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ИСТРАЖУВАЊЕ - ПРИСТАПИ, КОНЦЕПТИ И
ПОЛИТИКИ**

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SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE SECURITY SERVICES

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE FUNCTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION*

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Abstract

We are witnessing the emergence of a large number of emergency situations as a consequence of technical, technological and natural hazards, terrorist attacks and other sources of threat. These threats have also imposed the thinking of the importance of effective management in emergency situations in order to save lives, reduce negative consequences and provide minimal conditions for operativity of the basic society functions. Taking into account that the security of basic functions of economic and social development is directly related to the critical infrastructure protection, the aim of this paper is to point out the necessity of looking at the risk management process in critical infrastructure protection as an integral function of corporate security, both at the level of state and big corporate systems, as well as at smaller organizations linked with those systems, which face different types of natural and technical-technological hazards.

***Key words:** risk, emergency situations, critical infrastructure protection, risk management, corporate security*

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INTRODUCTION

Industrialization, informatization and progress have a positive influence on the human striving for creation of better and more comfortable life. However, the consequence of this progress is the existence of many critical spots in the human environment that can negatively impact human society and economic development. Due to the existence of many economic complexes that offer their services to the basic society functions, the society is increasingly becoming dependent on them, thus becoming vulnerable as economic complexes are threatened by various sources of hazards. Therefore, a particular attention is given to the prevention of exposition to threats. That is, every investment in security presents a manner of reduction of potential risks stemming from those threats and hazards, as well as reduction of their consequences.

One of the main preventive techniques for achieving security is risk management. Policy and practice of risk management are a complex function of security management with the aim of identification of the critical nodes of the system and establishment of adequate strategies for prevention and minimization of risks. The systems that possess such policies have strategic advantage in comparison with other systems that do not apply similar approaches.

Preconditions for efficient risk management clearly represent pre-defined, proactive policies and procedures aimed at timely removal of potential sources of threat. To assess the endangerment of an organization is to identify potential threats, their sources and forms, their potential effects and consequences and understand strengths and resources. On the basis of this knowledge we can implement measures for prevention and reduction of the probability of negative events and mitigation of consequence. All of this is the basis for successful operations of organizational systems with the aim of protection of human lives and health, material and cultural goods and environment.

In the earlier periods risk management was focused on removal or mitigation of consequences, i.e. the reaction to consequences. On the other hand, contemporary threats are characterized by complexity and interaction of numerous factors participating in the creation of adverse event, which puts individuals, security forces and subjects in front of complex conditions of prediction of future events and their consequences. This is particularly true with regard to the threats to critical infrastructures that are nowadays interconnected in such manner that small changes in one infrastructure are multiplied as complex and unpredictable scenarios with limited management capacities. If such organizations do not have clearly defined procedures, a

crisis or emergency situation can easily grow into a disaster with immense consequences. Risk management in such complex systems emphasizes prevention, i.e. protection of population and property from destructive impacts through risk mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery comprehensive program.

CURRENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Dependence of modern society on the technological development and complex systems is in direct proportion to the threats to these systems. Natural and technological hazards, terrorism, crime and other threats put individual countries face-to-face with challenges and dilemmas how to define and protect critical infrastructure, whose destruction or disruption of its operations can cause serious disturbances in the functioning of the economy and society. New risks and threats to critical infrastructure - social engineering and cyber threats have become reality. On the other hand, new technologies (information technology, nano-technology, nuclear technology, GM etc.) could enhance capabilities in facing those threats, but can also be considered as threats per se. A tremendous development of information and communication technology revived the question of using social network as a part of the solution, but a part of the problem too. The application of new tools in the protection of CI from unpredictable threats (morphological analysis, automatization of processes) is necessary.

Resources normally identified as critical infrastructure are: electrical energy system, banking and finances, telecommunications, storage and transport of gas and oil products, water supply system, transport system, industry, emergency services, police, fire brigade, and the sector responsible for business continuity of the Government (Moteff, 2005).

A slightly different systematization of critical infrastructures is the one where they are grouped in the following 11 sectors: water supply, agrarian sector and food industry, emergency services, public health, industry, energy, telecommunication, transport, banking and finance, chemical and other hazardous substances, postal and delivery service (Radvanovski, 2006).

Strengthening of national capacities and regional cooperation in relation to the critical infrastructure protection is a common goal of South-eastern European countries according to their national security strategies and contemporary security threats to the critical infrastructure protection. This objective is in line with the European perspective of the countries of South Eastern Europe as well as the Critical Infrastructure Protection Programm of the European Union.

Challenges and policies of national critical infrastructure whose boundaries are rather vague can be considered as the network of mutually interrelationships, as follows: public sector - private sector; the state – the state; the state - the group of states.

The relationship between public and private sector is being observed from the national and international perspective. A key challenge arises from the relationship between the public and private sectors and protecting those segments of critical infrastructure owned by the private sector. From economic point of view, there is no will to invest in adequate infrastructure protection without financial support from the state. The problem of harmonizing the daily operational activities and corporate security policies on the one hand, and the defense and security policy and the law of the states on the other hand is even more complicated due to the fact that a large number of critical infrastructures are managed by the multinational corporations that often operate beyond national protection policy and legal constraints. Protection should also be compromised due to the race for competitive position in the economic, technological and financial environment, which has increased the flexibility in the free market of goods and services and has made critical infrastructure even more vulnerable.

The complexity of public-private partnerships within the critical infrastructure protection is especially multiplied on the level of international and regional cooperation, taking into account different national, political and security interests of individual countries, the restrictions of financial resources and constraints influenced by the legislation. Except of nuclear energy sector which is well-regulated both on national and international level, the issue of ownership and public-private partnership is expected to be solved by the delineation of responsibilities in terms of safety and security and the protection of public interest.

The relationship between the state and the group of states is reflected through an integrated approach based on the need to adopt common policies and international standards for the critical infrastructure protection, and the fact that all South-eastern European countries are not members of the EU, regardless of the common European perspective. The EU Directive on critical infrastructure protection is not applied comprehensively in the national critical infrastructure protection as it does not cover certain areas but knowledge and protection tools and processes can be transferred and implemented among the sectors.

RISK MANAGEMENT IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Risk management is defined as a process in which organizations methodically assess risks of their activities with the aim of achievement of sustainable advantages within the frame of each activity and portfolios of all activities. The importance of this process stems from the constatation that organizations that analyse risks and create responses, in an adverse situation have advantage over competitors and generally in the market. Therefore, it is clear that risks in the organization should not be ignored, and that risk management process must be performed in every organization.

Risk management also signifies knowledge, capacity, readiness of managers to constantly eliminate active and potential threats, business and security risks, as well as all possibilities of occurrence of emergency events. In addition, risk assessment involves various policies, procedures and practices of assessment, monitoring and control of risks. Due to the fact that risks can be managed in various ways, depending on the social context, there are no absolutely reliable methods. At the best we can speak of good or bad practice of risk management. The application of security on operative environment can require various skills, especially skills of adaptation to the environment, so that structured procedures need to be transformed in the management of operative risks.

Risk management does not strive to completely eliminate risks, as it would be impossible to achieve, but to create environment in which optimal decisions can be made, taking into account identified risks and consequences that they may cause. The risk management concept enables systemic creation of realistic framework for prevention of damage and harm, i.e. for minimization of risks in the realization of certain processes, activities or services. Traditional risk management approach, mainly based on reduction of negative consequences connected with incidents, deaths and litigations, today are being changed with new preventive approaches, with such basic strategies as risk prevention, transfer of risk to another subject, reduction of negative impact through insurance and avoidance of risk. Both types of risk management are necessary for good management of an organization, further leading to successful achievement of basic tasks and goals (Kekovic, et al (2011:60).

Whether we speak of public or private sector, the efficient risk management contributes to the achievement of all goals of an organization or a society in general, as well as to their improvement. Risk management is not an independent activity, isolated from basic activities and processes of the organization, but an integral part of the management process and corporate security. The organization of corporate security includes a number of elements

that include the assessment of current risks, the causes and forms of endangering persons, property and operations of the system, defining the authorities and responsibilities of those engaged in protection of the vital values of the critical infrastructure, the organization and operation of physical and technical security, undertaking protection measures relating to health and safety at work, environmental protection, the measures for protecting corporation against all forms of corruption, various forms of abuse, embezzlement, fraud, and other methods of disposal of assets, defining measures for classified data protection, defining measures for controlling moving and residence of foreign persons in facilities, the operation of information systems in the security of persons, property and business, harmonization of normative acts, as well as evaluating the vulnerability of those engaged in the protection of company's essential values (Barney, Hesterly:2005). It needs to be incorporated in the organizational culture and practice, but also adjusted to the business processes of the organization. Risk management can help in setting the priorities in action and establishing differences of alternatives directions of action. Also, it can assist to decision makers to decide whether a risk is acceptable or not, and also if the treatment will be adequate and efficient. Only systemic, timely and well-structured approach to risk management contributes to efficiency, consistency, comparability and reliability of results. An adequate risk management helps decision makers to bring information-based decisions. The input data for the risk management process are based on sources of information such as experience, feedback information, observation, prognoses and expert evaluation. However, decision makers need to be well informed, but also to take into account the limits related to the available data and models and possible existence of differing options among experts. An adequate and timely involvement of important stakeholders, in particular decision-makers at all levels of organization, as well as numerous experts with different backgrounds provides results with relevant and up-to-date risk management process.

The goal of risk management within the framework of critical infrastructure protection is to identify relevant risk factors for a particular event, and then to create a risk management plan, in order to reduce the probability of occurrence of a supposed risk factor and its negative impact, i.e. the consequence. Even though risks cannot be completely eliminated, most of them are foreseeable and manageable. Their analysis and management can secure uninterrupted operation of an activity. Risk management must transfer strategy into tactical and operative goals, by dispersing responsibility throughout the whole organisation, and making responsibility for risk management enter the scope of the position of each manager and staff member.

The problems of critical infrastructures protection come from different perspectives, including risk management, business continuity management and crisis management. These perspectives have emphasized the importance of protecting those segments of the critical infrastructure that enable the exchange of security information. A special attention is paid to the development of specific risk management approaches in certain critical infrastructure sectors, especially in the energy sector and nuclear energy sector, including the monitoring mechanisms of the organizations and agencies that manage critical infrastructure protection.

Risk management is part of the organization's everyday activities. It permeates almost all activities of the organization, regardless of its business area and it aims to eliminate or reduce the possibility of realizing the risks and threats coming from the company itself or from the environment, without interfering with the regular activities of the company with security measures and procedures, and thus create favorable climate for its smooth functioning.

Risk management in critical infrastructure systems is a pertinent management function, because of their importance for the functioning of the whole society. As a strategic function of any organization, risk management is organized and implemented on the basis of forecasting the future events, assessing their probability and consequences and, in this regard, defining possible responses to emerging challenges. In this regard, corporate security management has never been more relied on adequate understanding of the threats that company is facing with, given the fact that today there is no business entity that is completely immune to the surprising factors, which was not the case in the past (Mishkin, Eakins, 2005:308).

Contemporary researches have indicated not only the importance of the exchange of ideas and best practices between countries in the region in the area of public-private partnership in the management of critical infrastructure, but also interoperability between human and technical capabilities. A comprehensive risk management approach based on national and international experiences is required, but there is no universally applicable solutions.

LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Based on the article 45, paragraph 4, the Law on Emergency Situations (Official Gazette RS, no.111/09), the Government of the Republic of Serbia brought a Decree on content and methodology for elaboration of Protection and Rescue Plan in Emergency Situations. A part of this document, apart from aforementioned elements of vulnerability assessment defined in the Law on Emergency Situations, is dedicated to critical infrastructure assessment, in terms of natural disasters and other major accidents. In this Decree, the

concept of Critical Infrastructure was introduced for the first time in Serbia, however without clear definition to which infrastructure elements or sectors it refers. Subjects, responsible for critical infrastructure protection, are not defined either. In the Decree on methodology for elaboration of Vulnerability Assessment and Protection and Rescue Plans in Emergency Situations, the critical infrastructure assessment in terms of endangerment from natural disasters and other incidents is defined as an important element of vulnerability assessment.

In accordance with this Decree, during assessment of type and intensity of threats and potential consequences of natural disasters and other accidents, it is necessary to identify critical infrastructure objects and analyze potential damages to their operations and consequences to their users in case of the disruption of their business activity, particularly in the following sectors:

1) *Production and distribution of electrical energy*: hydroelectric power stations, thermal power stations, alternative sources of energy, transmission lines, electrical substations;

2) *Energy supply network (energy distribution network)*: gas depots, depots of oil and other sources of energy (the main oil and gas pipelines and local gas network);

3) *Water supply*: system of water and purifiers distribution, sources of potable water, sources of water – wells, potential contaminants of surface and subterranean waters;

4) *Food supply of population (production storage and distribution)*: production objects and capacities, food production sections, storage objects of food products, distribution objects and resources, arable agricultural land, fruit plantations, objects for breeding of animals and meat processing;

5) *Health protection*: protection of health and locations (health institutions, locations, capacities, technical equipment);

6) *Material and cultural goods and environment*: objects of national importance (cultural and historical monuments, museums, legacies etc), cultural institutions, religious objects;

7) *Protected natural resources*: national parks, nature reserves;

8) *Telecommunication*: transmission routes (underground cables, aerial lines, wireless links), antenna masts, base station antennas for mobile telephony, telephone exchanges, portable broadcasting equipment of radio and TV stations (technical equipment for transmission and broadcasting of audio-video signal);

9) *Transport*: traffic and road networks, railway network, navigable waterways, bridges, viaducts, tunnels

10) *Production of dangerous materials* (objects for production, storage and transport of dangerous substances).

Also, the Law on Private Security defines mandatory protected objects, i.e. the objects that are of strategic importance for the Republic of Serbia and its citizens, as well as objects that are of special importance, which if destructed or damaged could cause severe consequences for human life and health or objects important for the defense of the state. Mandatory protected objects also encompass the area at which those objects are located, as well as their auxiliary objects.

By adopting these legal and regulative acts, for the first time in Serbia the attention is paid to the preventive function in critical infrastructure protection.

