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The Holocaust on Postwar Battlefields

Genocide as Historical Culture

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2006

Document Version:

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Karlsson, K.-G., & Zander, U. (Eds.) (2006). *The Holocaust on Postwar Battlefields: Genocide as Historical Culture*. Sekel Bokförlag.

Total number of authors:

2

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The Holocaust on Post-War Battlefields

Genocide as Historical Culture

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KLAS-GÖRAN KARLSSON
& ULF ZANDER (EDS.)



This volume has been published with financial support
of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

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Cover and layout: Lotta Hansson

Cover picture: Lotta Hansson

ISBN 91-975223-5-X

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Preface

This is the sixth volume of the research project *The Holocaust and European Historical Culture*. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the economic support of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation for the realisation of the entire project work. Mark Davies has checked the language and, in one case, translated the chapters of the book with great skills. Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to our publisher at Sekel Bokförlag, Carsten Jinert, and to the editor Lotta Hansson.

Lund 2006

Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander

Introduction

The Holocaust has provided many European battlefields with live ammunition since the end of the Second World War. Especially during the last quarter-century, these Holocaust-related battlefields have been too multifarious and too geographically widespread to be dealt with conclusively in one single book. Nevertheless, the present volume aims at shedding light on salient ways in which the Nazi genocide of European Jewry has been interpreted, represented and used in various European countries during the post-war era. The general focus is on differing and conflicting notions of the Holocaust, causing or reinforcing but sometimes also mitigating problems related to societal phenomena such as ethnic identity, morality, cultural representation, ideological struggle and political legitimacy.

Some of the battlefields have clearly been situated within national borders, in the sense that Holocaust debates originate from problems and situations related to one particular state or society and mainly concern national agents. Others, however, are better described as trans- and international in their scope, in terms of structural similarities as well as influences and transfers of Holocaust notions. Relevant concepts such as Europeanisation and Americanisation, the latter often connected to phenomena of popular culture, indicate that Holocaust contexts more often than not transcend national barriers.

Holocaust Battles – A Panorama

Holocaust battles have had varying characters. Many of the most protracted and stubborn of them have been intellectual and ideological, fought by scholars and debaters who have presented arguments in favour of or against comparisons between the Nazi genocide and Communist mass murder carried out in Lenin's and Stalin's Soviet Union,

or who have insisted that the Holocaust was part of a particular German development, a *Sonderweg*. Another line of argumentation, introduced by scholars such as Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman, has underlined the intimate relationship between the Holocaust and modernity, thereby diverting, or rather expanding, attention from the totalitarian or German historical contexts to a universal one. Other more existentially painful discords have concerned the extent of active support of Nazi genocidal ideology and politics among ordinary Germans, or among non-Jews in European countries where the Holocaust was actually perpetrated. This mainly existential and moral settlement of accounts of responsibilities and guilt has also, to an increasing extent, involved all those who passively and indifferently stood by, thereby making it easier for the Nazis to perform their evil deeds, or even taking economic or some other advantage of them.

Since a decade or two, the Holocaust has furthermore been made use of for political purposes. It seems that collectives, allegedly or in reality exposed to various kinds of discrimination or maltreatment, can easier gain a hearing if they, or a spokesman of their complaints, compare their situation with the genocidal situation of European Jewry during the years of the Second World War. Such a political context, in which the Holocaust performs the function of the absolute evil, often stirs up conflicts among all those who do not approve of the Holocaust being used in such a transferred sense to promote various political objectives, or who, in a more general sense, object to the strategy of emphasising similarities between the objects of comparison, at the expense of differences.

Additionally, the Holocaust has been brought before the court on irregular occasions since the Second World War. Accusations have not only concerned the perpetration of genocide or assistance to the Nazis in their evil deeds. Holocaust denial in the post-war era has also been an issue of law, as well as of international disputes related to economic retribution, such as the handling and recovering of bank assets of Holocaust victims, or claims of monetary compensation for losses suffered by Jews or other persecuted groups during the war.

Finally, it should again be mentioned that the Holocaust has with increased frequency become part of popular culture. Today, the traditional scenic representations of the tragic history of Anne Frank com-

pete with a great number of fictional works, films and plays in which the Holocaust more or less explicitly provides the framework or the plot. Without doubt, different opinions on the value of such popular works often turn into cultural battlefields. The critical and “negative” trench is often crowded with those who fear that any popularisation of the Holocaust runs the risk of ending up in banality and trivialisation, and those who warn that any artistic representation of the genocide intended for mass consumption departs from a strictly scholarly and correct interpretation of the Holocaust. On the other side, in the “positive” trench, advocates of artistic freedom coexist with those who argue that the attention given to popular cultural representations of the Holocaust goes some way to diffuse knowledge of the genocide and provoke a moral stand. Others maintain that a Holocaust history which is not made relevant for broad masses of people and allowed into popular culture will sooner or later be dead and forgotten.

The Holocaust and European Historical Culture

The general idea of the research project *The Holocaust and European Historical Culture* is to investigate several European post-war Holocaust battlefields. The national fields represented in this sixth project publication are, in alphabetical order, Austria, Croatia, The Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Poland, Romania, The Russian Federation, Sweden and Ukraine.¹ The period of analysis is the entire post-war era. In some of the contributions to this book, the authors adopt such a protracted chronological perspective, which enables them to critically investigate well-established notions of a total lack of Holocaust interest during the first post-war decades. However, due to several interrelated factors, the post-Cold War years from around 1990 to the present constitute a particularly interesting period of time for the majority of the scholars involved. Firstly, it is a period in which the old Cold War structures have been replaced by new or new-cum-old patterns of identity, developments and allegiances. Old images of “the Other,” of the enemy and of evil have needed replacement.

Secondly, it is a period in which both pan-European ideas of increased integration and ideas of multiethnicity and multiculturalism are at the centre of public and political attention. Simultane-

ously, national and nationalist ideas are publicly put forward, more or less in conflict with ideas of international solidarity. This complex of problems is most manifest but far from exclusively visible in the post-Communist states in the eastern part of Europe. In the battle between proponents of Europeanisation and of nationalisation, the Holocaust seems to be a crucial factor. "Auschwitz," as a symbol of the absolute evil that Europeans are supposed to be unequivocally negative to, is propagated as a possible basis for common values in an integrated Europe in search of a cultural identity. However, a focus on the genocide of European Jewry is regarded as much less desirable in individual European states and societies in which not only a place in the new European Union, but also the re-establishment of national identity after decades of Communist rule and what is considered as a suppression of national traits, is a priority goal. In several of these countries, an increased Holocaust focus runs the risk of awakening memories not only of indifference to the treatment of the Jews, but sometimes also of a more or less active "national" participation in the perpetration of the Holocaust, on the Nazi side of the Second World War. This conflict perspective imbues the entire research project and several chapters in this volume.

Thirdly, the post-Cold War years also comprise a period of a general revival of the historical dimension in societal life all over Europe. Historical perspectives are considered relevant in order to mentally cope with sudden, often large-scale transformations of individual and public life. In the research project, three main concepts are introduced to denote essential aspects of this dimension in general, and of its revival in particular. Most fundamental is historical consciousness, which should be understood as a mental capacity or processor that all human beings possess and more or less consciously activate in order to orientate themselves temporally in life and to create meaning out of experiences of the past – and of expectations for the future. Historical consciousness concerns historical thinking about basic existential and moral polarities in human life; among them life and death, good and evil, right and wrong, and "we" and "they." It is normally characterised by a large degree of continuity and stability. Its activation is related to experiences of dramatic change, upheaval and crisis in individual and collective life with regard to the basic di-

mensions just mentioned. Consequently, it seems reasonable to agree with the German history theorist Jörn Rüsen that the Holocaust is at the centre of our present historical consciousness, being “a borderline event whose importance consists of its reaching beyond the level of the subject matter of historical thinking into the core of the mental procedures of historical thinking itself.”²

Historical culture is the second concept of the theoretical and analytical framework employed to explore history’s role in post-Cold War European societies. The concept that, like other “culture” concepts, can be elaborated in processual, structural or functional ways, refers to history as cultural artifacts considered worth handing down to posterity.³ In this volume, analyses of historical culture take an interest in history products such as scholarly monographies, textbooks, films, museum exhibitions or public debates in the way they are produced, mediated or received. The analytical focus is either on the history-cultural “texts” themselves, or on the contextual prerequisites for their being “cultural” and made use of by individuals and collectives in a particular situation. As part of this context, mass media often exert a great influence on historical culture, which is also amply demonstrated in some chapters of the book.

The latter contextual aspect connects to the third main operational concept of the project work: uses of history. It is argued that history is used by individuals and groups in order to satisfy certain needs and interests. Various uses of history are connected to particular functions: a scholarly use is traditionally related to verification, and, in a somewhat more modern shape, to prospective interpretation; an existential use to remembrance, orientation and stability; a moral use to indignation, restoration and rehabilitation; an ideological use to invention, legitimisation and rationalisation; a political use of history to instrumentalisation, politicisation and medialisation. The contextual, history-cultural idea is to relate these uses of Holocaust history, which are certainly not mutually exclusive, to periods and spaces in which they are particularly manifest and salient.⁴ As mentioned, a general hypothesis of the project is that the period from the late 1980s to the present constitutes a space of time which contains a frequent, multifaceted and offensive use of history, in particular as regards Holocaust history.

Outline of the Book

Oscar Österberg's chapter offers a broad overview of how the Holocaust has been represented – and not represented – in Italian historical culture since the end of the Second World War. In general, Italy does not diverge from the European pattern of a rather one-sided and unproblematically positive focus on the national resistance, followed by a suddenly emerging Holocaust interest in the last full decade of the 20th century. Nevertheless, Österberg points at some highly unique traits in the Italian historical culture, of which the most conspicuous is that the attention directed towards the Nazi rule and the Holocaust has unavoidably gone hand in hand with a settlement with Mussolini's fascist regime. Similarities and, to a larger extent, differences between the two totalitarian rules concerning in particular the support of antisemitic ideas and involvement in the mass killings of Jews, have been put forward. In the highly polarised Italian political life of today, even Communist terror has become another variable in the history-cultural discourse of Berlusconi's Right.

The position of the Holocaust in French historical culture, or, rather, in the Paris-based *Centre de documentation juive contemporaine* and its journal *Le Monde juif*, is the topic of Johannes Heuman's text. In France, where the republican tradition of adhering to citizenship rather than to ethnicity has been predominant, and where the memories of the national resistance for long were revered and unimpeachable, the French wartime maltreatment of native and foreign Jews as a result of both acts of assistance to the German occupiers and independent actions from the Vichy leaders was not a preferential topic of historical culture. Using the journal as a prism, Heuman demonstrates that this silence concerning the Holocaust in France gradually changed during the post-war era, mainly as a result of external events and activities. An example of the former was the outbreak in 1967 of the Six Day War in the Middle East, which was conducive to strengthening ethnic identity among Jews in France. Scholarly analyses by North American historians such as Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, who published epoch-making works on Vichy France when French historians did not, may serve as examples of the latter.

Mikael Tossavainen contributes with an analysis of how the Holocaust was interpreted in the Israeli religious press from 1959 to 1979.

The main reference point is the attitude of religious Jews towards the state of Israel and its predominant Zionist ideology, according to which the Holocaust should be interpreted and commemorated in terms of the kind of physical heroism that activist Jews demonstrated especially in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943. In his chapter, Tossavainen firstly demonstrates that there was no such thing as a homogeneous Jewish religious representation of the Holocaust. Secondly, in the national religious newspaper, he discerns a development towards an increased focus on spiritual heroism that is in tune with a general change within Israeli historical culture. The ultra-Orthodox Haredi press, with its fundamental criticism of state commemoration initiatives and Zionist ideas, much more vehemently opposes the glorification of armed resistance, and in fact any political initiative to making use of the genocide and its Jewish victims.

Using a modified typology of various uses of history developed within the framework of the research project, Pär Frohnert analyses changing interpretations and representations of the Holocaust in West German – after 1990 German – school history textbooks during the last quarter-century. The changes he identifies are textual as well as contextual. Among the most conspicuous textual changes that can be observed is the effort to develop the students' historical consciousness and identity, by promoting explicit existential, moral and political relations between, on the one hand, the history student and her experiences, and on the other hand individuals, actions and situations in genocidal Nazi Germany. A new focus on commemoration of the Holocaust victims goes some way to establishing such time-transcending connections that are considered valuable in present-day German history teaching. The intervening contexts that Frohnert attaches systematic importance to are of two kinds: the development within a tradition of history didactics that has held a strong position within the West/German scholarly and educational community since the 1970s, and administrative controls on the state and federal state level to transform the contents, form and objectives of history teaching in the direction of civic and democratic values.

In order to analyse how Austria and Austrians have related to the Holocaust during the entire post-war era, Fredrik Lindström lays bare fundamental dimensions of Austrian historical culture. His empirical

findings certainly support a change in the 1980s, symbolised by the Waldheim affair of 1986, but he puts more stress on continuities of and “backlashes” in historical culture that tie early Austrian post-war strategies of externalisation of the Holocaust, i.e. concerted efforts to separate an Austrian non-guilt from a German guilt, together with recent history-cultural events and policies. Behind this continuity rest, in Lindström’s profound analysis, the ambivalence of Austrian national identity, the persistence of three socio-political sectors or *Lager* in Austrian society, and an enduring Austrian antisemitism,⁵ rooted in both Catholic conservatism and racial thinking of German national hue.

Tomas Sniegon analyses the reception of Steven Spielberg’s film *Schindler’s List* in the Czech Republic. Being a Sudeten German, Oskar Schindler, the hero of the film and the rescuer of hundreds of Jews from the Nazi destruction machinery, made Czechs aware not only or primarily of the atrocities of the Holocaust, but of several Czech-German troublespots of the past, including those related to the Sudeten German area that became an apple of discord between Czechoslovakia and Germany on the road to the Second World War, and from which millions of Germans were expelled at the end of and immediately after the war. For many Czechs with nationalist and Communist sympathies, who dismissed the rescue mission as directed by economic interests and mythical in its character, Schindler represented the Sudeten German prototype of a “well-known Nazi hangman.” For other, more liberal-minded Czechs, the important Schindler legacy was one of hope of interethnic rapprochement and reconciliation. For a very few, *Schindler’s List* served to promote the “pure” memory of the Holocaust.

Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, who was born and grew up in the Polish former shtetl Szydlowiec, has returned to her home town to find out how the Holocaust has been handled in the post-war town, and how present-day inhabitants relate to the genocide. During the war, almost the entire Jewish population of Szydlowiec and the majority of its inhabitants, more than 7,000 individuals, were brutally murdered by the Nazis. In her study, Törnquist-Plewa analyses artifacts of local historical culture such as buildings, monuments and a variety of written texts. Above all, she turns to oral history to interview old Polish

eyewitnesses of the atrocities as well as a much younger generation of schoolchildren whose cultural memories of the Holocaust are to a great extent due to the work of a devoted teacher. A social distinction that proves to be of crucial importance for the respondents' attitudes towards Holocaust history is the one between "bushes" – inhabitants of long standing who have known about the Holocaust but have been unwilling to commemorate or even tell of it – and "birds"; i.e. post-war newcomers who have known little but of late have demonstrated a desire to learn and remember about the tragedy that befell the Jews of Szydlowiec.

Kristian Gerner applies a systematic comparative perspective on two Central European historical cultures, the Hungarian and the Romanian. His point of departure is an observation of a common trait: the Holocaust became a precarious part of both historical cultures as a result of the dramatic dismantling of Communist rule in 1989–1990. Furthermore, in both cases, Gerner's analysis falls into two similar parts. The first elucidates the position of the Hungarian and Romanian Jews prior to the Holocaust, while the second part concentrates on how the genocide started to penetrate Hungarian and Romanian historical culture after decades of official silence. In general, the Holocaust has left fewer imprints on historical culture in Hungary than in the neighbouring country, where international pressure to make the genocide in general and its Romanian aspects in particular a salient feature that sets its mark on public life and on contemporary historical culture has been stronger. This difference notwithstanding, there are also, as Gerner notes, conspicuous similarities that can derive from pre-Holocaust history; strong traditions of antisemitism and ethnic identification have made the Holocaust a minor element in both Hungarian and Romanian historical culture.

In the Balkan region, genocides constitute an important part of national historical cultures. During the Second World War, the Jews in Serbia were murdered mainly by the German occupation forces, while warriors from the collaborationist Ustasha movement perpetrated most of the killings of the Jews and Roma in Croatia. Furthermore, Croatian Ustashe and Serbian Chetniks initiated campaigns of forced deportations and mass killings of Serbs and Croats, respec-

tively, and against Yugoslav Muslims. What is more, genocide was again perpetrated in the region as part of the Yugoslav wars of the years 1990–1995. In her chapter on Croatian historical culture, Kerstin Nyström demonstrates that the Holocaust is closely linked to the development of national identities and legitimacy in the Balkan area, and consequently to basic structures and patterns of conflict in both Communist Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav societies and states. For today's Croatia, turning its face towards the European Union, the Ustasha genocidal heritage is a delicate question of both historical culture and political orientation.

The uneasy wrestling with Holocaust heritage in Ukrainian historical culture in general, and school textbooks in particular, is the topic of Johan Dietsch's chapter. The analysis departs from a perceived situation of political competition between Europeanisation and nationalisation in post-Soviet Ukraine. Should it try to attain the status of an integrated part of the European Union as soon as possible, which in the case of Holocaust perspectives would mean to militate against expressions of antisemitism, to violate a well-established Soviet tradition not to inform about the atrocities committed against the Jews, and to acknowledge a Ukrainian guilt in co-perpetrating the Holocaust? Or should perspectives of Jewish suffering once more be suppressed, or rationalised by being judged subordinate to the victimisation of Ukrainians in both Nazi and the Stalinist terror, in the name of a sacred national identity? In his general answer, Dietsch demonstrates that the textbooks match the old stereotype of Ukraine being caught between east and west, taking no clear-cut history-cultural position for or against Europe.

In his contribution, Klas-Göran Karlsson exposes a conspicuous trait of Russian antisemitic nationalist thinking, as expressed on a set of available nationalist Internet web-sites: the ideological use of history intended to deny or reduce the scope of the Holocaust, and put the blame for the genocide on the Jewish victims themselves. For Russian nationalists, the really devastating Holocausts of the 20th century have not fallen upon the Jews but upon ethnic Russians, who recurrently – in the era of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, during the Stalinist terror and, again, in post-Soviet Russia – have been exposed to policies of extermination. Perpetrators are powerful Communist

or capitalist elements in Russia who more often than not are depicted as Jews. The chapter includes an analysis of the relationship between the antisemitic nationalist thinking that seems to gain ground in 21st-century Russia, and the so-called patriotic ideology of the Russian political leadership.

In the final chapter, Ulf Zander explicitly strikes the comparative note of the research project by analysing how two prominent and related topics of the Holocaust afterworld have been handled in British and Swedish historical cultures: the liberation of Bergen-Belsen in April 1945, and the white buses that transported thousands of camp prisoners from Germany to Sweden in the spring of 1945. In Britain as well as in Sweden, the rescuers attracted the greatest interest. Their efforts became a significant part of the national histories of the Second World War and were made use of in the construction of national identities in both countries. At the history-cultural centre of the White Buses Red Cross rescue operation stands the Swedish count Folke Bernadotte, whose status in Sweden as a heroic champion of humanitarianism was already questioned by contemporaries, in particular by the members of the Jewish Stern League who murdered Bernadotte in Jerusalem in September 1949. Triggered by a general criticism since the early 1990s against Swedish Second World War politics, present observers have again taken up a critical attitude towards the Red Cross expedition, especially its ambition to give priority to the saving of Scandinavian camp prisoners, leaving behind many Jews in urgent need of assistance.

Notes

1. The five volumes already published within the scope of the project are Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003; Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquiries into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Bokförlag 2004; Klas-Göran Karlsson & Kristian Gerner, *Folkmordens historia. Perspektiv på det moderna samhällets skuggsida*, Stockholm: Atlantis 2005; Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering. Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, Lund: Lund University 2006; Mikael Tossavainen, *Heroes and Victims. The Holocaust in Israeli Historical Consciousness*, Lund: Lund University 2006.
2. Jörn Rüsen, "Holocaust Memory and Identity Building: Metahistorical Considerations in the Case of (West) Germany," in Michael Roth & Charles Salas (eds.), *Disturbing Remains: Memory, History, and Crisis in the Twentieth Century*, Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute 2001, pp. 252–253. See also Jörn Rüsen, "Interpreting the

Holocaust. Some Theoretical Issues,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquiries into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Bokförlag 2004, pp. 35–62.

3. Cf. Klas-Göran Karlsson, “The Holocaust as a History-Cultural Phenomenon,” in Martin L. Davies & Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), *How the Holocaust Looks Now. International Perspectives*, London: Palgrave Macmillan (forthcoming).
4. For a more elaborated discussion and an empirical application of this typology of uses of history, see Klas-Göran Karlsson, “The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture: Theoretical and Analytical Challenges,” and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, “The Jedwabne Killings – A Challenge for Polish Collective Memory,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 38–43, 141–176.
5. Concerning spelling, we follow Gavin Langmuir’s example: “Since there is in fact no such thing as ‘semitism’ [...] the term is literally meaningless when applied to Jews, which is why I refuse to hyphenate ‘antisemitism’”; see Gavin I. Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1996, p. 16.

OSCAR ÖSTERBERG

Taming Ambiguities

The Representation of the Holocaust in Post-War Italy

Non c'ero, e se c'ero, dormivo

[I wasn't there, and if I was, I was sleeping]

ITALIAN SAYING

In his speech delivered at the ceremonial opening of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000, Yehuda Bauer recounted how a number of Jewish children from Bosnia had been saved from the Holocaust by the combined help of Italian military personnel and Italian clergy.¹ Soon thereafter Massimo D'Alema, Italian premier and leader of the *Democratici della Sinistra*, the reformed Communist party (DS), addressed the audience. He then returned to Bauer's speech which seemed to have troubled him:

Democratic Italy cannot do without remembrance. Democratic Italy must not forget that our country is not only the country of Villa Emma di Nonantola to which Professor Bauer referred. Italy was the country of Mussolini, the country whose entrails spawned fascism in Europe. Woe upon us if we were to forget this lesson of history.²

At first glance D'Alema's comment might seem somewhat surprising, as statesmen normally tend to appreciate international praise for their countries and citizens, and avoid statements which might be harmful to their country's image. It might be explained by the occasion, where statements of penitence probably seemed more proper. However, as I will argue, it can also be seen as a reflection of the particularities of the contemporary Italian historical culture in which representations of the fascist period do not rest easily.

It is hardly controversial to claim that, at least in North America

and in Europe, scientific, public, and political interest in the Holocaust has increased noticeably in the last decades. Simultaneously the Holocaust has acquired a status as a central political-cultural symbol which tends to transcend national demarcations. Studying the American development, Jeffrey Alexander has described it as a shift from a “progressive narrative,” which dominated the first post-war decades, to a “tragic narrative of sacred-evil” in which the Holocaust is no longer an event in history but a universal symbol of human suffering and moral evil.³ In a similar analysis, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider have introduced the concept of a “cosmopolitan memory,” which they consider to coexist alongside nationally bounded memories and be founded in shared memories of the Holocaust. They also believe this development holds the promise of a formation of “transnational memory cultures, which [...] have the potential to become the cultural foundation for global human rights politics.”⁴

From a history-cultural perspective this suggests a correlation of historical consciousness across different countries manifested in a “cosmopolitan” historical culture.⁵ According to Levy and Sznaider this has been made possible through profound and rapid changes in communications technology and the globalisation of media industries, but they view the increased significance of the Holocaust in recent public thinking as ultimately founded in “the need for a moral touchstone in an age of uncertainty and the absence of master ideological narratives.”⁶ It might, however, be premature to rule out the importance of national differences. Historical cultures are not solely determined by present needs but are also conditioned by past events and established interpretations.⁷

Generally speaking, representations of history have, at least in Europe, for long been strongly connected to the state as an organisational reality and to the nation as a social fantasy. Academic scholarship, school textbooks, archives, museums, monuments, and public commemorations have, for example, tended to be shaped and structured according to the needs of the state, which in 20th century Europe has most often been conceived as a nation-state. An important task is therefore to study exactly how representations of national history relate to the representation of the Holocaust.

In this chapter I will turn to Italy, which presents an interesting

and ambiguous case. In the following I will mainly focus on how the Holocaust has been dealt with on the political level and in the historiography, which of course are only some segments of a national historical culture. However, ever since unification, Italian politics have been characterised by strong divisions between different groups and subcultures, and different representations of history have always played an important role in the political struggle. As Massimo Salvadori has noted,

the Italian historiography from the Risorgimento until today has, strongly marked by political and ideological conditions, become an essential part of the nation's political culture up to the point, that writing its history signifies writing [...] also that of the nation's political culture of which it is an intrinsic part.⁸

Furthermore, I will for practical reasons limit myself to discussing how the Holocaust has been presented in relation to national identity and political ideology. These restrictions will no doubt have unfortunate consequences as important perspectives will be left out. Especially the debate about the role of the Catholic Church would have deserved more attention, as it has strong links both to the political debate in general and to representations of national identity. However, also the regional dimension would, ideally, have deserved more attention. Consequently, what follows is merely a probe into a vast and ambiguous space.

The Cold War Years

In Italy, as elsewhere, there was initially minimal interest in the Holocaust. Article 31 of the armistice signed on Malta on November 29, 1943, obliged the Italian government to remove its racial legislation; a process which was on the whole completed by 1947 when full civic and political rights had been restored. Many Jewish Italians, however, still found it hard to return to their pre-1938 positions due to restrictions and legal loopholes.⁹ An important part of the official memory construction in the first post-war years was the selection of a number of key dates and events, such as July 25 (the end of the fascist regime), September 8 (the start of the Resistance), and April 25 (the day of Liberation), that could serve as sites of memory for the new

body politic, but there was no place in this republican “mythscape” for references to the Holocaust or to the racial persecution of Jewish Italians after 1938.¹⁰ The Italian government instead refused for a long time to include Jews in the category of “politically persecuted,” reserving this term for “antifascist” victims.¹¹ A similar lack of interest could be found in the public sphere. Primo Levi, for example, found it very difficult to find a publisher for his later so famous account of the Holocaust, *Se questo è un uomo*. This was not necessarily due to a lack of sympathy from the publishers. One of the editors who turned him down was, in fact, the Jewish writer Natalia Ginzburg, whose husband had been killed by the Nazis. When he finally managed to publish the book through a small publishing house in 1947, it received little attention.¹²

The detached attitude to the Holocaust was of course typical for the period and could basically be found all over Europe. In the Italian case, however, it was entangled in and enhanced by a broader reinterpretation of the fascism experience. The events of 1943–1945 presented the Italians with a “critical” historical experience; one that was hard to fit into the established patterns of historical meaning.¹³ The traumatic experience of national division and military defeat could not be easily reconciled with former representations of Italians as conquerors and colonisers. Furthermore, in the new situation it was opportune to distance oneself from all links to the fascist regime. Almost overnight, people started viewing their own pasts under fascism as something distant and unrecognisable. Already in December 1943, Benedetto Croce noted in his diary that “almost no one speaks of Mussolini any more, not even to curse him.”¹⁴ Croce viewed fascism as caused by an “intellectual and moral disease” which had intoxicated the Italians after the First World War. The dictatorship had therefore been nothing but a “parenthesis,” with little or no connection to Italian history and traditions. Alberto Moravia stated in a similar vein that Mussolini had frozen the Italians for twenty years under a “vacuum-packed glass bell.” As Ruth Ben-Ghiat has pointed out, the proliferation of such images facilitated the defamiliarisation of the fascist past and helped Italians to avoid disturbing issues of accountability and responsibility for the regime.¹⁵

In addition to the general need to give sense to a drastic shift in

the realities of every-day-life, there was the imminent political need, shared by all parts of the new political establishment, to secure a favourable peace treaty with the Allies. In the first post-war years, while the peace treaty was being negotiated and the foundations of the republican state created, official circles supported by the press continued to build upon and strengthen what could be called the anti-fascist paradigm of interpretation which tended to dominate Italian historiography and political debate for decades to come. The paradigm united basically all political parties except for the neo-fascist MSI¹⁶:

[T]he Italian people had been subjected to the fascist dictatorship, and had been dragged into an unpopular war, alongside the detested ally Germany; the Italian soldiers had fought bravely, despite poor conditions and a lack of preparation, unlike their German counterparts they had shown humanity to the inhabitants of the occupied countries; they had been betrayed on the battlefield by their German comrades; as soon as Mussolini's dictatorship loosened its grip, the Italian people had participated in the struggle for national liberation, not only the armed forces and the partisans, but also the civilians who had supported the Resistance, paying a high price in terms of human life, as borne out by the numerous massacres perpetrated by the fascists and Germans, the Italians, alongside the Allied troops, had by their own efforts liberated the cities of central and northern Italy, defeating the Germans and their fascist accomplices; from this point of view, Italy should consider itself morally victorious and consequently it deserved a "just peace."¹⁷

The focus on the opposition to fascism served not only to provide a symbolic foundation for the new democracy. It also helped to obscure uncomfortable questions about the past. The government and official circles worked hard to present the right image by avoiding trials against Italian war criminals;¹⁸ by avoiding a discussion about atrocities committed by Italian authorities in the African colonies,¹⁹ and by generally promoting the image of *il bravo italiano* ('the good Italian'). Even if post-war Italian governments were prepared to admit that some Italians had committed war crimes in contravention of the rules and customs of war, they typically maintained the posi-

tion that, unlike Germany, Italy had committed no crimes against humanity.²⁰

Inside the antifascist paradigm there were, however, considerable differences, especially in the 1950s when the Cold War created strong political tensions.²¹ The pattern of Italian politics in these years has been described as polarised pluralism and was characterised by sharp divisions between Left and Right.²² After 1948 the historical heritage of *la Resistenza*, the Resistance, was appropriated by the Left, and especially by the Communist Party (PCI). Whereas in the immediate post-war years the Resistance had provided a common denominator of unity between the major parties, it now became strongly associated with the Left. On the one hand, the Left repeatedly continued using the common antifascist narrative of a unified patriotic war of liberation while, on the other hand, making use of a highly ideological Marxist, class-based interpretation of fascism and the Resistance. The motive was not only to mobilise voters but also to attack the government parties, especially the Christian Democrats, who were accused of having betrayed the legacy of the Resistance and maintaining fascist social structures.²³

The Christian Democrats (DC) and the other parties in the coalition governments also tried to embrace the legacy of antifascism. They often charged against the Left's attempts to monopolise the Resistance. In 1949, Alcide De Gaspari typically stated that his party (DC) represented "the entire spirit of the Liberation," which he identified with internal freedom, peaceful relations with other countries and protection against those who broke the peace. The Left had no right to speak in the name of the Italian partisans as many of these had not belonged to the Left, and especially not the best partisans, "those who fought for the Fatherland (*Patria*) and only for the Fatherland, without reserving anything for the party."²⁴ Instead, the Christian Democratic interpretation of antifascism and the Resistance was cast in a model of anti-totalitarianism which fitted well into the party ideology of staunch anti-Communism.²⁵

It was, however, the Left that won the symbolic struggle. Communists had made up an important segment of the partisan movement and their anti-fascist credibility was for historical reasons strong. It was much harder to demonstrate any straightforward connections

between the armed resistance and the Christian Democratic Party. The DC's links to industrial and financial circles and to the Catholic Church were also problematic in that they had to a great extent collaborated with the fascist regime. In the 1950s the DC (and consequently official circles) was not particularly interested in addressing the recent past.

The celebration of the Resistance, for example, enjoyed only a partial and disengaged patronage from the state. Instead, older representations of official Italy persisted.²⁶ Until the 1960s contemporary history was also basically absent in the school curricula. When the Italian state television started broadcasting in 1954, it typically tended to avoid references to contemporary Italian history. When historical themes were transmitted, the emphasis was normally on patriotism and unity.²⁷ Also in other fields of popular mass entertainment, the fascist period and the Second World War were seldom present. In the developing consumer society of the 1950s, a hedonistic-optimistic outlook on life prevailed, and Hollywood glamour had a strong attraction for Italian audiences.²⁸ The DC also used its government powers of censorship and control over the state sector as well as patronage to encourage a depoliticisation of the cinema. As Giulio Andreotti, then undersecretary of the *Presidenza Consiglio dei Ministri* and responsible for the cinema, reputedly defined the objective: "less rags, more legs."²⁹ The great majority of the Italian post-war film productions avoided both history and overt political comment, and of those films that did address the fascist period most did not question established official truths. The Resistance was presented as a national, unitary, and popular movement; the enemy was normally German, and the fascists were cast outside the nation.³⁰

Given the importance of the antifascist paradigm there was obviously a need to interpret the persecution of the Jewish Italians in a way that could easily fit into the general narrative of Italians as victims rather than oppressors. Already from the start, Italian post-war historical culture was characterised by a strong *externalisation* of the Holocaust *per se*. The blame for the mass killings of European Jewry was put on the Germans, even though fascists and officials of the Republic of Salò had indeed been present and active in many Holocaust operations on Italian territory.³¹ In addition to blaming the

“wicked Germans,” writers with a Leftist inclination tended to apply a Marxist analysis to fascism. They often reduced the persecution of Jews to just a part of fascism’s general oppression of the “people,” something which ultimately served the interests of capitalism.³² In the early 1960s, the Roman section of the PCI typically commemorated the German raid against the ghetto of Rome on October 16, 1943 without any references to the victims’ Jewish origin. They were simply “citizens of Rome.”³³

Furthermore, the racial legislation of 1938 was denationalised.³⁴ The dominant interpretation introduced a strong separation between the policies of the fascist state and the sentiments of the Italian people. Antisemitism was claimed to be a phenomenon completely contrary to Italian culture and history, and the antisemitic propaganda of the fascist regime had therefore not had any real effect upon the common people. In 1948 the *Enciclopedia Cattolica* typically stated that “modern antisemitism has never existed in Italy” and described the Italian race laws as a fascist “imitation” of those in Germany. In a similar vein, the *Enciclopedia Italiana* (1949) only briefly mentioned the Italian racial policies, whereas the German practices were discussed in more detail. The entries for “racism” and “Jews” emphasised the imitative character of Italian policies, and the readers’ attention was directed to the help and protection offered to Italian Jews by “the population and the Church.”³⁵ The prominent historian Federico Chabod – posthumously described as “the supreme regulator of the Italian academic life in all fields of modern history”³⁶ – stated in 1950 in a lecture at the Sorbonne:

In Italy, a country which never has experienced racial persecution, the racial question arose in September-October 1938. [...] Now everything changed: racial legislation was passed, persecution of the Jews was organised. The public opinion revolted; the opposition manifested itself not only in terms of a great support from the large majority [...] to the persecuted, but this time especially in the voice of the Catholic Church. At this point the Holy See and the bishops took position; they could not admit such persecution. The racial laws [...] thus provoked [...] the great rupture between the Church and the State, between public opinion and the fascist regime.³⁷

This interpretation proved to be long-lived and was supported from both sides of the Left-Right division.

The apparent ease with which the Holocaust and the racial legislation were cast outside the Italian nation no doubt reflected the needs which governed the antifascist paradigm, but the interpretative work was also aided and conditioned by past events. To begin with, all evidence suggested that the obsession with annihilating the Jews had primarily characterised German Nazism, not Italian fascism, and this circumstance combined with the German *de facto* occupation of Northern Italy in the last years of the war made it easy to externalise the Holocaust.

Furthermore, Italian state officials and military personnel had, for whatever reason, helped to protect Jews in occupied territories and in North Africa. Information about this was available already by the end of the war and was systematically disseminated by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which believed that by presenting Italy as the saviour of the Jews it would be possible to create not only a favourable image of Italy in general, but also to establish good relations with Jewish circles in the victorious powers – something which in turn could influence the Allies' treatment of Italy. As a result an informative campaign was launched that tried to demonstrate how the Italian administration had deliberately sabotaged the German persecution of the Jews. As early as May 22, 1946 the *New York Times*, for example, published an article on the subject under the headline "Fascist Rescues of Jews Revealed," based on Italian information. The campaign also included the publication of the volume *Relazione sull'opera svolta dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri per la tutela delle comunità ebraiche (1938–1943)* which was part of the documentation presented to the Allies by the Italian government before the peace treaty negotiations.³⁸

Even more important for the denationalisation of fascism's antisemitic practices was probably the courageous behaviour of many Italians, lay and clergy, who risked their lives in the last years of the war to aid their Jewish compatriots, thus contributing to a survival rate of 83 per cent, one of the highest in Europe.³⁹ Testimonials about this were frequently given by Jewish Italians, who described how they had been helped, supported, and rescued by their countrymen.⁴⁰ On April 25,

1955, the *Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane* even published a “Manifest to the Italians” which was plastered on the walls of buildings in all major Italian cities:

At the tenth anniversary of the Liberation the Jews of Italy who, as Italians and as Jews, were twice oppressed by the Nazi-Fascist tyranny, [...] gratefully praise the courageous work, at times up to sacrifice, by all those Italians – partisans, soldiers, clergy and lay, modest people of all sorts and of all creeds – who, redeeming the fault of a minority – in an Italian-like way [*italianamente*] tried their utmost to save the defenceless persecuted inside and outside Italy’s borders [...].⁴¹

This legacy, which fitted well into the general antifascist paradigm, clearly facilitated the distinction between the evil fascist state and the good Italian people.

However, while the brave actions of some Italians were elevated to a national standard, the legacy left by others was obscured. As late as March 1944 the Fascist Republican Party had numbered as many as 487,000 members. The Salò Republic had furthermore mustered an army of about 250,000 men, its different police forces an additional 140,000–150,000, and some 20,000 Italians had joined the German-controlled Italian SS. Another 70,000 served in different paramilitary units. Even Salò’s Female Auxiliary Service troops, which were created in the spring of 1944, had attracted close to 6,000 volunteers by April 1945.⁴² Obscured was also the legacy left by those who had profited from the racial legislation, many of them leading intellectuals. Even among those who had not taken advantage of the situation, extremely few had openly voiced any protests against the introduction of this legislation, and opposition from the Catholic Church had been half-hearted at best. In fact, the perhaps ideologically most important paper of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano*, had instead pointed out that Jews had for centuries been restricted in their liberty and reassured its readers that the Italian Jews would not be worse treated by the fascist state than they had been by the popes in the past.⁴³ History had left competing legacies, but only one that suited the needs of post-war Italian society.

In the early 1960s the intellectual and political climate gradually changed, the Christian Democrats’ most extreme expressions of

anti-communism disappeared, and there was a slow but gradual shift in the public debate, which in time led to the “opening to the left.” Of importance for this development were not only changes in the international climate and in the American policy towards Italy after John F. Kennedy’s assumption of the presidency, but also developments inside Catholicism.⁴⁴ The brief papacy of John XXIII initiated a re-evaluation of the role of the Church in Italian society and politics. Pius XII’s political, crusading and anti-communist conception of the Church’s function gave way to one that was more based on its spiritual role. The famous encyclical *Pacem in terris* pleaded not only for international conciliation but also for the need to improve the economic and social development of the working classes. This opened the door for a dialogue between Catholics and Marxists.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Tambroni affair in 1960, when riots broke out in Genoa after the MSI had decided to hold its congress in the city, had demonstrated the popular support for antifascism (at least in Northern and Central Italy), and established that the Christian Democrats could not hope to rule with the support of the MSI. The only road left was the one to the left. On the political level this meant that the strong polarisation declined and politics became increasingly consensus-driven, at least at the elite level. The era of what often has been described as consociational democracy gradually took its beginning with the first centre-left government in 1963.⁴⁶

In terms of Italian historical culture these developments tended to make the antifascist paradigm even stronger. Already in 1960 a new teaching programme extended school education in history to also cover the period until the end of the Second World War; before it had ended with the First World War. The following year television began for the first time to address the fascist period in satirical shows and historical documentaries. The cinema followed suit. In September 1962 *Il Mondo* wrote that there appeared to be “a boom of antifascist films.”⁴⁷ The changed atmosphere could also be seen in the upsurge in commemorations of the Resistance. While few monuments had been erected in the 1950s, there was now a phase of monument building that would last until the late 1970s. It was also only in the 1960s that Italian academic historians began studying fascism and the Second World War in Italy. Government archives gradually began opening

their doors for researchers and in 1961 the first chairs in contemporary history were established at Italian universities. By the end of the decade contemporary history – defined as the history of the origins and nature of the fascist regime – had become the most prestigious but also the most contended field of historical research.⁴⁸ Over the course of the 1960s and especially in the 1970s the Resistance was finally elevated to an all-encompassing national myth. Simultaneously, however, celebrations took on a rigid and politically dominated form.⁴⁹

As in many other countries in Western Europe, it was also only around 1960 that the first signs of greater public interest in the Holocaust could be discerned. Of great importance was no doubt the public impact of the Eichmann trial, but it was probably also a reflection of the increased attention given to the fascist period. Already when the second edition of Levi's *Se questo è un uomo* was published in 1958, this time by the prestigious publishing house Einaudi, which had turned him down a decade earlier, it now exhausted its rather modest first print run of 2,000 copies in a few weeks.⁵⁰ So far Italian film-makers had almost completely avoided references to the Holocaust, but in 1959 Gillo Pontecorvo addressed the theme in *Kapo*. Also Roberto Rossellini's *Il Generale della Rovere* (1959) contained a sequence of Jews praying before execution, and in 1961 Carlo Lizziani released a film about the deportation of Rome's Jewish population in October 1943, *Loro di Roma*. Furthermore, in 1962 the Jewish-Italian author Giorgio Bassani had great success with a novel set in the Jewish community in Ferrara, *Il giardino dei Finzi-Contini*, in which he explored the onset of the antisemitic legislation. The following year Primo Levi published a second novel, *La tregua*, based on his experiences of the Holocaust.

In 1961 the first scientific study of the Jewish Italians under fascism, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo*, was published. It was written by the young historian Renzo De Felice, who had been commissioned by the *Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane* and given free access to the archives of the *Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea* and to the state archives.⁵¹ De Felice's massive and well-documented *œuvre*, however, on the whole only tended to confirm the established views and give them a scientific footing. Until 1938 there had been little official antisemitism in the united Italy, and

the Jews were an accepted and well-integrated part of the population. The antisemitic campaign was instead explained by other factors: the conquest of Abyssinia and the consequent racial codes to forbid “miscegenation” in the colonies; the economic sanctions of the League of Nations, and Mussolini’s determination to strengthen the alliance with Nazi Germany. The Holocaust had furthermore been forced upon Mussolini and the other leaders of the Salò Republic by the Germans. De Felice did not deny that the fascists bore a moral responsibility for what had happened but maintained that the mass killing of European Jewry had not been intended.⁵² After this first wave of public interest, little happened for more than two decades. De Felice’s study was published again in 1972 and 1988 but little new research was done in the field. From time to time references to the Holocaust were made in the public debate, but it was hardly perceived as a politically significant and meaningful event.⁵³

One should note that the condemnation of the Holocaust and the racial laws was also supported by the neo-fascist MSI, which otherwise was firmly placed outside the antifascist paradigm. In fact, the publicity around the Eichmann trial provided an opportunity for the MSI, which found itself in a difficult position in the early 1960s – after the electoral backdrop in 1958 and the Tambroni affair, which had compromised all links to the Christian Democrats – to “historicise” its roots in the fascist party and try to move on. On April 12, 1961 *Il Secolo d'Italia* strongly condemned all forms of racial discrimination “in the past, at present and in the future.” As the trial in Tel Aviv tended to confirm that the Italian civilian and military administration had rather obstructed than aided the German extermination programme, the MSI was given an opportunity to play down fascism’s responsibility. Without being in the position to deny the participation of Italian fascists in antisemitic persecution, the party tried to demonstrate the ambiguities in the fascist practices.⁵⁴ In a parallel to how the parties inside the antifascist paradigm constructed an opposition between the “evil fascists” and “the good Italians,” the MSI tried to separate the “good fascists” from the “evil Nazis.”

A clear repudiation of fascism’s racial policies was given in 1967 when Giorgio Almirante, founder of the MSI and former editor-in-chief of Mussolini’s antisemitic mouthpiece, *Difesa della Razza*,

condemned the racial laws in a television show admitting that he had been wrong in the late 1930s. In his autobiography, published in 1974, he also claimed that his experiences during the last months of the Salò Republic had “vaccinated” him against racism. In a 1987 interview he returned to this: “The Good Lord has given me a lesson and this has provided me the opportunity to overcome and repudiate my previous experience for humane reasons.”⁵⁵

It should be added that the Italian auto-representation was also supported abroad. Suffice it here to mention Hannah Arendt’s extremely influential *Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil*, which also presented a favourable image of the Italian behaviour, even indicating that the fascist authorities had consciously tried to sabotage the German activities.

Before the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the racial laws in 1988, increased attention was again directed to fascism’s racial policies. The Italian parliament passed new laws which finally removed the last residues of the fascist racial legislation. In connection to this, a volume was published which presented the texts of all post-war laws regarding the Jews. In its preface, the history professor and ex-premier Giovanni Spadolini typically returned to the established interpretation by stressing that racism never had entered the collective consciousness of the Italians. He also pointed out that the new legislation signified that the Italian state now had paid its debt to the Jews in full.⁵⁶ With hindsight the anniversary, however, turned out to be something of a watershed.

The “Holocaust Boom” of the 1990s

After 1989 the Holocaust has increasingly become an important point of reference in Italian political and societal debate, and Holocaust studies have established themselves as a scientific field. Of great importance for this development has no doubt been the research done at the *Centro di documentazione ebraica contemporanea*. Translations of international research have probably also provided stimuli. Many of the new studies have challenged established truths and presented a much more critical evaluation of the Italian contribution to the Holocaust. For example, Michele Sarfatti has questioned De Felice’s claim that the fascists bore no direct responsibility for the Holocaust in Italy. In

La Shoah in Italia he has instead argued that the fascist authorities of the Salò Republic willingly collaborated with the Nazi regime and that Mussolini indeed harboured antisemitic sentiments.⁵⁷

The television and the cinema are probably of far greater importance than the works of scholars for the formation and expressions of a historical culture in contemporary society. Many have, for example, emphasised the importance of the American mini-series *Holocaust* for the broadening of Holocaust awareness in the last decades of the 20th Century.⁵⁸ *Holocaust* was also broadcasted in Italy, but it has been claimed that it was Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* that really made an impact upon younger Italians.⁵⁹ However, in the last decade several Italian filmmakers have turned to the topic. Most renowned is, no doubt, Roberto Benigni's *La vita è bella* (*Life is Beautiful*) which provoked some controversy, especially abroad, but was a huge blockbuster at home. When it was broadcasted by RAI 1 on October 22, 2001, it also set a new spectator record with more than 15 million viewers.⁶⁰

The Italian state has also made clear efforts to improve Holocaust awareness. Even if Holocaust education is not required by law, Italian schools and textbooks devote much more attention to it than was earlier the case.⁶¹ On July 20, 2000 the Italian parliament also issued a law which stated that January 27 would become a national day of memory of "the Shoah, the racial laws, the persecution of the Italian Jewish citizens, the Italians who were deported, the imprisonment, the death, as well as [the memory] of those [...] who opposed the extermination project and, while risking their own lives, saved the lives of others and protected the persecuted." The law stipulates that during the Day of Memory different public ceremonies and initiatives shall be arranged, especially in the schools, in order to "in Italy for the future conserve the memory of a tragic and dark period in the history of our country and of Europe, so that similar events can never take place again."⁶² The Day of Memory has been met by a strong and wide response also at a local level. The commemorations normally include public rallies, conferences, exhibitions, film screenings, as well as TV and radio programmes. The list of official initiatives could be made much longer.

The fascist racial persecution and mass murder of European Jewry,

which in earlier decades had at most been marginal events in the representation of the nation's history, have in the new millennium clearly been given much greater importance. A good example was given on April 25–26, 2005 when RAI 1 transmitted a mini-series by Liliana Cavani, *De Gaspari, l'uomo della speranza*, about the founding-father of the Italian Republic, Alcide De Gaspari. In a crucial scene De Gaspari strongly condemns the introduction of racial legislation and in an act of solidarity buys a big piece of cloth from a local Jewish shopkeeper who is suffering from the antisemitic campaign. As was underlined by *Corriere della Sera*, the problem was, however, that there is little evidence to support this representation. Instead, there were writings of De Gaspari in the *Illustrazione vaticana* in 1938 which indicated the contrary, especially a statement that “the Italian racism realises in concrete measures the defence and enhancement of the nation.”⁶³ Public attention to this issue was further increased by the publication of *Alcide De Gaspari: un percorso europeo* (Il Mulino, 2005), in which a couple of articles suggested that the Italian statesman, who grew up in the Habsburg Empire and was close to Karl Lueger's Christian Democrats, had indeed harboured antisemitic sentiments.⁶⁴

Clearly this was a sensitive topic. One of the editors of the volume, the historian Paolo Pombeni, refused to describe De Gaspari as an antisemite because “certain convictions were common in the environment in which De Gaspari was born and raised.”⁶⁵ Also other historians, such as Giovanni Sabbatucci, Alfredo Canavero, Giorgio Vecchio and Agostino Giovagnoli, were cautious, pointing out the need to understand the historical context and to avoid rash conclusions.⁶⁶ Even Michele Sarfatti was reticent. On the one hand it was clear that many in the ecclesial establishment had harboured antisemitic sentiments and wanted to marginalise the Jews in society. On the other hand it was difficult to judge to what extent De Gaspari, who in 1938 had been merely a junior official in the Vatican, had supported this position. In any case, the writings of De Gaspari in 1938 contained antisemitic tendencies.⁶⁷

In the end, De Gaspari's daughter wrote a lengthy article in the *Corriere* with documentation defending him against the accusations of antisemitism, and the debate thereafter quickly faded out.⁶⁸ This minor episode illustrates exactly how sensitive the question about

the racial legislation of 1938 has become in the last decades. In fact, the very need to include a scene about De Gaspari's reaction to the events of 1938 – true or not – is a clear demonstration of this. After all, it would be quite conceivable to make a film about the life of De Gaspari, whose importance for Italy's post-war development no one questions, without any references to the racial laws which had no direct consequences for him or his family.

The Political Feud

The increased attention given to the Holocaust clearly reflects the general international trend already discussed in the beginning of the chapter, and there is little which in this respect distinguishes Italy from other countries in Western Europe. More particular, however, has been the political response to the same phenomenon.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the total collapse of the Italian political system in the 1990s had profound effects on Italian historical culture. The first attacks on the antifascist paradigm were delivered already in the 1970s and 1980s by Renzo De Felice, who in a number of studies and interviews criticised what he called the “antifascist vulgate,”⁶⁹ but it was only in the 1990s that it really crumbled. Initially the debate seems to have been triggered off by the rise of the *Lega Nord*, with its threats of secession. Especially as it coincided in time with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, many Italian intellectuals sided with the nation-state.⁷⁰ Some turned to the fragmented historical consciousness and the role of an ideological use of history to explain the alleged fragility of the Italian body politic.⁷¹ To them the rub was to be found in the way the Republic had been given historical legitimacy, and they especially criticised the elevation of the armed resistance as a constituent moment.⁷² These “revisionists,” as they soon became known, above all questioned the alleged popular support behind the armed resistance. The fighting partisans had never comprised more than a tiny minority of the population. Furthermore, far from all partisans had fought for the introduction of parliamentary democracy, but had instead aimed at social revolution. As these views were controversial and had explicit ideological and political implications, major newspapers and television talk-shows quickly took an interest and brought them before a wider public.

Even if it would be a simplification to claim that the revisionists' main purpose was to assist the political Right, it is clear that their views were explosive material in the politically turbulent situation of the 1990s. It was caused by multiple factors. The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe had not only caused the PCI to split but had also changed the conditions for the DC, which earlier could count on voters who saw the party as the best protection against Communism. Furthermore, the economy was in crisis and the freedom of political action severely constrained by the pressures of European integration. As politicians could no longer turn a blind eye towards tax evasion and consequently had to increase the effective taxation, an important segment of the middle classes, namely Italy's many minor entrepreneurs, especially numerous in the North-East, was enraged and sought other political outlets. Finally, the *Tangentopoli* scandal in 1992 revealed widespread political corruption. In its wake both Bettino Craxi's Socialist party and – after 45 years in power – the DC collapsed.⁷³

Instead, not only the new parties *Lega Nord* and Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* but also the MSI, which changed into the *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), made great electoral progress and could form a government in 1994, despite the strong ideological differences between the *Lega* and the AN.⁷⁴ After the elections, the AN launched a campaign to change the commemoration on April 25 from an occasion to celebrate and remember the antifascist partisans into a holiday honouring also the soldiers who fought for the Salò Republic. Gianfranco Fini furthermore caused international unease by describing Mussolini as "the greatest statesman of the century."⁷⁵ Also Berlusconi, whose rhetoric emphasised the importance of overcoming old divisions and making a new start, blamed the Left for having appropriated a heritage of liberty which belonged to Italians "of all generations and all parties." According to him, the divisions between fascists and antifascists were merely "a piece of history" that was best forgotten.⁷⁶

Berlusconi's coalition government had to resign as early as December 1994, but returned to power after the 2001 elections, and the struggle between the "revisionists" and the Right, on the one hand, and those who embrace the values embodied in earlier interpreta-

tions, on the other, has continued. Even if many can agree that the old, antifascist interpretation was seriously flawed, far from all have been willing to accept the revisionist alternative. Not only intellectuals with left-leaning convictions but also the Italian president, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, have strongly defended the values they believe to be embodied in the antifascist paradigm.⁷⁷

Even if the debate to a large extent has focused on the Right's struggle to obtain historical recognition also for those who fought for the Salò Republic, many issues have been brought up. Exponents of the Right have often directed attention to the question of the atrocities committed by Tito's partisans against Italian civilians in Istria at the end of the war.⁷⁸ Another contentious topic has been the spontaneous executions and public lynching of fascists and alleged fascists by communist partisans in the period following the Liberation. Especially Giampaolo Pansa's study, *Il sangue dei vinti*, received great attention when it was published in October 2003. It sold in hundreds of thousands and was much debated in the press and television.⁷⁹ The Left has responded by paying increased attention to the war crimes committed by German troops against Italian civilians during the final years of the war. Even if there are many factors behind the upsurge of interest in these massacres, such as a number of trials against Nazi war criminals and the discovery of new documentation,⁸⁰ it seems evident that the focus on Nazi atrocities has been used by the Left to counterbalance the calls for "reconciliation" in the memory of the partisan war, and to strengthen the antifascist narrative.⁸¹

After several decades of relative unity around the antifascist paradigm Italian historical culture has thus in the last decade become fragmented and highly polarised in relation to representations of the Second World War. Opinions which in earlier decades were only publicly expressed by a small minority connected to the MSI and the extreme Right are nowadays given more space in the media. Much of the information given in Pansa's book about partisan violence against civilians had, for example, been published already in the 1970s but was then given little attention.⁸² In this turbulent situation representations of the Holocaust have also been effected by the political feud, even if there is a common agreement about its universal significance and evil nature.

The parties on the Left have had no difficulties in their treatment of the Holocaust. Politicians there are generally quite willing to recognise that Italian fascism bore a shared responsibility for the Holocaust. To them the Holocaust represents the inherent dangers of fascism, and a reminder of the moral duty to prevent anything similar from happening again.⁸³ As Piero Fassino of the DS put it before the Day of Memory in 2006:

The memory is not a static fact; it is a process, an action, a moral duty. To have fixed the day of the liberation of Auschwitz [...] in the civic calendar of our country [...] does therefore not signify looking to the past. In order to transform the public memory into collective conscience it is necessary to turn our eyes to those times as a tool to read our present conditions. [It is necessary] to make the memory an act that takes place among the living in order to create common values which serve us today. For this reason the Italian Left has the duty [...] to feed the memory and to be a leading actor in this sharing of values. Because the unity of a country, the solidarity of a nation, the respect for everyone's identity and rights are formed around shared values.⁸⁴

The parties in Berlusconi's governing coalition have displayed a more ambivalent attitude. If there is one common denominator it would be their staunch anti-Communism, and they have constantly stressed the need of also paying attention to the victims of Communism and to the murder of thousands of Italians civilians by Yugoslav partisans at the end of the Second World War.⁸⁵

In the rhetoric of Berlusconi the Holocaust has often been of secondary importance to the spectre of the GULAG.⁸⁶ He has also continued upon a well-travelled path by putting the main blame on Germany and Nazism. On the Day of Memory in 2003 he even managed the feat of giving a speech without mentioning the words *Shoah*, *olocausto*, or Auschwitz. Instead he condemned "the horrors and [...] the pains inflicted upon humans by two totalitarianisms: Nazism and Communism."⁸⁷ In December 2005 he again caused commotion by stating: "The fascism in Italy was never a criminal doctrine. There were the racial laws, horrible, but it was because one wanted to win the war together with Hitler. The fascism in Italy has this stain, but nothing else comparable to Nazism and Communism."⁸⁸

Even if the populist *Lega Nord* has paid lip-service to the struggle against racism and tuned down the racist outbursts of the first years, its statements about immigration tend to essentialise cultural differences and give them quasi-genetic characteristics.⁸⁹ Even if the fascist past is of minor importance to the party, this rhetoric is in itself enough to cast doubts upon the party's commitment to the commemoration of the Holocaust. In January 2005, one of the party's deputies to the European Parliament also refused to sign the resolution passed in connection with the 60-year anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. He interrupted the ceremony by shouting: "Soviet, Soviet."⁹⁰

In fact, the right-wing party which has been most eager to come to terms with the past is the AN. It is also striking that whereas most Italian politicians have been reluctant to assume direct responsibility for the Italian contribution to the Holocaust and blame fascism, Gianfranco Fini has instead openly admitted to some sort of responsibility.⁹¹ In 2002 Fini declared that he would no longer describe Mussolini as "the greatest statesman of the 20th century," as he had done in 1994. On the contrary, Mussolini had "pushed Italian democracy aside." The same year Fini stated in an interview with the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz*:

I have already made many similar statements in Italy: I have said that fascism suppressed human rights and I have added that the racial laws incited to the worst atrocity perpetrated in human history. [...] In actual fact as an Italian I should accept the responsibility. I should do that in the name of the Italians who bore the responsibility for what happened after 1938, after the passing of the racial laws. They bore a historical responsibility, a responsibility which is inscribed in history, and I am therefore obliged to make statements, to ask for forgiveness. I am talking about a national responsibility, not a personal one.⁹²

The interview was followed up by an official visit by Fini to Israel in November 2003, where he defined fascism as "absolute evil."⁹³ Having returned to Italy, he explained his statement, which had provoked negative reactions in some circles within the party: "If the Holocaust is the absolute evil this also applies for those parts of fascism which have contributed to the Holocaust. We know that fascism was also

other things, but we should have the courage to tell the truth and draw our conclusions from that.”⁹⁴ Fini’s statements were greeted with satisfaction by spokesmen of the Jewish Italian community, even if they expressed doubts about whether all members of the AN stood behind Fini in this question.⁹⁵

However, the political opposition reacted strongly to Fini’s conversion and his attempt to speak on behalf of all Italians. Representatives of the Left (Margherita), for example, spoke of “political opportunism,” and the DS objected to Fini’s statement of assuming responsibility in the name of all Italians, pointing out that “there were Italians who opposed fascism and for this paid the highest prices.”⁹⁶ A similar criticism was found in the columns of the leftist press. In *La Repubblica*, Massimo Salvadorini, for example, challenged Fini for having talked about the Italians’ Holocaust responsibility and for having asked for forgiveness in their name.

It was not the Italians *tout cours* who bore the responsibility for the racial laws and the persecution which united Mussolini’s men with Hitler’s, as Fini clumsily has claimed, but the fascists. The persecuted Jews were Italians, the antifascists who fought against the racial laws were Italians, and Italians were also those who, without having the courage to object, did not agree with these laws and the persecutions. Fini should have spoken about the responsibility and the guilt of fascism in no uncertain terms.⁹⁷

Even if it is hard to argue against this statement, it is still interesting to notice the reluctance to nationalise any responsibility for the Holocaust. Instead the question of guilt is connected to political ideology. To make one comparison, it seems highly unlikely that a German Social Democrat would in a similar vein deny German national responsibility. In the light of this tendency to let ideological divisions influence historical representation, D’Alema’s remark at the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust does not seem surprising.

Italians: *brava gente*?

The image of Italians as *brava gente* seems to be an intrinsic and important part of post-war Italian national discourses.⁹⁸ It is therefore hardly surprising that, despite the works of scholars such as Michele

Sarfatti, strong tendencies to denationalise the Holocaust clearly remain. The day chosen to commemorate the Holocaust is, for example, 27 January, i. e. the day when Auschwitz was liberated, and not as the Left initially suggested 16 October, the day of the raid against the Rome ghetto. This clearly puts the focus on Germany and Nazism rather than Italy and its fascist past.⁹⁹ Even if Italian school textbooks nowadays normally provide comparatively much space to the Holocaust, the focus tends to rest on Nazi-Germany, whereas fascism's racial practices are often given only a brief treatment. One history textbook published in 2004, for example, states about fascism's racial legislation:

The most odious consequence of the alliance between Mussolini and Hitler was the introduction in Italy of racial laws against the Jews in 1938. [...] The laws imitated those introduced in 1935 in Germany by Hitler. But in Italy there was no antisemite tradition, that is [no tradition] of hatred and persecution of the Jews, and these laws provoked perplexity in the public opinion and they were strongly condemned by the Catholic Church. The laws against the Jews weakened the Italians' support of fascism and paved the way for what was going to happen to the regime during the Second World War.¹⁰⁰

There is indeed little to separate this text from Chabod's statement from 1955 quoted above.

There has also been a strong tendency to continue focusing on the good Italians who helped the Jewish refugees. Especially the fascist Giorgio Perlasca, who saved the lives of about 5,000 Jews in Budapest in 1944, and Giovanni Palatucci, deputy chief of police in Fiume (Rijeka), who provided Jewish refugees with false documents until he was arrested and brought to Dachau where he died, have been brought into the limelight. Both have been named "Righteous among the nations," and exhibitions, books, broadcasts, plaques and street names have been dedicated to their memory. When, on January 27 and 28, 2002, RAI 1 transmitted a dramatisation in two parts about Perlasca's activities, *Un eroe italiano* (An Italian hero), estimations indicated that the first episode had been watched by 11.4 million people, or 38.9 per cent of all viewers that evening. Also in many of the official statements and celebrations there have been noticeable

efforts to, on the one hand, officially acknowledge that the fascist regime shared a responsibility for the Holocaust, but, on the other hand, reconcile this fact with the memory of the Italian efforts to save Jews from the Germans.¹⁰¹

The Italian Right in particular clearly prefers talking about Italian rescue efforts instead of racial persecution, and the AN especially has devoted much attention to “good fascists” such as Palatucci and Perlasca.¹⁰² The interest in the Italian rescue of Jews is, however, also shared by those who have otherwise been critical to the general treatment of the Holocaust in Italian post-war publicity. In the beginning of 2006, Liliana Picciotto Fargion of the Cdec, for example, published the volume *Giusti d'Italia. I non ebrei che salvarono gli ebrei 1943–1945* (Mondadori) about 400 documented cases where Italians had saved Jewish refugees. In an interview she explained, however, that it was important not to exaggerate this aspect of the Holocaust: “[t]he contribution of the Righteous is very important but it is nothing more than a detail in the 20th century’s history of anti-Jewish persecution.” She also considered it important to understand the historical and social context. The rescue of Jews had been a “civic resistance which, alongside the political and armed resistance, has had its heroes.”¹⁰³

Ever since the spring of 1945 the Holocaust has presented a problem in Italian national discourses. Not only were the events of 1938–1945 traumatic and terrible to confront. They were also full of ambiguities. Fascism had suppressed all civic liberties and brutally oppressed all opposition; fascism had thrown Italy into a devastating war, and fascism had introduced a severe racial legislation directed against the Jewish-Italians. Yet many of these had been fascists. In fact, some Jewish Italians ran into difficulties after the war exactly because of their fascist past. Italians had willingly taken part in Holocaust operations on Italian soil, but Italian military, state officials and civilians had also protected and helped Jews at home and abroad. In fact, in no other country were foreign Jews given so much aid from the local population as in Italy. In Rome, Italian-born Pius XII and the Vatican had kept silent about the Holocaust, but high-ranking Italian clergymen such as Cardinal Pietro Boetto in Genoa, Cardinal Elia Della Costa in Florence, Placido Niccoloni, Bishop of Assisi, Cardinal Fossati in Turin, Cardinal Schuster in Milan, and Archbishop Antonio Torrini

in Lucca had provided all kinds of support and refuge to Jewish refugees, as had many parish priests.¹⁰⁴

Most Italian politicians, historians and publicists for decades chose to keep silent and avoid confronting this dark aspect of their national history. However, when addressed, these ambiguities had to be tamed and pressed into a coherent narrative. For many decades the solution was to denationalise the Holocaust and to put the blame on the Germans and the fascists, who according to the dominant narrative had only represented the values of a minority of the Italian people. In the 1990s the increased international interest in the Holocaust and simultaneous fragmentation of the anti-fascist paradigm again released the inherent ambiguities, and they have still not been tamed into a new national master-narrative.

On the Day of Memory 2006 two events took place in Rome which could provide an illustration of the present-day situation. The city's left-wing mayor, Walter Veltroni of the DS, presented the project of constructing a Holocaust museum in Rome, which will be inaugurated on 16 October 2008. The selected site is highly symbolic: Benito Mussolini's Rome residence, Villa Torlonia. As Veltroni stated: "The fascist regime had [...] a gigantic responsibility for the Shoah and the German occupation. It is just that this is symbolically recalled." Simultaneously at the Farnesina, Gianfranco Fini presented Picciotto Fargion's *Giusti d'Italia*, which had been produced in co-operation with the foreign ministry. He then emphasised the responsibility of the nation as a whole. Even if Fini believed that the evidence given in the volume indicated a "widespread and extensive phenomenon," he also warned that this must not be used as an alibi for the Italians:

The values of a few do not pardon the torturers' inhumanity. It also does not pardon the culpable passivity of many, who with their silence aided the wicked design of persecution. The celebration of the eternal values of their actions cannot and must not count as a collective auto-absolution.¹⁰⁵

Notes

1. Yehuda Bauer, "Speech at the Ceremonial Opening of the Forum, 26 January 2000," *The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. Proceedings*, Stockholm: Regeringskansliet 2000, pp. 35–36.
2. Massimo D'Alema, "Speech at the Ceremonial Opening of the Forum, 26 January 2000," *The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. Proceedings*, Stockholm: Regeringskansliet 2000, p. 46.
3. Jeffrey C. Alexander, "On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The 'Holocaust' from War Crime to Trauma Drama," *European Journal of Social Theory* 2002:1.
4. Daniel Levy & Natan Sznaider, "Memory Unbound. The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," *European Journal of Social Theory* 2002:1. Quotations on pp. 88, 93.
5. Historical consciousness denotes the mental process by which humans orientate themselves temporally in the light of perceptions of the past and expectations for the future whereas *historical culture* relates to the practical realisation of these mental procedures in social communication. Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 30–46.
6. Daniel Levy & Natan Sznaider 2002, p. 88.
7. Jörn Rüsen, "Interpreting the Holocaust. Some theoretical Issues," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquiries into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Bokförlag, 2004, pp. 41–44.
8. Massimo L. Salvadori, "Legittimazione politica e storiografia italiana," in Loreto Di Nucci & Ernesto Galli della Loggia (eds.), *Due nazioni. Legittimazione e delegittimazione nella storia dell'Italia contemporanea*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2003, p. 188.
9. Guri Schwarz, *Ritrovare se stessi. Gli ebrei nell'Italia postfascista*, Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza, 2004, pp. 8–18.
10. See, for example, Maurizio Ridolfi, "2 giugno: la festa della Repubblica," in Maurizio Ridolfi (ed.), *Almanacco della Repubblica. Storia d'Italia attraverso le tradizioni, le istituzioni e le simbologie repubblicane*, Milano: Bruno Mondadori 2003.
11. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, "The Secret Histories of Roberto Benigni's *Life is Beautiful*," *The Yale Journal of Criticism*, 2001:1 (a), p. 261.
12. Guri Schwarz 2004, pp. 114–116.
13. Jörn Rüsen 2004, p. 46.
14. Quoted in Ruth Ben-Ghiat, "Fascism, Writing, and Memory. The Realist Aesthetic in Italy, 1930–1950," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 67, 1995, p. 660.
15. Ibid., p. 660. See also Loreto Di Nucci, "GUF, il lungo viaggio nel consenso fascista," *Corriere della Sera*, June 15, 2003.
16. The *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) was formed in December 1946 as a political party. It survived for nearly fifty years within the same organizational framework with a permanent electoral constituency averaging 5 per cent of the vote nationally. It was especially strong in the south where it would occasionally reach regional scores of up to almost 16 per cent of the vote. As the party was perceived by most Italians as a direct successor to the Fascist party it was placed beyond the democratic consensus and would never achieve ministerial representation, but it remained a factor to be

taken into account in the political game, especially as it would normally vote with the Right.

17. Filippo Focardi, "Reshaping the Past. Collective Memory and the Second World war in Italy, 1945–1955," in Dominik Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge. Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–1958*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 47.
18. Filippo Focardi & Lutz Klinkhammer, "The Question of Fascist Italy's War Crimes: The Construction of a Self-Acquitting Myth (1943–1948)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 2004:3; Effie G. H. Pedaliu, "Britain and the 'Hand-over' of Italian War Criminals to Yugoslavia, 1945–48," *Journal of Contemporary History* 2004:4.
19. See, for example, Angelo Del Boca, "Una lunga battaglia per la verità," in Angelo Del Boca (ed.), *I gas di Mussolini: Il fascismo e la guerra d'Etiopia*, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1996; Nicola Labanca, "Colonial rule, colonial repression and war crimes in the Italian colonies," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 2004:3.
20. Effie G. H. Pedaliu 2004, p. 520.
21. See, for example, Silvio Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2001:2.
22. Simon Parker, "Political Identities," in David Forgacs & Robert Lumley (eds.), *Italian Cultural Studies. An Introduction*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 110.
23. Filippo Focardi, *La guerra della memoria. La Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi*, Roma-Bari, Laterza 2005, p. 25; Stephen Gundle, "The 'Civic Religion' of the Resistance in Post-War Italy," *Modern Italy*, 2000:2, pp. 122–123; Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "La perpetuazione del fascismo e della sua minaccia come elemento strutturale della lotta politica nell'Italia repubblica," in Loreto Di Nucci & Ernesto Galli della Loggia (eds.), *Due nazioni. Legittimazione e delegittimazione nella storia dell'Italia contemporanea*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2003, pp. 230–237.
24. Filippo Focardi 2005, p. 26.
25. Roberto Pertici, "Il vario anticomunismo italiano (1936–1960): lineamenti di una storia," in Loreto Di Nucci & Ernesto Galli della Loggia (eds.), *Due nazioni. Legittimazione e delegittimazione nella storia dell'Italia contemporanea*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2003, pp. 299–313. One should, however, note that in Italy the assaults on Communism made less use of open references to the model of totalitarianism than was the case in Anglo-Saxon countries and in Germany. Enzo Traverso, "Il totalitarismo. Usi et abusi di un concetto," in Hans Mommsen et al., *Lager, totalitarismo, modernità. Identità e storia dell'universo concentrazionario*, Milano: Bruno Mondadori 2002, p. 174.
26. Adriano Ballone, "La Resistenza," in Mario Isnenghi (ed.), *I luoghi della memoria. Strutture ed eventi dell'Italia unita*, Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza 1997, p. 415.
27. Adriano Ballone 1997, pp. 422–426; Stephen Gundle 2000, p. 118. R. J. B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism*, London: Arnold 1998, p. 184.
28. See, for example, Stephen Gundle, "Hollywood Glamour and Mass Consumption in Postwar Italy," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2002:3.
29. Stephen Gundle, "Feminine Beauty, National Identity and Political Conflict in Postwar Italy, 1945–1954," *Contemporary European History* 1999:3, pp. 372–373. Quotation on p. 373. One should note that the Neorealist movement in particular was a source of constant irritation for the DC. Vittorio De Sica's internationally appraised *Ladri di biciclette* (*Bicycle Thieves*, 1948), for example, annoyed Andreotti who saw the film

- as an attempt to increase social tensions within the country and destroy Italy's international reputation. After its release he warned the film workers' syndicates that they must stop producing movies that depicted "the most deleterious aspects of our national life." Ruth Ben-Ghiat, "The Italian Cinema and the Italian Working Class," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, Spring 2001, p. 43.
30. Stephen Gundle 2000, p. 121, R. J. B. Bosworth 1998, pp. 164–166.
 31. According to statistics of the *Fondazione centro di documentazione ebraica contemporanea* 1,951 Jews were arrested by Italians and 332 were taken in combined Italian-German actions. Furthermore, the fascists had defined Jews as "enemy aliens" already in November 1943 and the Salò Republic was, at least officially, in charge of the "Jewish question" until February 1944.
 32. This phenomenon could be noticed also in other West European countries, for example in France; see Michel Winock, *La France et les Juifs. De 1789 à nos jours*, Paris: Éditions De Seuil 2004, pp. 270–272.
 33. Giovanni Belardelli, "Ma l'Italia scoprì l'Olocausto solo dopo gli anni del silenzio," *Corriere della Sera*, January 12, 2005.
 34. By this I mean that there were clear attempts to present antisemite persecution as something alien to the Italian population at large. The word *nation* (*nazione*) had however been discredited by fascism and was shunned in post-war Italian politics (with the exception of the extreme Right). Martina Avanza, "Une histoire pour la Padanie. La Ligue du Nord et l'usage politique du passé," *Annales HSS*, No. 1, janvier-février 2003, pp. 104–106.
 35. Guri Schwarz 2004, pp. 124–125.
 36. Stuart Woolf, "Reading Federico Chabod's *Storia dell'idea d'Europa* Half a Century Later," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 2002:2, p. 270.
 37. Federico Chabod, *L'Italia contemporanea (1918–1948)*, Torino: Einaudi 1970 (1961), p. 96.
 38. Guri Schwarz 2004, pp. 130–140.
 39. See, for example, Liliana Picciotto Fargion, "Gli italiani, quelli Giusti," *Diario del mese*, January 27, 2006, and, by the same author, "The Jews during the German Occupation and the Italian Social Republic," in Ivo Herzer (ed.), *The Italian Refugee. Rescue of Jews during the Holocaust*, Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press 1990. See also the testimonials given by Jewish Italians in Nicola Caracciolo, *Uncertain Refuge. Italy and the Jews during the Holocaust*, Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986.
 40. Guri Schwarz 2004, pp. 117–120.
 41. Quoted in Guri Schwarz 2004, p. 153. See also pp. 142 and 168.
 42. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities. Italy, 1922–1945*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001(b), p. 204. In relation to the total population this is, of course, not a high number. It must, however, be remembered that also the armed resistance was a comparatively limited movement. It never seems to have exceeded 250,000 members, and most people joined just before the end. In the spring of 1944 there were "only" some 90,000 active partisans. Compared with many other occupied European countries the Italian resistance movement was, however, still impressive in numbers.
 43. Ruth Ben-Ghiat 2001(b), pp. 151–153. See also Susan Zuccotti, "L'Osservatore Romano and the Holocaust, 1939–1945," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2003:2.
 44. See, for example, Leopoldo Nuti, "The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left, 1953–1963," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Summer 2002.

45. Ginsborg 1990, pp. 259–261.
46. However, see the criticism of the common application of the concept consociationalism on Italian politics, 1960–1992 in Matthijs Bogaards, “The Italian First Republic: ‘Degenerated Consociationalism’ in a Polarised Party System,” *West European Politics* 2005:3.
47. Galli della Loggia 2003, p. 249.
48. R. J. B. Bosworth 1998, p. 108.
49. Stephen Gundle 2000, p. 129; Filippo Focardi 2005, pp. 42–43.
50. R. J. B. Bosworth 1998, p. 185. It is, of course, very likely that the very reason for the second edition’s success was that it was published by Einaudi. Large and prestigious publishing houses are strong gate-keepers to the public sphere.
51. Gino Schwarz 2004, pp. 164–168.
52. Renzo De Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo*, Torino: Einaudi, 1993. As late as in 1987, De Felice, who by then had reached the position of Italy’s leading expert on the fascist period, stated in an interview to *Corriere della Sera* that “I know that Italian Fascism is sheltered from the accusation of genocide, and quite outside the shadow [of guilt] for the Holocaust.” Quoted in R. J. B. Bosworth 1998, p. 101. See also Renzo De Felice, “Foreword,” in Nicola Caracciolo, *Uncertain Refuge. Italy and the Jews during the Holocaust*, Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press 1986.
53. A few days after the *Brigate Rosse*’s murder of Aldo Moro the communist trade union leader Luciano Lama, for example, stated that Moro’s murderers were like “those Germans in the camps of Mauthausen and Auschwitz who tortured and murdered millions of innocent and defenceless men, women, and children.” Quoted in Filippo Focardi 2005, p. 54.
54. Gian Scipione Rossi, *La Destra e gli ebrei. Una storia italiana*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore 2003, pp. 94–95. Quotation on p. 94.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97, 101–103. Quotation on p. 103.
56. Mario Toscano (ed.), *L’Abrogazione delle leggi razziali in Italia (1943–1987)*, Roma: Servizio Studi del Senato della Repubblica 1988.
57. Michele Sarfatti, *La Shoah in Italia: La persecuzione degli ebrei sotto il fascismo*, Torino: Einaudi, 2005, pp. 73–74, 105–108.
58. See, for example, Ulf Zander, “Holocaust at the Limits. Historical Culture and the Nazi Genocide in the Television Era,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 255–292.
59. Milena Santerini, “Holocaust Education in Italy,” *Intercultural Education* 2003:2, p. 226.
60. Even if the film was never intended to primarily address the Holocaust, Benigni had taken precautions. Not only had he and his co-writer Vincenzo Cerami carried out extensive research, they also hired the consultant Marcello Pezzetti, director of the audio-visual department of the *Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea* in Milan, and furthermore screened the film for Italian Jewish groups before its release. Ruth Ben-Ghiat 2001(a), pp. 253–254; Steve Siporin, “Life is Beautiful: four riddles, three answers,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 2002:3, pp. 348, 359.
61. Milena Santerini 2003.
62. Legge 20 luglio 2000, no. 211, *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, July 31, 2000.
63. “Molte lodi a Liliana Cavani per la fiction televisiva Rai,” *Corriere della Sera*, April 30, 2005.

64. See, for example, Giovanni Bellardelli, "Il Cattolicesimo sociale austriaco e quello che ha scritto Alcide sugli ebrei," *Corriere della Sera*, April 24, 2005.
65. Dino Messina, "De Gaspari e gli ebrei, una ferita cattolica," *Corriere della Sera*, April 26, 2005.
66. Dino Messina, "De Gaspari e gli ebrei, indagine su un pregiudizio," *Corriere della Sera*, April 25, 2005.
67. Dino Messina, "De Gaspari e gli ebrei, una ferita cattolica," *Corriere della Sera*, April 26, 2005.
68. Paola De Gaspari, "Alcide De Gaspari antirazzista. Anche nel '38," *Corriere della Sera*, May 6, 2005.
69. See, for example, Michael A. Leeden, "Renzo de Felice [sic] and the Controversy over Italian Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1976:4; Borden W. Painter, "Renzo De Felice and the Historiography of Italian Fascism," *The American Historical Review* 1990:2; and R. J. B. Bosworth 1998, pp. 17–20, 120–132.
70. Silvana Patriarca, "Italian neopatriotism: debating national identity in the 1990s," *Modern Italy* 2001:1, pp. 23–24.
71. See, for example, Pietro Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti. Profilo storico della democrazia in Italia (1945–1990)*, Bologna: Il Mulino 1991; and Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Se cessiamo di essere una nazione*, Bologna: Il Mulino 1993.
72. See, for example, Silvana Patriarca 2001; R. J. B. Bosworth, "Explaining 'Auschwitz' after the End of History. The Case of Italy," *History & Theory* 1999:1; Alberto De Bernardi, "Introduzione. L'antifascismo: una questione storica aperta," in Alberto De Bernardi & Paolo Ferrari (eds), *Antifascismo e identità europea*, Roma: Carocci, 2004, and Filippo Focardi 2005, pp. 61–79.
73. Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and its Discontents. Family, Civil Society, State 1980–2001*, London, Penguin Books 2001, pp. 249–284. See also Tobias Abse, "From PCI to DS: How European Integration Accelerated the 'Social Democratization' of the Italian Left," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 2001:1.
74. The AN, which mainly drew its support from the South and Rome, was nationalist and wanted a strong centralised and interventionist state. The *Lega*, whose stronghold was the North-East, was instead separatist and in favour of minimal intervention from Rome. Furthermore, it was highly racist but cared little for the fascist period.
75. Paul Ginsborg 2001, p. 297.
76. Quoted in Ruth Ben-Ghiat 1995, p. 630.
77. See for example, Norberto Bobbio, "Revisionismo nella storia d'Italia," in Norberto Bobbio et al., *Italiani, amici, nemici*, Milano: Reser 1996; Nicola Tranfaglia, *Un passato scomodo. Fascismo e postfascismo*, Roma-Bari: Laterza 1996; and Sergio Luzzatto, *La crisi dell'antifascismo*, Torino: Einaudi 2004.
78. Filippo Focardi 2005, pp. 75–76.
79. Filippo Focardi 2005, p. 72. For criticism of Pansa see, for example, Sergio Luzzatto 2004, pp. 26–29.
80. In 1994, 695 judicial proceedings against members of the SS and *Wehrmacht* who were responsible for massacres on civilians were discovered in the offices of the Military Public Prosecutor in Rome. They had been prepared immediately after the war but had never led to any legal action, as the Italian authorities decided to bury these cases for political reasons. Their discovery has led to an upsurge of books which often reflect a moral use of history which contrasts the right of the local communities that suffered from German reprisals to have their sufferings recognized with the official

- politics of memory stemming from the corridors of power in Rome. See, for example, Mimo Franzellini, *Le stragi nascoste. L'armadio della vergogna: impunità e rimozione dei crimini di guerra nazifascisti 1943–2001*, Milano: Mondadori 2002; Toni Rovatti, *Sant'Anna di Stazzema. Storia e memoria della strage dell'agosto 1944*, Roma: DeriveApprodi 2004; and Franco Gisulisi, *L'Armadio della vergogna*, Roma: Nutrementi, 2004.
81. Filippo Focardi 2005, pp. 82–83.
 82. Giorgio Galli, "Il Contesto," in Pier Giuseppe Murgia (ed.), *Il vento del Nord. Storia e cronaca del fascismo dopo la Resistenza, 1945–50*, Milano: Kaos edizioni, 2004, pp. 8–9.
 83. See, for example, Furio Colombo, "La memoria del mondo," *l'Unità*, November 1, 2005.
 84. Piero Fassino, "Perché non accada mai più," *La Repubblica*, January 26, 2006.
 85. This was, for example, evident in the parliamentary debate about the Day of Memory.
 86. See, for example, Maurizio Caprara, "Berlusconi: Nazismo folle ma fu il comunismo il crimine più grande," *Corriere della Sera*, July 18, 2002.
 87. "Messaggio del Presidente del Consiglio Silvio Berlusconi nel Giorno della Memoria," http://www.governo.it/Presidente/Interventi/testo_int.asp?d=18094.
 88. Massimo Giannini, "Usare Stalin come una clava," *La Repubblica*, December 24, 2005.
 89. Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell, "The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of its own," *West European Politics* 2005:5, pp. 960–964.
 90. Furio Colombo, "Il fascio e lo sfascio," *l'Unità*, January 30, 2005.
 91. Even if Fini can bear no direct responsibility for fascism's racial policies, the *Alleanza's* roots in the MSI and consequently strong connections to the fascist party made it in all likelihood necessary for him to cleanse himself and his party from the metonymic association with the Holocaust. Without passing any judgement on Fini's sincerity, it can be stated that this was most likely a necessary precondition for his later assumption of the post as foreign minister. In this case one can see an analogy with the demands made by the European Union on applicant countries from East Central Europe to come to terms with their past.
 92. Adar Primor, "Fini: 'Chiedo scusa per le leggi razziali,'" *La Repubblica*, September 13, 2002.
 93. Maurizio Caprara, "Il viaggio in Israele," *Corriere della Sera*, November 26, 2003.
 94. "Fini insiste: siamo antifascisti," *l'Unità*, November 27, 2003.
 95. Fini was supported by many of the younger within the party leadership. "Ad Arezzo An applaude Fini: diciamogli grazie," *Corriere della Sera*, November 29, 2003. Others, however, strongly objected. One of these was Alessandra Mussolini, who stated that she challenged Fini's arrogation of the right to pass judgment upon and dismiss an important period in Italian history, and announced that she would leave the party. Also Mirko Tremaglia, who held a post in the government, was highly critical. Fini's condemnation of fascism was ridiculous. The Republic of Salò had, furthermore, been created not in an attempt to uphold the racial laws, but to defend Italy against Hitler. "La fronda a Fini. Dalla Mussolini a Tremaglia," *l'Unità*, November 27, 2003.
 96. Marco Galluzzo, "Leggi razziali, Fini chiede perdono come italiano," *Corriere della Sera*, September 13, 2002.
 97. Massimo Salvadorini, "Ma ora il partito deve mostrare coerenza," *La Repubblica*, September 13, 2002. Also in the Left, however, were those who recognised that the

- responsibility for the racial persecution could not be limited to the fascist party. See, for example, Gianpasquale Santomassimo, "Pentimento di ieri, razzismo di oggi," *Il Manifesto*, September 14, 2002.
98. See, for example, Filippo Focardi 2005, p. 90. See also James Walston, "History and Memory of the Italian Concentration Camps," *The Historical Journal* 1997:1, and the articles in *Storia in rete* 2005:2.
 99. Filippo Focardi 2005, pp. 91–93.
 100. Gianni Gentile & Luigi Ronga, *La storia in rete. Il nuovo navigare nella storia per la riforma*, 3B, *Dal primo dopoguerra ai giorni nostri*, Editrice La Scuola 2004, p. 27. Similar statements can be found in other school textbooks. For example: "The racial laws were not received favourably by the majority of the Italian population [...] and induced many to open their eyes and take distance from fascism"; see Gianfranco Bresich, *La memoria del mondo*, Novara: De Agostini Editore 2004, p. 223.
 101. See, for example, Ciampi's speech, at the sixty-year anniversary of the deportation of Rome's Jewish population. "Ciampi al Portico d'Ottavia nel 60° anniversario della deportazione degli ebrei romani: 'la memoria dell'Olocausto dev'essere tenuta viva, perché la storia che si dimentica si ripete'," *INFORM*, October 16, 2003.
 102. Gian Scipione Rossi 2003, pp. 151, 269–272.
 103. Roberto Beretta, "Anche i Giusti entrino nella Storia," *L'Avvenire*, January 26, 2006.
 104. Liliana Picciotto Fargion 2006, p. 46.
 105. Andrea Colombo, "Il giorno della memoria e dei giusti," *Il Manifesto*, January 28, 2006.

