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Modern Military Technology in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Experience of the Nationalist Army during the Chinese Civil War

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Abstract

In an era in which the West is seeking effective strategies in the war against “terrorism”, the use of innovative military technology in counterinsurgency warfare has attracted attention from scholars and policy makers alike. Existing opinion contends that innovation of offensive weaponry, such as artillery, is likely to favour the stronger sides in a conflict.

However, the Nationalist/Guomindang (GMD) experience in the Chinese Civil War (1946-49) proved otherwise. Most of the offensive weapons, such as long-range artillery and tanks, imported from America proved not only ineffective in combat, but also a liability to GMD logistics. Based on newly released civil war documents from PRC and Taiwan, this working paper summarises the preliminary findings of a study on the GMD experience using modern military technology during the Chinese Civil War.
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Introduction

In his work on the politics of violence, social theorist Anthony Giddens emphasizes the importance of new military technology to the modern nation-state. He concludes, “No state that did not possess military forces able to use the new organizational forms and the new weaponry could hope to withstand external attack from those that could muster such forces.” ¹ Giddens’ assumption seems to explain an important component of the Americans’ China policy in the post World War II era. During the Chinese Civil War, the United States attempted to influence the outcome of the war by supporting the GMD regime through provision of firepower. The US was the major supplier of military equipment to the GMD, borne out by the equipping of the elite GMD armies with advanced weaponry at the end of 1945, and by August 1946, the sale of war surplus worth $900 million at bargain price to the GMD government.² By the end of 1947, the US dispatched an Army Advisory Group to China, offering counsel to the GMD military.³

Existing studies contend that innovation of offensive weaponry, such as artillery, is likely to favour the stronger sides in a conflict. Political scientists Emily O. Goldman and Richard B. Andres have argued that large and wealthy states are more likely to utilize their larger resources base and reap benefit from the modern offensive weaponry and use it more effectively on the battlefield to subdue their weaker opponents. On the other hand, smaller and less wealthy countries tend to use defensive weaponry more effectively than the offensive weapons.⁴

In particular, Goldman and Andres use the innovation of modern artillery technology and tactics in modern European history as evidence to support their claim. They contend that the innovation of artillery allowed those biggest and wealthiest states, such as France, to wage war against its weaker and less wealthy adversaries by using artillery to attack the heavily fortified castles, fortresses and cities defended by the enemy forces. On the contrary, Goldman and Andres maintain that the innovation of fortification technology in modern Europe permitted the smaller and weaker states to take advantage of the new technology in defending their cities and castles in siege warfare against their stronger opponents. The use of innovative defensive military

technology by these European states had great impact in the making of modern Europe: the use of fortification technology succeeded in checking the hegemony of the Hasburg Empire and stopping the Ottoman expansion.\(^5\)

Furthermore, Goldman and Andres argue that the adoption of the offensive strategies, tactics and military doctrines was one of the main reasons of the rise of the Mongols. The use of offensive weapons such as artillery and mounted archer; and the use of offensive cavalry tactics and effective equipment for siege warfare, has contributed to the rise of the Mongol Empire. Thus, the use of innovative offensive military technology, such as artillery, seemed very effective for the stronger sides to subjugate their weaker enemies in the history of warfare in Europe and Asia.\(^6\)

However, the GMD experience in the Chinese Civil War proved otherwise. The American weaponry proved to be a handicap to the GMD Army. As General Albert Wedemeyer observed in 1947, the American artillery was, in many cases, a logistic drain to the GMD forces. In combat, the American artillery limited the mobility of the GMD troops “in a fluid situation” and caused the GMD army officers to be overly cautious for fear of having the artillery captured by the enemy.\(^7\) In this sense, the GMD experience in the Chinese Civil War deserves attention.

The latest research on this topic also suggests that different states may react differently faced with the influx of innovative military technology.\(^8\) Thus, more document-based case studies are needed to advance our knowledge on this subject. This working paper studies the GMD experience in its counterinsurgency campaign during the Chinese Civil War by conducting research against the newly released civil war documents from Taiwan and the PRC. The first section of the paper studies the combat effectiveness of the American weapons during the GMD campaign against the armies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Manchuria in 1946. The second section examines the use of armoured warfare in the GMD counterinsurgency campaign in eastern China during the height of the Chinese Civil War in 1947. This paper seeks alternative explanations to the impact of advanced military technology on counterinsurgency strategy.

