

Introduction. The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, "Focal Points--Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts"

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The five papers following were all presented at the 17th Arne Ryde

Symposium on Focal Points Coordination, Complexity, and Communication
in Strategic Contexts. The symposium was arranged by the Department
of Economics at Lund University, Sweden, sponsored by the Arne
Ryde Foundation, established in the memory of the late Arne Ryde. It was
held at Trolleholm castle, August 20 21, 1997. The following excerpt from
the call for papers states the intentions of the symposium.

Since its introduction, by Thomas Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict, the notion of focal point has been a major puzzle for game theory. This notion suggests that coordination in game situations relies on factors that are not included in the game-theoretic formalism. Real-life equilibrium selectors exploit strategically seemingly irrelevant features such as precedence, simplicity, or just some hard-to-define idea of salience.

For a better understanding of coordination behavior, several approaches may be considered. In particular one wants new formalizations of relevant information and, concurrently, new analyses of the emergence of equilibrium selection rules in a rationalistic, evolutionary, or other framework.

The connections between framing, more formal preplay communication, and focality, as well as various bounded-rationality themes, such as the role of complexity, are also of interest. Finally, experimental studies of coordinating behavior constitute a vital complement to the theoretical analysis.