Contact Space: Shanghai

The Chinese Dream and the Production of a New Society

Vaide, Johan

2015

Contact Space: Shanghai

The Chinese Dream and the Production of a New Society

Johan Vaide

LUND
UNIVERSITY

Typeset: Johan Vaide

Cover design and picture editing: Sharif Shawky

Cover photo: Waibaidu Bridge, David Leo Veksler (flickr.com)

Faculty of Social Sciences and Department of Sociology
ISBN 978-91-7623-231-6 (print), 978-91-7623-232-3 (pdf)

Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University
Lund 2015

To my grandparents who blessed me with the greatest parents

Contents

Acknowledgements

This doctoral thesis was made possible by my PhD student position at the Department of Sociology, Lund University, between 2004 and 2009, and generous grants from *Crafoordska stiftelsen* (*The Crafoord Foundation*) and *Smålands Nation* in Lund. Without engaged conversations with my interviewees in Shanghai, this study would not have been possible. The final version of this study would not have been possible without my proofreader, Janette Rawlings. Thank you!

During the years I have worked on this study (2004-2015), I have had the great opportunity to stay and work in different places (Västerås, Malmö, Lund, Shanghai and Hong Kong) and meet different people, all of whom have contributed to this study in many ways. I am truly grateful for my supervisors, Professor Diana Mulinari and Professor Johanna Esseveld, who have accompanied me resolutely for more than ten years. They have supported me through their engaged and critical comments on my work. Diana and Joke have also 'been there' during difficult times. I also want to show my gratitude to the participants at my final seminar. Particularly, I am genuinely grateful for the comments by Professor Mats Franzén, Professor Katarina Sjöberg and Professor Marina Svensson in the examining committee, which at that time also consisted of Professor Irene Molina and Professor Tomas Wikström. Thank you all! I am also thankful for the warm institutional support of Gunnar Andersson, Britt-Marie Andersson, Christofer Edling, Magnus Karlsson, Anna-Lisa Lindén and Marie Persson. I am glad that Lisa Eklund has contributed with engaged discussions about contemporary China at the department. David Wästerfors has given me thoughtful comments on a previous version of the chapter on methodology and methods. Several other former colleagues have contributed to my years at the department. Special thanks to Christer Albertén, Terese Anving, Mimmi Barmark, Daniel

Bjerstedt, Simon Ceder, Göran Dahl, Göran Djurfeldt, Sara Eldén, Anna Engstam, Henriette Frees Esholdt, Malin Espersson, Klas Gustavsson, Kristina Göransson, Anna Hedlund, Carl-Göran Heidegren, Antoinette Hetzler, Bo Isenberg, Marta Kolankiewicz, Anna Kovasna, Eva Kärfve, Helena Ledje, Susanne Linné, Anders Lundberg, Henrik Lundberg, Åsa Lundqvist, Agneta Mallén, Daniel Melén, Maria Nilsen, Mina O'Dowd, Rose-Marie Olsson, Anders Persson, Marcus Persson, Susanna Persson, Anders Ramsay, Magnus Ring, Jonas Ringström, Johan Sandberg, Ann-Mari Sellerberg, Daniel Sjödin, Martin Sunnerdahl, Jakob Svensson, Lena Swärd, Jill Sörensen, Magnus Wennerhag, Hanna Wittrock, Chia-Ling Yang, Charlotta Zettervall and Malin Åkerström. Within other departments at Lund University, I am most grateful for having met Ulrika Andersson, Linda Fagerström, Sara Goodman, Lena Karlsson, Mia Näslund, Helle Rydström, Jens Rydström and Kerstin Sandell. I am also thankful for the support given by Annika Hultgren, Linda Nordin and Hans Wirje.

For several years, Jan-Olof Nilsson and Kjell Nilsson have been my 'China mentors' and academic gatekeepers to Shanghai. They have provided me with important contacts at Fudan University owing to Lund University's extensive international exchanges. I am especially grateful for engaged conversations with Professor Yu Hai and Professor Faith Fan Lizhu at the Department of Sociology. At the Nordic Centre, I had the privilege to meet Maria Henoch, who was the programme manager at the Centre for several years. Maria introduced me to Li Qing at the School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University. Thanks to Maria, I also met Ulrika K Engström. Maria and Ulrika have also been my 'China mentors'. Teemu Naarajärvi, who also was the programme manager for some years, assisted me and Gun Lauritzon in 2011 when we had the privilege to instruct Nordic students at the summer course on modern China. I am grateful for Gun's stories about pre-reform China and her incredible warmth. I am also thankful to have met Hoai Anh Tran in Shanghai. Cecilia Cassinger, Annelie Håkansson, Karin Lindgren Jeppsson, Henrik Loodin and Magnus Danerek contributed to a meaningful and pleasant time in Shanghai and Malmö. Similarly, my cousin Kajsa Rydehed has delighted me with her presence in

Shanghai. Cecilia also commented on a previous version of this study. Shen Lei has been my private Chinese language teacher in Malmö.

For several semesters, I had the great opportunity to teach Urban Studies at Malmö University. Special thanks go to Carina Listerborn, Jesper Magnusson and Magnus Johansson. Thanks also for providing me with brilliant students! Lina Olsson has given me thoughtful comments on a previous version of this study. Lina, thanks for sharing a devoted interest in Lefebvre's spatial theory.

At the Department of Strategic Communication, Campus Helsingborg, Lund University, I recovered my strength and confidence thanks to Åsa Thelander, Charlotte Simonsson, Mats Heide, Jörgen Eksell and Sara von Platen. At the department, I also had the pleasure to meet Susanne Andersson, Asta Cepaite, Lotte Eidskrem, Jesper Falkheimer, Tamara Landia, Susanna Magnusson, Henrik Merkelsen, Veselinka Möllerström, Camilla Nothhaft, Howard Nothhaft, Lena Rolén, Maria Rosén, Jacob Stenberg and Marja Åkerström. At Campus Helsingborg, I also had the privilege to work with Johan Alvehus, Ulrika Paradis and Carina Sjöholm.

At the School of Health, Care and Social Welfare, Mälardalen University, I am pleased to share my daily life with Helena Blomberg, Hans Ekholm, Magnus Elfström, Annica Engström, Lena Hallström, Elisabeth Jansson, Tomas Kumlin, Kitty Lassinantii, Jonas Lindblom, Mohammadrafi Mahmoodian, Eduardo Medina, Ildikó Asztalos Morell, Anne-Sofie Nyström, David Redmalm, Jonas Stier, Emmie Wahlström, Ulrika Wernesjö and many others. Thanks for all your support! I am also thankful for the comments that I received on a previous version of the introduction to this study at the advanced seminar in sociology.

I have presented my PhD project at several seminars. I am especially grateful for comments given by Catrine Andersson and Helen Ekstam at a seminar at the Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University. Special thanks to commentators at a Gender and Built Environment seminar and an Urban Research seminar arranged by Malmö University. Within the Space and Place research network, I am most grateful for comments given by

Anna Hult, Gunilla Kronvall, Cecilia von Scheele and Maria Teder. Warm thanks also go to seminar commentators at David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University.

In Shanghai and Hong Kong, I am grateful for the close friendship that I have developed with Qiqi Li, Frank Wang, SiuYung Wong and Nova Chen, and new academic friends, Tommy Tse and Isaac Leung. All have contributed in different ways to my stays in both cities. Besides engaged conversations about contemporary China and Hong Kong, they have introduced me to shopping, fashion, pop culture, design, arts and culture, academic life, cafés, restaurants and eateries, bars and gay venues.

Last, but not least, I am deeply grateful for the people who have been most close to me. In yoga classes and 'off the mat', Irene Mårtensson taught me to be present in my body and be patient throughout my yoga practice and in everyday life. Joakim Sjunnesson has kept me updated on fashion, style, left politics and Malmö's nightlife. Together with Martin Berg, I spent a very loving but also challenging ten years of my life! I am also grateful for the connection with Sharif Shawky, who shares my interest in spirituality and spatial theory. Sharif also edited the photos in this book and made the cover. Thanks, Sharif! Finally, my gratitude goes out to my family: my mother and father, my sister and her husband, and their kids. Thanks Heléne, Mats, Anna, Mikael, Victoria and William for your love and support! My parents' dog, Zsa-Zsa, has also contributed in her own unique way.

While I have shown my gratitude, all errors in this study are my own!

Slättåkra, 6 January 2015.

Johan Vaide

Part I

The study at a glance

1 Introduction

In March 2013, Xi Jinping took office in Beijing as the president of the People's Republic of China (PRC). While installing the new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping began to ground his politics in the rhetoric of his predecessors and conceptualize his vision for the country. By introducing 'the Chinese dream', Xi envisions that the CCP will have enabled a moderately well-off society on the Chinese mainland by 2049, which will be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Providing the nation with a new rhetorical device, 'the Chinese dream' involves the production of a rejuvenated nation, deepening of reform and opening up, sustainable and high-quality economic growth, improvement of people's livelihoods, patriotism, rule of law, national prosperity, peaceful development, a strong military, a crackdown on corruption, cultural advancement, civility, social harmony, strengthened Party-building, and continued adherence to the CCP and socialism with Chinese characteristics.[1] Interestingly, the place where Xi Jinping first officially used the term 'Chinese dream' to describe his vision for the country is significant. Sketching out his 'Chinese dream', Xi Jinping addressed senior officials at the National Museum's exhibition 'Road to Rejuvenation' in Beijing. Displaying China's history between the 1840s and today, the official exhibition takes the visitor through China's defeat in the Opium War with Britain (which resulted in the forced opening up and establishment of a treaty port system ruled by several colonial powers), the Chinese society under semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism, the CCP's

[1] 'Xi Jinping: Pursuing a dream for 1.3b Chinese', *China Daily*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/17/content_16313950_6.htm (accessed 2 September 2013).

struggles before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao's consolidation of the country, and the present day opening up and economic reforms under Party rule. With China's official history and Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream' in mind, the present study focuses on the processes of producing a modern society, which has been the CCP's mission for almost four decades.

Since the late 1970s, the PRC has experienced profound changes, which are highly visible in the built and landscaped environments. In its quest to modernize the country, the CCP has opened up the PRC to the outside world and embarked on an overall change of political ideology, produced new modern spaces such as infrastructure (airports, metros and railways), business districts, residential high-rises and shopping malls, and attempted to change the behaviours and mindsets of the Chinese populace. This is realized under the official rubric of *gaige kaifang*, the reform and opening-up policy. Generally, the empirical term 'opening up' denotes official China's monitored introduction of market measures within one-party rule and re-engagement with the outside world. While initially addressing economic policy, the term today denotes people's sense of being open-minded and modern, as well as the modernization of the country as whole (which, however, excludes reform and liberalization of the one-party rule). Historically, the term 'opening up' was used by colonial powers when China was forced to open several port cities to foreign trade as a result of the defeat in the Opium War (as stated in the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842). Encouraging mental, ideological, material and interactional changes, the CCP is in the process of adjusting and making the Chinese mainland into a modern society. Showing the importance of space to social change (Lefebvre 1991/[1974]), the CCP strives to produce a new society, which involves new conceptualizations of space, new built and landscaped environments, new activities in and through space, and new lived experiences (Chun 2006; Gamble 2003; Lu 2006; Lu and Simons 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Rofel 2007; Wu 2007).

The aim of the study

Within the context of understanding the opening up of the PRC and the city of Shanghai, the broad aim of the present study is to explore 'space' in CCP rhetoric, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and personal intercultural engagements. By the term 'space', I refer to an understanding of societal production that integrates space as part of the analysis, taking into account the interplay between official statements on nation building, regional and urban planning, concrete built environments and people's situated understandings of space (Lefebvre 1991). With this in mind, the tripartite aim is to establish an understanding of how the CCP envisioned the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai, how the Shanghai Municipal Government has implemented the CCP's visions for the city and how young Chinese talk about their experiences of the changes taking place in Shanghai in interviews about intercultural communication in the city.

Corresponding to this tripartite aim, I carry out my analyses at the following intersecting levels: the envisioned nation, the city, and people and space. First, I study how the CCP envisioned the opening up of the country. Taking into account CCP rhetoric since the late 1970s, I focus on the general characteristics of the envisioned society, how the CCP produced the country's history, the spaces that it claimed were required to modernize the country, how the CCP legitimized the changes within one-party rule, how it encouraged the production of modern subjects, and how the CCP formulated the vision for a selective, modern, socialist state. In China, political rhetoric by the ruling powers historically and today has essentially been a tool to initiate and legitimize social change (Lu 1999; Lu and Simons 2006). While the reforms were initiated in the late 1970s, this level of analysis also deals with the spaces that have been established as a result of the implementation of CCP's visions as well as more contemporary CCP rhetoric.

Second, I analyse the transformation of Shanghai into a global city and its official promotion. This is carried out by studying how official spatial planning discourse represents the implementation of the CCP's envisioned society. Focusing on the concrete workings of the opening up, the changes have centred on the reconfiguration of old cities and creation of new ones in

the Guangdong province (neighbouring Hong Kong) and the east coast, including Shanghai (Lu 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Wu 2007). As Shanghai was designated to lead the change in the country (Deng 1994), the aim of this level of analysis is to establish an understanding of how the Shanghai Municipal Government represents its making of Shanghai into a global city and which spaces the Shanghai Municipal Government prioritizes to realize the envisioned society. I bring to the fore the spatial practices that are considered to represent and enable openness.

Third, I strive to understand the experience of the opening up as expressed in how young Chinese talk about their experiences of intercultural communication in Shanghai. Understanding intercultural communication as the interactional site where similarity and dissimilarity are produced and negotiated, I aim to foreground how young Chinese characterize historical and contemporary Shanghai, where and how they engage in intercultural contact in the city, and what meanings attach to those experiences (Halualani et al. 2006; Halualani and Nakayama 2012). While the individuals were interviewed primarily for their experience of contact with foreigners in Shanghai, the individuals interviewed also represent the anticipated future populace of the PRC, as the individuals can be loosely defined as belonging to the emerging educated, urban middle classes (Anagnost 2004; Fong 2007; Jacka 2009; Murphy 2004).

I have chosen to structure and focus each analysis on different levels and periods of the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai. Providing context for nearly forty years of social change in China, the analysis of the CCP rhetoric covers the initiation of the opening up of the PRC from 1978 onwards; the second analysis deals with how Shanghai has implemented the CCP's visions from early 1990s onwards; and the third analysis deals with how young Chinese experienced the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai between 2005 and 2006. The analytical framework that I apply is developed mostly to show the different levels of spatial production (conceptualizations, material spaces and understandings) and does not imply that the changes in the PRC have followed a clear cause-and-effect path. While it is important to keep in mind that this study deals with a state that founds its social and economic

development on five-year plans (and more recently, five-year guidelines), it is also central to acknowledge that the CCP has been vague about the precise meaning given to the term 'opening up' since its introduction. While the CCP released the forces of opening up in 1978, the vagueness of the term has enabled the CCP to emphasize different content in particular times and spaces, and thus, has introduced a dynamic that suggests a balancing act between closure and openness involving every level of the Chinese society.

Studying a phenomenon and developing a concept – notes on contact space

I establish the tripartite spatial understanding of the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai by introducing, developing and applying the term 'contact space'. By this term, I wish to illustrate and analyse the phenomenon of the opening up processes taking place in the PRC and Shanghai, and also to develop an analytical tool—to be used throughout the study—that allows for an analysis of how the opening up involves several integrated levels of the Chinese society.

Based on major findings in contemporary China studies and my own readings of CCP rhetoric, there is a belief within the Party that to modernize the country, contact with the outside world has to be established (Deng, 1994; Lu 2006; Lu and Simons 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Wu 2007). This implies that contact can be created by reconfiguring Chinese society in specific ways. Thus, the present study deals with how the Chinese society is being restructured to attain contact and enable the production of a new, modern society. Having this in mind, contact with the outside world can be envisioned, implemented, promoted, described and understood. Ranging from state politics and spatial planning to social interactions in and through space and people's mindsets, contact is negotiated and produced. Implied in the term 'contact space' is a constant balancing between contact and non-contact, an unceasing play that can be regulated by the state, as the nation is used as a container to separate itself and its contents from the outside world and as a crucial starting point when contact is initiated, enabled and maintained.

As the phenomenon of the opening up involves several levels of the Chinese society, the term 'contact space' is used as a tool to structure, differentiate, clarify and connect the analyses of the CCP rhetoric, official spatial planning discourse and personal intercultural engagements. The different analyses can be read independently, as each one focuses on different levels and periods of the opening up processes, but they can also be treated as an integrated whole. I consider the term 'contact space' an analytical tool that enables an interlocking understanding of how the opening up involves different levels of the Chinese society and thus illustrates the dynamic relationships among these levels.

While contact space encompasses an attempt to illustrate a phenomenon and an intention to develop a concept, it also displays my effort to combine two theoretical fields, the sociology of space and post-colonial studies. First, I draw on developments in the field of sociology of space and how this field provides tools to understand the production of society (Lefebvre 1991). Most importantly, the field shows that societal production is fundamentally spatial. Second, I draw on developments in the field of post-colonial studies and how this field provides tools to understand the complex relationships between China and the outside world, and most importantly, the experiences of colonialism on the Chinese mainland as they unraveled in Shanghai and other port cities forced to open up to trade by colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century, and how those historical experiences partly influence the production of contemporary Chinese society (Barlow 1993; Lu, 2006; Shih 2001; Xie 1997). As part of concrete historical conditions, the CCP's anti-imperialism was fundamental to the founding of the PRC.[2] I wish to provide an understanding of the opening up processes in the PRC and Shanghai, which combine sensitivity to the historical condition of the PRC and the contemporary production of the envisioned society. As a conceptual entity, contact space indicates a sociological spatial exploration of how contact can be initiated, enabled and maintained, and thus how the society needs to be configured in order to initiate, enable and maintain contact. Therefore, within

[2] "Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China", http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html (accessed 22 December 2014).

the context of the present study, I explore how contact space is envisioned in CCP rhetoric, implemented and promoted by the Shanghai Municipal Government, and understood and described by young Chinese residing in Shanghai.

2 Situating the study

In this chapter, I situate the study within the context of classical accounts on urbanism in 'the West' and problematize the usage of such theories in studying China.[3] At the same time, I also show contemporary accounts on modernities and urban China. By this contextualisation, I place the study within the discipline of sociology and also central considerations on China's emerging society. I also illuminate the limitations of the study and some possible advantages of my approach. Lastly, I provide a description of the organization of the study.

Urban sociology, Chinese modernity and the post-colonial global order

Entangled in the colonial power structures of the time, the site of spatial exploration of contact in sociology has been 'the Western city'. Ever since the classical works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber and the Chicago school, the field of sociology has revolved around the idea that the Western city – 'the imperial city' – is the single site of modernity, civilization, artificiality, progress, capitalism, public life and cosmopolitanism (Bhambra 2007a, 2007b; King 1991; Robinson 2002, 2004, 2011; Roy 2009; Wheeler 2005). Standing as

[3] I have put the West in quotation marks ('') to emphasise that I refer not only to 'the West' as constituting the geographical entities of Europe and North America but also to the production of 'the West' in global mass media, politics, culture and so forth. I have also used quotation marks to highlight the construction of similar expressions, such as 'non-Western'. In this context, I use quotations marks as a strategy to acknowledge that expressions such as 'the West' are not neutral but implicated in how the world is understood socially, politically and culturally by different actors.

the archetypical representations of Western cities, London, Berlin, Paris, Chicago and New York have been understood in evolutionary and dichotomizing terms in relation to spaces elsewhere in the world. In classical urban sociology, the history of the Western city is put into stages constructing a linearity of progress and development. The Western city was rarely addressed and scrutinized as the site where the imperial colonizing powers headquartered and administered the colonization of different parts of the world. Similarly, colonized cities (such as Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore) were largely overlooked in classical urban sociology, despite the fact that they were:

> the sites for the encounter, on any significant scale, between what today we term 'developed' and 'developing' societies and peoples, between racial, cultural, and ethnic groups from Europe and other groups from the continents and regions where the colonization took place. In a very real sense, they were 'global pivots of change' (King 1985: 7–32), instrumental in creating the space in which today's capitalist world-economy operates. (King 1991: 7)[4]

While their imagined others were produced, the Western cities and 'Western societies' were conceptualized by the use of several dichotomies. The othering processes include labels such as traditional/modern, centre/periphery, unruly/civilized, undeveloped/developed, rural/urban, rooted/alienated, irrational/rational, familiarity/strangeness, stasis/change, communality/individuality and 'Orient'/'Occident'. Moreover, the theorizing of urban space in classical urban sociology is bound to particular socio-spatial arrangements found in the imperial cities of the West (renovation or demolition of medieval urban structures, the introduction of the grid system and several other urban trends during imperial times), the imagination of centre and periphery, the claims of the origin of modernity and particular constructions of difference. While the other was portrayed as lacking subjectivity, it was argued that the so-called 'non-Western' spaces were incapable of generating modern urban life as it developed in Europe and North America (Bhambra 2007a, 2007b; King 1989; Robinson 2002, 2004, 2011; Roy 2009).

[4] In this quote, King provides a reference to his entire article on "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change" (1985).

Theorizing questions of modernity, social change and othering processes, the field of classical urban sociology has taken its point of departure in Euro-American cities. Insights within classical urban sociology, nonetheless, have been applied to study cities in East and Southeast Asia. In the context of applying tools developed to understand the urban West, non-Western cities are often assumed to change following the same linear logic of the Western city, and consequently, the non-Western city is assumed to develop similar characteristics as its counterpart in the West. The Western city appears as the 'one static model for other cities to converge to' (Ma and Wu 2005: 10). With that in mind, it is important to 'question the validity of this linear, causal, simplistic and essentialist view which masks the complex reality of cities more than its selected evidence purports to represent' (Ma and Wu 2005: 10). As a result, non-Western cities have been understood as exceptions, transitory, unusual and deviations from the Western urban norm (Ma and Wu 2005). In this context, it is important to acknowledge that

> similar surface features of a phenomenon (in this case, urban form) may be created by different processes in different places and that universal processes can be mediated by local forces and processes embedded in local culture, history or economic and political systems. (Ma and Wu 2005: 12)

While the Chinese cities may appear similar to their counterparts in the West on the surface (shopping malls, commercialized public spaces and central business districts), it is important to acknowledge that they are implicated and changed in relation to distinct features within the country. Contemporary Chinese cities are produced within the context of the legacies of former dynasties, the partial colonization of different cities along the east coast by Western powers in the middle of the nineteenth century, the former anti-imperialist sentiments that partly triggered the founding of the PRC, state socialism, the changes in land management and pro-developmental leadership since 1978 and neo-Confucianism (Chen 2005; Lu 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; Ong 1997; Shih 2001; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003, 2007; Xie 1997; Zhang 1997). In addition, unique to the context of the contemporary Chinese city, is 'the strong party–state at the central and local levels', 'the widely recognized close relationship between city leaders' career advancement and the performance of their cities', rural–urban migration and 'the strong inter-

personal ties and networks built on the basis of kinship and provenance' (Ma and Wu 2005: 12). With that in mind, it is also important to acknowledge that the PRC and Shanghai are highly interconnected with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the East and Southeast Asian region. By the constant influx of regional capital, Shanghai is developing urban characteristics similar to Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo and Singapore. Implicated in local and regional processes, it is crucial not to reduce Shanghai to the most Western city on the Chinese mainland, as this ignores the complexities of the historical and contemporary city. In constant contact with Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, Shanghai is increasingly part of the 'East Asian urban modern' that was founded as part of the *East Asian Miracle* in the 1980s and 1990s. Grounded in the post-war regional economic growth, the 'East Asian urban modern' is characterized by interconnected capitalist modernization, development of an alternative capitalist modernity, increasing economic centrality, a shared desire for a 'First World East Asia', growth of urban modern lifestyles, increasing circulation of pop culture and culture industries, expansion of consumption and growth of the new middle classes (Wee 2012).

Central to colonization processes, Western urban modernity has forcefully positioned itself as the ultimate criterion for social change in the world. To come to terms with this bias and understand contemporary China, it is important to de-territorialize modernity 'from its spatial associations' with the West (Dirlik 2003: 281) and strive to provide a flexible analysis that focuses on the production of space itself and not Western normative debates on what constitutes modernity, 'the urban' and the ideal city. This also means that I support the view that 'the urbanization process in China is best seen as an integral part of the general processes of development, political, social and economic change that have assumed distinctive configurations in China in the post-1978 era' (McGee et al. 2007: 5).

The decolonization of the world, the subsequent establishment of new states and Cold War politics enabled a fundamental questioning of Western modernity and ways of understanding modern cities. As anti-imperialist sentiments were institutionalized and the formerly colonized populations gained their voice in relation to the colonial powers, several new ways of

producing, organizing and understanding societies emerged. Post-colonial societies were recast to fit new political and social visions. As a strategy to overcome the Euro-American-centrism of classical urban sociology and address the changes taking place in the PRC, I acknowledge how several contemporary social theorists have understood the fundamental changes of the world through the concepts of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2000), alternative modernity (Ong 1997) and global modernity (Dirlik 2003). On multiple modernities, Shmuel Eisenstadt writes:

> It goes against the view of the 'classical' theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assume, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world. (Eisenstadt 2000: 1)

Fundamental to Cold War politics and the emerging post-colonial global world, the more recent modernizing societies are questioning the hegemonic and homogenizing assumptions of Western modernity. The new, emerging modernities are selectively appropriating, reinterpreting, reformulating, changing and rejecting the Western concept of modernity (Eisenstadt 2000: 14–15). According to Eisenstadt (2000: 2), 'Many of the movements that developed in non-Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or even antimodern themes, yet all were distinctively modern.' The variability of modernities is a result of how domestic forces in the former colonized spaces (anti-imperialist, nationalist and/or socialist groupings) react upon the histories of the violent colonial travel of Western modernity throughout the world (Eisenstadt 2000). In the process, 'a proliferation of claims on modernity' has emerged (Dirlik 2005: 6). The newly modernizing societies are producing 'different programs of modernity', which contain 'very different ways on what makes societies modern' (Eisenstadt 2000: 2). Once more returning to Eisenstadt:

> The cultural and institutional programs that unfolded in these societies were characterized particularly by a tension between conceptions of themselves as part of the modern world and ambivalent attitudes toward modernity in general and toward the West in particular. (Eisenstadt 2000: 15)

The negotiation of Western modernity is also highlighted by the term 'alternative modernity'. By this term, Aihwa Ong (1997: 195) denotes 'not so much the difference in content from Western ones as the new self-confident political reenvisioning of futures that challenge the fundamental assumption of inevitable Western domination'. The term 'alternative modernity' illustrates how modernizing societies produce new localized versions of modernities, establish new thriving centres in the global economy (sometimes making use of old centres established during the colonial era) and in this process, struggle to reconfigure the world order that was produced during the colonial era. Echoing the concept of multiple modernities, alternative modernity refers to 'a dynamic that is oppositional to existing hegemonies, a counterforce arising from other sites that are not without their own particular mix of expansive and repressive technologies' (Ong 1997: 194–5). Situating the term 'alternative modernity', Ong continues:

> In Asia, state narratives insist that their modernity is an alternative to the West because from the viewpoint of Asian states, capitalism should strengthen state control, not undermine it. The major difference from modernities in the West thus lies in the way state biopolitics and economic competition are routinely recast as timeless cultural practices and values, and in the way events generated by the breaking down of national borders are managed through the institutionalization of Confucian moral economies, set off against Western liberal democracies. These hegemonic moves seek to instill cultural solidarity and control in the diverse populations while deflecting Western domination in the economic and political realms. (Ong 1997:195–6)

As Asian states are producing their own social spaces based on the combination of state-sanctioned capitalism and neo-Confucianist morals, they are also producing new power centralities (as exemplified by the term 'the East Asian urban modern') (Wee 2012) that reconfigure the world order. Clearly connecting his argument to the decolonization processes, Dirlik (2003: 276) defines global modernity 'as a period concept, to contrast it with a preceding period which, for all its complexities, was indeed marked by Euro/American domination and hegemony'. Deviating from traditional writings on modernity, the term 'global modernity' recognizes 'the spatial and temporal co-presence of those whom a Eurocentric modernization discourse had relegated to invisibility and backwardness' (Dirlik 2003: 276).

While I take the East Asian urban modern as an example, Dirlik continues:

> The former colonial 'subjects' of Euro/American projects of modernity are empowered in a postcolonial world to assert their own projects of modernity. Those who are the most successful in doing so are those who have acquired an indispensable partnership in the world of global capital, and demand recognition of their cultural subjectivities, invented or not, in the making of a global modernity. (Dirlik 2003: 286)

In the processes of decolonization, former imperial (London, Paris and Tokyo) and colonized cities (such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai) have been reconfigured and reintegrated into a new post-colonial globalizing order, and reinstalled as important sites of business and finance. Emerging as global cities, they have become strategic managerial sites for the global economy (Sassen 2006). Displaying changes in global power relations, they are also partly 'the spaces of post-colonialism and indeed contain conditions for the formation of a postcolonialist discourse' (Sassen 2000: 89). Thus, while re-integrating into the global economy, global cities (whether they are independent city states or situated within a nation) also produce their own modern distinctiveness.

With the conceptualizations provided by Sassen (2000), Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997) and Dirlik (2003) in mind, it is possible to suggest that the CCP, by producing its own version of modern space on the Chinese mainland, is problematizing the characteristics of Western modernity. Situating the production of Chinese modernity in the context of the socialist revolution, national liberation and founding of the PRC in 1949, Liu (1996) suggests that Chinese modernity is implicated in anti-imperialist sentiments. In relation to the workings of modernity on the Chinese mainland, Liu argues for 'a plurality of modernities' in which 'nationalism and nationhood serve revolutionary purposes in opposition to Eurocentric modernity' (1996: 197). Under the rule of Mao Zedong, the Chinese city was labelled capitalist and decadent, and particular cities, such as Shanghai, were labelled imperialist and sites of national humiliation. Highlighting Mao Zedong's efforts to produce a socialist space on the Chinese mainland, Duanfang Lu writes:

> Almost immediately following the founding of the People's Republic, production was associated with development while consumption was associated with waste and bourgeoisie lifestyle. Cities, related to consumption and colonialism, were considered evil and corrupting. Shanghai, for example, was depicted as 'parasitic city … where

> consumption is greater than production'. A campaign to convert the 'cities of consumption' into the 'cities of production' was launched in 1949. (Lu 2006: 82–3)

In contrast to Mao's cities illustrated above, contemporary post-1978 Chinese cities have emerged as strategic sites for the opening-up reforms and modernization of the country, and hence the production of the new society (Lu 2006; Ma and Wu 2005, McGee et al. 2007; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003, 2007). Acknowledging that Mao Zedong's efforts to socialize the country were devastating, the CCP redirected its attention and started to promote ideological pragmatism and economic reforms. In its efforts to modernize the country, the CCP launched 'the city' as the experimental site of the opening-up reforms and marketized socialism. While cities such as Shanghai were reinstalled as important sites of economic activity in the post-1978 reforms, new cities, such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, were developed in the Guangdong province (neighbouring Hong Kong and Macau). Fostering the modernization of the country, the Chinese cities have been integrated into the Hong Kong, Taiwan, East Asian (Japan and South Korea) and South East Asian region (Singapore) and global economic activity. Showing the complicated workings of contemporary China, Ma and Wu write:

> the Chinese city under transformation has developed new elements of market capitalism and neoliberalism, both spatial and socioeconomic, but it continues to be affected by the path-dependent processes and to have elements left behind from state socialism and the more distant past. (Ma and Wu 2005: 13)

In the post-colonial global order, which I have sketched out in the preceding section, new modernities are formulated and new global and regional economic centres are emerging or reinstalling themselves. In this context, I wish to situate the present study and explore the production of modern post-1978 China and Shanghai.

Limitations and studying China's leading experimental site towards a modern society

As a result of the priorities of the CCP, the opening up of the PRC to the outside world has produced a social divide between provinces and cities that have received the most benefits from the changes and those that have not.

With this in mind, the opening up of the PRC is mostly manifested and experienced in several cities in Guangdong province and along the east coast (Dunford and Liu 2014; McGee et al. 2007; Wu 2007). Especially since the early 1990s, Shanghai has emerged as the main experimental site for producing the new, modern society (Deng 1994; Gamble 2003; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003). In the process, the city is thriving with new, modern infrastructure and built and landscaped environments, as well as a rising 'quality'/*suzhi* of its inhabitants (i.e. the emerging middle classes). To modernize the country, the CCP declared that the quality/*suzhi* of the Chinese populace had to be raised. While the term quality/*suzhi* first appeared in the early 1980s in official statements attributing 'China's failure to modernize to the 'low quality' (*suzhi di*) of its population, especially in rural areas' (Anagnost 2004: 190) and as a strategy to legitimize the one-child policy (Fong 2007), the term quality/*suzhi* has evolved into a popular discourse about social distinctions ('low' vs 'high' quality/*suzhi*), social mobility and class identity.[5] In diverse contexts, the quality/*suzhi* discourse is used in campaigns for the importance of education, morality, civility, modernity and cosmopolitanism in the modernization of the country (Anagnost 2004; Fong 2007; Jacka 2009; Murphy 2004). In Anagnost's words,

> *Suzhi*'s sense has been extended from a discourse of backwardness and development (the quality of the masses) to encompass the minute social distinctions defining a 'person of quality' in practices of consumption and the incitement of a middle-class desire for social mobility. (Anagnost 2004: 190)

In the production of the new society, the official effort to raise the quality/*suzhi* of the populace has become as important as producing modern spaces. Having said this, the present study is situated in the city that has gained the most from the opening-up reforms. While Shanghai has been in constant change since the early 1990s, it is important to acknowledge that the changes are unevenly distributed within the city (Li and Wu 2006; Zhang 2005). Showing an awareness of the uneven development in Shanghai, I focus

[5] For a comparison between quality/*suzhi* and Pierre Bourdieu's capital, see Fong 2007.

on the emerging spaces in the city, and I am also limited to interviews with young Chinese individuals who intentionally engage in contact with foreigners, and who supposedly belong to a diverse and growing social group that is in the process of raising their quality/*suzhi* or have acquired high quality/*suzhi*.

While I have acknowledged the limitations of my approach, I also want to put forward some possible advantages regarding this approach. As Shanghai has been designated by the CCP as an experimental site of the envisioned society and will lead the changes of the PRC into a modern, prosperous socialist state (Deng 1994), I assume that the city also represents CCP's future aspirations for the entire Chinese mainland. Understanding the changes taking place in Shanghai is essential to understanding the opening-up reforms and the envisioned society. It also provides insight into what kind of spaces and subjects are seen to be necessary to modernize the country as a whole. As the CCP rhetoric proclaims, other provinces, regions and cities will catch up with Shanghai eventually and attain a similar degree of modernization and prosperity (Deng 1994). Within the context of CCP rhetoric, the CCP believes that the future on the Chinese mainland can be monitored and controlled through different means, as the changes within CCP rule are based on dynamic and complex path-dependent processes, which are formulated in former five-year plans and the most recent five-year guidelines. While the CCP is 'increasingly receptive to a more open and consultative process in planning the future of the nation', the plans and guidelines are still 'key indicators of the directions and changes in development philosophy' (Fan 2006: 717, 708). In this manner, this study deals with the embryonic stages of the envisioned society on the Chinese mainland.

The organization of the study

This study is organized into three major parts. Part I presents and situates the study within a wider context. In Chapter 1, I have introduced the study by providing the aim of the study and initial notes on the term 'contact space'. In Chapter 2, I have situated the changes taking place in Shanghai and China in

relation to classical urban sociology and theoretical accounts on colonialism, post-colonialism, modernity and East Asia. Part II details my theoretical starting points and my methodological tools and considerations. Thus, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding the processes of opening up of China and Shanghai. In Chapter 3, I focus on the general production of space and its different levels. In Chapter 4, I introduce concepts that are crucial for understanding Shanghai from a post-colonial perspective and I also provide historical contextualization of the experiences of colonialism on the Chinese mainland. In Chapter 5, I summarize my major starting points and briefly connect to the analytical chapters. In Chapter 6, I detail my engagement with Shanghai, how I developed the aim of the study, how I applied Lefebvre's spatial theory in my analyses and several central methodological considerations that have influenced my work and the final version of the study. Part III contains my three analytical chapters. In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I embark on an analysis of how the CCP envisioned the new society on the Chinese mainland, how the visions have been implemented in Shanghai and how young Chinese talk about their own experiences of the opening up of China and Shanghai. In Chapter 10, I conclude the study by summarizing the key findings in relation to the aim of the study, further my exploration of the term 'contact space' and explore possible directions for further studies.

Part II

Theoretical and methodological framework

While the previous part has introduced the aim of the study and presented my working concept 'contact space', I have also situated the study within the context of different fields and illuminated limitations to and possible advantages of my approach. In Part II, I put forward my theoretical starting points, which cover Chapter 3: 'The sociology of space', Chapter 4: 'Postcolonial studies and the Chinese semi-colonial experience' and Chapter 5: 'Combining spatial theory and post-colonial studies'. In Chapter 6, I cover my methodological considerations.

The theoretical framework is divided into two major chapters. In Chapter 3, I begin with a brief presentation of the field of sociology of space and its presence within the discipline of sociology. Hereafter follows an introduction of Henri Lefebvre's spatial theory, and how I approach and read Lefebvre. I continue by defining the interrelated relationship between society and space through Lefebvre's term 'social space'. I describe how Lefebvre details the production of social space in modernity vis-à-vis the state and capitalism. The chapter also includes definitions of Lefebvre's different levels of social space. In Chapter 4, I begin by situating Shanghai and the PRC within the field of post-colonial studies and providing some key definitions of the term 'post-colonialism'. After this is a demonstration of the workings of colonialism and how colonialism unfolded on the Chinese mainland as part of the partial colonialism of several cities by colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century. To enable an understanding of the partial colonization, the term 'semi-colonialism' is described in detail. The chapter then details the colonial built environments that were produced as part of the colonizing processes; the colonial spatialities that were built in Shanghai are used as examples. In addition, I describe the colonial conceptualizations of the world

that emerged, as well as detailing how Shanghai has been conceptualized within a highly colonized framework. Later, I demonstrate the colonial lived experiences by the use of the terms 'contact zone', 'third culture', 'hybridization' and 'cosmopolitanism'. In Chapter 5, I merge my theoretical starting points by making some concluding remarks.

3 The sociology of space

> [W]hilst space is an ever-present backdrop in their work, neither Marx, Weber nor Durkheim provided any clear and sustained analytical consideration of the significance of space as an essential element or concept through and upon which their social, political and economic analyses were founded. (Zieleniec 2007: 1)

Despite the continuing presence of sociologists interested in the spatial aspects of modern social life, the sociology of space has never been part of the sociological mainstream (Lechner 1991; Shields 1991; Zieleniec 2007). Historically, sociology has been preoccupied largely with understanding modern social life through frameworks of temporal linearity, change, development and progress. The discipline emerged out of the interplay between modernizing processes in the West, and the simultaneous colonization of Africa, the Americas, Asia and Australia by Western powers and the expansion of Western capitalism (Bhambra 2007a, 2007b; Eisenstadt 2000). In the processes of modernization and colonization, temporality emerged as the structuring principle for sociological analyses. Spaces were recast into a linear time frame suggesting that modern life was conditioned and found in certain bounded localities (i.e. the urban West). Although modernization and colonization processes were intrinsically spatial, as observable in the concreteness of the built environments of colonial and colonized cities, the idea of linear time as structuring social life was prioritized and understood as dominating space. While progress/time was viewed as active, space was passive. As a container for social relations, space was treated as neutral, lifeless, geometric and absolute (Lefebvre 1991/[1974]). As temporality became the structuring principle for analyses within the discipline, '[t]he sociological classics dealt with space but in rather cryptic and undeveloped ways' (Urry 1995: 7).

Despite the fact that the concepts Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Tönnies 2002/[1887]) have spatial implications for urban analysis, they lack appropriate tools to develop and lay out the grounds for a substantial sociological understanding of the production of space. The social production of the spaces within the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is not fully scrutinized. While ignoring the possibility of establishing an understanding of the spaces

that were produced within each sociality, Tönnies (2002) applies several spatial metaphors to describe social life. Gemeinschaft is characterized by rurality, feudality, routineness, closeness, tradition, timelessness, rootedness, unity and continuity. In contrast, Gesellschaft refers to urbanity, modernity, industrialism, public life, rationality, changeability, instrumentality, time, fragmentation and reflection. Disregarding space as a force of production, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels study 'the effects of "modern" patterns of mobility on social life wherever it is to be found' (Urry 1995: 9). Lefebvre argues, 'space presented itself to Marx only as the sum of the places of production, the location of the various stages' (Lefebvre cited in Elden 2004: 186). Although Max Weber analyses the historical conditions of the development of the Western city, he hesitates to use spatial notions in his analyses (Urry 2004; Weber 1958/[1921]). While the early twentieth-century Chicago school has received the most attention from sociologists and others dealing with the relationship between social relations and urban space, the Chicago scholars analyse urban life through extensive ethnographic fieldwork but only occasionally analyse the social production of space as such. Rather, they concentrate on the city as an entity and the spatial distribution of social phenomena within its assumed boundaries (Saunders 2005; see also Deegan 2001).

Although space has not been central to the discipline of sociology, Émile Durkheim (2002) and Georg Simmel (1997/[1903]) briefly address the importance of space to modern social relations. I argue that Durkheim's notes on materiality and architecture in *Suicide* (2002) and Simmel's essay, 'The Sociology of Space' (1997), could have triggered spatial analysis in the discipline but their respective elaborations on the significance of space for modern social relations have been largely ignored by later sociologists. Simmel's seminal article, 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (1971/[1903]), is far more addressed as a contribution to urban spatial theory by sociologists, architects and geographers. While Simmel (1971) deals with urban life, space is not the main analytical category. In this article, Simmel 'does not so much explain urban life in terms of the spatial form of the city' (Urry 1995: 9), but rather he concentrates on analysis of the new mental structures that were

generated within the city boundaries.[6] In a short passage of his book, Durkheim (2002) explicitly treats materiality and architecture as crucial to social life. Durkheim insists that social life consists not only of people but also of material phenomena. In Durkheim's view, social life is crystallized in and supported by material artifacts, which demonstrates that built environments are possible to grasp as inherited sociality. Simmel (1997) addresses the fundamental qualities of space through the aspects of exclusivity, partitioning, fixity, distance and movement. Simmel's theory largely 'offers ideas on the spatial dimension of modern social structures and the modernization of space itself' (Lechner 1991: 196). Lechner explains that Simmel focuses on the interconnectedness between space and society as he acknowledges that 'many forms of sociation cannot be understood without taking into account both their spatial context and their use of space' (1991: 198). Simmel demonstrates how space enables exclusivity for social relations as 'every portion of space possesses a kind of uniqueness' by suggesting that 'certain types of association can only be realized in such a way that there is no room for a second one within the spatial area that one of its formations occupies' (1997: 138, 139). Simmel (1997: 141) further demonstrates that space is 'divided into pieces which are considered units and are framed by boundaries—both as a cause and an effect of the division' and has the capacity to fix the contents of social formations, i.e. to order, stabilize and maintain social life. Simmel (1997: 151) also acknowledges how space enables a sensory play 'between proximity or distance between people who stand in some relationship or other to one another' and that the fixedness of space requires people to move across space in order to engage in social interactions that are exclusive to certain locations (i.e. units).