Conflicting Memories

The French Jews and Vichy France

Research carried out in France on the Holocaust has been surprisingly modest in comparison to countries such as Germany, Israel and the United States, where the issue has been more frequently and thoroughly addressed. This could be explained by two different reasons. Historical writing after the Second World War has been dominated by the tradition of the *Annales School*, where focus has been on structures and mentalities over a long period of time, and not on contemporary events such as Vichy France. Secondly, a strong French republican tradition, in which the Jews have not been considered as a group separate from the nation, has influenced universities in France.¹

Two main problems have echoed in the French Holocaust discussion: the antisemitism of the Vichy regime, and French collaboration with the Germans. In 1987, the historian Henry Rousso published an analysis of the post-war memory of the Vichy regime and argued that France had still not come to terms with that period. In the optimistic post-war atmosphere, disturbing questions about the Vichy regime did not fit in. In Rousso's account, the country was united through the narrative of Charles de Gaulle and the strong resistance, *la Résistance*. It was not until the end of the 1960s that the patriotic memory was challenged and gradually replaced by an infected debate about French antisemitism and assistance in the final solution. Consequently, the Jewish experience of the Vichy regime was no longer marginalised.²

It is estimated that more than 300,000 Jews lived in France when the Franco-German armistice of June 22, 1940 was signed. France was divided into two zones: the north which was under German

military occupation, and the south which was left to be governed by the Vichy regime. The Jews suffered both from the impact of the German occupation and from a traditional French antisemitism. In total, 75,721 Jews were deported. Only 2,500 survived the gas chambers and crematorium furnaces.³ Independently, the regime of Philippe Pétain passed antisemitic laws and was engaged in collaboration with the Germans. In Paris, collaborationist groups operated with great vigour and the French municipal police were ordered to arrest Jews in roundups. In the south, most of Vichy's autonomy was reduced in November 1942, after the Allied intervention in North Africa. The Vichy regime then increasingly became a tool of German policy. The same year, Pierre Laval returned to power as head of the Vichy government. Laval created the Milice, a political police force that was playing a leading role in capturing Jews and left-wing activists. After Paris was liberated in late August 1944, the regime was abolished, together with all its laws.

Already during the war, a Jewish centre for Holocaust history and commemoration was secretly established. In Grenoble the CDJC, *Centre de documentation juive contemporaine*, was formed in 1943 under the leadership of Isaac Schneersohn. The purpose was to collect proof against the Nazis and their collaborators. After the war, the group established an archive in Paris and started to publish books on the Holocaust, as well as the journal *Le Monde juif*. This was the first journal in the world to deal solely with the Holocaust. Isaac Schneersohn, however, also wanted to create a more symbolic place of commemoration. Therefore the Tomb of the Unknown Jewish Martyr was inaugurated in Paris in 1956. An urn containing ashes from concentration camp victims was also placed beneath an eternal flame.⁴ Schneersohn's project has today become the Memorial of the Shoah – usually referred to simply as the Memorial – containing a significant research library and an important museum on the Holocaust. The Memorial also serves as a venue for different commemorative events.

The purpose of this article is to give an outline of how the CDJC has treated the issue of the Vichy regime and the collaboration. The main sources are the journal *Le Monde juif* and a selection of books that the centre has produced. Besides essays on the Holocaust, *Le Monde juif* also contains descriptions of commemoration ceremonies

that will be a part of a discussion on the problem of constructing a Jewish memory of the Holocaust in France. The investigated period is the years 1958–1980. During this period historical writing about Vichy and the collaboration changed dramatically, and the Jewish experience became an important part of the public discussion of these issues. In 1958, the Fifth Republic was established in France. A period of political crises and instability had cleared the way for President Charles de Gaulle, who more than anyone else influenced the French collective memory of the occupation years.

The analysis consists of four parts. Two different commemoration ceremonies at the Memorial will be described in the first part. They show some of the particularities of the Jewish Holocaust memory in France. This is followed by a comparison of the CDJC publications and the general historical writing about Vichy during the first ten years of the investigated period. In the third part, the influence of the Six Day War on the CDJC will be examined. During this time, when the political myth of the strong French resistance was losing its credibility, *Le Monde juif* became a forum for articles dealing with the Jewish resistance in France. Finally, the analysis will show how the American historian Robert Paxton's interpretation of the Vichy regime fought its way into *Le Monde juif* in the middle of the 1970s.

Holocaust Commemoration

In the post-war discussion of the Holocaust in France, the Vel'd'Hiv roundup has become a central event. On July 16 and 17, 1942, 13,152 Jews were arrested in Paris and, awaiting deportation, placed in the bicycle stadium *Vélodrome d'Hiver*. Many of those arrested were women and children, and a majority of them never returned. Vel'd'Hiv is a stain on French history: it was French police that arrested the Jews, and it was collaborators who, together with German authorities, planned the roundup. The tragedy of Vel'd'Hiv has also, since 1993, become a National Day in France. Two years later, at a commemoration of Vel'd'Hiv, President Jacques Chirac officially recognised the French state's responsibility for the deportation of the Jews from France and also, indirectly, for the Holocaust.⁵

Silence, however, surrounded this roundup in France, even in scholarly history books as late as in the 1970s. This was also the case

with the Jewish deportation victims. Despite the fact that the French state founded a National Deportation Day in 1954, the Jews were never recognised among the victims of the deportation. When the few Jewish survivors returned to France after the war, their experiences and memories from Auschwitz and other concentration camps were not distinguished in public consciousness. The Jews were often subsumed under the category *déportés politique* and found no particular interest or sympathy for their case.⁶

However, at the Memorial there were commemoration ceremonies on the anniversary of the Vel'd'Hiv roundup and on the National Deportation Day. Different groups arranged commemorations where the Jewish victims were paid more attention due to the symbolic place and the Jewish character of the rituals. In the journal *Le Monde juif* these ceremonies are described and speeches sometimes quoted, often emphasising the importance of remembering the tragedy, as in this reflection on the 1958 National Deportation Day:

Is it possible to forget all this? For those who have been interned in concentration camps, for those few who have managed to escape from the camps, for those who are relatives of the missing and for those who are not apathetic – it is impossible, in the same way as veterans from Verdun or Stalingrad cannot forget the inexpressible horror of modern war. However, is it wise to cling to the memories, wouldn't it be better to let time run its course, and hope that the horrors will be forgotten? If you forget, you neglect the most important duty: to pay homage to the victims. But most importantly, you also deprive yourself of the most reliable method there is to prevent something like this from happening again. The horrible memories of the War will remain the best way to prevent that.⁷

The journal *Le Monde juif* contains many similar accounts. The memory and knowledge of the Jewish tragedy were very important in the CDJC publications during the first decades after the war. This can be seen as a reaction to the French society that had very few Holocaust representations during the 1950s. It was the Cold War and the overhanging threat of nuclear war that dominated public consciousness, like in all Western societies. The silence concerning the Vichy regime's contribution to the Final Solution was even more obvious

in France. Instead, political myths about the strong French resistance were used by politicians from the far left to the far right to unify the country. After de Gaulle was back in power in 1958, allusions to this heroic past were very common.⁸ As we shall see, even in *Le Monde juif* few essays before the 1970s dealt with collaboration or French antisemitism: The Holocaust was simply considered a catastrophe.

A recurrent theme in the history of the French Jews is their devotion to the republic. Their emancipation after the French revolution allowed them to be assimilated as French citizens. The French state model has traditionally been to assimilate minorities. Therefore, a characteristic French-Jewish culture developed in France, where the principles of the republic became an important part of the Jewish identity. This French universalism later had a major impact on the memory of the Holocaust. In the commemoration ceremonies at the Memorial, elements from the secular republican tradition were combined with religious components. During the ceremonies a rabbi was always present and a Jewish liturgy was carried out during which *El Mole Rahamim* – a funeral prayer from Poland – was recited together with the *Kaddish*, the prayer for the dead. Also, an official representative of the French state was present.⁹ Another feature was the military music “*Aux Morts*,” that since the Second World War has often been performed at official occasions for honouring the dead.¹⁰

The tension between the Jewish and the French republican traditions shows some of the complexity in constructing a Jewish memory of the Holocaust in France. What was particular to the Holocaust trauma in France was the failure of the very principles on which the French republic had been founded, and on which the Jews had built their secular lives. The Jews had long been engaged in the process of assimilation, and even during political crises such as the Dreyfus Affair, the majority of Jews chose to assert their Frenchness. The Vichy regime was a terrible blow to the peaceful coexistence of Jewish and French identities.¹¹ In the 1950s, however, when Isaac Schneersohn presented his project to build the Memorial, there was still a part of the Jewish community that disliked the idea of creating an institution of the dark years. Many Jews still wanted to be reintegrated as Frenchmen and to avoid painful questions concerning Vichy France. The republican tradition in France supported this attitude.

The commemoration ceremony of Vél'd'Hiv showed up in *Le Monde juif* in 1959. A speaker during the ceremony stated that de Gaulle and his government would work to make sure that the Vél'd'Hiv would never happen again.¹² The attention paid to the ceremony grew in the 1970s, as a more critical attitude towards Vichy developed among Jews. During the commemoration ceremony on the 35th anniversary, three different speeches, quoted in *Le Monde Juif*, showed how the memory of this traumatic event was coloured by the contemporary situation for the Jews in France. The speeches related to three main topics in the Holocaust discussion in France. The first one underlined the danger of historical falsification:

The memory must always lead to vigilance. Having experienced the dramatic years, we know how easy it is to indoctrinate the masses. Unfortunately, there are already a great number of books trying to prove that the Holocaust never happened. They argue – contrary to all evidence – that the concentrations camps and gas chambers never existed.¹³

The importance of memory had a strong moralistic sense in this context: a warning of the historical revisionism that emerged during the 1970s, with Robert Faurisson as its most famous representative.

The second speech in the ceremony for Vél'd'Hiv was more hopeful, and addressed to Israel: "Thus, Israel has shown its full significance. Israel as a people, and the land of Israel, the soil of the people. Wandering in the diaspora through this world, the Jewish people have always been accompanied by this soil."¹⁴ During the Six Day War in 1967 the support of Israel among the Jews was stronger than ever – particularly when de Gaulle changed his political course and criticised Israel. Even if the journal *Le Monde juif* had expressed a positive interest in Israel before, this increased after the Six Day War. Israel became part of Jewish identity in France. In the quoted speech it represents a positive contrast to the tragedy of Vél'd'Hiv.

In the third speech, the war criminals were targeted. The new wave of neo-Nazism emphasised that the memory of the victims of Vél'd'Hiv must act as a reminder of the necessity to demand justice, even though 35 years had elapsed since the crime was committed: "These Barbie, Lischka, Mengele and others should – for our glory and for the glory of our epoch – be judged, each man according to

his crimes. Thus we hope that all our dead, all those who died in the arrest in Vél'd'Hiv, rest in peace. We hope that their sacrifice has not been in vain.”¹⁵ The CDJC has played an active role in some of the major trials of war criminals after the Second World War. During the Nuremberg trial a CDJC delegation represented France, and during the process against Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem 1961 the centre assisted the court with evidence. In the 1980s, CDJC could forward a document from its archive to the French justice system that made it possible to start the prosecution of Klaus Barbie. Thus, the demand for justice has been an important part of its historical activity.

Already in the early 1970s, attention was paid to the Barbie case. The lawyer Serge Klarsfeld acted to have Barbie extradited from Bolivia.¹⁶ Klarsfeld, whose father was deported to Auschwitz in 1943, and his wife Beate worked more than anyone else to raise consciousness in France about antisemitism during the war. They are best known for their achievement of hunting down Nazi war criminals. However, Serge Klarsfeld is also a historian, associated with the CDJC, and the one who has published the name of every deported Jew in France and written important books on the Final Solution in France.¹⁷ In 1979, he created the association *Fils et Filles des Déportés de France*, Sons and Daughters of Jews Deported from France, which has organised different activities to keep the memory of the deported alive.

The Silence about French Antisemitism

In France during the first two decades after the war, the resistance was the dominating issue in the history of the occupation. It was not until 1954 that the first comprehensive study of the Vichy regime was published, written by the non-academic historian Robert Aron. During the war, Aron evaded antisemitic persecution by going into exile in Algiers. His work *Histoire de Vichy, 1940–1944* was widely spread and is typical for the spirit of that time. Aron described the evolution of the Vichy regime and the relationship between France and Germany during the occupation. His conclusion was that Vichy was against Hitler and that Germany forced France into collaboration. Aron made a distinction between the Vichy of Pétain that retained a good relationship with Great Britain, and the Vichy of Pierre Laval, who was considered a major traitor. This distinction was common

among those who defended the honour of Pétain. Antisemitism, or the regime's hard pressure on members of the Resistance, was hardly mentioned in the book.¹⁸

In general, the Jews were absent in historical studies before the 1970s. It is therefore interesting to note that the CDJC published pioneering books on the Jews during the occupation as early as in the 1940s.¹⁹ The most important study during the late fifties was Joseph Billig's work *le Commissariat général aux Questions juives*. It was published in three parts between 1955 and 1960. The Commissariat was a French institution, founded under the influence of Germany with the purpose of co-ordinating the antisemitic policy. However, Billig's book was given no public attention and did not lead to any controversy.²⁰ Nevertheless, through documentation from the CDJC, Billig made a survey of important collaboration structures. He was in fact one of the first historians to more systematically study an important aspect of French assistance in the Nazi's politics against Jews in France. The last part showed how official French bureaucracy and other professions were made unavailable to the Jews due to the activities of the Commissariat. The "Aryanisation" process was aiming to reduce the Jewish influence in the French economy. In this book the French responsibility for the antisemitic politics was shown with a clarity that was unique in France at that time:²¹

This enterprise [the Aryanisation] seems deeply rooted in the very foundations of French society. We have also, on numerous occasions, been able to notice that the actions of CGQJ [*Commissariat général aux Questions juives*] followed a consequent policy, in spite of the changes which took place in France during the occupation. CGQJ has effectively made sure that the Jews were excluded from offices and professions. It has also urgently worked to deprive the Jews of their property, and its special police has firmly supported both their own activity, and also murderous measures such as internment and deportation of Jews. CGQJ acts, in all fields, in accordance with the law, and with the instructions from the Vichy Government.²²

After Billig's last book on the Commissariat, the journal *Le Monde juif* and the books published by the CDJC paid relatively little attention to the Vichy regime. The journal mainly contained essays that

dealt with other countries. The Eichmann trial occupied much of CDJC's attention in the beginning of the 1960s,²³ whereas the Holocaust in France was treated only in connection with special occasions. In 1962, however, twenty years after Vel'd'Hiv, the CDJC produced a special edition of the journal, reporting on the event. Emotional testimonies on the tragic days were collected, together with the public reactions in Paris against the roundup. George Wellers, a CDJC official who wrote books on the Jews in France and the Holocaust, also produced a historical overview of how the action was planned and carried out.²⁴ Wellers analysed the negotiations between Pierre Laval and the German authorities. The Germans accepted the proposal of Laval to deport foreign Jewish children in place of French Jews. Wellers approached an issue that later in the 1970s would prove to be important in the more critical discussion about the Vichy regime: Did Vichy protect the French Jews? Nearly 70 per cent of the Jews deported from France were foreign-born. They had arrived from Eastern Europe in the 1920s or as refugees from Germany in the 1930s. The immigrants differed a lot from the French assimilated Jews, and the two communities acted very differently during the occupation.

Some of the essential studies of the Vichy regime have been made by historians outside France. The German historian Eberhard Jäckel's book *Frankreich in Hitlers Europa* (1966) offered a new view of the Vichy regime and the politics of collaboration. Jäckel was not the only one; the Franco-American historian Stanley Hoffman had already, in an article from 1956, described the Vichy regime's anchorage in various political fractions in France.²⁵ Jäckel showed that Vichy actively sought collaboration and that this policy was carried out even before Pierre Laval took power in 1942. He also stated that it was Germany and not France which interrupted the collaboration later on. Jäckel's book appeared in a French translation in 1968, but went largely unread in France.²⁶

Nor was any attention paid to the book in *Le Monde juif*, in spite of the fact that the journal contained reviews on books from all over the world that treated aspects of the Holocaust. The same year as Jäckel's book was published in Germany, the CDJC produced an inventory of documents that concerned German administrative structures in France. The contacts between the German authorities and

collaborationist groups in Paris were explored in this study.²⁷ However, the more critical perspective on France that would appear during the next decade was still absent, like in most of the CDJC publications. Joseph Billig's empirical study of the Commissariat for Jewish affairs was quite unusual since it showed how rooted the institution was in a French antisemitic tradition. The majority of the texts in *Le Monde juif* were generally careful to distinguish between the small elite of Vichy – with Pierre Laval as the major villain – and the French population, which was regarded with sympathy.

The following is an example from a short essay in 1967 about the first deportation of Jews in France. Documents from the SS officers Theodore Dannecker and Adolf Eichmann illuminated how the action was planned. Beside the German orders, the achievements of the French population to save the Jews were elevated: "...the help which was incessantly distributed [...] and not only by Jews or especially committed Frenchmen, but also by many associated with Pétain and the Vichy Ideology – and also the collaboration with Germany – contributed to many releases."²⁸ The positive attitude towards the French population in the journal *Le Monde juif* during this period mirrored the willingness among many Jews after the war to be reintegrated as French citizens. For them it was easier to accept the enemy as German or as a small reactionary Vichy elite that did not have any support in French society. However, radical changes in French politics and an escalation of the Middle East conflict would change this attitude.

Israel and the Jewish Resistance in France

The importance of the Six Day War for the Jewish memory of the Holocaust is emphasised by the historian Joan Wolf. She claims that the memory of these historical events cannot be understood and discussed separately. After the Middle East conflict, the Jewish trauma became a symbol of persecution and victimisation in a variety of public narratives in France.²⁹

A few years later, the patriotic memory of the occupation was also losing its credibility in France. The student riots in May 1968 challenged de Gaulle and a government that saw themselves as heirs of the Resistance. Another more symbolic event was de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, and his death the following year. New representa-

tions of the Vichy regime appeared in public – mainly in the cultural sphere. In Marcel Ophüls's documentary film *Le Chagrin et la Pitié* (*The Sorrow and the Pity*, 1969), the French population during the occupation was presented in an unfavourable light. The Resistance was replaced by antisemitism and collaboration with the Germans. The film caused an infected debate that lasted several years.³⁰

However, *Le Monde juif* contained another tendency. After the Six Day War the attention paid to the Jewish resistance in France increased. Several articles in the journal dealt with such issues at the end of the 1960s. There was even one text from 1968 that turned the focus from the Vél'd'Hiv tragedy to the Jewish resistance during those days. The author, Adam Rayski, was a member of a Jewish Communist resistance group, and his point of view was that much had already been written about this "miserable roundup." According to Rayski, the Vél'd'Hiv also marked an important stage of the Jewish resistance in France:

If July 16 and 17, 1942 will live in infamy, while they mark an important phase in the enforcement of the plan to annihilate the Jews, the dates must also – because of the paramount role played by the Resistance movement during the arrests – be remembered as the days in which the occupants were faced by the Jews' refusal to be captured.³¹

Even if the interest in Jewish resistance reached its peak after the Six Day War, it has always played an important role in the historical writings of the CDJC. Among the early books on the CDJC that appeared in the 1940s, there were two studies on the Jewish resistance in France.³² Another important event in the CDJC memory work was the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943. Each year there were commemorative ceremonies for the uprising at the Memorial. The CDJC arranged expositions of the Jewish revolt, and many essays in *Le Monde juif* treated the issue during the entire investigated period.³³ In fact, the group that constituted the CDJC in secret during the war had their roots in different resistance movements in France. Unlike the situation in Eastern Europe, the Jews in France did not live in separate ghettos and could more easily take an active part in the general resistance as well as in Jewish organisations that worked for specific objectives.

However, the Middle East conflict had a strong influence on the Jews in France, strengthening their solidarity and identification with Israel. In one essay in *Le Monde juif* about the illegal press, there was even a comparison between the Jewish resistance in France and Jewish heroism in the Six Day War.³⁴ As in Israeli historical culture, the Jewish resistance was a centrepiece.³⁵ The image of the Jew with a gun in his hand was a comforting contrast to the poor ghetto Jew who died without resistance. This was particularly so after the Six Day War.³⁶

Jewish life in France also experienced a revival during this period. In *Le Monde juif*, an article paid tribute to the heroism in Israel and described how the Six Day War had evoked new reactions among the Jews in France. The reactions indicated a more critical attitude towards France and a break with the traditional assimilation of French Jews:

A train headed by Israeli flags approached the crossroads. The train consisted of a great number of Jews, and they were all singing when the police surrounded them. Passers-by looked at them, intrigued or irritated.

What did they want to achieve? They wanted Israel to emerge victorious, and they wanted the land in which they were citizens to support the cause of Israel. Give us neither words nor illusions as payment. They are not the "population of Paris," they are Jews – "the Jewish population of Paris," if we may say so.³⁷

Thus, the Jews were no longer only French citizens with a religious confession in the private sphere. They were the "Jewish population of Paris," united through various forms of solidarity with Israel. Another part of this identity was a consciousness of the horror of the Holocaust.³⁸ The French Jews would also soon reconsider the attitude to the Vichy regime and the collaboration.

Vichy France

When historians during the late sixties started to make more use of German and American archives, they contributed to a change of view regarding the Vichy regime. This is most obvious in the American historian Robert Paxton's interpretation of the period in *Vichy France – Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*. Paxton inspired a whole

generation of French historians. The book was published in 1972 and translated into French a year later. In the new interpretation, Paxton did not see Vichy as a parenthesis in French history or a victim of special circumstances during the occupation. As the subtitle of the book reveals, the Vichy regime was described both as a continuation of an extensive historical context and as consisting of new elements. In earlier studies, Philippe Pétain was often seen as the French patriotic leader who in fact struggled against Germany. But like Eberhard Jäckel, Paxton stated that the Vichy regime insisted on collaboration with Germany and that there was no Pétainist double game. The antisemitic legislation and the deportation of Jews were presented as part of the larger project of collaboration. The significance of the resistance in France was, according to Paxton, also strongly overestimated.³⁹ Some aspects of Paxton's work had already been presented by others, but his book appeared with perfect timing, and the interpretation caused a strong reaction in France. After Paxton's book, research on the Vichy regime increased considerably.⁴⁰

In *Le Monde juif*, the interest in the Vichy regime increased already in the early 1970s. Vichy's antisemitic propaganda centre, the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Questions, was described in two essays, and Joseph Billig also published an inventory of documents concerning the issue. This inventory shows a profound insight into the extent of the Institute's relationship to antisemitic groups in France before the war. When Billig described the Institute, he made clear that there was a difference between French antisemitism and German racism: "If the antisemitic politics were an integral part of 'the French State,' then its leaders understood this in the way that they should pursue antisemitic policies in the 'French manner'. Nazi racism which concentrated on the racial issue did not inspire them at all."⁴¹

Despite the new focus, the reception of Robert Paxton's book was quite modest in *Le Monde juif*. In a short review, the lawyer Roger Berg described some of its contents. He pointed out that Paxton was only eight years old when France was occupied, and that he had almost only used American and German sources. Furthermore, Paxton had neglected to seek evidence from all the witnesses of the period, he maintained. But Berg also wrote that the book redressed the is-

sues of those who suffered under the Vichy regime.⁴² One can add that the Jewish press in France was in general supportive of the book, although it did not attract substantial attention.⁴³ In *Le Monde juif*, the breakthrough for Paxton's interpretation would have to wait until 1976. From this year on the attitude towards Vichy became more critical, and the connections to a contemporary public and historical debate increased.

As an example, there was a discussion that year about an article that the French historian Claude Gounelle had published in the revue *Historia*. Gounelle had written that the Vichy regime was antisemitic but tried to save the French Jews from deportation. In *Le Monde juif* George Wellers dismissed this point of view and exemplified with an arrest of French Jews as early as 1941, whereas he found no evidence that Vichy tried to refuse collaboration or save native French Jews. When the Germans started their large-scale deportation in 1942, it triggered no reaction from the Vichy administration. Vichy must in fact have been in accord with the Germans, Wellers argued:

Such a programme could obviously not have been carried out by the Germans alone, without the active participation of Vichy. It stands to reason that they could not have passed through the free zone (and the occupied zone) to get 100,000 people out – even if they dedicated several months – without effective assistance from the Vichy administration.⁴⁴

Even if the Vichy regime collaborated in the deportation and had their own antisemitic legislation, one can ask if more Jews could have been saved without an independent French government. Wellers's conclusion was that French Jews had been better off during the occupation without the Vichy regime. He also argued that the Vichy authorities which preferred a more lenient policy against the French Jews were in fact only afraid of the public reaction.

This essay was followed by another article by the historian Fred Kupferman. In order to more clearly display the politics of collaboration, the journal published an excerpt from Kupferman's book about Pierre Laval that was published the same year. An illuminating detail is that this was the first time Robert Paxton and Eberhard Jäckel were included in the references in *Le Monde juif*. Kupferman also

dismissed the idea that the Vichy regime played a double game to cheat the Germans.⁴⁵

Another debate the same year was about a programme on French television where the politics of collaboration were described as enforced by the Germans. The old dichotomy of the evil Laval and the good Pétain was also reproduced. The programme provoked strong reactions and *Le Monde juif* published an interview with the historian Henri Michel. He criticised the feature and asserted that the collaboration was voluntarily sought by the Vichy regime:

[I]t was Pétain who asked for, and also ordered the politics of collaboration. Hitler was never interested; as far as he was concerned, severe paragraphs of truce were sufficient. It is true that administrative collaboration was unavoidable. It is true that the economic collaboration in the northern zone was almost unavoidable. The Germans were there to set the prices and establish the rules for economy and trade, among other things. The political collaboration was, however, not unavoidable, and it was the choice of Pétain, Laval and Darlan, with Weygand as the only opponent. And it is from this that all evil has sprung.⁴⁶

Henri Michel was for a long time the leading expert on the occupation and headed the *Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*. The dominating research issue for this historical committee was the resistance. But Henri Michel also published an early study of the Vichy regime in 1966 in which he presented a perspective that had many similarities to Paxton's later account.⁴⁷ In the *Le Monde juif* article, Michel was also asked if coming to terms with Vichy is the same thing as coming to terms with the French population. In this question Michel made a clear reservation:

You cannot blame the French for what happened in 1940. They were struck after the defeat. The fact that such a small number of people joined the Resistance is mainly due to Pétain being the leader of the country. Had it not been for Pétain, the Resistance would have had more participants.⁴⁸

Besides the fact that the French population was still exempted from criticism, the different examples above from 1976 indicate a new attitude in *Le Monde juif*. The critique of the Vichy regime became an

important part of the historical writing. In France, most of the work about the Vichy regime also appeared in the middle of the seventies, inspired by Robert Paxton's pioneering book.

Studies of public opinion were also in the making. The interaction between the regime and society had not been sufficiently explored before. Paxton's simplified view was that only a minority in France took an active part in the resistance and that most people in the beginning of the occupation were "collaborators in a functional sense."⁴⁹ *Le Monde juif* was never as radical during the investigated period. In 1979, however, the CDJC arranged a symposium where the attitude towards the persecution of Jews in the resistance, the church and the state was discussed. The symposium lasted for three days, with historians from all over the world participating, one of them Robert Paxton. In *Le Monde juif* the symposium was summed up in one long article. These are some of the questions that were discussed during the symposium: "The French during the 1940s, were they indifferent to the persecutions of Jews? Did they assist or oppose, or did they choose not to meddle with the fatal threats and plans aimed at the Jews?"⁵⁰

Questions of this kind marked a new interest among historians attached to the CDJC. The purpose of the symposium was to let survivors from the period confront and add to the knowledge of the professional historians. In *Le Monde juif*, it was the first time that the attitude towards the persecution of Jews within the Resistance was discussed. The participants of the symposium agreed that for the most part the resistance groups in general showed little interest in the Jewish population. The resistance never actively inspired antisemitism, but there was a conviction that it could have reacted differently during the first years of the war.

At the symposium there was a tendency to question the strong dichotomy between the Resistance and the collaborators. Later studies have in fact shown that there were many different responses to the regime and the persecution of Jews.⁵¹ In the book *Vichy and the Jews*, the historians Robert Paxton and Michel Marrus maintained that the Vichy regime and the collaboration demonstrated a strong antisemitic atmosphere in France. According to them, there was only a tiny majority who were against the antisemitic politics, while other historians, such as Serge Klarsfeld, maintained that the French popu-

lation helped to save three-quarters of the Jews of France.⁵² The conference showed, however, that the CDJC was ready to confront not only the horror of the Vichy regime, but also wartime antisemitism in France.

The Post-War Recovery

Isaac Schneerson and his team made sure that the history of the Holocaust was written, and that the memory was transferred to future generations. It was for a long time the only institution in France with such ambitions. Thanks to Serge Klarsfeld's achievements, the Jewish victims of the Holocaust in France have been traced, and a wall with all their names has been constructed at the Memorial. However, the commemorative ceremonies during the investigated period were usually not well visited by Parisian Jews. The journal *Le Monde juif* and other CDJC publications were almost only of interest to specialists. When France was liberated from the German occupation, it left the Jewish community in France exhausted. Besides the 75,721 Jews who were deported, 4,000 died in internment camps in France or were executed. A large recovery work remained that involved different Jewish organisations. But the memory of the dark years was painful, and many Jews preferred not to look back on the past. There was a willingness among Jews to become integrated French citizens again.⁵³ They did not want to bring up questions about French assistance in the Holocaust.

The activities of the CDJC indicated a way within the community to emphasise the particularity of the Jewish trauma. The commemorations were an attempt to create a Jewish memory of the tragedy through rituals long before French society had been confronted with its responsibility for Vél'd'Hiv and recognised the Jewish deportation victims. They showed that the Jews had suffered apart from the French nation. This was not in accordance with the traditional French minority politics. But the CDJC also tried to establish a correspondence between the particular Jewish experience of the Holocaust and the universalism in France. The crypt on the Memorial is the symbolic tomb for all the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, but is simultaneously part of a patriotic tradition where characteristics such as military endeavour and self-sacrifice are associated with un-

known individuals who died in combat.⁵⁴ The tension between the republican tradition in France and the Jews was also displayed in the commemorative ceremonies, where a Jewish liturgy was combined with a secular.

The Jews were usually absent in historical writing about the occupation during the first two decades after the war in France. The same goes for profound studies of the Vichy regime and the politics of collaboration. During the first twelve years of the investigated period in the CDJC publications, little attention was paid to the Vichy regime and the collaboration. Joseph Billig's work *le Commissariat général aux Questions juives*, which described important collaboration structures, was an exception.

To understand the new reactions in the historical writing of the CDJC after the Six Day War, it is also necessary to recollect how the Jewish community in France changed after the Second World War. The independence of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria contributed to an influx of Jews from Maghreb who played an important role in the reconstruction of Jewish identity in France. The newcomers brought a new dynamism to Jewish life, with greater religiousness and a concept of Judaism that was more than just a practice confined to the private sphere.⁵⁵ This new face of French Jewry also had an impact on the memory of the Holocaust. During the Six Day War, it was particularly the North African Jews who expressed an unfailing support for the state of Israel.⁵⁶ Even if most North African Jews had no direct experience of the Nazis, the Holocaust became an important part of their identity. In *Le Monde juif* there was an increased interest in the Jewish wartime resistance in France after the Six Day War.

In the beginning of the 1970s, new studies of different aspects of the Vichy regime and the collaboration appeared at the CDJC. The Institute for the Study of the Jewish Questions was analysed in two essays in *Le Monde juif* and in one book. The attitude became more critical in the middle of the seventies when some of Robert Paxton's main theses started, increasingly, to permeate *Le Monde juif*. Public discussions were reflected in the journal, and French assistance to the Nazis in the Holocaust became an important history.

The symposium arranged by the CDJC in 1979, where the attitude towards the persecution of Jews among the French population

was discussed, marked another historiographical phase. The interest in public opinion during the occupation increased during the end of the 1970s. In today's France, the experiences of the Jews are central to the perception of the Second World War. The media coverage of the trials against Klaus Barbie, Paul Touvier and Maurice Papon strongly contributed to this change. This new step in the French collective memory has also been criticised. Henry Rousso has warned of what he calls a "Judeocentrism." He argues that such a memory tends to neglect other victims of the Vichy regime and other aspects of that period of time in France. Rousso also rhetorically asks if it is healthy for French society to always be reminded of the crimes committed by the Vichy regime.⁵⁷ Such a statement could seem controversial and surprising when it comes from a prominent historian such as Rousso, but should probably be regarded in the light of a fear that too strong a focus on the dark past might attract people who want to rehabilitate Vichy.⁵⁸ The disproportionate attention paid to the Vichy regime's assistance in the Holocaust can also be seen as either a reaction to the previous neglect in discussing these issues, or new forms of antisemitism in France. De Gaulle's assertion that Vichy was not France is no less misleading than repudiating that the Resistance also represented France.⁵⁹ The debate about French assistance in the Holocaust will continue to create discussions on national identity, as is illuminated by the conflicting memories of the Vichy regime.

Notes

1. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "Le défi de la Shoa à l'histoire," in *Les Juifs, la Mémoire et le Présent II*, Paris: la Découverte 1991, pp. 412–413. See also Annette Wieviorka, *Déportation et génocide. Entre la mémoire et l'oubli*, Paris: Plon 1992, pp. 430–431.
2. Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome. History and Memory in France since 1944*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1991.
3. Esther Benbassa, *The Jews in France. A History from antiquity to the present*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1999, p. 173.
4. Annette Wieviorka, "Un lieu de Mémoire et d'Histoire: Le Mémorial du martyr juif inconnu," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, No. 1–2, 1987, pp. 107–132.
5. Peter Carrier, *Holocaust Monuments and National Memory. Cultures in France and Germany since 1989. The Origins and Political Function of the Vél'd'Hiv' in Paris and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books 2005, p. 50.
6. Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years 1940–1944*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 611–612. See also Annette Wieviorka 1992, pp. 141–157.
7. "La journée des déportés," *Le Monde juif* No. 80, March–April 1958, pp. 34–35.

8. For French attitudes to the Vichy France during 1954–1971, see Henri Roussio 1991, pp. 66–97.
9. For instance, Jacques Chirac, as mayor of Paris, was present during a commemoration ceremony for Vél'd'Hiv in 1979. See “Commémoration des rafles de juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 95, July–September 1979, p. 116.
10. For a similar discussion, see Annette Wieviorka 1992, pp. 391–411.
11. Joan B. Wolf, *Harnessing the Holocaust. The Politics of Memory in France*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2004, pp. 12–14.
12. “La commémoration des Rafles du 16 juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 85–86, July–October 1959, pp. 50–51.
13. Alain de Rothschild, “Cérémonie commémorative des rafles des 16 et 17 juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 87, July–September 1977, p. 124.
14. Joseph Weinberg, “Cermonie commémorative des rafles des 16 et 17 juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 87, July–September 1977, p. 125.
15. Marcel Stourdézé, “Cermonie commémorative des rafles des 16 et 17 juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 87, July–September 1977, p. 125.
16. “L’affaire de Klaus Barbie,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 63–64, July–December 1971, pp. 65–66.
17. Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz, Le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France*, Paris: Fayard 1983; Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz 2, rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France 1943–1944*, Paris: Fayard 1985.
18. Jean-Pierre Azéma, *Vichy et la mémoire savante: quarante-cinq ans d’historiographie*, in Jean-Pierre Azéma & François Bédarida (eds.), *Le Régime de Vichy et les Français*, Paris: Fayard 1992, pp. 26–27.
19. See for instance, Joseph-Isaac Weill, *Contribution à l’histoire des camps d’internement dans l’Anti-France*, Paris: CDJC 1946; Joseph Lubetzki, *La condition des Juifs en France sous l’Occupation Allemande (1940–1944). La législation raciale*, Paris: CDJC 1945.
20. Henri Roussio 1991, p. 243.
21. Henri Roussio 1991, p. 243. See also Renée Poznanski, “Vichy et les Juifs. Des marges de l’histoire au cœur de son écriture,” in Jean Pierre Azéma & François Bédarida (eds.), *Vichy et les Français*, Paris: Fayard 1992, p. 59.
22. Joseph Billig, *Le Commissariat général aux questions juives III*, Paris: CDJC 1960, p. 310.
23. See for instance “Numéro spécial. Le procès d’Eichmann,” *Le Monde juif*, No 24–25, May–June 1961.
24. George Weller, “Le déroulement de la rafle des 16 et 17 juillet 1942,” *Le Monde juif*, No 12, April–June 1967, pp. 40–44.
25. Stanley Hoffman, “Aspects du régime de Vichy,” *Revue de française de science politique*, Janauri–March 1956.
26. Henri Roussio 1991, p. 251.
27. Lucien Steinberg, *Les Autorités allemande en France occupée. Inventaire commente de la collection de documents conservés au CDJC*, Paris: CDJC 1966.
28. Lucien Steinberg, “Il y a 25 ans: La première déportation de Juifs de France,” *Le Monde juif*, No. 11, January–March 1967, p. 38.
29. Joan B. Wolf 2004, pp. 26–27.
30. Henri Roussio 1991, pp 98–101.
31. Adam Rayski, “Paris face à la grande rafle,” *Le Monde juif*, No 12, April–June 1967, p. 28.
32. David Knout, *Contribution à l’histoire de la Résistance juive en France*, Paris: CDJC 1947; Jacques Lazarus, *Juifs au combat. Témoignage sur l’activité d’un mouvement de résistance*, Paris: CDJC 1947.

33. Furthermore, in 1968 there was a special edition concerning the event. See "20e anniversaire du soulèvement du ghetto de Varsovie," *Le Monde juif*, No. 49, January–March 1968.
34. Adam Ryaski, "Contre 'la nuit et le brouillard' – Octobre 1942 – la premières publications sur l'extermination," *Le Monde juif*, No. 14, October–December 1967.
35. Mikael Tossavainen, "Calendar, Context and Commemoration. Establishing an Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 59–80.
36. In 1968, Yad Vashem arranged a conference where the Jewish resistance in different countries in Europe was discussed and the CDJC was represented at the conference. Lucien Steinberg, "Le congrès des Historiens de la Résistance Juive," *Le Monde juif*, No. 51, September–May 1968.
37. Arnold Mandel, "Juifs de France et Israël – la modification," *Le Monde juif*, No. 47, July–September 1967, p. 1.
38. Dominique Schnapper, "Israélites and Juifs: New Jewish Identities in France," in Jonathan Weber (ed.) *Jewish Identities in the New Europe*, London: The Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies 1994.
39. Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order 1940–1944*, New York: Columbia University Press 1982.
40. Henri Rouso 1991, p. 252–259.
41. Joseph Billig, *L'institut d'Études des Questions Juives*, Paris: CDJC 1976, p. 14.
42. Roger Berg, "La Vichy France," *Le Monde juif*, No. 70, April–June 1973, p. 42.
43. Joan B. Wolf 2004, p. 66.
44. Georges Wellers, "Vichy et les juifs – à propos d'un article de M. Claude Gounelle," *Le Monde juif*, No. 81, January–March 1976, p. 7.
45. Fred Kupferman, "Le gouvernement Laval et les tentatives de relance de la collaboration," *Le Monde juif*, No. 84, October–December 1976, p. 136.
46. Jean-Marie Borzeix, "La politique de collaboration," in *Le Monde juif*, No. 84, October–December 1976, pp. 154–155.
47. Henry Michel, *Vichy, année 40*, Paris: R. Laffont 1966.
48. Jean-Marie Borzeix, "La politique de collaboration," in *Le Monde juif*, No. 84, October–December 1976 p. 156.
49. Robert O. Paxton 1982, p. 235.
50. Roger Berg, "Le Colloque 'L'État, les églises et les mouvements de résistance devant la persécution des juifs de France pendant la seconde guerre mondiale'," *Le Monde juif*, No. 93, January–March 1979, p. 3.
51. See for instance Pierre Laborie, *L'opinion publique sous Vichy*, Paris: Seuil 1990.
52. Jean-Pierre Azéma & Olivier Wieviorka, *Vichy 1940–1944*, Paris: Perrin 2004, p. 351.
53. Julian Jackson 2001, p. 612.
54. Peter Carrier has a similar and more detailed discussion of another commemoration place; Peter Carrier 2005, pp. 58–59.
55. Esther Benbassa 1999, pp. 185–189.
56. Esther Benbassa 1999, p. 191.
57. Eric Conan & Henry Rouso, *Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas*, Paris: Fayard 1994.
58. Julian Jackson 2001, p. 619.
59. Julian Jackson 2001, p. 632.

MIKAEL TOSSAVAINEN

Heroism, History and the Holocaust

The Religious Israeli Press between Judaism and Zionism

From the very beginning of the Zionist settlement of the Land of Israel in the second half of the 19th century, heroism was an important value in the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine. Together with pioneering and strength, it was one of the characteristics that was attributed to the protagonists in the writing and rewriting of the history of the Jewish people and the settlement of the land in modern times. Together with modern-day heroic pioneers, heroes from the past such as the Maccabees, and the rebels at Masada and Bar-Kokhba and his soldiers, were all lifted out of Jewish history, extolled and given a new interpretation, more fitting the times and the circumstances of the Yishuv, as shining examples of physical heroism.

With that in mind, it is not surprising that the Israeli commemorations of the Holocaust also sought out and elaborated instances of heroism in the dark time of the Nazi genocide. The best known and most important of these instances for the shaping of the Israeli view of the Holocaust was the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising that broke out on the eve of Passover, April 19, 1943. Fighters from the Warsaw ghetto founded two kibbutzim that became focal points of the Israeli historical culture. The Israeli memorial day for the Holocaust, tellingly called the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, was established in proximity to the anniversary of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto.

Zionist ideology in a broad sense and the worldview that comes with it, greatly influenced the Israeli understanding of the Holocaust in the early years of statehood. The archetypical Israeli view of a hero of the Holocaust was a secular Zionist who took up arms against the Nazis, a mirror-image of the new type of Jew – proud, strong and courageous – that the Israelis tried to be.



Mordechai Anielewicz is one of the heroes from the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. At the Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, a direct link was established between Mordechai and the few kibbutz fighters, who for several days resisted Egyptian battalions in May 1948. Because of this link, Nathan Rapoport placed his statue over Mordechai in front of the water tower, which collapsed after the battle in 1948. Photo: Ulf Zander.

From the very inception of Zionism, religious Jews have struggled with its implications for Jewish life, on the theoretical as well as the practical level. Even those religious Jews who were, and are, in favour of the Zionist project find some aspirations of the predominantly secular Zionist movement problematic. Zionist attempts to create a new Jew and its new set of values, more closely linked to other secular nationalisms than traditional Judaism, is one such problematic aspiration. The struggle over the relationship between Zionism and Judaism continues to this day in Jewish communities all over the world, but nowhere is it as acute as in the State of Israel.

The religious sector of Israeli society can roughly be divided into two major groups: the national religious, modern Orthodox, and the Haredi, sometimes called ultra-Orthodox. Both these groups incorporate a wide range of different and sometimes even contradictory views and opinions, but there is quite a lot of common ground between them. Nonetheless, there are a number of distinctive features that separate them. One is their respective attitudes toward Zionism and the State of Israel.

How do these two religious groups relate to the theme of heroism in the Holocaust? What do their approaches to this theme disclose regarding their relation to Israeli society and Israeli historical consciousness, and its great emphasis on physical heroism? The following is an analysis of attitudes toward the theme of heroism in the Holocaust in these two segments of the religious sector of Israeli society, as reflected through the two leading religious newspapers, the national religious, Zionist *Ha-Tzofe* and the Haredi, non-Zionist *Ha-Modia*. The analysis will centre upon what these newspapers have written in connection to Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day during the first twenty years after the Knesset passed the law establishing the memorial day in 1959.

History and the Past

There is no inherent meaning in the past, no manifest truth laid bare as time unfolds. On the contrary, what soon will be called the past is an innumerable amount of events occurring all the time all over the world. History is a different thing altogether – it looks nothing like the past. History is the past given meaning.¹ The past is chaos, whereas history is order. History explains what, and most importantly why, things turned out the way they did. The past is given meaning within the framework of *historical consciousness*, which can best be described as a mental process in which the individual makes sense of the contemporary world in the light of past experiences, perceptions of the present and expectations of the future.²

Since historical consciousness is a mental process, it leaves no traces or concrete manifestations that lend themselves to analysis. It does, however, affect the way a society processes and narrates the past and thus it, or rather its reflection, can be detected in the discourse of that society, most notably in its historical culture, understood as “cultural products or commodities, of various forms and content” that relate to history in one way or another.³ Through the study of historical culture one can analyse historical consciousness and thus understand how a certain society gives meaning to the past and what that meaning is. The historical consciousness of the individual develops through socialisation into a mnemonic community, be it a nation, a religious group or a fan club. Thus, our personal understanding of

the past is to a large extent a product of the historical cultures into which we have been socialised.⁴

Traditionally, scholarly works dealing with this process of socialisation have focused on historiography, that is history textbooks and academic publications. However, much – if not most – of the products and commodities of historical culture are not a part of the educational system or a product of scholarly debate. Although schools and their textbooks have an important role to play in the process of mnemonic socialisation into a distinct historical consciousness, there are many other arenas of historical culture. One such arena is the press, and many scholars have noted the importance of the press in shaping what Benedict Anderson has called an imagined community.⁵

It is clear that the public arena of the press is not open to everyone on equal footing, and so the reading public can easily be seen as an “abstract gathering of individuals, receiving impressions from the media,” lacking any real independence as individuals in the public discourse.⁶ In decades past it has been popular to ascribe much influence to the press as a power structure, able to tell the impressible masses what to think and do, thus shaping “the collective consciousness.”⁷ Nonetheless, it is overly simplistic to view readers merely as passive receivers of messages from a monolithic press, which tries to conserve the societal status quo. Clearly, there is a feedback-loop between the press and the public.⁸ Consequently, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction over the last few years, and now scholars tend to stress how the press is dependent on the public.⁹ The fact that the message must be bought – both figuratively and literally – forces the producing agent to take the reader into account. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even though the relationship between the press and the public is by no means a one-way communication, it is still markedly asymmetric.¹⁰

The Israeli Press

In the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine, the Yishuv, the press was virtually the only means of information on a mass scale. Radio was still a relative rarity in the world in general and had not yet reached this part of the world.¹¹ Television was introduced in the State of Israel only in the late 1960s. Even though the introduction of

other media since then has weakened the importance of the press, the Israelis are still a people who read newspapers to a great extent. This holds true especially for the television-avoiding religious public.¹²

There are essentially two kinds of newspapers – those that want to sell an idea, and those that just want to sell. In the pre-state years and during the first years after the inception of the State of Israel, the party press was an essential part of the distribution of news in the Yishuv. The political parties have traditionally kept their respective newspapers under strict control. Since the *raison d'être* of the party press was always to spread the opinion of a particular party, and the party always cared for the sustenance of its mouthpiece, the party dailies were never governed by the rules that applied to the non-aligned commercial press. Since they never had to adapt to the dramatic demographical, cultural and economical changes in Israeli society at large, the inevitable result was that they became increasingly out of touch with the general public. This was never really a problem as long as the party kept supporting its paper financially, but the weakening of the willingness of the parties to funnel resources to the press in the 1960s and 1970s led to a crisis and ultimately the collapse of the secular party press. Since the early 1990s, the only newspapers aligned with a political party left in the State of Israel are the religious newspapers.¹³

The religious party press, to which the national religious *Ha-Tzofe* and the Haredi *Ha-Modia* belong, always had a considerably smaller circulation than the larger commercial dailies. However, it plays a more important role for its readership than the press in general does in the process of mnemonic socialisation.¹⁴ The religious newspapers serve as an important forum for debate in the religious sector of Israeli society and give a voice to the religious public in the State of Israel. This makes them essential arenas for mnemonic socialisation and the development of the historical consciousness in the religious sectors of Israeli society.

Still, there are radical differences between *Ha-Modia* and *Ha-Tzofe*, reflecting the differences between the two parties and religious communities they represent. These dissimilarities must be seen in the context of the conflicting views within the religious communities in the State of Israel pertaining to issues such as Zionism, the State of Israel itself, modern society and – in this case – the Holocaust.

Zionism and Judaism – Clash and Consonance

Zionism, that is the idea of a Jewish independent state in the Land of Israel and the immigration of world Jewry to this state, is the ideological cornerstone of the State of Israel. One might think there would be a consensus in the Jewish state endorsing Zionism, but that is not the case. On an ideological level, the Haredi segment of religious Jewry rejects the modern world in general and Zionism and the State of Israel in particular.¹⁵ The Haredi worldview crystallised in Europe over a century ago, more or less parallel to the development of the Zionist movement. It was a reaction to the spread of secularism, assimilation, socialism and nationalism, and calls for religious reform in a liberal direction among the rank and file of European Jewry. The Haredim felt the secularising threat to their traditional worldview, in which God is the King of the Universe and Lord of History and everything that happens in the world is according to His will. To counter this threat, the Haredi party Agudat Israel was formed in Kattowitz in 1912. The party's task was, and continues to be, preserving the traditional Jewish way of life, and it gradually developed into a major platform for the propagation of the pious and very strict Haredi interpretation of Judaism and Jewish law, Halakhah.¹⁶

Zionism and the State of Israel are based on two concepts that the Haredi community cannot accept: on the one hand the strive toward normalisation of the Jewish people, to turn the Jews into a people like every other nation, and not “a people that dwell alone,” and on the other hand, the ingathering of the exiles to the Land of Israel ostensibly before this was deemed appropriate by God.¹⁷ The Haredim also object to the idea of a secular Jewish identity and the development of a secular Jewish culture in general. Some segments of the Haredi community in the State of Israel refuse not only to recognise the state, but even to speak its language or take part in its elections. Even those Haredim who do speak Hebrew and vote in the Israeli elections, still send their children to special Haredi schools, where they do not run the risk of being exposed to a secular education, and refuse to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces, the IDF. The Haredi sense of perennial opposition has far-reaching implications for the approach of the Haredi community to Israeli historical consciousness and of course also for its interpretation of the Holocaust.

However, all religious Israeli Jews are not Haredim. The second major sector is the national, i.e. Zionist, religious one. At a convention in Vilna in 1902 the religious Zionists founded their party, Mizrahi; the predecessor of the National Religious Party, NRP, of today. From the very outset, the Mizrahi as a movement was torn between the romantic notion of "renewal of the days of old" and the modern idea of the establishment of a modern Jewish state in the traditional homeland of the Jews.¹⁸ The party and its supporters have also always been keenly aware of Haredi criticism of Jewish nationalism as a Gentile influence, and religious Zionists were traditionally very careful in stressing that their movement was not messianic and that they were not in violation of Divine decrees of exile.¹⁹ The religious Zionist movement is very broad and includes people with very shifting interpretations of Judaism. What they all have in common, though, is a positive approach to the Zionist movement and the State of Israel – some even grant religious meaning to the state itself.²⁰

The size, and even more so the importance, of these sectors are hard to assess, but roughly ten per cent of Israeli Jews can be described as Haredim and another ten per cent as national religious. These two tenths are the core segments of the two main religious sectors in Israeli society, although a considerable portion of the rest of the Jewish population, somewhere between thirty and fifty per cent, identify as traditional Jews who observe religious customs and practices to some extent, without being ideologically committed to them. Only about half of Israeli Jewry identify themselves as secular, and the majority of these are Ashkenazim, that is to say of European origin, whereas the lion's share of the traditional Jews are of Oriental origin. The religious sectors consist of both Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews, but it may be of interest to note that the elites of both the national religious and the Haredi sectors are Ashkenazi, and their newspapers under scrutiny here are dominated by Ashkenazi owners and reporters.

The Holocaust and Israeli Historical Culture

Despite the enormity of the Holocaust, the forms of national Israeli commemoration of the genocide were long in coming. The first commemorations were observed by those who mourned relatives and friends, and these commemorations took on traditional forms.²¹ The

1950s saw increasing social and financial problems for the young Jewish state, brought on by an ailing economy, the dramatic influx of new immigrants, both from Europe and the Arab world, and the aftermath of the bloody War of Independence that had cost the state one per cent of its population.²² In this situation the Holocaust was far from a top priority on the public agenda, and in any case dwelling on the past was not encouraged; the new immigrants from Europe were expected to look forward and build new lives for themselves and the new Jewish state.²³ This willingness to forget the past in favour of building a new and brighter future was prominent in many socialist-influenced societies at the time. In the Israeli case, it translated into shedding the memories of powerlessness, humiliation and exile in the diaspora, and instead cultivated the image of the New Hebrew who would be a farmer and pioneer in the ancient homeland – proud, strong and sun-tanned – as opposed to the pale and weak ghetto Jews of yore.²⁴

The government, headed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, had problems finding a suitable format for commemorating the destruction of European Jewry. Although the Holocaust seemed to vindicate the Zionist dictum that Jewish life in the diaspora was doomed, it also presented conceptual problems. The top priority for the leadership of the newly established state was to strengthen it, develop it and secure its survival. The upper echelons of Israeli society wanted to shape Israeli historical consciousness in a positive manner, emphasising pioneering, victory, development, and ultimately the normalisation of the Jewish people. Against this background, there was nothing to benefit from a cultivation of the Holocaust memory.²⁵

Nonetheless, the Holocaust was an event too enormous in its hideousness to be ignored by the state, and thus the government set out to find a suitable framework for its commemoration. Israeli society was, however, deeply divided on the issue of what would be a suitable framework, and it took the Knesset until 1959 to definitely establish the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day on Nisan 27. The choice of this date, which connects the commemorations of the Holocaust with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943, might have been popular and seen as natural by broad segments of the Israeli public, but the religious sector in general, and the Haredim in particular, opposed it.²⁶

Although the format of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day from 1959 remains intact today, its image and the general public's adherence to the law regulating the commemoration of the Holocaust have varied greatly over the years. These developments are also reflected in the press coverage of this memorial day. An analysis of this coverage discloses not only the nature of these changes, but also hints toward shifts in Israeli historical consciousness.

Ha-Tzofe – Combining Judaism and Zionism

Ha-Tzofe was founded in 1938 and has always served as the mouth-piece of the National Religious Party, the NRP. As a consequence, the paper has always represented a positive approach to the Zionist project and been part of the activist segment of the Yishuv. Like the religious Zionist movement in general, *Ha-Tzofe* has a positive attitude toward the State of Israel – in fact endows it with theological meaning – and supports participation in its development, trying to influence this development in a religious direction or at least steering away from increased secularism.

The religious branch of the Zionist movement rests on the two pillars of Judaism and Zionism that are not always harmonious. In a way, religious Zionism fights a two-front battle against secular Zionists on the one hand and non-Zionist religious Jews on the other, trying to find a way to combine the two sometimes conflicting worldviews.²⁷ Generally speaking, this show in the coverage of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day in *Ha-Tzofe*, which covers all the regular elements featured in the secular Israeli press, such as important ceremonies at the secular kibbutzim, but also gives prominence to religious commemorations.²⁸

Thus the prominent place given to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in the Israeli historical culture was accepted and reflected in the pages of *Ha-Tzofe*. The majority of religious Zionists also viewed the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising favourably, although their interpretation was slightly different than that of the secular, especially left-wing, segments of Israeli society. Broad segments of the religious Zionist sector drew spiritual conclusions from the uprising, linking it to the belief in imminent redemption and martyrdom through sanctification of God's Name, and emphasised the ghetto fighters' alleged

“deep messianic faith, the faith that unites us, by virtue of which we have established the state.”²⁹ *Ha-Tzofe* has always stressed that armed resistance was not the only form of resistance, speaking out against the one-sided focus on the rebels. One important aspect of this is criticism leveled at the tendency of the left-wing opposition party MAPAM, the United Workers’ Party, and other leftist groups to attempt to monopolise Jewish heroism.³⁰

Embracing Physical Heroism

A feature article devoted to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising published in 1959 provides a good illustration of how the general Israeli historical consciousness, focusing on physical heroism and armed resistance, appears also in the national religious *Ha-Tzofe*. The article contains a passionate description of the few Jews against the large number of German soldiers, as well as their Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian aides. The article states how the Nazis advanced on the ghetto and how heavily armed they were in comparison to the few and poorly-armed Jews with little or no military training. Then it describes the cruelty of the German army in some detail and how the ghetto was defeated and destroyed.³¹ This way of describing the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising as an heroic act that was doomed beforehand runs as a constant theme through the whole period of analysis, as can be seen also in later descriptions.³²

These sentiments of hopeless Jewish heroism and ultimate defeat in the Warsaw ghetto were also at the centre of attention on the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day in 1963, twenty years after the uprising. Although much positive attention is paid to the uprising’s 20th anniversary, the paper’s religious outlook is also apparent: “And behold it was a miracle – youths that until this day had never as much as touched heavy arms, the majority of whom used any kind of gun for the first time in their lives – did not become nervous at all.”³³

The fact that physical heroism and armed resistance were generally associated with the left-wing Zionists in Israeli historical consciousness was a cause for some embarrassment to the religious Zionists, who defended themselves against explicit or implicit claims of cowardice and passivity in contrast to their secular brethren. A feature piece from 1963 stresses heroism among religious Jews, implicitly ar-

guing against the claim of the left and the majority of the religious community that heroism is exclusively a left-wing affair:

To our great sorrow, religious Jewry, in all its streams, has not done anything since the end of the war to clarify for itself whether and to what extent religious youth participated in the active war against the Germans. This indifference borders on gross irresponsibility. This Jewry does not know at all that there were youth from among the believers of Israel who took part in the war for Jewish honour in the ghettos and partisan forests. There were yeshivah students, those attending batei midrash, believers in the commandments of the Lord. They no less than others knew how to defend their souls, both physically and metaphorically. Many, many of them fell in the partisan war against the Germans. Comprehensive scholarship, based on testimonies, documents etc. can disclose the truth in this.³⁴

The article concludes that remembering these religious fighters is “nothing short of a historical duty, not only to the past but especially to the future, because the coming generations must receive a more truthful picture of the Holocaust and of the heroism.”³⁵ Presumably this “more truthful picture” would serve to undermine the monopoly of the left on heroism, giving the religious Zionist movement some of its glory too.

As time progressed, and especially after the Eichmann trial in 1961, Israeli understanding of the Holocaust deepened and the implicit accusation of those who did not resist the Nazis gave way to an even greater respect for those who did fight despite the conditions surrounding European Jewry during the Second World War.³⁶ In 1973, an editorialising column attacks those who still accuse the Jews of Europe of cowardice and ask why they did not resist: “There is no people in Europe that was not bereft of its sons and daughters in Hitler’s camps, but one does not hear of any people that hang a sign saying ‘cowards’ on their murdered children. Such a thing only happened among the Jews.”³⁷

Although *Ha-Tzofe* favours descriptions of Jewish physical heroism and armed resistance, the paper also features descriptions of Jewish weakness, suffering and death.³⁸ Although a lot of attention is given to the Warsaw ghetto and the uprising there, other aspects of

the Holocaust and the plight of the Jews in German-occupied lands are described in the national religious newspaper without reverting to the redeeming narrative of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the saving of Jewish honour.³⁹ A long feature article from 1970 about a cantor in Warsaw, “the Jewish Caruso” Gershon Sirota, illustrates what was lost in terms of pre-War Jewish life in the Holocaust, something that became increasingly common in the years following the 1961 Eichmann trial. The article does not feature any participants in the uprising, which is mentioned only in passing toward the end:

The Jews of Poland, and especially of course the Jews of Warsaw, loved Gershon Sirota of blessed memory very much and they were proud of him. Not only religious people but even atheists tried to get hold of tickets to his services and concerts where he appeared. [...] Gershon Sirota met a very tragic end in the Warsaw ghetto. He shared the fate of the many thousands of Jews who adored him and enjoyed his services so. [...] This giant among the cantors of Israel withered away until he was nothing but a shadow of a man. At the time of the ghetto uprising, at Passover 1943, he found his death together with the members of his family in a bunker at Wolinska Street 6.⁴⁰

Such descriptions of Jewish weakness and suffering during the Holocaust should not be seen as anomalies or exceptions to the general formula of physical heroism and armed resistance. Descriptions of suffering and weakness were assigned an inherent value in and of themselves since they helped Israelis to understand and identify with European Jewry under Nazi rule.⁴¹ This is a tendency that grows increasingly strong over the analysed period, following the Eichmann trial in 1961, when the Israeli public was exposed to long and detailed testimonies of the horrors of the Holocaust. The trial brought about increased sympathy for the Holocaust survivors and an understanding of their actions. This tendency was further strengthened by the Six Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Spiritual Heroism as Parallel Heroism

The religious Zionist sector might have shared the positive Israeli attitude toward the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and other forms of physical heroism, but already at the beginning of the analysed period the

picture of the Holocaust presented in the national religious *Ha-Tzofe* is broader, also including Jewish life in pre-War Europe as well as suffering in the ghettos and the camps. There are also quite a few examples of articles praising spiritual heroism, especially toward the end of the period.

In an article published in 1966 dealing with Israeli attitudes to the Holocaust and its victims, the issue of why Israelis ask why the Jews did not do more to resist the Germans is brought up once again. The article notes that it was asked frequently during the Eichmann trial:

[B]ut the answer was always the same: there was nowhere to flee and therefore there was no objective for an uprising. In fact, the heroism was to continue living. To keep going day after day despite the terrors [...] Chaya Friedman says: they did anything to live. To live like Jews. They lit stubs of candles on the eve of Shabbat in order to infer an ambiance of Shabbat and of holidays and to feel the human being inside of them. Under the horrible conditions of Auschwitz this was [true] heroism as it was heroism to go to the gas chambers and the owens singing [...] or praying the "Shema." Many of them took their stories of heroism with them to their grave. It was also unforgettable heroism when youths went into the gas chambers with their parents only so as not to abandon them on their last journey.⁴²

Even though *Ha-Tzofe* – true to its religious roots – stresses spiritual heroism and faithfulness to Judaism and the commandments even in the extremely harsh conditions of the ghettos and the camps, it does not value spiritual heroism above its physical counterpart – the two forms of resistance are parallel rather than conflicting:

In the years of the catastrophe, in the ghettos and the death camps, during the most horrible torture, masses of Jews kept their image, the image of the Creator in the created, in the continuation of congregating for prayers and in the study of Torah, and in acts of kindness and in the faith in the eternity of Israel. This is the spiritual heroism of the people who sanctify God's Name in their lives and beyond it. A considerable number expressed it through armed resistance in the ghettos and partisan actions in the forests.⁴³

Also the official prayer for the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, published in 1978 by the Chief Rabbinate, the most prestigious and respected religious body for the national religious sector, shows this parallelism of heroisms. It illustrates that the religious Zionist community identifies with Israeli historical culture but feels a need to fill the ceremonies and commemorations with additional religious content. The third section of the prayer, composed by chief rabbi Goren, speaks of “the ghetto fighters, remains of the sword of the heroes of spirit and deed who roused their souls to die for the sanctification of God’s Name and the revival of the people.”⁴⁴

With the shift in Israeli historical consciousness following the Eichmann trial in 1961, the Six Day War in 1967 and especially the trauma of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, there was an increasing debate in Israeli society on the value of heroism and the consequences of stressing it so much in the commemorations on the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day. This is reflected also in *Ha-Tzofe*, which defends the parallel heroisms and argues that those who criticise the formula of “Holocaust and Heroism” use too narrow a definition of the term heroism, focusing only on armed resistance. Instead, the paper wants to promote a wider interpretation that includes spiritual, as well as physical, heroism.⁴⁵ Arguably, it would be hard to express national religious sentiments in connection to the Holocaust, equating physical and spiritual heroism, in any clearer terms.

Ha-Modia – Judaism In Opposition to Zionism

The Haredi desire to keep its distance from the secular society that surrounds it also has consequences for the Haredi press, and a newspaper such as *Ha-Modia* is governed by other rules than the secular, or even non-Haredi religious, press. The explicit strategy of the paper, founded in 1949 as the mouthpiece of the non-Zionist Haredi party, Agudat Israel, is not so much to inform the public as to strengthen its belief in the superiority of the Haredi way of life and the party-sanctioned version of the truth.⁴⁶ Instead of describing the world as it is, *Ha-Modia* serves its readers a vision of what the world should be like. As a consequence, the ratio of editorials and columns to news is much higher than in the press generally.⁴⁷ By and large, the success of this strategy can be credited to the cooperation of the Haredi public.⁴⁸ In combi-

nation with the Haredi reluctance to interact with secular people and their shunning of television and non-Haredi radio stations, one can assume that *Ha-Modia* plays a much more important role in the mnemonic socialisation of the Haredi historical consciousness than is the case with other newspapers and other sectors of Israeli society.

In 1953, the year of the 10th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, *Ha-Modia* displays ambivalence toward this prominent symbol of Jewish physical resistance during the Holocaust. On the one hand the paper writes positively about the uprising and that it saved Jewish honour, but on the other it has problems with the connection between the uprising and Zionism. Much like the national religious *Ha-Tzofe*, the Haredi *Ha-Modia* stresses that the left has no monopoly on resistance and that the uprising is the inheritance of all Jews. The paper also stresses the keeping of the commandments as equal to – if not superior to – armed resistance, and *Ha-Modia* criticises the Israeli commemorations of the Holocaust with their emphasis on armed resistance. There are signs already here hinting at the later alienation from the Zionist historical consciousness of the Israeli society, but this attitude has yet to crystallise.⁴⁹

This alienation is based on the difference between the Haredi and Zionist worldviews in general and more specifically their clashing historical consciousnesses. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was used by the Zionists to stress the difference between the new free-spirited and proud Jew and the old diaspora Jew. This is a difference that the Haredi community has always rejected, or at least reinterpreted with positive connotations to the pious diaspora Jews. Thus, in opposition to the common interpretation of the uprising as an honorable display of heroism, the Haredim could not assimilate the image of the rebellious secular Jew in the burning ghetto as a positive role-model.⁵⁰ Some voices in the Haredi community even tried to undermine the glory of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising by claiming that the revolt was not a sign of heroism and strength, but rather of weakness and assimilationism. The traditional Jewish way is to always try to preserve life at all costs. Seeking death as the rebels did in the Warsaw ghetto in the spring of 1943 is thus turned into a sign of how alienated they were from Jewish values and their own people, and of how desperately they tried to act like the Gentiles.⁵¹

Opposing Israeli Historical Culture

The increasingly dominating theme in the Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day coverage in *Ha-Modia* is its distancing from the Israeli commemorations of the Holocaust and an ever-intensifying criticism against the date chosen for the Holocaust commemoration and the content of the ceremonies. After the establishment of the memorial day on Nisan 27, the heated debate about which date would be most suitable soon subsided or disappeared in most sectors of Israeli society, but not among the Haredim. Articles in the Haredi newspaper repeatedly criticise the memorial day, starting with a religiously argued point against focusing commemoration to one specific date: “Remember what Amalek did to you’ – this commandment of remembering the actions of Amalek in every generation is not bound to a specific time, day or hour. This commandment is one that every Jew has to learn every moment, all the time, and it is not possible to limit it to a specific date.”⁵²

Much criticism is also directed at the Knesset for establishing the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day on this “alien date” in order to shape Israeli historical consciousness in a one-sided direction: toward the glorification of heroism and armed resistance instead of commemorating the destroyed diaspora communities in the traditional Jewish – and implicitly more authentic – way.⁵³ An editorial published in 1963 in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising focuses on the liquidation of the ghetto and not the uprising, and then stresses that the feeling of loss is too great to be contained in one day. Such polemic arguments go against not only the Israeli focus on the heroism of the ghetto fighters, turning it into an honourable and almost positive experience, but it also negates the validity of the memorial day itself. The article ends with the remark that official Israel does not pay proper tribute to the victims of the Holocaust – those who displayed heroism by dying a martyr’s death for sanctification of God’s Name – and finally that the only proper way to honour their memory would be to emulate their righteous way of life.⁵⁴ Lack of “proper,” that is religious, commemorations is lamented repeatedly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and *Ha-Modia* points out that “the people” would prefer more traditional Jewish forms of commemoration: “It is a fact that memorial days and

secular symbols are not accepted by the people. [...] Jewry knows one term connected to the Holocaust and that is sanctification of God's Name. Heroism of the spirit is crucial in the Jewish world, not heroism of the body."⁵⁵

There are some religious elements in the commemorations such as the reciting of certain prayers, but the ceremonies on the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day are essentially secular, inspired by international modes of national secular commemorations. This draws a lot of criticism in *Ha-Modia*, which decries these commemorations as "un-Jewish." In keeping with the Haredi outlook of the paper, the established commemorations seem unfit and unworthy: "The program established for this day by the secular authorities cannot answer to the hidden feelings of man's heart." The Haredi newspaper sees a day of remembrance that does not conform with Halakhah, Jewish law, as not only incapable of creating the proper mood of mourning, but even as a dishonour to the victims.⁵⁶

The idea of a gap between the secular and secularising leaders and the people yearning for religion shows up again and again in this context. After the first Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, *Ha-Modia* asks rhetorically if the day has succeeded in properly commemorating "those who perished in the years of slaughter and killing of our people in the Holocaust unparalleled in quantity and brutality from the day God created man on earth." The leaders of the state love to talk about the Holocaust and the establishment of the state as the two most significant occurrences in our generation, but they fail to see God's hand in this. "But if the Jewish state must be a remembrance of the terrible Holocaust, then it must be a state that is really Jewish, not a distortion of Judaism and not a falsification of Israel." The conclusion is that the only thing that will honour the martyrs of the Holocaust is the establishment of a state based on Torah, or in other words replacing the secular democratic institutions of the state with a Jewish theocracy, presumably led by Haredi rabbis.⁵⁷

Beyond the date chosen for the memorial day and the content of the commemorations, *Ha-Modia* goes one step further and offers the religious opinion that no contemporary body, such as the Knesset, has the authority to establish any new days of mourning in the Jewish calendar. After establishing that no date could have been acceptable

due to the lack of a proper authority to decide on these matters, the editorial goes on to say that in any case it is strange that the “secularists” chose a day in association with the “liquidation” – not uprising – of the Warsaw ghetto.⁵⁸ The paper distances the Haredi sector from the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day by describing its inception as a secular and illegitimate scheme, concluding that “Torah Jewry did not take part in the decision of the Knesset to establish Nisan 27 as Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day. The secular Knesset may not decide on the establishment of a memorial day for the six million martyrs.”⁵⁹

The secular forms of national mourning are seen by *Ha-Modia* as a means to further the Zionist goal of normalisation for the Jewish people, promoted especially by the first prime minister of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion. Needless to say, this is a goal vehemently opposed by the Haredim on religious grounds, and the criticism of the adoption of non-Jewish customs for public mourning must be seen from this perspective: “The lowering of flags to half-mast, two minutes of silence and similar ceremonies – for all their statist etiquette – are weeds alien in the House of Israel and they are not likely to stir the soul to contemplation and mourning suitable for this day.”⁶⁰ The paper brandishes the commemorations as void of meaning since they are not religious and the proper lessons are not learnt, and the conclusion is that the non-Jewish customs adopted by the Zionist leadership not only fail to speak to the Jewish public, but also do not teach the proper lessons of the Holocaust.

In fact, *Ha-Modia* accuses the government of using the memorial day to blur the memory of the Holocaust in order to advance its own political agenda.⁶¹ The paper claims that the establishment dedicated a day for Holocaust commemoration, but at the same time they do whatever they can to make Israel forget the Holocaust so that they will be able to make peace with the “German murderers.” *Ha-Modia* is against normalisation of ties with Germany and exchange of ambassadors and scolds those who would like to “drive to Memorial Mount [and the state commemorations] in an elegant German car.”⁶² In 1971, the paper elaborates on the theme of the secular Israeli élite paradoxically using the memorial day to forget and not to remember the Holocaust, and distinguishes between real pain and Zionist pain

in relation to the Holocaust. It criticises those who wish to forgive and forget, those who “declared more than once that the Germans of today are not the ones that murdered Jews,” and also puts forward the habitual Haredi accusation that the Zionists are assimilationists who undermine the future of Judaism.⁶³

During the 1960s and 1970s, the commemorations of the Holocaust on the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day continuously grew in popularity in Israeli society at large and gained wider acceptance and observance from the general public. However, judging by the press coverage in *Ha-Modia*, the trend in the Haredi sector of Israeli society was the opposite. The objections are voiced over and over again almost every year, and with the passing of time are sharpened. In the early 1960s, the paper is mostly skeptical about the chosen date and its association with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Toward the end of the analysed period the paper argues not only that the date is flawed, but even that there should not be a single date; and if there after all is one, then the Knesset does not have the authority to establish it anyway. The hesitance to get involved in the Israeli historical culture from the earlier years is later replaced by a firm rejection of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day and everything connected to it.⁶⁴ Thus one can discern a widening gap between the historical consciousness in the Haredi sector and Israeli society at large.

Spiritual Heroism as Alternative Heroism

The image of the Holocaust in the Haredi historical consciousness is to a large extent an inverted picture of the general Israeli one. This entails a lot of criticism against the secular Israeli commemorations and the focus on physical heroism and armed resistance. Instead it stresses spiritual heroism and continued adherence to a religious way of life as the highest ideal and most laudable behaviour in the Holocaust.⁶⁵ As opposed to the religious Zionist sector, which employs stories of spiritual heroism as a parallel to physical heroism to share in the glory allotted to the heroes, the Haredi community goes beyond that and strives to supplant the established image of physical resistance as the archetypal form of heroism. A more fitting term of the Haredi version, then, would be alternative – rather than parallel

—heroism.⁶⁶ There is a clear tendency to stress this kind of alternative heroism also in *Ha-Modia*.

From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that *Ha-Modia* rejects the accusation of “sheep to the slaughter” that was widespread in Israeli society during the first decades after the Holocaust. Already in 1960, the paper decries public leaders who allow themselves to blame victims who perished without defending themselves, and suggests that it is a way for them to clear their conscience for not having done enough to save them. “They desecrate the memory of the Holocaust and viciously blur the memory of Jewish heroism that was embodied in the martyrs who accepted their agony with love, faith and without hesitation accepted their fate.”⁶⁷

Ha-Modia worries about the modes of commemoration in Israeli society and the lack of attention given to spiritual heroism during the Holocaust: “There must never come a situation in which our children won’t know about the destruction and the heroism of the soul among the Jews who undertook their last journey with the happiness of sanctification of God’s Name, about the Jews who in bunkers, forests and death camps gave their lives to lay tefillin and eat matzah, read the megillah and dwell in a sukkah.”⁶⁸ According to the paper, the state exaggerates physical heroism at the expense of the spiritual. *Ha-Modia* wants more commemorative attention given to the fact that Jews despite starvation and other horrors kept their divine image: “They scorned the Nazi animals in the depth of their hearts and went to their deaths out of sanctification of God’s Name, reciting Shema Israel.”⁶⁹ In an effort to foster an alternative historical consciousness in competition with the Israeli one, the paper lashes out against the commemorations of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day that focus solely on physical heroism, especially of the Warsaw ghetto rebels, and belittles the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and asks rhetorically if it isn’t absurd that physical resistance gets to represent the Holocaust instead of the spiritual kind.⁷⁰

A part of the supersession of Israeli historical culture is the promotion of alternative heroes. A good example of one such an alternative hero is Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel. He was a Haredi rabbi who struggled very hard during the Second World War to aid Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland. The way in which *Ha-Modia* extols

him and his deeds is a typical example of the construction of a Haredi alternative hero, establishing a paradigm of alternative heroism. Rabbi Weissmandel, and his tireless efforts to save Jews during the Holocaust, is presented as a superior form of hero to the rebels in the Warsaw ghetto who fought and died for something as vain and pointless as national honour. The contrast is quite conscious and it even employs the language and phrases used in the Zionist historical culture, but turns them on their head:

He did not know guns of steel and he did not raise the banner of rebellion. Nonetheless this man was a remarkable partisan. One of the greatest that the people have known. He didn't plunge lead bullets into the hearts of Germans and didn't demand "a hero's death" for himself. His heart was given to rescue operations, only rescue, of many thousands. He possessed great sobriety of a leader in the days of the Holocaust.⁷¹

Ha-Modia claims that the secular establishment tries to silence or profane the memory of such people as Rabbi Weissmandel, because he did not belong to a secular, socialist Zionist organisation, but was a pious man and consequently useless as a hero to the Israeli establishment.⁷² The Israeli view of pre-war European Jewry is also criticised in *Ha-Modia*. The paper accuses the Israeli government of "selection of history" and of willful distortion through which religious life and the importance of religious institutions are downplayed.⁷³

The overall tendency in the coverage of the Holocaust on the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day in *Ha-Modia* is a development of an increasing Haredi distancing from the mainstream of Israeli historical consciousness, manifested in the newspaper's reluctance to participate in, and later even a rejection of, the commemorations of this memorial day. Whereas the general trend in the Israeli press on this day is a deepening and broadening coverage with the passing of time, *Ha-Modia* writes less and less about it for every passing year, and its coverage shifts from news of the events, memorial services and commemorative ceremonies to editorialising denunciations of the memorial day. Although the paper's editorial line is steadfastly critical of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, the disapproval grows increasingly radical and focuses on more fundamental issues as time passes. Thus the general Haredi distancing from

Israeli society and its historical culture shines through in the coverage in *Ha-Modia*. In fact, one of the dominating themes in *Ha-Modia* in connection to the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day is the paper's need to distance itself from Israeli historical consciousness, a need that intensifies during the 1960s and 1970s.

The Holocaust and Heroism

Overall, there is a clear development in the coverage of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day both in the national religious *Ha-Tzofe* and the Haredi *Ha-Modia*, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The development is, however, different in the two newspapers. Quantitatively, the national religious newspaper tends to increase its coverage of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day throughout the analysed period, whereas its Haredi counterpart cuts down the number of articles devoted to the topic. In fact, the Haredi *Ha-Modia* even starts to exclude news items covering the events connected to the day, and also refrains from publishing advertisements from Yad Va-Shem publicising the commemorative ceremonies. Toward the end of the analysed period, *Ha-Modia* has distanced itself from Israeli historical culture to the extent that the only way that the Haredi paper acknowledges the memorial day is by denouncing it. The national religious *Ha-Tzofe*, on the other hand, develops its coverage in a quite different direction.

Heroism, the dominating theme of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day in the Israeli press in early years, also shows up in the national religious newspaper, although it has a complex relationship to the phenomenon. In comparison to Israeli society at large, the religious sector focuses less on physical resistance, a fact sometimes lamented in *Ha-Tzofe*. One possible reason for this could be the apparent embarrassment in the national religious community over the fact that armed resistance was so intimately connected with the socialist Zionists, represented in the State of Israel by the United Workers' Party, MAPAM, and to a lesser extent the governing Labor Party, MAPAI. This connection also resulted in the reoccurring claims on the pages of the national religious newspaper that there were scores of religious ghetto fighters, partisans and other resistance heroes, but that their story has not been discovered and remains untold.

The dilemma presented by the embracing of physical heroism and the difficulty in finding religious representatives for it, is solved in *Ha-Tzofe* by expanding the category of heroism. This also gives the paper a way to describe both Jewish suffering and traditional Jewish life in pre-War Europe, subsequently lost in the maelstrom of the Nazi genocide, while still adhering to the heroism ideal. In the aftermath of the Eichmann trial in 1961 and the wars in 1967 and 1973, a growing acceptance for such a broadening of the concept of heroism can also be discerned in Israeli historical culture generally. This development is best described as a cultivation of parallel forms of heroism. That being said, the armed resistance never lost its status as *primus inter pares* among all the forms of heroism in the Holocaust during this period.

Simultaneously with the broadening of the heroism concept, there is a growing tendency to answer the accusation of cowardice leveled against those who did not take part in physical resistance against the Nazis. The catchphrase “like lambs to the slaughter,” implying that the Jews who were murdered let themselves be butchered in a shameful manner instead of putting up a fight, is in fact only heard when it is repudiated. At the same time as perceived Jewish passivity is explained and exonerated, there are instances where suffering and death of the faithful who did not abandon religion even in the face of death, are extolled as values in themselves. These instances become more commonplace as time progresses.

Whereas the national religious *Ha-Tzofe* operates in concert with – albeit not completely within – the secular Israeli historical culture throughout the analysed period, the Haredi *Ha-Modia* grows increasingly hostile to secular Israeli modes of commemorations on Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day. The criticism leveled at the Israeli interpretation of the Holocaust is increasingly vehement and radicalised. A clear example is the memorial day itself. At first it is met with cautious skepticism in regard to the date chosen for the commemorations, but soon the concept of a day of commemoration is itself called into question, and the authority of the Knesset to establish such a day is rejected on religious grounds. The Haredi community carries a self-image of opposition to the Zionist project in general, and it is only logical that it would also keep its distance to Israeli secular historical culture.

Haredi historical consciousness is coloured by religious beliefs, according to which God is the Lord of History and as a consequence everything that happens is His will. Although this position stands in staunch opposition to Israeli historical consciousness, this by no means implies that the Haredi view would be unaffected by it. On the contrary. This phenomenon is also clearly visible in the pages of *Ha-Modia*. The concept of heroism that dominates Israeli historical culture, and in fact defined the establishment of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, is reflected here as well. The Haredi newspaper both rejects the positive image of the heroic resistance fighter and extols alternative forms of heroism such as continued Jewish education and observance of the commandments, even if that meant death.

Judaism is a factor of great importance in both newspapers. However, even though they refer to religion and employ religious imagery and language, the ways they do so and the meaning they derive from their religious belief differ radically and are in fact the main dividing factor between them. The national religious *Ha-Tzofe* accepts the essentially secular Israeli framework for the memorial day commemorations, even though it stresses the religious elements of the commemorations and makes room for religious content in its coverage of the memorial day. *Ha-Tzofe* also emphasises instances of physical resistance among religious Jews as a way to weaken the connection between socialist Zionism and heroism and to boost morale in the national religious sector of Israeli society, thus reaffirming the Zionist positive value of armed resistance. In contrast, the Haredi *Ha-Modia* does not accept the legitimacy of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, and consequently neither the religious elements in the commemorations. Instead it employs religion to delegitimise the commemorations, for instance by the rejection of the day itself on the grounds that it was established in a way that is contrary to Jewish law, Halakhah, and thus deeply suspect or even invalid. When the Haredi newspaper extols adherence to Halakhah as alternative heroism to the "Gentile" physical resistance, its national religious counterpart values both as parallel forms of heroism.

The differences in the coverage of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day and the depictions of heroism in connection to it in the two leading religious Israeli newspapers, are a consequence and

reflection of the differences between the two sectors they represent. The national religious and Haredi sector of Israeli society both have a religious worldview, but their respective interpretations of Judaism and evaluations of Israeli society are radically different. As a consequence, they understand the past in different ways and do not share a common historical consciousness. Whereas the national religious sector not only accepts but indeed embraces the Zionist project and is part of it, the Haredi community can at best be said to tolerate it *de facto*. Consequently, *Ha-Tzofe* displays shifts in the historical consciousness of the sector it represents, which is more closely linked to Israeli society at large, whereas *Ha-Modia* takes a different path, following the development of the Haredi historical consciousness in opposition to the surrounding Israeli society.

In conclusion, there is no common religious framework for commemorations and no common religious historical consciousness. The fundamental difference in the Haredi and national religious historical consciousness is based on their diametrically different views of Zionism and the State of Israel. Whereas the national religious approach to Zionism has always been positive, as the movement can indeed be seen as a product of Zionism, the Haredi community builds much of its identity on its opposition to that very same endeavour. The common ground in terms of adherence to Halakhah and affirmation of religious beliefs is not enough to transcend this political division in order to establish a common religious framework of commemoration. In fact, Judaism can, and to some degree indeed does, even serve as a dividing factor.

