language is not included in the understanding of equality' (Gürbey 1996: 10). Indeed, 'the difficulties arise with the expressions of Kurdish identity rather than with the fact of being Kurdish' (Pierse 1997: 329). However, it is a matter of discussion the extent to which one can be considered Kurdish when s/he is requested not to speak her/his language nor to express her/his identity. Moreover, 'being "Kurdish", as a discursive outcome of various narratives defining the Kurds as problematical or non-existent, is tiring […], this epistemic violence works to make Kurdish identity burdensome, even questionable by

134 The government amended this paragraph of Article 10 as follows: 'State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings and in all activities pertaining to the provision of public services' on 9 February 2008. According to Seyla Benhabib (2008), this amendment would enlarge and consolidate the principle of non-discrimination in Turkey. However, the Constitutional Court annulled the amendment on 5 June 2008 on the grounds that the amendment is against the fundamental principles of the Republic.

its "erasure of biography"' (Houston 2001: 19). This epistemic violence equates Kurdishness 'with ignorance, incivility, superstitiousness (religiousness) and backwardness, and without an interest in Kurdish politics' (ibid). In short, as Houston (ibid) recapitulates, 'Kurds can become Turks by becoming modern, or change back into Kurds by re-interpreting the history that privileged Turks in that way'.

How Kurds become Turks is explained by Cornell as follows: 'a great number of Kurds, especially those that willingly or forcibly migrated to western Turkey integrated *successfully* into Turkish society and adopted the language, values, social organisation of the Republic' (*italics added*). When he calls this successful integration a 'remarkable level of *assimilation*' (2001: 35), he reflects a common view, which usually equates assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish majority to their successful integration into society. Like all linguistic minorities, only the Kurds are considered responsible for the 'success' of such an integration process. Therefore, the term 'integration', which is used by states to imply the harmonisation of minorities with the society, is translated into minorities' language as the homogenisation of the society by the 'assimilation' of their identity into the dominant one.

In fact, the conditions of Article 10 are not special to the Turkish constitution, but rather are common to many constitutions of liberal nation-states. The liberal model of modern nation-states regards individuals, who are equal citizens of the state, as the source of national sovereignty. Citizens give exclusive power to the state in exchange for the protection of their rights. Yet, the sovereign power of Kurdish individuals is not exchanged for, among other things, the protection of their linguistic rights. As was argued, this discrepancy stems from the fact that Kurdish individuals constitute a group of people who are not equal to the Turkish majority. Members of the Turkish majority enjoy the right to speak their mother tongue collectively with other members of their community in both public and private spheres, whereas the members of Kurdish minority are required to enjoy their linguistic rights individually and in the private sphere. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that Kurdish intellectuals emphasise that the Kurds need not individual but collective rights to be enjoyed in both public and private spheres, especially with regard to the linguistic freedoms. According to Sami Tan,

> 'linguistic rights are not individual but collective rights… the [Kurdish] linguistic rights that are to be ensured without the definition of the status of the Kurds will not

have meaningful and permanent results… The existence of Kurds should be constitutionally guaranteed and … the Kurdish language should be the co-official language, especially in the region populated by the Kurds'.

Zana Farqini argues that the consideration of linguistic rights as individual rights will help neither the Kurds nor Turkey, and asks 'is it possible to consider the right to education in one's mother tongue at public schools an individual right?'. His question corresponds to the rising Kurdish demands for the right to education in Kurdish at public schools[135]. Şerafettin Elçi emphasises similarly that the right to education in Kurdish should be guaranteed as a collective right of the Kurds to be enjoyed by the support of the state[136]. He also emphasises the co-official status that the Kurdish language should acquire in order to be equal with Turkish. Said Veroj (2003: 70), one of the directors of Kurdish magazine, *Bîr*, also argues that the Kurdish language should be recognised as a co-official language, the education of which should be guaranteed in the constitution and supported by the state. According to Ekinci (2001: 150), Turkey's 1982 constitution should be adjusted to the requirements of contemporary democracies to include the linguistic and cultural rights of minorities for the solution of the Kurdish question. In short, most Kurdish intellectuals seem to share the view of Şefik Beyaz: 'Such historical errors as the prohibition and prevention of Kurdish from development should be compensated by the state' (2006: 62). Such compensation refers directly to the proliferation of the Kurdish language in the public sphere. Moreover, the Kurdish language could only survive if it would be available in the public sphere, according to Beyaz (ibid: 34). Finally, the relationship between the recognition of the Kurdish language in the public sphere and the development of peace has been increasingly emphasised by Kurdish intellectuals and political leaders.

On the other hand, some argue that the implementation of positive collective rights enjoyed in the public sphere might lead to segregation and conflict in society. Cornell, for example, argues that to 'institutionalise ethnic distinctiveness' might fuel 'ethnic antagonism' in Turkey's society – a tension between Turks and Kurds which has remained low despite a long and harsh armed conflict (2001: 42). In this sense, he claims, 'while … preserving Turkish as the sole official language of the state and the medium of education in schools… to allow private and supplementary school

135 See the series of interviews conducted with the Kurdish intellectuals and politicians in *Radikal* 2 –7 March 2008.

136 See the interview conducted with Elçi in *Radikal* 14 February 2005.

instruction in minority languages would enable Kurds (and others) to retain their identity while integrating with society' (ibid: 12). However, it is easy to see that the solution Cornell advocates seems far from the expectations of the radicalised and politicised Kurds fighting for their language and identity. As İçduygu *et al.* (1999: 998) argue, once ethnic identity is politicised, it becomes a strong motivating and unyielding force that solidifies the identity. In this sense, the Kurdish question becomes more than a question of negative minority rights to be enjoyed individually in the private sphere. As Kıran (2003: 84) recapitulates, the conflict will continue unless the Kurds are permitted to speak and write in their mother tongue in the streets, at schools, in the public and private sphere – a challenge to the current liberal approach towards the linguistic rights of minorities.

On the other hand, some argue that the Kurdish question stems from the lack of liberalism and modernity in Turkey. According to Argun, for instance, 'Turkey's Kurdish problem can in part be attributed to distorted interpretations of liberal principles' and to 'too little or incomplete modernity rather than too much of it' (1999: 86, 102). Although her analysis is not totally unfounded, it is also true that even 'undistorted' interpretations of liberalism and 'completed' modernity lead to inequality and injustice against the unprivileged groups. In this respect, one should not necessarily wait for Turkey to complete the process of modernity and establish clear interpretations of liberalism in order to criticise its authoritarian politics. Moreover, Argun favours universal citizenship rights rather than special rights dedicated to cultural differences: 'within a national context the foundation of universal rights is nationally defined', whereas 'claims of discrimination or violation of universality … contest the very definition of that foundation… [and] the very definition of Turkishness' (ibid: 91). She argues that the definition of Turkishness in Article 66 of the Constitution, which states that: 'Everyone who is connected to the Turkish state by citizenship ties is a Turk' represents the 'nationally defined' universal civil and political rights.

First, everyone who is connected to the 'Turkish state' by the tie of citizenship cannot be a 'Turk', but rather can be entitled to be a citizen of the Republic. This so-called all-inclusive definition of 'Turk' reflects the consideration that the Turkish national identity is open to all those who live in the territory of Turkey and who 'say' 'I am Turkish' – implying a willingness to be Turkish regardless of ethnic ties. This willingness is framed in part by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous saying: 'how happy is one who says I am Turkish'. According to Turkish nationalists, this saying represents the

civic characteristics of Kemalist nationalism, which is unique from ethnic ones, because it does not say 'how happy is one who is Turkish'. However, this saying implicitly means 'what a pity for those who does not say "I am Turkish"'. This saying also imposes that the Turkish identity and language are worthier than other identities and languages. In short, this 'civic' discourse defines national identity in Turkey by language and even ethnicity (besides religion). Arguing that Turkish nationalism is civic ignores those inhabitants of Turkey who are not willing to become Turkish and who are excluded from not only national identity, but also access to equal citizenship rights. In this respect, as Ekinci argues accurately, 'citizenship in Turkey is directly conditioned upon being Turkish or identifying with Turkishness' whereas what the Kurds need 'is a sort of citizenship status that recognises the identity and linguistic and cultural rights of Kurds on equal terms [with the rights of Turks]' (2000: 249-52). This explains why Argun's call for 'a return to a civic understanding of Turkishness' seems irrelevant (1999: 98). In fact, the separation between civic and ethnic understandings of nationality is highly problematic, for both have a similar ambition of a homogeneous national identity and use similar assimilative instruments as their solution to linguistic minority questions. Finally, as Hassanpour rightly contends, Argun's theory of 'nationally defined' universal rights, which is based on 'positivistic assumptions such as the neutrality and objectivity of law', fails to take into account the question of threatened cultures and languages (1999: 113). Therefore, he argues that Argun's recipe 'only gives Turkey a civilized face' (ibid).

This 'civilized face' of Turkey seems to be what satisfies the EU. For this reason, nearly every Kurdish intellectual in Turkey highlights the insufficiency of the legal reforms that the governments in Turkey introduced for the sake of the EU harmonisation process. Ümit Fırat, a Kurdish politician and one of the authors of *Serbestî*, argues that the recent reforms can be regarded only as an opening within the context of the history of Turkey, though they do not make sense in terms of the developments in contemporary world[137]. Ekinci (2001: 112) argues that Turkey's National Programme (2001) for EU accession is not a genuine road map for democratisation in Turkey, but rather is a misleading document that was prepared to ensure Turkey's EU membership without challenging the pre-

137 See daily newspaper, *Radikal*, "AB Eşiğinde Kürt Sorunu" 28 May 2004. *Serbestî* is a quarterly political magazine on the Kurdish issue in Turkish, which has been published by the *Doz* publishing house in Turkey since 1998.

vailing regime[138]. The current undemocratic regime in Turkey, according to Ekinci (ibid: 111), is based upon the 1982 constitution, which regards the state as superior to the citizens and the society. The DTP's Mayor of Diyarbakır, Osman Baydemir (quoted in Çakır 2004: 150) states that the reforms introduced by the government in Turkey ensure the maintenance of the state's authoritarian ethos and the status quo that seeks a cautious and anxious democracy rather than a proper one. In this respect, the deficient implementation of reforms is often highlighted.

Those who emphasise the lack of political will in implementing the reforms also point out that that deficiency undermines the trust of the Kurds in the governments' ability to initiate further reforms. The head of Diyarbakır Bar, Sezgin Tanrıkulu (quoted in Çakır ibid: 72), argues that this lack of political will is caused by a resistance of military, civil and judicial bureaucracy to change, as they are prejudiced towards the Kurdish community in Turkey. Similarly, the co-president of the DTP, Ahmet Türk (quoted in Çakır ibid: 126) emphasises that the question of deficiency in the implementation of reforms, in fact, corresponds to the lack of trust in the Kurds. In other words, the main concern is that the Kurds are seen as a potential threat. The EU is criticised for failing to challenge the problematical image of Kurds in Turkey by excluding them from Turkey's EU membership process. In fact, most Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey disapprove of the current process of Turkey's EU membership, as the EU has never directly addressed the Kurds. Hasip Kaplan, MP for the DTP and a prominent lawyer of those who brought several 'v. Turkey' cases to the European Court of Human Rights, complains that the Kurds themselves were always excluded from the solution of the Kurdish question[139]. Similarly, Zana Farqini argues,

> 'the Kurds started to support Turkey's EU membership due to the possible improvements in the field of rights and freedoms … the EU should contact the representatives of the Kurds … this [the Kurdish question] is not simply the question of identity, culture, or mother tongue; this is a political question … the Kurds want to be recognised all with their identity, language, history and geography'.

138 Turkey prepared two more national programmes in 2003 and 2008. The section of 'Political Criteria' included in the latter reads, 'cultural diversity and cultural rights of all Turkish citizens have been guaranteed and the right to learn and broadcast in different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives has been *ensured*' (*italics added*). See the Programme at URL: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/UlusalProgram/UlusalProgram_2008/En/Doc/ii_politicalcriteria.doc.

139 *Radikal*, "AB Eşiğinde Kürt Sorunu" 27 May 2004.

On the other hand, some Kurdish intellectuals think that the recognition of Kurds with all their political and cultural features could only be realised by the Kurds themselves, which would require Kurdish political and cultural leaders to take a more dynamic role in Turkey's EU membership process. Fehim Işık states that the Kurds should not simply be content with supporting Turkey's EU membership, but rather they, especially those abroad, should take a diplomatic initiative in order to make the Kurds part of the process[140]. According to Sami Tan,

> 'we [the Kurds] are not well organised with regard to the EU process; we should confess that we have no work for taking us to the [EU] agenda … Moreover, there is no coordination among the [Kurdish] organisations and institutions that inform [and impact on] the [Kurdish] political actors [about the EU]'.

In a more clear way, Zana Farqini states that the Kurds do not follow strictly the recent developments about EU decisions, regulations and law on the linguistic rights and their implementations within the member states. These self-criticisms, in fact, highlight the potential role of Kurdish intellectuals in enlarging the areas where the Kurdish language could exist, whereby new battlegrounds could be acquired for the struggle for Kurdish linguistic rights. Sami Tan and Lal Laleş, owner of *Lîs* publishing house, for example, contend that the Kurds have not utilised Kurdish private courses, which could be transformed into sites where intermediate levels of Kurdish could be taught, Kurdish teachers trained, Kurdish materials prepared and Kurdish linguistic research done[141].

Similarly, many Kurdish intellectuals criticise their colleagues in positions of power for failing to utilise Turkey's EU membership process as a means to enhance the positive impacts that recent reforms could have had on the Kurdish community. They also draw attention to the deficits of the Kurdish community, which was unprepared for enjoying fully the reforms introduced. Fırat Anlı; major of the Yenişehir district of Diyarbakır, Nebahat Akkoç, the head of KAMER (Centre for Woman/ *Kadın Merkezi*) in Diyarbakır and Şeyhmus Diken, author and activist liv-

140 See the interview with Fehim Işık in 2006 at URL: http://www.kusca.com/modules.php?name=News&op=NEArticle&sid=3089 [9 February 2008].

141 Before establishing the *Lîs* publishing house in Diyarbakır in 2004, Laleş wrote poems and criticisms of poetry and theatre in several Kurdish magazines. The author conducted an interview with Lal Laleş in Turkish in Diyarbakır on 28 September 2007 and in İstanbul on 11 February 2008. All statements of Laleş that are submitted throughout this study are extracted from the interviews, unless otherwise specified.

ing in Diyarbakır, complain about the ill-equipped position of the Kurdish community in Turkey (Çakır 2004: 25-9)[142]. Kawa Nemir seems to express this unpreparedness in a different way: 'I got tired of the understanding that the Kurds have as "we were oppressed, destroyed". Such a psychology of "aggrieved-ness" seriously harms the Kurds'. It is this self-defeating that prevents the Kurds from formulating their demands in a well-structured way. More clearly, as Sami Tan argues,

> 'Kurds could not constitute a [strong] will [independent of a political one] … in order to demand a right, a power should be accumulated behind that demand. It does not simply mean a political demand … rather it means that when a right is acquired, there should be an organised [community], knowledge and materials to utilise that right'.

With such accumulation and organisation, he adds, the Kurds could have carried out many of the responsibility they have for their linguistic rights. In fact, Tan's perception of an active Kurdish community is in compliance with his perception of the EU:

> 'The EU is a continuing process [which the Kurds could be a part of] … for example, there is a network of lesser used languages in the EU; when you enter the EU you will inevitably be a part of this struggle … the Kurds could work within such a network… we should utilise the experiences of Catalonia, [Northern] Ireland … we should see the EU as a process but not as a completed project…'

Lal Laleş also regards the EU not as an ends, but rather as an ongoing process, with a set of common values and principles consolidating democracy and freedom in member states. He argues,

> 'the EU works for the democratisation of Turkey whereby the individuals can [freely] express themselves. It [the EU] anticipates that the citizens living in Turkey will keep change and transformation progressing through the internal dynamics within such a democratised milieu. The EU should not be perceived as a service of complaint but rather it should be seen as a platform of rights and freedoms and a common democratic world whereby the questions [the Kurdish question] can be solved'.

Kawa Nemir is more critical of both the idea of EU itself and the attitude of Kurds towards the EU project:

142 More information about KAMER is available in the next chapter.

> 'I think the EU as a demand or as a process is an ambiguity for the Kurds… The EU is not only an economic but also a civilisation project, a project of western civilisation… Is there much that the EU may politically or culturally provide for the Kurds? … If the EU will be the union of peoples, it will bring us much otherwise I do not think it will do so…'.

Notably, the younger members of the Kurdish intelligentsia in Turkey hold the opinion that the EU is less than a potent political actor that can and should save the linguistic minorities, but more than a simple interstate organisation that is sealed against political entities other than the nation-states. This awareness helps them to perceive the Kurdish community as a potential actor in the EU minority politics rather than a powerless people to be protected by a European power. In its emphasis of the EU as an on-going process, an incomplete project or a union of peoples, the younger generation tends to regard the Kurdish community as part of this process. The reasons for this distinctive approach might stem from the fact that the younger generation is much more interested in and informed of the EU on the one hand, and has greater contact with other linguistic minorities in the EU, on the other. It is the language-and-culture-oriented view of the new generation of the Kurdish intelligentsia that enables it to interpret the political in a sub-or-supra-national way and separates it from the earlier and 'highly political' generation.

On the other hand, Kurdish intellectuals who work exclusively on the Kurdish language, literature and publishing claim that the Turkish public opinion only acknowledges those Kurdish political figures, who, in fact, are incapable of representing the Kurds because they have less contact with the Kurdish people and culture and they cannot speak Kurdish. According to Sami Tan, 'those who work hard for this [Kurdish] language are not known [by the Turkish people].' He adds that the Turkish majority disregards those who do not accept the Republic's definition of Kurdish identity and role. Zana Farqini argues,

> 'when you look at Kurdish intellectuals who are given place in the mainstream Turkish media you see those, who have lived in isolation, [that is] far from the Kurdish struggle and the Kurdish people … those who are asked to tell their opinions are the *Kurdic* but "independent" intellectuals who are close to neither the state nor the Kurdish leftist political structures … Why are not those Kurdish intellectuals, who work for the Kurdish cause in civil and cultural organisations, let alone the political ones, asked what they think [about the Kurdish issue]? … Those Kurdish intellectuals, who speak and act on behalf of the Kurds although they do not speak

> Kurdish or have little competence on the Kurdish language [vocabulary], constitute an unenthusiastic role model [for the Kurds] and a negative Kurdish profile [for the Turks] (*italics added*)'.

Neither Tan nor Farqini argue that those who do not speak Kurdish cannot be considered Kurdish. However, they point out that the ability to speak Kurdish has positive implications not only on the language, but also the identity. According to Tan,

> 'identity is a matter of choice; if he feels or accepts himself Kurdish, he is Kurdish … However, language [Kurdish] is a considerable factor determining, for example, the [Kurdish] literature … [On the other hand] that the people feel themselves Kurdish is a result of the impact of those who work for the Kurdish language … Those who speak Kurdish and work for the Kurdish language create an atmosphere or a basis, which transforms the consciousness of people [who recognise their Kurdishness]'.

In this respect, it seems that Kurdish intellectuals who speak the language have the potential to contribute to the solution of the issue, as they are more capable of enhancing Kurdish linguistic rights and providing a more consistent profile for the Turkish majority. However, this potential cannot be activated due to, among other things, the dominant Turkish public opinion, which does not regard the Kurds as the source of 'national' wealth. The Turkish majority either perceives the Kurds as a potential threat or as unqualified members of the society. As Uzun rightly asks, 'what do the people of Turkey know about the Kurdish language, culture, national values, arts and music, except those ridiculous official theses?' (2001: 84). It is this indifference which undermines the politics of brotherhood or equality between the Turks and Kurds.

EU as a Quest for Recognition

At variance with the liberal states, illiberal Turkey is less subtle in disguising the violence of law on minorities. Both the names of regulations enhancing the freedom of non-Turkish languages and the additional articles ensuring the basic principles of the Republic are the clear expressions of the state authority demarcating linguistic rights. Most strikingly, the state authority in Turkey does not yet underline notably the individuality of

minority rights in opposition to their communal nature. This emphasis has not yet been detected in the documents issued by the governments in Turkey – seemingly a result of a lack of liberalism in Turkey. In other words, Turkey has not yet regarded the Kurdish community as a minority to be entitled by minority rights. On the other hand, the limited existence of the Kurdish language in the public sphere and political arena fits the picture drawn above with regard to the binary oppositions constructed within liberal nation-states.

Although the liberal states of Europe and the illiberal state of Turkey cannot be treated similarly in their policies towards the linguistic rights of minorities, they do have some aspects in common. The right to state sovereignty is the last thing they plan to pool in or transfer to the EU because the union has the potential to undermine the philosophy of nation-state in favour of minority groups. However, this potential cannot be activated without diligent minorities who exercise power in a transformative way as discussed in the next chapter, which also analyses power and resistance in the search for emancipatory politics that can be initiated by minorities and diasporas. It is clear what type of democracy the Kurdish community expects from Turkey's EU membership: the recognition of its distinct linguistic, cultural and 'political' identity. However, the recognition that the Kurdish community seeks through Turkey's EU membership can also be analysed critically by questioning the 'national' and 'imitative' aspects of this demand for recognition. This analysis is done with the help of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey in the last two chapters within the theoretical framework of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

Power and Resistance

The deconstruction of the aforementioned binary oppositions reveals the unequal distribution of power between the parts of oppositions. The powerless is always constructed as an exception, the degenerated and evil, while the powerful is seen as the norm, the origin and good. Furthermore, these oppositions are postulated as objective and natural facts of truth to which we are disposed. Therefore, to what we are subjected is the domination of truth through 'the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of a discourse', whereby the relations of power can be established, consolidated and implemented (Foucault 1980: 93). This picture of power and truth as domination, on the other hand, seems to have no room for resistance, except for the one that reproduces the truth of the dominative power. It is the aim of this chapter to deconstruct this picture in order to problematise minority resistance in favour of a transformative mode of resistance. To discuss such a transformative resistance, then, the first section discusses conventional and contemporary conceptions of power in a critical way. This critical elaboration of power provides a critical analysis of resistance, which is submitted in the second section. The third section evaluates the emancipatory politics that is purportedly initiated by minorities who adopt a critical approach towards power and resistance. The fourth section extends this evaluation to diasporas as groups who can generate trans-nationality as a source of this emancipatory politics. As another source of this emancipatory politics, the final section includes a critical approach towards the relationship between language and identity that may be engendered by both diasporic and minority communities.

Conceptions of Power

The traditional definition of power 'as a locus of will, as a supreme agency to which other wills would bend, as prohibitory' are related to the classical conception of 'power zero-sum', 'power as negation of the power of others' (Clegg 1998: 4). Indeed, 'references to power are rarely neutral; there are few words that produce such admiring or, in the frequent case, indignant response' (Galbraith 1994: 217). However, if power can be approached 'with a sceptical mind but not with one that has a fixation of evil', it is possible to see that 'power can be socially malign; it is also socially essential' (ibid: 219). This designation is essential and productive in that the individual 'is not *vis-à-vis* of power; it is […] one of its prime effects' and 'the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle' (Foucault 1980: 98; *italics original*). This explains why Foucault calls for 'an *ascending* analysis of power', which works on the 'infinitesimal mechanisms' of power (ibid: 99; *italics original*). This micro-analysis of power provides Foucault with the 'analytics of power', which mainly studies 'the power without the king' (1998: 91; see Shapiro 1981: 218). If power exercises 'not through the direct will of a sovereign nor through legal proscriptions but through the creation of objects and persons' (Shapiro ibid), then 'the subject is indebted to the limits, however oppressive, imposed on him or her for the possibility of being anyone at all, having an identity and capacities to act' (Simons 1995: 4). In this respect, 'all resistance movements owe a major debt to and are necessarily implicated in official discourses' (Valverde 1999). Resisting domination thus both empowers and constructs the identity of the oppressed.

This analysis enables us to regard power 'as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth' (Shapiro 1981: 218). The circulating chain of power results in an exercise of power that is not unilateral but transactionary between the parts (Simmel 1994: 203-6). Therefore, power could be better perceived 'as a process which may pass through distinct circuits of power and resistance' (Clegg 1988: 18). In this respect, power could not be considered something to be eliminated, but rather might be conceived of as intrinsic to the existence of human beings and their relationships. Power inhabits everybody. This definition also refers to the con-

ception of power as something relative, rather than absolute. Power cannot be thought of as generalised, but differentiated in terms of resources, skills, motivations and costs (Dahl 1994: 44-6).

These differentiated conceptions of power, as a result, indicate that nobody has a total and overarching power over others in every aspect of life. In this sense, minorities have relative and differentiated *power to* activate their resources and motivations towards resistance. It is necessary, then, to distinguish between power and domination in order to conceive of 'a productive notion of power that is not antithetical to freedom, subjectivity and resistance' (Howarth 2000: 83). However, resistance is not only composed of productive power. Rather, minority groups' resistance mostly includes *power over* subjectivities inside in order to acquire *power to* challenge oppression outside. Therefore, dominating power, which is 'the strategic capacity to achieve goals', should be differentiated from productive power, which is 'the intersubjective generation of specific forms of solidarity' (Stewart 2001: 6). This differentiation leads one to differentiate between dominative and productive resistance.

This analysis of productive power (and resistance), which highlights intersubjectivity and solidarity, also implies that power also inhabits collectivity. In fact, this implication becomes possible only through the acknowledgement of that which is inherent in the conception of productive power – an understanding that power does not only produce, but also is produced. As Arendt describes, 'power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, […] it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then they may follow' (1994: 68). Habermas clarifies that in Arendt's non-teleological model 'power serves to maintain the praxis from which it springs' (1994: 77). This is the praxis of collectivity in the political, which is found in Spinoza's understanding as follows: 'the "soul" of the body politic [in which individuals work together] is not a representation but a praxis' (Balibar 1998: 71). In line with Spinoza, Balibar rejects the individualistic understanding of power because 'the idea of such an isolation is simply another mystificatory abstraction of the individual' and argues that 'it is the relationship of each individual to other individualities and their reciprocal actions and passions which determine the form of the individual's desire and actuate its power' (ibid: 108). It is the interaction among individuals which activates power. It is the collective activity of individuals which makes power present. Power thus refers to a collective muscle, rather than to an indi-

vidual one. '*Power* corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together' (Arendt 1994: 64; *italics original*).

Stewart similarly speaks of the 'inherently interactive' social power of *concerted agency*, which stands in contrast to the 'reproduced asymmetric social relations' that he calls domination (2001: 50). This interactive social power of concerted agency corresponds to the resistance led by minorities who do not reproduce domination. The social aspect of power is also highlighted by Habermas, who specifies power 'as a unique social resource, produced through communicative action, understood as action directed toward intersubjective understanding' (1994: 77; see Stewart 2001: 40). However, it should be noted that 'under conditions characterised by an unequal division of burdens and privileges, communicative action assumes the form of a struggle that the concerned subjects conduct over ways of conducting their common praxis' (Honneth 1993: 270; quoted in Stewart ibid: 47). Therefore, the social aspect of power, or the social power of concerted agency or the power of communicative action, does not stem from the anticipated intersubjective understanding that rises on the basis of consensus, but rather inherently includes struggle among the concerned subjects.

In fact, because 'the hope of a world without power is disabling; what is empowering is engagement in struggle' (Foucault 1982: 222-3; Simons 1995: 22). This engagement can only be meaningful if it empowers the dominated by letting them generate productive power to resist domination. This is a struggle for self-development and self-determination, which are antonymous to oppression and domination (Young 2000: 31). Oppression does not necessarily refer to a brutal and bare force, but rather includes structural domination that stems from social, economic and political inequalities engendering injustice. More specifically, the oppressed can be seen as a social group which is subjected to exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism or violence (Young 1990: 48-63). Although all interact with each other, it is generally powerlessness that generates the core of domination. Therefore, it is empowerment – rather than protection, tolerance or clemency – that minorities need to be freed from domination. The empowerment of the oppressed does not serve only to end injustice and domination, but also eliminates the constraints on resistance. Empowerment creates what protection, tolerance or clemency

cannot – it leads minorities to formulate resistance that can be freed from reproducing domination.

The formulation of this resistance that resists reproducing domination also requires a pluralistic understanding of resistance. This understanding is what is proposed by the political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism, which argues that if the power to be resisted is organised as a net, then the resistance should become pluralistic in character (see May 2000: 67). This pluralism implies that the state is no more the central address of resistance or the political instrument to be possessed for particular interests. Also it means that resistance should not be organised in an essentialist and authoritarian way. This is the ethical limitation of resistance that defies essentialism and authoritarianism. As Newman (2006: 254), in line with Derrida, reminds us, the ideals and ethics inherent to the notion of emancipation of Enlightenment remain important as long as they are open to other struggles and hitherto ignored identities. This is the reason why Bhabha highlights,

> [i]f the jargon of our times – postmodernity, postcoloniality, postfeminism – has any meaning at all, it does not lie in popular use of the 'post' to indicate sequentiality – after-feminism; or polarity – anti-modernism… [they would be meaningful] if they transform the present into an expanded and ex-centric site of experience and empowerment (2001: 4).

Scenes of Resistance

Regarding power as an imminent element in all relationships requires acknowledging that '"truth" isn't outside power, or lacking in power, but a thing of this world, which must be internally connected with logics of power and domination' (see Foucault 1987: 72; Howarth 2000: 72). This acknowledgement requires the reconsideration of truth claims asserted by resistant movements and their standing before the notion of power. The power of dissident resistance cannot to stem from their eagerness to offer and/or impose an alternative truth, which may easily fall into the trap of domination. 'What makes a discourse useful for resistance is not simply its derivation from the mouths of the oppressed, as they can either turn around a dominating discourse (e.g. the demand for recognition of the

'naturalness' of homosexuality) or find that their discourse has been appropriated by the dominant social forces (e.g. the commercialization of punk)' (Foucault 1998: 101-2; Simons 1995: 91). A useful discourse of resistance should include a criticism of subjection itself. It is the failure of liberation movements to fight against repression, rather than the power of subjection itself. It is 'the trap of humanism, which binds us ever more tightly to our subjectivities through our efforts to liberate ourselves' (Simons ibid: 47).