Sociology has several ways to address the importance of space to social relations. The terms often used are space (Lefebvre 1991; Simmel 1997), place (Gieryn 2000), location, site, locale (Giddens 1984), context (Giddens 1984), container (Giddens 1984) and setting (Goffman 1990/[1959]). Nonetheless,

[6] For a similar critique, see Borden (1997).

the terms 'setting', 'location', 'locale' and 'site' often indicate a rigidity of space. Although the terms are used to show the importance of space to social relations, I find them unsatisfactory as the social production of space is only loosely scrutinized. While acknowledging space through concepts such as front and back stage, social interactions are still prioritized. In Erving Goffman's spatial elaborations of social relations, the setting appears to be tenacious and almost fixed. Acknowledging that social relations are distributed in and through space, Goffman writes:

> A setting tends to stay put, geographically speaking, so that those who would use a particular setting as part of their performance cannot begin their act until they have brought themselves to the appropriate place and must terminate their performance when they leave it. (Goffman 1990: 33)

Showing the relationship between social life and space, Goffman (1990) discusses the setting as scenery, a stage and a backdrop to social interactions. Having the capability of fixing identity, the setting is characterized by how societal values are built in materially. Adding the possibility of permanency to social relations, the setting involves the physical layout (material space), which is understood as 'assemblages of sign-equipment' and 'expressive equipment' (Goffman 1990: 32–4, 125–6), such as décor and furniture. While acknowledging the interconnectedness between space and society and providing hints for the productive nature of space, Goffman does not fully scrutinize the processes of spatial production at different social levels. Although highlighting the social expressiveness of settings and thus providing embryotic terms to establish a sociology of space, Goffman does not explicitly show that settings can be understood in terms of socially produced arrangements implicated as part of a general production of space.

While understanding space as a container of social relations, Giddens (1984: 118) introduces the term 'locale' to address how space provides the setting of social interaction. Giddens (1979: 207) suggests that spatial and physical aspects of locales are 'routinely drawn upon by social actors in [the] sustaining of communication'. With that in mind, Giddens (1983: 79) insists that locales 'are inherently implicated in the structural constitution of social systems, because settings are integral to the mediation of presence'. Giddens (1979: 207) maintains further: '[a] setting is not just a spatial parameter, and

physical environment in which interaction "occurs": it is these elements mobilized as part of the interaction'. In this respect, social relations are situated and have the capability to 'bind' time and space (Giddens 1981: 30). Locales vary in scale from the tiniest room to territorial demarcations–districts, cities, regions and states. The locales are drawn upon, activated and mobilized by social actors. To refer to the mobility and immobility of people in and across space, Giddens addresses locales as 'stopping places'. Discussing the 'intermingling of presence and absence that constitutes social conduct' (Giddens 1981: 8), Giddens argues that context—i.e. the stopping place—denotes the time–space 'strips' in which gatherings take place (1984: 71). Giddens (1984: 119) further suggests that settings as contexts may constitute 'the meaningful content of interaction'. Affirming that space is implicated in social relations and showing how people's movement in and through space can be analysed, Giddens provides embryos for the establishment of a sociological spatial analysis.[7] Although arguing for the importance of space in understanding social relations, Giddens does not detail the processes of spatial production (in modern societies) thoroughly and how they are deeply 'implicated in the structural constitution of social systems' (Giddens 1983: 79).

In his review article, Gieryn (2000) delivers one of the most recent and widely quoted attempts to re-launch the sociology of space within the discipline. While revolving around the term 'place' rather than 'space', Gieryn (2000) suggests that place has three necessary features. Within his outline for a place-sensitive sociology, place is constituted by and emerges through the combination of its geographical location and how it conditions social life, how social processes happen through material form, and how people invest their own meaning and value in the built and landscaped environments in which they inhabit.

[7] For further discussion on Giddens' contribution to spatial sociology, see Saunders (2005) and Gregory and Urry (1985).

As I have illustrated, the discipline of sociology deals with space through several different terms, yet it provides limited comprehensive frameworks to establish a theoretical understanding of the interrelated production of space and social relations, and to explore and analyse the changes taking place in the PRC and Shanghai at different spatial levels. Therefore, in the remainder of this part of the theoretical chapter, I turn to philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1991) to demonstrate how space and social relations are highly interrelated and indeed, mutually constitutive.

Introducing Lefebvre's spatial theory

While I recognize the contributions of the sociologists discussed earlier, I situate the present study within the framework of Henri Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991). Suggesting that space is essential to an understanding of society, Lefebvre (1991) delivers a theoretical framework for the general analysis of space, the social production of space and the different levels of its production. In his seminal volume, *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre (1991: 16) 'expose[s] the actual production of space by bringing the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis together within a single theory'. Within a predominately Marxist framework, Lefebvre (1991) contributes to a comprehensive sociology of space by dealing with macro- and microspatial concerns. While refuting the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser's structural Marxism, Lefebvre aims 'to make Marxism less dogmatic and more spatial' (Merrifield 2002: 72), and importantly, sensitive to human experiences. With his openness towards space and human experiences, Lefebvre worked against theoretical, economic and political reductionism among Western Marxists during the 1960s and 1970s. While Althusser's structural Marxist analysis (2001/[1971]) was celebrated by Marxist theorists, leftist sociologists and political radicals, Lefebvre was marginalized for his elaborations on spatiality and human experiences (Elden 2004; Goonewardena et al. 2008). In his spatial theory, Lefebvre (1991) delivers an understanding of space in which structural conditions (macro structures; social formations, i.e. modes of production; capitalism, socialism, etc.), material space (as a spatializing social practice) and lived experiences (micro; people's

understandings of space, bodily movements in and through space) are taken into account. Combining the Marxists' focus on structure (macro) and the humanists' focus on lived spatial experiences (micro), Lefebvre (1991) makes use of insights within each theoretical framework to understand the production of social space.[8]

While Lefebvre has emerged as a holy figure in Anglo-American Marxist geography (Harvey 1989, 1990) and spatial cultural studies (Soja 1996) since the 1990s, Lefebvre is still positioned on the outskirts of sociology. Several social theorists suggest that the reason behind this marginal position is that Lefebvre is associated with spatial production and not temporality, an arbitrary and utopian style, and a critique of Lefebvre's spatial theory by prominent sociologists (Castells 1977; Kipfer et al. 2008a; Saunders 2005). In Gieryn's review article (2000), which I referred to earlier, Lefebvre is reduced to a footnote. I argue that the neglect of Lefebvre's spatial theory in sociology is surprising because Lefebvre provides analytical tools to examine social space that resemble the classical conceptualizations of macro/micro, structure/agency and other established sociological frameworks. Nevertheless, there are few exceptions to the neglect of Lefebvre within the sociological discipline (Castells 1977; Shields 1991, 1999; Urry 2004; Zieleniec 2007).

Rather than drawing on every title by Lefebvre, I have chosen to focus on *The Production of Space* (1991). In this work, Lefebvre provides the most comprehensive spatial theoretical framework, which details the general characteristics of the social production of space and its integrated levels. I find this work suitable for my present purposes, as I focus on the production of China's emerging new society, and how different societal levels are reconfigured to accommodate the CCP's modernizing vision. Additionally, I make use of an excerpt from Lefebvre's work on state production (Lefebvre 2009/[1978). I have excluded Lefebvre's specific works on urbanism (Lefebvre 2003/[1970]; Kofman and Lebas, 1996) and everyday life (Lefebvre, 2008a/[1947], 2008b/[1961], 2008c/[1981]). With this in mind, I

[8] See also Elden (2004) for a similar discussion.

acknowledge that there are many 'Lefebvres' as each title only provides a partial understanding of his entire theoretical endeavour (Shields 1999). With this remark, I have extracted parts of his spatial elaborations, which I regard as crucial for this study. In what follows, I present Lefebvre's spatial theory.[9]

Society and space—social space

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre (1991) shows that the nature of society is inherently spatial. Society assumes a fundamental spatial character, as social relations are deeply intertwined in space. Principally, society is produced through the creation of built and landscaped environments, activities in and through space, representations of space and lived experiences. While space has been viewed as a container of social relations in Western thought, it should be understood as relationally produced. Instead of analysing 'things in space' (treating space as objective), Lefebvre (1991) argues, it is important to analyse the actual 'production of space'. In Lefebvre's spatial theory, the expression 'production of space' encompasses the production of society in its entirety. This implies that Lefebvre offers a theory of the social, rather than a theory of space exclusively. As an integrated wholeness, social space is conceptual, as space is envisioned by politicians, planners and architects, and imagined by ordinary people, and material, as space is felt, enacted through everyday activities, built (architecture, infrastructure) and landscaped (parks, etc.). In this spirit, Lefebvre (1991: 411) maintains that 'space can no longer be looked upon as an "essence", as an object distinct from the point of view of (or as compared with) "subjects", as answering to a logic of its own.' By the use of the term 'social space', it is possible to grasp the conventional separation of society and space instead as an integrated whole. While material space (walls, rooms, buildings, infrastructure) is assumed to be 'there' with its solidity and fixity, it is, put simply, produced for human activity. Lefebvre (1991: 191)

[9] The extraction was a complicated yet entertaining endeavour as Lefebvre (1991) uses an unconventional and non-linear writing style, which is described by Soja (1996: 9) as 'a polyphonic fugue that assertively introduced its keynote themes early on and then changed them intentionally in contrapuntal variations that took radically different forms and harmonies'.

maintains that '[s]pace appears [to us] as a realm of objectivity, yet it exists in a social sense only for activity'.

Each social formation produces a social space that supports its own intentions ('how' social life should be lived, experienced and organized). Lefebvre (1991: 46) maintains that a shift from one mode of production to another requires the production of a new social space. Every society produces its own space on top of what already exists on site, which often includes the spatial arrangement inherited from previous social spaces. This implies that the new social formation seeks to produce its own representations of the inherited space. The existing material space acquires new social meanings through diverse reinterpretations, such as renovation projects, and partial or wholesale demolition. Old built environments are reconfigured into offices, entertainment and leisure venues and housing complexes. In other cases, the built environments are totally demolished, while the spatial organization and its characteristics (streets and zoning) are kept intact. Hence, the present social space encompasses older social spaces that once existed on site to serve new purposes. This suggests that while conducting spatial analyses, it is crucial to apply a historical perspective and accordingly, understand the production of social space as a process (Lefebvre 1991). On the absorption of inherited space into new social spaces, Lefebvre states:

> The new mode of production (the new society) appropriates, that is to say, adapts to its own ends, pre-existing space, whose patterns had been previously formed. Slow changes, penetrating a space that had already been consolidated, but sometimes brutally disrupting it…. (Lefebvre 2003/[1986]: 212)

To address the historical and contemporary production of social space in detail and acquire tools for the analyses of social space, the relationship between modernity, capitalism and the state is discussed in the following section.

Modernity, capitalism and the state

Lefebvre (1991) details the spatial production within modernity. The processes of modernity create a certain understanding of social space, which is called abstract space. While temporality becomes the structuring principle,

modernity produces space as an empty void ready to be filled, exchanged and exploited. The abstract space of modernity produces an understanding of space as formal and quantitative. As a production of symbolic thought, abstract space is driven by a will to classify, order and homogenize social relations and society as a whole (Lefebvre 1991). Abstract space is profoundly political; it is a genuine product of capitalism, nations, warfare, colonialism, bureaucracy, planning and science. The abstract space produces a social space that relies upon assumptions such as geometry, logic, rationality, instrumentality, predictability, exchangeability, reproducibility and homogeneity (Lefebvre 1991: 1–3, 396). Abstract space colonizes lived social space and reduces humanity, which make bodies, senses, emotions and experiences obsolete. While producing this illusory and limiting view, the abstract space of modernity conveys prohibitions to people by producing a view of space as definite and neutral (Lefebvre 1991: 285, 287, 319, 411). Thus, abstract space has real consequences; space is divided into functional units, each intended to serve different social purposes. As opposed to the term used, abstract space is highly concrete. Lefebvre explains:

> Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the 'world of commodities', its 'logic', and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state. This space is founded on the vast networks of banks, business centres and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information lattices. (Lefebvre 1991: 53)

The abstract space of modernity is concretized in and works through the production of built and landscaped environments such as real estate developments, central business districts, parks, department stores, banks and other corporate venues and larger spatial entities such as cities and states (Lefebvre 1991). Similarly, abstract space is fundamental to colonialism. Referring to Lefebvre's work on the state's role in spatial production, Kipfer et al writes:

> colonization refers to the role of the state in organizing territorial relationships of center and periphery, with all the alienating, humiliating, and degrading aspects such relationships entail. (Kipfer et al. 2008b: 294)

Entangled in the former imperial system and contemporary global relations, the state has a major role in the maintenance of abstract space and thus, the

production of modern social space as a whole. While planning and organizing societies rationally, states impose and promote themselves as stable centres. The state has the capacity to arrange and classify social space (Lefebvre 1991: 375). With the use of bureaucratic institutions, laws, regulatory means, technology, military and scientific traditions, the state has emerged as a particular form of spatial production. Regardless of their location, states impose analogous and homologous measures independent of ideology, background or the class origin of their rulers (Lefebvre 1991: 23). The modern social space is intervened continuously by the state and its political and bureaucratic apparatuses. While relying on the circulation and control of capital, the state manages land and positions itself as the sole player of the organization of space. The production of national space implies 'a political power controlling and exploiting the resources of the market or the growth of the productive forces in order to maintain and further its rule' (Lefebvre 1991: 112). Having the main function of organizing social space, the state strives to regulate the global economic, political and cultural flows and networks of space (Lefebvre 1991: 383). In this respect, the state is an enforced entity. Through the use of different political, administrative and social means, each state strives to produce a unified and homogenous society (Lefebvre 1991: 281). Within its own delimited space, which is the national territory, the state produces 'a social space as such, an (artificial) edifice of hierarchically ordered institutions, of laws and conventions upheld by 'values' that are communicated through the national language' (Lefebvre 2009: 224). In the process of spatial production, the state emerges as a power container. Each state partitions its own space, introducing its administrative classification of space and its discourses of space, objects and people. Part of the process of producing national space, 'the state occupies a mental space that includes the representations of the state that people construct—confused or clear, directly experienced or conceptually elaborated' (Lefebvre 2009: 225).

Addressing Lefebvre's analysis of the role of abstract space in state production, Brenner and Elden suggest that

> the production of abstract space entails transformations not only in political practices and institutional arrangements, but also in political imaginaries: it involves new ways

> of envisioning, conceiving, and representing the spaces within which everyday life, capital accumulation, and state action are to unfold. (Brenner and Elden 2009: 359)

In the above sections, I have shown several important features of Lefebvre's contribution to an understanding of space. The next section deals with how Lefebvre details the production of social space.

Spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces

In Lefebvre's theory, the production of social space is analytically understood through a three-way process. As briefly illustrated earlier in this chapter, social space is produced through the combination of physical environments, activities in and through space, representations of space and lived experiences. Lefebvre illustrates this process of production by introducing the conceptual triad: spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces (Lefebvre 1991).

With the capacity to arrange and structure social relations, the built and landscaped environments are implicated in the production of social space. Social space is fixed by the production of physical environments, such as walls and borders, buildings, parks, infrastructure (highways, streets and subway systems) and other physical demarcations. Having said this, built and landscaped environments can be understood as spatial practices. By the term spatial practice, Lefebvre addresses physical space (how buildings and infrastructure are organized), how space appears to its users, and activities (what people do) in space. While facilitating taken-for-grantedness, spatial practices conceal a society's space, i.e., the intentions of a given social space. Lefebvre explains the term as follows:

> The spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the analytical standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space. (Lefebvre 1991: 38)

Within the abstract space of modernity, spatial practices are produced as objective, natural and definite.

On the term 'spatial practice', Lefebvre continues:

> Spatial practice, which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society's relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance. (Lefebvre 1991: 33)

Giving support to social space, spatial practices are the combination of concrete buildings, the physical and social organization of space, the relationship between the human body and its immediate surroundings and how people get to know environments and experience space (sensing, orientation and bodily movement). Supporting the intentions of abstract space, spatial practices often enable stability, unity and consistency in social relations (Lefebvre 1991).

By the use of spatial practices, social space has the capacity to restrict activities to certain physical spaces; it decides what kind of activities may occur within its borders (Lefebvre 1991: 143). Within each social space, spatial practices indicate specific uses of space. In accordance with the intentions of abstract space, social space delegates appropriate places to relations of production and reproduction (Lefebvre 1991: 32). Social space is divided into designated areas to which certain individuals and social groups are invited or excluded. Within different social spaces, relationships between people and spaces are valorized and hierarchized in different ways. As I understand Lefebvre, the processes of spatial valorization and hierarchization are often conducted by the state (spatial division, censuses), municipalities (place promotion), corporations and mass media, which, accordingly, result in 'connotative discourses concerning these places' (Lefebvre 1991: 56). With respect to this, Lefebvre (1991: 375) argues that capitalist social spaces have the capability to sort people, as space is classified in the service of dominant social strata and classes. With the solidity of space, the users of space act mostly in accordance with laws, rules and social codes of social space, and in this process, space is taken for granted and becomes secured.

Implicated in the abstract space of modernity, representations of space have the capacity to regulate and dominate the production of social space

(Lefebvre 1991). Representations of space are largely the means by which ruling powers dominate social space. Representations of space are explicitly 'tied to the relations of production and to the "other" which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to "frontal" relations' (Lefebvre 1991: 33). Thus, representations of space have a 'substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space' (Lefebvre 1991: 42). Generally locatable to those with power over a given social space, representations of space produce new spatial organizations by conceptualizing and planning spaces, such as cities, streets and buildings.

Representations of space are produced by various actors, including politicians, planners, architects, technocratic subdividers, social engineers, urbanists and scientists. As a product of intellectual thought, representations of space are conceptualizations of how the future social space should be spatially organized and how it should be used. Thus, representations of space have the capacity to impose conceptualizations of space onto the lived spatialities of social space. Representations of space are thus abstractions and detached from lived experience. In order to legitimize its undertakings, representations of space cite laws and other regulatory frameworks of social spaces. While relying on their close relationship with powerful actors and other official means, representations of space strengthen and reproduce social space. Having the capacity to produce truth claims, representations of space appear as authoritative, unified, sterile and homogeneous (Lefebvre 1991: 230).

In contrast to representations of space, Lefebvre (1991) suggests that representational spaces are the users and inhabitants of social spaces, which include how social spaces are imagined and symbolized by individuals and social groups. Implicated in the production of social space, representational spaces are foremost characterized by people's feelings, experiences, understandings, interpretations, descriptions, memories, identifications, values, labels and imaginations of space. Yet, representational spaces are interwoven with the resilient abstract space, spatial practices and representations of space. Lefebvre defines representational space as

> space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few

> writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe. This is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. Thus representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs. (Lefebvre 1991: 39)

Born out of feelings and thoughts, spoken and written words, representational spaces are alive, unique, affective, emotional, passionate, qualitative, dynamic and fluid. Representational spaces are inherently subjective and involve people's engagement with space (Lefebvre 1991). On representational space, Lefebvre (1991: 41) writes, '[r]edolent with imaginary and symbolic elements, they have their source in history—in the history of a people as well as in the history of each individual belonging to that people'. Social space manifests itself as representational spaces in conversational topics; spaces are often cited and commented upon (Lefebvre 1991: 362). As spatial practices are interwoven in different ways, representational spaces involve imaginations, symbolisms and fantasies, which relate to existing built environments and activities in space. Lefebvre (1991: 230) states that the '[p]re-existing space underpins not only durable spatial arrangements but also representational spaces and their attendant imagery and mythic narratives'. On the term 'representational space', Lefebvre continues:

> Representational spaces, embodying complex symbolism, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces). (Lefebvre 1991: 33)

While Lefebvre emphasizes marginal positions as crucial features of representational spaces, I suggest that all complex symbolism by the users and inhabitants of social spaces are vital. They are vital features in the sense that they display how people engage personally with social space, despite the fact that they might maintain the status quo of a given social space.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have detailed the sociology of space by focusing on Lefebvre's spatial theory. Most significantly, I have suggested that the use of Lefebvre's 'social space' allows for a comprehensive spatial analysis, which takes into account the production of modern spatiality and its characteristics and each level of its social production. While Lefebvre's 'abstract space' allows for an analysis of China's shifting political ideology and how the new modern society (social space) is subsequently envisioned, Lefebvre's conceptual triad provides tools to understand social production of space at different integrated levels. In this context, the societal levels include official representations of Shanghai's changes (representations of space), the new built and landscaped environments in post-1990s Shanghai (spatial practices), and China's new emerging modern subjects and how they experience and understand the implementations of the envisioned society (representational spaces).

In order to understand the production of contemporary China, it is also important to situate this production in a historical context. As I briefly illustrated in the introduction of this study, China's historical experiences of colonialism are crucial for how contemporary China opens up to the outside world and how the CCP produces the history of the country.

4 Post-colonial studies and the Chinese semi-colonial experience

In this chapter, I position the workings of colonialism on the Chinese mainland in the field of post-colonial studies. I define central interventions in the field, which are crucial for understanding the historical encounters between China and the outside world prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Therefore, I focus on specific parts of post-colonial studies, and the colonial histories and cultures that are unique to the Chinese mainland. With this in mind, this chapter also works as a historical contextualization of Shanghai and China.

Post-colonial studies and China

> The historical complexity of East Asian colonialisms, semi-colonialism, multiple colonialization, and neocolonial formations suggests many different ways of rereading earlier, totalizing notions of colonial discourse. (Barlow 1993: vii)

The Chinese semi-colonial experiences question often universalizing understandings of colonialism. While the majority of post-colonial theorists show an awareness of how colonialism and post-colonialism work differently depending on their location in time and space, the field of post-colonial studies is often universalizing and ahistorical (Shohat 1992). As the term 'post-colonial' has become 'a universalizing category which neutralizes significant geopolitical differences' (Shohat 1992: 103), it lacks sensitivity to particular social spaces and particular historical experiences of colonialism. The term 'post-colonial' does not take into account diverse beginnings of different colonial periods, how colonialism was structured depending upon its location in time and space, and when and how particular countries gained independence from colonial powers (Shohat 1992).

Several scholars are striving to broaden the field of post-colonial studies to include the Chinese experiences of semi-colonialism (Barlow 1993; Shih 2001). The post-colonial literature theorist Shu-Mei Shih (2001: 278–9) states that the 'theories of colonialism and postcolonialism based on South Asian, African and Caribbean experiences have been influential but of limited

applicability to the Chinese context'. The experiences of colonialism and semi-colonialism in China have been neglected by most post-colonial theorists due to the assumption that 'China materialized as an essentially noncolonial national unit at the very moment academic scholarship on Asia turned to social science' as 'China was not really colonized' (Barlow 1993: 225, 246). Until recently, the total colonization of Hong Kong and Macau and the partial colonization of several port cities, such as Shanghai, were largely ignored by post-colonial theorists.

Within the field of post-colonial studies, there is a debate regarding the implications of the use of the prefix 'post' in the term 'post-colonial'. As post-colonial theorists have shown, the prefix 'post' re-establishes European time as it indicates the point in time when the colonizers left the colonized spaces and beyond (McClintock 1995). Thus, the use of the prefix 'post' is assumed to indicate a linear historical development. Anne McClintock suggests that the term post-colonial

> is haunted by the very figure of linear development that it sets out to dismantle. Metaphorically, the term postcolonialism marks history as a series of stages along an epochal road from 'the precolonial', to 'the colonial', to 'the postcolonial'—an unbidden, if disavowed commitment to linear time and the idea of development. If a theoretical tendency to envisage 'Third World' literature as progressing from 'protest literature' to 'resistance literature' to 'national literature' has been criticized for rehearsing the Enlightenment trope of sequential linear progress, the term post-colonialism is questionable for the same reason. Metaphorically poised on the border between old and new, end and beginning, the term heralds the end of a world era but by invoking the same trope of linear progress which animated that era. (McClintock 1995: 10)

While the prefix 'post' prioritizes the West in its re-centring of history along colonialism and capitalism, it also indicates, more significantly, the negotiation, change and transfer of administrative and political power from the colonizer to the formerly colonized. Showing its implication for the building of a new national identity, the prefix indicates a factual retreat of colonial administrative and political powers from the formerly colonized spaces (Hall 1996). The majority of the colonies were liberated from the colonial powers and became self-governing in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the context of the Chinese mainland, Lu characterizes

> the new temporality of post-1949 China as the 'postcolonial time'. By doing so, I am aware of the risk of applying the notion 'postcolonial' to a historical context that differs greatly from the one in which the notion was first formulated. The evocation of the term, is, however, worth the risk, as it will not only help to comprehend some underexplored aspects of Third Worldliness of Chinese socialism, but will also allow a reassessment of the claims of postcolonialism through Chinese experiences. (Lu 2006: 3)

In relation to Lu (2006) and McClintock (1995), I argue that the use of empirical expressions such as 'liberation' by a new ruling power suggests that the prefix 'post' is crucial for how scholars understand the processes of social change, as it suggests the production of a new nation by a new governing apparatus (by narrating the nation in constitutions, laws, advertisements, on television). Post-colonial literature theorist Shaobo Xie (1997: 9) argues that post-colonialism is 'a counterdiscourse of the formerly colonized Others against the cultural hegemony of the modern West with all its imperial structures of feeling and knowledge'. Xie (1997) argues that post-colonialism interrogates and dismantles imperialist forms of knowledge. Post-colonialism attempts to go beyond Eurocentric ideology, colonial binary oppositions and racism. Post-colonialism seeks to rethink, reconstruct and rediscover 'the history of the world against the inadequacy of the terms and conceptual frames invented by the West' (Xie 1997: 10). In relation to Xie (1997), I argue for the importance of sensitivity to and grounding in empirical expressions, such as 'liberation', 'opening up' and 'modernization', as they are crucial for the understanding of the official production of the new nation, and official China's monitored re-integration with the outside world vis-à-vis China's historical experience of semi-colonialism. Within this context, the expressions are implicated in the CCP's attempt to legitimize its rule.

Several post-colonial theorists maintain that the prefix 'post' undermines the traces of colonialism in contemporary culture, politics and economy. Problematizing the alleged distinctiveness between colonialism and post-colonialism, Shohat (1992: 105) writes, '[t]he term "post-colonial" carries with it the implication that colonialism is now a matter of the past, undermining colonialism's economic, political, and cultural deformative-traces in the

present'. Providing another perspective on the use of the term post-colonial, Xie explains:

> The postcolonial does not signify the demise or pastness of coloniality; rather, it points to a colonial past that remains to be interrogated and critiqued. It admits an indebtedness to the past and a responsibility to the future; it intends to clear the ground of older colonialism in order to resist neocolonialism. (Xie 1997: 15)

In the preceding quote, Xie highlights the complicated workings of colonialism in the present. Relying on the alleged ideological, economic and technological superiority of the West, neocolonialism hegemonizes Western values, morality, institutions and structures (Xie 1997). Rather than outright colonial rule, the neocolonization of the formerly colonized is enacted and sanctioned by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and several governments in the West (Banerjee et al. 2009).

Colonial power and semi-colonialism

> By the 1930s, colonies and ex-colonies covered 84.6 per cent of the land surface of the globe. Only parts of Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Tibet, China, Siam and Japan had never been under formal European government. (Loomba 2005/[1998]: 3)

Colonialism was concerned with outright spatial supremacy. Subjecting others through warfare and other disciplining tools, colonial powers attained complete domination and formal sovereignty over colonized spaces. Accompanied by armies and trade systems, the colonial powers produced colonial social spaces – formal colonies – throughout the world. While European colonizers penetrated deep into several societies, they were sometimes involved in 'superficial' contact with others (Loomba 2005). Although the entire Chinese mainland never was under formal colonial rule, several port cities and localities were either totally colonized or partly colonized by foreign powers. In contrast to formal colonies, China was subjected to informal colonization, which is a phenomenon seldom explored in the field of post-colonial studies.

Informal colonization is:

> the integration of a peripheral area [of a foreign country] into the economy of an industrial power in a relationship of dependence, one in which the strategic decisions governing the direction and rate of growth of the 'informal colony' were made by the imperial power and governed by its own interests. (Winn 1976: 126)

In relation to informal colonization, I make use of the terms 'semi-coloniality' and 'post-semi-coloniality' to denote the particular condition of colonialism that China experienced between 1842 and 1949, and is experiencing today (1949–). After China's defeat in the Opium War in 1842, the Qing Dynasty rulers were forced to open up several ports and cede Hong Kong Island to Great Britain. As a result, treaty ports were established in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou and Xiamen. Macau became a Portuguese colony in 1887.[10] Covering over 100 years, the semi-colonial era encompassed the late Qing dynasty and Republican China (1912–1949). While retaining several Chinese areas, the treaty established two separate concessions in Shanghai, the International Settlement (Great Britain and the United States) and the French Concession. While Great Britain, the United States and France were the major actors in semi-colonial China, others were Portugal, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary and the Soviet Union. In addition to Great Britain, the United States and France, Imperial Japan also played an extensive role in semi-colonial China and elsewhere in Asia, as the imperial power fought several wars and colonized several parts of the region.

In contrast with formal colonies, the Chinese mainland was subject to 'a different mode of colonial control [which] operate[d] through fragmented, multiple, or multilayered forms of domination' (Shih 1996: 938). The system of treaty ports (and the internal organization of each treaty port) amalgamated into complex structures of collaboration between colonizers and the local political and economic elite (Osterhammel 1986). Shih (2001: 31) uses the term 'semi-colonialism' to denote the consequences of the simultaneous co-

[10] During different times, several other Chinese localities were also colonised or semicolonised by numerous foreign powers. They were Dalian, Qingdao, Changsha, Changchun, Hunchun, Nanjing, Yuezhou, Chongqing, Harbin, Shantou, Aihun, Sanshui, Zhenjiang, Yingkou, Manzhouli, Shenyang, Haikou, Nanning, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao, Yichang, Niuzhuang, Yantai, Jiujiang, Mengzi, Wenzhou, Hankou, Shashi, Simao, Dengyue and Beihai.

presence of numerous imperialists, their fragmented colonial spatiality (as the treaty ports were dispersed along the eastern and south-eastern coast of the Chinese mainland), their control, and the social and cultural formations that emerged out of this situation. Abbas describes semi-colonial Shanghai:

> The existence of the different concessions, each with its own set of extraterritorial laws, meant that internal control of the city always had to be negotiated, often with the triad underworld operating as unofficial arbiters. However, this created less an anarchic city than a polycentric, decentered city controlled by many different hands. … But far from being lawless, the space of Shanghai was subject to constant negotiations, and every initiative was observed from multiple perspectives. (Abbas 2000: 774)

Ever since the 1920s, Chinese communists have used the term semi-colony to denote the co-presence of colonial and feudal structures in pre-1949 China. As a strategy to position itself against the Qing Dynasty rulers and Republican China, Chinese communists introduced 'semi-colony' and 'semi-feudal' to define the societal condition that emerged in the early twentieth century. It was argued that a hybrid social formation emerged, as the feudal system was only partly penetrated by colonial powers. Mao also stressed that semi-colonialism was itself a unique social formation during the late-Qing dynasty and Republican China. The term 'subcolony' has also been applied to describe the Chinese experiences of colonialism (Shih 2001). The founder of Republican China, Sun Yat-sen, introduced the term 'subcolony' to describe the situation as the worst-case scenario of colonialism, as China was not 'slaves of one country, but of all' (Shih 2001: 31–4).

The effects of semi-colonialism in China have been understood in different ways. Principally, three approaches exist (Osterhammel 1986). While a third approach has been developed, which addresses the effects of semi-colonialism as marginal to China, two major approaches address semi-colonialism as 'oppression' and semi-colonialism as 'modernity'. The oppression argument revolves around the understanding by several Chinese communists (Mao Zedong), and Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang: Sun Yat-sen), as well as dependency and world system theorists.

Historian Jürgen Osterhammel (1986: 292-3) explains:

> [I]mperialist intrusion unbalanced the traditional economy and stifled its inherent developmental potentials…; genuine capitalism was not allowed to unfold; the Chinese state was weakened to the extent that it could not behave in a Gerschenkronian manner, that is, take the lead in economic development; the Chinese economy was partially reshaped to suit the needs of the metropolitan economies; a lopsided or even dualistic structure emerged with a foreign-dominated modern sector existing alongside a stagnant traditional sector that was not only exploited to provide cheap export commodities, but was also penetrated and partly ruined by foreign manufactured goods. The class structure of Chinese society was deformed with a nascent bourgeoisie vacillating uneasily between 'national' and 'comprador' attitudes. Imperialism allied itself with indigenous landlord, merchant and usury capital and, in general, propped up the most backward and oppressive elements in Chinese society. (Osterhammel 1986: 292–3)

While semi-colonialism hindered domestic development, as Osterhammel (1986) details above, the second approach argues that 'the "input" of Western capital, Western technology and, above all, Western values was necessary, perhaps historically inevitable and at any rate beneficial to China' (Osterhammel 1986: 293). This approach suggests that modernity is inherent to the West and not others. Similarly, resembling the formulations that are criticized by Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997) and Dirlik (2003), this approach argues that modernity was transferred from the West to China. While the West might have triggered China to modernize, it did so under forced semi-colonial rule. The third approach argues that the colonial presence on the Chinese mainland 'made no significant impact' on the country proper, as the colonial powers were only confined to selected areas (Osterhammel 1986). While the three approaches suggest that semi-colonialism affected China to different degrees, colonial built environments were raised in the treaty ports.

Colonial space and Shanghai architecture

The production and reorganization of social space have been central to colonialism and semi-colonialism. After conquest, pre-existing space was significantly altered and restructured, and new spaces were produced. With their respective architecture and urban spatial forms, colonizing powers established new spatial practices in the colonized and semi-colonized spaces (Abbas 2000; King 1991; Mills 2005). Colonies became experimental sites for

new spatial arrangements and adoption of Western metropolitan environments. Thus, colonial architecture resembles urban forms found in the metropolitan centres of the West (King 1991). In the treaty ports in China, Western architecture and planning principles were introduced. They included modern urban facilities (electricity, gas and water), urban construction (waterfronts, bridges and roads), construction techniques, public and corporate buildings (hotels, banks, railway stations, department stores) and private homes (Abbas 2000; Lee 1999; Zhu 2009). The semi-colonization of Shanghai is evident in the city's built and landscaped environments. Concentrated in the International Settlement and the French Concession, colonial powers produced neoclassical, neo-baroque and neo-Gothic structures, art deco buildings, German-style mansions, Spanish-style townhouses, Russian-style churches, modernist structures, Tudor-style villas and the Bund waterfront. Modern spaces, such as coffeehouses, churches, opium dens, factories, villas, schools, theatres, brothels, cabaret clubs, hotels, banks, parks, dance halls, racecourses, department stores and cinemas were produced (Abbas 2000; Lee 1999; Zhu 2009).

The Bund waterfront (photo by Carsten Ullrich)

The International Settlement was the central business district and administrative centre of the city. Centred on colonial trade, the Bund was established as a waterfront esplanade along the Huangpu River in the late nineteenth century. As the seat of British colonial power, the Bund came to symbolize the prosperity of semi-colonial Shanghai. With linguistic origins in Sanskrit and Persian, the Bund connotes a riverbank, a harbour and a landing-place (Taylor 2002: 128–9). The term bund 'came to signify the entire space along the port side which, despite being littoral in nature, actually formed the centre of European life in the treaty ports' (Taylor 2002: 129). The equivalent to the Bund in Chinese is Waitan, which connotes the 'outside bank' and 'outside beach' of the Huangpu River. The Bund buildings were 'in essence a parade of monuments to particular institutions associated with a non-Chinese treaty presence in the city' (Taylor 2002: 126). The Bund housed several international firms and consulates, collaborations and joint-ventures between Chinese and foreign powers, and several private actors. Serving also recreational purposes, the Bund contained colonial commemorative and decorative monuments, and a Victorian park. The park was rumoured to have a sign that declared 'Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted' (Bickers and Wasserstrom 1995). After 1949, the colonial monuments were demolished and the park was redesigned and made into a public space. Today, the Bund contains a statue of Chen Yi, the first mayor of post-1949 Shanghai, and the Monument to the People's Heroes. In semi-colonial Shanghai, most locals were barred from the area, as the colonizers preferred to partake in 'leisure activities in the company of each other rather than with members of "native populations"' (Taylor 2002: 138). Hosting several clubs and hotels, the Bund emerged as a sophisticated and exclusive site for colonizers and the local elite. As the commercial extension of the Bund, Nanjing Lu was established as one of the two major shopping streets (Huai Hai Lu is the other). Similar to the Bund, Nanjing Lu became a symbol of the colonial presence in the city (Lee 1999: 15). With the combination of consumerism and recreation, Nanjing Lu offered, department stores, restaurants, rooftop bars, coffeehouses and dance halls and a tram system (Bergère 2009: 252).

The French Concession emerged as a retail, leisure and residential centre for the colonizers, the local elite and others. As a metaphorical extension of Paris, the French colonial government planted plane trees along the streets (Bergère 2009" 119–20).[11] Evoking Paris, contemporary Fuxing Lu was called Rue Lafayette. Attracting many upper-class patrons, Avenue Joffre (Huai Hai Lu today) was lined with boutiques, bars, cafés, coffeehouses and restaurants. Residential blocks, churches, cemeteries and schools were also built in the French Concession (Bergère 2009: 247–51). Still, the old French Concession (today divided into several subdistricts) is lined with trees, mansions, entertainment spaces, villas, apartment buildings, recreational spaces, boutiques, department stores and parks.

Western and Chinese architectural traditions were merged in semi-colonial Shanghai. Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Chinese and foreign architects modified European building styles in Shanghai. Scattered around the city, *longtang* structures were produced to meet the urgent need of residential space. The *longtang* built environments were built mostly by Western property owners for local residents. As the primary living space for the Shanghainese on the verge of semi-colonial modernization, the *longtang* structure was—and still is—a distinctive architectural style only found in Shanghai. Concentrated within the concessions, *longtang* structures emerged as a fusion between Western and Chinese architectural traditions. Evoking English terraced housings, the *longtang* built environment 'blends European architectural elements such as slate-gray [and red] bricks and French windows with Chinese features such as courtyards and stone gates' (Ren 2008). The s*hikumen* housing style was the most common *longtang* structure, while new-style *lilong* buildings and others were also constructed. Characterizing the architecture of the semi-colonial city, *longtang* built environments were a particular dwelling form produced in the midst of the 'process of moving from tradition towards modernity, which succeeded in breeding a transitional yet new urban dwelling culture within its particular

[11] For a discussion of the parallel between Paris and Shanghai, see Yue (2006), pp. 226-7.

local historical context' (Zhao 2004: 50). *Longtang* structures were the major residential form in the city until the 1980s (Zhao 2004; Ren 2008). While numerous *longtang* built environments deteriorated due to lack of repair, overcrowding or were demolished beginning in the 1980s, several *longtang* blocks have been redeveloped through official and private initiatives.[12]

Orientalism, 'the West' and Shanghai

Colonial powers were engaged in producing 'knowledge' about their cultural others. As part of the processes of modernity, Western colonial knowledge produced stereotypes, myths and prejudices about non-Western societies. The analytical term 'Orientalism' was introduced by Edward Said (2003/[1978]) to address the Western 'scientific' production of 'the other'. Western knowledge did not reflect 'the Orient', it constructed and invented it. With the term 'Orientalism', Said (1985) addressed the historical relationship between Europe and Asia throughout 4,000 years, especially the early nineteenth century, and how the field of 'Oriental studies' understood distant traditions and cultures and other ideological productions of 'the Orient' (fantasies, images and presumptions). Western colonial knowledge produced an imagined geography, which separated 'the Occident' from 'the Orient' (Said 1985). While social spaces were categorized and hierarchized, spatial differences were turned into temporal differences, and several societies were placed in a linear temporality in which Euro-America indicated progress (Dirlik 1996). The colonization processes produced categorization schemes in which geographical spaces and their inhabitants were put into hierarchies. Several dichotomies were created, such as centre/periphery, modern/traditional, civilized/uncivilized, active/passive, superior/inferior, moral/immoral, primitive/advanced and developed/underdeveloped (Dirlik 1996; Loomba 2005; McClintock 1995; Said 2003, 1985).

[12] See analyses in empirical chapters.

Similarly, semi-colonial Shanghai was represented in several Western historical accounts, stories, myths and images (Chen 2007; Shih 2001; Lee 1999). While China became 'traditionally the image of the ultimate Other' (Zhang 1988: 110), old Shanghai was represented as 'the Other China' (Bergère 1981). The city was represented as barbarous, sick, dangerous, promiscuous, mysterious, primitive, oriental, uncivilized, decadent, chaotic and dirty. The city emerged as a space of Western depravity, money worship, pleasure, sins, hedonism and temptations. Shanghai was also a paradise, a space of energy, fortune and Chinese modernism (Chen 2007; Shih 2001). Chen Xiaolan further demonstrates how the city was represented in orientalist accounts:

> Shanghai typically embodies a heterogenic quality for accepting the opposite of values of Western traditions and accommodating those aspects which are forbidden by Western morals, orders, laws and religions. (...) Shanghai is almost seen as the 'heretical' evil city and at the same time as an unrestrained, free, taboo-breaking, primitive, dangerous, sexual and free city with various possibilities and opportunities. (Chen 2007: 544)

Extending the orientalist sexualization of semi-colonial Shanghai, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized was also symbolized by the heterosexual relationship between a colonizing White male (assumed to represent civilization) and a colonized Chinese female (assumed to represent pristine vitality) (Chen 2007).

The production of Orientalism was not entirely a one-way process. Through European colonial travel in Asia, the 'Asian views of Asia' were also integrated into the history of Orientalism. Rather than being produced in isolation, Orientalism was a product of historical contact between Europeans, Americans and Asians in the colonial and semi-colonial localities. Later, Orientalism was also reinforced and produced through Asians' travel to Europe and the United States (Dirlik 1996). Similarly, Occidentalism was not an isolated phenomenon.

Chinese Occidentalism

While the post-colonial mainstream revolves around the production of Orientalism, the term 'Occidentalism' is crucial for understanding colonialism and semi-colonialism on the Chinese mainland. Accompanying Orientalism, 'the Chinese Orient has produced a new discourse marked by a particular combination of the Western construction of China with the Chinese construction of the West' (Chen 1992: 688). In essential respects, Chinese Occidentalism operates differently from Orientalism. Shih explains:

> Occidentalism, a strategy of appropriating the West, (...) cannot be conflated with Orientalism, a strategy in which the supposed Western universal consolidates itself by incorporating, managing and controlling the non-Western, particular other. (Shih 2001: 131)

As Shih shows above, Occidentalism is not equal to Orientalism. Occidentalism does not work through economic and political suppression as its counterpart. Rather, Chinese Occidentalism allows 'the Orient to participate actively and with indigenous creativity in the process of self-appropriation, even after being appropriated and constructed by Western others' (Chen 1992: 688).