Notes

1. Jörn Rüsen, "Historical Objectivity as a Matter of Social Values," in Joep Leerssen & Ann Rigney (eds.), *Historians and Social Values*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2000, p. 60.
2. Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, p. 43.
3. Klas-Göran Karlsson 2003, p. 32.
4. Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps. Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*, Chicago & London: Chicago University Press 2003, p. 5.
5. See for instance Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso 1991; Eugen Weber, *Peasants into French-*

- men. *The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1976; Jürgen Habermas, *Borgerlig offentlighet. Kategorierna "privat" och "offentligt" i det moderna samhället*, Lund: Arkiv Förlag 1998; and Per-Olof Andersson, *Den kalejdoskopiska offentligheten. Lokal press, vårdemönster och det offentliga samtalets villkor 1880–1910*, Växjö: Växjö University Press 2001.
6. Jürgen Habermas 1998, p. 214.
 7. Douglas Kellner, *Media Culture. Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern*, London & New York: Routledge 1995, p. 3.
 8. John B. Thompson, *Medierna och moderniteten*, Göteborg: Daidalos 1995, p. 20.
 9. Douglas Kellner 1995, p. 3.
 10. John B. Thompson 1995, p. 39.
 11. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor, *The In/Outsiders – The Media in Israel*, Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press 1999, p. 63.
 12. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor 1999, p. 59.
 13. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor 1999, p. 69.
 14. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor 1999, p. 69.
 15. Samuel Heilman, *Defenders of the Faith. Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry*, New York: Schocken Books 1992, p. 12. See also Walter Laqueur, *The History of Zionism*, London & New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks 2003, p. 409. Sometimes the Haredi community is called ultra-Orthodox, in opposition to the national religious, modern Orthodox, community. Other streams of Judaism prevalent in the Ashkenazi Diaspora, such as Reform and Conservative Judaism, were for long virtually non-existent in the Land of Israel. They are still only small margin phenomena principally confined to largely American immigrant communities.
 16. Samuel Heilman 1992, p. 27.
 17. Samuel Heilman 1992, p. 28.
 18. Yosef Salmon, "Religious Zionism Between Tradition and Modernity," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 53 Winter 1990, p. 127, and Walter Laqueur 2003, p. 482.
 19. Yosef Salmon 1990, p. 130, and Walter Laqueur 2003, p. 483.
 20. Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press 1996, p. 125, pp. 182.
 21. Dalia Ofer, "Israel," in David S. Wyman (ed.) *The World Reacts to the Holocaust*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, p. 854.
 22. Ahron Bregman, *A History of Israel*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 80.
 23. Dalia Ofer 1996, p. 864.
 24. Mikael Tossavainen, "Calendar, Context and Commemoration. Establishing an Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.) *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, p. 59.
 25. Charles S. Liebman & Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel. Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish state*, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press 1983, p. 104.
 26. For a more detailed discussion on the controversies surrounding the establishment of the Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day and its implications for Israeli historical consciousness, see for instance James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1993, p. 263, and Charles S. Liebman & Eliezer Don-Yehiya 1983, p. 151.
 27. Chavah Eshkoli, "Ha-Tzionut Ha-Datit Be-Eretz Israel Le-Nokhach Mered Geto

- Varshah," in *Yahadut Zmanenu – Tzionut, Medinat Israel Ve-Ha-Tfutzot*, vol. 11–12, 1998, p. 128.
28. See for instance: "Ha-Am Be-Israel Hityached Im Zekher Sheshet Ha-Milionim" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 6, 1959, p. 1, "Be-Dumiya, Be-Tfila U-Ve-Atzrot-Zikaron Tzuyan Yom Ha-Shoah Ve-Ha-Gvurah Be-Israel" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 4, 1970.
 29. Chavah Eshkoli 1998, p. 150.
 30. Roni Stauber, *Ha-Lekach La-Dor – Shoah U-Gvurah Ba-Machshevah Ha-Tziburit Ba-Aretz Bi-Shnot Ha-Chamishim*, Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi 2000, p. 110.
 31. "Ha-Srefah Ha-Gdolah Be-Geto Varshah" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 5, 1959.
 32. See for instance "Hashmad U-Mered" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 29, 1973, and "Pirkei Zaam U-Gvurah Hoalu Ba-Knesset Le-Zekher Mered Geto Varshah" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 22, 1963.
 33. "Ha-Yom Ha-Rishon La-Maavak" (Rachel Oyerbakh), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 21, 1963.
 34. "Ha-Noar Ha-Dati Ha-Lochem Ba-Getaot U-Vaayotav" (Y. Garnemstein), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 19, 1963. A yeshiva is a school for higher religious learning. A beit midrash (pl. batei midrash) is a study hall.
 35. "Ha-Noar Ha-Dati Ha-Lochem Ba-Getaot U-Vaayotav" (Y. Garnemstein), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 19, 1963. See also "Hem Lo Amru: Hine Darki Ha-Acharon" (Avraham Tirosch), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 15, 1966, the weekend magazine, and "25 Shanah Le-Mered Ha-Getaot Be-Polin" (Yaakov Libermensh), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 25, 1968, p. 2.
 36. "Kol Anot Gvurah" (Y. Amos), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 5, 1967.
 37. "'Pachdanut' U-Gvurah – Kitso Shel Mitos" (K. Shabtai), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 27, 1973. See also "Helem, Zaakah, Cheker Meuzan" (Naomi Gutkind), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 5, 1978.
 38. "Mered Geto Varshah Be-Einei Ha-Oyev" (uncredited), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 22, 1960.
 39. "Shtei Eduyot Min Ha-Geto Ha-Boer" (D. I. Zakay), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 13, 1961, p. 2. See also "Ha-Yeladim Ha-Meunim Shel Geto Varshah" (Gershon Zhikovsky), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 29, 1965.
 40. "Chazan Ha-Geto – Gershon Sirota Zikhrono Li-Vrakhah" (Moshe Ron), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 3, 1970.
 41. "Keitzad Lehaamik Todaot Ha-Shoah?" (Itzhak Shneerson), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 27, 1976.
 42. "Ma Yachas 'Ha-Tzabarim' Le-Tkufat Ha-Shoah?" (Y. Edelstein), *Ha-Tzofe*, April 15, 1966, the weekend magazine. "Shema (Israel)" is a central part of Jewish daily prayers, sometimes called the Jewish credo.
 43. "Yom Ha-Shoah Ve-Ha-Gvurah" (editorial), *Ha-tzofe*, April 27, 1976.
 44. "Ha-Tfilah Ha-Meyuchedet Le-Yom Ha-Zikaron She-Chiber Ha-Rav Ha-Rashi Goren" (Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 4, 1978.
 45. "Hakravah U-Gvurah Be-Tkufat Ha-Shoah" (Yehoshua Eibshitz), *Ha-Tzofe*, May 4, 1978.
 46. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor 1999, p. 69.
 47. Samuel Heilman 1992, p. 94.
 48. Dan Caspi & Yehiel Limor 1999, p. 70.
 49. Roni Stauber 2000, p. 112.
 50. Menachem Friedman, "The Haredim and the Holocaust," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 53, Winter 1990, p. 98.
 51. Menachem Friedman 1990, p. 100.

52. "Hantzachat Ha-Shoah – Keitzad?" (A. Avitov), *Ha-Modia*, April 25, 1960. See also "Hed Ha-Yom – Be-Yom Ha-Zikaron La-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 7, 1967, and "Hed Ha-Yom – Zekher Ha-Shoah Ve-Ha-Gvurah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 25, 1968.
53. "Hantzachat Ha-Shoah – Keitzad?" (A. Avitov), *Ha-Modia*, April 25, 1960.
54. "Hed Ha-Yom – Eshrim Shanah" (editorial) *Ha-Modia*, April 21 1963. See also "Zikaron Ha-Shoah" (A. Weiss), *Ha-Modia*, April 30, 1965.
55. "Hed Ha-Yom Shoah U-Gvurah Be-Apeklariah Chadashah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 8, 1975. See also for instance "Hed Ha-Yom – Be-Yom Ha-Zikaron La-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 7, 1967.
56. "Hed Ha-Yom – Yom Ha-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 5, 1959.
57. "Acharei Yom Ha-Shoah" (Y. Israeli), *Ha-Modia*, May 6, 1959.
58. "Hed Ha-Yom – Be-Yom Ha-Zikaron La-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 7, 1967.
59. "Tzavaat Ha-Kdoshim Be-Rei Yamenu" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 27, 1976.
60. "Nemale Chovoteinu Klapei Ha-Kdoshim" (S. I. Gross), *Ha-Modia*, May 5, 1959. See also "Hed Ha-Yom – Nisan 27" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 22, 1960, and "Ha-Shoah Ka-Yom: Tekes O Mikhlalah La-Yahadut" (Rabbi Y. Milstein), *Ha-Modia*, April 8, 1975.
61. "Mi-Yom Le-Yom – Zekher Ha-Milanim" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 17, 1966. See also "Hed Ha-Yom – Yom Ha-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 5, 1959, and "Hed Ha-Yom – Nisan 27" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 22, 1960.
62. "Hed Ha-Yom – Yom Ha-Shoah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 17, 1966. See also "Shealu Et Ha-Srufim" (A. Weiss), *Ha-Modia*, May 8, 1967.
63. "Hirhurim Le-Yom Ha-Shoah" (Rabbi I. Milstein), *Ha-Modia*, April 23, 1971.
64. "Hed Ha-Yom – Eize Zikaron Darush La-Shoah Ve-Le-Gvurat Ha-Nefesh Ha-Yehudit" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 14, 1977.
65. Menachem Friedman 1990, p. 99.
66. Kimmy Caplan, "Have 'Many Lies Accumulated in History Books'? – The Holocaust in Ashkenazi *Haredi* Historical Consciousness in Israel," *Yad Vashem Studies* XXIX 2001, p. 335.
67. "Hed Ha-Yom – Nisan 27" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 22, 1960.
68. "Hed Ha-Yom – Nisan 27" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 22, 1960. Tefillin are capsules containing scripture, which are worn on the forehead and the left arm during morning prayers on weekdays. Matzah is the unleavened bread eaten during Passover. Megillat Ester, the Book of Esther, is read during the holiday of Purim. A sukkah is a booth in which religiously observant Jews eat during the holiday of Sukkot.
69. "Zikaron Ha-Shoah" (A. Weiss), *Ha-Modia*, April 30, 1965.
70. "Zikaron Ha-Shoah" (A. Weiss), *Ha-Modia*, April 30, 1965, p. 2. See also "Tzavaat Ha-Kdoshim Be-Rei Yamenu" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, April 27, 1976, and "Mi-Yom Le-Yom – Zikaron La-Shoah U-La-Gvurah" (editorial), *Ha-Modia*, May 4, 1978.
71. "Ha-Partizan She-Lo Henif Et Degel Ha-Mered" (Shmuel Mor), *Ha-Modia*, April 17, 1966.
72. "Ha-Partizan She-Lo Henif Et Degel Ha-Mered" (Shmuel Mor), *Ha-Modia*, April 17, 1966.
73. "Ha-Shoah Mul Meoraot Yamenu" (Y. Spiegel), *Ha-Modia*, April 26, 1968.

PÄR FROHNERT

"We Want to Learn from the Past"

The Holocaust in German History Schoolbooks before and after Reunification

History textbooks are important products of historical culture suited to study changes in historical consciousness. One aim of the project "The Holocaust and the European Historical Culture" has been to study phenomena affecting broader groups. The producers of history textbooks in Germany – the nation of the perpetrators – obviously had to handle a problematic task. The memory of the Holocaust was a societal trauma that in the long run had to be confronted.¹ Since history was a compulsory school subject in the period investigated, the late 1970s until 2002, *all* pupils were confronted with textbooks dealing with the traumatic German history of the 20th century. The aim of this article is to study how the Holocaust was represented in German textbooks before the collapse of communist East Germany (GDR) and after the reunification in the years 1989–1990.²

There are several ways of gaining access to the historical consciousness developed within an educational system. Interviews are one of them, but were not possible to conduct in this project.³ Instead, textbooks will be used as a means of reaching the collective level of historical consciousness. To be sure, textbooks correspond to the intentions of their authors, but are also embedded in larger social and cultural contexts. Most states – like Germany – issue publication permissions and directions. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer characterises the textbooks as "national autobiographies" and underlines that they mirror the authors' conceptions of history and the state's intentions. Thereby, they are closely connected to predominant norms in society.⁴ Furthermore, it has recently been stated that "the analysis of textbooks is an excellent means to capture the social and political parameters of a given socie-

ty.”⁵ Although there are other products and conditions within schools that contribute to historical consciousness, such as the teaching situation, working materials and the social and ethnic composition of classes, textbooks must be seen as the most important element.⁶ Outside the school there are other products of historical culture which influence young people’s historical thinking, such as films and computer games. It is reasonable to believe that competition from these kinds of artifacts has increased during the period of analysis. The traditional idea that results produced by professional historians trickled down to the textbooks and unaffected reached the pupils was questioned already in the 1970s. A more realistic idea is that the text passes filters of interpretation of the teachers and the pupils formed by personal experiences (*Lebenswelt*) and previous educational practice. This is not inconsistent with the notion that also influences from professional history research must be paid attention to in a textbook analysis.

History textbooks can be analysed in different ways.⁷ Departing from an interest in concepts such as historical consciousness and historical culture, I have chosen to employ a typology of different uses of history developed by Klas-Göran Karlsson, however with some modifications.⁸ So far I have found no such studies that have made use of German history textbooks, but only a few general studies about historical consciousness and German schoolbooks. Of course, much has been written over the years about German history textbooks and the treatment of the Third Reich and the Holocaust: broad syntheses as well as narrower thematic analyses. It should however be underlined that it was not until the end of the 1960s that textbooks really confronted the entire German war and genocide history, and not just blamed Hitler, the Nazi regime or the totalitarian society. The victims were forgotten, and the language of the perpetrators was still used in the 1980s. The important role of the West German state in directing the production of history textbooks should also be stressed.⁹

The typology applied here differentiates between six uses of history:

- (1) A scholarly use characterised by a respect for empirical facts and reconstructions produced according to scholarly standards, and by an effort to discover and situate the Holocaust in its contemporary historical context;

- (2) An existential use concerning questions of identity and needs to remember the victims of the Holocaust;¹⁰
- (3) A moral use related to ethical judgments and questions of guilt and responsibility for wrongs afflicted upon victim groups in the past;¹¹
- (4) A political use of what could be called a historical transfer – seeing lessons learned from the past as easy to apply to the present;¹²
- (5) An ideological use where certain versions of history are invented and constructed in order to authorise and legitimate ideological beliefs. In a democracy, the legitimisation of the ideological-political system must not imply direct distortions of history, but is rather a question of chosen perspectives and narratives;
- (6) A pedagogical use where the intention is to convey generally accepted information about the past to broader strata. Although the facts initially conveyed are produced according to scholarly standards, I think that a pedagogical use ought to be separated from a scholarly one. A pedagogical use does not include the research process and reconstructions of the past.¹³

It must be assumed that the textbooks changed during the period studied. How are these changes to be explained? What was the impact of the reunification in 1990 – was the history of the Nazi past and the Holocaust rewritten? At the time of the reunification, critical voices fearing a new nationalism were often heard.¹⁴ Did such a new nationalism manifest itself in the textbooks? Hopefully, investigating history textbooks published before and after 1990 makes it possible to detect such changes. During the same period, i.e. from the late 1970s until 2002, German society and thereby the conditions for the writing and production of textbooks changed independently of dramatic international development. Should changes in the schoolbooks be explained in the light of these different preconditions?

The older books studied are all West German. The situation in GDR was so different that a comparison can hardly be meaningful. The ideological use of the Third Reich's history to legitimate the dictatorship was conspicuous, not least the "antifascist" interpretation.¹⁵ The main purpose of this study is to analyse the contents of the history textbooks by means of the typology of uses of history, and to

discuss the preconditions of the history textbook representations in relationship to observed changes.

The importance of a study of German textbooks is enhanced by the fact that the education ministry of each federal state must give its publication permission. The intentions of the state are thus possible to discern. The Permanent Conference of the Ministries of Education carries out important co-ordination work within the republic. It prepares recommendations for the teaching of different school subjects, and the textbooks. Due to different political positions these recommendations often express a minimum of attainable consensus. The Conference has had a great impact on the curricula and the school-books.¹⁶ In West Germany there was a tension between on the one hand the experience from the Nazi era and its use of the school for political propaganda, and on the other hand the need to use schools to convey a truthful and thereby deterrent picture of the Nazi regime. In the 1960s, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, founded in 1952, made extensive use of different kinds of learning materials to influence schools.¹⁷ Important were also the German-Israeli mutual textbook recommendations, first published in 1985, which among other things stressed the role of antisemitism as a central element in the Nazi ideology, and that the persecution, which met no resistance from the ordinary Germans, started long before the actual mass killings. The recommendations also underlined that the testimonies and perspectives of the victims must be made use of and that Nazi terminology be avoided.¹⁸

Another precondition that left traces in the textbooks was the development of history didactics in West Germany. Important in this respect was the voluminous teamwork *Handbuch der Geschichts-didaktik*, published in several editions starting in 1979.¹⁹ Key words were historical consciousness, introduced by Karl-Ernst Jeismann,²⁰ a *Lebenswelt* idea that all processes of learning ought to depart from lived experience, multi-perspectivity, identity, emancipation, civic education, work with source materials and oral history.

The books studied are written for the classes 9 and 10, i.e. for pupils at the age of 14 or 15 years.²¹ One older book and one of the books from 2002 are directly written for grammar school, the *Gymnasium*, while the other four books are general and not connected to a type

of school. In an international perspective, the West/German school system is known for an early sorting of pupils into different types of school. The grammar school, which leads to a final examination after 12 or 13 years, is the only way to acquire a university entrance qualification. In addition, there are the secondary general schools, *Hauptschule*; the intermediate school, *Realschule*, and the comprehensive school, *Gesamtschule*, which the pupils can leave after nine or ten years or continue to different school types. Among the school-leavers, 24 per cent had in 1995 acquired university qualification and 65 per cent leaving-certificates from the other types of school.²²

Six textbooks in history – all of them first editions – have been chosen for this study, three published before the re-unification in 1989/1990: *Zeiten und Menschen* (1978),²³ *bsv Geschichte* (1986),²⁴ and *Geschichte und Geschehen* (1987),²⁵ and three in 2002: *Das waren Zeiten*,²⁶ *Entdecken und verstehen*,²⁷ and *Zeiten und Menschen*.²⁸ Most books have been printed several times and used over many years.²⁹ The specific books that have been chosen are representative for the time of their publication.³⁰ The space devoted to the Third Reich and the Second World War grows from the older books to the new ones.³¹

The Pedagogical and Scholarly Uses

Not surprisingly, the overall impression from studying all six history textbooks is the predominant pedagogical use. The knowledge taught mainly rests on scholarly produced facts and interpretations. The information is collected from both an accepted and uncontested canon of facts, to be found in encyclopaedias and general historical surveys, and in new scholarly works. The pedagogical intentions that permeate the books decide how the texts are composed, source materials and illustrations used, and pupils addressed. However, to state that the pedagogical use is predominant does not bring us very far in an analysis of schoolbook texts in a democratic, open society. The interest must instead focus on other uses of history that can add to our knowledge of the characteristics and changes in historical culture.

The scholarly use must be differentiated. Four salient elements will be commented on: the utilisation of archival sources, methodological instructions, references to scholarly debates, and reflection upon the

study of history. References to various source materials and the reproduction of extracts from documents are frequent in all six books. In the 1970s, the West German history books had changed from canonical books, containing nothing but the truth, to workbooks with a substantial proportion of source texts.³² The sources used have very different origins: from the perpetrators, such as Himmler's notorious speech to SS-officers in Posen in 1943, in which he spoke about the millions of Jews exterminated, to the victims, for example eyewitnesses to the Holocaust.³³ The high esteem of source materials reflects a deep respect for historical facts. The information is seldom wrong. One strange exception is though to be found in *Entdecken und verstehen* (2002), where the commander Höss' estimation of 3 millions killed in Auschwitz is presented.³⁴

The most significant change in scholarly use was the instructions to the pupils on methods. Before 1989 no such information was given. All three books from 2002 put considerable emphasis on and start with introductions on methods. This tendency is both connected to new ideals in historical didactics and the recommendations given by the ministries of education. One text published by the Permanent Conference from 1997 talks about "learning on the local spot." The idea is that pupils should visit former concentration camps, investigate traces of a Jewish past and the physical surroundings.³⁵ In *Entdecken und verstehen*, the pupils are asked to write down their previous knowledge on the subjects treated. In the same book there are separate sections on "History Workshop" and "Local history on the spot." The aim of the authors is thus clearly to promote an attitude that historical knowledge is dependent on sources and open to interpretations. It is also stressed that photos and paintings can be used as sources.³⁶ The questions that pupils are confronted with animate them to active source work, mainly available through workbooks used together with the textbooks. The use of archives and museums in the pupils' hometowns is also recommended, as well as oral history.³⁷ *Entdecken und verstehen* devotes a whole page to instructions on how to interview eyewitnesses. The authors underline that the testimonies must be treated as views from the present, where the facts about the past are filtered. The pupils are asked to compare the testimonies with their own new knowledge.³⁸

In the oldest book from 1978 there is, somewhat surprisingly, an important reflection on the concept of contemporary history, *Zeitgeschichte*. The authors underline that this quite recent past influences to a much greater extent the present and also the future. They also write that their own personal experiences, though not telling anything about them, influence their point of views. This reflection must be seen as an important element of a scholarly, analytic-critical use of history. This element is also found in the books from 2002, e.g. *Zeiten und Menschen*, which start with an introduction where one headline is “The Nazi Era – a Totally Normal Education Theme.”³⁹

Current scholarly debates are given more space in the books from 2002 than in the older ones. Sometimes the standpoints are quoted from the prestigious news magazine *Die Zeit* that has often triggered the debates. Traces of the discussions can also be seen in headlines and among the key words given in the margins. The choice of illustrations can also reflect the present debates, for instance when, in *Das waren Zeiten*, a photo is chosen which shows an antisemitic meeting, with the slogan “The Jews are our misfortune” on the wall.⁴⁰ The American scholar Daniel Goldhagen used this photo as the cover to his highly contested *Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* from 1996, which underlined the intrinsic antisemitism among Germans before 1945. In *Entdecken und verstehen* the pupils are requested to compare the German historian Ulrich Herbert’s and Goldhagen’s views on the motives of the perpetrators.⁴¹ This tendency to devote more space to the perpetrators will be commented on below in the analysis of the existential use of history. In *Zeiten und Menschen*, the section about the fierce debates concludes that these recurring controversies force any person who studies the period to take a personal standpoint.⁴² All six books from both periods devote much space to extracts from scholarly works. Finally, the scholarly ambition to explain by situating phenomena in their historical contexts is also salient.

The Existential Use

The existential use is the most frequent use of history in German schoolbooks, apart from the expected pedagogical and scholarly uses. The existential use concerns mainly questions of identity and

of remembering the Holocaust and its victims. Several existential elements will be highlighted: national identity, the perspective of the perpetrators, shame before the eyes of the surrounding world, young people as identification objects, and local and personal identities.

The question of national identity was treated roughly in the same way before and after the reunification – though substantially reduced in the later period. In this respect the reunification did not influence history textbooks. Conspicuous in two of the books from 1986 and 1987 is the use of the term “we” when it comes to Germans in the Nazi era. An interesting example is the two pages in *bsv Geschichte* from 1986 devoted to source materials and extracts from literature on the relation between the Germans, past and present, and National Socialism.⁴³ The conspicuous absence of the authors’ own commentary can be interpreted as a way to hide behind the reproduced texts.⁴⁴ The text shows that the “we”-address was already used in 1952 by the president of the Republic. The reproduction of president Richard von Weizsäcker’s speech in May 1985 can be interpreted as the logical final word: “[T]he 8th of May [...] liberated us all from the National Socialist rule of violence.” He talked in the “we”-form.⁴⁵ The same address is also to be seen in the frequent use of “German” in *Geschichte und Geschehen* from 1987: “It was German soldiers and [...] German ‘special units’, German civil servants and [...] German women and men.”⁴⁶ This we-address is underlined when the authors point out that the perpetrators “were raised by German parents [and] visited German schools.” The authors even put present-day Germans – i.e. the pupils – in the same position: “exactly as we, individuals born thereafter.”⁴⁷ The “we”-form is also to be found in the books from 2002. In *Zeiten und Menschen* the authors talk about “coming to terms with our own history.”⁴⁸ The “we”-approach to the German history is now expressed in other ways, for example through appealing to local and personal identities which includes the difficult German past.

Important changes occurred in the treatment of the perpetrators. As these persons were mostly Germans, it is a theme linked to an existential use. Before 1990, the number of involved Germans and the space devoted to the subject was small. In the textbook from 1987 the pupils could read that “thousands of Germans participated

[...] *as perpetrators and as persons knowing what was going on.*"⁴⁹ The low number does not at all correspond to facts available at that time. In the oldest book echoes from the 1950s, when Hitler alone was blamed, still can be heard: "[H]idden from most Germans, Hitler was [...] in the East able to carry out his Final solution."⁵⁰ The use of a Nazi term without quotation marks is conspicuous. Usually all books investigated make note of Nazi terminology.⁵¹ The way of expressing how many Germans were actually involved in the Holocaust is thus revealing.

In 2002 longer texts and larger figures are presented: "hundreds of thousands had made themselves guilty." The historian Ulrich Herbert is referred to in one book as stressing that the perpetrators "came from the middle and the upper ranks of [...] society."⁵² It is apparent that in 2002 the perpetrators are paid much greater attention. The headlines "The perspective of the perpetrator" and "The perspective of the victim" are put against each other in *Zeiten und Menschen*.⁵³ This change obviously mirrors the new focus on the perpetrators in the 1990s.⁵⁴ In this book the pupils are given a task: "Try to make a culprit profile of the typical perpetrator,"⁵⁵ and in *Das waren Zeiten* pupils are given the unconventional task of staging and recording a role play recreating Goebbels' notorious 1943 speech, when he rhetorically asked the audience if they wanted the total war.⁵⁶ This example, where the pupils are requested to slip into the clothes of enthusiastic followers of the Nazi regime, is a clear example of an existential use, related to identity. As Germans they have to take on the identity of perpetrators.

One important element of an existential use is the feeling of shame in the eyes of the surrounding world. This element was more salient before 1989 than in 2002. As already mentioned, *bsv Geschichte* reproduces Heuss' speech from 1952, which is explicit in terms of shame when commenting on the Holocaust: "no one will liberate us from this shame."⁵⁷ The oldest book from 1978 deals with the theme of shame in a way reminiscent of the 1940s and 1950s. The text states that a "terrible crime was committed against the European Jews" which "has stained the reputation of the German people in the whole world." The conclusion is thus not that the genocide should cause feelings of guilt among the Germans. The argumentation that



Young people as objects of identification. Original text: “Jewish children being derided in front of their classmates in 1933. On the blackboard the Star of David and the sentences “The Jews are our greatest enemy! Beware of the Jews!”” (Source: Robert Hermann Tenbrock & Kurt Kluxen (eds.), *Zeiten und Menschen. Geschichtliches Unterrichtswerk, Ausgabe B, band 4, Zeitgeschichte (1917 bis zur Gegenwart)*, Paderborn: Schöningh & Schroedel, 1982 (1978), p. 104.

the crime “proves what eliminatory instinct of human beings the order from a totalitarian state can trigger” also resounds from decades long passed, when totalitarianism was blamed and perpetrators were universalised.⁵⁸

In 2002 only one of the books talks about shame. As mentioned above, a feigned pupil in the introduction gives his opinion in a speech bubble that today’s Germans must stand the shame before the eyes of other countries. Shame is also one aspect when the book reproduces an uncommon photo from 1945 showing a boy looking at a poster with heaps of corpses from a concentration camp. The text on the poster is “These acts of dishonour: Your guilt.”⁵⁹ The photo, as such, shows that the Western Allies actually launched this campaign with an approach closely linked to the thesis of a collective guilt – an opinion highly contested and discussed.⁶⁰

The use of young people as objects of identification can be found in all three early books. One example is a photo from a classroom in the 1930s. It shows two Jewish schoolboys standing before the black-

board with the text "The Jews are our greatest enemies."⁶¹ Children and young people are often chosen as examples of the Jewish and other victims. This tendency to make use of young people is even stronger in 2002. *Entdecken und Verstehen* devotes three full pages solely to youth and schools in the Nazi era.⁶² In *Zeiten und Menschen* one girl testifies to the fantastic feeling of shaking hands with the Führer.⁶³

In 2002 a dominant theme in connection with an existential use of history is the appeal to local and personal identities of the young readers. In the three oldest books no traces are to be found of the local identity, and only few examples of appeals to personal identity. In fact, these new trends are among the major changes which can be observed in this study.

The "learning on the local spot" approach of searching for the darker history of one's own home district in the Third Reich at the same time implies the construction of a local identity. The best example of the different means to build such an identity could be found in the book for Saarland. As *Entdecken und Verstehen* is especially written for this federal state, this is hardly surprising. It has a special recurrent section under the heading "Local history" with regional examples of general phenomena, such as the murder of handicapped Germans or the local persecution of the Jews. Numbers, occupations and residencies of the pre-war Jewish population are stated. The 1938 "Kristallnacht" is illustrated with a photo of the synagogue in Saarbrücken set on fire.⁶⁴ *Zeiten und Menschen* lists ambitious projects for the pupils on local history. It is proposed that they gather information about concentration and work camps in their local district which can be presented in the form of an exhibition; organise a journey for their class to a concentration camp and document the trip, and arrange an alternative city walk about "the dreary sides of the past."⁶⁵ This new aim of connecting the local identities of the pupils is, as demonstrated, quite conspicuous.

Beside the focus on local identities, the authors of the 2002 textbooks, and to some extent of the period before 1990, pay quite substantial attention to questions of personal identities. An interesting trait already mentioned is the exhortation to pupils to put themselves into the clothes of Germans living in the Nazi era. This tendency was much stronger in 2002, but was also found in *Geschichte und Geschehen*

from 1987. The authors ask pupils: “Which goals and measures would have impressed you if you had lived at that time?” This tendency to a parallelisation of, or a transfer of Germans in the past to the present, is also conspicuous in another example. After reading the section on the Holocaust, the children are requested to imagine that they and their classmates and neighbours lived in the Third Reich. How would they all have acted at that time? The same approach – and going one step further – is used when a reproduced poem from 1962 states that the grandfather as well as the father died in the war. It ends by the question “from what am I going to die?”⁶⁶ The intention of the authors is obvious. We Germans have started those wars – the First as well as the Second World War – and perhaps we will start one again.

Under the subheading “Reflecting on and discussing the handling of one’s own history” in *Zeiten und Menschen* (2002), an introduction to the whole chapter about Nazi Germany is presented. It focuses on how pupils can deal with the difficult German past. A photo shows pupils and teachers in classrooms. Speech bubbles above the pupils mirror different attitudes to the past: one stresses the personal responsibility, one the shame in the eyes of other countries, one unawareness of the Nazi period, and lastly one says that his family still has a chest in the attic containing some stuff from the Third Reich. References to the private lives and everyday experiences of the pupils are evident further on in the same book when the pupils are confronted with popular, positive attitudes towards Hitler and Nazism, which they are requested to find counter-arguments against. It is made clear to the readers that statements of this kind are sometimes heard, and that they don’t stem from the authors.⁶⁷

Another aspect of the appeal to the personal identities of the pupils is the exhortation to interview relatives. A photo of dead German soldiers in Stalingrad and a text extract from a field post letter is followed by a request for the pupils to interview “elderly relatives or acquaintances of what they experienced in the war and as prisoners of war.”⁶⁸ Here we see both an existential use of history and a moral use in the underlying implication that the question is about acting morally right. In another text, pupils are requested to ask their grandparents the more controversial question of what happened to the Jewish inhabitants in their parish.⁶⁹ In this case they should probably ask

their great grandparents instead, because their grandparents would have been children at the time of the Holocaust.

The need for remembering the victims of the Holocaust is a final existential aspect. Obviously, this element primarily concerns the victims, not the perpetrators. Here the focus will be on the need to remember what happened in order to stabilise the German identity. This element is not very salient in the books studied. Two of the earlier books⁷⁰ and one from 2002 deal with the topic. A clear connection to the need of stability is found in *Geschichte und Geschehen*, published in 1987. The authors directly reflect on how to deal with the memory of the past. They maintain that a relativisation of the Holocaust and a body-counting would make “the necessary reflection on our own history difficult for us Germans.”⁷¹ Here we can observe a direct argumentation motivated by national needs of stability for the Germans. Imaginary critics are met with counter-arguments. The lines indirectly refer to the famous speech by president Richard von Weizsäcker on May 8, 1985.⁷²

The Moral Use of History

A moral use of history is evident in the books studied. In some aspects, it is stronger in 2002. The changes mainly regard the space devoted to the victims, and the description of them – and the question of commemoration. In addition, questions of a German guilt and personal responsibility are analysed. Only the book from 1987 among the earlier ones devotes substantial attention to the victims. A survivor describes the selection process in Auschwitz. His story is supported by official documents. The pupils can also read about 150 women used as laboratory specimens. All died.⁷³ The 1987 book seems to be the exception to the rule by giving the victims individual identities at this early stage. It both contains sentences from Anne Frank’s diary, and mentions individual victims, including photos. Among the victims were not only Jews.⁷⁴ Eva Kolinsky has found that photos of the victims were reproduced in the 1980s. However, they were usually anonymous, and Jews only figured as victims of the Nazi regime.⁷⁵

In 2002 much more space is devoted to both Jewish and other victims. This tendency is in line with official recommendations.⁷⁶ The use of sources both from victims and perpetrators is frequent. The Ausch-

witz selection is retold by a girl chosen to work. She tried to join her mother in the death row but was stopped by a Jewish Kapo. When reading the testimony, pupils are asked to describe their feelings. It is obvious that an emotional reaction is intended.⁷⁷ I interpret the use of a vignette colour photo of a Zyklon B tin on several pages as an emotional reminder, though ethically questionable.⁷⁸ In 2002 the description of the victims is in general more personal. This can be seen in the choice of photos. One shows the diary of a boy – later gassed in Treblinka – in a ghetto, describing his family's suffering.⁷⁹ An exceptional photo motif of a normal life situation is the Jewish wedding couple in the 1920s.⁸⁰

The suffering of the victims is much more clearly in focus in 2002. The learning combines a reading of the subject matter and emotional elements intended to rouse empathy; a link recommended in didactical texts from the 1990s.⁸¹ The highly emotional lines from Günther Anders are however unusual: “[O]ur strength doesn't suffice [...] to really hear the terrific wailing, which the sum of the many million cries of death caused.”⁸² Many photographs, often the same from one book to another, show women and children.⁸³ These documentary photos have obtained the status as Holocaust icons.⁸⁴ At the same time it must be said that some editors have succeeded in finding seldom seen photos.

The forced labourers are a new topic in 2002. A new group of victims thereby receives an attention not previously given in the textbooks. One book lets a Polish woman tell about her work in Germany. Another reports that the wartime labourers have claimed for damages from German industry in 2000; something highly contested at the time. The authors underline that “the moral responsibility” will remain even after an economic agreement.⁸⁵

An important change occurred with the books from 2002, when perspectives of commemoration were paid new attention. To be sure, already in the book from 1987 it is argued that it is better to confront the past than try to forget.⁸⁶ Also in the book from 1986, parts of von Weizsäcker's speech are reproduced where he gives advice on how to deal with the memory of what happened to both the victims of the Nazis and the many Germans who experienced forced eviction from their homes.⁸⁷ However, the memory turn becomes much more explicit in the new millennium and mirrors a shift in the German public debate on the past.⁸⁸ One example is the introduction in 1996 of

an official day of commemoration for the victims of Nazism. It also can be seen in a publication from the Permanent Conference, where it is underlined that “the commemoration of the Holocaust [has] a central place” in the history education.⁸⁹

Das waren Zeiten may serve as an example of the situation in 2002. Under the headline “Remembering and commemoration,” the commemoration of victims and survivors is emphasised. A request to discuss the Jewish wisdom that “the secret of salvation is named commemoration” confronts pupils with the demand to enter into an ethical discussion, as descendants of the perpetrators. How such a strategy is to be carried out remains unclear.⁹⁰ This new focus is in line with the development discerned by scholars such as Aleida Assmann and Norbert Frei, who talk about a shift from *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, coming to terms with or mastering the past, to *Geschichtsbe-wahrung*, the preservation of history. In the same spirit, Jörn Rüsen speaks of “mourning as a new mode of making sense of history.”⁹¹

The Germans’ guilt is another aspect of a moral use of history. Two of the older books deal with the topic. The tendency to speak of “we” when referring to the past has been mentioned. In one book the starting point is that people must have known that terrible things occurred. A drawing of Paul Weber shows people putting their heads into the sand. Only one person withdraws his head and looks around with amazement. The text comments: “[m]ost Germans repressed the questions of guilt.” The other book deals with the legal processes under the headline “Penance and re-education to democracy.”⁹² In 2002 the guilt questions take up more space. The pupils are requested to scrutinise the often-heard statement that one did not know what was going on. Indifference and fear are put forth as plausible explanations. The account under the headline “Guilt and responsibility” is the most penetrating among the books studied. The legal processes are also thoroughly described.⁹³

Personal responsibility is another aspect of a moral use. *bsv Geschichte* suffices as an example from the first period. It uses a drawing with people walking up a hill under swastikas, and tumbling down the other side into a coffin. It illustrates that there was a moral choice.⁹⁴ In 2002 the pupils are confronted with Christopher Browning’s revealing case of the German policemen who were offered non-

participation in the unit's first execution of Jews, but where almost everybody refused the offer. The text underlines that "[t]he responsibility for one's action lies ultimately in every individual himself."⁹⁵ These observations are in line with Bodo von Borries' findings that the new textbooks have an important element of "shaping of meaning and the pupils' taking [own] positions."⁹⁶

The treatment of the German resistance must be left aside, and only some comments are necessary as the subject has a bearing on the moral use of history. The resistance was an important topic in the 1950s and 1960s, often as important as the Holocaust. It was often located immediately after the Holocaust text. This positioning was obviously designed to counteract German guilt.⁹⁷ The position of the text is still the same in four of the textbooks.⁹⁸ Young people in the resistance, such as Sophie Scholl from the White Rose, are used as role models. Their examples should show that another political behaviour had been possible, although at a high price. This tendency, noticeable from the end of the 1970s, is in line with the recommendations from the Permanent Conference. According to a decision in 1980 it should be demonstrated that the resistance was "the key to the future of our democratic system."⁹⁹ In 1986 pupils are given the task of discussing the actions of the White Rose. In 2002 the request is different: "put yourself into the clothes of these people and consider if you would have had the courage to resist this regime."¹⁰⁰ That the great majority supported the Nazi regime and that the German resistance was very limited are underlined in most of the books investigated.¹⁰¹ More resistance groups and actions are mentioned in 2002. One example is the successful protest of German women married to Jews in Rosenstrasse in the centre of Berlin in 1943.¹⁰²

The Political Use of History

The transfer idea, i.e. the opinion that lessons from the Holocaust can be directly transferred and applied to the present, was not included in the older books before 1989. In 2002, however, all books contain discussions on how knowledge of Nazism and the mechanisms of the Holocaust can be used to counteract right-wing extremism and prevent racial discrimination.

In *Zeiten und Menschen* it is emphasised that the German social



“Stop the memorial!” In all textbooks from 2002, a political use of history to counteract right-wing extremism is conspicuous. Original text: “29 January, 2000: For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, right-wingers march through the Brandenburger Tor in Berlin. With their authorised demonstration they opposed the building of a memorial to the commemoration of the Holocaust victims.” (Source: Thomas Berger-von der Heide & Hans-Gert Oomen (eds.), *Entdecken und verstehen*, 3. *Geschichtsbuch für die Klassenstufen 9/10 im Saarland. Von 1917 bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin: Cornelsen 2002, p. 151.)

and political system in which the pupils live is the outcome of difficult learning processes that started after the war. Today’s democracy and respect for human rights cannot be taken for granted, it is argued. The pupils are requested to discuss the post-war situation and discern the values which may have “enabled a new start building on democratic and humanitarian values.” These values have been bitterly learned from the war and the fallen dictatorship. This learning that started in the young federal republic, often described as a democracy without democrats, was initiated by the Western Allies and had a long way to go.¹⁰³

In *Das waren Zeiten* the question of why voters elected Hitler starts with facts about the racial worldview of National Socialism. This question is directly linked to the present through the additional task of discussing why parties today with similar opinions can attract voters. In the same book, direct connections are also made between the description of the killing apparatus in Auschwitz and German right-wing extremist groups who deny the genocide. In this context, the pupils are requested to comment on the law from 1985 that makes it illegal to deny the Holocaust. They are also expected to suggest the

best way of acting against right-wing groups.¹⁰⁴ Behind these text passages is the idea that something like the Holocaust may occur once again if the society is not on alert and fails to learn from history. This notion was stressed by both the Permanent Conference and those working in the field of history didactics.¹⁰⁵ In *Entdecken und verstehen* the transfer is explicitly expressed: “[W]e want to learn from the past, so that history does not repeat itself.”¹⁰⁶

In *Zeiten und Menschen* the debate on the German guilt and the legal processes after the war are thoroughly treated. The authors ask rhetorically: “Is the single result that we will be left with resignation?” Their own answer is a direct moral exhortation to the pupils: “Stop the beginnings.” A photo of a crematorium oven in Auschwitz accompanies the appeal. The exhortation is repeated by being related to an image in which a boy claims that today’s right-wing extremism has nothing to do with Nazism, while a girl is critical to such an opinion. The message is illustrated with photos from demonstrations with youths in black boots and SS-emblems cut into their shaved heads. The message is of course that today’s youth must be vigilant: what happened in the past may happen again.¹⁰⁷

Entdecken und verstehen devotes many pages to today’s rightwing extremism and to the question of how to counteract it: “What do the right-wing extremists want and how can we counteract them?”¹⁰⁸ A Nazi propaganda photo showing the march through the Brandenburger Tor on the evening of January 30, 1933, when Hitler came to power, is located close to an image of a demonstration against the building of a memorial to the victims of the Holocaust at the same place in the year 2000. The pupils are also told that these extremist groups rule the streets in certain former GDR towns. An example of extremists beating up an old woman in the street, compelling two elderly men to intervene, ends with an appeal: “It depends on You!”¹⁰⁹

The books from 2002 also bring to life the theme of racism and antisemitism in connection with right-wing groups. One book tells about how these groups use internet and their music as instruments for baiting foreigners in general and Jews in particular.¹¹⁰ In another book, Siegfried, a right-wing extremist, is interviewed and poses before the camera. Behind him a demonstration is taking place; something often seen in Germany in the 1990s: “Chain of candles against

xenophobia.”¹¹¹ Racism, right-wing extremists and counteractions are thus also in this text interrelated to the lesson to be learnt from the German Nazi past. These themes are connected to the fact that Germany, from far back in time, is a multicultural society with large minority groups. The official recommendations to foster tolerance and a “cultural understanding with foreign fellow citizens” started with a decision by the Permanent Conference in 1985.¹¹²

Living History

The concept historical consciousness captures attitudes towards the past, the present and the future into a temporal whole. Seen in such a perspective, a clear trend in the material under investigation is the much larger space devoted in 2002 to discussions on the imprints of the past in the present, and of their effects on the future. In the older books, the theme of “living history” occurs in a limited degree. In *Geschichte und Geschehen* this history is interpreted as meaning that “the committed crimes still today have their effects: A past that will not disappear.”¹¹³ Curiously enough, it is the oldest book, from 1978, that presents an interesting discussion about the concept of contemporary history. The authors mean that this is a past that has immediate effects on the development of the present and the future.¹¹⁴ That the past is physically still present in the private lives of pupils is shown through the mentioned boy who says that his family has an attic chest containing objects from the Nazi era. On the same page, a photo of a phone card from the small village of Kandanos in Greece also shows how the past can manifest itself today. The reverse of the card shows a memorial reminding the afterworld that the Germans, as an act of retaliation, levelled the village with the ground during the occupation. History is alive.¹¹⁵ In the same book, the pupils are requested to discuss if there are prerequisites for a similar development in present-day Germany as there were in the 1930s.¹¹⁶

Another connection between the different time dimensions is the request to the pupils in a 2002 book to interview their grandparents about what destinies the Jewish inhabitants in their vicinity met with. In *Entdecken und verstehen* it is emphasised that the weight of the German “heavy heritage” will depend on how the Germans handle the memory of the Holocaust.¹¹⁷

The Ideological Use of History

As mentioned above, an ideological use is less easy to discern in products of a historical culture in a parliamentary democracy. The values and “truths” underlying school textbooks are easily regarded as “natural” and unproblematic because the observer him- and herself is part of this society. Anyway, there are, in any event, examples in the schoolbooks of an ideological use supporting and enhancing central values in today’s Germany. These expressions of values give legitimacy to the existing political system and support the unity of society. As already mentioned, the cumbersome and lengthy learning processes from the 1940s to present-day Germany are described in some books. “We” are today better than the Germans living in the Nazi past. The Nazi regime was an undemocratic, racial and authoritarian state. Today there is a functioning civil society and a state both on the alert against racism and defending the rights of minorities. There is a respect for the human dignity. Today’s Germany is a pluralistic democracy within a multicultural society – if yet with frequent and serious flaws. The books also point out the enemies of an open society and the parliamentary system and how they should be counteracted. These observations are in line with the official recommendations from the Permanent Conference that started already in the 1970s. To create citizens through establishing common values has always been a central task allotted to the school textbooks, regardless of the political system.¹¹⁸

Major Textbook Shifts

Hopefully, this study has demonstrated that the typology of uses of history is a fruitful theoretical device in analysing history textbooks. It has been possible to distinguish different elements in the books and establish changes between the periods before and after German re-unification. Regarding the previous lack of this kind of studies, the present analysis may be a piece in the larger puzzle of research on German textbooks and their treatment of the dark German past. This said, it should not be denied that it is often difficult to distinguish between the different uses. Nor should anything else be expected, as most concrete uses at one and the same time contain more than one or several uses.¹¹⁹

Major shifts in use are discerned in the textbooks. The *existential use*, which alongside the expected pedagogical and scholarly uses was

the most salient, changed in important respects concerning questions of identity. The images of what it meant to be a German were transformed via the larger space and attention devoted to the perpetrators. A “we” also included Germans in the past. What for a long time was considered a taboo topic was in 2002 considered an important theme – one not to be swept under the carpet or distorted. The texts confronted the pupils with disturbing questions of how they themselves would have acted at the time, taking into consideration that many Germans participated in the Nazi misdeeds. The newest books also appealed to and dealt with questions of local and personal identity, a perspective totally absent before 1990. Children and youngsters giving faces to the past, both as victims and ordinary Germans, were used to a large degree in 2002. These changes in an existential use of history were in tune with both changes in the history didactics and official recommendations and regulations presented by the state.

Important changes also occurred in the *moral use* of history. While older books devoted limited space to the victims, the attention was much more substantial in 2002. The way of presenting the victims was personalised in the sense that victims appeared clearer as individuals exposed to and experiencing horrendous suffering. Before the re-unification, some attention was paid to aspects of commemorating the victims, but this element became much more important in 2002. These moral changes are also in accordance with recommendations from both history didactics and the state, promulgated through the ministries of education.

The transfer idea, more often than not tangibly interpreted as the problem of how to counteract right-wing groups, became a salient element in the *political use* of history in the German history textbooks of the new millennium. Before re-unification, the idea of the transferability of historical lessons learnt from the ugly past to the present, also influencing the future, had no place in the textbooks. The measures taken against right-wing extremism had an insignificant place in the earlier period. The transfer idea lies implicit in many pedagogical and didactical ideas circulating at this time.¹²⁰ The idea of learning from history, and how to stand up against right-wing extremism, must indeed be seen as one major component in the West German intellectual and public discussions from the late 1960s.¹²¹

That the pedagogical use – the desire to transmit accepted knowledge about the past – has such a dominating position is not surprising, but the importance of a scholarly use of history in the German history textbooks must also be underlined. There was and remains a close relationship between academic research and the schoolbooks. New results and debates are presented to the pupils, stressing the multiperspectivity. Probably, this close connection between the academy and the school is typical for Germany.¹²²

Finally, one must ask oneself why these changes took place. The starting point for this study was the German re-unification. Did this development influence the schoolbooks? When, and how? The fears expressed at that time of a stronger German nationalism influencing the history textbooks were not realised. This is in line with Jan Selling's argumentation that the dominant German history discourses, adhered to by both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, accepted and incorporated the trauma of the Holocaust into the national memory of the past, the symbolic expression being the Berlin Memorial to the murdered European Jews in Berlin inaugurated in May 2005, 60 years after the end of the war.¹²³

To a great extent, the books from the 1980s and from 2002 reflect the recurring public debates in West Germany that started in 1986 with the so-called historians' controversy, when the left-liberal project *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, coming to terms with the past, was unsuccessfully questioned from right-wing historians who wanted to downplay the gloomiest parts of the German past. These debates continued in the same infected tone also after the re-unification. The Goldhagen debate in 1996 put new focus on the German perpetrators, while in the Walser debate of 1998¹²⁴ voices were heard that questioned the ongoing discussions about the Nazi past and the Wehrmacht exhibition in 1997. This mental climate of an ongoing debate of how to handle the Nazi past has been mirrored in the textbooks.¹²⁵

Thus the 1990 re-unification did not stir a new nationalism in the German history textbooks. In this limited perspective the collapse of the GDR and the new Germany that took shape did not leave many traces in the textbooks. Seen in a broader perspective and over a longer time span, however, the end of the Cold War influenced the discourse on the Nazi past and paved the way for the new tenden-

cies in historical culture demonstrated in this chapter: the interest in both the perpetrators and the victims, in commemoration, and in the political and moral lessons to be learnt from Holocaust history. To be sure, these tendencies are not solely to be found in Germany, but have a European resonance.

Notes

1. See e.g. Norbert Frei, *1945 und wir. Das Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen*, München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2005; Pär Frohnert, "The Presence of the Holocaust. *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in West Germany, East Germany and Austria," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003.
2. In some school types history was part of an all-embracing subject. I differentiate between the persecutions as the measures taken against the German Jews before the actual Holocaust, the German genocide of the European Jews.
3. Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller & Karoline Tschuggnall (eds.), *"Opa war kein Nazi." Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag 2002, has made use of interviews.
4. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, "Das Schulgeschichtsbuch – Gedächtnis der Gesellschaft oder Autobiographie der Nation," *Geschichte, Politik und ihre Didaktik*, Vol. 26, 1998:1–2, pp. 27, 30; after Gabriele Honikel, "'Judenverfolgung – Endlösung – Holocaust.' Sprachliche Analysen des Begriffsgebrauchs in Geschichtsbüchern für die Mittelstufe/Sekundarstufe I in der Bundesrepublik," unpublished 2001, p. 2.
5. Hanna Schissler & Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe, and the World. Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books 2005, p. 7.
6. Bernd Spreemann, "Fragen an das Geschichtsbuch – Kriterien für die Auswahl eines Schulbuchs," in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, Vol. 10, 1993, p. 64f; after Gabriela Honikel 2001, p. 14. Eva Kolinsky, "Geschichte gegen den Strom. Zur Darstellung des Holocaust in neuen Schulgeschichtsbüchern," *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, Vol. 13, 1991, p. 122, instead stresses the importance of the teacher, which may hold its truth for the 1950s and 1960s.
7. Inspiring is Dietrich Scholle, "Schulbuchanalyse und Schulbuchkritik," in Hans Süßmuth (ed.), *Geschichtsunterricht im vereinten Deutschland*, Vol. II, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag 1991.
8. Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 38–43. Karlsson first presented his typology in 1999 in a slightly different version in Klas-Göran Karlsson, *Historia som vapen. Historiebruk och Sovjetunionens upplösning 1985–1995*, Stockholm: Natur och Kultur 1999. In my opinion the categories were a bit too influenced by his subject on uses of history in the collapsing Soviet Union and the new Russia. The typology is also presented in Klas-Göran Karlsson, "Historiedidaktik: begrepp, teori och analys," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Historien är nu. En introduktion till historiedidaktiken*, Lund: Studentlitteratur 2004, pp. 55–66. I am influenced by the comments on the typology by Barbara Törnquist-Plewa in her application of the concept in "The Jedwabne Killings – A Challenge for

- Polish Collective Memory,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 141–176.
9. See e.g. Falk Pingel, “National Socialism and the Holocaust in West German School Books,” *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, Vol. 22, 2000; Walter F. Renn, “Federal Republic of Germany: Germans, Jews and Genocide,” in Randolph L. Braham (ed.), *The Treatment of the Holocaust in Textbooks. The Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, The United States of America*, New York: Columbia University Press 1987; Bodo von Borries, “‘Wer sich des Vergangenen nicht erinnert, ist verurteilt...’ Historische Analysen und normative Überlegungen. Vernichtungskrieg und Judenmord in den Schulbüchern beider deutscher Staaten seit 1949,” in Klaus Bergmann et alia (eds.), *Lebendiges Geschichtslernen. Bausteine zu Theorie und Pragmatik, Empirie und Normfrage. Bodo von Borries zum 60. Geburtstag*, Schwalbach/Ts: Wochenschau Verlag 2004; Peter Dudek, “Der Rückblick auf die Vergangenheit wird sich nicht vermeiden lassen.” *Zur pädagogischen Verarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland (1945–1990)*, Opladen: Westdt. Verlag 1995.
 10. Klas-Göran Karlsson 2003, p. 39, does not explicitly comment on identity, but this aspect is underlined by Barbara Törnquist-Plewa 2003, p. 158.
 11. Barbara Törnquist-Plewa 2003, pp. 154–156, who includes the view on history as “vitae magistra” (below called the transfer idea), i.e. the opinion that it is possible to learn from history for the future.
 12. Karlsson speaks of this category as a “political-pedagogical” use, but I have chosen to look upon the pedagogical aspect as a use of its own. In 1999 Karlsson did not include a political use in his typology, but mentioned a further “special pedagogical or didactic use [...] concerning history as a learning process” (Klas-Göran Karlsson 1999, p. 161.) Barbara Törnquist-Plewa 2003 only mentions a “political use” (pp. 162–163). A political use also includes history used by politicians or other agents with political purposes to gain influence both in domestic and foreign politics. Only the transfer thought is applicable in this study.
 13. A special pedagogical use is also in accordance with Klas-Göran Karlsson’s intention, which of course could be discussed, of connecting different uses to different groups of users; see Klas-Göran Karlsson 1999, p. 57 and Klas-Göran Karlsson 2004, p. 55.
 14. The Swedish historian Jan Selling writing about the Nazi past, history discourse and nationalism in Germany, 1990–2000, chooses a perspective in his dissertation starting from the opinion that the reunification must have had nationalistic effects on the history discourse; see Jan Selling, *Ur det förflutnas skuggor. Historiediskurs och nationalism i Tyskland 1990–2000*, Stockholm & Stehag: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposion, 2004, especially pp. 11–14, 265–268.
 15. Stefan Küchler, “Zur Interpretation des Nationalsozialismus, der jüdischen Geschichte und des Holocaust im Geschichtsunterricht der DDR,” *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, Vol. 22, 2000. Ansgar Weißer, Die Darstellung des Dritten Reiches und des Holocaust in Geschichtslehrbüchern und Unterrichtsmaterialien der DDR 1949 bis 1989, unpublished Hausarbeit Ersten Staatsprüfung, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster 1999.
 16. Falk Pingel 2000; *Zur Auseinandersetzung mit dem Holocaust in der Schule. Ein Beitrag zur Information von Länderseite*, Bonn: Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1997, p. 34; Karl-Ernst Jeismann & Bernd Schönemann, *Geschichte amtlich. Lehrpläne und Richtlinien der*

- Bundesländer. Analyse, Vergleich, Kritik*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg 1989, pp. 115–116.
17. Walter F. Renn 1987, pp. 7–9.
 18. *Deutsch-israelische Schulbuchempfehlungen*, Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg 1992, pp. 28–29. The importance of observing the distinction between “racial” and “racist” was underlined. (The ed. is almost totally similar with the ed. from 1985.)
 19. Klaus Bergmann et alia (eds.), *Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik I–II*, Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann 1979 (reprint in 1980); 3d ed. in 1985; 5th ed. in 1997.
 20. This central concept was established by Karl-Ernst Jeismann. See e.g. his article “Geschichtsbewußtsein als zentrale Kategorie der Geschichtsdidaktik,” in Gerhard Schneider (ed.), *Geschichtsbewußtsein und historisch-politisches Lernen. Jahrbuch für Geschichtsdidaktik*, 1988.
 21. Kolinsky underlines that the history textbooks for the advanced level of the grammar school (“Sekundarstufe II”) are less suitable for an analyses due to the working method focused on the pupils own independent work with the help of different kinds of working materials; Eva Kolinsky 1991, p. 128.
 22. It is in some cases also possible to change to the upper level grammar school from the comprehensive school. Gisela Teistler, *The Education System of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert-Institute for International Textbook Research 1998; “Schultypen in Deutschland,” Wikipedia, der freien Enzyklopädie, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulsystem_in_Deutschland (July 11, 2005).
 23. Robert Hermann Tenbrock & Kurt Kluxen (eds.), *Zeiten und Menschen. Geschichtliches Unterrichtswerk, Ausgabe B*, band 4, *Zeitgeschichte (1917 bis zur Gegenwart)*, Paderborn: Schöningh & Schroedel, copyright Ferdinand Schöningh 1978 (printed in 1982). This book was specially written for the grammar school.
 24. Karl-Heinz Zuber & Hans Holzbauer (eds.), *bsv Geschichte* (1986), 4 N, München: Bayerischer Schulbuch-Verlag 1986.
 25. Peter Alter et alia, *Geschichte und Geschehen IV*, Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag 1987, 1st ed.
 26. Dieter Brückner (ed.), *Das waren Zeiten 4, Das 20. Jahrhundert, Geschichte an Gymnasien, Sekundarstufe 1, für die 10. Jahrgangsstufe*, Bamberg: C. C. Buchner 2002, 1st ed. This book was specially written for the grammar school.
 27. Thomas Berger-von der Heide & Hans-Gert Oomen (eds.), *Entdecken und verstehen, 3. Geschichtsbuch für die Klassenstufen 9/10 im Saarland. Von 1917 bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin: Cornelsen 2002, 1st ed..
 28. Hans-Jürgen Lendzian & Wolfgang Mattes (eds.), *Zeiten und Menschen 4*, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2002.
 29. The average life cycle was ten years. Bodo von Borries 2004, p. 388.
 30. The books have been chosen after recommendations from the chief librarian of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig. I have also studied textbooks written for secondary general and the intermediate school, without burdening this article with references to this material. The difference lies mainly in the fact that these books are thinner.
 31. Layout and page size of the older books differs but the text volume is approximately the same, around 50 pages of the “modern” size. The volume in 2002 in all three books is around 70 pages.
 32. “Forum. Perspektiven der internationalen Schulbuchforschung – ein Gespräch mit Karl-Ernst Jeismann,” *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, Vol 17, 1995:1, p 66; Eva Kolinsky 1991, p. 124.

33. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 115–118. The space devoted to perpetrators and victims is commented below.
34. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 114.
35. E.g. *Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik*, (eds. from 1979 to 1997). *Auseinandersetzung* 1997, pp. 18, 33, 46.
36. Almost all photos and paintings reproduced in the six books are treated as sources, that demand certain care concerning the interpretation.
37. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 111.
38. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 89.
39. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 99.
40. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 81. The quotation is from Heinrich von Treitschke's infamous words from 1879, which was chosen as the slogan for the Nazi antisemitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*. Wikipedia, <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treitschke#/Antisemitismus> (January 24, 2006).
41. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 118–119. See also *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002 where one headline goes “The perspective of the perpetrators,” p. 146.
42. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 154.
43. *bsv Geschichte* 1986, pp. 118–119.
44. The observation fits with Renn's result that the parts in history textbooks from the 1970s and 1980s concerning the Holocaust almost always ended without any interpretation. Walter F. Renn 1987, pp. 102–103.
45. *bsv Geschichte* 1986, pp. 118–119.
46. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, p. 112 (see also pp. 113–114).
47. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 112, 124. “Nachgeboren” is only used about the Nazi period.
48. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 99.
49. Italics in original. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, p. 114. *Zeiten und Menschen* from 1978 talks about “a few ten of thousands,” p. 141.
50. *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, p. 139. Pingel 2000, pp. 14–15.
51. Kolinsky found that books from the 1980s still used the Nazi language. Kolinsky, 1991, pp. 124–125.
52. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 150. *Entdecken und verstehen*, 2002, p. 118, mentions “many tens of thousands.” The role of the army is stressed in *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 104.
53. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 146, 148.
54. E.g. with the well-known books by Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen.
55. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 147.
56. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 109.
57. *bsv Geschichte* 1986, p. 118.
58. *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, p. 141 (also p. 103). See also *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, p. 124, where a thirteen year old boy says that “[h]e has dragged our [German] name into the dirt.”
59. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 99, 155.
60. Aleida Assmann claims that the Western Allies started a campaign in summer 1945 which rested upon an accusation of the collective guilt of the German people. Aleida Assmann & Ute Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1999, pp. 112–139. This opinion is questioned by most authors commenting on the topic, see e.g. Nobert Frei 2005, p. 32.

61. *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, p. 104.
62. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 94–97, 108, 110–111, 114–118, 140.
63. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 99, 132, 138, 144, 148. See also *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, which e.g. devotes a section on the struggle to grasp the youth, pp. 78–79.
64. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 101, 112–113, 120–121, 134, 142. See also *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 112, which gives tips on excursions in Baden-Württemberg.
65. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 156–157.
66. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 88, 123.
67. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 99, 132.
68. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 108.
69. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 113.
70. Perhaps significantly not the oldest book from 1978.
71. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, p. 112.
72. See also *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 107.
73. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 115–117. Honikel has found that the books from 1981–1990 devote more space to the victims than before; Honikel 2001, p. 61.
74. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 114–115, 121–122.
75. Eva Kolinsky means that this tendency prevented the pupils to get a closeness to the victims; see Eva Kolinsky 1991, pp. 134–139. See also Gabriele Honikel 2001 who found that *Zeiten und Menschen* (1978) in the language takes a chilly distance to the victims, pp. 49–50.
76. E.g. instruction for the schools in Nordrhein-Westfalen, in *Auseinandersetzung*, 1997, p. 32.
77. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 118–119. The same witness is used in *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 148. In *Entdecken und Verstehen*, 2002, p. 114, the story of the little girl taken out from the gas chamber by a German guard just before the door was closed and who miraculously survived Auschwitz is highly emotional.
78. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 115–120.
79. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 148. In *Entdecken und verstehen*, 2002, p. 116, the well-known German Jewish literature critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, describes life in the Warsaw ghetto. A girl experiencing the siege of Leningrad is another example. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 104, 113, 118–119.
80. *Entdecken und verstehen*, 2002, pp. 108–109.
81. Recommendations by Karl-Ernst Jeismann in 1994 “Emotionen und historisches Lernen,” in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 1994, and Ido Abram, “Erziehung und humane Erziehung” in Ido Abram & Matthias Heyl, *Thema Holocaust. Ein Buch für die Schule*, Reinbek: Rowohlt 1996, p. 19; after Gabriele Honikel 2001, pp. 25–26.
82. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 149. No information is given to the pupils about the author (an Austrian-Jewish social philosopher and author), Wikipedia, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%BCnther_Anders (February 14, 2006).
83. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 116, 118, 120, 150; *Entdecken und verstehen*, 2002, pp. 114–118; *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 130–131, 148–149.
84. Jürgen Hannig, “Dokumentarfotos’ in Geschichtsbüchern,” in Gerhard Schneider (ed.), *Geschichtsbewußtsein und historisch-politisches Lernen, Jahrbuch für Geschichtsdidaktik*, 1988, pp. 141–161, is very critical to this kind of publication, which doesn’t underline the perpetrators’ perspective. I don’t agree with his recommendation to restrict the use of photos as far as possible.
85. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 113 (also p. 110). See also *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 134–135.

86. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, p. 123; see also p. 105, where it is mentioned that people in Eastern Europe commemorates their murdered countrymen. See also *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, p. 107, about searching for local Jewish memorials and *bsv Geschichte* 1986, pp. 118–119, which does not focus on the victims in the presidents' speeches from 1952 and 1985.
87. *bsv Geschichte* 1986, p. 119.
88. Bodo von Borries notices the same interest in the commemoration in the history textbooks from the 1990s, Bodo von Borries 2004, p. 406.
89. *Auseinandersetzung* 1997, pp. 5 (quote) and 6 (see also p. 25).
90. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 121. The pupil gets suggestions of a CD-ROM with testimonies from survivors and of homepages with links to commemorations sites in Germany. See also *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 99, 149 (quote from Anders ending with his appeal of commemoration). *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, though, leaves the pupils without any instructions. See pp. 107, 120.
91. Jörn Rüsen, "Interpreting the Holocaust. Some Theoretical Issues," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquiries into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Bokförlag 2004, pp. 54–58; Norbert Frei 2005, pp. 26, 39–40; Aleida Assmann & Ute Frevert 1999, pp. 146–147.
92. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 114, 123 (quote). The drawing is probably from the 1930s or 40s; *bsv Geschichte* 1986, pp. 114–115, 118.
93. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 90, 92, 150–153. See also *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 210–215, which support the assertion of an initial Allied accusation of a collective guilt with reference to former camp inmate Eugen Kogon's contemporary and highly contested statements; Norbert Frei 2005, pp. 149–150.
94. A moral use is also intended when a field post letter from a soldier at Stalingrad is published. He talks about his own predictable near death in the terms of "guilt perceived, guilt redeemed." *bsv Geschichte* 1986, p. 118. Paul Weber's drawing is from 1932.
95. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 105. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 154, devotes the section "A past, that wouldn't pass. The question of the personal responsibility" to the topic. The recurring debates, among them the Goldhagen debate, are mentioned. The authors conclude that everybody has to acquire an own opinion.
96. Bodo von Borries 2004, p. 406, see also pp. 410–411.
97. Walter F. Renn 1987, pp. 102–103, 107.
98. *bsv Geschichte* 1986; *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987; *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002; *Das waren Zeiten* 2002. The oldest book, *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, devotes 50 per cent more space to the resistance than to the Holocaust.
99. *Auseinandersetzung* 1997, pp. 53, 55.
100. E.g. *bsv Geschichte* 1986, p. 101; *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 140, 142.
101. The oldest book *Zeiten und Menschen* from 1978 significantly tells that "too many Germans [were] dazzled by Hitler's successes" (p. 146). In 2002 *Zeiten und Menschen*, p. 122, tells about a "dictatorship with the people."
102. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, p. 124.
103. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 155.
104. *Das waren Zeiten* 2002, pp. 67, 119.
105. *Zur Auseinandersetzung* 1997. Already from 1979 and onwards *Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik* contained a chapter on "Didactics of Peace Education" (pp. 230–232).
106. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 107.
107. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 156, 158–159.

108. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 148–149.
109. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 151–157, quotation p. 157.
110. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, p. 153.
111. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 159.
112. Declaration for tolerance and solidarity in 1992. *Zur Auseinandersetzung* 1997, pp. 5, 57.
113. Gerhard Schneider in 1991 recommended the schools to treat the “the history of effects, of what happened in the past.” “Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Einheit. Über die neue Aktualität eines traditionellen Unterrichtsgegenstandes,” in Hans Süßmuth (ed), *Geschichtsunterricht im vereinten Deutschland*, II, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag 1991, p. 184; Klas-Göran Karlsson 2003, pp. 9–13; Jörn Rüsen 2004, pp. 35–36. *Geschichte und Geschehen* 1987, pp. 122–123. The last sentence resounds of Ernst Nolte’s invocation in the “Historikerstreit” in 1986 that a troublesome past must disappear. Deutsches Historisches Museum, http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/NeueHerausforderungen_redeNolte1986/ (February 6, 2006). The authors of the schoolbook of course knew these words, but hardly the pupils. The rest of the text section and the conclusions clearly show that the intention of the text isn’t in line with Nolte.
114. *Zeiten und Menschen* 1978, p. 1.
115. *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, pp. 98–99.
116. The discussion should be inspired by a text from Ian Kershaw, *Zeiten und Menschen* 2002, p. 157.
117. *Entdecken und verstehen* 2002, pp. 107, 113.
118. *Zur Auseinandersetzung* 1997; Hanna Schissler & Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (eds.) 2005, pp. 1–2.
119. Jörn Rüsen, “Was ist Geschichtskultur? Überlegungen zu einer neuen Art, über Geschichte nachzudenken,” in Jörn Rüsen, *Historische Orientierung*, Köln: Böhlau 1994, pp. 211–234.
120. See e.g. Ido Abram & Matthias Heyl 1996.
121. An interesting theoretical reflection is Max Miller, *Kollektive Lernprozesse. Studien zur Grundlegung einer soziologischen Lerntheorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986.
122. See also Pär Frohnert, “Vergangenheitsbewältigung efter murens fall. *Der Spiegel* och historiedebatterna kring Förntelsen och Tredje riket,” in Mai-Brith Schartau & Helmut Müssener (eds.), *Den okände (?) grannen: Tysklandsrelaterad forskning i Sverige*, <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-367>, 2005 (February 2, 2006).
123. Jan Selling 2004; Hanna Schissler & Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (eds.) 2005.
124. Pär Frohnert 2005.
125. Recent overviews in Nobert Frei 2005 and Pär Frohnert 2003.

The First Victim?

Austrian Historical Culture and the Memory of the Holocaust

The established view of the Austrian way of dealing with the Nazi past – Austrian *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* – is strongly shaped by a tacit model of two discontinuities. In this view, the first discontinuity in the Austrian development came in 1945 when the former integral part of Nazi Germany was able to extricate itself from all blame and forge a self-image as the “first victim of Nazism.” The above description of Austria as the first victim came from the allied Moscow declaration of 1943, and was two years later used to the full by the provisional Austrian government. Furthermore, at this time a whole national ideology presenting Austria as a non-German nation with a long history of political as well as cultural separateness from Germany was constructed to underpin the claim of German aggression against Austria in 1938. The result of this policy was an externalisation of guilt that in the main was upheld until the mid-1980s. Up to this time there was not much attention in Austria paid to the history of Nazism and the Holocaust, neither by historians or politicians, nor by the public at large.¹

The second discontinuity came in 1986 when, during the heavy international pressure of the Waldheim affair, this whole ideological construction collapsed and Austria was forced to face its own close involvement with Nazi Germany forty years earlier. In the 1990s the Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky accepted moral responsibility for the Holocaust on behalf of Austria, and there was a surge of interest towards the Austrian participation in the crimes of Nazism and especially the Holocaust. During this time a large-scale restitution fund was created; historical research into these questions ballooned; a historical commission set to work on confiscations by the Nazi regime and on the lack of restitution by the Second Austrian Republic;

an Institute for the history of the Jews in Austria was founded, and Simon Wiesenthal crowned his long career by initiating the building of a memorial in a central Vienna location commemorating the 65,000 Austrian Jews murdered by the Nazis.²

The established view of two main discontinuities points to the important shift Austria experienced in the 1980s, and links it to the previous shift of 1945. As such this is wholly unproblematic. However, this view does become problematic through its tendency to lock the focus on the shift of the 1980s and thus draws attention away from the continuities of Austrian history, which are crucial for understanding Austrian history after 1945 and perhaps especially for understanding developments after 1986. Firstly, the long stability of the “victim myth” between 1945 and 1986 cannot be examined fruitfully with the model of two discontinuities; it is simply taken for granted as the pre-Waldheim era is given a narrative function in this model as a contrasting foil or pre-history to the post-Waldheim period. Secondly, the backlash in Austrian history and memory politics from the late 1990s – one thinks of the harsh debates surrounding the Wehrmacht exhibition in the late 1990s and the policies of the conservative *Wende* government after 2000 – strongly indicate continuities in Austrian historical consciousness that are completely incomprehensible when approached with the model of two discontinuities.

To move beyond this model and deal in a more productive manner with the development of Austrian society in this regard during the post-war era, a model working with *continuities* is needed; a model which shifts attention from the discontinuity of the Waldheim affair to diachronic perspectives on continuity *and* change during the whole post-war era. As I see it, such a model needs to take into account structural factors of Austrian society, which have contributed to giving Austrian historical self-understanding its fundamental shape. I will here present such a perspective on the fundamental patterns of Austrian historical culture. As the memory of the Holocaust as such will be mostly absent from the discussion in this article, I want to point out that the perspective developed here is devised to approach the problem of Austrian Holocaust memory indirectly, by examining that wider Austrian historical culture that frames in and gives meaning to the memory of the Holocaust in Austria.

The Framework: Collective Memory and Historical Culture

Many of the influential studies into Holocaust memory made in the last two decades – such as those by Peter Novick and James Young,³ to mention two of the most important – use the concept collective memory. Without lessening the achievements of these and other pioneering studies into Holocaust memory, it should nevertheless be noted that the concept of collective memory has certain analytical weaknesses. Firstly, collective memory is by definition something that can only appear after the event. Studies of the collective memory of the Holocaust are therefore purely histories of the Holocaust after 1945. However, this disregards the important fact that when an event takes place – even if it is an event of the magnitude of the Holocaust – it will be received by and integrated into an interpretative framework that is already in place, and which has been shaped over a long period of time. Historical culture is a concept which can be used to shift attention to this pre-existing collective cultural framework. Secondly, as Peter Novick noted, collective memories are modular and shifting and prone to be put to many different uses over time.⁴ As the political and cultural currents shift, the collective memory of one and the same event can change markedly, Novick demonstrated in his study of the collective memory of the Holocaust in the USA. As I see it, this quality of collective memory is a further argument for focusing upon those framing structures of historical culture that shape and give collective meaning to the memory of the Holocaust. I believe that shifts in collective memory can be understood better, and will appear as less arbitrary, when placed in their historical cultural context.

Historical culture and historical consciousness are closely related concepts. Historical consciousness is the mental process of thinking historically; to see oneself as placed in a time continuum between past and future, where a perceived past is used for orientation towards the future. Historical consciousness as such is very difficult to study. Historical culture, on the other hand, is the concrete impression historical consciousness makes on culture. Historical culture can be studied through artifacts and narratives that give expression to a certain collective's historical consciousness.⁵ However, historical cul-

ture is problematic as an analytical concept insofar as it appears on many different societal levels. One might identify historical culture in small social groups and localities, as well as within political and social movements or nations and states; it is a concept that necessitates closer definition in order to be used fruitfully for historical inquiries. Ideology most certainly often functions to shape and determine historical culture.⁶ Collective identity is also important.⁷ Similar to ideology, national and other identity-building projects always contain a historical dimension; a historical narrative which explains the road a nation/group/political movement has taken and gives it a future orientation and direction. It is thus crucial to examine identities of different sorts when looking for the factors shaping historical culture.

Historical culture is both process and structure. Process, because history is continuously used over time for, *inter alia*, political, existential and moral purposes by a number of different agents in a society. Structure, because some of these uses are fairly consistent and thus reproduce and reinforce certain patterns of historical culture.⁸ For instance, identity-political projects of some longevity in this way tend to produce what I will call fundamental patterns of historical culture. Historical culture is therefore fairly stable and normally slow to change, creating patterns and forms that limit the way history can be used and reshaped at a certain time. However, just like identity-political projects can change markedly over time and even be terminated, historical culture can be transformed. Although historical culture has structural qualities that determine the way history can be used and interpreted in a society, one should therefore also be aware of its dynamic potential, and the influence of agents. However, in the present article the focus will be squarely on some fundamental patterns of Austrian historical culture that have functioned as structural determinants for the meaning given to the memory of the Holocaust in post-war Austria.

Fundamental Patterns of Austrian Historical Culture

The collective identities and mentalities that shaped 20th century Austrian historical culture originated in the late 19th century. Indeed, the tradition of an Austrian Catholic and Baroque cultural identity that was later developed into a notion of an Austrian national identity, just

as its counterpart, the notion of Austria as the carrier of an old German political and cultural tradition, can be traced even farther back in history. Nevertheless, this field of tension was decisively shaped in the period of the Dual Monarchy (1867–1918) and during the inter-war era, and it received its final shape through the events of 1938 and 1945. This ambivalent national identity created the first of three fundamental patterns of historical culture to be examined here. A second fundamental pattern was created by the interaction between the socio-political *Lager* (“camps”) of Austria. The *Lager* originated in the second half of the 19th century and they were shaped into very stable, socially organised political identities during the inter-war era. A third pattern which is less important for understanding Austrian historical culture as such, but absolutely crucial when it comes to understanding the place of the memory of the Holocaust in this culture, is the long and strong Austrian tradition of antisemitism. The development of Austrian antisemitism was intertwined, indeed integrated, with that of Austrian national identity. Furthermore, Austrian antisemitism was also closely integrated with at least two of the three *Lager* traditions. These three fundamental patterns will be discussed in turn below, after which I will suggest what their concerted effect on the memory of the Holocaust in post-war Austria has been.

Austrian National Identity

According to a widespread view, Austrian national identity was created after 1945 to support the myth of Austria as the first victim of Nazi Germany. However, there is an ongoing debate, scholarly and otherwise, on Austrian national identity, which intensified during the crisis of national self-understanding that occurred in the 1980s.⁹ At least as far as the domestic Austrian part of this debate is concerned, one should not approach it as though it were a matter that can be resolved; one should rather approach the different positions taken in this debate as expressions of different mindsets that have been represented in Austrian society for a long time and still are today. I will here focus on the tensions between these mindsets, which give an ambivalent quality to Austrian national identity that has produced the first fundamental pattern to be identified here.

I want to make two points about Austrian national identity: First-



Anschluss 1938. Hitler holds his historical speech at the Heldenplatz in Vienna on March 15, 1938. Bildarchiv Austria/OEGZ: S 60/47.

ly, that there is a long-standing ambivalence in the Austrian national identity between an Austrianist view of this identity and a Germanist view; secondly, that the Austrianist view, the one dominant after 1945, uses Germany as the main and firmly established counter-image. The main characteristic of the Austrian national identity project after 1945 is the consequent use of Germany as the identity-generating counter-image. The line of development drawn in the historical narrative of Austrian nationhood was a *Sonderentwicklung* vis-à-vis Germany, which was sometimes traced back to the Middle Ages. However, this perceived opposition to Germany was not only a construction of the time after 1945; it can be traced back to the 18th century conflicts between Austria and Prussia, through the conflicts of the 19th century which culminated in the war of 1866, and it became programmatic in the Austrian ideology of the *Ständestaat* (1934–1938) and its defensive struggle against Nazi Germany – the latter is often termed *Staatswiderstand* (“state resistance”) against Nazism in the terminology of the Austrian national ideology. The Anschluss to Germany in 1938 was the Great Defeat in this tradition.

To complicate matters, it must be noted that there is in Austria



Plebiscite Day, March 10, 1938. Workers demonstrate on the Ringstrasse in front of the Parliament. Banner: 'We want a free, independent Austria.' Bildarchiv Austria/VGA: E3/516.

also a strong German national tradition. The Austrian German national tradition harks back to the German-Roman Empire and the Great German tradition that expressed itself in the Frankfurt parliament of 1848. The great trauma of this tradition is the war of 1866 and the following exclusion from Germany through the realisation of Bismarck's Little German solution. In the inter-war era the German national tradition was gradually assimilated to Nazism and it viewed the Anschluss of 1938 as the Great Victory and the fulfilment of its aims.

The events of March 1938 focused this field of tension in Austrian national identity in a very short space of time. The great support for the Anschluss – as demonstrated at the Heldenplatz on 15 March – should not conceal the fact that there was also significant support for a retained Austrian independence in 1938. What is not always noted when discussing the events of March 1938 is that in the week preceding the Anschluss a campaign building up to a planned popular referendum for the independence of Austria amassed a large and enthusiastic support; mainly from other sections of Austrian society than those

represented at the Heldenplatz on 15 March – a referendum that in part activated strongly patriotic Austrian *national* sentiments. In fact, this planned referendum and the accompanying anti-German campaign unleashed the Nazi German aggression on Austria.¹⁰

The events of March 1938 could be described as a confrontation between two opposing camps in Austria; two camps with fundamentally different views of the Austrian national identity – the one Austrian national, and the other German national. In 1938 the German national camp was victorious, with benign assistance of Nazi Germany, and the segments of the Austrian population that adhered to the Austrian national view had to accommodate themselves as well as they could. Some of them, of course, ended up in concentration camps – just like the Austrian Jews. This was true for the earlier holders of power in the *Ständestaat*, the Christian Social elite, but also for the opponents of this “austrofascist” regime, Social Democrats and Communists, who were also opponents of Nazism.¹¹ However, most adapted to the new circumstances; some did it so well that they became Nazis or at least collaborators themselves. In 1945 the tide turned against the former victors and the Austrian nationals came out on top, this time with the benign assistance of the Allies. They launched an intense Austrian national campaign to purge Austria from Nazism (=Germanism). The new state ideology was rabidly anti-German and tied into the older Austrian national tradition. Now the former Nazis and the German nationals (often the same people) had to accommodate themselves. This was difficult in the first few years of intense denazification, but became easier only a few years later when the re-integration of former Nazis began. However, a German national stance was stigmatising for several decades more. Nevertheless, most German nationals adapted to the new circumstances. Some did it so well that they made prominent careers in the Austrian state or in one of the two state-supporting parties: the ÖVP, the heirs of the Christian Socials, and the SPÖ, the Social Democrats.¹²

As I see it, this history of sudden and dramatic changes in Austrian national identity has created a basic corresponding instability that still has repercussions today. Both after 1938 and, more importantly, after 1945 the Austrian national identity partly rested and rests on a mass of experiences which it explicitly negates.¹³ However, most important to

note here are the effects of the national ideology that was victorious in 1945 and dominated the Austrian Second Republic for several decades more: the Austrian national variety. The ideology and its companion piece, the victim myth, may look like opportunist escape hatches for former Nazis who did not deign to accept responsibility for their crimes, but this is not the way it looks from an Austrian national perspective. In this perspective, Austria is seen as having a long history of conflict with Prussia/Germany, and the Nazi "occupation" of Austria in 1938 is read into a much longer narrative about the threat from Germany – ranging from Frederick the Great in the 1740s, Bismarck in 1866, to Hindenburg/Ludendorff in 1917–1918, and the defensive struggle of the *Ständestaat* in the years preceding the Anschluss. The 1930s especially are in some segments of the Austrian population perceived as a period of struggle for survival against *German* aggression. The culmination of this struggle in the complete defeat of the Anschluss crowns a historical narrative which points forward to the resurrection of Austria in 1945. The logic of this narrative powerfully supports the notion of Austria as the "first victim of Nazi Germany." The narrative is furthermore underpinned by the individual experiences of many Christian Social and Social Democratic politicians holding prominent positions in the Second Republic until around 1980. Many of them had fought the Nazis and paid for it by being put in jail, in concentration camps, or by being exiled.¹⁴

Although the victim myth and the post-war Austrian national ideology were both products of 1945, this does not mean that they were free inventions or products of opportunism. On the contrary, they lay prepared in the Austrian national tradition and were activated during their adherents' concrete experience of struggle against Nazi Germany. When the political conjunctures turned as they did in 1945, I would sooner argue that this outcome was to be expected. The relative fragility of the victim myth, as could be observed in the 1980s, is a result of the ambivalence of the Austrian national identity, which during the decades following on 1945 rested too heavily on an interpretation of the past which was only fully accepted in parts of the Austrian population, and which directly negated the experiences of other segments, such as the German nationals, but also the Jews. However, this also means that the famed Austrian "externalisation"

of responsibility for the Holocaust, an idea put forward by Rainer Lepsius, is only partly accurate. In the Austrian national world-view it was the Nazis who were responsible, and the Austrian German nationals were, indeed, overwhelmingly Nazis. Nevertheless, the Austrian national community as defined *after* 1945 was, indeed, untouched by guilt; it had belonged to the victims of Nazism.

The Socio-Political Lager

The patterns of the historical narratives of the three Lager partly support and reinforce the patterns created by the Austrian national identity. However, if the patterns created by the Austrian national identity removed responsibility for the Holocaust from Austria to Germany, the patterns created by the Lager have an additional effect of firmly moving the focus of positive historical interest from the Nazi period to the inter-war era of internal strife in Austria.

The Lager were during the post-war era embodied in the Catholic-Conservative ÖVP (*Österreichische Volkspartei*), the Social Democratic SPÖ (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*) and the National Liberal FPÖ (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*). They are not merely political parties; they constitute broad socio-political sectors in Austrian society, with many different forms of organisations and associations tied to them. Characteristic of this type of socio-political Lager or “pillars,” *Säule*, that can also be found as an important organising principle in, for instance, the Netherlands, is that they are not really democratic parties competing for votes, but organisations that encompass the lives of their members from cradle to grave and that build on identification with a world-view. This is particularly true of the Christian Socials, today the ÖVP, and the SPÖ, whilst the FPÖ has been more loosely organised and changed more over time. The latter is often called “the third camp,” *das dritte Lager*.¹⁵ Most important to note is that the Lager build on identity, which is in part grounded in narratives about the origins and development of the Lager, and on formative events for the Lager, which often include narratives on the conflicts with the other Lager. The conflict-ridden inter-war era is an especially rich source of identity-constituting narratives. For this reason the Lager have been important factors in shaping Austrian historical culture.

The Lager were formed during the second half of the 19th century. The National Liberal Lager is the oldest, with its origins in the revolution of 1848. At that time the National Liberals fought for their fundamental values and for the unification of Germany. This matrix became the permanent foundation for this camp, although German nationalism over time almost completely eclipsed liberalism. In the inter-war era this Lager was embodied by the *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei*, which in its turn was swallowed up by Nazism in the 1930s. During the 1930s the struggle against the Christian Social dictatorship was of overriding concern. The Christian Socials outlawed the Nazi party and thus supplied an identity-generating conflict for the adherents of this Lager. With the Anschluss the German nationals – as they are more accurately labelled at this point in time – had reached their goal, but in 1945 this tradition lay completely ruined. Only in the 1980s did it return, partly transformed, to the centre-stage of Austrian politics in the guise of Jörg Haider's populist, rightist and German national regeneration of the FPÖ. The German national element was later toned down, although it basically remains in place.¹⁶

The Christian Social party was founded in the 1870s, and around the turn of the century it became one of the two leading mass parties of Imperial Austria. The party was a modern, democratic-conservative party, which built its ideology on political Catholicism. After the demise of the empire in 1918 it became the largest party in the small state republic. The Christian Socials dominated Austrian politics from 1920 until the series of coups in 1933 and 1934 when the party established a Christian Social dictatorship – this state called itself *Ständestaat*, but was called Austrofascist by its opponents. It was this Christian Social incarnation of Austria that was crushed by the Nazis in 1938. In 1945 this Lager was reconstituted as ÖVP and became the leading party in Austria up until around 1970.¹⁷ In 2000 the ÖVP made a return as the leading party after three decades of being more or less subordinated to the Social Democrats.

The Social Democratic camp has its origins in the revolution of 1848, but only grew to become the second mass party of Imperial Austria during the last decades of the 19th century. The party emphasised its German identity to some extent in the nationalities conflicts of the late Habsburg Monarchy. After 1918 the small state version of the par-

ty had a clear Great German orientation. It supported Anschluss until 1933, and in some cases individual Social Democrats also welcomed the actual Anschluss of 1938. Most importantly, this Lager was able to realise its ideology in the construction of “Red Vienna” between 1918 and 1933 – here was built a whole organisational infrastructure to match the Catholic one that underpinned the Christian Social Lager. During the inter-war era the Social Democrats were in opposition to the ruling Christian Socials on the national level in a political atmosphere that drifted in the direction of civil war. In 1927 the first street-battles occurred, and in February 1934 the Social Democrats were crushed in a brief civil war. The party was banned, and many adherents were arrested and put into jail or detention camps, or went into exile, while others went underground and organised an opposition movement. During Austrofascism – to use the Social Democratic label for the *Ständestaat* – there was even a sort of informal co-operation between Social Democrats and Austrian Nazis, as the two parties were joined by their common opposition to the clerical dictatorship. This is an experience that is often said to be behind Bruno Kreisky’s and many other Social Democrats’ lenient attitudes towards former Austrian Nazis after 1945. Anschluss in its way only brought about a renewed phase of dictatorship for a party that was on the losing side both in 1934 and 1938. However, many Social Democrats also welcomed the crushing of the *Ständestaat*, as well as the unification with Germany. After 1945 the Social Democratic party became one of two state-supporting parties in the new so-called *Proporz System* that joined them to the ÖVP in a pledge to forget old conflicts and to take responsibility for the re-established republic – this dual commitment was basically maintained until the year 2000. It would, however, take until the Kreisky era (1970–1983) for the party to be in a position to use the power of government to shape Austrian society according to its own world-view.¹⁸ Since 2000 the party has been in opposition.