In fact, 'there is no such project as liberation from power … there is no such thing as liberation, not only because power is always implicated in liberation as in domination, but also because there is no preexisting human essence to be liberated' (Valverde 1999). We need the liberty to determine who we are rather than the liberty to insist on essentialised and repressed subjectivity (see Eagleton 1994: 31). However, the liberating power of resistance may disappear if 'the resistant capacities of the subject' cannot serve the subject to work 'on the limits to which he or she is partially indebted and [to fashion] new forms of subjectivity' (Simons 1995: 4). As Brah defines, 'subjectivity – the site of processes of making sense of our relation to the world – is the modality in which the precarious and contradictory nature of the subject-in-process is signified or experienced as identity' (2003: 123). In this sense, minority subjectivity should not necessarily be 'a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities in dominant ideologies would want us to believe) but [could be] a question of position, subject position that in the final analysis can be defined only in "political" terms – that is, in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, social manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects and discourses' (JanMohammed and Lloyd 1990: 9). The resistance capacities of minorities could not substantially challenge subjectivity unless those capacities are utilised to reject playing the role or to have the identity that is imposed on minorities by the dominant order.

However, as Kitzinger highlights, 'the oppressed are actively encouraged to construct identities that reaffirm the basic validity of this dominant moral order' (1989: 94; quoted in Burr 1995: 76). Bhabha calls the product of this encouragement 'discourse of mimicry', which is shaped by the dominant power's 'desire for a reformed, recognizable Other' (2001: 86). Minorities that do not reject to be the recognisable Other of the majority inevitably undermine their power of opposition. 'Opposition has been rendered increasingly ineffective because the representatives of the "forces

of negativity" – although they have not lost the "title of opposition" – have all too often become mimics of the dominant apparatus' (Marcuse 1941; quoted in Held 1980: 69). Bhabha similarly draws attention to 'the danger that the mimetic contents of a discourse will conceal the fact that the hegemonic structures of power are maintained in a position of authority through a shift in vocabulary in the position of authority' (2001: 242). Ling (2004: 116-7) differentiates the forms of mimicry in relation to their implications on both the mimick*er* and the mimick*ed*. The formal mimicry, which reflects first-order learning and surface copying, differs from the substantial mimicry, which 'deepens into a cumulative strategy of integrated, more coherent problem solving, producing a hybrid sense of self and other' (ibid). It is not surprising then that 'substantive mimicry articulates an innovative, internally developed ideology in contrast to formal mimicry's conventional, externally borrowed one' (ibid). Furthermore, while the hegemonic power's response to the formal mimicry might include 'amusement, tolerance, even encouragement', it is 'punitive' and 'disciplinary' towards the substantial mimicry because of the latter's threatening nature (ibid). In this sense, the substantial mimicry is more capable of leading a truly transformative resistance.

This critical analysis of mimicry might allow translating an omnipresent and regular, namely imitative resistance into a transformative one. In fact, 'there is *always* resistance, whether from the criminal, the rebel, or the civil dissident' (Stewart 2001: 105; *italics added*). Scott (1990) argues that resistance generates from the abyss within the oppressed her/himself. This abyss is a result of the tension between the *public transcript*, which implies obedience to the dominant power, and the *hidden transcript*, which emerges as a reaction to repression and humiliation (ibid: 44). The tension between these two different transcripts creates 'a double life with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes' (Du Bois 1969: 221-2; quoted in Scott ibid), from which resistance leaks. Therefore, the nucleus of resistance may be found within the informal networks of community in various forms of folk culture, which Scott calls 'infrapolitics'. As a response to the suppression or denial of their identity, minorities usually develop a defensive stance that re-interprets their narratives and poems, songs, culture and history. Moreover, these elements of infrapolitics easily traverse the borders and limits drawn by the dominant power in today's communication and information society. In this respect, one can think of infrapolitics as 'the building block for the more elaborate institutionalised

political action' (Scott ibid: 201). Infrapolitics weakens the obedience to the public transcript, and the dominant discourse itself.

As Foucault argues, 'discourses are not one and for all subservient to power or raised up against it [...] Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it' (1979: 100-1). Power and resistance are a dovetailing pair means that 'prevailing discourses are always under implicit threat from alternatives which can dislodge them from their position as "truth"' (Burr 1995: 70). In this sense, the source of resistance is the gap between the official discourse on equality and liberty and the injustices that minorities experience and express (see Scott 1990: 52-5). This gap illustrates the interstices into which minorities are squeezed – that is, the binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere. On the other hand, these interstices constitute the nodal points of resistance (see Stewart 2001: 105). These points refer to perpetual spaces available for freedom even through the most oppressive subordination (Simmel 1994). If we are generally not aware of it, it is 'because its manifestation would entail sacrifices which we usually never think of taking upon ourselves' (ibid: 204). These sacrifices might be read as responsibilities, but not simply as obligations imperatively imposed by power. Responsibility here means the duty to formulate an innovative means of resistance that not only would serve the interests of the oppressed, but also aim at the origin of ever-present domination. To be responsible is 'to prevent the solidification of strategic relations into states of domination' (Foucault 1982: 222-3; Simons 1995: 22). Otherwise, neither a full accomplishment of interests nor a real emancipation of the oppressed can exist.

In order to discuss a real emancipation, a separation between interests and 'transformative objectives' is helpful (Benton 1981: 72; quoted in Stewart ibid: 43). While the transformative objectives have a more radical standpoint that looks to transform the current dominating system, the interests serve the chain of dominations following one another. Additionally, Stewart proposes a 'distinction between expressions of wants and preferences and the symbolic and immanent meaning of social practices dissonant with the reproduction of structures of domination' (2001: 44). In this sense, a responsible and transformative resistance includes resisting the translation of *power to* into *power over*. 'Power to' is the productive power necessary for responsible actions to eliminate injustice, while 'power over'

refers to the imposition of minority concerns over the rest in the same manner as the previous hegemonic oppressor. 'This concept of responsibility is inseparable from a whole network of connected concepts (property, intentionality, will, freedom, conscience, consciousness, self-consciousness, subject, self, person, community, decision, and so forth)' that is subject to deconstruction because, as discussed before, 'deconstruction calls for an increase in responsibility' (Derrida 1992: 20). Moreover, deconstruction 'is carving out a space for forgiveness, if not forgetfulness, that is, a responsibility dissevered from retribution' (Maley 1999). Deconstruction calls for justice that goes beyond revenge (ibid). If justice is what motivates transformative resistance, then resistance should be a 'gift without exchange' (Derrida 1992: 25).

Truth be told, resistance movements are frequently criticised for being insistent on proceeding with predetermined objectives, most of which involve a kind of revenge. However, independent of a desire for revenge, the objectives of a resistance movement should not be autonomous of changing conditions in a long-lasting struggle. Rather, they should be flexible and open to revisions in order to shift the appropriate paths (see Hindess 1982: 509; quoted in Stewart 2001: 49). The rigidity of minority resistance styles might fail to change the fixed and unquestioned opinions established by the majority (Mugny 1982: 37). In this respect, what forces the majority to question the unquestionable dominance of prevailing discourses is the transformative resistance of minorities.

In terms of linguistic minorities, interests and predetermined ends can be regarded as traditional and conservative claims for the nation-state, while revisable and transformative objectives can be conceived of as innovative politics beyond the politics of nation-state. Therefore, the critical question is how omnipresent, regular, or imitative resistance can be designed in a responsible and transformative manner that does not reproduce domination. This is the paradox of resistance. Minority groups formed by power become the vehicle of power which they resist. Resistance, then, reproduces power on the one hand, while challenging it on the other. If domination produces resistance and resistance might reproduce domination – in order to generate emancipatory politics that eradicate the origin of domination – what we look for is the transformative resistance of productive power. Resistance, which might not reproduce domination and would be a transformative one, must be relatively empowered and freed from domination. Of course, expecting the powerless and oppressed to

be flexible and innovative enough under severe domination would not only be unjust but also unrealistic. However, it seems nearly impossible to eliminate domination completely. Therefore, there appears to be no other choice than searching for a form of transformative resistance that is responsible enough to break this vicious circle. Furthermore, new conceptualisations of domination and resistance may be helpful to conceive the paradox in a productive way. When domination is regarded 'as disrespect and misrecognition, socially institutionalised as marginalisation and exclusion', then resistance can be considered 'collective mobilisation on the basis of consciousness of injustice and transformative struggles as the relation between them' (Stewart 2001: 58-9). Such resistance could be initiated as concerted actions and reactions to domination by disclosing the contradictory aspects of the latter in order to undermine its power.

Emancipatory Politics

In light of these remarks, emancipatory politics can be read as the organisation of consciousness of, or interest in, the contradictions and inconsistencies of the dominant discourse. Inevitably and naturally minorities become aware of these contradictions and inconsistencies. The question becomes the organisation of this minority consciousness in a transformative way. A further question regards the extension of this organisation to the members of the majority, who are also predetermined subjects of the dominant discourse. When minorities are able to transmit this consciousness to majorities, they can lead a transformative resistance in the name of emancipatory politics. As Burr argues, 'these marginalized voices and discourses are seen as important sources of resistance for us all in challenging the legitimacy of the prevailing "knowledges" through which we understand ourselves and our lives' (1995: 69). In this sense, Marcuse (1966; quoted in Held 1980: 76) names two groups as 'the only counterforce': those 'underprivileged', who struggle for survival outside the capitalist nation-states, and those among the privileged whose consciousness and instincts break through or escape social control. The idea of 'consciousness' refers to a radical departure from the understanding of basic conflict 'as an opposition between social groups or classes', to 'the field of opposition between purposive-rational and communicatively-organised action spheres' (Honneth 1993: 268;

quoted in Stewart 2001: 47). This departure means a dramatic exit from the prevailing forms of politics to an emancipatory one. Emancipatory politics '[are] no longer about the struggle to gain power in order to impose a particular claim or interpretation; rather, the struggle is about expanding the opportunity for groups to determine, and live according to, their own claims and interpretations' (Alway 1995: 136). The emphasis on the struggle for the expansion of opportunities here questions the limits of the political, which are drawn by the liberal conception of politics.

Mouffe's (1993) criticism of the liberal conception of politics calls for democratic forces to revisit the political. She argues that liberal politics 'as a rational process of negotiation among individuals' are apolitical in that collective identities but not individuals perform in the political field (ibid: 140). Therefore, she refers to the power of collective, particularly marginal identities as 'democratic forces' when she calls for the political. What is political in a radical democratic interpretation of 'the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality' is 'a collective form of identification among the democratic demands found in a variety of movements' (ibid: 70). This collective identification is supposed to 'take account of the different social relations and subject positions in which they are relevant: gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on' (ibid: 71). 'Any radical politics cannot be premised on the domination of any particular political project … but must be constructed in terms of the recognition of difference and the identification and development of points of common interest' (Barker and Galasiński 2001: 11).

Furthermore, Mouffe maintains that liberal politics demolishes 'the whole dimension of power and antagonism', what she calls the political (1993: 140). She looks at the construction of collective identities on the basis of an 'us/them' distinction as political antagonism. The political cannot operate when this antagonism is neglected; rather it is the acknowledgment of this antagonism that keeps the political alive (ibid). Antagonism, however, 'should not be conceived as an external relation taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather, as constituting the identities themselves' (Mouffe 1999). The inevitability of constructing an identity without a limit or an outside makes the latter a constitutive one. This explains why Mouffe (1993: 4) reinterprets this antagonism in favour of the notion of agonism. In this reformulation, 'the enemy' is transformed into 'an adversary', who is not to be destroyed, but rather one whose existence is legitimate and necessary. She (1999) distinguishes between *antago-*

nist political relations among enemies and *agonistic pluralism* among adversaries, arguing that the latter refers to democratic politics that mobilise passions to promote democratic designs rather than relegating them to the private sphere. The concept of agonistic pluralism should not necessarily be limited to an understanding of the political *between* communities, but rather it should be extended to revisit the political *within* communities. As Abizadeh argues, 'difference can exist *within* the putative inside', which calls into question the sharp distinction between inside and outside (2005: 57). In this sense, 'difference need not refer to actually existing persons at all' but also can refer to non-humans or characteristics, namely 'the hypothetical values on which collective identities are centred; or values of a past historical identity', from which the members of a group mark their distance (ibid: 58). This conception of difference complies with a deconstructive analysis, which not only indicates similarities between the poles of binary oppositions, but also highlights differences within them. It is this analysis which helps minority resistance to acquire transformative and emancipatory characteristics to be shared by the members of the majority.

Addressing the lack of transformation and emancipation in minority resistance, Eagleton (1983: 30) states that the nationalist struggle, likewise class and gender politics, could not escape falling into the categories which it hopes to destroy because of the ironic effect of oppression which prevents the oppressed from recognising its real need for emancipation. Power not only oppresses the social, sexual or ethnic identities, but also forces the oppressed to emphasise many values that are not as important in the long-term (ibid: 28). As Gramsci highlights, 'the imposition of a national language (or a dominant ideology) created by a small elite cannot, […] be made to fit the lives and experiences of others with very different social, class, and geographic conditions', and more importantly, such an attempt suppresses 'their creativity, productivity, intelligence and ultimately their humanity' (see Ives 2004: 57). In this sense, although emancipatory politics inevitably focuses on an authenticity that is imposed by the dominant power, it should be enriched with a multi-dimensional view on politics. The freedom to be sought is not the freedom of having the identity oppressed, but rather the freedom to determine the identity one wishes (ibid: 31). In terms of linguistic rights, this is the freedom to speak the language one wishes rather than the freedom 'only' to speak one's mother tongue, which often becomes an obligation for the members of minorities.

In this sense, what is called for is a kind of politics that constrains dominating practices and encourages collective standpoints of political communities, which are not merely imagined as essential identities. What is needed is a radically critical approach towards identities which resists reinforcing vicious cycles. Bhabha (2001: 5) contends that an awareness of the epistemological limits of the ethnocentric ideas is also the enunciative terrain for dissonant and dissident histories and voices. 'What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial … is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences' (ibid: 1). Bhabha regards the possibility of 'a movement away from a world conceived in binary terms' as 'a shift from the political as a pedagogical, to an ideological practice as the stressed necessity of everyday life – politics as a performativity' (ibid: 15). In this sense, emancipatory politics might work best on a banal domination based on the politics of binary oppositions. The effect of the 'language of critique' is severely restricted unless 'it overcomes the given grounds of opposition and opens up a space of translation: a place of hybridity' as a public articulation of difference (ibid: 25). In this sense, hybrid members of both minority and majority groups seem more eligible to inhabit this space of translation.

The concept of hybridity does not refer only to a biological one; rather, it is a conception of multiple/differentiated belongings, which might stem from regarding group differentiations as a function of relationships and interaction (Young 2000: 253). Since multilevel, transnational interactions lead to an increase of multiple/differentiated belongings, one can speak more about such a notion of hybridity in today's world. This hybridity might generate a capability of detecting and criticising such common problems as objectification, alienation and marginalisation. In this respect, the hybrid members of communities could also be seen as 'intellectuals' in Marcuse's terms, who comprise 'not only cultural workers but the new working class as a whole' and who 'are able to develop a critical, oppositional consciousness that resists and rebels against subjugation' (1967: 417; quoted in Alway 1995: 91). More crucially, Alway (ibid: 95) adds that the novelty of Marcuse's conception of intellectuals is an interest in revolutionary subjectivity, rather than a specific revolutionary subject. This interest in subjectivity is also appropriate for contemporary emancipatory movements, which are mostly composed of radical criticisms of the national socialist revolutionary struggles. Those movements were mainly

led by authoritarian cadres who aimed to mobilise the masses on the way to form socialist nation-states. The revolutionary subject was the working class who belonged to a certain ethnic community that was oppressed by the dominant majority. However, as discussed above, both the strategy and the subject of those socialist revolutionary movements were shaped by the dominant discourse, which nurtures the vicious circle of nationalism. The recession of socialism provided new perspectives to examine not only liberalism but also socialism.

Both deconstructive and discursive analyses that discuss the implications of liberal politics on the minority question are among those perspectives. The commonality of authors referenced in this chapter is their emphasis on the possibility of different subjectivities in resistance against power, which is not necessarily concentrated in the particular hands of states but rather is inherent to all social interactions. This emphasis calls for the re-thinking of resistance movements, which might easily turn into dominating practices. In such a re-thinking process, the emphasis is put on the current limit of the political, which is a limit penetrated by 'a Western concept of the state and of sovereignty' (Derrida 1997: 12). This limit is also the edge of trans-national subjectivities, which would go beyond the current stage of internationality led by given nation-states (ibid). According to Bhabha, 'the demography of the new internationalism is the history of postcolonial migration, the narratives of cultural and political diaspora, the major social displacements of peasant and aboriginal communities, the poetics of exile, the grim prose of political and economic refugees' (2001: 5). This is one of the reasons why, from a deconstructive stance, the work of justice is most suited to peoples who are already diasporic and groups whose unification is always deferred and whose identity is always in question (see Valverde 1999).

Diasporas are especially seen as the motor force of 'transnational grassroots movements for social justice' (see Braziel 2008: 163). More precisely, 'diasporic forms of activism and cultural production may articulate resistance to nationalist abuses of power, as well as infractions and human rights violations of multinational corporations, internationally funded development projects, or the deleterious impacts of global capitalism on the daily lives of citizens and immigrants from or in small developing countries' (ibid: 159). Braziel regards the diasporic forms of cultural production (literary and artistic) that 'expose violences, power differentials, and injustices', as 'diasporic arts of resistance', which constitute 'important forms of

political critique worldwide' (ibid). In this respect, the potential of hybrid members of diasporas – as inhabitants of a space of translation, a space of 'mediation and co-existence between diverse people and cultures' – needs to be highlighted (see Bialasiewicz and Minca 2005: 370). The question is if these anticipated translators in diaspora are able to engender trans-nationality in politics and resistance.

Diaspora as Trans-nationality

Defining diaspora as a category of analysis becomes a controversial issue because of a rise in the number and diversification of diasporic communities. For this reason, Brubaker (2005: 12) proposes to think of diaspora as a category of practice in terms of making claims, articulating projects, formulating expectations, mobilizing energies and appealing to loyalties, and only then ask whether or how the term can be used as a category of analysis. In this sense, he is correct to claim that diaspora is often a category with a strong normative charge. Indeed, this study considers diaspora a part of trans-nationality as a normative category, which challenges the prevailing ways of looking at the world and politics[143]. This conception of trans-nationality presupposes the epistemological break with the current conception of diaspora, which Vertovec defines as 'a self-identified ethnic group, with a specific place of origin, which has been globally dispersed through voluntary or forced migration' (2006). Brubaker (2005: 5) lists the following three core elements as the constitutive of diaspora: dispersion in space; orientation to a 'homeland'; and boundary maintenance, noting that all criteria have been challenged by the recent works on diasporas. For example, if part of a population lives as a minority outside its homeland, they can be defined as a diasporic community – while the prominence of a homeland as a teleological point of origin/return has been undermined by decentred, lateral connections (see Clifford 1994: 304-6; quoted in Brubaker ibid: 6). Furthermore, the emphasis on boundary-maintenance and the preservation of identity, which refers to a deliberate resistance to

143 It may be useful to repeat that the term 'transnational' is used in this study to denote the transfer and transaction of thoughts and experiences across the borders of nation-states, whereas 'trans-national' refers to thoughts and experiences themselves which go beyond the national.

assimilation, has been replaced by an emphasis on heterogeneity, diversity and particularly hybridity (see Brubaker ibid).

In short, the growing numbers of people living in multiple cultural, political and spatial contexts calls for a reconceptualisation of diaspora, which 'needs to address the global, transnational, experience of diasporic groups and individuals who construct new and hybrid belongings … through the routes of their diasporic journey' (Georgiou 2006: 4). In this account, Sheffer argues that diasporas 'are indeed the precursors of post-modern trans-state social and political systems' (2003: 245). These systems, in fact, refer to transnational networks as location where diasporas act. This shift in transnationality marks 'the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' (Basch *et al*. 1994: 6). More significantly, the actors of these networks, namely diasporas are subjected to plural lives and cultures. This plurality is seen as a situation in which 'migrants have become icons of hybridity' rather than as being caught between two [or more] cultures (Salih 1999: 1; quoted in Westwood and Phizacklea 2000: 116). Consequently, 'the subjective mark of the transnational would be cultural hybridity or the way in which transnationals can challenge the notion of a fixed identity' (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000: 118). Therefore, recent transnational conceptions of diaspora differ from the traditional and nationalist one in that the latter constitutes a lineage of pure descent, not hybridity (see Lie 2001: 359).

Brubaker is critical of such a conception of diaspora: 'diaspora can be as an alternative to the essentialization of belonging, but it can also represent a non-territorial form of essentialized belonging' (2005: 12). The very definition of the term diaspora, which 'indicates the dispersal or scattering of a body of people from their traditional home across foreign lands; yet, like agricultural sowing of seeds from which the word comes to us (from the Greek *speirein*)' it 'also suggests an anticipation of root-taking and eventual growth' (Israel 2000: 1)[144]. Indeed, diaspora is not a recent phenomenon, essential aspects of which 'are the endless cultural, social, economic, and especially political struggles of those dispersed ethnic groups … to maintain their distinctive identities and connections with their homelands

144 The word diaspora derives from the Greek dia, 'through', and speirein, 'to scatter' and 'embodies a notion of a centre, a locus, a 'home' from where the dispersion occurs' (Brah 2003: 181).

and other dispersed groups from the same nations' (Sheffer 2003: 7)[145]. According to Brah, nevertheless, diasporas 'are often composite formations made up of many journeys … each with its own history, its own particularities' (2003: 183). Although 'these multiple journeys may configure into one journey via a confluence of narratives as it is lived and re-lived, produced, reproduced and transformed through individual as well as collective memory and re-memory', the identity of such an imagined diasporic community is not stable (ibid).

This is one of the reasons why 'the concept of diaspora offers a critique of discourses of fixed origins, while taking account of a homing desire which is not the same thing as desire for a "homeland"' (ibid: 180). The distinction between a homing desire and the desire for a homeland is important, not least because not all diasporas sustain 'an ideology of "return"' (ibid). Vertovec notes that 'any longed-for return to the homeland now tends to be downplayed in favour of ideological identification or transnational practice that can link the scattered community with the homeland' (2005). This conception of the relationship between diaspora and homeland focuses on the de-territorial notion of diaspora, which conveys diaspora as either a transnational socio-cultural process or as an activity of identity-formation – as a reaction of those who were displaced, exiled and excluded (Alinia 2007: 98). This de-territorial notion of diaspora stands in opposition to the re-territorial notion of diaspora, which highlights a national project of returning to the homeland and strengthens the concept of identities that are natural and limited with the locality (ibid: 99-100).

The more comprehensive definition of diaspora provided by Adamson and Demetriou is notable because it highlights the notion of transnationality as one of the constituents of diaspora:

> … a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links (2007: 497).

145 However, as Reeves notes, 'it is safe to say that the term Diaspora has only gained wide usage within the past 7 or 8 years. The term "Diaspora" was not effective in locating older titles of books and journal articles. For example, out of the 264 references in the database those include the term "Diaspora", only 5% were published before 1996. With that said, the search terms "expatriates", "migrants", "transnational", and "overseas ethnic groups" were still useful in locating recent titles' (2005: 29).

With regard to the second tier, it can be said that diasporans, who both establish multiple organisations in order to pursue their collective interests in the host countries and intensify their activities connecting them to their homelands, enhance their role and influence in not only domestic and international, but also transnational politics and identity definitions. Diaspora politics operate on wide-ranging and transnational networks that are composed of multiple organisations of diasporas working within the institutions of host countries and governments, in tandem with other diasporic communities in host countries, and with regional (e.g. European) organisations, in addition to their relationship with their homelands. Recent diasporic politics, which operate via a transnational axis, 'connect various political organizations and actors to each other, change or influence the dynamics of local politics by reinscribing local politics inside a transnational circuit, and in the process establish a political arena distinct from the national political system' (Laguerre 2006: 3-4). Therefore, diasporic entities become important cultural, social, economic and political actors who facilitate internal, inter-state and worldwide connections. The transnational diasporic sphere has used the discourse of human rights and democracy as its major form of legitimacy and nurtured a *lingua franca* that gives much substance and unity of practices to its transnational actions (see Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 166).

'The layers of the diasporic space', namely the home, the public, the city, 'the nation', the transnational, and the scheme of their interconnections and autonomies become 'the layers for identity construction and community building', whereas 'media and communication technologies cut across space, redefine it and frame symbolic community space and imagination' (Georgiou 2006: 3). The 'diasporic public sphere', a transnational space for negotiating identities, has served as an arena for diasporic intellectuals to construct socially, articulate and mobilize identifications (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 509-12). This explains why contemporary diasporas are 'exemplary communities of the transnational moment' (Tölölyan 1991; quoted in Brah 2003: 186). In this respect, Brah defines 'diasporic identities' as 'networks of transnational identifications encompassing "imagined" and "encountered" communities' (ibid: 196). Transnational identifications thus weave transnational communities, which Portes describes as 'dense networks across political borders' created by immigrants and diasporas (1997: 812). Therefore, diaspora 'is the term often used to describe practically any population that is considered "deterritorialized" or "transna-

tional" – that is, which has originated in a land other than that in which it currently resides, and where social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states, or, indeed, span the globe' (Vertovec 1997: 277). In short, 'the idea of diaspora is inextricable from the idea of transnationalism, redolent with the possibility of myriad identities and multifarious networks' (Lie 2001: 356).

On the other hand, the concept of transnationalism is very 'slippery' because firstly the concept has been used 'historically in similar yet distinct ways' and secondly it refers to 'a wide array of activities – from social movements to economic relations to mass media to migrant's ties to their homelands' (Mahler 2006: 66). Moreover, transnationalism can be classified as a process 'from above', which includes 'homogenizing and elitist forces', or as a process 'from below', which 'generates multiple and counter-hegemonic powers among non-elites' (ibid: 67). The second refers to transnational processes through which 'everyday people generate creole identities and agencies that challenge multiple levels of structural control: local, regional, national, and global' (ibid: 68). However, Mahler argues that elites can be seen as the facilitators of 'transnationalism from below', and therefore transnationalism from below should be distinguished from 'transnationalism from above' 'on the basis of whether participants' activities reaffirm existing hierarchies of power that favour elites or reconfigure existing hierarchies of power toward empowerment of the "grassroots" (i.e., traditionally excluded populations)' (ibid: 71). He (ibid) notes though that both type of transnationalism are too interrelated to be put in a binary opposition, which also reinforces dualistic paradigms of power. In fact, regarding intellectuals of diaspora groups as actors of 'transnationalism from below' – as long as those intellectuals take a critical standpoint towards the existing hierarchies of power – is useful to delimit the concept of transnationalism used in this study.

An alternative way to delimit the field of transnational studies is 'to demarcate it as the study of migrants who retain ties to their homeland' (ibid: 73). However, the alleged centrality of mobility to such transnationalism is disputable because 'the movement of embodied not bodily ties' are usually ignored (ibid: 76-81). Moreover, as Roudometof notes, 'while transnational social fields pertain to the relations between individuals, organizations and agencies, the people who are thus connected are not necessarily themselves transnational' (2005: 120). 'To be transnational means to belong to two or more societies at the same time ... In this way, not all

diasporas are transnational communities, but transnational communities arise within diasporas' (Vertovec 2005). However, this statement enables one to argue that the idea of trans-nationality may also arise within minority groups who belong to two or more societies at the same time. The most challenging aspect of trans-nationality is not the acquisition of plural cultural identities, but rather the act of searching for an identity including plural cultural and political standpoints. Therefore, the issue is the acquisition of an outlook that makes the transnational sphere generate trans-national identities and politics, which transform the existing hierarchies of power. This fact also explains why this study does not focus only on the intellectuals of a specific migrant, exile or refugee group in the European diaspora, but rather regards the intellectuals of the minority group in the respective homeland as the potential bearers of trans-nationality (discussed in the next chapter).

Language and Trans-national Identity

The search for trans-nationality in diasporic and minority groups creates the question of how the members those groups perceive the relationship between language and identity. This question requires a discussion on the relationship between language and 'national' and/or 'ethnic' (cultural) identity[146]. As Fishman notes, 'contrastive self-identification on the basis of language is a very ancient human proclivity' (1972: 54). However, the depth and breadth of the commonly-acknowledged link between language and identity has hardly been recognised or tapped (Hewitt 2003: 196). Language and identity choice are inevitably linked to political arrangements, relations of power, language ideologies and individuals' perceptions of their own and others' identities. Language is designed to function as a marker of ethnic or cultural identity, although it may become a form of symbolic capital or a means of social control in some cases. In this sense, besides marking identity, language may also be a site of resistance, empowerment or solidarity, particularly in minority or diasporic communities. The use of language, especially in contradictory cases, indicates 'a complex

146 Although the term 'cultural identity' is preferred in this study, both terms are used interchangeably due to the high rate of recurrence of the term 'ethnic' in the literature on language and identity.

set of assumptions about the interlocutors' mother tongue, ethnicity, linguistic competence, political position … and even open-mindedness and politeness' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 11). This is the reason why a critical approach to the relationship between language and identity must focus on how 'languages are appropriated to legitimize, challenge, and negotiate particular identities and to open new identity options for oppressed and subjugated groups and individuals' (ibid: 12). These options more likely exist in the cases of bilingualism or multilingualism which may lead to hybrid identities within minorities and diasporas. Therefore, increasing transactions among different languages and identities on the one hand, and critical approaches to the traditional conceptions of language and identity on the other, allow and require a more comprehensive approach to the relationship between language and identity.