Occidentalism has permeated the Chinese culture ever since the Opium War in the middle of the nineteenth century (Wang 1997). Chinese Occidentalism has been applied by different groups within the Chinese society (Chen 1992). In the early twentieth century, Occidentalism was evoked by Chinese modernist writers. With reference to semi-colonialism, Shih (2001) discusses how Chinese authors and intellectuals had an ambivalent and contradictory relationship to Western culture in Shanghai. In the semi-colonial city, there was 'a split in the concept of "the West", between the metropolitan West (Western culture in the West) and the colonial West (the culture of Western colonizers in China)' (Shih 2001: 36). While analysing the Shanghai modernists, Shih writes:

> Semicolonialism (...) sanctioned the strategy of bifurcating the metropolitan and the colonial, with these writers celebrating the metropolitan culture of the West and Japan as constitutive of their cosmopolitanism, but the bifurcation threatened to break down when they flaunted a Western-style urbanism which was largely a byproduct of semicolonialism. (Shih 2001: 233)

Chinese modernity was partly formulated in semi-colonial Shanghai. As the Nationalists (Kuomintang) removed the Qing dynasty and founded the Republic of China in 1912, the societal climate in Shanghai was characterized by a questioning of Chinese tradition and feudalism. In Shanghai, the production of Chinese modernism and the appropriation of Western modernism were justified as a counter-discourse to Chinese tradition and morality (Shih 2001). While the semi-colonial reality was displaced, cultural enlightenment was propagated (Chen 2007; Shih 2001). Shih (2001:37) suggests, 'the semicolonial condition undermined the clarity of colonial relationships, infusing the Chinese cultural imaginary with uncertainties and ambiguities in its relationship with colonial reality.' Semi-colonialism was characterized as a diffuse cultural and ideological domination. While showing traces of self-imposed cultural colonization, Chinese Occidentalism had the power to select and incorporate Western theories and discourses (Shih 2001). Xianlin Song (2000: 84) understands the term Occidentalism as 'a specific discourse of constructing images of a cultural Other as a way of coming to terms with Western ideas that is based on the West's place in Chinese experience'. Chinese Occidentalism worked as a self-empowering impulse that had the capacity of negating the Chinese self (Shih 2001).

Ever since the founding of the CCP, the strategy has been to evoke anti-imperialism and nationalism by essentialising 'the West'. Historically, Chinese official Occidentalism opposes Western cultural hegemonism (which includes bourgeois culture) (Chen 1992; Wang 1997). As part of the endorsement of a Third World identity in cultural revolutionary ideology, official historical Occidentalism is illustrated by how Mao Zedong used the Cold War rhetoric of 'the three worlds' in order to portray himself domestically as the leader of 'Third World' countries. Addressing the entire Chinese mainland, Lu (2006: 5) maintains, 'Memories of national humiliation under foreign powers are continuously evoked in contemporary Chinese nationalistic discourse to construct and strengthen a Third World national identity.' While representing the city of Shanghai, the CCP has often relied on Occidentalist expressions.

On the workings of official Occidentalism in Shanghai, Shih writes:

> In the nationalist imaginary of the Chinese Communist Party from about the 1930s until the late 1970s, the city of Shanghai likewise evoked a similar sense of disgust as a symbol of national humiliation and colonial exploitation. The Party propounded the need to eliminate all vestiges of colonialism, if not through physically tearing down colonial architectures then through the intense ideological remodeling of is populace. (Shih 2001: 234)

As opposed to the semi-colonial era where people were made into modern 'subjects' by colonial powers, it is argued that the post-1949 national space has turned into a place where people make themselves modern (Lu 2006: 5), or perhaps more accurately, in which the CCP strives to make the Chinese populace modern. On the importance of Chinese Occidentalism in the production of the new national identity, Wang Ning writes:

> Undoubtedly, in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism immediately after the founding of the People's Republic, Occidentalism did play a certain positive role in establishing China's position in the world and breaking through its isolation and economic sanction issued by the Western clique. (Wang 1997: 64)

Chinese Occidentalism works intimately with the processes of self-orientalization. Enabling self-orientalizations, the Euro/American images of Asia have been included in the self-images of the Chinese people and their perceptions of the past (and vice versa) (Dirlik 1996). Recalling Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997) and Dirlik (2003), contemporary official self-orientalism in the PRC works as a strategy to position the country as a subject vis-à-vis its cultural others and is used as a tool to strive for modernity on its own terms. Thus, 'the "pure Chinese" self-understanding by such belated figures had already been historically "contaminated" and even constructed by cultural and cross-cultural appropriations that belong to the whole of Chinese–Western relationships' (Chen 1992: 687).

Shanghai modern and literature

Semi-colonial Shanghai symbolizes China's early modernization. Since the late Qing dynasty, the city has emerged as a modern subject in various texts, such as historical works, films, essays and novels (Lee 1999; Shih 2001; Chen 2007; Zhang 1996). The Chinese modernist writers demonstrated 'an intense and

enduring consciousness of space' (Chen 2007: 544). The major authors were Lu Xun, Zhang Ailing, Mao Dun, Liu Na'Ou, Shi Zhecun, Dai Wangshu, Du Heng, Fei Ming, Mu Shiying and Guo Moruo.[13] Their writings were filled with extensive spatial vocabularies.[14] The itineraries of several characters, streets, intersections, sights, buildings, alleys, passageways and spatial borders were detailed.[15] Recalling Shih's discussion on semi-colonialism (2001), the foreign concessions were the spaces where the writers' associations and ambivalent sensibilities towards the West and modernism were mostly stimulated. Chen continues:

> The urban spatial consciousness in literature is closely related to the colonial features of Shanghai itself and represents an intense experience of the organization of space, of the oppositeness and co-existence in different spaces and of transcending boundaries. (Chen 2007: 544)

Centred on the colonized sections of the city, the modernist writers vigilantly illustrated public, commercial and private modern spaces. They were new department stores, banks, cinemas, parks, luxury hotels, mansions, tea houses, cafes, theatres, dance halls, opium dens, brothels, docks, railway stations, racecourse, writers' homes, balconies and tram carries (Chen 2007; Lee 1999; Shih 2001).

In Chinese, the modern culture that emerged in semi-colonial Shanghai is traditionally illuminated by the Jingpai/Haipai terminology. Originally a derogatory discourse among Beijing writers to distinguish between Beijing and Shanghai literature in the 1920s, the term 'Jingpai' refers to Beijing's assumed cultural refinement vis-à-vis Shanghai's commercialism. The term 'Jingpai' also denoted Beijing's traditional culture, conservatism, masculinity, inwardness and community living. In contrast, the term 'Haipai' denoted Shanghai's modernity, liberal lifestyle, urbanity, individualism, femininity,

[13] For extensive analyses of these authors, see Shih (2001) and Lee (1999).

[14] See also, Shih (1996 and 2001), Lee (1999) and Zhang (1996).

[15] For a discussion about Shanghai and the flâneur, see Lee (1999).

progressivity, outwardness and materialism (Gamble 2003; Greenspan 2012; Shih 2001; Zhang 1996; Zhong 2012).

Implicated in the Jingpai/Haipai terminology and Chinese Occidentalism, the semi-colonial city was also often symbolized as a courtesan and later a modern independent woman.[16] Quoting literature theorist Catherine Vance Yeh at length (in Chinese in the original), Chen Xiaolan writes, 'Shanghai and the courtesan, as two representative subjects, are used in presenting'

> the lifestyle of the city and her ideology. The fascinating, prosperous, luxury, confident and energetic image of Shanghai is closely related to the courtesan. The Shanghai courtesan, owing to her very extravagant lifestyle and business pattern, becomes an attraction for foreign concession tourists. Her image stands for the fashion, her behavior and manner becomes the model of women. She is regarded as the incarnation of the Shanghai spirit, symbolizing her power of seducing and corrupting. (Chen 2007: 547–8)

During the 1920s and 1930s, the role of the courtesan was reduced and replaced by the image of a modern woman (Chen 2007). Within a highly patriarchal framework, she was portrayed as ladylike, sensual, mysterious, pretty and soft. However, Shih (2001) argues that the Shanghai modern woman was also increasingly independent. Given some degree of autonomy and agency, she was able to act and return the male gaze, and resist Chinese patriarchy and Western Orientalism.

Lived contact spaces

> Postcolonial space (...) is very much a mixed space, mixed not only in terms of its historical structures but also in terms of the postcolonial's subjective responses to it. It is marked by the simultaneous presence of different historical layers and sensibilities anachronistically jostling one another, and not easy to separate. (Abbas 1993: 13)

The lived colonial and post-colonial spaces have been addressed in different ways by post-colonial theorists. Generally, the social life in the colonies and

[16] For an extensive analysis of courtesans in semi-colonial Shanghai, see Yeh (2006). On the Shanghai modern woman, see Shih (2001).

post-colonies has been understood by the terms 'contact zone' (Pratt 1992), 'third culture' (Featherstone 1990; King 1991), 'third space' (Bhabha 1994), the dichotomy colonizer/colonized (Loomba 2005) and cosmopolitanism (Abbas 2000; Ashcroft et al. 2013; Hannerz 1990). The terms 'frontier', 'boundary', 'border', 'hyphen' and 'liminality' are other theoretical tools to understand colonial and post-colonial lived space (Ashcroft et al. 2013; Loomba 2005). By the term 'contact zone', post-colonial literature theorist Mary Louise Pratt refers:

> to the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict. (Pratt 1992: 6)

With Pratt (1992) in mind, contact zones are conflictual and contradictory heterogeneous spaces in which cultural others co-mingle. The term 'contact zone' indicates that cultural encounters occur in certain spaces and times and not others. Colonial cities were the initial and main site of cultural encounters between the colonizer and the colonized (King 1991; Pratt 1992). With the term 'contact zone', Pratt (1990) enables an understanding of how people came together in historical colonial spaces and how they interact in contemporary post-colonial spaces. Acknowledging the symmetricality and asymmetricality of contact, individuals are situated differently in colonial and post-colonial spaces. Contact zones are:

> social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination—like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today. (Pratt 1992: 4)

Adding to the asymmetricality of contact zones, Pratt (1992) also acknowledges the spatial play between distance and proximity. Enabling an analysis of how contact is structured in different spaces and times, Pratt (1992: 7) elaborates: '"contact zone" is an attempt to invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographical and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect'. While Pratt (1992) suggests that distance and proximity are structuring contact, it is possible to propose that space and time have to be organized in certain ways to enable and maintain contact. To certain degrees, particular spaces and times are,

therefore, more likely to make contact possible than others. Questioning essentialised categories within the contact zone, Pratt writes:

> By using the term 'contact,' I aim to foreground the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination. A 'contact' perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other. It treats the relations among colonizers and colonized, or travelers and 'travelees', not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power. Pratt 1992: 7)

Above, Pratt addresses the lived contact spatialities as being constitutive of the colonizing and colonized subjects. Having this in mind, the lived spatialities that emerge in contact zones are third cultures as they are neither part of the cultures of the colonizers nor the cultures of the colonized. Third cultures, such as colonized and semi-colonized cities, 'are different from metropolitan and indigenous cultures, although they draw upon and modify elements from each one' (Mills 2005: 105). Orientated beyond the boundaries of nations and fixed cultural identities (yet sometimes exaggerating them), the third cultures produce new hybrid lifestyles, worldviews and behaviours. The third culture spaces produce flexible cultural identities, which are capable of 'moving backwards or forwards between different cultures' (Featherstone 1990: 8). While the colonized and semi-colonized cities were yesterday's third culture spaces, they are today's global and globalizing cities, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai (Featherstone 1990; King 1991; Sassen 2000; Abbas 2000).

In the field of post-colonial studies, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized is considered vis-à-vis the culture that emerges within contact spaces. While focusing lived spatialities of formal colonization, Ahmed (2000: 12) suggests: '[c]olonial encounters disrupt the identity of the "two" cultures who meet through the very process of hybridization—the meeting of the "two" that transforms each "one"'. As semi-colonial Shanghai was fractured and not under total colonization, the term hybridization enables an understanding of lived contact space as a vital site of altering dichotomies (such as colonizer/colonized) (Lee 1999).

Criticizing post-colonial studies, Leo Ou-Fan Lee writes:

> All post-colonial discourse, it seems to me, assumes a colonial structure of power in which the colonizers have the ultimate authority of the colonized, including their representation. It is a theoretical construct based on the situation of former British and French colonies in Africa and India. It also assumes that the colonizer is the 'subject' of the discourse, for which the colonized can only serve as the 'object' or 'other'. In Shanghai, Western 'colonial' authority was indeed legally recognized in the concession treaties, but it was also conveniently ignored by the Chinese residents in their daily lives [...]. (Lee 1999: 308)

As indicated above, the colonial powers in Shanghai were not able to produce proper colonized subjects. The local Shanghai inhabitants were merely semi-colonized, and thus, the structuring dichotomy of colonizer/colonized was destabilized. While embracing Western modernity and welcoming the concrete 'mechanical' form of modernity (cars, electric lights, tram lines and telegraphs, etc.), the local Shanghai inhabitants led their lives separate from the colonizers, and stood firm in their own identity (Lee 1999). Rather than outright colonial domination, Shanghai's semi-colonial cosmopolitanism resembles the definition of Occidentalism. Quoting Lee (1999), Abbas suggests (2000: 775) that Shanghai's cosmopolitanism 'could be understood not as the cultural domination by the foreign but as the appropriation by the local of "elements of foreign culture to enrich a new national culture"'. The foreign presence in Shanghai resulted in new public spaces that could be 'appropriated by the Chinese themselves and used to construct a Chinese version of modern cosmopolitan culture' (Abbas 2000: 775).

The end of semi-colonialism and the founding of the People's Republic of China

While the city developed its cosmopolitanism during semi-coloniality, Shanghai acquired its unique status under the premises of a weak Chinese state (Abbas 2000). As stated earlier, the late Qing Dynasty rulers were forced to open up selected parts of the country to external powers (particularly Great Britain, the United States and France).

Highlighting the problematic nature of Shanghai's cosmopolitanism, Abbas writes:

> it should not be forgotten that Shanghai's strength as a cosmopolitan city was always based on China's weakness as a nation. As such, there was always an underlying tension between national culture on the one hand, which could only be constructed as anticolonial resistance, and Shanghai cosmopolitanism on the other. (Abbas 2000: 775)

While the Nationalists (Kuomintang) disarmed the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China in 1912, they did not decolonize the country's treaty ports from the colonial powers and other parts of the country which were under Japanese imperial rule. As a result of this conflicted and complex situation, tensions between several social groups prevailed, and the republic was questioned by an increasing number of the population. Most significantly, semi-colonial Shanghai was subject to several struggles between the ruling Nationalists (Kuomintang) and the CCP, which later escalated into the Civil War. While Japanese military aggression was terminated as part of the Japanese defeat in World War II, the Civil War ended in 1949 when Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China in Beijing. As a result, the Nationalist government (Kuomintang) fled to Taiwan and reinstalled the Republic of China on the island. After 1949, the Chinese mainland was subject to a major reconstitution through Mao Zedong's attempts to produce an alternative modern socialist society. As Mao Zedong consolidated the CCP rule of the country, the Chinese mainland closed itself off almost entirely from the outside world, anti-imperialist sentiments prevailed, and the country experienced increased homogenization and vast social engineering experiments (Bray 2005; Lawrance 1998; Lu 1999; Lu 2006; Lynch 2004; Zhang 2010/[1996]).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how colonial experiences are central to China's history. While the country never was entirely colonized, selected parts were under colonial or semi-colonial rule for approximately 100 years. I have illustrated how China was fragmented by different colonial powers and how

Shanghai attained its semi-colonial cosmopolitanism. I have also shown how semi-colonialism was manifested in Shanghai's built and landscaped environments. Shanghai's semi-colonial status was also incorporated into Orientalist and Occidentalist accounts of the city. Most importantly, the city was—and still is—understood through the Jingpai/Haipai terminology, which denotes the city's uniqueness vis-à-vis Beijing. I have also shown how Chinese Occidentalism and self-orientalism have laid the foundation for the production of the new nation.

5 Combining spatial theory and post-colonial studies

> As in the works of most Western Marxists, questions of colonization and imperialism appeared only as secondary concerns in Lefebvre. As a consequence, his understanding of "colonization" (as one aspect of urbanization and the production of space) still remains under-mediated historically, geographically, and socially. (Kipfer et al. 2008b: 297-8)

In the previous two chapters, I have illustrated my theoretical starting points. While the field of post-colonial studies provides a historical contextualization of China's semi-colonial experiences, Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991) provides a comprehensive framework to understand China's production of its envisioned society. In this theoretical context, I develop my concept *contact space*. By combining Lefebvre's spatial theory and insights from the field of postcolonial studies, the concept enables an integrated analysis of the CCP's opening up reforms and the production of its envisioned society, which also takes into account how the new society is produced in relation to the country's most recent history. Thus, I also adapt Lefebvre's spatial theory to the Chinese context by acknowledging the importance of the country's history and experiences of semicolonialism. While *contact space* is also an empirical phenomenon, the analytical tool provides an understanding of how social space is reconfigured to facilitate contact with the outside world.

To enable this understanding, I make use of Lefebvre's concept of social space. As Lefebvre (1991) shows, the concept encompasses societal production at different integrated levels. The levels include general conceptions of space (such as the abstract space of modernity), official representations of space (how dominant actors produce their view of society), spatial practices (inherited built and planned environments and new ones that are constructed, and how people move in and across space) and representational spaces (how people are produced by and within a certain social space, and how people maintain, negotiate and question a given social space). As I show in this study, the changes that are taking place in contemporary China include each of these levels. Thus, I understand China's emerging society as a new social space in the making. Illuminating China's changes through Lefebvre's social space, I focus on how the CCP formulated a new abstract space for its modernization

of the country and how this abstract space is implemented in Shanghai through major reconfigurations of the existing social space, which include an integrated production of new representations of space, new spatial practices and representational spaces. Having this said, the concept contact space emerges as an analytical tool to show how the CCP envisions and enforces contact (abstract space), how the Shanghai Municipal Government implements (spatial practices), conceptualizes and promotes (representations of space) contact and how contact is understood at a personal level (representational spaces).

As Lefebvre (1991) acknowledges, the production of space is also intertwined with concepts of time, and thus, the social spaces that are inherited. While Lefebvre (1991) provides the term 'abstract space' to analyse the general view of space and time in modernity, his theory lacks tangible tools to understand the production of social space under colonialism and post-colonialism. However, it is important to recognize that Lefebvre acknowledges the importance of colonialism to modern spatial production, as Kipfer et al. (2008b) illustrate. With regard to Lefebvre's minor attention to colonialism, I turned to post-colonial studies and situated the field within the context of China's experiences of semi-colonialism. As I have shown, China was forced to open up designated spaces to colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century. This led to the production of several treaty port cities and a fragmented Chinese state. Within Lefebvre's spatial theory, I understand semicoloniality as a unique abstract space, which details the general characteristics of how the society was organized. As illustrated earlier, China's semicoloniality was fragmented under different power regimes (the local Qing dynasty rulers, the Republican government and several colonial powers). In 1949, this fragmented semi-colonial reality was terminated by the founding of the PRC, and Mao Zedong's socialist revolution. While post-colonial studies criticizes the production of historical linearity, the field also shows how contemporary post-colonial cities and states negotiate and make use of pre-existing social space. Post-colonial governments often produce a historical linearity, which indicates a political end to colonial rule and subsequent liberalization and independence from colonial powers under a new local power

regime. Within the context of analysing China, this becomes crucial as the CCP positions itself as the sole actor that freed the Chinese populace from colonial powers (and the nationalist government). While I have detailed the structuring of China's contact historically with the use of post-colonial studies, the empirical chapters analyse how the CCP envisions and implements contact with the outside world today, and how young Chinese engage in China's emerging society in Shanghai. As the CCP re-integrates the PRC with the outside world, the historical memory of semi-colonialism is also reworked in the present through official discourse, renovation of colonial built environments, place promotion and people's understanding of the history of the country and Shanghai. In this post-semi-colonial condition, the CCP strives to produce its version of the country's history and its own modern social space.

6 Methodology and methods

While previous chapters have provided the theoretical framework for the study, this chapter details my process of conducting research in China. Beginning with how I immersed myself in Shanghai, I go on to describe how the aim of the study developed and how I have worked methodologically with Lefebvre's spatial theory. After that follows a description of how I collected the empirical material, methodological considerations regarding interviewing and textual resources and the analytical process. The chapter goes on to detail relations in the field, the situatedness of interviewing and also the specific conditions of doing fieldwork in China and Shanghai. As a strategy to relate to the subsequent analytical chapters, I finish the chapter with my reflections regarding the structure of the analytical chapters.

Understanding the processes of opening up and immersion in social space

The ultimate aim of the present study is to explore 'space' in CCP rhetoric, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and personal intercultural engagements. I take an interpretive approach (Ray 2007), as I have been interested in immersing myself in the existing social realities and current conditions in Shanghai, and have attempted to understand the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai from the viewpoint of the CCP, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and individuals intentionally interacting with foreigners. Generally, an interpretive approach refers to 'understanding the meaning of action from the actor's point of view' (Ray 2007). Similarly, an interpretive approach denotes an attempt to get 'inside' the concepts people use to organize their understanding of the world (David 2010). Immersing myself in Shanghai, I engaged in extensive walks around the city, informal conversations with local Shanghainese, Chinese from other parts of the country, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, and foreigners (like myself), making friends, and taking part in language studies. With this interpretive approach, I struggled to be sensitive to the social space of Shanghai and to provide myself with first-hand knowledge and ultimately to contribute to a flexible and open

understanding of contemporary China and Shanghai. Instead of relying on preconceived notions about China and the West acquired in Europe, I have attempted to understand the contemporary Chinese society through an extensive engagement with local accounts on China (formal and informal conversations with local Chinese, reading local newspapers and official documents, and so forth). While contemporary Western representations of China are often orientalist (Vukovich 2012), I am also aware that local Chinese accounts are partial and situated. In particular, they are located within the one-party rule. As part of my interpretive approach, I did not intend to praise the changes taking place or condemn the current status quo of the PRC. Rather, I have attempted to study the changes that take place as they unfold within the given conditions. However, I will later shed light on some difficulties with doing fieldwork within a one-party state.

My interpretive approach is informed by the different positions I have taken prior to conducting the fieldwork, writing my analysis and during the process of finalizing the study. My twenty-year interest in the 'East Asian urban modern' (Wee 2012) (since my mid-teens when I watched Japanese and Chinese TV programs showing Tokyo and Hong Kong) and my academic engagements in cultural studies, global city studies, spatial theory, post-colonial studies and concrete post-colonial spaces have directed me to the subject of the present study. Together, my interests and engagements have sparked my curiosity to simply know more about the concrete workings of the 'East Asian urban modern' (Wee 2012). This resulted in my repeated stays in China over the last ten years. In 2003, I conducted fieldwork for my master's thesis in cultural studies and in 2004, I attended a PhD course on researching in China on China at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University. In 2005 and 2006 respectively, I conducted the main fieldwork for the present study, and in 2007, I attended a research conference on intercultural communication studies in Harbin (Heilongjiang Province) and stayed for a few weeks in Shanghai. In 2009, I collected new material for my study and in 2011, I instructed Nordic students, together with another Nordic China researcher, at the Nordic Centre summer course 'Introduction to Modern China'.

Working methodologically with Lefebvre's spatial theory

In relation to my recurring stays in Shanghai, the aim of the present study was developed in three major phases. Taking the point of departure in my master's thesis in gender studies (Vaide 2004), I intended to move from intercultural communication online and how it was unfolding in Shanghai personal classifieds and blogs to analyse the experiences of intercultural communication in the material spaces of Shanghai for my PhD study. I began interviewing people with intercultural experiences in the city in 2005 and 2006. Informed by ethnographic works (Crang and Cook 2007; Geertz 1973), I focused on activities and experiences in space, such as what they were doing together, where the interactions took place, how they detailed their experiences through different examples, and how these activities and experiences of intercultural contact unfolded in the interviews. Lacking appropriate theoretical tools for a sociological spatial analysis, I treated the space of Shanghai as a mere backdrop to the intercultural communication experiences.

In the second phase, which began in 2006, I aimed to analyse the interplay between 'race'/ethnicity and space in the interviews conducted during the first phase. At that point, the vocabularies that the individuals used to describe their intercultural communication experiences in Shanghai were understood as narratives of 'race'/ethnicity and space. While my theoretical and methodological tools to analyse 'race'/ethnicity were developed (Halualani et al. 2006; Riessman 1993), my tools for studying space were highly unsatisfactory. In contrast with Lefebvre (1991), the content of the interviews was not understood as partly constitutive to social space. Similar to other sociologists (addressed earlier), I understood space as a context for social interactions, a largely fixed entity, one conditioned by the narrative structure.

Evaluating the research agenda completely and reading Lefebvre's work (1991) on social space in 2008, the third phase began. Approaching the interviews from a Lefebvrean perspective, I became aware of the importance of the different spatial levels of social space and the importance of illuminating them analytically. Therefore, I decided to include analyses of Chinese political rhetoric and Shanghai spatial planning discourse (abstract space and representations of space) and new spaces (spatial practices), as the interviewees

(representational spaces) referred to these levels of social space. While being born in the early years of the reform era, the interviewees often use the economic reforms and opening up as reference points while talking about the changes taking place in Shanghai and how they experience the city's increased openness. As I established an understanding of the production of social space in general and the interviewees' experiences (of intercultural communication) as partly constitutive to social space in particular, the tripartite aim of the present study was elicited. However, it is important to mention that the interviewees' accounts are not fully equal to representational spaces. Rather, the interviewees' accounts contain substantial traces of representational spaces, as the accounts have been structured by the interview genre, and thus have been adapted for interview purposes.

While Lefebvre (1991) provides a comprehensive theoretical framework, I argue that he did not develop tangible methods for empirical sociological spatial analyses. Despite the extensive use of Lefebvre's spatial theory in cultural geography, architecture and spatial planning, his works on space are rarely raised in methodological literature and how his spatial theory is treated from a philosophy of science perspective. Highlighting the difficulties of applying Lefebvre, Zieleniec states,

> a criticism of Lefebvre's analysis is that it does not provide sufficient illustrative and substantial detail of the operation, the workings, of each of his dynamic elements. It is an abstract theoretical analysis that identifies a number of macro and micro social factors without specific consideration of the implications and applications of each of his elements. (Zieleniec 2007: 93)

In order to fill the gap in methodological approaches to Lefebvre's spatial theory, I suggest that Lefebvre's elaborations can be translated into a range of methodological tools, which already are found in the social sciences. Depending on how social science methods of observations and ethnographies, interviews and textual analyses are treated theoretically and what questions we ask the material while conducting research (not to be confused with the questions we pose to the interviewees), the existing methods can be incorporated into Lefebvre's theoretical framework. Considering Lefebvre's spatial theory, I argue that abstract space and each part of the spatial triad (spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces) suggests

concrete methods for the gathering of empirical materials for sociological spatial analyses.

Approaching established social science methods from a Lefebvrean perspective, they become vital tools for spatial analyses. As Lefebvre (1991: 38) addressed spatial organization and activities in space by the term 'spatial practices', I suggest that observations and ethnographies are useful for the purpose of 'deciphering of space', as observations and ethnographies generally focus on activities in and through space (Cloke et al. 2004). However, while observations and ethnographies conventionally take space for granted (space is typically treated as a backdrop) and mainly centre on people's activities in and through space, these methodological tools can also be applied to analyse how space is built, landscaped and organized (i.e. how space appears to the observer and ethnographer) and how space structures people's activities. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that spatial practices are implicated in the production of social space and a vehicle for the abstract space (including representations of space) to maintain the status quo (Lefebvre 1991). Correspondingly, representations of space can be grasped by textual and visual analyses of plans and maps (master plans, five-year plans, land use and zoning maps), other documents, informational and promotional booklets and books (place promotion), as representations of space are the knowledge, signs and codes produced by those dominating the production of social space. Representations of space also stimulate how people comprehend spatial practices. In addition, abstract space is addressed by analyses of political rhetoric as well as analysing established and new material spaces (spatial practices). Representational spaces are illuminated through interviews and informal talk, as well as journals and digital cultures. Similar to representations of space, representational spaces also show traces of spatial practices, representations of space and abstract space. In conversations and other means of communication, people show how they understand built environments, official views and the overall society.

Interviews as guided conversations

In order to analyse the experiences of opening up of the PRC and Shanghai, I have turned to the interviews conducted during the first phase. As a strategy to access individuals with intercultural communication experiences in Shanghai, the websites Shanghai AsiaXPAT (http://shanghai.asiaxpat.com) and Shanghai Expat (http://www.shanghaiexpat.com) were understood as online spaces where intercultural contacts are initiated. The websites enable people to post personals looking for Chinese and foreigners in the city. The websites target people that are intentionally looking for intercultural contact. As part of the first phase of the research process (as described above), the websites were used as a strategy to delimit the group of interviewees. By frequenting Shanghai AsiaXPAT and Shanghai Expat websites during my key research stays in 2005 and 2006, I announced that I was searching for interviewees for a research study on intercultural communication in Shanghai. I posted variations of this personal:

> Intercultural communication in Shanghai
>
> I'm a Swedish doctoral candidate in Sociology/Cultural Studies working on a project about intercultural communication in Shanghai. Basically, I'm focusing on what Chinese and foreigners are doing together, and where they get together. For the project, I'm looking for interviewees (both Chinese and foreigners) who would like to share their experiences of communicating with foreigners or Chinese in Shanghai. Your experiences would be a great input. Thanks!

Being aware of the fact that the use of 'intercultural', 'Chinese' and 'foreigner' might imply that I carry an essentialist view on identity and cultural belonging, I wanted to make use of cultural labels that carry recognizable meanings to the ones involved in Shanghai. As I stated earlier, I understand intercultural communication as an interactional site where similarity and dissimilarity are produced and negotiated (Halualani et al. 2006; Halualani and Nakayama 2012). Drawing on representations of the city and formal and informal conversations in Shanghai, the words 'intercultural', 'Chinese' and 'foreigner' were often used in day-to-day interactions between Chinese and foreigners in the city.

As the primary drive in interviewing is 'an interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience' (Seidman 2006: 9), I started to engage in guided conversations in 2005 and 2006. To obtain an initial understanding of the intercultural communication experiences, I began to conduct exploratory fieldwork. As I interviewed twelve individuals in 2005, I made written notes after each guided conversation (major topics discussed and indicative formulations by the interviewee). Later the same year, I realized that the written notes were not as detailed as I expected them to be. They were more anecdotal in nature. Having the preliminary findings from 2005 in mind, I conducted twelve recorded guided conversations with Chinese locals in 2006. They were also found through the above websites.[17]

Situated between the semi-structured and unstructured interviewing techniques, the guided conversations were conversational and relaxed in nature (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Conducted in the second language of both participants, the guided conversations were partly structured by the situational questions I posed, and the several different positions that the interviewee and I took during the event. While semi-structured interviews are content focused, unstructured interviews are interviewee focused. I attempted to balance both interview forms. During the guided conversations, I relied on the theme of 'intercultural communication in Shanghai' and the associations the interviewees drew from this guiding theme, and what I found relevant in each situation. In this associative context, the major conversational topics were consumption, the city's history and the colonial built environment, places, working in international companies, culture and language exchanges, the opening up of Shanghai, food, restaurants and nightlife, music and literature. The guided conversations were interviewee focused yet were loosely guided by the major theme of the first phase (as described above). Therefore, the guided

[17] As the guided conversations in 2005 were exploratory, they have not been quoted in the present study, as the aim of the fieldwork in 2005 was to get initial insight into the intercultural communication experiences in the city. Therefore, they were not recorded. However, the conversations have been important for the present study as a whole, as they set the framework for how themes were formed and questions were posed during the guided conversations in 2006.

conversations also resemble the semi-structured interviewing technique. Even though I understand the thematic and situational questions I asked during the guided conversations as content focused, I did not make use of a pre-written interview guide. Rather I relied on a rough sketch of what I wanted to cover in my notebook as I believe that a 'proper' interview guide in my hands would have fixed the conversational atmosphere and created an even more artificial situation. In this sketch, I listed major aspects that should loosely structure each guided conversation. I wanted to cover how my interviewees engage in intercultural contact, what they were doing together with their foreign or local counterpart, and where they interacted with them. However, it is important to say that by this procedure I did not attempt to mask the asymmetrical relationship between myself and the interviewee. Prior to the guided conversations, to authorize my position as a researcher and make the roles manifest, the interviewee and I exchanged business cards (which is customary when meeting new acquaintances in the PRC). Apart from the usual greeting practices and interviewees' questions about my background, the initial exchange of business cards was fitting as the participants of a research project 'should know the full identity of the interviewer' (Seidman 2006: 63). While it is important to share experiences only occasionally with the interviewee (Seidman 2006), I openly responded to the interviewees when they asked questions regarding my own relationship to Chinese culture and my stay in Shanghai.

In the beginning of my fieldwork, I was interested in interviewing local Chinese and foreigners in the city. After posting several personals on stated websites, I realized that only a limited number of foreigners replied. As few foreigners responded, I made the decision to include only guided conversations with Chinese individuals in the study.[18] In limiting myself to Chinese interviewees, I started to consider it meaningful to give voice only to empirical materials that display how Chinese engage in the opening up of

[18] While I could have chosen other strategies to access interviewees, I persisted in using the websites as the tool to access individuals with intercultural experiences in Shanghai, as the aim of the first phase was to enable a bridge with and a deeper understanding of the major findings in Vaide (2004).

China and Shanghai to the outside world since I find it important to provide local accounts on the changes taking place in contemporary China, while acknowledging that local accounts are yet implicated in unique local circumstances, such as the one-party state. After some consideration, I also came to the conclusion that foreigners' personal views on China can be considered as a research subject in its own right (Vukovich 2012). I also acknowledge that this study is motivated by my own situatedness (as a Swedish sociologist in China), research interests and theoretical positioning in sociology, spatial theory, contemporary East Asia studies and post-colonial studies.

While the main objective for the guided conversations was to produce an understanding of intercultural communication experiences in Shanghai, the guided conversations contained several indicative formulations about the city and the opening up processes. As I embarked on reading Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991) during the third phase, I began to understand the guided conversations as partly constituted to social space, and hence as representational spaces. In this phase, I decided to narrow down the number of guided conversations included in this study in relation to the current tripartite aim. Thus, the guided conversations that I have chosen to include more extensively through quotations were conducted with Nathan, Sophie, David, Tina, Ebba, Emelia and Jennie in 2006 (fictive names). As I will show in my analyses of the guided conversations, their expressions illustrate the intricate play between different spatial levels by their way of talking about their own unique experiences of intercultural contact in Shanghai in relation to popular discourses and official notions of Shanghai and China, and the emerging new society. In this context, my spatial theoretical interest became most manifest. As I analysed the guided conversations from a Lefebvrean perspective, I was directed to involve the official CCP rhetoric on the opening up of the country and Shanghai (abstract space and new spatial practices) and Shanghai spatial planning discourse (representations of space).

Textual resources

> Governments are not neutral referees overlooking society but players actively involved in the game. Like other organizations in society, they have particular objectives in obtaining, processing and presenting information and particular interests at stake in its content. (Cloke et al. 2004: 42)

While I initiated and conducted the guided conversations within the context of this study, the textual sources are naturally occurring data and externally produced. Nonetheless, they are not neutral artifacts. Official textual sources are situated and produced within the objectives of a particular government (Cloke et al. 2004). Understanding official textual resources within Lefebvre's spatial terminology (1991), they emerge as illustrative manifestations of the state's envisioned, implemented and promoted abstract space. Thus, I analyse official material as a strategy to understand the state's production of the envisioned society and how this production is envisioned, implemented and promoted in official sources. Particularly, I focus on how official China details its intended contact with the outside world, and how it is envisioned, implemented and promoted. With this in mind, I present the official textual resources analysed in this study.

In order to analyse the official visions for the new society, I have turned to the CCP rhetoric that has laid the framework for change in the country. As the paramount leader of the one-party state between 1978 and 1992, Deng Xiaoping envisioned the modernization and opening up of China in several speeches and talks. Ranging from Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and the current leaders, Chinese political rhetorics have been used to 'push social change as well as using them as vehicles for legitimizing their rule' (Lu and Simons 2006: 267). Illustrating the relevance for including an analysis of Deng Xiaoping in this study, it is crucial to acknowledge that Deng Xiaoping directed the changes that the PRC has experienced since the late 1970s, and the contents of his speeches and talks are major reference points for the succeeding leaders of the PRC. Top-down CCP rhetoric during the reform era plays a fundamental role in re-creating China's political ideology (Boutonnet 2011; Fan 2006; Lu 1999; Lu and Simons 2006; Wong 1998). Containing several indicative phrases of the envisioned society, the speeches and talks were given by Deng Xiaoping to different

governmental organs (the CCP National Congress, the CCP Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee, and the Central Advisory Commission of the CCP) and several foreign delegates and journalists. Supervised by the Editorial Committee for Party Literature, the speeches and talks have been compiled in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1994, vols. 1–3). I rely on the English version of the compilation, which is a translation approved by the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

To analyse Shanghai spatial planning discourse (representations of space), I have turned to 'the Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in Shanghai' (2006; hereafter referred to as 'the Outline'), which was approved by the Fourth Session of the Twelfth Municipal People's Congress of Shanghai, and materials published by the Information Office of Shanghai Municipality. Principally, 'the Outline':

> represents a strategic, fundamental and overall vision for the economic development and social progress in the city, constitutes an important basis for the government to fulfill its functions in economic adjustment, market regulation, social administration and public service, and lays the ground for the formulation and implementation of various thematic plans, regional plans at the district or county level, annual plans and relevant policies for economic and social development in Shanghai. (The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in Shanghai 2006)

As the uttermost strategic tool to develop the city, 'the Outline' is produced to 'fulfill the requirements of the CPC Central Committee [the highest authority within the CCP] and the State Council [the highest executive organ of state power in the PRC] to build a well-off society and substantially realize the goals of socialist modernization ahead of other regions of the country'. 'The Outline' has been compiled by the Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission, and translated into English by Shanghai International Studies University. While 'the Outline' describes the major achievements of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and sets the direction for the further development of the city between 2006 and 2010, the Information Office of Shanghai Municipality is the principal authority for communicating the city to different

audiences. As a department of the Shanghai Municipal Government, The Information Office of Shanghai Municipality is 'dedicated to showcase the glamor of the Oriental metropolis of Shanghai to the world'.[19] Jointly managed by the Shanghai Chinese Communist Party Committee and the Shanghai Municipal Government, the Information Office of Shanghai Municipality 'aims to showcase Shanghai in an objective and accurate way by offering a range of services to media from home and abroad'.[20] The major responsibilities of the office are:

- Introducing the economic and social development of Shanghai.
- Instructing and coordinating news reports on major policies, events and conferences.
- Offering guidance for news coverage.
- Distributing news announcements from major government bodies, organizations, institutions and bureaus in districts and counties.
- Arranging municipal press conferences.
- Providing assistance for overseas reporters and reporters from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
- Organizing overseas promotions events to feature Shanghai.
- Supervising the creation and publication of books, audio-visual material, film and television programmes on Shanghai.
- Supervising internet news coverage.
- Researching and responding to stories and items about Shanghai from major international media and media from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.[21]

[19] 'About Us: The Office', Information Office of Shanghai Municipality, http://en.shio.gov.cn/about-office.html (accessed in 2013).

[20] 'About Us: The Office', Information Office of Shanghai Municipality, http://en.shio.gov.cn/about-office.html (accessed in 2013).

[21] 'About Us: The Office', Information Office of Shanghai Municipality, http://en.shio.gov.cn/about-office.html (accessed in 2013).

Having the major responsibilities of the Information Office of Shanghai Municipality in mind, I have chosen to analyse their annual publication, 'Shanghai Basic Facts' (2007) which is co-produced with the Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau. Providing the informative essentials for knowledge producers (journalists and researchers), private organizations and official institutions, and people considering Shanghai (investors, tourists and students), 'Shanghai Basic Facts' (2007) details the city and how Shanghai has developed regarding issues such as the economy, urban construction, industries, the opening up to the outside world and tourist spaces. 'Shanghai Basic Facts' has been produced in both Chinese and English. While it is the main annual publication by the Information Office to its English-speaking audiences, other textual materials have also been produced. With regard to my focus in this study, I include *Shanghai Urban Planning* (Liu and Huang 2007), which provides the first official overview of Shanghai's urban planning in English. Translated from Chinese, the book was sponsored by the Information Office of the State Council and supported by the Information Office of Shanghai Municipality. The book presents the urban development of Shanghai and details the Master City Plan of Shanghai 1999–2020 (in effect since 2001). Approved by the State Council, the Master City Plan is

> a legal document to guide urban development and construction, a basis for compiling the short-term plan of national economic and social development, zoning plans, district (county) planning, detailed planning, special planning, and a foundation for implementing urban construction and management [and] an important strategic plan of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council concerning the long-term development of Shanghai in the 21st century, and a grand blueprint for the development of Shanghai over a 20-year period. (Liu and Huang 2007: 67)

Apart from the mentioned materials, I visited several exhibitions at the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Centre in 2009 to collect several indicative phrases in its promotion of Shanghai. Owned by the Shanghai Municipality, the Centre is the main permanent space for exhibiting the development of the city.

It is important to acknowledge that I have been reluctant to use English translations of official texts. However, applying authorized translations while conducting analysis is interesting in its own right. As China's soft power has

increased significantly in recent years, official English translations can be seen to be part of China's attempts to reintegrate itself with the outside world. By making several publications available for non-Chinese speakers, it becomes possible for official China to spread its views on contemporary China throughout the world. At the same time, it enables the international community – including researchers – to understand and analyse official China (Kurlantzick 2007; Paradise 2009).

Analysing social space and writing style

While analysing the guided conversations in the different phases outlined above, I noticed that the interviewees connected their experiences of intercultural communication to the opening up of Shanghai and the PRC to the outside world. As Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991) provided me with a compelling theoretical framework to structure my analyses of the guided conversations, I began to see how different spatial levels interact in the production of the new Chinese society. I traced the multifaceted content of the guided conversations to CCP rhetoric and Shanghai spatial planning discourse, i.e. official accounts on the changes that are taking place in China and locally in Shanghai. Although the structuring of this study in different phases is analytical, it displays the major twists and turns that I have taken ahead of the final version of the present study. The different phases have been characterized by an ongoing fuzzy interplay between attending to the contents of the guided conversations, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and CCP rhetoric, and my engagements with post-colonial studies, global city studies and Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991). In this interplay that characterized my process, the analyses of the empirical materials crystallized.