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\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.


GMD Military Blunders in Manchuria: American Weaponry and the Logistics Capabilities of the Chinese armies

Soon after the end of the World War II in 1945, the CCP and the GMD sent their best troops into Manchuria in a race for territorial recovery. The GMD forces, despite their American weaponry, failed to defeat the CCP in the battle. On the GMD’s military blunders in the initial stage of the Civil War in Manchuria, the performance of the GMD armies in combat has been a neglected topic by current scholarship. This section examines closely the combat records of the GMD 13th Army — the first GMD force to lose an entire regiment against CCP attack in Manchuria — and attempts to find the reasons behind its combat incompetence on the battlefield. Civil War records show that although the 13th enjoyed firepower superiority thanks to substantial artillery provided by the Americans, the technological edge over the enemy failed to boost its offensive capabilities. The experience of the GMD 13th Army in using American artillery confirms the philosophy that “shells do no harm when they are dropped in the wrong place.” During a fierce battle with CCP guerrillas in February 1946, the American long-range artillery pieces of the 13th proved useless as their shells fell far behind the CCP battleline. Without effective artillery support, 1,500 GMD troops were killed in that battle.

Many factors (e.g. poor instruction, bad calibration and defective equipment) could have contributed to the military fiasco, and the CCP strategy naturally affected GMD decision-making. The aim of this case study, however, is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of all these factors against the empirical process of the battle, but rather the technological dimension of the war and lessons to be learnt from the GMD military misfortunes. Most

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12 Jiang Yonghui, “Jinjun dongbei hou de diyi ge jianmie zhan.” (The first annihilation battle since our advance into the northeast), in Yuan Wei, Xueye xiongfeng: liu zai dongbei zhanchang de jijiy (Heroic warriors in the snowy field: the northeast battlefield in our memory). Shenyang: Baishan chubanshe, 1988, p. 74.
countries continue to seek technological advantages over their adversaries, therefore this case study is as relevant today as it was in the 1940s for the GMD. The lesson to be learnt from the GMD military blunder in Manchuria in 1946 is clear: There was a gap between obtaining the advanced military technology and using it effectively on the battlefield.

The GMD officers learnt this lesson from their defeat. On 15 February, only two days after defeating the GMD 13th Army, a superior CCP force ambushed a regiment of the GMD New 22nd Division in the vicinity of Shenyang. The GMD commanders did not dispatch their units armed with heavy weapons for the relief mission. Instead, they sent as reinforcements seven infantry platoons with light weapons. The GMD rescue campaign was exceptionally successful, resulting in the retreat of the CCP besiegers after suffering substantial losses.

The GMD victory was determined by two important factors, neither of which was related to the advanced weapons diffused from America. The first was that the relief column commander of was able to obtain a military map from the Division’s headquarters, not provided by the American military aid, and this map proved extremely valuable. Secondly, the weather benefited the GMD. It was a full moon and a clear sky when the GMD platoons launched their campaign. The moonlight allowed the light-armed GMD troops to avoid the main road and advanced along small paths, and with the help of the map, they were able to sneak behind the CCP forces and defeat them in a surprise attack.13

The GMD operational success was achieved through excellent manoeuvrability of its light-armed infantry units, not through the firepower provided by the American artillery. The combat situation on the battlefield created a tactical dilemma for the GMD officers: The increased troop speed gained from using light arms would enable their troops to outmanoeuvre the CCP guerrillas, but by doing this, their forces would lose their technological superiority over the enemy.14

The reality was that a considerable number of American weapons (e.g. the US truck-drawn 105mm howitzers) and military equipment needed to be transported by vehicles but the GMD motorized logistics units were disappointing. Firstly, a large number of the GMD’s American vehicles still were at depots in the rear, waiting to be repaired. Secondly, the vehicles

14 Li Daren, Dongbei kanruan huiyi. Taipei: Boxue chubanshe, 1979, p. 111.
frequently broke down in the muddy road conditions in Manchuria.15 Thirdly, the motorized logistics teams travelling on the main roads were easy targets for CCP army ambushes. The GMD experience in Manchuria demonstrates that in a combat situation against CCP guerrilla forces, it was military suicide to advance a truck convoy before the army’s flank and rear were totally secured.16 The efficiency of modern transportation did not match logistics effectiveness for the GMD armies.