CONCLUSION

When we speak about corporate security in terms of critical infrastructure protection, we can see that the frame of these activities is usually unjustifiably reduced to the activities related to physical and technical security, thereby leaving aside an entire range of activities that can equally disrupt the regular functioning of the critical infrastructure system.

Raising awareness of the risks, the activities related to the risk identification and risk analysis, risk assessment and evaluation influence the security policy, programs and procedures in a way that a comprehensive risk management approach becomes common feature of technology and infrastructure protection, information risk management, business continuity management, crisis and emergency management.

Critical infrastructure protection is usually under the state jurisdiction and state itself is responsible for the achieved level of protection. Therefore, the countries are highly independent in planning, organizing and conducting critical infrastructure protection, and the consequences of failure to achieve that are usually limited to the territory inside the national borders.

Nevertheless, since Serbia recently became a candidate for the EU, a need for harmonization of critical infrastructure protection with the European programs for critical infrastructure protection will for sure soon come to the agenda (Kekovic, et all, 2013:212).

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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING THE QUALITY OF EXPERTS' WORK*

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Abstract

This paper addresses the issues of normative definition of procedure for the assessment and monitoring of the quality of experts' work through presentation of the current solutions present in the criminal procedural and other relevant legislation in the countries of the region (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Montenegro). Recognizing the inevitability of the increasing use of expert evidence in determining the relevant facts in criminal and other legal proceedings, with full consideration of the view that the quality of expertise depends largely on the competence of the expert, and that firstly it is provided with adequate definition of the assumptions of the selection procedure (appointment) of an expert, this paper pays special attention to the different

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modalities of permanent encouragement, i.e. maintenance and testing of competence. This is primarily through the presentation and analysis of the normatively defined framework and for maintenance of records of the engagement of an expert, or evaluation of the work of an expert, for submission of objections to the work of an expert, as well as punishment and dismissal of an expert.

Keywords: expert, assessment of experts' work, punishment of an expert, dismissal of an expert

INTRODUCTION

The question of normative organization of expertise in general, even those aspects that are important for recognition of the need and procedure for assessing and monitoring the quality of experts' work, can be viewed through the prism of the provisions of criminal law and other regulations that in more details regulate the assumptions and procedures for appointment and dismissal of an expert. In the text that follows, these issues will be addressed through the comparative analysis of normative solutions present in the legislation of the countries in the region. This is due to the fact that the regulations that are currently in force, in terms of years of common history and very similar current social circumstances, in their significant part have a large number of nearly identical solutions, but also a number of peculiarities. Before all, analyzed procedural legislations of the Republic of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic Srpska, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Montenegro, have the unique view in relation to the legal nature of expertise. This is about of the evidentiary actions from the chapter VII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Serbia (ZKP RS), chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Croatia (ZKP RH), chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZKP BiH), chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZKP FBiH), chapter XIII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic Srpska (ZKP RSP), chapter VII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Montenegro (ZKP RCG), i.e. the means of evidence from the chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Macedonia (CPC RM).¹

¹ *Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia*, "Official Gazette RS", nor. 72/11 and 101/11, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 and 55/2014; *Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Croatia*, "Official Gazette", no. 152/08, 76/09, 80/11, 121/11, 91/12, 143/12, 56/13 and 145/13; *Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, "Official Gazette BiH", no. 3/03, 32/03, 36/03, 26/04, 63/04, 13/05, 48/05, 46/06, 76/06, 29/07, 32/07, 53/07, 76/07, 15/08, 58/08, 12/09, 16/09, 93/09 and 72/13; *Criminal Procedure Code of the Federation of*

Almost identical definitions are present in the part of the provisions of the aforementioned regulations that define the objectives that, with ordering and execution of expertise, are trying to be accomplished. It is emphasized that the expertise is determined with the objective to enable the determination or evaluation of some important facts (Article 95 ZKP BiH, Article 109 ZKP FBiH, Article 169 ZKP RSP, Article 308 ZKP RH, 136 ZKP RCG, Article 236 paragraph 1 ZKP RM), i.e. some facts in the proceedings (Article 113 ZKP RS). In certain regulations it is emphasized that the realization of the aforementioned objectives include obtaining findings and opinion of the person who has the necessary specialized knowledge (Article 95 ZKP BiH, Article 109 ZKP FBiH, Article 160 ZKP RSP, 136 ZKP RCG, Article 236 paragraph 1 ZKP RM), i.e. specialized knowledge or skill (Article 308 ZKP RH). The solution present in ZKP RS does not specify the outcome of expertise in the form of findings and opinions, but only states that the authority of the proceedings should determine the expertise when for determination or evaluation of some of the facts in the process, specialized knowledge is required (Article 113).

RECORDING AND INCENTIVES (PROPOSALS) FOR A REVIEW OF THE EXPERT'S WORK

In addition to specifying preconditions and procedure of the selection (appointments), legislators also focused on measures that seek to further enhance the quality of performed expertise. This is also in the provisions on periodic verification of these preconditions, the duration of the mandate of experts, as well as in their stimulation to continually prove themselves with professional and scientific improvement and with the quality of their work. So, for example the Article 10 of the Law on experts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina² (ZV FBiH) and the Article 10 of the Law on Experts of the Republic Srpska RSP³ (ZV RSP) predict that the expert shall be appointed for the period of six years by the Minister of Justice and that the expert can be reappointed. Both laws predict that after the period of six years and after the submission of the request (Article 18 ZV FBiH), i.e. without it (Article 12 ZV RSP), and on the proposal given by the Commission his / her mandate is being prolonged each time for the period of six years (except if in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Official Gazette FBiH", no. 35/03, 37/03, 56/03, 78/04, 28/05, 55/06, 27/07, 53/07 and 9/09, 12/10, 8/13 and 59/14; *Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic Srpska*, "Official Gazette RS", no. 53/12; *Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Montenegro*, "Official Gazette RCG", no. 57/09 and 49/10; *Criminal Procedure Code*, "Official Gazette RM", no. 150/2010 and 100/12

² "Official Gazette FBiH", no. 49/05

³ "Official Gazette RS", no. 16/05 and 65/08

the particular case when the Commission, taking into account the criteria stipulated by the law, determines otherwise).⁴ In the Republic of Croatia permanent court experts are appointed for the time period of four years and they can be reappointed (article 126 paragraph 4 of the Law on courts of the Republic of Croatia).⁵ Before passing the decision on the appointment of a permanent court expert, the president of the appropriate county or commercial court will refer applicants to professional training in appropriate professional association of court experts (Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Regulation of permanent court experts of the Republic of Croatia⁶ - PSSV RH).⁷ With the request for reappointment the candidate is required to submit proof from the Article 2 paragraph 1 pint 2 of the Regulation (that he / she is medically fit to perform the duties of a permanent court expert). Request shall be accompanied by a list of cases in which he / she performed expertise and certificates of professional development. Before the reappointment of a permanent court expert president of the county, i.e. the commercial court shall determine that the applicant is not under any criminal proceedings and that he / she was not lawfully convicted of a criminal offence that could be a barrier for his / her admission to the civil service. In the process of reappointment of a permanent court expert, as well as in the process of enlargement of the expertise of already appointed court expert, the expert has no obligation to undertake professional training or to take the oath (Article 12 PSSV RH).

The law on expertise of RM⁸ (ZV RM) predicts that a license issued for the expertise is valid for a period of five years and shall be extended by the Ministry of Justice based on the request of the expert submitted two months before the expiry of the license. As barriers to the extension of the license, the legislator stipulates that the expert, by the authority to which he / she performs expertise, was fined three times in one calendar year, or that the expert does not fulfil the obligation of attending organized forms of

⁴ Criteria provided with the law for the appointment of an expert are connected to: professional knowledge and work performance; proven professional ability based on previous career results, including participation in organized forms of training; proven capacity through academic written works and activities within professional associations; working capability and ability to professionally and clearly explain the given findings; ability to impartially, conscientiously, diligently, decisively and responsibly performs the duties of an expert; conduct outside of work, integrity and reputation.

⁵ "Official Gazette" No. 28/13

⁶ "Official Gazette", No. 38/14

⁷ On assumptions and procedure for appointment (selection) of experts see more in: Kesić T., Žarković M., Bjelovuk, I.: *Assumptions and Selection Procedure – Appointment of Experts*, International Scientific Conference *The Balkans between Past and Future: Security, Conflict Resolution and Euro-Atlantic Integration*, Volume 1, St. Kliment Ohridski University - Bitola, Faculty of Security – Skopje, 2013, Volume I, p. 212 - 228

⁸ "Official Gazette RM", br. 115/10, 12/14 and 43/14

continuous training conducted by the Chamber of experts (Article 19 paragraphs 4 and 5 ZV RM).

The law on court experts RCG⁹ (ZSV RCG) predicts that the expert is appointed for the time period of six years and that he / she can be reappointed (Article 16), but it does not specify the procedure by which it can be realized.

The law on court experts of RS¹⁰ (ZSV RS) does not specify the time period for which an expert is appointed, and consequently, neither the procedure for reappointment.

Legislation of some countries in the region recognize another assumption for the election (appointment) of an expert, i.e. extra stimulation of responsible conduct of an expert, as well as the guarantee that an expert shall compensate any damage caused by the performance of his / her activities. Thus, for example it is stated that the experts must be insured against liability for damage caused during the performance of an expertise. The minimum amount of the insurance, types of insured damage and the extent of the risk to be covered is determined by the Federal Ministry of Justice (Article 37 ZV RSP), i.e. the Ministry of Justice. PSSV of RH predicts that prior to the appointment of a permanent court expert the candidate shall submit proof of agreed liability insurance for settlement of claims for damages that are caused by the actions of permanent court expert to the president of the county or to the commercial court that is responsible for his / her appointment.¹¹

The ZV of RM predicts that an individual expert, company for expertise, public administration, university education institution, or scientific and technical institutions have an obligation to be insured against liability for the damage that can be caused to the contracting authority or a third party during the performance of an expertise (Article 24).

Among the measures aimed at raising the quality of expertise are the ones contained in the provisions and which define the principles, rules, and procedures for the assessment and monitoring of an expert, the expert's responsibility for unsatisfactory work, including his dismissal. Viewed in this context, above all, one should have in mind the provisions that emphasize the right and duty of the court to truthfully and completely determine the facts that are important for making legal decisions and that the evidence presented, which is of importance for a judicial decision, is assessed freely by the court. That being said, the court can and must check the quality of performed

⁹ "Official Gazette RCG", No. 79/04

¹⁰ "Official Gazette RS", No. 44/10

¹¹ The candidate must be insured during the entire period of his / her appointment as the appointed court expert. Minimum amount of the insurance is HRK 200000,00. At the beginning of each calendar year the appointed court expert is required to submit the proof of insurance contract concluded for the current year to the president of competent county or commercial court (Article 9 PSSV RH).

expertise and to analyse the findings and opinion given by the expert, and in case of doubt in the validity of the testimony of an expert to determine new or additional expertise. If in the work of an expert "serious failures" are spotted, the court has the ability to initiate a review of the justification of his / her engagement in the future. This, above all, is valid in terms of expert's skilfulness that is the most important assumption of his engagement,¹² but it is also about his / her impartiality, accountability and ability to clearly and reasonably present the findings and opinions. In order to improve the competence of the experts, the legislations often explicitly predict their commitment to undertake professional trainings even after the appointment. Thus, for example it is emphasized that the expert, after the appointment, is bound to follow the latest developments in their fields (Article 35 ZV SRP), i.e. to complete the training on the performance of experts' work according to the regulation passed by the Federal Minister of Justice (Article 34 ZV FBiH), as well as to submit the information on further professional training and specialization to the authority that keeps the records on experts. This authority is obliged to entered above the mentioned data into all the relevant documents and to notify the courts and prosecutors from the Republic of Srpska (Article 36 ZV SRP) or from the Federation (Article 35 ZV FBiH) about those changes in due time.

ZSV of RCG stipulates that the expert has the right and obligation to undertake professional training that could be organized by the Association of court experts and other professional associations and institutions. Costs of such professional training are covered by the expert, and a general programme of professional development of an expert is determined by the Administrative Office on the basis of which the organizer designs a special programme (Article 34). The obligation of continuous training, including sanctions for non-compliance, is also familiar to the ZV of RM. Training involves continuous professional development with the objective to expand the theoretical and practical knowledge and skills in order to ensure their professional and efficient performance of expertise, and the expert is obliged to undertake continuous professional trainings to be in line with scientific developments and methods of the profession and to participate in conferences, trainings and other forms of education in the country. The commitment of the expert to attend training every year is especially emphasized in order to have continuous improvement implemented by the Chamber of experts in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice (Article 25).

Among the assumptions whose realization allows monitoring of the experts' work are those defined by the regulations of individual countries in

¹² Jokić, D., *Determination of an Expertise in a Criminal Proceedings in the Republic Srpska*, Security Police Citizens, No. 2, Banja Luka, 2009, p. 184

the region regarding the obligation of keeping records of experts' engagement. In some it is envisaged that, in accordance with precise instructions given, experts maintain records in a book with the title "Diary of performed expertise" and to fill it up with a number of data, including those on: the number and date of the act made by the court or other authority, company or other legal entity on whose request the expertise is being performed, i.e. surname, name and address of the person requesting the expertise and the date of the request, the subject of expertise (with a brief indication of the content of expertise), the amount of collected fees and costs of expert and awards for expertise (Article 30 ZV FBiH, Article 31 ZV RSP).

The obligation of keeping records on performed expertise, i.e. super-expertise, in accordance with the provision of Article 6 ZV RM, have the company for expertise, individual expert, public administration, higher education, scientific and technical institutions.