With the point of departure in Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991), I decided to structure the analyses of the phenomenon of the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai following Lefebvre's abstract space and spatial triad (spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces). This structuring allowed me to categorize and analyse indicative phrases, sentences and catchwords that display the phenomenon of the opening up of the PRC

and Shanghai in guided conversations about intercultural experiences in Shanghai, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and CCP rhetoric. The indicative phrases, sentences and catchwords are characterized by their telling and revealing nature of the phenomenon being studied. Generally, they display the intersection between modern spatial production and contact with the outside world. Emerging as the conditioning structural context of the intercultural communication experiences, the themes of 'the opening-up reforms', '1978', 'Deng Xiaoping', 'the opening up of Shanghai' and 'the history of the city' were constantly referenced. In this context, I began to study Deng Xiaoping's statements on the envisioned society ('socialism with Chinese characteristics'), how the new society should be spatially organized and the designated spaces for the implementation of the envisioned society (which were labelled as special economic zones and open coastal cities) and the historical advantages of selecting Shanghai as a space for the implementation of the envisioned society. While the guided conversations contain concrete references to 1978 and the opening-up reforms and examples of intercultural communication experiences, they also display the 'associated images and symbols' that Lefebvre (1991: 39) sees as constituting representational spaces. Shanghai was often represented as open, international and modern. Attending to several images and symbols that unfolded in the guided conversations, I have, to varying extent, studied those images and symbols in the analytical chapters.

While using Lefebvre as the primary guide, the selection of indicative phrases, sentences and catchwords has been done through a careful reading of the speeches and talks by Deng Xiaoping, Shanghai spatial planning discourse and the guided conversations. Balancing between theory and the empirical material, the analytical process has been characterized by a constant and careful re-reading and re-listening of the guided conversations, writing notes and underlining contents in the empirical materials that I considered significant. By the use of a laptop and manual work, I was able to discern and categorize key themes, which are presented in the analytical chapters. Within each key theme, I identified central CCP statements and interviewee utterances which illustrated each theme.

By analysing Deng Xiaoping's speeches and talks and official spatial planning discourse in Shanghai, I have attempted to obtain a close understanding of the opening-up processes, and how the implementation and people's experiences are structured by Deng's visions. While this closeness to the official story and my writing style might be confused with a favouring of CCP ideology, it is merely an attempt to 'get under its skin', make CCP ideology manifest and understand official China. While the country has experienced radical changes towards a modern society since the late 1970s and an updated CCP ideology, the changes are still produced within the realm of the one-party rule.

Relations in the field

Like all social relations, the research process is conditioned by ourselves, others and overall societal conditions. Therefore, it is important to consider how the guided conversations are implicated in different spatial relations (Stein 2006). While studying the opening up of Shanghai and the PRC, I am also in the midst of the opening up processes. Consisting of one individual from the PRC and Sweden respectively, the guided conversations were an interpersonal contact space. With the purpose of getting insights into intercultural communication experiences in Shanghai, the guided conversations were temporary contact spaces in selected material spaces of the city. While representational spaces were unfolded in the guided conversations, they were also referring to material spaces (spatial practices) in Shanghai and representations of the city.

Engaged in interactions with Chinese and foreigners while conducting guided conversations and communicating with individuals in several formal and informal situations in the city, it is difficult to say that I was a complete outsider. As the interviewees for this study positioned themselves as 'open to foreigners' (which is often seen in relation to other 'Mainland Chinese'), I can be understood as being 'open to Chinese cultures'. Several of my interviewees, friends and colleagues positioned me as a 'good foreigner', as they understood me as being interested in listening to their stories, learning from them and having a genuine interest in Chinese cultures. With that in mind, one

interviewee contrasted me with some foreigners that reside in China only for financial reasons (short-term investment and profit-making). As the interviewees and my friends defined themselves as 'being open' to foreigners, the blurring of the dichotomy insider and outsider became even more intensified, as we often shared similar experiences: working in international environments, both supposedly being part of the middle classes, having (or in the process of acquiring) university degrees, similar age, English language proficiency, visiting similar cafés, restaurants and other entertainment spaces. Showing the workings of contact spaces, being an insider or outsider is related to where one is located in Shanghai. I deal with certain spaces in Shanghai, where a range of questions arise: 'Who belongs here?', 'Whose space is this?' and 'Whose culture is represented in this space?' Some interviewees and friends state that they move within, across and between certain spaces in the city. Suggesting that some individuals 'feel' that they belong to certain spaces and not others, certain spaces are understood through different labels, such as 'local', 'Chinese', 'modern Chinese', 'foreign', 'tourist' and 'expatriate'.

While I was taking part in interpersonal contact spaces with interviewees, friends and colleagues, the interactions were also situated in and structured by the post-colonial global order. While Sweden has not been involved in colonializing practices in Shanghai (or elsewhere on the Chinese mainland), Great Britain, France and the USA partly colonized Shanghai in the middle of the nineteenth century and maintained close relationships with the city until 1949. Although I was positioned as white and European while I was conducting the guided conversations and interacting with friends and colleagues, I was not automatically identified with the former colonial presence in the city. As a Swedish sociologist with a focus on Shanghai, I acknowledged and was sensitive to the diverse relationships Europe has had and still has with Shanghai and the PRC, and how particular economic, cultural and social relations from the semi-colonial era still impact contemporary Shanghai. Some interviewees were also relieved when they realized that my mother tongue is not English, as this fact was considered to balance the asymmetrical relationship between the interviewee and interviewer.

Commercial public spaces, ethical considerations and self-censorship

The study is informed by the ethical guidelines of the Swedish Research Council[22] and the unique circumstances that I encountered upon conducting fieldwork in China. As I have followed the Council's guidelines, which address the importance of providing the participants with accurate information about the research project, establishing consent, assuring confidentiality and that the material collected is only used for research purposes, the unique circumstances that I encountered range from conducting guided conversations in commercial public spaces to self-censorship. As a strategy to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees and their safety, they have been given fictional names. As the majority of interviewees introduced themselves using their English names and not their original Chinese names, I have chosen to give them English names.

The guided conversations were situated in several commercial public spaces in the city. With the use of Shanghai AsiaXPAT and Shanghai Expat mail services or regular e-mail, text message or phone call, the interviewees were given the opportunity to decide where to meet in the city. The most frequently suggested space for the guided conversations was Starbucks Coffee. While Starbucks Coffee opened its first café in Seattle in 1971, the American coffee chain today is a popular symbol of globalization. With menus and advertisements in Chinese and English, Starbucks is located at different locations in Shanghai. Addressing individuals as coffee (and extensively café leisure) consumers, Starbucks Coffee is recognized in Shanghai as a social space where new acquaintances get together, white-collar workers frequent, tourists get a peaceful rest and where culture and language exchanges take place.[23] Prior to the guided conversations, I insisted on paying for the beverage, if the interviewee did not insist first.

[22] Swedish Research Council, www.vr.se, 2014.

[23] For analyses of Starbucks in China, see Henningsen 2012; Smith Maquire and Hu 2013.

Conducted in commercial public spaces in Shanghai, the guided conversations were subject to self-censoring practices due to the one-party rule. To protect my interviewees and myself, I did not engage in conversations that could affect our safety. Hence, with the potential risk of being overheard, I did not ask explicit concrete questions about topics that were sensitive, which were mostly of political systemic character. Sensitive topics include personal views on the CCP rule, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the one-child policy, forced evictions, Taiwan's political status, the Tibet independence movement, the Muslim majority in Xinjiang and the falun gong movement. I censored the guided conversations as a precaution, and presumably the interviewees censored themselves, too. Sometimes the conversations revolved around the lack of public social debates in contemporary Shanghai in comparison with the existence of different political strands in semi-colonial Shanghai, and when I sensed that the interviewee became uncomfortable, I changed focus and continued. I did not want to engage the interviewees in discussions about sensitive topics, as I did not want to cause emotional discomfort and make the interviewees lose face.

Notes on analytical structure

Although the content of the conversations guided me to analyse CCP rhetoric and Shanghai spatial planning discourse, I have chosen to follow Lefebvre's analytical framework (1991), as it delivers a comprehensive sociological theory about spatial production (the envisioned society as a whole) and details every moment in this process (spatial practices, representations of space and representational space). Having this in mind, I contextualize the guided conversations by first analysing the visions of the new society (abstract space and new spatial practices) and how the Shanghai Municipal Government (representations of space) has implemented these visions in the social space of Shanghai. By this approach, I strive to obtain a comprehensive spatial understanding of the production of the emerging new society.

While Lefebvre (1991) maintains that the production of space is a historical process, it makes sense to follow a chronological framework

(although it reduces complexity in the spatial production), as it displays the phenomenon of the opening up of the PRC and Shanghai at different levels: the nation (the visions), the city (the implementations), and people and space (the personal experiences and understandings of space). The analyses of the CCP rhetoric and Shanghai spatial planning discourse (in the first and second empirical chapters) are straightforward and deal simply with abstract space, new spatial practices and representations of space. As I embark on analysing the guided conversations (in the third empirical chapter), the complexity of the production of space is displayed as the guided conversations are implicated in the CCP rhetoric and Shanghai spatial planning discourse. Implicated in different levels of social space, the guided conversations contain several references to concrete spaces in the city. While I could have described these spaces myself (through ethnographic notes), I have relied on texts from local English language city guides and the promotion of these spaces, as a strategy to include the level of representations of space and show how spatial practices emerge in this context. For the same reason, I have also chosen to include similar texts to display the spaces in which the guided conversations themselves were spatially situated. I have chosen the most popular local city guides for this purpose.

Part III

The production of contact space

With regard to the tripartite aim of the study, this part covers the analyses of the production of the new society on the Chinese mainland, and how this society is attained through contact with the outside world. Encompassing the changes in the country from 1978 to 2006, the chapters range from analysis of the vision for the new society to its implementation in Shanghai and how the implementation is talked about in guided conversations. Within this analytical framework, I show how contact space is envisioned, implemented and understood. I analyse how China is reordering itself conceptually and spatially, and how this process is understood by my interviewees. I cover the several levels of social production of space by incorporating additional levels as the analyses proceed. While beginning the analysis of the visions for the country and Shanghai by studying the CCP rhetoric and the spaces that were encouraged in chapter 7, I proceed by analysing the implementation of the CCP rhetoric by considering Shanghai official spatial discourse and new spatial practices in Shanghai in chapter 8. In chapter 9, I analyse the interviews about intercultural experiences in Shanghai and how they are deeply intertwined with the production of the envisioned society. Each chapter ends with concluding remarks, which locate the chapter in relation to the aim of the study and the chapter that follows. In chapter 10, I conclude the thesis as a whole and put forward some ideas for further studies.

7 Envisioning contact space and new spatial practices on the Chinese mainland

In this chapter, I focus on how the CCP envisioned the modernization and opening up of the PRC. The chapter shows the major rhetorical formulations that have laid the groundwork for the emerging new society on the Chinese mainland. This includes formulations on the declared characteristics of the new society, how the CCP legitimizes its changes, how the CCP addresses the inherited historical conditions from previous rulers, the new spaces that are required by the CCP to modernize and open up the country, how socialism has to be tailored to Chinese conditions, and how one-party rule should remain to facilitate and enable the new society. Principally, I show how the CCP envisioned the country's contact with the outside world, how contact should be initiated, enabled and maintained on the Chinese mainland. With regard to Lefebvre's spatial theory, this chapter details how the CCP has formulated its new abstract space for the development of the PRC. Echoing theoretical accounts on how new modernities are produced globally (Eisenstadt 2000; Dirlik 2003), and in Asia (Ong 1997), and how modernizing processes are stimulated and concretized on the Chinese mainland (Gabriel 2006; Liew, 2005; Liu 1996; Lu 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Wong 1998; Yao 2000; Zhang 1997), the endorsed abstract space shows how China has to modernize on its own terms.

Introduction

> The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.[24]

Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP has been the sole ruling power on the Chinese mainland. In classical Marxist–Leninist rhetoric, the CCP positions itself as the vanguard party that is leading the change of the

[24] 'Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China', http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html (accessed 22 December 2014).

PRC into a modern socialist state. Despite its constant rule since the socialist revolution in 1949, the CCP has fundamentally changed its abstract space. The CCP has changed itself from a revolutionary party to one that promotes modernization at any cost (Lu 1999; Lu and Simons 2006). With respect to its changing abstract space, the CCP has applied several methods to pursue its vision for the country. The years between 1949 and 1978 were characterized by Marxist–Leninist dogmatism, anti-imperialism, rejection of capitalism, anti-traditionalism (which primarily targeted Confucianism), collapse of the state economy, persecution of several groups ('rightists' and other opponents), production of the socialist individual, implementation of a household registration system (*hukou*), collective land ownership, the work unit system (*danwei*), other social engineering experiments, and starvation as the result of the socialization of the country (Bray 2005; Lawrance 1998; Lu 1999; Lu 2006; Lynch 2004; Zhang 2010/[1996]). In contrast, the post-1978 period is characterized by increased pragmatism, decentralization of power, controlled insertion of capitalism, neo-Confucianism, corruption, emergence of a new left (calling for social justice and equality), and constant balancing between openness and closure. Under constant negotiation, the emerging society is characterized by a balancing act: promoting consumption, reducing economic restrictions, further opening economic and development zones and easing of the *hukou*-system, and clamping down on social unrest (i.e. loosely organized citizens who fight against forced evictions and corrupt local officials), imposing religious and spiritual restrictions, and monitoring and controlling the Internet (Lawrance 1998; Liew 2005; Lu 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Wong 1998; Yao 2000; Zhang 2010).

Initiating the change of abstract space, a major reshuffle began within the CCP after Mao's retreat from power and death in 1976. As a result of the damaging consequences of his rule, an ideological battle between different strands within the CCP emerged. As a new leadership was formed out of the turmoil, Deng Xiaoping's line succeeded. Under the guiding hand of Deng Xiaoping, the CCP started to question Mao's undertakings, while simultaneously defeating Deng's opponents within the Party. During Mao's leadership, Deng Xiaoping was criticized as 'rightist' and an advocate of

economic reforms (i.e. 'a capitalist roader'). In contrast to Deng Xiaoping, '[i]t was Mao's belief that with correct conformity to Marxist–Maoist ideals, endless energy would be released for the production and subsequent distribution of newly created economic wealth' (Lu and Simons 2006: 271). Within the CCP, ideological flexibility and pragmatism surfaced as a result of Mao's disastrous attempts to radically transform the Chinese mainland into a communist society through the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). (Goodman 2002; Lu 1999; Lu and Simons 2006)

Reconsidering the years of rule by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping laid the new groundwork for the country. Thus, Deng Xiaoping has been described as 'the chief architect' of reform and the processes of opening up.[25] Instead of holding on to political dogma (as Mao Zedong forcefully had done), Deng Xiaoping argued that the main priority should be to produce a prosperous, modern, socialist state. This goal was to be achieved regardless of the methods used. As Deng Xiaoping once stated: 'No matter whether the cat is black or white, it is a good cat so long as it catches mice' (cited in Lu and Simons 2006: 269). Accompanying the new priority of the CCP, the Party initiated several ideological campaigns as a strategy to legitimize and lay the groundwork for the changes of 'its' social space. By using the banner 'rectification of disorders', Deng Xiaoping began to modify the CCP ideology. As a strategy to evaluate the rule of Mao Zedong and legitimize the processes of the opening up, the political campaigns 'seeking truth from facts' and 'liberation of mind' were launched. Downplaying dogmatic ideology, the campaigns addressed the importance of practice and dealing with concrete conditions (i.e. scarcity, starvation and poverty), and instigated pragmatism (in relation to what once was) amongst the members of the CCP and the Chinese populace. In this context, the practices of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were officially condemned. While political dogma was downgraded, modernization was favoured and became the sole priority of the CCP.

[25] 'Deng Xiaoping', http://en.people.cn/data/people/dengxiaoping.shtml (accessed 22 December 2014).

Providing a new abstract space, the slogans put forward by the CCP 'redirected the country's attention to an ideology of pragmatism, and provided a vision for China's future' (Lu 1999: 500). Since 1978, the CCP's main goal has been to produce 'a relatively well-off society' on the Chinese mainland. Deng Xiaoping called for a society in which every citizen could lead 'a relatively comfortable life' (Wong 1998). This implies 'a level of material well-being after his basic needs have been satisfied or wen-bao—literally, "enough to wear and eat"' (Wong 1998: 142). To produce this envisioned society, Deng Xiaoping called for 'the Four Modernizations', which addressed the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology (Lu 1999: 499). Deng stated:

> By achieving the four modernizations, we mean shaking off China's poverty and backwardness, gradually improving the people's living standards, restoring a position for China in international affairs commensurate with its current status, and enabling China to contribute more to mankind. […] By achieving the four modernizations, we mean achieving a comparative prosperity. Even if we realize the four modernizations by the end of this century [2000], our per capita GNP will still be very low. If we want to reach the level of a relatively wealthy country of the Third World with a per capita GNP US $1,000 for example, we have to make an immense effort.[26]

Deng Xiaoping was forced to convince the old guard that the change of priorities was necessary and that the CCP ideology had to be modified accordingly. While arguing that the country had to pursue opening up and economic reforms to modernize (as Mao Zedong's attempts to modernize had been disastrous), Deng Xiaoping had to rely on Marxist rhetoric. Thus, as a strategy to balance and legitimize the opening up of the country, Deng Xiaoping introduced 'the Four Cardinal Principles', which proclaimed a continued adherence to the proletariat dictatorship, the Party's leadership, Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought and the socialist path (Lu 1999; Lu and Simons 2006). By this framing, Deng Xiaoping managed to 'gain support from the old guard, unite the nation, and pave the way for rapid economic reform and an open-door policy' (Lu and Simons 2006: 270).

---

[26] 'China's goal is to achieve comparative prosperity by the end of the century', *People's Daily*, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1380.html (accessed 14 November 2013).

Thus, 'the Four Cardinal Principles served as a rhetorical strategy to create a stable environment for economic reform' (Lu and Simons 2006: 270). While honouring Mao Zedong's legacy, Deng Xiaoping managed to dissociate the Party from Mao's dogmatism and redirect the CCP. However, it is noteworthy to mention that

> [w]ary of any possible political unrest that might result from public ideological debates, Deng Xiaoping issued a ban 'for at least three years' of any theoretical discussion of the ideological nature of reform in his new reform directives issued in the spring of 1992. Ironically, questions of socialism and Marxism have become taboo in the socialist China under Deng's decree. (Liu 1996: 202)

Deng's 'pragmatic' opening up formula was instituted and became the sole official ideology of the CCP and thus, the leading formula for the development of post-1978 China. To quicken the production of 'a relatively well-off society', Deng Xiaoping (1994) declared that several spaces on the Chinese mainland should open up and be used as experimental sites for the production of the envisioned society.

East China (map by Google)

Initiating new spatialities

To attain the envisioned society, Deng Xiaoping (1994) emphasized the importance of an appropriate material space. Hence, the CCP has been engaged in reconfiguring and producing a new, modern social space, which is suited to its new aims. Literally, the CCP is using space to produce a new society. In order to implement 'the Four Modernizations' and attain 'a relatively well-off society', the CCP began to experiment with a controlled insertion of capitalism into the existing social space, which meant that the processes of opening up were designated and limited to certain geographical sites on the Chinese mainland. (Gaubatz 1999; Lu 2006; Lu and Simons 2006; Ma and Wu 2005; Olds 1997; Wu 2002, 2007; Zhang 1997) Principally, Deng Xiaoping (1994) envisioned 'the city' as a key engine to drive the modernization of the country.

In 1979, the CCP decided to set up special economic zones in Shenzhen (strategically located near Hong Kong, a British colony until 1997), Zhuhai (near Macau, a Portuguese colony until 1999), Shantou (a former semi-colonized city) and Xiamen (a former semi-colonized city). In 1988, a fifth special economic zone was established in the south, on Hainan Island (located near Hong Kong and Macau) (Deng 1994; Cao 2005). Produced to attract foreign direct investment and expand the country's exports through the use of tax incentives and other means, the five special economic zones were envisioned as 'medium[s] for opening to the outside world and an experiment in the reform of China's economic structure' (Deng 1994: 379) and as 'medium[s] for introducing technology, management and knowledge' (Deng 1994: 61-2). The special economic zones were also produced to enhance the 'nation's influence in the world' (Deng 1994: 62). Emerging as monitored market-oriented spaces within the prevailing socialist space, the special economic zones were envisioned and produced as strategic tools to drive the modernization of the country. On allowing the use of capitalist means within the one-party socialist state, Deng declared:

> The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an experiment. It will be sometime before we know whether we are doing the right thing there. It is something new under socialism. We hope to make it a success, but if it fails, we can learn from the experience. We are adopting all measures to develop them, including use of foreign funds and

> introduction of advanced technologies. This is a great experiment, something that is not described in books. (Deng 1994: 134)

Selected and labelled as open coastal cities in 1984, fourteen sites were encouraged to open up for new spatial practices to modernize the country. Making use of their strategic locations and spatial arrangements from the semi-colonial era, the CCP approved the opening up of Tianjin, Shanghai, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Beihai, Dalian and Qingdao, and the non-post-colonial cities of Lianyungang, Nantong and Zhangjiang (Deng 1994). In the spirit of 'seeking truth from facts', the CCP learned from the production of the special economic zones, and the open coastal cities were designated to offer preferential taxes and simplified governmental approval procedures to facilitate the establishment and management of companies (Sang 1993; Sit 1985; Wei and Leung 2005).

Producing the new society, the CCP is making use of social spaces inherited from previous rulers. As the majority of the cities designated as special economic zones and open coastal cities can be characterized as post-semi-colonial or post-colonial, it is possible to argue that the CCP reproduces the spatial organization that was strengthened by the colonial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. By opening those cities to the outside world, the CCP reinforced the colonial legacy on the Chinese mainland, which triggered anti-imperial sentiments at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, and ultimately the founding of the Party in 1921 and the PRC in 1949. However, it is also important to keep in mind that most of the sites were established trading sites prior to the arrival of the colonizers. Yet, as part of the treaty port system, they were reconfigured, developed, modernized and incorporated into the colonial trading system, and became significant sites of contact between Chinese and foreign cultures. Thus, the CCP displays an increasing pragmatism towards capitalism and the former colonial presence on the Chinese mainland as it serves the modernization of the country. While colonial powers have been disarmed, contemporary cities are strategically promoted through the use of

their colonial and semi-colonial histories, which is clear in the case of Shanghai.[27] While the majority of those twenty cities were forced to open up by colonizers in the late nineteenth century, the cities are (forcefully) opened up today by the CCP. As two distinct social spaces surface, the city has moved from an extraterritorial spatial logic ruled by several different powers prior to 1949 (as capitalism was introduced from the exterior as a result of the defeat in the Opium War) to a post-semi-colonial spatial logic defined and monitored by the CCP (a controlled insertion of capitalism from within the country).

As I have illustrated, selected parts of the country were designated as special economic zones and open coastal cities and have been reconfigured according to the CCP's new goals. Thus, while spatial arrangements have been incorporated from previous eras, space is treated strategically by the CCP as a resource for the production of a new, prosperous, modern, socialist state. In the spirit of 'seeking truth from facts', several additional sites have experienced similar measures, as the CCP has considered the opening up of the original special economic zones and open coastal cities a success.[28] The opening up reforms have been successful in terms of constant economic growth and lower poverty rates (Liew 2005). It is argued that between 1978 and 1995, China lowered the number of its people in poverty by 200 million (Yao 2000). In its quest to modernize the Chinese mainland, the CCP also strives to produce its version of the country's history. The official history often revolves around the socialist revolution and the founding of the PRC in 1949 (Liu 1996).

[27] All cities presented above have official websites, and my argument is based on a careful reading of them.

[28] 'Achievements – Communist Party of China CPC', http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206979/index.html, *People's Daily* (accessed 2 December 2013). 'Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory for an all-round advancement of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st century', http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/25/content_363499_3.htm, report by Jiang Zemin (accessed 2 December 2013).

The history of the country and producing the new socialist state

As part of the founding of the new abstract space, Deng Xiaoping (1994) was engaged in the production of nation-building narratives, which worked as tools to reunite and reconsolidate the country. Within a modernist framework, the stories of the CCP and the triumph and victory of socialism and Marxism were recurring features in the speeches and talks by Deng Xiaoping. Deng once stated:

> For more than a century after the Opium War, China was subjected to aggression and humiliation. It is because the Chinese people embraced Marxism and kept to the road leading from new-democracy to socialism that their revolution was victorious. […] Kuomintang followed the capitalist road for more than 20 years, but China was still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, which proved that that road led nowhere. (Deng 1994: 72)

Stressing the conflictual and asymmetrical relations of semi-colonial space, Deng Xiaoping stated that the country was subjected to humiliation and aggression after China's defeat in the Opium War in the middle of the nineteenth century. Delineating two rulers of the Chinese mainland, Deng Xiaoping maintained that China remained a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under Kuomintang rule (i.e. Republican China) and was changed into a post-semi-colonial independent state with the founding of the PRC. The Chinese mainland regained its national sovereignty after the PRC was declared by Mao Zedong in Beijing on 1 October 1949. Similarly, the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party reads:

> Under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the Communist Party of China led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship.[29]

With regard to the founding narrative of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping (1994: 72) argued that the country still would have been fragmented and dependent if the

[29] 'Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China', *People's Daily,* http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html (accessed 22 December 2014).

country had not taken the road that claimed a continuing adherence to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. Clearly stating that the CCP is in power and rhetorically repositioning the Chinese populace as subjects, the CCP narrative resembles the mode of staging history that is frequently criticized by post-colonial theorists (McClintock 1995). Centring the Chinese history along the departure of the colonizers from the Chinese mainland, the CCP simultaneously reasserted and re-established the official Chinese identity.

Revisiting the years between 1949 and 1978, Deng Xiaoping (1994: 86) acknowledged that it was a problem to disconnect the country from the outside world (read the capitalist social spaces of the West, nationalist Taiwan and Japan) and attempt to produce an enclosed socialist space. To legitimize the production of the special economic zones and open coastal cities within the prevailing social space, Deng Xiaoping suggested that closed-door policies prevent countries from developing. As Deng Xiaoping (1994: 123) maintained, '[n]o country can develop in isolation, with its doors closed; it must increase international contacts, introduce advanced methods, science and technology from developed countries and use their capital'. While stressing that the PRC should be independent and remain under CCP rule, Deng Xiaoping declared that the country should acquire foreign investment and technology to realize its envisioned social space (1994: 86). Deng Xiaoping argued that the PRC required monitored contact with the outside world to produce its own envisioned society. Ultimately, the CCP introduced the means of capitalism (under guidance of PRC laws and other regulatory means) within designated areas in the country. In response to this change, Deng Xiaoping formulated a phrase, which has guided the reconfiguration of the Chinese mainland into a modern society ever since its introduction in the late 1970s.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the new middle classes

As a rhetorical device to legitimize the change of the country's socialist social space, Deng Xiaoping introduced the phrase 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. In the spirit of 'seeking truth from facts', Deng Xiaoping claimed that the Marxist–Leninist ideology had to be 'tailored to Chinese conditions' (1994: 73). Lu and Simons (2006: 270–1) write: 'Deng was rhetorically required to provide a new slogan that would indicate a departure from the Maoist idealist/utopian path, and yet still legitimize the Party's rule'. While '[t]he main part of China must continue under socialism', Deng Xiaoping (1994: 69) stated, capitalist means were accepted in designated areas of the country. Producing China's unique social space, Deng Xiaoping argued that the special economic zones and open coastal cities should 'serve as a supplement to the socialist economy and help to promote the growth of the socialist productive forces'. Arguing for his vision, Deng Xiaoping stated:

> We have opened some 20 cities to the outside world, on condition that the socialist economy remains predominant there. These cities will not change their socialist nature. On the contrary, the policy of opening to the outside world will favour the growth of the socialist economy there. (Deng 1994: 109)

In several speeches, Deng Xiaoping dissected the alleged dichotomy between socialism and capitalism. Keeping the CCP rule, Deng Xiaoping claimed that introducing foreign investment within designated areas and permitting a degree of individual economy (at the provincial and municipal level) would serve the development of the socialist economy. According to Liew (2005: 333), Deng Xiaoping argued that '[t]he market was to complement the plan, not to replace it'. Hence, the label 'socialist market economy' emerged. Legitimizing the introduction of capitalist means into the current socialist social space, Deng Xiaoping stated:

> It is wrong to maintain that a market economy exists only in capitalist society and that there is only 'capitalist' market economy. Why can't we develop a market economy under socialism? Developing a market economy does not mean practising capitalism. While maintaining a planned economy as the mainstay of our economic system, we are also introducing a market economy. But it is a socialist market economy. Although a socialist market economy is similar to a capitalist one in method, there are also differences between them. The socialist market economy mainly regulates interrelations

> between state-owned enterprises, between collectively owned enterprises and even between foreign capitalist enterprises. But in the final analysis, this is all done under socialism in a socialist society. We cannot say that market economy exists only under capitalism. Market economy was in its embryonic stages as early as feudalist society. We can surely develop it under socialism. Similarly, taking advantage of the useful aspects of capitalist countries, including their methods of operation and management, does not mean that we will adopt capitalism. Instead, we use those methods in order to develop the productive forces under socialism. As long as learning from capitalism is regarded as no more than a means to an end, it will not change the structure of socialism or bring China back to capitalism.[30]

Having to convince the old guard within the CCP that one-party rule would not be threatened, Deng Xiaoping (1994) maintained that the CCP would only apply capitalist means to produce its envisioned society and not introduce the capitalist system as a whole. Thus, Deng Xiaoping introduced a system that constantly balances the authoritarian rule of the CCP and the opening up of the country. Liew describes it as

> a market economy where the state continues to intervene actively to promote its political goals and where the state remains a strategist in industry policy. The state also remains tied to the CCP, limiting the scope of market reform to what is possible under prevailing Party ideology and requiring the state to protect the CCP's privileged market position so that the CCP can preserve its monopoly on political power. (Liew 2005: 332)

Echoing Ong's conceptualization of alternative modernity (1997), the CCP uses capitalist means to strengthen the state and modernize the country on its own terms. While making use of capitalist means in service of the envisioned society, Deng Xiaoping argued that the prosperous socialist state eventually will be achieved. Gabriel explains that the phrase 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'

> aimed to retain much of the modernist narrative of movement along a linear path toward a telos and the necessary role of communist party rule in pushing the society along that path, but also 'accidently' opened the path to jettisoning the idea of fixed characteristics common to all manifestations of socialism. The phrase 'with Chinese characteristics' decentered the notion of socialism and opened up the possibility of multiple socialisms. (Gabriel 2006: 9)

---

[30] 'We Can Develop a Market Economy Under Socialism', http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103388.htm (accessed 22 December 2014.

While Deng Xiaoping prepared the ground for the new society and China's version of socialism, his successors have continued the opening up and economic reforms. The successors have to pay respect to preceding leaders of the CCP and the PRC, and also put their unique mark on the changes of the country. Accompanying the policies of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, slogans have defined their respective periods as presidents of the PRC. While the 'Three Represents' slogan defined the presidency of Jiang Zemin between 1993 and 2003, the former president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao (2003–2013) were famed for their attempts to produce a 'harmonious society' (which is discussed further below). While the current president Xi Jinping and premier Li Keqiang took office in March 2013, their imprints will be revealed during the years ahead (2013–2023, expected). However, as explained in the introduction, Xi Jinping commenced his leadership by envisioning his 'Chinese dream', which was quickly established as his slogan for the continued modernization of the country.

By the 'Three Represents' slogan, Jiang Zemin addressed the development of advanced productive forces (the production of new technologies), advanced culture (the production of a national, scientific and popular socialist culture, which referred to instigating high ideals, moral integrity, a strong sense of discipline and good education among the Chinese populace), and 'the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the Chinese people' (Lu and Simons 2006: 273). As such, Jiang Zemin's undertakings marked the changing nature of the CCP, its role and mission for the country. In this context, Jiang Zemin called for 'keeping up with the times', which addressed the importance of further adapting the CCP and the country to the changing conditions domestically and globally (Boutonnet 2011; Dynon 2008; Lu and Simons 2006). Apart from rhetorically serving the working classes and peasants, the CCP also became a vanguard for the emerging middle classes. Entrepreneurs and educated professionals 'posed a potential threat to the Party's authority with their accumulated wealth and increasing demands for political participation' (Lu and Simons 2006: 272). In order to gain trust and support from this diverse group of thriving professionals, Jiang Zemin invited them to join the CCP. Subjected to critique

from the old guard, which claimed that the change violated CCP ideology, Jiang Zemin was forced to address the new members of the CCP as 'role models from other social strata' (Lu and Simons 2006: 272). In 2001, Jiang Zemin addressed the change:

> With the deepening of reform and opening up and economic and cultural development, the working class in China has expanded steadily and its quality improved. The working class, with the intellectuals as part of it, and the farmers are always the basic forces for promoting the development of the advanced productive forces and all-round social progress in our country. Emerging in the process of social changes, entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by non-public scientific and technological enterprises, managerial and technical staff employed by overseas-funded enterprises, the self-employed, private entrepreneurs, employees in intermediaries, free-lance professionals and members of other social strata are all builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics. We should unite with the people of all social strata who help to make the motherland prosperous and strong, encouraging their pioneering spirit, protecting their legitimate rights and interests and commending the outstanding ones in an effort to create a situation in which all people are well positioned, do their best and live in harmony.[31]

While the CCP was initially the vanguard for the working classes and peasants, the CCP transformed itself into the vanguard for every citizen contributing to the production of the modern socialist nation. The 'role models from other social strata' are often addressed as 'the new middle class', 'the new rich' and 'cadre capitalists' (Tomba 2004: 4). These new rich 'are welcome to join because they are "productive forces" and are therefore potential "advanced elements of society"' (Liew 2005: 343). While allowing the emerging class to become members of the CCP, Jiang Zemin endorsed the 'building of a well-off society in an all-around way' (Jiang cited in Tomba 2004: 6). Tomba writes:

> while the role of entrepreneurs as power brokers and supporters of economic liberalization must not be underestimated, the project of a middle-class society is of greater importance as it has focused on expanding the purchasing power and status of significantly larger groups of urban employees and professionals. (Tomba 2004: 6–7)

[31] 'Full text of Jiang Zemin's report at 16th Party congress', http://english.people.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml (accessed 8 October 2010).

While intensifying the economic development of the PRC, Jiang Zemin reconstructed the Party with the purpose of 'advancing the culture' of the socialist social space. In this context, Jiang Zemin promoted 'high' education, ideals and morals, and invited people from 'other social strata' to join the Party. This echoes Deng Xiaoping's idea that the quality/*suzhi* of the Chinese population has to be raised as to facilitate the modernization of the country. During the deepening of economic reform in the 1990s, it became a central concern for the CCP 'to bring forth human "products" who are "up to standard" for a modern market society' (Jacka 2009: 528). During Jiang Zemin's presidency, the quality/*suzhi* discourse was turned into a popular discourse, appearing not only in official documents but also in glossy fashion and lifestyle magazines, portraying urban middle-class identities. In this context, it is also noteworthy to mention that Jiang Zemin called for 'liberation of consumption forces', to increase the overall consumption rate, which clearly resonates with the quality/*suzhi* discourse, the invitation of people from 'other social strata' to join the Party, and the cultural advancement of the Party and country as a whole (Tomba 2004). Thus, Jiang Zemin has provided rhetorical devices 'by which to shift the Party further from an ideological guardian to a service-oriented institution, with economic prosperity as its primary goal' (Lu and Simons 2006: 274). With Jiang Zemin's deepening of opening up and economic reforms, China also gained membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

Of central concern for the CCP (and its continued rule) is the increasing gap between the designated areas for prosperity and undeveloped areas. While Deng Xiaoping introduced socialism with Chinese characteristics, the question of equal access to that prosperity has emerged.

Promoting uneven access to prosperity

> Some people in rural areas and cities should be allowed to get rich before others. (Deng 1994: 33)

Despite inequalities within each experimental site, the special economic zones and open coastal cities have developed into embryos of 'a well-off society' and have seen a rise in the quality/*suzhi* of their inhabitants. As a result of the opening up and economic reforms, extensive divides within cities, between urban and rural areas, and the coastal and inland regions have emerged. Within China's path to common prosperity, the cities symbolize progress, prosperity and high quality/*suzhi*, while rural and undeveloped areas symbolize backwardness, poverty and low quality/*suzhi* (Dunford and Liu 2014; Sun 2009; Wu 2007; Wu et al. 2013; Zhang 2004). Due to emerging divides, it became crucial for the CCP to legitimize its undertakings. Producing a developmental agenda, which laid out a path to common prosperity, Deng Xiaoping (1994) stated that the special economic zones and open coastal cities were allowed to 'get rich before others'. The phrase rapidly began to symbolize Deng's efforts to modernize the country and made its way into popular discourse. By envisioning the changes as linear (from poverty to prosperity) and assuring that the country would eventually reach common prosperity, Deng Xiaoping gained legitimacy. While not providing an exact timetable for when each phase would be accomplished, Deng Xiaoping stated:

> The coastal areas, which comprise a vast region with a population of 200 million, should accelerate their opening to the outside world, and we should help them to develop rapidly first; afterwards they can promote the development of the interior. The development of the coastal areas is of overriding importance, and the interior provinces should subordinate themselves to it. When the coastal areas have developed to a certain extent, they will be required to give still more help to the interior. Then, the development of the interior provinces will be of overriding importance, and the coastal will in turn have to subordinate themselves to it. (Deng 1994: 271–2)

In the quest to modernize the entire country, Deng declared that the coastal areas were allowed to prosper before others. When coastal areas had developed and attained the level of a relatively well-off society, Deng stated that priority would then be given to interior regions and the coastal areas would be required to provide their newly acquired knowledge to inland provinces. Envisioning China's development path, Deng Xiaoping (1994: 145) maintained, '[i]t is

precisely for the purpose of enabling more and more to become prosperous until all are prosperous that some areas and some people are encouraged to do so first'. Thus, Deng declared that some spaces and their inhabitants have to lead and set the agenda for common prosperity. While several cities, such as Shanghai, were envisioned to lead the modernization of the country, Deng Xiaoping (1994) rhetorically maintained and anticipated that the entire socialist social space would prosper eventually. The use of space to promote certain ideas has been used during the course of the CCP's history:

> Since the apotheosis of the CCP, specific localities have been used to market particular ideas; from the revolutionary base of Yan'an in the 1940s, to the oil capital of Daqing in the 1960s, to the special economic zone of Shenzhen in the 1980s. (Dynon 2011: 186)

Instigating common prosperity, Deng Xiaoping continues: '[i]f a few regions develop a little faster, they will spur the others to catch up. This is a shortcut we can take to speed up development and attain common prosperity' (1994: 169). Deng declared that leading experimental cities and their inhabitants should act as models for others to catch up. In 1993, the CCP argued that 'those who have become well-off should be encouraged to lead forward and support those lagging behind, so as to achieve common prosperity' (Liew 2005: 343). Concretely, the urban, middle-class, one-child-policy children came to represent high quality/*suzhi* and the prosperity of the emerging society (Jacka 2009: 525).

While changing the pre-existing social space, Deng Xiaoping addressed the increased inequalities that emerged as a consequence of the opening up and economic reforms. Explicit in the vanguardism of the CCP's Marxist–Leninist ideology is that a group of people (i.e. the CCP and its co-opted partners) should lead the change in and of the country. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping declared that 'there must be no polarization' between the prospering cities and undeveloped regions, and their respective inhabitants. Deng Xiaoping (1994: 142) stated:

> 'If there is polarization, the reform will have been a failure. Is it possible that a new bourgeoisie will emerge? A handful of bourgeois elements may appear, but they will not form a class.'

Reviewing nearly forty years of opening up and economic reforms, it is clear that social polarization has emerged, with social inequalities and unrest increasing at high speed. (Dunford and Liu 2014; Sun 2009; Wu 2007; Wu et al. 2013; Zhang 2004) With Deng Xiaoping's acknowledgement of uneven development and his successor Jiang's official sanctioning of social stratification by co-opting 'role models from other social strata', the cities have experienced an increase in wealthy residents. While Jiang Zemin was focused on the first two parts of 'the Three Represents', Hu and Wen primarily addressed the third part, as a strategy to strengthen legitimacy and show that the CCP is keeping its promise of prosperity for the entire nation and not exclusively for the cities and their emerging middle classes. Addressing the divide between the coastal areas and western regions, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao strived to reduce the widening gap between 'the haves' and 'the have-nots'. (Lu and Simons 2006; Yu 2006) However, it was Jiang Zemin, who in 1999, began to call for western development (Fan 2006). While the early years of reform were characterized by allowing coastal regions to become 'rich first', more recent years have been characterized by the CCP's attempts to balance the changes and generate common prosperity. Reframing CCP ideology, Hu and Wen began to propagate for 'a harmonious society' and 'a scientific outlook on development'. With their rhetorical devices, Hu and Wen addressed emerging regional, economic and social divides, environmental pollution and excessive consumption of resources, and a coordinated path of development under CCP rule (Fan 2006; Holbig 2009; Lu and Simons 2006). Rhetorically, the CCP's 'harmonious society' was envisioned to

> put people first and make all social activities beneficial to people's subsistence, enjoyment and development. In a harmonious society, the political environment is stable, the economy is prosperous, people live in peace and work in comfort and social welfare improves.[32]

[32] 'Deciphering "harmonious society"', http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/21/content_426686.htm, 2005 (accessed 22 December 2014.

Thus, while putting people first, at least rhetorically, the CCP sought to maintain its power. Reframing and acknowledging Jiang Zemin's third 'represent' through the 'putting people first' slogan, Hu Jintao stated:

> Party officials at every level should solidly establish the mindset of serving the people and the spirit of honesty to and responsibility for the people. They must exercise their power for the people, build an emotional bond with the people, and seek benefits for the people. They must solve concrete problems for the people, make every effort to handle difficult situations for them, persistently doing good deeds for the sake of the people, and always place people's interest above everything else. (cited in Lu and Simons 2006: 276)

By the 'putting people first' slogan, Hu and Wen began to 'redirect priorities, from economic growth at any price to development balance, from encouraging entrepreneurship to crackdowns on corruption' (Lu and Simons 2006: 269). In 2004, the CCP launched the 'Five Balances' as a strategy to address economic development and the increasing inequalities that have emerged since 1978. The 'Five Balances' policy includes

> balancing urban and rural development, balancing development among regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing development of men and nature, and balancing domestic development and opening wider to the outside world. (Lu and Simons 2006: 285)

While redirecting the CCP's priorities, Hu and Wen applied Confucianist rhetoric as a strategy to legitimize their undertakings. Within the context of Confucianist rhetoric, it is argued that Mencius (a follower of Confucius) advised that Chinese rulers should 'think and act in the interest of the people' and 'stay benevolent in order to sustain their legitimacy and control' (Lu and Simons 2006: 276). Similar to other Asian states, the emphasis on Confucianist values illustrates how China is returning to 'its roots' to produce its own version of modernity (Ong 1997). The slogan also echoes the Maoist 'serving the people'. Thus, the contemporary abstract space is a merger between Communist and Confucian ethics (Lu and Simons 2006).