The socio-psychological approach to the relationship between language and identity assumes 'a one-to-one correlation between language and ethnic identity' (ibid: 4-5). Such an approach suffers from a monolingual and monocultural bias which conceives individuals as members of a homogeneous and uniform entity, ignoring hybrid identities and complex linguistic repertoires of bi- and multilinguals living in a contemporary global world. In this approach, members of linguistic minority communities must identify themselves either with their mother tongue or the one they acquired later, but rarely with both (ibid). Moreover, 'not knowing (or using) the code [language] that is most closely tied to the ethnic identity in the community can be a source of shame, embarrassment or criticism (Fought 2006: 28). 'The pressure to use the heritage language can be particularly strong where the language tied to an ethnic identity is perceived as threatened' (ibid: 29). This pressure, therefore, may lead those who do not speak the language to find their ethnic identity called into question, and speaking the language 'may be a way of explicitly asserting ethnic identity' (ibid: 31). Those who do not know the language may tend to express their identity more offensively with other political, social and psychological tools. In some cases, on the other hand, where the language has been lost, the strong tie between language and ethnic identity may be lost also (ibid). The identity in question may be perceived as having stronger ties with elements of culture other than language such as history, culture or commitment to identity.

Another approach to the relationship between language and identity suggests that ethnic identity does not always coincide with the language

used, in other words, 'the relationship between a language and an ethnic identity is one of association' (Eastman 1984: 259). The main argument is that 'a particular "associated language" is a necessary component of ethnic identity, but the language we associate ourselves with need not be one we use in our day-to-day lives' (ibid). This argument distinguishes '*ethnic identity* as a form of cultural behaviour, including the appropriate use of language in association with that identity, from *language use* as the way we employ linguistic knowledge' (ibid: 261; *italics added*). This means that language has two different functions as an identity maker: language as a marker of cultural (ethnic) identity, and language as a marker of social (economic) identity. The first function refers to the behavioural-cultural usage of language as an aspect of cultural (ethnic) identity, whereas the second one corresponds to the communicative use of language as an aspect of social capital. In this respect, the behavioural-cultural usage of language is 'one of the ways we can act "ethnic", but it is certainly not all there is to behaving ethnically' because other overt behavioural factors such as values, tales, dress or cuisine may mark 'us' as the holder of that identity (ibid). In fact, it is particular circumstances that determine the relationship between identity and its markers. 'If the group can get what it needs to maintain itself using its associated language it will. If it can get what it needs wearing ethnic dress it will' (ibid). In short, changes in dress and language use need not necessarily change the group identity. People may retain their 'ethnic identity without active (instrumental) use of their language as long as they still have an association (or sentimental attachment) with it' (ibid: 265).

When the separation between the two functions of language, namely marking both cultural (ethnic) and social (economic) identity overlaps with the separation between the two aspects of cultural (ethnic) identity, namely primordial (belief) and behavioural (social), we have a less tense relationship between language and cultural (ethnic) identity. The interpretation of such relationship flows as follows: 'our cultural [ethnic] behaviour is not altered if we speak another language; only the language aspect of our ethnic [cultural] identity changes' (ibid: 270). On the other hand, this interpretation seems to try to assuage those linguistic minorities who are afraid that they will lose their cultural identities when they lose their language, or those who argue for linguistic rights to protect their cultural identities. In this study, this interpretation is used in the search for situations in which people associate themselves with many languages and identify themselves as a multilingual group. In other words, study focuses

on the conditions whereby people use their different languages in different circumstances without being forced to abandon the language they attach to their cultural (ethnic) identity. These people are not, and in fact, cannot be expected to have many cultural (ethnic) identities. In short, 'when an English speaker learns French, that English speaker's perception of what it is to be French is what the English speaker thinks being French is' (ibid: 260). Nevertheless, since the aim is not to obtain multiple identities, this transgressing experience questions the primordial aspect of national or cultural (ethnic) identity and is a good starting point to generate a trans-national identity. As Hewitt argues clearly:

> What we have here is not a "multiculture" as it is represented in multiculturalism … but – to form a Greek/Roman Creole – a *polyculture*, or at any rate a collection of cultural identities that are not (a) discrete and complete in themselves; (b) that are not in any sense "intrinsically" "equal"; and (c) are active together and hence bound up with change (*italics original*) (2003: 190).

On the other hand, the use of a language associated with a culture to which the speaker does not belong does not necessarily lead to the emergence of a trans-national identity – which opposes to the establishment of a direct connection between language and identity. Likewise, rejecting the use of a culturally unassociated language is not necessarily associated with nationalist prejudice, but rather is highly contextual.

As Hannerz points out, 'for quite some time, language has probably dominated our thinking about cultural boundaries, since it has coincided with notions of nation, and the active involvement in other symbolic modes – music, gesture, and others, and their combinations – has tended to be mainly confined to local, face-to-face settings' (1996: 21). However, both human transactions and communication technologies challenge the dominant role of language and its symbolic modes in daily life as the principal components of a common identity. Moreover, 'in contrast with the tendency to think culture as "language-like" (and thus linear), the "connectionist" cognitive psychology … suggests that everyday thought depends on "clumped networks of signification", integrating information simultaneously in a multiplicity of ways … And the information thus managed is only in part linguistic' (ibid: 40). As Sapir argues, 'culture may be defined as *what* a society does and thinks. Language is a particular *how* of thought' (2003: 33; *italics original*). This means that cultural identity is not only fed

by language, but also by other assets that can be found in different social contexts and societies.

Furthermore, language is not less dynamic than culture – meaning that a cultural identity that is too strictly modelled on language alone is under the threat of linguistic change. In fact, the nature of the relationship between language and culture is not as simple as it seems. 'Languages may spread far beyond their original home, invading the territory of new races and of new culture spheres [whereas] the accidents of history are constantly rearranging the borders of culture areas without necessarily effacing the existing linguistic cleavages' (ibid: 29). Moreover, as the increase of human transactions and communication technologies entail language shifts and multilingualism, 'personal identification with one language may change character, together with the identification with the one imagined community attached to it' (Hannerz 1996: 87-8). Put differently, 'just as identity can be fluid and changing throughout an individual's life, so can a person's relationship to the minority and dominant languages' (Fought 2006: 21). It is hardly surprising because 'as the context of a particular community changes historically, views about the value and use of particular codes [languages] may also change' (ibid: 32). The question is if this change engenders trans-national identity, and if this trans-national identity works as a source of cultural resonance, particularly for diasporic and minority communities.

Trans-national Resistance

Is trans-nationality exclusive for members of a diasporic community who are both 'deterritorialized, multilingual and capable of bridging the gap between global and local tendencies' and 'often concentrated in particular cities where the location of global economic, political and communication power is now debouching to'? (Cohen 1997: 176). Or, does 'the sense of uprootedness, of disconnection, of loss and estrangement, which hitherto was morally appropriated by the traditionally recognized diasporas, … now signify something more general about the human condition' (ibid: 196) and now refer to a cultural menage that is not necessarily deviant and second-rate, but rather has such connotations as creativity and richness? Diasporas teach us that all identities are constructed. Said reminds

us that 'borders and barriers which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason or necessity. Exiles cross borders, break barriers of thought and experience' (2006: 441). Today, it is not the borders and barriers of territories, but rather the boundaries of languages and identities that fence thoughts and experiences. Bilingual minorities with dual identities can be seen as the bearers of potentiality for crossing and breaking those boundaries. This is also what a productive conception of power teaches us – namely the possibility of transformative resistance that is conscious of those boundaries. This awareness is what makes transformative resistance able to resist reproducing hierarchical and dominative opposition.

Diaspora, in this sense, is a sphere of influence that helps the oppressed to resist generating dominative resistance by delimiting the tendency to exercise power over others. This is what diaspora itself teaches to the oppressed diasporic groups. However, it is not simply a pedagogical moment that diasporic groups cross borders and break barriers of thought and experience. What makes this thought and experience trans-national is its performative aspect, which, not coincidentally, goes hand in hand with transformative resistance. Although diasporic communities do not necessarily have a trans-national outlook, diaspora, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, challenge the borders of languages and identities that are drawn by nation-states.

This theoretical discussion acts as the basis for the analysis of the Kurdish linguistic community in the European diaspora and in Turkey in the following two chapters. Within this framework, the analysis will question the extent to which Kurdish intellectuals living in the European diaspora and in Turkey are able to initiate trans-national identities and politics that can generate a transformative resistance. These two chapters together serve to discuss the limitations and opportunities of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora and in Turkey to generate the transformative and trans-national resistance portrayed in this chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Kurdish Language: Power or Resistance?

The first section of this chapter provides a brief description of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora as an introduction to the following two sections. The approaches of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora towards the status planning for the Kurdish language are analysed in the second section within the framework of the relationship between language and power on the one hand, and language and resistance on the other. The third section examines the political and cultural connotations of linguistic rights for the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora within the framework of a discussion on power and resistance. The last section is devoted to an analysis of the position of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey within the context of the binary opposition between power and resistance. The comparison between the approach of the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey and that of the earlier generations is also discussed in detail in the last section of this chapter. The last section further addresses the question of the relevance of the democratic experiences and the cultural and linguistic works of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora in the evolution of such a new generation. The overarching question of Kurdish language and literature as a transformative resistance against the hegemony of the majority is also discussed.

Kurdish Intelligentsia in the European Diaspora

A considerable portion of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe was composed of members of Marxist-led Kurdish movements in Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the Marxists were aiming at the establishment of an independent socialist Kurdish state, they ignored such 'lateral' questions as culture, language, gender, etc. As Bozarslan argues, 'Kurdish "Marxism" in Turkey, like Turkish Marxism itself, and that throughout the Third World, offered little opportunity for political pluralism' (1992: 110), whereas the non-pluralist character of those Kurdish Marxists also stemmed from the patriarchal and tribal structure of the Kurdish society. In this respect, the majority of Kurdish migrants who had been socialised within a political culture that was largely traditional/authoritarian, nationalist/secular, totalitarian/Marxist-Leninist, or a combination of all of these, gradually resocialised and integrated into their new host societies and were influenced by deep-rooted democratic political processes and organisational forms during their years of refuge and exile in different Western European countries (Sheikhmous 2000). For this reason, Sheikhmous argues that 'a new era of realism, toleration, cooperation and accommodation' emerged among Kurdish intellectuals in Europe in the late 1980s (ibid). Østergaard-Nielsen also finds that while 'a Kurdish diaspora political network in Germany … advocated communism/socialism and outright Kurdish independence through organised demonstrations in the 1980s, then [it] increasingly formulated [its] goals in terms of human rights and democracy in Turkey during the 1990s' (2006). Consequently, freedom of speech and advancement of civil society helped the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora to develop a diversified approach to the Kurdish question in Turkey. Seemingly, those far from the front lines of conflict and able to access a wider variety of information sources may have a perspective less influenced by sentiments and violent antagonism.

On the other hand, it is not the intention to describe a single shared image or identity of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. Neither does such an image or identity represent all Kurdish communities in the European diaspora. As Houston notes, Kurdish diaspora

> … is firstly produced through the narrative imagination and has an irreducible intersubjective content. It also has an irreducibly plural aspect: as the various, sometimes rival ways of imagining the character and significance of the Kurdish homeland

> shows, different individuals and groups have different memories, sentiments, and convictions about wherein the vitality of that homeland consists (2005: 113)[147].

Alinia (2007: 235) similarly argues that the imaginations and meanings of 'homeland' vary among the Kurdish diaspora according to personal experiences and political discourses, which means that the imagination of a common fatherland need not show an agreement on the *type* of fatherland imagined. In this respect, the de-territorial notion of diaspora discussed above is highly relevant for Kurdish intellectuals in Europe, who mostly regard the wish to return to 'Kurdistan' as a notion whereby they express and keep their solidarity and loyalty to Kurdishness, rather than a viable objective of returning to the territory in which they intend to re-settle[148]. On the other hand, one cannot say that 'the legal status of Kurdistan is becoming irrelevant; [rather] as a symbol of Kurdish identity it will remain of prime importance to the Kurdish diaspora' (Bruinessen 1999). 'The loss of the homeland or the theft of a territory named Kurdistan is facilitated by the actual lost locality of the village' (Houston 2005: 113). In short, exile 'brought educated Kurds of different regional backgrounds together and thereby helped them to imagine Kurdistan as their common fatherland. It was exile that transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical entity into a political ideal' (Bruinessen 2000b). Moreover, it is this political ideal which activated Kurdish intellectuals in Europe. As the then-advisor to the Ministry for Migration of Sweden, Lars Gunnar Eriksson (1992: 98) noted in 1989, the Kurds were more successful and active than other migrant groups in utilising the opportunities they have in European countries.

Indeed, Kurdish intellectuals have initiated the foundation of Kurdish institutes and associations in European capitals since the 1980s. The first Kurdish workers federation, the Union of Kurdistan Associations (KOMKAR) was established in Frankfurt in 1979 and spread quickly throughout Europe with 35 member associations in Austria, Belgium,

147 Although Houston's study focuses on the Kurdish community in western cities of Turkey, his conclusions fit the patterns of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

148 Berruti *et al.* (2002: 56) note that 24 of those Kurdish people interviewed in France said that they wanted or hoped to return to their country of origin, another 24 said that they no longer wished to go back, even if things had changed. 'Of those who would like to return to their country of origin, many emphasise the fact that Turkey would first have to "become like France"' (ibid).

Britain, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden[149]. The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden was established in 1981 as a representative of Kurdish left-wing individuals and groups. The first and most prominent Kurdish cultural institute was founded in Paris in 1983 by a group of Kurdish intellectuals and artists who were supported by their French colleagues. In 1985, the Kurdish Cultural Centre was established in London for the cooperation between the Kurds in Britain[150]. The Kurdish Institute in Brussels was set up in 1989 from the ashes of *Têkoser*, which was established in 1978. The founders of the Institute left it to establish the Kurdish Bureau for Liaison and Information in 1996. The International Association for Human Rights of the Kurds (IMK) was established in Bonn in 1991 as a by-product of the cooperation between KOMKAR-originated Kurdish intellectuals and German politicians and intellectuals. The Kurdish Human Rights Project was established in London in 1992 by a group of Kurdish and British academics with the aim of raising awareness of the human rights situation in the Kurdish regions, bringing an end to the violation of the rights of all who live in Kurdish regions and promoting the protection of rights of Kurdish people wherever they live[151]. The Kurdish Institute in Berlin was founded in 1993 and directed until 2005 by Mihemed Emin Pencewînî, who worked with Mustafa Barzani in Iraq and studied Kurdish language and history. The Kurdish Library was founded in Stockholm in 1997 'to collect, preserve, distribute Kurdish literature and place it at everybody's disposal'[152].

Furthermore, Kurdish publishing in Europe has developed remarkably since the mid-1970s (see Hassanpour 2005a: 341-2)[153]. As Emanuelsson

149 The Federation has a member association in Australia as well as in Europe. The base of the Federation is composed mainly of supporters of the PSK (Party of Socialist Kurdistan), which supports the right to self-determination of the Kurdish people, particularly in the form of federalism. The PSK principally rejects the use of violence as a political means and signed a short-lived protocol on cooperation with the PKK, when the latter declared ceasefire in 1993. The KOMKAR also publishes many important books on Kurdish history, culture, and language. For more information about the KOMKAR see its website at URL: http://www.komkar-info.org.

150 For more information about the Kurdish Cultural Center see Emanuelsson (2005).

151 For more information about the Kurdish Human Rights Project see the website at URL: http://www.khrp.org/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/.

152 For more information about the Library visit their website at URL: www.kurdishlibrary.org.

153 In fact, Europe in general, and Sweden in particular was the centre of Kurdish publishing between the 1980s and the early 2000s. However, that trend has changed, and currently it seems that it is no longer possible to find any remarkable Kurdish

(2005: 110) notes, immediately after foundation, all Kurdish organisations in Europe start publishing regular newsletters and journals to mobilise the Kurdish diaspora. The most prominent ones were *Berbang*, published by the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden; *Melband* by the Kurdish Cultural Centre in London; *Information and Liaison Bulletin* and *Kurdish Studies* by the Kurdish Institute in Paris; *Têkoser*; and *Denge KOMKAR* (ibid). These newsletters and journals 'focused on the situation in Kurdistan … Kurdish history and culture as well as the activities of the organisation in question' (ibid: 111). Besides the aforementioned publications, Kurdish broadcasting and the use of the internet have also become instruments of Kurdish identity-building process and served as the standardisation of Kurdish language in diaspora[154]. In this respect, Israel seems right in contending that 'although generally homologous with loss, the

publishing house in Europe. Ali Çiftçi, owner of the APEC publishing house, argues that the demand for the books in Kurdish has decreased considerably since the late 1990s because of the assimilation of the new generation into the languages of the countries in which they live and even to Turkish (See the interview conducted with Çiftçi at URL: http://www.arzeba.com/apec-8217-in-stockholm-kurt-yayinevi-20-yillik-kurtce-kitap-seruveni-soylesi-t9646.html [21 April 2008]). Moreover, the centre of Kurdish (Kurmanji) publishing has moved to Turkey since the 2000s due to the recent relaxation of restrictions on the Kurdish language. The phrase 'Kurdish publishing' here does not refer merely to publishing in the Kurdish language, but also to publishing on Kurdish issues. The phrases 'Kurdish books' or 'books in Kurdish' clearly means the books published in the Kurdish language, whereas 'books on the Kurdish issue' imply the books published in Kurdish or Turkish. In passing, it is striking to note that only about 20 books were published in Kurdish in Turkey between 1844 and 1923, 14 of which appeared after 1918 (Malmîsanij 2007: 43; Hassanpour 2005a: 297-301). During the period between 1923 and 1990, the total number of Kurdish books published in Turkey is 39 (Malmîsanij ibid: 53). Except for some short periods, e.g. the years between 1962-8, there was no Kurdish publication in Turkey until the early 1990s (Ahmadzadeh 2003: 146). Following the lifting of the ban on Kurdish in Turkey in 1991, the number of Kurdish books reached to 212 by 1999 (Malmîsanij 2007: 50). The number of Kurdish books published in Turkey in 2005 is 654, out of which 11.3% (78) are in Kırmancki/Zazaki, whereas the other 580 are in Kurmanji (ibid: 53). However, only 15 out of more than 40 Kurdish publishing houses that were established after 2000 succeeded in publishing more than 10 books because many publishers quit after only a few publications. Consequently, the number of Kurdish publishing houses decreased to 16 in 2005 (ibid: 59-60). Abdullah Arı notes that there are 17 publishing houses and two institutions, namely Diyarbakır and Sur Municipalities, which publish books in Kurdish, in Turkey in 2007 ('Kürdçe Yayıncılığın Durumu' at URL: http://www.daplatform.com/news.php?nid=711 [14 April 2008]).

154 Bruinessen argues that 'a growing corpus of modern written Kurdish is becoming available online, and the web is likely to play a crucial part in the effort to develop a modern standard language' (2000b).

word "diaspora" … has accrued a positive resonance as well, bespeaking a sense of tenacity, resistance, and preservation of faith during the worst circumstances' (2000: 2). As Vertovec further adds, 'most self-described diasporas do not emphasize the melancholy aspects … Rather, they celebrate a culturally creative, socially dynamic, and often romantic meaning' (2005). This romanticism has nourished the Kurdish existence in the European diaspora in the form of literary and artistic works of Kurdish intellectuals, who were deprived of the opportunities to read and write in their language in their homelands.

This study aims to map a diversified 'Kurdish approach' in Europe by asking questions about how living in the European diaspora affects the approach of Kurdish intellectuals towards the question of Kurdish language and linguistic rights in Turkey. The majority of Kurdish intellectuals contributing to this study live in Germany and Sweden[155]. It seems hardly surprising because 'most of the activity took place among the Kurd settlers in Europe with Sweden and Germany becoming the main centres of action focusing on standardization of the language and publication in Kurdish' (Yavuz 1998: 16). Furthermore, these two countries reflect two main veins of the Kurdish movement in Europe. Germany, which is known to have a considerable amount of the Kurdish working class, is recognised as the political arena of this movement, while a relatively well-educated Kurdish refugee community in Sweden (which is mainly composed of writers and linguists), is the vein of cultural movement[156]. That 'many of the Kurds in Sweden were already highly politicized before reaching that country' in the 1980s and 1990s explains, moreover, why the PKK made relatively few recruits in Sweden (Bruinessen 1999). In contrast, in Germany there are a large number of Kurdish workers who were not politicised before they migrated to this country in the 1960s and who were also defined as Turks until the late 1970s. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, a large migration of politicised Kurds arrived in Germany, and the emergence of the PKK movement worked as a catalyst for the Kurds' 'ethnic' awareness. The PKK had the opportunity to organise 'the marginalised members of the second

155 In passing, it is important to note that the Kurdish diaspora in Europe grew to over one million in 2001, the majority of which live in Germany and subsequently in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, the Great Britain, Sweden, and Greece (see Emanuelsson 2005: 82-3).

156 The interviewees who live in Sweden and Germany, on the other hand, are not simply constrained by these two veins. There are many diverse approaches that indicate highly individual and original stances.

generation growing up in Germany' (Bruinessen 2000a: 99), whose parents were apolitical 'Turkish' *Gastarbeiter*[157]. Therefore, young Kurds in Germany subsequently led their parents to rediscover their Kurdishness.

On the other hand, Sweden has been the most important European country to provide facilities to immigrant communities to aid in promoting their mother tongue. Kurdish writers utilised this 'stimulating environment for developing Kurdish into a modern literary language' (Bruinessen 1999). Mehmed Uzun (2001: 92-3), who was the most notable of those writers, confirmed that he became well-acquainted with his mother tongue in Sweden. On the other hand, Uzun emphasised that the vitality that Kurdish literature experienced in Sweden would be a temporary phenomenon because 'the exile could never be the literary motherland of any language and culture' (1998: 238). For this reason, he (ibid: 119) proposed a transfer of this vitality to 'Mesopotamia', which seems to have been realised in the last decade as discussed below. In fact, Izady (2007: 314) underlined in 1992 that there were signals of a coming 'renaissance in the Kurdish literature' in Turkey[158].

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157 In this respect, although the KOMKAR 'did much to advance cultural consciousness among the Kurdish workforce', it was the PKK 'which mobilized these refugees and their migrant predecessors' (McDowall 2004: 436-7). The PKK was different from KOMKAR in that the primary concern of the latter was 'to help Kurds making something of their lives in Europe', while the former 'made sure the struggle for Kurdistan was always at the forefront of Kurdish thinking' (McDowall ibid). Hence it was the KOMKAR which first initiated the 1985 campaign for the right of Kurdish immigrant children to learn Kurdish as their mother tongue in schools. The PKK kept the aim of a territorially independent or autonomous Kurdistan by working through an almost invisible network around the world (Bruinessen 2000a: 104). By doing so, the PKK was not only able to gain financial support from the Kurdish diaspora, but also succeeded to recruit young Kurds in Europe to the armed struggle in Turkey, particularly during the first years of the 1990s. On the other hand, Peköz (2002: 221-2) argues that the PKK started to focus on the protection of the rights of Kurdish migrants in Europe after the end of the 1990s due to a change in its strategy. Eccarius-Kelly (2002: 93) agrees with this argument, noting that 'the core of the Kurdish movement headed by a transforming PKK focuses on Diaspora political activism today, rather than terrorist or guerrilla strategies as in the past'.

158 It should be noted that the term 'Kurdish literature' has some controversial meanings that make the term ambiguous. Firstly, there is a question if Kurdish literary works that emerged in different countries populated by the Kurds can be studied under the single title of 'Kurdish literature'. As Ahmadzadeh formulates, 'one of the major problems of concerning the study of Kurdish literature is the definition of its boundaries' (2003: 127). Secondly, there is a discussion on what the term 'Kurdish literature' describes. Some argue that the term should mean simply the literary works in the Kurdish language, whereas others argue that the literary works of Kurdish

The Status Planning for the Kurdish Language as a Struggle for Power

Language planning, which has been defined as 'the authoritative societal assignment of scarce resources to language' (Fishman 2004), has three interdependent sub-dimensions: *corpus planning*, 'an activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community' (Haugen 1968: 673; quoted in Bakmand 2000); *status planning*, strategic choices about the status of a language *vis-à-vis* other languages and/or dialects; and *acquisition planning*, policies concerning the teaching and learning of language (Cooper 1989). As Bakmand states, 'whereas status planning can serve to turn a language into a prestigious one, corpus planning elaborates on the potential functions in ensuring that the language dealt with has the necessary terminology to function as the medium of administration, education, etc.' (2000). Acquisition planning is often regarded as a subordinate dimension of status planning (ibid). Therefore, the field of language planning for minority languages mostly falls under status planning (Paulston 1997: 77-8).

On the other hand, '*corpus planning* definitely has a *status planning* agenda, rationale and implications, no matter how inconsistent or changeable that agenda may be' (Fishman 2004; *italics added*). This is, among other things, because of the prohibition on status planning, which makes 'the seemingly more innocuous corpus planning the only activity which is permitted by the repressive authorities governing the functions of the language X' (ibid). It is not surprising then that status (including acquisition) planning and corpus planning for a dialect/language are intertwined with nationalist discourses[159]. In fact, 'most of the vernaculars utilized by mass nationalist movements … required substantial planning in order to *make* them simultaneously the unifying, authenticating, and modernizing tools that they were expected to be' (Fishman 1972: 58; *italics original*). This movement of linguistic nationalism is 'not only a movement of the

authors who write in other languages are a part of Kurdish literature because such works are also about the life of the Kurdish people (ibid: 135-9).

159 According to the Haugen Model developed by Einar Haugen (1966; quoted in Hassanpour 2005a: 92-4), the language planning has four dimensions as follows: the selection of one of the dialects as the norm; the codification of the norm; the advancement and dissemination of the function of the codified norm; and the acceptance of the codified norm by the relevant community.

masses and for the masses but, rather, also a movement to replace one elite with another' (ibid: 60). In this respect, status and acquisition planning for a minority language reflects the struggle of minority elites for power both to resist the hegemony of majority language and to dominate diversities within the minority language.

This struggle might explain why one of the most controversial topics about the Kurdish language is the status planning for the Kurdish language[160]. Most Kurdish intellectuals accept the variants of Kurdish, namely Kurmanji, Sorani, Kırmancki/Zazaki and Gorani, as dialects of Kurdish language, while some argue that Kırmancki/Zazaki is a distinct language[161]. Ziya Gökalp (1992: 24-5) argued in 1921 that the differences between Kurmanji and Kırmancki/Zazaki were like the differences between distinct languages and did not simply correspond to the differences between dialects. On the other hand, he emphasised that those Kurdic languages were not completely foreign to each other. Therefore, he named the variants of Kurdish as Kurdic languages that derived from an old version of Kurdish, namely *Kürdî-i Kadîm*[162]. Izady (2007: 302) contends that two branches of proto-Kurdish, namely Kurmanji and Pehlewani (from which Kırmancki/Zazaki derived) are two independent languages, like French and Italian. In fact, some of those who speak Kırmancki/Zazaki argue that their language is neither a dialect of Kurdish nor derived from proto-Kurdish, but rather

160 This study does not deal with the corpus planning for the Kurdish language, although the standardisation of Kurdish is discussed with the interviewees where relevant.

161 Throughout the study, a less value-added term, 'variant' is used rather than 'language' and 'dialect' to describe different Kurdish languages/dialects. The term 'variant' is used to show that these languages/dialects differ from each other but not from a standard one. The term 'Kurdish language', on the other hand, is used as a common name referring all the variants. Not only different authors but also speakers of these variants name differently the variant they speak, which results in a lack of standard classification (nomenclature) of the variants of Kurdish. However, the classification above is the mostly accepted one, especially by linguists and the interviewees (for a discussion on the classification, see Hassanpour 2005a: 77-9). It should be noted that Kurmanji and Sorani are derived from a common branch, whereas Gorani and Kırmancki/Zazaki/Dımılki are derived from another proto-Kurdish branch (Izady 2007: 299-310). Kırmancki/Zazaki is the language spoken most exclusively in Turkey besides Kurmanji. As Malmîsanij (2007: 53) notes, only 74 of a total of 654 Kurdish books published in Turkey in the period 1923-2005 were in the Kırmancki dialect.

162 Gökalp (1992: 25) gave the example of Latin and Neo-Latin languages in order to explain the relationship between *Kürdî-i Kadîm* and the derived Kurdic languages. This may explain why he (ibid: 95-6) argued that the Kurds did not constitute only one nation, but rather that they were composed of four nations with four variants that could not comprehend each other.

is a separate language which simply belongs to the same linguistic family – that is, the north western branch of the Indo-European languages. Kreyenbroek adds another aspect to the discussion when he notes, 'Sorani and Kurmanji differ as much from each other as English and German' from a grammatical point of view, although 'differences in vocabulary and pronunciation are not as great as between German and English' (1992: 71). In this sense, he adds, it seems appropriate to call them languages but not dialects.

Kurdish intellectuals who argue that it would be wrong to regard the Kurdish dialects as separate languages agree that the discrepancy among the variants of Kurdish language is a result of the lack of political unification (see Uzun 1998: 35)[163]. In fact, until the First World War, two principal dialects, namely Kurmanji and Sorani, were used in the publication of journals and books, although Kurmanji was dominant because Kurdish national movements were mostly run by urbanised Kurmanji-speakers (Hassanpour 2005a: 646-7). The division of Kurdistan into four states in 1918 and the linguicide to which the Kurmanji dialect was subjected in Turkey since 1923 and in Syria since 1962 indirectly allowed the progress of the Sorani dialect (Hassanpour ibid: 647; Izady 2007: 313). However,

163 Uzun (1998: 146-7) noted that he kept all dialects as they exist while he was studying on the anthology of Kurdish literature [(2007) *Antolojiya Edebiyata Kurdî*. İstanbul: İthaki] in order to bring the wealth of Kurdish to light. Uzun and other Kurdish intellectuals frequently emphasised the significance of the Kurdish masters of sung narratives (*dengbêj*) in the protection and transmission of Kurdish over generations. The word *deng* means voice and *bêj* means uttering, whereas Uzun (2005: 11) describes *dengbêj* as the one who transforms voice into utterance and utterance into ballad. *Dengbêj* was the Kurdish musician, who had a strong memory of societal events, tales and myths and who sang those narratives in a particular form of music without accompanying musical instruments (see Christensen 2006). The tradition of *dengbêj* was damaged by the destruction of Kurdish tribal structure because the best of those *dengbêjs* were under the patronage of emirs and aghas, who stored the history of their tribes in memory through *dengbêjs*. Nevertheless, the tradition survived until recent times through travelling *dengbêjs*, who performed in divans that were established at villages. Moreover, radio stations in Baghdad and Yerevan broadcasted sung narratives by *dengbêjs* throughout the territories populated by the Kurds in the 1950s and 1960s. Many Kurdish intellectuals specify that the Kurds, who had nothing but those radio programmes in Kurdish, experienced those broadcasting times as a ceremonial happening (see Uzun 2005; Kızılkaya 2001). As a consequence, *dengbêjs* and their sung narratives became the heart of Kurdish language, culture, and history that were based on oral tradition until the time when the Kurds have the opportunity to write and publish in Kurdish. In fact, *dengbêjs* still serve as the source of modern Kurdish literature in that Kurdish authors utilise the vocabulary and narratives of *dengbêjs* in their current works.

recent developments in the standardisation of Kurmanji dialect, which has been led by the Kurdish diaspora in Europe since the 1980s and revitalised in Turkey since the 1990s, indicates that Kurdish would have at least two standardised dialects as long as the division of the Kurds remains intact (Hassanpour ibid: 618-9)[164].