ZSV of RCG predicts for the court to follow the work of experts and to keep records of performed expertise and rewards paid to any person (Article 26). The duty of the court to monitor the work of the expert is predicted by the ZSV of RS (Article 18 paragraph 1). The same law stipulates that the court reports to the Ministry of Justice (Article 18 paragraph 2) about its remarks and fines imposed on the expert. Almost identical solution is present in the ZV of FBiH in which it is stipulated that the presidents of the courts or the authority conducting the procedure follow the work of the experts and inform the Federal Minister of Justice about their observations, i.e. objections and imposed fines, but they can also propose determination of expert's responsibility in accordance with this law (Article 19 ZV FBiH). This law predicts the possibility for the parties, i.e. legal representatives of the parties, as well as professional associations and association of experts, they can submit their remarks on the work of an expert. These remarks are submitted in writing to the Federal Minister of Justice (Article 20 ZV FBiH). The provisions substantially identical to those of the Articles 19 and 20 ZV of FBiH are contained in the ZV of RSP (Articles 19 and 20). The PSSV of RH predicts that the primary duty of monitoring the experts' work is for the presidents of county and commercial courts, but also the presidents of courts and public prosecutors who will inform the presidents of the relevant county and commercial courts about their observations. The remarks on behaviour of the permanent court expert can be submitted by the parties or their attorneys, as well as professional associations. These remarks are to be submitted to the court president who appointed the expert (Article 19 PSSV RH). In the identical text ZSV of RS and ZSV of RCG predict that on the judges' meetings at first instance courts, at least once a year, issues of importance to the Court which relate to the work of an expert are discussed, and that, based on the conclusion from judges' meetings, the president of the court may determine

the need to increase the number of experts in a particular area, but also to submit a reasoned proposal for the dismissal of an expert (Article 18 paragraphs 3 and 4 ZSV RS and Article 26 ZSV RCG).

In the Republic of Serbia, a reasoned proposal for the dismissal of an expert because of his / her improper, negligent or dishonest expertise can be submitted by the numerous entities interested in the quality of the work of a particular expert. It is all about the court, the authority that is running the proceeding, parties and other participants in judicial or other proceedings (Article 18 paragraph 5 ZSV RS).

The national legislation of the Republic of Montenegro is significantly more restrictive in determination of subjects who have the right to submit proposals for the dismissal of an expert and predicts that those could only be the president of the court or a judge. They submit the request for the dismissal of an expert to the Commission for the appointment and dismissal of experts¹³ (Article 28 ZSV RCG). On this occasion the legislator did not specify the grounds for submitting a request to dismiss an expert, but merely stated the reasons for the dismissal of an expert (Article 27 ZSV RCG).

PSSV RH emphasized that in the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of a court expert one should apply the provisions of the Law on General Administrative Procedure (Article 14 PSSV RH), and that the complaint against a decision on dismissal of an expert is allowed to be submitted to the Ministry of Justice within 15 days from the delivery of the decision (Article 12 paragraph 6 PSSV RH).

ZV of RM predicts the possibility that the Minister of Justice, in accordance with the law stipulated conditions, revokes the license for expertise (Article 26 paragraph 1 ZV RM), and when it comes to the incentives it is only emphasizing the obligation of the authority that fined the expert who in front of it made the expertise and to inform the Ministry of Justice and the Chamber of experts about that (Article 26 paragraph 2 ZV RM). As a body of the Chamber of experts, the disciplinary commission has an important role in the functioning of the experts' review procedures (Article 31 paragraph 7 ZV RM).¹⁴ The manner and conditions of the work of Disciplinary commission shall

¹³ This is about five members Commission that includes the president of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Montenegro. Two members of the Commission are judges, two are from the Association of court experts, and one member is from the Ministry of Justice (members of the Commission who are the judges are appointed on the proposal from the general meeting of the Supreme court, members who are from the Association of court experts are appointed on the proposal from the authority determined with the statute of the Association, and the member from the Ministry of Justice is appointed on the proposal from the Minister - president of the Commission is also a judge). Members of the Commission are appointed for the period of four years (Article 11 ZSV RCG).

¹⁴ The Disciplinary commission consists of five members and their deputies (two members and two deputies are the members of the Assembly of the Chamber of experts - one member and one

be governed by the regulation on disciplinary procedures adopted by the Assembly of the Chamber of experts on the proposal of the Chamber's Board (Article 38 paragraph 6 ZV RM). The disciplinary commission may impose a measure of public warning to an expert if he / she: stores official documents and data contrary to the regulations for archiving and office operations; violates the duty to respect the parties and monitoring authorities; violates the provisions of the Statute, the Codex, professional standards and acts that are mandatory for an expert. The fine shall be imposed by the Disciplinary commission to an expert if he / she: does not keep a secret; does not attend training for continuous professional development; performs biased expertise (Article 40 paragraphs 1 and 2 ZV RM).

Other national regulations predict a procedure that takes place after the submission of an incentive for the dismissal of an elected (appointed) expert. The legislation of the Republic of Serbia envisaged that in the process based on the proposal for the dismissal of an expert, the Minister of Justice can form an expert commission with three members out of the leading experts from field of expertise in which the expert performs the expertise. For the evaluation of professionalism of expert's work he / she can be allowed to comment on the facts and circumstances on which the dismissal proposal was made (Article 19 ZSV RS).¹⁵ Against the decision on dismissal, the expert can initiate an administrative dispute. The expert who is dismissed shall be erased from the Register of experts, and the decision on dismissal of expert shall be published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" (Article 21 ZSV RS.)

ZV FBiH includes several provisions that define the rules of procedure that should be done after the Minister of Justice receives a proposal for establishing liability, i.e. remarks on the work of an expert. The Federal Minister of Justice shall, if he / she do not pass a decision on the dismissal of an expert, deliver remarks to the Experts' Commission¹⁶ for their consideration

deputy are from the relevant authorities; one member and one deputy from the Association of judges of RM; one member and one deputy from the Association of public prosecutors of RM; one member and one deputy are appointed by the Ministry of Justice). When selecting the Disciplinary commission, the Board of directors select its president from the members of the Chamber of experts (Article 38 paragraph 4 ZV RM).

¹⁵ In this regard it is important to point out that the legislator does not predict the obligation, or even the possibility of the participation of experts, i.e. professional associations in the appointment of an expert, but the procedure is entrusted exclusively to the Ministry of Justice. More in: Kesić, T., Žarković M., Bjelovuk, I.: *op.cit*, p. 212 - 228

¹⁶ This is the Commission appointed by the Federal Minister of Justice. Permanent members of this Commission are by the President of the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a judge authorized by him, the President of the Bar Association of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a lawyer of his powers, chief federal prosecutor or prosecutor authorized by him, representative of the Federal Ministry of Justice, and three temporary members, from the leading experts in the areas where the expertise is performed, and they are appointed by the permanent members with the majority vote (Article 6 ZV FBiH).

and proposals, i.e. for the imposition of appropriate measures (Article 21 ZV FBiH). When they estimate that it is necessary, the Federal Minister of Justice shall, about remark or imposed measures, inform also professional association, experts' association, i.e. other institutions and agencies (Article 24 ZV FBiH).

One should keep in mind also that, independently of the incentives of other entities, the expert commission performs periodic evaluation of the expert's work and proposes or imposes appropriate measures and informs the Federal Minister of Justice about that (Article 22 ZV FBiH), gathers data and information (including records from the courts, opinions of professional associations and associations of experts, interviews with an expert, as well as the interview with the submitter of the remarks) that it deems necessary for the performance of periodic evaluation of the expert's work, i.e. considers complaints from the Article 21 of this Law (Article 23 ZV FBiH). In cases where the expert performs the expertise unprofessionally or negligently, or does not respect the established deadlines for expertise without justifiable reason, as well as when he / she does not respect the court or parties, does not take cases assigned to him / her or when his / her work has received other serious complaints, or when he / she does not act in accordance with Article 15 of this Law (does not inform the Federal Ministry of Justice immediately, and latest within the eight days from the change of relevant data including those about the change of the first name and family name, permanent address, temporary address, phone number, service phone number, name of employer, the narrower specialization of expertise, etc.), the expert commission may order a measure of public monition. This measure is, without delay, published in accordance with Article 12 paragraph 3 of this Law in the "Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina" as well as on the notice board at the headquarters of the Federal Ministry of Justice and the notice boards of the courts and prosecutors' offices in the Federation. The commission is also responsible for making proposals for the dismissal of an expert to the Federal Minister of Justice (Article 25 ZV FBiH). In the process of making a decision on dismissal, an expert must be able to comment on the facts and circumstances on which the decision on dismissal was based. An appeal cannot be made against the decision of dismissal, but an administrative dispute can be started in front of the competent court. The expert who is dismissed shall be deleted from the Registry and from the list of experts, which is published without delay in accordance with Article 12 paragraph 3 of this Law (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH).

ZV RSP predicts that if, in accordance with Article 27 of this Law, a decision on the dismissal of an expert is not made, the Minister of Justice delivers remarks referred to in Article 19 and 20 of this Law to the Experts'

commission referred to in Article 6 of this Law¹⁷, for their consideration and to proposals, i.e. ordering of appropriate measures (Article 21 ZV RSP). At the same time the legislator predicted that the Experts' commission shall periodically evaluate the work of an expert every three years and recommends, i.e. imposes appropriate measures and informs the Minister of Justice about that (Article 22 ZV RSP). The commission obtains data and information (including records from the courts, opinions from professional associations and associations of experts, interviews with an expert, as well as interviews with the submitter of the remarks) it deems necessary for the performance of periodic evaluation of the performance of expert's work, i.e. consideration of complaints from the Article 21 of this Law (Article 23 ZV RSP). When it deems it is necessary, the Minister of Justice informs professional associations and associations of experts, or other institutions and agencies about the received remarks i.e. ordered measures (Article 24 ZV RSP). In cases where the expert performs the expertise unprofessionally or negligently, or does not respect the established deadlines for expertise without justifiable reason, as well as when he / she does not respect the court or parties, does not take cases assigned to him / her or when his / her work has received other serious complaints, or when he / she does not act in accordance with Article 17 of this Law, the Professional commission may determine a written public monition, a public monition, which is published without delay, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of this Law, in the "Official Gazette of the Republic Srpska" and "the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina ", and a proposal for dismissal of an expert can be submitted to the Ministry of Justice (Article 25 ZV RSP).

“In the process of making a decision on dismissal, the expert must be able to comment on the facts and circumstances on which the decision on dismissal was based. An appeal cannot be made against the decision of dismissal, but an administrative dispute can be started in front of the competent court. The expert who is dismissed shall be deleted from the register and list of experts, which shall be published without delay in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3 of this Law (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV RSP)”.

As it was already stated in the ZSV RCG it is envisaged that a reasoned proposal for the dismissal of an expert is submitted to the commission by a

¹⁷ The expert commission is consisted of permanent members, including the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic Srpska or judge authorized by him, the President of the Bar Association of the Republic Srpska of a lawyer authorized by him, Chief Republic Prosecutor or a prosecutor, authorized by him, representative of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic Srpska and odd number of temporary members from the leading experts in the areas where the expertise is perform, and they are appointed by the permanent members with the majority vote (Article 6 ZSV RSP).

president of the court or a judge (Article 28 of the ZSV CG). The decision on dismissal of an expert is passed by the commission. The decision on dismissal is than being delivered to the expert, the Administrative office, and it is published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro". The expert, who has been dismissed, as well as the expert, who after the expiry of the mandate is no reappointed, is deleted from the Register of experts (Article 29 ZSV RCG).

“The national legislation of the Republic of Serbia predicts that an expert cannot perform an expertise if there is a criminal proceeding against him / her for a criminal offence that makes him / her unworthy for the performance of an expertise during the duration of the proceedings. About the initiation of the criminal proceedings against an expert, the body conducting the proceedings shall without delay inform the Ministry, and after a final decision of the criminal proceedings, the court shall notify the Ministry about the outcome (Article 20 ZSV RS)”.

In accordance with the provisions of the applicable regulations in the Republic of Croatia, the expert may temporarily be banned to perform expertise (from three months to one year) if he / she does not respect the court or the parties, does not take cases assigned to him / her, does not justify why he / she did not finish the expertise within the established deadline, or because of some other serious reasons. The president of the court that appointed the expert with an order shall forward the temporary ban to all the judges of the court in which he / she is the president, presidents of municipal, misdemeanour, administrative and commercial courts and the Ministry of Justice. The permanent court expert against whom there is a criminal proceedings for some criminal offence and who is prosecuted ex officio and to whom is constituted an impediment for the employment in the civil service, shall immediately upon learning about the mentioned notify the court president who appointed him / her, and to stop the work on cases assigned to him / her for the purpose of making findings and opinions. The court president who appointed a permanent court expert shall impose a temporary ban on performing the tasks of permanent court expert to the expert against whom there is an ongoing criminal proceeding for some criminal offence. The temporary ban will last till the final completion of the criminal proceedings (Articles 20, 21 and 22 PSSV RH).