Seeking to discipline contact space—modernity on its own terms

> Our policy of opening to the outside world will inevitably bring into China some evil things that will affect our people. (Deng 1994: 159)

Laying the groundwork for the reforms and opening up, Deng Xiaoping strived to produce a new social space, in which certain features of the outside world were considered acceptable and others unacceptable. Showing how the country should modernize on its own terms, Deng Xiaoping's envisioned a highly selective state. Deng announced that 'undesirable things may be brought into China' and 'some negative elements will come in, and we must be aware of that' (1994: 97). Echoing Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997), Dirlik (2003) and Liu (1996), Deng stated, 'we keep our doors open, but we are selective, we don't introduce anything without a purpose and a plan…' (1994: 54). Deng continued by stating:

> We should make use of the intellectual resources of other countries by inviting foreigners to participate in key development projects and other construction projects in various fields. […] In the matter of modernization we have neither experience nor technical knowhow. We should not be reluctant to spend money on recruiting foreigners. […] Once they are here, we should make the best use of their skills. (Deng 1994: 43)

Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PRC, for the sake of development, has to learn from 'the developed countries' and make use of their science, technology and management skills. Legitimizing the new strategy, Deng Xiaoping (1994: 182) maintained that the act of assimilating 'useful things from capitalist societies… [was] made only to supplement the development of our socialist productive forces'. Envisioning a prosperous country through the appropriation of capitalist means, Deng Xiaoping announced that the PRC has to remain a one-party state. Resonating with the 'Four Cardinal Principles', Deng Xiaoping reiterated that adding 'useful things' from capitalist social spaces was carried out only to modernize and strengthen the socialist productive forces. In this context, Deng Xiaoping (1994) argued that science and technology could be introduced as means to produce the envisioned society as they did not threaten CCP rule. Deng Xiaoping stated:

> we cannot say that everything developed in capitalist countries is of a capitalist nature. For instance, technology, science—even advanced production management is also a

> sort of science— will be useful in any society or country. We intend to acquire advanced technology, science and management skills to serve our socialist production. And these things as such have no class character.[33]

While encouraging economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping strived to monitor opinions and cultural practices of representational space to facilitate and enable the modernization of the country. Thus, to facilitate the production of the envisioned society and secure CCP rule, Deng maintained that political stability was required. Deng Xiaoping (1994: 130) stated, 'Our major task is to build up the country, and less important things should be subordinated to it. Even if there is good reason for having them, the major task must take precedence.'

While intellectual resources, such as skills in development, construction, technical know-how and cultural exchanges were desired, the bourgeois culture of the modern West was not tolerated. For instance, liberal democracy, individualism, decadence, drug abuse, economic crimes, corruption and prostitution were not accepted by Deng Xiaoping. Deng maintained that bourgeois liberalization in Western capitalist countries worships democracy and freedom and discards socialism (Deng 1994: 54, 129). Understanding the opening up as a potential risk to the status quo, Deng Xiaoping stated:

> Mental pollution can be so damaging as to bring disaster upon the country and the people. It blurs the distinction between right and wrong, leads to passivity, laxity and disunity, corrupts the mind and erodes the will. It encourages the spread of all kinds of individualism and causes people to doubt or even to reject socialism and the Party's leadership. (Deng 1994: 54–5)

As illustrated in the proceeding quote, Deng Xiaoping (1994: 54–5) identified several difficulties in the processes of opening up. As part of the new post-colonial state, the fear of pollution is related to the country's historical experiences of semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism, and thus Deng Xiaoping attempted to control features that might dissolve political stability and CCP rule (Lu 1999). Deng's views also displays the concrete workings of Chinese

[33] 'Answers to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci', *People's Daily*, http://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1470.html (accessed 2 December 2013).

Occidentalism and self-orientalizations (Chen 1992; Dirlik 1996; Shih 2001; Song 2000; Wang 1997). In the effort to control social space, Deng Xiaoping (1994) identified a close relationship between bourgeois liberalization and capitalism. Delineating his version of a modern society, Deng Xiaoping stated:

> China must modernize; it must absolutely not liberalize or take the capitalist road, as countries of the West have done. Those exponents of bourgeois liberalization who have violated state law must be dealt with severely. Because what they are doing is, precisely, 'speaking out freely, airing their views fully, putting up big-character posters' and producing illegal publications—all of which only creates unrest and brings back the practices of the 'cultural revolution'. (Deng 1994: 129)

While struggling against bourgeois freedom and adhering to the four cardinal principles, the CCP endorsed the production of a 'spiritual and material civilization'. While material civilization refers to sustained economic growth (market development and facilitating mass consumption), spiritual civilization refers to the promotion of 'high' moral standards and practices, which are in tune with the CCP's visions for the country. During his rule, Jiang Zemin further addressed the modernization of the Chinese populace and endorsed nationalism, patriotism and loyalty to the CCP. Although the two civilization concepts were introduced by Deng Xiaoping, the spiritual civilization was mostly developed and promoted by Jiang Zemin. While Deng Xiaoping's rhetoric was filled with socialist ideology, Jiang Zemin inserted traditional Chinese political philosophy (submission to authority and social order) to the CCP rhetoric as to instigate cultural nationalism and gain legitimacy. Accompanying material civilization, the spiritual civilization discourse prompted the Chinese populace to acquire identities in tune with the opening up reforms (material civilization) and follow the path that the CCP has laid out for the country. The spiritual civilization discourse stressed the importance of acquiring adequate morals, behaviours and political thoughts. Parallel to spiritual civilization, the term quality/*suzhi* emerged as an official tool to discuss, value and rate the level of people's civilization. As addressed in the introduction and elsewhere in the present study, the Chinese people considered to have high quality/*suzhi* are often located in cities (such as Shanghai), as urban areas have been the focal points of the economic reforms (Boutonnet 2011; Dynon 2008; Lu 1999; Tomba 2009).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown and analysed the contours of the new emerging society and how Deng Xiaoping envisioned its development. As illustrated, Deng Xiaoping encouraged a controlled insertion of capitalism within the one-party system to modernize the country. Several cities, such as Shanghai, were designated to lead the country into a modern, prosperous, socialist state (i.e. 'a relatively well-off society'). While the coastal cities emerged as vanguard spatial entities of the reforms, inland provinces were neglected. To balance the increasing divides, several efforts were made to produce a 'harmonious society', which meant that inland provinces also became targets for development projects. Parallel to the material production of the envisioned society, the CCP also strived to produce civilized, modern, educated and patriotic inhabitants, which could carry forward and facilitate the opening up and economic reforms in their day-to-day lives.

8 Producing the post-revolutionary global city

> 'Change life!' 'Change society!' These precepts mean nothing without the production of an appropriate space. (Lefebvre 1991: 59)

While analysing CCP rhetoric and the Shanghai Municipal Government's implementation of Deng's envisioned society, Lefebvre's words resound clearly. In this chapter, I focus on how the Shanghai Municipal Government has interpreted and implemented Deng's visions for the modernization and opening up of the PRC in Shanghai. Following Deng's emphasis on reconfiguring China's space to enable the envisioned society, I show how Shanghai has been changed. While analysing how the Shanghai Municipal Government is representing the changes of the city, I also address the key new spaces that have been encouraged and produced as a strategy to re-install the city's international character and make Shanghai into a global city.

Introduction

> Compared with other cities in southern China, particularly those in the Pearl River Delta, Shanghai was under tight control of the central state prior to the 1990s. The city contributed a significant proportion of revenue to the central state and hence it was imperative for the central state to impose a strict fiscal policy. (Wu 2000a: 1359)

Deng Xiaoping (1994) envisioned Shanghai as one of the strategic sites to lead the transformation of the country. Emerging as a state project, Shanghai was envisioned as the 'dragon head' of the opening up and economic reforms (Wu 2003: 1684). During an inspection tour to Shanghai in early 1991, Deng (1994: 353-355) acknowledged the mistake not to have developed the city earlier. While Shanghai was neglected in the early years of economic reforms, as Wu (2000) points out, the establishment of the four special economic zones in the late 1970s and early 1980s was based on their advantageous locations: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province (neighbouring Hong Kong and Macau), and Xiamen in Fujian Province (Sit 1985; Wei and Leung 2005). On neglecting Shanghai, Deng once stated:

> we did not take the intellectual advantages of Shanghai into account. Since the people of Shanghai are clever and well educated, if we had decided to establish a special economic zone here, the city would look very different now. (Deng 1994: 353)

While highlighting the importance of new spatial practices, Deng also absorbed old social spaces in his drive to modernize the country. Having relatively established infrastructure and industrial edifices, several cities were established as open coastal cities in 1984, as they consisted of structures from the semi-colonial period and the early socialist period between 1949 and 1978. During Mao's rule, Shanghai was a 'locomotive' of state-led industrialization and contributed significantly to the country's economy (Wu 2003). Considering Shanghai as an open coastal city, Deng envisioned the development of the city and the surrounding region:

> Development of the Pudong District will have a great impact not just on the district itself but on all of Shanghai, which in turn will serve as a base for the development of the Yangtze delta and the whole Yangtze basin. So we should lose no time in developing the Pudong District and persevere until construction is completed. So long as we keep our word and act in accordance with international practice, foreign entrepreneurs will choose to invest in Shanghai. That is the right way to compete. (Deng 1994: 353)

With the development of Pudong, Shanghai and the surrounding region were also envisioned to gain from the changes, as the city 'enjoys obvious advantages in skilled people, technology and management and can have an impact over a wide area' (Deng 1994: 363). To rejuvenate the opening up reforms after the 1989 Tiananmen protests, 'the announcement of Pudong New Area served as a symbolic function indicating the continuity of reform policies and the government's determination to open China to the world economy' (Wu 2003: 1684). While envisioning the change of Shanghai, Deng Xiaoping (1994) connected his vision for the future with the city's past and created an imagined continuity between different social spaces. Drawing on Shanghai's semi-colonial history, Deng made a clear statement of his vision for the post-revolutionary city:

> Shanghai used to be a financial centre where different currencies were freely exchanged, and it should become so again. If China is to acquire international status in finance, we should depend primarily on Shanghai. It will take many years, but we should act now. (Deng 1994: 353)

While Shanghai is re-installed as an international city, the period between 1949 and the early 1990s appears as a temporal exception to Shanghai's historical status as a crucial contact space between China and the world.

The global city with Chinese characteristics

> 'Changes Every Year. Transformations Every Three Years.'
>
> *– A slogan by the Shanghai Municipal Government in the early 1990s (cited in Ren 2008: 28)*

In order to implement and produce the envisioned society, an overall redistribution of state power was required within the central planning system. State power was decentralized and local governments were strengthened. While Mao consolidated state power through the socialist revolution, Deng adapted the power structure to meet the requirements of his envisioned post-revolutionary society. Local provincial and municipal governments were given fiscal autonomy and became responsible for managing state land. Thus, China's central governing apparatus merged into semi-independent entities. Accompanying changes in the power structure, there was also a reduction of funding from the central government. The funding for spatial development projects was redirected to outside formal state channels. As a result, local provincial and municipal governments were required to become market players (Gaubatz 1999; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2005).

Emerging into an entrepreneurial local state in the early 1990s, the Shanghai Municipal Government was changed from a passive tool of the central government to an active promoter and manager of urban spatial development. While the state owns land, a land-leasing system was introduced to facilitate domestic and foreign investment in Shanghai (and in other open coastal cities and special economic zones). As a note, almost all land was confiscated and turned into public property as part of the socialist revolution and founding of the PRC in 1949. Through changes in the central planning system towards a more decentralized power structure, planning and leasing permissions became locally administered and authorized (Gaubatz 1999; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang 1997). While considering the changes taking place in China, it is crucial to point out that,

> The central feature of China's land-use reform is the separation of land-use rights from ownership. In nature, what the reform created is a land leasehold system, but the Chinese government feels the importance of emphasising the separation of 'use rights' from 'ownership' because of political restraints rather than other considerations. It is

> vital to the CCP regime to retain the ownership in the hands of the state. (Zhang 1997: 192)

Demolishing vast areas of deteriorated buildings and forcing residents to move out, the establishment of the land-leasing system introduced various actors into the spatial development of the city, such as domestic, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, overseas Chinese and foreign investors and developers, and state-owned enterprises. By site clearance and introduction of the land-leasing system, the Shanghai Municipal Government turned several parts of the city into a site ready to be leased, filled and exploited. Thus, Shanghai emerged as a confined experimental site for the production of Deng's envisioned society (Ren 2008; Wei and Leung 2005; Wei et al. 2006; Zhang 1997).

With the guiding hand of the Shanghai Municipal Government, Shanghai has experienced a rapid transformation of its pre-existing social space. By the practice of bulldozing for change, the city was turned into a space of state-of-the-art modernity and monitored insertion of capitalism. Each building destined for demolition was marked with the Chinese character for '*chai*' (demolition). Since the early 1990s, Shanghai has come to 'embody nationalist ambitions of wealth, power, and recognition' (Ong 2011: 3). With reference to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 'the Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan' declares:

> Under the strong leadership of CPC Central Committee, the State Council and the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee, guided by Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, the people of Shanghai have put into earnest practice the scientific concept of development and the grand strategic vision of building a harmonious socialist society, and given consistent priority to development in governing and prospering the country. ('the Outline' 2006: 150)

Acknowledging several government institutions, Deng Xiaoping and the respective slogans of post-Deng leaders, the Shanghai Municipal Government produced the envisioned social space. Recalling Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997), Dirlik (2003) and Liu (1996), the Shanghai Municipal Government enables China's own version of modernity, and the city's future is depicted as a socialist, prosperous, developed and international spatial entity.

The main targets of Shanghai's Eleventh Five-Year Plan have been:

> To keep the social and economic growth on a fast and sustained pace, make the World Expo 2010 successful, splendid and memorable, and establish a framework for an international center of economy, finance, trade and transport, make major progress toward building the city into a socialist modern international metropolis, lay a solid foundation for the city's sustained socioeconomic growth during 2011–2020. (SBF 2007: 124)

In the preceding quote, the Shanghai Municipal Government projects a totalizing vision onto the existing social space of Shanghai. In spatial vocabulary, the Shanghai Municipal Government seeks to fix the contents of the city (introducing new spatial practices) in order to produce its envisioned society. By pulling down '42.81 million square meters of shabby and dilapidated houses', as an exhibition quote describes it, the official goal is 'to rejuvenate Shanghai, develop Pudong, serve China and open up to the world' (Liu and Huang 2007: 69). Thus, several quarters of Shanghai's unique traditional *shikumen* buildings were demolished. While making use of domestic, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, overseas Chinese and foreign investments as strategic tools for producing space, the Shanghai Municipal Government is the key actor to encourage production of new spaces (Ren 2008; Wei and Leung 2005; Wei et al 2006; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Xu and Yeh 2005). Connecting the changes of the city to PRC's early years, the official promotional booklet 'Shanghai Basic Facts' states:

> In the past more than 50 years, the city has seen marked progress in its economic and social development. Particularly, since the Chinese government adopted the reform and opening policy in 1978, Shanghai has made outstanding achievements in growing as a megalopolis. Today, Shanghai has become one of the largest economic centers in China. Now, the city is striving to turn itself into one of the economic, financial, trade and transportation centers in the world. It also aims to lead the country in building a socialist harmonious society. (2007: 4)

Since the reform and opening policy was initiated in 1978, the city is represented as having made 'outstanding achievements' in the production of a megalopolis. While constantly referencing cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, Paris, London and New York in several promotional contexts, the Shanghai Municipal Government transformed Shanghai into 'a world class city'. However, it is important to keep in mind that '[a] number of Asian cities have come to stand as replicable models of an urban futurity that

does not find its ultimate reference in the West' (Ong 2011: 14). Literally, Deng Xiaoping called for the production of 'a few Hong Kongs' along China's coast (Ong 2011: 17). Deng (1994: 366) also praised Singapore for its 'strict administration' and 'good public order'. Constantly referencing the above cities, the Shanghai Municipal Government is engaged in encouraging production of new spatial practices, i.e. buildings (shopping malls, factories, banks and other commercial spaces; each requiring certain spatial identities), infrastructure (metro system, highways, airport, etc.) and public parks, to open up, internationalize and modernize the city.

In the early 1990s, Shanghai and its social spaces were understood as insufficient for the new purposes (Deng 1994). Clearly forging its own social space, the Shanghai Municipal Government is reconfiguring the city and its spatial organization to ease and serve the re-entering of Shanghai and the country into post-colonial global space. Wu (2000: 1374) writes: 'By making space available for globalisation, Shanghai—like other cities in market economies—attempts to secure a position in the global system.' Striving for modernization, the goal is to make Shanghai into an ideal global city that provides environments of international standard (Liu and Huang 2007: 116, 118). Showing Shanghai's aspirations to be globally reconnected, '[t]he popularity of the global city has shaped Shanghai's policy direction towards more globally oriented activities, emphasizing economic competitiveness and the new image of global Shanghai' (Wu 2003: 66). Having this in mind, the Shanghai Municipal Government encourages the production of certain spatial arrangements, such as the Pudong New Area discussed below, to enable investments in Shanghai and implement the envisioned society.

Map of Shanghai (By ChinaMaps.org)



The Pudong New Area – the future of the country today

Pudong New Area (photo by Micah Sittig)

> The astonishing development of Pudong began in the mid-1990s. Its cluster of huge skyscrapers in the 'Tomorrow Square' of Lujiazui was meant to surpass the colonial buildings on The Bund in Puxi. The new Shanghai would no longer be in the shadow of its imperialist capitalist past; the earlier phase of modernization that had built the city into 'the Paris (or New York) of the East' would be dwarfed by new forces propelling the shiny metropolis skywards from the rice fields. (O'Connor 2012: 18)

Historically, Shanghai's urban culture has been located to the west of the Huangpu River, and hence, central Shanghai has been labelled Puxi ("pu" is short for Huangpu River and "xi" means west). In the CCP's efforts to turn Shanghai into a twenty-first century globalizing city, the area east to the river (Pudong) was designated to showcase the country's opening-up reforms. While Puxi's colonial built environments along the Bund represent Shanghai's historical international status and the country's humiliation under semi-coloniality, today's Pudong symbolizes the new China and the CCP's efforts

to turn the country into a modern nation and global economic player. On its website, the Pudong New Area Government states:

> In the past 19 years, upholding truth-seeking and pioneering spirit, Pudong New Area accelerated its reform and development by opening up, searched for new urban development model by combining international thought with local characteristics, built infrastructures and developed Hi-tech industry and modern service industry based on high standard to build itself into an outward-oriented, multi-functional and modern new district so as to become the economic, financial, trade and shipping center regionally and internationally.[34]

Designated to lead the country on its way to Deng's envisioned society, the Pudong New Area is unceasingly marketed by the Shanghai Municipal Government and the CCP. Glossy brochures, exhibitions, books, billboards, souvenirs, television and metro advertisements are created to promote Pudong to investors, tourists and other actors. It is declared, 'Pudong: [is] the Land of Promise' (SBF 2007: 72). As a material manifestation of the envisioned society, Pudong stands as a promise for the development of Shanghai and the PRC as a whole. With this in mind, it is possible to get a glimpse of China's future today: a very clean, organized and modern space. The glimmering cityscape of Pudong quickly became a popular symbol of new Shanghai and a sign of the CCP's resoluteness to modernize the entire country. Remodelling Shanghai to serve the CCP's opening aims, the Shanghai Municipal Government places the Pudong New Area 'at the service of the whole country, and orients [the area] towards the outside world' ('the Outline' 2006: 229). Resonating with Deng Xiaoping's vision for the city, 'the Outline' states: 'Pudong will be turned into a testing and pioneering area for reform and opening-up, a model and a pilot area for independent innovation, and a key cluster of modern services' (2006: 229). With its hypermodern cityscape, the Pudong New Area emerges as a vanguard space that will lead the city and the entire country towards the envisioned, prosperous, modern Chinese society.

[34] 'Introduction of Pudong New Area', http://english.pudong.gov.cn/html/pden/pden_ap_oop_pi/2010-04-10/Detail_72491.htm, (accessed 1 September 2010).

To transform Pudong New Area into a globalizing district, then-mayor Zhu Rongji and the Shanghai Municipal Government initiated an international consulting process. Joining the Shanghai team of official representatives from the Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Institute, East China Architecture and Design Institute, Shanghai Municipal Institute of Civil Architectural Design and Tongji University, several high-profile international architects were invited to take part and submit their own master plans for the area. (Olds 1997) Pudong became 'the high-profile site for international architects to employ their ideas of high modernity in spatial terms in order to impose an interpretive grid on the city' (Huang 2004: 105). In 1992, Dominique Perrault, Toyo Ito, Massimiliano Fuksas and Richard Rogers were chosen to become vital partners in the development of Pudong. While the foreign experts did not have any experience in Chinese urban planning and architecture, 'the [Shanghai Municipal Government] wanted global architectural celebrities with a firm understanding of how a futuristic 21st century international finance centre should look and function' (Olds 1997: 117). They were part of an official marketing strategy 'to project a credible urban image so as to draw in global capital' (Huang 2004: 108). With their combined efforts, all participants understood that future Pudong would act as an important spatial symbol of Shanghai's re-invention, the opening up reforms and the success of the CCP's efforts to modernize the country (Olds 1997; Huang 2004).

Showing the workings of abstract space, Pudong was treated as an empty void ready to be filled. With the land-leasing system as a tool, the Shanghai Municipal Government cleared space in Pudong to rebuild the area into its own materialized version of a post-colonial global space. Focusing on the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone, which is Pudong's commercial centre and makes up Shanghai's new skyline, the master plan clearly illustrates the new priorities and the spatial fixation of the area in service of the envisioned goals. Of the total buildable area (4.18 million square metres), the master plan states that 75 per cent is devoted to finance, business, trade and hotels, 16 per cent to department stores, 6.6 per cent to residential space and 2.4 per cent to leisure and culture activities. Typical for modernist urban spatial

developments, the plan did not take into account Lujiazui's 100,000 residents that lived on the site (Olds 1997). Implementing the CCP's vision, the Shanghai Municipal Government made the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone in Pudong into 'a carrier for the efforts to build an international finance center' in Shanghai ('the Outline' 2006: 231). Giving the new Pudong skyline its character, several landmark structures have been built. For instance, Lujiazui hosts the Oriental Pearl Tower, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Jinmao Tower, Shanghai International Finance Centre, Shanghai World Financial Centre and Shanghai Tower. Emerging as a clean, modern, commercialized space, Lujiazui is a site of conference venues, exhibitions, tourism, luxury hotels and shopping malls. With functional zoning practices, Pudong has been turned into a space of production and consumption. Apart from Lujiazui, Pudong consists of several other contact spaces, such as Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, Jinqiao Processing Zone and Zhangjiang High-Tech Park. Realizing the CCP's opening aims, the different zones are 'targeted for the expansion of particular sectors of the economy and designed in order to promote these specific and specialised activities' (Gaubatz 1999: 1505). Whereas Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone headquarters several 'multinational corporations and domestic large companies', Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone functions 'as a modern logistic and port facility'. Displaying its acquired connectedness with global capitalist space, Waigaoqiao hosts 2,700 companies, which have 'trade ties with 160 countries and regions' (SBF 2007: 75–6). While Zhangjiang attracts domestic and foreign high-tech industries, Jinqiao has 'expanded its industrial functions' with '88 overseas-invested projects' in 2006 (SBF 2007: 77). Resonating with 'the Four Modernizations', the Zhangjiang Hi-tech Park is envisioned as 'an important carrier for the master strategy to prosper the city through science, technology and education' ('the Outline' 2006: 232).

While old and new Shanghai are represented by the colonial built environments along the Bund and Pudong's shining skyscrapers, the contrast between 'past' and 'present' is also highlighted when Pudong's new urban character is promoted to display the rapid development of the area and the

determination of the Shanghai Municipal Government to transform Shanghai into a globalizing city, as this spatializing representation illustrates:

> Before the 1990s, the area featured paddies and fishing villages, where the socio-economic development lagged far behind that in Puxi, the city on the western side of the river. In 1990, China adopted the policy of opening and reforming Pudong, and three years later, the new area government was established. After 17 years of opening and reform undertakings, the area has established itself as a modern urban district geared toward investment environment and multifunctional services, becoming window showcasing the country's reform and opening achievements and a mirror of Shanghai's modern construction. (SBF 2007: 72)

While the former 'paddies and fishing villages' are contrasted with the contemporary 'modern urban district' that now exists on site in Pudong, it is suggested that modernity requires its own distinctive built environment. Stressing two types of social spaces, rural Pudong is contrasted with a new modern urban spatiality. The Shanghai Municipal Government has literally changed Pudong's former organic 'Gemeinschaft' into the archetype of a planned 'Gesellschaft'. Backed by the CCP's vision and the country's land-leasing system, '[c]apitalism has taken possession of the land' (Lefebvre 1991: 335). Thus, the Pudong New Area appears as 'subordinate to the overriding order of globalization' (Huang 2004: 63).

Symbolic identity, large-scale events and spaces of culture

> While the majority of recent infrastructural developments in Shanghai focused on making space for finance and commerce, cultural infrastructure has not been neglected—the establishment of cultural complexes as well as the preservation of local heritage structures—in recognition of their role in the making of global cities. In a strong bid to bring Shanghai to the level of regional rivals like Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore, culture has been made a major priority. (Kong 2007: 389)

Generating a symbol of progress and prosperity, the production of new spaces in Shanghai not only improves the city's investment environment. With its radical change of the cityscape, Shanghai is turned into a city of new signs, sights and sites. The Shanghai Municipal Government strives to enhance Shanghai's cultural image. Combining spatial practices and representations of space, the Shanghai Municipal Government is engaged in producing a new

symbolic urban landscape that fosters a vision of an emerging global city (Dynon 2011; Kong 2007; Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2003).

As essential strategies to promote a new spatial identity, increase the city's influence and visibility domestically, regionally and globally, and turn Shanghai into a global culture city, the Shanghai Municipal Government is engaged in encouraging and organising events such as international festivals, fairs and other urban spectacles (Wu 2000b). As part of the process of opening up the city, 'the Outline' (2006: 241) maintains, 'Shanghai will actively bid to host major international events and intensify exchanges with friendship cities overseas to promote international exchange.' While Shanghai is reconnected with the outside world, permanent and temporary large-scale projects characterize the changes pursued by the Shanghai Municipal Government. While the *Shanghai World Expo 2010* was strategically used to assist the production of Deng's envisioned society, the *World Expo* was also used as a tool to foster a new vision of the city and the entire country. Enabling the production of new spatial practices in Shanghai, several events are used as strategies to display infrastructure projects and new China to the world. (Wu 2000b) By hosting the *World Expo*, the Shanghai Municipal Government aspired to 'raise the international profile of the city' and 'improve the city's international communication abilities' ('the Outline' 2006: 167). According to 'the Outline', the *World Expo* was:

> an opportunity for the country to display the charm of the Chinese civilization and its ancient history and culture, and for the city to enhance its image as an international metropolis and present the profound cultural legacies that this socialist modern international metropolis has. ('the Outline' 2006: 227)

By hosting the *World Expo*, the Shanghai Municipal Government attempted to showcase Chinese traditional culture, strengthen Shanghai as an international city and display China's socialist social space to the outside world. The World Expo has worked as a tool to re-brand the nation, the city and the CCP's ruling ideology (Dynon 2011).

As a strategy to instigate a change of the Chinese populace (i.e. raise their quality/*suzhi*), the World Expo was also envisioned as 'an important medium to implement national strategies, promote civic awareness and

respectful behavior, and improve the overall service capacity of the city' ('the Outline' 2006: 224). While showcasing China's achievements to domestic and international audiences, the World Expo emerged as a temporary space in which the Shanghai Municipal Government strived to open up its residents to the outside world and raise their quality/*suzhi* by assembling not-at-home-places at home (through a staging of several national cultures in diverse national and themed pavilions). Today, the World Expo area is turned into office and exhibition spaces. In contrast with the Maoist era, contemporary Shanghai residents are encouraged to foster a modern subjectivity and take part in 'fine' spatial activities, such as watching films, attending performances, fashion shows and art exhibitions. Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Government changes not only the city's spatial practices but also strives to promote the production of certain representational spaces (i.e. to enhance people's quality/*suzhi*). Striving to monitor activities in space and produce modern globalizing subjects, the Shanghai Municipal Government encourages 'civilised behaviour' through different campaigns, such as by putting up billboards promoting certain ideas and manners throughout the city, and arranging courses on social etiquette and English language. In 2006, the Shanghai Municipal Government launched the campaign 'Civilised behaviours for Shanghai to welcome the World Expo—seven objectives to achieve', which asked people to 'build a city ruled by law, politeness, trust and friendship, a healthy and educated city and where the environment is protected' (Boutonnet 2011: 37). Mirroring Deng and Jiang's efforts to increase people's quality/*suzhi* and advance culture, the Shanghai Municipal Government acts as a modernizing force and aspires to cultivate its residents into modern international subjects by providing certain cultural activities and excluding others.

To enhance Shanghai as a global city, the Shanghai Municipal Government has produced several cultural landmarks. Providing a vision for the city, 'Shanghai will transform itself into a high-level international cultural exchange center where traditional Chinese culture coexists with cultures from around the world' (Liu and Huang 2007: 92). While displaying China's national culture and Shanghai's unique characteristics, the Shanghai

Municipal Government produces spaces that encourage contact through cultural consumption. Most significantly, Shanghai Museum, Shanghai Grand Theatre and Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Centre (which displays a model of Shanghai in 2020) share the centre of the city with the building of the Shanghai Municipal Government in People's Square. By locating crucial spaces of culture in the city centre, the Shanghai Municipal Government demonstrates that culture and not just economic success are valuable to Shanghai's new identity. Exhibiting arts and crafts from diverse Chinese dynasties, Shanghai Museum resembles a traditional Chinese cooking pot and symbolizes 'the ancient Chinese philosophy that the square earth is under the round sky'.[35] With its neighbouring glimmering skyscrapers, contemporary Shanghai is linked with China's dynastic history. By the museum's staging of China's past, the visitors become viewing subjects and most importantly, consumers of Chinese history. In Abbas' words, 'The obvious visual message here is that in the city's pursuit of modernity, Chinese tradition is not forgotten' (2002: 51). Similarly, the Shanghai Urban Exhibition Centre displays not only Shanghai's most recent developments and the city's future but also how the historical city has evolved into its current post-semi-colonial status. The building of Shanghai Urban Exhibition Centre is a hypermodern version of a traditional Chinese temple. Similarly, the adjacent Shanghai Grand Theatre represents a dynastic palace. Located in different parts of the city, other venues are the Shanghai Library, Shanghai Science and Technology Museum and Oriental Arts Centre. According to official representations of space, the new spaces are produced to foster and sustain contact with the outside world, and to provide spaces in which residents and visitors can enjoy arts, culture and entertainment activities, and also serve as sites for patriotic education (Kong 2007; SBF 2007). As a strategy to enable and maintain openness, the Shanghai Municipal Government has also organized several festivals. By cooperating with domestic and international businesses and official institutions, the city hosts annual events such as the Shanghai

[35] 'History', Shanghai Museum, http://www.shanghaimuseum.net/en/history/history.jsp (accessed 11 December 2013).

International Film Festival, Shanghai International Tourism Festival, Shanghai Fashion Festival and China Shanghai Art Festival. While '[c]arrying forward fine cultural traditions' (Liu and Huang 2007: 120), the festivals are deliberately used to enhance China's involvement in film, fashion and art in the world.

In addition to the World Expo, cultural landmarks and festivals, Shanghai has experienced a proliferation of creative industries and art spaces. The city has experienced 'a boom' of cultural spaces, as Shanghai today is home to 'more than 2,500 creative industry companies from more than 30 countries and regions' (SBF 2007: 97). They are mostly located in preserved industrial structures along Suzhou Creek and scattered around the streets of Xuhui district (the old French Concession). Once organically orchestrated by artists and cultural professionals to avoid state control and seek alternative financial means, the Suzhou Creek arts and creative industry spaces are today integrated parts of the Shanghai Municipal Government's strategy to rejuvenate Shanghai's cultural image (Zhong 2012). Combining structures from semi-colonial Shanghai and the city's socialist industrialization, the banks of Suzhou Creek early on hosted warehouses and factories. While the Shanghai Municipal Government began to relocate industries to the outskirts of the city in the early 1990s, artists and creative industries rapidly gathered in the abandoned structures. They became important contact spaces for local and foreign artists. Over ten years, Shanghai's unofficial arts and creative industries evolved significantly. However, in 2005, the Suzhou Creek arts and creative industry spaces became formalized and part of the city's official promotion of creative industry clusters. Shanghai's main creative industries are located at *M50 Creative Park* (Suzhou Creek), *The Bridge 8 Creative Park* (old French Concession) and *Red Town* (near Xujiahui). On the changing character of the arts and cultural industries in Shanghai, Gu notes:

> Most recently the banks of Suzhou Creek have seen a quickened pace of commercialization which has further minimized the presence of artists and their activities. Many art studios have closed or relocated. Within the established art clusters, art studios have been edged out to make way for galleries, craft shops, cafes and restaurants resembling the character of an entertainment cluster. (Gu 2012: 203)

In Shanghai's commercialized world of arts and creative industries, top-end venues, along the Bund waterfront, such as *Bund18* and *Three on the Bund*, also host their own galleries and temporary exhibitions. While located in the Hongkou district, the *1933 Shanghai* complex is another example of an old colonial structure converted into a creative and commercial space. Turned into a hub of galleries, shops, exhibitions, restaurants and design companies, *1933* was once a colonial slaughterhouse. Similarly, the creative hub Tianzifang on Taikang Lu (in the Old French Concession) was once a bottom-up restoration of an old residential neighbourhood. Today, Tianzifang is praised by the Shanghai Municipal Government and other official institutions as a good example of restored *longtang* buildings. The present neighbourhood includes art and craft spaces, cafés, design studios, galleries, small eateries and boutiques. While art spaces and creative industry spaces have multiplied and the city aspires to global status, Shanghai's gallery scene is monitored by the authorities, and several exhibitions are shut down annually (Catching 2012; Gu, 2012, 2014; Wang 2011).

Preparing the past for the future – producing the history of the global city

> [L]ocal cultural elements have become a constitutive part of cosmopolitanism. When cities become more homogenous with global flows, local cultural differences become rare commodities sought after by mobile global consumerist elites. (Ren 2008: 36)

While Shanghai is being produced into a global city, several efforts have been made to preserve certain built structures to display Shanghai's unique character. Han Zheng, the former mayor of Shanghai, once declared: 'Building new is development, preserving old is also development' (quoted in Ren 2008: 31). Today, Han Zheng is the CCP Secretary of Shanghai and member of the Politburo of the CCP. As different spatial structures co-exist in contemporary Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Government has realized the value of anchoring the city in its history. With celebratory words, 'the Outline' states, '[t]he inner city is a showcase of Shanghai's prosperity, and cultural and historical legacy' (2006: 220). Displaying the many social spaces of Shanghai, the city has inherited spatial structures that originate from several dynasties

(pre-1912), semi-colonialism (1840–1949), socialism (1949–) and present-day socialist capitalism (1978–). Regarding the Shanghai Municipal Government's efforts to preserve built structures, 'the 'Outline' declares, '[t]he city will protect historical features, heritage architectures, historical and cultural towns, communities and streets, and excellent folk arts' (2006: 249). Using the different historical layers of Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Government is engaged in preservation of the city's built environment. While realizing the importance of preservation, the Shanghai Municipal Government keeps only selected built environments. Displaying the politics of heritage construction, the physical structures that are considered worthy of preservation are mostly revolutionary spaces, colonial built environments, dynastic architectures and industrial structures.

> Shanghai is a city with a long history and glorious revolutionary traditions. Many important revolutionary events in the modern history of China took place in Shanghai. There are many important revolutionary relics and former residences of well-known figures in the city.[36]

Although Shanghai often is associated with its historical international status, the material space in which the CCP was founded is highlighted in Shanghai's cityscape and official representations of space. The city becomes a crucial site for the nation, and most importantly, for its reconstruction, as the CCP was founded in semi-colonial Shanghai in 1921. Once sites for China's anti-imperial struggles, the built environments in which the CCP was formed are made into memorial sites of struggle, achievement and triumph. With several neighbouring commercial spaces, the historical buildings of the CCP are produced as *red tourist sites*. Red tourism is "used by the nation-state to develop new patronage of the communist ideology among the young generation, in order to sustain the communist identity in a rapidly changing China of the twenty-first century" (Li et. al, 2010:102). While producing a historical linearity, the spaces are strategically renovated and promoted as a tool to show that the city and the country as a whole have surpassed the revolutionary stage; it is time to enjoy oneself. As Li et al. (2010) illustrate, the

[36] Quote from one of the exhibitions at the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Center.

upgrading of the CCP buildings is part of the CCP's efforts to re-legitimize itself, which has turned architectural relics of the revolutionary history into red tourist spaces. While renovated for the purpose of educating the Chinese people about the Party's accomplishments and to nurture patriotism, the CCP buildings are squeezed into highly commercialized built environments. As we stroll in the city and shop in nearby boutiques, we are supposed to gaze at the staging of the CCP history. As the inner city is turned into a consumer space, Shanghai is simultaneously constructed as the core of CCP history. Appearing as memory traces in contemporary Shanghai, the spaces are represented as sites where anti-imperialist sentiments were formed and successively led to the liberation of the country from semi-colonisation and the Nationalists (Kuomintang) in 1949. Storying the nation under the CCP rule, Shanghai is constructed as a space of the founding of the CCP and a space of its revolutionary history.

Site of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xintiandi (photo by the author)

Located in Luwan and Xuhui districts (once the Old French Concession), several sites are crucial for the CCP history in the city. Revolutionary spaces such as the Site of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Site of Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the residences of Sun Yat-sen (founder of the Republic of China), Mao Zedong (founder of the CCP and PRC), Zhou Enlai (the first premier of the PRC) and Lu Xun (Chinese modernist writer) have been renovated and turned into red tourist spaces. While Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai emerge as leading subjects of the Republic of China and the PRC, their corresponding residences are understood as places of significance for the founding of modern China (the abolishment of the Qing dynasty and feudalism, the critique of imperialist rule, and the beginning of Chinese modernity). Connecting the revolutionary history with contemporary Shanghai, the spaces emerge as strategic sites in which it becomes possible to consume the founding fathers of modern China and the PRC, and celebrate that the socialist revolution has been accomplished.

Similar to the revolutionary spaces, Shanghai's colonial heritage reappears as a tourist attraction. Keeping in mind that the CCP was founded in Shanghai as part of anti-imperialist struggles in the early twentieth century, the Shanghai Municipal Government is grounding its production of Shanghai in the city's semi-colonial history. While producing Shanghai into a contemporary global city, the Shanghai Municipal Government strives to show that Shanghai once was an international city. Addressing the early twentieth-century semi-colonial Shanghai as 'the Debut of Prosperity', another exhibition quote continues, '[s]ince Shanghai was opened as a treaty port in November 1843, it has gradually become the biggest metropolis in the Far East and industrial and commercial center in China'. Connecting Shanghai with the pre-revolutionary city, several colonial built environments have been renovated and revamped into dining venues, bars, cafés, galleries, boutiques, spas, hotels, banks, consulates and private homes. As addressed in chapter 4, the colonial built environments are located in the former concession areas. The material spaces range from commercial buildings, *shikumen* houses, mansions and factories. As examples of the renovation of old colonial built

environments, the Bund, Xintiandi (an entertainment and leisure area that shares space with the building in which the CCP was founded in 1921) and Passage Fuxing (an old French concession culture and leisure space located in a restored colonial building) are discussed in next chapter.

Reconnecting contemporary Shanghai with the semi-colonial period, the renovation of colonial built environments has to be understood through the historical linearity that the CCP is producing as part of PRC nation building.

> In the mid-nineteenth century, the city evolved into a major trading port and gateway to inland China. On 27 May 1949, Shanghai was liberated by the People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China from Kuomintang rule and began to write its chapter in the history of the development of New China (SBF 2007:3)

Emerging as an official representation of social space, the history of the city is divided into several stages focusing on who dominated the space: the trading port/semi-colonial era; the Kuomintang rule (also understood as semi-colonial by the CCP); and the 'New China' under the CCP. The CCP appears as the sole actor ruling the Chinese mainland. As the main CCP antagonist, the Kuomintang is denigrated as a power that was unable to abolish either the feudal or the colonial system. On the CCP's victory, an exhibition quote reads, '[t]he founding of the People's Republic of China won the Huangpu River back from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. The calamity-ridden port town was greeting a grand resurrection'.[37] Producing the history of the city, while also emphasizing the Japanese colonial presence, another exhibition quote reads:

> Britain was the first to set up its concession in Shanghai in 1845, the United States and France followed suit in Hongkou in 1848 and in the south of Yan'an E. in 1849 respectively, which were extended later. The concessions were recovered after the triumph of the War Resistance Against Japan in 1945.

Owing to CCP's accomplishments, the social space of Shanghai is progressing into another stage in China's evolutionary history. As the CCP installed its ruling system on the Chinese mainland, post-1949 China and Shanghai are

[37] Quote from one of the exhibitions at the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Center.

understood as being in the state of post-semi-coloniality and post-semi-feudality. While Shanghai is emerging as a post-colonial globalizing city, the Shanghai Municipal Government is strategically using the semi-colonial history as part of the production of the envisioned society. Once considered by the CCP and the Nationalists (Kuomintang) as signs and sites of humiliation of the Chinese people, the colonial built environments are being turned into architectural trophies of the colonial era. By transforming the colonial built environments into tourist sites (i.e. the history of the city is supposed to be gazed at, not enacted), the Shanghai Municipal Governmet is emphasizing that the semi-colonial period has been surpassed and the CCP has been victorious.

While Shanghai's history is frequently linked to the colonial era, the Shanghai Municipal Government strives to incorporate the city into the Chinese history that precedes the colonial presence in Shanghai. As part of the CCP's promoted social space, Shanghai is re-integrated into the history of several dynasties. The year 1292 is frequently addressed as 'the official beginning of the city of Shanghai' (SBF 2007: 2). By connecting contemporary Shanghai with its early years, the semi-colonization of the city is merely rendered as one of several phases (social spaces) that Shanghai has passed through to the present. Providing a representation of the city's history, the official website of the Shanghai Municipal Government reads:

> With a history of more than 700 years, Shanghai was once the financial center of the Far East regions. Since the reforms that began in 1990s, great changes have taken place in the city. The municipal government is working towards building Shanghai into a modern metropolis and into a world economic, financial, trading and shipping center by 2020.[38]

[38] 'Office of the Mayor', http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node17256/index.html. (accessed 22 December 2014).

Taking advantage of the city's past in the promotion of Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Government is in the process of producing ('working towards building') a new social space ('a modern metropolis' and 'world economic, financial, trading and shipping center'). While producing global Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Government also acknowledges '[t]he long history of Shanghai [that] can be traced back to ancient times'[39]. Declaring that the city was founded 700 years ago, the Shanghai Municipal Government produces the new nation in general and Shanghai in particular grounded in Chinese history.