There is a partial correlation between the structure of the Lager and that created by the ambivalence in Austrian national identity in the process of forming Austrian historical culture. The Christian Social historical narrative lies close to the Austrian national one. The party was the bearer of the concrete experience of “state resistance” to Nazi Germany, which is a central element both in Austrian na-

tional ideology and in the victim myth. The party, with its Catholic ideology, is also in a general sense closely identified with traditional Austrian culture. Furthermore, the long Catholic-Austrian tradition has a natural counter-image in that Prussian Protestantism that for an Austrian Catholic conservative seems naturally linked to Nazism. Within Austria ÖVP always emphasises the Ständestaat as a positive, nation-building experience. The fact that the Social Democratic party was forcefully repressed for four years by the Christian Socials was a problem in the age of Grand Coalitions after 1945, but this memory was generally controlled by emphasising the common experience of Social Democrats and Christian Socials of being repressed by the Nazis in the years 1938–1945.¹⁹

The Social Democrats' view of national identity is more complex. There is a Great German element in it, which after 1945 has been repressed in favour of the project of building a modern society within the borders of the Austrian small-state republic. For many Austrian Social Democrats, Nazism seemingly once and for all made German nationalism impossible and created the need for a modernistic variety of Austrian nationalism focusing the building of a welfare state. Although the strongly cultural nationalism supported by the ÖVP after 1945 only receives limited support from Social Democrats, the linking of victim status and resistance to Nazi Germany could be assimilated by a party that in the decades after 1945 can be designated as junior partner to the ÖVP in the project of Austrian nationalism.²⁰

In a way corresponding to the ÖVP, the historical narrative of the FPÖ is close to the German national view of Austrian national identity described above. This view has been intact throughout the 20th century in the German national tradition, but is deeply problematic in a party that tacitly counts the NSDAP among its forerunners. The FPÖ traces its history back to 1848 and somehow succeeds in affirming "Great Germany" of the years 1938–1945, without directly affirming Nazism. The political marginalisation of many Austrian Nazis after the Anschluss – the leadership of the Nazi regime in Austria was mainly recruited from Germany – is a psychological explanation for the partial externalisation of the crimes of Nazism that can also be found in the deeply implicated Austrian German national tradition. Many Austrian German nationals, just like some Social Democrats,

probably viewed Nazi Germany primarily as an instrument for realising Greater Germany. However this may be, the historical narrative of the FPÖ attempts to integrate – Nazi – Greater Germany into Austrian history, whilst simultaneously externalising guilt and responsibility for the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes from its variety of the Austrian historical narrative.²¹

To sum up, one effect of the Lager narratives is to underpin the Austrianist-Germanist field of tension in the Austrian national identity. However, in the interplay between these historical narratives a few further strongly formative effects on Austrian historical culture arise. Firstly, the Lager narratives contribute to a strong focus on the inter-war era of internal conflicts in Austrian society. Arguably, these conflicts, anchored as they were in the personal life worlds of the Christian Social as well as Social Democratic elites, made a very strong impression on the people who would rebuild Austria after 1945 and guide the country through the following decades. Secondly, the focus is turned away from the Nazi period, unless it concerns resistance to the Nazis. Part of the experience of these same elites was to have been persecuted by and to have resisted the Nazis in the years 1938–1945. All in all, this accounts for the strong focus away from the Nazi period and towards the inter-war era, when it comes to *positive* content in the historical narratives of the two main Lager after 1945. Furthermore, despite its focus on integrating the period 1938–1945 into Austrian history, the German national narrative does not contribute to changing the general picture – the Holocaust is externalised also here, although in a more ambiguous and dubious way.

Austrian Antisemitism

Antisemitism is a complex factor in Austrian historical culture. Austrian antisemitism has a long history, but during the modern era it had one peak during the late 19th century and another in the inter-war era. After 1945 antisemitism became taboo in the public sphere, but reappears often enough to belie the notion that it has disappeared. Its character of antisemitism without Jews, as well as without antisemites(!), makes it a foremost cultural phenomenon; one seemingly deeply ingrained in Austrian culture.²² Therefore it is, arguably, also a powerful formative influence on Austrian historical culture.

Modern Austrian antisemitism has parts of its origins in an older religious antisemitism, and as Catholicism is a central element in Austrian culture and national identity, so is antisemitism. Moreover, antisemitism spanned the whole political party spectrum in Austria. On the one hand, an older Catholic antisemitism was modernised by Christian Social leader Karl Lueger in the late 19th century. On the other hand, a modern, racial variety was developed in the German national and anti-Clerical camp. Austrian antisemitism from the late 19th century thus bridged the political opposition between Catholic conservatism and secular liberalism/social democracy. It should be noted, however, that antisemitism was generally weaker or at least more ambivalent in the Social Democratic camp. The Social Democrats had a strong Jewish element in the party elite as well as widespread support in the large Jewish middle-class in Vienna until the 1930s. Nevertheless, after 1945 this Jewish element was gone and it was partly replaced by former Nazis – ironically, the Austrian Social Democratic party became more antisemitic after the Holocaust. Although Austrian antisemitism is therefore connected to Nazism, it is not identified with it. Antisemites could and can be found in all camps, and they were especially common in the Christian Social camp.²³ This also means that outspoken antisemites were amongst those placed in concentration camps by the Nazis.

A telling example is Christian Social Labour leader Leopold Kunschak. He was persecuted by the Nazis in 1938 and left out in the cold during the whole Nazi period. When he returned to political leadership in 1945, in the summer election campaign, he agitated openly antisemitically, stating in public that he was proud to be an antisemite.²⁴ The explanation for the fact that Austrian antisemitism overrides all other conflict lines is probably that antisemitism played an important role in nation-building. As in many other places, the Jews must be seen to have played the part of the Other in modern Austrian identity construction. This characteristic of Austrian nation-building is especially noticeable after 1945, when returning Jews experienced that they could not write their own history and experience into the Austrian national narrative because it had been wholly cleansed from any and all Jewish components.²⁵ It is also observable in the way – Christian – Austrians today habitually and self-evidently

view Jews as non-Austrians, although their roots in Austria may be deep.²⁶ All in all one can note that, in a manner similar to Poland, antisemitism has been and arguably is still today an integrated part of a positive Austrian national identity.²⁷

Iwona Irwin-Zarecka has coined the concept “community of memory” to analyse the Polish way of relating to the Holocaust. She concludes that in Poland the Holocaust was excluded together with the Jews from the Polish community of memory. The Catholic Poles were in the process freed to focus completely on their own victimisation by the Nazis.²⁸ The parallel to Austria is strong. The Austrian community of memory has not simply repressed and externalised the Holocaust. Rather, it has excluded the Jews, and with them the Holocaust disappeared as an event relevant to the Austrian community of memory. One may therefore speak of a process in three stages, where the Jews were excluded from the Austrian national community through antisemitism before 1938, the Jews were physically removed from Austrian society in the period 1938–1945 – one third murdered, two thirds expelled – and they were, finally, excluded from the Austrian community of memory after 1945. The externalisation of the Holocaust in the post-war era is in part simply a phantom extension of the long Austrian tradition of antisemitism.

Effects on Austrian Holocaust Memory

Drawing together the different observations on fundamental patterns of Austrian historical culture made above, one can say that their concerted, and partly overlapping, effects on the memory of the Holocaust are strong. The effects can be summed up in the keywords exclusion, marginalisation and externalisation. Firstly, the Jewish experience, including that of being Holocaust victims, is excluded from the Austrian community of memory through antisemitism. Secondly, the positive content of Austrian collective memory is built around historical periods other than the Nazi period, especially the inter-war era, and the Nazi era as a whole is subsequently marginalised in Austrian collective memory. To the extent that the Nazi period is present in Austrian collective memory, the focus was for a long time purely on resistance against Nazism, thus marginalising the experiences of both Austrian perpetrators and Jewish non-resisting victims in it.

This has lately been changing. Thirdly, what happened in Austria between 1938 and 1945 is in its entirety externalised and blamed on the German Nazis – some of whom, incidentally, happened to be Austrians. Summing up, this turns the Holocaust in the basic Austrian collective memory matrix into an event that was acted out between German Nazis and Jews. It only partly happened to take place in Austria. Moreover, for modern Austrian historical self-understanding, Nazism or the Holocaust do not constitute important formative events – this function is filled by the Habsburg Monarchy and the golden era of the major socio-political Lager in Austria, the inter-war period, and increasingly by the successful rebuilding of Austria in the post-war era.

A perspective on Austrian historical culture as that presented above needs qualification in several regards. Firstly, one must say that these fundamental patterns of historical culture are underlying influences or tendencies, rather than something that can be clearly identified in Austrian society. For the most part they guide historical consciousness passively and in general ways. However, the fact that these patterns of historical imagination are anchored in collective identities, which are in their turn anchored in firmly established socio-political groups in Austrian society, make their impact substantial.

Secondly, there are changes over time when these patterns are slowly transformed or when they gain or lose in importance. I would argue that Austrian national identity steadily gained in importance over the first decades after 1945, and then slowly subsided. I think that the whole post-war era must be examined more closely with regard to the active strengthening of Austrian national identity from above. I believe these official history politics were crucial to the development of Austrian national identity up to the 1980s, with corresponding effects on Holocaust memory. Concerning the socio-political Lager, they are generally described as having been most vital and dynamic in the formative inter-war era, while they retained great importance in institutionalised shape between 1945 and at least the 1970s, after which they have lost much of their previous centrality to Austrian society.²⁹ As I see it, these socio-political identities are still important in the political elites and amongst the politically active, but have in the last few decades lost much of their previous support in wider soci-

ety, especially among the younger generations. Concerning Austrian antisemitism I would say that, disregarding a certain weakening over time, it is so closely integrated with Austrian culture in general that it is still today a powerful influence in Austrian society, with correspondingly strong effects on Holocaust memory.

Thirdly, the changes and transformations in the structural conditions of historical culture observable over time necessitate a serious look at the problem of agency. Generally, the strong influence of political agency on the formative period of Austrian nationalism immediately after 1945 is recognised. I do not disagree with this view. However, I would like to emphasise more strongly the fact that these agents – Christian Social and Social Democratic politicians with a background of opposition to Nazism – were themselves products of fundamental patterns of Austrian historical culture, and should not, as they often enough are, be viewed merely as political opportunists. What needs to be looked at more closely is the continuing active shaping of Austrian historical consciousness for political purposes up to the 1980s.

However, and this is the final point qualifying the history-cultural perspective presented here, the Cold War must be seen as an extremely important formative influence on the whole Western historical culture. The approaching end of the Cold War during the 1980s changed fundamental conditions of collective memory that had been relatively stable for the whole post-war era. Consequently, the 1990s brought a wholly new historical cultural landscape.³⁰ In this regard, the Waldheim affair in Austria is only one instance of a much wider shift in the whole Western historical culture. However, this recognition does not detract from the need for a diachronic perspective on the continuities in historical culture in order to fruitfully approach Holocaust memory.

Austrian Historical Culture after Waldheim

In conclusion I would like to support the assertion of the need of diachrony with a sketch of the changes and continuities in the historical culture of post-Waldheim Austria. The five main tendencies that I will identify constitute a more conflicting pattern than the long-standing consensus-oriented pattern supported by the Grand

Coalitions of the Austrian post-1945 *Proporz System*: one can speak of the fragmentation of Austrian historical culture from the mid-1980s. Firstly, during the 1980s a critical stance on particularly the Austrian victim myth grew strong. In 1986, during the Waldheim affair, it erupted as a pent-up force in the Austrian public, and in the following years it became a commanding influence on Austrian collective memory, demanding the end of denial and self-delusion and a more active *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. Its aim was the acceptance of Austrian responsibility and guilt for the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes. However, this wave of criticism had passed its crest already in the mid-1990s – the critical stance now met strong counter-criticism, which focused upon the problems inherent to replacing the victim myth with an, allegedly, equally biased “perpetrator myth.”³¹ I believe that this peculiar shifting between extreme interpretations of the Austrian past is in itself a symptom of the instability in Austrian national self-understanding; one created by the strong field of tension generated by the sharp shifts in the Austrian national identity during the first half of the 20th century.

Secondly, there occurred a German national revitalisation at the exact same time as the Waldheim affair, when Jörg Haider took over the leadership of the FPÖ in 1986 and again activated the previously marginalised German national tradition as a political force to be reckoned with in Austria. The sharp rise of the FPÖ between 1986 and 1999 is a complex affair that cannot be understood by merely focusing on the German national bias of the party – on the contrary, the party flirted heavily with Austrian nationalism in the 1990s. Nevertheless, it did so without really abandoning its German national values, which have remained at the core of this party even during its sharp decline in the last few years. Furthermore, there is a tendency in today’s Austria to accept a German identification and a profession to the German and national liberal tradition that preceded Nazism, and to do so without identifying this stance with the FPÖ, or to see it as implicitly post-Nazi. In any case, the German national view of Austrian national identity has since the late 1980s resurfaced as an alternative to the badly damaged Austrianist position.

Thirdly, also during the Waldheim affair, an older “popular” tradition – one that had long dominated local historical culture in Aus-

tria³² – about the role of the Second World War in Austrian history appeared on the public stage.³³ Carried by the veterans' organisations, which could identify with Waldheim's assertion that he had only done his duty in the *Wehrmacht*, it emphasised the war as a defence of the Austrian *Heimat*. The popular tradition was reinvigorated in the late 1990s, during the conflicts over the Wehrmacht exhibitions in Austria, which revealed the existence of a vigorous opinion of this type.³⁴ The popular tradition and the German national tradition reinforced one another in certain aspects, without being identified with one another; primarily by negating the victim myth and by furthering the integration of the period 1938–1945 into a positive history of Austria. They also interacted uneasily with the first of the above, viz. the critical stance on the victim myth, together creating a strong pressure on the withering Austrian national tradition built closely around the victim myth.

The fourth tendency, the return in force of the Austrian-Jewish tradition to the public stage in Austria, delivered a blow to the Austrian national tradition and the victim myth, from an unexpected direction. Two complementing aspects of this Jewish resurgence in Austria are represented by Simon Wiesenthal and Ariel Muzikant. Wiesenthal crowned his lifelong struggle for collectively remembering the destiny of the Austrian Jews – and the Austrian perpetrators – by his initiative in the early 1990s to build a memorial to the Austrian Jews murdered by the Nazis at a central Vienna location. The monument was inaugurated in 2000.³⁵ This was a victorious end and a symbolic fulfilment to an endeavour that had been actively counteracted for decades in Austria, also from official direction. Ariel Muzikant brought out the Jewish community in Vienna – he is the head of the *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde* since 1998 – as a major actor in the public arena, demanding restitution of the former properties of the community and also focusing on the need for reconciliation between Jewish victims and Austrian perpetrators. He was also a decisive influence behind the initiative for the large-scale official historians' commission, investigating confiscations in the years 1938–1945 and restitution after 1945, that was initiated by the Austrian government in 1998 and finished its work in 2003 – there are some 60 odd reports published by this commission.³⁶ Together with the critics of

the victim myth, who have been especially influential in the discipline of *zeitgeschichte*, contemporary history, the revitalisation of the Jewish tradition has brought an increased focus in Austria on some formerly neglected aspects of Austrian history in the Nazi period. One major change in the Austrian historical consciousness over the last two decades is that it has integrated the memory of the Jewish victims and that of Austrian perpetrators in the Austrian collective memory.

However, this collective memory is now strongly fragmented, whereby it also contains whole sectors that tend to integrate Nazi Great Germany into Austrian history, without bothering much about either Jewish victims or Austrian perpetrators. In addition, both the critical stance on the victim myth and the German national tradition has been decisively weakened in the intervening time. Furthermore, since the year 2000 mounting opposition to any revision of the victim myth has appeared. The fifth major tendency in Austrian historical culture after Waldheim is the revitalisation of the victim myth within a renewed and aggressive Austrian nationalism carried by the now dominating government party, the ÖVP. Unencumbered by the advances in historiography, the "Christian Socials" are now again shaping Austrian historical culture, officially advocating the defence struggle against the Nazis in the 1930s as the centrepiece of the Austrian state ideology; in the process bringing the seemingly dead victim myth vigorously back to life.³⁷ In 2005 the 50th Jubilee of renewed Austrian independence – the State Treaty of 1955 – brought out this renewed state ideology in force, with exhibitions and publications and official statements.³⁸ Twenty years after Waldheim, Austrian nationalism and the victim myth return, in the process demonstrating the perseverance of the fundamental patterns of Austrian historical culture.

Notes

1. See Günther Bischof, "Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklärung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg," in *Zeitgeschichte* (20), Heft 11–12, 1993, and Thomas Albrich, "Es gibt keine jüdische Frage". Zur Aufrechthaltung der österreichischen Opfermythos," in Rolf Steininger (ed.), *Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust. Europa – USA – Israel*, Vienna: Böhlau 1994. See also the original official argument in *Gerechtigkeit für Österreich! Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch. Darstellungen, Dokumente u. Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte*

- u. *Geschichte d. Okkupation Österreichs 'nach amtlichen Quellen.'* Ministerkomitee unter Führung des Außenministers Dr. Gruber, Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1946. On the externalisation of guilt in post-war Austria, see Rainer Lepsius, "Das Erbe des Nationalsozialismus und die politische Kultur der Nachfolgestaaten des 'Großdeutschen Reiches,'" in Friedhelm Neidhardt, Rainer Lepsius & Johannes Weiss (eds.), *Kultur und Gesellschaft*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1986.
2. A documentation about the political turn under Vranitzky (including excerpts from Vranitzky's relevant speeches) in Anton Pelinka & Sabine Mayr (eds.), *Die Entdeckung der Verantwortung. Die Zweite Republik und die Vertriebenen Juden*, Vienna: Braumüller 1998. On Vranitzky's speech, see further Helga Embacher & Margit Reiter, *Gratwanderungen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und Israel im Schatten der Vergangenheit*, Vienna: Picus Verlag 1998, pp. 273–284. On the memorial at the Judenplatz in Vienna, see Simon Wiesenthal (ed.), *Projekt Judenplatz Wien*, Vienna: Zsolnay Verlag 2000. On restitution, see Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, *Die Entstehung der Rückstellungs- und Entschädigungsgesetzgebung. Die Republik Österreich und das in der NS-Zeit entzogene Vermögen*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik 2003 (report in the Austrian historians' commission, see further www.historikerkommission.gv.at). The institute for the history of the Jews in Austria (Institut für Geschichte der Juden in Österreich) is in St. Pölten and was founded already in the first wave of renewed *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in 1988 (see further www.injoest.ac.at).
 3. See Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin 1999, and James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1993.
 4. Peter Novick 1999, pp. 3–6.
 5. For a relevant discussion on historical consciousness and historical culture, see Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 30–49.
 6. For an argument focusing on ideology as forming historical culture, see Klas-Göran Karlsson 2003, pp. 33 ff.
 7. Jörn Rüsen emphasises identity as forming historical culture, see, for instance, Jörn Rüsen, "Interpreting the Holocaust. Some Theoretical Issues," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquiries into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Förlag 2004.
 8. See Klas-Göran Karlsson 2003, pp. 31 ff., 38–43.
 9. There is a large, often polemical literature on the problem of Austrian identity. For one central anthology, see Gerhard Botz & Gerald Sprengnagel (eds.), *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte: verdrängte Vergangenheit, Österreich-Identität, Waldheim und die Historiker*, Frankfurt am Main & New York: Campus Verlag 1994. Two central works on the history of Austrian identity are: Friedrich Heer, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität*, Vienna: Böhlau 1981, and Ernst Bruckmüller, *Nation Österreich: kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, Vienna: Böhlau 1996. For an interesting recent perspective on the identity of the German-Austrians in the late Habsburg Monarchy, see Jörg Kirchhoff, *Die deutschen in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie – ihr Verhältnis zum Staat, zur deutschen Nation und ihr kollektives Selbstverständnis (1866/67–1918)*, Berlin: Logos Verlag 2001. On Austrian nationalism after 1945, see Fritz Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945,"

- in *Journal of Contemporary History* 60, 1988, pp. 264–289. On the historical process of differentiation of identity between Austria and Germany, see Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners. Austria and Germany since 1815*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1976. On the “ambivalence of Austrian identity” between Germanism and Austrianism in the post-war era, see Peter Thaler, *The Ambivalence of Identity. The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society*, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press 2001, and Matthias Pape, *Ungleiche Brüder. Österreich und Deutschland 1945–1965*, Cologne-Weimar-Vienna: Böhlau 2000.
10. For an overview of the events of March 1938, see Hanns Haas, “Der ‘Anschluss,’” in Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer & Reinhard Sieder (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch*, Vienna: öbv & hpt 2002. For a patriotic, Austrian national perspective on these events, see Felix Kreissler, *Der österreichische und seine Nation. Ein Lernprozeß mit Hindernissen*, Vienna, Graz & Cologne: Böhlau 1984, pp. 29–114. For a recent and balanced treatment of the events leading up to the Anschluss, see Thomas Weyr, *The Setting of the Pearl. Vienna under Hitler*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press 2005. On the different views of the Anschluss in retrospect, see Paul Schneeberger, *Der schwierige Umgang mit dem “Anschluss.” Die Rezeption in Geschichtsdarstellungen 1946–1995*, Innsbruck-Vienna-Munich: Studien Verlag 2000.
 11. The standard overview work on the Nazi era in Austria is Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer & Reinhard Sieder (eds.), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch*, Vienna: öbv & hpt 2002. See also Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press 2000, and Thomas Weyr 2005.
 12. On the Austrian post-1945 nationalism, see Fritz Fellner 1988. On two propaganda actions within this renewed nationalism during 1946, see Wolfgang Kos, “Die Schau mit dem Hammer. Zur Planung, Ideologie und Gestaltung der antifaschistischen Ausstellung ‘Niemals Vergessen!,’” in Wolfgang Kos, *Eigenheim Österreich. Zu Politik, Kultur und Alltag nach 1945*, Vienna: Sonderzahl Verlag 1994, and Stefan Spevak, *Das Jubiläum “950 Jahre Österreich.” Eine Aktion zur Stärkung eines österreichischen Staats- und Kulturbewußtsein im Jahr 1946*, Vienna: Oldenbourg Verlag 2003. On denazification and continuity in elites, see Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley & Oliver Rathkolb (eds.), *Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne. Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955*, München: Oldenbourg Verlag 1986. The SPÖ has in the last few years done some internal party *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, see primarily Maria Mesner (ed.), *Entnazifizierung zwischen politischem Anspruch, Parteienkonkurrenz und Kaltem Krieg. Das Beispiel SPÖ*, Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag 2005, divulging the extent of former Nazis in the post-war Social Democratic party. After the SPÖ started this internal cleansing operation, the head of the ÖVP party academy (Vogelsang-Institut) has stated that the ÖVP will follow suit (see *Der Standard*, January 24, 2005). However, the simultaneous statement from ÖVP party ideologue Andreas Khol, that this would not be necessary as “the people who founded our party all came out of the KZ and the resistance,” sounds less promising (see *Der Standard* internet-edition, July 5, 2005).
 13. For an interesting psychoanalytical approach to the consequences of this peculiar Austrian history of collective identity changes, see Meinrad Ziegler & Waltraud Kannonier-Finster, *Österreichisches Gedächtnis. Über Erinnern und Vergessen der NS-Vergangenheit*, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag 1993. This perspective is definitely possible to develop in historical cultural terms.
 14. On the individual experiences of a large number of the leading politicians in the first

- decades of the Second Republic, see the collective biography: Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich & Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), *Die Politiker: Karrieren und Wirken bedeutender Repräsentanten der Zweiten Republik*, Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 1995. This work demonstrates, I would say, the great importance of these experiences for Austrian politics and reproduction of historical cultural patterns until around 1980.
15. On the theory of socio-political "pillars" or "camps," see for instance Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1968; Kurt Richard Luther & Kris Deschouwer (eds.), *Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational Democracy*, London: Routledge 1999. On Austria, see particularly Rudolf Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der strukturellen Versäulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in Österreich*, Meissenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain 1975, and Adam Wandruszka, "Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen," in Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), *Geschichte der Republik Österreichs*, Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag 1954, pp. 289–485.
 16. On the history of the German national camp, see Adam Wandruszka 1954, here pp. 369–421, and Lothar Höbelt, *Von der vierten Partei zur dritten Kraft. Die Geschichte der VdU*, Graz: Stocker 1999. See also Hans-Åke Persson, "Uppgörelsen med det förflutna, politisk kultur och högerpopulistiska partier i Tyskland och Österrike: en jämförelse," *Scandia* 1996:1. On the revitalisation of the German national camp under Jörg Haider, see Ruth Wodak & Anton Pelinka (eds.), *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2002. For an enlightening family history in the German national camp, see Martin Pollack, *Der Tote im Bunker. Bericht über meinen Vater*, Vienna: Zsolnay 2004. For an expression of a non-FPÖ German identity in Austria today, see Gabriele Holzer, *Verfreundete Nachbarn. Österreich – Deutschland: ein Verhältnis*, Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau 1995.
 17. For the history of the Christian Social camp, see Adam Wandruszka 1954, pp. 301–368. On the general development of the camp after 1945, see Rudolf Steininger 1975.
 18. On the history of the Social Democratic camp, see Adam Wandruszka 1954, pp. 422–485. On the general development of this camp after 1945, see Rudolf Steininger 1975.
 19. See the references in notes 9 and 12 for the general picture of Austrian nationalism after 1945. On the national identity project in the decades after 1945 closely identified with the ÖVP, see also William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1973. On individual biographies of leading ÖVP politicians, see Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich & Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.) 1995. On Austrian national identity in the perspectives of the different Lager, see Heinz P. Wassermann, *Naziland Österreich?: Studien zu Antisemitismus, Nation und National Sozialismus im öffentlichen Meinungsbild*, Innsbruck-Vienna-Munich: Studien Verlag 2002a, here pp. 82–89. The different party narratives are partly discernible in the party press of the Second Republic. See here, for instance, Heidemarie Uhl, *Zwischen Verstörung und Versöhnung. Eine Kontroverse um Österreichs historische Identität fünfzig Jahre nach dem 'Anschluss'*, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar: Böhlau 1992, and Heinz P. Wassermann, "Zuviel Vergangenheit tut nicht gut." *Nationalsozialismus im Spiegel der Tagespresse der Zweiten Republik*, Innsbruck-Vienna-Munich: Studien Verlag 2000. See also Paul Schneeberger 2000. As the governing party since 2000, the ÖVP gives official support to the controversial view of

- the Ständestaat as “state resistance” against Nazi Germany propagated, for instance, in historian Gottfried-Karl Kindermann’s works. His latest work (Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, *Österreich gegen Hitler. Europas erste Abwehrfront 1933–1938*, Munich: Langen Müller 2003) was presented in the Austrian parliament by the First Speaker of the House and ÖVP party ideologue Andreas Khol on May 6, 2003 (Khol’s speech is reprinted in the periodical *Die Furchen*, May 2003).
20. William T. Bluhm 1973, makes interesting observations on Austrian Social Democracy and national identity after 1945, here pp. 177–207. See also Heinz P. Wassermann 2002a, pp. 82–89. The Social Democratic balancing act here is also discernible in the Social Democratic press, particularly the *Arbeiter Zeitung* (see Heidemarie Uhl 1992, and Heinz P. Wassermann 2000). See also Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich & Wolfgang Müller (eds.) 1995 for individual biographies of Social Democrats. Bruno Kreisky is an interesting case. Kreisky refused to acknowledge his Jewish background as important for his identity (members of his family were murdered in the Holocaust) and retained a “South-German identity,” simultaneously as he identified strongly with Austrian statehood and some sort of Austrian national identity grounded in his personal experience of persecution from, and resistance against, Nazi Germany. The most interesting approach to Kreisky in these regards is probably, Herbert Pierre Secher, *Bruno Kreisky. Chancellor of Austria. A Political Biography*, Pittsburgh Penn: Dorrance Publishing Co 1993.
 21. The German national narrative of Austrian history has been actively reshaped in the last two decades, after having been ostracised in the decades after the breakdown of Nazism. A central position in this development is held by Lothar Höbelt, professor of history at Vienna University. Höbelt was a sort of party ideologue for the FPÖ during a period in the 1990s and has worked in the borderland between academic history and overt history politics. He has published on the longer history of the National Liberal Lager from 1848 to Haider and has, arguably, attempted to construct and spread a view of the German national tradition as continuous and firmly anchored in Austrian society and history. See, for instance, Lothar Höbelt 1999, Lothar Höbelt, *Defiant Populist: Jörg Haider and the Politics of Austria*, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press 2003; Wilhelm Brauneder & Lothar Höbelt (eds.), *Sacrum Imperium. Das Reich und Österreich 996–1806*, Vienna: Amalthea 1996, and Lothar Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler. Die deutsch-freiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs, 1882–1918*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik 1993. Höbelt also published a large number of articles in the FPÖ party organ *Freie Argumente* in the 1990s, when he constructed the long continuity of the party tradition.
 22. On the Austrian post-1945 variety of antisemitism without Jews (and without antisemites), see Bernd Marin, “Ein historisch neuartiger ‘Antisemitismus ohne Antisemiten’,” in John Bunzl & Bernd Marin (eds.), *Antisemitismus in Österreich. Sozialhistorische und soziologische Studien*, Innsbruck: Inn-Verlag 1983. For a few important works on Austrian antisemitism and on the history of Jews in Austria that I draw on below, see the above quoted work by John Bunzl & Bernd Marin (eds.); Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution. A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism*, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press 1992; Heinz P. Wassermann (ed.), *Antisemitismus in Österreich nach 1945. Ergebnisse, Positionen und Perspektiven der Forschung*, Innsbruck-Vienna-Munich: Studien Verlag 2002b; Gerhard Botz, Ivar Oxaal, Michael Pollak & Nina Scholz (eds.), *Eine zerstörte Kultur. Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, Vienna: Czernin Verlag 2002;

- Werner Bergmann, Rainer Erb & Albert Lichtblau (eds.), *Schwieriges Erbe. Der Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus in Österreich, der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag 1995; Ruth Wodak, Peter Nowak, et al., "Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter." *Diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1990; Evelyn Adunka, *Die vierte Gemeinde. Die Wiener Juden in der Zeit von 1945 bis heute*, Berlin & Vienna: Philo 2000; and Helga Embacher & Margit Reiter 1998.
23. On antisemitism in the ÖVP, see Walter Manoschek, "Aus der Asche dieses Krieges wieder auferstanden'. Skizzen zum Umgang der Österreichischen Volkspartei mit Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus nach 1945," in Werner Bergmann, Rainer Erb & Albert Lichtblau (eds.) 1995, pp. 49–64. On antisemitism in the FPÖ, see Kurt Richard Luther, "Zwischen unkritischer Selbstdarstellung und bedingungsloser externer Verurteilung: Nazivergangenheit, Antisemitismus und Holocaust im Schrifttum der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs," in *ibid.*, pp. 138–167. On antisemitism in Austrian Social Democracy, see Richard Mitten, "Die Sühne ... möglichst milde zu gestalten'. Die Sozialdemokratische 'Bearbeitung' des Nationalsozialismus und des Antisemitismus in Österreich," in *ibid.* pp. 102–119, and Margit Reiter, *Unter Antisemitismus-Verdacht: Die österreichische Linke und Israel nach der Shoah*, Innsbruck-Vienna-Munich: Studien Verlag 2001. On the background in the Austrian fin de siècle, see Bruce Pauley 1992, pp. 27–44, and Robert S. Wistrich, "Sozialdemokratie, Antisemitismus und die Wiener Juden," in Gerhard Botz & Gerald Sprengnagel (eds.) 1994.
 24. On the Kunschak case, see Evelyn Adunka, "Antisemitismus in der Zweiten Republik," pp. 12–15, in Heinz P. Wassermann (ed.) 2002b.
 25. See Jacqueline Vansant, *Reclaiming Heimat. Trauma and mourning in memoirs by Jewish Austrian réémigrés*, Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press 2001.
 26. On this, see Ruth Wodak, Peter Nowak et al 1990.
 27. On antisemitism as a positive part of the national identity in Catholic Poland, see Michael Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead. Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust*, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997, pp. 32 ff.
 28. See Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance. The Dynamics of Collective Memory*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 1994, pp. 47–65.
 29. This was already the view of Rudolf Steininger, writing in the 1970s (see Rudolf Steininger 1975).
 30. On this, see the different contributions in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003. See also Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, and Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, London: William Heinemann 2005.
 31. The above-quoted book *Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne*, were the proceedings of a conference in the spring of 1985, which gathered many of these critics who had been at work for some years at this time. Another important expression of this wave of criticism is Anton Pelinka & Erika Weinzierl (eds.), *Das große Tabu. Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit*, Vienna: Edition S 1987, which collected a broad cross-section of critical intellectuals. The following years saw a wave of similar works in Austria. However, a backlash followed in the counter-criticism of the "perpetrator myth." On this shift, see Gerhard Botz, "Geschichte und kollektives Gedächtnis in

- der Zweiten Republik. 'Opferthese', 'Lebenslüge' und 'Geschichtstabus' in der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung," in Wolfgang Kos & Georg Rigele (eds.), *Inventur 45/55. Österreich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik*, Vienna: Sonderzahl 1996.
32. On this, see Heidemarie Uhl, "The Politics of Memory: Austria's Perception of the Second World War and the National Socialist Period," in Günter Bischof & Anton Pelinka (eds.), *Austrian Historical Memory & National Identity*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 1997.
 33. Heidemarie Uhl 1992, pp. 15–35.
 34. There is now a substantial literature on the debates unleashed by the Wehrmacht exhibitions in Austria in the years 1995–1997 and again a few years later. For a few examples, see Hannes Heer, Walter Manoschek, Alexander Pollak & Ruth Wodak, *Wie Geschichte gemacht wird. Zur Konstruktion von Erinnerungen an Wehrmacht und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Vienna: Czernin Verlag 2003, and Helga Embacher, Albert Lichtblau & Günther Sandner (eds.), *Umkämpfte Erinnerung. Die Wehrmachtsausstellung in Salzburg*, Salzburg & Vienna: Residenz Verlag 1999.
 35. See Simon Wiesenthal (ed.) 2000.
 36. The conflicts a few years ago between Ariel Muzikant and the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, on the one hand, and the Austrian Conservative government, on the other, were given a useful overview in the Austrian periodical *Profil* No. 30, July 21, 2003, pp. 120–127. On the longer history of Austrian recognition of responsibility, and especially of restitution questions after 1945, see Brigitte Bailer-Galanda 2003, as well as Albert Sternfeldt, *Betrifft: Österreich – Von Österreich betroffen*, Vienna: Löcker Verlag 1990, and Anton Pelinka & Sabine Mayr (eds.), *Die Entdeckung der Verantwortung. Die Zweite Republik und die vertriebenen Juden*, Vienna: Braumüller 1998. On the official historians' commission, see note 2 above.
 37. On this, see note 19 above. The government-supported Austrian *lieux de memoires* project, mapping Austrian national symbols and sites of national collective memory, can be cited as a further interesting example of these memory politics. See Emil Brix, Ernst Bruckmüller & Hannes Stekl (eds.), *Memoria Austriae I. Menschen, Mythen, Zeiten*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik 2004, and *Memoria Austriae II. Symbolische Orte*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik 2005.
 38. See *Österreich 2005. Ein Lesebuch für das Jubiläumsjahr*, Salzburg & Vienna: Residenzverlag, 2005, published by the Austrian government (Bundeskanzleramt). See also the programme book for the multitude of events during the year, *Österreich 2005. Jubiläen, Programme, Kalender*, that can be obtained from the Bundespressdienst, 1014 Wien, Ballhausplatz 2, Austria, or downloaded from the homepage of this Gedenkjahr, see www.oesterreich2005.at.

TOMAS SNIEGON

Schindler's List Comes to Schindler's Homeland

Oskar Schindler as a Problem of Czech Historical Culture

Schindler's List, one of the most influential but also most controversial films on the Holocaust, came to Europe in February 1994, two months after its first release in the United States. At the time of its first European showing in Vienna on February 16, this Steven Spielberg film was already known as a widely discussed and successful Hollywood project, awarded three Golden Globes in the United States. Only a few weeks later, *Schindler's List* also won seven Academy Awards. Soon after Vienna, the film came to Germany and Poland, two countries strongly connected to Oskar Schindler's life. In Germany, *Schindler's List* opened on March 1, 1994 in Frankfurt, the city where Oskar Schindler spent the last 16 years of his life.¹

In the Czech Republic, the film had an official premiere on March 10 in Prague, with President Václav Havel as one of the prominent members of the audience. In this aspect, the importance of the Czech opening was similar to the German one in Frankfurt, where President Richard von Weizsäcker supported the event. In the Czech case, however, the film also had a preview showing in the little town of Svitavy one day earlier. The reason for this was the fact that it was just there, in Svitavy, German Zwittau, that Oskar Schindler was born on April 28, 1908.² At the time of his birth, Zwittau belonged to Austria-Hungary. In 1994, however, Svitavy was a part of the newly-created Czech Republic. Between the two dates, during Oskar Schindler's lifetime, the town was included into two other states – the Republic of Czechoslovakia (1918–1938 and later 1945–1992) and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler (1938–1945). Thus, until the age of 37, Schindler already had Austrian, Czechoslovak and German citizenships.

Among more than three million Germans in Czechoslovakia between the wars, i.e. among those Germans who had never lived on German territory but who spoke German and not Czech or Slovak as their mother tongue and kept German culture as their priority, Oskar Schindler was by no means exceptional. Most of these Sudeten Germans³ were forced to leave Czechoslovakia soon after the war. They were punished by Czechoslovak authorities and people for their earlier support of Adolf Hitler's Germany and its terror and violence against Czechoslovakia.

The great success of *Schindler's List*, however, made its main hero a "Good Nazi," symbolising German goodness that contrasted sharply with the image of collective guilt of all Germans for the Holocaust. Furthermore, it started a new and extensive discussion about this former public taboo. Suddenly, Oskar Schindler became the most famous Sudeten German in the world. Almost fifty years after the end of the Second World War, his war-time efforts provoked new and strong feelings in his homeland, the Czech Republic. As the film story approached the real world, the past once again approached the Czech present.

In the film, Schindler's real roots were never properly mentioned. Even though he was taking "his" Jews from Cracow to "Czechoslovakia," and his hometown Zwittau there, he identified himself in the simplest possible way in a single dialogue with his accountant during the very first meeting between the two men: First, the accountant says to Schindler: "By the law, I have to tell you, Sir, I am a Jew." "Well, I am a German," Schindler answers. In fact, not only Spielberg, but even a great majority of viewers and reviewers outside Czech borders, did not care about Schindler's real origin. *Schindler's List* was a story of the Holocaust. In this context, nothing else was important. In the Czech context, however, this ethnic dimension could not be avoided. As I am going to show, it became the main focus.

The task of this chapter is to analyse how *Schindler's List* and its Sudeten German hero fit into the Czech identity building of the 1990s. In Czech historical culture, Czech-German relations in the past were highlighted during most of this period. On the one hand, groups in the post-Communist Czech Republic indicated very soon after the Velvet Revolution that they wanted to clean its image and right the wrongs of the past. According to one very early initiative of President

Václav Havel, the Czechs should even send their excuses to the Sudeten Germans for war crimes and unnecessary violence during the transfer of the Czech Germans in 1945 and 1946. While a general transfer⁴ of German minorities from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany and Austria was approved by the Allied powers at Potsdam in 1945, the Czechs considered this officially agreed framework insufficient and too slow. Consequently, they organised a more radical and violent, so called wild, transfer of the ethnic Germans. Havel's main political ideas of "life in truth" and "victory of truth and love over lie and hatred" could not be harmonised with a continuous traditional picture of innocent Czechs, seen more or less implicitly as German victims. In this idea, the Czechs were supposed to humanize their future by uncovering and discussing unpleasant moments of their own history and seeking reconciliation with their victims. Here, thanks to Schindler and the Holocaust, one such opportunity had appeared.

On the other hand, there were voices both inside and outside the Czech Republic that feared a newly growing influence of the reunited Germany in Europe and in the world. For these voices, any "amnesty" for the Nazi crimes during the Second World War was unacceptable. In the Czech context, such an opinion, perceptible especially among the oldest generations, was combined with a fear that the once expelled Sudeten Germans could return and claim back their former properties. In such a context, even the "good German" Schindler, despite his help to the Jews, became a problematic and threatening figure. But who was Oskar Schindler? Who were the main protagonists in this dispute of Czech historical culture, and what role did the Holocaust actually play in this process?

Oskar Schindler Created by Steven Spielberg

Schindler's List begins as the story of an unimportant businessman, gambler and womanizer, who at the right time sees an opportunity that only war can offer. He forces some Jews to do business with him under for them very unfair terms. With the golden badge of the Nazi party NSDAP on a flap of his suit, he once says to his wife: "In every business I tried, I can see it was not me who failed. Something was missing..." That something was just the war.

Played by Liam Neeson, Oskar Schindler is far from the loser he

once used to be. He is a strong man, always under strict self-control. He calmly observes the drinking and killing Nazis as if he was not one of them. He quietly blackmails the Jews as if he did not desperately need them. Everybody seems to be just a part of his game and he likes to be the one who decides which move is going to follow. He conducts his plan and nothing seems to stop him; not even the otherwise strictly totalitarian and bureaucratically pedantic Nazi regime.

It takes almost four years of war to him to finally start to grow sober. A shock from witnessing the total devastation of the Cracow ghetto in March 1943 starts to turn his priorities upside down and makes the former Mr. Black into Mr. White. Suddenly, the war means “never the good, always the bad,” as he once opens his heart to his accountant Icchak Stern. He keeps his mental strength, but becomes human. Oskar Schindler starts to act. Rumours about his goodness float quickly among the Jews when he creates a haven in his factory, Deutsche Emailwaren factory. And when he gets to know that his workers are in danger, he decides to save them by moving from Cracow to Brünnlitz (Brněnec) near his hometown of Zwittau. The romantic hero fears nothing: Neither kissing a Jewish woman in public at his own birthday party, nor spraying water to thirsty Jews in a train in front of SS guards. He is driven by a mighty force to save Jews. Oskar Schindler and Icchak Stern put together a list, Schindler’s List, that contains about 1,200 names. The man who – five minutes ago – said he had so much money he would never be able to use it during his lifetime now spends a fortune to buy Jewish prisoners, who for other Germans in his surroundings are worthless. “The list is an absolute good,” Icchak Stern concludes when they finish the writing job. “The list is life.”

Schindler’s new factory in Brünnlitz treats the workers even better than the one in Cracow. In order to keep the Jews in safety, the company fakes military production. Instead of producing the goods that the army desperately needs, Schindler buys the products of others and pretends he made them himself. The text on the screen confirms: “For the seven months it was fully operational, Schindler’s Brinnlitz munitions factory was a model of non-production. During this same period he spent millions of Reichmarks to sustain his workers and bribe Reich officials.”

The end of the war, however, must come anyway. Schindler goes

bankrupt but manages to fulfil his mission. He is happy, though also self-critical: "I am a member of the Nazi party. I am an ammunition manufacturer. I am a profiteer of slave labour. I am a criminal," he admits in his final speech to "his" Jews. Finally, he takes off his golden badge of the NSDAP. If he had sold even this, he could have saved two more Jewish lives... Only then does he start thinking about himself again and leaves the stage to save his own skin.

Schindler's Identity According to Thomas Keneally

Steven Spielberg based his film on a novel, *Schindler's Ark*, written by the Australian writer Thomas Keneally and first published in 1982. Unlike Spielberg, Keneally indeed dealt with Schindler's Sudeten German origin. Furthermore, according to Keneally's version, "there were signs that he wasn't *right thinking*, though he paid well, was a good source of scarce commodities, could hold his drink and had a slow and sometimes rowdy sense of humour."⁵ He also suggested that Schindler was "disaffected with National Socialism."⁶ Though he mentioned that he, indeed, "was wearing the Hakenkreuz, the swastika emblem of Konrad Henlein's Sudeten-German Party," he also claimed that

they did not take it too seriously; it was something young Czech Germans were wearing that season. Only the Social Democrats and the Communists did not sport the badge or subscribe to Heinlein's party, and, God knew, Oskar was neither a Communist nor a Social Democrat. Oskar was a salesman. All things being equal, when you went into a German company manager's office wearing the badge, you got the order.⁷

Already by the beginning of the war, in Keneally's understanding, Schindler took a political position that could be understood as morally right or at least morally almost non-controversial: "Whatever his motives for running with Henlein, it seems that as soon as the military divisions entered Moravia he suffered an instant disillusionment with National Socialism." And more:

he seems to have expected that the invading power would allow some brotherly Sudeten Republic to be founded. In a later statement he argued the new regime's bullying of the Czech population and the sei-

zure of Czech property appalled him. His documented acts of rebellion would occur very early in the coming world conflict, and there is no need to doubt that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, proclaimed by Hitler from Hradschin Castle in March 1939, surprised him with its tyranny.⁸

While trying to understand the motive for Schindler's rescue of almost 1,200 Jewish lives during the Second World War, Keneally began with a look at the history of Schindler's family. Here, he found more about the national identity of the Schindlers as well as their religious background, but could not in Oskar's family history find any key to his rescuing impulse:

Hans Schindler, Oskar's father, approved of the imperial management, considered himself culturally an Austrian, and spoke German at the table, on the telephone, in business, in moments of tenderness. Yet when in 1918 Herr Schindler and the members of his family found themselves citizens of the Czechoslovak republic of Masaryk and Beneš, it did not seem to cause any fundamental distress to the father, and still less to his ten-year-old son. The child Hitler, according to the man Hitler, was tormented even as a boy by the gulf between the mystical unity of Austria and Germany and their political separation. No such neurosis of disinheritance soured Oskar Schindler's childhood. Czechoslovakia was such a bosky, unravished little dumpling of a republic that the German-speakers took their minority stature with some grace, even if the Depression and some minor governmental follies would later put a certain strain on the relationship. [...] The family Schindler was Catholic."⁹

Last, but not least, we can learn more about the environment in Svitavy during Schindler's childhood from the following sentences: "Oskar had a few middle-class Jewish friends, whose parents also sent them to the German grammar school. These children were not village Ashkenazim – quirky, Yiddish-speaking, orthodox – but multilingual and not-so-ritual sons of Jewish businessmen."¹⁰ In these lines, there is no mention of Schindler's relationships with his Czech neighbours in Svitavy during the earliest periods of his life. We just learn a little about his depersonalised attitude to the Czechoslovak state. In his book, and in contrast to Spielberg's film, Keneally lets Oskar Schindler's personality undergo great changes towards humanity, turning

against the goals of the Nazi regime, already before the outbreak of the Second World War II.

Early Returns to Czechoslovakia

Neither this information about Oskar Schindler, nor a later idea to commemorate his act of saving 1,200 Jewish lives during the Holocaust by building a memorial to him, came to the Czechoslovak and later Czech public as a result of an internal activity. Keneally's book was as little noticed in Communist Czechoslovakia as Schindler himself. There were only two exceptions to the rule. The first was when Israel in the 1960s started to celebrate Schindler as one of "the Righteous," and the Czechoslovak secret police showed some activity in order to learn more about the man who had Czech Sudeten-German roots, a Nazi past, and who received awards from both West Germany and Israel.¹¹ The second event took place two decades later, in 1986, four years after Thomas Keneally's book was published and well-received by Western critics. The only Czechoslovak newspaper or periodical that noticed the book was the literary magazine *Světová literatura* ('World Literature'). This not very influential, but especially among Czech intellectuals very respected magazine, published a review that – while still written under a Communist regime hostile to both Jews, Sudeten Germans and West Germany – was surprisingly positive to Keneally's book and to Oskar Schindler. The article presented Oskar Schindler's identity in the following way: "You must not forget," the writer quoted one of the so-called Schindler's Jews, "that Oskar had not only a German face, but also a Czech one. He was similar to the Good Soldier Schwejk. He loved making fun of the regime."¹² The writer, Eva Oliveriusová, admitted that even for her, Oskar Schindler was a totally unknown man, but after receiving a letter from the regional archive in Svitavy, she finished her review with a note, confirming that a certain Oskar Schindler really did come to Brněnec at the end of the Second World War and established a sham concentration camp. By this act, she maintained, he saved the lives of "about 1,200 Polish citizens, mostly of Jewish origin."

The lack of Czechoslovak public reactions to the book and everything else about Schindler before the end of the Cold War could first of all be interpreted as a sign that the Czechoslovak Communist re-

gime never found a reason for considering Oskar Schindler so important – and therefore even so dangerous – that it would have to focus its propaganda on his personality. Not even the success of *Schindler's Ark*, awarded with the prestigious Booker Prize Award for fiction in 1982, made the then Czechoslovak regime take notice of Schindler.

After the fall of Communism in 1989, the first initiatives to celebrate Schindler came to Czechoslovakia from Germany and Israel. In 1991, three years before the Czech opening of *Schindler's List*, the German Munich-based organisation "Ackermann-Gemeinde" (AG) wrote a letter to the Svitavy town councillors and asked whether it could place a memorial plaque to the honour of Oskar Schindler in his hometown. The AG was already established in 1946 as a Catholic organisation uniting primarily those Germans who were forced to leave Czechoslovakia soon after the Second World War. Within the Sudeten-German movement, the group is considered moderate, defining itself as seeking understanding, not revenge. Soon after the letter from Germany, another letter came to Svitavy from one of "Schindler's Jews," now living in Israel. This man, a long-time member of the Israeli Supreme Court, had a similar question on whether it would be possible to erect a Schindler memorial.¹³ Although both ideas came to Svitavy almost two years before Steven Spielberg completed his film, no memorial to Oskar Schindler was officially approved by the City Council in Svitavy before the success of the film *Schindler's List*; that is before the spring of 1994.

"Drive Schindler Out!"

Finally, not only one but two monuments of Oskar Schindler were established in his hometown. The first, official Czech one was financed by the City of Svitavy and was made of stone and iron, while the second one, a memorial plaque, was financed by AG. The first memorial was commemorated on the same day that *Schindler's List* was previewed in Svitavy on March 9, 1994. It was not placed on the house where Schindler was born as was originally planned, but in a park on the other side of the street. According to the press, the current owners of the house would not allow any memory dedicated to Schindler to be placed directly on the house, since Schindler, in their eyes, "was a fascist."¹⁴

The fact that an identical text in Czech and German is written on both these memorials, no matter if originating from the Czech or Sudeten-German side, is very interesting. It goes: "Oskar Schindler. To an unforgettable rescuer of 1,200 fated Jewish lives."¹⁵ The timing of the decision by the local authorities indicates that Schindler's memorial was approved even before the citizens of Svitavy had a chance to see the film and make up their minds about it, and before the discussion about Oskar Schindler actually started both in Svitavy and the Czech Republic as a whole.

Thus, the first strong refusals were related to the memorial at least as much as to the film. The strongest refusal in the discussion that followed came from the circles that frequently made ideological use of history. In August 1994, the extremist nationalist party, The Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC), represented in the Czech parliament in Prague, brought charges against those who had built the Schindler memorial plaque in Svitavy. The SPR-RSC accused them of the criminal act of supporting movements suppressing civil rights and freedoms. "The Republicans," in the words of their party secretary Jan Vík, considered Svitavy's native Schindler not "a venerable Nazi who had to pay for the Jews to redeem them" or "a good Nazi with a human face" but "a well-known Nazi hangman." While in some contexts, the SPR-RSC stood very close to neo-Nazis and called for actions especially against the Czech Republic's Romani population, this time, according to Vík, the party considered the unveiling of the memorial plaque to be "a celebration of Nazi bestialities" which must receive an immediate and well-deserved punishment so that the Nazi and Fascist evil can be "rooted out."¹⁶

While *Schindler's List* turned the Czech extreme right against German Nazism, it did not provoke any strong and open antisemitic feelings. One of very few exceptions was an article "History falsified by the Oscars" in the newspaper *Republika*, published just by the SPR-RSC:

I am not going to discuss the fact that the Oscars can hardly be won by non-Jewish film directors today. I will not question the opinion of the Jews about this version of the Holocaust. It is their problem. May-

be they will one day even believe that Eichmann too was a humanist, that gas chambers were just a fabrication of the Pan-Slavic movement and that Theresienstadt was just a peaceful camp for the scouts.

“Why is a war criminal presented as a fearless saviour of the Jews?” the author further asked. “Why not build a monument even to Himmler, best of all directly in Prague Castle?... To make Schindler a famous philanthropist was easy. It was enough to put the story into the hands of Mr. Spielberg, himself a Jew.”¹⁷

Unlike “the Republicans,” those labelled “Communists” in their relation to Oskar Schindler were not so strongly connected to the existing Czech Communist Party that considered itself the successor of the pre-1989 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The top official representatives of this party, in fact, did not show any public activities related to *Schindler's List* at all. While the SPR-RSC was a political party with a rather clear political ideology and a political platform, “the Communists” in this context were in fact first of all the people who shared a view of Oskar Schindler and of history; one that corresponded with the ideological frame of the former Czechoslovak regime between 1948 and 1989.

The first of the two basic standpoints of “the Communists” was the radical resistance against any “revision” of the facts that the Sudeten Germans, including Oskar Schindler, were guilty of treason to the Czechoslovak state and Czech people during the late 1930s and the whole period of the Second World War. According to this version, the treason against Czechoslovakia excluded a chance that Schindler could have even a good side, or that his pro-Nazi view from the beginning of the war could change as he gained better knowledge about the Nazi policy against the Jews. The Czech Germans as a whole were said to deserve to be sent to Germany, including those from Svitavy, where they comprised an overwhelming majority before the Second World War. Moreover, in the “communist” arguments both Thomas Keneally and Steven Spielberg were blamed for “ignorance of the facts” about Schindler and for “uncritically spreading the false Schindler myth.” Also Israel was criticised for the same thing, while the entire process of the Holocaust and its memory after 1945 were left aside.

One example of this kind can be found in articles by Jiří Frajdl

from the National Council of an organisation called *Klub českého pohraničí* ('The Club of the Czech Borderland'); a kind of Czech attempt at counterbalancing the "Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft." Although the organisation defines itself as a "non-party patriotic movement," the ideological undertone in Frajdl's articles was obvious when he wrote: "Nobody in the world would stoop so low as to celebrate his enemy, a representative of the Nazi regime and Germanic pride." According to the author, "in order to please the mighty rulers of today's Czech Republic," the Czech liberal press spread Schindler's "fairy tale-ish legend," looking for an exemplary Sudeten German they could use for a Czech-German mutual coming-together.¹⁸ In the openly left-wing newspaper *Nový zítřek*, the same author wrote with irony: "Why shouldn't this criminal, swindler, liar and Nazi have his own memorial? It is sure that the right-wing politicians need some positive examples even among the members of the Henlein party."¹⁹

In some basic features, "republican" and "communist" attitudes were very similar. First, there was a radical attitude without any will to compromise, based on a black and white ethnic division between a good – Czech – and a bad – German – side. In this scheme, there was no place for a possible Czech self-reflection. Besides this, there was also a very unbalanced attitude to the Jews and to Israel. When suitable, the Jews were used as an argument against Germany and Germans, but when such a use had fulfilled its role, Jews and their memory of the Holocaust were refused or criticised without any deeper analysis. This, too, was the case of the only organisation of the war veterans that wanted to participate in the debate. *Český svaz bojovníků za svobodu* (The Czech Union of Freedom Fighters), known under the Communist period as The Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, issued a special declaration. Protesting against the memorial plaque to Oskar Schindler, the members wrote in March 1994:

Schindler took part in the occupation of our territory in 1938, in the occupation of the rest of our country by military troops on March 15, 1939, in terror against our citizens and at the beginning of the Second World War, when 360,000 of our best citizens gave their lives on the battlefields, in the resistance movement and in the Nazi concentration camps [...] During the whole war, he led a luxurious life, profit-

ing from the exploitation of the Jews... Today, we cannot study what led Oskar Schindler to his activity. If Israel honoured his act, let his memory stay alive in Israel and among the Jews who are spread elsewhere in the world. But why should a Czech town celebrate a German, a Nazi, an agent of the German secret service?²⁰

On the one hand, Jewish victims were here included in the number of victims as “our best citizens.” On the other hand, however, only “Jews in Israel and elsewhere in the world” were recommended to honour Schindler’s act, while Czech Jews and other Czech sympathizers with Schindler were completely missing in this declaration.

Schindler’s Shadow in the Czech Parliament?

Jitka Gruntová, a history teacher and historian of the City Museum in Svitavy, shared a categorical anti-Schindler view. She declared herself “a fighter against the Schindler myth” already in a very early period of the debate. As she once admitted, she had not seen *Schindler’s List* until 1999 at the earliest, but was fighting the Schindler myth already long before. Thus, her main targets became Keneally’s book and those who “spread the legend” and supported Schindler’s memorial. Nevertheless, she too paid very little attention to the fact that *Schindler’s Ark* was a novel and not a scholarly work on Oskar Schindler. While often calling for the maintenance of “professional standards” in history as a scholarly discipline, she never recognised the dual role of history. Gruntová thus never separated history as a scholarly discipline from history as historical consciousness, used by the whole of society and supposed to satisfy many more needs than just scholarly standards. She nevertheless became the foremost Czech expert on Schindler’s life, more exactly on the two periods of his life on Czech territory; that is, from the time of his birth until the late 1930s, and the period 1944–1945 when Schindler brought “his” Jews from Plaszow to Brněnec, near Svitavy. In addition, from a political point of view she was the most important among all those who reacted to the film, since she was a member of the Czech Parliament and used history connected to the “Sudeten German question” even there on some other occasions.

In her book *Legenda a fakta o Oskaru Schindlerovi* (‘Legends and Facts about Oskar Schindler’), published in two editions in 1997 and

2002, Jitka Gruntová presented new evidence about Schindler's personality and drew four main conclusions. Firstly, Oskar Schindler was not a man who sympathised with the Nazi regime mainly as part of a business strategy. Rather, his sympathy was genuine. In the late 1930s he worked for Germany as an agent against both the Czechoslovak Republic and Poland. Gruntová brought new evidence about how the Czechoslovak police investigated Schindler's spy activities and how Schindler himself confessed them already before the beginning of the Second World War. The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the outbreak of the war saved him from all possible punishments from the Czechoslovak authorities.²¹

Secondly, in her research Gruntová also studied the activities of Schindler's factory that, in fact, was a concentration camp in Brännlitz/Brněnec (an affiliated camp to the main one in Gross-Rosen) during the period 1944–1945, when "Schindler's Jews" were working there. She came to the conclusion that life there was by no means better than in other similar concentration camps on Czech territory. The death rate was even among the highest. She additionally showed that the opening of this concentration camp had been planned even before Schindler's decision to transport the prisoners there from Poland, and thus cannot be explained as an individual step in order to transfer a private business from one place to another. In that case, Gruntová concluded, the decision did not emanate from Schindler's good will. Schindler was not an initiator of it; he just wanted only to make the best of the situation while the Red Army was approaching Plaszow.²²

Thirdly, Gruntová also refused to admit that war production in Brněnec was only fictitious and that Schindler, in fact, let the prisoners fake the war production. According to her, referring to some Czech witnesses from the area, Schindler's factory in Brněnec produced normal weapons for the Third Reich until the very end of the Second World War II.²³

Last, but not least, taking the famous document called "Schindler's List," Gruntová analysed no less than eight different versions of it that all had a direct connection to "Schindler's" concentration camp in Brněnec. The very first one, dated October 21, 1944, was made on the basis of the number of prisoners and contained 700

names. The numbers started with 68,854 and ended with 74,695. This, according to Gruntová, did not show any special selection of the prisoners. A similar case was another list, made on November 12, 1944. All the other lists were written in the following year of 1945 with two exceptions, which were undated.²⁴ On the basis of these lists, Gruntová defined several groups of prisoners, reaching a conclusion that only a minority of them were chosen personally by Schindler. In such cases, they were people he needed for his various interests, while others had been chosen for humane reasons.

Combining her ideological standpoint with her research, once, commenting the Schindler monument in Svitavy, she stated: "It is a great shame that this Nazi has a monument in Svitavy." In the same interview, she added a comment about the fact that Oskar Schindler became one of "the Righteous" in Israel, suggesting a kind of conspiracy behind his appraisal: "In the same year, there was an Eichmann trial in Israel. It was very diplomatic to present a contradictory, i.e. good German to the world."²⁵ Schindler, however, was recognised as Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem in Israel in 1967,²⁶ while the Eichmann trial took place in the same country six years earlier. Paying no attention to that, and presenting no evidence at all on the subject, she repeated this statement several times, even in the programme "Fakta" on Czech Television in 1999.²⁷

Thanks to her research, Gruntová indeed brought some quite new facts to light, but even gave the Czech resistance against Schindler a "scientific ground." Presenting herself and presented by others as a "professional historian," she became "the Schindler expert" of the Czech Republic. That helped her to get a lot of attention in various media – she was asked and quoted in most instances that named the Schindler case, in both the daily press and television.²⁸ As takes the problems of the "Schindler myth," as it was presented by Thomas Keneally and Steven Spielberg, Gruntová in fact came to a similar conclusion as American historian David Crowe, the author of the first (and so far the only) complete scholarly biography of Oskar Schindler that included all periods and places of his life. In fact, David Crowe partly used Gruntová's research in his work, too. Paradoxically, however, the two came to quite different conclusions on the question of whether Schindler saved Jewish lives or not and whether

he deserved any respect at all. Crowe indeed considers Schindler to be a hero who saved more than 1,000 Jewish prisoners' lives. This heroism was not earned by his direct participation with the list, but by his will to risk his own life and fortune in order to get permission to bring the Jewish prisoners from Plaszow to Brněnec. His decisive act took place outside Czech territory (i.e. outside the then Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia) in 1944, and had nothing to do with his Czech-German background.

Formally, Gruntová was not a member of any political party, but agreed to become a candidate for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, a successor to the former totalitarian party from the Communist period, in various elections on various levels. In 2002, still officially politically independent, she even became a Communist deputy in the Czech parliament in Prague. In her political opposition against the Sudeten-German "Landsmannschaft," Jitka Gruntová even became one of the three deputies who in 2003 initiated a new controversial Czech law praising former Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš and his contribution to the Czechoslovak state. Even though the law does not explicitly thank Beneš for the "transfer" of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, its proposal was presented at a time when the Czech campaign against new activities and demands of the Sudeten-German organisation reached its peak in the post-Cold War Czech Republic. During the pre-election campaign to Czech parliamentary elections in 2002, the anti-Sudeten arguments played an important role, and in the 2003 presidential elections the new Czech president Václav Klaus, who replaced outgoing Václav Havel, was partly elected due to his intensive anti-Sudeten propaganda. In this way Klaus, as a conservative candidate representing Czech post-communist capitalist thinking, was even able to get votes from the deputies of the Communist Party, including Jitka Gruntová. The law about Beneš was widely understood and discussed as just another demonstration of the Czech official non-compromise attitude and refusal of self-reflexion on the Sudeten-German question.

In several dozen articles, published during the whole first decade after 1993 and written either directly by her, or at least containing her quotes and comments, Jitka Gruntová never placed Schindler in other contexts than the Czech-German one; never used testimonies

of other witnesses but the Czech ones, and never analysed him within a Holocaust narrative. She also admitted that her attitude to Schindler included even very personal, existential aspects. As interviewed for the TV documentary film *Zatykač na Oskara Schindlera* (Arrest Warrant for Oskar Schindler), she compared the story of her own family to Schindler's, saying:

My father was arrested by the Gestapo on September 1, 1939. He was kept prisoned in a concentration camp. Thanks to a skilful lawyer, it was possible to ransom my father for a lot of money. My dad had to give two houses to the Third Reich, the family had to sell a car and a collection of coins. All that went to one Gestapo official that helped my father to get back his freedom. Thanks to that, I could be born. When I once told this story to my daughter a long time ago, she told me a naive infant sentence: Mom, you have to be grateful to this Gestapo-man for your very existence. I have never felt any gratitude to that man, never had any such idea. It is not about saving human lives when a man does something like this for money. What did Schindler do? He did not save people. He traded with human lives.

Jitka Gruntová's categorical rejection of the "Schindler legend" found the support of another Czech historian, Jaroslav Valenta. In the periodical *Soudobé dějiny* ('Contemporary History'), published by the Institute of Contemporary History in Prague,²⁹ Valenta praised Gruntová's work. At the same time, he criticised the attention given to Gruntová's book from the side of the Sudeten Germans.³⁰ Their attention, according to Valenta, was "incompetent" and "pseudo-historical."³¹ Gruntová, on the other hand, "did not use her sources selectively." Showing very clearly that even his viewpoint was primarily based on a Czech-German ethnic dimension, and that even for him the Holocaust was actually not the most important point of the Schindler story, Valenta added another criticism against a Czech historian and author of a smaller book about Oskar Schindler, Radoslav Fikejz. Pointing at Fikejz's rather liberal evaluation of Schindler's activity during the early stages of the Second World War, Valenta wrote: "I would not expect such a hyper-tolerant attitude of declared treason from a Czech historian."³²

Invisible Schindler Histories – Fear, Hesitation and Compromise

With regard to Czech scholars, it might seem surprising that all “heavyweights” among the historians were completely absent from the discussion. While there were very few of them who could be described as Holocaust researchers, many specialised in Czech-German relations. There was, for example, a special commission of Czechoslovak and German historians, established before Czechoslovakia’s breakdown in the early 1990s by the ministers for foreign affairs, and later continuing its work, divided into Czech-German and Slovak-German commissions. However, none of its Czech members found it worthwhile to present their opinion in connection with *Schindler’s List* in the Czech media, even though many of the discussed subjects obviously would have been relevant even for these historians. None of the historians who in 2002 wrote the widely discussed book *Rozumět dějinám* (‘To Understand History’) about the Czech-Germans in Czechoslovakia (actually written as an order from the Czech government in its campaign against Jörg Haider in Austria and the Sudeten-German “*Landsmannschaft*” in Bayern, Germany) showed any activity. Due to this absence, any broader scholarly perspective than the one suggested by Jitka Gruntová was missing. The reason may be that the main task for historians, according to Czech standards at that time, was to write “real history” based on archive materials and source criticism, and not participate in media discussions. For a long time, it was only Gruntová who was dealing with primary sources about Schindler. In 1999, she was accompanied by historian Mečislav Borák, who, however, wrote only a script for a TV documentary on Schindler. Here, too, Borák dealt with some primary sources and witness testimonies describing a limited part of Schindler’s life and his activities in the Ostrava region near the Czech-Polish border during the late 1930s and the rest of the war. Even Borák confirmed the fact that Schindler worked as an agent for Germany against Czechoslovakia and Poland, but he did not reach any further conclusion regarding Schindler’s activities within the context of the Holocaust. Nor did he question or condemn Schindler generally, as Gruntová had.

None of these scholars recognised the problem with Schindler's legacy as primarily one of collective memory, historical consciousness and a clash of historical cultures. There were very few – if any – interdisciplinary studies related to history and no research studying history from just these points of view, even though Jan Křen, a prominent Czech historian dealing with Czech-German relations, already in 1990 published a whole book about “white spots in Czech history.”³³ However, even Křen's book became primarily an appeal to historians to make a complete critical reconstruction of some crucial periods of the controversial Czech recent past, rather than an attempt to look at history from any other than just a chronological perspective.³⁴

Another unexpectedly “invisible” group in the Schindler discussion were leading Czech politicians, including the president Václav Havel. While the US president Bill Clinton urged people to watch *Schindler's List*, Havel, who became one of the greatest symbols of freedom-fighting and against dictatorship in the post-communist world, did not make any comment on the film at all in order to mark his own standpoint, or to use the Holocaust lesson for education leading to democracy and tolerance. Thus, the only public reaction from the highest political leadership of the country came in 1994 from Prime Minister Václav Klaus, the leader of the Conservative Party ODS. He did not make a voluntary choice to speak but was forced to react to the scandal provoked by the right-extremist protests of the “Republicans” against Schindler's Svitavy memorial in parliament. In response to a SPR-RSC's deputy in the Czech Parliament, Klaus stated that it was for the courts to assess the view that the unveiling of a plaque to Oskar Schindler meant a criminal act of support and dissemination of a movement striving to suppress the rights of citizens. It was solely up to the local people to assess this specific activity of the local government, Klaus said, presenting the whole problem as clearly only a judicial matter. Thus, even though the SPR-RSC did not achieve any success with its activity against Oskar Schindler after all, it was impossible to see what human, political and other possible values might be connected to *Schindler's List* in the heads of those responsible for building the new Czech democratic system.

There were other groups that could be considered as likely partici-

pants in the debate but instead remained silent. Those Czech-Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia during the whole post-war period stood close to Schindler's story and could be expected to at least try to express their own view. With regard to the post-war historical context, however, the Czech-German silence was in fact not surprising at all. Even the onset of the 1990s did not mean any rapid change in this aspect. Reactions that could be classified as "Czech-German" were not only missing in Schindler's case, but even in such important moments as when Václav Havel, just elected as President in the end of 1989, very surprisingly suggested for the first time that the Czechs should apologise to the Sudeten Germans for their "wild expulsion" right after the war.³⁵

The situation of the Czech-Germans in the early 1990s can be illustrated by the following facts and figures: In 1921, there were more than 3.2 million Czech Germans in Czechoslovakia; three million of them in the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia.³⁶ After the Munich Treaty and the occupation of Czech lands by Germany, the "Sudeten Germans" became citizens of the Third Reich. When the transfer of the Germans was officially declared completed by the restored Czechoslovakia in the first two years after the Second World War, only 240,000 Czech-Germans were allowed to stay. This does not mean, however, that these people were seen as non-problematic by the Czechoslovak authorities and citizens. The Czech government wished to send more Germans "home" to Germany but was not allowed to do so by the Allies.³⁷ Despite that, some more Germans were forced to leave anyway during the late 1940s. As historians have reminded us, among those driven out of Czechoslovakia were also German anti-Nazis and even German Jews returning from the concentration camps.³⁸ Official statistics from 1950 spoke about 165,000 Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia, i.e. 1.3 per cent of the population.³⁹ Even though Czechoslovakia gave a kind of "amnesty" to at least part of Germany – the Eastern, Communist-led one – the ideology demonising the "revanchist threat" from West Germany, as well as continuous distrust, made the position of remaining Czech-Germans continuously complicated during Communist rule. The number of remaining Czech-Germans decreased further during the late 1960s when many people emigrated. By the early 1990s, the Ger-

man minority consisted of less than 50,000. Sociologist Eva Stehlíková has observed that this remaining German minority is very heterogeneous. There is no typical "German region" or even political and cultural agenda in the country. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Czech-Germans can hardly be described as generally pro-German. To a large extent, they have been assimilated in Czech society, and some were not even fluent in German.⁴⁰ The Czech public debate about *Schindler's List* does not seem to have had any visual effect on the life and image of the German minority in the Republic at all.

Another important minority, the Czech-Jewish one, was in some respects in a similar situation. There were not many reactions to *Schindler's List* from the side of the Czech-Jews. A possible reason might be that Jewish organisations were not very strong and influential in Bohemia and Moravia at that time, and that open manifestations of collective Jewish identity were not welcome during a long period of Communist rule until 1989. Furthermore, Czech-Jews were isolated from the international debate about the Holocaust during most of the Communist period and were occupied by different problems than Jews in the West. It is therefore difficult to estimate the priority given to the memory of the Holocaust among Czech-Jews right after the collapse of the Communist system, and whether the silence might be motivated by their fear of possible counter-reaction and repression.

The generational aspect is moreover relevant, too, since it is very difficult to analyse the level of the younger Jewish generations' knowledge of the Jewish genocide during the Second World War. The young Jews got their formal education in the same official schools as their non-Jewish counterparts, i.e. within the framework of communist ideology, and had no free and independent space in which they could express their thoughts, beliefs and feelings before 1989.⁴¹ It is likely that the Jewish generations of the children of Holocaust survivors were better educated about the Nazi genocide of the Jews than other non-Jewish children in Czechoslovakia, due particularly to the histories communicated within their own families. However, such a private education was not quite automatic for all the Jews either, as the case of the Czech-born US secretary of state Madeleine Albright might suggest. Those families who could convert or manage to hide their Jewish identity during the Nazi period might have

chosen to continue to do so even in the post-war era. If Madeleine Albright's Czech parents could do so during their US exile, it is even more plausible that this was the case for similar families in Communist Czechoslovakia, especially after the anti-Jewish wave of the early 1950s.⁴² Even the official Czech-Jewish periodical *Roš Chodeš* dedicated very little space to the film. The only exception to this rule was an interview with the distinguished historian of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg, in which he expressed his understanding for the success of the film. The interview was not originally carried out by the Czech-Jewish periodical, but by French journalists, and translated into Czech after being published in the French press.⁴³

In this situation, the Chief Rabbi Karol Sidon from Prague became, in fact, the only active spokesman of a Jewish opinion about Schindler in the Czech media. The Rabbi did not, however, stress only the "Jewish matter" in his speeches, but primarily emphasised respect for humanity instead, and praised the fact that – even in such very difficult times – an individual was able to save other people's lives. "He proved that it was possible. Everybody who did a similar thing deserves a memorial because he or she would show that is possible to save the others," Sidon said during an opening ceremony when the memorial to Schindler was uncovered in early 1994.⁴⁴ Sidon held the same line more or less consistently during the forthcoming years. In 1999, for example, when Czech Television made the already mentioned documentary programme about Oskar Schindler, he said: "He [Schindler] saved a thousand human lives and every life is very precious. It does not matter what he was like in private, no matter where he grew up or where he came from. The human lives were the only thing that mattered."⁴⁵

In the same documentary, however, recalling the events from 1994, Sidon even disclosed some previously unknown details from the opening of the Schindler memorial in Svitavy five years earlier. He admitted that he was more or less forced to make a speech and uncover the memorial, since all other Czech guests present at the ceremony were afraid and lacked the courage to do so. "If Schindler had not been a German but a Czech and if he had done the same thing, he would probably have been much more accepted," the Rabbi added. When, for Sidon himself, the ethnicity of Oskar Schindler was not a decisive factor, the

same could be said about his presentation of the ethnicity of victims, i.e. the Jewish prisoners. Sidon did not speak about the importance of saving Jewish lives during the Holocaust, but about the importance of saving human lives during the war. Thus, he did not even stress a special place for the Jews among other victims of the Nazi regime. The all-human aspect of Schindler's act was the most important for him, which made his words acceptable in all parts of Czech society and led to no criticism and no strong reaction from other participants in the debate, including even the most extreme ones.

The last group I want to mention here as "uncertain" or perhaps "careful" in its interpretation of Schindler is a small group of witnesses who personally remembered Oskar Schindler or his relatives, his factory in Brněnec, and "his" Jews from the time of the Second World War. There were some local voices that appeared in the debate with their testimonies. All of them were searched out by either journalists or researchers, which meant that their testimonies were in all cases interpreted and used by others. The messages from the testimonies, however, were not easy to decipher at all. In the most paradoxical case, one witness testimony was used both to give credit to Oskar Schindler and to disprove "the Schindler legend."

During the last years of the Second World War, Cecilia Niederlová lived next to Schindler's factory in Brněnec. While interviewed by the German daily newspaper *Berliner Morgenpost* in March 1994, she remembered the prisoners speaking very nicely about Schindler. They were grateful to him for their lives," she said.⁴⁶ Also Jitka Gruntová met Cecilia Niederlová and used her words to prove that "the Schindler legend" was not based on real facts. In her book, published in 2002, Gruntová wrote: "Cecilie Niederlová says that she used to see Schindler in his office, wearing the uniform of the SS [...] In 1994, she related it to many journalists, but this important testimony – confirmed even by her husband – was refused by them and considered as impossible."⁴⁷ Niederlová's memories are further used to prove that Schindler stole "a huge, huge amount of Jewish goods" from the Jews and stored it in his Brněnec factory.⁴⁸ There are, however, no details as to how and where the Jewish prisoners, who after "aryanisations" of their properties and three years of the ongoing process of the "Final Solution" came in the end of the war in very poor condi-

tion from Cracow to Brněnec by goods trains, got this “huge, huge amount of Jewish goods” that was so evident even for an outsider. No matter, Niederlová is said to also question the good conditions of the Schindler Jews in the factory: When Niederlová once tried to throw an apple to a Jewish prisoner, an SS officer immediately ran to her and forbade her to do it.”⁴⁹

Cecilia Niederlová was not the only “problematic” source among the direct witnesses and survivors in the Czech Republic.⁵⁰ The atmosphere of the public discussions about Schindler influenced and even scared other Czech witnesses. Some journalists wrote that people who remembered Schindler were afraid of their neighbours. “I have not found a single witness who was not afraid of speaking about Schindler as a good man. Somebody always threatens them afterwards,” the liberal daily *Mladá Fronta* wrote soon after *Schindler’s List*’s first Czech appearance.⁵¹ Another liberal periodical, *Reflex*, mentioned one woman who was the only Czech survivor of Schindler’s concentration camp in Brněnec⁵²: “A former prisoner No. 76408 does not want to let the others in the small city of Svitavy know too much about her.” His article was illustrated by a photo where “Mrs. 76408” could not be recognised. Her face was digitally masked by a computer, as was the face of her husband. Nevertheless, the readers got to know that the last name of the lady was Mrs. Reicherová. In the article, she did not speak about Schindler at all.

Since Gruntová, too, met the same survivor in person, I could later learn that Mrs. Bluma Reichertová (spelled differently than in *Reflex*) changed her name a long time ago, after her marriage. Thus the name Reichertová was in fact her maiden name. Anyway, from Gruntová’s work, the reader can never learn what Mrs. Reichertová thought about Schindler, either. Once Mrs. Reichertová mentioned with a kind of sympathy “a man in civilian clothes” who tried to help the prisoners in Brněnec, without specifying whether it really was Schindler. Two pages later in the book, Reichertová was quoted as just saying that “some liked Schindler, some did not.”⁵³

All these indications suggest that none of the minorities or groups standing closest to Schindler’s time and life on Czech territory have found it worthwhile to profile themselves clearly in the Czech Schindler debate. Neither the Jews nor the German-Czechs found the

Schindler debate crucial for sharpening their own historical consciousness and collective identity. Thus, with the exception of Chief Rabbi Karol Sidon, they remained almost unnoticed.

Schindler? Allow Him In!

In a chronological order, most positive Czech reactions to Oskar Schindler came in the beginning of the whole discussion. The first of this kind focused more on the success of *Schindler's List* than on the authenticity and moral standard of Schindler's personality or other factors. For authors of these articles – mostly reviewers of the film – *Schindler's List* was taken as a work of art based on a real story.⁵⁴ Some reactions, however, were almost immediately suggesting that the film should be used as a “bridge over troubled waters” between Czechs and Germans. Only some days after the opening in Svitavy and Prague, the daily *Český deník* understood the film as well as Schindler's memorial as a “step on a way to rapprochement”:

The Town of Svitavy lacks historical memory, since 90 per cent of its inhabitants have lived here only since 1945. The discussion about the act will not end by uncovering the memorial plaque. This is the moment of necessary self-reflection about new forms of relations between people speaking different languages. It is also an impulse to thinking about our own identity, about our place in the democratic community of advanced European countries,”

the newspaper quoted the Svitavy mayor Jiří Brídl.⁵⁵ Some authors even wanted to see the film in a broader context as a pedagogic lesson for the prevention of genocide: “It is important for us, because Schindler was a Sudeten German, it is important for the whole world because it is important to realise right now, at the time of the Serbian rage, what genocide is all about,” the liberal daily *Reflex* wrote early in 1994.⁵⁶ In the summer of 1994, the daily *Mladá Fronta Dnes* even saw the film as the end of the old Czech perception of the ethnic Czech-German conflict and the old communist view of the problem:

The case of a Nazi and Jew saviour Oskar Schindler could teach us to be more critical towards our past... It is obvious that the general condemnations of the Sudeten Germans cannot last forever, even though far from



Oskar Schindler's monument in the Czech town Svitavy, with a front section of the house where Schindler was born on April 24, 1908. Photo: Tomas Sniegón.

everybody will be – just because of Schindler – willing to revise the simplifying indoctrinations brought to us by the Communist regime.⁵⁷

On a scholarly level, two local historians from Svitavy with a partly similar professional background to Jitka Gruntová showed a rather liberal attitude to Oskar Schindler and wanted to use his act, not for Holocaust research or memory, but for the purposes of improving Czech-German relations. The first of these two men was Radoslav Fikejz, whom I have already mentioned as a criticised “non-patriot” by historian Jaroslav Valenta. The second was Milan Štrych. Both of them worked during some time as historians of the Svitavy town museum, where even Gruntová once used to work. Both Fikejz and Štrych, however, took much less part in the debate than Gruntová. In an interview from 1994, published in *Týdeník*, Radoslav Fikejz, then only a student of history, said:

There are still many people in our country who understand history in terms of collective guilt [...] It is important to draw a line between the past and the present, to start a new chapter and forget national animosities. I think that Schindler especially could be the one who brings reconciliation between the Czechs and the Germans.⁵⁸

Fikejz wrote a study about Schindler, first as a thesis at the Masaryk University in Brno. For this work, he was given an award by the Czech Minister of Education as the “talent of the year 1997.” Later, the study was published by the Museum in Svitavy,⁵⁹ but did not get as much attention as Gruntová’s book in the Czech press. Nor was it available nationwide but only in the Svitavy Museum. Nevertheless, even Fikejz formulated his studies on some archive materials and interviews with the survivors, but on a much smaller scale than Jitka Gruntová. He leaned heavily on an unpublished study by the English researcher Robin O’Neil and came to some quite opposite conclusions to Gruntová: Although both Keneally and Spielberg distorted the story, the core of it – that Schindler intended to save and in fact saved the Jewish prisoners – was real. While saving Jewish lives, Schindler did not act only as a businessman, but also as a man of honour. Fikejz also pointed out that Schindler did not need to “re-write” his own history by the end of the Second World War in order to save his own skin, as Gruntová claimed, because he had had a chance to save his own life earlier in 1944, through emigration to Switzerland, but he had refused.⁶⁰

Fikejz, contrary to Gruntová, was generally very enthusiastic about Schindler in his conclusions: “Oskar Schindler became a great personality just at the same time as he managed to take over the responsibility not only for himself, but also for others. His action balanced out all the negative sides of his life.”⁶¹ Thus Schindler’s courage in relation to his prisoners overshadowed the negative sides shown during the eve and subsequent first years of the war. At the end of his work, Fikejz even touched upon one more sensitive point when he wrote: “Not only can Oskar Schindler himself get credit for the people in Brněnec. The local population in Brněnec, too, supported the prisoners – no matter whether they were Czechs or Germans.” Schindler’s life, according to Fikejz, “overcame a presumption about the badness of the whole German nation.” Schindler’s act, not Schindler’s life, becomes an appeal to future generations, Fikejz concluded, combining a scholarly and a pedagogic use of history.⁶²

Milan Štrych was quoted by the national liberal daily *Lidové noviny* as giving the same message: “Schindler – it is our opportunity to reach reconciliation.”⁶³ This article was even published before the

opening of *Schindler's List* in the Czech Republic. The two journalists who wrote the text finished it with the following words:

Together with the most important thing – that human lives were saved – the case of Schindler, although still open, brought together all elements into one theme: demarcation lines are drawn neither between nations and political parties, nor between religions. There are not even clear lines in our own minds. Black or white, negative or positive, everybody can in his or her life do something that matters.

A general problem with all these positive reactions to *Schindler's List* was their temporary character. As the enthusiasm from the film soon decreased, so did calls to use the film for the “democratic education” of Czech society and for a new self-reflection in terms of Czech national identity. The opponents, headed by Gruntová, were on the contrary much more consistent in the long run. With new evidence about Schindler's guilt in his relation to the Czech nation emerging, it made the initial effort to use Spielberg's film for self-reflective purposes look like a temporary effort of incompletely informed enthusiasts.

During most of the period of my study, which means between 1994 and 2003, the problem of the Holocaust was pictured as secondary in the Czech debate about *Schindler's List*, if it was recognised at all. I cannot say that Schindler was condemned entirely for who he was and not what he did, since he was condemned to a large extent for his own Nazi activities. Nevertheless, his ethnic origin played a very important role in all discussions and helped in the end rather to widen the gap than to bridge it. Besides, *Schindler's List* never led to crucial discussions about such questions as the behaviour of “ordinary Czechs” during the Holocaust or the tragic history of the Czech (or former Czechoslovak) Jews, in order to prevent antisemitism.

Thus, the debate about *Schindler's List*, which in fact was the first extensive debate in the new-born Czech Republic initiated entirely by the Holocaust and its memory, has never become a turning point for Czech self-reflection, neither regarding the Holocaust nor the Sudeten Germans. During the first decade after the “Velvet Divorce,” the arguments against Schindler proved to be much “heavier” than some attempts to use Schindler in order to influence Czech historical culture.

I found the need to confirm the understanding of the Czech na-

tion as a collective victim of the much bigger and stronger German neighbour prevailing in the debate. It was accompanied by silent approval or at least absent opposition from most of the new post-communist elites and from the main groups involved. Old stereotypes, valid during the whole post-war period, seemed to be too stable in comparison to attempts to challenge them. Put differently, *Schindler's List* as a history-cultural impulse was not strong enough to successfully challenge old perceptions of history.