REASONS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN EXPERT

The national legislations of countries, whose regulations (relevant for the selection, monitoring and dismissal of experts) were analyzed, contain provisions that predict the reasons for the dismissal of elected (appointed) experts. Enumerated these reasons are largely identical and can be summed up to the fact that an expert shall be dismissed (i.e. that his / her licence shall be revoked – ZS RM):

- at his/her own request; if they request that by himself / herself, if requests to be dismissed; (Article 19 ZSV RS, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZSV RCG, Article 13 paragraph 1 PSSV RH, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV RSP);
- if it is determined that the conditions under which he / she was appointed did not exist, i.e. that those conditions have stopped (Article 19 ZSV RS, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZSV RCG, Article 13 paragraph 1 PSSV RH), if it is subsequently determined that he/she does not meet the conditions from the Article 3 of this Law (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV RSP);
- if he / she is convicted of a criminal offence that makes him / her unworthy and unfit to perform an expertise (Article 19 ZSV RS); if he / she is sentenced to imprisonment or has been convicted of a criminal offence that makes him / her unworthy for the performance of an expertise (Article 27 ZSV paragraph 1 RCG); if, as to a permanent court expert, a final judgment was delivered to him / her for a criminal offence that is a barrier for an employment in civil service (Article 13 paragraph 1 PSSV RH), if he / she is sentenced to imprisonment for the offence that makes him / her unfit for the performance of expert's work (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV RSP.);
- if he / she is served with a protective measure prohibiting the performance of activities in the area where he / she performs an expertise (Article 19 ZSV RS); if he / she is served with a protective measure prohibiting the performance of activities on which basis he / she became an expert (Article 27 ZSV paragraph 1 RCG);
- if, on the grounds of judicial decisions, his / her working ability is taken away (limited) (Article 19 ZSV RS, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZSV RCG, Article 13 paragraph 1 PSSV RH);
- if in the manner prescribed by law is determined that he / she has lost ability to work (Article 19 ZSV RS, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZSV RCG); if he / she loses the ability for further performance of the duties of an

expert (Article 27 paragraph 1. ZV FBiH, Article 27, paragraph 1 ZV RSP);

- if on the basis of a lawful decision of a competent body he / she is declared incapable of conducting activities in the area for which he / she is appointed (Article 13, paragraph 1 PSSV RH)
- if he / she performs an expertise disorderly, negligently or incompetently (Article 19 ZSV RS)¹⁸; if he / she is negligent or unprofessional in the performance of delegated expertise (Article 27, paragraph 1 ZSV RCG);¹⁹ if he / she negligently or improperly performs tasks of entrusted expertise (Article 13, paragraph 1 PSSV RH); if he / she performs an expertise improperly, negligently or contrary to the rules of profession's science, ethical norms, professional standards and in cases where he / she is in a conflict of interest (Article 40 paragraph 3 ZV RM);
- if the violations of performed tasks are reflected in the fact that the tasks of expertise are performed by an expert in an incompetent or negligent manner, if he / she does not respect the deadlines established for the performance of an expertise without justifiable reason, when he / she does not respect the court or the parties, does not work on entrusted subjects, when the remarks are of particularly serious nature or when his / her work has other serious objections, or if he / she fails to comply with the duty to report relevant changes to the (Federal) Ministry of Justice immediately, but not later than eight days (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH, Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV RSP); if untimely performs an expertise (Article 40 paragraph 3 ZV RM)
- if he / she does not conclude a contract of liability insurance for a permanent court expert (Article 13 paragraph 1 PSSV RH); if as a company for expertise, an individual expert, public administration, higher education institution, scientific and technical institution do not conclude or do not extend the insurance contract (Article 40 paragraph 3 ZV RM);

¹⁸ The expert disorderly and negligently performs an expertise if unreasonably refuses to do the expertise, does not respond to the summons of the court or other authority conducting the proceedings, does not perform expertise within the period specified, as well as in other cases predicted by the law. The expert unprofessionally performs an expertise if he/she gives incomplete, unclear, contradictory or inaccurate findings (Article 19 paragraphs 2 and 3 ZSV RS).

¹⁹ The expert disorderly performs an expertise if he/she offends the court or other participants in the proceedings or, if unjustly: refuses to testify; does not respond to court summons; does not end with expertise in the deadline that the court ordered; in other cases stipulated by law (Article 27 paragraph 2 ZSV RCG). The expert improperly performs an expertise if he / she give incomplete, unclear or contradictory findings (Article 27 paragraph 3 ZSV RCG).

- if as a permanent court expert violates the duty to keep as a secret everything he learned while performing the tasks of a permanent court expert or if he / she acts contrary to the ban that as a permanent court expert, i.e. as a legal entity who performs the duties of a permanent court expert outlines the properties of a permanent court expert in public and private areas or advertises himself / herself (other than through ordinary labels at the address of a permanent court expert Article 13 PSSV RH);
- if as a legal entity, i.e. as a responsible person in the legal entity he / she is convicted of an unjustified refusal to perform the work of and expertise (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZV FBiH)
- if he / she violates the duties predicted by the law on the expertise and thus seriously endangers trust in his / her impartiality or if he / she takes action that under the provisions of this or any other law was not allowed to take (Article 40 paragraph 3 ZV RM)
- if he / she does not act upon decisions, orders or findings of the competent court or authority (Article 40 paragraph 3 ZV RM)
- in other cases stipulated by this Law (Article 27 paragraph 1 ZSV RCG).

CONCLUSION

Recognizing the fact of increasing use and importance of expertise in determining lawful relevant facts in criminal and other legal proceedings, with the view that the quality of expertise depends largely on the competence of an expert, the facts that it provides adequate definitions of assumptions, criteria and procedures for the selection (appointment) of experts, the legislators are increasingly opting for a normative definition of numerous and mutually aligned modalities of continuing encouragement and development of the audit of their work quality.

Bearing in mind the importance of an expertise to establish the facts and make a decision in a criminal proceeding (proper qualification of the offence and sentencing the offender), especially in the lights of the growing use of scientific evidence, and the impact of the findings and opinions of the experts on the legal status of the defendant, but also on the victim in the criminal proceedings, one should not ignore the question of their competence for the performance of an expertise. In fact, as the defendant, as well as the victim, have an interest for the expertise to be done in a professional and respectful manner, i.e. that the person appointed as an expert possesses adequate knowledge and has the capability to perform a particular expertise, and provides findings and opinions in accordance with the rules of science and profession, impartially, fairly and honestly. The competence of an expert is of

importance for the effective implementation of criminal procedure with which one of the fundamental rights of a defendant is guaranteed and that is the right to a fair trial. On the other hand, realization of the right on compensation to the victim, i.e. indemnification claims, also depends on the quality and impartially performed expertise. Finally, since the laws strictly regulate the conditions to be met by the persons who should take part in the criminal proceedings as a judge, public prosecutor, defence lawyer and others, it would be logical to express interest in questions of expert's competence, regulation of the process for their election (appointment) and criteria for assessing the quality of the experts' work.

“This, through the provisions on the right i.e. obligation of the law determined entities to analyse, evaluate and put doubt in the competency of an expert, his / her work and the results of the expertise, is by the legislators in the countries in the region often defined as the obligation of keeping records on performed expertise. In certain laws the obligation that is imposed is keeping records on paid prizes for each expert, as well as fines that are imposed on them, and then on the notification of relevant ministries about them and the remarks on the work of an expert. Monitoring and analyzing of the work of an expert may be accompanied by a motion to dismiss that expert for improper, disordered or dishonest expertise, but also because of the occurrence of a number of other circumstances, including those that make the expert unworthy of performing an expertise. In this regard, it sounds paradoxical that the national legislature does not anticipate hiring of expert committees during the expert's selection process, but it does that when it defines the procedure for dismissal of an expert, started upon a proposal”.

Of particular importance are the provisions on periodic verification of assumptions of the selection (appointment) of an expert, duration of the mandate of an expert, his / her stimulation, and even the obligation to constantly verify and improve his / her competence through professional and scientific education and quality of the performed work, and about the procedure when applying for extension of the license (reappointment) he / she provides a list of cases in which the expertise was performed. Of interest are the provisions with which the assumption of selection (appointment) an expert, i.e. additional stimulation of his / her responsibly, but also as a guarantee that he / she shall compensate the damage caused by the performance of his / her work, predict the obligation of an expert to submit evidence on the conclusion of a liability insurance contract. Unfortunately, the Law on Court Experts of the Republic of Serbia does not specify a period to which the expert is appointed, and thus it lacks the definition of assumptions and procedures for reappointment or periodic assessments of the working quality of the appointed expert.

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP PERSONAL VALUES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Abstract

The way societies function in the global world nowadays can bring major security challenges. This is particularly emphasized in transitional countries such as Republic of Macedonia and other countries in the region. The minor economic power is the foundation for having significant number of situations that can easily influence the stability of the security. Therefore, the politicians that are on head of the state institutions should possess leadership abilities and appropriate personal characteristics in order to be able to practice appropriate approach in managing the everyday situations that the society is facing at the moment. Leaders are the people on whom the management of the challenges in the contemporary societies depends are the driving force. The way they act will determine whether the challenges will become unsolvable and insurmountable, and escalate into serious security crisis, or will be simply overcome through timely reactions and finding the most suitable solutions.

The value system in people determines the behavior. The values define the attitudes that will be later transformed into actions. Precisely, the connection between values, attitudes and behavior, will be focus of exploration in this research paper. Moreover, it will be defined the relation between the leadership personal values and the approach in resolving the security challenges. Furthermore, it will be explored the key values that the representatives of the managing societal positions must retain in order to be

able to practice the most suitable approaches for generating solutions instead of causing escalation of the security challenges. The research paper will also give directions in regards to which key personal values should be searched for in the process of selection of the present leaders. In addition, it will provide directions in regards to which personal values should be developed in the future societal leaders.

Key words: leadership, security, personal values, security challenges.

INTRODUCTION

The way societies function in the global world nowadays can bring major security challenges. The everyday changes in all of the aspects of living create many problems and situations that need to be resolved. As a result of the technology development, nowadays, it cannot be predicted where the citizens, in any country, will receive information from, or whether they can be influenced by a specific ideology or belief and became a potential threat for the security of the state. Nowadays, any event on any place on earth can influence other countries as well. For instance, an incident that happened in France can be taken as a cause for protests or other activities that can be a threat to the security of some faraway country. Such security situations are present in, almost, all countries. However, those are more likely to be found in countries in transition such as Republic of Macedonia and the countries in the region. The minor economic power is the foundation for having significant number of situations that can easily influence the stability of the security. The Balkan region is still a region with a high rate of a security risk. Even though part of the countries are NATO members, smaller part are EU members, still, the region possess “unsettled ghosts” that can easily initiate security crisis. Despite the fact that all of the countries in the region are moving towards same direction, being focused on implementing reforms for becoming NATO and EU members, still there are clear signs that the security can be easily disrupt. In a relation to this, the region does not fulfill the wishful standards for a highly developed democratic society because of the following issues: insufficient developed institutions, their insufficient independency and having no transparency in their working; abuse of the political functions for political and party goals; manipulation over the party membership; the readiness for making pressures and blackmailing the voters, and many other forms of undemocratic functioning. This particular state is causing the security in our region to be vulnerable. Many issues are found in the framework of each state and between different states that literally are like bombs that are waiting to be ignited so that the security situation can be easily disrupt.

THE APPROACH TOWARDS THE SOCIETAL PROBLEMS AS A KEY SECURITY FACTOR

Everyday situations and challenges will continue being present in the societal functioning. However, the approach towards their solution is actually the key factor that determines whether they will strengthen or weaken the security system. In this segment of the research paper we will explore one problem solving model that the eminent American University Yale has presented as the best practice in regards to the problem solving matter. This model guarantees comprehensiveness in all of the segments: perceiving, defining, analyzing, selection of alternative solutions and their testing, final election of the best solution and its implementation. This approach as such will guarantee that the solution of the problems will not produce new problems, but will produce solutions.

Problem solving models¹ are used to address many issues that come up on a daily basis in the society. These problems may be technical or issue-based. Issues can be solved more easily and with better results by using a problem solving model, i.e. a structured, systematic approach to solving problems and making improvements. There are several reasons for using a structured, systematic approach to problem solving:

- To ensure consistency; everyone needs to know what method everyone else is using to solve a problem. It keeps the process more scientific and less susceptible to individual biases and perceptions.
- To help manage the internal process; the six steps in the problem solving model provide a focus for the leader and its followers and help set the agenda: everybody can work on following the model, rather than use their individual approaches all at the same time. Following a method and using data to make decisions makes it easier to reach consensus.
- To solve problems effectively; using this model will make solving problems easier and ultimately yield a better result because it provides testing all ideas and eliminated those that will not work in the particular scenario.
- To build a convincing case for change; using a problem solving model enables a leader to consider all possible causes of a problem and all possible solutions. A problem solving model uses a series of logical steps to help the leader to identify the most important causes and the best solution. Following the model not only helps the leader to arrive at a solution, it helps the leader to arrive at a justifiable solution.

¹<http://www.yale.edu/bestpractices/resources/docs/problemsolvingmodel.pdf>

- To present a clear and convincing rationale for action; a process improvement model is also useful as a methodology for presenting the conclusions of process improvement activities. The diagrams and charts used in the process improvement cycle help make the proposal for change more convincing.


A systematic approach to problem solving allows for:

- decision making based on data, rather than hunches
- determining root causes of problems, rather than reacting to superficial symptoms
- devising permanent solutions, rather than relying on quick fixes

SIX-STEP PROBLEM SOLVING MODEL

Although problem solving models can be highly sophisticated and technical, the following model has just six simple steps. Despite its simplicity, this model is comprehensive enough to address all but the most technical problems. The simplicity of the model makes it easier to be remembered when solving a problem.

Image 1: Six-step problem solving model



Source: <http://www.yale.edu/bestpractices/resources/docs/problemsolvingmodel.pdf>

The steps in this sequence are arranged in a circle to emphasize the cyclical, continuous nature of the problem solving process. All six steps must be followed in the order shown above, beginning with the first step, “1.

Identify the Problem.” Each step must be completed before it is preceded clockwise to the next step.

- Step One: Definition of the Problem

The first step, identifying the problem, is a broad review of the current situation — a fitting together of information, like pieces of a puzzle. In this first stage, there are identifying and discussing the symptoms and scope of the problem. That is, it determines what “hurts,” the degree to which the symptoms are shared, and the urgency of relieving the symptoms. It can be used tools such as brainstorming, interviewing, and completing questionnaires to gather this information. This step includes raising, reviewing, and discarding statements of the problem until the symptoms of the problem are set. What it follows afterwards is looking behind those symptoms to make a tentative definition of the underlying problem.

- Step Two: Determining the Root Cause(s) of the Problem

As soon as the symptoms are recognized and the problem is tentatively defined it follows collections of information about the nature of the problem. At this step, it can be used tools such as the Fishbone diagram, or Pareto analysis in order to help with the organization of the information and underlying causes of the problem. In this way, there will be determined the root causes of the problem. When the will be restated, the definition will reflect the causes. The efforts over the next two steps will be directed to finding solutions that address the roots of a documented problem, not merely its random symptoms.

- Step Three: Developing Alternative Solutions

Once the problem is defined, the creative problem solving requires exploration of full range of viable solutions before reaching a conclusion. In order to assemble a variety of solutions from which to choose a final solution, it must be taken the following actions: generate as many potential solutions as possible; relate each solution to the causes of the problem; and merge similar or related solutions. At this stage, there is no selection of the best solution. This is a stage of reducing the redundancy, and eliminating any possibilities that don't address the causes identified earlier. Force field analysis is a good tool for preliminary screening of this solution field.