In Turkey, on the other hand, the Kurmanji dialect is challenged by the Kırmancki/Zazaki one, which is seen by some Kurdish/Zaza intellectuals in Europe as a distinct language. It is this challenge that is analysed within the framework of power and resistance through the interviews conducted with Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. In this respect, the Chair of the Kurdish Bureau for Liaison and Information in Brussels, Pervine Jamil's following statement is remarkable[165]:

> 'It has been the same all over the world; nowhere people said that let's take something from every dialect and make a language. By force and political authority, the state has made the strongest dialect official… Within the boundaries of Turkey, it should be Kurmanji… Everybody can speak and write her/his dialect… namely, we don't say it should be forbidden but if it would be possible someday in Turkey, teaching in every [Kurdish] dialect is not good for me'.

More specifically, she argues that Kırmancki/Zazaki is simply a dialect of Kurdish but not a separate language:

> 'Sure, it is a dialect, not a language for us. But if a Zaza person calls her/himself Zaza but not Kurdish, then we should sit and talk… if there are many Zazas, then, as a different minority, like Arabs and Turks, they should be given rights. I mean beheading does not help but minimum discipline is necessary'.

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164 Hassanpour (2005a: 646-7) argues that the standardisation process of the Kurdish language started in the 15th and 16th centuries when the development of literary Kurdish was accompanied by the rise of Kurdish political power in the form of semi-independent principalities. According to him, the first conscious endeavours to promote the status of the Kurdish language emerged in the 17th century, nurturing such poets as Ehmedê Xanî and Hacî Qadirî Koyî, who called for the establishment of an independent and united Kurdish state. Shakely describes the 16th and 17th centuries as 'the period in which Kurdish classical poetry began and developed' (1992: 42). In fact, 'the history of Kurdish literature has been nothing more than the history of poetry until the early decades of the 20th century' (Ahmadzadeh 2003: 139).

165 Jamil worked as professor of French literature in the Congo between 1969 and 1975 and served as the Head of the Kurdish Institute in Brussels between 1979 and 1996. The Kurdish Bureau provides services including translation, a library, French courses, painting and music courses and seminars, in addition to its quarterly publication, *Newsletter*. For further information about the Kurdish Bureau, please see their website at URL: www.kurdishbureau.be.

When questioned if the same problems that the Kurdish people experience today would not occur for Zazaki speakers when her proposal is realised, she answers:

> 'As I said, it [the Kurdish language] is only one language, not two languages. The government obliges it, that's it… it is the same everywhere… we cannot oblige them [Turkish-speaking, Arabic-speaking people] to speak Kurdish but we are talking about the Kurds'.

She favours a single Kurdish language in the form of the strongest dialect, Kurmanji, which is to be protected by a political authority.

A member of the *Vate* group and a teacher of Kırmancki/Zazaki living in Berlin, Lerzan Jandil, strongly disagrees with Jamil[166]:

> 'Kurmanji is not the common language of all individuals that accept themselves as Kurdish but many Kurdish intellectuals automatically identify Kurdish with Kurmanji due to political reasons… in every nation, even among minorities, one dialect's prestige is higher than the other… Kurmanji is very strong in Diyarbakır … [but] if speaking Kurmanji is imposed on us [Zazaki speakers], some will reject Kurmanji and prefer Turkish'.

Jandil emphasises that it is natural to have differences among the dialects of Kurdish language because of a lack of a Kurdish nation. To the question how the status planning for the Kurdish language should be conducted, he answers:

> 'Among these dialects, the most advanced one, which can be accepted by all – this is very important, the people should be emotionally ready for such thing – should be favoured… however, it is not something that can be decided by the people but should be managed by the [Kurdish] state, state policy, language policy or the intelligentsia… look at the example of France, Paris accent… Let's take Zazaki… if we should make a choice, and that should be done, *Dersim* accent should be accepted… everybody should renounce the accent s/he has initially learnt in order for the unity of Kırmancki/Zazaki'.

It is striking that he rejects the idea of a single Kurdish dialect (Kurmanji) dominating the whole region of Turkey populated by the Kurdish community while simultaneously proposing the *Dersim* accent to be selected

166 The *Vate* group was derived from a Kırmancki/Zazaki magazine *Vate*, which has been published in Europe every three months since 1997, and in Turkey since 2004. Members of the *Vate* group work for the standardisation of Kırmancki/Zazaki by, among other things, publishing books and journals in the dialect.

as the standard form of Kırmancki/Zazaki as the sake of dialectical unity. It is equally striking that although they are in opposition to each other, both Jamil and Jandil refers to the same example of status planning for French as a national language representing the model of nation-state. In fact, the notion of linguistic unity refers directly to the assumption that language and nation are closely intertwined. According to Recep Maraşlı, an author living in Berlin, the relationship between language and nation is a historical rather than a topical one[167]. He states,

> 'if there is a different language, I think that it necessarily corresponds to a different nation… if a nation has different dialects, it can be said that there are different ethnic groupings within that nation… Surely, the Kurds have never ensured their [national] unity and this resulted in extreme differentiation among the Kurdish dialects… This differentiation can be eliminated during the nationalisation process, otherwise, this differentiation can deepen and these dialects can become different languages… we should focus on the possibility of closing the gaps rather than deepening them'.

It seems that he favours a kind of assimilation of dialects/ethnic groups within the Kurdish community into the dominant one for the sake of 'national' unity.

Kazım Orak, a teacher of Kurdish and a member of Kon-Kurd (The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe) in Brussels, has an uneasy understanding of the relationship between the linguistic and national unity[168]. He explains:

> 'In democracies, all languages should live, we believe in this … our aim is to keep alive all dialects that emerged among the Kurds … but while they are living, there is a need for linguistic unity for communication … we mean a language of education for the Kurds on the way of formation of a Kurdish unity… it is necessary to find a solution for the formation of a linguistic unity … majority is always valid in

167 Maraşlı was a prominent member of the Rızgari movement in Turkey during the 1970s and served as the director of a pro-Kurdish publishing house, Komal. He regularly writes articles on the following website at URL: www.gelawej.org.

168 Orak also conducts radio programmes on the Kurdish language. The Kon-Kurd (which is known to have close relations with the PKK) was established in 1993 and has members in Australia (Fed-Ka), Austria (Fey-Kom), Belgium (Fek-Bel), Canada, Denmark (Fey-Kurd), France (Feyka), Germany (Yek-Kom), the Netherlands (Fed-Kom), Norway, Sweden, Switzerland (Fekar) and the U.K. (Fed-Bir). At the 13th Congress of the Kon-Kurd in June 2007 it was decided to promote the development of the Kurdish language with all its dialects. For more information about the Kon-Kurd, see URL: http://www.kon-kurd.org.

democracies … but if a quarter does not want this, they should be free in their own language'.

Although he refers frequently to democracy and linguistic diversity, he emphasises the necessity of linguistic unity for communication and national unity. In this sense, he finds that 'it is natural that the Kurds, who lived apart from each other, use languages that are different from each other' and immediately adds that Kurdish is a single language composed of different dialects. On the other hand, he argues that none of the dialects are individually capable of being a language of mass communication in today's conditions, and that Kurmanji inevitably is enhanced by words from Sorani and Kırmancki/Zazaki. He regards Zazaki as a dialect of the Kurdish language that can be standardised on the basis of the mainstream dialect, Kurmanji. In a similarly contradictory way, Cemal Ballıkaya, co-director of the Kurdish Institute in Berlin, states, 'we have nothing to do with imposing Kurmanji to ensure the linguistic unity… [What we try to do is] to have linguistic unity on the basis of grammar and to extend the use of the alphabet of Kurmanji'[169]. He further notes that both Kurmanji and Zazaki are defined as Kurdish at the institute that he runs, arguing that there are no significant gaps between them. In comparison to Orak and Ballıkaya, Kendal Nezan, head of the Kurdish Institute of Paris, seems less ambiguous in his opinions: 'when we are pro-linguistic rights of the Kurds, what we are asking is the Kurdish language to be taught at schools… the Zaza dialect will also be taught along with Kurmanji, which is the main communicating instrument'[170].

According to Munzur Çem, an author living in Berlin and working with the *Vate* group, 'there is no scientifically established criterion that identifies

169 The Institute trained Kurdish teachers in the education of Kurdish children in Berlin. The current director of the Institute is Fehmi Balayi, an author from Iraq. He noted at the Symposium on Kurdish Language and Education at the Federal Parliament of Belgium in January 2007 that the Kurdish Institutes in Europe have been working to establish a Kurdish Language Academy. For more information about the Institute, see URL: http://members.aol.com/kurdins.

170 The interview with Nezan was recorded in English. The Kurdish Institute of Paris is run by both Kurdish and non-Kurdish intellectuals. Besides its library as 'the centrepiece in the restoration of the Kurdish culture', the Institute publishes books and periodicals and offers language courses in Kurdish (both Kurmanji and Kırmancki dialects), Arabic, Persian, Turkish and French, and organises regular meetings in which Kurdish linguists and intellectuals come together (see also Emanuelsson 2005: 108). For more information about the Institute, see its website at URL: http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute.

what language is and what dialect is… this is something to be shaped by the decision of the political authority … there is an axiom that language is the dialect which has an army'[171]. As an author and researcher studying with the *Vate* group and working at the Kurdish Library in Stockholm, Malmîsanij supports Çem's statements: 'Linguistics cannot make a clear-cut distinction between language and dialect. In general, if two varieties do not comprehend each other, they are called two different languages but it is not precise either. Linguists as well decided that it was a political issue'[172]. With regard to the Kurdish language, he says that those who speak Kurmanji do not comprehend those who speak Kırmancki/Zazaki, although he adds that it is not a criterion; 'if there was a Kurdish state, communication and market, it would be different… They are dialects of the same language'. In this sense, he argues that even an autonomous political structure is not sufficient, but rather something akin to a state is necessary for the status and corpus planning of the Kurdish language.

On the question of corpus planning, Munzur Çem gives the example of the way that the *Vate* group prefers for the Kırmancki/Zazaki dialect, explaining how standardisation should be done for the Kurdish language in its entirety. He describes, 'firstly all dialects should be standardised within themselves and then they should be brought close to each other'. However, he adds with regard to status planning, 'there should be no coercion on this issue, it should be left to the natural process… it should be accepted that all dialects are indisputably equal… all dialects should be entitled to have same rights'. By increasing communication between people and the development of academic, economic and educational activities, there could be a rapprochement between dialects, he argues.

The founder of the Kurdish School (*Dıbıstana Kurdî*) in Västerås (Sweden), Haydar Diljen points out that those who speak different dialects but live together comprehend each other, while in those regions where there is no communication cannot[173]. According to him, 'there is a set of

171 Çem wrote articles in *Özgürlük Yolu* and *Roja Welat* in Turkey and worked at the monthly newspaper *Dengê Komkar* in Europe. Çem has also contributed novels in both Zazaki and Turkish.

172 The interview with Malmîsanij was not recorded per his request.

173 Diljen teaches Kurdish at the Kurdish School. The website of the School was constructed in 2000 and became a part of the Swedish National Agency for Education School Network, and finally owned by the Centre for Bilingualism, City of Västerås. The main aim of the website is to teach Kurdish online, and includes pages for Kurdish education, class suggestions, Kurdish grammar, syllabi, teaching material, student material, Kurdish in the world, culture and folklore, language exercises,

differences between Zazaki and Kurmanji but these differences do not indicate that they are different languages. When people do not comprehend the languages of each other, it is not meaningful to immediately conclude that they are two different nations, two different peoples'. This explains why Diljen rejects that the differences between dialects lead to the emergence of distinct languages. In a similar way, Fırat Cewerî, who was the owner and editor of *Nûdem*, argues that one could not easily learn another dialect by simple contact if they were distinct languages, which is not the case for the dialects of the Kurdish language[174]. Not unlikely, as an interpreter and owner of a translation office in Cologne, Adnan Dindar notes that the dialects of the Kurdish language are mutually intelligible, noting 'one who perfectly knows a dialect of Kurdish can comprehend others to eighty percent'[175]. He further explains:

> 'There are some differences in pronunciation and some different local concepts. In order to surpass them, common institutions rather than individual efforts are necessary … common instruments of communication naturally creates a common language [that] nourishes from all varieties… if there is no or a restricted dimension of communication, there will emerge an instrument [the language] that functions in that restricted dimension. That is what the Kurds experience today … so, I do not believe they [Kurmanji and Zazaki] are distinct languages'.

With regard to the 'restricted communication' among the Kurds, Hassan Ghazi, a journalist studying linguistics in Brussels, similarly argues that 'people who have no contact with each other may have difficulties for comprehending each other… [But also] it depends on your level of education,

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Dımılki (Zazakî), test material, articles and presentations. For further information about the Kurdish School, the following website can be visited at URL: http://www.dibistanakurdi.com.

174 *Nûdem* is a literary magazine published in Stockholm between 1992 and 2002 that gathered the works of Kurdish authors scattered all around the world. The author conducted an interview with Fırat Cewerî partly in Turkish. In some cases when Cewerî preferred to speak in Kurdish, Abidin Parıltı, a Kurdish author, translated Cewerî 's answers into Turkish as well as expressing his own ideas. All statements of Cewerî and Parıltı that are submitted throughout the study are extracted from the interview, unless otherwise specified.

175 Dindar took refugee in Germany in 1986 while studying Oriental Studies at the University of Cologne. He speaks Arabic, Persian, Kurdish (both Kurmanji and Kırmancki), German and English and runs the translation office in Cologne since 1992.

how long you have studied [the language]'[176]. In this sense, concerning the status planning, he explains, 'I think to speak about a standard form is not very healthy at this stage [without the possibility to use the language in education]... Now, I think, everyone in every area should have the widest possible freedom to use whichever dialect they want… "Because the majority speaks that dialect, others must accept that dialect"; this approach is not democratic according to me'.

As a teacher of Kurmanji in Berlin, Alan Dilpak is clear in his stance about the status planning for the Kurdish language when he argues that the differences between these dialects should be protected to produce the standard form in the future[177]. The same should hold true with corpus planning, according to the Head of the Association of Kurdish Education in Amsterdam, Egith Herbest, who favours the standardisation process to be left to its own devices[178]. Of course, 'its own devices' is a problematical notion for language planning according to some. Arguing that Zazaki is a not a dialect of the Kurdish language but rather a separate language, Asmeno Bewayir, who studies Indo-European languages at Frankfurt University and who acts as the co-director of Frankfurt Zaza Language Institute, emphasises that 'Kurdish and Zazaki have many common characteristics in grammar and wording just because they belong to the same linguistic family and share the same geography for thousands of years', adding that 'it is not possible that any two languages that have neighbourhood and common living area do not comprehend each other'[179]. According to him, however, Zazaki cannot be called a dialect of Kurdish. This explains why he immediately gives the examples of the European languages that are mutually intelligible but considered distinct languages due to national borders and political justifications. In fact, such an analogy reflects the

176 The interview with Ghazi was conducted in English. He produces programmes at Roj TV and studies the Kurdish language. He published dictionaries (Swedish-Kurdish and Kurdish-Swedish) and translated some books on the theory of language.

177 Dilpak also prepared Kurdish (Kurmanji) grammar books for children that were published in 1998 by the Kurdish Institute in Berlin.

178 The Association was established in 2000 and trained Kurdish teachers. Due to the lack of interest in learning Kurdish in Amsterdam, the Association does not continue to give Kurdish courses.

179 The Frankfurt Zaza Language Institute was established in 2004 in order to standardise Zazaki, to produce a comprehensive Zazaki dictionary and to publish school texts and a linguistic magazine. The official website of the Institute is at URL: www.zazaki-institut.de. Bewayir himself published an article on the linguistic distinctiveness of Zazaki in *Çıme*, the Journal of Zaza Language and Culture that can be found on the website at URL: http://cimezaza.tripod.com.

political aspect that dialects/languages have in relation to each other. On the other hand, it is striking to note what Bıraê Bexti – a self-proclaimed educationalist and 'non-aligned' author living in Amsterdam – highlights: 'working for the protection and development of Zazaki, which is the mostly mistreated language, is more an ethical than a political deed'[180].

It seems that it is challenging for 'nationalist' Kurdish intellectuals to separate corpus planning from status and acquisition planning, which are also directly related to the construction of linguistic unity. They regard the monopoly of the dominant dialect of the Kurdish language as a prerequisite for linguistic unity and the survival of the Kurdish language, a state which can be cultivated only by a political power. Despite attempts to preserve a 'democratic stance' that acknowledges different dialects, Kurdish intellectuals seem to prioritise linguistic unity in order to ensure Kurdish 'national' unity. They claim official status for the most powerful Kurdish dialect, which is spoken by the majority in its respective region. This approach highlights the instrumental aspect of language rather than emphasising its intrinsic value, and it refers to state power as the guarantor of linguistic and national unity. It seems that the 'power to' protect the Kurdish language as a resistance to the hegemony of Turkish language can easily turn into *power* of the dominant dialect of Kurdish, Kurmanji, *over* the variants of the language, especially Kırmancki[181]. Resistance against the claims of Turkish national unity does not necessarily generate diversity. In this respect, this approach is inadequate to lead a transformative resistance, which is the only way that speakers of the Kurdish language can be truly emancipated.

Others who take a cultural emphasis to the question of the standardisation of the Kurdish language regard all dialects of Kurdish as adding to the wealth of Kurdishness, and they do not favour strict language planning for the sake of linguistic unity. They do not consider linguistic diversity a threat

180 The Interview with Bexti was not recorded per his request. He published a dictionary *Türkçe Mi* in 2003 (İstanbul: Zed), in which he submits the originally Iranian (Persian, Dımılki/Kırmancki, Kurmanji) words in Turkish, trying to show the richness of Kurdish and the impurity of Turkish.

181 With Fishman it can be argued that the Kırmancki-speaking intellectuals tend to 'ausbau' from Kurmanji, which means 'the building away of a weaker variety from a stronger but very similar, fully recognized and therefore bone-fide "language", in order to provide ample evidence that the "dialect" charge against the former in comparison to the latter is unfounded' whereas Kurmanji-speaking intellectuals emphasise 'bringing two varieties together, so that they will fuse', (the idea of 'einbau' in Kurmanji) (2004).

to the unity, nor do they interpret unity in a nationalist manner. Put differently, they do not regard linguistic unity as a pre-requisite for national unity. They consider the four main dialects of the Kurdish language equally valid and equally important to be individually protected. Although they are not eager to call the dialects distinct languages, they are enthusiastic to preserve the survival of all the variants. Furthermore, they believe that all variants of languages and cultures should be protected for their intrinsic values instead of for instrumental purposes. It seems that the cultural emphasis on linguistic matters has nothing to do with 'power over' whereas it has less with 'power to'. Such cultural emphasis might stem from the misconception of power, which cannot fully grasp the productive aspect of power. This misconception does not prevent the cultural standpoint from organising a resistance to promote the survival and vitality of the language(s), which has a far-reaching impact on the arena where further resistance movements can act. However, it is not easy to say that such a cultural resistance itself can turn into a transformative one.

Political and Cultural Connotations of Linguistic Rights

The ways in which interviewees answered questions about how to guarantee the full implementation of linguistic rights indicates their attitudes towards the political and cultural connotations of linguistic rights – which are analysed in regard to the relationship between power and resistance. Unsurprisingly, most interviewees connect directly the issue of linguistic rights to politics. As Uzun (1998: 220) emphasises, even the most a-political Kurdish intellectuals were seen as political figures because writing in the Kurdish language and having Kurdish identity were considered political actions in themselves. Uzun (quoted in Ahmadzadeh 2003: 130) also stated that everything he did was political even though he was far from being an active politician. This example helps to explain why many Kurdish intellectuals stand strongly for political authority, namely federation or autonomy, as the guarantor of the full enjoyment of linguistic rights. This political authority would help to serve the survival and vitality of the Kurdish language and identity. These intellectuals also refer to the improvement of the economic and social status of the Kurdish language as conditional to ensure its survival and vitality. Hassanpour (2005a: 253) also points out that the

survival and the vitality of the Kurdish language might not be guaranteed merely by the promotion of linguistic rights because of the unequal distribution of economic, political and cultural power that limits practitioners of minority languages.

As discussed in the earlier pages, political power is seen by most as the principal actor to conduct status planning for language. Lerzan Jandil further argues that corpus planning for the Kurdish language should be conducted also by a political authority and an academic (national) institution. This emphasis on the political aspect of Kurdish linguistic rights stems from that Kurdish intellectuals refrain from naming the Kurdish community in Turkey as a minority, which deserves 'simply' linguistic rights. Rather, they find that the Kurdish community in Turkey should be called 'nation' or 'people', and should be entitled to the right to self-determination – a political right that directly guarantees the survival and vitality of the Kurdish language. Along this line, Lerzan Jandil argues that 'non-political, cultural linguistic rights are only meaningful in those countries that solved the problem of the national question… the Kurdish question is not the question of linguistic rights, neither the question of minority'. As the head of the KOMKAR in Stockholm, Kemal Burkay as well notes, 'the question of language is only a part of the question that has political, economic and cultural aspects as a whole… the Kurdish community is not a minority but a people… they deserve more than minority rights'[182]. Similar to Burkay, Kendal Nezan argues, 'cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurds could be implemented fully [on] the day the Kurds will also have their own institutions including political institutions, like a parliament', citing the example of Catalonia. He adds, 'if you want to have a healthy democratic system in Turkey, the Kurds should have the right to ask whatever they want without questioning the written borders and without having recourse to violence'.

Pervine Jamil is one of the interviewees who defend clearly the need for a federal administration for the Kurdish community in Turkey. She regards linguistic rights as 'minor rights', which are not directly helpful to the Kurdish cause. However, she adds, 'they [linguistic rights] are so

182 Burkay founded the magazines *Özgürlük Yolu* in 1975 and *Roja Welat* in 1977. He has lived in Stockholm since the early 1980s. Burkay was a member of the Turkish Worker's Party between 1965 and 1972, and founded the Party of Socialist Kurdistan (PSK) in 1974. He served as the head of the PSK until 2003. He has numerous books on the Kurdish issue and poets both in Turkish and Kurdish. For more information about the PSK and the recent articles of Burkay, please see websites at URLs: http://www.kurdistan.nu and http://www.demanu.com.tr.

important, already basic. If the linguistic rights are truly ensured, not like today, the Kurds will also change, their mentality will change and they will gain self-confidence'. Munzur Çem also considers the linguistic rights of the Kurds as a part of the political right to self-determination. However, he states, 'the right to education in Kurdish can be met even when there is no opportunity for the right to self-determination'. He adds, 'it is not an obstacle to ensure the right to education in Kurdish that the Turkish Constitution recognises only Turkish as the official language'. At the same time that he argues for the official status of the Kurdish language in Turkey, he underlines that other people, namely Arabs and Syrians living in Kurdistan, should be entitled to the right to use their languages in every field.

In fact, linguistic rights as a political right to self-determination 'naturally' become 'national rights' in this equation. Recep Maraşlı explains, 'because I think that there is a very close link between language and nation, I regard linguistic rights as the skeleton of national rights'. According to him, if the political (national) aspect is not taken into account, linguistic rights will hardly develop and cannot survive, especially in times of globalisation. As a result, he claims that the linguistic rights of the Kurds should be backed by a Kurdish political structure 'that ranges from autonomy to federation or independence… it depends on the balance of politics how it will be formed'.

On the other hand, some are not eager to connect directly the full implementation of linguistic rights to an independent or autonomous administration although this connection implicitly resides in their statements. As Fırat Cewerî argues, Kurdish linguistic rights can be relevant without an independent Kurdistan as long as Kurdish becomes the language of instruction in primary schools and the language of economic and social life. This emphasis seems to refer to a kind of autonomous administration. An autonomous administration is not essential for the full enjoyment of linguistic rights, according to the Head of the Kurdish Institute in Brussels, Derviş Ferho, who also adds, 'I never believed that the Kurdish question was just a linguistic or a cultural question… it is a political question, [linguistic rights are] political rights'[183]. He continues: 'If the peoples in Turkey, namely,

183 The Kurdish Institute in Brussels was established in 1978 as a centre for cultural and social development of the Kurdish communities in Brussels and in Kurdistan. The Institute provides courses for adults in French, Dutch and Kurdish; organises conferences on language, literature, culture, 'the national question', human rights,

the Kurds, Armenians, Syrians can use their rights as the sovereign peoples [Turkish majority] can do, nothing more is necessary.' What is highlighted in this statement is the political equality between the peoples living in the same territory.

Similarly, Alan Dilpak argues that the political equality is essential for the implementation of linguistic rights. He explains:

> 'It was an aim of us to learn Turkish in order to take place [in the society]. However, what follows the discourse that we are all equal brothers/sisters is another one that we are all Turkish. Brotherhood/sisterhood requires being equal in not only duties but also rights. But we cannot be brothers/sisters when we deny each other… Therefore, the question cannot be solved without the status of political equality'.

Şermin Bozarslan, head of the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden, focuses on the same point when she asks why the Kurdish and Turkish brothers/sisters do not have the same rights[184]. She argues that only the Turks have owned the discourse of brotherhood/sisterhood because the Kurds have always had to struggle for their rights without considerable support from their Turkish brothers/sisters. According to her, if all citizens could simultaneously learn Turkish and Kurdish, they would accept each other more easily. In this sense, she criticises the state approach that polarises and politicises the issue, and contends that, 'we should have political solutions because the state approach is political'.

In a similar way, Hassan Ghazi also states, 'it is a political right because as a result of politics there has been a ban on a specific language so there must be a specific politics in order to compensate this ban'. Mirhem Yiğit, who broadcasts programmes on Radio *Denge Mesopotamia* in Brussels, emphasises the relationship between the prohibition on language and the 'politicisation' of the issue as well[185]. While arguing that 'the greater the disrespect [to language] prevails the higher political connotation the lan-

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democracy and the history of the Kurdish people; and has publications concerning the Kurdish language, history and 'national question'. Further information about the Institute could be attained from its website at URL: http://www.kurdishinstitute.be.

184 Bozarslan had worked in various Kurdish woman organisations for nine years and was elected for the second time as the head of the Federation in 2004. She is pedagogue and has lived in Stockholm since 1993.

185 Besides Radio Denge Mesopotamia, Yiğit produces programmes at Roj TV. Yiğit left Turkey for Czechoslovakia in 1969, enjoying a scholarship provided by Musa Anter. Until 1978, he worked at the National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe, which was established in Wiesbaden in 1956. For more information about Kurdish student organisations in Europe in the 1950s and 60s, see Edmonds (1971: 105-6).

guage attains', Yiğit highlights a more democratic, tolerant and respectful structure for the full enjoyment of Kurdish linguistic rights. Nedim Dağdeviren, the Director of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm until 2007, addressed state policies as the most important factor that politicised the issue of linguistic rights[186]. He explains that 'when you support linguistic rights, it is supposed that you are saying something political… it is independent of your will'. As a result, he added, linguistic rights must correspond to political rights. As a student at Stockholm University and the head of the Association of Kurdish Students and Academics, Cesur Nujen as well refers to the state pressure on speaking native language as something that makes political what is 'originally cultural'[187].

Nujen is not an exception; there are many who emphasise the originally cultural aspect of linguistic rights. According to them, linguistic rights should not necessarily be connected to political rights because protecting a language primarily means protecting a culture. Cemal Ballıkaya explains that 'the question is that the language, culture and literature of this people are disappearing… therefore, to speak your language is not something political'. Similarly, Kazım Orak strongly rejects the idea that the struggle for linguistic rights is a political instrument. He adds, 'to claim for the independence of a language… does not necessarily mean a political independence'. Adnan Dindar expresses clearly that he is more interested in the cultural dimension of the linguistic issue, noting that autonomous or local administrations could be helpful for the full implementation of linguistic rights. He states that people should be able to communicate in the Kurdish language with the officials in respective regions because, otherwise, it would be a language without a function. Therefore, he regards the limited right to education in the Kurdish language as insufficient and unhelpful for the survival and vitality of the language.

On the other hand, it is not simply the official status that Dindar considers a prerequisite for the survival of the language; rather he high-

186 Dağdeviren was a teacher and a member of the DDKD until he left Turkey in 1981. He took refuge in Sweden in 1983. He served as the director of the Library until his death on 2 March 2007. The interview with him was recorded on 8 May 2006.

187 The interview with Nujen was recorded in English. He describes himself as a Kurdish nationalist because, as he states, he wants his own Kurdish state. He also stated that his family left Turkey for Stockholm when he was four and he never visited Turkey. Further, he made known that the Association was founded in 2002 at Stockholm University and that they planned to establish similar associations in other cities such as Uppsala, Örebro, Linköping and Lund.

lights the need for a state-wide political will to meet linguistic demands. Consequently, he emphasises the ways whereby the linguistic issue could become less political and more cultural to be managed autonomously by the Kurds themselves. Similarly, Egith Herbest argues that it is not significant now to bargain or make further calculations about the political implications of linguistic rights. He makes himself clear as follows:

> 'We, as the Kurdish community, must ensure our own transformation by ourselves but not with the rights that would be entitled by someone… The Kurds are in the process of individual professionalism and consciousness … this is something good for actualising this [transformation] with our own dynamics… if you can master a language, a culture, it will be no matter that you are denied… it is important to make denial meaningless'.