Jing'an Temple (photo by Pablo Markin)

[39] A quote from Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Center.

In the process of grounding Shanghai in Chinese history, several built structures, such as Yu Yuan Garden, Jing'an Temple, Longhua Temple, Jade Buddha Temple and Confucius Temple, have been renovated to strategically showcase the city's traditional Chinese heritage. Similar to the revolutionary spaces and colonial built environments, the pre-semi-colonial architecture is returned to its original use or turned into tourism and consumption spaces. Renovating and rebuilding structures from the Qing (1644–1912), Ming (1368–1644), Song (960–1279), Five Dynasties (907–960) and Tang (618–906) dynasties, Shanghai is connected with historical social spaces that once existed on these sites.

Conclusion

In this subchapter, I have shown how the Shanghai Municipal Government is implementing Deng's envisioned society. Through a land-leasing system, and demolishing vast areas of *shikumen* houses, relocating their residents and renovating certain built environments, Shanghai is acquiring the material and visual components of a globalizing city. While making use of the city's inherited social spaces, the Shanghai Municipal Government is producing contemporary Shanghai as a twenty-first-century post-revolutionary city anchored in ancient China, the semi-colonial era and early socialism. While Shanghai once was a sign of China's weakness as a state, the city today is a sign of the CCP's revolutionary beginning and resoluteness to produce a new, modern society. As Shanghai is turned into the country's leading experimental site of the envisioned society, some of the city's residents have experienced increased living standards. Particularly, the younger generations are engaged in the country's reordering of Shanghai into a globalizing city.

9 Understanding lived contact space

While the previous analytical chapters have focused on the CCP rhetoric of the opening up and economic reforms and the Shanghai Municipal Government's implementation of the envisioned society in Shanghai, this chapter brings the guided conversations to the centre of the analysis. The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part, 'Characterizing Shanghai', focuses on how the interviewees negotiate the history of the city, Shanghai vis-à-vis other places on the Chinese mainland and nostalgia for Old Shanghai. The second part, 'Spaces of contact', revolves around culture and language exchanges as a voluntary and temporary contact space, working at foreign/international companies and the issues of spatial hierarchies and people's quality/*suzhi* in commercial public spaces. In this context, while bringing into play Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991), I have chosen to make closer engagements with several associated images and symbols that the interviewees use, negotiate and maintain. The associated images and symbols are often culturally shared and used, and therefore I have given them additional attention.

As the CCP's envisioned society is implemented in Shanghai, the city's residents are also engaged in China's efforts to modernize in many different ways. While Shanghai was designated 'to get rich before others' and lead the country towards common prosperity, the city displays vast social disparities as a reminder that the emerging society is unevenly distributed. In the new, modern society that unfolds, the interviewees emerge as a diverse group of individuals, who most likely can be characterized as China's emerging middle classes (Anagnost 2004; Crabb 2010; Fong 2007; Jacka 2009; Tomba 2009). Being part of this group, the interviewees carry their own unique understandings of China's opening-up reforms, Shanghai and intercultural communication. While living the emerging society in Shanghai, the interviewees engage themselves in China's reordering through their ways of characterizing Shanghai, their own experiences of foreign culture and intercultural communication, and frequenting several contact spaces in Shanghai. Through their personal engagements in China's reordering, the

interviewees emerge as a diverse group subjectively accustomed to the opening-up reforms. They have attained the ideal subjectivity of the new society (urban, educated, open-minded and high *suzhi*), or are in the process of attainting it (some interviewees were studying at the university at the time of the guided conversation). The interviewees match the requirements of the new, modern society that is encouraged and being produced by the CCP. In several guided conversations, while the interviewees positioned themselves as open, other Shanghai residents are similarly understood and categorized as either open or not. This is illustrated by Nathan when he compared Shanghai's new spaces and the city's residents. In 'Shanghai most places are very international', Nathan stated, 'but some people's views are not international'. While the Shanghai Municipal Government has physically altered Shanghai and introduced new spatial practices, Nathan argues that corresponding changes have not yet occurred in some people's mindsets (representational spaces). In Lefebvre's spatial theory, a new social space is fully established when spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces are an integrated whole. In this respect, the interviewees symbolize the "required" identities in China's emerging society, as they consider themselves open and have the opportunity to engage in international practices in Shanghai.

Characterizing Shanghai

While the interviewees are characterizing Shanghai, the contemporary city is understood through its history, comparisons with other spaces on the Chinese mainland and literary representations of pre-1949 Shanghai. In Lefebvre's terminology, the interviewees characterize Shanghai's historical and contemporary social spaces, juxtapose different social spaces on the Chinese mainland to display Shanghai's unique character and show a close relationship between their lived space and literature.

Negotiating the history of the city

In the guided conversations, the history of Shanghai was addressed in several ways. While I was talking with Nathan, the spatiality of the guided conversation actualizes the city's semi-colonial history. Consisting of cafés, boutiques and offices, Shanghai Central Plaza is located in one of the busiest intersections in downtown Shanghai, Huai Hai Lu and Madang Lu. With the combination of classical European architecture and modern design, Shanghai Central Plaza was opened in 1999 and branded as a middle to high-end shopping centre. Providing a corporate representation of the spatial practices of Shanghai Central Plaza, the Hong Kong developer Sun Hung Kai Properties maintains:

> The 38-storey building was originally built in a classical French style, and in order to preserve the valuable architecture, the developer incorporated the old French building in the shopping arcade and retained a well-known architect to renovate it, maintaining its old characteristics. Inside, the shopping arcade features a modern design, with a large glass-roofed atrium. This blend of the old and the new gives the building a special appeal.[40]

While the colonial built environment is emphasized by Sun Hung Kai Properties, it also represents the extensive presence of Hong Kong capital in the city. Frequented by white-collar workers, expats, students and tourists, Starbucks is located on the ground floor of the restored building. At Starbucks, I had an appointment with Nathan. Dressed in a black business suit, Nathan elaborates on the grounds for the openness of the city:

> **Johan**: You say that it is easier for Shanghainese to accept foreign influences, and why is it like that?
>
> **Nathan**: Because of historical reasons. You know, Shanghai was very westernised in the 1920s and 1930s. It was the place in China that got the most influence from Western countries. A lot of countries made concessions in Shanghai. At that time, Shanghainese got more influence from Western people and Western companies. There were a lot of Western companies, and a lot of Western people came to Shanghai. And, so, the Shanghainese can accept the Western life very easily. And, about twenty years

[40] 'Sun Hung Kai Properties: Shanghai Central Plaza', http://www.shkp.com/html/quarterly/09-99/english/16.html (accessed 3 August 2010). The link is no longer accessible. The current website consists of a much shorter description of Shanghai Central Plaza, which can be accessible at http://www.shkp.com/Pages/shanghai-detail-4 (accessed 23 December 2014).

> ago, Shanghai open to other countries, so it is more open. And nowadays, it has become a finance and economic centre, and more and more Western people come to Shanghai, and a lot of Chinese people go abroad and come back to China. So they can easily understand the Western way. And some people work in Western companies, foreign companies. So they get a lot of contact with foreigners, so they can easy understand the Western way.

With respect to above quote, the openness of contemporary Shanghai is traced historically to the experiences of contact between Shanghainese and foreigners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, Shanghai and its residents have inherited their open-mindedness from previous generations. Grounding today's contemporary openness in the city's semi-colonial experiences, Nathan echoes and reinforces the city's distinctive Haipai culture. While addressing the semi-colonial history as a prerequisite for the city's openness, Nathan argues that the contemporary openness is also due to the more recent changes that the city has experienced, propelled by the opening-up reforms. Connecting the historical social spaces of the city, 'the past' is 'present' in contemporary Shanghai through a shared historical identity, which is not only illustrated by Nathan but also in the blending of different architectural styles in the *Shanghai Central Plaza* complex.

While the Starbucks branch of Metro City in Xujiahui provides the immediate surroundings of my guided conversation with Sophie, the busy commercial district, where several other department stores also are located, triggers the question of spaces as authentic (traditional) or inauthentic (modern). Representing its corporate spatial practices, Singaporean developer Metro Holdings[41] states:

> Strategically located at Xujiahui, Shanghai, Metro City, Shanghai is a lifestyle entertainment centre with 350,000 square feet of space. Xujiahui is a retail and leisure hub in south-west Puxi linked to major access roads and the Shanghai subway system that draws in very high shopper traffic. Metro City, Shanghai offers a variety of leisure and lifestyle choices including a cineplex, an amusement centre, fitness centres and a

[41] 'Metro City: Shanghai'. http://www.metro.com.sg/storefront/ContentDetail/AboutUs3.asp?ContentId=465 (accessed 3 August 2010). The link is no longer accessible. The current website consists of a much shorter description of Metro City, which can be accessible at http://www.metroholdings.com.sg/properties_china_metrocity_shanghai.html (accessed 23 December 2014).

wide array of dining options, but it has become especially well-known in Shanghai as a popular information technology centre.

As the Singaporean developer embodies the presence of overseas Chinese capital in China, Xujiahui is connected with global capitalist space. With the establishment of Metro City in 1993 and other shopping complexes (such as Grand Gateway Plaza, discussed below), Xujiahui has developed into a clean, modern space resembling commercialized cityscapes in Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo and Singapore.

Xujiahui (photo by the author)

Xujiahui was one of the first districts to be totally altered after the city was designated to lead the change of the country. Similar to Wee's East Asian urban modern (2012), Xujiahui is distinctively pan-Asian, with signs and billboards in Chinese and English, architectural details, and contemporary Chinese, Cantonese, Taiwanese and Japanese restaurants. Appealing to the

questions of authenticity and inauthenticity, the meaning of Xujiahui also anchors the site to the city's complex history. Xujiahui refers to the home of Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), a major Catholic convert, and his family. In the midst of Xujiahui, I met Sophie and discussed the city's history, heritage and cultural identity. Viewing the busy intersection from the terrace of Starbucks, Sophie elaborates:

> I think still Shanghai is a Chinese city. That time [in early 20th century] the foreigners left some buildings and some factories, but I think that people's minds are still Chinese. But, the Shanghai dialect has absorbed some foreign words. But that's not a big deal.

In the preceding quote, Sophie addresses the division between authentic and inauthentic social spaces. Downplaying the colonial built environments and the foreign influence on the local dialect, Sophie questions the foreignness of Shanghai and stresses the mindset of the city's residents. Showing similarities with Shanghai official discourse, which dates Shanghai's early years to before the arrival of the colonizers, Sophie re-asserts Shanghai as a Chinese city. My analysis of Sophie's statement is that material space is understood as 'foreign' (spatial practices), while mental space is understood as 'Chinese' (representational space). Thus, the former semi-colonial space does not structure Sophie's understanding of the city's identity. Furthermore, Sophie highlights the lack of domestic power during the semi-colonial era. Showing similarities with Deng Xiaoping's abstract space and Shanghai's official discourse, Sophie says:

> One hundred years ago, the government was very bad. Now, the government can control the Westerners. Today, they [the government] have the power to control the Westerners and, at that time, the government had no control.

In Sophie's understanding of the change of political power, the country has moved from semi-coloniality ('one hundred years ago' and 'at that time') to post-semi-coloniality ('now'). While Sophie re-centres the history of the PRC around colonial times, more importantly, she also emphasizes a significant event for the establishment of the PRC. Since the opening-up reforms, 'Shanghai has its own ability to develop', Sophie states. Sophie's understanding refers to the pre-1949 era when diverse governments (Qing dynasty and Republican China) lacked absolute political control over the

territory and were unable to control its borders. While the city was forced to open up by external powers in the middle of the nineteenth century, contemporary Shanghai is opened up by an internal power.

Corresponding to my initial contextualization of the present study in Eisenstadt (2000), Ong (1997) and Dirlik (2003), Sophie furthers the discussion of the city's semi-colonial history and its influence on Shanghai. Connecting representational space with representations of space, Sophie relates her understanding of Shanghai to how the city's history has been represented in Chinese historical studies. In this context, while keeping in mind Sophie's statement that the foreigners did not make a significant impact on Shanghai, Sophie states that history books present two approaches to the foreign presence in old Shanghai. Highlighting the struggles over social space, the first approach revolves around the history of colonial invasion, while the second approach conveys the history of foreigners bringing modern culture to Shanghai/China. Thus, Sophie's elaboration relates to how Osterhammel (1986) discusses semi-coloniality in China. As illustrated earlier, Osterhammel (1986) delineated three approaches to the colonial presence on the Chinese mainland. While suggesting that the Chinese history books have two different approaches, Sophie, however, aligns herself with Osterhammel's third approach, which states that the colonizers made no significant impact on the country as a whole.

Shanghai and places elsewhere on the Chinese mainland

While Shanghai's history is often highlighted, the city is also juxtaposed with other spaces in China. Generally, Shanghai is represented as urban, wealthy, modern and progressive. In contrast, other places are often represented as rural, poor, traditional and backward. Within this framework, the coastal cities and urban regions designated to prosper before others emerge as representations of a new thriving China, while the inland provinces become their opposite. Through the historical Jingpai/Haipai terminology, Shanghai is also highlighted by its antagonistic relationship with the capital.

Some interviewees suggest that the geographical location of Shanghai is central to the city's openness. Returning to *Starbucks Metro City*, Shanghai is further addressed by Sophie. While focusing on Shanghai's geographical location, she suggests that the city has several other advantages that have prompted its openness:

> The geography is good here. The city has a port, and it faces the Pacific Ocean. It is the centre for manufacturing ships. And it is also located in the end of Yangtze River [which is the largest trading route across the Chinese mainland]. So the geography is good, which gives the city its economic advantages. The weather, the people, the history.

While Shanghai literally means 'over/above/on the sea', Shanghai is understood by Sophie as a link between exteriority ('faces the Pacific') and interiority ('the end of Yangtze River'). Linking representational space with geographical location, Shanghai is conceptualized as a bridge between 'inside' (China) and 'outside' (the world). Thus, Shanghai becomes a literal third space, a liminal space. Similar to the city's literal meaning, geographic location and the Jingpai/Haipai terminology, Shanghai received another label that historically displays the city's connection with the water. Since the late nineteenth century, the expression 'Shanghai tan' refers to seaside Shanghai (Lu 2002). Apart from its geographical meaning (waterside/beach), 'Shanghai tan' connotes the city's openness, signifying 'outreach-ness' and boundlessness, which deeply contrasts with the traditional walled city (such as Beijing). Thus, space may signal openness (Shanghai) or closed-ness (Beijing). The expression 'Shanghai tan' indicates in-between-ness, a space that links the country with the ocean and the outside world. The Chinese equivalent for the Bund is Waitan ('wai' means outside/outer/external). The expression 'Shanghai tan' also implies 'that Shanghai was a place like a public beach open to everyone and, while people can enjoy life there, decadence also follows' (Lu 2002: 180). To downgrade the status of the semi-colonial city, the CCP also used the expression between 1949 and 1978. In the context of anti-imperialist sentiments, the city was addressed as a 'sink of iniquity' (Lu 2002: 180). Since the 1990s, the expression 'Shanghai tan' has been reapplied as part of Shanghai's re-integration into global space, as official and commercial actors

strategically use the city's historical and contemporary openness as part of promotional campaigns.

In contrast to Shanghai's seaside location, the city's ultimate others are the inland provinces. Returning to the guided conversation at Shanghai Central Plaza, Nathan situates the city in a wider national context. Keeping in mind his elaboration of Shanghai's inherited identity and more recent changes, Nathan suggests that openness to 'the West' is less present in other places in China. Making a connection between geographical locality and representational space, Nathan argues that people who live in places other than Shanghai 'don't have the feeling for the Western way. They don't understand Western culture'. In this way, Nathan implies that openness (to the West) is located in certain social spaces and not others. While Nathan asks me a question, geographic location, modernity and openness are further addressed:

> Do you plan to go to some places that are not as modern as Shanghai? Like Guizhou Province or Hubei Province in the middle of China? To know more about Chinese culture? You know, different places have different culture. Maybe in Shanghai, a lot of people's habits are very similar with… maybe not similar but they can accept the Western way very easily but in other places this is very difficult. So maybe if you go to these places you can completely understand Chinese culture.

In the preceding quote, Nathan suggests that certain social spaces support certain everyday spatial practices and not others. Showing that social spaces are dispersed geographically, Nathan suggests that Shanghai has its own unique social space, which differs from Guizhou and Hubei. Through Nathan's viewpoint, modernity is understood to characterize certain social spaces and not others. While Guizhou recently has experienced a development in heritage tourism (a commercialized revitalization of Chinese tradition, ethnic minority cultures and the region's historical concentration of distilleries), the province 'has long suffered a stigmatized identity associated with abject poverty' (Oakes 2000: 679). While Hubei has not received similar popular connotations, Shanghai's ultimate other is Anhui. Although Anhui is developing, the province still suffers from a well-established stigma of poverty, backwardness and a low-quality/*suzhi* population, which is concretized in the floating population of Anhui migrant workers, beggars and maids in coastal cities such as Shanghai (Oakes 2000; Sun 2009). Talking about how people from other

provinces are treated in Shanghai, David asserts that sometimes people from Anhui and Xinjiang are discriminated against. David describes how people from Anhui are perceived in Shanghai:

> We have a lot of physical labourers from Anhui. They aren't doing very well. They turned to be thieves and beggars. That's why they got a very bad reputation.

Above, David shows how the intricate play between concrete livelihoods and geographic origin produces a discourse on people's quality/*suzhi*. In this context, David suggests that there is a conventional view that 'people from other places in China are poor and badly civilized'. As opposed to China's educated urban dwellers, the rural population is often discursively produced as representing low quality/*suzhi*. Showing the intricate play between space and identity, Anagnost writes:

> The discourse of suzhi appears most elaborated in relation to two figures: the body of the rural migrant, which exemplifies suzhi in its apparent absence, and the body of the urban, middle-class only child, which is fetishized as a site for the accumulation of the very dimensions of suzhi wanting in its 'other.' (Anagnost 2004: 190)

While the rural population's quality/*suzhi* is downgraded vis-à-vis its ultimate other, their cheap labour is used for capital accumulation in urban areas and the country's economic zones (Anagnost 2004), and is therefore essential to China's emerging society.

Turning to my guided conversation with Tina at *Starbucks Raffles City*, the immediate surroundings bring to mind another former colonized city. Managed by CapitaLand, a major Singaporean real estate company in Asia, the Raffles City shopping and office complex was opened in 2003, and named after Singapore's founder, Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raffles. While Deng Xiaoping looked to Singapore, as it was reimagined and rebuilt after its liberation from the British colonizers, for inspiration in governance and urban construction, Raffles City displays the two cities' aspirations to become global retail meccas. Located next to People's Square in central Shanghai, the Raffles City complex targets fashion-conscious consumers passionate about urban

lifestyles, wellness and international brands.[42] In this corporate surrounding, Tina contrasts Shanghai with Beijing through Jingpai/Haipai terminology:

> **Tina**: Beijing is more Chinese. Shanghainese people, they accept the overseas culture and Beijing people, they are more proud of their own culture. Because Beijing has been the capital of China for a very long time.
>
> **Johan**: So why are, compared to people from Beijing, Shanghainese more open to overseas culture?
>
> **Tina**: I think, maybe it's related to the location of the city. You know that Shanghai is a city near to the sea.

With respect to above quote, Tina suggests that people from Beijing are more local ('proud of their own culture') and the Shanghainese are more cosmopolitan ('they accept the overseas culture'). Understanding Tina's elaboration through Lefebvre's terminology, the representational spaces in Beijing are more authentic, and in Shanghai, more inauthentic. Thus, the Jingpai/Haipai terminology is reapplied to characterize each city's social space. Tina illustrates Shanghai's uniqueness: 'In this city, you can't restrict yourself, you have to be open-minded. To know more and you will have more capability.' Reading Tina's statement, openness becomes mandatory and a prerequisite for personal growth in Shanghai. While showing similarities with Sophie, Tina also adds that the location of the city conditions openness ('a city near to the sea'). In contrast to Shanghai's seaside culture, it is possible to suggest that the inland locations of Beijing and Chengdu have conditioned their unique social spaces. Moreover, Shanghai native Tina continues to compare her city with Beijing. She says:

> There are more foreigners in Shanghai than in Beijing. I know that most foreigners favour Shanghai. They prefer Shanghai as their living place. One reason I think is the social environment. The second reason is the weather. Beijing is very cold in the winter. Personally, I don't like Beijing very much. I think it lacks service-mindedness. Sometimes a little bit rude I think [laughter]. For example, in Shanghai, when you talk to the police in the street, they'll help you. But in Beijing, when you ask for directions, they aren't very polite. And Beijing people, that's my personal opinion, they boast

[42] 'Raffles City, Shanghai', http://www.rafflescity-shanghai.com/site-english/about.htm (accessed 24 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. The current website consists of a short description of Raffles City, which can be accessible at http://www.rafflescity.com.cn/en/inchina_shanghai.aspx (accessed 23 December 2014).

more about themselves. But compared to Shanghai, Beijing has more sightseeing. In Shanghai, you can just see modern buildings. The city doesn't have many historical places or any traditional culture. Shanghai has its own culture.

Tina's illustration above demonstrates a popular understanding of the two cities (Gamble 2003; Greenspan 2012; Shih 2001; Zhang 1996; Zhong 2012). Considering Tina's statement through the Jingpai/Haipai terminology, Shanghai emerges as a social space of service-mindedness, politeness and wholesale modernity. In contrast, Beijing denotes a space of impoliteness and traditional culture. In addition, while comparing Shanghai and Beijing, David brings another city into his elaboration. Talking about which spaces we have visited, David says:

David: If you want to study Chinese culture, you do need to go to Beijing. I think each place has some difference with the other. I think Shanghai is mostly westernized. Beijing is not.

Johan: In what way is Shanghai more westernized?

David: More foreigners. And I think, if you visit Chengdu in Western China, you'll see a lot of tea-houses. More than bars and cafés like this [looking around the place]… That's the difference.

In Lefebvre's terminology, David suggests that the presence of different representational spaces ('more foreigners') and certain spatial practices (such as tea-houses and bars/cafés) are crucial for whether social spaces can be understood as 'Chinese'/authentic or not. Thus, the previously colonized spaces, such as Shanghai, can be understood as inauthentic, as they still have many colonial built environments intact. Similarly, spaces that have been changed or produced as part of the opening-up reforms can also be understood as more modern and inauthentic. Historically, Chengdu (in Sichuan Province) has been known for its traditional tea production and tea-house culture.[43]

Moving to the Starbucks outdoor seating at the Grand Gateway Plaza walkway in Xujiahui, the guided conversation with Ebba also addresses the relationship between modernity, tradition and space. Managed by Hong Kong

[43] 'History of Chengdu', http://www.chengdu.gov.cn/echengdu/overview/history.jsp (accessed 7 April 2014).

developer Hang Lung Properties, the Grand Gateway Plaza is 'a western style shopping mall [that adds] to the synergy of the dynamic Xujiahui commercial district'.[44] In its multistorey facility opened in 1999, the Grand Gateway Plaza hosts over 300 shops and around thirty restaurants.[45] Within this corporate surrounding, Ebba addresses the city's openness by suggesting that 'people are more traditional in other cities'. Ebba also suggests that the presence of foreigners in Shanghai contributes to the city's inauthenticity. However, while maintaining that Shanghai is more modern than other places in China, Wuhan native Ebba still questions the assumption that the Shanghainese are the most modern in China:

> I don't think that Shanghainese are the most modern people in China. They pretend to be modern! Even though they wear fashionable clothes, it doesn't mean that they do it well. If you pay attention to how the Shanghainese are dressed, many of my foreign friends say that the Shanghainese have no judgment about beauty and fashion. The Shanghainese want to be modern, they want to be open-minded but they do it the wrong way. You can also see that there are many Shanghai girls who want to have a foreign boyfriend. They think it's cool and fashionable. Actually, it's not, right? I think it's not. I think they want to be open-minded, and they think open-minded is you can accept a lot of things, which others cannot. But this is not open-minded for me. Open-minded for me is that you travel a lot, you see a lot of different culture and people. That is open-minded for me. So I think they just go the wrong way.

In the preceding quote, Ebba distances herself from the assumption that Shanghai natives are the most modern in China. Ebba maintains that Shanghai natives make a huge effort to be modern by how they dress, change their level of acceptance and engage in intercultural relationships. Being critical to those strategies, Ebba suggests that open-mindedness is about travelling to different places and experiencing other cultures and peoples. In this context, she mentions that she went abroad to get her academic degree. While recognizing Ebba's critique, the strategy to-be-open-in-place is noteworthy in the context of this study. Although international travel among

---

[44] 'Grand Gateway – Shopping Mall', http://www.grandgateway.com/en/2_1.html (accessed 26 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. A similar updated version is accessible at http://www.grandgateway66.com/en/shopping-mall/overview.aspx (accessed 23 December 2014).

[45] 'Grand Gateway – Shopping Mall', http://www.grandgateway.com/en/2_1.html (accessed 26 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible.

the Chinese population is increasing, the outbound travel is stratified; the Chinese middle-classes were the most frequent travellers in 2009-2010 (China Tourism Academy, 2010). However, coastal cities, such as Shanghai, have become contact spaces where local Chinese experiment and engage in international culture at home. Similarly, Shanghai's openness stimulates people from other provinces to move to the city, which is illustrated next in the guided conversation with David.

Nostalgia for pre-1949 Shanghai and living the stories of Chinese modernist writers

In contemporary Shanghai, the pre-1949 city is reinvented in the production and consumption of spaces, in literature, music and films, and other objects (posters, photographs and antiques). Specifically, old Shanghai is represented by Chinese modernist writers and film production (such as screen versions of the Chinese modernists' writings). The represented city has an impact on how Shanghai is lived (representational spaces) and materially changed (spatial practices). David's readings of the Chinese modernists Lu Xun and Zhang Ailing[46] triggered his move to the city. At Starbucks in Xintiandi, David reflects upon his move from Wuhan (in Hubei province) to the city of his imagination.

> **Johan**: Why did you choose to go to Shanghai?
>
> **David**: When I finished my high school, it was really a hard decision to choose where to study… in the university. But basically, I thought, I would like to go somewhere far away so I took the map, and Shanghai was the most far away big city and it is located by the sea, so it might be beautiful. And you know, I like culture, I like literature, I read a lot of stories. My favourite writers are Lu Xun and Zhang Ailing. They all had a lot of stories taking place here in Shanghai. They also made Shanghai a very interesting place to be in. So it's far away, it's by the sea, and there must be a lot of stories.
>
> **Johan**: So what kind of stories did they tell?
>
> **David**: All kinds. Shanghai must be a city with a lot of complexity and diversity. I think you know Lu Xun. He's really famous, and Zhang Ailing is the one that I prefer

[46] In international contexts, Zhang Ailing is known as Eileen Chang.

actually. She left after the 1950s to Hong Kong or the United States, but she wrote a lot of stories in 1930s. She wrote a lot of interesting stories. If you want to know more about Shanghai, maybe you should read something by Zhang Ailing.

Johan: So do you think that those stories about old Shanghai, do they have an effect on Shanghai today?

David: Yeah. I believe the concept of making this area into Xintiandi with lot of bars within old houses [looking around the place], I think this idea definitely has something with Zhang Ailing. I'm sure.

Johan: How? In what way?

David: I think, conventionally the government would probably just pull down all these old houses but I think if you read Zhang Ailing stories you would know that these old things are so interesting. So some people would rather make some effort to repair them. I think they reflect Shanghai a lot.

To David, the literary spaces of Lu Xun and Zhang Ailing influence how contemporary Shanghai is lived and understood. Characterizing Shanghai as a social space with countless stories, David decided to move to the city. In Lefebvre's spatial terminology, representational space connects to and is inspired by representations of space. Hence, the representational space, as defined by David's words, illuminates 'space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols' (Lefebvre 1991: 39).

At the level of spatial practices, David implies that restoration projects, such as Xintiandi, have a relationship with literary representations of semi-colonial Shanghai. While the Shanghai Municipal Government usually demolishes old *shikumen* buildings, the literary pieces by Lu Xun and Zhang Ailing make 'some people' aware of the value attached to these historical spatial structures and what social life they represent. To evoke the semi-colonial atmosphere of the old city, several developers restore buildings and turn them into spaces of heritage consumption. While blocks of old buildings were totally redesigned, contemporary Xintiandi is a clean upgraded urban space with fashionable boutiques, restaurants, cafés and bars. Developed by the Hong Kong-based Shui On group in cooperation with renowned architect Ben Wood and opened in 2001, Xintiandi literally means 'New Heaven and Earth' (paraphrasing China's modernizing efforts).

Xintiandi (photo by the author)

As the area becomes a materialized version of the city's future, Xintiandi simultaneously evokes semi-colonial Shanghai:

> As a re-creation born out of the sprawls of Shikumen housing, which is the architectural symbol of Shanghai in the 20th century, Shanghai Xintiandi, 'The City's Living-Room' is a place to unwind and relax after a long day. A window to the past and the future, to China and the world.[47]

While old Shanghai was discredited as bourgeois, decadent and imperialist by the CCP (in its early years), contemporary Shanghai hosts several spaces, such

[47] 'About Us', http://www.xintiandi.com/english/aboutus_1.asp (accessed 2 August 2010). The link is no longer accessible. Much of the content is accessible at http://www.shanghaixintiandi.com/xintiandi/en/about_info.asp (accessed 23 December 2014).

as Xintiandi, that display similarities with the city's past. Representing the space, the website of the developer *Shui On* states:

> Shanghai Xintiandi features a multitude of specialist F&B [food and beverage], retail, entertainment, cultural, recreational, commercial and residential facilities in restored 'Shikumen' houses—a special old form of building architecture only found in Shanghai—as well as state-of-the-art new buildings, catering for both residents and visitors.[48]

Anchoring the modern spatial practices of Xintiandi in the city's history, the *shikumen* form is represented as an architecturally unique feature of old Shanghai. The need to renovate (or demolish) deteriorated *shikumen* structures is often emphasized as a strategy to legitimize the radical change of the city. Relating to the years of the Mao Zedong rule, the developer Shui On explains:

> Shikumen houses are a relic of Shanghai's fascinating history, but over the years had sadly deteriorated because of the lack of maintenance. In order to restore the original appearance of the Shikumen 'long tangs' (alleys), Shui On reconstructed selected buildings based on old design drawings. The original bricks and tiles were preserved before construction commenced.[49]

Shui On portrays its change of the area, which today is Xintiandi, by suggesting that the company is a lifesaver of dilapidated *shikumen* structures and the city's inherited social space. Evoking nostalgia for old Shanghai and confusing linear time, Xintiandi is branded as a place 'where yesterday meets tomorrow in Shanghai today'.[50] While the Shui On group has been praised for its preservation of selected buildings in the city, it also 'reveals... how nostalgia can be utilized for commercial purposes and how political correctness can serve to safeguard money-making' (Lu 2002: 174). Similarly, David stated above that, while the old facades of the *shikumen* buildings remain, the interiors have completely been redesigned to host modern spaces. Contemporary Xintiandi emerges as a post-revolutionary space in which it is possible to consume

---

[48] 'Shanghai Xintiandi', http://www.shuion.com/eng/sol/pptdev/xin.asp (accessed 24 July 2010).

[49] 'Shanghai Xintiandi', http://www.shuion.com/eng/sol/pptdev/xin.asp (accessed 24 July 2010).

[50] 'About Us'. http://www.xintiandi.com/english/aboutus_1.asp (accessed 6 August 2010). The link is no longer accessible. Much of the content is accessible at http://www.shanghaixintiandi.com/xintiandi/en/about_info.asp (accessed 23 December 2014).

Shanghai's semi-colonial and revolutionary history, and the city's imagined future. Drawing on the city's revolutionary past, Xintiandi centres around the birthplace of the CCP. As the city magazine *City Weekend* represents Xintiandi:

> Formerly the heart of the French Concession, Xintiandi, the site where Chairman Mao formed the Communist Party, is now ironically also a place where commercialism thrives. Arguably the country's best historical restoration project, designers turned wrecked Shikumen-style houses into stylish restaurants, bars, and boutiques—a hotspot for tourists and the young, hip and sophisticated locals. ('Home & Office'/City Weekend, summer edition 2007: 37)

Recalling Deng Xiaoping's 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' formula, Xintiandi and the CCP become 'a seamlessly integral whole' in which the assumed contradictory relationship between socialism and capitalism is flattened out and neutralised (Lu, 2002: 175). While strolling Xintiandi, it is possible to gaze at fashionable local white-collar workers and expatriates, excited domestic and foreign tourists, the cleaners and security staff, the busy outdoor seating areas of restaurants and cafés, temporary and permanent exhibition spaces, chic window displays of famous international and local brands, and the birthplace of the CCP. Whereas the area of Xintiandi showcases an increased pragmatism and openness towards consumer spatial practices within the CCP, the city's character has changed over time. Returning to the guided conversation with David at Starbucks in Xintiandi, the degree of openness is highlighted historically. While sipping on our lattes on the second floor, I asked:

> **Johan**: Compared to Shanghai during the 1930s, do you think that Shanghai is as open as it was before?
>
> **David**: I think maybe it is not as open as before. As far as I know about Shanghai in the 1930s, I think at that time, we had lots of social debates and much more diversity. But now I think, no [*with a huge sigh*], haha.[51]

[51] Due to the sensitive subject of our guided conversation, I did not pose any further questions of the reasons for the lack of social debates and diversity as we got together at a commercial public space. Although, in retrospect, drawing on more recent experiences, I believe that there would not have been any problem in doing so.

With a distressed expression on his face, David implies that there is a lack of social debate and diversity in contemporary Shanghai. Showing the differences between the old and new social space, it is evident that David makes a division between semi-coloniality ('in the 1930s') and post-semi-coloniality ('at that time'). In relation to my analysis of Deng Xiaoping, David recounts implicitly how Deng envisioned and strived to discipline the opening up of the PRC. While Deng emphasized the change of economic space while maintaining political stability, social debates and diversity can be understood as part of 'bourgeois liberation', and thus, a threat to the status quo. Suggesting that contemporary Shanghai is not as open as in the early twentieth century, David exemplifies by stating:

> The district of Hongkou was one of the most interesting places at that time. A lot of writers lived in Hongkou. And they had different writers' communities, one did not agree with the other group. We called them right and left; the right writers' group and the left writers' group. Of course at that time we also had lots of revolutionary things. We had foreign schools at that time. We also had horror movies and western parties. But to me now I think, Shanghai is ok. I like Shanghai. Compared to other places, compared to Wuhan, I think Shanghai is good. I think for me, it is interesting and good to stay here. By staying in Shanghai, you are going to learn and experience more. You also have more job opportunities. It is very comfy here [*laughs*].

Above, David alludes to the political uniformity in China today by highlighting the presence of political diversity ('right and left groups') in early-twentieth-century Shanghai. While today's Shanghai does not provide social debates and diversity, the city provides a comfortable modern social space. Today, Hongkou has been renovated to commemorate the old area. Particulary, the official online *Live in Shanghai Guide* represents Duolun Road as a quiet street with boutiques which sells products from Old Shanghai. It is highlighted that many writers – such as Lu Xun, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo and Ye Shentao – dwelled in the area. In the official guide, Duolun Road is regarded as 'an epitome of the change of Shanghai'. This implies that the authors that once lived in Hongkou and provided the area with an intellectual ambience, facilitated the transformation of the Chinese mainland and

triggered the foundation of modern China.[52] Within a linear historical framework, contemporary Duolun Lu embodies the change of the city. Today, Duolun Lu consists of not only the Duolun Museum of Modern Art, but also renovated and newly built *longtang* structures that house cafés, antique shops, memorial halls and art galleries. Duolun Lu hosts a replica of the café that Lu Xun frequented. The *Gongfei* café was the centre of the leftist cultural movement (Pang 2006). On Duolun Lu, Hanchao Lu writes:

> In 1997 this street was officially designated as a 'preserved area,' for in the Republican period this neighbourhood was the home of a number of twentieth-century China's most prominent writers. Lu Xun's (1881–1936) last residence in Shanghai, now a national relic, is also within walking distance of this street. Duolun Road was therefore designated as a 'cultural celebrities street' (wenhua mingrenjie) as part of the Hongkou district's project of 'Salvaging our Cultural Heritage, and Protecting Old Homes and Relics.' The street, which is now a no-car zone, is a deliberately preserved shrine for those who wish to reminisce about the literature and architectures of old Shanghai. But this nostalgia was justified with an ideological legitimacy. The so-called cultural celebrities that this street celebrated were mostly the left-wing writers who were active in the 1930s in the CCP sponsored League of Left-Wing Writers—all are among the CCP's leading 'men of letters.' (Lu 2002: 173)

Above, Lu (2002) adds a crucial point to the understanding of Duolun Lu. Recalling David's statements on the existence of the right and left writers' groups in Hongkou, the nostalgia for old Hongkou is supported by the CCP, as most of the leftist writers frequented this part of the city. By anchoring the renovation of the area in the pre-revolutionary history of semi-colonial Shanghai, the old social space does not threaten new Shanghai, but selected pieces of the old city are being re-used for commercial purposes as a way to promote and re-insert the city into the world and also, importantly, to legitimize the modernizing efforts of the CCP (Lu 2002).

[52] 'Duolun Road', http://live.shanghaidaily.com/guide_shopping.asp (accessed 24 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. Much of the content is accessible at http://www.idealshanghai.com/venues/3717/ (accessed 23 December 2014).

Conclusion

In this section of the chapter, I have shown how the interviewees' characterizations of Shanghai are implicated in the city's history, the city's identity vis-à-vis other places in China and the city's representation in Chinese modernist writings. Simultaneously, I have attempted to show the new spatial practices (mostly commercial spaces) that characterize the city. In the guided conversations, Shanghai emerges as a contact space conditioned by its semi-colonial history (its previous social space) and recent changes (today's emerging social space), geographic location (social space's geographic emplacement and its social conditioning) and literature (representations of space). While the interviewees provide their own unique characterizations of the city, they also show that they are part of wider popular understandings and societal conditions. Situated in CCP's staging of the country's history, the interviewees connect the city with its historical semi-coloniality, Shanghai's unique labels and contemporary changes. Within this context, the interviewees also talk about their concrete experiences of intercultural communication in Shanghai.

Spaces of contact

In this section, I address the spatial practices of the interviewees that unfolded during the guided conversations and how they were understood. While the interviewees characterize Shanghai, they are also participants themselves in the concrete manifestations of the new emerging society. The interviewees were engaged in culture and language exchanges, working at international companies, and frequented commercial public spaces. I argue that the interviewees' engagements can be understood as cosmopolitan spatial practices, as they represent intercultural contact through concrete forms (culture and language exchanges and at work) and the frequenting of certain commercial public spaces (entertainment venues).

Culture and language exchanges—cosmopolitan spatial practices

> Cosmopolitanism has been constructed in relation to what the government calls 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is how the Chinese state has brought capitalism to China. It also means new ways to value human activity and new ways of 'worldling' China (Rofel 2012: 448).

While cosmopolitanism usually implies travel to distant spaces and being able to move across, orient oneself and interact with a variety of spaces and people, 'cosmopolitanism must [also] take place somewhere, in specific sites and situations' (Abbas 2000: 772). As 'the world' is brought to Shanghai by the production of new spaces, new kinds of social interactions have also emerged. Since the opening-up processes were initiated, culture and language exchanges have become a new way to socialize in the city. As a cosmopolitan spatial practice, an exchange takes place when at least two individuals from different cultures intentionally interact with each other and talk about different topics relating to their own culture and/or language. As a contact space that one can enter and leave as one desires, the culture and language exchange emerges as a tool to learn and experience cultures and languages, and enrich oneself on site in Shanghai. The one-to-one culture and language exchanges are often conversational around certain topics chosen by the participants. In a casual manner, the culture and language exchanges usually take place in commercial

public spaces, such as the popular coffee chains Starbucks Coffee, Costa Coffee and Coffee Bean & Tealeaf and other café venues in downtown Shanghai, as well as nearby university campuses. Culture and language exchanges are not only one-to-one private occasions in commercial public spaces but also organized corporate events, official culture year events and mega exhibition spectacles, such as the *Shanghai World Expo*.

The culture and language exchanges work as a strategy to increase openness and raise the quality/*suzhi* of the individual, the city and China. In diverse contexts, the CCP encourages the Chinese populace to obtain knowledge and learn from the outside world. On China's new emerging cosmopolitanism, anthropologist Lisa Rofel (2012: 447) writes: 'Since the mid-1980s, a sea-change has swept through China to replace the socialist citizen with the kind of subject who can embrace a new kind of cosmopolitanism'. Displaying the CCP's ideological change, post-socialist cosmopolitanism has redirected the Chinese populace from revolutionary sacrifices and heroism to 'cultivate a wide range of different desires, from consumption to work to sex' (Rofel 2012: 448). Implicated in the official promotion of post-socialist cosmopolitanism, the culture and language exchanges have emerged as a temporary contact space. As a voluntary tool to communicate with cultural others, the culture and language exchange is used to acquire a domesticated cosmopolitan identity in Shanghai. Post-socialist cosmopolitanism is 'a self-conscious transcendence of locality, accomplished through the formation of a consumer identity, and a domestication of cosmopolitanism by way of nationalist-inspired renegotiation of China's place in the world' (Rofel 2012: 448).

Analysing the guided conversations, I recall social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz' definition of cosmopolitanism (1990). The interviewees show 'an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other' (Hannerz 1990: 239). Showing similarities with the practices and attitudes of the interviewees, Hannerz (1990: 239) describes cosmopolitanism as 'an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences'. Taking into account Hannerz' definition of cosmopolitanism (1990) and Lefebvre's spatial theory (1991), culture and language exchanges appear as a

cosmopolitan spatial practice. Displaying openness and curiosity towards cultural others, the interviewees have an interest in learning about other cultures, listening to foreign stories and also telling their own.

At a busy intersection in the leafy Old French Concession, I met with Emelia. While walking to Ginger Café, we engaged in an intense conversation about culture exchanges. Passionately, Emelia described how she and her friends engage in cooking Spanish food and listening to Spanish music at home. As we ended up at Ginger Café, which was located in the western part of the old French Concession, our chat continued. Serving contemporary Asian fusion foods, Ginger Café was nestled in a small alleyway restoration project (in 2006), which is called Le Passage Fuxing. Le Passage Fuxing is a branch of the Le Passage Changhai company,[53] which 'specialize[s] in reviving long-neglected old properties for the benefit of their conservation and their reintegration into a modern Shanghai'.[54] Renamed 'Ginger by the Park', the venue has relocated to Xingguo Road (which also is in the western part of the Old French Concession). Sipping on a green tea latte, Emelia highlights her one-to-one exchanges and reflects upon her interactions with foreigners in Shanghai:

> Not everybody can go abroad frequently. For me, I really want to visit New York but it is really hard for Chinese to go to America, you can't get visiting Visa. So you need an invitation from an American company. So if I can't visit so many countries and I don't have so much money, because I'm still young, so I just read books and meet the people from these countries here. Because in Shanghai, it is not very hard to meet different people. So I try to meet different people from different country and talk with them. But before I meet them I will read some books. I will find some information about his or her country. Maybe see some movie because from the movie you will know something about his or her country… then you can have the same topic with them. Because I really want to have some same topic with them, you know, to open the topic. You can't just always talk about Shanghai, you know. You should share something with them, so I will get information first, and then, I have some questions about their culture to ask them and they'll tell me something.