- Step Four: Selecting a Solution

As a fourth step, each potential solution is evaluated for its strengths and weaknesses. Selecting a solution entails searching for the most effective solution by applying two general criteria. An effective solution is:

- technically feasible,
- acceptable to those who will have to implement it.

Feasibility is determined by asking the following questions: Can it be implemented in a reasonable time? Can it be done within cost limits? Will it

work reliably? Will it use staff and equipment efficiently? Is it flexible enough to adapt to changing conditions? The evaluation of a solution's acceptability is done by asking the following questions: Do the implementers support the solution, perceiving it as worth their time and energy? Are the risks manageable? Will the solution benefit the persons affected by the problem? Will it benefit the society as a whole?

The solution that will be selected has to be effective – the solution has to have sufficient technical quality to resolve the problem, and to be acceptable to those who will implement it.

- **Step Five: Implementing the Solution**

Choosing a solution does not immediately solve a problem. Putting a solution into action may prove as difficult as deciding on one. The implementation stage requires action planning: What must be done? Who will do it? When will it be started? When will key milestones be completed? How will the necessary actions be carried out? Why are these actions a solution?

- **Step Six: Evaluating the Outcome**

In simplest terms, evaluation is the monitoring that any project needs to ensure that milestones are met, costs are contained, and work is completed. Unfortunately, most leaders neglect or short-change the evaluation step, and therefore do not get the continued results or performance they were hoping to achieve. Good leaders, however, plan additional feedback mechanisms to detect the need for midcourse corrections and to ensure that the problem is solved without creating new problems. Collecting data and reporting on what has been accomplished it's another important element to be done. Finally, the reflection on the executed process makes the leader to be effective. It also brings the problem-solving process full circle, as reflecting on results helps the leader to identify the next step.

LEADERSHIP AS A KEY SEGMENT IN DEALING WITH THE SECURITY CHALLENGES

Leaders are the people on whom the management of the challenges in the contemporary societies depend, are the driving force. The way they act will determine whether the challenges will become unsolvable and insurmountable, and escalate into serious security crisis, or will be simply overcome through timely reactions and finding the most suitable solutions. Leadership can be described as a process of social influence in which a person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task.² According to the definition, leadership is very powerful "tool"

² Chemers M. (1997). *An integrative theory of leadership*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. ISBN 978-0-8058-2679-1

in the social environment. It can influence positively or negatively on citizens and therefore it can influence the way they approach, respond and resolve a situation in society, which can have a direct impact on safety. Problems can be prevented if they are taken into consideration on time and if there are taken appropriate measures for finding institutional solutions that will satisfy stakeholders in the best possible way, instead of increasing the tension and then its escalation. In some of my previous research papers it was investigated the influence of the personal conflict styles on the leaders' approach to dealing with conflicts in society. Whereas the focus in this research paper will be few steps backwards. Specifically, it will be examined the approach to problems in the initial stage of their appearance. What kind of approach the leaders have towards those new situations for which they have no immediate response and a particular solution. How the leaders react in the first stage of solving problems will determine the path that the situation will take in the following process. That is the reason why politicians who are in charge of state institutions should possess leadership abilities and appropriate personal characteristics for suitable management of the everyday situations in society.

THE PERSONAL VALUES AS A FOUNDATION TO THE BEHAVIOR

The value system of the individual determines the attitudes, decision-making, and the behavior itself. It can be seen as a filter through which the individual perpetuates the reality and values its own experience. Regardless of whether the individual is aware of the influence of the value system, the system is present and has major influence.


The values represent the highest priorities of the individual. They represent beliefs that specific actions and conditions are individually and collectively preferred over others actions and conditions. They, actually, represent the ideals that the individual wish to accomplish for itself and society as well. They influence on what is perceived as good or bad.³ Each value has its own content and intensity. The *content* presents what people perceive as good and valuable, whereas *intensity* presents how much is that good and valuable. If we rang the values in one individual in accordance to importance and if we interlink with each other, we will get the individual value system. The system not only shows which values the individual possess and what she / he considers for good or bad, but it also shows which values she/he considers as more important than the others and what is the relation between them. As such, the individual value system presents the predispositions about the

³ Santrock, J.W., A Topical Approach to Life-Span Development New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2007, p. 24;

individual's behavior.⁴ The value system in people determines their behavior. The values define the attitudes that will be later transformed into actions. Precisely, the connection between values, attitudes and behavior, will be focus of exploration in this research paper.

It is important to emphasize that *values* are the foundation upon which *attitudes* are being created, and the attitudes are determining the individual *behavior*.

Image 2: The process of forming attitude and behavior from a specific value



The image above presents the role of the value system as a system that determines the behavior and approach of the individual. The personal values determine how the individual will react or solve different challenges.

One value, along with a specific belief generate specific number of attitudes for a specific issue, therefore each group of similar attitudes implies to specific value as a source. For example, if the leaders who are managing high societal positions accept flexibility as a value, they will have positive attitude towards changes, they will be able to adjust easily to the new circumstances and generate solutions coolheaded which is especially crucial in time of major issues or security crisis. Taking into consideration all above in relation to values and their influence on the attitudes and behavior a conclusion can be made that the leaders' problem solving approach is under direct influence of the individual value system.

⁴ Ibid, p.35;

NATIONALITY BACKGROUND AS FOUNDATION FOR CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

The value systems are based on the cultural differences that are generated from the nationality background of the individual. The Dutch scientist Geert Hofstede conducted a research that included 116000 respondents from 40 countries. The research was about their values related to work.⁵ Taking the research results as a foundation, Hofstede discovered established four basic dimensions of values that can vary depending on the culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity via femininity, and individualism via collectivism. In the later researches Michael Bond located fifth dimension as well: long-term via short-term orientation.⁶

Power distance index (PDI): "Power distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally." Individuals in a society that exhibit a high degree of power distance accept hierarchies in which everyone has a place without the need for justification. Societies with low power distance seek to have equal distribution of power.⁷ Cultures that endorse low power distance expect and accept power relations that are more consultative or democratic.

Individualism (IDV) vs. collectivism: "The degree to which individuals are integrated into groups". In individualistic societies, the stress is put on personal achievements and individual rights. People are expected to stand up for themselves and their immediate family, and to choose their own affiliations. In contrast, in collectivist societies, individuals act predominantly as members of a lifelong and cohesive group or organization (note: "The word collectivism in this sense has no political meaning; it refers to the group, not to the state"). People have large extended families, which are used as a protection in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.

Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI): "a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity". It reflects the extent to which members of a society attempt to cope with anxiety by minimizing uncertainty. People in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance tend to be more emotional. They try to minimize the occurrence of unknown and unusual circumstances and to proceed with careful changes step by step planning and by implementing rules, laws and regulations. In contrast, low uncertainty

⁵ Hofstede, 1980. For a critique of this work, see Dorfman, P. W., 6c Howell, J. P., Dimensions of national culture and effective leadership patterns: Hofstede revisited. *Advances in International Comparative Management*, 3, 1989, p. 127 - 150;

⁶ Hofstede G., *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind* London: McGraw-Hill, 1991, p. 4 - 21;


⁷ <http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html>

avoidance cultures accept and feel comfortable in unstructured situations or changeable environments and try to have as few rules as possible. People in these cultures tend to be more pragmatic, they are more tolerant of change.

Masculinity (MAS), vs. femininity: "The distribution of emotional roles between the genders". Masculine cultures' values are competitiveness, assertiveness, materialism, ambition and power, whereas feminine cultures place more value on relationships and quality of life. In masculine cultures, the differences between gender roles are more dramatic and less fluid than in feminine cultures where men and women have the same values emphasizing modesty and caring. As a result of the taboo on sexuality in many cultures, particularly masculine ones, and because of the obvious gender generalizations implied by Hofstede's terminology, this dimension is often renamed by users of Hofstede's work, e.g. to Quantity of Life vs. Quality of Life.

Long-term orientation (LTO), vs. short term orientation: First called "Confucian dynamism", it describes societies' time horizon. Long-term oriented societies attach more importance to the future. They foster pragmatic values oriented towards rewards, including persistence, saving and capacity for adaptation. In short term oriented societies, values promoted are related to the past and the present, including steadiness, respect for tradition, preservation of one's face, reciprocation and fulfilling social obligations. Indulgence versus restraint (IVR): The extent to which members of a society try to control their desires and impulses. Whereas indulgent societies have a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun, restrained societies have a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict norms.

Image 3. Division of cultural dimensions in different countries in the world



Source: Hofstede, Geert (2001). Culture's Consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks,

Even though all of the value dimensions explored above have its own influence on the problem solving and decision making processes, in the framework of this research paper it will be explored more deeply the uncertainty avoidance as a type of approach towards the issues and their solving. The Uncertainty Avoidance, "a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity" reflects the extent to which members of a society attempt to cope with anxiety by minimizing uncertainty. The uncertainty avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which a person in society feels uncomfortable with a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong Uncertainty avoidance Index or UAI, maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles. People in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance tend to be more emotional. They try to minimize the occurrence of unknown and unusual circumstances and to proceed with careful changes step by step by planning and by implementing rules, laws and regulations. In contrast, low uncertainty avoidance cultures accept and feel comfortable in unstructured situations or

changeable environments and try to have as few rules as possible. People in these cultures tend to be more pragmatic, they are more tolerant of change.

INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL VALUE SYSTEM OVER THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES

As it was previously stated, every society face challenges on a regular basis. They are part of the existence. The society is a dynamic category. The development in the technology nowadays makes the society to be an open system. Citizens receive information from all around the world which gives additional load to the challenges that has to be dealt by the societal leaders who hold formal societal functions and by those who have power of influence but do not execute formal functions. The personal characteristics, precisely, are the key success. One of those characteristics is the personal value system. The system makes each situation to be approached from a different angle. Some leaders will ignore the problem, some will try to find the quickest possible solution, and some will act systematically following each step of the problem solving process.

If we make union between the personal value system seen through the aspect of the *uncertainty avoidance*, and the 6 steps problem solving process, it can be said that the problem approach will not be complete and thorough. The high avoidance of uncertain situations will make the leaders to approach the problems superficially and with tendency to eliminate the uncertainty fastest they can. More specifically, instead of 6 steps the challenges will be solved in 3 steps: acknowledging the symptoms, selection of the first solution they came up with, quick and poorly prepared implementation. The lack of patience to stay in the uncertainty will generate lack of patience in leaders to do all the steps in the problem solving process. As a result, they often do not define the problem well instead they propose solution based on the symptoms. The quickly made solution will not be suitable because of the missing steps in the process. The lack of suitable definition of the problem and especially the lack of thorough analysis of the problem causes, and the lack of patience will generate unsuitable solutions as well. Instead of solving the problem, they will complicate more. The lack of analysis will cause spending more time, energy and other resources without finding the best possible solution. It's just like a doctor who is treating a patient based on the symptoms that the patient reports to him/her without making proper diagnostics to locate the real causes of the symptoms. In this situation it can be waste many medication but the medical condition of the patient will not be solved but worsen.

In continuum, if there are not generated and tested variety of solutions after the problem analyze part it is highly probable that the first proposed solution will not be the best, the most efficient and the most successful. The

main element that will obstruct the problem solving process is exactly the personal value Uncertainty Avoidance of the leaders. If they lack tolerance and patience in unsolved situations instead of finding solutions they will create additional problems. Taking into consideration that the security challenges that the leaders face in their societies are unique and characterized with elements specific to the societies they live in, many uncertain situation may appear. In those cases, if they show resistance and unacceptance towards the issues they will not be able to create solutions but will generate complications and will worsen the situation including the security state of the country.

In the final part of the research paper it will be presented two examples that will support the upper statements.

The first example will explore specific situation in Republic of Macedonia. From the very beginning of the establishment of the country, in the voting process of the Constitution, the political representatives of the Albanian minority (as it was then formulated) refused to vote for the Constitution. This behavior indicated a problem which was not addressed with full attention, but it was ignored. In the later years other situations came up that had the same foundation as the previous described. One of those situations is the establishment of the para-university Mala Rechica which indicated that ethnical Albanians from Macedonia demonstrated strong will to study on Albanian language. This specific problem was not, also, approached well. It was not analyzed well, the crucial causes were not found, and there were not proposed various alternatives but it was approached with the quickest solution - using the police force for violent management of the situation which ended with victims as well. At the end, all of these situations escalated damaging the state security to be more precisely they ended with an armed conflict.

The second example will explore specific situation in regards to the prostitution in Sweden⁸. In 5 years the number of street prostitutes in Stockholm has lowered for two thirds and the number of customers dropped for 80%. In the same time the number of girls that are being imported in Sweden to work as prostitutes is between 200 and 400 whereas in Finland the number is between 15 and 17 thousands. These achievements came as a result of an applied suitable problem solving strategy. In 1999, after deep analysis and going through the whole problem solving model, Sweden sets a law by which buying sex services became crime but not selling sex services. The third element of the strategy is securing rich and comprehensive services and funds dedicated to sexual workers who want to leave the business. Despite of the comprehensive planning of the legislative, the first year of its implementation did not bring many changes. However, this situation did not cause panic. On

⁸<http://esnoticia.co/noticia-8790-swedens-prostitution-solution-why-hasnt-anyone-tried-this-before>

the contrary, the government started to look for the problem in the implementation of the legislative. They concluded that the police and the others responsible for implementation do not understand the law. The police had to acknowledge that prostitution is part of the violence over women and that the customers should be punished whereas the sexual workers should be helped. The government invested additional resources in the preparation of the police and then the positive results started to show.

In a relation to this, there was also similar attempt for changing the law about prostitution in Scotland, in 2003. They then hired the University of London to make a comparative analysis of different policies for the sex trade worldwide. The analysis considered Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands as countries that have different models for regulation or legalization of prostitution. The results are that the legalization of prostitution leads to:

- Dramatic growth in all aspects of the sex industry
- A dramatic increase in the involvement of organized crime in the sex industry
- Dramatic growth of child prostitution
- Explosion in numbers of foreign women and girls who are trafficked within the region
- Indications of an increase in violence against women

In the state of Victoria, Australia, where there is a system of legalized and regulated brothel, there was a dramatic increase of newly brothels that exceed the system's ability to regulate. In addition, the girls who worked in this system continue to feel forced and unsafe. In the Netherlands, 79% of prostitutes said they want to get out of this business. Even though each of the programs for legalization promises help to the prostitutes who want to change their profession, that assistance was almost never made. By comparison, 60% of Swedish prostitutes have used state programs. The key difference between the plan of Sweden and the other jurisdictions is that Swedes perceive the prostitutes as victims of male coercion and violence, while the rest perceive the prostitution from a male point of view, not female.