According to Uzun (2001: 240-1), the Kurds believe that the political struggle would serve other fields such as the survival and vitality of the Kurdish language. However, this was not the case. Uzun criticised principally the cultural institutions and organisations who have not carried out their essential duties (namely developing the Kurdish language and culture), and for prioritising political and diplomatic work even though he acknowledged the positive impact of political struggles. However, the role of the Kurdish political struggle in the development of the linguistic consciousness of the Kurdish people – which might activate the internal dynamics that Herbest emphasises – remains disputable. The question is whether Kurdish political movements are able to lead the Kurdish people to master their language in order to overcome the constraints on the language.

The PKK Movement: A Case of Pragmatism of Language

It is striking that the most popular Kurdish movement, the PKK, has never initiated clearly a specific policy to protect and develop the Kurdish language. Therefore, the movement is criticised for failing to focus significantly on linguistic rights as one of its main struggles. However, as Özdoğan (1999) notes, the increasing radicalisation that determined the political scene in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s resulted in the emergence of various clandestine leftist revolutionary groups that lacked an agenda of linguistic rights. In this respect, she adds, the PKK 'adopted a strictly revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist platform and tried to survive, com-

peting for support against various leftist activists and militants, including other Kurdish groups'. The source of the support for which the PKK was competing did not lie in linguistic rights. To the contrary, the Kurdish people did not patronise other Kurdish political groups emphasising language and culture, as they were accused of favouring cultural nationalism by some left-wing political movements.

However, Kendal Nezan regards the PKK as a new and temporary phenomenon because, he argues, 'the Kurdish political movements in the 1950s-1960s in Turkey and including the 70s were paying a real attention to the issue of language'. Similarly, Nedim Dağdeviren argued that the PKK was an exception to the exclusion of linguistic prioritisation, as all other Kurdish political movements had worked to improve the Kurdish language and identity – particularly the PSK (the Party of Socialist Kurdistan). Indeed, *Kawa*, *Rızgari* and the PSK put more emphasis on the role of language in the Kurdish struggle through their magazines, meetings and defences, where the Kurdish language was obstinately used. On the other hand, to the subsequent question of why the PKK then became popular despite its indifference to the linguistic rights of the people it struggles for, Dağdeviren responded:

> 'The PKK is always seen and analysed as a political organisation, but rather I regard it as a military organisation… A military organisation has not a big concern for such issues as language and culture… Such a military organisation recruits people through a militarist discourse; it does not need to tackle the issue of mother tongue'.

Although the PKK did not give priority to the linguistic rights of Kurds in its political strategy and did not refrain from using Turkish in its meetings and publications, it did use the Kurdish language and Kurdish historical symbols or mythical names to recruit ordinary people and gain their support. This also means that as ordinary people became active members of the PKK, they started to speak in Turkish in order to follow the instructions, meetings and publications of the movement. Therefore, it seems that the PKK was one of the agents that *prevented* the protection and development of Kurdish. According to Kawa Nemir, the PKK is responsible for the auto-assimilation process that the Kurds experienced. He criticises the incorporation of Kurds into the politics in the Turkish language:

> 'Even take our mothers … the Turkish Republic tried for 80 years to teach them Turkish and failed but [Kurdish] "peace mothers" have learnt Turkish at the woman

> sections of political parties … the reason is traumatic; it is stipulated that "we should make politics"… we learn Turkish for the sake of making politics but we sacrifice our reason of state, our aim of struggle, [that is] Kurdish'.

Şermin Bozarslan similarly notes,

> 'the Kurdish organisations that do not make their own language official in their internal operations damage the Kurdish struggle… Because if you cannot develop your language, you assimilate yourself; or if you passively accept these state policies, you lose a great part of your aim'.

In this sense, the responsibility of the PKK is two-fold: the PKK lacks a comprehensive policy to protect and develop the Kurdish language, while at the same time indirectly serving the subjugation of Kurdish to the Turkish language. As Leissner argues, 'the PKK itself is the proof of the Turkification policy to which millions of Kurds in Turkey were subjected' (1992: 9). This may be one of the reasons why Cemil Gündoğan contends that the PKK is a typical Kurdish movement in that it did not base its main strategy on language[188]:

> 'There was no opportunity to make politics principally devoted to the language because a great part of the people that constitute the [Kurdish] movements were not able to conduct intellectual activity in their own language; […] even if those who speak Kurmanji and Zazaki had been competent enough [to do so], they would have faced with the same question, namely they would have needed a common language and that language would have not been any one other than Turkish that everybody had learnt at school… In this sense, the PKK is not the exception'.

When asked how the PKK was able to organise the Kurdish people without addressing their linguistic rights, Gündoğan states that:

> 'The movement was firstly established by oppositional students at universities and later disseminated to high-schools, officials, and small cities and towns… namely it was possible to operate in Turkish [in the beginning]… when it [the movement] reached out to ordinary people in the 1990s, it turned to the Kurdish language but there was no high politics anymore'.

188 He adds that the only exception was the movement of Dr. Şivan (Dr. Sait Kızıltoprak), who established the T-KDP, in Iraq in 1969. It was partly followed by Kawa, which published a book on Kurdish grammar in 1976. Gündoğan, who was a member of Kawa, left Turkey for Stockholm in 1996. He received his Master's degree in social anthropology from Stockholm University in 2000.

Gündoğan explains further that it was not urgent to protect and to develop language during a time when the assimilation was not high[189]. Moreover, he adds, the study of language was seen as the job of those known as cultural nationalists who worked in isolation and had no contact with the people. He emphasises that Kurdish political movements were in a mode to revolutionise the inferior status of the Kurds and Kurdistan in favour of modernity. In this respect, the struggle was against not only the state, but also the feudal and religious structure of Kurdistan. Therefore, as he clarifies, a modern Kurdistan was an absolute symbol for the Kurdish peasants dispossessed of their land, proof that the Kurdish language was not the motor force of the Kurdish struggle. According to Gündoğan, it is the political atmosphere that determines which symbol is more eligible to be used in a political struggle. In this sense, he argues that language becomes a more suitable symbol in the current one, in which both the processes of globalisation (especially Turkey's EU membership) and the developments in Southern Kurdistan bring the linguistic rights of the Kurds in Turkey to the international agenda. The political, cultural and linguistic struggle that the Kurdish diaspora undertake in Europe can also be added as a constituent of the current conjuncture.

According to Haydar Diljen, the lack of emphasis on language was a handicap of all Kurdish political movements in Turkey due to the degradation of the Kurdish language, which is labelled as the language of peasants or 'uncivilised people'. As Fırat Cewerî states clearly, 'the official discourse rendered Kurdish the language of backwardness and ignorance… the countryman cannot read or write the language whereas the urban moved away from Kurdish'. Adnan Dindar, however, implies that the degradation of the language is not simply the result of state policies discrediting the Kurdish language, but also is caused by leftist political movements in Turkey: 'all the Kurdish movements grew inside the uterus of the Turkish left… Those Kurds who separated from the Turkish left did not want to be accused of [social] chauvinism by the internationalist socialist discourse'.

189 The late 'success' of the Republic to assimilate Kurdish-speaking people into the Turkish language is a factor that made it unnecessary for Kurdish political movement to focus on the Kurdish language as an instrument of nationalist agitation. In fact, never before was the Kurdish language under the threat of extinction as it is in the last decade due to the mass displacements caused by the armed conflict in the 1990s. The voluntary or obligatory urbanisation of the Kurdish people that caused rapid assimilation made the emphasis on language and affirmative action necessary to protect the Kurdish language.

In this sense, he adds, the Kurdish political movement, i.e. the PKK, was not a nationalist movement in the beginning; rather, the PKK tried to refrain from emphasising nationalist symbols, one of which was the language. According to him, it would be better if the Kurds had experienced nationalism, 'an illness that communities have in their childhood':

> 'Europe started to unite when it completed its fragmentation … after acknowledging that the peak of independence or those borders are against itself… The peak is the maturation… if the nationalist discourse and the Kurdish language had been at the foreground, the Kurds would have had measles a long time ago [when the Kurdish community was in its childhood]'.

Looking at the question from a different angle, Malmîsanij argues that it would be better if the emphasis on the Kurdish language was put by Kurdish political movements from the beginning stages, referring to İsmail Beşikçi's statement, which highlights the ironic position of the Kurdish language in Turkey as: 'Kurdish-speaking village guard vs. Turkish-speaking guerrilla'. This irony, on the other hand, makes it possible to understand why the Kurdish people did not deny support to the PKK, which was not interested in the Kurdish linguistic rights. Moreover, Kemal Burkay argues that the question why the Kurdish people backed the PKK can only be analysed within a wider sociological outlook, because, strangely, Kurds vote for conformist political parties or support sheiks that do not advocate the rights of the Kurds. Furthermore, he adds, when both the Kurds and the Turks took their respective sides after the PKK started its military struggle against the army of the Republic in 1984, 'the left weakened and the democratic powers receded while militarism and chauvinism was empowered in the Turkish society; the PKK also got strong among the Kurds'. According to Malmîsanij, the Kurdish people supported the PKK because there was no other organisation, or, in Şermin Bozarslan's words, 'Kurdish people inevitably support such organisations due to the lack of civil society in Turkey'.

The potential dynamism of Kurdish society stuck between the state on the one hand and the PKK on the other, is pointed out frequently by the interviewees. According to Recep Maraşlı, the impasse that Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey face is a result of their failure to activate that dynamism. He argues that the PKK suffocates the emergence of such dynamism, which has the capacity to change radically the structure of Turkey and provide a solution to the question. Pervine Jamil also draws attention

to the suppression of that potential dynamism by both the state and the PKK. She criticises strongly Öcalan's role as a representative of the Kurdish people, adding 'we are really ashamed… when you look at the history of Kurdistan you see many leaders who were really genuine'. However, she states, it is unsurprising that the Kurdish people, who are kept illiterate and frightened, support such a movement and its leader. This is the reason why most Kurdish intellectuals argue that the reputation of the Kurdish language must be restored to make the Kurdish people proud of their language and identity, which will increase their self-confidence. According to Haydar Diljen, 'in order to honour Kurdish, prominent Kurds, namely mayors, leaders of parties and trade unions, authors, artists, lawyers, teachers should lay claim on Kurdish'.

Others, to the contrary, do not see the phenomenon of a Turkish-speaking Kurdish political movement as something entirely negative. Asmeno Bewayir, for example, argues that the Kurdish political movement succeeded in forging bonds with the Turkish majority by speaking Turkish. Egith Herbest, moreover, implies that the lack of emphasis on the Kurdish language may have prevented the development of linguistic nationalism. Kazım Orak emphasises that the PKK never pursued linguistic nationalism because 'if language had been simply seen as a political instrument, the Turkish language would have been left long time ago. Even those who speak Turkish [within the Movement] might have been silenced by force'. However, the Zazaki-speaking members of the Kurdish political movements argue that the Kurdish political movements are not completely free from linguistic nationalism, which is directed at the Zazaki minority within the Kurdish community.

Zazaki Movement: A Case of Linguistic Nationalism

Calling himself a Zaza nationalist, Faruk İremet argues,

> 'the Kurds and the Zaza are two distinct peoples; they have distinct languages and cultures … However, the Zaza people regarded themselves as Kurds in the 1970s when they inevitably attended the Kurdish political movements that were separated from the Turkish revolutionary movement'[190].

Asmeno Bewayir also notes that the Zaza people had no choice other than participating in Kurdish political movements after the collapse of

190 İremet is an author living in Stockholm.

the leftist movements in the 1980s. During that time, İremet explains, 'the Zaza people should speak either Turkish or Kurdish [Kurmanji] in order to communicate with others [in the respective movements]... the Kurdish nationalism [especially the PKK] did everything in order to assimilate Zazaki'. Both İremet and Bewayir note that the Zazaki linguistic and political movement have tried to overturn this assimilation process since the 1990s.

However, many Kurmanji-speaking intellectuals deny that Zazaki speakers were subjected to such assimilation. They argue rather that 'historical conditions' prevented the development of Zazaki in comparison to Kurmanji, as well as the widespread use of the latter within the Kurdish movements and institutions. Fırat Cewerî, for instance, states that *Nûdem* published, among others, the poems of Faruk İremet. However, he adds, they could not sustain publishing in Zazaki because they could not find an editor who was competent in Zazaki. Şermin Bozarslan also mentions that the Federation cannot maintain Zazaki studies due to the lack of human and material sources, adding that anyone may feel free to speak any Kurdish dialect in their meetings. Kemal Burkay rejects strongly the argument that Kurdish national organisations did not allow any expression in Zazaki:

> 'We, as the journal of *Özgürlük Yolu*, published articles in both Kurmanji and Zazaki [in the mid-1970s]… However, Zazaki is a dialect that was less-processed than the Kurmanji one… Therefore, those [who argue that speaking or publishing in Zazaki was blocked by the Kurdish movements] are not right … the prominent Zaza intellectuals [he names Munzur Çem and Malmîsanij] do not think like that'[191].

Malmîsanij explains the reasoning of the emergence of the Zazaki movement in a variety of ways: psycho-sociological factors; the impact of some controversial leading figures within the movement; and the considerable linguistic differences between two dialects, though the final factor seems the least important[192]. Cemil Gündoğan also emphasises the significant role of the psycho-sociological elements and political conflicts in the de-

191 Malmîsanij confirms Burkay's opinions in that Zazaki became a written dialect only in 1898 and remained underdeveloped in comparison to Kurmanji.

192 The leading figures of the Zazaki movement in the 1990s, e.g. Ebubekir Pamukçu, were highly controversial names that were accused by the Kurdish political movements of serving the state authority in Turkey (see Bruinessen 1997a). In order to highlight the historical role of the state in the development of the Zazaki movement, Bayrak (1994: 409-90) refers to the report entitled 'Zazalar Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler'

velopment of the Zazaki movement. Although the works on the Zazaki language makes it a linguistic movement, he argues, the movement is also related to power politics within the Kurdish political movement (PKK). According to Gündoğan, 'the hegemonic position of the PKK in the Kurdish movement gives it some facilities by which it can shape the movement's "present" as well as its past' (2002: 1-2). He (ibid) draws attention to the power structure that shapes the past in its own image and which 'is not only valid for the legal power but, to some extent, also for the oppressed which, in itself, includes a stratification between the powerful and the powerless'. In this respect, during the interview he explained the reasons that led to the emergence of Zazaki movement as follows:

> 'During the 1970s, the Kurdish middle-class stayed out of this movement [the PKK] and when they participated in the movement after 1991, they wanted to clear a field for themselves and pushed some, especially Alevi Zazas, who had a strong representation in the movement, to the edges'.

It seems that the Zazaki movement emerged from the periphery of the PKK, an area that was also marginalised by the solidarity between Kurmanji speakers and Sunnis who served to construction of the 'other', Zaza identity. Gündoğan contends that the solidarity was not formulated directly against the Zaza identity, but rather that the Kurmanji dialect became the area in which the power within the movement expressed itself. On the other hand, he regards the Zazaki political movement a symbol for the rise of plurality and a part of the internal democratisation process within the PKK. Gündoğan also highlights the post-modern emphasis on local cultures as the source of the recent interest in Zazaki language and identity. In this respect, the Zazaki political movement can be analysed as an example of a construction of identity. As Gündoğan explains:

> 'Ordinary people may respond to the discourse that only elites apply today when the social structure is reshaped tomorrow… This [Zaza] identity is so artificial today but it may easily become natural… The process of the construction of Kurdish identity in the 1970s operates the same for the Zaza identity today… [But again] it depends on the conjuncture'.

Moreover, Bruinessen (1999) emphasises the role of migration on the growing ethnic awareness of 'sub-national' groups among the Kurds when

(Sociological Studies on the Zazas) that was prepared in 1935 and submitted to İsmet İnönü by Prof. Hasan Reşit Tankut.

he argues that the freedom of publishing and teaching in Kurdish in the European countries made some Zazaki speakers more aware of the differences between Zazaki and Kurmanji dialects. As he clarifies, 'in the 1980s a number of Zaza speakers in Sweden and Germany, who had previously identified themselves as Kurds, began speaking of the Zazas as a distinct people, with their own culture and a common history that separate them from the Kurds', noting that it has not evolved into an organised nationalist movement (ibid).

Indeed, the Zazaki political movement is highly fragmented and dominated by internal controversies. According to Malmîsanij, the Zazaki political movement, which emerged in Europe in 1986, is in recession today, and has never found great support in Turkey. Indeed, the common view holds that the Zazaki political movement was constructed in Europe by the Zaza elites who lost their ideological and political position when they broke away from the Turkish and Kurdish leftist movements that were exiled to Europe after the 1980 military coup in Turkey[193]. In this respect, the Europe-originated political movement is criticised for being disconnected from the Zaza people in Turkey who are characterised by distinctive cultural and linguistic traits of themselves, but who do not reject the political alliances and cultural-historical ties between the Zaza and Kurdish [Kurmanji-speaking] communities. Moreover, the Zaza people in Turkey do not easily trust the Zazaki political movement, which is constructed primarily on the basis of anti-Kurdish contours that frequently lead to the assumption that there is collaboration between the movement and the State.

In reality, except for those who participate actively in the Zazaki linguistic and political movement, all interviewees state that most Zazaki speakers and prominent Zaza linguists do not envisage Zazaki as a separate language and identity. They find that the Zazaki movement has a more political dimension than a linguistic one. On the other hand, when nationalist Kurdish intellectuals emphasise the role of linguistic unity in protecting a single Kurdish political standpoint, they refer not only to the external threat – namely the hegemony of Turkish language – but also to internal

193 This common view can also be seen in the internet-based forums on the websites of various Zaza groups. For instance, see the article 'Avrupa Zazacılığı' by Piro Zarek, at URL: http://www.dersimzaza.com/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=27. [19 April 2008]. Also see the article of Seyfi Cengiz, one of the leading Zaza activists, at URL: http://www.zazaki.de/zazakide/s-cengiz/seyficengiz-mansur.htm. [19 April 2008].

challenges, namely the Zazaki linguistic dissidents. This non-pluralist attitude of nationalist Kurdish intellectuals corresponds to the question of mimicry: the idea that the elites of minority groups try to obtain homogeneity within the group while they are struggling with the homogeneity claims of the majority. The question of mimicry also refers to the question of power; namely, the act of resistance against the dominant power could easily slip into the transformation of *power to*, which the minority group acquired to resist, into *power over* that the group exercises on minorities within itself[194].

The 'purely' political Kurdish figures of the European diaspora seem reluctant to differentiate the political connotations of linguistic rights from the cultural ones, whereas others who emphasise the language itself highlight the cultural aspect of language as independent of the political. With regard to the first group, they do not envision linguistic rights as a non-political issue, but rather see the problem as the classical conception of power and politics. This conception itself is not wrong with regard to linguistic rights as a political issue, but rather the concern is with the 'political' itself, which is delimited by the majority power or state discourse. In this sense, the struggle for linguistic rights is simply seen as resistance against the majority power, which would then be replaced by a minority one. This is what prevents the resistance movements from being transformative. It is not a coincidence then that those who are included in the first group sacrifice easily the diversity within the Kurdish speaking community on the grounds of linguistic unity as the sole guarantee of the survival of Kurdish language and identity.

The culture-oriented group, which refrains from naming linguistic rights as a political issue, favours linguistic diversity within the Kurdish community and refers to the state as the agent to politicise such cultural issues. Interestingly, the members of this group do not advocate a political movement like those of the nationalist group, although both indicate the same agent as the source of hegemonic power. The 'culturalist' group regards the political as something related to high politics conducted by the state power and does not want to be part of a political resistance claiming

194 This explains why those who speak Zazaki strongly support Turkey's EU membership which would guarantee the survival of not only Kurdish but also of other minority languages or dialects. Asmeno Bewayir argues that membership would not make sense for Zazaki speakers if only the right to education in Kurdish [Kurmanji] is recognised. He adds, 'the colourfulness that Anatolia has should be taken into consideration'.

such a hegemonic power. However, such an anti-political standpoint prevents this group from converting its 'cultural' resistance into a transformative one. Moreover, this cultural resistance has already become a part of a political agenda that is more malleable due to its unorganised character. Essentially, the Kurdish language is disappearing and it should be stopped; but the act of stopping it is not simply a cultural act. While it is true that freedom to practice a language does not necessarily conflate with political independence, the ability to resist renouncing this freedom is a political deed. The current definition of politics that is delimited and dominated by the hegemonic power and which is not challenged by the conventional opposition, is waiting for a transformative resistance that can re-interpret power in an emancipatory way to empower those who persevere in their languages and identities. In this respect, it would be interesting to trace such a transformative resistance of Kurdish in Turkey.

The Kurdish Intelligentsia in Turkey

In the period of transformation from an authoritarian mindset to a liberal one, the state authority in Turkey seems to prefer a smooth operation of assimilation. Lal Laleş argues that while the state does not physically prevent the Kurds from publishing in Kurdish anymore, it does not take any positive measures to change the current understanding in the society, which considers the Kurdish language as a threat to the system. Kawa Nemir argues that the current oppression is not significantly different from the earlier one in its systematic operation. Sami Tan calls this systematic oppression 'marginalisation', which controls the scope of interest in Kurdish reading and learning in the Kurdish society. Therefore, the Kurdish linguistic resistance needs to generate a novel resistance against such new types of domination.

This new form of resistance has been emerging since the 1990s through a new generation of Kurdish intellectuals who focus on aesthetic and civil reactions based on the Kurdish language, literature, arts and publishing. The emergence of such a new generation may not be seen as a coincidence in light of several observations by Yeşen (2006b: 35). He argues that the Kurdish dissatisfaction gained through popular and dynamic content when the Kurdish question entered a new process that has been led by a

great transformation in the overall imagination of modern politics and in the dominant coordinates of international politics since 1989. He (ibid: 36) notes that democracy and human rights have become the two motifs of the framework that constitutes the conceptual-discursive sphere where the demand for justice is articulated, whereas the end of the Cold War caused the emergence of new regimes, coalitions, conflicts and geo-political borders. The Kurdish opposition of the 90s, he (ibid) argues, is one of the projections by Turkey of global political activity revitalised by the rhetoric of democracy and human rights in a newly-emerging international political field. As Yeğen (ibid: 41) recapitulates, the Kurdish opposition that was respectively shaped and activated by the programs and slogans of nationalism and socialism until the 1980s has been shaped by a general and amorphous program of democracy and activated by the slogans more related to the notion of 'rights' since 1989. As Lal Laleş contextualises,

> 'the '90 generation tried to conceive the world in Turkish language through, e.g., Orhan Pamuk, whereas the '80 generation [activists and intellectuals of the late 1970s] tried to understand [the world] in line with Neruda, Ahmed Arif, Nazım Hikmet, and the problems of working class'.

He argues that the new generation does not perceive the Kurdish issue from the viewpoint of class struggle, but rather it tries to develop a more comprehensive discourse on the basis of linguistic, artistic and cultural works. This perception can also be seen in the works of the publishing house that Laleş runs, which publishes books in two languages (Kurdish and Turkish) and two alphabets (Latin and Arabic) as a linguistic and artistic act crossing political and cultural limits[195]. According to Lal Laleş,

> 'surely, these are all symbolic acts; this is an aesthetic concern of expression … For example, the aim was to indicate that the Turkish and Kurdish languages can live together [and learn from each other] and to violate the borders [between different dialects and alphabets of Kurdish in different countries]'[196].

195 Indeed, Malmîsanij draws attention to a new tendency in Kurdish book publishing, which has been increasingly 'independent of political organizations' (2007: 90).

196 In fact, according to Sami Tan, the main characteristic of the *Kurdish press* is that it has always been bilingual because it needs to give message to the sovereign states and the non-Kurdish people (URL: http://www.plat-forum.org/forum/archive/o_t__t_8125__k%C3%BCrt%C3%A7e-bas %C4%B1n.html [2 January 2008]).

Furthermore, Laleş proposes that there could be civil projects and job opportunities to redirect people's interest in speaking Kurdish into a kind of resistance. More specifically, he suggests,

> 'the [Kurdish] intellectuals should play their role in a correct way; [that is] they should get an approach based on civil reflexes … assimilation, oppression surely exist but today there is no obstacle for people in Turkey to individually learn Kurdish … [on the other hand] I think it is highly related with economy; imagine that a gigantic company of [Kurdish] movies or productions is established … and it tells "you should speak Kurdish in order to be employed here" … one who earns money with Kurdish would conceive Kurdish in a different [more prestigious] way … the state allows the learning of Kurdish but if it does not complete this possibility with employment, there will be problems again … [and if it is clear that the state will not do this in the near future] there could be civil initiatives, civil projects providing employment opportunities for the people [who speak Kurdish] … surely they cannot solve the problem but they can make the state understand that its policy failed [and that the solution needs innovative policies]'.

Laleş's approach corresponds to a kind of transformative resistance that would not only render restrictive state policies abortive, but also overturn the 'mis-politicisation' of the Kurdish language. Kawa Nemir similarly states,

> 'there should not necessarily be a parliament, a government or a state … most prominent Kurdish authors and poets serve as the Turkish teachers at public schools; unfortunately there are no such fields that they could be employed [in the service of Kurdish language] … even if the institutions that are established by the Kurdish movement does not do this, we can do so [through such civil projects in which those 'Turkish' teachers can be employed]'.

In fact, Nemir disowns those Kurdish dissident practices that harm the Kurds and the Kurdish language by copying the methods and materials of the dominant nationalist and military powers. As a poet and a translator, Nemir focuses on the language of slums, which enriches the dissident literature and culture on the one hand and the Kurdish language itself on the other. In this respect, the emphasis that the new generation places on civil initiatives and movements does not mean that it has simply a depoliticised approach[197]. Rather, it tries to multiply the Kurdish political

197 Urla similarly points out that the Basque youth has 'a conscious attempt to make use of intentionally marginal and "outlaw" publicity … to give their voice to their minoritized language and their not-so-polite critiques of the state, consumer capitalism, and a host of other social concerns' (2003: 212).

agenda by associating the Kurdish issue with linguistic, cultural, economic, feminist and environmental agendas, all of which are also related to the question of power[198]. Laleş states that the main drive behind publishing a series of books composed of stories of five women authors in both Turkish and Kurdish languages, is the belief that the Kurdish literature can only be improved by translations into the Kurdish language besides that the feminist vein is very thin in the Kurdish literature, that is to say the aim is to prevent the Kurdish literature from being patriarchal[199].

Sami Tan also represents the approach of the new generation in formulating the Kurdish Education and Language Movement (*Kürt Eğitim ve Dil Hareketi, Tevgera Ziman u Perverdehiya Kurdî, TZP Kurdî)* as a non-classical political act, which focuses not only on the survival and vitality of Kurdish (Kurmanji) language, but also tries to include women and Kırmancki/Zazaki speakers into the male-and-Kurmanji-oriented movement[200]. Sami Tan and his friends initiated the *TZP Kurdî* in 2006, which aimed 'to revive dead or peaky linguistic reflexes' that are the results of assimilation policies. The *TZP Kurdî* plans to increase literacy in Kurdish by teaching the language and training Kurdish language teachers in districts, towns and several institutions[201]. According to Tan, by including women and Kırmancki/Zazaki speakers, the *TZP Kurdî* reflects the criticism of a non-pluralist understanding, which the Kurds took over from the Turks[202]. During the interview, he criticised the Kurdish movement for imitating the Turkish nationalism:

> 'The Kurds tend to do the exact opposite of what the Turks do; such an opposition corresponds to the likeness because you think within the same paradigm … we do not conceive the nation as something eternal; rather it is a historical phenomenon and when this historical period ends the nation will evolve into something different … there is a hegemony of such a discourse that the Kurdish issue will end with an independent united [Kurdish] state … however, the Kurds could be the cement of a regional unity including the Arabs, Persians, Turks and Kurds … [In fact] the idea of creating a homogeneous nation has weakened among the Kurds by the acquisition of democratic consciousness in recent years … [Moreover] we acknowledged

198 This tendency can be pursued in the list of publications of the Kurdish publishing houses, especially those established in the 2000s.

199 See also the interview conducted with Lal Laleş in *Birgün* 14 December 2007.

200 See the interview conducted with Sami Tan and Alaattin Aktaş, the leaders of the Movement, in *Ülkede Özgür Gündem*, 4 April 2006.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

in such cases of Ireland, Algeria and India that having a state need not be sufficient to protect a language'.

Tan proposes that the Kurdish issue should be discussed from a different point of view that transcends the nation-state philosophy. This proposition confirms what Yeğen (2006b: 40) argues, that is, that recent Kurdish opposition is more a part of de-nationalist processes than a national question or a nationalist opposition. In this respect, it is less surprising that Tan draws attention to the increasing communication and cooperation between the Kurds and Catalans, which resulted in a few meetings at conferences and publishing projects. Tan explained that they had a guest speaker from a Catalonian civil institution at the conference they had organised in Diyarbakır in 2007, noting that 'we wanted to learn the Catalonian experiences'. In addition, the Association for the Research and Development of Kurdish Language in Diyarbakır (*Kürt Dili Araştırma ve Geliştirme Derneği*, Kurdî-Der), which is a part of the *TZP Kurdî*, has initiated a joint Project for the Training of Kurdish Language Teachers with an institution in Catalonia, CIEMEN, in 2008[203]. It seems that the novelty of the *TZP Kurdî* can also be discerned from the transnational appeal it acquires.