Notes

1. Schindler died on October 8, 1974 in Hildesheim, Germany, but according to his own wish, he was buried in Jerusalem.
2. Among those who were present in Svitavy during this preview showing were the local politicians, the chief-rabbi in the Czech Republic, Karol Sidon, the ambassadors from Germany and Israel and some representatives of the US Embassy in Prague. None of the creators of *Schindler's List* took part in the Svitavy ceremony.
3. The terms "Sudetenland" and "Sudeten German" were created by the nationalist German politicians, who after 1918 appeared on Czechoslovak territory as a part of Czechoslovakia but actively opposed such a development. The expressions were supposed to stress the unity of Czechoslovakia's German population. During the following years, the terms got many political undertones: some authors distinguish between "Sudeten Germans" and "Czech Germans" where Czech Germans are those Germans who lived in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia outside the "Sudetenland," i. e. the border areas near Germany and Austria. During the Second World War, when Bohemia and Moravia became an occupied Protectorate, the official "Sudeten district" covered only the regions in the western and northern parts. After the war, when most of the Germans were forced to leave for Germany and Austria, "Sudeten German" became mostly a synonym for all Germans driven out from Czechoslovakia.
4. "Transfer" is a rather neutral expression used in official documents. Many authors, however, speak about "expulsion." Since the same word became an organic part of the vocabulary of the Sudeten German activists, many Czech sources consequently refuse it and continue to speak and write about "odsun," meaning "transfer" or "displacement."
5. Thomas Keneally, *Schindler's Ark*, 1982, p. 19.
6. Ibid., p. 35.
7. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
8. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
9. Ibid., pp. 35–36.
10. Ibid., p. 37.
11. In fact, even the West German government was taken by surprise in the middle of 1960s. As Liliane Weissberg has noted, politicians there first noticed Oskar Schindler when they learned about the MGM plan to make a film about him. See Liliane Weissberg, "The Tale of a Good German: Reflections on the German Reception of *Schindler's List*," in Yosefa Loshitzky (ed.), *Spielberg's Holocaust. Critical Perspectives on Schindler's List*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1997, p. 179.

12. Eva Oliveriusová, "Úspěšný pokus o fúzi mýtu a literatury faktu," *Světová literatura* 1986:1, p. 241.
13. Stanislav Motl, "Schindlerův rok," *Reflex* 1994:12.
14. *Reflex* 1999:10, p. 30. This information even appeared in several other newspapers.
15. Oskar Schindler, Nezapomenutelnému zachránci života 1200 pronásledovaných židů.
16. Czech News Agency ČTK, August 9, 1994.
17. –jok–, "Historie falšovaná Oscary," *Politické noviny Republika*.
18. Jiří Frajdl, "Jak si svitavští radní ušili z ostudy kabát," *Hraničář*, January 1998.
19. Jiří Frajdl, "Schindlerovské mýty ukončeny," *Nový zítřek-Levicové noviny* 1997:12. The Henlein Party was a party uniting the Sudeten Germans against the Czechoslovak State in the 1930s.
20. Quoted according to *Týdeník*, the local newspaper in Svitavy, March 9, 1994, p.2. This declaration was published and quoted in several newspapers.
21. Jitka Gruntová, *Legenda a fakta o Oskaru Schindlerovi*, Praha: Naše Vojsko 2002, pp. 14–19 (first published by Barrister & Principal in Brno in 1997).
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 86–130.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 87–91.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.
25. "K pravdě o Schindlerovi se přiblíží až příští generace, míní historička," *MFDnes*, March 30, 1999
26. http://www1.yadvashem.org/righteous/bycountry/germany/oskar_schindler.html.
27. In 1961, Oskar Schindler visited Israel for the first time. For more about the circumstances of this visit and its relation to the Eichmann trial, see David Crowe, *Oskar Schindler. The Untold Account of His Life, Wartime Activities, and the True Story Behind the List*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 2004, pp. 493–539.
28. In the preface of the second edition of her book, however, Gruntová described the situation during the first three years after the premiere of the film in quite different terms. According to her, "many our newspapers refused to publish my articles" and "it took a long time for me to find a publishing house that had the courage to help me in my fight against windmills." See Jitka Gruntová 2002, p. 6.
29. Jaroslav Valenta, "Kauza Oskara Schindlera v dvojím pohledu," *Soudobé dějiny*, 1998:2–3, pp. 328–343.
30. Valenta refers to an article by F. Seebauer with the title "Sowjetische Weltsicht konserviert" in *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, March 6, 1998, p. 2.
31. Jaroslav Valenta 1998, p. 331.
32. Jaroslav Valenta 1998, p. 337.
33. Jan Křen, "Bílá místa v našich dějinách," *Lidové noviny*, Praha 1990.
34. For an analysis of this state of scholarly historiography, see Jan Stříbrný, "Rezistence a válka v paměti současné české společnosti," in Július Lipták (ed.), *SNP v paměti národa. Materiály z vedeckej konferencie k 50. výročiu SNP*, Banská Bystrica: Múzeum SNP 1994, pp. 45–46.
35. Václav Havel was elected as Czech President on December 29, 1989 and made his suggestion repeatedly at the same time, both inside the Czech Republic and during his very first presidential visit abroad that – symbolically – led just to Germany. Havel's idea met great scepticism among most Czech citizens.
36. *Rozumět dějinám*, Praha: Gallery 2002, p. 56.
37. Karel Kaplan, *Pravda o Československu 1945–48*, Praha: Panorama 1990.
38. For more about the situation of the German Jews, see, for example Tomáš Staněk,

- "Němečtí židé v Československu 1945–1948," in *Dějiny a současnost* 1991:5, pp. 42–46.
39. Karel Kaplan, *Pravda o Československu 1945–48*, pp. 153–158.
 40. Eva Stehliková, "Aktuální kontexty obrazu Němce a Německa v české společnosti," in Němců Obraz (ed), *Rakouska a Německa v české společnosti 19. a 20. století*, Praha: Karolinum 1998, pp. 253–267.
 41. For further discussion about the Holocaust as a part of Czech(oslovak) school education, see Michal Frankl, "Holocaust Education in the Czech Republic, 1989–2002," *Intercultural Education* 2003:2. However, I was unable to find any facts about how much Jews born during the period 1948–1989 actually knew about the Holocaust already during the communist system.
 42. Albright discovered her Jewish roots first when she became the US Secretary of State in 1997, and thanks to information brought by an Arab newspaper. Interestingly, her father Joseph Korbel did not mention the Holocaust at all when he wrote a book about the history of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s; see Josef Korbel, *Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History*, New York, 1997. For more information about the whole Albright affair, see Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary*, New York: Miramax Books 2003, pp. 235–249.
 43. *Roš Chodeš*, May 1994, pp. 8–9.
 44. Quoted according to the *Daily Express* from March 14, 1994.
 45. *Zatykač na Oskara Schindlera*, Czech TV, 1999.
 46. Czech News Agency ČTK, March 4, 1994.
 47. Jitka Gruntová, "Legendy a fakta o Oskaru Schindlerovi," *Naše Vojsko*, Prague 2002, p. 121, this quotation translated from Czech by the author.
 48. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
 50. In this analysis, I am not studying witnesses from other countries, for example those who helped Keneally and Spielberg in making the film. Writing his novel during the Cold War, Keneally either could not or did not wish to interview Czech/Czechoslovak sources. As far as I know, Spielberg did not attempt to do so either, even if he started filming already after the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia.
 51. Štěpánka Králová, "Jeden ze šestatřiceti spravedlivých," *Mladá fronta Dnes*, March 12, 1994.
 52. Stanislav Motl, "Schindlerův rok," *Reflex* 1994:12.
 53. Jitka Gruntová, "Oskar Schindler, Legendy a fakta," *Naše vojsko*, Praha 2002, pp. 128, 130.
 54. See, for example, "Neuvěřitelný a fascinující Schindlerův seznam," *Mladá Fronta*, December 18, 1993.
 55. *Český deník*, March 12, 1994, p. 10.
 56. "Schindlerův seznam," *Reflex* 1994:13.
 57. Martin Schmarz, "Bez Schindlerů bychom to měli jednodušší," *MF Dnes*, August 24, 1994.
 58. "Nemyslím si, že Schindler židy zvláště miloval," Radoslav Fikejz in an interview with *Týdeník*, 1994.
 59. Radoslav Fikejz, *Oskar Schindler (1908–1974)*, Svitavy: Městské Muzeum a galerie Svitavy 1998.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
 63. "Každý svého Schindlera," *Lidové noviny*, February 26, 1994.

BARBARA TÖRNQUIST-PLEWA

The Tale of Szydłowiec

Memory and Oblivion in a Former Shtetl in Poland

Since the fall of Communism, Poland has been shaken by a series of scandals and violent debates which put into question truths and authorities hitherto taken for granted. In view of all the current delicate issues the country has to handle, it is remarkable that the most important debate so far in post-Communist Poland has not been concerned with current affairs but with events that took place about sixty years ago. This debate, known as the Jedwabne affair, was launched in 2000 by the publication of the book *Sąsiedzi, Neighbors*, by the scholar Jan Gross. By documenting a mass-murder committed by Poles on their Jewish neighbours in the small town of Jedwabne on July 10, 1941, Gross confronted Polish society with facts which had not had any place in its collective memory. The author questioned the image that Poles had of themselves as merely passive, helpless witnesses to the Holocaust. He wanted the Poles to discuss antisemitism and their way to remember the Holocaust. The victims of the Holocaust had never been mourned in Poland, he claimed.¹

Was Gross correct in his statement? The past fifteen years have seen steadily growing research into the memory of the Holocaust in Poland. Most researchers into the subject would probably now agree with the argument put by Michael Steinlauf, among others, that the Poles had during the post-war years “Polonised” the Holocaust. What occurred was that the emphasis was soon placed on the Poles’ own suffering during the war. Auschwitz became a symbol of Polish martyrdom, and the majority of Poles until recently believed that Auschwitz was first and foremost a place where Poles had been killed.² Steinlauf demonstrated how the memory of Jewish life and annihilation in Poland was pushed aside in the public discourse,

in media, textbooks and historical writings, in the years 1945–1995. However, what still remains largely uninvestigated is the question what happened with the memory of Jews and the Holocaust at the local level in the multitude of Polish small towns, many of shtetl character, that lost their Jewish population during the war and saw a total population change after the Holocaust.³ What happened in the local communities, in private discourse and in family narratives? As for other events during the Second World War, which were also for long periods hidden by censorship, such as the activities of *Armia Krajowa* (the resistance troops controlled by the pre-war government-in-exile) there was widespread transmission of memories within families, on the private level that often contested the official discourse. Were the memories of the Jews transmitted in the same way?

In the following I attempt to cast more light on the issue by analysing the memory of Jews and the Holocaust in Szydłowiec, a former Jewish small town in central Poland. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the town numbered about 11,000 inhabitants, thereof 7,200 Jews. In 1940 the Nazis transformed practically the whole town into a so-called open ghetto and gathered about 16,000 Jews there. In September 1942 they were deported to the gas chambers in Treblinka. Afterwards the Nazis gathered yet a further 5,000 Jews from surroundings areas in a new – this time closed – ghetto in Szydłowiec. These were transported to Treblinka as well in January 1943. Several hundred were executed at the town's Jewish cemetery.

After the liberation of Szydłowiec by the Red Army in January 1945, about 105 Jews, most of them former inhabitants of Szydłowiec, appeared in the town. However, they felt unwelcome and insecure and all of them left in the summer of 1945.⁴ The relations between the Jewish and Polish populations of the town were hostile. Documents in the county archives show that Szydłowiec was not exceptional in this regard.⁵

My choice of precisely this shtetl as an object for investigation is to a large extent motivated by the fact that I was born and grew up there. This has enabled me to collect a considerable documentation and verify several data using my own experience and knowledge gathered in the years I lived in the town.⁶ To be brought up in a certain culture and environment can with some reservations be seen as a kind

of extended participant observation.⁷ A risk of home blindness that is overhanging for researchers doing fieldwork in their home towns was in my case counteracted by the fact that I left the town at the age of eighteen and have lived the greater part of my life outside Poland. Therefore, I treat myself and also have been treated by people in Szydłowiec as both an “insider” and “outsider” at the same time. I believe that this position towards the object of study has been advantageous not only for the collection but also for the interpretation of the material. It gave me necessary insights and distance. I am at the same time aware that my background might have influenced my analysis. Any researcher’s work is shaped by her or his cultural, psychological and other characteristics.⁸

Collective memory is not about a collection of memories which members of a given group hold. It is about socially shaped forms of memory and the constructed, negotiated and shared meanings attributed to the past. In order to reach the collective memory of a town – or rather that of its inhabitants – I decided to study different activities through which the memory can be articulated and negotiated in a local community. One of them is cultural preservation, related to questions of what buildings, names etc. have been preserved and what people have not been eager to preserve. Others are cultural performances, such as commemoration ceremonies, monuments and exhibitions, and historical writing about the locality by professional historians, semi-professionals or amateurs.⁹

Yet another way of approaching collective memory is to make use of oral history; to get individuals to tell what they remember of their own experience or of the narratives of others about the past. In these narratives, the researcher into collective memory may discover recurrent patterns and shared representations of the past. With this idea in mind I have conducted a number of interviews, surveys and conversations with the inhabitants of the town.

Because of limited space I will only briefly present the results of my research on cultural preservation, commemoration activities and historical writings in the town.¹⁰ Instead, I will focus on the oral history study that I conducted there.



Ejzenberg's synagogue in Szydłowiec, today used as a pub. Photo: Barbara Törnquist-Plewa.

The Jewish Past and the Townscape

A town cannot in itself tell about its past, but the past is written into the townscape that can be seen as a “text” filled with signs which may be interpreted by those willing and able to interpret. The past manifests itself in the town's sites, buildings, streets, passages – the iconosphere, or the entirety of signs and images inscribed in the town, reflecting the patterns of cultural habits, movements and social hierarchies.¹¹

If one compares the townscape of Szydłowiec today with the pre-war one, which can be seen on old maps and in pictures, one can understand that the Jewish past has been suppressed and the text of the town has been rewritten. The war left half the town destroyed. The Germans set fire to the synagogue and to a number of Jewish wooden houses. No buildings connected with Jewish life in the town were reconstructed after the war, while the historical edifices of power and authority damaged during the war, such as the town hall and the castle, were repaired or rebuilt. The names of the streets connected with Jewish life, Rabbi Street or Synagogue Street, were changed. A secondary school was built on the site of the synagogue and four blocks of flats on the site of the former Jewish Square. The children



The Jewish cemetery in Szydłowiec. Photo: Barbara Törnquist-Plewa.

who grew up in these blocks had no idea that they lived in the centre of the old Jewish neighbourhood.¹²

However, there are still such elements in the townscape that may recall the life of the old shtetl. The main street, Radomska, and some of its side streets have remained largely intact, and many of the houses there were Jewish. Here one can find narrow and long back-yards, so typical of the shtetl streets. This type of houses can also be found in Garbarska street where perhaps the wealthiest man of old Szydłowiec, a tannery owner, Ejzenberg, had a prayer house built for his Jewish workers. However, barely anyone knows that this building, now a pub, was once a synagogue. The traces of Jewish life in the townscape are illegible for most inhabitants. Therefore, they cannot function as sites of memory. James E. Young writes that the site

lacks the will to remember, that is [...] without a deliberate act of remembrance, buildings, streets or ruins remain little more than inert pieces of the cityscape. Memory of a site's past does not emanate from within a place but is more likely the projection of the mind's eye onto a given site. Without the historical consciousness of visitors, these sites remain essentially indifferent to their past, altogether amnesiac, they "know" only what we know, "remember" only what we remember.¹³

However, one material relic which through the years has challenged this collective oblivion of the Jewish past is the Jewish cemetery, with the oldest gravestones dating from the eighteenth century. After the

war the cemetery became derelict. Local authorities turned a blind eye to the disappearance of gravestones, which were used for building materials. In 1956–1957 they decided to clear the place and make room for a department store and sports field for schoolchildren. Those of the gravestones still in fairly good condition were moved to the tiny remaining part of the cemetery near Wschodnia Street.¹⁴ After that, the site sank into oblivion. For a long time it was not even considered a historical landmark. The Jewish cemetery is conspicuously absent from the official list of the town monuments and historical sites, addressed by the local authorities in 1957.¹⁵ The lack of interest from the local population and the authorities' neglect of the place are reflected in short notices which appear in various documents from the 1960s.¹⁶ It was only in the 1980s that the authorities in Szydlowiec began to care a bit more about the state of the cemetery and eliminated the worst traces of the decay. This was in response to the interest for Jewish culture awakened among Polish intellectual elites and to the rising number of Jewish visitors from abroad.

Commemoration and Cultural Performances

The material remains of Jewish life are thus still in the town but do not form part of the rhetoric of commemoration which was established in Szydlowiec after the war. This rhetoric was carefully staged by the authorities in Communist Poland. Everywhere, local governments were ordered to appoint special committees called "The committee for preserving memorials of struggle and martyrdom." These committees addressed lists of sites where battles and executions, especially those from the Second World War, had taken place, and took the initiative to erect memorials. Such a committee was also active in Szydlowiec. Here as well in other places, local schools became the keepers of one or more historical sites. Ceremonies, choir performances and lectures were held, scouts mounted guards and laid down flowers. This organised commemoration in Szydlowiec did not include Jewish victims of the Holocaust, with one exception that took place in 1967. That year a monument was erected in order to honour the memory of "Polish citizens of Jewish origins" from Szydlowiec and its surroundings who were killed during the Second World War.¹⁷ However, the monument was not a local initiative but came



The monument dedicated to the memory of the Jews from Szydłowiec and its surroundings. Photo: Barbara Törnquist-Plewa.

as an order from the Communist Party on the district level. The monument was built and unveiled but later quickly forgotten. Until 1974 it was not even mentioned on official lists of monuments and memorials in Szydłowiec. Since the attitude of the Communist Party towards the Jews was hostile after 1968, nobody ever cared for the monument, which started to decay.

The location of the monument is significant. If the monument had been intended as a site of memory for the inhabitants of the town in

order to remind them of Szydłowiec's Holocaust victims, it should have been placed at some visible point. Instead it was built right in the middle of the forgotten and neglected Jewish cemetery, amongst derelict gravestones. Most Szydłowiec inhabitants do not even know about its existence. And among those few who do, some consider it an alibi: "Look, we erected a monument for them. What else can they ask?"¹⁸ – an attitude partly confirming James Young's view: "For once we assign a monumental form to memory, we have to some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember. In shouldering the memory work, monuments may relieve viewers of their memory burdens."¹⁹

It was first after the democratisation of Poland in 1989 that the first local initiatives were taken to organise cultural performances that commemorated the Jewish past in Szydłowiec. In 1996 the local power elites organised a scholarly conference on the subject of the Szydłowiec Jews, followed by a publication in 1997. There were also initiatives at grass roots level. The primary school teacher Slawa Harnusz engaged her pupils aged 10–13 in an educational project with the title "To save from oblivion." She urged them to interview elderly

town inhabitants in order to gather pre-1945 recollections about their family, their town and also specifically about the Szydłowiec Jews. In 1999 the teacher and her pupils created an exhibition about the history of the town that became the basis for a permanent “memory room” at the school; an embryo of a small local museum. The important thing here is that the history of the Szydłowiec Jews emerged clearly during these activities, and the memory room holds a number of objects telling about their presence in the town. The pupils who took part in the project were the first who got to learn more about the history of the Szydłowiec Jews. In 2002 other groups of pupils followed. The same teacher got them to participate in a contest organised by the Polish-Israeli foundation “Shalom,” entitled “On common soil.” The point of the contest was to collect memories of the vanished local Jewish community and present them in some artistic form. All in all, about 900 children were involved in one way or another in these memory activities that triggered some memory work among the youngsters of the town.

Local Historical Writings

History teaching at schools in Szydłowiec included the history of the town and the region, but until the mid-1990s the Jewish theme was ignored or dismissed with a few empty facts.²⁰ Where else could the pupils, or others for that matter, find information about the history of their town? An obvious source seemed to be the Polish encyclopaedia. In all Polish encyclopaedias published in post-war Poland there are shorter or longer articles about Szydłowiec. However, not one of those printed during the Communist era mentions the Jews in Szydłowiec and their annihilation. Information about it appears first in the *Nowa Encyklopedia Powszechna* from 1996.

Another source of knowledge of Szydłowiec comprised minor works on the town's history, written by local historians. Several such works, aiming to retell chronologically the history of the town, were published during the Communist era.²¹ All these works mention the large number of Jews in Szydłowiec as well as their destruction during the war, but the marginal space given to this information is remarkable. As for accounts of the Holocaust, local history writing is characterised by marginalisation and externalisation.²² The extermination

of the Szydlowiec Jews is depicted as an external event. It took place in the death camp and did not impinge upon the life of the rest of the town inhabitants. In the local historical narratives, the killing of three quarters of the inhabitants in 1942–1943 does not constitute a dramatic break in its history. It is an event among many others, while continuity is emphasised. The Jews in the history of the town are presented in such a way that the readers do not get a chance to realise that the town was a shtetl. Nor can they understand that the Holocaust took place in its streets and squares.

The break with this narrative came first in 1997 with the publication of a book, *Zydzi Szydlowieccy* (The Jews of Szydlowiec) written by professional historians. The book was a result of a conference on this subject organised by local authorities. It was financed by the Batory Foundation but produced and distributed locally.²³ The articles in the book are supported by solid source material and present Szydlowiec as a shtetl. When mentioning Polish-Jewish relations during and after the Holocaust the authors are very cautious. They avoid any moral judgements and emotional involvement in the topic.

Private Memories and Collective Memory

Every person is unique. That goes for everyone's memory as well. Even if several people experience the same thing, they each remember it in their own, individual way. Therefore, one may ask if it is worth analysing the memories of individuals in order to discover the collective memory of a community. There are reasons for doing so. In the words of Young:

groups share socially constructed assumptions and values that organize memory into roughly similar patterns, individuals cannot share another's memory any more than they can share another's cortex. They share instead the forms of memory, even the meanings of memory generated by those forms.²⁴

It is these "forms" and "patterns" of memory which are interesting for studies of collective memory.

I wished to study people's private memories of the Jews in Szydlowiec and of the Holocaust in order to observe shared memory patterns and to see whether these might explain the town's long col-

lective oblivion. In the years 2002–2004 I conducted sixteen open-ended in-depth interviews with people who, because of their age, hold their own memories from the Second World War; three interviews with local school teachers and two with former representatives of the town's authorities. I also made several group interviews – two with people of different generations and four with generation-based groups – in order to observe how memories are negotiated between and among different generations. Besides this, I had countless informal conversations about the subject with the town's inhabitants. The contacts with the informants were established by recommendations by friends and acquaintances and accumulated by the snowball method. As to the oldest informants, the recommendation of a local priest was important for overcoming the distrust and suspicion.²⁵ However, of crucial importance for establishing the trust were my origins in the town. The fact that I could introduce myself not only as a Polish-speaking researcher from Sweden writing about memories from the Second World War, but also as the daughter of a family living in the town, usually broke the ice and attracted some openness. In the conversations people could refer to names and places in the town, relying on me knowing them because I was “from here.” This made the contacts easier and created a feeling of mutual understanding.²⁶ Still, there were some individuals who treated me with suspicion, declined to speak with me or were evasive in their answers. The majority of my informants did not allow me to tape the interviews. My analysis is thus first and foremost based on notes that I made during and immediately after the meetings. Therefore, in my presentation, I use reported speech rather than direct quotations. Due to ethical reasons I do not use the real names of the informants.

In analysing the interviews I do not aspire to any objective knowledge. The interview is always a source produced by an interaction between the informant and the interviewer, and it is fully possible that a different interviewer could get different answers from the same informant. I report here about memories and views that were given to me.²⁷ When possible I tried to complete and check the interview material against other sources. One such important source for me was the *Yizkor* book about Szydłowiec, *Szydłowiec Memorial Book*, published in New York in 1989 and containing Jewish memories of

the shtetl and the Second World War in Szydlowiec.²⁸ Apart from this I also used articles written in the local newspaper, a number of scholarly articles, results from some surveys I conducted in the town and about thirty essays written by schoolchildren, aged 10–13 years, in Szydlowiec and containing stories about the town during the Second World War. The essays and surveys together with “field observations” were for me important sources of information about how the memory of Szydlowiec Jews has been transmitted.

The Shtetl Before the War

A picture of town life before the war emerges from the stories told by those who lived in the town or its close surroundings prior to and during the war. These oldest inhabitants of Szydlowiec call themselves “bushes,” in contrast to people who moved to the town after the war from different corners of Poland and whom they call “birds.” The “bushes” consider that the “birds” know nothing about the town’s past.

Like many others shtetls, pre-war Szydlowiec had a semi-agrarian character. Most of the existing industries, workshops and shops were owned by Jews. They were most often one-person businesses, generally not making a lot of money. Nevertheless, they gave rise to socio-economic envy. The phrase “everything was in the hands of the Jews” is recurrent in the interviews. Envy was mixed with barely hidden admiration for the Jews’ thrift (often represented as avarice), internal solidarity (“they always stood up for each other, not like us Poles”) and entrepreneurship. A number of people, when describing both Jews and Poles, used the expression *zydowski leb* – “Jewish head” – meaning clever and enterprising, someone who can get things his own way.

Many of my informants told of thorough and reliable Jewish craftsmen, doctors and pharmacists in the town, while at the same time claiming that Jewish tradesmen cheated. Several people used the expression “fair as Jewish scales.” Most informants were eager to point out that no Pole who opened up a business in the town had any chance of competing. The Jewish shopkeepers would stick together and lower their prices in order to eliminate him. They often had better prices and everyone, both Jews and Poles, preferred to take their

custom there. Most people also claimed that Jews lent money at high interest rates. The image of the Jew as usurer and ruthless businessman was sometimes balanced against accounts of Jewish helpfulness, for instance Stanisława Tomska's story of how her Jewish employer generously paid her salary in advance so she could save her parents from eviction.

The informants did not all claim that all Jews were rich. On the contrary, apart from rich tanners or producers of soft drinks, there were also very poor Jews in the town: water carriers, rag collectors, itinerant craftsmen. People described their cramped, poor, foul-smelling lodgings. Simultaneously, however, every one of the interviewed elders claimed that the Jews generally were better off and it was the Poles who had to work for and borrow money from them, not the other way round. This was a state of affairs that most of my informants had difficulties to accepting. Maria Kubik, in her lower teens before the war, said: "The Poles had to work as their servants. My friends used to run over and light their lamps on Saturdays for a few pennies. Luckily I never sank that low."

The accounts show that differences in religion made contacts between the groups more difficult: "We were allowed to play with Jewish playmates in the yard, but we seldom went to each others' homes and never ate at each other's place. They found our food disgusting" (Jan Trzeciak, 78 years old). Barbara Lipska told about Jewish teenagers in her own age: "They considered their faith better than ours. They were the chosen people, right? They mocked us when we went to church on Sundays and we mocked them back when they 'howled' at the cemetery during their holidays."

Poles and Jews attended the same schools and sat next to each other, but during the breaks they stuck to their own groups. Friendships across religious boundaries were rare. Jewish and Polish boys' gangs sometimes bashed at each other, but there were no major conflicts. One interview (with Zenon Krasicki, 75 years old) indicates that antisemitic propaganda reached the town in the 1930s through the efforts of the Polish nationalist parties, via newspapers, posters and spreading of rumours. Most of the informants, however, said that they never had the time or were too young to interest themselves in politics.

When comparing these accounts to the Jewish memories in *Szydlowiec Memorial Book* a picture emerges, not very different from the Polish one, even if the perspective differs. Motl Eisenberg, for instance, writes: "Szydlowiec was a typical Jewish shtetl, like hundreds of others in Poland [...] At the outskirts of Szydlowiec lived the Poles – about 20 percent of the population – who earned their livelihood from the Jews."²⁹ The authors of the *Memorial Book* are clearly proud of the fact that it was the Jewish community which was in charge of the town's economic development. They list leather factories, small shoe factories, a button factory, quarries and breweries and stress that these were Jewish-owned. At the same time it emerges from the accounts that the majority of Jews were poor craftsmen and proletarians, whose livelihood depended on the thin layer of entrepreneurs.³⁰ The authors of the *Memorial Book* also dwell considerably on the prevailing tough economic competition. The Jews felt that the Polish state did not side with them.³¹ At the same time, other accounts suggest that the Jewish community in Szydlowiec managed pretty well, thanks to, among others things, the support of American Jewish organisations.³²

There is very little in the *Memorial Book* about contacts with the town's Polish population. The Jewish community lived by and large on its own, had its own cultural life, its own cultural and political organisations. Religion was very important. Chassidism prevailed and there was strict observance of religious decrees and rules for living. Many Jewish parents did not want their children to attend the "Christian" state school, but there were few who could afford private Jewish religious schools, *yeshivas*. Therefore many parents clubbed together and hired private tutors who taught larger groups of children. Then the children took an external examination with the headmaster of the local state school. It is said that around one third of the Jewish children in Szydlowiec attended the Polish state school.³³

It emerges from the *Memorial Book* that the Jews in Szydlowiec felt that their Polish neighbours did not like them, but that they did not feel threatened. Kagan stresses: "Gentiles were rebuffed when they tried to harass Jews."³⁴ However, the antisemitic propaganda that appeared in the town, especially in the 1930s, worried the Jews. In spite of their relatively strong economic position, the Jews expe-

rienced that their access to political power was limited both on national and local level.³⁵

Both Jewish and Polish memories of pre-war Szydłowiec depict a *shtetl* stuck in old patterns and traditions, leading a rather isolated life. The assimilation processes, which during the interwar years were in full swing in larger cities, did not affect Szydłowiec. Certainly, more and more Szydłowiec Jews learnt Polish, the state language which was compulsory in the school curriculum, but apart from that their contacts with Poles and Polish culture were extremely limited. Only those who left the *shtetl* to study at upper secondary school took part in the assimilation process.³⁶ Poles and Jews in Szydłowiec lived in separate worlds which interacted almost only in the sphere of economics and sometimes local politics. There were few personal links of friendship. The interviews and the texts in the *Memorial Book* suggest what their attitudes to each other were. The attitude of Jews towards Poles was often marked by distancing, contempt for uneducated Polish peasants and suspicion. That of Poles towards Jews was also characterised by distancing, but also by social envy and an emotional mix of contempt – for their religion – and admiration – for their competence and their social and economic skills. Both communities tried to prove its own supremacy referring to economic success, religion or political power. The feeling of mutual estrangement is very tangible in both groups' narratives about the past. The question is whether these narratives reflect the reality of the interwar years or if they are post-constructions, created after the experience of the German occupation in the post-war era. The material studied by me does not deliver a clear answer to the question of how it really was, but it shows how it is remembered today by those who lived in the *shtetl*.

Recollections of the Holocaust

The *Szydłowiec Memorial Book* consists mainly of the survivors' stories about their life during the Holocaust. I have no intention of trying to relate these harrowing and dramatic tales, but would just like to summarise the representation of their Polish neighbours in these accounts. During the German occupation and before the deportations in 1942, Poles and Jews in Szydłowiec had intensive economic

contacts. As the Jews had very limited freedom to travel, they relied on local Poles for trade, which was the base of their livelihood. The Poles did indeed take advantage of their monopolistic position as go-betweens, but the relations worked well.

When the order of deportation came, the Poles kept away. The deportations and the executions were carried out by Ukrainian guards and German policemen. After this, the looting of Jewish houses began. When the Germans had collected whatever they considered valuable, the Poles immediately followed and took whatever they could lay their hands on. The survivors tell of many cases when the looters discovered Jews hiding in the houses. Most often they demanded money in exchange for not telling the Germans. Yet it happened that they directly tipped the Germans about the hiding-places.³⁷ The Germans sent Polish firemen and policemen to look for hiding Jews. Mostly these were scrupulous in the carrying out of their duties, unless the Jews they found bribed them. The Germans told the Polish farmers in the neighbourhood that they would get rewards for handing over Jews. There are cases described in the *Szydlowiec Memorial Book* where Jews were handed over in exchange for several pounds of sugar or a bottle of vodka. The fleeing Jews lived in constant fear of betrayal. It happened that they were pointed out by Poles in the street. They had no other choice but to plead with the Poles for protection and hiding-places. A number gave them food and clothing but feared for their own lives and did not let them stay. They did not trust their own neighbours who might tip the police. Many only helped if they were paid well.

Most of the survivors had had the good fortune to meet Poles who either for gain or through compassion were ready to help them. One particularly touching story is that of Bronek Tsingisser, who was rescued together with his brother by a Polish farmer, Jagelo. Jagelo took care of these two Jewish boys, aged ten and six. Later he also gave shelter to their father and seven other Jews. Tsingisser writes: "He did not have the heart to say no to anyone."³⁸ He paid with his life. The Gestapo surrounded the village and found all the Jews except the boys. Jagelo was sent to Auschwitz, but his wife kept the boys and they survived the war.

How do these Jewish recollections relate to those of the Poles

from the same time in Szydlowiec? I expected the people interviewed would try to hide all unpleasant facts which would lay some moral guilt on the inhabitants. I expected them to take up a defensive position from the outset, to pity or glorify themselves. This is the attitude one often encounters in Poland when discussing the behaviour of the Poles during the Holocaust. It is possible that those who completely refused to discuss the past with me or sent me off with some non-committing short answers represented such attitudes. On the other hand, those who willingly talked, mentioned facts and events which to a great extent confirmed the accounts of the survivors. It should also be added that most of those willing to be interviewed were young people between 12 and 16 during the Holocaust. They tell of strong childhood memories and may also use their childhood as their alibi. Adults cannot do this, and those who refused to speak to me belonged to that age group.

The old Szydlowiec inhabitants remember the oppressed atmosphere in the Szydlowiec ghetto and recall with particular horror the second, closed ghetto which was created in part of the town after the first deportation. In that ghetto there was real hunger and terror. As the ghetto was badly guarded, Polish children often went there with food, which they sold or gave away. Mieczyslaw Jarski, who at that time was a boy of 12, tells how he brought a pot of soup. He was to be paid by a Jew and followed him to his lodgings. What he saw there made him sick and scared, with room after room filled with people, up to eleven in each. He just wanted to get out, but got lost in the house and could not find the exit. Suddenly he heard shots in the street and then the sound of an arriving lorry. He imagined that the Germans had come to fetch the Jews and was terrified. He thought he would be pushed onto a lorry with all these human wrecks and be sent to his death. He cried and wandered round in the building until somebody took him outside. He crept away and then ran home as quickly as he could. He never set foot in the ghetto again.

The deportation day, September 23, 1942, is remembered as a day of terror. When people realised in the morning what was happening most of them stayed home, not daring to go outside. They were afraid of being taken for Jews. Some Polish families received a visit from their Jewish neighbours who left their keys and asked them to look

after their houses until their return. The Poles also well remember the looting of Jewish houses. A 75-year-old man, Mateusz Dziura, commented: "People were like Egyptian locusts. They were driven to it by poverty." There were many places in the houses where valuables were hidden "for a rainy day." The Germans did not find them all. Even when the houses were completely in ruins and sold off by the Germans as building material or timber, the buyers hoped to find gold in the walls or the floors. Sometimes they found hiding Jews as well.

Did the Poles inform on the Jews? Most often the answer I received was pretty avoiding: "Some did and others did not." Instead my informants were generally eager to point out that there were also Poles who risked their lives by hiding Jews. One frequently mentioned instance is the Antoniakowie family, who lived in the centre and hid a Jewish child. All were killed by the Germans. Some other names were mentioned, but not many. The explanation I was given was "Well, you know, people kept it secret." Nor did many people tell about it after the war. One could only make conjectures. "When someone received packages from America or from Israel. When somebody's situation suddenly improved. Then people said that they must have hidden Jews during the war" (Włodzimierz Kula, 75 years old). Comments of this kind, however, are not told in an admiring tone of voice, but rather with some envy of the rewards.

"Are those Poles who protected Jews worth particular respect?" I asked quite bluntly, surprised at not finding more appreciation of them.³⁹ "Oh yes, oh yes," my interlocutors assured me. One person, an old woman of 72, added: "The Jews say today that the Poles did it for money, but what is the value of money when you might pay with your life, and besides, how could people otherwise have provided for those they were hiding when they themselves had hardly anything to eat?"

Did the Poles in Szydłowiec do everything they could to assist their Jewish neighbours? I asked a number of people who remembered the war. The most frequent answer was: "The Jews would certainly not have done more for us if they had been in our shoes."

It comes out clearly from the accounts that those Poles who gave shelter to Jews were not only afraid of the Germans but also of other Poles. What drove people to betrayal? Various motives emerge from

the accounts. A common one was greed. Blackmail was not unusual. There is a story of a farmer near Szydłowiec who hid five Jews for payment. When they had no more money, he informed on them. People knew about this since he was then killed by other Jews who came out from the forest and took revenge.

What is striking in these stories is a sense of some moral fairness in getting rich at the expense of Jews. The Jews – even in rags and imploring for help – were still viewed as the rich people whom the Poles had the right to make a profit on. “They had dollars sewn into their overcoats”; “They had pots of gold and valuables buried in their gardens”; “Fancy having collected so much before the war that it lasted them through the war although the Germans took so much from them!”⁴⁰ Some people I talked to seemed to think that it was only right that the Jews had to pay for the assistance they received. It seems that the Poles applied different ethical standards for Jews than for other Poles.

Tipping off was explained by greed, revenge, willingness to please the occupational authorities, but sometimes also hatred or antipathy towards the Jews. The people interviewed mention some town inhabitants who were infamous for pursuing Jews or pointing them out in the street because “they did not want them around any more.” The informants even included teenagers. Danuta Wyka, 14 years old at the time, told how she one day looked out of her window and saw an emaciated Jew who had entered their yard and was drinking water from an old barrel. He must have been very thirsty because the water was green and disgusting. Suddenly she saw that stones were being thrown at him by a gang of small boys who then chased him, shouting “Jew!” The woman ran outside, chased away the children and gave the man some ordinary water. Then he left. The children teased her afterwards. She finished her story with the words “but the Jews were human beings too.” This phrase was recurrent at the end of stories about ordinary human compassion – giving food, clothes or simply mourning somebody. As if there was a need for an explanation for all these acts, the narrators often added that “they were like all other people” or that “they were normal people too.” This need to stress the humanity of the Jews shows that the narrators consider that this is not obvious to one and all.

How did the Polish inhabitants of Szydłowiec react to the two deportations and the killings of those who had lived in their town? The accounts I have collected are not an easy basis for general conclusions. Yet one clear reaction was fear of what the Germans had shown themselves capable of and the idea that next time it might be the turn of the Poles. Another reaction was to take possession of everything the Jews had left behind.

Is there any sadness and mourning in the accounts of the Poles? Sadness sometimes appears in stories of individual Jewish fates. Jan Matyja mourns a Jewish classmate to whom he brought food in the ghetto. Renata Sok has tears in her eyes when she tells how she saw a mother and her small child being killed. Yet the same people are capable of adding comments such as “had the Jews remained in town, we Poles would have been their servants today” or “if they had remained, Poles would have become their dogs,” or even “why should we want the Jews here? What good have they done us?” It is thus not unusual to mourn individual Jews but it seems that the Jews as a group are not mourned at all.

“Should something be done to commemorate the Szydłowiec Jews?” I asked sixteen of the old representatives of “the bushes” who had agreed to the interview. Half of them were negative to this idea. The other half said yes, but could not come up with any suggestions as to how it should be done. Thus their positive answer was not very convincing. It seems that for a majority of the “bushes,” the Jewish past of the town is “nothing to commemorate.”

Negotiating Memory – Post-War Generations

The “field observations,” interviews and surveys I carried out point to a gap between pre-war and post-war generations and between “bushes” and “birds” when it comes to the town’s Jewish past. Those who moved to the town after the war and those born and raised there in the same era generally only know that there were Jews living in Szydłowiec and that they were deported to death camps. They do not have a clear idea of their number and that the town was a shtetl. They have no idea at all of the fact that the murder of Jews also took place in the town. The only Jewish historical landmark they know in the town is the Jewish cemetery, but they know nothing about the mass

graves in this place and very few have ever seen the monument to the killed built there. It is obvious that neither local schools nor families have taken part in the transmission of this memory.

Should more be done to commemorate the Szydlowiec Jews? With this question I turned to the younger inhabitants of Szydlowiec. I put the question in a short survey which I then followed up by conversations with the group that had responded. In the group of twenty people aged 30–50 there were seven who considered that more should be done. They also expressed their disappointment that a large chunk of their town's history had for so long been kept from them. Four of them were not sure, but in the course of the conversation said that in the end they too were positive. Nine of them, i.e. one third, said no. They were not particularly willing to explain. "Well, we do not really know anything about it and how things really were," they said, "How do we know that it is worth commemorating?"

"Even if you feel that you don't know enough," a person from the "yes"-camp answered, "is it not still important to show respect and sorrow for so many people from your town whose lives ended tragically?" A series of comments followed: "How do we know that they were worth mourning?"; "Why should we pity the Jews? They don't pity the Palestinians!"; "Is it not enough that the Jews mourn the Jews? If the Jews want to do something in Szydlowiec, erect monuments or something, we're not going to prevent them, but what business is it of ours?" The voices of this group echoed to some extent a distrustful attitude towards Jews and the views expressed by the media in Communist Poland.

The second group which I confronted with the same question consisted of a hundred pupils from the upper secondary school in Szydlowiec. More than half of them (56) gave a definitive "yes." Their motivations were for instance: "It is about time that we learned more about the Szydlowiec Jews and the Holocaust"; "We have to learn much more. I once heard that Szydlowiec was for a long time called Palestine and I had no idea why. I'm ashamed of my ignorance"; "Of course we should commemorate them. They lived in Szydlowiec and during the war they suffered much more than other inhabitants." Ever so often the familiar phrases were heard: "They were human beings too!"; "They too were ordinary people."

Eleven out of the hundred did not answer the question, while thirty answered “no.” The latter did not want to discuss the matter, perhaps because the whole group was too large and the “yes”-camp too vociferous. Somebody just shouted: “Why should you keep going on and on about the past? Are not the memorials in town already enough?” However, in the survey on paper there were also other arguments for the “no” answer: “Before the war the Jews oppressed the Poles in Szydłowiec. Therefore they are not worthy of commemoration.”; “Why return to unpleasant memories?”; “I don’t know why but I don’t like Jews – but I’m no antisemite.”; “I am no racist but there were too many Jews in Szydłowiec. I don’t like them.”

The third and last group to whom I put the same question were 60 schoolchildren aged 11–13. Half of them had taken part in the educational project “To save from oblivion” described earlier. Therefore I questioned them separately. I expected a difference between the groups, which turned out to be quite striking. Among the children who had not taken part in the project, eleven out of thirty considered that people should learn more about the Jews in Szydłowiec and do more in order to remember them. Nine had no opinion while ten answered no. The reasons given for that were brief: “No – Jews do not belong in Poland.”; “No. I don’t like Jews.”; “No, there is nobody here who likes Jews.”

In the group that had participated in the educational project there was only one out of thirty who answered no and refused to motivate this answer. Two pupils left a blank while twenty-seven gave a clear “yes.” Many expressed the will to learn more. This was also the group that was best acquainted with the Jewish history of the town.

I make no pretence to considering these surveys representative. However, they point to some interesting phenomena. First, the survey shows that the oldest generation have transmitted to the younger a considerable amount of negative ideas about Jews, prejudice and even antisemitism, without actually transmitting any information about the past. The comment I have quoted, such as “I don’t know why, but I don’t like Jews”, is telling. One can adopt an attitude of antipathy when one’s nearest – parents or grandparents – clearly show that they dislike something or someone. They do not need to explain.

Gestures, the tone of voice, and short casual remarks are enough. The parents' phobias become those of their children. Thus, antisemitic stereotypes can go on living in a society without Jews. In fact, they can remain strong partially because their bearers cannot confront their prejudice with reality via personal contact with Jews.

The survey also shows that it is meaningful to try to work with phobias. The results in the group of children who had participated in the educational project are almost too good for any far-reaching conclusions. Still, they show that education which not only includes information but also feelings and ways of expressing them can be a way of fighting against prejudice. Perhaps there are no other ways.

The results of the survey also point to the fact that there is a budding conflict about how the town's memory is to be shaped, and this conflict is probably connected with the division into "bushes" and "birds." Many "birds" want to know more about the past that was withheld from them. It was they who in the 1980s began to discover the Jewish past of the town, after it had been brought to their attention by outsiders: visitors from Warsaw or from Israel. It was also a "bird" from Silesia, the teacher Slawa Hanusz, who started the educational project "To save from oblivion" and worked eagerly with her pupils, teaching them the Jewish past of their town. It is obvious that the "birds" received assistance in the 1990s from governmental and non-governmental institutions, which in democratic Poland took up the work on Jewish memories. However, if the "bushes" had been asked, these institutional initiatives would have been met by resistance or indifference.

The conflict about if and how to remember the Jewish past was also expressed in the local paper, *Głos Szydłowiecki*, a non-profit paper, published by representatives of the town's intelligentsia with financial support from local authorities and businesses. In the 1990s this paper became a forum which from time to time returned to the Jewish issue and "negotiated" the memory. A number of articles invited the inhabitants to preserve the memories of Jews and those sites and memorials which belonged to the Jewish part of the town. Both ethical and commercial arguments were put forward. If the Poles do not wish that their cemeteries and their history in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania should be forgotten, they must understand that they

have a moral duty to remember those who once lived in Poland and contributed to its development, it was claimed in an issue from 1997. It was also argued that it was important to remember that Poland had been a multiethnic country, and thus teach the young generations to be tolerant and open-minded towards other cultures.⁴¹ Just as often, commercial arguments were put forward, as if the writers doubted that the moral arguments were enough to convince the public. They wrote that Jewish memorials could attract both domestic and foreign tourists to Szydłowiec.⁴² The idea of establishing a museum of the town's history in Ejzenberg's synagogue was discussed. By giving considerable space to Jewish history, it was hoped that Jewish foundations would contribute to it.⁴³

In contrast to these articles inviting people to commemorate the Jewish past, there were articles alluding to an antagonistic past which people did not want to remember. In the article "The Jewish community in the nineteenth and twentieth century," the anonymous author wrote about the Jews: "They did not play a proud part in the history of Szydłowiec. During the January uprising [in 1863 against the Russians – BTP:s comment] they were traitors. A Jew from Jas-trzab warned the Russian garrison that the Polish troops were about to attack."⁴⁴ The article conveyed a clearly negative picture of the part played by the Jews in the town's history. A number of other articles stressed the economic conflict between Jews and Poles before the war.⁴⁵ One of them, with the significant title "Who in Szydłowiec is afraid of Jews?" and written under the pseudonym Szymon Haber, was especially outspoken and articulated ideas that I could recognise from the interviews with the "bushes." Haber described pre-war Szydłowiec as the scene of cut-throat competition between Poles and Jews:

The meagre earth was not able to feed both peoples. The most cunning and the most ruthless would win, often it was a Jew. The war put an end to this. It killed off one group and let the other develop [...]. These praised God for the generous gifts in the form of possessions that had lost their owners, and they considered that justice had been done in the relations between Poles and Jews'.⁴⁶

Haber went on to remind his readers that the few surviving Szydłowiec Jews were frightened away from the town. He gave examples of both Poles and Jews who had looked for “Jewish gold” hidden in old houses and gardens. He described a number of cases when Jews came to visit their hometown – or that of their parents – and was met with hostile words such as “There is nothing for you here. Go back to Palestine.” The fear that the Jews will claim their property back still lingers, the author concluded. The existence of this fear was confirmed by the reaction of the “bushes” to the scholarly conference about the Szydłowiec Jews, organised by local authorities in 1996. There were so many upset and worried voices that the mayor felt he had to comment upon this in an article in *Głos Szydłowiecki*. The article implies that the conference was interpreted as a sign that “the Jews are on their way back and they will recover their houses.”⁴⁷ The mayor had to assure the inhabitants that their right of ownership of the former Jewish houses was not in danger.

Thus after the years of silence and oblivion of the town’s Jewish past, there are negotiations going on today concerning if and how to remember the Jews and the Holocaust in Szydłowiec. What is strikingly clear is that Jews themselves, survivors and their descendents who visit Szydłowiec, are not involved in these negotiations.⁴⁸ Polish and Jewish memory cultures follow their own paths.

Behind the Processes of Remembering and Forgetting
What are the forces driving those who want to remember? Why do others want to forget? “The motives of memory are never pure,” Young writes.⁴⁹ The material I have presented here might lead to some preliminary conclusions about such motives. Some Szydłowiec inhabitants who were born after the war, especially the children of “the birds,” noticed that it was people from outside who had told them that they came from a former shtetl. To be given an identity which is completely unfamiliar gives an unpleasant feeling of amnesia. One must remember in order to understand where one comes from and who one is. This existential need to find orientation, security and identity lies behind the wish of many of the younger inhabitants of Szydłowiec to familiarise themselves with the Jewish history of their town, a phenomenon not unusual in the former *shtetls*

in contemporary Poland. The younger generations do not have any personal memories of the war. They want to remember in order to understand themselves better through their local roots, and because their curiosity about the Jewish past is stimulated by different initiatives reflecting the growing interest for the Jewish-Polish history among Polish elites.

Among the people who have become involved in the process of remembrance, some have other goals. The teacher who was the instigator of the project "To save from oblivion" and her assistants had pedagogical and educational objectives. They hope that the memory of the Jews and the Holocaust in the town may make the children more open-minded towards other cultures, teach them tolerance and help them to understand Poland's multiethnic past. It is about teaching history in order to influence opinions and attitudes; informing younger generations about the past in the hope that this will create a better future.

There are also those in the town who want to remember because they have realised that Jewish memorabilia have a commercial value and can attract tourists. These people made even some "bushes" take out long-hidden Jewish objects and try to sell them.⁵⁰ Finally, there are those who want to remember for political reasons, since the state powers from the mid-1990s onwards have sent out signals that it is politically correct. Thus, it may promote one's political career.

Nobody in Szydłowiec motivated the need for remembering as an act of moral expiation for the lack of solidarity with Jews during the Holocaust. Perhaps it is too early for that. The young people still know too little about the events in the town during the Holocaust, and the "bushes" do not want them to know.

What was the reason behind this long collective oblivion of the Jewish inhabitants of Szydłowiec? In my view, an explanation is to be found in a number of social, psychological and political factors that are intertwined with a legacy of antisemitism.

The negative attitudes towards the Jews were recurrent in several interviews and surveys I conducted in the town. In both Polish and Jewish narratives, the pre-war *shtetl* emerges as a place for deep social, cultural and national divisions and ethnic competition for scarce economic resources. The image of Poles and Jews in pre-war Szyd-

lowiec confirms a claim made by the researcher Rosa Lehmann that the relations between Jews and Poles in *shtetls* in pre-war Poland were characterised by a patron-client relationship⁵¹. Lehmann argues that the Jews, who with the collapse of feudalism had lost their traditional role in Poland as brokers between the landlords and the serfs,⁵² in the new economy of growing capitalism gained a new role as patrons providing access to resources like jobs and funds for their peasant clients. This was possible because in the poorly urbanised Polish lands, the Jews constituted a core of the urban population, specialising in trade and crafts. Usually, they were also better educated than Polish peasants. My interviews with the inhabitants of Szydlowiec show that economic dependency on Jewish patrons entailed social envy among Polish clients, especially poor peasants looking for work or loans in difficult times, and among the competitors – Polish lower middle-class who aspired to build up their own small businesses. The Jews as a group were viewed as rivals and economic oppressors. The superiority of Jewish competitors was not accepted in the same way as that of Polish ones since the Jews, because of the existing strong religious and ethnic boundaries upheld by both communities, were defined as “the others”. They were seen as strangers, who according to the informants “were not to rule us Poles in our own country”. This quotation echoes the nationalistic rhetoric of pre-war Poland and reflects the national dimension of the conflict. In the 1930s the majority of Poles adopted a definition of the Polish nation propagated by the National-Democratic party, viz. an ethnic community with its language and Catholic religion as main identity markers. In this way the Jews were by definition excluded from the national community. The National-Democratic propaganda soon reached the inhabitants of the *shtetl*. In a situation with a genuinely felt economic imbalance this propaganda, representing the Jews as the great economic rivals of Poles fell on fertile ground. The Poles as a nation forming a state were urged to recover their “rightful” place in the economy of the country. This discourse led to a significantly increased antisemitism. The exclusion of the Jews from the Polish national community meant that the solidarity and moral standards which applied to the Polish ethnic group did not apply to them. This became obvious when the Germans occupied Poland and set in their extermination policies against

the Jews. This is confirmed in the accounts of both Poles and Jews. Blackmail, betrayals, looting and various attacks were not rare.

In Poland, where attempts to hide Jews were punishable by death, people were put to a severe test. In regard to the antisemitism and estrangement between Poles and Jews before the war, it is perhaps not surprising that the Poles failed. More than 90 per cent of the Jews in Poland were killed during the Second World War. Perhaps more would have been rescued if assisting Jews had had the same social support as other forms of resistance, also punishable by death; for instance assisting the guerrillas or military sabotage. This issue of antisemitism and its connection with the consequences of the Holocaust is extremely delicate and has been taboo for a long time. The Poles suffered considerably during the war, and they have always seen themselves as victims. By focusing on their own hardships, they pushed away the issue of their own possible responsibility. This was an effective psychological operation.⁵³ My conversations with the old Szydlowiec inhabitants show that these people do not feel the slightest responsibility for what happened to their Jewish neighbours. Their fate was only the work of German Nazis, and to say anything else is felt as extremely offensive and upsetting. Perhaps this is the reason why they do not want to tell their children about the days of the Holocaust in Szydlowiec. Nobody wants to brag about looting and betrayal. There may be various forms of psychological repression behind the reluctance to transmit these memories.

The reasons for oblivion should also be sought in the social consequences of the Holocaust in Szydlowiec and other Polish shtetls. The Jews' fate during the Second World War turned out economically advantageous for large groups of Poles living in the shtetl and its neighbourhood. As soon as the Jews were gone, they were ready to take over their shops and tiny businesses, they moved into the empty Jewish houses, and laid their hands on those Jewish possessions which the Germans had left behind. The Holocaust was a non-negligible factor in the social and demographic transformation in Poland during and just after the war. About three million Jews disappeared and millions of poor Poles moved from suburbs and villages to the Jewish centres of towns, especially small towns. Perhaps the scale of the post-war silence about the Jews and the Holocaust is proportional to the

scale of participation in the lootings? The fact that those who took the place of the Jews did not want to tell their children and grandchildren about what had occurred would suggest that the memories led to a kind of guilt and moral discomfort. Instead of narratives about life in the shtetl, children got an unclear antisemitic image of clever Jews who never liked Poles and always cheated them. Antisemitism helped in fighting possible feelings of guilt. The belief that "Jews have always been the oppressors and enemies of Poles" helped to interpret the events as historical justice. It alleviated remorse and could be used to morally legitimise, for oneself and for others, the right to the acquired Jewish property. In this way, the taking over of Jewish possessions by Poles created a breeding ground for a kind of secondary antisemitism; an antisemitism without Jews.

The new inhabitants of the Jewish houses gradually legalised their ownership. Mostly, they purchased the houses at a low price via somebody acting for distant relatives of the deceased, people living abroad, or purchased it from the state as an abandoned property. In other cases people received the right to ownership after a lengthy occupation.⁵⁴ However, these owners worry that what was taken in this way might one day be taken from them. This is expressed in their nervousness when Jewish visitors turn up in the town, and also in the unwillingness to talk about Jews at all. Several owners of the Jewish houses in Szydłowiec refused to talk to me and the few who agreed started the conversation with the words "You know that I have a contract of sale for this house," without my having even asked. Some of the old Szydłowiec inhabitants fear the Jews – fear that they will return to take back what belonged to them. This fear does not help memory work; quite the contrary. People want to forget the cause of this fear.

Antisemitism connected to a series of psychological and social factors might explain why memories have not been transmitted from one generation to another. Still, this will to forget on grassroots level might have been neutralised had there been a political will and institutions trying to work through the memories and the legacy of antisemitism. Institutions and organisations can create foras where the meaning of the past can be negotiated. They may also socialise new generations into a system of memory with defined narratives and

meanings. The modern state is perhaps the most powerful institution in the workshop of collective memory. The Communist state with its monopoly of political power and its tight control on society was particularly active in the construction of collective memory. However, the Communist regime that ruled Poland in the years 1945–1989 was neither able – because of the lack of legitimacy – nor willing to deal with the sensitive memories of the Polish-Jewish past. Instead, it did not hesitate to use antisemitism as a political weapon. During the first post-war years the regime launched a campaign against antisemitism. Yet the problem was that accusations of antisemitism were used without distinction in order to discredit, in the eyes of the West, the anti-Communist opposition enjoying considerable support in society. At the same time, the Communists' condemnation of antisemitism was welcomed by the remaining Jews in Poland. Many Jews afraid of antisemitism in Polish society based their hopes for the future in Poland on the promises made by the regime about an equal society free of discrimination. However, in Poland, where the stereotype of Jewish Communism has prevailed since the 1920s,⁵⁵ the slightest support given by Jews to the regime nourished antisemitism.

This is illustrated by the situation in Szydłowiec. When the Red Army chased the Germans from the town on January 16, 1945 and began setting up new authorities, Abram Finkler, the leader of a small Jewish guerrilla unit and formerly a teacher of religion in the town, was named head of the local police. One of the tasks of the police was to fight the Polish guerrilla units that were in opposition to the Communist rulers. The local Poles were upset about it and the few Jews who had returned to Szydłowiec were viewed as the favourites of the new regime.⁵⁶ The assistance they received from the regional authorities and Jewish organisations was interpreted as privileges. This contributed to the hostile atmosphere that made the Jews leave the town.

During the popular protests against the regime in 1956, voices were heard accusing “the Jews in the government” of the “anti-Polish policy” of the regime, and of Stalinist crimes. These voices were hushed up, but the crack within the governing elite was revealed. Some of the party members were clearly ready to use Jews as scapegoats and wriggle out of their own responsibility. Thus the situation of the Jews

in Poland in the years 1956–1968 was vulnerable. This development is reflected by events in Szydlowiec. It is certainly no coincidence that the decisions first to limit the Jewish cemetery and then, in 1957, to close it, came after the position of the Communists of Jewish origin had become weakened within the Polish Communist Party. However, when the monument to the victims of the Holocaust was erected in 1967, there were still people in power who cared about that memory. A year later, following the antisemitic campaign launched in order to settle accounts within the Communist Party, those people were gone. March 1968 saw the implementation of the scenario left over from 1956; the Israeli-Arab conflict and student riots at universities around the country provided a suitable pretext for Communists of Jewish origin to be accused of Zionism, expelled from the party, harassed and more or less forced to emigrate. The so-called “Jews in government” were pointed out as responsible for the mistakes and crimes of the regime. Afterwards, the subject of antisemitism and Jews generally became taboo for many years. Jewish memorials, including those in Szydlowiec, were ignored.

However, in the mid-1970s, a democratic underground opposition emerged. Its activists and supporters took up the issue of Jewish-Polish relations and condemned antisemitism. The younger Poles, especially those from intelligentsia circles, became interested in the history of Polish Jewry, the history that had for so long been withheld from them. This interest grew even more after the emergence of the democratic mass movement Solidarity in 1980 and actually continued in spite of the martial law introduced in 1981. The leaders of the democratic opposition considered that tackling the legacy of antisemitism was very important for the moral renewal of the whole society, which was part of the Solidarity programme. It should also be added that the Catholic intelligentsia grouped around the review *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and even the Polish-born Pope John Paul II, were particularly committed to this process. This was a fact of great importance in Catholic Poland.⁵⁷

In the 1980s the Communist regime tacitly accepted the steadily growing interest for Jewish history. Apparently, it did not want to confront the opposition on this point as well. Again, this also influenced the situation in Szydlowiec. In the 1980s the Jewish cemetery

was “discovered” by intellectuals from Warsaw. This interest made the town authorities view the cemetery as a site deserving maintenance. In 1987–1989 the inventory of the graves was completed and the most urgent repairs carried out. After the fall of Communism in 1989, the memory work received support from the new political elite. The local authorities in Szydłowiec received signals from above that it was about time local communities started caring for the Jewish part of their past. Individuals keen on Jewish memorials, such as the history teacher in Szydłowiec, could now count on some help in their work. The process of negotiations on the forms of memory of the Jews took its beginning in the local community.

My own investigation of the memory of the Jews in Szydłowiec became a part of this process. While I was trying to get a grip on local memory by interviewing people and asking questions, I influenced the ongoing work on memory. Not necessarily deliberately, I sat in the discussions and made people think about matters that they previously did not bother about. In the workshop of memory my study got its own dynamic. Thus this paper contains an analysis of the memory of Jews and their destruction in the former shtetl, but at the same time, through the person of the researcher and the method used, it participates in the gradual transformation of this memory. The changes mean a chance for Szydłowiec to become not only a *lieu d'histoire* but also a *lieu de mémoire*, in Pierre Nora's understanding of this concept – a place with an intent to remember.

Translation: Margareta Faust, Ph.D.

Notes

1. For an analysis of the Jadwabne debate in Poland, see for example Antony Polonsky & Joanna B. Michlic (eds.), *The Neighbors Respond. The Controversy Over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2004, and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, “The Jedwabne Killings – A Challenge for Polish Collective Memory,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 141–176.
2. Michael C. Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead. Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust*, New York: Syracuse University Press 1997, p. 141.
3. The books which come closest to this theme and should be mentioned are Ewa Hoffman's literary and historical account *Shtetl: The Life and Death of a Small Town and the World of Polish Jews*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1997, and a social anthropological

- study by Rosa Lehmann, *Symbiosis and Ambivalence. Poles and Jews in a Small Galician Town*, New York: Berghahn Books 2001.
4. See APR (Archiwum Państwowe w Radomiu), Protokół z konferencji Komitetów Żydowskich województwa kieleckiego, May 14, 1945, Okręgowy Komitet Żydowski, sygn. 2.
 5. AP Kielce (Archiwum Państwowe w Kielcach), UWK II, sygn. 1389, k. 69, sygn. 1340, k. 103, sygn. 1341, k. 91.
 6. The interviews that I have used for my analyses would have been very difficult to carry out for a total outsider because of the considerable suspicion on behalf of the town inhabitants.
 7. Many ethnologists and social anthropologists argue for this view. See, for example, Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, "Discipline and Proactice: The 'Field' as Site, Method and Location in Anthropology," in Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson (eds.), *Anthropological Locations. Boundaries and Ground of a Field Science*, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1997.
 8. For a discussion about this, see for example Robert Aunger, "On Ethnography: Storytelling or Science?," *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 36, No 1, 1999, pp. 97–114, and James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and Art*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1988.
 9. These kinds of activities are also seen as crucial by John Eidson, "From Avoidance to Engagement? Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past in German Home Town," in Frances Pine, Deema Kanefff & Haldis Haukanes (eds.), *Memory, Politics and Religion: The Past Meets the Present in Europe*, Münster: Lit-Verlag 2004.
 10. A much more detailed analysis of these activities is to be published in Martin Davies & Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), *How the Holocaust Looks Now: International Perspectives*, London: Palgrave MacMillan.
 11. For a more comprehensive discussion of the concept of iconosphere, see Ella Chmielewska, "Logos or the Resonance of Branding. A Close Reading of the *Iconosphere* of Warsaw," *Space and Culture*, Vol. 8, No 4, November 2005. Cf. Mieczysław Porebski, *Ikonosfera*, Warsaw: PWN 1972.
 12. This came up in the conversations with people who had grown up there.
 13. James E. Young, *At Memory's Edge. After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture*, New Haven & London: Columbia University Press 2000, p. 70. Cf. Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory. The Construction of the French Past. Volume I: Conflicts and Divisions*, New York: Columbia University Press 1996, p. 15.
 14. See the following documents in the archives: APR PPRN (Przewodniczący Powiatowej Rady Narodowej) sygn. 130: APR MRN, sygn. 61.
 15. APR PRN sygn 316.
 16. APR MRN, sygn. 32.
 17. APR, PPRN, Vol. 787.
 18. A view expressed by a 50-year-old man in one of the group interviews conducted in 2003.
 19. James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1993, p. 5.
 20. Interviews with older and younger teachers: Hanusz, Waszczyk, Klepaczevska.
 21. Here I would like to mention the articles by a professional historian, Krzysztof Dumala, "Z dziejów Szydłowca na schyłku XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII w.,"

Zeszyty Historyczne Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1963, t.3; Krzysztof Dumala, "Studia z dziejow Szydłowca," *Rocznik Muzeum Świątokrzyskiego*, 1967 v. 4, and the works by the semi-professional historians Tomasz Palacz, *Ziemia Szydłowiecka w historii i kulturze kielecczyny*, Szydłowiec 1971, and Danuta Paprocka, *Szydłowiec*, Cracow: KAW 1983.

22. These are two of several rhetorical stances that could be applied in historical writings in general. See John Eidson 2004, op. cit. p. 70.
23. The Batory Foundation is a Polish branch of the large Soros Foundation aimed at supporting the development of democracy in the whole of Eastern Europe.
24. James E. Young 2000, p.11.
25. In some conversations I understood that the Jedwabne affair made older people suspicious of scholars coming from abroad and "looking for scandals that cause damage to Poland."
26. However, this put me in ethically difficult situations in cases when I felt that people expected a mutual understanding while they expressed antisemitic prejudices.
27. Within ethnology and anthropology there is a considerable methodological and theoretical literature analysing interviews as sources, and historians engaged in oral history have still much to learn from these disciplines. See for example David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods in Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications 1995.
28. *Memorial Books* are specific Jewish forms of remembrance for the Jewish communities that disappeared during the Holocaust. They contain accounts of the survivors' memories of life before, during and directly after the Holocaust. There are many *Memorial Books* of those *shtetls* in Poland that have disappeared.
29. Motl Eisenberg, *Szydłowiec Memorial Book*, New York 1989, p. 36.
30. On the basis of the size of the tax paid by individual Jews to the Jewish community the historian Regina Renz concludes that 81.7 per cent of the Szydłowiec Jews may be described as poor, 14.2 per cent as middle-class and 4.1 per cent rich. See Regina Renz, "Życie codzienne Żydów w Szydłowcu w latach 1918–1939," in Jacek Wijaczka (ed.), *Żydzi Szydłowieccy*, Kielce: Takt 1997, p. 100.
31. *Szydłowiec Memorial Book*, New York 1989, p. 30.
32. *ibid.*, p. 80.
33. *ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
34. *ibid.*, p. 89.
35. Until 1935 the Jews constituted a slight majority in the town council, which dropped to under 50 per cent thereafter. The positions of the Mayor and vice-Mayor were always occupied by Poles. See Marek Przeniosło, "Aktywność polityczna Żydów w Szydłowcu w latach 1918–1939," in Jacek Wijaczka (ed.) *Żydzi Szydłowieccy*, Kielce: Takt 1997.
36. Regina Renz, p. 103.
37. There were particularly a few young men under the leadership of the Plaskota brothers who were well-known for their ruthlessness towards the Jews. One of the brothers was later executed by Polish guerillas. Information from an interview with Mieczysław Jarski (72 years old), conducted in 2002.
38. *ibid.*, p. 303.
39. The question was posed to several people at the same time, in a group interview with 12 women aged from 30 to 80, conducted in 2002.

40. Quotations from the interview with Włodzimierz Kula (75 years old), but this kind of statements also appeared in essays, written by schoolchildren on the basis of the conversations with their grandparents.
41. "Bóg może wszystko – pilnuj swojej pamięci," *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 27, 1997.
42. Stefan Wesolowski, "Dla mieszkańców i turystów," *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 9, 1998.
43. Parszewski Kazimierz, "Spieszmy się kochać ludzi," *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 7, 1998.
44. *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 23, 1996. I also heard this story several times in my interviews.
45. E.g. *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 3, 1990.
46. Szymon Haber, "Kto się w Szydłowcu boi Żydów," *Głos Szydłowiecki*, No 23, 1996.
47. W. Kurzepa, "Żydzi wracają?," *Głos Szydłowiecki*, April 1997.
48. However, they can function as points of reference in arguments that I heard for better care of the Jewish cemetery such as: "Neglect disgraces us in the eyes of the Jewish visitors."
49. James E. Young 1993, p. 2.
50. Information from the local paper, I. Kozakiewicz, "Ballada o sąsiadach," *Magazyn*, No 2234/R, 2002.
51. Rosa Lehmann 2001, pp. 169–170.
52. For an analysis of this role see Murray Jay Rosman, *The Lord's Jews: Magnate-Jewish Relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the 18th Century*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1990.
53. On the psychological effects of the Holocaust on the Poles, see also Ewa Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge. Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust*, New York: Vintage Press 2004, pp. 134–147.
54. Grzegorz Miernik, "Losy Żydów i nieruchomości żydowskich w Szydłowcu po II wojnie światowej" ("The fate of Jews and former Jewish real estate in Szydłowiec after World War II"), in Jacek Wijaczka (ed.), *Żydzi Szydłowieccy*, Kielce: Takt 1997.
55. The stereotype spread by the *Endecja* party was reinforced during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920–1921. The small Polish Communist party then supported the union of Poland with Soviet Russia. Communists of Jewish origin were visible among the party leaders.
56. Two of my informants, who lived in the town at this time, reported about these feelings.
57. The first public debate about the Poles' attitudes to the Jews during the Holocaust took place in 1987 when *Tygodnik Powszechny* published the now well-known article in by Jan Blonski, "Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto" ("Poor Poles watching the ghetto.")

KRISTIAN GERNER

Hungary, Romania, the Holocaust and Historical Culture

Representations of the past in the public sphere are a constitutive part of politically recognised collective memory. This is an expression of a nation's historical culture. The concept ranges from scholarly works to monuments, novels and films, to "sites of memory" in Pierre Nora's sense.¹ An important part of historical culture is public debate and political discussion. It is impossible to record all instances of public attention to, or commemoration of, historical events and personalities in a certain country in a certain period. However, what can be gauged and discussed is the prominence or absence of, in our case, Jewish history in general and the Holocaust in particular in the public sphere in Hungary and Romania. These two countries are treated together here for the reason that they are neighbouring states that in many respects have a common, or intertwined, twentieth-century history² – Transylvania is regarded by nationalists in both countries as the "cradle" of the respective nation – but also are significantly different concerning the position and importance of their respective Jewish population in nation-building and modernisation. The Jewish dimension was absolutely central in the modernisation of Hungary between 1867 and 1914, the historical period that preceded the epoch of the Holocaust.³ Jewish people were certainly an important category in the formation of the Romanian state in the period from the Paris Peace at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 to the peace of Trianon in 1920. But they did not play a paramount role.

The Polish scholar Antonina Kloskowska has suggested the concept of "bivalence" to denote "non-conflicting interlinking of elements selected from two cultures, possessed, approximately, in the same degree and accepted as close to one's value system."⁴ Kloskows-

ka refers to two ethnic – confessional or linguistic – categories in a state and an (any) individual's ability to identify with both. Is it possible for a historical culture in a state to be bivalent in the sense that it incorporates narrations and sites of memory of two ethnic categories?

The place of the Holocaust in the historical culture of Hungary and Romania is the result of a blend of historical facts and their interpretation in different times. It is obvious not only that the Holocaust became a concept in these countries as a consequence of the international trend to pay attention to the annihilation of European Jewry – in 2005 Tony Judt remarked that “[b]y the end of the twentieth century the centrality of the Holocaust in Western European identity and memory seemed secure”⁵ – but also that the Holocaust entered the realm of historical culture in Hungary and Romania as an effect of the demise of the communist regimes in 1989–1990.

Collective memory and historical culture are generally “national” or even “ethnic.” As a consequence of the course of European history during the last two millennia, many European Jews can be considered to belong both to a “national” and to a “Jewish” historical culture and be defined as historically culturally bivalent.⁶ Many Jews in Central Europe believed that they were both “nationals” (Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and so on) and “Jews” and thus having both a “national” and a Jewish history – the latter closely related to the Jewish creed. However, members of the “host” population usually did not accept the national identification of Jewish people as German, Hungarian and Romanian. In the interwar period, the Nazis as well as politicians and intellectuals in Hungary and Romania formulated a “Jewish question.” This was a means to exclude “the Jews” not only from political life and the economy but from the respective “national” culture and history as well. This observation points to a fundamental aspect of the Holocaust. It amounted to an amputation of a vital part of those national cultures to which the Jews belonged. In 2003, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer proclaimed that the Holocaust was a self-destruction of the German culture (*eine Selbsterstörung deutscher Kultur*).⁷

It is reasonable to regard the Holocaust as an extreme consequence of antisemitism and also as a consequence of the new international

order that was established in Europe through the Paris peace treaties in 1919–1920. That is, European antisemitism was a necessary but not a sufficient condition behind the Holocaust. The sufficient conditions were the internal political developments in a number of states in Europe after 1920, primarily in Germany, but also, and this is relevant here, in Hungary and Romania. In both Germany and Hungary, across the political spectrum there was great discontent with the “dismembering” of the respective state through the Versailles and Trianon treaties. In Romania, which had increased its territory at the cost of Russia, Austria and Hungary, a great number of the Jews lived in the new territories and thus were not regarded as truly “Romanian.” In both Germany and Hungary, “the Jews” were held responsible for the harsh treatment that the victors meted out to the defeated powers. In both these states, Jewish integration, which was close to becoming assimilation with the titular nations of the respective country before the First World War, was halted and even reversed in the 1930s. In Romania, Jews became outcasts as well.

Intensified antisemitism was not the only consequence of the breakdown of the old European order in the First World War. Social upheaval and the emergence of communist movements was another consequence. These movements were defeated in both Germany and Hungary, but communism was successful in Russia. The Russian Bolsheviks made their coup in 1917 and in 1920 they stood as victors in the diminished successor state to tsarist Russia. In the communist movements, “Jews” were prominent actors, not only in Russia but also in Germany and Hungary and in the other states of Central and South East Europe. In both Hungary and Romania in the interwar period, Jews were prominent in the free professions in general and especially in medicine, science, the arts, the economy and engineering. There were also hundreds of thousands of poor Jews in both states.

As a consequence of the Holocaust and Jewish emigration after 1945, the Jewish element lost both its societal role and visibility as a special category in Hungary and Romania. Moreover, the Jewish history dimension of these states was not acknowledged in historical research and education during the communist era.⁸ Although Jewish historical museums were established in both Bucharest and Budapest, Jewish history was treated as the separate history of an insignifi-

cant, alien minority, if it was mentioned at all. When touched upon, the Holocaust was regarded as Jewish history only and not as part of the history of Romania and Hungary.

Not only in Hungary and Romania, but also in Christian society as such there is a long tradition of viewing Jews as “the Other,” as aliens. As a consequence of the Jewish emancipation in the nineteenth century, enterprising Jews became prominent in banking, the construction industry, the building of department stores, banks, villas and whole neighbourhoods in many Central European big cities such as Budapest and Nagyváros (Oradea) in Transylvania. Jewish individuals also became prominent in the new entertainment, advertisement and film businesses, which developed in the early twentieth century.⁹ Even when individual Jews and whole families felt that they were assimilated, by many others they were perceived and defined as “Jews.”

Religion, language and “race” are social categories. In practice, they are often amalgamated in the concept of culture. We speak of a German culture, a Romanian culture, a Hungarian culture, and so on, referring to both language and Christian confession. In the literature as well as in people’s imagination, Jewish culture is often subdivided into different “national” Jewish cultures, Jewish–Hungarian, Jewish–Romanian and so on. In contrast to the concept of “culture,” which has a very prominent place in the German language and society and has acquired a strong ethnic connotation, the notion of civic society, which was established as a result of the French revolution, implies that an individual can both be a citizen and belong to more than one “culture.” It is not a coincidence that the “civilisation” concept ideally lacks any ethnic connotation. However, in practice also French “civilisation” is closely linked not only to the French language but also to “Gallic” ethnicity. In certain circumstances, such as at the time of the Dreyfus process in the 1890s and in the interwar period, French civilisation has also been defined in ethnic terms, with a rather strong emphasis on Catholicism. The German tradition of ethnic “culture” has been strong in both Hungary and Romania, overriding the French notion of the civic state. This was certainly so in the period 1920–1945 and also in the following decades, quite openly in Romania and somewhat subdued in Hungary.

In the German and Hungarian cases, there is a certain tension between Catholic and Protestant traditions. In these societies, language and “race,” not confession, have been the unifying concepts. Jewish integration and assimilation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a matter of Jews acquiring civic rights and using German and Hungarian as their secular language rather than Yiddish. In the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910, “Jews” were not a nationality but only a religious community – Mosaic – comparable to the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Reformist. In the periphery of Hungary, in Carpatho-Ruthenia and parts of Transylvania, there was a fairly large Jewish population of the traditional East European variety that was not assimilated but stood out as a distinct social category. The same was true for the Austrian province of Bukovina and the Russian province Bessarabia, both of which – with Transylvania – became parts of the enlarged Romanian state after 1920.

The history of the Jews in Hungary and Romania during the last hundred years must be viewed in the wider context of the history of East Central European Jewry in general. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, and at least one generation after the same process had started in Prussia, Austria and Hungary, the Jewish population in the Russian Empire started to become secularised. Young people left the *shtetl*, moved to the quickly developing industrial centres, and joined socialist movements. Many broke their bonds with their families and with Jewish society. They viewed the socialist revolution not only as a road to social and sexual equality and freedom, but also as the inauguration of a society without ethnic and religious barriers and discrimination. The most radical instrument to be used against persecution because of ethnic background or religion was the abolishment of the ethnic dimension in society. It was rather common for young Jews to become revolutionary socialists, to become communists.

A small minority of the Hungarian and Romanian Jews became communists, and among the communists, the Jews were a minority. However, some of the leading communists in the Russian Revolution and in the young Soviet state as well as the short-lived Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919 had Jewish names. These people did not identify themselves as Jews, but as revolutionary socialists. They renounced

both religion and ethnicity. In both Russian and Hungarian society – and in Romania, which of course was a home country of both “Russian” and “Hungarian” Jews – they were perceived as being Jewish and as acting in their capacity as Jews.¹⁰ The process that made “the Jews” especially visible was repeated when communism was introduced by the Soviet occupiers and “liberators” in East Central Europe after the Second World War. In Hungary and Romania, people of Jewish origin were prominent in the communist leadership. They did not identify themselves as Jews and they did not promote Jewish culture or interest in coming to terms with the history of the Holocaust in these countries, but they were Jews in the eyes of the Gentiles. The experience of the first years of communist rule served to reinforce antisemitism. First the population in general experienced the communist oppressors as “Jews,” and then the Stalinist anti-Zionism campaign, which was epitomised by the Rák trial in Hungary¹¹ and the Pauker trial in Romania,¹² had an obvious antisemitic tinge.

The general picture of the Holocaust in Romania¹³ and Hungary¹⁴ is well known. In the present text, the ambition is to place antisemitism and the Holocaust within the context of Romanian and Hungarian society. Concerning the pre-Holocaust period, the antisemitic atmosphere in the respective country is described by means of presenting contemporaneous reports from the inside that show how the character and development of Jewish-Gentile relations were experienced and interpreted in public discourse. These presentations serve as a history-cultural framework to the public treatment of Holocaust history in the post-Holocaust period. The focus of attention in this part of the study is on the interface of historical culture and internal politics, on the one hand, and on the other, influences from the Western world after 1989 on Holocaust commemoration in the two countries. The study is neither a historiographic analysis of research on the Holocaust in Hungary and Romania nor a sociological survey of contemporary attitudes to the Holocaust in the population. It is an overview of the place of Jews in public life in Hungary and Romania before the Holocaust and the place of the Holocaust in the contemporary historical culture.

Towards the Holocaust in Romania

In the year 2001, Romanian historian Andrea Oisteanu published an analysis of the image of the Jew in Romanian culture through the centuries up to the present date.¹⁵ The book showed with meticulous documentation of texts and pictures that antisemitism has been a mass phenomenon in Romania, in civil society as well as in the Christian Orthodox religion of the country. Oisteanu notes that in the interwar period, popular and intellectual antisemitism coalesced. Concerning the country's cultural elite, its role in the promotion of hatred of the Jews was, according to a reviewer of Oisteanu's book, a clear-cut example of Julien Benda's famous thesis from 1927 on "*La trahison des clercs*."¹⁶

In Romania's case, it is possible to gauge the growth of public antisemitism in the 1930s thanks to the notations by a gifted and centrally placed observer, a young writer. His diary from 1935–1944, which was published half a century after it was written,¹⁷ has rightly been compared to the famous diaries of the German Victor Klemperer, the Jew who survived Nazism in Dresden. The Romanian counterpart to Klemperer is Mihail Sebastian (Iosif Hechter, 1907–1945). He was born in Braila in Moldavia and worked as a critic and writer in Bucharest in the interwar years. As a Jew, he was persecuted during the war but survived, only to die by being hit by a lorry in Bucharest in May 1945. The diary was published in English in 2000.¹⁸ It was adapted for the theatre by the playwright David Auburn and performed as a play on March 23–April 4, 2004 in New York.¹⁹ The book won international recognition as an original source of information on an aspect of Romanian history fairly little known.²⁰ One reviewer noted that it provoked a sensation in Romania, "revealing as it did the depth and strength of Romanian anti-Semitism as well as Romania's part in the Holocaust."²¹ A Romanian commentator underlined the important fact that Sebastian's diary shows – as does Klemperer's – that "the identity crisis which Sebastian experienced is the crisis of many Jews in the diaspora."²²

Sebastian was a secularised Jew. However, when the antisemitic persecutions began in the late 1930s, he chose to identify publicly as a Jew. In 1937–1938, when agrarians under Octavian Goga and the Christian Liga under Alexandru Cuza formed a short-lived govern-

ment, anti-Jewish measures were taken to keep Jews outside political posts, the press and economic and cultural institutions. A law on January 22, 1938 deprived a quarter of a million of Jews of their civic rights. The new constitution in the same year legalised discrimination of the Jews, their exclusion from the political, economic and cultural institutions. New antisemitic laws followed in 1941.²³ In Sebastian's diary the main theme is the gradually more outspoken antisemitism among Romanian intellectuals.

After the Second World War had started in 1939, with Romania remaining neutral, Sebastian noted how reports of the victories of the Nazi troops were followed by more and more harsh persecution of the Jews in Romania. When Sebastian in 1939 read the famous history of the Jews by the Jewish historian Simon Dubnow from Vilnius, he noted that the Jewish people had experienced worse persecutions in history than those Sebastian experienced in Romania. Sebastian did not have any premonition of the Holocaust. In 1941, with the new discriminatory laws, the situation for the Jews in Romania deteriorated further. Their property was confiscated; they were forced to give practically all their belongings to the state, and were only allowed to buy much smaller rations of food than the "Aryans." When Romania's dictator Ion Antonescu in the internal struggle for power in Romania defeated his former ally the Iron Guard in January 1941, not only some among the latter but also many Jews in Bucharest were murdered.

In Iasi in Moldavia a pogrom in the summer of 1941 cost thousands of Jews their life. Following this outburst of state persecution, the Jews in the provinces of Bessarabia, Transnistria and Bukovina began to be deported to the extermination camps in occupied Poland. On August 2, that is after the German attack on the Soviet Union and Romania's becoming a German ally, a governmental order to the Jews in Bucharest created the impression that wholesale deportation was imminent. Acquaintances and friends of Sebastian complained to him concerning the treatment of the Jews. Nobody did anything on Sebastian's or other Jews' behalf. On August 5 Sebastian noted in his diary:

Everyone disapproves and feels indignant – but at the same time everyone is a cog in the huge antisemitic factory that is the Romanian state, with all its offices, authorities, press, institutions, laws and procedures. I don't know if I should laugh when Vivi or Braniste assures me that General Mazarini or General Nicolescu is “staggered” and “disgusted” at what is happening. But whether or not they are staggered or disgusted, they and thousands like them sigh, endorse and acquiesce, not only tacitly or passively but through direct participation. As for the mass of people, they are jubilant. The bloodying and mocking of Jews has been public entertainment *par excellence*.²⁴

After Antonescu had been toppled on August 23, 1944 and a new government was formed, Romania changed sides in the war. The country was liberated rather than conquered by the Soviet Red Army. The entry in Sebastian's diary for December 22, 1944, when the country had been liberated and antisemitic policy certainly was not on the agenda any more, tells about a reception in the Foreign Office in Bucharest. The author found himself in the “nice society” of people who only a few months earlier had courted the ambassador of Germany. Sebastian had become completely disillusioned. He had experienced how those he had admired, such as his mentor Nae Ionescu and Mircea Eliade, had betrayed him and the Jews and become supporters of the fascists and the Antonescu regime. Eliade, subsequently to make an academic career as a historian of religion in the United States, publicly accused the Jews of being the cause of Romania's misfortunes. He greeted the Iron Guard as the saviour of the country. In the last diary entries of December 1944 Sebastian argued that Romania would become a decent society only when the question of Romanian antisemitism and its consequences became an object of public concern. As we now know, this would take fifty-four years, until 1998. Sebastian's notes give a clear description of the emotional tensions and fierce hatred towards “the Jews” in Romanian society in the thirties.