On the other hand, the GMD non-motorized logistics teams were also stretched to the limit in the face of increasing American military equipment. The reduction in the number of servicemen in some GMD army units was severe after World War II. In the case of the New First Army, it retained only one-third of its total authorized strength when it arrived in Manchuria in 1946.17 According to a CCP intelligence report, the New First Army did not reach full strength until the second half of 1947, after replenishing 5,686 rookies.18

The logistics nightmare for the GMD in Manchuria in 1946 was that its foot soldiers were forced to transport recently issued American arctic clothing on the march in mild weather. With no adequate transportation for them, the GMD army officers hired carrying coolies, commandeered pack animals, and conscripted mule carts. The overloaded baggage not only slowed the marching column, but also compromised its security.19 This explains why the American military equipment was a problem for the GMD logistics.

In reality, the GMD logistics in Manchuria relied only on pack animals. However, most of their military animals had been left in southern China. Civil war records show that the Nationalist government did not have modern

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16 Liaoshen zhan yi qingliji: yuan guomindang jiangling de huiyi, p. 578.
transport capacity and had to rely on the US. The US ships transported GMD troops to Qinhuangdao, the nearest port to Manchuria in China proper, but apparently the US shipping services did not include the livestock of the armies.\footnote{The logistical assistance for the Nationalist government was only the fourth priority of the US Army Department. See “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)” (20 September 1945), in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Far East, China, 1945-46. Vol. 7. Washington: Department of State Publication, 1969, pp. 566-567; Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993, p. 93.} According to the field diaries of an elite GMD division, which was engaged in combat mission in Manchuria in 1946, a staggering 62 per cent of the division’s logistics capabilities was lost.\footnote{Guojun dang’an (Nationalist Army Archives), “Lujun xinbian shi zhenzhong riji (Xin sanshiba shi)” (Field diaries of the New Organized Army Division [The New 38th Army]). 540.4/421.5, 1946-47. Taipei: Guofangbu shizhengju.} According to an American source, the GMD troops in Manchuria in 1946 managed to advance at an average speed of only 27-32 kilometres per day and the chance to defeat the CCP guerrillas virtually did not exist.\footnote{Gao Yale “Zhanche diyi tuan yange shi jiyao” (A summary of the history of development of the First Tank Regiment). In Lujun zhanche diyi tuan nianjian (Yearbook of the First Tank Regiment, the National Army). N. p., 1947, pp. 31-39.} The GMD failure in counterinsurgency warfare in Manchuria in 1946 vividly demonstrates logistics problems created by the advanced offensive weapons could undermine the strategic setting of a military campaign.

**GMD Armoured Warfare: The Myth of Blitzkrieg and Chinese Realities**

At the onset of the Chinese Civil War, the GMD Army had only three tank battalions in combat condition.\footnote{The New York Times, 22 and 24 May 1946.} Although these tank units were not the dominating forces within the GMD Army, they were considered as the most lethal strike force in its counterinsurgency campaign against the CCP. Given the importance of these tanks to the GMD, the impact of having them captured by the CCP would be unimaginable, strategically and politically. Nevertheless, the GMD leaders decided to send 45 American M3A3 Stuart tanks to fight the CCP.\footnote{Ouyang Chongyi, “Lunan Yi-Zhao zhanyi zhong de diyi kuaisu zhongdu,” (The First Mobile Column at the Yi-Zhao campaign in southern Shandong), in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi (2002), p. 477.} The decision was made in the belief the firepower and speed of modern tanks could destroy the poorly armed CCP forces without taking into account the importance of allowing their armies time to adapt to the armoured warfare tactics before these weapons were used on the battlefield.
In 1946, these tanks and two mechanized infantry and an artillery regiments formed the elite of the GMD Army — the First Mobile Column. In early October, the column was deployed as an attachment to the 26th Division and engaged in a large-scale offensive against CCP forces in southern Shandong with the strategic goal of severing the communication between the CCP areas. At the beginning of the campaign, the GMD mechanized units advanced at a fast pace. The CCP main forces, utilizing the great tactical mobility of their light infantry, chose to disengage and left the GMD troops with no target to attack for two months. As a result, the GMD mechanized forces and their offensive weapons were completely neutralized by the CCP tactics.