To understand the novelty of the resistance that the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey produces, it would be better to describe earlier generations of Kurdish intellectuals and to discuss the distinctive characteristics of this new generation. Kawa Nemir argues that the '90 generation – *Rewşen* generation (see below) – is the third of the Kurdish struggle, noting that the first generation called *Hawar* was represented by the Bedirhan family in the 1920s and 1930s, while the second one was led by Musa Anter and his friends between the 1960s and 1980s. The members of the Bedirhan family individually contributed to the advancement of Kurdish language and literature through their publications and

203 See URL: http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2520329 [14 April 2008]. CIEMEN (Escarré International Centre for Ethnic Minorities and Nations) 'focuses its activities on research'; 'eventually leads studies on minorities and marginalised peoples'; 'in agreement with the European Commission it is developing a Data Bank on Linguistic Rights and Legislation (as a part of the "Mercator" program)'; 'maintains a constantly updated Documentation Centre with bibliographic material, references about other centres, journals, unpublished texts, and so on'. See CIEMEN's website at URL: www.ciemen.org. CIEMEN is also a member of EBLUL (European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages). Moreover, in passing, it is interesting to note that a study of Necat Ayaz, titled '*Katalonya Dîrok Ziman Otonomî*' ['*Catalonia History Language Autonomy*'] was published in Kurdish in 2007 by the *Aram* publishing house.

linguistic works, while Musa Anter and his friends focused on the Kurdish political struggle rather than improving Kurdish as a literary language. The differences between the two generations stem from their respective political climate, which determined the discourse and strategy of these generations. According to Muhsin Kızılkaya (2001: 94-5), for instance, Musa Anter was not a great Kurdish author, but he connected the Kurdish intellectuals of the constitutional monarchy to those of the republican era and introduced the Kurds to the Turkish intellectuals of the republican era. The relationship between the Anter generation and the Kurdish language and culture was limited to minor literary works that were published in the periodicals of Kurdish political movements. This is why Anter's generation is hardly considered a school in terms of Kurdish language and literature. As Muhsin Kızılkaya notes, literature was a strong weapon of the movements of the 1960s and 1970s as a means of expressing their political ideas in an impressive way[204].

The Kurdish activists and intellectuals of the 1970s were either jailed or exiled to Europe after the 1980 coup in Turkey. This provided the incubation period of Kurdish literature in Europe between the 1980s and 1990s, and the literary works that fermented in exile [Europe] during that period has started to produce the first modern products during the 1990s[205]. In this respect, the 1980 military coup unintentionally served the development of Kurdish literature in Europe, which generated another 'cohort' between the second and third (*Rewşen*) generations of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey. It is more than a cohort, according to Kızılkaya:

> 'If one can speak of a school [in Kurdish linguistic and literary life], the first one is the school of *Hawar* [the magazine published by Celadet Bedirhan in Syria between 1932 and 1947] and the second is *Nûdem* [the literary magazine which was published in Stockholm between 1992 and 2002]… *Nûdem* gathered the works of Kurdish authors scattered all around the world [among other things, by serialising their literary works].'

Fırat Cewerî also argues that *Nûdem* was the first modern equivalent of *Hawar* in that both were independent of any political party and published entirely in Kurdish:

204 See Kızılkaya's article 'Türkçe'de Kürt Edebiyatı' at URL: http://www.diyarbekir.net/cgi-bin/index.pl?mod=news;op=author_id;id=90 [22 April 2008].

205 Ibid.

> 'Surviving for ten years, *Nûdem* served as a laboratory for the newly emerging Kurdish poets, authors and novelists [whose works were firstly published in *Nûdem*] … Almost every Kurdish author who writes since 1990 visited the pages of *Nûdem* [which] became a school [in Kurdish literature] … *Nûdem* also served as the bridge to convey the approaches of Kurdish authors to each other [and] to engender a standard language in Kurmanji'.

In this respect, *Nûdem* is a symbol of how Kurdish language, literature and publishing developed in the European diaspora during the 1980s and transferred to Turkey in the 1990s.

One of the channels of this transfer was the *Rewşen* magazine, which moved to Turkey in the early 1990s and gave the name of the '90 generation in Turkey that published the Kurdish magazines *Rewşen*, *Jiyana Rewşen* and *Rewşen-Name* between 1992 and 2002. Nemir distinguishes the *Rewşen* generation from earlier ones in Turkey in that the latter did not produce any considerable linguistic or literary work in Kurdish but focused instead on the political struggle. Moreover, he identifies the *Rewşen* generation similarly to *Hawar* in that each focused on individual literary and linguistic works in Kurdish rather than acting or writing as a part of Kurdish political organisations. To the contrary, Kızılkaya states that the *Rewşen* magazine was under the patronage of the Kurdish political movement, i.e. the PKK, noting, though, that the authors of the magazine were not 'the enlisted men' of the movement. Cewerî also argues that *Rewşen* was a magazine that did not simply focus on literature, but also entangled with politics, while he adds that the authors of *Rewşen* actually belonged to the *Nûdem* School in that they firstly published their works in the magazine *Nûdem*. Indeed, Nemir acknowledges the interference of the political movement in their linguistic and literary works, noting that it was the reason why they stopped publishing the magazine but continued individually to produce Kurdish literary works.

In respect to those literary works of *Rewşen* generation, Cewerî criticises the authors for using 'a nylon language', that is, 'an artificial language', which has no sources in the Kurdish society. More than their 'political engagement', Kızılkaya similarly criticises the authors of *Rewşen* for focusing on the 'purification of the Kurdish language from the invasion of foreign and neighbouring languages' and making Kurdish unintelligible to the ordinary Kurdish readers in the name of the authenticity of the language. Furthermore, Kızılkaya argues, 'the problem was not the purification or modernisation of Kurdish but [the justification of] its existence'.

He argues that such modernisation work in language can be meaningful only for the languages that have a written tradition, whereas 'the first thing that should be done with the Kurdish language is to generate the tradition of Kurdish literature, even before that, to engender a literary canon in Kurdish'. Nemir seems to accept that they have nothing to do with the 'national' literary canon and that they are trying to do something innovative:

> 'In terms of production, the generation which has a more avant-garde, radical and critical approach towards both internal and external power with a more sophisticated and high-level language is our [*Rewşen*] generation … We, who assert a claim for an identity that is mainly oriented with cultural elements and dynamics, work in an environment, which imposes an identity that is based on political identification … and we try to say that there are 'other' Kurds [different from the simply political Kurdish figures]'.

In light of the foregoing, it can be said that the new generation provides a critical approach to resistance, which resists mimicking the dominant nationalist practices and tries to question the origin of domination. This critical approach utilises productive power to transform the tragic experiences of the degradation and oppression of Kurdish language and identity into works of art, literature and culture. This transformation also serves to promote the Kurdish language in the public sphere in an aesthetic way deconstructing the binary oppositions that delimits both minorities and majorities[206]. As Kawa Nemir notes, for example, the oppression of the Kurdish language has damaged the Turkish language because languages enrich one another. In this respect, the emphasis on translating classical and modern literary works written in other languages into Kurdish also reveals the distinctive approach of the new generation towards resistance. The new generation regards the translation of literary texts in other languages into Kurdish as the central part of the endeavour to develop the Kurdish

206 A similar conception of resistance that challenges the content and limits of the public sphere was found by Urla in the new generation of Basque movement: 'Basque free radios [run by the youth] create an alternative form of public culture that differs significantly in its language ideology and modes of resistance from the institutionalized sectors of the Basque nationalist movement' (2003: 220, 212). The public sphere that the new generation has created 'differs significantly from the kind of public typically imagined within minority language revitalization and/or ethnic nationalist movements [in which] language politics tend to be oriented towards normalization, expanding literacy, and gaining legitimacy within the terms of state hegemonic language hierarchies' (ibid).

language and literature on the one hand, and as a justification of the richness and capacity of Kurdish language on the other. On the contrary, according to Muhsin Kızılkaya,

> 'the translation of books [that were translated from other languages into Turkish] into Kurdish is not beneficial … because the Kurds can read them in Turkish … this is the work of another time when Kurdish becomes the language of instruction at public schools… what is important today is to work on the other part [that is, to translate the books in Kurdish into Turkish] because only such works eliminated the discussion on the non-existence of Kurdish … what the Kurdish authors should do is to produce innovative [original] works whereas the translators should translate such works in Kurdish into other languages'.

But, as Abidin Parıltı notes, such an argument is irrelevant on the grounds that 'the Kurds do not live only in Turkey nor all the Kurds speak Turkish'. Moreover, Fırat Cewerî argues that a play written by a Kurdish author who reads Shakespeare in Kurdish would be different than the one written by those who did not do so. He also explains, 'when a literary text is translated into Kurdish, not only the vocabulary but also the structure and mastery of that text is translated into Kurdish [which enriches the Kurdish language and literature]'. Such essential criticisms aside, it may be said that Kızılkaya's standpoint represents a more classical understanding of resistance, which still places a dominant discourse at the centre. In other words, trying to justify the distinctiveness and richness of Kurdish by translating the Kurdish literary works into Turkish rather than working to enrich Kurdish through the translation of literary works in other languages into Kurdish reveals the classical form of resistance, which accommodates itself against the majority power. This is what reproduces the binary opposition between the minority and the majority.

The transformative resistance led by the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals also expands and renovates the public spheres in which the Kurdish language expresses itself. In this sense, the argument of this generation that the centre of Kurdish linguistic and cultural studies, which had moved from Europe to İstanbul in the 1990s, has started to move from İstanbul to Diyarbakır in the 2000s, is noteworthy[207]. According to the report of the Union of Municipalities in the South-eastern Anatolian Region (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Belediyeler Birliği*) 25 non-governmental or-

207 As Malmîsanij notes, 'some Kurdish publishing houses and periodicals have moved their centres to Diyarbakır and new publishing houses have been established there in recent years' (2007: 61).

ganisations were established in Diyarbakır in the 2000s[208]. One of them is the Association of Kurdish Authors, which was established in 2004 to strengthen the network between the Kurdish authors, to facilitate publishing in Kurdish and other languages spoken in Turkey, and to work for the development of Kurdish language[209]. Another is the *Çıra* Association of Culture and Arts, which has initiated studies on the Kurdish language, culture and arts since 2006[210]. Kurdî-Der, which is a part of the *TZP Kurdî*, declared its aim as providing the vitality of not only Kurdish, but also other Mesopotamian languages in daily life. Kurdî-Der has opened branches in Hakkari and Van in 2007, as well as the Library of Feqî Hüseyn Sağnıç[211]. Diyarbakır Municipality founded Mehmed Uzun City Library on 19 February 2009.

What is most striking is the emergence of a critical feminist organisation, KAMER (Centre for Woman/*Kadın Merkezi*) in Diyarbakır[212]. The head of KAMER, Nebahat Akkoç outlines the framework they have for a solution to the Kurdish question as follows: rejecting the status of a 'constitutive element' for the Kurds (which devalues other non-Turkish groups in Turkey); remembering the loss of other peoples in Turkey; opposing the struggle for political power; unconditionally rejecting the use of violence; and supporting the independent woman movement[213]. She (quoted

208 See the report at URL: http://www.gabb.gov.tr/dosyalar/Stk_veritabani_dokumani.doc. [14 April 2008]

209 For more information about the Association see the URL: http://www.kurtyazarlardernegi.org.tr.

210 For more information on *Çıra*, see the URL: http://www.diyarbekircira.org.

211 Feqî Hüseyin Sağnıç (1926-2003) was a prominent Kurdish intellectual and author, who studied on the Kurdish language. He was also one of the founders of the İstanbul Kurdish Institute. See the news about the Library at URL: http://www.kurdistanpost.com/Niviskar-op-printpage-artid-924.html [14 April 2008]. Hakkari Kurdî-Der also initiated workshops in the Kurdish language, history and culture in Yüksekova district in November 2007. See the URL: http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2514153 [14 April 2008].

212 KAMER was founded in 1997 and has run activities in all 23 provinces of the Eastern and South Eastern Anatolian District since 2000. The main principles of the foundation were laid out as follows: 'being independent from all political, non-governmental organizations … rejecting all kinds of discrimination; rejecting all kinds of violence; rejecting structural hierarchy; being for sharing and solidarity; and thinking universally and working locally'. See KAMER's website at URL: http://www.kamer.org.tr.

213 From Akkoç's speech at the session of "Peace Building from a Gender Perspective", the conference on "Kurds in Turkey: Main Requirements for a Peace Process" 29-30 September 2007, Diyarbakır. She also provides a clearly differentiated Kurdish women's approach to the Kurdish question in her answers to Ruşen Çakır (2004: 31).

in Çakır 2004: 41) particularly emphasises that the solution lies in developing a new language and culture of 'violence-less', which is completely different from the prevailing modes of perception and behaviour. It seems equally meaningful that the place where a new language of Kurdish political and cultural life has been emerging is Diyarbakır. On the other hand, Muhsin Kızılkaya argues that such a conception of Diyarbakır as a new cultural centre only reflects an intention or a wish more than a reality. As he says, 'when you go there [Diyarbakır], you unintentionally interfere in politics [that] creates an atmosphere [which keeps you away from creativity] … you [also] frequently witness brutality … it is difficult to extract a great literature from brutality'. Although this statement indicates that the ongoing move to Diyarbakır needs time to be verified substantially and interpreted meaningfully, it nevertheless acknowledges the ongoing move.

The discussion of the linguistic and cultural movement from Europe to Diyarbakır is accompanied by another on the contribution of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe to the development of the Kurdish language and literature, as well as the Kurdish cause in Turkey. According to Lal Laleş, Diyarbakır became the Kurdish cultural centre not because those in Europe moved back to Diyarbakır; to the contrary, those in Europe turned their face to Diyarbakır when Diyarbakır evolved a dynamic cultural reflex. He also argues that the contribution of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe to Kurdish language and literature is limited because the Kurdish literary works produced in Europe are not highly significant in their quality. Nemir is similarly critical of the argument that Kurdish intellectuals in Europe contributed to the Kurdish language and literature:

> 'Except for a few, most Kurdish authors in Europe [who were mostly oriented with politics] carried out a political conflict among each other through literary texts … and therefore they did not have chance to utilise the opportunities in Europe … for instance, a real avant-garde approach towards the Kurdish poetry evolved in Turkey after the 1990s … most of them [Kurdish intellectuals in Europe] sacrifice literature for the sake of making politics'.

Despite his distinctive position in Kurdish literature, Mehmed Uzun (quoted in Ahmadzadeh 2003: 168-9) accepted that he used the novel as a medium to relive past and lost heritage and connect the past to the present in order to create continuity in the history of Kurds, whom he tried to

Nebahat Akkoç was among 36 people honoured by *Time* Magazine with the "Middle Eastern and European Heroes Award" in 2003.

unite. Indeed, as Malmîsanij argues, most authors writing in Kurdish write for 'idealistic reasons' or as 'a patriotic duty', whereas for some 'writing in Kurdish means standing up for your identity, for some writers it is a matter of honour' due to the national oppression they experienced (2007: 25-6). Nevertheless, Uzun (1998: 31) emphasised that seeing literature and arts as merely means of a particular political group or an ideology would influence negatively the development of Kurdish literature and culture, which is also under the threat of neighbouring and undeveloped cultures. Therefore, he proposes that 'the literature, arts and intellectual life that the Kurds would create should be profoundly democratic, civilised, tolerant and a part of the contemporary world'. Muhsin Kızılkaya describes Uzun as one of the intellectuals who redefined exile by freeing themselves from the 'ideological enslavement' that they were subjected to in their homelands, which led them to evolve a universal literary language and acquire the faculty of democratic thinking[214]. Those who could not utilise exile are highly criticised by Lal Laleş:

> 'What is in Europe is a cultural reaction constructed by the failed [Kurdish] politicians … [Moreover] Kurdish intellectuals in Europe are still in a mode that clings them to life with a socialist jargon while adjusting them to the democratic pressure that Europe imposes … a mode that is nationalist and conservative in the Kurdish question but socialist in other social issues'.

Sami Tan agrees with Laleş's statement:

> 'Especially some is more conservative and rigid [than their counterparts in Turkey] … they still have the idea of a united, independent and democratic Kurdistan [to be constructed from the top] … they did not have much contact with the country in which they lived … they remained the same as they left here … even they did not learn Kurdish'.

214 As Zeleca observes, 'Africans in the diaspora rather than those on the continent, were the first to launch protracted and passionate struggles for epistemological and political liberation' (2005: 217; quoted in Kostantaras 2008). On the other hand, with Kostantaras, it is possible to see these struggles as 'specific products as well of a visceral reaction to the unique circumstances and stresses that accompanied their [diaspora intellectuals] lives abroad, one in which defiance to the 'epistemological violence' of their surroundings is mingled with a lingering bid to win the esteem of the society that had in countless ways demeaned them' (ibid). In this sense, Kostantaras refers to Zeleca, who 'has written of the sentiments found in diaspora literature expressing a rather universal "longing for redemption"' (ibid).

On the other hand, both Laleş and Tan note that the experiences of Kurdish intellectuals in the education 'of' and/or 'in' Kurdish in European countries have considerable benefits in Turkey. According to Sami Tan, 'we should utilise the Sweden experience of Kurdish education; we can utilise the works on the Kurdish language in Germany'. In this respect, he acknowledges that 'until the 1990s Kurdish intellectuals in Europe made a crucial contribution [to the Kurdish language]', noting that this contribution was limited to the first generation in Europe:

> 'Their children speak neither Turkish nor Kurdish; they speak the language of the country in which they live … I think that a serious integration and assimilation process has started among them [the children of the first generation] … I do not think that there is chance to keep the Kurdish cultural identity alive in Europe'.

Nevertheless, Tan suggests that the well-educated members of the new Kurdish generation in Europe should be active and effective in diplomatic affairs with their knowledge and skills in foreign language and academic training. Fırat Cewerî argues that although the new Kurdish generation in Sweden does not write in or produce the Kurdish language, some of them have started to hold notable positions in the Swedish media and literature without disowning their Kurdish identity. According to Kawa Nemir, however, only those who have been well-acquainted with the Kurdish language could contribute to the Kurdish cultural life – the chances of which are small. Forebodingly, he adds that, 'the [linguistic and cultural] production in Stockholm has stopped'.

However, it was the production or the by-products of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora that directly or indirectly contributed to the Kurdish linguistic and political movements in Turkey. As Özdoğan notes, 'the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been acting as an intellectual team for Kurdish cultural reinforcement, i.e. standardization of the language, creation of a modern Kurdish literature and strengthening of Kurdish ethnocultural consciousness' (1999). It is not meaningless then to argue that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora contributed more to the cultural and linguistic studies than the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey argues in that the cultural and linguistic studies of the former provided the base, namely the development of the Kurdish language, on which the latter acts today. As Ahmadzadeh explains, 'the diaspora Kurds have tried to compensate their nostalgia and "national duty" toward the homeland through an active contribution to the development

of Kurdish culture in exile' (2003: 162). In fact, as one of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe, İkram Oğuz notes, the Kurdish linguistic and literary works in the European diaspora might be examined with respect to two different periods, namely before and after the 1990s[215]. He states that political affairs mostly dominated the works that were produced before the 1990s, whereas the products of the 1990s were mainly coloured by artistic concerns. Moreover, a Kurdish literary critic, Bêgerd, argues that the qualitative development of Kurdish novels during the 1990s – the change in 'the direction of narrating the stories from a plain and simple traditional manner to a more literary and modern one' – is a result of the increasingly frequent acquaintance with the techniques of modern Western art and literature' (quoted in Ahmadzadeh 2003: 177). Besides this, the experiences that the Kurdish diaspora share with other diasporic communities in Europe leads to the development of a transnational diasporic sphere, which affects the society and politics of both the host countries and the homelands.

Kurdish: Language of Power and Resistance

Kurdish should not be conceived merely as a language of the oppressed, even though it may be. A language of the oppressed can become a language of resistance when provided with the tools of empowerment. Status planning for the Kurdish language is seen as one of these tools, whereas another is the struggle for Kurdish linguistic rights. Therefore, the language of the oppressed becomes the language of power. However, the resistance of Kurdish language through status planning and the struggle for linguistic rights can turn easily into the domination of a majority dialect on minority ones. The domination that is exercised by the elites of the Turkish majority is internalised by the elites of the Kurdish minority in the name of resistance. However, when the power of the Kurdish minority turns into domination and makes them a new majority, new challenges arise from the resistance of the Zazaki minority, which shares the same paradigm of the dominant discourse both Turkish and Kurdish elites enjoy. It is this irony or paradox, on the other hand, which opens the way for transforma-

215 See his article 'Diasporada kürt edebiyatı, gelişimi ve sorunları' at URL: http://www.navkurd.eu/nivisar/ikram_oguz/diasporada_kurtedebiyati.htm [21 April 2008].

tive resistance that has a critical outlook on power and resistance. This transformative resistance seems to emerge in Turkey through the efforts of the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals. To understand the limits that prevent the Kurdish intelligentsia in Europe from initiating such a transformative resistance that could include other sub-national and transnational entities, and to see the opportunities that have already pushed those limits to the extent that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora become able to transfer the basis of such a transformative resistance to Turkey, the next chapter analyses the notion of 'Europeanness' and its impact on the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora, reflecting on the relationship between language, identity and politics.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Kurdish Intelligentsia in the European Diaspora: Trans-nationality?

This study distinguishes the members of minorities and diasporas as potential actors of the transformative resistance that will be nurtured by, among other things, a trans-nationality that challenges the nation-state philosophy. This chapter, analysing the questions inherited from the previous one, discusses the limits and opportunities that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora face with regard to the emergence of a trans-national outlook. The first pillar of analysis focuses on the possibility of a trans-national Kurdish intelligentsia by analysing the transnational activities of the Kurdish diaspora and discussing the impacts of experiences that Kurdish intellectuals have had in Europe on their approach towards Europeanness, Kurdishness and the Kurdish question in Turkey. The second pillar of analysis examines the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora towards the relationship between language and identity with regard to the conception of Kurdishness. The interviews conducted with members of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora are analysed in the final section within the categories of approaches adopted by the interviewees, focusing on the trans-national approach. Remarks on the attitudes of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora close the chapter.

A Trans-national Kurdish Intelligentsia?

Bruinessen (2000b) regards the term 'transnational' as appropriate to refer to the network of contacts and the complex web of activities connecting Kurdish communities in Europe and Turkey. Wahlbeck (1999: 163) also argues that Kurdish organisations in the European diaspora have a transnational character[216]. Both Bruinessen (1999) and Wahlbeck (ibid: 171) see the Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which was established in the Netherlands in 1995 and followed by the Kurdish National Congress, as new Kurdish transnational activism. Bruinessen argues that the Parliament is '"trans-state" in that, although established by Kurds from Turkey, it includes at least one member from Iraqi Kurdistan and attempts to strengthen the representation of the other parts' (ibid). Moreover, he describes the Parliament as transnational because 'its permanent offices are located in Brussels and … it has convened in different European countries, including Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Russia. It acts as a Kurdish diplomatic representation and has established contact with numerous parties and personalities in Europe' (ibid). Finally, Bruinessen argues that the international community has begun to recognise the Kurds, 'no longer just as citizens of Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria. Various persons and bodies representing Kurds… have had high-level meetings with officials and politicians in many different countries' (2000b).

The role of MED-TV (MEDYA TV/ROJ-TV), which Aksoy and Robins (2003: 372) describe as a transnational channel and which Wahlbeck (1999: 171) defines as a transnational cooperation, is seen also as an important transnational component of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. As Adamson and Demetriou note, 'between 1995 and 1999 the headquarters of the Kurdish station was in London, from where it broadcast via satellite to Europe, North Africa and West Asia. Most of the production work, however, was carried out in various other European capitals, at studios in Brussels, Berlin, Stockholm and Moscow' (2007: 510). According to

216 Although Wahlbeck (1999: 147) studied the Kurdish diasporas in England and Finland in a comparative way, some conclusions of his study can be extended also to the Kurdish diasporas in other European countries. According to Wahlbeck, although there are specific differences between the Kurdish communities depending on their country of origin, 'all Kurdish refugees [in England and Finland] had in common included their wish to return, their feeling of displacement and various psychological problems owing to their refugee experiences. All refugees also created and maintained transnational social networks' (ibid: 181).

Yavuz, 'with MED-TV, one can argue that the Kurds are the first satellite nation: they do not have a seat in the United Nations, but they do have an air frequency in the sky' (1998: 17). Houston (2001: 26) also argues that MED-TV resembles the TRT in creating a sense of national unity. Such 'transnational and network-based' Kurdish organisations 'have used transnational spaces in Europe to challenge hegemonic constructions of Turkish nationalism, a practice that would have been impossible within the territorial boundaries of the Turkish state during most of the 1980s and 1990s' (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 512). This is the reason why the Turkish state has perceived Kurdish transnational channels as a threat to its national unity and tried to persuade the European states not to allow their broadcasting.

In this respect, as Adamson and Demetriou explain, the 'diasporic public sphere has served as an arena for Kurdish political entrepreneurs to socially construct, articulate and mobilize nationalist identifications which fundamentally oppose official versions of nationalism propagated by the Turkish state' (ibid: 509-12)[217]. According to Alinia (2007: 236), the Kurdish diasporic movement is a haven to provide continuity and belonging for the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, a haven that transcends different territorial borders and nation-states. This cultural and linguistic safe-space in the European diaspora, however, serves primarily the diasporic consolidation of communitarian conception of Kurdish identity.

Although, as Emanuelsson notes, 'the overall context and the main objective of the Kurdish organisations established in Europe in the 1980s were directly linked to the situation of the Kurdish people in the region of origin' (2005: 104-5), these organisations also aimed to increase the knowledge of Europeans about the Kurdish people through their publications in the language of host countries (ibid: 114). The Kurdish Institute of Paris published its original Kurdish bulletin in French, German and Spanish, whereas the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden translated its newsletter into Swedish in 1998 (ibid). Moreover, Kurdish organisations throughout Europe in the late 1980s developed a kind of cooperation with left-wing parties, anti-racist initiatives and other organisations led by non-Kurdish activists dedicated to human rights issues (ibid: 115-7). This

217 Not unlikely, Aksoy and Robins (2003) argue that such a diasporic public sphere which Turkish-speaking migrants (including Kurds) inhabit in London, reflect their transnational experiences that transcend the borders of national imagination of sociality.

interest to contact with the society in the host country indicates that the Kurds 'did not opt for a separation of the community from the rest of the host society, even if they were linked to the homeland and were concerned with the Kurdish culture and language' (ibid: 90).

Wahlbeck (1999: 174) similarly notes that Kurdish associations acquire new functions related to problems in the country of settlement, although they are mobilised around a political struggle in their country of origin. Moreover, Adamson and Demetriou argue that the 'Kurdish activists in the diaspora have also confronted European states [which have relied in the past on close cooperation via bilateral treaties with the Republic] with demands for access to new immigrant services and educational opportunities, such as Kurdish-language instruction' (2007: 513). Emanuelsson (2005: 211) finds that Kurdish diaspora organisations have shifted focus from the UN to the EU since the 1990s. More specifically, Eccarius-Kelly notes that since the end of the PKK guerrilla war in the late 1990s, 'the Kurdish Diaspora has reached out successfully to individual allies within the EU structure, including members of the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Confederal Group of the European United Left (EUL), and the Green/environmental factions. The Diaspora's objective, to develop a strong voice in the parliament, challenges traditional Western European notions of minority politics' (2002: 92). She also notes that since 'the Kurdish Diaspora lacks the necessary political unity, and highly educated and legally trained members among its leadership to sustain a large-scale insider lobbying campaign [in the Commission] … the European Parliament provides a much more accessible and politicized target for Kurdish human rights activists in comparison with the Commission' (ibid: 110)[218]. Through access to the European Parliament, the Kurdish activists 'instead of solely targeting Turkish and select European government officials with protest activities on the local and national levels … pursued Kurdish political, cultural, and human rights on the supranational level' (ibid).

Emanuelsson (2005: 125-75) argues that the chemical bombings of Halabja in 1988 accelerated the process of transnationalisation of the Kurdish cause. International conferences organised by Kurdish diaspora organisations in Europe brought together all Kurdish and European activ-

218 The EP adopted a Resolution on the Rights of the Kurdish People in 1992 and gave the Sakharov Prize of Freedom of Spirit to Leyla Zana in 1996 (see Emanuelsson 2005: 156).

ists, intellectuals and politicians together to highlight the violations of the rights of Kurds. This transnationalisation process also corresponds to 'the incorporation of human rights and humanitarian principles as important foundations and frames of reference for the activities and networks of the Kurdish diaspora organisations' (ibid: 176). As Østergaard-Nielsen notes, 'Kurdish calls for a solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey has increasingly been formulated in universalistic rather than nationalist terms and backed up by references to UN and EU human rights charters' (2006). Therefore, those Kurdish diaspora associations, which have been 'increasingly invited to participate in the German political arena', became able to increase interaction with mainstream policy-makers and various NGOs, which further reinforced the 'moderate and comprising line' within these associations (ibid). Indeed, as Eccarius-Kelly argues, 'since 2000, the Kurdish movement's commitment to disruptive yet non-violent public marches, its large-scale demonstrations, petition-drives, internet-based messages, and transnational, coordinated lobbying efforts strengthen the argument that a process of political maturity has been reached' (2008). Moreover, 'through the formation of a transnational sphere of influence, Kurds are remarkably empowered in contrast to the actual size of their community' (ibid). In light of these remarks, Kurdish diasporic politics seem to include not only the Kurds living in different European countries (and in homelands), but also non-Kurdish groups in the European countries in favour of the rights of diasporic communities in Europe. According to Laguerre, 'transnationality manifests itself, for example, when diasporic politics takes the responsibility of making claims for the recognition of diasporans' status' (2006: 164-5).

Differently from the aforementioned studies on the Kurdish transnationalisation, this study investigates if the transnational activity that has been run by the Kurdish diaspora creates a trans-national outlook among the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora. More precisely, this study addresses the question of such transnationality as something that influences Kurdish intellectuals' perceptions of Europeanness and Kurdishness. In this respect, the experience of democracy and pluralism in Europe seems to be the most important factor that shapes the distinctive or 'European' aspect of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. As Kendal Nezan emphasises, 'the people who have been living in Europe for many years put a significant emphasis on democracy'. Munzur Çem

explains the democratisation process that he and his friends experienced in Europe as follows:

> 'We [those who were belonging to the leftist or Kurdish nationalist movements] were speaking of democratisation in Turkey before the 1980s but we were referring to the dictatorship of the proletariat … we saw in Europe how socialist policies might come to power through plural and democratic ways'.

Likewise, Kemal Burkay notes,

> 'we were accepting the European social democrats as the collaborators of capitalism but one becomes more realistic when one lives in the European democracy; you understand that there is no need for a dictatorship of the working class… and you see how the process of democracy operates. While you are contemplating your own society, you also utilise what you have learnt… There are many things that the Kurds learnt from Europe. The cadres that grew here could be useful'.