CONCLUSION

Societies are a dynamic category. They are open to external influences. Specifically, the dynamic element and the openness as well can create unique situations on daily basis which, if not treated suitable it can grow into smaller or larger threats to the security. The approach to the problems and challenges in the society must be thorough and comprehensive. It must implement the models created by the scientific thought. The problem solving model consisted of six steps is a great model that allows to approach problems carefully, to analyze the causes of the problem thoroughly, to create and test the alternative

solutions, and to finally select the best possible solution that will be fully implemented. The given approach will ensure that the resolution of the problems will be successfully while improving the situation, rather than worsening it. Leaders are crucial in leading the society. They are key figures that have great impact on the individuals and thus on the social movement. Their characteristics are key in determining how they will behave. Their values are of particular importance in determining their behavior. Values together with beliefs influence on the creation of attitudes which are then converted into concrete actions. Values are the root cause of the behavior.

Every nation has its own values. They can be divided into several categories. One particularly important category of values is *uncertainty avoidance*. It reflects the approach towards the new and undefined conditions. Taking into consideration that most of the social conditions are new, *uncertainty avoidance* has a crucial impact on the way leaders would react to problems and therefore has an impact on the ability of the society as a whole to deal with new situations. If the new situations are not dealt with and prevented on time, the societies will be full of unresolved situations that will be serve as time bombs for the entire system. It will be a matter of time when these situations will escalate and disrupt security. These statements can be confirmed by a range of examples, two of them are explored in this paper. In Macedonia, ethnic intolerance is still a high risk factor for the security, while in Sweden prostitution is closed. The reason behind the different outcomes of those burning issues is just because the leaders in Sweden have higher tolerance towards the undefined problems and are able to solve problems with a correct application of the problem solving models. It is essential the countries that have low tolerance towards the undefined situations, first to become aware of this weakness and then through appropriate changes in the educational programs for children and young people and media campaigns to work to improve the situation by initiating changes in the national value systems. It is of high importance, first, to be made changes in the leaders' values throughout specific leadership programs, because when the leaders will change, the whole society will change.

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REFORMS AIMED AT SERVICE ORIENTATION OF SECURITY SERVICES

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Abstract

The principle of service orientation should be incorporated in the physiognomy of the security institutions as an essential ingredient, but also as the primary standard in the mindset and professional portfolio of the security personnel. In this article, the basic attributes that constitute the identity of the substrate orientation service in terms of a law and social consideration are detected. In addition, the stress is put on the importance of this fundamental principle which is based as a substantial element in the contemporary European security architecture.

Service placement should be the main guide and roadmap in functioning; in other words, the social welfare and security should be established as statutory regulations for their work. Service orientation is a most relevant barometer for the level of democracy, security, tranquility and comfort of the citizens in the exploitation of the guaranteed rights and the exploitation of the social graces. Ultimately, the legitimacy and authority of the security institutions depend on the service orientation, because the intention of some developed countries is creating a culture of “qualitative and secure services for the citizens” which is established as an ideology.

Service orientation imperatively requires significant cultural change in the actions of the security organizations. It also requires adequate facilities as catalysts of the change, and time for that change in order to be implanted and realized. The reform process that moves along this trajectory should receive treatment on an ongoing and continuous activity, which will require a serious understanding and receptivity by the employees, who must receive appropriate training, incentive, and benefits. Also, in this context it should be noted that

successful reforms are twofold, that require action “from the top to the bottom” (for instance leadership) and vice versa (improving the performance and employees’ agility).

The anachronous model of rigid security system which is based on rigid and inflexible rules and procedures must be substituted by a model oriented towards results. The main point of this approach is that security services are above all providers of services or products to their clients or customers. This is the starting point for establishing the contours of the security model of an entity that guarantees quality services and generates effective results. On the other hand it leaves the retrograde concept of security system that only offers services without a clear mission profiled. The care for the efficient and effective provision of security services, which will anticipate and protect the citizens’ needs, is established as an essential professional and ethical component of the modern security services.

In this article the emphasis is placed on certain designs and recommendations as well, which should serve as an inspiring paradigm for establishing the contours of professional and valuable crystallized security entity, which will be a service to the citizens and the society as a whole.

Key words: security services, service orientation, officers, clients, services

INTRODUCTION

Security services as a substantial element of the state mechanism and its main cell perform authoritative activities in which the government is vivified and provides the leadership role of the state in society. The function of white blood cells in the human body generally, in transmission and metaphorical connotation can be attributed to the security authorities within the state organism. Their primordial mission is to provide protection of life, peace, tranquility, and safety as the highest primal, fundamental, and universally established and inviolable human values, guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, protection of the constitutional legal order, ensure the stability of the social order overall, etc. The protection of the social (public) interest, which actually represents a summary of the individual interests of all parties, should be the main attribute and essential determinant in the action of the security system. Citizens consistently establish relations with the security institutions, but such relationships do not always permit warmth and kindness. It is not a rare case when there is a gap between them which separates citizens away from the security services sign, which disturb and burden that relationship and generate animosity and confrontation. Security authorities and citizens are interdependent, so their relationship should be based on a new qualitative foundation, which will allow the

development of partnership and mutual respect. It is undisputed that the security services as a central core and main lever of the state apparatus should be in function of the legal manifestation of the state, but still less arguable is the immanent need for its transformation into an efficient service to the citizens. In fact, wherever there is a possibility these entities should disassemble repressive and arbitrary properties and should begin to acquire more cooperative partnership and service attributes.

TERM, PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE REFORM IN THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

The term reform can be used in a positive connotation and means a change of the status, process, content, structure, method of work, behavior, procedures, etc., or reconstruction, restructuring and revitalization of certain social segment in direction of its qualitative improvement. The reform should reset and decode the national security institutions and strengthen their organizational, functional, and personal capacities. The aim of the reform, first of all, is to remove the anomalies and dysfunctions of the security sector and to establish sophisticated standards as a seed to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability. “What does not stop is the fear of the changes. And yet, our salvation depends on the changes. People accept changes only in times of necessity, and recognize necessity only in times of crisis” (Krajovski 2011, p. 543).

Successful countries generally implement reforms continuously, permanently honing and building the existing institutional arrangement. In these countries, if the system is effective, then the expectation is that the stagnation as the signal itself initiates change. On the other hand, there are countries where reforms are made whenever you face difficulties, while others, only when the current situation is extremely difficult and the existing institutional framework collapses entirely. The concept of reforms in the security sector is inherently complex and multidimensional, but here we allude primarily to the reforms that should be implemented in the state institutions of security provenance, that should cope with subtle, sophisticated and asymmetrical threats, with the ultimate aim to provide citizens' safe, secure and legitimate state authority (Hendrickson / Karkozska 2002, pp. 175 - 201).

To offset the modern types of security risks (organized crime, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, etc.) there is a requirement of new forms of organization and functioning of the security sector. The security sector should have the potential to deal with all these forms of threats, to be capable of preventative action, to be able to move quickly, and then act to ensure recovery from the impact and to prepare for future operations.

There are several reasons for reforms in the security sector: achieving optimal structure of the security sector (personnel management, equipment, and training); democratic control of the security sector by the Parliament and the Government; rationalizing of the security sector and care for the wastage of resources for the purpose of deriving powers; significant changes in the security perceptions in the society; more focus on the new types of risks; willingness to participate in missions outside of its own borders, etc. (Johanna Mendelson Forman 2005). Security services are infiltrated in all spheres of social tissues, or reflections of their activities pulsate in all areas of life. Therefore, their reform must be understood as a necessity, as a prerequisite for effective implementation of the objectives of the rule of law, and not as a fad, because without the modern, consistent, resistant security system we could not have a stable and functional state. Very often, the reforms are implemented in terms of resistance, which occurs due to innovations that respond to the existing structures. Namely, employees are the most irascible and show distrust and resentment towards reform measures, because they do not want to be disrupted in their own commodity. Very often, after bitter efforts to transform the existing groggily structures, peeking initial minor effects of reform measures taken, we witness the practice that once you fall right of the reorganization, employees begin to behave and work as before. Therefore, the challenge is not only to initiate the change itself, but to instill a mental code of the employees' need for permanent, durable and self-sustainable processes of change that will be aimed at development and improvement (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2003, 79 - 80). Other factors which are the obstacles of the reform process are: authoritarian political arrangements, anachronistic and conservative mental matrix of thinking, which is an opponent of the modern progressive trends and proponent of the current status quo, the absence of strong political will and compromise on the main directions reform measures and the effects of their institutional establishment, stereotypical social culture, lack of a clearly defined strategy with designs to achieve the reform objectives and not being introduced to the citizens and legal entities with the benefits of the reforms, the opposition and lack of public support, etc.

The most common reasons for implementing reforms in the security services are: building strong institutional mechanisms with strengthened capacity, i.e. improvement of the organizational and functional structure of services and increase their efficiency and effectiveness in order to successfully carry out public works and solve public problems, as well as the development of a sustainable democratic society. With a properly designed concept of reform we should achieve the following performance of the security institutions:

- Democratic values (responsibility, responsiveness, transparency, accountability, etc.);
- Legal values (legality, the rule of law, legal certainty, uniformity in procedures to all, protecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens, honest, conscientious and impartial conduct of the proceedings, legal liability, material, disciplinary, criminal, etc.);
- Social values (social viability, solidarity, social sensitivity, protection, assistance to the citizens, etc.);
- Economic values (efficiency, effectiveness, economy);
- Contemporary values (professionalism and competence, ethics and not being corrupted, quality public services, coordination, horizontal connectivity and awareness, initiative, etc.).

The main aim that should practically be operational reform is the creation of responsive and service oriented security authorities whose main focus of their overall activity should be put on the citizen and the public interest.

NOTION DETERMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SERVICE ORIENTATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR SECURITY AUTHORITIES

Service orientation is a relatively new concept, created and proposed by Chinese scientists in the early 21st century, a designed wedge of taxpayers to enable fulfillment of all legitimate rights (YUAN / YAN u Qiang). The term service implies to the duty of the employees in the security authorities to ensure flawless protection of legally guaranteed rights and interests of citizens and of public interest, and the citizens will see a partner who can pay back at any time, in order to achieve some of their needs. The human resources of security services should be a key link in the chain of direct relations between the citizens and the state, which should provide normative projections for human rights to become a reality. People who are permanently and professionally incorporated into national security mechanism should be an extended arm of the citizens, who through the payment of taxes alimented their work, not to be subservient instrument of political power brokers. After all, serving the citizens and the public interest represents legal basis for their existence. Or as Mahatma Gandhi once said “the client is the most important visitor on our facilities. They do not depend on us. We depend on them. They are not an obstacle for our work. They are the purpose of the work. We do not do them a favour by serving them. They provide us with a service by allowing us to do that” (Vitanski 2014b, 539). The orientation towards serving the customer would mean not only producing good services in the present, but also constantly striving to improve sustainable services.

What is meant by the word customer? This term in its original dimension is taken from the private sector and means a person who has a choice of what to buy and from whom, or who can choose between several alternative suppliers of products and services that are paid and whose assets providing income by which businesses generate profits. However, “pure” definition of customer cannot be mechanically implanted in a part of the state system, including the relationship between security authorities and entities that use their services. In this context, for example, when people need birth certificates, marriage, or death certificates, a certificate of citizenship, identity card, passport, etc., they have no alternative choice, because these documents are only issued by the state authorities.

The private companies, even before producing a product, accurately determine their customers or target group to consume their products. Also, with many of the public institutions their clients are known in advance. For example, in the primary schools there are children from seven to fourteen years old; in secondary schools there are people with elementary education at the age from fourteen to eighteen; in the Pediatric Clinic the clients are children with a pathology, etc. As for the security services, such as police, here in the capacity of clients there are the perpetrators of an illegal act (persons who have committed offenses, punishable offense), but also “victims”, i.e. those who had been inflicted with a damage. The difference is that on one side of the spectrum occur the perpetrators of offenses that are unwilling users of the service without the option of “output”, while on the other side there are citizens who were once harmed or threatened a certain protected value as life, peace, security, etc., require intervention and protection by the competent national authority.

To receive the attribute of service-oriented employees, they must possess the following performances:

- To establish and maintain credibility with the public, customers, partners and collaborators;
- To access successfully the customer’s needs, in order to effectuate their requirements and expectations;
- To have a positive energy in the interaction with customers;
- To identify the opportunities and ways of improving customer service and increase their satisfaction;
- When servicing utilities to establish partnerships with customers;
- To use a simple and understandable language, which will ensure an effective communication with the service users;
- To balance the interest of the client to the public interest;

- To establish and maintain high standards of quality work and accountability in service delivery (NIH / OHR - Competencies Dictionary - Service Orientation).