Between 280,000 and 380,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews were murdered or died at the hand of Romanian civilian and military authorities and in territories under their control. Approximately 340,000 Romanian Jews survived because the government terminated deportations in 1943.²⁵

Towards the Holocaust in Hungary

In order to grasp the importance and salient place of “the Jewish question” in interwar Hungary, it is necessary to understand the great national trauma, which bears the name “Trianon.” In the peace treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920, Hungary was forced to secede two-thirds of its pre-war territory. The lost lands included Slovakia, the capital of which Bratislava had been Hungary’s capital – under the name Pozsony – from 1571 to 1784, and Transylvania, which had belonged to the Hungarian crown from the Middle Ages and which in the nineteenth century had been elevated in the Hungarian historical culture to a symbol of Hungarianness. Practically no politician in Hungary accepted the “verdict” of Trianon. The refutation was captured in the slogan *Nem, nem soha* (“No, no never”). In *Szabadság Tér* (Freedom Square) in the centre of Budapest – within eyesight of the Parliament – there were four monuments symbolising the loss of Burgenland, Slovakia, Transylvania and the Vojvodina. In the square was also the Trianon monument with *Turul*.²⁶ The Hungarian national flag hung halfway down the monument’s flagpole. The Trianon monument was a tombstone. The Hungarian declaration of faith, which was adopted after 1920, reads “I believe in God, I believe in the Fatherland, I believe in eternal divine justice, I believe in the resurrection of Hungary.”²⁷

In an analysis of Hungarian historical myths, Éva Kovács and Gerhard Seewann assert that “the obsession with history” in *contemporary* Hungary, more than eighty years later and after another world war, is founded on “the trauma of Trianon.”²⁸ In any event, it is obvious that a basic factor behind Hungary’s siding with Germany in 1938 was the wish to revise the Trianon boundaries. In a similar way as “the Jews” were held responsible by the Nazis for the Versailles “verdict,” “the Jews” were held responsible by the Hungarian political elite for the Trianon peace. The interpretation was that Hungary had been “punished” not only for its defeat in the World War, but also because of the existence of Béla Kun’s Soviet republic in 1919, which was perceived at the time as a threat to the new order to be established by the Allied powers in Central Europe. Kun and most of the people’s commissars in his government were of Jewish origin. The historian István Deák has noted that in the interwar period the Hungarian parliament was

“obsessed with the ‘Jewish question’” and that “pre-occupation with the Jews was akin to a sickness that afflicted all strata of society, but especially the educated classes.”²⁹

In the countryside, Budapest was called Judapest. This refers to a very important divide among the intellectuals in interwar Hungary between urbanists – *urbanisták* – and populists – *népiek*.³⁰ “Populism” referred to the countryside, the peasants, the soil and race. “Urbanism” referred to Budapest. The urbanists were modernists and socialists. Many among the latter were emancipated, assimilated Jews in the capital. The political conflict between populists and urbanists acquired an antisemitic dimension because the latter were associated with concepts such as cosmopolitanism and internationalism, as opposed to the patriotism of the “people,” the peasantry. The word “Judapest” indicated that the capital was dominated by Jewish capitalists and Jewish left-wing intellectuals, both considered to be unpatriotic. Many leading populists were not antisemites. Nevertheless, the anti-Jewish laws in 1938, 1939 and 1941 reinforced the division between “the people” and “the Jews” in Hungarian society and culture.³¹

An eyewitness report from 1934 by a foreigner who happened to learn the Hungarian language and lived in the country in the thirties and during the war is a good source concerning the role of antisemitism in public life. The Swede Valdemar Langlet (1872–1960) was married to a Hungarian woman and fluent in Hungarian. He lived in Budapest from 1931 to 1945, from 1933 as a member of the Swedish Consulate General and Legation. In 1944 he was active on behalf of the Swedish Red Cross to save Jews in Budapest from deportation to Auschwitz. He distributed so-called protection letters to those in danger. Langlet took the initiative himself, but worked in parallel to the Raoul Wallenberg mission.³²

Langlet’s report from Hungary is written by a person who attempted to give his Swedish readers a sympathetic view of his chosen new country of residence. It is evident that he was eager to present an “explanation” of the obvious antisemitism in that country. His book has a special chapter on “Jews” which has a rather antisemitic tone. When read closely and with hindsight, the text turns out to be a journalistic and even sociological account of the role and the perception of Jews in post-Trianon Hungary and not necessarily an expression

of antisemitism. Langlet reports from and about an antisemitic society. Although he recognises “a Jewish question” in Hungary – this is an expression which belongs to the antisemitic discourse – and also generalises about Jews in general, he is certainly not recommending discrimination and persecution of the Jews. He begins his overview with a summary of the general attitude in Hungarian society in the 1930s towards “the Jews.” It goes: in Trianon we Hungarians were treated as criminals and although we were innocent victims we were punished much more than those peoples who actually were responsible for the evils of World War I. We allowed and still allow both our domestic and international Jewry to dominate us. Béla Kun’s Bolshevik regime of 1919 was forced upon us and dominated by Jews. Rich Jews control our banks, cartels, trusts and profitable business; they thereby control the state administration. We pay horrendous taxes not only to the state but also to the big companies owned by Jews and the Jewish agents of international capitalists in our country. After enumerating a number of antisemitic arguments, Langlet concludes that except for Germany, Hungary was the country in Europe with the strongest and most outspoken antisemitism.³³

After thus having given a fairly correct sociological analysis of the place of the Jewish population in the cultural and economic history of Hungary since the mid-nineteenth century and of the prominent place of Jewish people in the economy and the free professions, Langlet argued that there were two possibilities to “solve the Jewish question” in Hungary. Either Hungarian politicians and society in general as well as the Jewish population could choose the way of Sweden, France and other West European countries, “complete freedom [for the Jews] and modest assimilation,” or Hungary could “follow the way of tsarist Russia, with oppression and murder, or that of contemporary Germany, with oppression and forced exile.”³⁴ This was written in 1934. With the promulgation of the antisemitic laws a few years later, Hungary chose the second road. The first law defined Jews according to religious confession and restricted their proportion in the economy and the liberal professions to 20 per cent. The second law restricted their proportion in the two fields to 6 per cent. In addition to the restrictions concerning work, it deprived Jews of their political rights as citizens.³⁵

As a consequence of developments from the mid-nineteenth century, Jews held a prominent position in pre-war Hungarian economy. Although comprising about 6 per cent of the population, 55 per cent of physicians, 49 per cent of lawyers, 30 per cent of engineers, 59 per cent of bank officials and 46 per cent of salesmen were Jews by religion in 1930. Hungarian historians Gábor Kádár and Zoltan Vági note that if those “who were Christian by religion but subjected to the anti-Jewish laws are included, proportions are larger still.” Roughly 25 per cent of the Jews were well off and a few families were the major owners of Jewish wealth.³⁶ The proportion of poor people among Jews was considerable. However, among the Gentiles, it was a common perception that “the Jews” were rich and “the people” poor. Kádár and Vági explain that it made both political and economic “sense” to expropriate the Jewish population:

These dynasties, no more than a few dozen, owned a high proportion of total Jewish assets, thereby acquiring a degree of highly concentrated economic influence, coupled, for a certain period, with political influence that was virtually unparalleled in any other country. The economic and political significance of these numbers becomes clear if we consider that discriminating against 5–6 per cent of the population permitted the redistribution of 20–25 per cent of national wealth. Therefore, given the scale of these assets, the looting of Jewish wealth in Hungary offered much greater profits than anywhere else in Europe.³⁷

The adoption of the anti-Jewish laws resulted in the expropriation of the Jews. There followed deportation of the major part of the Hungarian Jewish population in 1944. The Germans organised the deportations, but this was obviously the logical end to Hungarian politics from the time of Teleki’s government in 1939 to the Szálasi regime in late 1944.

Langlet’s experience of the general antisemitic atmosphere in the thirties in combination with the data above make it seem logical that the adoption of the anti-Jewish laws resulted in the expropriation and deportation of the Jews, i.e. the elimination of the Jewish part of the Hungarian population.

564,500 Hungarian Jews became Holocaust victims. This number includes the territories that were acquired in 1938 and 1940 from

Romania and Czechoslovakia and in 1941 from Yugoslavia. It thus includes all Jews murdered in territories under Hungarian jurisdiction during the Holocaust. In 1945, Hungary's Jewish population amounted to around 100,000.³⁸

After the Holocaust: Romania

Before 1989, the Holocaust was hardly mentioned at all and the public in Romania was ignorant about it.³⁹ Immediately after the war, Jews were allowed to commemorate the 1941 Iasi pogrom, but after the communist takeover of political power in this country the Holocaust was all but swept in oblivion.⁴⁰ Romanian historian Mihai Chioveanu argues that "the Romanians love their Past unconditionally because they actually do not know their history well."⁴¹ Writing in 2003, Romanian historian Liviu Rotman even claimed that concerning the memory of the Holocaust, "post-Communist Romania records a *vacuum* in this field."⁴² Sebastian's *Journal* received a mixed reception when it was published in Romania in 1996. This caused Radu Ioanid to write, in his introduction to the English edition of the book, that "it remains difficult if not impossible to engage in a serious discussion about any challenge to Romania's self-image and self-definition as a nation of eternal victims, never perpetrators."⁴³

In the homepage of *The Romanian Institute for Recent History* (the programme *Learning Democracy through History Teaching*) one aim is said to be increasing "the awareness of the need and usefulness of debating recent history issues."⁴⁴ Concerning the issue of the Holocaust in Romania, Dr Felicia Waldman, a lecturer at Bucharest University and the director of the think-tank IDEE (*Initiatives for Democracy in Eastern Europe*), has published an overview of Holocaust education in Romania.⁴⁵ She argues that after 45 years of "relative silence" on the topic under Communism, "relevant silence" was imposed by the new regime until 1998. It is significant that the silence was broken mainly by scholars who "happened" to be Jewish and also that their works have been counteracted by "increasingly numerous publications [...] that deny or minimize the Holocaust in general and its Romanian chapter in particular."⁴⁶ However, beginning in 1998, a number of official initiatives have aimed at redressing the situation. In that year, the *Goldstein Goren Center for Hebrew Studies* was set up in Bucha-

rest as a joint venture between Bucharest University and the Cukier Goldstein Goren Center in Israel.⁴⁷ In 1999 the Holocaust became a compulsory topic in history education.⁴⁸ After some highly publicised political qualms under the new Iliescu presidency, it all seemed to end well with the establishment in October 2003 of the *Wiesel International Commission for the Study of the Romanian Holocaust*. It is lead by Elie Wiesel and includes historians and public figures from Romania, among them Radu Ioanid, and also from Israel, the United States, France and Germany.⁴⁹ As is well known, Wiesel is a survivor of the Holocaust from Transylvania. It is of interest in the present context that Wiesel many years ago argued that the Holocaust is beyond human comprehension. In the 1970s he wrote the article "A Plea for the Survivors," which ends in the following way:

And so I tell you: You who have not experienced their anguish, you who do not speak their language, you who do not mourn their dead, think before you offend them, before you betray them. Think before you substitute your memory for theirs. Wait until the last survivor, the last witness, has joined the long procession of silent ghosts whose judgment one day will resound and shake the earth and its Creator. Wait...⁵⁰

Wiesel's position is that the Holocaust is unique and that the memory of the victims might be tainted if non-survivors attempt to approach the subject. This argument questions that it is possible to treat the Holocaust as a historical event, place it in a certain context or compare different instances of it. It might only be remembered. It is thus of some consequence that the Wiesel commission and the Romanian government after some deliberations agreed to mark Holocaust Day in Romania not on January 27, which is common in Europe, but on October 9, the date when the deportations started of Jews from Old Romania to Transnistria.⁵¹ In this way not only Wiesel but also the Romanian authorities recognised that the Holocaust belongs to Romanian history and historical culture.

After 1989, the Jewish community in Bucharest renovated and enlarged the Jewish Museum in the city. New monuments commemorating the Holocaust were established.⁵² Finally, on October 12, 2004, the then Romanian President Ion Iliescu delivered what

Michail Shafir has labelled “an historic speech [...] when he acknowledged in no ambiguous terms and with no ‘ifs and buts’ his country’s participation in, and responsibility for, the perpetration of the Holocaust.”⁵³ That there is a special Romanian Holocaust Day with a date that is exclusively Romanian is an official recognition of the fact that the Holocaust also took place in Romania. However, according to Waldman, the Holocaust has a precarious place in contemporary Romanian historical culture. She enumerates a number of “problematic issues”: minimisation of the number of victims and of the importance of antisemitic laws and attitudes in 1918–1944 and of the role of the army and the national gendarmerie as perpetrators and of the Orthodox Church, political parties and the population in general as bystanders; the “selective negationism” argument that only the Nazis were perpetrators; the inclination to leave Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria outside discussion, territories which were under Romanian jurisdiction and where the Holocaust was ruthlessly carried out; the issue of post-war restitutions and reparations to survivors; and “the moral and collective responsibility of the Romanians.”⁵⁴

One must add to Waldman’s list of problematic issues that on October 25, 2004 a Holocaust denier, professor of history at Bucharest University Ion Coja, who is leader of a “Foundation for Combating anti-Romanianness,” was featured in a one-hour television programme. Coja argued that Romanian Jews had undermined the Romanian state during the war by serving communist interests.

Not because they were Jews were they killed by the Romanian army, but because they committed reprehensible acts against the state... Almost 100 % of the Jews killed died because they committed acts against the state. [...] Some are claiming that thousands were killed but it is more likely that only hundreds died [...] but in Romania there was no genocide.

Significantly, the incident was reported by a Hungarian news agency.⁵⁵ It is also significant that whereas Jews in contemporary Romania regard the wartime dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu as an oppressor who was responsible for the murder of Romanian Jews, many Romanians regard him as a good anti-communist and patriot. In Romania today, the cult of Antonescu is closely linked to hatred of the Jews.⁵⁶

There is a monument to the marshal in the courtyard of the prison in Jilava where he was executed.⁵⁷ Thus, this is also a monument to antisemitism.

Waldman's analysis of school and high-school textbooks in history shows that the subject is not well covered. Some textbooks omit the Holocaust, the treatment in others is beside the point or inaccurate.⁵⁸ Reading her report one gets the same impression as when reading Sebastian's diary from the thirties and forties: Jews are not part of the Romanian people nor of Romanian history. They are rather a bothersome irritant factor. However, Waldman ended her overview with the exclamation: "the future looks bright." She referred to Romania's application in late 2003 for joining the *International Force for Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research* and the government's commitment to sponsor conferences, seminars and training courses on the Holocaust.⁵⁹ This had been preceded by the promulgation in March 2002 by the Romanian government of an "Emergency Ordinance 31/2002," outlawing "organizations and symbols of a fascist, racist or xenophobic character and the promotion of the cult of persons guilty of crimes against peace and humanity." The oblique reference concerning "the cult of persons" was to Antonescu and the Iron Guard leader Codreanu.⁶⁰ On October 9, 2005 a National Institute for Romanian Holocaust Studies was opened in Bucharest.⁶¹

The question remains: will the Holocaust be treated as something external to Romanian history or as internal? In late 2004, the *International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, headed by Radu Ioanid, presented its report, which contained the following unequivocal declaration:

The Commission concludes, together with the large majority of bona fide researchers in this field, that the Romanian authorities were the main perpetrators of this Holocaust, in both its planning and implementation. This encompasses the systematic deportation and extermination of nearly all the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina as well some Jews from other parts of Romania to Transnistria, the mass killings of Romanian and local Jews in Transnistria, the massive execution of Jews during the Iasi pogrom; the systematic discrimination and degradation applied to Romanian Jews during the Antonescu administra-

tion—including the expropriation of assets, dismissal from jobs, the forced evacuation from rural areas and concentration in district capitals and camps, and the massive utilization of Jews as forced laborers under the same administration. Jews were degraded solely on account of their Jewish origin, losing the protection of the state and becoming its victims. A portion of the Roma population of Romania was also subjected to deportation and death in Transnistria.⁶²

However, this frank conclusion does not imply that the Holocaust has become part of Romanian historical culture. The report ends: “Unfortunately, for now there is no genuine readiness to perceive the history of the Jews in Romania as part of Romania’s own history. This artificial division is a major obstacle on the road to a critical assessment of Romania’s national past.” One must bear in mind that the Commission on Holocaust History in Romania is not an endogenous phenomenon but the direct result of influence from abroad, primarily the United States and Israel. Israeli historian Leon Volovici argues that there is a rift in Romanian society between a new, post-communist generation of intellectuals – especially students “who have had the chance of a longer stay at Israeli or western universities” – and a xenophobic and antisemitic new Right. Attempting to steer a middle course, “the Romanian political class [...] simulates an open-minded democratic attitude.”⁶³

After the Holocaust: Hungary

After 1989, Hungarian society had to cope with the Holocaust and the communist era. However, other dimensions of pre-war and war-time history came to the fore. This made the post-1989 treatment of the memory of the Holocaust a thorny issue, because all attempts to rehabilitate politicians from the interwar period and from the war years brought forward the fate of the Jews in those days.

The history of the Jews in Hungary from the emancipation to the first communist years was called to life by the Hungarian director István Szabó in his film *Sunshine* in 1999. Szabó has declared that the film “is the story of his family and of all the other Jewish families in Budapest he knows.”⁶⁴ A total of five generations is covered. The story opens with an explosion in the distillery of a rural innkeeper.

The whole family is killed except for the son Emmanuel, who takes with him to the capital the recipe of the herbal tonic produced in the distillery and builds a successful enterprise: he is typical of the first generation of Jewish entrepreneurs in late Habsburgian Hungary. The real-life model could be the family Zwack, producers of the famous digestive liqueur *Unicum*, whose members were saved by Raoul Wallenberg's mission in 1944.⁶⁵

In the film, Emmanuel's son Ignatz becomes a successful judge, and the general emancipation pattern is thereby followed. The entrepreneur's son becomes an academic in state service. The fate of the interwar generation is especially relevant to the discussion of the Holocaust in Hungary. It brings in assimilation in a double sense: change of the family name from Yiddish *Sonnenschein* to Hungarian *Sors* ("Fate"), and conversion to Catholicism to become "Hungarian." Furthermore, there is a conscious refutation of the physically weak Jewish image. The main protagonist in this part of the story is the fencer Adam Sors (here the "model" was Attila Petschauer, who won an Olympic gold medal in fencing in Berlin in 1936). Adam Sors becomes a reserve officer in the Hungarian army but is finally tortured to death in a concentration camp, only because he is Jewish by "race." His son, who survives the war, becomes a communist security policeman. Finally disillusioned, he ends up recognising his Jewish identity.

Szabó's film is a historical and sociological study of the fate of Hungarian Jews in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in interwar Hungary, during the Holocaust, and in the communist period. As an item of contemporary Hungarian historical culture, the film is a sample of the tragic history of the Jews in Hungary. Critics of *Sunshine* have been keen to comment on the tragedy of refuted assimilation. Thus, Susan Suleiman observes that "[t]he specificity of Hungarian Jews until the Holocaust [...] is that they felt Hungarian: they were not exiles, Hungary was their home. Furthermore [...] they played an important historical role in the modernization of Hungary and in the creation of modern Hungarian identity."⁶⁶

A good example of the controversy between a Hungarian national and a Hungarian Jewish standpoint is the fate of Admiral Miklós Horthy's earthly remains. Horthy acted as head of state of Hungary

in the absence of a king in 1919–1944. His reign saw governments of different political colours, among them that of the Fascist-leaning Gyula Gömbös in the late 1930s and the two anti-Jewish Teleki governments at the beginning and towards the end of the interwar period. In July 1944 Horthy halted the deportations of Jews, especially those from Budapest. However, 430,000 Jews had already been deported and exterminated between May 15 and July 7. In history, Horthy remains the person who was Hungary's head of state when 550,000 of the country's Jews were sent to the gas chambers. Horthy is also remembered in Hungary for his attempt to reach a separate peace with the Western powers in the autumn of 1944. The attempt was of course doomed to fail. Horthy was forced into exile, and the butchering of the Jews could be resumed under the Szálasi regime.

Horthy died in exile in Portugal in 1957 and was buried there. In his will, he asked that his body not be returned to Hungary “until the last Russian soldier has left.” In 1993 when the last Russian (Soviet) troops had been withdrawn from Hungary, Horthy's ashes were returned and reburied in his hometown Kenderes.⁶⁷ Ministers of the Antall government – the dominant party, the MFD, belonged in the populist tradition – attended the reburial. This was met with sharp criticism from the social democratic and liberal opposition, representatives of the urbanist tradition. They interpreted the event as a homage to fascism.⁶⁸ Michael Shafrir has called attention to the fact that the issue of whether the memory of Admiral Horthy shall be honoured in Hungary is not a case of dealing with historical complexity and the weighing of different aspects, but with “who remembers whom and why” and with “who remembers what and why.” Furthermore, Shafrir argues, when it comes to historical figures, “[p]oliticians and historical figures can be legitimised (or delegitimised, or re-legitimised) only for the purpose of the present.”⁶⁹ We have noted the similar controversy concerning the place of Ion Antonescu in Romanian history and in the historical culture of that country.

Michael Shafrir has called attention to another issue of the same kind as the Horthy case. It concerned the project of a statue to honour the memory of Pál Teleki, launched by nationalist associations.⁷⁰ The statue would be unveiled on April 3, 2004, on the anniversary of

Teleki's suicide in 1941. The first anti-Jewish *numerus clausus* law in 1920 was adopted under Teleki's first period as premier and the racist antisemitic legislation came under his second period of 1939–1941. However, for most Hungarians Teleki was remembered for the reconquest of northern Transylvania in 1940 and the attempt to keep equal distance between Germany and Britain in foreign affairs. Teleki committed suicide when Hungary was forced by Hitler to either attack Yugoslavia on the German side or resist a German invasion. Hungary did become Hitler's ally and attacked Yugoslavia, and Teleki became a martyr for the Hungarian case. After protests from the Alliance of Hungarian Jewish Religious Communities (MAZSIHISZ) and the Wiesenthal Center, the Budapest City Council rescinded its authorisation of the project.⁷¹ The event was a clear-cut example of a clash not only about the public space but also, in relation to this, over historical culture. Should the national hero be commemorated or should the anti-Jewish perpetrator remain outside public commemoration? Should Hungarian historical culture be ethnic nationalist Hungarian or should it become bivalent, both Magyar and Jewish? The Teleki and Horthy cases show that the Jewish dimension affects a core element of the country's historical culture, i.e. the role of national "heroes."

Thus, in the Hungarian fight over commemorations in the public space and over what to honour and what to omit from the historical culture, the old populist-urbanist divide from the interwar period re-emerged. As was hinted at above, it became linked to the opposite camps in the political arena. Contemporary urbanists are the Social Democrats (MSZP, the post-Communists) and the liberal young democrats (SZDSZ), whereas on the populist side have been the Magyar Democratic Forum (MDF), who led the first post-communist government in 1990–1994, and FIDESZ, (The Hungarian Citizens Party, conservative) who led the third post-communist government in 1998–2002. Among the contemporary urbanists have been people of Jewish descent, whereas the modern populists have identified themselves with ethnic Hungarian issues, especially the "kin" in the neighbouring countries, the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Serbia and Romania. Anti-communism is high on the populist agenda.⁷²



The Terror House Museum is housed in a building from 1880, owned up to 1936 by the Perlmutter family. The Arrow Cross Party used the building as headquarter between 1937 and 1944. In 1945, the building was taken over first by the communist-led Political Police and thereafter by The State Security Police, which remained there until 1956. The building's dark history is marked by an extension on the roof with the reversed word "Terror" as well as the symbols of the Arrow Cross Party and the Communist Party stamped on it. Photo: Ulf Zander.

The contemporary edition of the urbanist-populist divide and the struggle over historical culture found concrete expression concerning two exhibitions about the Holocaust and communist terror in Hungary. When he became premier in 1998, the FIDESZ leader Viktor Orbán visited Auschwitz. He decided to have the Hungarian pavilion remade into a "pro-Horthy apologia designed to sanitize the Nazi era in general and the Hungarian involvement in the Final Solution in particular." The new exhibit would present the image of a happy life for the Jews in Hungary between 1867 and 1944. However, the whole project was cancelled after protests from MAZSIHISZ. Orbán's special expert on the issue of Auschwitz, Mária Schmidt, argued that the Holocaust had been a "marginal issue" in the Second World War and, moreover, that if the word should be used, it should also, and primarily, denote the "genocide" of the Communists.⁷³ She argued that the social democrats and liberals in Hungary had "decided on the overexposure of the 'Jewish question'" in order to discredit their bourgeois opponents.⁷⁴

In 2002, towards the end of the Orbán regime, on the eve of the new elections that would bring the social democrats back in power, Mária Schmidt, who had “inspired” it, became the director of the new *Terror Háza* (House of Terror) museum.⁷⁵ It is nominally dedicated to the victims of both Nazi and Communist terror, but only two of the two-dozen rooms are dedicated to the Arrow Cross regime and the rest to communist terror. The exhibition is presented on the home-page of the museum:

Walking through the halls named after the periods exhibited within them, one can get acquainted, in chronological order, first with the terror of the Hungarian nazi and then the communist regime. The exhibition entitled Double Occupation presents Hungary’s two subsequent occupations. In one side of the room, Hungary can be seen under Nazi German occupation, in the other, under Soviet rule. After 1945, when Rákosi and the communists trained in Moscow returned home, the Hungarian Communist Party’s membership was minimal, and so a number of the so-called small-time Arrow-cross people of the previous regime also had to be accepted in order to grow. The room also tries to present that all layers of society “changed their clothes” and entered into a new world. This hall is aimed at presenting the roughest period of communism in Hungary. The monitors show excerpts from 50s news programmes. Placing the headphones on our heads, we can hear political speeches from major communist leaders of the era (Farkas, Révai, Gerő.) Behind the fancy curtains, we can find tapping devices from the time.⁷⁶

The exhibition thus suggested that communist terror had been more important than the Arrow Cross terror. Moreover, because both FIDESZ and the notorious, openly antisemitic Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIEP) missed few public chances to state that some of Hungary’s worst communists had been Jewish, according to Shafir, “the implicit message received by the museum’s visitors was that the Jews were responsible for the country’s post-war ordeal.”⁷⁷ It is also important to note, as István Deák has observed, that in contemporary Hungary nationalists blame the Arrow Cross for all atrocities at the end of the war in order to exonerate Admiral Horthy’s regime. Concerning the rather innocent words in the House of Terror on the

“major communist leaders of the era,” Deák has made their context clear by going into the relevant details; details that may be supposed to be well known by all Hungarians with the slightest interest in modern Hungarian history:

The reconstruction of Hungary in ruins proceeded at an amazing pace in which Jewish entrepreneurs and engineers played a crucial role. Moreover, because the Jews alone were absolutely reliable and untainted by fascist crimes, the Soviet occupation authorities, and the first democratic coalition governments, entrusted the Jewish survivors with key positions in the police and administration. In 1947–1949, the Communist leaders, returning from Moscow, gradually established a totalitarian dictatorship; the infamous Bolshevik “Quadriga,” consisting of Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő, Mihály Farkas and József Révai, were all of Jewish origin, and so was the head, as well as many commanders, of the powerful political police. Thus it came that, following the massacre of most of the Hungarian Jews, individual Jews assumed control, for the first time since 1919, not only of much of the economy but also of politics and the administration.⁷⁸

The singling out of the names of Jewish communists in the House of Terror, which implies Jewish responsibility for the post-war communist terror in Hungary, can be considered to be a contemporary counterpart to the antisemitic discourse in the interwar period, when “the Jews” were held responsible for the ordeals brought upon Hungary and “the Magyars” through the peace of Trianon. However, in the special section on the Jewish community in the room in the House of Terror that is devoted to the religious communities, an information text takes care to note that “a significant number of Party members and leaders of its terrorist organizations (PRO, ÁVO, ÁVH, KATPOL, GRO) were of Jewish origin, who did not only disavow their God, but their country and their roots as well when they became the inhumane communist ideology’s toadies.”⁷⁹ The point is that the individuals were Jews, but they did not act as representatives of the Jews. The question then arises: why mentioning their Jewishness if it wasn’t relevant, and why present the information on these villains in the hall devoted to religious communities? As a whole, the exhibitions in the House of Terror reflect the populist interpretation

of Hungarian history. Hungary is portrayed as a victim of communist modernisation after 1945, a project where Jews were prominent. Mária Schmidt has made clear that the issue is not about “the Jewish question” but about placing communist terror on equal footing with the Holocaust in Hungarian historical culture and thereby politically de-legitimize the social democrats and liberals, the contemporary urbanists:

As the perpetrators of the Holocaust were held accountable a generation after the crimes were committed, so will the communist criminals. Those, too, will be held liable who hampered the transition, sustained the entire post-communist power and sabotaged any effort to come clean. And they will be asked to justify why they used the anti-Semitic/anti-fascist rhetoric in favor of the post-communist power elite.⁸⁰

The difference between the urbanist and populist views on what to commemorate is also evident when it comes to remembrance days: in 2000, April 16 became the day of remembrance of Auschwitz, and in 2001, February 25 that for the victims of communism.⁸¹ There is one Memorial Day for each ideological camp.

Representatives of the Jewish community in Hungary chose not to accept the status of national minority when the minority law was adopted in 1993.⁸² The message is that the Jews are an integral part of Hungarian society, and in matters of historical belonging absolutely on equal footing with the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. Not all political currents in Hungary accept this Jewish standpoint. It is significant that in March 2004 the well-known Hungarian writers Péter Eszterházy and György Konrád and 82 of their colleagues left the Hungarian Writers' Union in protest against antisemitic statements by other members of the union, especially Kornei Döbretenei, who criticised the award of the Nobel Prize for literature to Imre Kertész. Döbretenei described Kertész as belonging to a “minority” with a “taste for terror.”⁸³ As is known, Kertész is a Jew and an Auschwitz survivor. Döbretenei was true to the discourse of the Terror Háza. However, just a year later, Lajos Koltai's film based on Kertész autobiographical novel *Fateless* about the latter's experience as a Holocaust victim⁸⁴ “was a never-seen blockbuster in Hungary if we can use the term for Hungarian movies.”⁸⁵ The dilemma

of refuted assimilation, which is so eloquently described in Szabó's film *Sunshine*, is still present, although, reviewing eight movies on the Holocaust and Jewish history shown at the Hungarian Film Festival in February 2005, film critic Erzsébet Bori noted that sixteen years after 1989 "the Jewish question may be a delicate subject still, but it is no longer taboo."⁸⁶

The Holocaust in Hungarian and Romanian Historical Cultures

The rather insignificant place of Hungary's Jews in the historical culture of the country from 1945 to 2004, when the Holocaust Memorial Centre and Museum was opened, is an indication that the Holocaust did not set its stamp on this culture, although it at least featured in films. It is noteworthy that in the last decade of the Kádár regime, there was a strong interest in Hungary in the fate of Hungarians in the territories that had been lost at Trianon. This interest was an important factor in Hungarian politics in 1989 and again in the late 1990s. On this issue, Trianon and postwar communist rule became intertwined as two aspects of the twentieth-century Hungarian tragedy.⁸⁷ This matter overshadowed the memory of the Holocaust in the political debate.

Historical culture can be assumed to function as a means to bring cohesion to a multinational state; to be a vehicle for integration. One cannot say that this has happened in Hungary: the Terror Háza on the Andrásy Street is at the heart of the exuberant late Habsburg cityscape in Pest, whereas the new Holocaust Memorial Center/Museum, designed by István Manyi, is tucked away in the old proletarian suburb of Ferencváros.⁸⁸ The two sites of historical memory are separated. Tony Judt observes that whereas "Hungarians have flocked to the Terrorháza," the Holocaust Center is visited "by a thin trickle of visitors – many of them foreign."⁸⁹ Hungarian historian Zsolt Horváth, who is the Hungarian translator of Pierre Nora's *Lieux de mémoire*, has concluded that "the *House of Terror* is not a traumatic, commemorative place but an object of the political uses of the past, whose *telos* is the maintenance of the representation of the nation of sufferings caused by communism." Horváth stresses that the context of such a memorial as the Terror Háza is very important for its func-



The New Building Complex of the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest, which opened in April 2004. Photo: Ulf Zander.

tion: “at the time of its inauguration, in February 2002, in the beginning of the political election campaign, its political allusion to the Hungarian left could not be ignored.”⁹⁰

The marginalised place of Romania’s Jews in the historical culture of the country from 1945 to 1998 and the fact that the attention paid to the Holocaust after 1998 has been part of an international movement and pressure from abroad, and not primarily the effect of internal Romanian strivings, is a case for the argument that historical culture in Romania has been monovalent. Not only the Jews, but also the Hungarians and the Roma, the other main ethnic groups in the country after the exodus of the Saxons and Swabians (*Volksdeutsche*), were left out.⁹¹

There is a multidimensional explanation for the long public indifference in Hungary and Romania towards the Holocaust: the perseverance of antisemitism, an antisemitism that was reinforced after the war because of a number of factors, such as the high visibility of individuals of Jewish origin in the first Communist regimes, at the same time as many Jews belonged in the category of the class enemies; the demands for restitution of survivors’ possessions, which was a threat to the current owners of them; and the economic hardship for

the post-war population, which left little space for compassion with those who had suffered in the Holocaust.⁹² It is another issue that the arguments about Jewish domination were not based upon facts. At least in Romania, the majority of the Jews “were extremely reluctant to join the party and on the whole wary of communist ideas.”⁹³

The Holocaust takes on different significance whether it is perceived as belonging to Jewish historical culture, to Hungarian historical culture or to Romanian historical culture – or whether these historical cultures are thought of, in ethnic terms, as bivalent. Thus, using the same concepts as the ones concerning certain individuals’ orientation in a bicultural environment, one can argue that the historical culture in any bi- or multinational state ideally should be bivalent or polyvalent. In this perspective, historical culture is assumed to function as a means to bring cohesion to a bi- or multinational state, to be a vehicle for integration. Certainly, concerning memory and history and their relation to ethnic categories in a state, “one man’s acknowledgement is another’s omission,” as Tony Judt has formulated the challenge.⁹⁴ Are the Hungarian and Romanian societies prepared to integrate in their historical cultures not only different ethnic groups but also terrible events and figures that are heroes for one ethnic group and villains for another, both central actors in the nationalist discourse and Holocaust perpetrators, such as Admiral Horthy and Marshal Antonescu?

The larger issue is the tradition of ethnification of both historiography and historical culture in Europe in the twentieth century. The ethnification of civic society, if one can use such an expression, was reinforced with the Hungarian and Romanian anti-Jewish laws in 1941, which followed the pattern of the German Nuremberg laws of 1935. Although the laws were abolished at the end of the war, in practice the notion of the pure ethnic state remained during the communist period. It influenced both the writing and teaching of history and the historical culture in general in terms of monuments and commemorations.

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The Holocaust and Croatian National Identity

An Uneasy Relationship

The Ustasha leadership in the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945) was directly in charge of the extermination of Jews in Croatia. They ordered, organised and administered the system of camps for prisoners, where Jews, Serbs, Roma, communists and partisans perished.¹ In this respect, the Ustasha's responsibility for the Holocaust was as great as that of the German Nazi regime. The Ustasha also ordered, organised and carried out the mass killings of Serbs in the territory. Croatian historians and many among politicians and the general public do not deny all this.² Croatian writers have argued, though, that the number of murdered people has been exaggerated in order to discredit the Croats.³ Furthermore, as late as during the whole 1990s, the Croatian authorities encouraged a description of the Ustasha government which denied or distorted the Ustasha's role in the Holocaust.⁴ The Ustasha were hailed as the founding fathers of the post-communist independent Croatian state.⁵ It should be obvious that the discussion in Croatia on the Holocaust has to be viewed in its specific context; namely, Croatia as a republic in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its break-up by means of war in 1991–1995.

The Problematic Ustasha Memories

Why has it been problematic for public opinion in Croatia to admit the Ustasha guilt in the Holocaust? The answer is to be found in the circumstance that Croatian national identity was connected to the Ustasha in a specific way during the Yugoslav period. The relationship between the republics in the Yugoslav federation structured the way the issue was dealt with after 1945, and blocked any attempt to discuss the problem in a serious way.

The Holocaust in Croatia is also connected with the relationship between Croats and Serbs as collectives, i.e. as members of the Croatian and the Serb nations respectively. In addition to exterminating the Jews in the Independent State of Croatia, the Ustasha authorities planned and carried out mass killings of Serbs there, and organised extensive expulsions of them as well.

While virtually all Jews in the Independent State of Croatia perished, many Serbs survived the Ustasha atrocities. The Serbs comprised about 12 per cent of the population in Croatia during the post-war era, and the Serbian nation was one of the six Yugoslav nations which formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁶ Concomitantly, in its own right the Ustasha guilt has had a profound impact on relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia, and has influenced the relationship between the republics of Croatia and Serbia as well.

The Ustasha mass killings left memories among both Croats and Serbs. These memories were kept alive in Yugoslavia as collective memories within each national group without any process of reconciliation between them. This affected the relationship between Croats and Serbs on a personal level, at least as an underlying context: "What is my position and yours, respectively, towards these events? Are you or your forefathers guilty or not?" During the whole existence of Yugoslavia, memories of the Ustasha mass killings of Serbs were part of the trauma for both nations, which also related to the fact of the Holocaust as a memory.

Additionally, in socialist Yugoslavia new mythologies of antifascism and the young socialist nation were constructed. Two of those myths were the Serbian *Jasenovac myth* (that of Croatian genocide against the Serbian people) and the Croatian *Stepinac myth* (that of Croatian martyrdom in the Serb-dominated Yugoslav states). According to the former myth, the Ustasha carried out genocide at the concentration camp of Jasenovac and elsewhere in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter myth conveys the narration of the martyrdom of the Croats under Serbian hegemony.⁷

The traumatic experiences and cultivation of the myths on genocide and martyrdom had the effect that the Holocaust and the mass killings of Serbs became tied to each other in the collective memories of these two peoples. References were made to "the Serbian

Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia.”⁸ The Holocaust in a Croatian context thus consists of two parts of a guilt complex: The Ustasha as exterminator of Jews and Roma and as perpetrator of mass Serb killings. As politics in the federation developed into a tug of war between the republics, the memory of the atrocities against the Serbs became the dominant theme as regards references to the Holocaust in the Yugoslav context.

The Independent State of Croatia was the first Croatian nation-state, nominally independent but in reality a German puppet state. Nevertheless, the Ustasha regime constituted the empirical representation of Croatian national independence. It is thereby inevitably associated with Croatian national identity. Because of this, the issue of the Ustasha as guilty of the Holocaust directly concerns the Croatian national identification. As a consequence of these relationships, for the Croats the Holocaust comprises a threefold problem concerning their national identity:

- (1) The Ustasha guilt and Croatian self-esteem as a nation;
- (2) The consequences of the Ustasha guilt for the Croatian national identification in relation to its identification of the Serbs as the “Other”; a nation defined in contrast to the Croatian nation;
- (3) The Ustasha guilt as a collective memory which interferes in the daily interaction between Croatian and Serbian individuals.

Being of central importance for Croatian national identity, the Ustasha’s extermination of the Jews is a dark, degrading history of war crimes and genocide. The other part of the guilt complex, the Ustasha mass killings of Serbs, has been a living trauma since the events took place. References to the Holocaust were made in the various deliberations between Serbs and Croats until the break-up of the Yugoslav federation.

In the following I will investigate how the three aspects of the Holocaust in Croatia, stated above, are rooted in the Yugoslav context and what changes were brought about as a consequence of Croatian independence since 1992. Has there been any profound change as regards prospects of dealing with the Holocaust in Croatia and, eventually overcoming the trauma?

The Yugoslav context

In Yugoslavia, the Holocaust was debated from the beginning of the state's existence. The communist leadership accused the Croatian Catholic Archbishop Stepinac⁹ of involvement in the Ustasha atrocities, and Serbian writers emphasised the great amount of Serbian victims in the war and in the Holocaust. Many Croats felt that they were regarded with suspicion as a people.¹⁰ The issue of the responsibility of the Croatian nation for the Ustasha mass killings and the Holocaust was brought up continuously during the following decades.¹¹ The use of the Holocaust as a weapon in the debate between Croats and Serbs in an ongoing national struggle throughout the existence of postwar Yugoslavia is well documented.¹² It remains to clarify what the struggle was about. Why did Croats and Serbs engage in this exchange of arguments, aimed at denigrating the status of each other's nation?

In the national debate, the motives behind the arguments of Croats and Serbs, respectively, were to defend themselves as nations in the sense of legitimate political units. In the immediate postwar context this is understandable: the aim behind the Ustasha atrocities had been to exterminate or expel the Serbian population in the Independent State of Croatia. In Serbia, the defence forces called the Chetniks also had nationalist goals. Their aim had been to kill as many Croats as possible and to incorporate Croatian territory into a centrally governed Serbian monarchy.¹³ However, was there any reason why, in the postwar socialist Yugoslav federation, both peoples felt that their national identity was threatened by the other? Was not the opposite claim more adequate? One could maintain that the perception of a national threat was totally unfounded, because both nations were constitutionally regarded as legitimate: the Serbs and Croats were defined as nations in Yugoslavia and the republics were *de facto* regarded as the home of these nations.¹⁴ So what constituted the threat?

The threat consisted of the fact that the leaderships of the two nations had opposing aims for the future of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. National legitimacy was restricted to the legitimacy to exist as a nation *in Yugoslavia*. However, there were several contradictory visions within the communist leadership of how to

realise a viable postwar Yugoslavia. Besides socialism, Yugoslavism was proclaimed as the unifying ideology in the country – in time, all the various South Slav nations were to be united in a common identity as members of the supra-national Yugoslav community. However, while the Serbs regarded Yugoslavism as a substitute for Serbian nationalism, the other nations emphasised the point that, although South Slavs, they were at the same time members of their individual nations.

In the 1950s and onwards, strong elements within the communist leaderships in Croatia and Slovenia worked with the aim of developing the federation into a loosely-knit community; what was later to be called a con-federal construction of the state. On the other hand, Serbia's communist leadership aspired to keep the state together and develop it into a centrally governed unified state. The implication of these differences was opposing national goals: Croatian aspirations to preserve and develop national autonomy and Serbian ones to merge the other nations in Yugoslavia into a Yugoslav nation. The Communist slogan that the idea of Yugoslavism would unite all the nations in Yugoslavia was regarded by large sections of all non-Serb nations as a Serbianisation project.¹⁵

Both aims were closely attached to the respective peoples' historical ambitions for national independence. The Croats have a long tradition of political aspiration for creating an independent national state. This stirred a major conflict in the first Yugoslavia and these aims were not abandoned when the second Yugoslavia was created. Many nationally inclined politicians preferred a communist Yugoslavia to a fascist German puppet state. However, their ideal political solution was nevertheless an independent Croatia.¹⁶

The Serbs also had a long tradition of struggle for national independence. Serbs were living in many places in the Ottoman Empire and the aim of the Serbian national liberation was to unite all Serbs living under the Ottomans into one Serbian national state. The struggle was successful: in the 1860s Serbia gained autonomy from the Sultan and in 1878 became an independent state. When the first Yugoslavia was created after the First World War, the Serbian government regarded it as a greater Serbia; the idea of a federation was no option to Serbia's leaders. This attitude also remained among many

Serbs in the second Yugoslavia – in addition, the socialists were convinced that the national conflicts would disappear by themselves as soon as socialism was established in the country.

The second Yugoslavia went through many reforms during its 45 years of existence, carried out through constant conflict and heated debate. In all these debates, an underlying theme was the far-reaching national aspirations. However, there was also another theme in these debates, one that constituted a greater threat against the communist party: the theme of democratic development. It was not even possible to establish a loyal opposition within the communist party, as had been suggested by some party leaders in the beginning of the 1960s. Such an opposition would join members across the republic's borders and work for reforms from a pan-Yugoslav perspective. A strong pan-Yugoslav trade union, which would unite workers across the republic's frontiers, was in the making during discussions of economic reforms in the first half of the 1960s. These tendencies would threaten the communist interpretation of what the right policy should be; in fact it threatened the idea that there was one correct policy – the communist one.

The idea of a loyal opposition within the Yugoslav communist party competed with the various nationalisms in the country in the sense that it depicted Yugoslavia as a viable state which should survive and be developed rather than be weakened or dissolved. The communists held a monopoly of political power and they were united through their will to remain in power. The discussions on a loyal opposition directly threatened the power of the party, as did the development of a strong federal trade union. Therefore the party leadership prevented the establishment of any pan-Yugoslav institutions, other than those under communist control.¹⁷ Instead, increased autonomy for the republics was accepted, whereby the power of the republican communist parties was strengthened at the expense of that of the federal party organisation.

The republican communist parties were still united in their common will to remain in power, but at the same time were competitors as regards the distribution of resources among themselves. From 1969 republic party congresses preceded the federal congress, where decisions on policy were taken.¹⁸ The republic party congress stated

the republic's position on the issues at stake – to seek coalitions with other republics on a specific issue or to make a certain demand at the federal congress. Support from a strong opinion in the republic was an asset in these bargaining processes. In this way, the republican parties became increasingly dependent on the opinion of the inhabitants of their respective republics. This situation favoured national opinions in the republics. Nationalism and the republican parties' aims for greater autonomy went hand in hand. Over time, the republican parties became the representatives of the interests of their particular republics, and federal party meetings became a forum for conflicts and compromises between the republican parties. Nationalism, not Yugoslavism, gained momentum.

In conclusion, the structure of the federation did not make the development of pan-Yugoslav opinions impossible, but the actors in power, the Yugoslav communist party and its republican branches, hindered this through their political actions. In the end the only pan-Yugoslav organisation left was the army, which was also dependent on the communists' monopoly of power. It is obvious that the nationalists interpreted the conflicts concerning reforms in the country as zero-sum games. The perspective of whether the federation would turn into a confederation (victory for the Croats) or a unified state (victory for the Serbs) was always there. When the legitimacy of the communists subsequently vanished, all that remained were the national conflicts. No pan-Yugoslav organisations, which would have contested the nationalist interpretation of the situation, had developed.

Nationalist Defence of Legitimacy: The Holocaust as a Weapon

Being aware of the fact that national conflicts lurked in the background during the whole of Yugoslavia's existence, the communists had to find ways of suppressing nationalism. Positive counter-measures, such as encouraging spontaneous initiatives to pan-Yugoslav organisations, were too risky to rely on, as they could threaten the communist monopoly of power, as argued above. To retain their monopoly of political power, authorities in the republics had to restrict themselves to negative measures. However, it was not possible to pro-

hibit nationalism when at the same time the autonomy of the republics grew. The nationalist arguments undermined the nations' self-confidence as nations.¹⁹ Serbian arguments depicted the Croatian nation as inhuman and prone to committing atrocities, such as the actions of the Ustasha. Croatia and the other non-Serbian nations regarded all initiatives to centralise at least some functions in the federation as signs of Serbian attempts at gaining hegemony in the country.

Until 1967 Croatian nationalists felt as pariahs in the country, with no right to feel proud of their nationality. After that an agreement between Yugoslavia and The Vatican was concluded, which made Croatian nationhood more acceptable. Soon thereafter Croatian nationalism came to the fore in the form of a mass movement, the so-called Croatian Spring. The movement was suppressed by the communist leadership in 1972, when the Croatian communist party was purged of its nationalist members.

Serbian nationalists, in their turn, felt that their national existence was threatened by the increasing decentralisation of the country. They had no idea of how to preserve the dignity of their national identity if Yugoslavia could not be kept together – the Serbs in the other republics would be “abandoned,” and the achievements since the victory over the Ottomans would be lost. The construction of a federal Yugoslavia in the first place was perceived by Serbian nationalists as an insult to Serbian national identity – many Serbs regarded Montenegrins and Macedonians as Serbs. When in 1968 two regions in Serbia gained autonomous status, Serbian nationalists felt humiliated – theirs was the only republic with autonomous regions within its boundaries. The regions were multi-national Vojvodina in the north, with a notable Hungarian minority, and Kosovo, with a numerous Albanian population, in the south.²⁰ Against this background, the leadership of the republic of Serbia had every reason to prevent further weakening of the unity of Yugoslavia.

A strong nationalist opinion in Serbia considered it very important to maintain the Serbian identity among Serbs living in the various Yugoslavian republics. The Serbian authorities did not oppose these tendencies.²¹ With a Serb population in each republic, loyal to the preservation of Yugoslavia, Serbia's leadership had at least a

vehicle to use if the country's development tended towards further decentralisation.²² This structural phenomenon promoted a "nationalisation" of Serbian political culture in Yugoslavia. Another way of strengthening support for the preservation of Yugoslavia was to argue that its dissolution would entail danger for Serbs who lived in other republics than Serbia. As regards Croatia, the memory of the experiences of the Ustasha atrocities was awaked as a warning that similar actions could be committed again. By arguing that the Croats *as a nation* were inclined to commit Ustasha-like atrocities, Serbia's writers and other participants in the discussion reminded the Serb minority in Croatia of the Ustasha and implied that the Croats even now constituted a threat against them.²³ By association it was also a warning against Serbian assimilation to Croatian society and thus functioned to preserve Serbian identification among the Croatian Serbs.

Being attacked as a collective perpetrator, Croats responded by defending themselves.²⁴ As they could not deny the Ustasha guilt and responsibility in the Holocaust and the concomitant mass murder of Serbs, their defence took the form of arguing that the Serbian accusations were untrue, exaggerated, misinforming, and so on. The Serbs thereby gave the Croats an opportunity to avoid painful discussions on how to deal with the heritage of the Ustasha state as the common history and collective memory of the two nations. This also made some of Croatia's nationalists more susceptible to the Ustasha attitudes, which survived among circles in the Croatian diaspora. Connections between Croatia's nationalists and the diaspora were resumed during the nationalist revival in the 1970s, and also in the 1990s during the wars.²⁵

During the whole existence of Yugoslavia, the opposing goals of Serb and Croat nationalists comprised the political dynamics of the country. The argument that the Croatian nation was in essence identical with the Ustasha, was instrumental for Serbian political interests. However, as a consequence of the Croatian defence against these accusations, reflections within the Croatian community on the Ustasha's guilt and responsibility for the Holocaust and the mass killings of Serbs were hampered. To deny or diminish the Croatian involvement in the Holocaust was part of the defence of the legitimacy of Croatian national identification.

As has been shown, the conflict between Croatian and Serbian nationalists continued in socialist Yugoslavia, although it was not always openly admitted. This conflict did not concern competition about political influence; it was about national legitimacy and concerned the survival of the nations as such. The nations were legitimate as nations of the Yugoslav federation, as stated in the Yugoslav constitution. While the Serbs could argue that their legitimacy as a nation was secured through the federation's proclaimed Yugoslavism, for the Croats their own legitimacy as a nation could be eliminated through a decision on constitutional change. In their turn, Serbian nationalists perceived an eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia as a threat against their legitimacy as a nation.

No actors with interests in maintaining Yugoslavia as a country emerged during the whole period of the country's existence. The strongest forces in the dynamics of Yugoslav society turned out to be actors with opposing nationalist goals. The foundations of nationalist actions were the arguments in defence of their legitimacy as nations. By depicting the Croatian nation as responsible for the Ustasha atrocities, Serbian writers left no room for the Croats to do other than defend their nation and, by implication, the Ustasha. As a consequence, the Ustasha guilt was not generally discussed amongst Croatia's population as this would erase the legitimacy of their nation. Thus, the difficulties among Croats in admitting the Ustasha guilt were conditioned by the way the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was constructed and by the dynamics of political development during the following years.

The Ustasha Heritage and the Croatian Nation's "Other"

The definition of a nation implies that there are people who do *not* belong to the nation – there is an "Other" in contrast to the "Nation." The Croatian nation traces its roots to the seventh century, when the Croats claimed their autonomy as a people by allying themselves with the Catholic Church.²⁶ Likewise, the Serbs became aware of themselves as a people through the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Religion has ever since served as an ethnic marker for the Balkan peoples. When ideas of nationalism entered the discourse,

other markers developed, such as language and territorial continuity, but the religious boundaries were always implicit in the respective national identification.

The Churches had their own agendas as institutions, and they were competing for influence over people and territories. Eventually the territories under Habsburg rule became Catholic, while the rest of the Balkans became Orthodox. When the Ottomans successively conquered the Balkans in the 14th and 15th centuries, parts of the population converted to Islam in what today are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and the Sandžak. Competition and distrust between the various Christian Churches still exist and relations between Christendom and Islam are tense.

As we have seen, from a strictly national perspective the Ustasha heritage could be presented as both positive and negative. As Croatia's future president Tudjman put it: "The NDH [Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War] was not simply a quisling creation and a fascist crime; it was also an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian People."²⁷ However, from the perspective of relations to the "Other," the Serbs, this heritage has only negative connotations. In the name of the nation, the Ustashe engaged in brutal mass killings of the Serbs because they were Serbs – the "Other." In order for this to make sense, in order to argue that there was any reasonable reason for these massacres, a definition of the "Other" as evil had to be constructed. And it was.

In structural terms, both national and religious identities were carefully considered when decisions were made on how a Socialist Yugoslavia should best be organised and how to draw the boundaries between the republics.²⁸ The establishment of a Yugoslav federation was a compromise, intended to alleviate remaining national distrust among the population. The same purpose lay behind the definition of the nations as equally constituting peoples in Yugoslavia. Structurally defined, the various nations and nationalities²⁹ in Yugoslavia were different but equal – equal "Others" to one another.

Likewise, in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the Churches were allowed to work among their believers as long as they did not interfere in politics.³⁰ The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Muslim organisations soon came to an agreement with the state,

and over the years the Serbian Orthodox Church became financially dependent on state support. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was more reluctant. As the Pope is the highest authority among Catholics, the communists could not be sure of having total control over the Catholic Church. Moreover, this Church was openly anti-communist and there were Croatian Catholic priests who had been involved in Ustasha atrocities in the war, so there was a fundamental distrust between Yugoslavia's communist party and the Catholic Church. The traditional suspicions and competition between the Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox churches remained, but Yugoslavia's population was highly secular, and religion as such did not play any great role in most people's everyday lives. Therefore one could reasonably conclude that in Yugoslavia, once the war memories had been put into oblivion, the prospects of a smooth relationship between people, regardless of their respective religious backgrounds, seemed good.

There were reasons for animosities between Serbs and Croats as categories in Croatia, which could be characterised as examples of normal group competition. When the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established, Serbs were favoured with important societal posts because they had been loyal supporters of Josip Broz Tito – the leader of the partisan movement fighting the Germans and the Ustasha during the Second World War as well as the strong man in the communist party from the late 1930s and president of Yugoslavia 1953–1980 – while many Croats had been positive towards Croatian independence if not towards the Ustasha regime. These circumstances could explain the initial overrepresentation of Serbs in important posts in Croatia; an issue which was constantly debated during the whole existence of Yugoslavia. It was regarded by many Croats as still current and unfair, and complaints were continuously heard about this injustice. The issue of Serbian overrepresentation in Croatia's communist party has many dimensions;³¹ what is important here is that the perception remained, and with it also the interpretation.

While the Serbs were competitors to the Croats for attractive positions, there was nothing in the situation as such that required a depiction of them in derogatory terms. Competitors are in a sense equals – they compete with basically equal competence for the same

goal. Thus one might argue that the socio-economic and socio-political conflict between Croats and Serbs in Croatia by itself did not constitute a sufficient reason for engaging in the description of Serbs and Croats, respectively, in similar terms as during the Second World War. The competition between them was at most an additional factor, an argument and not a cause, in the development of the national distrust into grave conflict and war. The basic reason for this development lay elsewhere; that is, in the actions of nationalists in the country.

For the nationalists, the Croatian nation as such was in danger. The claim that Serbs were overrepresented and dominated influential posts was used as an argument to prove this. The perceived threat consisted of the idea of a strong connection between this population and the republic of Serbia, and that both worked for the annihilation of the Croatian nation. The Croatian nationalists' depiction of the Serbs as a collective constituting a threat against the Croatian nation was fertile ground for developing a picture of the Serbs as the "Evil Other." The national stereotypes from the 1930s and 1940s were not forgotten. In addition, the nationalists got support from the Catholic Church.

The Churches had an active interest in depicting members of the other church as bad and threatening, in order to motivate their abstention from engaging in ecumenical measures and to encourage their believers to take an active part in Church matters. The political dynamics in Yugoslavia promoted an alliance between the Churches and the nationalists in the respective republics.³² During the Second Vatican Council in 1962–1965 Yugoslavia and The Vatican reached an agreement and opened diplomatic relations in 1970.³³ This gave more freedom for the Croatian Catholic Church to act. For the Yugoslav communist party it meant a greater opportunity to influence the Church's policy.³⁴ But the Council advocated ecumenism between the Churches, which was not in the party's interest. The party feared that an ecumenical development might constitute a threat against the party's monopoly of power. Therefore the party encouraged mistrust between the two Churches. However, even without help from the party, distrust between them was deep: "From a Serbian Orthodox perspective 'true' ecumenism would have meant an excuse of the

Catholic Church for the atrocities of the Ustashe.”³⁵ Consequently, a description of Catholics and Orthodox adherents, respectively, in pejorative terms was allowed. Those within the respective Churches who preferred confrontation to ecumenism were thus strengthened and the Churches formed an alliance with the nationalist associations or, at least, worked in the same direction as these.

When, during the 1980s, nationalism gained momentum although nationalist expression within the party was not allowed, the Churches became willing mouthpieces for nationalist aspirations.³⁶ They took upon themselves the role of being the bearer of their respective nations, as they had done before in history. Thus a strong coalition formed between nationalist and Church interests among Croats as well as Serbs. The traditional nationalist stereotypes were easily revived.

In Croatia the coalition between nationalists and Catholics also worked as a coalition against unpleasant memories. Catholics as well as non-religious Croats had been involved in Ustasha activities, and neither party was inclined to reconsider its role in these. Thus the coalition was also strong as regards the attitude to the Ustasha, the Holocaust and the mass killings of Serbs.³⁷

The same pattern of structural conditions and political dynamics was at work in religion as in politics: Yugoslavia as a society consisted of politically weak Churches and a secular population, which made conditions easy for the development of an open atmosphere between people of various religious backgrounds. But the will of the dominant actors was directed at confrontation, religious as well as national. In a situation where opinions were mobilised, the “Others” were demonised. The consequences were disastrous.

The alliance between Church and nation favoured the resurrection of stereotypes from the Second World War. This was also done at full force towards the end of the 1980s during mobilisation before the war broke out and during the wars that followed. For the Croats, the Serbs became the “Other” of the Second World War. Mass media on both sides referred to the atrocities and injustices that had taken place during the War and the warring parties defined themselves in the conflict as Ustasha and Chetniks – they even wore uniforms resembling the original ones. Thus it is reasonable to argue that the Second World War was resumed in 1991. The same goals were proclaimed:

national independence and killing or expulsion of the enemy nation, and the wars were fought brutally and mercilessly. A new generation of perpetrators, victims and bystanders appeared with much the same attitudes as those held in the 1940s.

When it became obvious that the communist party had lost its legitimacy in all Yugoslavia, the nationalists took over and carried out the conflicts which had been latent during the whole existence of the country. These conflicts were zero-sum games and the first conflict concerned Yugoslavia's existence. The options were a centralised state or a dissolved state; no compromise was envisaged.

Politically, the dissolution of the country started when the Slovenian communist party, followed by the Croatian, left the extraordinary federal party congress in January 1990. The de facto dissolution followed after a short military confrontation in Slovenia. The second conflict concerned the division of former Yugoslav territory. The dissolution process involved a series of wars during the whole decade. All republics were involved in these except Macedonia; in Slovenia the war lasted about ten days. The conflict on the Croatian territories was solved in two steps. A war there between June and December 1991 ended in a cease-fire, and control of the territories which had been occupied by Serbian military groups was transferred to UN forces. In August 1995 Croatia re-conquered the territories through a short military action, the so-called *Operation Storm*. There were three parties to the conflict on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina together with Croatia's military forces; the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina with support from the former Yugoslav army (which de facto was Serbia's army by then), and the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had proclaimed the republic as an independent state in the dissolution process. The war went on in 1992–1995 and ended with the Dayton Accords.

The Ustasha Heritage and Croatian Self-Esteem

The mobilisation of Croatian opinion in defence of national independence as a political goal relied on the arguments and manifestations of opinion which had come to the fore in the Croatian Spring of the 1970s. Many political leaders from that time were also active in the 1990s. In 1989 political parties were allowed to form and

preparations were made for free democratic elections.³⁸ The Croatian diaspora also took part in the political campaigns, generously supporting the future president Tudjman and his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). In this process, Tudjman openly referred to the Ustasha as a positive force in the process of achieving Croatian independence. The Independent State of Croatia was referred to as a model for Croatian independence, Ustasha symbols were allowed to be used, and prominent Ustasha leaders were hailed as heroes.³⁹ The fact that the Ustasha were responsible for the Holocaust was of course problematic. The Tudjman regime (1990–1999) solved this problem by separating the heritage of the Ustasha regime into two parts: the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia was one thing, while the Holocaust was quite another matter. The Ustasha were heroes because they founded the Croatian state; the fact that they at the same time were perpetrators in the Holocaust process was something else. The latter was regrettable, of course, but should not overshadow the glorious deeds performed by these founders of the modern Croatian state.⁴⁰

Concomitantly, a historical revisionism concerning Ustasha's role in the Second World War and in the Holocaust was initiated, defending the organisation and denying or distorting facts about the atrocities which had been committed by its members. At the same time the conditions in both royal (1918–1941) and socialist (1945–1991) Yugoslavia and the crimes committed by these regimes, were presented in a way as to supposedly justify an ultra-nationalist policy and the Ustasha crimes.⁴¹ For instance, in his book *The Horrors of War* (1989) Franjo Tudjman quotes falsified documents to argue that in the Jasenovac camp the Serbs were killed not only by the Ustasha but also by the Jews.⁴² Citing the publicist Ante Ciliga's (1898–1992) idea that the Jews regarded themselves as the chosen people who were entitled to kill others to save themselves, Tudjman claims that the Jews in Jasenovac "took the initiative in preparing and provoking not only the individual but also the mass slaughter of non-Jews, Communists, Partisans and Serbs."⁴³

In January 1992 Croatia was internationally recognised as an independent state. In the process of its consolidation, Ustasha leaders were honoured with monuments; streets and other places were

renamed with references to the Ustasha, and Archbishop Stepinac was hailed as a national saint. Anti-fascist monuments, such as memorials to victims of the Ustasha and Nazi terror, were destroyed or removed. Symbols which had been used in the Ustasha state became established in the emblems of the Croatian nation and national state, such as the red-and-white checkerboard flag, and the name of the currency, the *kuna*, which was re-introduced in 1994.⁴⁴ There were rational reasons for this revisionism: among the Croatian diaspora were supporters of the Ustasha, and Croatia needed the financial help which was offered from them for Tudjman's political campaigns, as well as for getting weapons for the country's defence in the ongoing wars. There would probably not have been much help had the Ustasha been neglected or even criticised.

During the 1990s, Croatian national identification and national self-esteem became tightly bound to the Ustasha heritage and the Catholic Church. This was made possible because of the conflicting relationship between Croats and Serbs in socialist Yugoslavia. When the conflicts escalated into wars, help from the nationalistically inclined diaspora was badly needed. This made it almost inevitable that the Ustasha heritage became the foundation of the independent Croatian national state.

The Serbs – The “Other” from the Second World War

In socialist Yugoslavia, Croatia's Croats and Serbs lived in a situation of mutual suspicion, formed by events during the Second World War. Many Serbs distrusted the Croats because of the Ustasha's atrocities carried out upon the Serb minority in the Independent State of Croatia; and Serbia supported this distrust. Likewise, many Croats distrusted the Serbian population in the republic and were suspicious of the motives of those Serbs who held powerful posts in the republic. When nationalism grew in Croatia from the end of the 1960s onwards, this mutual distrust deepened.

In Croatia, the election in 1990 was won by the Croatian Democratic Union and Franjo Tudjman became president. As mentioned, Tudjman had been active in the debate on the Holocaust in the 1960s when he contested the figures given by the Yugoslav authorities on the number of dead in the Croatian camps. He was also the driving

force in the revisionism of the 1990s concerning the Ustasha and the Holocaust.

The Tudjman regime regarded the Serbian population in Croatia as a fifth column serving Serbia's interests. At the same time, Serbia's president Milosevic encouraged Croatia's Serbs to separate from Croatia, which some of them eventually did.⁴⁵ Croats and Serbs who worked to create a state which could be accepted by both peoples were overrun by the Tudjman regime.

In post-communist Croatia, the wording of the constitution was changed. From being the state of the Croats and Serbs living in Croatia, Croatia was now declared a Croatian national state. In the hitherto constitution, Croats and Serbs had together been the constituting nations of the republic; the Serbs were now regarded as a national minority in parity with Hungarians and Italians, who were indigenous minorities in Croatia. Although the 1990 constitution stated that "the members of other nations and national minorities, who are her [Croatia's] citizens, will be guaranteed equal status with citizens of Croatian nationality," the Serbs perceived this change as a degradation of their status into second class citizens.⁴⁶ Moreover, in order to keep their work positions, Serbs had to sign a document which declared their loyalty to the Croatian state. This was humiliating for the Serbs.

The Serbs were appalled by Tudjman's legitimization of the Ustasha symbols in 1990. This reminded them of the Ustasha mass killings of Serbs in the Second World War, and Tudjman knew this very well. He made no attempt to seriously convince the Serb minority that the Ustasha atrocities were not going to happen again. Neither did he ask for forgiveness for the Ustasha mass killings during the war. Instead he planned to convert Jasenovac into a memorial park, to commemorate "All Croatian war victims": to have "all victims of Communism" and the "victims of fascism" buried at Jasenovac side by side. These plans became known in 1995. There were also plans to reinter the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic at Jasenovac before Tudjman met a storm of criticism.⁴⁷ Thus, at the end of the 1980s relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia deteriorated considerably and the actions of the Croatian authorities in 1990 recreated the images which the nations held of one another during the Second World War, including the role of the Ustasha state in the Holocaust.

The Yugoslav Wars 1990–1995: “The Holocaust” Resumed

Tudjman's consolidating work had hardly begun before the war broke out in 1991. It lasted until 1995. In this war, the Serbian minority in parts of Croatia was the main enemy in Croatia's struggle for independence. The Serbs proclaimed the so-called “Republic of Krajina,” declaring that this republic was now independent of Croatia and intended to join Serbia. They got wholehearted support from Serbia, mostly verbally but also to some extent militarily. However, at the end of the war Croatia re-conquered the territory. Tudjman's regime was not only defending Croatia's status as an independent country. Croatian military forces were also fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina against Bosniak troops, aiming to incorporate the territory called Herceg-Bosna (with the city of Mostar) with Croatia. Not until after the year 2000 did Croatian authorities abandon their actions to incorporate Herceg-Bosna within its boundaries.

In effect, patterns of the Second World War were resumed. As a consequence of Tudjman's neglect in assuring Croatia's Serb minority that they were to be treated fairly in independent Croatia, and also as a consequence of the outbreak of war, the old images of Serbs and Croats as arch enemies were once again reactivated. The process started long before the war broke out. In the exchange of arguments during the war, the Serb enemy was characterised as racially and culturally inferior in the same way as during the Second World War. Moreover, Croatia used the Holocaust as a metaphor for Croatian suffering under the threat of attacks by Serbia,⁴⁸ thereby fulfilling the function of legitimating the feelings of hatred against the enemy. Arguments once used to legitimise the Ustasha atrocities and Holocaust actions were now used to legitimise the Croatian defensive actions in the war. As is evident from the political use of the Holocaust, Croatian writers and participants in the debates were fully aware of the extent of this genocide. At the same time the Ustasha's responsibility as a perpetrator in the Holocaust was denied.

The actions during the war reinforced the connection with the Second World War. Pictures from the latter were used in Serbian and Croatian war propaganda as documentation of atrocities committed by the parties in the ongoing war.⁴⁹ The fighting parties called them-

selves Ustashe and Chetniks, respectively; an indication that they identified themselves with the actors in the Second World War. In 1991 the presidents of Croatia and Serbia, Tudjman and Milosevic, agreed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between them according to an agreement which had been made between Yugoslavia and Croatia in 1939, the *Sporazum*.

Largescale killings and expulsions of Serbs occurred in Croatia during this war. General Ante Gotovina is accused by the UN International War Crime Tribunal in The Hague of having killed 150 civilian Serbs and expelling 150,000 Serbs from the Knin area during the so-called *Operation Storm* in 1995.⁵⁰ He is also accused of having planned, together with the late president Tudjman, to exterminate the Serb population of Krajina once and for all. After having re-conquered the territory, during three months Croatian soldiers burned down several villages in the territory.⁵¹ Among the Croats, the Ustasha attitude to the Serb enemy was revived and made legitimate, and, as a consequence, the *feelings* which lay behind the Ustasha atrocities were once again regarded as justified. The same emotional climate as had been prevalent during the Second World War developed once the war broke out.

War crimes took place. Croatian military leaders have been brought to trial and sentenced at the UN International War Crime Tribunal. However, there was great reluctance among the government to hand over the most important of the political and military leaders who were charged as war criminals; many of them were regarded as heroes and defenders of their country's independence. Some of them died while the tug of war was going on between the Tribunal and Croatia.

Yugoslavia's structure allowed a development towards peaceful relations between the peoples in the country – the nationalist parties of the Second World War had been defeated, the political influence of the churches was eliminated and the population was highly secularised. However, for the remaining nationalists among the population, the Second World War did not end in 1945. The peace and the communist regime constituted a ceasefire, during which the nationalists regrouped and waited for an opportunity to renew their actions to achieve national independence. The nationalists could profit from

the distrust among party members towards one another (they suspected one another of having secret nationalist agendas) and from the choice of the party's leadership *not* to encourage pan-Yugoslav organisations to form. Thereby the remaining nationalists could regroup informally, and eventually, as the legitimacy of the communists vanished, act according to their nationalist goals.

The way socialist Yugoslavia developed reinforced nationalist attitudes. For the Croats, the legitimacy of their national identity was threatened, which also made non-nationalists insecure about the position of Croatia in the federation. The Holocaust became a weapon in this conflict. In order to claim legitimacy as a nation and defend themselves against accusations that the Croatian nation was genocidal by nature, Croatian nationalists chose to deny the Ustasha responsibility in the Holocaust.

The actions of the Yugoslav communist party facilitated the establishment of an alliance towards the national goals between Croat nationalists and the Catholic Church, which proved strong in competition with the forces in the republic that advocated cooperation between Croats and Serbs. Furthermore, in the course of the wars 1991–1995, the Croatian nationalists' relationship with pro-Ustasha circles in the Croatian diaspora strengthened, as they had the same political goals. These circles gave valuable help to successfully fight the war.

The wars in the 1990s took the form of a continuation of the Second World War. The warring parties, their goals, and their attitudes towards one another were similar to those pursued during that war. Thus, with the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Second World War was finally ended as well. This means that the post-communist situation in former Yugoslavia is not wholly comparable to that of the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe. Under communism the East European states preserved their status as nationstates, and the legitimacy of the national identity of their nations was not questioned. Although the states' political freedom was reduced as they became satellite states to the Soviet Union, their governments were responsible for how the heritage of the Second World War and the Holocaust was dealt with. In contrast, in Yugoslavia, the battle between the nations in the federation continued parallel to the communist ruling of the state.

The Yugoslavian regime did not take responsibility for the heritage of the Holocaust and the atrocities committed during the Second World War. Instead, the regime allowed the Holocaust to become a weapon in the battle between the remaining nationalist forces inside and outside the communist party. The break-up of Yugoslavia fundamentally changed the context of the Second World War and the Holocaust in the historical cultures of the former states of the federation. The memory of the Holocaust is now the responsibility of the governments of Yugoslavia's successor states. For the Croats, does this constitute a blessing or a curse?

The Holocaust in Croatia: The Post-Communist Context

The post-communist conditions present a new situation for Croatia as regards both the relations to other countries and those inside the republic. Croatian national identity is now legitimate and Croatia is an uncontested national state. The goals for which the Ustasha heritage was mobilised are achieved. The structural reasons for the Holocaust being denied no longer prevail. The "Other" of the nation, the Serbs, no longer comprises a threat against Croatian national legitimacy. Serbs might still charge that the nature of the Croatian nation is genocidal, but this charge does not represent a threat against Croatian national legitimacy as it is no longer attached to the conflict on Croatia's future status. In the new context, as part of the international community, Croatia does not have to defend the legitimacy of the Croatian nation. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia has resulted in fundamentally new structural conditions for the position of the Ustasha heritage and Holocaust guilt in Croatian historical culture.

Before the dissolution, the creation of a Croatian national state was a common goal for virtually all Croatian actors.⁵² They accepted the Ustasha state as a model. With the national state as a fact, the Croatian actors no longer have a common goal. The task of the government is now at least two-fold: to realise the idea of the common national state into practical objectives and show that the national goal was worth fighting for, and to turn the population into a common political community, i.e. a population which supports the idea of living together in Croatia. The task of the various political parties

and interest groups, on the other hand, is to present their respective programmes of how to realise the objectives inherent in their vision of the common national state. In short, their task is to compete for contrasting visions of the nation.

In their competition for the winning concept of the national idea, the parties will use history and ideology to convince popular opinion. Having been a shared national model for the Croats, the Ustasha will now be treated as part of the history of each individual Croatian group. Consequently, the Ustasha and its responsibility for the Holocaust and mass killings of Serbs will be evaluated relative to the various subgroups which claim to belong to the Croatian nation – political parties, interest groups, organisations, associations and institutions. To the extent that these groups existed in the interwar period – were these groups, or individual members of them, involved in or associated with the Holocaust and other Ustasha crimes? These questions will have to be posed.

As regards how to solve the objective of making Croatia's citizens a political community, the task of reconciliation between the former enemies, Croats and Serbs, is inevitable. A true reconciliation requires a serious discussion of both the Holocaust and mass killings of Serbs. However, a *modus vivendi* between Croats and Serbs may be reached without any reconsideration of the past; the experiences of former Yugoslavia give ample evidence of this. Under the new circumstances, references to the Ustasha and the Holocaust have become an internal concern for Croatia and its inhabitants, and related groups in the Croatian diaspora. For the Croatian authorities the main concern is whether a discussion of the topic runs the risk of destroying the cohesion among Croats in the country. There are probably resourceful groups with strong interests in maintaining the Tudjman solution to the moral problem. Likewise, it is likely that many people among the public at large are not interested in discussing the Holocaust or, for that matter, moral questions concerning actions during the recent war. One indication of this is the strong reactions of people against the idea that those who held responsible posts during the war should be delivered to the UN International War Crime Tribunal in the The Hague.

In relation to other countries, Croatia is no longer part of a larger

unit, as was the case when it was a part of the Yugoslav federation. As an independent state, it is free to choose to join the European Union or not. At the end of Tudjman's regime it seemed uncertain whether the country would finally choose to join Europe – Tudjman declared that Croatia was European in contrast to Serbia, but he failed to consolidate a democratic system in his country. Under the new regime in 2000 Croatia clearly opted for joining the European Union, and took measures to live up to the standards proposed by the Union.

In contrast to the previous communist pressure, the pressure from the European Union is voluntarily chosen as a consequence of Croatia's own political aspirations. Popular support in Croatia for joining the Union might vary over time, but the prospects of a successful future outside the European Union seem poor, which makes it fairly certain that the country as a whole wants to comply with the Union's conditions for membership. Therefore this circumstance might be considered as a structural condition as regards Croatia's future.

In the member states of the European Union, discussions on how to relate to the memory of the Holocaust have been going on for decades. The Holocaust is recognised as a common European traumatic memory, and it is at the heart of many remaining internal and inter-state tensions among Europe's peoples. The discussions have developed in a peaceful and prosperous Europe where the postwar generations are without first-hand experiences of war. In Croatia the structural conditions for a serious discussion of this memory have recently become favourable; however, the experiences of the recent wars may have created conditions which will postpone the development of a corresponding discussion in Croatia. Fresh traumas from the wars in 1991–1995, and the question of personal guilt in these wars will probably be decisive as regards what debates will be initiated.

The situation after the recent war is different from that in 1945. While, after 1945, many refugees from Croatia had been supporters of the Ustasha and continued to pursue their fascist goals after emigrating, many of those who left the country in the 1990s did so in opposition to Tudjman's authoritarian, anti-democratic regime. Thus there is a change in the composition of the Croatian diaspora, which is likely to have a positive influence on Croatia's development in a

democratic direction. Many academic contacts have been established between Croatia and countries all over the world to an extent which was not possible during communism. These factors are likely to promote discussions on all kinds of challenging problems; among them is the problem of the Ustasha, the Holocaust and the mass killings of Serbs. An additional condition for such discussions to come about is the fact that Croatia in the 21st century is a democracy.

For Croatian nationalists in Yugoslavia, as the national conflict developed, the Ustasha regime and the Independent State of Croatia came to represent the ideal of the national state. It is now presented as the foundation of the post-communist Croatian state. In a European context this could be a disturbing factor. There is reason to question whether the Tudjman solution to this dilemma – the Ustasha committed certain reprehensible deeds but their creation of an independent Croatia was positive – will be a convincing argument for a European opinion to accept the organisation's status as a heroic movement. For many Europeans, a recognition by the Croatian authorities of the Ustasha guilt as a fully responsible perpetrator of the Holocaust, on one hand, and the mass killings of Serbs on the other, is required, in order for the Croatian nation to gain dignity.

The Holocaust in Croatia: The Democratic Context

As we have seen from this analysis, new structures do not necessarily mean that actors will pursue new goals; even new actors are dependent on whether the goals of their predecessors remain goals or not. Croatian nationalists as well as the Catholic Church in Croatia have a common wish to retain the revisionist picture of events, which was the official history during Tudjman's regime. Many rich and influential people among the nationalists will certainly invest their resources in measures to maintain revisionist history writing, thereby preserving the Croatian self-esteem which served them well during the decades of national conflict. This will not be in tune with European discussions on the Holocaust and the question of perpetrators, victims and bystanders, but experiences from other countries tell us that it takes some generations before such questions are posed.

While the alliance between Catholicism and nationalism was highly instrumental for the successful achievement of Croatian na-

tional independence, this situation has changed due to the new circumstances. The unifying goal of achieving national independence is gone; instead various competing programmes for consolidating the state politically and economically are put forward. The political parties in Croatia accept the new rules of the political game, i.e. democracy. Even the Croatian Democratic Union is developing towards a European Christian Democratic Party.⁵³ The Catholic Church still represents Croatian national identity, and Catholic values are guiding social life in the state. Abortion is illegal and women's role as mothers is emphasised. Whether Catholicism is a valuable partner for achieving political goals or not is dependent on public opinion. To the extent that most Croats are Catholic believers, Catholic values are political assets for a political party; otherwise not. As we know, Croatia was a fairly secular republic and it is not a far-fetched idea to assume that, during the conflict at the end of Yugoslavia's existence, many Croats demonstrated adherence to Catholicism as a means of advertising their nationalistic aspirations rather than their belief in God. In the new circumstances, therefore, the floor is open for negotiations concerning cooperation between the Catholic Church and the individual political parties. It can be assumed that a secularly based Croatian nationalism will eventually develop parallel to the Catholic one.

A central issue for the new state is to make all its inhabitants loyal citizens – in social science terms, they should constitute the political community of the state. This requires that reconciliation be achieved between Croats and Serbs in the state; otherwise there is the risk that the Serbs will always be suspected of being disloyal to the state. As far as these relations are concerned, the first decade of the 21st century is a favourable time for reconciliation. Serbia cannot offer any better alternatives for Croatia's Serbs than a Croatia with membership in the European Union in sight. The socio-economic conditions in Serbia are poor and Serbia has no resources to influence the political conditions or to support any resistance from the Serbian minority against the Croatian authorities. In short, Serbia has no resources to once more claim that the Serb minority in Croatia is part of Serbia's project of creating a great Serbia from all parts of former Yugoslavia where Serbs lived. The Serbs who remain in Croatia will have to

regard themselves as Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality, with guaranteed minority rights according to the rules of the UN and the European Union.

While a *modus vivendi* may well be reached without reconciliation, it is necessary to address the problem attached to the Holocaust in Croatia, as well as the war crimes committed in the recent wars, if the ambition is to develop a relationship between the two groups built on trust. In such an operation, the Ustasha heritage as an ideal for the Croatian state constitutes an obstacle to mutual understanding, and it will most certainly also be challenged. The key to opening a reconciliation process is to question the Ustasha status as the “founding fathers” of the Croatian national state. The reason for questioning is the Ustasha guilt and responsibility for the Holocaust and the mass killings of Serbs during the Second World War. This will require a re-evaluation of the bases of Croatian self-esteem as a nation.

Notes

1. See e.g. Tomislav Dulic, *Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941–42*, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Historica Upsaliensia 2005, pp. 81–83, 254–281, and David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 2002, pp. 134–135.
2. See for instance Ivo Goldstein, *Croatia. A History*, London: Hurst & Company 1999. See also Ivo Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, Zagreb: Novi liber 2001.
3. Franjo Tudjman attracted worldwide attention and a lot of debate in the 1970s after having published, as head of the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement of Croatia in Zagreb, much lower figures for deaths in the camps than the official numbers so far. See Marcus Tanner, *Croatia. A Nation Forged in War*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1997, pp. 152, 190, 195–196, 205.
4. See Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein, “Revisionism in Croatia: The Case of Franjo Tudjman,” *East European Jewish Affairs*, Vol. 32, No 1, 2002, p. 52.
5. Maja Brkljacic & Holm Sundhaussen, “Symbolwandel und symbolischer Wandel. Kroatiens Erinnerungskulturen,” *Osteuropa*, No 53, Jahrgang 7, 2003, pp. 933–948.
6. The Yugoslav nations constituting the federation were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and, from 1968, the Bosnian Muslims, now called the Bosniaks. Gale Stokes, “From Nation to Minority. Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 52, No 6, November/December 2005, pp. 3–4.
7. Vjekoslav Perica, “The Sanctification of Enmity. Churches and the Construction of Founding Myths of Serbia and Croatia,” in Pål Kolstø (ed.), *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, London: Hurst & Company 2005, p. 136. Perica documents how these myths are constructed by the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, respectively, and how they were linked to existing older national myths.

8. Patriarch Germanus Djoric in the 1980s or 1990s; Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 154. Cf. the title of a book by Vladimir Dedijer, published in English in 1990: *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian massacre of the Serbs during the Second World War*. Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 139 (footnote 28).
9. Aloysius Stepinac became Archbishop of Zagreb in 1937 and was head of the Catholic Church in Croatia. He welcomed the Ustasha leadership but became increasingly critical of the regime and its brutality. He was sentenced as an enemy collaborator by the communist regime in 1946 and became the symbol of the Catholic Church's resistance against Communist Yugoslavia. Stepinac became Cardinal in 1952. His role in the Independent State of Croatia is still a controversial issue.
10. These feelings were strengthened by the Yugoslav regime's suspicions and hard politics against practising Catholics, especially priests. See Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945*, London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press 1979, chapter 8. See also Klaus Buchenau, "What Went Wrong? Church–State Relations in Socialist Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 33, No 4, December 2005, p. 555.
11. Bruce MacDonald 2002, chapter 6.
12. Bruce MacDonald 2002, chapters 3–8.
13. Tomislav Dulic 2005, chapter 9.
14. Gale Stokes 2005, pp. 3–4.
15. Yugoslavism as a political campaign was abandoned by the party already in 1964. See Pedro Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963–1983*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984, chapter 3, especially pp. 55–56. However, the idea did not die out; attempts were made – in vain – to revive it later on, e.g. when the constitution of 1974 was introduced. See Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*, London: Hurst & Company, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs 1977.
16. One example is Rudolf Bicanic, who held the Chair of Economic Policy in the Law Faculty of Zagreb University 1946–1968. See Rudolf Bicanic, *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1973, pp. vii–viii. Many communists were also nationalists, e.g. the Croatian communist party leader Andrija Hebrang. See Marcus Tanner 1997, pp. 164–165, 181–182.
17. I have elaborated this analysis in Kerstin Nyström, "Jugoslaviens upplösning 1990 var kommunisternas eget verk," *Multiethnica* 21–22, October 1997, pp. 20–21.
18. Pedro Ramet 1984, p. 76.
19. See Pedro Ramet 1984, pp. 107, III–II5.
20. Pedro Ramet 1984, pp. 81–83; Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 211.
21. Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 210–215.
22. In the dissolution process, Serbia encouraged the Serbs in all republics to support its policy. This strategy was successful in Montenegro, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but failed in Macedonia.
23. For instance, in 1986 the Belgrade historian Vasilije Krestic published a study about the genesis of the idea of genocide in Croatia, seeing its roots in Croatian culture and religion. Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 153. Serbian arguments on the genocidal nature of the Croatian nation also borrowed arguments from Holocaust studies on the role of "ordinary men," such as Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Knopf 1996). Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 140. See also Bruce MacDonald 2002, pp. 149–150.

24. See Bruce MacDonald 2002, p. 166.
25. Pedro Ramet 1984, chapter 7, especially p.137; Marcus Tanner 1997, chapter 13 and pp. 221–223; Bruce MacDonald 2002, pp. 98–103.
26. Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 135.
27. This occurred at the first meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community. Gale Stokes 2005, p. 10. The meeting took place on June 17, 1989; Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 221.
28. See e.g. Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York: East Central European Studies of Columbia University 1968.
29. In Yugoslavia, the nations were Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. So-called nationalities were e.g. Hungarians (Magyars), Albanians, Italians, Czechs and Slovaks. The 1974 constitution defines these *narodnosti* as “members of nations whose native countries border on Yugoslavia,” Gale Stokes 2005, p. 18 (footnote 3).
30. For relations between the Catholic Church and the Yugoslav authorities, see Klaus Buchenau 2005, and Stella Alexander 1979.
31. In 1980, the Serbian paper *NIN* admitted that Serbs comprised 24 per cent of the Croatian party and a majority of the Croatian police force, even though only 14 per cent of Croatia’s inhabitants were Serbs. Pedro Ramet 1984, p. 173. In 1971 citizens of the Croatian Republic constituted about 20 per cent of the Yugoslav party; Croatia contained 21 per cent of Yugoslavia’s population. A decade later, only 16 per cent of Croatia’s inhabitants were party members; Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 204.
32. Klaus Buchenau 2005, pp. 547, 552–553.
33. Stella Alexander 1979, pp. 245–248.
34. Klaus Buchenau 2005, p. 556.
35. Klaus Buchenau 2005, pp. 556–557. The Orthodox patriarch several times implicitly invited the Croat episcopate to issue a public apology for crimes against the Serbs in the Second World War. Vjekoslav Perica 2005, p. 153.
36. Klaus Buchenau 2005, pp. 558–559.
37. For the agenda of the Catholic Church, see Klaus Buchenau 2005, and Vjekoslav Perica 2005.
38. Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 221.
39. Marcus Tanner 1997, pp. 221–223.
40. Maja Brkljacic & Holm Sundhaussen 2003.
41. Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein 2002, p. 52.
42. Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein 2002, p. 57. Through a detailed source criticism the authors disclose the way Tudjman distorts and even falsifies his material.
43. Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein 2002, p. 60. The citation by Tudjman is given by the authors. See also Bruce MacDonald 2002, pp. 167–168.
44. Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein 2002, p. 63. Marcus Tanner 2002, pp. 223–224 remarks: “In fact the old chequerboard symbol had been the official coat of arms of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and had faded from use on election posters and other propaganda only in the 1950s. No matter. The Serbs had now decided it was the footprint of the Ustashe.”
45. Those who seceded were the Serbs in the territories called *Krajina*. See Marcus Tanner 1997, pp. 212–213, 234. More than half the Serbs in Croatia lived in the developed and urban parts of the country – among them and the Croats there were attempts at finding peaceful solutions to the conflict. Gale Stokes 2002, p. 5.