The statements of Çem and Burkay reflect a similar tone to the simple words of Bıraê Bexti: 'we had been revolutionists without being democrats'. 'The opportunities in Europe and the ideological and cultural journey we made in Europe made us more flexible, open-minded and tolerant', Fırat Cewerî states. Accordingly, Haydar Diljen highlights, 'what I learnt in Europe is to be more tolerant and to look at questions from different point of views'. This experience of democracy and pluralism is what made Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora 'much closer to the ideal of Europe', as said by Adnan Dindar.

Cemil Gündoğan argues that, 'living in Europe breaks one's mindset that is structured by the idea of a nation-state'. As he adds, 'the promotion of the status of Kurdish identity in Europe' due to the oppressive policies of the state in Turkey engendered self-confidence that the Kurds need and had positive effects on 'their way of thinking'. According to Kendal Nezan, 'the way of thinking' that the Kurds obtain is the result of authoritarian policies in the states they live: 'a part of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey [that] have been educated in Turkish schools and education system in Turkey is not exactly a democratic one because of the official ideology… they are rather for authoritarian ways of solution for the problem'. This authoritarian viewpoint also derives from that 'Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey are under the influence of feudal approaches that impose such binary oppositions as black and white, right and wrong, good and bad … us and them', as indicated by Adnan Dindar. Moreover, as Şermin

Bozarslan highlights: 'the restrictive conditions in Turkey prevent the freedom of speech and the development of civil society', which she regards as a prerequisite for freedom of thought. Munzur Çem explains how the restrictions on the freedom of speech restrict the freedom of thought as follows:

> 'For example, the word Iraqi Kurdistan is the legal name of the administration in Northern Iraq but the Kurds in Turkey do not or cannot use this phrase [Kurdistan] when they are talking about that region … the discussion on the 'supra' (Turkish) and 'sub' (Kurdish) identities in Turkey is misled … Kurdish intellectuals participate in the discussion without questioning connotations of the notions of "supra" and "sub"'.

According to Malmîsanij, 'in Europe one can regard any idea, which does never come to her/his mind in Turkey, as natural' and further draws attention that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora are also free from the pressure of the PKK.

On the other hand, Munzur Çem argues that Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey have 'the advantage of being close to the Kurdish people'. Lacking this boon, Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora are seen to lose the interest in the Kurdish question. In Kemal Burkay's words, 'they [Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora] adapt to the European society by time and if the expression fits, Europe might corrupt one'. In a similar manner to Burkay, Cemal Ballıkaya argues that, 'Kurdish intellectuals in Europe lapse into lethargy'. Moreover, 'those in Europe might forget the situation in which those in Turkey live' and the former might easily criticise the latter's precautious and reserved attitude, as maintained by Ballıkaya. According to Asmeno Bewayir, in fact, 'the approaches of those in Turkey are more substantial … they experience the constraints in a bitter way'. However, he emphasises that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora have the advantage of making cultural and linguistic studies, which can support the arguments of those in Turkey. This means that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora benefit not only from the experiences of democracy, pluralism or freedom of thought and speech. They also experienced the freedom of thinking, speaking, reading and writing in Kurdish. This experience provides them the opportunity to conduct linguistic studies that not only strengthen but also enlarge the base of where Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey may act. In this respect, the words of Haydar Diljen are striking: 'I saw the first Kurdish textbook in

my life in Europe ... I recognised the difference between the education of and in mother tongue after I saw such examples in Europe'.

Therefore it is not difficult to understand why Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora want to transfer the Kurdish linguistic and cultural accumulation from Europe to Turkey. Nedim Dağdeviren complained about the lack of transferability from Europe to Turkey, and wanted to open a Kurdish library in Diyarbakır. He realised his dream to open the Kurdish library with the help of the Swedish state. The Association of National Libraries in Europe invited the Kurdish Library in Stockholm to act as an observer, much to Dağdeviren's delight. Nevertheless, he regretted that 'the Turkish state would not support the project, even if it did not prevent it, of establishing a Kurdish library in Diyarbakır, where I was born'. Kendal Nezan similarly complains, 'we have no chance to set up a Kurdish institute in Diyarbakır despite our close links with Kurdish intellectuals, writers, artists and mayors in Turkey'. For Pervine Jamil, who has 'limited contact' with Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey, the problem is that 'there is no chance for transforming this [limited contact] into a systematic relationship'. Şermin Bozarslan seems to agree with Jamil: 'there is no direct platform in Turkey whereby we improve our relationship with Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey'.

On the other hand, some argue that recent technological developments have helped to bridge the communication gap between Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and those in Turkey. As Kazım Orak argues, increased communication minimises the differences between the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora and in Turkey, and as a result 'there are no huge differences anymore because the world gets smaller'. This is a result of globalisation, according to Hassan Ghazi, who states, 'I know even in some Kurdish villages, people are following the question of civil society in a much more subtle way than [the Kurdish] people in Europe'. In this respect, Recep Maraşlı rejects the clear-cut separation between 'those outside' and 'those inside': 'I feel myself as if I am still in Turkey'. Although he accepts that being abroad helps to relieve from the constraints to which he was subjected in Turkey, he argues, 'nothing changed in the main approach I share with those in Turkey'. Maraşlı seems to draw attention to the fact that there are some Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora who are 'not corrupted by Europe' or 'do not lapse in lethargy'. This statement makes the perspective of Kendal

Nezan, who defines the Kurds in Europe as Euro-Kurds, is remarkable[219]. He (2000; quoted in Emanuelsson 2005: 184) regards the Kurdish diaspora in Europe as 'a part of the cultural, human and political landscapes of Europe'. During his interview, he implied the potential of being a part of this European landscape as follows: 'as the citizens of European countries, we have the right to ask for public support for our own activities … so, we can play a role of bridge between those [worse] parts of the world [including Kurdistan] and Europe'. It is this role which may evolve into the transnational feature of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora.

Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora point out the transformation of their conception of socialism and political struggle to a democratic and pluralist understanding of society. Although they speak less directly about the idea of Europe or trans-nationality as something that has changed their approach to the Kurdish issue, they emphasise democratic experiences in Europe as a factor that makes their approaches distinctive. This distinctiveness does not seem to mean 'being' European or transnational, but rather 'being' more democratic. The latter is also what differentiates their approach from the approach of most Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals in Turkey. Through the aids of democracy, pluralism, civil society, freedom of thought and speech in Kurdish and even self-confidence as well as the opportunity to give linguistic and cultural products in Kurdish, Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora may enjoy the trans-nationality.

The hesitant attitude of some to call this feeling a part of their distinctive approach (and identity), and the emphasis on the 'unaffected' position that some Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora try to take stems from their desire to demonstrate their eternal loyalty to the Kurdish cause in Turkey. They feel responsible to protect their strictly-defined Kurdish identity and to keep it intact by the understanding they carry through their political history. This responsibility prevents Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora from generating a trans-national outlook. Furthermore, it seems that 'Europe' has not encouraged them to have such

219 In fact, Nezan seems to represent all that is extraordinary to the Kurds in the European diaspora. As Berruti *et al.* (2002: 56, 89) note, out of 44 interviewees in France, only 10 consider themselves partly Kurdish and partly French, whereas 30 of them consider themselves uniquely Kurdish. 34 of 40 interviewees in Germany consider themselves to have a Kurdish identity, 10 to have a German, and 6 to have a European whereas 7 interviewees, who have either German/double citizenship or unrestricted permission to stay, self-identify as both Kurdish and German (ibid).

a trans-national stance. As Wahlbeck reminds us, 'although the refugees' social reality can largely be understood as de-territorialized and transnational... in many decisive ways the society of settlement influences refugees and the social organization of the refugee communities' (1999: 184). The exclusionary structures such as racism and discrimination can be regarded as more important than the diasporans' own diasporic consciousness (ibid: 188). The exclusionary discourses of the host country prevents diasporic communities from generating a critical outlook to identity and politics, which could be the source of their most important contribution and 'integration' to the society - a trans-national outlook and a transformative resistance. Therefore, one can question the limits of living in Europe for Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora, focusing on the ability to acquire a distinctive approach towards the relationship between language and identity. This question can lead to a discussion of the possibility of a trans-national linguistic resistance.

Language and Identity: Kurdishness for Diaspora

The relationship between language and identity is highly controversial for all Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. Living in a diasporic community and speaking the language of the host countries (and even Turkish) more than Kurdish makes it difficult to determine the role of language in the construction (and reconstruction) of Kurdishness. Although many accept that language is not the only signpost of identity and reject such an easy connection between language and identity, they cannot ignore the role of language in the construction of identity. Haydar Diljen is perhaps the most poignant in explicitly establishing a direct connection between the two:

> 'Everybody knows that language has a strongly direct relationship with identity and that many things will be lost when language is lost because you cannot communicate with the society in which you live if you have lost the language… you do not know traditions, history, culture, music, tales, cuisine; [you do not know] anything of that society… why are you Kurdish then, if you do not know these?'

Less clearly, Kazım Orak argues, 'if one says that this is my language, my culture, my identity and owns them, they belong to her/him … if a person

names her/himself as Kurdish, s/he has to own it'. To own an identity and language, according to him, means to claim or to protect that identity and language; and in doing so, he implicitly establishes a direct connection between language and identity. In short, if one defines her/himself as Kurdish, s/he is expected to speak the language.

Lerzan Jandil seems to disconnect 'inevitably' language and identity: 'language is not simply a tool of communication... language is the expression of personality in the form of words [but] to say "I am Kurdish" is not conditional upon speaking Kurdish'. He seems hesitant to underscore a direct connection between language and identity, but he does emphasise the negative effects of incomplete language individuality on the formation of identity. He is careful, however, not to call this lack a 'deficit' of the Kurdish identity because many Kurdish people in the European diaspora and in Turkey do not or cannot speak Kurdish. This explains why Alan Dilpak argues that the Kurdish children in the European diaspora and in Turkey, who do not speak Kurdish but speak Turkish, can be considered Turkish as much as the Turkish children in Germany who do not speak Turkish can be considered German. Lerzan Jandil explains the situation as follows:

> 'It is not the problem of individual persons that those who say "I am Kurdish" cannot speak Kurdish or those who speak Kurdish but say "I am Turkish" … this is the question of state policy … take the example of Algeria, if an Algerian child speaks French, will s/he say "I am French"? … It should be seen that the demand of people [to speak Kurdish] is not a serious one but the question is not the demand of people … the question stems from the depreciation of a language that has been banned for many years and the internalisation of this depreciation'.

As Fırat Cewerî clarifies, 'it is the official policy that transforms Kurdish into the language of backwardness and ignorance while civilisation, the rules of good manners and education is conducted in Turkish'. Therefore, Kurdish people who abandon speaking Kurdish free themselves from identification with the uncivilised. Moreover, as Haydar Diljen states, 'it is so limited [to speak a language] if you do not earn your bread and butter with that language'. It is the oppressive and degrading state policies towards the Kurdish language that constitute a source of this inevitable disconnection between language and identity, meaning that the disconnection does not stem necessarily from the apathy of those people who call themselves Kurdish to the language. As a result, Cemal Ballıkaya rejects the idea that

one is not Kurdish if s/he does not speak Kurdish, adding immediately, 'if seventy or eighty percent of the people cannot speak the language, this is not the fault of that people. We cannot blame [Kurdish] people for not speaking Kurdish'. In fact, all the interviewees refrain from judging the Kurdish people who do not or cannot speak Kurdish. It is an idea shared by most that this 'paradoxical' relationship between language and identity in the Kurdish case cannot be explained by the indifference of the Kurdish people to their own language.

At the same time, some argue that state policies that oppress or degrade the language may lead to the establishment of an unfortunate connection between language and identity. Adnan Dindar, who emphasises the socio-psychological aspect of this question, explains how language can become one of the factors constituting identity: 'When there is an attack on one's language, s/he accepts this as an attack on her/himself and s/he identifies her/himself with that language'. Therefore, he adds, 'speaking that language provides the sense of self-confidence… if you speak Kurdish, you can substantiate your saying "I am Kurdish"'. The youngest of the interviewees, Cesur Nujen also confirms the emphasis on the socio-psychological aspect of the question:

> 'For me language is very important absolutely… I do not see him [his best friend who is Kurdish but cannot speak Kurdish] as something else, I see him a Kurd, so the identity part is no problem but he does not get the respect … I would never take the part as the Head of the Association [of Kurdish Students and Academics] if I could not speak Kurdish because it would mean a very unserious organisation. In that way it is a status to know your language, especially when it came to Kurdish, you have to know it to get some respect from both our generation but mostly from the older generation'.

However, to the question which language is spoken at the Association, he answers, 'Mostly we speak Swedish but more and more we are speaking Kurdish'. What is more striking is his answer to the subsequent question, if this bilingualism can provide an additional identity, like European in general or Swedish specifically. He rejects strongly such a possibility and states, 'I see them [who call themselves European Kurdish] as they have an identity problem or crisis... I don't see them as European Kurdish I see them as Kurds living in diaspora'. In fact, he reflects on the tension between fragmented, decentred and shifting identities experienced by diaspora groups and their desire for meaning and coherence (see Pavlenko

and Blackledge 2003: 18). In this respect, it is not as striking that Nujen defines himself as 'pure Kurdish' because of the common 'platform' of 'the same ethnicity and language', even though he has 'more connection with Swedish than Kurds here in Sweden'. In fact, it seems that Nujen and his peers move between cultural and social mixing on the one hand and social and cultural closure on the other (see Hewitt 2003: 189). Maraşlı interprets the source of such a socio-psychological move:

> 'Like societies and nations, human beings ever become multilingual, multicultural, even multiethnic … but we know that one of them is the dominant… it is important to continue our way of thinking with the language, within which we were born and grew… objectively, a person could have been made up of different nations but s/he can politically and culturally prefer one of them … s/he would try to emancipate her/himself by emancipating the assimilated part of her/himself … this would have a political connotation'.

The political connotation is an artificial creation according to Nedim Dağdeviren, who argues that identity detached from language is much more political rather than national (cultural). He provides an analysis of the formation of such a political identity:

> 'When one asks about my ethnic identity, I say that I am Kurdish on the ground of my language, culture and identity … however, the Kurdish issue is being politicised… you are being politicised. Identity and politics become so intertwined that … you are also seized by this illusion. When you say I am Kurdish, you say this in an affiliation with anger. Then the Kurdishness is perceived as an element of conflict even by yourself … According to me, those who politically define themselves as Kurdish without emphasising language and national identity define themselves as political beings owing to this political illusion and therefore the emphasis on language and culture decreases... this is an artificial political situation'.

Dağdeviren seems to reject a direct and artificially-established connection between language and (political) identity which is politicised by oppressive or degrading state policies, whereas he gives the impression that he is less suspicious about a possible direct connection between language and national (cultural) identity. He is more critical of the politicisation of the direct connection between language and identity than the direct connection itself. Nevertheless, he underscores the inevitable and politicised aspect of this direct connection by highlighting the illusionary internalisation of this artificiality.

Similar to those who inevitably establish a direct connection between language and identity, there are some Kurdish intellectuals who try to disconnect language and identity or, in other words, who put less emphasis on language as a marker of identity. They emphasise the role of culture, history or solidarity rather than language itself as the bearer of a common identity. In this respect, culture and language are separated from each other. According to Kendal Nezan, 'culture cannot be reduced only to language; you have a way of life … the sense of Kurdishness is stronger among some Kurds who have lost their language … so you can be a Kurd without speaking Kurdish and we have some people who speak fluent Kurdish but they do not have Kurdish national feeling [namely the Kurdish village guards in Turkey]'. In a similar but less clear manner, Kemal Burkay argues that, 'to speak Kurdish is not absolutely necessary in order to say "I am Kurdish" … there is something called national honour that does not necessitate speaking Kurdish fluently'.

Bıraê Bexti struggled for the right to education in Turkish in the Netherlands. He argues that not speaking the language is a deficit, but not something that misidentifies or denies an identity. A different kind of shortage is also noted by Egith Herbest: 'The Kurds are more polite when they speak Kurdish while they more easily lie and become rude when they speak Turkish… people can fake in a language that is imposed on them as they avenge this imposition… your own language keeps you polite and human'. Nevertheless, he strongly agrees that identity is not simply composed of language, but also includes such elements as 'history and essence'. He says, 'I do not index my Kurdishness to speaking Kurdish … I regard those who do so as primordialist in a developing, global world'. Although seemingly contradictory (emphasising essence sounds more primordialist than underlining language), he refers to other elements such as common historical and/or political experiences that shape an identity. Munzur Çem also asserts that it is wrong to claim a direct connection between language and identity:

> 'Even someday the Kurds become free but Kurdish may disappear… If one regards her/himself from Kurdistan and also claims some political demands, s/he is Kurdish even if her/his language is not Kurdish. I do not agree with that the Kurdishness will disappear if the Kurdish language disappears'.

Malmîsanij explains why the loss of language does not necessarily lead to a loss of identity as follows: 'losing identity takes a very long time even if

language is lost. Especially when it [the loss of language] is made by force and oppression, it has a different reflection that leads to putting much more emphasis upon identity'. This statement is congruent with the argument that high levels of structural assimilation into a dominant language can co-exist with lower degrees of identification with a dominant culture (see Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 5). In fact, as Hassan Ghazi emphasises, 'language is not the main factor for identifying yourself as belonging or affiliating to a certain group … people have been assimilated in some way linguistically but as a result of political dynamism they identify themselves as Kurds'. Şermin Bozarslan clarifies the political dynamism Ghazi emphasises when she notes the example of police who do not discriminate against those who do not speak Kurdish while punishing the Kurdish students who demonstrate in the streets. She explains, 'even those who do not speak Kurdish feel themselves Kurdish because they bear all other elements … they know why they are deprived of linguistic rights and they see themselves sharing same sense of destiny'.

According Bıraê Bexti, 'only the people who construct the future together will decide if the current identities will belong to the future or not … national identities belong to the past'. This intentional disconnect of language and identity can be traced clearly in the statements of Cemil Gündoğan, who does not regard language as an essential factor of identity, and in fact, rejects any element of identity as something essential:

> 'Identity is simply an artefact or a construction … identity is something composed of the definition you made for yourself through the needs of time… while selecting the materials [that make identity], needs [of the actor who wants to construct that identity] and conjuncture are the determinants; it means that it [identity] is so variable at the same time'.

In this respect, the most remarkable statement on the connection between language and identity came from Adnan Dindar, who focuses on the German aspect of his identity as well as defining himself as both Kurdish and Turkish:

> 'Yes I am Kurdish, I was born into a Kurdish family, but I am also Turkish. I love the Turkish language as much as I love the Kurdish one; I love the German language too. When I say I am Kurdish, if my Kurdishness excludes my Turkishness, my Germanness, it will impoverish me, it will not define me… I do not want to prefer only one of them; it will be torture'.

He rejects the dilemma between 'them' and 'us' and explains, 'I am nourished by both oriental and occidental cultures, literatures and religions'. He emphasises the virtue of being supra-religious and supra-cultural, noting that 'it is not something "to be" but "to become"'. With this statement, Dindar places himself at the opposite end of the spectrum to those who explicitly establish a direct connection between language and identity.

In the middle of the spectrum are those who swing between implicitly establishing a direct connection between language and identity and attempting to disconnect the two. By separating language and identity, they emphasise other elements of identity such as culture, solidarity, history, destiny, political experiences or demands, and even national honour. While in some ways this "middle ground" approach opens an interstice between language and identity, it is a restricted one when it comes to question how identity is constructed, by what or whom. Nevertheless, this approach shows that the discussion on the connection between language and identity may be a misleading one whereas the correct one may be on the connection between language and *identities*. Although those who speak Kurdish are seen as examples of a healthier construction of cultural identity, the common view is that language is not necessarily the milestone of cultural identity, and more importantly, that language should not be a marker of political identity. The second argument is only rejected by those who have a 'political' stance, which is constrained by the nationalist discourse that views those who speak the language as the real owners of the Kurdish political identity.

What this discussion shows more significantly is that it is increasingly difficult to regard language as an unproblematic marker of identity. The diverse conceptions of Kurdish identity as political, national, cultural or ethnic collapse with the various definitions of the relationship between language and different identities, and the question becomes a puzzle. The Kurdish cultural identity in Europe has fewer ties with the Kurdish language because Kurdish people in the European diaspora do not have the opportunity to speak Kurdish. Moreover, the multilingual requirements of the new Kurdish generation strengthen the likelihood that a Kurdish cultural identity will need new factors upon which to construct itself. On the other hand, a cultural identity without a linguistic code can more easily become a less flexible and critical political tool. For this reason, both the linguistic competence of those who claim the respective cultural identity and the instruments needed to construct a hybrid identity should be en-

sured. Hybridity does not and cannot mean owning more than one identity in equal terms, but rather it must refer to trans-national thinking, which conceives the national identity as constructed. This kind of 'anti-hybridity' that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora have is rooted in their history of resistance against the assimilation process to which they are subjected in Turkey. They discount hybrid linguistic and cultural forms as threatening to the integrity of their language and identity. The limit of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora to acquire such a kind of hybridity prevents the emergence of a trans-national outlook among them. Understanding the limits and opportunities of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe will help to diversify their approaches. This diversification is done through the categorisation of approaches that are traced from the interviews conducted with Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora.

'Kurdish' Approaches in the European Diaspora

The 'Kurdish' approaches of the European diaspora are not the only possible reading of the answers of the interviewees, but rather the author has interpreted them within the theoretical framework of this study. In light of the answers, the approaches of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora are categorised within the following sub-categories: the nationalist approach, the cultural approach and the trans-national approach. The approaches place the answers of the interviewees into a relevant wider context. The names of the interviewees are not listed strictly under the particular categories because the aim is to reveal the main approaches of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora rather than to note who represents which approach. The first two approaches are more clearly and easily communicated from the answers, while only the embryo of the third category can be shown in some statements of the interviewees. The first two are more traditionally established than the third one, which seems to emerge in recent times. However, the aim of this study is not limited to illustrate the classical and well-defined approaches, but also to give place to the less-structured views in order to reflect the diversity of standpoints. Moreover, the study aims to analyse critically the prevailing discourses in order to enrich the discussion with contemporary ideas.

Nationalist Approach

The most important characteristic of the Kurdish nationalist approach in the European diaspora is its emphasis on the status planning for the Kurdish language as an instrument to serve national unity. As Fishman notes, 'nationalist language planning aims not at esthetics or euphonics … per se but at a definite cluster of overt, behavioral goals. Its image of language is an overt behavioral one as well' (1972: 66). The nationalist account also regards linguistic unity as superior to diversity because 'internal diversity of usage is not only inefficient and potentially dangerous (for it fosters and protects behavioural and ideological disunity more generally), but it also invites invidious comparisons with more favored and better established rivals' (ibid: 69). In this respect, the nationalist approach relates the protection and development of a language to the standardisation and the dissemination of the strongest, most advanced and widespread, or the ancient dialect of that language. This dialect in the case of Kurds is Kurmanji, which is challenged by the Zazaki linguistic movement. The nationalist approach in the European diaspora regards the current linguistic differentiation among the Kurdish community as unfortunate. In order to cope with this untoward differentiation, nationalists stand for a unification to be conducted through a linguistic policy that is formulated by 'national' academic institutions and consolidated by a political authority. Therefore, the nationalist approach assigns the most important role in the survival and vitality of the Kurdish language to the nationalisation process. Acquiring official status is the crowning of this linguistic and political endeavour.

Linguistic rights have highly political connotations as nationalist minority elites struggle to regain the independence and authority they have lost in the fight for the official status of their language. In fact, linguistic rights are seen as part of political and not exclusively cultural rights. Since the nationalist approach rejects naming the Kurdish community a minority, it usually considers the linguistic rights of minorities insufficient to solve the question of Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey. Nationalists argue that only an independent state or a federal administration can guarantee the full implementation of linguistic rights. When linguistic rights are not seen as political rights, restrictive state policies are accused of politicising the linguistic rights. As a result, while linguistic rights may originally

correspond to cultural rights, the ban on language makes the support for linguistic rights a political act. Therefore, such a politicised question needs a political solution.

The nationalist approach is related to a modernist conception of politics, which considers the nation-state a necessary force in the history of an 'ethnic' community. Therefore, the nationalist approach looks to the examples of nation-state projects that promote linguistic unity. It is this nation-state oriented outlook that prevents the nationalist approach from generating transformative resistance and emancipatory politics. This incapability is embodied in the Zazaki movement, which illustrates the vicious circle of nationalism that leads minorities to create its own 'others'. Since linguistic unity is seen as a prerequisite for the integration of the Kurdish people, a single Kurdish language also corresponds to a single Kurdish identity.

According to the nationalist approach, if language is lost then the national identity will also disappear. If language is regarded as the most significant marker of national identity, those who say 'I am Kurdish' are expected to speak Kurdish too. Similar to the 'de-colonising discourse' in the Northern Ireland, the nationalist approach connects a person's nationalist political development with her/his interest in the language. In this sense, speaking Kurdish is seen as a political act and a weapon in the struggle to achieve independence. Therefore, a trans-national conception of identity is not engendered by the nationalist approach.

Within this paradigm, Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora who take the nationalist approach do not put forth a distinctive plan to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey. They do not differentiate themselves from those in Turkey who regard the question as a national one that cannot be solved by the EU membership of Turkey. They refer frequently to the interventions of the state that restrict the linguistic rights of Kurdish children in Europe. Indeed, Rohat (1992: 97-8, 118-9) submits several examples about the negligent attitude of the German governments towards the linguistic demands of the Kurdish community due to the implicit agreements between the states of Germany and Turkey (see also Malmîsanij 2007: 14-5; Zanders 1989: 91)[220]. Having such experiences, those Kurdish intellectuals with nationalistic traits are not concerned about seeking a

220 Emanuelsson (2005: 92, 94) notes that not all German governorates provide the service of mother tongue education to the Kurds because the Kurds are not officially recognised as a group. For completely different reasons, the same holds true in Britain,

trans-national outlook and transformative resistance that does not focus on power politics. However, as Alinia (2007: 269) argues, Marxist and leftist nationalists are more consistent than right-wing nationalists in criticising the discrimination of minorities or migrants in Europe because the latter lacks an ideological shelter to resist such xenophobia. Therefore, particularly right-wing nationalists cannot envisage a solution other than an independent Kurdish nation-state or a Kurdish federal administration.

Cultural Approach

The Kurdish cultural approach in the European diaspora draws attention to threat to the survival of the Kurdish language. The Kurdish language here includes all dialects of Kurdish, which are considered equally important to protect. Since this standpoint argues that it is a matter of political definition whether the variants of Kurdish are languages or dialects, it is of no interest to make a clear-cut separation between language and dialect. Therefore, it argues that all dialects should be equally entitled to linguistic rights, particularly the right to education. In this respect, the cultural approach does not favour such a standardisation policy that assimilates all varieties into the strongest dialect of the Kurdish language. Significantly, this approach highlights the anti-democratic nature of such an assimilative linguistic policy. To the contrary, the cultural approach supports the widest freedom possible for all speakers to use their own language or dialect, and supports the protection of differences between those varieties. Those differences promote the richness of language and culture, and protecting such a wealth is something ethical and not simply political.

This resembles what Fishman describes as the prenationalist view, which 'is primarily related to dimensions such as beauty, parsimony, efficiency, feasibility, rather than to an ethnically authentic approach to any or all of the foregoing' (1972: 73). In fact, the cultural approach is not against the idea of rapprochement among dialects because the latter is seen as necessary for the survival of Kurdish language/dialects in the long-term. However, the cultural approach emphasises the 'natural' and non-obligatory character of such a rapprochement process based on a higher level of communication. In this respect, cultural institutions that would provide

France, Italy and the U.S. whereas Sweden offers education of Kurdish language at schools (Emanuelsson ibid; Berruti 2002).

this opportunity to the Kurdish people are particularly highlighted. More significantly, the cultural approach gives emphasis to the importance of academic institutions to promote on linguistic matters, and the importance of mass media in disseminating such works to the people. This approach seems to have the potential for generating transformative resistance in terms of its lack of interest in 'power over'.

The cultural approach, which regards culture and language as a cultural wealth free from political connotations, argues that linguistic rights should not simply or necessarily be connected to political rights. Accordingly, the struggle for linguistic rights should be detached from the struggle for national independence. Culturalists contend that protecting a language means protecting a disappearing culture. This explains why the work of academic institutions on the Kurdish language (but not the Kurdish nation-state) is regarded as crucial for the survival of Kurdish. With regard to the vitality of language, the cultural approach pinpoints the importance of the efforts of the Kurdish people to protect and develop their own language, as well as the importance of the role of Kurdish intellectuals in encouraging the Kurdish people in this endeavour.

Furthermore, culturalism aims to restore the dignity and efficiency of language rather than using language as an instrument in the service of political aims. Therefore, the cultural approach criticises more clearly Kurdish political movements, especially the PKK that places less emphasis on the protection and development of Kurdish. The state policies that do not give credit to Kurdish intellectuals are also criticised by the cultural approach. The improvement of democracy and civil society in Turkey is highlighted as a prerequisite for both the full implementation of linguistic rights and the solution to the Kurdish issue. Therefore, the cultural approach finds a democratic administration sufficient for the full enjoyment of linguistic rights, rather than regarding the Kurdish state or federal administration as a prerequisite. However, the allergic reaction to politics of the cultural approach has prevented it from engendering transformative resistance, which challenges the current limits of the political.

Followers of the cultural approach are not interested in a Kurdish national identity constructed on the Kurdish language, whereas they are satisfied with Kurdish linguistic studies that contribute to the protection of Kurdish culture. In this respect, the cultural approach does not favour a strong and direct connection between language and identity. Language is not seen as the single marker of the Kurdish identity. The cultural ap-

proach tends to differentiate between politically-defined national identity and culturally-defined (allegedly-apolitical) national identity. Within this differentiation the latter shares a sense of a collective common culture more than simply a language, while the former is separated clearly from language. Many examples of those who have a strong feeling of Kurdishness but cannot speak Kurdish due to the assimilation into or adoption of the dominant languages are frequently mentioned.

The conception of national identity that overemphasises language is seen as a political act that actually diminishes the role of language in the formation of cultural identity. Like the cultural discourse in Northern Ireland, (which asserts that Irish language and politics should be kept separate, and regards speaking Irish as an expression of a cultural identity in contrast to its nationalist or political connotations), the importance of Kurdish lies in its beauty and cultural worth. Speaking Kurdish is seen as merely an expression of a distinct cultural identity, according to the cultural approach. This apolitical stance towards the connection between language and identity prevents the cultural approach from engendering a critical attitude that may generate a trans-national outlook. Nonetheless, the cultural approach maps the terrain of such trans-nationality.