The principle of service orientation is one of the fundamental principles which must be abode by all employees, from the top to the bottom of the security pyramid. It should be the primary standard and essential attribute in the professional portfolio of each employee. The wholeheartedly serving the citizens should not be reduced to declarative phrase, dogma, or demagogic coiffed political declaration, but to establish how the world "duty of employees of each organizational level and as a starting criterion in their work (making efforts to construct service-oriented government invest). Participation of the clients in decision-making is one of the main links in the chain reform which catalyze the improvement of the quality of the service. For this purpose it is necessary to:

- Inform customers about the nature of the service and the level of the success you can expect, as well as the quality of service delivery compared with established standards or goals. Information about the services leads to clarification of the rights of the citizens, assisting clients in accessing services, dialogue with customers and providing service to act in accordance with the required standards, creating trust between security and customers etc;
- The consultation with the customer involves establishing dialogue between the bidder and the user of the services related to the needs, challenges, opportunities and alternatives, and despite the fact that the final decisions shall be adopted by the institution. Customers can be asked through surveys, about which aspects are the most important in determining the type of service or how much weight should be given to certain aspects of the implementation of a specific service. For example, the public may be considered as one of the important aspects of the service that offers its police presence and mobility to the streets in order to reduce crime. But it is the final assessment of professional police analysts and experts about which is the most effective and most productive way of police action in order to combat the crime. In any case, the possibility of service users to give their comments and suggestions are considered as useful source of information. Therefore, it is required a constant contact and continuous dialogue with employees in the services with their users, because in this way we can feel the pulse of the customers and feel their (un)pleasure of consumption of the services they use. Usually, admissions office is where the customer establishes the first contact with the authority. In addition, the quality of the relationship to the client is largely determined by the treatment that is applied on the first contact and

based on initial impression. The client estimates what are their rights and opportunities for getting the service. Mutual communication and civic participation in certain segments allows making better decisions which will be founded on the views of the citizens and that will effectively solve the issues that they have initiated. Also, decisions will be better accepted if they respect the opinions and suggestions of customers in the decision making.

- Partnership with customers means establishing relationships of mutual cooperation, mutual trust, and respectability;
- The control by the customers, which is achieved through inspection of citizens in the procedure and operation officers who can detect and disclose some abnormalities which, if not timely amortized may represent a potential threat to the deepening of dysfunction in a body (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2003, 15, 21 - 23, 61).

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE SERVICE ORIENTATION OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES

To improve the service orientation of the security institutions it is necessary to undertake a range of measures and activities. As one of the most important, of course not the only we point to particular need to put the emphasis:

a) **Personnel Policy.** The spoils system (political recruitment) by entering amateur dilettantism generates failure and paralysis of the national security body. Because of this, there is an imminent need for uncompromising implanting of the meritocratic system (recruitment based on expertise and competence) in all aspects of the security tissue. Membership in a party affiliation of the ruling political nomenclature should not be a substitute of the expert ability and professional competence. On the contrary, the foundation and substantial element of the security system should comprise professional and value crystal clear footage. Only staff with this background will have the potential, capacity, and credibility to overcome the challenges and temptations, as well as to achieve the objectives of the security system. We have to draw a clear demarcation line between officials that include ministers or managers of the security authorities of political cadres, and thus politically responsible for what is a provided spoils system and professional civil servants or career officials who should fall under the merit system. Such a legal and organizational functional structure of officials and civil servants in the hierarchical structure of the bodies allows distinction between the political and professional security services, the relation between the expert and professional staff and the politically appointed staff.

b) **Independence.** The matters of the security authorities under its jurisdiction should be performed independently on the basis and framework of the Constitution and the laws. According to a determinant constitutional there is a guarantee mechanism that the premises of the principle of independence should be included in all activities of the security authorities, such as the implementation of the policy, the implementation of laws and other acts of the Parliament and the general regulations adopted by the Government, settlement paperwork and more. The basic framework and guide of the security authorities in addressing specific cases should be the only law. This means that in this segment no other body (nor parliamentary neither government) can act on them to repress or to give specific orders and orders to be resolved as a certain subject. As the courts are independent in the conduct of criminal and civil proceedings, in taking of the procedural actions, in determining the material truth and in making judgments, the security organs should enjoy autonomy in the implementation of the procedures and decision-making.

c) **Efficiency.** Efficiency means establishing of the optimal ratio between the involved resources: human, financial, technical and effects. So, it is calculated by dividing the outcomes (objectives, results, or effects) with what is recorded as a resource (staff, time spent, or technical and material assets) (Berman, 1998, p. 55 - 62). The essential dimension of the principle of the efficiency, is primarily manifested in the following:

- If two types of shares give the same results in achieving the projected goal, it should be preferred the kind that entails lower cost; or
- If both types of actions cause the same price, it should be preferred the one that provides greater benefits (Grizzly / Davitkovski 2001, 17).

Efficiency includes fast, agile and zealous action of the security authorities when circumstances inevitably require, for belated intervention in such cases becomes irrational and pointless. For example, a quick intervention of the police in case of disturbance of the public peace and order, in case of the robbery, terrorism, etc; timely intervention of the army in case of violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty; timely detection and tracing of foreign “hostile” groups by the intelligence services, following of the relevant intelligence information to the competent authorities for the purpose of preventing from their infiltration in the country and preventing from the risk of endangering public order, and so on. Timeliness is one of the crucial aspects of performance. However, for efficiency not only time is important; this will operationalize the goal / task, but a very important component, is also the quantity of material, and technical and human resources that will be spent.

d) **Effectiveness.** The effectiveness of the security authorities means successful achieving of goals or solving the tasks which are set by the law. The principle of efficiency is expressed as the ratio between the actual results and objectives. The measures of effectiveness are related to the quality or the

degree of exercise that are designed objectives. So, effectiveness stresses quality and answers the question whether the services and staff should take something, as opposed to efficiency that puts the focus on reducing costs and increasing the output and answers the question of whether things are out of dust way, i.e. properly (Berman, 1998, p. 55 - 62). Efficiency and effectiveness should practically be given life as mutually complement principles of operation in every process for the customers to obtain services that will incorporate all the necessary parameters.

e) **Quality.** Quality of service is a crucial aspect for the success of the mission of the bodies. Generally, the quality can be defined as the appropriateness or suitability, i.e. it is an indicator of whether the services are convenient for the needs of customers. If we define as quality “fitness for purpose”, it implies that it is the people who use the service that are the relevant entities that carry Court of parameters that would make the service suitable for the purpose and whether it was achieved. However, services are intangible, hence quality standards can only be measured based on the notion of the perception of the client. Furthermore, unlike products and services cannot be stored but must be made accessible and available at the time when customers will want.

f) **Proportionality.** The essential component of the proportionality principle is consisted in the obligation of the officers, the actions and activities they undertake to comply or be proportionate to the objectives wished to be achieved. The aim of this principle is to provide a reasonable balance between the interests involved, for example, the public interest on the one hand and the private interest of individuals on the other side (Council of Europe in 2005, p. 290). The principle of proportionality is enshrined in the European law for a good administrative behavior: In making decisions, the officer should ensure that the measures taken are proportionate to the aim that should be fulfilled. In particular, avoidance of restricting of the rights of citizens or imposing restrictions when they are disproportionate to the purpose. In making a decision, the official respects fair balance between the interests of the individuals and the general public interest "(Fromont, 2010, p. 257 - 258).

g) **Regulation and limiting of discretionary powers.** The term *discretionary authority* means the authority in which the particular situation of the body or the official shall be entrusted certain degree of freedom in terms of the decision to adopt, enabling them, thereby, for more legally admissible decisions in legal norm to choose one that is considers as the most appropriate (Council of Europe in 2005, p. 283). In case of a discretionary decision it should be chosen the one alternative that best suits the public interest. That is, when using discretionary authority, officials must take into account the social interest. Moreover, their actions and decisions must not move into

voluntarism, arbitrariness or capriciousness. Authority in the exercise of discretionary authority:

- We must not aim to achieve a different goal than the one which is entrusted with the authority;
- the principle of objectivity and impartiality should be respected, taking into account only the factors that are relevant into this case;
- the principle of equality before the law should be respected, avoiding unfair discrimination;
- We should maintain an appropriate balance between any adverse effect that its decision may cause on the rights, freedoms and interests of individuals and objective decision should realize, that should provide a reasonable balance between the interests involved, for example, the public interest on the one hand and the private interest of individuals on the other side;
- to make a decision within a reasonable time;
- all other general administrative guidelines in a consistent manner should be used, and at the same time to take into account the specific circumstances of each case (Council of Europe, 2005, p. 283 - 284).

The juxtaposition between the so-called imposed jurisdiction when the authority has no room for maneuver in making decisions and discretion is mitigated by the so-called theory of margin assessment. According to this theory, the body is able to choose between several legal characterizations of the facts that the legal terms do not explicitly identify the law and thus allow several possible interpretations and consequently several possible solutions. For example, if a certain situation can be described or not be described as a very dangerous to the public order, the police may take a decision on smaller or greater restriction of freedom, or decide not to intervene (Fromont, 2010, 203).

h) **Training.** Modern social challenges that lurk over security require from their current staff knowledge and inventive ideas and competencies and skills in order to deliver quality results. Employees who need to adapt to the changes facing organizations must constantly train to maintain and upgrade their qualifications. In this context, professional horizons are constantly expanding as well as the continuous accumulation quantum of professional knowledge and skills of employees as a condition sine qua non for establishing consistent and functional security system as a major substrate of social architecture. With training, respectively, with permanent professional development and training, the following objectives should be achieved:

- Building and capacity building of human resources and establishing a stable institutional structures;
- Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operations;

- Enhancing the relationship with customers;
- Learning new management techniques and procedures of work or increasing the competencies and skills of employees in accordance to the technological, technical, cultural, administrative and management changes;
- Enabling horizontal mobility of the clerk - redeployment;
- Enabling vertical Mobility - advancement;
- Improving the motivation for work;
- Better implementation of the regulations;
- Support implementation of reforms, etc.

i) **Measurement of the performance.** The main point of measurement of the performance is that the authorities should formulate their desired performance and determine how they can be measured by defining the so-called Performance indicators; the security authorities have to set specific, measurable, attainable, and relevant goals targets to be met within a specified period of time and eventually pass the bill, or to account to citizens about whether and how they satisfied advanced deterministic goals. The practical establishment of the system for measuring the performance allows determining of the current performance of the security agencies, but it is also an opportunity to formulate a strategy that would incorporate comprehensive measures and actions to effect real attainable performance. The measurement of performance usually contains the following components:

- Establishing norms of effect, which should be formulated in an objective way which will allow their quantification and measurement;
- Analysis and description of operational processes, tools, technology, and human and material resources that are necessary for practical operationalization of the norms of the effect;
- Setting impact indicators that will be used to assess the level of efficiency and the quality of service;
- Creating the most appropriate measurement mechanisms that will allow comparison between the goals and the realized level of effect.

Evaluation is a good opportunity to look into the past (achieved results, performance, surpassed difficulties etc.), but also into the future (new goals, training needs, improvement of the conditions in which the work is carried out, the assessment of the potential for development, etc.).

Measuring performance is a tool that helps to detect errors that officials have made in their work, but it is also a roadmap to increase their effectiveness.

j) **Responsibility.** As an imperative pushed and creating a new system of accountability which would mean abandoning of the collective and individual exercise more exact responsibility, or anyone responsible for their actions and

behavior. So, the focus in the future, above all, will be placed on individual responsibility. Responsibility would be put in plain declarative phrase and demagogic coiffed declaration without specific tangible practical effects, if not accompanied by sanctions of negative implications for the officer, because the sanction is one of the fundamentals of the responsible business. Regarding to the institution of responsibility, it is necessary to separate the phases in the implementation of services, so that for every taken step an official can be called to account specifically in order to bring correlated awards in the successful results, sanctions in the unprofessional performance through the system “stick and carrot”.

k) **Transparency.** The credo of the modern security system should be transparency, which will provide access to the citizens in the work they do in the organs and their control. In this context, it is as close to the security services to citizens through various books, brochures, guide books, TV spots, mobile information stands and organizing open meetings where citizens will be informed about the newly introduced or amended laws, procedures, regulations or get useful and necessary advice and help, needed for successful realization of their rights.

l) The motivation of employees is one of the measures for increasing the productivity and service operations (Rosen 1993, p. 138 - 166). It may be material and immaterial. Material motivation is usually done in the following ways: by delivering cash bonuses to those employees that exceed the norm of operations for a period of time, giving cash bonuses for overtime and for work during weekends and holidays, paid vacations, etc. Using these methods we put an effort for their proper evaluation, in which only successful and productive employees are awarded. That is, the traditional system of payment underhand, according to the rank and position that should be substituted in the system “salary by success” (Peters 2009, p. 383). Immaterial motivation, however, consists in creating a favorable and positive atmosphere in the workplace, harmony, cooperation and collegiality, the possibility of acquiring a higher social status and reputation in the society, a sense of belonging to a team that decides on important issues, etc.

CONCLUSION

Security institutions must not treat citizens in an authoritarian, superior, or contempt way; in fact, customers must not be treated in their services as vassals, subjects, or subordinates applicants. Citizens should be in the focus of security entities, because they actually represent the purpose and the legal basis of their existence and represent an integral part of their being. “Customers are the most important visitors of our facilities. They do not depend on us. We depend on them. They are not an obstacle for our work.

They are the purpose of the work. We do not do them a favor with what we are serving. They perform a service that gives us the opportunity to do it.” When this prominent thought guiding the remarkable Mahatma Gandhi will carve the mindset of the employees at all levels, from the top to the bottom of the organizational pyramid and the guidance, direction, and cemented trajectory of movement in their work, we rightly conclude that it is composed of a mosaic cubes of service orientation. Service orientation should be a productive mechanism which will transform the behavior of employees, so that will shake their bureaucratic routine and make them focus on the needs of the citizens; that should be a useful tool to break the bureaucratic walls and to improve the integration and functionality of the security services. Service set up should be the main guide and roadmap in functioning, or social security welfare that should be established as a statutory rule of their work. Ultimately, it depends on the legitimacy and authority of the security institutions.

Security services are increasingly identified as an unbreakable thread of tissue of the community, and less as a represent tool of the government. This process is neither simple nor easy. It cannot be done by decree or by some other solutions. On the contrary, the implementation of this concept and the philosophy of action of the security system require a long-term, permanent, dedicated and systemic activity of all relevant stakeholders.

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THE IMPACT OF MILITARY EDUCATION ON THE QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING OF THE MILITARY LEADERS

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Abstract

Appropriate preparation of personnel is crucial to the effective performance of the duties in the work contexts, especially in the case of the security sector in one country. Given the specifics of the tasks and the hierarchical organizational structure in which primacy is reached in the army, management personnel as direct participants in the decision making process dictate the effectiveness of the personnel in the defense system, in general. In addition, appropriate education and training of military leaders is a key link for readiness and successfully performing of their military duties, which directly affect the security of the country, and which actually is the main task of the Military Academy in Skopje, as a part of the Ministry of Defense in the Republic of Macedonia.