---

[53] 'Le Passage Changhai', http://www.lepassageshanghai.com/lepassagefuxing.php (accessed 23 July 2010). The content is no longer accessible. The current website provides limited information about *Le Passage Shanghai*.

[54] Apart from Ginger Café, in 2006, Le Passage Fuxing consisted of clothing and interior decoration boutiques and a spa.

Stuck in place with consular and financial difficulties, Emelia details how she engages in culture exchanges in Shanghai. Preparing herself ahead of an exchange event by reading about her exchange partner's culture and watching a movie in which the culture is represented, Emelia suggests that the city provides a social space where contacts with foreigners are simple and straightforward. In this context, Emelia also states that she brings her foreign friends to places that are 'very modern Chinese style', as they are 'easier for foreigners to accept' and provide 'a clean, more private' atmosphere than 'noisy' and 'smoky' Chinese restaurants. Similar to Emelia, several other interviewees were also engaged in culture and language exchanges. In 2005, Lynn indicated that exchanges were a good tool to get to know different languages and cultures. While Matthew developed his French language skills online, Lynn gathered with her language and culture exchange partner in Shanghai to talk about British culture several times a week. Detailing her exchange itinerary, Lynn met with her exchange partner in different spaces that were previously unknown to her, such as the dining complex Face (which hosted two restaurants in a restored colonial villa with garden seating in Ruijin Park between 1999 and 2009), popular entertainment complex Park 97 (under different names) in Fuxing Park and the classy bar Cloud 9 in Jin Mao Tower (in Pudong). During the exchanges, she was introduced to works by William Shakespeare and got to know several traditional words and sayings. Similarly, Matthew was introduced to French music, such as Serge Gainsbourg, Jane Birkin and Edith Piaf, and French movies, such as *Amelie*. While Emelia, Lynn, Matthew and several others displayed curiosity towards other cultures, other interviewees indicated that some people interact with foreigners simply to learn and practice English to increase one's job opportunities.

While one-to-one exchanges flourish, more organized occasions also exist. Temporary networking events are arranged by companies, consulates, chambers of commerce, universities and colleges, networking companies, leisure and entertainment spaces, paper and online city guides, and private individuals. Emerging as temporary contact spaces, several mixers are professional and business-oriented (on doing business in Shanghai/China and

the practices of *guanxi*), while others focus on cultural issues (expat life, relocation issues, cultural training), leisure, language and food exchanges and intercultural dating. As cosmopolitan spatial practices, such events gather white-collar workers and other business people, expatriates, officials, students and others who wish to meet and talk about different topics. While some interviewees have taken part in similar activities, Ebba organized her own mixer. Returning to *Starbucks Grand Gateway*, she explains:

> **Ebba**: When I first came to Shanghai [from Wuhan], I organized a gathering at a downtown café. Almost every weekend, I arranged for some Chinese and foreigners to meet each other. Each time, I prepared a topic for everyone to discuss so they could get to know each other. We discussed all kinds of topics. For example, 'Are you realistic or romantic?' [laughter]. Sometimes we talked about our job. For example, 'Do you prefer a female boss or a male boss?' This was very interesting. You could see that they were thinking differently. I organized this gathering for four months. After that, I became very busy, so I didn't do that anymore.
>
> **Johan**: How did you arrange it?
>
> **Ebba**: I put an advertisement on Shanghai AsiaXPAT.
>
> **Johan**: So how many were you?
>
> **Ebba**: Sometimes maybe just five, sometimes we were more than fifty. It depends. For example, this weekend you don't have time, maybe next weekend, you have. Through this gathering we made some friends and I even created a couple. They got married.

By advertising online, Ebba initiated a series of informal events for mainland Chinese and foreigners to meet and discuss several topics regarding their professional and private lives. While shedding light on their respective differences, the participants became more aware of the other's point of view. Having Ebba's description in mind, I define culture and language exchanges as temporal social spaces in which similarity and dissimilarity are explored, produced and negotiated in conversational practices. Demonstrating the process of immersing oneself in Shanghai's social space, the guided conversation with Ebba continued:

> **Johan**: Are there many kind of similar gatherings at the moment?
>
> **Ebba**: Before, I think, two years ago. But now, I don't think so, because if you want to know someone it is very easy to just go to bars.
>
> **Johan**: There are quite many mixers arranged.

Ebba: I don't know. I think, this depends on personality. For me, I'm very active. So I won't look for this kind of gathering information anymore because I can create this kind of chance by myself. I think for someone who is not that active will look for this kind of information.

Johan: How do you do it yourself nowadays?

Ebba: If I want to talk with a stranger, I just go to some clubs, it is that easy. And also I order some information from some organizers such as Shanghai AsiaXPAT, so when they have some gathering they will e-mail me. Also, I go to the Shanghai Art Museum, this kind of art place. I just give them my name card and when they have any art exhibition or show, they will also tell me. It's a chance to know some very high quality people. Not only foreigners. Also Chinese. I have been to the Three on the Bund. It's really nice. They have an art gallery and good paintings [Shanghai Gallery of Art]. It's also a good way to know some people who know arts. You can learn something from them. It's great. Much better than to get to know someone in the bars.

Explaining that established spaces provide opportunities to meet cultural others, Ebba does not need to attend temporary contact spaces (as the one she used to organize). While I understand art spaces, bars and clubs as recognized contact spaces, Ebba positions herself as being 'active' as she creates exchange opportunities by herself. In Ebba's elaboration, it also becomes apparent that people's quality/*suzhi* and space are related to each other. She suggests that people's quality/*suzhi* is higher at the Shanghai Art Museum and the Shanghai Gallery of Art (Three on the Bund) than in the nightlife scene. I will return to this in a later section when I discuss commercial public spaces, entertainment, spatial hierarchies and the question of people's quality/*suzhi*.

While the PRC opens up to the outside world and an increasing number of Chinese students, tourists and business people are crossing the globe, knowledge of English has become crucial. In Shanghai and elsewhere in China, English proficiency has emerged as a tool to facilitate and cultivate openness and acquire a cosmopolitan identity (and thus high quality/*suzhi*). Linguistic theorist Guangwei Hu writes:

> In the last quarter century, English language education has been a subject of paramount importance in China, and proficiency in English has been widely regarded as a national as well as a personal asset. (Hu 2005: 5)

Appearing as signs of the country's desire for contact with the outside world, bookstore shelves with English language studies, English language television programmes and proficiency contests are steadily increasing. As a booming

business in Shanghai, university language courses and private English language schools provide social spaces for language acquisition and contexts in which mainland Chinese interact with foreigners. The guided conversation with Sophie partly focused on English language proficiency. At a private school in Xujiahui, Sophie practices her English skills with native speakers. Mastering a different language is 'good', Sophie suggested, as it increases the chance of getting 'a better job' in a foreign company and receiving a higher income than in a Chinese equivalent.

Being a Mandarin Chinese teacher is also a popular profession among young urbanites. Similar to how English language schools have mushroomed in Shanghai, Mandarin Chinese schools target foreign students, expatriates and others. While introducing students to Mandarin Chinese, the schools also include Chinese culture and everyday life in their education packages. Sophie teaches Mandarin Chinese and the Shanghainese dialect to foreigners. Having a genuine interest in the Chinese language, Sophie wants 'to spread the Chinese culture' through her own teaching. While educating foreigners, Sophie also has the opportunity to learn about other cultures. She has met people from Japan, Brazil, South Korea and Spain. Regarding teaching Chinese to foreigners in Shanghai, Sophie states that it is 'a chance to get in contact with foreigners and to learn about their culture'.

While the majority of the culture and language exchanges are conducted in commercial public spaces, private language schools, community centres[55] and universities, they also engage local families in their homes. Providing a comprehensive education package, Chinese language home-stays are organized by several universities and private language centres. By living with a Chinese family, the home-stay concept is based on total immersion in the Chinese language, culture and everyday life. Showing the workings of contact space, the home-stay package works as a tool to get first-hand knowledge of Chinese language and culture, and develop a more profound understanding of

[55] Apart from universities and private language schools, culture and language exchanges are also promoted and organized by different administrative districts in Shanghai. Scattered around the city, public community centres provide activities ranging from social gatherings to English and Chinese language courses.

contemporary Chinese society.[56] While staying with a Chinese family, foreign students are also taken on excursions in and around Shanghai. With this in mind, I turn to *Starbucks* in People's Square, where I ask Jennie the following question:

> **Johan**: How did you meet your foreign friends?
>
> **Jennie**: Some of them at work, some of them I met during my years at the university, because I learned English. There were some exchange students. They were from New York. So usually they will do one or two days home-staying, so I thought that would be interesting, so I just signed up. It's like, would you like to help them and show them around Shanghai. I signed up and I was accepted. I joined them and participated in their activities.
>
> **Johan**: What kind of activities were you doing with them?
>
> **Jennie**: The first day we went out, we head out at night. I showed them around the city, the Bund, and then other places, the restaurants. I still remember we went to eat dumplings, *jaozi*. It was very interesting [*laughs*]. And they were very curious about that. I also brought them to eat *tanghulu* [candied fruit on a stick] near the Bund. Then I showed them different places. We ate in several restaurants, and they got to know dumplings and Tsingtao beer. Because the beer here is really cheap. And the food here is usually cheap too. And plus all of us were students. We were studying, so we didn't have a lot of generation gap so we could talk freely.

Signing up for a home-stay programme at her own university, Jennie guided American students around the city. As part of the city's emerging contact space, Jennie illuminates what I call cosmopolitan spatial practices. Guiding the students through her designated spatial itinerary, Jennie introduced the city. Similarly, individual initiatives, tourist agencies, language schools, consulting companies and other organizations also present and guide foreigners to contemporary Shanghai through tours around the city.

As a strategy to position Shanghai globally, cultural exchanges are also arranged at the municipal level. While *Shanghai World Expo* acted as an official mega culture exchange event in 2010, other events are also crucial. With cultural and business exchanges throughout Shanghai, the annual 'culture year' events are officially promoted to foster mutual understanding

[56] See for instance, http://www.eastwestbridge.org/English/CAhs.html for detailed information about home-stays in Shanghai (accessed 24 July 2012).

between China and the participating country. Events such as exhibitions, lectures, seminars, concerts, operas and fashion shows are organized. Nonetheless, some negative aspects are also raised by an interviewee. At Ginger Café, Emelia illuminates the organizers' unwillingness to invite the public to an Italian food exhibition in Pudong's New Global Exhibition Centre. While the 'French Culture Year' was generous with diverse events around town, the 'Italian Culture Year' was limited. Emelia states:

> There's just three days but they don't invite anybody there. Just some Italian people and some media. Chinese media. I got to know about it, cause my friend works there at the exhibition centre. And he can't get an invitation. So I can't get inside and there's speech about Italian food, Italian culture, Italian wine. You can try it but just Italian people try it… and just some Chinese media. Why is it? Why is it called this? Why? I don't know why. If not many people get there to try it, how they can know it… maybe the wine is very expensive, maybe the food is just from Italy… so maybe just a few but you should invite [empathizing] people to try it then… but… in this exhibition they give the media the six top level Italian restaurant in Shanghai, they are open by Italian people.. maybe and they told the media, if you want to try taste real Italian food, you should go to this six restaurant. But you should pay for the fee. So why should I go to this? It's not good, I don't think it's good, you know. So how to exchange culture? Its not just through some exhibition, not just through some fashion show. It's not just through some luxury store in China. It's not.

Above, Emelia suggests that exchanging culture is 'not just through some exhibition, not just through some fashion show. It's not just through some luxury store in China'. Questioning exhibition space and fashion shows as potential contact spaces, Emelia states that the exhibition targeted only Italian people and the Chinese media. With Emelia's elaboration in mind, contact spaces are not only limited in time but also to certain social groups. Thus, some contact spaces are highly restrictive; they include certain groups and exclude others. With reference to Emelia, culture exchanges cannot only be situated in exclusive consumer spaces in Shanghai, as only a limited number of people can take part in them. Inspired by Emelia, I argue that an ideal contact space is realized when there are no prevalent social boundaries and hierarchies.

While the food exhibition represents Emelia's understanding of the 'Italian Culture Year', she reflected upon the possibilities of cultural exchanges. She continues:

> How to make people really exchange culture? It's really hard, but not very hard. You see, every people in China or Italy, they know Marco Polo. They both know this man.

> He was great! He was a great man to lead some culture exchange. I've read some books about Marco Polo. And I've followed his route. But just in the China area. I follow his route, by his book. Because many people don't believe that Marco Polo really came to China. In Italy some people don't believe it, but I think he wrote a true story. So I followed his route; to Xinjiang, to Mongolia and some small towns. Everything is true! That was really great! And you know, in this book, he really connected the two countries together.

Within the context of our guided conversation, Emelia implies that Marco Polo's Silk Road stories could have acted as a cultural bridge between China and Italy during the 'Italian Culture Year'. By reviving Marco Polo's stories, Emelia suggests, the two countries could have gained more knowledge about each other. Displaying different levels of social space, Emelia's elaboration also shows how representational space is influenced by representations of space (similar to David above).

Working at an international company

> Given the national government's emphasis on globalization as a key strategy in China's modernization, business professionals in the foreign-invested sector see their careers as an act of patriotic duty, utilizing their skills and education to better China's position in the global economy. (Duthie 2007: 56)

Since the country began to open up towards the outside world, international and regional companies have emerged as concrete contact spaces in Shanghai. With its shining office buildings and consumer spaces, downtown Shanghai has developed into a haven for the city's white-collar workers and other business professionals. Well-dressed white-collar workers are educated, employed in the international corporate sector, work in glimmering office buildings and make a higher salary than ordinary people (Duthie 2005). Recalling Deng's vision, the presence of international and regional companies is central to the CCP's modernizing aims. By acquiring foreign knowledge in diverse areas and raising the quality/*suzhi* of the Chinese populace through education, it was argued that the country could modernize (Deng 1994; Murphy 2004). Thus, fundamental to China's modernization and opening up is the provision of educated employees to the booming number of international and regional companies. Several interviewees have a university degree (or attended a university programme at the time of the guided

conversation) and some shared the experiences of working at international and regional companies.

Connecting to the previous section on culture and language exchanges, the city's international and regional companies provide an intercultural and a bi-/multilingual space for local and foreign employees. While conference calls, documents and formal e-mails are regularly in English (or any other official working language), day-to-day informal conversations between co-workers are often conducted in Shanghainese and/or Mandarin Chinese. Illuminating Shanghai's emerging divisions, the ability to communicate in English sometimes structures how employees at international companies are perceived by people that are not involved in interactions with foreigners. At *Starbucks Grand Gateway*, Ebba reflected upon the use of working languages at her office:

> **Ebba**: Because most of my colleagues are Chinese, we use Chinese when we talk to each other. But all documents are in English; e-mails, all files, everything is in English. We communicate in Chinese but of course we combine some English words. This is not so good. For other Chinese, they don't like it. When you speak Chinese, and you combine one English word and another Chinese word, it is not good.
>
> **Johan**: Why is it…why?
>
> **Ebba**: Because they think you pretend to be very cool you know some English... I mean for other Chinese. In our company, it's already like a habit. Because it's easier when we speak some English words. It's easier for us.
>
> **Johan**: So other people mean that it is a way for you to show off?
>
> **Ebba**: Yes. Some, some, some Chinese will think like that way. But actually it is not. Because we are just already used to... you know...

Creating a dichotomy between herself (as an employee at an international company) and 'other Chinese', Ebba suggests that she belongs to a certain social group, which can easily communicate in English. As stated earlier, English language proficiency has been encouraged as part of China's reconnection with the outside world (Hu 2005). Today, Chinese students prepare themselves for a professional life through university education, international programmes at local universities or go abroad to attain a competitive international degree. The Chinese students that return home have emerged as a social group, labelled *haigui*. While *hai* means 'sea' or 'overseas',

gui means 'to return'. Returning from overseas, the students become more attractive as potential employees than students that did not study abroad. The students become an asset in China's opening-up reforms (Wang, Wong and Sun 2006). However, competition has also emerged among the skilled returnees. Reflecting upon her return from a master's degree programme in the UK, Ebba, who works at a multinational consumer goods company, says:

> It was great to come back to China. I'm familiar with everything. You got a good education, so you get a good job. But now there are a lot of Chinese who also go abroad. So the competition is also very tough. I used four months to get my job. But of course, I have high requirements. It's not difficult to get a job, but to get a good future and a good salary is difficult. I want to have a bright future.

While students educate themselves to be part of the new, thriving and competitive China, several companies provide cultural training for expatriates and other international staff, as a strategy to immerse them in Chinese culture and language. According to Ebba, expatriates and other internationals find it difficult to bring foreign organizational culture to China, suggesting that they also need cultural training. While some companies provide internal cultural training programmes, others hire external cultural training consultancy firms. Attempting to immerse expatriates and other international staff, they often provide relocation and arrival packages, language and culture courses, 'business in China' courses, community and networking events, counselling and recreational outings.

As part of China's reintegration into the global economy, several interviewees indicate that a hierarchy of companies has emerged based on their origin. While Deng Xiaoping maintained that the country lacks knowledge in science, technology and management, several interviewees expressed the idea that one is given more status if one has a position at an international company than at a local equivalent. Reflecting upon his decision to join an international company, Nathan illustrates:

> **Nathan**: You know China is in a different situation than other Asian countries. The South Korean and Japanese companies are very good. LG, Samsung, Sony, Panasonic and a lot of others. But in our country, the most local companies aren't very good. The company regulations aren't very good. The management isn't very good. But of course some are ok, and more and more are getting better.
>
> **Johan**: So you get more opportunities?

Nathan: Especially for younger people! The salary is much better. But nowadays the gap is smaller.

Johan: Why is it a difference between salaries?

Nathan: This is a very deep question, you know. Firstly, the profit of local companies are not very good compared to foreign companies. The second reason is that local companies have more staff than foreign companies. The third reason is that the management is not very good. For example, if you want to get promoted, you need to have really good relationships with your superiors.

Comparing companies in East Asia, Nathan suggests that mainland Chinese companies are often badly managed, lack regulations, emphasize informal networks (*guanxi*), overemploy and pay a low salary. While changes have occurred, this presumably relates to Deng's idea that the country's knowledge in management has to increase. In addition, Jennie and Ella highlighted that there are also differences between what mainland Chinese and foreigners earn in international companies. They stated that the latter group earns much more than the former one. Showing an asymmetrical aspect of Shanghai's emerging contact space, the Chinese staff often has local contracts based on China's salary levels, while the expatriate salaries are tied to the company's global salary rating. Moreover, Nathan continues to detail a hierarchy of companies:

> Today, I guess, you can divide four groups. The best consists of European and American companies, such as Dell and Evian. The second level consists of East Asian companies; Japan and South Korea. The third level is Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singaporean companies. And then China. The salary follows the same pattern. European and American companies are the best.

Running from the alleged highest to the lowest position, the hierarchy consists of the old colonial power centres of Europe and America, to the Asian tiger economies of Japan, South Korea, post-colonial Singapore and Taiwan, 'China-returnee' and post-colonial Hong Kong, and the emerging Chinese mainland market. According to several interviewees, the hierarchy is not only based on salary. Highlighting a rigidity in organizational structures and cultures, the interviewees also suggest that the likelihood of employees taking initiatives, expressing themselves more directly and taking a flexible approach are higher in international companies than in their local counterparts. While advancement in local companies is based on skills combined with *guanxi* (i.e.

good interpersonal relationships across organizational hierarchies), interviewees suggest that advancement in international ones is solely based on skills.[57]

While international companies emerge as formal contact spaces, commercial public spaces, such as leisure and entertainment venues, become sites of informal contact between Chinese and cultural others.

Commercial public spaces, spatial hierarchies and the question of people's quality/suzhi

Since the early 1980s, spaces are opening up for interactions between Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai. Predominantly entertainment and leisure venues, these contact spaces range from cafés, art spaces, shopping malls and boutiques to bars, restaurants and clubs in the downtown area (Puxi) and Pudong. Particularly, the entertainment culture is

> a story of varying strategies of engagement with Western culture and varying strategies of foreign engagement with China. Partly because they are spaces of easy conversation, bars have been an important site in the development of intercultural social and sexual ties in Shanghai as well as a site of consuming difference and otherness. (Farrer 2009-2010: 35)

Cultural interactions between Chinese and foreigners take place in the formerly colonized districts of Puxi. Showing the inclination for the city's bourgeois past, the restaurants, cafés and bars are often located in renovated 1920s corporate buildings, old villas and alleyway houses, and in some newly constructed high-rise buildings (along streets such as Huai Hai Lu and others in its vicinity). Emerging as contact spaces of post-revolutionary Shanghai, the majority of entertainment spaces are located in the central districts of Luwan and Xuhui (both part of the former French Concession), along Zhongshan Dong Yi Lu (formerly known as the Bund/Waitan, which was part of the International Settlement) and partly in Jing'an (near Nanjing Xi Lu and Jing'an Park). While the former French Concession is dotted with street-level entertainment spaces (mixed with residential space and small shops), the Bund

[57] For a more nuanced analysis of how *guanxi* works in the PRC, see Huang 2008.

venues are often located in the upper floors of renovated colonial buildings. While several other parts of the city have experienced the development of entertainment spaces (such as Wujiaochang, Lujiazui in Pudong and Hongmei Lu in Gubei), the scenes are still centred on and around the Bund, the old French Concession (stretching from Xintiandi via Huashan Lu to entertainment spaces in and around Xujiahui) and Nanjing Xi Lu/Jing'an Park).

Emerging since the early 1980s in subsequent order, the entertainment spaces are social dance halls, dance clubs, bars, karaoke clubs, saunas and barber shops, gay nightlife spaces and nightlife development zones (Farrer 2008). Essential to the emergence of entertainment spaces is the sexual opening up, as these spaces provide opportunities to produce and play with new sexual identities and practices (opposite and same-sex flirting, dating, one-night stands, commercial sex, etc.). The spaces are also arranged through several hierarchies: high/low, moral/immoral, appropriate/inappropriate, sexuality, race/ethnicity and so forth. Reminiscent of the semi-colonial city, the entertainment spaces in post-revolutionary Shanghai appear as sites of decadence, unrestrained behaviour, immorality and commercialized sexuality. Prior to the opening-up reforms, entertainment spaces were deemed bourgeois and banned by the CCP in the 1950s (Farrer 2008, 2011).

While the spaces enable contact between diverse subjects, the proliferation of entertainment venues in Shanghai also illustrates an increasing commodification and stratification of the city. Showing the radical change of socialist social space, the opening up of the city has introduced new spatial hierarchies based on entertainment consumption. In post-revolutionary Shanghai, certain spaces (and their clienteles) are valued and hierarchized in different ways, which resemble capitalist spatialities and semicolonial Shanghai (Lefebvre 1991 and Lee 1999). The city's nightlife spaces are also connected with global flows, which often are represented by transnational Chinese entrepreneurs (Farrer 2008). Together with investors, developers, venue owners and managers, the Shanghai Municipal Government participates in the production and gentrification of the city's entertainment spaces, as a strategy

to produce profitable, sanitized, controllable and decent entertainment spaces. On the politics of entertainment spatialities in Shanghai, Farrer states:

> Spatial nightlife stratification is the product of deliberate urban planning focusing on developing some spaces into profitable nightlife zones and the suppression of more-unruly and unprofitable spaces. (Farrer 2011: 762)

Drawing on the guided conversations, entertainment spaces are put into spatial hierarchies, which relate to questions of inclusion and exclusion and, hence, the making of boundaries in the emerging social space. In Shanghai, the questions of morality, ethnicity, sexuality and quality/*suzhi* are crucial when entertainment spaces are depicted, defined and represented. Hierarchizing the city's nightlife spaces, the interviewees suggest that unruly bars, clubs and restaurants along the bar-strip on Mao Ming Lu (in 2005 and 2006) were placed at the bottom of the hierarchy, while fine bars, clubs and restaurants located in restored colonial buildings along the Bund (today Zhongshan Dong Yi Lu) were placed at the top. Since the fieldwork for this study was conducted, the bars on Mao Ming Lu and Tongren Lu (another bar-strip) have been shut down and remodelled into clean, modern spaces, as the city 'has focused on developing sanitized and classy nightlife districts worthy of a global city' (Farrer 2011: 755).

Despite the shutdown of the bar-strips on Maoming Lu and Tongren Lu, and changes in Shanghai's nightlife during the past ten to fifteen years, it is crucial to elaborate further on this issue, as the remodelling of entertainment spaces symbolizes where the city is heading. As asymmetrical contact spaces, the spatial phenomenon of the bar-strips, such as Maoming Lu, Tongren Lu and Julu Lu (another bar-strip that has been remodelled during the last ten to fifteen years), were often seen as unruly, decadent and inappropriate. Apart from an uncontrollable extension of the partying into the street (which often was packed with taxis) and fighting between some customers, the bar-strips were also spaces of prostitution in which mostly white, middle-aged men purchased sex from so-called low quality/*suzhi* women (mostly from poorer provinces and other developing countries) (Farrer 2009; 2011). Similar to the radical changes of Maoming Lu and Tongren Lu, Julu Lu has also been subject to a clean-up process and changed into a more refined space. For

several years, Julu Lu was also known for its decadent nightlife scene. On the sexualization of the city, Farrer (2002: 92) writes: 'More than perhaps any other city, Shanghai has been represented through the metaphor of prostitution. In reform-era China, the prostitute symbolizes a crisis of morality that emerges with foreign influence and market reform'. Through its clean-up and gentrification of the city's entertainment spaces, the Shanghai Municipal Government works as a moral guardian, attempting to change how the city is represented, perceived and experienced.

Illuminating the contemporary fusion of CCP politics and a capitalist gentrifying logic, the clean-up of entertainment spaces appears as a government-sanctioned strategy to raise the quality/*suzhi* of the city's party crowd. While the bar-strips developed relatively organically (without official involvement or endorsement), the more recent developments are more planned in character (i.e. encouraged by the local government), and thus more controlled. On the increasing involvement of the local government in the entertainment scene, Farrer notes:

> high-profile nightlife developments, such as Shanghai's Xintiandi and new developments along the Bund, represent unprecedented levels of transnational investment and local government involvement, leading to a gentrification, stratification, and increasing regulation of Shanghai bar culture. (Farrer 2009-2010: 23)

In relation to the stratification of the nightlife scene, it is significant to explore how several interviewees illuminated an intricate play between quality/*suzhi* ('high' or 'low') and space. In a few, yet substantial sentences, Ebba described how Shanghai nightlife was understood in the mid-2000s. At *Starbucks Grand Gateway*, she elaborates:

> **Ebba**: I go to Three on the Bund, several bars there, it's cool.
>
> **Johan**: Why do you go there?
>
> **Ebba**: Three on the Bund, because, we believe that the people, their quality are higher than Zapata's. It's true [*laughs*]. You know. But Zapata's is also fun. When you are upset you go to Zapata's, and you'll get happy. If you want to have some quality conversation, we choose to go to Three on the Bund.
>
> **Johan**: Mint, Three on the Bund are more high class?

Ebba: No, Mint is also middle and Three on the Bund is definitely very high class. And also the Bund18, Bar Rouge. Zapata's is very low.

Johan: Mao Ming Lu?

Ebba: We never go to Mao Ming Lu. No. Mao Ming Lu is for old, ugly, foreign men [*laughs*].

In Ebba' social hierarchisation of space, several places of interest for this study are revealed: Three on the Bund, Zapata's, Mint (another closed venue), Bund18, Bar Rouge and Maoming Lu. While discussing *Three on the Bund* as attracting people able to engage in some 'quality conversation', it is also crucial to have in mind the location of the venue along the Bund and the life that this waterfront represents. Taking into account the total spatial experience of *Three on the Bund*, the contemporary space creates an exclusive and neocolonial atmosphere. Providing a corporate representation of space, the venue's website states:

> A historic building on Shanghai's most famous and elegant thoroughfare, The Bund, has been totally transformed into a ground-breaking celebration of contemporary living, where art, culture, food, fashion and wellness converge to inspire a richer life—an elegant, sophisticated gathering place for vibrant people and stimulating ideas. Commanding a superb location on the famous waterfront—a place that was once the hub of an extraordinary international society in the 1920s and 30s—Three on the Bund has breathed new life and energy back to this incredible historical location. Everything to stimulate the senses can be found in this stunningly renovated and transformed neo-classical 1916 building.[58]

Three on the Bund is represented through the building's social space; the history of the structure ('a historic building', 'neo-classical 1916 building'), its historical use ('an extraordinary international society in the 1920s and 30s'), the material form ('neo-classical'), geographic location ('The Bund', 'waterfront', 'historical location') and the attachment of certain meanings to the building ('celebration of contemporary living', 'inspire a richer life', 'an elegant, sophisticated gathering place'). Considering Three on the Bund

[58] 'Background', http://www.threeonthebund.com/en/pdf/backgrounder.pdf (accessed 27 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. Much of the content is accessible at http://www.threeonthebund.com/about.php, http://www.threeonthebund.com/about_history.php and http://www.threeonthebund.com/about_design.php (accessed 23 December 2014).

through Lefebvre's social space (as he argues that a spatial analysis should include different levels of social space), it is not surprising that Ebba suggests that the quality/*suzhi* of people is higher at Three on the Bund than Zapata's and Maoming Lu. By making a distinction between spaces (spatial practices) and their clienteles (representational spaces), Ebba positions herself. It is possible to suggest that Ebba identifies herself with the people that frequent Three on the Bund. Additionally, a representation of Zapata's is noteworthy for Ebba's distinction. Zapata's website states:

> Zapata's is a Mexican restaurant and Cancun-style party venue by night, with bar-top dancing, and a huge outdoor garden! We open 7 days a week with dinner starting at 5PM. We serve food late into the night. We feature two airy floors and a spacey garden where you can enjoy our fantastic food or famous Margaritas, in a cozy setting in the middle of Shanghai's old French Concession.[59]

While the immediate surroundings are evoked, bar-top dancing (often understood as a sign of vulgarity, and hence, low quality/*suzhi*) is an essential feature of Zapata's. Zapata's is also located on Hengshan Lu, which is another bar street (although more restrained than the bar-strips). In contrast with the bar-top dancing at Zapata's, the Three on the Bund complex hosts fine dining venues and bars (Whampoa Club, Jean Georges, Laris, New Heights and The Cupola), shopping (Giorgio Armani) and relaxation (Evian Spa, Barbers by Three), and an arts space (Shanghai Gallery of Art). To be able to enter Three on the Bund one supposedly must have high quality/*suzhi* (or pretend one has it), i.e. a level of quality/*suzhi* that is in line with how the space should be used. Ebba also mentioned Bund18, a venue that is represented using phrasings similar to Three on the Bund. Providing a representation of space, the website of Bund18 illustrates:

> At the centre of the Bund—China's most sought after waterfront estate—stands Bund18. Formerly the Chinese headquarters for the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, the stunning 1923 column-fronted building built in the popular neo-classical style by British architectural firm, Palmer & Turner. Offering unparalleled panoramic views of the Huangpu River and financial mecca of Shanghai's financial

[59] 'Zapata's', http://www.zapatas-shanghai.com/zapatas.html (accessed 27 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. The current website provides limited textual presentation of the venue.

> centre in Pudong, Bund18 has been carefully restored by a team of Venetian architects from Kokaistudios.[60]

While the presence of a British architectural firm is highlighted, the history of the building is evoked; the historical uses ('the Chinese headquarters for the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China'), its material form ('neo-classical') geographic location ('the centre of the Bund'), and its contemporary views ('Shanghai's financial centre') and the architects who revamped the building into today's Bund18 ('a team of Venetian architects from Kokaistudios'). In contemporary Shanghai, the city's old social space is present through the renovation of colonial buildings, corporate representations of space, and how the spaces are used, consumed and talked about. Describing its corporate spatiality, the Bund18 website continues:

> Faithfully pursuing the role of 'taste maker, trend setter', Bund18 assembles 11 first-class luxury brands' flagships, Asia's top tier Art Exhibition Space, as well as world-famous restaurants and bars to fulfill your ultimate dream of life and vacation in Shanghai.[61]

Considering the two quotes from Bund18, the venue revolves around upmarket cultural, leisure and entertainment consumption in restored colonial built environments, in which local elites co-mingle with expatriates, foreign students and tourists. With Ebba's elaboration in mind, the website of Bund18 and my observational visits to the venue, high quality/*suzhi* characterizes the space. Showing the inclination for old bourgeois Shanghai, the entertainment venue Bar Rouge is a part of the Bund18 complex. Connecting with the city's pre-existing social space, the website of Bar Rouge states:

> The Bar Rouge required a location commensurate to its fame or maybe it was the Bund that needed to have a restaurant worthy of its history. The answer is, obviously, both and the choice of location was readily apparent and truly harmonious. The Bund,

[60] 'Bund 18', http://www.bund18.com/about-us-teaser/bund18-intro/ (accessed 27 July 2010).

[61] 'Bund18', http://www.bund18.com/en/index_en.asp (accessed 27 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. Fragments of the old content is still accessible at http://www.bund18.com/cn/ (accessed 23 December 2014).

> a splendid and grand symbol of Shanghai, captivates with its beauty and the diversity of its colonial architecture from the golden age of the 1920-30s.[62]

With an outdoor terrace facing the Pudong New Area, the history of the immediate surroundings of Bar Rouge is evoked. By locating Bar Rouge along the Bund waterfront, the venue aspires to re-install 'the golden age' of semi-colonial Shanghai. With its red-coloured space, Bar Rouge displays pictures of orientalized Chinese women on the walls. With clean surfaces, the revamped and largely sterilized version of old Shanghai is present in the contemporary city.

While spaces that are targeting (and considered to host) high quality/*suzhi* clientele are multiplying, spaces that are frequented by low quality/*suzhi* subjects have decreased; they have been established in other parts of the city, been upgraded or demolished. In this context, it is interesting to illuminate the interplay between space, quality/*suzhi*, sexuality and race/ethnicity highlighted by some interviewees. As part of the opening-up reforms, sexuality has gone on public display, although only certain sexualized identities and practices are encouraged. Taking the point of departure in the guided conversations, certain contact spaces in Shanghai attract and target certain groups of people and not others. Similar to Ebba above, Jennie reflects upon on where Chinese and foreigners interact in Shanghai:

> They meet often in the clubs and bars, some are located in Huai Hai Road, and some in Xintiandi. There are a lot of rich people there. Maybe they think, for the students, they don't think they can afford it so they hang out in Mao Ming Nan Lu. There are a lot of bars there. The whole street. I can see a lot of foreigners there. I don't really like the place though. It's about the escort business. Black people and you know, those cheap guys went there. And they, they maybe, maybe they like the atmosphere there and you know people are more relaxed and they are more crazy. Well, when you are in those classy bars or clubs you cannot do the dirty dances and, so I think, those people in the bars they like the chaos and the very loud music there. And they will dance crazily. That's why I don't like Mao Ming Nan Road.

Illuminated by Jennie, Shanghai's contact spaces are gendered, sexualized ('escort business') and ethnicized ('black people') as well as constructed

[62] 'Bar Rouge', http://bar-rouge-shanghai.com/index_en.php (accessed 28 July 2010). The link is no longer accessible. The current website is accessible at http://www.bar-rouge-shanghai.com (accessed 23 December 2014).

through the moralizing quality/*suzhi* discourse ('cheap guys', 'dirty dances' vs 'rich people', 'classy bars'). In relation to Jennie's depiction of Maoming Lu, it is noteworthy to remark that the bar-strip on Maoming Lu was shut down for several reasons (which are not all publicly known); two reasons were the unruliness of the space (which is illustrated by Jennie) and the open air partying outside the bars (mostly on the sidewalk and in the street). While the bar-strip prostitution has almost been eliminated (i.e. eradicated from outdoor public display), the sex industry has gone 'indoors' and upmarket (as discreet features of Xintiandi and the confined spaces of the Bund venues and other nightlife spaces) and online. Prostitutes also take part in the nightlife spaces as paying customers.

Showing the asymmetries of contact space, the sexual intimacy between cultural others is divided along gender, race/ethnicity and sexuality. While straight foreign men were sexualized early on by straight local women, the straight foreign women are seldom sexualized either by local or foreign men. Similarly, straight foreign women seldom sexualize straight local men (Farrer 2010; 2011). In relation to this separating logic, the different nightlife spaces have their desired sexual subjects. Implicated in post-colonial discourses of gender, race/ethnicity and sexuality, the relationship between space and ethnicity is illustrated by Ebba. Focusing on ethnicized femininities and masculinities in nightlife spaces, she says:

> Here in Shanghai, Chinese women like foreigners, but the Chinese men don't like. Because the foreign men, you know, grasp Chinese women. So, if the Chinese men want to have fun, they will go to some typical Chinese clubs, such as Babyface [which was located on Mao Ming Lu]. There are still some foreigners but compared with Mint [which was located Tongren Lu], there are few. And some other places too. But I seldom go to the typical Chinese places. I don't like the music! It's popular Chinese club music.

Ethnicising social spaces, Ebba seldom visits what she calls 'typical Chinese places'. While local men frequent Chinese clubs (such as *Babyface*), Ebba implies that local women frequent nightlife spaces that contain a high degree of foreign men. In the preceding quote, Ebba also highlights a competition between men that are categorised through the Chinese/foreigner divide.

On this topic, Farrer writes:

> a racial hierarchy [emerged] in which white men and Chinese-American men competed for attention from Chinese women, some of them whom preferred white men, and others preferred Asian-looking men with bicultural backgrounds. African and South Asian men were seldom mentioned, but it was clear that they were positioned closer to the bottom of the hierarchy. (Farrer 2011: 756)

Having Ebba's elaboration and Farrer (2011) in mind, the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the entertainment scene relates to where and how people are enjoying themselves in Shanghai. While nightlife spaces initially targeted the expatriate community in the city and local patrons were limited, contemporary contact between cultural others are, as Jennie and Ebba also illustrate, still 'marked by widely recognised racial and gendered categories' (Farrer 2011: 755). In the following quote, Ebba continues her elaboration on how her interactions are structured along the Chinese/foreigner divide:

> For me it's interesting because I like to make foreign friends. But, I can say, most of my Chinese friends, they don't like to make friends with foreigners. So, I have to go out with them separately. Do you understand? If I go with my Chinese friends, only Chinese friends. If foreign friends, only foreign friends. This is a problem [*laughs*].

Identifying a problem in her own social relationships, Ebba's elaboration displays a separation between different groups, and specialization in Shanghai's entertainment scene. As local spending power has increased considerably in recent years, today's presence of foreigners has become a mere feature of Shanghai's entertainment spaces. While the entertainment spaces became more diversified in the mid-2000s, the nightclub Babyface (addressed by Ebba above) illustrates a growing demand for entertainment spaces that target the new, local middle classes. Babyface emerged as a popular nightclub among young, chic locals in the mid-2000s. While entertainment spaces were sites of intercultural contact early on, Babyface was known for its unwillingness to allow foreigners to enter the club. However, this may also relate to the character of the neighbouring nightlife. Possibly trying to diversify and raise the quality/*suzhi* of its surroundings, Babyface was located along the unruly Maoming bar-strip. Alluding to Maoming Lu's lack of quality/*suzhi*, the *That's China April* magazine characterizes Babyface as a 'Sleek lounge cum disco which attracts Maoming's more sophisticated set' (2005: 80). While

Maoming's unruly nightlife was shut down in the mid-2000s, Babyface was turned into a model of Chinese nightlife space.

While most nightlife spaces addressed in this section are predominantly sites of heterosexual contact, the city's gay nightlife spaces are also developing. As Shanghai has been positioned as the city to lead the opening up of the PRC, the city's commercial gay life has also benefited immensely and 'recently become known as the gay capital of China' (Bao 2012: 98). Once addressed as alternative venues in local city guides, Shanghai gay nightlife spaces have become recognized parts of the entertainment space in the city, and as crucial sites for contact between local gays and lesbians and their foreign counterparts. Although the gay and lesbian scenes have not been endorsed officially, the city has its own annual Shanghai Pride celebrations (yet without a parade). Several gay venues, such as Eddy's and Shanghai Studio, have been located at the same addresses for several years. Bringing into play the sexualized categories that once were established as part of colonial Hong Kong gay culture, the contact between Chinese and white gays are implicated in discourses of colonialism and sexuality, which are structured around identity categories such as potato queen/rice queen (potato queen refers to a Chinese gay man who is attracted exclusively to white men; rice queen refers to a white gay man who is attracted exclusively to Chinese gay men) and mashed potato queen/sticky rice queen (the former refers to white gay men exclusively attracted to other white gay men; the latter refers to Chinese gay men exclusively attracted to other Chinese gay men). However, most significantly, as part of a thriving pan-Asian urban gay culture, the mainland gay culture is increasingly integrated with the Chinese gay cultures that have developed in Hong Kong, Taipei, Singapore, and gay cultures in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. While the opening up of the PRC has enabled gay subjects to travel more easily and engage in gay nightlife spaces in the region (and elsewhere), gay subjects from neighbouring Asian cities are also taking part in the gay nightlife spaces in Shanghai, which enable the production of new subjectivities (based on regional gay culture), and some have also been involved in managing gay nightlife spaces in the city (Bao 2012; Chou 2000; Ho 2010; Kong 2006, 2011).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the interviewees engage in contact and talk about their own contact experiences in Shanghai. Describing how they engage in culture and language exchanges, work at international companies and take part in the city's leisure and entertainment spaces, the interviewees demonstrate how they create their own contact spaces (one-to-one occasions and group gathering initiatives) and make use of established contact spaces (university programmes, language schools, international companies, leisure and entertainment spaces). Simultaneously, I have also exhibited the city's new spatial practices (i.e. leisure and entertainment spaces) by including how they materialize in commercial representations. Although the interviewees show that contact with cultural others is voluntary within their diverse group of educated urbanites (contact spaces are easy to enter and exit), contact is still divided along recognized categories of quality/*suzhi,* 'race'/ethnicity and gender/sexuality. This shows that Shanghai's contact spaces are both based in the country's quality/*suzhi* discourse and globally recognized identity categories. Similarly, I have shown that the city government's upgrading of entertainment spaces is connected to capitalist gentrification processes.

10 Concluding remarks and looking ahead

Conclusions

Informed by Lefebvre's spatial framework (1991), I have sought to understand China's emerging society as a new social space in the making. By analysing China's contemporary changes within a Lefebvrean spatial understanding, I have attempted to show the integrated importance of space to social production. Through my concretization of Lefebvre (1991), I have analysed how the CCP produces what they conceptualize as a modern society, which takes into account official visions for the nation's future and its new spatial organization, the construction of new urban environments, and the change of people's mindsets and everyday practices. I have described the CCP's vision for a prosperous future on the Chinese mainland, and how that vision was implemented in post-1990 Shanghai through large-scale demolition and reconfiguration of existing space and the subsequent production of new urban spaces. Lastly, I have shown how the new society unfolded, through interviews about intercultural engagements in the mid-2000s.