Contemporary no-target principle and dispersion deployment models proposed by non-offensive defence (NOD) strategists are similar to the tactics used by the CCP forces. This was because many NOD advocates, particularly those of the 1980s, have been inspired by the strategies and tactics proposed by the great guerrilla captains such as Thomas Edward Lawrence, Mao Zedong, Josip Broz Tito, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto Che Guevarra. In fact, many strategies and tactics adopted by the NOD proponents are very similar to those used in guerrilla warfare.

Firstly, both guerrilla and NOD strategists support the use of “asymmetrical strategies” through which countering the enemy’s armed forces by different means (e.g. the use of anti-tank weapons against enemy’s tanks and countering enemy air attacks via air defence guns and missiles). Secondly, both NOD and guerrilla strategists seek to avoid decisive battles by widely distributing forces across a vast territory. In combat, both seek to use attrition as a strategy in a protracted war. Finally, both emphasize the significance of the tactical manoeuvrability of the armed force while the strategic mobility of the army is relegated to secondary importance.

Nevertheless, the main purpose of modern NOD is to enhance survivability and make your enemy’s pre-emptive attack less rewarding by placing your armed forces in small units over an extended area. The sole rationale of NOD is enhancing defence efficacy by adopting the strategy of dispersion. This strategy is to spread important military facilities such as “airfields, missile sites and troop assembly points” over an extended area. By

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28 Ibid.
presenting fewer concentrated targets to the enemy forces, the purpose of NOD is to remove the enemy’s incentive for pre-emptive strikes.\textsuperscript{29} As events unfolded, CCP forces proved that they could achieve well beyond the expectations of modern NOD proponents.

The first major difference between the CCP strategy and current NOD concepts was that the former was able to break the speed of the modern armoured vehicles and force the enemy commanders to make flawed decisions. As the enemy was nowhere to be seen, the GMD commanders decided to halt the advance of their mechanized force and placed their tanks and artillery at the centre of a heavily fortified position.\textsuperscript{30} The decision reduced the mechanized force to no more than a stationary fortress, defeating entirely the purpose of using the mechanized units as a mobile attacking force.

The second distinction between the CCP command decision and current NOD strategies was that in launching a counteroffensive, the CCP armies were able to shift deployment of their forces from dispersion to concentration in a very short period of time whereas the latter gives the enemy greater warning.\textsuperscript{31} In this case, the CCP commander was able to amass 70,000 troops in a fortnight and launched a surprise attack against the GMD mechanized forces after attaining numerical superiority.\textsuperscript{32} The GMD stationary tanks and artillery were trapped by their own blockade and became sitting targets for the CCP troops.\textsuperscript{33} The GMD suffered a catastrophic defeat losing its American armed division and the mechanized column of 30,000 men.\textsuperscript{34}

Remnants of the defeated GMD troops and their tanks retreated to the rural town of Yi in southern Shandong and made use of its ancient city walls to fortify their positions. The desire to use tanks as defensive weapons induced the GMD commanders to make another mistake: they put the tanks on top of

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. 114; pp. 242-45; p. 251.
\textsuperscript{32} Detwiler and Burdick (1980), p. 87.
\textsuperscript{33} Ouyang Chongyi (2002), pp. 480-82; Cai Shiqing, “Yinian lai zhi kanluan zhanduo” (The war of rebellion suppression in last year), in \textit{Lujun zhanche diyi tuan nianjian}, 1947, pp. 40-44.
the gate towers of the city wall via the road attached to the rampart. Although this ensured the tanks were deployed at secure vantage points, it reduced them to mounted batteries similar to those on city towers in the Imperial Age. When the CCP forces launched an assault, the GMD’s stationary tanks lacked combat effectiveness and fell into enemy hands.