46. Bruce MacDonald 2002, p. 103. See also Gale Stokes 2005, pp. 3–6; Marcus Tanner 1997, pp. 230–231.
47. Bruce MacDonald 2002, p. 168.
48. Bruce MacDonald 2002, chapter 4.
49. See e.g. Marcus Tanner 1997, p. 233.
50. *Upsala Nya Tidning*, December 9, 2005.
51. *Upsala Nya Tidning*, December 13, 2005 (source: TT-AP The Hague).
52. One should not forget, though, that a substantial minority of Croats and Serbs wanted to postpone the declaration of Croatian independence until a common understanding had been reached between Croats and Serbs. See Marcus Tanner 1997, pp. 227–228.
53. M. Steven Fish & Andrej Krickovic, “Out of the Brown and into the Blue: The Tentative Christian-Democratization of the Croatian Democratic Union,” *East European Constitutional Review*, Spring/Summer 2003.

JOHAN DIETSCH

Ukraine and the Ambiguous Europeanisation of the Holocaust

Incorporating the Final Solution in a Post-Soviet Historical Culture

Rabbi David Kahane began to write a diary while in hiding in the palace of Ukrainian Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi in Lviv in September 1943. Kahane had witnessed the collaboration of Ukrainian policemen in liquidating the city's ghetto inhabitants and the Janowska concentration camp massacre. Whilst in hiding, he pondered the difficulty of reconciling the two sections of the Ukrainian people, i.e. Ukrainians and Jews. On the one hand, Ukrainians had always vented their wrath against the Jews. All the Ukrainian national heroes and every national reawakening and uprising throughout history had been connected with "spilling rivers of Jewish blood." On the other hand, Kahane remarked that there were noble figures, such as the Metropolitan, who helped the Jews by hiding them. How was it possible to reconcile these two opposites, he asked himself.¹

Kahane not only pre-empted future discussions on the Holocaust in Ukraine but identified the problem of how any subsequent society could make sense of the seemingly senseless murder of Jews during the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the Holocaust has come to rest uneasily in history. It has been considered an "event at the limits," which tests our traditional conceptual and representational categories. Jean-François Lyotard found a particularly striking metaphor when he compared Auschwitz to an earthquake that destroyed all seismographic devices. It cannot therefore be measured and represented within available sign systems. The destruction of the European Jews left only a powerful yet imprecise trace of its magnitude.² Nonetheless, or perhaps because of its indefinite character, it has become

a common symbol of absolute evil; a sign that has come to represent Europe itself, turning the metonymical Auschwitz into a negative image of the imagined future European culture.³ Perhaps it is precisely the instability, uneasiness and perceived inherent character of the Holocaust as an “event at the limits” that has prompted the Council of Europe to proclaim that understanding and interpretation of it is one of the major stumbling blocks in fostering a European dimension in the minds of younger generations.⁴

In the Soviet Union there was very little effort put into reconciling the opposite Ukrainian and Jewish experiences of the war. The Holocaust as well as Jews were all but absent in official interpretations of the Second World War, while many Ukrainians, either collectively or individually, were branded as fifth-columnists and collaborators. However, the image of Ukrainians welcoming the *Wehrmacht* or actively helping them was not merely confined to Soviet accounts. Renowned Holocaust historians in the West such as Raul Hilberg and Leni Yahil have not only claimed that Ukrainians awaited the German forces as liberators, but also that they participated in various direct actions against Jews and in the Holocaust.⁵

It is hardly an overstatement to claim that relations between Ukrainians and Jews had been strained for a long time prior to the Holocaust. It is retrospectively easy to single out a past filled with antisemitic policies, pogroms and mutual suspicion stretching at least from the early sixteenth century to the present.⁶ Serious tension, however, mounted during the final decades of the twentieth century as interest, investigations and research into the Holocaust increased. Ukrainians living in Ukraine as well as in the West began to figure prominently in studies and investigations. To many Ukrainians outside Soviet Ukraine, war-crimes investigations confirmed their notions that Jews as well as Soviet historians had distorted the role of Ukrainians during the Second World War. They felt unjustly lumped together and branded as collaborators or, even worse, as perpetrators. In an effort to counteract the perceived stereotypes, Ukrainians in North America advanced the brutal way in which ethnic Ukrainians were treated during occupation as a basic proof that the vast majority did not cooperate with the occupying forces. Even if some Ukrainians might have cooperated, they were perceived as having

had good reasons: Jews were thought to have served as members of the Bolshevik secret police, The Cheka, or as Commissars in the Red Army, and therefore considered partly responsible for the Ukrainian animosity towards them.⁷ Assistance in the war-crime cases by the Soviet Union simply proved to many observers that most accusations and allegations were based on mere fabrication. Many tried to deflect allegations of antisemitism and responsibility for pogroms by pointing to the errors of labelling everything that happened in Ukraine as Ukrainian.⁸

In the sovereign Ukrainian state that emerged from under the rubble of the shattered Soviet Union, the elaboration of a new, feasible national history became one of the chief objects for historians. Throughout the 1990s, however, this process coexisted with a proclaimed aspiration to integrate the country into "Europe," often understood as integration into European institutions and its universalistic culture.⁹ The "wave of national myth making" and the turn towards the nation and its credentials in independent Ukraine have been explained as a result of interpreting diaspora scholarship as the norm for historical and social science scholars.¹⁰ Historians in Ukraine have found the works of North American Ukrainian studies particularly attractive. Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak has claimed that the paramount role played by the diaspora in both financing research institutes and influencing ideas, theories and methods of research, was specific to the Ukrainian situation after independence.¹¹ Diaspora intellectuals have thereby projected onto their colleagues in Ukraine the diaspora community's agenda. When their positions are reflected back at them, they perceive it as the genuine position of Ukraine's intellectuals working with the same topics and arriving at the same conclusions.¹²

The continuous obsession with refuting Soviet and Russian interpretations of Ukrainian history and promoting a national interpretation has produced a curious situation. Historians in the diaspora, and both historians and the general public in Ukraine, have unconsciously nurtured these interpretations as alternatives with which, albeit implicitly, to enter into dialogue or debate. Semioticians Jurij Lotman and Boris Uspenskij argued that what is past does not pass away. Radical breaks are not so radical, since cultures continue to harbour

“mechanisms that regenerate the culture of the past.” Even if episodes formerly interpreted as positive are re-interpreted as negative, they continue to be part of history.¹³ In the Ukrainian case such reversals and persistence are highly visible. Today Ukraine is highlighting the same episodes of the past as the Imperial Russian and Soviet interpretations deemed important, albeit with different conclusions and perceived lessons.

Still, the Soviet past has not only remained an alternative, but also an unresolved history. At once it is a history in which to take pride and sorrow. Attempts to raise the issue in the media have been discredited as eccentric obsessions with history. George Grabowicz has argued that there has existed “a great amnesia project;” a consistent and successful programme of forgetting. Not examining, not rewriting and not rethinking the Soviet past have been the norm. According to Grabowicz, the explanation to this phenomenon is both simple and obvious: since the old nomenclature remained in charge politically, they hardly encouraged or supported any programmes of rethinking or re-evaluating a past in which they were intimately involved. Consequently, the Soviet past and Soviet history have remained a highly ambivalent legacy.¹⁴

Expressed somewhat differently, it is possible to discern three different and important factors in Ukrainian historical culture: nationalisation, Europeanisation and a lingering Soviet legacy. These find different expressions in different parts of society and in different historical discourses. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a certain part of Ukrainian history in which all three are observable, namely in the



The huge Mat Rodina towering on the banks of the Dnepr River in Kiev, in memory of the Soviet sufferings during The Great Patriotic War. Photo: Ulf Zander.

history of the destruction of the European Jews, or the Holocaust. The object of this chapter is to outline how this historical event has been incorporated into, and has been situated within, Ukrainian historical culture. At the centre of study is the new history textbooks produced after independence. History textbooks reflect the concepts contained in curricula sanctioned by the authorities. They should be considered as vehicles carrying broader cultural messages and performing a social function; enforcing and reinforcing cultural homogeneity as well as promoting shared attitudes and cultural norms. This is especially true in the Ukrainian case, since the authorities have put great faith in the possibilities of a national education. At the same time, however, textbooks should not merely be considered as objects reflecting a society. They are also highly influential artefacts in a historical culture.¹⁵

The Ministry of Education, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, along with publishers, run competitions for new textbooks each year. It is important to note the inclusion of scholars and experts in the review process of history textbooks in Ukraine. According to Nancy Popson, this has helped to ensure that the changes in the representations of Ukraine's history at the scholarly level have been translated to secondary school texts, albeit to varying degrees. Once accepted, the textbooks approved by the Ministry are accepted for use across the whole of Ukraine. This of course limits societal input into the process, leaving ethnic, cultural, or regional groups fewer means by which to voice concern over content. On the other hand, it ensures that all the country's pupils in various grades receive the same instruction from the same text, heightening the impact of national socialisation.¹⁶

From Soviet to Ukrainian Nationalisation

The Ukrainian historian Yohanan Petrovsky-Stern has argued that one of the most astounding phenomena in modern Ukrainian thought is the radical reassessment of "the Jew," especially after independence. In his opinion, the sudden rapprochement can either be viewed as a "by-product" of the new Western and European orientation of the country, that is to say as stemming from a tendency to appease public

opinions in the West, or as the “whim of an insignificant group of national-minded intellectuals who apparently had no serious impact on modern Ukrainian political decision-making.” Whatever the case, President Leonid Kravchuk repeatedly emphasised the government’s strong will to combat antisemitism, and acknowledged the government’s share in the guilt of the Holocaust at the fiftieth anniversary of the Babi Yar massacre. Ten years later, President Leonid Kuchma reiterated his predecessor’s declaration.¹⁷ The current President, Victor Yushchenko, has similarly pledged that “the history of Holocaust must be learned and extensively explained so that a similar tragedy would never happen again” and that the Ukrainian government were doing their best to educate the young about it, so that “inter-ethnic conflicts” could be prevented.¹⁸

Still, political statements should not be regarded as necessarily reflecting real existing conditions. A recent study on what Ukrainian tenth- and eleventh-grade students know about the Holocaust concluded that most were at least informed about it, or rather about the extensive murder of the Jews in Europe during the war. Nearly all students who participated in the study demonstrated repulsive attitudes and condemned the Holocaust as a negative historical experience, even though the overwhelming majority had a vague idea, at best, about antisemitism. Most importantly, however, the study concluded that the students had to create an “independent public discourse” of their own, since there was no official “model at hand.”¹⁹ This conclusion is not only misleading, but also based on a naïve notion that it is possible to convey one model of the Holocaust based on professional scholarship. In fact, there is no single model in Ukrainian history textbooks to which students can relate, gain information from and make sense of the destruction of European Jewry, but two somewhat different models. However, these narratives do not correspond with what might be labelled a European or internationally accepted interpretation of the Holocaust.²⁰

Even though the Holocaust was made a required topic as late as in the 2001 Educational Programme for Upper Secondary School, issued by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education, references to the Jewish tragedy during the Second World War found their way into the first new history textbooks dealing with Ukrainian history, pub-

lished after independence. This was of course a significant departure from Soviet textbook practice and general ideology, which incorporated the Jewish experience into the epic suffering of the entire Soviet population, ignoring any uniqueness of it.²¹ This treatment originated in both the “patriotic” orientation of Soviet education and in the “anti-cosmopolitan,” and later “anti-Zionist,” campaigns which, in essence, amounted to state-supported antisemitic policies pursued both in domestic and foreign politics. In short, it is possible to argue that the destruction of the European Jews was targeted by nationalisation at the same time as antisemitism permeated Soviet society.²²

The Second World War became a symbol of patriotism, sacrifice and heroism and validated the Soviet system.²³ It became a watershed in the history of the Soviet Union; a history inscribed in society, in monuments and street names to an unparalleled extent. If the October Revolution was a founding myth, the Great Patriotic War sustained it until the very end. The war turned into a cult, in Nina Tumarkin’s words.²⁴ As such it not only became institutionalised to an unprecedented degree, but also closely guarded against any deviant interpretations. In the official interpretation of the war, emphasis was placed on the invaders’ strivings for political, administrative and economic domination. One textbook provides a striking example:

The assault and robbery of the Soviet Union, which was based on German fascist imperialism, was proved by history to be on the whole unjust and a war of plunder. The stipulated goal was the destruction of the socialist state and reconfiguration of its territory to house landowners and capitalists, liquidation of national sovereignty and repression of the Soviet people.²⁵

The driving forces were presented as imperialistic ambitions and a battle over natural resources, as well as other economic assets. No space was allotted to different experiences; those who perished defending the motherland were all Soviet citizens. Similarly, the six-volume official history of the war reveals a complete absence of references to Jews as well as antisemitism.²⁶ Simply mentioning Jews in the new Ukrainian history textbooks should thus be viewed as a considerably different approach compared with Soviet ones. However, the various mentions and allusions to both Jews and the Holocaust

are anchored in an ambiguous historical culture often preoccupied with the Ukrainian nation.

Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Koval has argued that Ukrainian independence made it possible for Ukrainian historians “to leave the swamp of dogmatism” that had prevailed under Soviet rule. The new-found scholarly freedom made possible reconsideration of the genocide of the Ukrainian Jews during the Second World War. However, Koval emphasised that “the extermination of the Jews was just part of the Holocaust that all Ukrainian people went through.”²⁷ Thus, while not ignoring the Jewish fate altogether, Koval instead stressed that Nazi German occupational policies, and in fact the Holocaust, were something the whole Ukrainian people suffered. The Jewish tragedy was only part of the national tragedy inflicted upon Ukraine; an interpretation concurred with by many Ukrainian historians and history textbooks in present-day Ukraine.

The narrative on the Second World War, present in textbooks on Ukrainian history published after independence, begins with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, under which the Red Army occupied the areas of present-day western Ukraine. Often cartoons from the British contemporaneous press, depicting the pact as a marriage between Hitler and Stalin, or them marching side by side wearing similar uniforms, are used to convey a message that puts both dictators on equal footing.²⁸ The underlying reasons and motivations behind the attack are ascribed to German efforts to colonise “the East.” However, peculiar to the “fascists” who occupied Ukraine was their belief in the possibility of improving humankind; a practice which they, after occupation of the countries in East Central Europe, intended to spread throughout the world, the reader is informed. “The New Order” in Central European civilisation was intended to be built on slave labour and the principle of the supremacy of the German race. As the eastern territories were absorbed, the methods of maximum “purification” of local inhabitants, whom the German “master race” called “defect people,” commenced. The occupiers introduced a “regime of terror and violence” in Ukraine as well as other areas of the Soviet Union. The logic and purpose of this regime was a plan devised by Hitler, which consisted of colonisation amounting to complete domination of the political, administrative and economic

spheres. However, wide-scale resistance from populations in occupied territories hindered the occupiers from immediately realising their plans.²⁹

In all essentials, the logic of the Nazi German attack on Ukraine and the Soviet Union has remained remarkably similar to previous accounts: a colonising empire, driven by hunger for land, with a pronounced desire to conquer the agrarian fertile lands in Ukraine.³⁰ Prominence is also given the occupiers' pronounced goal of exterminating the people inhabiting the land to the east, or more specifically the territory of present-day Ukraine. In Soviet interpretations these people were always presented as Soviet citizens, while the new Ukrainian narrative is both more vague and precise at the same time. To colonise Ukraine the Nazi German forces had to rid the area of "lower races," often explained as Ukrainians, Russians and Jews, i.e. the three most numerous ethnic groups living in Ukraine before the war.

One textbook provides a vivid account of the occupiers' harsh regime in practice. During "the 103 weeks of the occupation, each Tuesday and Friday military and civilian residents of various ethnic identities were shot at Babi Yar, primarily Jews. Virtually every Ukrainian city had its own Babi Yar. In the first months of the occupation a total of 850,000 Jews fell victim to the Nazis." In total, the reader is informed, almost four millions perished in Ukraine during the war. A little more than a million of these were civilians.³¹ Around 150 concentration camps – "factories of death" – and 50 ghettos were built in Ukraine in order to exterminate the population, but other methods were used as well. At the beginning of the occupation "special units" (*Einsatzgruppen*) of the SS murdered 800,000 Jews. "In Kiev, as early as during the two first days of occupation, 33,000 people were murdered at Babi Yar."³²

Unlike previous Soviet treatment of the destruction of civilians in general and Jews in particular, the new history textbooks differentiate between the victims. The targets of the German racial policy are now described as either the Slavic population in general or specified as Ukrainians, Russians and Jews. Even though this differentiation is a departure from Soviet treatments, prominence is implicitly given to Ukrainian victims. Jews are portrayed as targets for destruction only

at the beginning of the occupation. There is no information given about what happened to the Jews prior to 1941 in the rest of Europe, about antisemitic racial policies or about what happened to the Jewish population after the first months of occupation. Not a single clue is provided to answer the question why the Jews were targeted, other than that they happened to live in what today is Ukraine. Furthermore, the Jewish victims are implicitly deemed less important, though not marginal, since their total number is estimated at around four million.

As noted, it is acknowledged that Jews were targeted for destruction and that around 800,000 lost their lives in the beginning of the Nazi German occupation. It is also acknowledged that out of the four million who perished in Ukraine during the war, a million were “civilians.” Either the Jews made up a majority of the civilian population who perished or they are not included as civilian casualties at all. It is reasonable to assume that the Jews are treated as a separate category of victims, since making them the majority of civilian casualties would diminish the impact of Nazi German occupation policies directed against Ukrainians.

The narrative of the destruction of European Jewry in history textbooks provides little or no indication as to why Nazi Germany attacked Ukraine, other than their hunger for fertile land and plan for a new world order. The meaning or sense of the story can therefore best be described as an absence of the Holocaust, shifting focus instead towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. Since neither the term “Holocaust” nor an acknowledgement that Jews were particularly targeted by Nazi German forces is present, it is perhaps best to talk about a non-use of the Holocaust. That is to say, there seems to be a deliberate and ideological adaptation according to which the topic is actively ignored.³³ By making Ukraine and Ukrainians the centre of the narrative in the destruction of the European Jewry, the historical event is implicitly nationalised. This position was clearly expressed by Victor Yushchenko, then Prime Minister of Ukraine, at the *Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust* in January 2000, when he said:

The hard fate of the Ukrainian nation scattered it throughout the world. Ukrainians have lived through wars and famines as well as Stalin’s purges. Various empires seized Ukrainian land. There were times when even

the Ukrainian language and culture had been denied. That is why Ukrainians understand the ordeal of the Jews so well [...] [M]illions of Ukrainians [...] passed through all circles of the Holocaust hell.

At the same time as this speech can be viewed as a clear expression of the nationalisation of the destruction of European Jewry in Ukrainian historical culture, it also seems to have signalled a change in the interpretation and understanding of the Holocaust, or at least it was an expression of an already changed interpretation. Yushchenko proclaimed that Ukraine was sticking to the provisions of relevant Council of Europe documents, which required that the history of the Holocaust be taught in educational establishments of its member states. Furthermore, he acknowledged that the Holocaust as an event of modern history has influenced not only Europe but the world in general and that it could be used to promote ideas of tolerance and mutual respect of "nations."³⁴

The Holocaust as a European Trauma

As already argued, the above outlined nationalisation of the Holocaust is not the only one present in history textbooks published after independence. Changes in interpreting the destruction of the European Jews are visible in textbooks published around the turn of the century. In textbooks on international history, the Second World War in Europe starts with German claims to Gdansk. However, the war is continually portrayed in an excess of detail. More attention is paid to the German occupying regime in Europe, and antisemitism is at least mentioned and sometimes explained. The "New Order," however, is still portrayed as a more or less economic plan. Consequently, the function of concentration camps is presented as holding-pens for persons who resisted in the occupied areas. Still, it is acknowledged that the camps were also used to implement the Nazi German racial policies in Europe, by exterminating Jews. One textbook provides an insightful account:

The "New Order" envisaged the accomplishment of a special racial policy. The victims of this policy were the Jews, Gypsies and later the Slavic population of Eastern Europe. In 1942 the German leadership decided to begin the physical extermination of all the Jews in Europe.

Throughout its whole territory “factories of death” and concentration camps began to function; the largest of them were Auschwitz, Majdanek and Treblinka in Polish territory, Dachau, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück in Germany, and Mauthausen in Austria. In them suffered prisoners of war, participants in the resistance. The sum total of people in the concentration camps was 18 million, 12 million of whom were killed.³⁵

In the new narrative of the destruction of the European Jews it is acknowledged that something called a Holocaust took place. Jews are presented as specifically targeted. However, the antisemitic background to the “special racial policy” is often confused. In one account it is limited to quotes from Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, in which he “accounts for the Jewish involvement in Russian Bolshevism.”³⁶ It is possible to seriously question the intent of the quotation from Hitler. It seems no accident that an antisemitic quote containing Bolshevism is chosen. *Mein Kampf* is filled with other equally informative examples. This could be interpreted as an antisemitic message in itself; that Hitler was actually right in assuming Jewish involvement in Russian Bolshevism. This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that nowhere is the destruction of the European Jewry lamented or mourned. It is simply referred as part of the occupation policies of the Nazis and part of the Second World War.

A drastic change from the previously mentioned narrative, which by and large nationalised the Holocaust, is the representation of the different actors of the Second World War. History textbooks published during the middle of the 1990s were more than unclear about the positions of Ukraine and the Soviet Union; the new narrative clearly equates Nazism and Stalinism as two totalitarian ideologies. By strongly condemning both ideologies and removing any identification with the Soviet Union, Ukraine is deleted from the international history of the Second World War altogether. This is consistent with the general tendency to write world history from a civilisational perspective: both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were alien to European civilisation, which Ukraine is implied as belonging to.³⁷

The destruction of the European Jews, as an exclusive and distinct phenomenon related to the Nazi regime in Germany, is con-

ceptualised as a trauma affecting the whole of Europe. In an effort to explain how this unthinkable event could come about, one account starts its explanation with antisemitism, understood as “an ideology and politics aimed at Jews that takes the form of hostile intentions in relations towards the Jewish people,” something Hitler capitalised on. Antisemitism, in turn, is described as the rationale behind the Holocaust, which is defined as “the catastrophe for a large part of the Jewish population in Europe, as a result of an organised destruction by the Nazis and compatriots to Germany in their and other conquered territories 1933–1945.” In this interpretation, the victims of Nazi German racial policies and concentration camps are not conflated and interpreted as “Ukrainians” or “Soviet citizens” as in previous interpretations. The focus is exclusively on Jewish victims, illustrated in one account by the famous photograph of a little Jewish boy in the Warsaw ghetto in 1943. Because the horror was not only geographically confined to Germany and Poland, but also affected Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and other territories, the Holocaust is seen to “contain lessons for all of humanity that need to be reaffirmed forever so that such an event can be prevented in the future.” By attaching significant and fundamental values to the Holocaust, it becomes enlarged, since it is seen as an important moral touchstone for non-Jews as well.³⁸

In this representation, identification with the fate of the European Jews during the Second World War is deepened emotionally and detached at the same time. This treatment is in line with the essential message conveyed at the intergovernmental conference on the Holocaust that took place in Stockholm in January 2000. Through the Holocaust, Europe could imagine itself as a community of shared values contributing to an institutionalisation of a “collective European memory.”³⁹ The final declaration of the Stockholm Forum illustrates an understanding of the Holocaust as something instrumental. The international community pledged its solemn responsibility to fight ethnic cleansing, genocide and antisemitism to ensure that “future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences.” More important, however, was the “commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past [...] and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual un-

derstanding and justice.”⁴⁰ Ukrainian pupils working with textbooks on international history are not only required to define “Holocaust” during their classes and in tests, but also to geographically locate extermination camps, to ascertain the targets of the Nazi genocidal policy, and to discuss the lasting effects of the war on the history as well as historiography in the twentieth century.⁴¹

However, the Holocaust presented as a historical episode carrying fundamental values for all of humanity is essentially interpreted as a European phenomenon. Even though Ukraine, it is implied, belongs to Europe, the history of the Holocaust is basically a history of the destruction of the European Jews in all European countries except Ukraine. There is no information about what the Ukrainian Jews themselves suffered or how the occupying regime treated them after the initial months of invasion. Pupils are to learn about the extermination camps in Poland, about antisemitism in Germany and about the rise of the German dictator who capitalised on it. The lessons supposed to be learnt from the Holocaust, and the meaning and sense attached to it, is that humanity needs to reaffirm forever the horrors, so that such an event can be prevented in the future.

By attaching importance to preventive aspects and the general rejection of genocide, Ukrainian history textbooks dealing with international history come close to using the Holocaust to define inhumanity in our present time; that is to say, using the destruction of the European Jews as an example of the most fundamental evil. The Holocaust was often employed, especially throughout the 1990s, as a bridging metaphor that provided an analogical framework for interpreting contemporary traumas.⁴² In other words, it is possible to argue that the Holocaust has been employed as a reverse image of the imagined future European culture. Subscribing to such an interpretation, Ukrainian history textbooks seem to position themselves in a European “symbolic community” that is close to being preoccupied with the Holocaust.

Both Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson observed that new national movements, or rather nationalising states, generally borrow or “pirate” other nations’ ways of defining themselves.⁴³ Such an argument can at least partially explain the shift from nationalisation to Europeanisation of the Holocaust in Ukrainian history textbooks.

Such a claim would undoubtedly go some way, but merely explaining this shift as piracy, based on a national rationale, is to risk oversimplification of the issue at hand.

An Unresolved History

How, then, is it possible to explain the two seemingly different, if not to some degree even contradictory, narratives in Ukrainian history textbooks? Part of the answer might lie in the fact that efforts were concentrated on rewriting these books from the onset of sovereignty. Therefore, it might be argued that historians, previously trained in the Soviet Union, did not have sufficient time to incorporate the Holocaust into the textbooks and official history of Ukraine. However, such an argument is misleading. A great many other previously absent topics were included, as was the employment of history textbooks produced by scholars in the diaspora, which were not bound by the rigid Soviet restrictions.⁴⁴ To grasp the underlying causes of this dual treatment of the Holocaust it is necessary to consider three factors in Ukrainian historical culture: nationalisation, Europeanisation, and a lingering Soviet legacy.

Throughout the 1990s the political elite in Ukraine largely refrained from any explicit re-evaluations of the Soviet past. Without a doubt the Soviet period has been the most problematic as well as politically sensitive question in Ukrainian politics. At one and the same time, the Soviet past resonates in people's own life experiences both positively and negatively. As a probable result of this legacy of ambivalence, Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk claimed in 1998 that even though Soviet Ukraine might be considered a surrogate state, it inevitably formed a basis for Ukraine's full independence in the early 1990s. Consequently, great care was best taken in its treatment so that it at least got some credit as a predecessor.⁴⁵

Among the many sensitive issues of the Soviet past, the different interpretations and commemorations of the Second World War occupy a special place. Unlike other Soviet-era holidays, May 9 has remained popular in independent Ukraine. But, as noted by Catherine Wanner, efforts to strengthen the independent Ukrainian state by capitalising on the patriotism and bravery of Ukrainians during the war have been fraught with difficulties.⁴⁶ In 1992 president Leonid

Kravchuk argued that the Ukrainian state needed to strengthen and increase general respect for the war veterans.⁴⁷ But as the “victory over fascism” remains prominent in the corpus of commemorations, the question of whom to remember and celebrate remains. On the one hand, several Ukrainians distinguished themselves in the service of the Red Army. On the other hand, several Ukrainians fought for an independent Ukraine against the very same army.

Unlike his predecessor, President Leonid Kuchma openly condemned official Soviet interpretations of the Great Patriotic War. In a public speech, Kuchma rejected the use of the “Soviet paradigm,” which he thought had been corresponded and employed by the academic establishment in independent Ukraine. What were deemed desirable were truly Ukrainian perspectives, as opposed to Soviet ones. Greater significance was to be attached to the struggle for an independent Ukraine.⁴⁸ In line with such calls, Victor Yushchenko announced, in preparation for the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, that he wanted to see reconciliation between veterans of the Soviet armed forces and those who served in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).⁴⁹ But no wide-scale appeasement between the warring factions or with the Soviet past has taken place. In October 2005, veterans marched down the Khreshchatyk, Kiev’s main boulevard, in a manifestation to commemorate the sixty-third anniversary of the UPA’s creation. The participants demanded that the government recognise the organisation as a warring party in the Second World War, and its soldiers be given combatants rights, that is to say pensions and other social benefits. The rally was attacked by followers of the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party, who still denounce the UPA as a fascist organisation.⁵⁰

The clashes, political as well as physical, between veterans should not merely be seen as prompted by questions of pensions and the conferring of veteran status. They are rather symptomatic of how the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War are recollected, commemorated and nurtured in Ukrainian society today. Furthermore, the unresolved war experience places it in an uneasy position in Ukrainian historical culture. It is unclear which lessons should be drawn or how it should be interpreted in the wider history of present-day Ukraine. This of course makes interpretation and incorporation

of the Holocaust difficult. To some extent the unresolved history of the war turns attention away from the Jewish experience of the same. But more importantly, none of the two factions have shown any interest in the Holocaust, or in matters pertaining to it. Those who still hold sacred the old Soviet interpretation of a Great Patriotic War continue to conflate the victims into one category. Those who side with the UPA and the struggle for an independent state, on the other hand, are prone to focus on their own sacrifices and viciously fight accusations of collaboration.⁵¹

Holocaust Reassigned

If Europeanisation of the Holocaust is taken to consist of its use as a negative symbol of the imagined future European community, the Ukrainian case displays a high degree of ambiguity. Several observers, however, have noted that part of the Europeanisation, or perhaps globalisation, of the Jewish tragedy is its universalisation. It has been contextualised in broader terms, and put to use in understanding contemporary tragedies.⁵² In short, it is possible to claim that not only the Holocaust itself, as a historical event, has turned into an important event for many contemporary societies, but also that it has been used as a cognitive blueprint to understand genocidal events in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Darfur.

In Ukraine, this process of universalisation is visible in the history of the 1932–1933 famine.⁵³ Since independence the famine has become one of the centres around which a new integrative historical national narrative, aimed at creating loyal Ukrainian citizens, has revolved.⁵⁴ The famine is often integrated into an interpretation of a long oppression of the Ukrainian nation. Accordingly, the former leader of *Rukh*, Ivan Drach, associated the morally dominated discussions on the famine with Ukrainian-Russian relations generally. As the legal predecessor of the Soviet Union, Drach argued, the Russian federation should be punished for those crimes and sins it had brought upon itself through “Great Russian chauvinism” and relentless “imperial politics” in Ukraine.⁵⁵

Perpetrated by the Soviet authorities, or Stalin, and aimed at the heart of the Ukrainian nation, the famine is easily interpreted as genocide. This conceptualisation is further strengthened since most

textbooks interpret the famine as a weapon by which the authorities tried to physically destroy Ukraine's "troublesome" population, and especially the intelligentsia. The term genocide is often explicitly used to denote the horrible event.⁵⁶ In fact "genocide" and "Holodomor" are deemed of central importance to history education and are introduced as early as in the fifth grade.⁵⁷

Many historians in the newly independent Ukraine endorsed the thesis advanced by Robert Conquest and James Mace a decade earlier: that the famine was a genocide directed against the Ukrainian nation. In turn, these two scholars from the West used the Holocaust as a cognitive basis upon which to interpret the Ukrainian tragedy. Conquest, for example, compared Ukraine in the early 1930s to "one vast Belsen," in order to convey the tragedy to his readers.⁵⁸ Similarly, Wasyl Hrytsko argued that the 1932–1933 famine was a "Ukrainian Holocaust," a conclusion later corroborated by the United States' Congress.⁵⁹

Most likely as a consequence of the strong emphasis on the genocidal character of the famine, the need to set matters straight has been voiced over and over again in independent Ukraine. The chairman of the *Asotsiatsii doslidnykiv holodomoriv v ukrainy* (the Association of Holdomor Researchers in Ukraine), leader of the Liberal Party and former ambassador to Canada, Levko Lukyanenko, not only demonstrated that the famine could indeed be classified as genocide according to the UN convention.⁶⁰ He also argued for an international tribunal that would judge the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a process he called Nuremberg-II. The "totalitarian" past would thus be laid to rest so that the democratic present could be built undisturbed.⁶¹ But blame was not merely ascribed to the Communist Party; it was also put on the people believed to have created it – the Jews. In a publication from 2003, Lukyanenko expanded his genocide thesis. Blame for the Ukrainian suffering during Soviet times was laid squarely on "the Jews," among who he included both Lenin and Stalin. By listing the ethnic origin of those who held prominent positions during the Communist era in the Party, the NKVD and the GULAG-system, he supported his allegation that Jews turned against the Ukrainian nation. This thesis was complemented by I. A. Khyzhnyak, who argued that the "Bolshevik-Zionist" regime imposed by the New York Jews built a Soviet empire in order to take over the world.⁶²

As leader of the oppositional bloc, Victor Yushchenko expanded on his interpretation of the meaning and usefulness of the famine in a newspaper article. He argued that the lessons of the famine were indeed the need for, and role of, a free press that was a prerequisite for integration into the democratic European structures, which implicitly guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty. If there had existed a politically independent Ukraine in the 1930s, the Communist regime could never have instigated such widespread starvation and withheld relief from the population.⁶³ Yushchenko implicitly, but very deliberately, made comparative use of the Holodomor in order to render the transfer of political lessons between the past and the present simple and unproblematic.

The use of the Holodomor exhibited by Yushchenko comes close to the ways in which the Holocaust was presented at the Stockholm Forum as containing values and norms important for the future Europe. Perhaps Yushchenko had been influenced by the conference, or perhaps the way the Holocaust has been used as a cognitive model to understand the Holodomor prompted such reasoning. Whichever the case, it is possible to argue that the Holocaust has been “reassigned” in Ukraine. That is to say, it has been put to use in order to understand another genocidal event. The Jewish tragedy has indirectly been used as a model to bring order to the Holodomor. As a legal justice model, bringing attention to the criminal character of the Soviet government, the Holocaust has been put to a political use reminiscent of the Final Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum.

Ambiguous Europeanisation

Following independence, Ukrainian authorities have vested education with great faith in the process of constructing a viable Ukrainian nation, by emphasising national history. Consequently, the new textbooks on Ukrainian history largely carried on the Soviet practice of “nationalising” the Holocaust. In Soviet textbooks any Jewish victims were subsumed into the epic suffering of the whole Soviet population, while the Ukrainian ones simply downplay the Jewish experience in favour of the Ukrainian one. The occupiers’ treatment of ethnic Ukrainians is deemed more important, or at least equally oppressive, as the

one against Jews. Since neither the term “Holocaust” nor an acknowledgement that Jews were particularly targeted by Nazi German forces is present in this interpretation, there seems to be a deliberate and ideological adoption according to which the topic is actively ignored. Instead the territory of Ukraine, and Ukrainians as a group, are at the centre of the narrative of the Holocaust, implicitly nationalising it.

But the Holocaust is not altogether absent. In history textbooks dealing with international history, the Holocaust is dealt with in great detail. However, this event is basically presented as a history of the destruction of the European Jews in all European countries except Ukraine. No information about what the Ukrainian Jews suffered or how the occupying regime treated them after the initial months of occupation is conveyed. The concentration and extermination camps in Poland are mentioned and deemed important, as is antisemitism in Germany and Europe in general. Attention is thereby directed towards the Holocaust in Europe, i.e. countries west of Ukraine, and not towards the Holocaust as a European phenomenon. The Holocaust took place outside the national boundaries of Ukraine and is therefore assigned less significance. Instead a national genocide – a disaster that struck Ukraine and Ukrainians specifically – has been allocated a greater significance, namely the 1932–1933 famine, *Holodomor*.

Such a segregated treatment of the Holocaust is certainly a function of the division between national and international history in the Ukrainian curriculum. It is easy to situate the Jewish tragedy outside the borders by pointing to the cruelties that took place in the death camps of Poland, or to antisemitism in Germany before the war. In such international history, Ukraine is by definition not an object of study. However, the Holocaust also took place on the territory of present-day Ukraine. This was the area where the *Einsatzgruppen* carried out large-scale mass shootings of Jews they encountered in the wake of the advancing *Wehrmacht*; but of this history textbooks speak little. The division between national and international history may be sub-optimal in general, and it certainly contributes to the ambiguous treatment of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, the division is a circumstance underlining deeper conditions in Ukrainian historical culture.

The simultaneous nationalisation and Europeanisation, or de-nationalisation, of the Holocaust can best be explained by the different

and unresolved factors in Ukrainian historical culture. In addition, or as a result, there has been no consensus reached on how to interpret the Second World War; which parts and warring factions to celebrate or commemorate. This could be understood as a failure of the educational system as well as the authorities in general to produce, or rather reach, a common “national” interpretation of the country’s past.

However, Ukraine has incorporated the Holocaust into its historical culture in a rather ambiguous way. There is ample information about the Holocaust in Europe, and all presidents have officially denounced the terrible Jewish tragedy. Yushchenko has pledged that the country is sticking to the provisions of the Council of Europe that proclaim a need to educate Europe’s young about the Holocaust. As a formal representative of Ukraine in Stockholm, he argued that there was a great need to learn the history of the Holocaust in order to prevent a similar tragedy happening again. His mere presence at the conference, and perhaps more importantly what he pledged, could indicate the Europeanisation of the Holocaust, or rather that Ukraine subscribed to the more general tendency of turning the Holocaust into a negative symbol of the future Europe. To some degree such a conclusion is reasonable, but it does not fully clarify how the Holocaust has been incorporated into Ukrainian historical culture.

The inclusion of and emphasis on the 1932–1933 famine in history textbooks and political speeches, initially based on research and publications in the West, has introduced the Holocaust into Ukrainian historical culture, albeit in an awry way. Symptomatic of this process was Yushchenko’s speech in Stockholm, in which he assured the audience that Ukrainians knew “too well what genocide means,” as they themselves had been subjected to it in the 1932–1933 famine. Therefore, he argued that an “analogical commemorative forum on the victims of mass artificial famines in Ukraine under Stalin’s era” was needed.⁶⁴ To him the two genocidal events were similar. They were both effects of consciously planned policies by tyrannical dictators, and they both resulted in an intentional, systematic and organised use of violence against members of a stigmatised collective group. Or, as James Mace argued almost twenty years prior to Yushchenko, Stalin put the Ukrainians through a “final solution” of his own.⁶⁵ Thus, the famine and the Holocaust had become entwined. This was partly

a result of the latter being used as a cognitive blueprint to bring order to the former, but an explanation must also be sought in the Europeanisation, or perhaps globalisation, of the Jewish tragedy, whereby different actors put the Holocaust to various uses.

Maybe it is pertinent to revive the dusty cliché of Ukraine as a country and a society that is situated between “East” and “West.” In a well-known and influential essay, Ukrainian diaspora historian Ivan Rudnytsky argued that the Ukrainian “national character,” understood in socio-cultural terms, has throughout history attempted to unite the two traditions into a living synthesis. Whereas the “West” is understood as a positive attainable objective, Rudnytsky attributed solely retarding characteristics to the “East.”⁶⁶ In a new guise the dichotomy can be interpreted as Europe replacing the West and the Soviet Union the East. Given the focus of this chapter, the Holocaust in Ukrainian historical culture, it might be reasonable to argue that Ukraine is not so much a society situated between East and West, as a historical culture ambiguously situated between a Soviet past and a European future.

Notes

1. David Kahane, *Lviv Ghetto Diary*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1990, p. 136.
2. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1988, p. 56.
3. See Klas-Göran Karlsson, “The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, p. 18.
4. See Falk Pingel, *The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2000, p. 81. Since this work is a publication within the project “Learning and Teaching about the History of Europe in the 20th century” administered by the Council for Cultural Co-operation, the institution responsible for the Council of Europe’s work on education and culture, it is reasonable to assume that this is the official point of view of the Council of Europe.
5. Raul Hilberg, *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933–1945*, New York: Harper Collins 1992, pp. 60–61; Leni Yahil, *The Holocaust: The Fate of the European Jews*, New York: Oxford University Press 1990, p. 265.
6. See essays in Peter J. Potichnyj & Howard Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 1988.
7. See for example *The Ukrainian Weekly*, March 29, 1981.
8. Harold Troper & Morton Weinfeld, *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada*, Markham: Penguin Books 1988, pp. 15, 252.
9. This is amply demonstrated in Kataryna Wolczuk, “History, Europe and the ‘Na-

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10. Volodymyr Fadeev, "Ukrainski intelektualy v rezhymy vytysnennia," *Krytyka*, Vol. 1–2, No 75–76, 2004, pp. 24–25.
 11. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Ukraynskaia istoriografyia: 1991–2001. Desiatylyete peremen," *Ab Imperio*, No 2, 2003, pp. 433–434.
 12. Andriy Zayarnyuk, "On the Importance of Location and the Dangers of Self-Recognition," *Ab Imperio*, No 2, 2003, pp. 482–485.
 13. Jurij M. Lotman & Boris A. Uspenskij, "The Role of Dual Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture (Up to the End of the Eighteenth Century)," in Ann Shukman (ed.), *The Semiotics of Russian Culture*, Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Contributions, No 11, 1984, p. 4.
 14. Hryhorii Hrabovych (George Grabowicz), "Ukrayina: pidsumky stolittya," *Krytyka*, Vol. 3, No 11, 1999, p. 7.
 15. A problem inherent in most schoolbook studies is that although textbooks make up the core of the curriculum it cannot be assumed that what is included in the text is actually learned. Though it should be acknowledged that most students often lack sufficient historical knowledge, or access to such knowledge, to contest existing narratives within a society, especially concerning periods of the past where no direct personal link is available, it is likely that most students will accept what the history textbook communicates. Furthermore, textbooks carry a certain aura of authority. Knowledge stored in written form often appears to originate in a transcendental source, at least in a source other than the presenting speaker. Words become impersonal and objective, untouchable by criticism. See David R. Olsen, "On the Language and Authority of Textbooks," in Susanna De Castell, Allan Luke & Carmen Luke (eds.), *Language, Authority and Criticism. Reading on the School Textbook*, London, New York & Philadelphia: The Falmer Press 1989, p. 241.
 16. Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian Nation'," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 29, No 2, 2001, pp. 328–329, has argued, based on a general survey, that Ukrainian students generally accept whatever teachers say. Since teachers normally tell the students what is determined in the curricula, which in turn prescribes what has to be written in a textbook, it can be assumed that history textbooks provide a measure of what is said in classes on history. See Claudia Fischer "Writing About History Without a Heroic Pathos? Some Remarks on the Best Contributions to the 1998 Students' Competition on Ukrainian History," in Joke van der Leeuw-Roord (eds.), *History for Today and Tomorrow. What Does Europe Mean for School History?*, Hamburg: Körber Stiftung 2001, pp. 115–139.
 17. Yohanan Petrovsky-Stern, "Reconceptualizing the Alien: Jews in Modern Ukrainian Thought," *Ab Imperio*, No 4, 2003, pp. 520, 575–576.
 18. Victor Yushchenko, "Speech by the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mr. Viktor Yuschenko at the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust," January 27, 2000, www.holocaustforum.gov.se (December 14, 2005).
 19. Elena Ivanova, "Ukrainian High School Students' Understanding of the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol. 18, No 3, 2004, pp. 402–420. Students participating in the study were instructed to write an essay "...about the Holocaust (the mass extermination of Jews during the Second World War)." Thus, the results of the study do not reveal whether or not the students were familiar with the term Holocaust at all.
 20. It is of course difficult to determine a widely accepted interpretation of the Holocaust.

- Still, the Council for Cultural Co-operation, responsible for the Council of Europe's work on education, has published a teaching resource on the history of the Holocaust. Based on works by among others Raul Hilberg, Saul Friedländer and Christopher Browning, this resource can be interpreted as a map or blueprint of the Holocaust, intended as a guide for teachers around Europe. See Jean-Michel Lecomte, *Teaching about the Holocaust in the 21st century*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2001.
21. Zvi Gitelman has argued that claims of Holocaust ignorance in the Soviet Union are an exaggeration and that there existed no "party line" on how to handle it. Instead, Gitelman argues that it was not denied that six million Jews were singled out for destruction, but that the Holocaust was subsumed into the larger phenomenon of civilian casualties, and was thus "universalized." See Zvi Gitelman, "Politics and the Historiography of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union," in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy. Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1997, pp. 14–42.
 22. See Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust and the Russian Historical Culture. A Century-Long Perspective," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.) *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 209–210.
 23. Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams. History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1998, p. 160.
 24. Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*, New York: Basic Books 1994, p. 134.
 25. B. D. Datsyuk, *Istoriia SSSR*. Moscow: Uchebnoe posobie, Izdatelstvo VPSCH I AOHN pri CK KPSS 1963, p. 679.
 26. *Istoriia velikoi otechstvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuz, 1941–1945 gg.*, 6 vols, Moscow: Voennizdat, 1962–1965.
 27. M. I. Koval, "The Nazi Genocide of the Jews and the Ukrainian Population, 1941–1944," in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy. Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1997, p. 51.
 28. See for example F. G. Turchenko, *Novitnia istoriia Ukrainy. Chastyna perscha (1917–1945). Pidruchnyk dlia 10 klasu serednoi shkoly*, Kiev: Heneza 1994, p. 247.
 29. S. V. Kulchytskyi, M. V. Koval & Yo. H. Lebedeva, *Istoriia Ukrainy, Pidruchnyk dlia 10 klasu serednoi shkoly*, Kiev: Osvita 1998, p. 232. A noteworthy point is that most new textbooks published after independence mention that it was the Germans who "discovered the facts" surrounding the so-called Great Famine of 1932–1933, the *Holodomor*. During the war this information was used as propaganda against the "judeobolsheviks" thought to have been the masterminds behind the starvation of the Ukrainian people.
 30. F. G. Turchenko 1994, p. 295.
 31. F. G. Turchenko 1994, p. 295.
 32. I. Koliada, O. Suschko & O. Ilkova, *Istoriia Ukrainy (1917–1944 rr). 10 klas: Zoshit-konspekt temp*, Kiev: A. S. K. 1997, p. 113.
 33. On uses of the Holocaust see Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, p. 41.
 34. Victor Yushchenko 2000.

35. Ia. M. Berdicheskyi, *Vsemirnaia istoriia, 1939–1997*, Uchebnoe posobie dlia 11 klassa srednei obshcheobrazovatelnoi shkoli, Zaporozhe: Premer 1998, pp. 40–41.
36. S. V. Vidnianskyi & V. O. Dribnytsia, *Vsevitnia istoriia. Novitni Istorii. Chastyna dryga*, Kiev: Farenheit, 2000, pp. 27–29.
37. On the civilisational principle in international history textbooks, see Oleksij Dubas, “Vyvitelennia pitannia pro utvorennia natsionalnykh derzhav y 1917–1921 rr. U pidrychnykh vidavnytstva ‘Heneza’,” M. Telus & Iu. Shapoval, *Ukrainska istorychna dydaktyka. Mizhmarodnyi dialog*, Kiev: Heneza 2000, pp. 115–124.
38. Ia. M. Berdichevskii, T. V. Ladichenko & I. Ia Shchupak, *Vsemirnaia Istorii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia 11 klassa srednei obshcheobrazovatelnoi shkoli*, Zaporozhe: Premer 2000, pp. 50–55. The photograph of the little Polish boy was taken by SS Brigadeführer Jürgen Stroop as documentation of the ghetto liquidation. It was first made famous when published in *Life Magazine*, November 28, 1960. Stroop was the highest ranking officer that oversaw the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto in “Großaktion Warschau” 1943.
39. Daniel Levy & Nathan Sznajder, “Memory Unbound. The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 5, No 1, 2002, p. 100.
40. *Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust*, The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. A Conference on Education, Remembrance and Research, January 26–28, 2000, www.holocaustforum.gov.se (December 14, 2005).
41. Ia. M. Berdichevskii, *Vsemirnaia Istorii 11 klass. Sbornik testov, voprosiv i zadaniij po 12-ballnoi shkale ochenivaniia uchenikh dostizheniij uchashchikhsia*, Zaporozhe: Premer, 2001, pp. 3–26.
42. Jeffrey C. Alexander, “On the Social Construction of Moral Universals. The ‘Holocaust’ from War Crime to Trauma Drama,” *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 5, No 1, 2002., p. 46; Daniel Levy & Nathan Sznajder, 2002, p. 93. See also William F. S. Miles, “Third World Views of the Holocaust,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 6, No 3, 2005.
43. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell 1983; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso 1983.
44. Orest Subtelny’s book *Ukraine: A History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992 (originally published in 1988) was published in a Ukrainian-language edition as *Ukraina. Istorii*, Kyiv: Lybid 1991 and in Russian under the same name in 1994. In all the book has sold over 800,000 copies in Ukraine. It has also been extensively used as a history textbook at various levels.
45. *Den*, January 31, 1998.
46. Catherine Wanner 1998, pp. 162–163.
47. *Holos Ukrainy*, April 29, 1992.
48. *Holos Ukrainy*, May 11, 1995.
49. Roman Kupchinsky, “Mykola Lebed and the Ukrainian Partisan Army,” *RFE/RL Reports*, www.referl.org, Vol. 7, No 18, May 11, 2005 (November 1, 2006).
50. *Ukrainska Pravda*, October 17, 2005.
51. The Ukrainian *Memorial*, for example, published an article in their newspaper called ‘UPA and Fascism’, in which several personal fates were outlined. In line with the

- arguments advanced in Ukrainian history textbooks, the article emphasised that the Ukrainian national movement fought a two-front battle, against Communism and Fascism, and became a victim of both. More importantly, tracing the fates of specific members of OUN-UPA, it is shown that the Nazi occupiers deported several of them to concentration camps such as Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen or Buchenwald. See Evgen Hryniw, "UPA i fashizm," *Ukrainiskyi Memorial*, No 8, 2005, pp. 1, 3–4.
52. Daniel Levy & Nathan Sznajder 2002, p. 101; William F. S. Miles 2005, pp. 373–377.
 53. See Johan Öhman (Johan Dietsch), "From Famine to Forgotten Holocaust. The 1932–1933 Famine in Ukrainian Historical Cultures," in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 223–254.
 54. See Georgii Kasianov, "Razritaia mogilia: golod 1932–1933 godov v ukrainskoi istoriografii politike i massovom soznanii," *Ab Imperio*, No 3, 2004, pp. 237–269.
 55. Ivan Drach, "To the Famine-Genocide of 1933," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No 4, 1993, pp. 359–360.
 56. Valeriy Smolii, "1933 rik b nashiy pamati, v nashiy istorii," in Stanislav Kulchytskyi et al (eds.), *Holod-genosid 1933 roky v Ukraini. Istoryko-politolohichniy analiz sotsialno-demografichnikh ta moralno-psykholohichnykh naslidkiv*, Kiev & New York: M. P. Kots 2000, pp. 11–15.
 57. See Viktor Mysan, *Opovidannia z istorii ukrainy*, Kiev: Heneza 1997, pp. 175–177. The word *Holdomor* (plague of hunger) appeared in publication for the first time in an article by Oleksa Musiyenko in *Literaturna ukrayina*, February 18, 1988. The term denotes a genocide directed against the Ukrainian nation and instigated by the Soviet regime.
 58. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and The Terror-Famine*, New York: Oxford University Press 1987, p. 3.
 59. Wasyl Hryshko, *The Ukrainian Holocaust*, Toronto: Bahriany Foundation, Suzhero & Dobrus 1983, pp. 108–109. Originally this book was published in Ukrainian in 1979. See also Johan Öhman (Johan Dietsch) 2003.
 60. Levko Lukyanenko, "Yurydychni aspekty holodomory 1932–1933 rokiv," in Stanislav Kulchytskyi, Oleksandra Veselova, Levko Lukianenko & Vasyl Marochko (eds.), *Holod-benotsid 1933 roky v Ukraini: istoryko-politolohichniy analiz sotsialno-demografichnikh ta moralno-psykholohichnykh naslidkiv*, Kiev & New York: M.P. Kots, 2000, pp. 240–247.
 61. Levko Lukyanenko, "Njurnberg-2," in *Henotsyd ukrainskoho narodu: istorychna pam'iat ta polityko-pravova ocinka. Mizhnarodna naukova teoretychna konferentsiya*, Kiev & New York 2003, pp. 36–72.
 62. As quoted in the *Edmonton Journal*, September 22, 2003.
 63. *Holos Ukrainy*, February 11, 2003.
 64. Victor Yushchenko 2000.
 65. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 17, 1984.
 66. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Ukraine between East and West," in Peter L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1987, pp. 1–10.

KLAS-GÖRAN KARLSSON

Russian Nationalism, Antisemitism, and the Ideological Use of History

But why? Because they have century-long experiences of living together with Jews and know what awaits them. On the scales of history, they balance all the good things that the Jews have brought against all their evil, and draw the conclusion that the evil so much outweighs...

YURII FEDOSEEV, *Russkie i Evrei*, 2002

Even in the Soviet period, hegemonic Communism notwithstanding, Russian nationalism was an important ideology that helped to provide the ethnic Russian majority of the Soviet Union with a sense of meaning and mission, and the Soviet state with stability. Since the early Stalinist era, Communism and nationalism co-existed and often reciprocally reinforced each other, transforming Soviet ideology into a peculiar ideological blend that sometimes was denoted as National Bolshevism.¹ In the Brezhnev era, there were indications that this coexistence became increasingly uneasy and precarious, when Russian nationalists dissociated themselves from the so-called “real socialist” development pursued by the ruling Communist Party. Nationalist complaints were lodged against the environmental, demographic, cultural and social situation of what was more and more distinctly defined as an ethnic Russia within Soviet society and territory.² Nevertheless, the dual ideological foundation of the Soviet Union continued to exist.

The late 20th century delegitimation of Communist ideology, the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, did not imply that Russian nationalism lost momentum. On the contrary, already since the mid-



The armband is inspired by the ones that Nazis used to wear, but Russian nationalists have exchanged the swastika for the hammer and the sickle. Photo: Ulf Zander.

1980s and the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* politics, a Russian national identity crisis has given rise to a lot of questions about the national survival of the Russians. These concerns were rooted in the agenda of the Russian nationalists of the Brezhnev era, but became extremely aggravated by the revolutionary societal changes that occurred in the years around 1990. Gorbachev's reform politics and explicit ambitions to make the Soviet Union a part of a "common European house," but also the growing economic and political crisis, the dramatic revelations about

the Soviet past as well as a concomitant question of who was responsible for what had gone wrong – *Kto vinovat?* – even invited aggressive ideological manifestations such as antisemitism, that had so far been restrained in the Russian nationalist discourse.³ Best known of the nationalist organisations that were established in the *glasnost* period is probably *Pamyat*, Memory, an extreme right-wing organisation with an overtly antisemitic programme. *Pamyat* has furthermore been described as an organisation in which several leading ideologues of the post-Soviet Russian extreme right, such as Aleksandr Barkashov and Aleksandr Dugin, had their first political experiences, thereby providing an important bridge between Soviet and post-Soviet Russian nationalism.⁴ Another of those rightist movements that was set up in the turbulence of the demise of the Soviet Union was the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, led by the antisemite Vladimir Zhirinovskii. As early as 1990, he won some six million votes for his candidacy for the Russian presidency.⁵

After a few post-Soviet years of westernising experiments in lib-

eral democracy, political Russia has again, under Vladimir Putin's presidency, readopted a more nationalist or patriotic orientation. The president openly calls himself a "patriot," in order to avoid the negative connotations of the term "nationalism" in traditional Soviet-Russian ideology. Avoiding bluntly imperialist discourse of Soviet type, he propagates traditional *gosudarstvennik* ideas of the unification of state and society, of Russia as a strong state and great power, and of pride in Russia's historical achievements, traditions and values. Thus, when Putin together with several other international political leaders gave a speech at the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp sixty years after the Red Army's liberation of it, on January 27, 2005, he clearly deviated from the dominant political discourse. While the other participants of the commemoration ceremony unequivocally and wholly expressed their sympathy with the Jewish victims, Putin also took the opportunity to give prominence to Russia's and the Soviet Union's war-time role:

Soviet soldiers and liberators were the first to set eyes on the cold-blooded atrocities committed by the Fascists in Poland. They extinguished forever the furnaces of Auschwitz and Birkenau, Maidanek and Treblinka and saved Krakow from annihilation. Six hundred thousand Soviet soldiers laid down their lives and this was the price they paid to save the Jewish people, and many other peoples, from total extermination.⁶

Depicting the Holocaust as a catastrophe that mainly fell upon the Jews, Putin did not side with the traditional Soviet account of the Great Patriotic War, which never mentioned Nazi genocide as a Jewish phenomenon, but as part of a larger mass murder of civilians of all nationalities, and Communists. When he put the stress on the sufferings and feats of the "Soviet people," he came much closer to the official Soviet historical narrative.

Also in another respect, Putin's commemoration speech differed from all other speeches at the forum. In Auschwitz, the president ventured to address internal Russian conflicts when he compared the Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust with today's "terrorists," a concept that in Putin's interpretation obviously alludes to the Chechnyan guerrilla warriors of Russian Northern Caucasus:

Today we must also realise that modern civilisation faces a new and no less terrible threat. Terrorists have taken over from the executioners in their black uniforms. The similarities between Nazism and terrorism are obvious: the same contempt for human life, the same hatred for different views and, most terrible of all, the same commitment to their fanatical goals. Today's terrorists would not hesitate to exterminate all who do not share their aims or who do not meet the criteria they have set.⁷

Such a political use of Holocaust history is less a Soviet legacy than an association to the history discourse among antisemitic and nationalist individuals and groups within post-Soviet Russia. For them, the Nazi genocide is less interesting and useful as a historical event in its own right than as a tool that can serve the political and ideological purpose of highlighting what are perceived as urgent Russian concerns in late 20th and early 21st century.

However, the primary purpose of this chapter is not to analyse President Putin's use of history. Neither is it to investigate the entire spectrum of Russian nationalist movements and ideas that have arisen during the last two decades in late Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. There are several qualified recent studies on this topic.⁸ Nor is it a first-hand objective to investigate the relationship between Russian nationalism and Russian antisemitism, although there are fewer scholarly works with this double approach.⁹ Rather, the more limited problem that this article will address is how the historical dimension has been used by Russian nationalist antisemites, and, more precisely, how the Holocaust has been represented in the ideological use of history made by Russian nationalists on various web-sites and in some prominent books in the post-Soviet period. The purpose of this analysis is not to be an exhaustive quantitative investigation of all available internet homepages dealing with Russian nationalism, but rather will attempt to demonstrate the important nationalist history-cultural constructs in which the Holocaust is embedded. However, it goes without saying that any endeavour to analyse the Holocaust discourse of Russian antisemitic nationalists requires a wider contextualisation of the main features of Russian nationalism, Russian antisemitism and Russian ideological use of history.

Two-Headed Russian Nationalism

Historically, two ideological mainstreams of Russian nationalism can be distinguished. One is closely related to the protracted imperial experience of the Russians. According to such state or imperial nationalist ideas, with their origins in French Enlightenment thinking and a territorial approach to nationhood, Russians have for centuries constituted the backbone of a multinational empire, thus being responsible for carrying out fundamental political, economic and military tasks for the imperial Russian and Soviet state. While all ethnic groups were nominally ascribed the same position as subjects or citizens of the Soviet Union, the Russians in reality, and by virtue of their numerical and political strength, attributed themselves the identity as *primus inter pares*, who provided the uniting and defending element of the empire. Consequently, Russian state nationalists have often regarded "Russianness," *Russkost*, as a means of keeping imperial Russia and the Soviet Union together. Their identity as *gosudarstvenniki*, from the Russian word *gosudarstvo*, state, has continuously been closely intertwined with the changing fortunes of the empire and its hegemonic ideology. The state nationalist imperative in Russia cannot, however, merely be described as empire-saving, but also, in more general terms, as modernist, expansionist and militaristic. This has not prevented many Russian state nationalists from believing in basically idyllic conditions such as multinational harmony or *Pax Sovietica*, which nevertheless needs protection from various external enemies. This is, however, dependent on the work of those subversive forces inside Russia that Zhirinovskii has described as a "fifth column" that is always prepared to support the activities of "international secret powers and foreign intelligence services" in order to transform the country into a "Russian desert."¹⁰

The other Russian nationalism, Slavophilism, arose in the 19th century as a movement and ideology of protest. It was directed partly against the above-mentioned system of ideas in which ethnic Russians were considered too closely related to the Russian power-state, carrying empire on their backs as a burden, and partly against Russian *zapadniki* who looked to the West for models of Russian development. Marxism was considered one of these models, which had enslaved the Russian people. More often than not, the two main

enemies amalgamated into one great ideological enemy, personified by Tsar Peter, the “Anti-Christ” who in the early 18th century turned Russia into both a European and an imperial power, bringing foreign know-how to Russia in order to establish an “enlightened despotism” at the height of European development.

The cultural background of Slavophile thinking was German Romanticism, its orientation ethno-cultural, religious, moral and social, and its objectives to preserve Russia from the new order of capitalism, imperialism and liberalism. This was to be achieved by seeking *samobytnost*, that is turning the Russian way of life in a direction unknown to other nations. For Slavophiles, *Russkost* was a goal in itself, an expression of a particular ethnic Russian destiny, characterised by orthodox values, collectivism and *sinfoniia*, a social and political harmony between rulers and ruled. Many Slavophiles also include the two other east Slavic peoples in this Russian destiny, so that Ukrainian “Little Russians” and Belorussian “White Russians” are meant to form an organic unity with the “Great Russians,” under the leadership of the latter. The ethno-cultural nationalist imperative in Russia, which has for several decades been most successfully championed by the Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, is generally anti-modernist and introspective. Slavophile ideology, the basis of which according to the Polish author of a classical study of the Slavophiles, Andrzej Walicki, is “a certain narrow tribal particularism,”¹¹ focuses on the peasant family and village with their allegedly genuine and organic Russian integralness. It is foremost considered threatened from within, from forces in Russian society who want to introduce modernity, thereby erasing the ideal Russian or east Slavic distinctiveness and social unity.

For the purpose of this chapter, there are two things to add to the analysis of this dual character of Russian nationalism. One is that Russian nationalism in the early 21st century, outside of Russia often called the New Russian Right, is a much more multi-faceted and complex phenomenon than what has been indicated by the duality just introduced. There are National Bolsheviks who still find a specific Russianness in empire and Communism, based on a Russian power position, and there are Neo-Slavophiles who still consider imperialism and Marxism-Communism as alien elements in the course

of Russian history. A third group places more unequivocally than the Slavophiles orthodox values and standards, or even the Romanov dynasty as the core of a Russian way of life. A fourth group, whose ideas originated in Russian émigré circles after the Bolshevik revolution, describes the specific Russian predicament in the geopolitical terms of Eurasianism. For them, Russia is a civilisation in its own right, distant from the European and American civilisations and values, but with potential to integrate them. For the Eurasianists, Russia should not waste its energies copying Western institutions, but rather turn towards the East. A fifth group, finally, with openly neo-Nazi orientations, has since 1993 an organisational centre in the Russian National Union, which in 1998 was renamed Russian National Socialist Party.

The other thing is that the difference between the two basic Russian nationalisms is not as clear as the dichotomy implies. As a matter of fact, there are quite a few features which unite both varieties of this, and, in reality, all Russian nationalisms. One is the glorification of the strong political leader. More generally, representatives of both nationalisms distance themselves from Western liberal society, based on the rule of law, democracy and the market economy. It should, however, be underlined that the argumentations often differ; while *gosudarstvenniki* consider Western democracy hostile to the imperial and Communist Russian-Soviet state, according to patterns and notions of two antagonistic ideological systems established during the Cold War era, Slavophile cultural nationalists reject Western liberal fundamental values such as individualism, materialism and democracy, because these are considered incompatible with the Russian way of life, with Russian morality, spirituality and collectivism.

Another obvious uniting feature is the focus on the exclusive concerns of ethnic Russians. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian nationalists have demonstrated a particularly strong engagement in problems of ethnic Russian identity, in what they often denote as the Russian "idea." In the process of identification, the role of "the Other" is more often than not played by the Jews. A frequent nationalist concern is the weakness or non-existence of an ethnic Russian nation. In comparison, the Jews are often described as part of a nation with a particularly strong inner coherence; a na-

tion “united and fully self-sufficient,” as it is phrased on a Russian nationalist web-site.¹²

This kind of frequent ideas might be an expression of an analytic observation, but it also brings us closer to a third factor prevalent in both basic varieties of Russian nationalism: their antisemitic leanings. However, also in this respect, the motives and arguments are normally different. State nationalists consider the Jews the eternal enemies of the Russian and Soviet empires, who mostly attack the Russian state and Russians from outside, from powerful positions in the international political, capitalist and mass media world which today is often expressed in the abbreviation MEI: *Mirovaia Evreiskaya imperiya*, the World-wide Jewish Empire. Internal enemies are often depicted as assistants who are dependent on the evil external, so-called Zionist influences from abroad, in particular from the United States. Among these internal enemies are often found the late Soviet reformist leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and chief reform architect Aleksandr Yakovlev, who are supposed to have destroyed the Soviet Union, backed by anti-Communist Jewish capital and power from abroad.

Accusations that the Jews conspired to destroy the existing institutions and regimes in order to achieve supremacy in Russia and in the world have a long history in Russia. It was the tsar's secret police that in the revolutionary year 1905 published the infamous forgery “Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov,” *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, in an attempt to instigate anti-Jewish pogroms. *The Protocols*, purporting to demonstrate that Jews at the first World Zionist congress in Basel 1897 had set out far-reaching plans to destroy Christian society and establish world domination, were not only a great success with the future Nazis. They also became an archetype for various theories of Jewish conspiracy in the Soviet period, such as the anti-cosmopolitan campaign of the late 1940s, the Doctors' Plot in 1953, and the anti-Zionist campaigns in the period after the Arab-Israeli Six Day War.¹³ Since the *glasnost* period, *The Protocols* have been reprinted again and again by Russian nationalist organisations.

Turning this perspective on its head, Russian cultural nationalists identify Jews with the Communist Soviet Union. For them, the notion that the Bolshevik *coup d'état* was a Jewish revolution,

basically intended to suppress or exterminate the Russians, is substantiated among other things by the fact that several of the Bolshevik leaders, such as Trotsky (Bronstein), Zinoviev (Apfelbaum) and Kamenev (Rosenfeld), were Jews, as were the killers of Tsar Nikolai II and his family during the Red Terror in July 1918: Sverdlov, Goloshchekin and Yurovsky. The neo-Slavophile Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has provided many Russian cultural nationalists with their basic tenets of the Russian idea, but who does not himself surrender to the more simplistic and coarse antisemitic notions, maintains that while Russians basically are not disposed to antisemitic ideas, the factual Russian antisemitism was entirely a product of the Soviet period, of a Bolshevik – and Jewish – mentality, and of a legitimate Russian response to such acts of cruelty *von oben* as the Red Terror, the forcible agrarian collectivisation and the dekulakisation.¹⁴ The explanation of the fact that *The Protocols* were published and made use of long before the Bolshevik revolution is, according to Solzhenitsyn, that “it was the revolution of 1905 that opened the way for this publication.” Furthermore, *The Protocols* were an expression of a *antisemitizm pravitelstvennyi*, an antisemitism brought about by the government and the authorities, and not by the Russian people.¹⁵ Solzhenitsyn’s ideological kindred spirit Igor Shafarevich, author of the infamous *Rusofobiya*, adds that it was not until the murder of Tsar Aleksandr II, perpetrated by the Jewish-led populist organisation *Narodnaya volya* in 1881, and the broader association of many Russian Jews with various socialist parties in the first years of the 20th century, that Russians more purposefully started to distance themselves from the Jews and Jewish ideas.¹⁶

Consequently, the proposition that many Jews participated in the revolution on the Bolshevik side or in the ranks of the other leftist parties in Russia, the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, has compelled many Russian nationalists to draw the conclusion that Bolshevism–Communism was a Jewish invention, reflecting a particular Jewish mentality. There is an obsession among many of these nationalists on present-day Russian nationalist web-sites to link up Bolshevism with Judaism by pointing out as many of the first- and second-generation Bolsheviks as possible as Jews, half-Jews or, at least, the spouses of Jews.¹⁷ So is the endeavour to demonstrate that

Jews, who have certainly abandoned their Communist convictions but not their will to retain their influential positions, have succeeded in staying in power also in post-Soviet Russia, on the federal political and administrative levels as well as in the Moscow city government, led by mayor Yurii Luzhkov, named Katz in this kind of texts.¹⁸

The next link in the chain of Slavophile ideas is that Jews who took power in the revolution imputed new ideas intended for Jewish society to a Russia for which the same ideas were alien and destructive. A case in point has been the collective farms, *kolkhozy*, which are described as inspired from the pattern of Israeli kibbutzim and not out of consideration for Russian tradition and society. Consequently, the consequences for the Russians and other eastern Slavs of such a policy have thereby been disastrous, nationalists argue, pointing to the terror-famine of the Ukraine in 1932–1933 as an example.¹⁹ The fact that the original surname of the responsible People's Commissar for Agriculture of the late 1920s, Yakovlev, was Epstein, and that one of the most brutal enforcers of the collectivisation was Stalin's leading henchman, the Jew Lazar Kaganovich, has hardly diminished the tendency among neo-Slavophiles to regard Soviet agrarian collectivisation and the destruction of the Russian village as a Jewish conspiracy. It should, however, be added that this interpretation of the origin of the kolkhoz conflicts with traditional historiographical wisdom that situates the collective farm as a Soviet offshoot of a traditional Russian peasant community, the *mir* and the *obshchina*.

It goes without saying that Russian antisemitic nationalists of the post-Soviet era in all essentials adhere to the Slavophile interpretation of the Jewish question in Russia and the Soviet Union. Many of them are related to the Russian Orthodox Church.²⁰ Their conception of Russian-Soviet history and society is rather simplistic. Jews were overrepresented among the Bolshevik leaders and must therefore take the main responsibility for a Soviet Communist ideology and politics that from the outset proved extremely detrimental to the Russian people. Already in a book published in France in 1927, to be republished in Russia in 1992, *What We Do Not Like Them For*, the antisemite V. V. Shulgin summarises the nationalist argumentation well. Firstly, the Soviet Jews are criticised of taking too prominent a part in a revolution that proved to be a lie and a fraud. Secondly, the

Jews constituted “the backbone and core of the Communist Party,” which with discipline and a strong will accomplished “the maddest and bloodiest enterprise that humanity has ever experienced.” Thirdly, it was all carried out in loyalty to the teachings of the Jew Karl Marx. The fourth argument is that it has been the Russians, individually and collectively, who have had to suffer the Soviet experiment, and the fifth that Jews, Communists out of all proportion to their numbers, were the perpetrators.²¹ A much later exponent of the same Slavophile idea, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, writes in his most recent volumes on the history of the “Jewish question” in Russia and the Soviet Union, *Two Hundred Years Together*, that today’s Jews should feel morally responsible and do penance for the misdeeds of fellow Jews in the Bolshevik revolution and the Stalinist Terror.²²

There are a few things to be said about the factual background of this Russian nationalist world-view. Thus, it is true that ethnic Jews were heavily overrepresented among the higher echelons of the Bolshevik/Communist Party and other Soviet power institutions such as the secret police, in particular during the first two decades after the October 1917 revolution. In the Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties that competed with the Bolshevik party until they were suppressed shortly after the latter’s coup, Jews were even more numerous. On the eve of the revolution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which was responsible for passing the decrees of land and peace and forming the Council of People’s Commissars led by Lenin, included 62 Bolsheviks, of whom at least 23 were Jews, while 20 were ethnic Russians. Twenty years later, in January 1937, with the Great Terror just round the corner, 42 Jews and 35 ethnic Russians were among the 111 top NKVD officials.²³

However, no Russian nationalists bother to explain the Jewish dominance from a particularly East European situation, in which Jews to an increasing extent were subject to persecution and pogroms in the decades leading up to the revolution, or by mentioning expectations that the new Soviet Union should turn out to be a new kind of state, free from traditional ethnic hierarchies and antagonisms. Neither do they note the fact that the same situation of Jewish dominance disappeared in the 1940s, when a general process of ethnicisation of Soviet life and the founding of the State of Israel, which at once transformed

the Jews into a potentially disloyal ethnic diaspora, radically reduced the number of Jews on the upper-party and state levels. Instead, Russian nationalists have created for themselves a macro-theory of a perpetuated connection between Bolshevism and Jewishness, a theory in which the Russian Revolution is depicted as an intentional, alien assault on the Russian people, culture and society.

The Holocaust and the Ideological Use of History

It has been argued that the key concept of *Russkost* lacks meaning for Russian nationalists without references to the past.²⁴ Generally, Russian nationalists – as nationalists often do – use historical perspectives eagerly and frequently to support their argumentations. Macro-historical retrospects are often used in order to legitimise a present-day position, or, in a more general sense, to strengthen Russian nationalism as a political ideology that promotes certain “truths”: first, that a Russian nation exists or, at least, ought to exist, with identifiable members and characteristics, and, conversely, with identifiable enemies or “others”; secondly, that this Russian nation is the main source of political authority; and, thirdly, that the individual must be loyal to the interests and missions of the Russian nation, in particular during periods of decline and threat. The use of history is ideological, which means that the main objective is to create meaning and purpose to the nationalist undertaking, in order to help propagate, mobilise and legitimise what is considered to be a coherent historical narrative. This is done not primarily by means of empirical details and analytic-critical reasoning, but through sweeping continuity lines, ideas of cosmic change, unequivocally black-and-white descriptions and depictions of great, enduring national friendships and enmities.²⁵

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that Russian nationalists often regard professional historians as merely obeying; as politically correct instruments for those in power, that is Westernised liberals and Jews. Thus, the web-master of a nationalist forum explains that these professionals always demonstrate the same tendencies in their writings about the Second World War, not taking any kind of what he calls “national ethics” into consideration: to soil and humiliate Russia and its role in the war, and to exaggerate the sufferings of the Jewish people. But when he complains that histo-

rians always find facts to substantiate their “correct” interpretations, and use fantasy instead of using available archival material, he surely rather describes the ideological use of history made on his and other nationalist web-sites than its scholarly use among the majority of professional historians.²⁶

One cannot argue that the Nazi genocide of the European Jews is a crucial history-cultural concern of Russian nationalists. The Holocaust normally forms no basic tenet of their historical constructs, and it is not a very frequent topic of their debate. There are certainly quite a lot of texts with references to the Nazi genocide, but the original articles, which often have been published in nationalist journals to be redistributed on web-sites, are few.²⁷ In various nationalist discussion fora, references to the Holocaust are more frequent. At the same time it cannot, as will be demonstrated in the following, be dismissed as an entirely peripheral part of their constructs, since it obviously can serve and sometimes actually does serve the purpose of supporting some of the most widespread antisemitic myths of Russian nationalists.

Nor is it, although the ideological use of history is focused on the creation of meaning and purpose, possible to describe the historical world of Russian nationalism as coherent and homogeneous. As a matter of fact, the situation is rather the reverse, which is not surprising, due to the varieties of Russian nationalism described above. On a general level, organic ideas that Russia and the Russian people form a living societal body with an unlimited potential to develop go hand in hand with notions that the same Russia is a weak, vulnerable and static body which is threatened from both within and from the outside by dangerous alien forces, particularly those connected to the Jews. Some nationalists describe the Bolshevik revolution as a natural outcome of the course of Russian history, while others analyse it as an artificial rupture, brought about by victorious Western Marxist, modernist ideas, or by Jewish influences.

There are also several inconsistencies in the interpretations of the Holocaust, of which the most conspicuous is probably the vacillation between, on the one hand, the idea that the Holocaust is a mere figment of historical imagination, a myth or a deliberate lie, produced to satisfy certain Jewish interests, and on the other hand the idea that the Holocaust actually was perpetrated, and not only by the Na-

zis, but also the Jews themselves, to satisfy certain of their interests. On the web-sites are several echoes of the traditional Soviet antisemitic notion that Jewish bankers and industrialists helped finance the Nazis and prevented fellow Jews from taking part in the resistance against Nazism, thereby sharing responsibility for the extermination of the Jews. One of many examples is Vadim, a frequent writer in a nationalist forum in 2004 about what he denotes as a “joint-stock Holocaust” in which Jews actually destroyed Jews:

The idea is that almost the entire Jewish top echelon from Wall Street financed Hitler’s election campaign, since they wanted to create chaos in Europe, and a war. About this (Henry) Ford in vain explained that if fifty leading Jewish bankers could be taken into custody, there would be no war, since they had arranged it to make profit from it. There was a risk that the quarter-Jew Hitler, who in his environment also had Jews of pure blood, could go out of control, conquer everyone and, in recklessness, crush everyone, but, as it is said, nothing ventured, nothing gained... But their misgivings did not turn out to be justified: they profited on the war, got Israel by begging, pumped out of “guilty” Germany money for their newly created land, started to speculate in antisemitism and rally Jews around them. This means that Jews were left in the claws of Jews, that weak Jews were used as greasing material.²⁸

According to Vadim, the analogy should more specifically be understood in the following way: rich American Jews’ delivery of their poorer ethnic brothers into the hands of the Nazis is equivalent to the purchase of shares to the nominal value, that is murdered local Jews. The dividend, that is the shareholders’ bonus, is the state of Israel, economic compensation, various Holocaust monuments, a rewritten history, a much stronger international influence, and much, much more.²⁹

On the internet, a few revisionist Russian web-sites that are entirely dedicated to the Holocaust, or, rather, to outright denial of the Holocaust, can be found.³⁰ In substance, they are highly dependent on translations of non-Russian history revisionists, among them several collaborators of the notorious *Institute for Historical Review* (IHR) in the United States. Reviews and reports of leading interna-



“Russia with a Knife in Her Back. Jewish Fascism and the Genocide of the Russian People.” The antisemitic film, which is offered for sale on several Russian nationalist web-sites, is produced by a Russian nationalist film company in commemoration of Metropolitan Ioann, who died in 1995. As Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga, Ioann was a leading church dignitary, but he also regularly took part in the antisemitic discourse in various nationalist Russian journals, frequently using the infamous *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in his argumentation. The film mainly consists of interviews with leading Russian religious, political, scholarly and cultural figures, which develop their antisemitic ideas of a Jewish grand conspiracy directed against the vulnerable Russia and the Russian people.

tional revisionists such as Jürgen Graf and David Duke indicate that revisionist ideas that “six million Jews were not destroyed by the Nazis, there were no gas chambers, no soap-works that produced soap from Jewish hair, and no ovens for mass destruction of corpses,” as is stated in a conference report in the Saint Petersburg-based journal *Nash Sovremennik*, have a public in Russian nationalist circles. The same goes for the analysis of the fundamental motive force behind the Jewish dissemination of a “myth of the Holocaust,” and the reverence towards the “real” victims of mass murder:

It is in part a legitimization of Sionist terrorism, but another prime mover is the commercial geschäft: by means of the “Holocaust,” Israelis have pumped out of Germany millions of marks. And in me bleeds the memory of the sufferings of my brothers, the Russian people, who have suffered uncountable losses due not only to the Nazi invasion, but also to Jewish extremism.³¹

The dependence on translations of international revisionist literature does not prevent Russian nationalists from adopting a positive attitude towards and even elaborating on the idea that the Holocaust is a myth, and, what is more, that the myth is basically created and

disseminated by Jewish groups. One of the most well-known proponents of this idea is Boris Mironov, former Minister of the Press under Boris Yeltsin, who in 1998, in the Volgograd-based journal *Kolokol*, published the article "On Jewish Fascism," which can be found on several nationalist web-pages. In Russia, "fascists" is the traditional way of denoting the Nazi intruders of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Mironov starts from the observation that Jews, since the Judeo-Bolshevik revolution of 1917, have argued that they have been exposed to antisemitic discrimination by "Russian fascists." This trend of accusing Russians of antisemitism has been even more apparent since 1991, when "the Russian flag changed its colours, so that at present two of the three colours are white and blue, which makes the flag more Israeli than Russian." In Mironov's opinion, which is very close to the conclusion drawn above, the general aim has been to gain sympathy and support for the Jewish cause around the world. Such an international response is, however, not enough for the Jews. In order to also extract economic wealth, and with the same international success, a new "milking gold cow," the parallel myth of the Holocaust, has been introduced:

The myth of antisemitism – the persecution and repression of Jews in Russia – like the myth of the Holocaust – the German destruction of six million Jews – is fantastic, lucrative Jewish swindling, lovingly built up by Yids in skilful fashion, from which, out of nothing, out of just some noise, out of the shaking of air, colossal fortunes are created.

This greedy Jewish exploitation of the Holocaust to gain political advantages and economic profits in terms of restitution money, and furthermore to extort repentance from and a moral advantage over the non-Jewish world, is certainly one of the recurring Holocaust themes among Russian nationalists, from orthodox nationalist groups to extremist neo-Nazis.³²

Russian Holocausts

In the quotation from *Nash sovremennik* above, there is another common feature in the Russian nationalist Holocaust discourse which is closely related to the notion that Jews are successful in demonstrating the unprecedented horrors of the genocide. The general idea is that

other ethnic groups also suffered heavy losses and that the relative suffering of various peoples who were victims of Nazi aggression can be measured from the number of fatal casualties. Aleksei, contributing to a nationalist forum in 2004, is one of those who address what he describes as a lack of balance and reason in the Jewish honouring and remembrance of the Jewish Nazi victims, and neglect of the real heroes of the war against Hitler:

Even children, all over the world, know about six million Jews; memorials are erected, and they are mourned for. But about thirty million Russians, nobody remembers. Well, war is war, and losses are unavoidable. May only the Jews remember, that if there was no mighty Russian people, who set up a powerful defence against Hitler's forces, all these cowardly Yids, who hurried to hide in the rear, far from the front-line, would not have been left on earth.³³

In this quotation, and the quotation from *Nash sovremennik* above, the main outline of how Russian nationalists regard the Holocaust becomes clear. The first argument is that ethnic Russians not only suffered more from Nazi maltreatment than the Jews. This should have rendered the Russians much more international sympathy, were it not for the Jewish monopolisation of the Second World War suffering. Furthermore, Russians bore the heavy burden of being the main conquerors of the Nazis. This should have provided the Russians with much more Jewish and international gratitude and respect, if it were not for the international neglect of the Russian war effort in general, and the Jewish lack of respect in particular.

The second argument is that ethnic Russians not only suffered from the Nazi terror, but also, on several occasions during the 20th century, from a Jewish extremism which can be compared to the Holocaust. The first and most important occasion commenced with the Judeo-Bolshevik revolution in 1917. In a critical review of the American Communist author Howard Fast's autobiography *Being Red* from 1990, an unknown Russian nationalist, under the heading "Sionism and Holocaust," comments on Fast's observation that Jewish emigrants were undesirable everywhere in the West in the interwar period:

The reason for the vigilance towards the Jews was the revolution of 1917 in Russia.... The world understood that under the cover of Communist demagoguery, Jews destroyed the ruling class of the country, the Russian élite, and took its place. The tragic example of Russia demonstrated graphically what awaits humanity from a Jewish power position: poverty, hunger, terror, deprivation of civil rights, despotism, GULAG – the agonising destruction of millions of people. And, what is particularly important: the Western Jewish intelligentsia supported Bolshevik power with full sympathy (if the worst comes to the worst, without public blame, not to violate the pan-Jewish solidarity). People saw in the Jews a dark, inhuman force, capable of any evil deeds.³⁴

The Russian literary critic Vladimir Bondarenko, writing in the ultranationalist newspaper *Den*, is even more outspoken in his conviction that a real Holocaust fell upon ethnic Russians in the course of the Judeo-Bolshevik power takeover, including the murder of Prime Minister Piotr Stolypin and Tsar Nikolai II, that is “the events that changed the course of Russian history and caused a Russian Holocaust with its tens of millions of victims, which was much more horrifying than the Jewish one.”³⁵ For Bondarenko, Jews adhere to a kind of double standards when they accuse several nations of collective guilt, at the same time as they find themselves innocent, when, if fair had been fair, “international Jewish organisations should pay us their tribute, assuming their national responsibility.”³⁶ In an editorial, “Forum: Judaica,” from the same edition of *Den*, the basic Jewish attitude is that they “did not acknowledge their role in the Russian revolution and tragedy and did not repent, being preoccupied with their own tragedy as victims in the Second World War.”³⁷

It should, however, be underlined that far from all contributors to nationalist web-sites who make Bolshevism responsible for genocide on the Russian people regard this ideology as a Jewish phenomenon. Another frequent nationalist notion is that the entire Communist period, with its various political leaders, Jews and non-Jews, was an era of a “Russian Holocaust,” in which premature mass deaths were the consequence not only of direct Communist state terror, but also of discrimination on an ideological basis, collectivisation, harsh everyday living conditions, and general neglect and mismanagement. The moral history-cultural dimension may still be crucial, but Jews

are not directly involved, as in the writings of former Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov:

If the Jewish reaction towards ten years of destruction of other Jews has met with an understanding and a support in the entire democratic world, then why does doubt arise on the rightfulness of Russian endeavours to answer to the monstrous, not half-century but seventy years long Bolshevik Holocaust on the Russian nation?³⁸

Others rather locate a new Russian Holocaust in the post-Soviet era. Some of them ascribe it to a problematic demographic situation, which has its origins in an increased abuse of tobacco and alcohol, but without pointing out any more specific perpetrators than passive politicians and certain “beer barons.”³⁹ There is, however, an old antisemitic accusation that the Jews have deliberately and systematically killed the Russian people by distributing large quantities of vodka, which indicates that the beer barons must be Jews.⁴⁰ Other writers yield to more direct antisemitic interpretations when they blame economic and other problems of contemporary Russia on politicians and administrators of Jewish origin, who are assumed to take a larger interest in the Jewish Holocaust than in the destiny of the Russian people.⁴¹ Thus, Vladimir Zhirinovskii maintains that in the new era Russia suffers from “metastases on its backbone.” He locates the mother tumour in the West, among Jewish companies who have exploited the new situation of a weakened Russia to colonise the country and enslave its titular population.⁴² It should, however, be underlined that the logic of Zhirinovskii’s argumentation is quite poor, since he identified a Zionist conspiracy towards Russia as early as during the Soviet decades. Another renowned Russian nationalist mentioned above, the neo-slavophile academician, mathematician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich, also echoes traditional nationalist interpretations but loads them with new ammunition when he argues that the new, post-Soviet openness and integration of Russia into international networks have provided Jews with even better opportunities to “silence the majority.” For that purpose, the Jews, as always with excellent positions in the media and information world, use accusations of antisemitism, magnify the importance of the Holocaust and refuse to talk about competing ethnic Russian suffering.⁴³

Another prominent feature in what Shafarevich calls the second Jewish revolution in 20th century Russia is the emergence of a new group of extremely rich people, often called oligarchs, always of allegedly Jewish origin. They have earned their money from semi-criminal or criminal activities, which have enabled them to buy power and political protection, while many ordinary Russians, Shafarevich argues, live in misery in a collapsing society. The author draws two more or less explicit conclusions from this situation. The first is that there is a connection between Jewish enrichment and Russian decay. The second is that there is another, historical and structural connection between the present situation and the first Jewish 1917 revolution in Russia. The same patterns of the “small people’s” exploitation and destruction of the “big people” are at hand.⁴⁴ Another conservative nationalist ideologue, Aleksandr Eliseev, is even more distinct in his comparison when he writes about the Jewish oligarch and oil company Yukos founder Mikhail Khodorkovskii, and about his fears that Khodorkovskii will buy himself political power. Such a tragedy, Eliseev argues, “may lead to the most cruel dictatorship, compared to which Bolshevism will appear as a children’s matinée.” Processes of disintegration, which can be traced from 1917, will lead to a total catastrophe in Russia, he adds.⁴⁵

Events related to the fact that the same Khodorkovskii was arrested in October 2003, and in late May 2005 in a Moscow court sentenced to nine years in prison on charges of fraud, tax evasion, and embezzlement, probably at least partly as a result of his support to political initiatives opposed to the Kremlin, aroused indignation among Russian nationalists. However, their indignation did not relate to the arrest, or to the judicial decision, which they received with great satisfaction. President Putin is not always popular on Russian nationalist web-sites, in particular since he is often depicted as surrounded by Jewish “Bonners and Olshanskiis with hooked knives in their hands, waiting to capture the moment to assault and tear to pieces,” but on one web-site forum, the pseudonym Pioner honours “the president-chekist” for, by arresting Khodorkovskii, helping the Russians to “silently start to crawl up from the grave.”⁴⁶ Rather, the indignation referred to international political and mass media reactions. On one web-site, an article in the *Washington Post* with the following critical wording served as fuel:

For those who have not kept up their Russian, “oligarch” is a term of art for “rich Jews” who made their money in the massive privatization of Soviet assets in the early 1990s. It is still not a good thing to be a successful Jew in historically anti-Semitic Russia. [...] Since Putin was elected president in 2000, every major figure exiled or arrested for financial crimes has been Jewish. In dollar terms, we are witnessing the largest illegal expropriation of Jewish property in Europe since the Nazi seizures during the 1930’s.⁴⁷

Nationalist internet writers got upset by “the American Jewish lobby’s” undisguised comparison between Russian practices in the early 21st century and Nazi activities against the Jews in the 1930s. For them, another turn of the parallel was more conspicuous. They called the Chodorkovskii affair *Chodorkost*, which is very close to the Russian word for the Holocaust, *Kholokost*. The obvious idea behind the new concept was to demonstrate that international Jewry never hesitates to exploit an alleged Jewish victimisation, not primarily to discuss real facts, because facts would have proved that the Jews actually are guilty of exploitation and deserve punishment, but to put Russia, the Russian leaders and the Russian people in an unfavourable position before the international community. Behind this idea looms a traditional Russian nationalist strategy to deny, banalise or trivialise the Holocaust.