Central to the realization of the new society is the country's re-integration with the outside world. More specifically, I have analysed how the CCP is reconfiguring the Chinese mainland to facilitate contact with the outside world. While producing the new society, the PRC has experienced a proliferation of 'contact spaces'. As illustrated throughout my analyses, contact space is envisioned nationally, implemented spatially and locally, and lived personally. The CCP has reconfigured party ideology and envisioned the country's global re-integration, implemented its vision in designated spaces and embarked on the production of cosmopolitan Chinese citizens.

While producing the new society on the Chinese mainland, the CCP monitors the country's contact with the outside world. Within the CCP's anti-imperialist framing of China's history, the PRC displays an alternative capitalist modernity, which strategically monitors capitalism through one-party rule (as displayed by the opening up of designated areas for development as well as choosing Shanghai as an experimental strategic site to lead the

country's changes). Thus, the emerging society is characterized by a constant balancing between one-party rule and increased openness towards selected features of the outside world. Considering the CCP's ideology, I have applied insights from the field of post-colonial studies to the Chinese mainland context to show how the founding of the PRC was implicated in anti-imperialist sentiments. Through this application, I have shown that the CCP's anti-imperialism is closely related to China's historical experiences of semi-colonialism and party ideology. While maintaining one-party rule and land ownership, the CCP conceptualizes the Chinese mainland as a post-semi-colonial spatial entity that can be guided in a certain designated direction (i.e. towards its vision of common prosperity by 2049). Producing its own version of modernity, the PRC selectively appropriates certain features of the outside world (such as modern science, technology, management and a consumer society), and constrains and downplays others (liberal democracy and individualism). To facilitate and establish the envisioned society, the CCP maintains that the PRC has to adhere to Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin's Three Represents and Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook on Development. While reconfiguring the PRC into a major player in East Asia's economic centrality as well as globally, the CCP also questions and rejects Euro/American domination and hegemony. Similarly, to secure the status quo and facilitate the realization of the envisioned society, the CCP opposes Western concepts of democracy and individualism, and promotes loyalty to the CCP, patriotism, nationalism and neo-Confucianist values of submission to authority and social order. Displaying China's alternative capitalist modernity, I have shown that this emerging society constantly balances between openness and control, which is illustrated in official concepts such as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', 'socialist market economy' and 'spiritual civilization', the CCP's control over opponents and monitoring of the Internet, and the censorship of and self-censorship by people.

While the CCP strives to uphold its political rule, the contemporary party ideology has to be understood in relation to the concrete manifestation of the emerging society, in which I began the fieldwork for this study. Staying

and conducting fieldwork in the city that was chosen to lead China's transformation into a modern society, I met people who had increased their quality/*suzhi*, becoming modern, cosmopolitan Chinese subjects, by taking part in several contact engagements. As illustrated, their personal engagements are characterized by certain social forms and situated in certain places in the city. By enabling and producing 'contact spaces', the CCP balances the opening up of the country with its desire to produce its own version of a modern society. My guided conversations and official spatial representations illustrate that the realization of the envisioned society has prioritized spatial practices that are contact oriented and highly commercial. As tangible contact spaces, they are special economic zones, open coastal cities, free trade zones, central business districts, tourist spaces, shopping malls, other consumer spaces, and leisure and entertainment venues. In relation to the spatial implementations of the envisioned society, the PRC displays a growth of the new middle classes and urban modern lifestyles. In this study, this has been illustrated by the interviewees' contact engagements in Shanghai and how they understand the changes taking place in Shanghai and China. As the interviewees' stories unfold within China's leading experimental site for the opening-up reforms, they are an integrated part of the realization of the envisioned society. Displaying radical changes in China's representational spaces from Mao's years, the interviewees' personal engagements include taking university degrees, going abroad and returning to China, acquiring English language skills, acquiring a cosmopolitan attitude, working at international companies, carrying out informal interactions with foreigners at leisure and entertainment venues, and new consumer practices. My analysis of the guided conversations has also shown that the interviewees engage in established and dichotomous spatial conceptualizations, such as city vs. rural space, coastal vs. inland provinces, Shanghai vs. Beijing (i.e. Haipai vs. Jingpai culture), the spatialising discourse of low vs. high quality/*suzhi* people and traditional vs. modern. As illustrated, the conceptualizations are implicated in the interviewees' own understanding of themselves, Shanghai and the Chinese mainland.

Further studies

In the course of this study, I have experienced several openings for further studies. I assume that this study would have been different and raised additional questions if I had delved into more sensitive issues during the research process, and particularly, while I conducted the guided conversations. Due to my cautiousness, self-censorship and the risk of making my interviewees lose face, more politically focused personal engagements were deliberately excluded. Revealing alleged problems within the CCP rule, the engagements may include participation in social initiatives against forced evictions, non-governmental and non-profit organizations, environmental and labour rights organizations, HIV/AIDS groups, anti-corruption initiatives, charity programmes, migrant workers groups, Tibet- and Xinjiang-related groups and other organizations and networks. Giving voice to the workers in factories, urban construction, service industries and the sex industry would have also contributed to the study. Providing possible areas for future studies, this shows that China's contact spaces and the production of the new society are more multifaceted and asymmetrical than I was able to show in this study. This also illustrates that China's contact spaces can be characterized within a continuum from safe to more sensitive ones.

While I have touched upon other localities in the PRC briefly, it is my interest to further develop the term 'contact space' and apply it to other Chinese cities and provinces. Speaking in terms of 'contact spaces' in plural would deepen an understanding of the general processes of opening up and economic reforms, and also shed light on how the new society and its contact arrangements are unfolded and reacted upon in different parts of the PRC. Similarly, the term semi-coloniality can also be used in other localities on the Chinese mainland that have had colonial experiences similar to that of Shanghai. The term 'contact space' may also be adapted for an analysis of China's increasing presence in the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and the re-integration of the two cities with the Chinese mainland under Deng Xiaoping's principle of 'one country, two systems'. The term contact space can also be applied and adapted to contexts other than Hong Kong, Macau and the Chinese mainland.

Within the context of contemporary China, further studies may also include extended spatial analyses from a Lefebvrean perspective. Current analyses can gain more depth through the collection of additional empirical material. I also suggest that concrete observations and ethnographies as well as interviews of key actors within the production of contact spaces are of special interest. Local officials, investors, developers, planners, architects and managers are professional categories that are crucial from a spatial context. Similarly, extended analyses of people's own understanding of the emerging society and contact spaces from a humanist spatial perspective are also noteworthy. Given the CCP's path towards common prosperity and the current status quo, I may also continue to analyse the strategies that the CCP uses to achieve its envisioned society—'the Chinese dream'—by 2049. As I have illustrated in this study, the new Chinese society is not yet 'completed', as Shanghai and the country as a whole still display vast discrepancies between the CCP's broader intentions, official representations, new spatial practices and people's lives.

References and empirical material

Books and articles

Abbas, Ackbar. 1993. 'The Last Emporium: Verse and Cultural Space'. *Positions*, 1:1, 1-17.

Abbas, Ackbar. 2000. 'Cosmopolitan De-scriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong'. *Public Culture,* 12:3, 769-786.

Abbas, Ackbar. 2002. 'Play It Again Shanghai: Urban Preservation in the Global Era'. *Shanghai Reflections: Architecture, Urbanism, and the Search for an Alternative Modernity.* Gandelsonas, Mario (Ed.). New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Ahmed, Sara. 2000. *Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality.* London and New York. Routledge.

Althusser, Louis. 2001/[1971]. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Anagnost, Ann. 2004. 'The Corporeal Politics of Quality (*Suzhi*)'. *Public Culture,* 16:2, 189-208.

Ashcroft, Bill; Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen. 2013. *Postcolonial Studies: The Key Concepts.* Oxon and New York: Routledge. Third Edition.

Banerjee, Subhabrata, Bobby; Chio, Vanessa C.M. and Mir, Raza. 2009. *Organizations, Markets and Imperial Formations. Towards an Anthropology of Globalization.* Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Bao, Hongwei. 2012. 'Queering/Querying Cosmopolitanism: Queer Spaces in Shanghai'. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 4, 97-120.

Barlow, Tani. 1993. 'Editor's Introduction', *Positions,* 1:1, v-vii.

Barlow, Tani. 1993. '~~Colonialism's~~ Career in Postwar China Studies', *Positions*, 1:1, 224-267.

Bergère, Marie-Claire. 2009. *Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2007a. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2007b. 'Sociology and Postcolonialism: Another "Missing" Revolution?'. *Sociology*, 41:5, 871-884.

Bickers, Robert A. and Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. 1995. 'Shanghai's "Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted" Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol'. *The China Quarterly,* 142, 444-466.

Borden, Iain. 1997. 'Space Beyond: Spatiality and the City in the Writings of Georg Simmel'. *The Journal of Architecture,* 2:4, 313-335.

Bray, David. 2005. *Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System From Origins to Reform.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brenner, Neil and Elden, Stuart. 2009. 'Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory'. *International Political Sociology*, 3:4, 353-377.

Castells, Manuel. 1977/[1972]. *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach.* London: Edward Arnold.
Cao, Tian Yu. 2005. *The Chinese Model of Modern Development.* London and New York: Routledge.

Catching, Rebecca. 2012. 'The New Face of Censorship: State Control of the Visual Arts in Shanghai, 2008-2011'. *Journal of Visual Art Practice*, 11:2-3, 231-249.

Chen, Xiaolan. 2007. 'Primitive and Modern: Two Faces of Shanghai in Chinese and Western Literature'. *Frontiers of Literary Studies in China*, 1:4, 543-554.

Chen, Xiaomei. 1992. 'Occidentalism as Counterdiscourse: "He Shang" in Post-Mao China'. *Critical Inquiry*, 18:4, 686-712.

Chen, Zhimin. 2005. 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy'. *Journal of Contemporary China, 14:42, 35-53.*

China Tourism Academy, 2010. *Annual Report of China Outbound Tourism Development 2009-2010.* Heide: Profil Verlag.

Chou, Wah-shan. 2000. *Tongzhi. Politics of Same-Sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies*. New York, London and Oxford: The Haworth Press.

Chun, Lin. 2006. *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism.* Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Cloke, Paul; Cook, Ian; Crang, Philip; Goodwin, Mark; Painter, Joe and Philo, Chris. 2004. *Practising Human Geography.* London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Crabb, Mary W. 2010. 'Governing the Middle-Class Family in Urban China: Educational Reform and Questions of Choice'. *Economy and Society*, 39:3, 385-402.

Crang, Mike and Cook, Ian. 2007. *Doing Ethnographies*. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

David, Matthew (Ed.). 2010. 'Editor's Introduction: Methods of Interpretive Sociology', *Methods of Interpretive Sociology.* London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Deegan, Mary Jo. 2001. 'The Chicago School of Ethnography', *Handbook of Ethnography.* Atkinson, Paul; Coffey, Amanda; Delamont, Sara; Lofland, John and Lofland Lyn. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Deng, Xiaoping. 1994. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Volume III (1982-1992).* Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Dirlik, Arif. 1996. 'Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism'. *History and Theory*, 35:4, 96-118.

Dirlik, Arif. 2003. 'Global Modernity?: Modernity in an Age of Global Capitalism'. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 6:3, 275-292.

Dirlik, Arif. 2005. 'The End of Colonialism? The Colonial Modern and the Making of Global Modernity'. *boundary 2*, 32:1, 1-31.

Durkheim, Émile. 2002/[1897]. *Suicide. A Study in Sociology*. London and New York: Routledge.

Dunford, Michael and Liu, Weidong (Eds.). 2014. *The Geographical Transformation of China.* London and New York: Routledge.

Duthie, Laurie. 2005. 'White Collars with Chinese Characteristics: Global Capitalism and the Formation of a Social Identity'. *Anthropology of Work Review*, 26:3, 1-12.

Duthie, Laurie. 2007. 'Western Names for Chinese Identities: The Acquisition and Use of Western Personal Names among Chinese Business Professionals in Foreign-Invested Corporations'. *Asian Anthropology*, 6:1, 53-80.

Dynon, Nicholas. 2008. '"Four Civilizations" and the Evolution of Post-Mao Chinese Socialist Ideology'. *The China Journal*, 60, 83-109.

Dynon, Nicholas. 2011. 'Better City, Better Life? The Ethics of Branding the Model City at the 2010 Shanghai World Expo'. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy,* 7:3, 185-196.

Elden, Stuart. 2004. *Understanding Henri Lefebvre. Theory and the Possible*. London and New York: Continuum.

Eisenstadt, Schmuel N. 2000. 'Multiple Modernities'. *Daedalus*, 1-29.

Fan, Cindy C. 2006. 'China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): From "Getting Rich First" to "Common Prosperity"'. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 47:6, 708-723.

Farrer, James. 2002. *Opening Up: Youth Sex Culture and Market Reform in Shanghai*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Farrer, James. 2008. 'Play and Power in Chinese Nightlife Spaces'. *China: An International Journal,* 6:1, 1-17.

Farrer, James. 2009-2010. 'Shanghai Bars. Patchwork Globalization and Flexible Cosmopolitanism in Reform-Era Urban-Leisure Spaces'. *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, 42:2, 22-38.

Farrer, James. 2010. 'A Foreign Adventurer's Paradise? Interracial Sexuality and Alien Sexual Capital in Reform Era Shanghai'. *Sexualities*, 13:1, 69-95.

Farrer, James. 2011. 'Global Nightscapes in Shanghai as Ethnosexual Contact Zones'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37:5, 747-764.

Featherstone, Mike. 1990. 'Global Culture: An Introduction', in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. Featherstone, Mike, (Ed.). London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Fong, Vanessa L. 2007. 'Morality, Cosmopolitanism, or Academic Attainment? Discourses on "Quality" and Urban Chinese-Only-Children's Claims to Ideal Personhood'. *City and Society,* 19:1, 86-113.

Gabriel, Satyananda J. 2006. *Chinese Capitalism and the Modernist Vision.* London and New York: Routledge.

Gamble. Jos. 2003. *Shanghai in Transition. Changing Perspectives and Social Contours of a Chinese Metropolis.* London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

Gaubatz, Piper. 1999. 'China's Urban Transformation: Patterns and Processes of Morphological Change in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou'. *Urban Studies*. 36:9, 1495-1521.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays.* New York: Basic Books.

Giddens, Anthony. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1981. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1983. 'Comments on the Theory of Structuration'. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 13:1, 75-80.

Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press. (Reprint edition 1986)

Gieryn, Thomas F. 2000. 'A Space for Place in Sociology'. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 463-496.

Goffman, Erving. 1990/[1959]. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Goodman, David. 2002. *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography*. London and New York: Routledge.

Goonewardena, Kanishka; Kipfer, Stefan; Milgrom, Richard and Schmid, Christian (Eds.). 2008. *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre.* London and New York: Routledge.

Greenspan, Anna. 2012. 'The Power of Spectacle'. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 4, 81-95.

Gregory, Derek and Urry, John (Eds.). 1985. *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gu, Xin. 2012. 'The Art of Re-Industrialisation in Shanghai'. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 4, 193-211.

Gu, Xin. 2014. 'Cultural Industries and Creative Clusters in Shanghai'. *City, Culture and Society*, 5:3, 123-130.

Hall, Stuart. 1996. 'When was "the post-colonial"? Thinking at the Limit', *The Post-Colonial Question. Common Skies, Divided Horizons*. Chambers, Iain and Curti, Lidia (Eds.). London and New York: Routledge.

Halualani, Rona, Tamiko; Fassett, Deanna L.; Morrison, Jennifer, Huynh Thi Anh and Dodge, Patrick, Shaou-Whea. 2006. 'Between the Structural and the Personal: Situated Sense-Makings of "Race"'. *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 3:1, 70-93.

Halualani, Rona, Tamiko and Nakayama, Thomas K. 2012. 'Critical Intercultural Communication Studies: At a Crossroads', *Handbook of Critical Communication Studies*. Halualani, Rona, Tamiko and Nakayama, Thomas K. (Eds.). Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Sage.

Hannerz, Ulf. 1990. 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture', *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. Featherstone, Mike (Ed.). London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Harvey, David. 1989. *The Urban Experience.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Harvey, David. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change.* Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Henningsen, Lena. 2012. 'Individualism for the Masses? Coffee Consumption and the Chinese Middle Class' Search for Authenticity'. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 13:3, 408-427.

Ho, Loretta Wing Wah. 2010. *Gay and Lesbian Subculture in Urban China*. London and New York: Routledge.

Holbig, Heike. 2009. 'Remaking the CCP's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao'. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 38:3, 35-61.

Hu, Guangwei. 2005. 'English Language Education in China: Policies, Progress, and Problems'. *Language Policy*, 4:1, 5-24.

Huang, Tsung-Yi Michelle. 2004. *Walking Between Slums and Skyscrapers. Illusions of Open Space in Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Shanghai*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Huang, Xianbi. 2008. '*Guanxi* Networks and Job Searches in China's Emerging Labour Market: A Qualitative Investigation'. *Work, Employment and Society*, 22:3, 467-484.

Jacka, Tamara. 2009. "Cultivating Citizens: *Suzhi* (Quality) Discourse in the PRC", *Positions*, 17:3, 523-535.

Kipfer, Stefan; Goonewardena, Kanishka; Schmid, Christian and Milgrom, Richard. 2008a. 'On the Production of Henri Lefebvre', *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre.* Goonewardena, Kanishka; Kipfer, Stefan; Milgrom, Richard and Schmid Christian. London and New York.

Kipfer, Stefan; Schmid, Christian; Goonewardena, Kanishka and Milgrom, Richard. 2008b. 'Globalizing Lefebvre?, *Space, Difference, Everyday Life. Reading Henri Lefebvre.* Goonewardena, Kanishka; Kipfer, Stefan; Milgrom, Richard and Schmid Christian. London and New York.

King, Anthony D. 1985. 'Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change', *Colonial Cities*, Ross R. and Telkamp G. (Eds.). Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Leiden University Press.

King, Anthony D. 1989. 'Colonialism, Urbanism and the Capitalist World Economy'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 13:1, 1-18.

King, Anthony D. 1991/[1990]. *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System.* London and New York: Routledge.

Kofman, Eleonore and Lebas, Elizabeth. 1996. *Writings on Cities: Henri Lefebvre.* Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Kong, Lily. 2007. 'Cultural Icons and Urban Development in Asia: Economic Imperative, National Identity and Global City Status'. *Political Geography*, 26:4, 383-404.

Kong, Travis S.K. 2006. 'Sexualizing Asian Male Bodies', *Handbook of the New Sexuality Studies.* Seidman, Steven; Fischer, Nancy and Meeks, Chet (Eds.). Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Kong, Travis S.K. 2011. *Chinese Male Homosexualities: Memba, Tongzhi and Golden Boy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2007. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Lawrance, Alan. 1998. *China Under Communism.* London and New York: Routledge.

Lechner, Frank J. 1991. 'Simmel on Social Space'. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 8:3, 195-201.

Lee, Ou-Fan Leo. 1999. *Shanghai Modern. The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1991/[1974]. *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.

----------. 2003/[1970]. *The Urban Revolution*. Minneapolis and London; University of Minnesota Press.

----------. 2003/[1986]. 'Preface to the New Edition. The Production of Space', *Henri Lefebvre, Key Writings*. Elden, Stuart; Lebas, Elizabeth and Kofman, Eleonore (Eds.). New York and London: Continuum.

----------. 2008a/[1947]. *Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 1: Introduction.* London and New York: Verso.

----------. 2008b/([1961]. *Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 2: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday.* London and New York: Verso.

----------. 2008c/[1981]. *Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 3: From Modernity to Modernism.* London and New York: Verso.

----------. 2009/[1978]. 'Space and the State', *State, Space, World: Selected Essays / Henri Lefebvre.* Brenner, Neil and Elden, Stuart. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Li, Yiping; Hu, Zhi Yi and Zhang, Chao Zhi. 2010. 'Red Tourism: Sustaining Communist Identity in a Rapidly Changing China'. *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change*, 8:1-2, 101-119.

Li, Zhigang and Wu, Fulong. 2006. 'Socio-Spatial Differentiation and Residential Inequalities in Shanghai: A Case Study of Three Neighbourhoods'. *Housing Studies,* 21:5, 695-717.

Liew, Leong. 2005. 'China's Engagement with Neo-Liberalism: Path Dependency, Geography and Party Self-Reinvention'. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 41:2, 331-352.

Liu, Kang. 'Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization? The Debate about Modernity in China'. *boundary 2*, 23:3, 193-218.

Liu, Wujun and Huang, Xiang. 2007. *Shanghai Urban Planning.* Singapore: Thomson Learning.

Loomba, Ania. 2005/[1998]. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lu, Duanfang. 2006. *Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity and Space, 1949-2005.* London and New York: Routledge.

Lu, Hanchao. 2002. 'Nostalgia for the Future: The Resurgence of an Alienated Culture in China'. *Pacific Affairs*, 75:2, 169-186.

Lu, Xing. 1999. 'An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China'. *Discourse and Society*, 10:4, 487-508.

Lu, Xing and Simons, Herbert W. 2006. 'Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in the Post-Mao Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies'. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 92:3, 262-286.

Lynch, Michael. 2004. *Mao*. (*Routledge Historical Biographies*) London and New York: Routledge.

Ma, Laurence J.C., and Wu, Fulong (Eds.). 2005. *Restructuring the Chinese City. Changing Society, Economy and Space.* London and New York: Routledge.

McClintock, Anne. 1995. *Imperial Leather. Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest.* London and New York: Routledge.

McGee, Terry; Lin, C.S., George; Marton, Andrew M.; Wang, Y.L. Mark and Wu, Jianping. 2007. *China's Urban Space. Development under Market Socialism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Merrifield, Andrew. 2002. *Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mills, Sara. 2005. *Gender and Colonial Space*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Murphy, Rachel. 2004. 'Turning Peasants into Modern Chinese Citizens: "Population Quality" Discourse, Demographic Transition and Primary Education', *The China Quarterly*, 177, 1-20.

Oakes, Tim. 2000. 'China's Provincial Identities: Reviving Regionalism and Reinventing "Chineseness"'. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 59:3, 667-692.

O'Connor, Justin. 2012. 'Shanghai Modern: Replaying Futures Past'. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 4, 15-34.

Olds, Kris. 1997. 'Globalizing Shanghai: the "Global Intelligence Corps" and the Building of Pudong'. *Cities*, 14:2, 109-123.

Ong, Aihwa. 1997. 'Chinese Modernities: Narratives of Nation and of Capitalism', *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism.* Ong, Aihwa and Nonini, Donald (Eds.). London and New York: Routledge.

Ong, Aihwa. 2011. 'Introduction: Worlding Cities, or the Art of Being Global', *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global*. Roy, Ananya and Ong, Aihwa (Eds.). Chichester, Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 1986. 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*. Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (Ed.). London: Allen and Unwin.

Pang, Laikwan. 2006. 'The Collective Subjectivity of Chinese Intellectuals and Their Café Culture in Republican Shanghai'. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 7:1, 24-42.

Paradise, James F. 2009. 'China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power'. *Asian Survey*, 49:4, 647-669.

Pratt, Mary Louise. 1992. *Imperial Eyes. Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London and New York. Routledge.

Ren, Xuefei. 2008. 'Forward to the Past: Historical Preservation in Globalizing Shanghai'. *City and Community,* 7:1, 23-43.

Riessman, Catherine Kohler. 1993. *Narrative Analysis*. London and Newbury Park: Sage.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2002. 'Global and World Cities: A View from off the Map'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26:3, 531-554.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2004. 'In the Tracks of Comparative Urbanism: Difference, Urban Modernity and the Primitive'. *Urban Geography*, 25:8, 709-723.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2011. 'Cities in a World of Cities: The Comparative Gesture'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35:1, 1-23.

Rofel, Lisa. 2007. *Desiring China. Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Rofel, Lisa. 2012. 'Between *Tianxia* and Postsocialism. Contemporary Chinese Cosmopolitanism', *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*. Delanty, Gerard (Ed.). London and New York: Routledge.

Roy, Ananya. 2009. 'The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory'. *Regional Studies*, 43:6, 819-830.

Rubin, Herbert J. and Rubin, Irene S. 1995. *Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data.* London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Said, Edward W. 2003/[1978]. *Orientalism*. London and New York: Penguin.

Said, Edward W. 'Orientalism Reconsidered'. *Cultural Critique,* 1, 89-107.

Sang, Bin Xue. 1993. 'Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China? – An Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area'. *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business*, 14:1, 130-160.

Sassen, Saskia. 2000. 'The Global City: Strategic Site/New Frontier'. *American Studies*, 41:2/3, 79-95.

Sassen, Saskia. 2006. *Cities in a World Economy*. Third edition. London: Pine Forge Press.

Saunders, Peter. 2005. *Social Theory and the Urban Question.* Second edition. London and New York: Routledge.

Seidman, Irving. 2006. *Interviewing as Qualitative Research. A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences.* New York and London: Teachers College Press.

Shanghai Municipal Information Office and Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau. 2007. *Shanghai Basic Facts*. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.

Shanghai Municipal Government. 2006. *Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in Shanghai.*

Shields, Rob. 1991. *Places on the Margin. Alternative Geographies of Modernity*. London and New York: Routledge.

Shields, Rob. 1999. *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle. Spatial Dialectics.* London and New York: Routledge.

Shih, Shu-Mei. 1996. 'Gender, Race, and Semicolonialism: Liu Na'ou's Urban Shanghai Landscape'. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 55:4, 934-956.

Shih, Shu-Mei. 2001. *The Lure of the Modern. Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917-1937*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Shohat, Ella. 1992. 'Notes on the "Post-Colonial"'. *Social Text*, 31/32, 99-113.

Simmel, Georg. 1971/[1903]. 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', *Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms*. Levine, Donald N. (Ed.). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Simmel, Georg. 1997/[1903]. 'The Sociology of Space', *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings.* Frisby, David and Featherstone, Mike (Eds.). London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Sit, Victor F.S. 1985. 'The Special Economic Zones of China: A New Type of Export Processing Zone?'. *The Developing Economies*, 23:1, 69-87.

Smith, Jennifer Maguire and Hu, Dan. 2013. 'Not a Simple Coffee Shop: Local, Global and Glocal Dimensions of the Consumption of Starbucks in China'. *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture,* 19:5, 670-684.

Soja, Edward W. 1996. *Thirdspace. Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Song, Xianlin. 2000. 'Post-Mao New Poetry and "Occidentalism"'. *East Asia*, 18:1, 82-109.

Stein, Michael. 2006. 'Your Place or Mine: The Geography of Social Research', *The SAGE Handbook of Fieldwork*. Hobbs, Dick and Wright, Richard. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Sun, Wanning, 2009. '*Suzhi* on the Move: Body, Place, and Power'. *Positions,* 17:3, 617-642.

Taylor, Jeremy E. 2002. 'The Bund: Littoral Space of Empire in the Treaty Ports of East Asia'. *Social History*, 27:2, 125-142.

Tomba, Luigi. 2004. 'Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing'. *The China Journal*, 51, 1-26.

Tönnies, Ferdinand. 2002/[1887]. *Community and Society*. New York: Dover Publications.

Urry, John. 1995. *Consuming Places.* London and New York: Routledge.

Vaide, Johan. 2004. *Encountering the Other in Shanghai. A Study of Online Personals and Online Journals.* Thesis for Master's Degree, Centre for Gender Studies, Lund University.

Vukovich, Daniel F. 2012. *China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC*. London and New York: Routledge.

Wang, Cangbai; Wong, Siu-Lun and Sun, Wenbin. 2006. 'Haigui: A New Area in China's Policy Towards the Chinese Diaspora'. *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 2:2, 294-309.

Wang, Ning. 1997. 'Orientalism versus Occidentalism?'. *New Literary History,* 28:1, 57-67.

Wang, Stephen, Wei-Hsin. 2011. 'Commercial Gentrification and Entrepreneurial Governance in Shanghai: A Case Study of Taikang Road Creative Cluster'. *Urban Policy and Research*, 29:4, 363-380.

Wee, Wan-ling C.J. 2012. 'Imagining the Fractured East Asian Modern: Commonality and Difference in Mass-Cultural Production'. *Criticism*, 54:2, 197-225.

Weber, Max. 1958/[1921]. *The City.* New York: Free Press.

Wei, Yehua Dennis and Leung, Chi Kin. 2005. 'Development Zones, Foreign Investment, and Global City Formation in Shanghai'. *Growth and Change*, 36:1, 16-40.

Wei, Yehua Dennis; Leung, Chi Kin and Luo, Jun. 2006. 'Globalizing Shanghai: Foreign Investment and Urban Restructuring'. *Habitat International*, 30, 231-244.

Wheeler, Norton. 2005. 'Modernization Discourse with Chinese Characteristics'. *East Asia – An International Quarterly*, 22:3, 3-24.

Winn, Peter. 1976. 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century'. *Past and Present*, 100-126.

Wong, John. 1998. '*Xiao-kang*: Deng Xiaoping's Socio-Economic Development Target for China'. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 7:17, 141-152.

Wu, Fulong. 2000a. 'The Global and Local Dimensions of Place-Making: Remaking Shanghai as a World City'. *Urban Studies*, 37:8, 1359-1377.

Wu, Fulong. 2000b. 'Place Promotion in Shanghai, PRC'. *Cities,* 17:5, 349-361.

Wu, Fulong. 2002. 'China's Changing Urban Governance in the Transition Towards a More Market-Oriented Economy'. *Urban Studies,* 39:7, 1071-1093.

Wu, Fulong. 2003. 'The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question". *Urban Studies*, 40:9, 1673-1698.

Wu, Fulong (Ed.). 2007. *China's Emerging Cities. The Making of New Urbanism.* London and New York: Routledge.

Wu, Fulong; Zhang, Fangzhu and Webster, Chris. 2013. *Rural Migrants in Urban China: Enclaves and Transient Urbanism.* London and New York: Routledge.

Xiang, Yixian. 2013. 'The Characteristics of Independent Chinese Outbound Tourists'. *Tourism Planning and Development,* 10:2, 134-148.

Xie, Shaobo. 1997. 'Rethinking the Problem of Postcolonialism'. *New Literary History*, 28:1, 7-19.

Xu, Jiang and Yeh, Anthony G.O. 2005. 'City Repositioning and Competitiveness Building in Regional Development: New Development Strategies in Guangzhou, China'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29:2, 283-308.

Yao, Shujie. 2000. 'Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in China over 20 Years of Reforms'. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48:3, 447-474.

Yeh, Catherine Vance. 2006. *Shanghai Love: Courtesans, Intellectuals, and Entertainment Culture, 1850-1910*. Seattle, University of Washington Press.

Yu, Yanmin. 2006. 'Market Economy and Social Justice: The Predicament of the Underprivileged'. *Journal of Comparative Asian Development,* 5:1, 131-147.

Yue, Meng. 2006. *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires.* Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Zhang, Longxi. 1988. 'The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West'. *Critical Inquiry,* 15:1, 108-131.

Zhang, Mei. 2004. *China's Poor Regions: Rural-Urban Migration, Poverty, Economic Reform and Urbanisation.* London and New York: Routledge.

Zhang, Tingwei. 2002. 'Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai'. *Urban Affairs Review,* 37:4, 2002.

Zhang, Tingwei. 2005. 'Uneven Development Among Shanghai's Three Urban Districts', *Restructuring the Chinese City. Changing Society, Economy and Space.* Ma, Laurence J.C. and Wu, Fulong (Eds.). London and New York: Routledge.

Zhang, Wei-Wei. 2010/[1996]. *Ideology and Economic Reform Under Deng: 1978-1993.* London and New York: Routledge.

Zhang, Xing Quan. 1997. 'Urban Land Reform in China'. *Land Use Policy*, 14:3, 187-199.

Zhang, Yingjin. 1996. *The City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film: Configurations of Space, Time and Gender*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Zhao, Chunlan. 2004. 'From *Shikumen* to New-Style: A Rereading of *Lilong* Housing in Modern Shanghai'. *The Journal of Architecture*, 9:1, 49- 76.

Zhong, Sheng. 2012. 'Production, Creative Firms and Urban Space in Shanghai'. *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research*, 4, 169-191.

Zhu, Jianfei. 2009. *Architecture of Modern China. A Historical Critique.* London and New York: Routledge.

Zieleniec, Andrzej. 2007. *Space and Social Theory*. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Popular magazines

City Weekend, 'Home & Office', summer, 2007. Beijing: China Publishing Group.

That's China, April, 2005. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.

Academic online resources

Boutonnet, Thomas. 2011. 'From Local Control to Globalised Citizenship: The Civilising Concept of *Wenming* in the Official Chinese Rhetoric'. *Global Fences: Literatures, Limits, Borders.* Neri, Corrado and Villard, Florent (Eds.). Lyon: HAL. (open access archive)

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/835742/filename/GLOBAL_FENCES_mars_01.pdf (accessed 10 August 2013)

Ray, Larry. 2007. "Verstehen", *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology – Blackwell Reference Online*. Ritzer, George (Ed.). http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=768/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chunk_g978140512433128_ss1-12 (accessed 21 December 2014)

Urry, John. 2004. "The Sociology of Space and Place", *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology – Blackwell Reference Online.* Blau, Judith R. (Ed.). http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=768/tocnode?id=g9781405122672_chunk_g97814051226723 (accessed 10 September 2011)

Swedish Research Council. 2014-06-30. http://www.vr.se.

Quoted interviewees

2006, April. **Ebba**, female, 28, Master of Business Administration (UK), from Wuhan.

2006, June. **Emelia**, female, 29, Bachelor of Marketing, from Anhui.

2006, May. **David**, male, 25, Bachelor of Engineering, from Wuhan.

2006, May. **Jennie**, female, 25, Bachelor of English, from Shanghai.

2006, March. **Nathan**, male, 28, Bachelor of Engineering, from Shanghai.

2006, April. **Sophie**, female, 24, Student in Languages, from Shanghai.

2006, March. **Tina**, female, 27, Bachelor of Business Administration and Marketing, from Shanghai.

Mentioned interviewees

2005, March. **Lynn**, female, 26, (educational background unknown), from Shanghai.

2005, March. **Matthew**, male, 27, Bachelor in Education, from Shanghai.

Quotes from Shanghai Urban Exhibition Centre taken in February 2009.

Empirical online resources

'About Us: The Office', 2013-06-15, http://en.shio.gov.cn/about-office.html.

'THREE ON THE BUND OFFICIAL WEBSITE', 2014-12-23,
http://www.threeonthebund.com/about.php, /about_history.php and /about_design.php.

'About Us', 2010-08-02, http://www.xintiandi.com/english/aboutus_1.asp. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Xintiandi', 2014-12-23, http://www.shanghaixintiandi.com/xintiandi/en/about_info.asp.

'Achievements - Communist Party of China CPC", *People's Daily,* 2013-12-02, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206979/index.html.

'Answers to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci', *People's Daily*, 2013-12-02, http://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1470.html.

'Background', 2010-07-27, http://www.threeonthebund.com/en/pdf/backgrounder.pdf. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Bar Rouge', 2010-07-28, http://bar-rouge-shanghai.com/index_en.php. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Bar Rouge, Shanghai', 2014-12-23, http://www.bar-rouge-shanghai.com.

'Bund18', 2010-07-27, http://www.bund18.com/en/index_en.asp. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Bund 18', 2010-07-27 http://www.bund18.com/about-us-teaser/bund18-intro/.

'Bund 18', 2014-12-23, http://www.bund18.com/cn/.

'China's goal is to achieve comparative prosperity by the end of the century', *People's Daily*, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Online, 2013-11-14,* http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1380.html.

'Deciphering "harmonious society"', 2014-12-22, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/21/content_426686.htm.

"Deng Xiaoping", *People's Daily,* 2014-12-22, http://en.people.cn/data/people/dengxiaoping.shtml.

'Duolun Road – IDEAL Shanghai', 2014-12-23, http://www.idealshanghai.com/venues/3717/.

"Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China", *People's Daily,* 2014-12-22, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html.

'Full text of Jiang Zemin's report at 16th Party congress', *People's Daily,* 2010-10-08, http://english.people.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml.

'Grand Gateway – Shopping Mall', 2010-07-26, http://www.grandgateway.com/en/2_1.html. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Grand Gateway 66 – Shopping Mall: Overview – Hang Lung Properties Limited', 2014-12-23, http://www.grandgateway66.com/en/shopping-mall/overview.aspx.

'Duolun Road', 2010-07-24, http://live.shanghaidaily.com/guide_shopping.asp. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'History of Chengdu', 2014-04-07, http://www.chengdu.gov.cn/echengdu/overview/history.jsp.

'History', 2013-12-11, http://www.shanghaimuseum.net/en/history/history.jsp.

'Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory for an all-round advancement of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st century', 2013-12-02, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/25/content_363499_3.htm.

'Homestay in Shanghai', 2012-07-24, http://www.eastwestbridge.org/English/CAhs.html.

'Introduction of Pudong New Area', 2010-09-01, http://english.pudong.gov.cn/html/pden/pden_ap_oop_pi/2010-04-10/Detail_72491.htm

'Le Passage Changhai', 2010-07-23, http://www.lepassageshanghai.com/lepassagefuxing.php. *The content is no longer accessible*.

'Metro City: Shanghai', 2010-08-03, http://www.metro.com.sg/storefront/ContentDetail/AboutUs3.asp?ContentId=465. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Metro Holdings Limited', 2014-12-23, http://www.metroholdings.com.sg/properties_china_metrocity_shanghai.html.

'Office of the Mayor', 2014-12-22, http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node17256/index.html.

'Raffles City, Shanghai', 2010-07-24, http://www.rafflescity-shanghai.com/site-english/about.htm. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Raffles Portal', 2014-12-23, http://www.rafflescity.com.cn/en/inchina_shanghai.aspx.

'Shanghai AsiaXPAT', 2005 and 2006, http://shanghai.asiaxpat.com.

'Shanghai Expat', 2005 and 2006, http://shanghaiexpat.com.

'Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development in Shanghai', 2008-04-21, http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/images/shiyiwu/english.pdf.

'Shanghai Xintiandi', 2010-07-24, http://www.shuion.com/eng/sol/pptdev/xin.asp.

'Sun Hung Kai Properties: Shanghai Central Plaza', 2010-08-03, http://www.shkp.com/html/quarterly/09-99/english/16.html. *The link is no longer accessible.*

'Sun Hung Kai Properties – Shanghai Central Plaza', 2014-12-23, http://www.shkp.com/Pages/shanghai-detail-4.

'We Can Develop a Market Economy Under Socialism', 2014-12-22, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103388.htm.

'Xi Jinping: Pursuing a dream for 1.3b Chinese', *China Daily,* 2013-09-02

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/17/content_16313950_6.htm

'Zapata's', 2010-07-27, http://www.zapatas-shanghai.com/zapatas.html. *The link is no longer accessible.*

Maps

China Maps, 2015-01-07, 'Shanghai Street Map with Bilingual Text, Map of Shanghai, China':

http://www.chinamaps.org/china/touristmaps/shanghai-street-map.html

(no copyrights specified)

Google Maps: Map data ©2015 AutoNavi, Google, SK planet, ZENRIN, 2015-01-06, 'East China':

https://www.google.com/maps/@32.4696396,105.115069,5z

(for copyright issues, see http://www.google.com/permissions/geoguidelines.html)

Pictures retrieved online (License: Creative Commons only – Commercial use allowed – Modifications allowed)

Markin, Pablo, 2015-01-03, 'Jing'an Temple':

https://www.flickr.com/photos/pbmarkin/6008257343/in/photolist-a9VTzR-a9VWSa-a9YFyh-a9VU4v-a9YFNj-a9VVH4-a9VTBP-a9VTe4-a9YGYU-a9YJi9-a9VVAZ-a9VUAX-a9VTVc-a9YJaY-a9VVap-a9YM1w-a9YG7S-a9VVWc-a9VTRp-a9VW2p-a9YLBh-a9VW5V-a9VWmz-a9VXgi-a9YJff-a9VTDv-a9YKeS-a9VWv2-a9VX4B-a9YHbN-a8knNB-a9YL31-a9VXa2-a9YGLY-a9VXuc-a9VYtr-a9VSQV-a9YLvS-a9YK5q-EppQL-Epp1w-a8kpqx-a8ohEQ-a8ohp1-a8kpiT-a8ogz9-a8ofSh-a8koEt-a8krqp-a8ogkW

Sittig, Michah, 2015-01-03, 'Pudong New Area':

https://www.flickr.com/photos/msittig/5522231399/in/photolist-fQpZZy-FyKqZ-dzJxP3-9F1Laz-817qc1-9pYT1c-4u9ShU-dzD5bx-VQbRr-9e1Pd7-9sV1tT-e1Vzje-aMUhm-8Mk6Rd-4kL1um-dsBzaA-6E8dKQ-du7gvE-u9WBx-xV1pB-axFed6-M3hFG-8PmGfz-97jbNV-72wTsW-3YZTZ-9sXZcu-6K3QnJ-5MiL1V-5Mo1fS-9sV2Cv-d46ADm-gDPCNj-gDTMPe-9sXZoj-9sXZBJ-dPUNZP-hBEFz-gDSzDA-74eiqU-6txWAt-9sV1ik-6Gbsr8-nYKF5-gDPkN6-8Bx4Qd-9sY1sG-bxLeds-gDP3E7-cKNwuE.

Ullrich, Carsten, 2015-01-03, 'The Bund waterfront':

https://www.flickr.com/photos/ullrich/2954513564/in/photolist-5dFhm8-5dFhdD-aBVwNz-8BV5Tx-bSi8aD-9pYE22-4kL1um-cn31oS-dnX6pK-eP4dqi-4sZCU-4XZuMf-5v5DX3-fQq14U-4C3579-8gm4AJ-fQbDtc-fQpZZq-fQpZZE-hJyL-4XVe3R-4XVf1z-8sk9fg-7rYfXP-eP586x-85GEJC-e91p4X-e91nKF-6g1cR-ePgkDh-eP5KNt-ePgoKq-ePhbUu-eP5MUV-eP5NP8-eP4UhR-7rYgok-7s3dDs-VQik2-7s3dqN-7rYgaX-5nPQmY-gZFYhy-eP3Mtk-bx7bHd-7rYg3F-6Uiu8-jsPxZm-eP3ZXX-fMZVVD/.

Veksler, David Leo, 2015-01-03, 'Waibaidu Bridge':

https://www.flickr.com/photos/heroiclife/8601629327/in/photolist-fw7Npd-dsjnws-e76AHV-e7chhg-dsjnsA-e7hWBq-6dPyES-6dPyb3-6dPAdm-6dPyYu-6dPzG3-8bJgSC-6drtzs-efWMSG-9cB2nr-efWQ1f-efR3Si-dsjo2m-dsjdb8-dsjnEJ-6KtWB6-dyYCZX/