The GMD operational failure confirms the assumption that weapons carried by troops were more useful than large, complex offensive weapons, in terms of defence efficiency. Perhaps because of this, Chiang Kaishek changed his perception of armoured warfare in the wake of the defeat. In a speech, Chiang told his tank battalion officers that the function of modern tanks was nothing more than “offering protection to vehicles transporting troops”. Chiang also showed his distrust of modern artillery. In late 1947, he instructed one of his field commanders to shift “all the heavy weapons” to the rear. In his directive, Chiang condemned the use of large and complex weapons as “extremely harmful” and “contradictory” to the “tactical principles of the war of bandit suppression at the present stage”.

Concluding Remarks

“Weapons don’t make war.” A nation should adopt weapons acquisition programs with clear policy and strategy guidance. However, the GMD experience in the Chinese Civil War has demonstrated that realities in a war often are not the way we expected. The GMD leaders, with a mentality similar to Hilaire Belloc’s Captain Blood, “whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not”, were eager to use their imported American

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weapons before their armies fully adapted to the innovations. In the end, the modern weapons, particularly the offensive weapons, overloaded the logistics capabilities of their armies and constrained GMD strategy formulation. The GMD case shows not only that the speed and firepower of modern offensive weapons could be neutralized by adversaries’ guerrilla tactics, but also warns against the unrealistic expectation that firepower can compensate for bad strategy.\textsuperscript{42}

Nevertheless, this study bolsters the contention that a weapons system designed specifically to fight a particular enemy will not be an automatic benefit in the hands of a different army in a different war.\textsuperscript{43} The reality was that China’s poor interior infrastructure and antiquated military thinking simply did not support the use of large and complex weapon systems.\textsuperscript{44}

At the present, China relies heavily on imported modern weapons and technical support to achieve its strategic goal. A report on PRC military power to the United States Congress in 2004, titled “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power”, shows that the former Soviet Union states (FSU), such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are China’s chief sources of weaponry and military materiel. According the report, “arms agreement between China and FSU governments since 1991 total $20 billion, with actual deliveries to date estimated at $12 billion.”\textsuperscript{45} The report shows that China is particularly interested in importing the most advanced weaponry, such as the state-of-the-art aerospace weapons from the FSU. The report stated, “In 2003, China’s primary focus was aerospace buildup, spending more than $1 billion dollars on 24 Russian advanced fighter aircraft alone.”\textsuperscript{46}

However, the same report also reveals that PRC is currently facing challenges in incorporating the newly acquired weaponry into the military.\textsuperscript{47} Most recently, Beijing released its National Defence White Paper 2006. Not surprisingly, the White Paper states that the acquisition of high-tech military technology is one of the top priorities in PRC’s national defence policies. In particular, in Section VIII of the White Paper, titled “Science, Technology

\textsuperscript{42} Raymond F. Hain (1999), p. 18.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, p. 34.
and Industry for National Defense”, China announces its intention to speed up the upgrading of the high-tech weaponry and equipment of its military. As this study has shown, getting the modern weapons systems is one thing and using them to do the job effectively is quite another. How the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deals with the difficulties in integrating modern weapons into its forces will continue to attract the attention of Western observers and policy makers.

Nevertheless, this study has shown the PLA’s demonstrated ability to shift its forces’ deployment from defensive to offensive very quickly. Although China’s National Defence White Paper 2006 declares that PRC “pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in nature”, it also pronounces that the PLA is currently “reinforcing national defense mobilization and reserve force building to enhance its capabilities of rapid mobilization, sustained support, comprehensive protection”. More importantly, the White Paper enunciates the PLA’s commitment to enhance the “swift shift from a peacetime to wartime footing” of its forces.

Recently, American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has repeatedly expressed her concern about Beijing’s multibillion-dollar military spending. Given the emerging US-PRC global rivalries, Dr. Rice’s concern is merited in a grand strategic sense. However, in the advent of future war, the real concern for the US military is the question of how rapidly the PLA can mobilize its forces, “comprising mostly 1960s technology” and the newly imported weaponry.

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