A Holocaust Dialogue?

Since the demise of the Communist Soviet Union, many surveys and analyses have demonstrated that antisemitism is a salient ideological phenomenon in Russian cultural, intellectual and political life.⁴⁸ Russian historical culture is obsessed by the idea of “the Jews” as a phenomenon that defines what is considered as crucial tenets and turning-points in Russian life and history. From the present analysis, there is no way of measuring how widespread antisemitic ideas really are in Russia, but, as the president of the Russian Research and Educational Holocaust Center, Alla Gerber, argues, there has been fertile soil for this kind of ideas in post-Soviet Russia: “Russia today is a country of enormous pain. [...] And so it is in our day that aggression, cruelty, hatred, and the search for someone to blame have all come to the fore. The eternal search for someone to blame.”⁴⁹

Neither has this investigation aimed at analysing the political importance of Russian nationalism and antisemitism, although it should once more be underlined that Putin's new patriotism, focusing on Russia as a strong, centralised and homogeneous great power, may play into the hands of *gosudarstvennik* nationalists. When asked to elaborate on problems of xenophobia and notions of the Holocaust in Russia, the well-known Russian human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov warns of what he describes as "a genetic predisposition" of the authorities towards nationalism and xenophobia: "This danger is looming not in the streets and public squares but in offices, where it is finding expression not in leaflets, but in edicts and resolutions; not in the popular press, but in government pronouncements."⁵⁰

The present analysis has, however, indicated that the Holocaust, although not a dominant feature, plays an important role in Russian nationalist historical culture. It is ideologically used by representatives of various Russian nationalist ideas to prove the existence of "the Other"; a powerful enemy that ethnic Russians and east Slavs always must beware of and unite against to avoid national obliteration. For Russian nationalists, the Holocaust stands out as a history-cultural, mythological product that influential Jewish groups consciously and instrumentally use in a more general sense as a weapon to extract political, economic and moral gains, and more specifically to depreciate the memory of Russian suffering and exploits among Russians and non-Russians. The result is described as a weakening of the Russian national identity. The latter notion is also consistent with the idea that the Holocaust actually took place but occupies a far too big history-cultural space in relation to the Russian wartime ordeal, especially – which Putin underlined in his Auschwitz speech in January 2005 – since the Jews have the Russians to thank for the defeat of the Nazis.

For other Russian nationalists, the Holocaust is used much more instrumentally and comparatively to remind them and others of the fact that Jews have not merely been victims of the past, not even during the Holocaust, when rich Jews made capital out of the misfortune of their poorer brethren. Above all, during the 20th century, Jews have demonstrated their ruthlessness as perpetrators of genocides against the Russians. The main Russian Holocaust was the Judeo-Bolshevik

revolution of 1917, in which Jewish revolutionaries once and for all changed the destiny of the Russians by killing millions and enslaving the rest. The post-Soviet period in many respects turned most things in society upside down, but, in the opinion of Russian nationalists, Jews managed capitalist relations at least as well as Communist ones, which meant that “oligarchic” Jewish bankers and industrialists, actively supported by an influential international Jewish lobby, could intensify the exploitation of the Russians.

The Russian nationalist narrative constitutes a very distinct example of an ideological use of history: the consistently black-and-white perspective of struggle between Jews and Russians is protracted and almost eternal, which does not preclude the identification of distinct turning-points in history, in particular the years 1917 and 1991. Even when the Holocaust is demonstratively left out of the historical debate or narrative, this non-use of history is not accidental but intentional and organised and should obviously be regarded as a kind of inverted ideological use.

One way of bringing the history-cultural analysis a bit further is to relate the Russian nationalists’ use of the Holocaust as analysed above to the concept of traumatisation, introduced by the German historian Jörn Rüsen to denote a mental process in which a catastrophic historical experience has destroyed the potential for survivors to digest events history-culturally, into a sense-bearing and meaningful historical narrative.⁵¹ To be sure, the Holocaust itself is not a historical phenomenon that has any potential to traumatise Russian nationalists. For them, both the Jewish genocide itself and its mythologisation is imbued with sense and meaning, albeit of a very specific character. But, as has been demonstrated, there are several badly healed Russian nationalist traumas that are derived from and activated by the Holocaust. Most important are the general lack of recognition of the Russian war sacrifice, the physical and moral decomposition of Russian society after the 1917 Bolshevik coup, and the crisis of Russian identity and statehood after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. According to Rüsen, a process of detraumatization of the Holocaust primarily involves historicisation; that is, the necessity “to recognize the Holocaust as a historical event and to give it a place in the historiographical pattern of modern history, within which we

understand ourselves, express our hopes and fears of the future, and develop our strategies of communication with others.”⁵²

A final question is whether Russian nationalists are willing to “communicate with others,” so that the mythical significance of the Holocaust can be questioned from outside their groups. The conviction that the Holocaust has developed into an important history-cultural concern all over the Western world, while the Russian war narrative and “Holocausts” have not, intensifies many Russian nationalists’ conviction of a worldwide conspiracy, orchestrated by Jewish interests. The Russian nationalist response is denial, trivialisation and mythologisation, and, consequently, self-exclusion from an ongoing European history-cultural discourse.

President Putin can obviously play a crucial role by providing the politico-cultural framework of a Holocaust dialogue that will include Russia. To be sure, antisemitism has not been part of official Putinist policy – rather the opposite. In his commemoration speech in Auschwitz, in front of an international audience, Putin unequivocally repudiated any facets of neo-Nazism: “Russia will always not only condemn any such manifestations but will also fight them with the force of the law and through public opinion. As the President of Russia I say this loud and clear here at this forum.”⁵³ However, it still remains to be seen what influence the Putin regime’s “patriotic” orientation towards Russian wartime heroic achievements exerts back home on a Russian nationalistic discourse; one engaged in by intellectuals and activists who express their negative attitudes and conceptions of Jews inside and outside of Russia, of Jewishness and of the Holocaust, in relation to what they perceive as genuinely Russian interests.

Notes

1. Cf. Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome. National Bolshevism in the USSR*, Boulder: Westview Press 1986; David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2002. The concept “National Bolshevism” originates from the Russian émigré movement of *smenovekhostvo*, led by the Russian philosopher Nikolai Ustryalov. See his *Natsional-Bolshevism*, Moskva: EKSMO-Algorithm 2003.
2. Cf. Yitzhak Brudny, *Reinventing Russia. Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1998; John Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton: Princeton University

- Press 1983; John Dunlop, *The New Russian Nationalism*, New York: Praeger 1985; and Alexander Yanov, *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell 1988.
3. Thomas Parland, *The Rejection in Russia of Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal Democracy. A Study of the Russian New Right*, Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters 1993, p. 173.
 4. Andreas Umland, "Ofitsialnyi Sovetskii antisemitizm poslestatinskaya perioda," *Pro et Contra* 2002:2, available at *Moskovskij Tsentri Karnegi/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/procontra/56622.htm (August 20, 2005). For an exhaustive organisational historical background of the *Pamyat* organisation, see Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Vladimir Pribylovskii & Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, *Natsionalizm i ksenofobiya v Rossiiskom obshchestve*, Moscow: Izdatelstvo OOO Panorama 1998, pp. 41ff.
 5. For a detailed historical background of the LDPR, see Aleksandr Verkhovskii & Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Natsional-Patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii: istoriya, ideologiya, ekstremistskie tendentsii*, Moscow: Izdatelstvo Institut eksperimentalnoi sotsiologii 1996, pp. 33–36.
 6. "President Putin's speech at the Forum, Let My People Live!, Commemorating the Memory of the Victims of Auschwitz," on *Johnson's Russia List*, available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9039-3.cfm (November 11, 2005).
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To Rescue or be Rescued

The Liberation of Bergen-Belsen and the White Buses in British and Swedish Historical Cultures

History is often defined as both past reality, and later descriptions and studies of that reality. Due, not least, to history-cultural studies from recent years, it has become apparent that history is not just about bygone times. The past influences just as much our understanding of the present and expectations attached to the future. A fruitful departure point for a history-cultural study is therefore that humans both *are* and *make* history: people are both created by and creators of history. These perspectives are interdependent and influence each other. It is therefore just as important to understand history from a forward-looking point, from a specific past epoch, as it is from a backward-looking position. In the latter case one reaches back from the present. By using both these perspectives, producers and transmitters of history lessen the risk of being either unilaterally fixated on the past or reaching anachronistic verdicts in the form of modern values applied to people and societies of former times.

These discussed methods by no means negate the possibility of making an analytical division between the two approaches. The genetic perspective, forward-directed and chronological, has traditionally been used by professional historians. In addition to the above-mentioned distance between one's own time and the object of study, and between fact and fiction, these have prioritised causal explanations and interpretations, above all orientated towards understanding people from contemporaneous conditions and values, and analysing elements of change.

In this applied archetypical division, the other side of the dual historical thought process is termed genealogical. Because its starting point is the present, this perspective is past-looking and proceeds

from contemporary needs and questions. When using this method, the ideal is not to understand past peoples on the basis of their possibilities and opportunities. Rather, the historical relevance is decided by the onlooker, who uses or constructs the past with the purpose of finding the roots to a development which has failed; to “learn” from history or establish connections to earlier times, in order to create a sense of security in an uncertain present, and hope in relation to an uncertain, unpredictable future. The key words, such as continuity, concreteness, proximity and subjectivity, contrast sharply with the concepts prioritised in the genetic perspective.¹

This dual perspective on history can further benefit from being supplemented by a typology over different ways of using history, which are in turn dependent on the different needs of history among diverse groups, and thus history’s different functions in those societies. The scholarly-scientific use of history goes hand in hand with a genetic understanding of the past. Existential, moral, political-pedagogical and ideological uses of history have more in common with the genealogical perspective. Of these, the ideological and the moral uses of history will here be focused upon. The first kind, represented particularly by intellectuals and politicians, has the purpose of rationalising actions then and now, together with constructing or strengthening legitimacy. The latter’s representatives can consist of both intellectuals and broad popular groups, who voice indignation when some, in their view, crucial aspects of the past are neglected within or expelled from established historiography.²

In the following survey we shall be examining what the consequences have been for genetic and genealogical starting points respectively. Additionally, the uses of history apparent in history writing on the Holocaust, and their relation to national-identity building in Britain and Sweden, will be presented. The analysis is based upon reactions to and memories from the liberation of Bergen-Belsen, as well as humanitarian efforts by the Red Cross in Germany in the spring of 1945.

Bergen-Belsen – from Detention Camp to Concentration Camp

Bergen-Belsen, or Belsen as it is often called in British English, was established as a detention facility in 1943, its purpose being to lodge important Jews whom, it was thought, could be exchanged for ethnic Germans held by Allied forces. As a result of this, initial conditions in the camp were somewhat better than in others. However, for reasons we shall return to, only a limited proportion of the Jews interned there actually came to be exchanged.

In November 1944, Bergen-Belsen was officially transformed from a detention camp to a concentration camp. Shortly thereafter, the originally bad conditions deteriorated still further. At the beginning of 1945, prisoners in their tens of thousands arrived from extermination and concentration camps in the east. What is more, between January and March thousands of concentration camp prisoners were forced to march under extreme hardship from Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald to Bergen-Belsen. These death marches claimed thousands of victims but, despite this, so many survived that the situation in the camp itself became unendurable.³ Tens of thousands of people were now crowded together in a facility built for the internment of 4,000, which had major consequences for hygienic conditions. In addition, many had no food, and in the beginning of April there was even a complete lack of water. In this desperate situation instances of cannibalism occurred. An outbreak of typhus fever worsened still further the already catastrophic conditions. In March 1945 alone, 18,000 prisoners died in the camp; among them the sisters Anne and Margot Frank. The death toll continued to be high in the following month. A total of 35,000 people are estimated to have died in Bergen-Belsen between January and 15 April 1945, when the camp was liberated by British forces, and a further 14,000 between the latter date and 20 June 1945. Not counting those who arrived during the last pre-liberation days, approximately 50,000 people died in Bergen-Belsen, corresponding to 75 per cent of the total number of internees.⁴

To Confront the Horrors of the Holocaust

In his contribution to this book, Johan Dietsch refers to Western historians who have repeatedly compared the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 with the Holocaust. A further history-cultural conclusion can be drawn from this comparison. It is hardly a coincidence that the British historian Robert Conquest chose to put into concrete form this comparison between the ruthlessness of Stalinism and Nazism by describing Ukraine in the early 1930s as a huge Belsen. In British historical culture this camp has been bestowed with a unique position in Holocaust history. In the following we shall, through a genetic writing of history, examine how Bergen-Belsen was written into British history as a result of the efforts of British military forces there.⁵ With the help of a genealogical perspective we shall subsequently focus upon how the British view of the camp's activities, and of those who perished there, has been consolidated and partly changed during recent years as a result of post-war developments.

There were approximately 60,000 prisoners in Bergen-Belsen, most in bad shape, when it was liberated. Thousands of corpses lay, moreover, around the whole camp – a situation exacerbating the already appalling hygienic conditions. Prior to the liberation British officials and military personnel had some knowledge of Bergen-Belsen's purpose and, additionally, the overcrowding and diseases there, but this information did not reach the soldiers who actually liberated the camp. They were unprepared for the terrible conditions they met. The soldiers were, hardly surprisingly, shocked by the thousands of dead bodies and other obvious indications of neglect and mistreatment they saw, but also by the obvious contempt for the prisoners' lives exhibited by the German and Hungarian camp guards. They were disarmed after a few days when British troop reinforcements arrived, but until then repeatedly and mercilessly shot prisoners attempting to find food.⁶

In the months surrounding the end of the war in Europe, it was not only the Allied soldiers at the concentration camps who had difficulties understanding that a country with such proud cultural traditions as Germany could turn its back on humanity and instead ruthlessly exterminate millions of human beings. An early measure – apart from providing the survivors with food, drink and medical

attention – was therefore to document the concrete effects of Nazi race politics visible at the liberated concentration camps in the spring of 1945. Before this juncture, statements about the Holocaust had not been generally accepted. As long as the war progressed, the Jewish fate was a question of low priority among Allied political and military decision-makers compared with the war efforts. In the mass media, information about Jewish persecution competed with a steady stream of articles on military successes and setbacks, war crimes, and reports of large numbers of dead and wounded from battlefields across the world; all of which in turn meant that only a few understood that Jewish persecution was the core of a state-organised and massively implemented genocide. In line with this, such information was relegated to the back pages of newspapers.

An inherited scepticism from the First World War's exaggerated propaganda led many to brush aside reports of the annihilation of thousands of Jews, perceiving these as just more propaganda or explained as the results of epidemics. Many Jews themselves had difficulties taking in information regarding "the final solution" that had leaked through to them. Access to information about what was happening was no guarantee of a transformation into knowledge.⁷ The historian Tony Kushner has shown that information received by the British from the Soviet authorities about the scale of extermination in Auschwitz was met with doubt. On the occasions this camp was mentioned in parliament, the name was usually wrong and interest concerned whether there were, or had been, British citizens as internees. The liberation of the Majdanek extermination and concentration camp in July 1944 was frequently mentioned, but reports about what had been taking place in Majdanek were initially dismissed as Soviet propaganda. The BBC refused to transmit an on-the-spot report. It took until October before the information permeated British media. Like many British civilians, the soldiers were sceptical towards stories of SS-outrages that circulated, but these were re-examined when they arrived at Bergen-Belsen. The reports they sent back from here and from Buchenwald, however, were soon accepted as reliable. The difference here, as opposed to Soviet reports of extermination camps in the east, was mainly due to the fact that the readers' own, British, troops had come face-to-face with the horrors of the German concentration camps.⁸

It should be added that while conditions in Poland-situated extermination camps were awful, and Soviet forces were confronted by survivors in a terrible condition and piles of corpses, the Germans had had sufficient time to evacuate their internees in a more-or-less orderly way. They had also been able to remove many traces of their activities. As we have noted, the Bergen-Belsen situation was radically different, which contributed to the conviction among the liberators of concentration camps in Germany that these represented the worst examples of Nazi atrocities.⁹

To Document the Horrors of the Holocaust

A recurrent comment in reports from the concentration camps was that it was not possible to convey in words what had taken place there. The fact that journalists were unable to translate their experiences into texts strengthened the importance of photographs and documentary films. Those not present at the scenes could use these pictures as a starting point for transforming informational text into an impression of the Holocaust.¹⁰ Without actually being there, they became witnesses to the Nazis' evil deeds, which were described according to the principle: "the more realistic a representation, the more adequate it becomes as testimonial evidence of outrageous events."¹¹ The conclusive effect of this principle is apparent from *inter alia* Susan Sontag's often quoted statement about the fundamental importance of these pictures for her; this despite the fact that, at the time, she actually knew nothing of the event documented by the photographers.¹²

While the concentration-camp liberations were certainly used for propaganda purposes, in the same way as other accomplishments, it was emphasised that these scenes were authentic and how important it was that as many people as possible saw the photographic images. It can be added that those behind the cameras were forced to work with new methods because, amongst other things, they were trained to film battles and not static dead bodies; less so great numbers of murdered civilians. The concentration-camp liberations brought to the fore the question of why the war had been fought. For the journalists, photographers and documentary film-makers present, it was clear that here was an instance of needing to inform those who had

not as yet absorbed information concerning this genocide. The “discovery” of the concentration camps even led to censorship reduction – securing proof of what had taken place was the primary aim. This cleared the way for many non-professional photographers, a number of whom were soldiers, who saw their images published. Liberation of the concentration camps, writes Barbie Zelizer, “offered a forum for words and images to compete and images to emerge triumphant. Though not the only event to do so, the atrocities helped facilitate modern photojournalism coming of age.”¹³

The Jews – Invisible Victims in British Historical Culture

Using British reports from Bergen-Belsen as an example, we can establish that many people were mentally incapable of seeing the pictures from within. Neither did they need to confront the worst images, as these were excluded by editors of the larger daily newspapers. Those wishing to see them could turn to the *Daily Express*’s popular London exhibition “Seeing is Believing,” photo-magazines, and the *Daily Mail*’s publication *Lest We Forget: the horror of the Nazi concentration camps revealed for all time in the most terrible photographs ever published*, printed in the summer of 1945.¹⁴ But how were these pictures presented? What was the form and content of the accompanying texts; or, put another way, into what historical and contemporary context were the pictures placed?

Some of the eyewitnesses certainly knew that the majority of the internees were Jews whose only “crime” was their ethnic identity. The fact that they had been assembled together in camps around Europe, as the result of a policy designed to exterminate the continent’s total Jewish population, was seldom conveyed in concentration-camp press reports, however. The purpose of articles disseminated worldwide was not primarily to draw attention to the victims, and above all not the Jews. A significant number of on-the-spot troops thought that the camp liberations invested meaning in the expression “this is what we’re fighting for.”¹⁵ With similar words, but partly different intentions, the American and British governments legitimised their respective war efforts by means of pictures from the liberated concentration camps. In the USA these pictures were used to weaken objec-

tions that portended the Cold War's antagonisms and the opinion that Americans had fought the wrong enemy.¹⁶ In Britain the conclusion was that Jewishness was the opposite of liberal universalism. Jews and Jewishness were, moreover, a reminder that the Zionists sought to create a Jewish nation in Palestina; something the British government were against. The toning down of Jewishness continued even during those post-war years when Bergen-Belsen was a British-controlled camp for Displaced Persons.¹⁷

This policy had a powerful effect, as only a few people made the connection between the concentration camp pictures and the Jewish catastrophe. The British-American demonisation of the Germans following upon the camp reports led, ironically enough, to an increased hostility towards Jewish refugees. British journalists and war-artists pointed out that Germans had also been among the camp internees, but it was seldom made clear that they comprised both executioners and their victims. The Jewish proportion of this latter category was toned down. German-Jewish refugees in Britain often found themselves being mistaken for the hated Nazis. Both prior to and during the war, the British regularly praised themselves for how well they handled refugees, while many privately expressed their irritation about refugees from German-speaking areas. This irritation increased and became explicit in the autumn of 1945 as the result of a suggestion in the British press that the best solution to the shortage of homes would be to facilitate "foreigners" leaving the country. It can be concluded that only those with a particular interest in the Jews prior to the autumn of 1945 – when proof of the catastrophic consequences of Nazi-German race policies for Jews were presented in war-crime trials – connected the Bergen-Belsen pictures and the catastrophe later termed the Holocaust.¹⁸ When the camp monument was erected in 1947, through a British initiative, the victims were named in general terms. It took until the 1960s before visitors could access the camp's history, and only in the 1980s that the victim categories Roma, Sinti and Soviet prisoners of war – together as many as the Jews – were officially mentioned.¹⁹

Continuity in a disinclination to speak of the Jewish suffering was evident. The same reason for silence about the fate of the Jews was given before and after the war's end: a fear of increased antisemi-

tism.²⁰ It can be added that Nazi-German antisemitism was seldom connected with the Holocaust. This resulted in the Jewish catastrophe being, in many parts of the Western world, ignored or interpreted as a manifestation of Nazism's predilection for violence and control. It is probable that examples of antisemitism in Britain which, as in Germany, had deep roots, contributed to a specific British unwillingness to get to grips with the Holocaust.²¹

George Stevens' *The Diary of Anne Frank* (1959) was a great public and critical success in Britain. The fact that the film-makers had made Anne less Jewish in all likelihood contributed to its popularity. On screen she seemed a normal girl living in highly abnormal conditions. That these had a Holocaust context was not conveyed. The film's sequences followed the diary entries, which ceased upon her arrest. By following the literary original in this way, the film-makers could avoid having to feature her last, agonising days stricken with typhus in Bergen-Belsen – images which in all probability were unacceptable on either side of the Atlantic at this point in time.²²

During the following decades it was only by way of exception that the Holocaust featured as a matter for discussion in the British public sphere. Academic histories of the Jewish catastrophe did not attract much attention. Survivors were marginalised both within and outside the Jewish community. Representatives of the Anglican Church preferred to emphasise Christian opposition to the Hitler regime rather than discuss its Jewish victims. Nor did the Eichmann trial, to which has been attributed great importance for a renewed Holocaust attentiveness in many other countries, leave any significant traces.²³ It is first in the 1970s that an increasing interest in the Nazis' genocide can be discerned, but only with the screenings of *Schindler's List* (1993) and the British television film *Mosley* (1998), not to mention the opening at London's Imperial War Museum of "The Holocaust Exhibition" (2000), did this become generally rooted.²⁴ At this juncture, a change in relation to the Holocaust's geographical and symbolic point of focus had become apparent in Britain. It was primarily expressed by "Auschwitz," which had come to sum up the mass-murders by gassing at Poland-situated extermination camps, gradually replacing "Belsen" as the ultimate metaphor for evil, during the last quarter of the 1900s.²⁵

Uses of History in Modern British Historical Culture

The change of perspective has contributed to a problematisation of the long-dominating approach to the Holocaust. Indignation towards its limited recognition over a long period of time has engendered results in a moral use of history. In a number of cases this has been combined with a scientific use of history, in accordance with which the Holocaust has been placed in its temporal context by means of empirically based studies. One consequence of this change is that manifestations of British antisemitism prior to and after the Second World War have attracted more scholarly attention. The same applies to the gradual abolishment of the generous 1905 refugee legislation (Aliens Act) during the inter-war period. Britain was the country that during the period 1939–1945 received most Jewish refugees, which is sometimes highlighted in studies focusing upon who came forward as rescuers of the Jews. Other recent and noticeable research findings are that changes in the British refugee policy did not exclude restrictions against new arrivals, like the internment of Jewish refugees, and that Jewish emigration to Palestine was counteracted by the British both during and after the war.²⁶

Exchanges of prisoners initiated by the German authorities during the Second World War have also recently been examined. The background to these was the Nazi regime's conviction that Germans living abroad should be brought back and re-united with their *Volks*. The Western Allies feared that many of the Jews the Germans wanted to exchange were spies in the service of the Third Reich. Another reason was that the exchanged Jews did not meet their American hosts' expectations. Many were from the lower classes, spoke little or no English, and were uneducated. There was thus an obvious American discontent, but the pressures leading to the end of exchanges came from both the American *and* British intelligence services.²⁷ What is more, the British Foreign Office declined responding to negotiation initiatives from the Germans on the subject of continued exchanges of Jews for Germans under Allied control. Instead of negotiating the release of as many Jews as possible, the matter was pushed into the future. "It seems," writes Rainer Schulze, "highly likely that a large number of Jews held at Bergen-Belsen could have been saved if the negotiations about exchange had been conducted with a greater sense of urgency."²⁸

The British post-liberation rescue operation at Bergen-Belsen has recently been highlighted by the historian and television producer Ben Shephard in *After Daybreak. The Liberation of Belsen, 1945* (2005). His book is an account of the work performed by British military and medical personnel and the great difficulties and frustrations that confronted them, above all during the first two weeks, when 14,000 prisoners died. A reason for this death toll was obviously the terrible camp conditions during the last months of German control, but Shephard also emphasises that medical staff arriving after the liberation were badly equipped, and it took a further two weeks until the rescue work was organised. Doctors and other health professionals were equipped only with aspirin and morphine and lacked surgical instruments and anaesthetic drugs. Nor did the experts who arrived later fully understand the situation, and therefore misdiagnosed in several cases the ailments of former prisoners and prescribed the wrong medicine or unsuitable nursing care. The morally charged question put by Shephard is whether it is now time to re-evaluate the previously so highly praised British rescue measures at Bergen-Belsen.²⁹

Shephard does not find any clear-cut answers. His account is, on the one hand, a general criticism of the British authorities' inadequate preparedness to assist civilians. He scrutinises the medical mistakes that were made, of which many were a result of applying experience derived from starvation catastrophes in India at Bergen-Belsen without understanding that the conditions were very different. On the other hand, Shephard points to the difficulties faced by the British; for example, an effective treatment of trauma patients was not available at this time. A lot of mistakes were thereby made by the British, but for the most part people worked as best they could consider the extreme circumstances.³⁰

Bergen-Belsen Fifty and Sixty Years On

Have the recent nuanced studies of British efforts at Bergen-Belsen had any significant impact upon British historical culture? One way of answering this question is by comparing the 50th anniversary of the liberation in 1995 with the 60th in 2005. The first demonstrated a clear difference between the German and British ceremonies. At the former, the many who had become victims at Bergen-Belsen,

with Anne Frank as a recurrent example, were emphasised. In Britain, however, Frank and the other Jewish victims were rarely focused upon. There were, to be sure, several variations of a Second World War interpretation current in the late 1900s, by which the British had gone to war against Germany to put a stop to the Nazi terror and help the Jews, but the Holocaust itself rarely featured in the remembrance ceremonies of 1995. In the media, interviews with Holocaust survivors were noticeable, but were few in comparison to articles on, and interviews with, British liberators. Likewise, that year's most important liberation memorial event consisted of the exhibition "Belsen Fifty Years On" at London's Imperial War Museum. Against this background the following conclusion has been drawn:

Indeed, as in 1945, the liberation of Belsen could be used to concentrate further on the moral righteousness of the British war effort. The tendency to view the liberation of Belsen as *British* rather than Jewish/victim-centred was dominant in Britain during April 1995.³¹

As in 1995, a number of memorial ceremonies were arranged in 2005, both in Britain and at Bergen-Belsen on 15 April, the date of liberation. A difference comprised commemorations occurring on Holocaust Memorial Day, initiated in 2001 with official support from among others Tony Blair, Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Charles. A "highlight" of 27 January 2005 consisted of a Bergen-Belsen survivor transporting a memorial light to London. But even if the Holocaust had now gained a more conspicuous role through the creation of Holocaust Memorial Day, much was recognisable from earlier manifestations. The historian David Cesaranis' conclusion was that "[n]owhere in these carefully managed commemorations was there any inkling that Belsen was the site of an international catastrophe and that the relief effort was no less cosmopolitan."³²

The majority of news reports written in connection to the memorial ceremonies show that no significant re-evaluations had taken place. Just as in 1995, a decade later there were interviews with, and articles about, those who had been saved.³³ The fact that these survivors were represented in newspaper columns from the early years of the present century does not mean that they thereby held the position of protagonists. In a report from the commemoration day ar-

ranged in Bergen-Belsen on 17 April 2005, the main focus was upon the British veterans' march into the camp, with an emotional climax in the description of how "[o]ne elderly woman reached out to an old soldier, touched him on the arm and said 'You saved us' as he walked past, tears welling in his eyes."³⁴ This prioritisation is made even clearer in a 2002 interview with Gena Goldfinger, a Bergen-Belsen survivor. In this a description is given of the terrible condition she was in when the British soldiers arrived, but the main part of the "story" concerns her subsequent marriage to one of her military rescuers.³⁵ While relationships of this kind were not uncommon in the liberation aftermath, in this context the interview with Goldfinger functioned as a success story; one through which a survivor's memories demonstrated British humanity in the form of concrete relief achievements in 1945, and successful integrational efforts thereafter. That the liberation of Bergen-Belsen is still strongly associated with a British version of Second World War history is also apparent from the fact that news reports about and with the country's soldiers and medical personnel still dominated in connection with the 60th anniversary held in 2005.³⁶

The Battle over the Holocaust Memorial Day

Even if Bergen-Belsen remains a largely British symbol in Great Britain, the Holocaust now holds a more prominent position, not least due to the establishment of a Holocaust Memorial Day. But if this partly brought with it a cessation of earlier intermittent antagonisms between ethnic Britons and Jews, it also invited new conflicts of a somewhat different nature. In Britain, as many other Western and thereby multiethnic societies, the Holocaust is a politically contemporary matter that often surfaces in connection with the long-lasting Middle Eastern tensions and hostilities that have accompanied the USA-led war against Islamic terrorism. In the British public sphere, the contemporary relevance of the Holocaust has made itself felt in the form of protests against Holocaust Memorial Day. Its leading critic is Sir Iqbal Sacranie, general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which represents 1.2 million British Muslims. In January 2005 Sacranie declared that in other European countries 27 January was an inclusive day; one during which not only Jews but also the vic-

tims of genocide in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Palestine were remembered. This was not the case in Britain, which is why he encouraged the country's Muslims to boycott Holocaust Memorial Day.³⁷

Subsequent to the London terror attacks in the summer of 2005, Sacranie was appointed as one of the government's advisors on questions of Muslim extremists. In this capacity he forwarded the opinion that Holocaust Memorial Day was far too narrowly-orientated a ceremony for many young Muslims, and therefore suggested that it be altered to an EU Genocide Memorial Day.³⁸ As in January of the same year, Prime Minister Blair rejected the suggestion, but the matter attracted significant attention. One reason for this was that the Muslim Council had, at this same juncture, sharply criticised the BBC, whose reporters were accused of representing pro-Israeli views and for maintaining that Muslim leaders had not realised the extent of extremism amongst young Muslims in Britain.³⁹ A further reason for the attention brought to bear on the Memorial Day topic was law professor Marcel Berlin's more radical proposition. Because it was impossible to commemorate all the ethnic and religious groups who had been persecuted, the whole idea of a memorial day should be scrapped, he maintained.⁴⁰ A pronounced defender of Holocaust Memorial Day thereupon attempted to spread oil on troubled water by suggesting that Muslims should use it to call attention to injustices committed through history against them.⁴¹

The strong feelings caused by this debate can be explained, on a general level, by reference to national and European surveys from recent years which indicate clear tendencies towards increased antisemitism among Muslims living in Europe. Attitudes of this type have in all probability been further nourished by increasingly anti-Muslim feelings in Britain after 9/11 and the London terror attacks.⁴² Another and at least as important explanation is the progressive growth of British attention towards the Jewish victims over the last decade. This has not negated comments still directed against Jews, who are said to be too preoccupied with the Jewish catastrophe;⁴³ the critics implicitly conveying that this occurs at the expense of other victim categories. However, it is at the same time clear that Jewish Holocaust survivors who have long fought for a memorial day have received belated political support. Signs of this include Britain being the only European coun-

try which decided to move the 2006 memorial day to Thursday 26 January – based on consideration for the Jewish Sabbath – and that Tony Blair in his speech on this revised commemorative day declared that “[n]othing compares to the Holocaust, not in the intensity of the evil, nor in the ghastly scope of its inhuman ambition.”⁴⁴

The Liberation of the Concentration Camps in Swedish Media

The photographs and eyewitness accounts that illustrated the concentration camp situation were new features in Swedish reporting also.⁴⁵ The awakening these caused was brutal, and the shock was perhaps worse in a country where many at the beginning of 1945 thought that the war no longer affected them to any major extent.⁴⁶

The difficulty of conveying impressions from the camps was something that also affected many on-the-spot Swedish journalists. One candidly admitted that he was incapable of describing the dirt and vermin, and instead had written about diseases and the talkativeness of former prisoners.⁴⁷ With the aim of getting the information across to readers, despite the inherent difficulties, the link between seeing and understanding the extent of what had happened was emphasised in the Swedish press. The London correspondent of *Stockholms-Tidningen*, Hugo Björk, who reported from Buchenwald itself, believed that the concentration camp horrors had torn away the veil from British eyes. It was now time for the Swedes to gain this understanding, despite the in-built difficulties. The latter were connected to the Swedish press, until then “having been careful in describing acts of terror during the war in consideration of Sweden’s neutral position.”⁴⁸ Björk’s apprehensions were shown to be exaggerated. Articles from the concentration camps were given a great deal of space in the press, and liberated prisoners from the neighbouring countries of Denmark and Norway were interviewed.⁴⁹ It was additionally made clear that even if the concentration camps were awful, “the death factory Auschwitz” had been even worse.⁵⁰ Newspaper and magazine editors initially excluded the most terrible pictures, but several of these were in time printed. This was a result of pressure from opinion builders and newspaper readers who believed that “none of the evidence from these horrors should be kept from the Swedish public.”⁵¹

The press reports, photographs and documentary films did not, however, go unchallenged in Swedish debate. Some thought the images should not be shown because brutality did not inspire good actions. Among the critics were pro-Germans, with the explorer Sven Hedin as one of the leading names. They said that such pictures were of the same category as exaggerated propaganda from the First World War, or refused to understand that the crimes portrayed could have been committed by Germans.⁵² Others, without any manifestly German-friendly opinions, hesitated to show the graphic films to youths, but most interviewees held the view that as many people as possible should see the distressing images. It should be emphasised that opponents and doubters were very much a minority.⁵³ Against this background it seems probable that pictures of the Holocaust's consequences anchored the will to help its victims amongst broad societal groups.

Refugees from the Concentration Camps Come to Sweden

Already in connection with the reception of refugees from the Nordic countries in 1942–44, Sweden's reputation, tarnished as the result of very recent concessions towards Nazi Germany, had improved – something that contributed to a strengthened national position. The fact that restrictions became less and less, while the number of received refugees increased significantly from 1942, can partly be explained by their origins in surrounding territories for the most part. It was not only a question of geographical proximity, however, but also a result of ethnic Danes and Norwegians being perceived as having much in common with the Swedes. Conversely, attitudes towards the Baltic refugees, and Danish Jews who had managed to save themselves by journeying to Sweden in October 1943, were divided. In the latter case, as one could read in newspapers and from parliamentary debates, there was a difference between “ordinary Danes” and “Danish Jews.” Put another way, the Danish Jews were of both “family-like” status vis-à-vis the Swedish *folk*, and “something different.”⁵⁴

The longer the war lasted, the more positive were the views on receiving former camp refugees of both Jewish and other identities. According to the Swedish self-image, at the close of and after the war

the country was an oasis in the desert; almost a utopia. In accordance with this feeling, the surrounding world's help needs were recurrently placed in relation to Swedish generosity and an extensive capacity for assisting.⁵⁵ The image of peace-loving Sweden as a compassionate Samaritan fitted well with the conception of "people's home" definitions and was therefore easily integrated into the post-war national Swedish identity.⁵⁶ Another consistent theme in reports of the thousands of patients who had arrived from Bergen-Belsen for rehabilitation in Sweden was an emphasis on its modern and well-organised care facilities. Through a combination of peaceableness, friendliness, good health care and diet, Sweden stood out as a contrast to what the patients had earlier suffered. The care was also clearly beneficial, something both hospital staff and patients agreed upon.⁵⁷

The contrast between a violent Europe and tranquil Sweden led, however, to problems caused by Swedish personnel lacking sufficient understanding of what the former camp prisoners had been through. Life-saving measures carried out upon their arrival in Sweden, such as delousing, cleaning and disinfection, were too much of a reminder of the brutal medical experiments and other inhumane activities German doctors had subjected their prisoners to. The same applied to injecting medicines with syringes and the obligatory complete undressing for a doctor's examination. For those who had survived the extermination camps, bath-houses and shower rooms were especially traumatic. Neither is it surprising that a big fire in a Swedish field could further increase the newcomers' anxiety. Those who had been in extermination camps could imagine they were back in Germany, and about to be incinerated; a fear which increased when measures were taken to burn their original clothes.⁵⁸

The difficulties in understanding what former prisoners had been through were also very apparent when some refugees were forced to march to sanitary facilities between guards equipped with sub-machine guns. In many refugee camps military drills in German were held, which naturally gave refugees associations to their time in concentration and extermination camps. There were, moreover, frequent collisions between refugee needs and the experiences of the Swedish camp managers, who often came from the military or police force. The managers were consequently more ready to prioritise effective or-

ganisational demands than a caring role.⁵⁹ One official in charge was certainly aware of what years of starvation meant in terms of suffering, but this did not prevent him from complaining about the internees both stealing from the stores and having a “completely animal” attitude towards food. In accordance with anti-Nazi and democratic principles, he refused to allow a separation of ethnically Polish and Jewish women, despite there being antisemites in the former group.⁶⁰ In the same way, a school leader failed to understand that Holocaust survivors did not want participate in a get-on-friendly-terms initiative with war-wounded German students.⁶¹

The White Buses

It took a long time for some Bergen-Belsen patients to be physically restored to health.⁶² A minority remained in Sweden, but most left in accordance with their original thoughts of returning to their home countries. Repatriation was a less than attractive idea for many, however, given the remaining signs of antisemitism, mainly in Eastern Europe. In Sweden, where an economic slump and surplus of workers were feared, initiatives were taken to neutralise this refugee vision by describing the situation “back home” in positive terms. Many of those unconvinced by these arguments chose to emigrate to Israel or the USA.⁶³

With a rapidly diminishing number of Bergen-Belsen patients left in Sweden, the memory of them faded. In Swedish language usage, Bergen-Belsen thereafter became synonymous with being thin, in the same way as a British instance a year or so ago when a woman was accused of having mistreated her children until “they looked like victims from Belsen.”⁶⁴ In Sweden another rescue operation now stood in the foreground. The background was that in the early spring of 1945, the Red Cross received permission to transport concentration camp prisoners from Germany to Sweden. The rescue actions were carried out in two stages. In the beginning of March 1945, the white buses collected around 4,000 Danish and Norwegian concentration camp prisoners and placed them under Red Cross protection in Neuengamme. From here they were transported to Sweden, at the end of April. A new bus operation took place in the same month after Himmler had given the Red Cross permission to fetch several thousand Jewish women from the concentration camp of Ravensbrück

and its satellite work camp Malchow. In the same way as Bergen-Belsen, these camps were overpopulated, leading to a lack of food and water and terrible hygienic conditions.⁶⁵

To this day it is still unclear how many concentration camp prisoners were saved by the Red Cross expeditions. Estimates vary from 30,000 to 15,000. Irrespective of the number of those saved, it remains clear that the effort was one of the Second World War's most successful. It has, however, also been a topic for recurrent domestic discussion and debate. During recent years, studies focusing on the white buses have conveyed very different evaluations of their significance. The political scientist Sune Persson claims that the work performed towards the end of the war by the Red Cross, headed by its vice president, as well as scout- and sports-leader, Count Folke Bernadotte (af Wisborg), is underestimated and therefore disregarded by today's Swedes in positions of power.⁶⁶ The historian Ingrid Lomfors has instead maintained that the 1945 humanitarian efforts in Germany soon became an important building block in the construction of a Swedish post-war identity and a symbol for the good society. This heroic saga, which according to Lomfors still acts as a shining example, has been incomplete, however. The saving of certain prisoners namely required others' extinction.⁶⁷

It is not only in the above context that Lomfors and Persson present different views. Over a number of years they have engaged in intense debates, against both one another and others, on Folke Bernadotte's role and that of the white buses, from implicitly separate theoretical starting points. Persson's views can be seen as the continuation of a genetic writing of history, and an ideological use of history with (social) democratic values as a guiding light. Lomfors represents a genealogical perspective and moral use of history, which have maintained a strong position since the close of the 1980s.

Folke Bernadotte: The Creation of a Hero


It took only a short time before the saved became overshadowed by their saviours, with Folke Bernadotte as the dominant figure. "Folke the Peace Promoter," as he was baptised by the weekly magazine *Se*, was appointed "Sweden's man in world history." The great attention bestowed upon Bernadotte and the rescue actions of the white

buses were in part dependent on the earlier published press reports from the liberated concentration camps. The helpful Swedish count was, for instance, contrasted with the executioner – Bergen-Belsen’s later convicted and executed Commandant Josef Kramer.⁶⁸

Subsequent to the rescue operation becoming widely known about, at the end of April 1945, Folke Bernadotte’s comment that this task had been his “most poignant experience” was regularly quoted. The gratitude shown by the liberated towards him and other Red Cross personnel had been well-deserved, and time after time thereafter this feeling was expressed to the

count, *inter alia* in the form of a substantial number of letters from the general public. He was even awarded medals and other honours from, among others, the countries Denmark, Norway, Finland, Great Britain and France.⁶⁹ Much importance was attached to the Swedish support he had received during the assignment.⁷⁰ Of still greater significance for his newly-won hero status was his own contribution: *The Curtain Falls: Last Days of the Third Reich*. In this he, by way of introduction, made clear that Folke Bernadotte himself was at the centre of the narrative. The seed of the rescue missions was sown within him during the winter of 1944, and “from this seed the Swedish Red Cross expedition to Germany in the spring of 1945 would be developed.”⁷¹

In Sweden gratitude alternated with a manifest feeling of pride that a prominent Swede had accomplished a world political contribution. Such reactions dominated the reception of *The Curtain Falls*. Excepting the objection that he had given textual space to one of Himmler’s closest men, the SS- and SD-officer Walter Schellenberg,⁷² praise dominated. His contributions were not only a precursor of the kindness which the Bergen-Belsen prisoners had been recipi-



Folke Bernadotte

An ideal Swedish war-time hero: Folke Bernadotte in the white uniform of the Red Cross.



Few Swedish journalists missed the opportunity to comment upon the fact that the UN plane bound for Israel and the Bernadotte-led negotiations in 1948 was as white as the buses in 1945.

ents of. They moreover bestowed honour upon “the Swedish name” and could thereby serve as “a welcome correction of a view, that has in some parts of the world been earlier apparent about our attitude to the war and its victims,” concluded an editorial article in the social democratic *Morgon-Tidningen*.⁷³

Folke Bernadotte was murdered by members of the Jewish Stern League during a mediation assignment in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948. This deed was condemned by many heads of state and caused indignation and gloom in the Western world. The British journalist Ralph Hewins combined in the biography *Count Folke Bernadotte. His Life and Work*, published just a few months after Bernadotte’s death, praise of the count’s humanitarian efforts with harsh criticism of the insufficient British and American efforts to deal with the horrors of the camps:

unlike the uninquisitive British public, he [Bernadotte] was prepared to do something about it before it was too late, e.g. at Belsen and Buchenwald [sic], where for days the inmates under British care, which arrived too little, too late and too surprised, died at the rate of 1,000 a day. Allied indifference to the years long horror of the concentration camps is not one of the proudest aspects of our mighty struggle.⁷⁴

In Sweden, optimism and a sense of achievement had dominated reports from the mediation work's introductory phase.⁷⁵ This was replaced by a feeling of loss, but pride in his accomplishment was strengthened amongst the sorrow. Words like "honour," "humanity," "justice" and "freedom" were recurrent in descriptions of this, like the report that *shalom* – peace – was the only Hebrew word he had learned. Among his personal qualities were noted fearlessness, courage, humility, loyalty, thoroughness, organisational ability, a spirit of self-sacrifice and a strong yearning for peace – characteristics that were generally deeply anchored in Sweden.⁷⁶

Martyrdom brought with it not only tributes to Swedish characteristics. A frequently voiced fear was that the murder could lead to a new wave of open and aggressive antisemitism. These fears were realised, but only to a limited degree. On the other hand, an antisemitically deeply rooted conception of the slaying of Christ was reactivated. The historian of ideas and learning Henrik Bachner has shown that Bernadotte's stature as royalty and Second World War hero, in combination with his professed Christianity, were circumstances favourable to this interpretation. That his final task had taken place in the "Holy Land" also fit this pattern: "Bernadotte was turned into to the prince of peace who tried to spread the message of love and light among the Jews, but was met by hard-heartedness, hate and death. The UN mediator and the Stern League terrorist were transformed into participants in a modern passion drama."⁷⁷

Already in 1945, objections were raised against Folke Bernadotte's way of describing the rescue actions. Reactions from Danes participating in the operations and from Himmler's former masseur, Felix Kersten, were met by indignation and doubt. Kersten's view received new interest via an article in *Atlantic Monthly* in February 1953, written by the British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper. Even he objected to Bernadotte having accentuated his own actions, and implied that the count had shown insensitivity towards the fate of the Jews. The fact that the Stern League itself sought support for their assassination by referring to this latter criticism, and claiming that Bernadotte had not only been an enemy of Israel, but also sympathised with the idea of wiping out Europe's Jews, contributed to Trevor-Roper's criticism failing to gain a significant footing.⁷⁸ Of even more importance, the

Swedish government took up the gauntlet, counter-attacked, and received support from the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian media. The most substantial rebuttal was published in 1956 by the Swedish Foreign Office in the form of a White Book. Trevor-Roper was furthermore accused in the Swedish press of failing to understand that Sweden had attained peace and prosperity thanks to consistently carried-through neutrality politics. When Sweden had taken part in the recent devastating world firestorm, it had been in a voluntary capacity as rescuers in the hour of need.⁷⁹

A remaining dark cloud comprised a letter presented in 1953. In this, Bernadotte had written to Himmler that the Jews were as unwelcome in Sweden as Germany, and that he had no wish to transport any. Doubt about the letter's authenticity was immediately expressed, but it took until 1978 before the British historian Gerald Fleming, using *inter alia* Scotland Yard's laboratory, could prove it to be a forgery written on Kersten's typewriter.⁸⁰ This clearing up of the matter came five years after the appreciative view of Bernadotte had been confirmed in an authoritative work on Swedish foreign policy during the Second World War.⁸¹ However, there were now signs that interest in him was receding. For example, a Swedish historian and press researcher was surprised over the fact that Raoul Wallenberg, Folke Bernadotte and Dag Hammarskjöld, the latter also killed in a mediating assignment for the UN, were seen so differently. While the memory of the first was paid tribute to in various ways, both Hammarskjöld and Bernadotte, he claimed, were heroes on the wane.⁸² But even if Bernadotte's lustre was fading, in the 1980s there still remained a radiance around his accomplishment, which contributed to continued pledges to the effect that Bernadotte "shall be honoured."⁸³ It was because of this that none of the questioning in the 1960s, 1980s and early 1990s of his hero status, such as new attempts to illuminate and invest more value in Kersten's role in the rescue operation achieved any significant impact.⁸⁴

Dark Shadow over White Buses

The documentary "Take the Jews last" by journalist Bosse Lindquist, transmitted on Swedish radio in April 1998, did, however, provoke strong reactions. The foremost attention centered on information

that Bernadotte and the Swedish Foreign Office had unintentionally, but naively, accommodated Himmler. The latter had planned to reach a separate peace with the Western powers, and a demonstrated humanity at this late stage would facilitate this plan. Furthermore, a statement to the effect that distinction had been made between different prisoners, which had negatively affected the Jews, prompted great indignation.⁸⁵

Germane to this, it was the political context, rather than Lindquist's historical account, that was new. The Danish contributions and prioritising of Scandinavian prisoners were already written of in 1945, in an account from this year for the Red Cross general office.⁸⁶ The re-routing of prisoners was additionally confirmed by a trustworthy source in 1979. In the American historian Steven Koblik's *The Stones Cry Out*, a book published in Swedish in 1987, a comprehensive account of the 1945 negotiations' twists and turns is presented.⁸⁷

In 1998 professional historians expressed their disappointment about an absence of discussion related to the publication of earlier research findings.⁸⁸ A history-cultural question of more interest is why the debate failed to take off at the end of the 1980s but took place, to great effect, ten years later. One answer is that criticism of Folke Bernadotte's heroic role was an element in the confrontational process which followed the resurgence of moral history use in Sweden in the 1990s. This re-invigorated the old, recurrent argument that the count had conferred too important a role upon himself, at the cost of many other significant participants. Because Bernadotte had been an important figure in Swedish post-war history, he had indirectly become part of the official and social democratically coloured history writing that had been under attack from the end of the 1980s. Traditionally highly valued political elements like neutrality, prosperity, (European) outsiderness and social engineering came to be questioned on a broad front subsequent to Sweden joining the EU, and in debates about the legacy of the "people's home" utopians, which took up the so-called forced sterilisations, as well as friendliness towards Germany and NATO during the Second World War and the Cold War respectively.⁸⁹

In the wake of a revitalised Swedish interest in the Holocaust, the project *Levande historia* (Living History) was started in 1997 on the

initiative of Prime Minister Göran Persson. Apart from the goal of, by using the Holocaust as a historical example, combating modern hostility towards “outsiders,” antisemitism, racism and doubts concerning democracy as a governing system, there were other reasons for the project’s launch. For example, a lot suggests that the United States planned to expose Swedish involvement in business deals with money and art confiscated from Jews, as well as the export of Swedish products subsequently used in German weapons manufacture. By going on the offensive and starting *Levande historia*, the Swedish government avoided the negative publicity that major international press exposés would undoubtedly have led to. Persson could instead bask in the appreciative opinions of Western leaders.

It soon became clear, however, that interest in the Holocaust further nourished demands for a critical examination of the country’s politics both prior to and during the Second World War. In the following process the Jews were highlighted, which in turn influenced the image of Folke Bernadotte. In Swedish reference works published during the first post-war decades, nothing about the Jews was mentioned in connection with the white buses, but rather the focus was directed entirely upon the rescue of Danes and Norwegians. It was only in the last decades of the 1900s that Bernadotte’s hero status was supplemented by information about his endeavours to save Jews. Both the heroic conception of the count and his work to help the Jews were questioned in the debate of 1998. Right up until the April commencement of this debate, Sune Persson and Princess Christina, a younger relative of Bernadotte and later successor to him in the position of chairperson of the Swedish Red Cross, had confirmed the long-dominant interpretation when they praised the count. In the wake of Lindquist’s radio programme, both Persson and the Princess have counter-attacked on several occasions.⁹⁰

During recent years the roles have been reversed. Despite continuing tributes to Bernadotte – the Swedish king, for instance, unveiled a bust of him in Uppsala on UN-Day, 24 October 2005 – his defenders have had to struggle to ascend a media uphill slope in the late 1900s and early 21st century. This became apparent as late as 2005 by the mainly positive reactions to Lomfors’ book. Several reviewers paused at the fact that the author did not put the contrafactual and morally

conclusive question of what the result would have been if no rescue expedition of any kind had been carried out – implicitly conveying, thereby, that the white buses did more good than harm, despite everything. This did not exclude a predominantly positive support behind her wish to bring about an illumination of this “blind spot” that the transportations of non-Scandinavian prisoners has amounted to in Swedish history writing. In accordance with this, there was a recurrent reflection that the buses’ both literally and figuratively white innocence should henceforth be exchanged for a somewhat greyer shade.⁹¹

Patriotic and Universal Perspectives on World War II and the Holocaust

A common feature in historiographical studies of the debates on the Second World War, which accelerated in almost the whole of Europe at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, is the conviction that this war has been, and still is, a central component of national historical cultures, with great importance for identity-building and historical consciousness. Another recurrent conclusion is that the memory of the war became nationalised through narratives emphasising unity in the fight against Nazi-Germany. In this process, those who did not fit in – mainly Jews, communists and collaborators – were marginalised. Such monolithic portrayals of the war first began to be seriously moderated in the 1980s, when reconstruction and integrational endeavours had been completed. This development was helped along by the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s collapse.⁹² The result, according to the French-German historian Etienne François, has been a transition from patriotic accounts to universal equivalents. The latter are distinguished by an engagement in the war’s painful and traumatic traces generally, and the Holocaust in particular.⁹³

An earlier, only sporadic, Holocaust interest has undeniably been succeeded by a major focus on the Nazi genocide, which has, among other things, resulted in this catastrophe being commonly used in arguments, and as an object of comparison, in political settings. The Second World War’s universal aspects, which have gained a strong foothold because of the Holocaust’s now central position in historical cultures, does not mean that these aspects were earlier absent. Neither

has the shift in emphasis referred to above led to a cessation of war nationalisation and the Holocaust.

In one respect this universal perspective has been represented since the spring of 1945; namely by news pictures from the newly-liberated concentration camps. Although the whole context was not always presented when these were referred to in the 1950s and onwards, the great attention these pictures awakened from the very beginning was decisive for the Holocaust's future significance. In a contrafactually inspired discussion, Robert Abzug has underlined the importance of the British and Americans having been confronted by the horrors of the concentration camps. Had the Germans been able to remove the traces of their activities in Germany, the Holocaust could well have been treated in the same manner as the Armenian genocide by the Young Turks or the Soviet Union's GULAG system, both of which were uncommon topics in the Cold War's Western historical cultures. If Holocaust proof could solely have been found in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, the question is whether "much of the record of Auschwitz would have continued to be dismissed as 'Hun atrocities' propaganda similar to the 'Rape of Belgium' and other inventions of World War I," Abzug concludes.⁹⁴

Barbie Zelizer has, moreover, established that pictures from the liberated concentration camps have served a dual function: in part as authentic proof that the Nazi genocide took place, and also as visual symbols from which collective Holocaust memories have been constructed and applied to subsequent genocides. As an example, photographs from the Bosnian concentration camp Omarska were published in many newspapers and magazines under the headline "Belsen 1992." Pictures which at their creation showed a new way of communicating outrages have thus established a visual model, and not just within photojournalism. They have been recurrently used in art, television series and films across the world, and have additionally functioned as objects of comparison in relation to contemporary racism and hostility to "outsiders." This has contributed to their status as modern, secular icons. The downside of this, Zelizer emphasises, is the risk that a preoccupation with previous genocides can result in those that have taken place, and are being committed in our times, are forgotten.⁹⁵

Another of history's ironies is that the universal potential contained in press coverage from the concentration camps by no means guaranteed that the Holocaust's main victim category – the Jews – were allotted space in British and Swedish historical cultures. Tony Kushner has analysed how the Holocaust was interpreted in Western liberal democracies. Among democratically-minded liberals there was a prevailing ambivalence towards persecuted minorities. Even if they condemned all forms of intolerance towards ethnic minorities, at the same time they had obvious problems accepting ethnically specific features and customs in a world that was ideally built upon universal values.⁹⁶ This tendency was quite noticeable in Britain, partly as a result of the many Jews in the late 1940s who, in opposition to British policies, actively supported and contributed to the creation of an Israeli state. The other factor comprised the manner in which Britain's universal starting point was, as in many other countries, supplemented by a nationalisation of the Holocaust. In this way, the liberation of Bergen-Belsen became first and foremost associated with the liberators themselves, as well as the British war effort – not with the survivors.

The creation of the Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001 is one of several indications that the modern universal World War narrative, with the Holocaust in a central position, has become influential even in Britain. Another is a conception, first introduced in the years following 1945, that has returned during the last decade or so. According to this, the primary reason for the British war effort was to fight against the Nazi atrocities and rescue the Jews. The impact of this claim has, however, been limited, among other reasons because the factual basis for an interpretation of this kind is almost non-existent.⁹⁷ One other explanation for this interpretation's lack of impact is that it is hard to combine with the recurrent images of war, always fought as just causes, in British popular culture – “a culture,” writes historian Michael Paris, “that has transformed war into an entertaining spectacle, and reconstructs battle as an exciting adventure narrative.”⁹⁸ It is therefore hardly surprising to find that the Holocaust is seldom found in the traditional understanding of the Second World War; one recently summed up by Paris' colleague David Souden. He discusses the concrete military measures taken, which were aimed at

preventing an invasion of the British Isles, and the fight against the Axis Powers in Europe, North Africa and Asia, orientated towards protecting the British Empire. A just as important aspect consisted of maintaining "the British way of life: family and home; soaring cathedrals and village greens; cockney singalongs and country estates; cotton mills and pints of bitter."⁹⁹

That such interpretations are still current is evident from both the content of and comments regarding the manifestations arranged for the 60th anniversary of the Holocaust and the War's end. Comparing the Victory days in Moscow, Warsaw and London, the Eastern Europe expert Timothy Garton Ash observed that, even if the first two were substantially different, they were completely unlike the British capital's nostalgic ceremonies, which only came close to the brutal realities of wartime Poland and the Soviet Union when depicting Japanese prisoner-of-war camps and their British internees.¹⁰⁰ The tendency to remember the Second – and First – World War as "a national experience of finest hours and last hurrahs, with poppy wreaths at the Cenotaph, Churchill's last growl and Vera Lynn singing for Britain,"¹⁰¹ has contributed to a weak interest for recollections of atrocities, whether committed by the British both before and after the Second World War or by the communists and Nazi Germany.¹⁰² Efforts to make the Holocaust more conspicuous have therefore for the most part been limited to occasional events. Not only have the Muslim Council of Britain protested against these. On the eve of VE Day, a writer in *The Times* expressed the view that too much attention had been paid during recent years to the Holocaust, at the expense of daily life – "the raw, confused, undifferentiated stream of events," which could play a part in a greater understanding of the Second World War.¹⁰³

As a combatant and neutral nation respectively, the wartime roles of Britain and Sweden were completely different, but one characteristic they shared was that of bystanders to the Holocaust. Pride towards participation in the War has been and still is manifest in Britain. Right up into the 1990s, a combination of modernity and neutrality occupied an elevated position in Sweden, which contributed to gratitude for having been spared. The War memory was concentrated upon the themes of constant vigilance, producer-gas-powered cars,

and coffee substitutes. With the exception of a few independent writers and news articles subsequent to the broadcasting of television series *Holocaust* in 1979, about what was known in wartime Sweden of the Holocaust, an unwillingness towards in-depth discussion about antisemitism, relations with Nazi Germany and the restrictive refugee policies of the 1930s was widespread for a substantial period of time.¹⁰⁴ As in Britain, this led to a situation whereby the Swedish contribution to helping refugees from Bergen-Belsen and the white-bus rescue operation dominated. Swedish medical care, the Swedish Red Cross and, above all, Folke Bernadotte were the narrative's heroes – at the cost of those who were saved and here, for the most part, the Jews. Over the last decade the notion of neutral, bystanding, but at the same time humanitarian and helpful Sweden has been successfully challenged. But even if Lomfors' research has stimulated much interest, it seems that the time for showdowns has rapidly gone by. The sociologist Piero Colla's explanation for this is that objections were channeled into a Swedish tradition of state-initiated information projects and *folk*-education. Against this background, establishing Living History was a way of attempting to take control of criticism and replace it with "the creation of a 'new' charismatic official history."¹⁰⁵

Post-war Sweden exerted itself for a considerable time, and successfully, to obtain a standing as a great moral power and world conscience. In a modernistic and supposedly anti-nationalistic spirit, the post-war national identity was founded upon the conception that Sweden was the "favourite child of an enlightenment project" – a country that other states should measure themselves against and, by implication, strives to resemble.¹⁰⁶ During 2005, Prime Minister Göran Persson, on several commemorative occasions, took his departure point in speeches from a history writing that was essentially anchored to these traditional and charismatic features. On the centenary of the peaceful Norwegian–Swedish union dissolution, in September 2005, Persson described with the help of several historic examples from the 1800s and 1900s, and with references to August Strindberg and the first social democratic party leader, Hjalmar Branting, a Scandinavian development characterised by democracy, neighbourliness, prosperity and successful Swedish peace endeavours.¹⁰⁷ At a seminar

in Norway about the white buses on 18 May 2005, the starting point comprised a tribute to one of the rescue operation's drivers, who was also now present. On even this occasion Persson referred to an earlier social democratic party leader, Tage Erlander, who had been in place to receive the refugees upon their arrival in Sweden. Erlander had understood that the arriving Norwegians had very different experiences than the Swedes, which led to a feeling of inadequacy. Persson also mentioned the white-bus debates. At the same time that many still show their gratitude for the Red Cross expedition, criticism was raised and new research received publicity. This was good, he said, but should absolutely not lead to a situation in which the help initiatives were forgotten. It was therefore important that the life-savers Raoul Wallenberg and Folke Bernadotte, as well as less well-known wartime heroes, received continued appreciation.¹⁰⁸ The defence of Swedish Second World War history had earlier been conveyed by Persson on Victory Day in Moscow, 9 May, when he declared that if more nations had chosen Sweden's peaceful example, the world would have been a better place to live in. In a post-speech interview he added that he saw no reasons whatsoever for Swedes to apologise for the wartime neutrality politics.¹⁰⁹

How are we to understand the continued preoccupation with, and defence of, well-known patriotic narratives, and hesitancy towards systematically "writing in" the Holocaust in the history of Second World War Britain and Sweden? An important answer is that genetic writings of history have gone hand in hand with ideological history use, which have legitimised and rationalised wartime politics and ideology. At the same time national identity-building which has arisen from this base, has provided many people with a sense of pride and security, because the dark shadows are seldom allowed to become visible. Not least amongst older people and in political establishments, there is significant opposition to deserting familiar conceptions, which thus leads to counteractions every time they are attacked.

The genealogical perspective has, however, been foremost associated with resolving matters concerning moral history use. Apart from central elements in national identities being thereby threatened by deconstruction, an attention focus on the Holocaust has brought

into view painful examples, often personified by single tragic human fates, of what the restrictive refugee politics of the late 1930s resulted in for fleeing Jews. These warning historical examples have also in recent years helped to cast new light upon current debates concerning “bogus asylum-seekers” and “economic migrants,” as well as similarities between historical prejudice against ethnic minorities and today’s persecutions. When connecting lines have been drawn between then and now, the spotlight has increasingly been directed towards current refugee restrictions; even these illustrated by news articles about those affected. The rescuers’ famed reputation is at risk if the burden of guilt is extended to not only including weakness towards Nazi Germany, but also ignorance in relation to both those who survived the Holocaust and today’s persecuted minorities.

Cynics claim that all we learn from history is that we learn nothing from it, but it is significantly more practicable to, indeed, refer to the lessons of history. If, however, one of these is that not only Nazi Germany and their allies were responsible for the Holocaust, and that consequently everyone was a bystander – with the implicit conclusion that their function as rescuers began far too late – we should not be surprised that passion remains for familiar and morally black-and-white narratives about the life-and-death struggle on Second World War battlefields between good democracies and evil dictatorships.

Translation: Mark Davies

Notes

1. Klas-Göran Karlsson, “Making Sense of the Holocaust after Sixty Years: An Introduction,” and Jörn Rüsen, “Interpreting the Holocaust. Some Theoretical Issues,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Holocaust Heritage. Inquires into European Historical Cultures*, Malmö: Sekel Förlag 2004, pp. 23, 35–37.
2. Klas-Göran Karlsson, “The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture. Theoretical and Analytical Challenges,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), *Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2003, pp. 38–43.
3. Yehuda Bauer, “The Death-Marches, January–May, 1945,” *Modern Judaism* 1983:1, pp. 1–21.
4. Eberhard Kolb, *Bergen-Belsen: From “Detention Camp” to Concentration Camp, 1943–1945*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 2002, pp. 43–49; Christine Lattek, “Bergen-Belsen: From ‘Privileged’ Camp to Death Camp,” in Jo Reilly, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner & Colin Richmond (eds.), *Belsen in History and Memory*, London & Portland: Frank Cass 1997, pp. 37–71.

5. An equivalent pattern in the USA characterises the emphasis on the American liberation of Buchenwald; see, for instance, Robert H. Abzug, *Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps*, New York: Oxford University Press 1985, pp. 45–59; Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company 1999, pp. 63–66, 93–94, 122; Jeffrey Shandler, *While America Watches. Televising the Holocaust*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, pp. 11–13, 16–18; Edward T. Linenthal, *Preserving Memory. The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum*, New York: Columbia University Press 2001 (1995), pp. 193–194.
6. Ben Shephard, *After Daybreak. The Liberation of Belsen, 1945*, London: Jonathan Cape 2005, pp. 24–53. For similar American reactions, see Robert H. Abzug (1985), pp. 18–19, 55, 67–68, 85.
7. Cf. for instance Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret. Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's "Final Solution"*, New York 1998 (1980), pp. 12–15, 196–208; Robert H. Abzug 1985, pp. 3–19; Steven Koblik, *The Stones Cry Out. Sweden's Response to the Persecution of the Jews 1933–1945*, New York: Holocaust Library 1988, pp. 79–115, 141–165; Laurel Leff, "When the Facts Didn't Speak for Themselves. The Holocaust in the *New York Times*, 1939–1945," *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2000:5, pp. 52–72.
8. It took four days, however, before the BBC transmitted Richard Dimbleby's report from Bergen-Belsen. In London there were initial difficulties in accepting his information as accurate; Roger Boyes, "When Belsen was liberated, the Holocaust came to Britain," *The Times*, April 16, 2005, and "Lessons of Belsen," www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main, April 18, 2005 (January 16, 2006). See also Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and Liberal Imagination. A Social and Cultural History*, Oxford, United Kingdom & Cambridge, USA 1994, pp. 208–209; Tony Kushner, *We Europeans? Mass-Observation, 'Race' and British Identity in the Twentieth Century*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 2004, p. 217–218; Toby Haggith, "Filming the Liberation of Bergen-Belsen," in Toby Haggith & Joanna Newman (eds.), *Holocaust and the Moving Image. Representations in Film and Television since 1933*, London & New York: Wallflower Press 2005, pp. 35–36.
9. Tony Kushner 1994, p. 208. It was also of significance that the Soviet news reports were manifestly more emotionally charged in a way that was strikingly different to the Western Allies' equivalents; see Larry D. Wilcox, "'Shadows of a Distant Nightmare': Visualizing the Unimaginable Holocaust in Early Documentary Films," in Margot Levy (ed.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide. Volume 3: Memory*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001, p. 488.
10. Max Liljefors, *Bilder av Förintelsen. Mening, minne, kompromettering*, Lund: Palmkrons Förlag 2002, pp. 17–22.
11. James Young, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1988, p. 17.
12. Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, London: Allan Lane 1978, pp. 20–21.
13. Barbie Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget. Holocaust Memory through the Camera's Eye*, Chicago 1998, p. 12. See also Toby Haggith 2005, pp. 37–38, 42.
14. Tony Kushner 1994, p. 219; Tony Kushner, David Cesarani, Jo Reilly & Colin Richmond, "Approaching Belsen: An Introduction," in Tony Kushner, David Cesarani, Jo Reilly & Colin Richmond (eds.), *Belsen in History and Memory*, London & Portland: Frank Cass 1997, pp. 4–5.

15. Max Hastings, *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–45*, New York: Knopf 2004, pp. 591–592; Toby Haggith 2005, p. 38.
16. David Culbert, “American Film Policy in the Re-Education of Germany After 1945,” in Nicholas Pronay & Keith Wilson (eds.), *The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies*, Totawa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books 1985, p. 191; Larry D. Wilcox 2001, pp. 485, 489; Toby Haggith 2005, p. 44.
17. Tony Kushner 1994, pp. 205–269; Tony Kushner, David Cesarani, Jo Reilly & Colin Richmond 1997, pp. 7–8; Tony Kushner, “The Memory of Belsen,” in Jo Reilly, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner & Colin Richmond (eds.), *Belsen in History and Memory*, London & Portland: Frank Cass 1997, p. 191; Arie J. Kochavi, “Britain’s Image Campaign against the Zionists,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 2001:2, pp. 297–299.
18. Tony Kushner 1994, pp. 215–221; Tony Kushner 2004, pp. 189–225; Ben Shephard, pp. 168–169. Apart from the Jewish press, only the *Manchester Guardian* and, on a lesser scale, *The Daily Mirror* emphasised that the Jews had been worst hit by the Nazi race politics; Tony Kushner 1997, p. 187. The words “Jew” and “Jewish” were for the most part noticeably absent from American press reports from Buchenwald; see Peter Novick 1999, pp. 64–65.
19. Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces. Artifacts of German Memory, 1870–1990*, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press 2000, p. 251.
20. Michael J. Cohen, “Churchill and the Jews: The Holocaust,” *Modern Judaism* 1986:1, pp. 27–49; Tony Kushner 1994, pp. 213–237.
21. David S. Katz, *The Jews in the History of England 1485–1850*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996 (1994), Bill Williams, “The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance. Middle-Class Manchester and the Jews,” in Alan J. Kidd & K. W. Roberts (eds.), *City, Class and Culture. Studies of Social Policy and Cultural Production in Victorian Manchester*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1985, pp. 74–102; David Cesarani, “The Anti-Jewish Career of Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Cabinet Minister,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 1989:3, pp. 461–482; Tony Kushner, *The Persistence of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in British Society During the Second World War*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989; and Tony Kushner 1994.
22. Judith E. Doneson, *The Holocaust in American Film*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press 2002 (1987), pp. 64–69. About the reception of *The Diary of Anne Frank* in Great Britain, see Tony Kushner 1994, p. 245–247, and Judith Petersen, “A Little-Known Classic: *Night and Fog* in Britain,” in Ewout van der Knapp (ed.), *Uncovering the Holocaust: The International Reception of Night and Fog*, London & New York: Wallflower Press 2006, pp. III–II2.
23. Tony Kushner 1994, pp. 240–269. See also Tom Lawson, “Constructing a Christian History of Nazism. Anglicanism and the Memory of the Holocaust, 1945–49,” *History & Memory*, Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 159–162.
24. Athena Syriathou, “Großbritannien: ‘Der Krieg wird uns zusammenhalten,’” in Monika Flacke (ed.), *Mythen der Nationen. 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen*, Vol. I, Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum 2004, pp. 303–305.
25. Neil Ascherson, “The film Britain hid from Germany,” *The Observer*, September 8, 1985. See also the statement of historian Stephen Smith, head of the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre in Nottingham, in Roger Boyes, “When Belsen was liberated, the Holocaust came to Britain,” *The Times*, April 16, 2005. Tony Kushner, David Cesarani, Jo Reilly & Colin Richmond 1997, pp. 9–10, provide several examples showing that the

- British history culture in some instances still has difficulties distinguishing the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen from the extermination camp Auschwitz-Birkenau.
26. See for example Bernhard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939–1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979; Peter Gillman & Leni Gillman, “Collar the Lot!” *How Britain Interned and Expelled Its Wartime Refugees*, London: Quartet Books 1980; Robin Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, New York: Longman Publishing 1994; Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948. British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000; David Cesarani, “Mad Dogs and Englishmen: Towards a Taxonomy of Rescuers in a ‘Bystander’ Country – Britain 1933–45,” and “‘Pissing in the Wind?’ The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust ‘Bystanders,’” in David Cesarani & Paul A. Levine, *‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation*, London & Portland: Frank Cass 2002; Arieh J. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945–1948*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2001.
 27. Max Paul Friedman, “The U.S. State Department and the Failure to Rescue. New Evidence on the Missed Opportunity at Bergen-Belsen,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Spring 2005, pp. 30–43.
 28. Rainer Schulze, “Keeping very clear of any ‘Kuh-Handel’: The British Foreign Office and the Rescue of Jews from Bergen-Belsen,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Fall 2005, p. 226. See also Richard Norton-Taylor, “Britain stymied help for Jews in Nazi camps,” *The Guardian*, July 21, 1999.
 29. Ben Shephard 2005, especially pp. 4–6.
 30. Ben Shephard 2005, pp. 96–101, 190–200.
 31. Tony Kushner, David Cesarani, Jo Reilly & Colin Richmond 1997, p. 12.
 32. David Cesarani, “At Camp Horror, heroism and chaos,” *The Guardian*, June 11, 2005.
 33. “The horror Rachel kept silent” (interview with Rachel Levy), and “Never again, warns Belsen survivor” (interview with Paul Oppenheimer), *Daily Mail*, January 25, 2005; Chris Johnston, “Horror of Belsen death camp remembered,” *The Times*, April 15, 2005; Tony Paterson, “Belsen survivors remember day that shocked the world,” *The Independent*, April 16, 2005.
 34. Hanna Cleaver, “Horrors of Belsen flood back for survivors,” www.telegraph.co.uk, April 18, 2005 (January 15, 2006).
 35. “I married the soldier who liberated me from the horrors of Belsen” (interview with Gena Goldfinger), *The Sun*, November 18, 2002. On relations in general between former concentration camp prisoners and their liberators, see Ben Shephard 2005, pp. 137–140.
 36. See for example “The liberator” (interview with Douglas Paybody), *The Observer*, January 9, 2005; Luke Harding, “‘I have never seen such horror in my life’. Sixty years on, the world must not forget Belsen, says liberator” (interview with Dick Williams), *The Guardian*, April 14, 2005; “Belsen liberation remembered,” *Daily Mail*, April 15, 2005; “1945: British troops liberate Bergen-Belsen,” www.news.bbc.co.uk/onthistday/hi/dates, April 15, 2005 (January 10, 2006); “Brit tribute to Belsen,” *The Sun*, April 16, 2005; “Cannibalism in Prison Camp. British Medical Officer’s Visit to the ‘Most Horrible Place,’” *The Guardian*, April 19, 2005; Liz Hazelton, “Anniversary reminds Geoff of Belsen link,” www.iccoventry.icnetwork.co.uk, April 26, 2005 (January 8, 2006).

37. Sacranie's suggestion did not lack precursors. In connection with the opening of the Imperial War Museum's Holocaust exhibition, Jay Rayner voiced his objection to an exclusive focus on the Jewish Second World War catastrophe; see Jay Rayner, "Don't isolate the Holocaust," *The Observer*, June 4, 2000. Agreement among Muslims was not, [however,?] complete. Member of Parliament Khalid Mahmood declared that he was proud to be a Muslim, but had no intention of supporting the boycott, Everybody interested in human rights should, he maintained, stand up for Holocaust Memorial Day; David Leppard, "Muslim boycott Holocaust remembrance," *The Sunday Times*, January 23, 2005.
38. Iqbal Sacranie, "Holocaust Memorial day is too exclusive," *The Guardian*, September 20, 2005. See also Abul Taher, "Ditch Holocaust day, advisers urge Blair," *The Sunday Times*, September 11, 2005, and Toby Helm, "Holocaust Day must be scrapped, says Muslim leaders," www.telegraph.co.uk/news, September 12, 2005 (January 15, 2006). With this in mind, it is not surprising that the Swedish EU-parliamentarian Göran Lindblad's suggestion – presented just prior to the 2006 Holocaust Memorial Day – of a remembrance day for the victims of communism was given media attention; see, for example, Jon Henley, "MPs vote to condemn 'evils of communism'," *The Guardian*, January 26, 2006.
39. See, for instance, Owen Gibson, "BBC denies charge of pro-Israeli bias after complaint by Muslim leaders," *The Guardian*, August 15, 2005; Martin Bright, "Muslim leaders in feud with the BBC," and "Let's shed more light on Islam," *The Observer*, August 14 & 28, 2005; Claire Cozens, "BBC rejects Muslim Council complaint," *The Guardian*, September 30, 2005. Similar criticism of the MCB's leadership had been earlier forwarded in, *inter alia*, "A crying need for leadership," *Daily Mail*, July 14, 2005.
40. Marcel Berlins, "Victims of the Holocaust get a memorial day. Victims of other atrocities do not. Isn't it time we dropped the whole idea?," *The Guardian*, September 14, 2005.
41. David Cesarani, "A way out of this dead end," *The Guardian*, September 16, 2005. Several statements supporting Holocaust Memorial Day are found under the heading "Why we need Holocaust Memorial Day," *The Guardian*, September 19, 2005.
42. See, for instance, Christopher Allen, "Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 2004:3, pp. 1–25.
43. Bess Twiston Davies, "Faith News," *The Times*, January 14, 2006. Blair's statement was disputed by one person in the audience, who drew attention to the Armenian genocide. Among the guests were victims of the genocide in Rwanda.
44. Tony Blair quoted in Stephen Bates, "Survivors with a message lest we forget Nazi genocide," *The Guardian*, January 27, 2006.
45. Steven Koblik 1988, pp. 100–101, 142–165; Ingvar Svanberg & Mattias Tydén, *Sverige och Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933–1945*, Stockholm: Arena 1997, p. 387.
46. Cf. Alf W. Johansson, "Neutrality and Modernity: The Second World War and Sweden's National Identity," in Stig Ekman & Nils Edling (eds.), *War Experience, Self-Image and National Identity: The Second World War as Myth and History*, Stockholm & Hedemora: Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund & Gidlunds Förlag 1997, and Max Liljefors & Ulf Zander, "Det neutrala landet Ingenstans. Bilder av andra världskriget

- och den svenska utopin,” *Scandia* 2003:2, pp. 209–242; a shorter version of the latter article is published in German with the title “Schweden: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die schwedische Utopie,” in Monika Flacke (ed.), *Mythen der Nationen. 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen*, Vol. II, Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum 2004, pp. 569–587.
47. Eric Swenne, “USA-blod räddar fånglägrets offer,” *Aftonbladet*, April 25, 1945.
 48. Hugo Björk, “Tyska koncentrationsläger avslöjas: Ohyggliga skräckscener, många miljoner dödsoffer,” *Stockholms-Tidningen*, April 19, 1945. See also Daniel Viklund, “Fruktansvärd skildring från tyskt fångläger,” *Dagens Nyheter*, April 18, 1945, and “Parlamentsledamot svimmade vid åsynen av fånglägret,” *Stockholms-Tidningen*, April 23, 1945.
 49. See for instance “Fasor utan like i Gestapos läger,” *Aftonbladet*, May 4, 1945; Hugo Björk, “‘Koncentrationslägret var en helvetisk mardröm’. 5 av 1.000 norska judar överlevde tortyren,” and “Tysk mörderska chef för fångna skandinaver,” *Stockholms-Tidningen*, April 25, and May 5, 1945; Ingvar Axelsson, “På tröskeln till gaskammaren: Tatuerade fången 177258 om livet i förintelselägret,” *Expressen*, May 4, 1945; “Ögonen brändes på tyst patriot,” *Dagens Nyheter*, May 5, 1945.
 50. Hugo Björk, “Buchenwald rena rekreationslägret emot dödsfabriken Auschwitz,” *Stockholms-Tidningen*, April 26, 1945.
 51. “Hur reagerar Ni för denna bild?,” *Expressen*, April 29, 1945. See also Tobias Lindberg, *Ett nytt sätt att se. Om bildtidningen Se 1938–1945*, Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet & Nordicom 2004, p. 311.
 52. Stéphane Bruchfeld, “Grusade drömmar. Svenska ‘nationella’ och det tyska nederlaget 1945,” in Charlotta Brylla, Birgitta Almgren & Frank-Michael Kirsch (eds.), *Bilder i kontrast. Interkulturella processer Sverigel Tyskland i skuggan av nazismen 1933–1945*, Aalborg: Schriften des Centers für deutsch-dänischen Kulturtransfer Nr 9, 2005, p. 80.
 53. “Hur reagerar Ni för denna bild,” *Expressen*, April 29, 1945, and “Varför ska vi se Buchenwald på film?,” *Idun*, June 7, 1945. See also Max Liljefors 2002, pp. 22–33.
 54. Mikael Byström, “Den nordiska tanken. Ett förklaringsperspektiv på svenskt flyktningmottagande och debatten om flyktingar och flyktingpolitik 1942–1947,” in Hans Albin Larsson (ed.), *Forskningsfronten flyttar fram: Nordiska perspektiv, Aktuellt om historia* 2005:2, pp. 125–144. See also Piero Colla, “Race, Nation, and Folk. On Repressed Memory of World War II in Sweden and its Hidden Categories,” in Nina Witoszek & Lars Trägårdh (eds.), *Culture and Crisis. The Case of Germany and Sweden*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books 2004 (2002), pp. 136–147.
 55. “Svensk insats,” “Ökad hjälp till Norge” and “Vad Sverige gjort för krigets offer,” *Se*, April 12–18, 1945; Rickard Lindström, “Flera sjuka i Sigtuna än på Södersjukhuset,” *Morgon-Tidningen*, June 25, 1945. Cf. Max Liljefors & Ulf Zander 2003, pp. 221–223.
 56. For examples of the conception of Sweden as a generous and compassionate samaritan, see Sten Söderberg, *Svenska röda korset. 1865–1965 – de första 100 åren*, Stockholm: AB Svensk Literatur 1965, pp. 277–279, 289–310, and Hans Dahlberg, *I Sverige under andra världskriget*, Stockholm: Bonniers 1989 (1983), p. 317.
 57. For a detailed analysis of press reports concerning Bergen-Belsen patients, see Ulf Zander, “Efterskrift,” in Ben Shephard, *Befrielsen av Bergen-Belsen*, Lund: Historiska Media 2005, pp. 229–232.
 58. Inga Gottfarb, *Den livsfarliga glömskan*, Höganäs: Bokförlaget Bra Böcker 1986, pp. 174–177.

59. Elisabeth Reuterswärd, "Det svenska mottagandet 1945 av flyktingar från koncentrationsläger," *Ale* 2005:3, pp. 24–25.
60. Torbjörn Nilsson, "Doverstorp, 1945: Svensk flyktinghjälp bakom taggtråd," in Marika Hedin, Åsa Linderborg & Torbjörn Nilsson, *Bilden av Sveriges historia. Fyrtio sätt att se på 1900-talet*, Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand 2005, p. 214.
61. Inga Gottfarb 1986, p. 200.
62. In 1947 there were still 1,000 extermination- and concentration-camp patients in Swedish hospitals and convalescent homes; see; see Hugo Valentin, *Judarna i Sverige. Från 1774 till 1950-talet*, Stockholm: Natur och Kultur & Judiska museet 2004 (1964), p. 195.
63. Several articles in David Bankier (ed.), *The Jews Are Coming Back. The Return of Jews to their Countries of Origin after WWII*, New York, Oxford & Jerusalem: Berghahn Books & Yad Vashem 2005; and Andrzej Nils Ugglä, *I nordlig hamn. Polacker i Sverige under andra världskriget*, Uppsala: Centrum för multietnisk forskning 1997, pp. 202–209.
64. John Revill, "Belsen kids' mother is jailed," *Birmingham Post*, August 13, 2003. See also Tony Kushner 1997, p. 196.
65. Rochelle G. Seidel, "Ravensbrück Concentration Camp and Rescue in Sweden," in Margot Levy (ed.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide. Volume 3: Memory*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001, pp. 172–188.
66. Sune Persson, "Vi åker till Sverige.' De vita bussarna 1945," Stockholm: Fischer & Co 2002, pp. 16–17, 521–524.
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