In this respect, Kurdish intellectuals who follow the cultural approach define their roles in Europe as introducing the Kurdish language and culture to the Europeans and gaining support for their struggle to protect Kurdish language and culture. They see their work on the Kurdish language and culture in Europe as something substantiating the arguments of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey. As Houston (2005: 117) notes, Kurdish intellectuals re-interpret the concealment and containment policies of the Turkish state in order to resist such domination. As a reply to the concealment or denial of Kurdish identity, they have defended the historical presence of Kurds by researching and writing the Kurdish history 'in a glorifying manner' (ibid). More importantly, they respond to the containment or humiliation of Kurdishness by reproducing Kurdish culture (e.g. Kurdish narratives and poems in a written form or Kurdish songs set to a modern tune) in a more distinguished mode. These offshoot cultural materials penetrate easily the spaces that are contained by national borders due to the technological developments and cultural curiosity in today's transnational world. Only the cultural approach's fear of the political keeps this creative transnational cultural reproduction from turning into a major force of trans-national resistance.

Trans-national Approach

It is much more difficult to clearly expose a well-defined trans-national approach, which seems to recently emerge among Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. Because of the dominant position of the nationalist and culturalist standpoints, it is also difficult to develop a different approach. Nevertheless, the author attempts to portray the nascent trans-nationality of the Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora by analysing the trans-national expressions gleaned from interviews regarding the main themes of this study. Concerning the status planning for the Kurdish language, the trans-national approach seems not to seek an official status for the Kurdish language, but rather proposes to abolish the official status of the current national language, namely Turkish. This argument becomes more convincing when 'being a "state" variety rather than a "stateless" one can mean very little in the world as it is today' (Edwards 2003: 42). Moreover, 'it would be great mistake to assume that the acquisition of official status by a small language means that a corner has been decisively turned' (ibid). The trans-national approach rejects the idea that national unity can be ensured only through linguistic unity. In fact, it has no concern with either national or linguistic unity. As Fishman notes, 'a major parameter of prenationalist (and postnationalist) evaluation of vernaculars is undoubtedly esthetic' (1972: 63). In this respect, the trans-national approach is similar to the cultural one in that both oppose the instrumentalist conception of language. Both reject the Kurdish nation-state as the sole political authority that guarantees the survival and vitality of language. What differentiates the trans-national approach from the cultural one is the former's focus on a decentralised political structures composed of autonomous administrations to protect and develop the language. This difference reflects the nascent feature of the trans-national approach to generate transformative resistance.

The trans-national approach supports the idea that the struggle for linguistic rights is a political act, but opposes the overly-specific interpretations of politics sandwiched between the established power and the power-seeking dissidents. The trans-national approach occupies a multi-political standpoint that connects linguistic issues to a wider political agenda than the independent nation-state. Emanuelsson also argues that the Kurdish organisations in diaspora

> … went from proposing outright Kurdish independence in the region of origin to legal guarantees for "universal" human rights and democracy within the borders of each "state of origin"… they called for political processes in which practical steps for a political solution of the complex Kurdish issue was proposed as a better alternative to violence and militancy… This included cultural and linguistic rights…(2005: 213).

This Kurdish initiative is similar to the 'rights discourse' in Northern Ireland, which breaks the political/apolitical dichotomy and contests a depoliticised approach to linguistic rights. The emphasis on a multi-politicised rights discourse highlights simple solutions for practical matters that could not be handled without a multidimensional approach. In this sense, it is interesting to note that Kurdish diaspora organisations 'began to differentiate between sub-groups within the Kurdish community in terms of considering specific needs of women, teenagers, children, elderly people and asylum seekers' (ibid: 212-3). Therefore, the question of Kurdish linguistic rights is connected to wider political, cultural and economic restrictions to which the Kurds are subjected. This interconnectedness differentiates the trans-national approach from the cultural one, which tries to de-politicise linguistic rights. The trans-national approach rejects both individualist and communitarian conceptions of linguistic rights for their common ignorance regarding the survival of diversity. In this sense, it is interesting to learn from Emanuelsson (ibid: 213-4) that Kurdish organisations in the European diaspora have 'acted to strike a reasonable balance between individual and group rights on the one hand and between group rights and territorial demands on the other' since the 1990s. The adoption of a kind of 'rights discourse' indicates that the critical aspect of the trans-national approach towards power and resistance may engender a transformative resistance.

In this regard, it is not surprising that the trans-national approach articulates the direct connection between language and identity as something constructed. However, the trans-national approach does not reject the meaning that Kurdish people ascribe to the Kurdish language as an element constructing their cultural identity. Rather, it criticises the homogenising nationalist policies that mislead and restrict the political connotations of this meaning. The trans-national approach is similar to the critical approach in terms of identity formation, which 'highlights the fact that identities are constructed at the interstices of multiple axes, such as age, race, class, ethnicity, gender, generation, sexual orientation, geopolitical locale, institu-

tional affiliation, and social status, whereby each aspect of identity redefines and modifies all others' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 16). The transnational approach acknowledges that identity formation in transnational social spaces is 'more often in a state of "becoming" rather than "arrival"' (Guarnizo and Smith 2006: 21). In such transnational and multilingual settings, 'identity is not always an interesting or relevant concept for investigation of language use' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2003: 19). Although the argument is shared by the trans-national approach that 'identity is contextual but not radically discontinuous' because people, especially those in diaspora seek to have 'an anchor amidst the tempest' (Guarnizo and Smith 2006: 21), the contextual and constructional conception of identity gives way to the emergence of a trans-national outlook that identities a transnational approach. Trans-nationalists are more interested in the European component of their Kurdishness, which creates a more critical role for the solution to the Kurdish question. The acquisition of a European Kurdish identity is a kind of necessity or obligation for those Kurdish intellectuals who wish to transcend the identity dilemma and adopt themselves to the new discourses of trans-nationality[221]. Similarly, Kurdish diaspora organisations 'had entered a process in which they were increasingly encouraged to accept the ideas and realities of multiple non-territorial allegiances of individuals, poly-centred or overlapping territorial loyalties as a basis for political compromises and accommodation at various levels; from the individual to the global' (Emanuelsson 2005: 215).

In fact, Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora place a special emphasis on their experiences of European democracy and pluralism, which have transformed their perceptions of the Kurdish question and the ways to struggle for the solution. They also argue that this transformation in their perceptions could enrich the approach of not only Kurdish but also Turkish intellectuals in Turkey. However, those Kurdish intellectuals are seriously restricted to turn this transformation into a transformative re-

221 Kaya also notes that a similar distinctiveness is found in Euro-Turks, especially in 'the third/fourth generation youngsters [who] have developed a cosmopolitan identity that underlines differences, diversity, and citizenship… Those first generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed a discourse revolving around economic issues; the second generation in the 1980s generated an ideological and political discourse originating from issues related to the homeland; and lastly, the third generation has, since the 1990s, developed a culture–specific discourse stressing intercultural dialogue, symbolic capital, cultural capital, difference, diversity, tolerance, and multiculturalism' (2005).

sistance. Most Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora do not clearly represent a trans-national approach that can nurture a transformative resistance to the current understanding of Kurdish politics. In this respect, it cannot be argued that Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora can be the translators of recently emerging trans-nationality. Although some submit a critical analysis of the perception of Kurdish identity and linguistic rights and formulate a kind of emancipatory politics, most seem delimited by the nationalist and cultural concerns. Emanuelsson similarly argues that although Kurdish diaspora organisations 'certainly entered a process transcending exclusive nationalism in the 1990s, notions such as transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and globalism are perhaps too wide… they did not explicitly consider or advocate processes of hybridisation, even if some of them expressed awareness of trans-cultural process' (ibid: 216).

Kurdish Language as a Site of Struggle

There is great disagreement among Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora on the status planning for the Kurdish language. This disagreement partly stems from the lack of academic and cultural institutions that could further organise studies on the Kurdish language that are inevitably conducted by individual persons or groups in isolation today. The political connotations of those studies also deepen differences among the studies and opinions on the status planning for the Kurdish language. The nationalist approach is clearly pro-standardisation of the Kurdish language on the base of the strongest dialect, Kurmanji, while the cultural approach appreciates the diversity of Kurdish and stands for the protection of each variety of Kurdish language. Moreover, the nationalist approach argues that only an official status can help protect and develop the Kurdish language, while the culturalist approach does not regard the official status as a prerequisite for the survival and vitality of Kurdish. The trans-national approach stands with the cultural approach in that it advocates for the diversity of Kurdish languages, but at the same time rejects the official status of any language.

The nationalist approach regards linguistic rights as political rights (including the right to self-determination) to be embodied in an independent Kurdish state or a federal Kurdish administration. The cultural approach,

on the contrary, views linguistic rights first and foremost as cultural rights and that should not correspond to political rights. Nevertheless, the cultural approach accepts that such 'original' cultural rights are politicised by the antidemocratic linguistic policies of states. While the nationalist approach finds confining individual linguistic rights to the private sphere as insufficient and deceptive, the cultural approach regards such linguistic rights as necessary and helpful to protect language. The trans-national approach overlaps with the nationalist approach in its criticism of linguistic rights that individuals must enjoy in the private sphere. However, it does not propose a sovereign authority such as the state in order to surpass this deception, which would create new ones for 'others'. Rather the trans-national approach argues for a structure of decentralised autonomous communities in which individuals can collectively enjoy linguistic rights in both private and public spheres. In this sense, the trans-national approach has a political agenda that is not limited to state-centred and dominating politics, but rather extended over non-dominant forms of power in multi-political structures.

In terms of the relationship between language and identity, there is an element of ambiguity in the opinions of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. This ambiguity may stem from the fact that Kurdish people in Europe and Turkey are loosing increasingly their capacity to speak Kurdish even while they keep the feeling of Kurdishness. Both the nationalist and cultural approach emphasise that to speak Kurdish is the expression of Kurdish identity. However, the first approach perceives the Kurdish identity as a political one while the second limits the conception of the Kurdish identity to a cultural affiliation. According to the cultural approach, the Kurdish language represents the Kurdish culture rather than the political unity of a Kurdish nation. To the contrary, the nationalist approach connects speaking Kurdish to a political activity, which serves to form a Kurdish nation. In opposition to both approaches, the trans-national account regards identity as constructed, unable to be substantiated by elements such as language.

Only those Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora who bear the trans-national approach have a room for Europeanness in their outlook. For this reason, they are eager to take an active role in the construction of a diasporic transnational sphere. In this respect, it is not surprising that the adherents of nationalist and cultural approaches are more conservative in their transnational mechanisms. Nevertheless, culturalists regard

European cultural life as a space where they can promote their linguistic and cultural works. The nationalist approach also tries to influence the politics of European countries in favour of the Kurdish cause in Turkey. However, the capability of these approaches to generate a trans-national outlook seems highly restricted, whereas the trans-national approach is restricted in scale and effect due to the dominant positions of traditional approaches.

Together with the conclusions of the previous chapter, which puts forth that the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey seem capable of generating a transformative resistance and trans-national outlook, it is safe to argue that a diasporic community does not necessarily constitute the only place where a trans-national approach can emerge or where a transformative resistance can evolve. The question to be answered in the future is if such a trans-national approach and transformative resistance can emerge within the next generations of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora.

CHAPTER NINE

Concluding Remarks

Antigone, the 'first great heroine of civil resistance, almost the leader or inspirator of a resistance movement against tyranny', embodies the quest for justice in antiquity (Weinreb 1987: 21; quoted in Douzinas and Warrington 1994: 27). She disobeyed King Creon's decree prohibiting the burial of her brother, Polynices the 'traitor'. Antigone defends her act before Creon by referring to eternal law, which commands the burial of the dead to enable her/his soul to move from this world to Hades:

> CREON: You, tell me briefly, no long speeches – were you aware a decree had forbidden this?
>
> ANTIGONE : Well aware. How could I avoid it? It was public.
>
> CREON: And still you had the gall to break this law?
>
> ANTIGONE: Of course I did. It wasn't Zeus, not in the least,
> who made this proclamation – not to me.
> Nor did that Justice, dwelling with the gods
> beneath the earth, ordain such laws for men.
> Nor did I think your edict had such force
> that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods,
> the great unwritten, unshakable traditions.
> They are alive, not just today or yesterday:
> they live forever, from the first of time,
> and no one knows when they first saw the light (Sophocles 1984: 81-82).

Antigone insists on the power of belief, love and solidarity over the power of state authority. 'Creon's refusals of god, family ties, love and the dead' are part of a '"politics of forgetting" that every polis must use in order to ban what questions the legitimacy of the institution' (Douzinas and Warrington ibid: 78). Antigone rejects Creon's legitimacy and law in the

name of justice supported by eternal law, which lives in the minds and acts of people.

Antigone was surely not the first deconstructionist in literature, but justice is certainly the leading motive behind deconstruction. A deconstructive move is the one that exposes injustice. Injustice operates on the binary oppositions that are constructed and reconstructed. The 'more equal' parts of these oppositions tend to engender domination whereas the 'less equal' ones resist it. What renders their resistance vain is their limits, or, in other words, the borderlines of binary oppositions. A significant resistance is not the one that only stands against domination, but it is one that which undermines the basis of domination by violating the boundaries of that binary opposition. The deconstruction of binary oppositions brings these boundaries to light and makes them violable. The violation of the boundaries is a violation of limits, to which the 'less equal' is indebted for its existence. Limits produce objects and subjects. To transgress the boundaries of the binary opposition is to transgress the limits of oneself. The power that is necessary for this transgression inhabits everyone; power produces. This display is not simply content with empowering the 'less equal'; it also helps to differentiate power from domination, or, to put another way, it depicts productive power and dominative power. The resistance advanced by the dominative power is in vain whereas the one that moves from the productive power is a transformative resistance. Transformative resistance is motivated by responsibility but not reprisal. Justice is not revenge.

Deconstructive Movement

The idea of justice makes the argument for the linguistic rights of minorities less challenging because it avoids entanglement with linguistic nationalism. The principle of justice enables this study both to criticise the nationalist discourse, which enforces linguistic unity in the name of building a nation, and to question the reactions of linguistic minorities to this nationalist discourse. The criticism of nationalist discourse is embodied in the deconstruction of the binary opposition between the minority and the majority. This deconstruction reverses the hierarchical relation between the minority and the majority by showing that the former is actually the common form of society. It is the power of the nationalist discourse that

constructs the common perception of the minority as inferior, deterioration, complication and evil, in opposition to the majority that is conceived of as superior, the origin, normal and good. This construction is consolidated by the two binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere in the liberal nation-state. The liberal nation-state's attempt to confine the linguistic rights of minorities to individual use and to the private sphere constructs the community and the private sphere as backward and evil parts of the binary oppositions. The liberal nation-state discriminates between individual members of the minority and those of majority in the name of equality between citizens. The members of the majority enjoy their linguistic rights collectively whereas the members of the minority are required to speak their mother tongue individually. In the name of 'impartiality' of the state, members of the minority are requested to speak their mother tongue in the private sphere whereas the language of the majority is the language of the public sphere. In fact, the individual is not superior to the larger community (the nation), nor is the public sphere impartial – that is, national.

The nation is not a bulwark of individual liberty as the liberalists supposed it in the mid 19th century (see Smith 1999: 179). Renan was too optimistic: the existence of nations was not a guarantee of liberty; nor is man a 'reasonable and moral being before allotted to such and such a language, before being a member of such and such a race, an adherent of such and such a culture' (2001: 172). Man has been transformed into a nationalist loyal to a language and culture, if not a race. The conflict between liberalism and nationalism has not been solved by the imposition of 'citizenship ideals upon society' or 'interests (individual or class) within civil society upon the state' (see Breuilly 1999: 165). Citizenship ideals overlap with the ideals of the majority; consequently, the national interest does not reflect the interests of minorities. The liberal nation-state fails to keep its promises that the authoritarian nation-state never gives. This contradiction within the liberal nation-state and its impact on minorities are highlighted through the deconstruction of binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere. Beyond the deconstruction of these binary oppositions, this study discussed the reconceptualisation of the community and the connection of the public and private spheres in order to serve the full implementation of linguistic rights of minorities. The community should not be conceived

of as the poison to individual liberty, nor does the public sphere inevitably exclude the private one; to the contrary, 'the personal is political'.

In light of the foregoing, international and European documents on the linguistic rights of minorities are analysed critically. Minorities are not included in the process of inscription of these documents, nor were they allowed to enjoy the rights introduced by these documents in full due to the reservations and restrictions of the nation-states. This criticism holds truer for 'supra-national' organisation, namely the European Union. With sovereignty transferred to or pooled in the EU, the latter is expected to be more proactive for the linguistic rights of minorities. Although the European Parliament differs from the European Commission in its inclusive approach towards minorities, the latter's state-centred viewpoint remains dominant. This dominant approach prevents the Union from generating a far-reaching and comprehensive linguistic rights policy. Therefore, the Union's motto of 'unity in diversity' leaves out diversity *within* member states, namely the languages of minorities. Nevertheless, minorities with higher demographics or a greater institutional footing can access the multilevel EU politics and benefit from EU funds. Catalans, for example, who identify themselves more easily with Europeanness, could be part of an ever-closer union. The Catalan language is the official language of an advanced minority that is recognised by the Spanish state, which means that the EU indirectly or implicitly reinstates the limits of nation-states. A minority group must be first recognised and institutionalised by its respective nation-state in order to be addressed by the EU's affirmative action. The EU is unable to address minorities directly without the consent of the candidate or member states or unless the minority question threatens the European security and stability. If the collaboration between the Union and minorities undermines the nationalist discourse that delimits both of them, the former must consider the sovereignties it has pooled. It is the Europe of peoples, not the Europe of states, which could keep the linguistic diversity in Europe alive.

It is the Europe of peoples that the Kurdish linguistic community in Turkey wants to be a part of. It is this type of perception of the EU that makes the Kurds supportive of Turkey's EU membership. Kurdish language and identity has been ignored and oppressed by the Republic of Turkey, which viewed the Kurdish 'question' it inherited from the Ottoman Empire as a question of backwardness, banditry and terrorism. The binary opposition between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish majority were

deconstructed by problematising the construction of the former as evil and the latter as good. This deconstruction shows that the Kurdish 'question' is also the question of Turkish nationalist discourse. The policies of centralisation, secularism and homogenisation that the Republic utilised to build a nation-state and to modernise the society marginalised and degraded the Kurdish language and identity. Kurdishness is constructed as representative of pre-modernity and a threat to the ideals of the Republic. The history of the Kurdish 'question' in Turkey is the history of 'Kurdish' resistance against the enforcement of Turkish language and culture as the sole components of 'national' identity. The only community that is present and represented in the public sphere is the Turkish majority. Kurdish political parties and cultural organisations are not allowed to act in 'Turkish' politics. When the armed struggle between the Republic and the PKK lost acceleration during the late 1990s, both Kurdish political movements and the EU became more willing to take the linguistic rights of Kurdish community to the political agenda. The 2000s were the first time when the Kurdish-speaking community was entitled to the right to learn Kurdish through private language courses and to watch and listen to Kurdish TV and radio broadcasts on the TRT. Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey criticise these 'EU reforms' as products of the unilateral and authoritative standpoint of the Republic, which does not take into account the needs of those benefiting from the reforms. The problems in implementing the current reforms and the apathy of the Republic to introduce further reforms concerning the linguistic rights of the Kurdish community has raised criticism against the EU's incapability to address and include the Kurds in the process of Turkey's membership.

In fact, the Kurdish 'question' is frequently embraced by the EU in the Regular Reports of the Commission on Turkey's progress, and as a result the EU has questioned indirectly the competence of the Republic in determining which groups to entitle with linguistic rights. However, this criticism is not satisfactory for the Kurdish community, who does not define itself as a minority in its quest to demand linguistic rights from international and European documents. The Kurdish community refuses to be branded as a minority, a term which is considered a threat to the national unity by the state authority. Moreover, to hold a legal status as a minority reinstates the non-dominant position of the Kurdish community to the Turkish majority. In this sense, the Kurdish linguistic community in Turkey challenges the EU to transcend the binary opposition between

the minority and the majority - and this challenge is a call for the Europe of peoples. The EU conceptualised as the Europe of states will not require the Republic to entitle the Kurds with positive rights whereas the Europe of peoples will not be content with the current regulations against discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination, in fact, has already been incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic. What the Kurds need is a kind of empowerment that would expand their ability to make life choices. This empowerment would also enable them to challenge the limits of the current linguistic reforms in favour of a more far-reaching resistance, which also deconstructs the binary opposition between the minority and the majority.

Transformative Resistance

This far-reaching resistance was called transformative resistance in this study, which took a critical approach to the conception of power in terms of post-structural understanding. This critical analysis of power has enabled this study to differentiate between power and domination, making it possible to conceive of power as something that produces resistance. The most important question is what one can do with any power given to resist domination: will one use this power *over* others or *to* resist reproducing domination? If power is not necessarily in opposition to resistance and may not become domination, then resistance is not necessarily in opposition to domination and may not generate emancipation. This deconstructive attempt to problematise resistance and the post-structural analysis of power provided the conception of transformative resistance. The resistance that fights not only domination but also *reproducing* domination, that is, resistance resisting the translation of *power to* into *power over*, is transformative. Only those minorities which engender such transformative resistance against nationalist discourse and banal domination can lead to an emancipatory politics that would include the members of majorities.

In this respect, transformative resistance is a call for the political that does not seek the reconciliation of interests or identities, but rather argues for an agonistic pluralism. This pluralism mobilises passions towards the promotion of democratic designs rather than relegating them to the private sphere (see Mouffe 1999). Moreover, 'an agonistic account of de-

mocracy suggests the possibility of retrieving the concept of reconciliation from a state-sanctioned project of nation-building for a democratic politics centred on the possibilities of self-determination and solidarity among citizens divided by a history of state violence' (Schaap 2006: 255). The reconciliation has always been a matter of political compromise that is expected from minorities. It would be the state, however, if not the majority, that should take the responsibility for the historical injustices against the minority. 'If people of a nation aim to re-establish morally reliable institutions – institutions that entail intergenerational responsibilities – then they can best demonstrate a collective, long-term commitment to those who have reason to distrust them, by taking responsibility for injustices of their predecessors' (Thompson 2006: 167). If those who have reason to distrust the institutions (namely the state) are the members of the minority, then the people of a nation who must feel responsible for these injustices are the majority. In fact, this is more reconstructing the future than repairing the past. Therefore, this is a call for the future, which should not necessarily be inhabited by the liberal nation-states.

What enable the members of majority and all of us to imagine a different future are, among others, the minorities, colonised people, diasporas, women, transsexuals, if not the working class. This study regards these people as possessing the potential to resist the current political limits in a transformative way, which can lead to more emancipatory politics. The members of linguistic, cultural, 'ethnic', or 'national' minorities and diasporas are seen as the potential actors of transformative resistance and the candidate bearers of a trans-national outlook that is critical of the nationalist discourse. With the opportunity of inhabiting transnational public spaces and enjoying transnational networks, diasporic groups are particularly positioned to acquire such a trans-national outlook and lead the transformative resistance. Focusing on the limits and opportunities of diasporic groups, this study highlighted that the transnational aspect of diasporas does not guarantee the emergence of a trans-national outlook and a transformative resistance among those diasporic groups, who can reproduce nationalist discourse in their host countries.

The study found that the status planning for the Kurdish language generates a resistance through Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora. Some of them see this status planning as a guarantee of the survival and vitality of the Kurdish language. This status planning includes the goal of Kurdish linguistic unity, which is intolerable to the diversity of Kurdish

dialects. This linguistic unity is perceived as inextricable from a national unity that would be ensured through a political structure, namely an independent nation-state or a federative administration. The struggle for linguistic rights, therefore, becomes part of a political struggle, if not it is the political struggle in itself. Some who emphasise the cultural aspect of the language, reject this strong association among the status for the Kurdish language, linguistic rights and the national or political struggle. According to them, linguistic diversity itself provides a wealth of the language that should be protected and developed by cultural and academic works, not necessarily conducted under a political roof. Working to attain linguistic rights is seen as a cultural work for the survival and vitality of the language – an apolitical act. The political resistance led by the nationalist group is not only imitative but also a dominative one whereas the apolitical nature of the resistance led by Kurdish linguistic and cultural workers undermines its potential for being more efficient. Both kinds of resistance are far from being transformative.

Trans-national Outlook

In order to understand the limits that prevent Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora from initiating a transformative resistance, the study focused on the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora towards the notion of Europeanness. Without exception, they highlighted the experiences of democracy and pluralism in Europe as the most important factor that changed their approach towards the Kurdish 'question' in Turkey. Their experiences represent the European aspect of their 'new' outlook and identity in part, although Europeanness or transnationality is not explicitly expressed. The desire of some not to separate themselves from those in Turkey seems to be a reflection of the concern for being 'uncorrupted by Europe'. This concern is a kind of anti-hybridity, rooted in the struggle to protect the Kurdish identity from Turkishness. The analysis of the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in Europe towards the connection between language and identity helps to understand how strong this anti-hybridity is. The common view that speaking Kurdish does not necessarily equate with Kurdishness (or vice versa) cannot become a trans-national outlook, which questions the connection between

language and national, cultural or 'ethnic' identity. The 'loss' of a particular language is compensated for in two different ways: either by more offensive expressions of the Kurdish national, cultural or 'ethnic' identity (the socio-psychological approach) or by the expression of a trans-national identity (the 'disassociation approach'). Most Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora oscillate between reluctantly disconnecting language and national (political) identity, which means implicitly recognising a connection between the two; and a conscious attempt to disconnect language and national (political) or cultural identity in order to substantiate the existence of Kurdish national or cultural identity without the language. Those who intentionally disconnect language and national identity and who regard the Kurdish identity as a construction are exceptional ones who also have a trans-national outlook. Together with the interviewees' answers to other questions, reflections on such a trans-national outlook enabled this study to categorise the approaches of Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora as a trans-national approach.

The trans-national approach has recently emerged in comparison to the nationalist and cultural approaches. The nationalist approach characterises those who tend to turn the power of the status planning for the Kurdish language into a imitative and dominative one; who regard the struggle for linguistic rights as a political and nationalist act; who perceive Europeanness as the bastardisation of the Kurdish identity; and who explicitly or implicitly establishes a direct connection between language and national (political) identity. The cultural approach is characterised by those who regard the status planning for the Kurdish language as a cultural activity; who formulate the struggle for linguistic rights as a cultural effort to preserve the survival and vitality of the language; who are inclined to see the European aspect of Kurdish identity as a democratic and pluralist component; and who try to disconnect language and cultural (apolitical) identity. The trans-national approach, which is not very well established, can be found in some expressions of those who utilise the power of the status planning for the Kurdish language as a source of transformative resistance; who favour the association of linguistic rights discourse with other political (but not national) struggles; who do not hesitate to discuss European Kurdishness; and who intentionally disconnect language and national or cultural identity. The answers of interviewees are sometimes difficult to characterise them under only one of the approaches analysed. Those who have a nationalist approach to one of the questions might take

a cultural approach to another one, or vice versa. Those who seem to have nothing to do with the trans-national approach may highlight a nascence of trans-nationality in one of her/his expressions. Nevertheless, the nationalist and cultural approaches are more clearly definable from the answers of the interviewees, whereas the trans-national approach seems to be far from clarity or maturity. However, it is the Kurdish interviewees in the European diaspora who made possible the inclusion of this approach to the study.

The Kurdish intelligentsia in the European diaspora provides a basis on which the new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey can engender a kind of transformative resistance. The political resistance in Europe serves to relieve the Kurdish language in Turkey from oppression and restriction, whereas the cultural resistance empowered by Kurdish intellectuals in the European diaspora proves that Kurdish is a distinct language with its own literary works. The new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey seem to transcend the political (national) /apolitical (cultural) dichotomy by connecting the resistance of linguistic and cultural works with a wider political agenda, including other languages/dialects and women. This dichotomy is further transgressed by disconnecting political resistance from the nationalist discourse, which fuels the desire for a Kurdish nation-state. When this two-fold act is complemented by civil violations of the borders of binary oppositions between the individual and community and between the public and private sphere, it turns into a kind of transformative resistance. This resistance is not led simply by communitarian arguments that regard individuals as the subjects of revolutionary resistance. Rather, this resistance organises the 'civil reflexes' of the Kurdish community in a transformative fashion. These civil reflexes are articulated in the public sphere in an aesthetic way by which the prevailing understanding of the political and the nationalist discourse are subject to criticism. In this respect, transformative resistance provides a trans-national outlook.

The emphasis that this study places on transformative resistance and trans-national outlook may be seen as superfluous in regards to the restrictive state policies and violence that still dominate the discussion on the Kurdish 'question' in Turkey. However, the aim of this study has been to problematise and de-normalise the dominant discourse of linguistic rights of minorities by deconstructing the binary opposition between the minority and the majority in the liberal nation-state. In this way, the motive of this study is to re-accommodate justice into the political. It is this motive

which allows the study to move beyond questioning the idea of the majority power; the study also criticises minority resistance. This motive is, of course, a theoretical endeavour that reflects a critical approach to the binary opposition between theory and practice. As Adorno reminds us, only those who do not permit themselves 'to be terrorized into action' have the possibility of building resistance because 'the subordination of theory to praxis [easily] results in the support of renewed repression' (2001: 200-2). Horkheimer and Adorno regard 'thought for thought's sake, not for action's sake', as 'true revolutionary practice' (1972: 41).

In light of these remarks and standing with minorities' quest for justice, this study has provided a theoretical approach that can help generate the subjectivity of transformative resistance and trans-nationality. More precisely, this study has argued that the linguistic rights of Kurdish community in Turkey should be discussed with regard to the notion of justice to be constructed in each initiative. Justice should be continuously reconstructed if it cannot survive when it is once constructed and frozen. In this way, the share of Kurdish intellectuals is more significant than the one of the state as the latter cannot be the subjectivity of an eternal quest for justice. This significance is conditional upon the responsibility that Kurdish intellectuals would take to generate a transformative resistance and a transnational outlook.

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