Therefore, the Military Academy program is of interest to the security managers, which indicates a need for more serious approach to its construction and permanent monitoring. On the other hand, the demands of the contemporary challenges impose reforms aimed at harmonization with the European credit transfer system from one, and the principles of modern warfare and security challenges on the other side. Most thoroughly to all this can respond science by setting a system of evaluation in a scientific way, as an opportunity to scan the situation, providing objective indicators for monitoring changes and their effects, in order to answer the classic dilemmas - relations of academic and professional education, military sciences on the contrary of other sciences, the connection between theory and practice, etc.

Within this paper, an empirical research was conducted in order to determine the extent of applicability of the knowledge acquired at the Military Academy while performing the officer's duties at various levels of decision making in the Army, in response to questions about the practical requirements from theoretical knowledge. The sample is convenient and consists of two groups: 1. Military officers (N = 24) who completed Specialization of command and staff duties, and 2. Cadets (N = 34) of the fourth year; as only students per accredited study program of 2012/13, which is taken as a subject. The results show that work experience increases awareness about applicability of the knowledge gained by military education in performing military duties in practice; military officers assess that knowledge by military studies is more used on tactical than on operational decision-making level; and finally, despite the highest importance to the application of knowledge by military science at the tactical level, on the operational level the priority is given to the social sciences. The results will be further used for setting up a system of improving the effectiveness of military education, in scientific way.

Key words: military education, military leaders, decision making, security

INTRODUCTION

Providing security in a rapidly changing and unpredictable world and maintaining national security still depends to a large extent on the military, their morale, motivation, and specialized skills which are influenced by their academic background, professional education, and special military training. In this approach, the social and economical justification for the subsistence of the Military Academy comes out of the needs of the Republic of Macedonia to generate its own officer core. In the Republic of Macedonia, the Military Academy is the only institution for university education of military officers, which encompasses continuous professional education for the officer core of the Army. As a part of the university education system, the Military Academy has a status of associate member to one of the state universities, but organizationally is located under the Ministry of Defense. The basic role of the Military Academy is education, training and qualification of the personnel for the needs of the Ministry of Defence, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, Crisis Management and Protection and Rescue Systems, and conducting researches in this scientific area, as well.

Based on the Republic of Macedonia's determination for NATO and EU membership, the Military Academy is in transition process, according to the need for transformation of the officer education and training system, and in line with that, redefinition of the role and responsibilities of the Military Academy have emerged. Thereby, the goal is building educated and skilful

officer' core that will successfully accomplish the mission in the country and abroad, respecting the basic standards, values and regulations.¹ In that process, the balance between the academic and the specialized education and between the humanitarian and the technical education is expected to be provided. By the other side is the Information Age, which needs continuous change of the educational methods. In regard of that, not only special skills and knowledge is required, but a higher level of abstract thinking in addition, which can be acquired from a university academic education and a system of life-long learning². This shows the importance of continuous professional military education of officers, where the most important is to become active problem solvers and collaborative learner. On the other hand, increased uncertainty and ambiguity of the new era which is especially apparent in the military profession, increases the need for critical thinking³ when making decisions as a key aspect of the military leadership performance.

All this implies to the key importance of constant program effectiveness followed through evaluation, using scientific methods for which an attempt is made within this study as a pilot project conducted on the first generation of graduate cadets after the Military Academy reactivation in 2009. On the other hand, the importance of military education for the quality of decision-making among military leaders is indicated within the specifics of the military context.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY CURRICULA

The educational process in the Military Academy is accomplished through **three cycles of university studies** (bachelor degree, master studies and specializations, and PhD), which according to the Bologna Convention and European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) have duration of 4+1+3 years, and provides development of better intellectual and analytical knowledge and skills for the officer core.

The first cycle enables candidates to manage the tactical level of decision making. The curriculum for the *first cycle* provides theoretical and practical (hand on) education, focused on developing fundamental knowledge in the social, natural, technical and military sciences, including academic

¹ Angelevski, S., Smileski, P., Popovski, O. (2011) Reforms in the System of Military Education as Part of the Euro-Atlantic Integration Processes, International Scientific Conference, *Record of Proceedings*, 2, p. 387 - 401

² Gilman, E. Herold, D.E., eds., (1993). *The Role of Military Education in the Restructuring of Armed Forces*, NATO Defence College, Rome

³ Angelevski, S., Hadzi-Janev, M., Popovski, O. (2012), Developing skills for critical thinking in the process of security problem solving, *International Scientific Conference, Record of Proceedings*, 2

disciplines, modules of military training, and physical education. The first two years are general, and the last two years are branch specific (infantry, artillery, armour, signals, engineer, air defence, pilots, NBC, and also for specific duties in crisis management, disaster relief, protection and rescue), which provides all the necessary preparation for the first commanding duty - platoon commander, and other duties. Programme supports broader general and technical culture for further education, computer literacy for the service, good foreign language training (English + other optional language); high military knowledge and skills; higher level of military expertise at tactical level, physical fitness and mental readiness and professional training for basic leadership responsibilities.

Within the framework of continuous professional education for the officer core, the Military Academy developed a set of *courses at intermediate level: a Company commander course and Battalion staff officer course*. The first is aimed to produce officers for the appropriate positions, while the second - their preparation for battalion staff positions. This education level is not branch specific and its aim is to provide the officers that are promoted to O-3 (captain rank) with all the leadership skills, tactics and techniques necessary for command position on company level, as well as battalion staff positions. They should be able to understand all the principles of joint military operations, as well, that includes an oversight of resources, restrains and use of doctrine at this operation level. At this education level, there is a shift from officer skills focused on training and missions on lower tactical level to development of analytical skills pointed to planning and evaluation of more complex military missions. The next is the *advanced level*, in which the Military Academy organizes university studies for the second and the third cycle (master and PhD) in the field of military, defence and security sciences. The aim is to further improve the officer knowledge in military science, and prepare the officers for command and staff positions at higher levels.

Selected officers develop values and standards to professionally carry out military and non-military operations, during peacetime, conflicts and war. At this level, the officer studies procedures, tactics, scenarios and doctrines for joint tactical units at a battalion level and higher, and at the same time they are trained for staff positions at a brigade level and above, and command positions at a battalion level. Further at this level, the officer develops skills to analyze and solve different military problems, to work as a part of a team at the unit staffs, which includes fully understanding of complex military operations, and organization and procedures for the mission. This form of education is organized within the second cycle of university studies, as a specialization for

command and staff duties, which is organized for the need of the personnel in the system for crisis management and disaster relief, as well.⁴

THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION FOR DECISION MAKING IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT

It is almost impossible to imagine performing of the military officer duty within each of the levels of decision-making without a clearly defined and effective decision-making process, taking into account that this is about leadership in military organization and context, which have their own specifics. The strict hierarchy and subordination suggests multiplication of any error which increases in proportion to the level of decision-making, and on the other hand, take into account the objectives of the army existence which impose the main tasks of the perpetrators - the use of force in an unpredictable context. In addition, crucial is the information level available to the person during making a decision, when it comes to light their level of professional competence.

The decision making, as an aspect of military leadership performance, is defined as ability to reach sound, logical conclusions based on analysis of factual information and the readiness to take appropriate action, based on the conclusions.⁵ Defined in this way, it is a cognitive process which is nonlinear, recursive and has several stages. It is affected by many factors (psychological, organizational, political, etc.), but its bases are cognitive abilities, which together with the temperament are entirely biologically determined. The validity of cognitive abilities to work performance is the highest in the military profession, especially in General military proficiency vs. Leadership factor, suggesting more complex relationship in the leadership tasks.⁶ From the other hand, knowledge is a major positive mediator between cognitive abilities and performance of each type, which in turn increase the knowledge through the work experience.⁷ This means that indirect impact of the cognitive abilities (through knowledge) to the work and training performance is higher than the direct one. In addition, there are found differences in the correlation among cognitive abilities, knowledge, performance and evaluation ratings in civilian

⁴ Angelevski, S., Hadzi-Janev, M. (2014). Contemporary Challenges in Military Education – Macedonian Military Academy in the Context, *Journal Contemporary Military Challenges*, June 2014 – 16 / 2: p. 41 - 56

⁵ U.S. Corps of Cadets (1995). Leadership evaluation and developmental ratings. (USCC Regulation 623-1). West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy

⁶ Scott, J.C., Reynolds, D.H. (2010). *Handbook of Workplace Assessment*, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 60 - 80

⁷ Barling, J., Cooper, C.L. (Eds.). (2008). *The SAGE handbook of organizational behavior: Volume I - micro approaches*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

vs. military occupations, which are more quantitative than qualitative. So, all correlations are lower in military than civilian occupations, except those between the knowledge and the work performance, which are reverse.⁸ In contrast to knowledge, relations between the work experience and the performance are complex. Correlations decrease with age and years of work experience, taking in account the dynamics of today life. On the other hand, cognitive abilities are those which turn the experience into work knowledge and enable higher performance. All this indicates that cognitive abilities and work experience affect the performance through the knowledge, which shows the importance of the proper education and training for successful decision making as a part of the leadership performance, which is maximized in the military occupations.

On the other hand, decision making as a process in the military is a complex process, which differs from the other governmental institution, particularly from the civilian sector. Officers' responsibilities within the military organization are established in accordance with the formation posts or positions. Each officer is responsible for his activities (personal) and for the success of its unit (collective). The responsibility cannot be transferred to other person, except with delegation through written assumption of command orders. Depending on the position in which they are posted, military leaders receive adequate level of decision making, which can be tactical, operative and strategic level.⁹ Type, complexity, and importance of decisions are different between levels. While tactical level is responsible of leading direct perpetrators in the use of military force, operational is middle management, the strategic means making military strategy. While operational and strategic planning are structured formal processes, the tactical is a dynamic and multidimensional process, where the degree on ambiguity is the largest. Hence, each level requires a separate preparation, scientific content and knowledge.

METODOLOGY

Aim. Within this paper, empirical research is conducted at the Military Academy in 2012 and 2013, aimed at determining whether and how the knowledge acquired at the Military Academy studies helps in successful performing of the military leader' duties, on the separate decision-making

⁸ Schmidt, F. L., Hunter, J. E., Outerbridge, A. N. (1986). Impact of job experience and ability on job knowledge, work sample performance, and supervisory ratings of job performance, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71: p. 432 - 39

⁹ Gjozo, K., Zlatkov, V., Mitkovska - Trendova, K. (2011), Models for Military Decision Making in the Army and NATO, *Contemporary Macedonian Defense*, 22: p. 93 - 109

levels in ARM. As a subject is taken the Military Academy Curriculum 2012 / 13¹⁰, as the only accredited one at the time of the survey.

Sample. The sample is convenience, even it is absolute according to the subject, and consists of two groups - participants of two cycles of the curricula taken as a subject. Thus, the first group is composed of cadets from the fourth year of the first cycle (N = 34) of which male (n = 26) and female (n = 8), with average age of 21, of three branches - infantry (n = 15), artillery (n = 9) and communications (n = 10). They are interviewed after completing the internship in the end of the fourth year and implementation of leadership course of platoon' commanders. The second group is constituted by Army officers (N = 24), who finished the second cycle of studies - Specialization for command and staff duties (SCSD), consisting of male (N = 22) and females (N = 2), with an average age of 36.96, average work experience of 13.50 in the Army officer's duties; by branches: infantry (n = 12), artillery (n = 4), armor (n = 2), AAD (n = 2), logistics (n = 3), communications (n = 1), and engineering (n = 1); even though all are officers, just 21 of them have completed Military Academy, while the rest have finished other universities (economic, N = 2 and technology, N = 1), so they are not taken in the comparative analysis.

Instruments. As techniques, evaluation scales prepared for this study are used, in which subjects were assessed to what extent they helped practical execution of officer's duties during the internship (tactical level) and during performance of tasks in the ARM (on tactical and operational level), from 1 to 5, where 1 means "Did not help me," and 5 "Completely helped me".

Statistical methods. From the statistical procedures are used descriptive statisticians, F-test, Pirson' correlation and factor analysis. The data are analyzed with the statistical package SPSS 15.0

RESULTS

1. **The subjects of the first cycle of the Military Academy curricula have different applicability to the tactical level duties, during the internship:**

- The average of the first cycle Military Academy curricula practical applicability of the subjects in internship is above average (M = 3.01), within a range of 1.33 to 4.54
- The practical applicability of the subjects has no difference between the branches (F =,757, p<,477)
- The largest application of mandatory subjects found Weapons with theory and practice in shooting, Physical education (M = 4.34), Management and Leadership (M = 4.13) and Communication with

¹⁰ Military Academy Skopje (2009). Curriculum for the first cycle of studies, Skopje

communication skills ($M = 3.81$), and the lowest found French ($M = 1.33$) and German ($M = 1.45$), Basics of electro-mechanics 1 and 2 ($M = 1.74$) and the subjects of the natural and mathematical scientific field.

- The factor analysis indicates to seven factors of the first cycle application of the subjects in an internship, with 82.17% of the variance, the first so-called *General Academic factor* (45.48%); the second is *Professional-specialist factor* (15.15%); the third is the *Factor of specific academic skills* (6.65%); the fourth is the *Factor of Additional applied disciplines* (5.20%); the fifth 3.54% *Art of War*; the sixth: Organizational-leadership factor (3.40%); and the seventh is named the *Factor of additional foreign language* (2.74%). The correlation matrix indicates their independence, except the relation of third first with the first and the sixth that are exempting, and between the first and the sixth which are complementary.
- The largest applicability found the subjects from the military scientific field ($M = 3.68$) and physical education ($M = 4.15$) (if it is included as a separate area), and the lowest application found natural-mathematical field ($M = 1.81$), which difference is statistically significant ($F = 21,535$, $p < .000$). In addition, physical education is more applied than the mathematical ($MD = 2,338$, $p < .000$), social ($MD = 1,522$, $p < .000$) and technical ($MD = 1,393$, $p < .000$), but not than the military science field; The mathematical showed significantly less applicability than the military field ($MD = -1,869$, $p < .000$) and the technical sciences ($MD = -.945$, $p < .026$); the military are more applicable than the technical ($MD = .924$, $p < .032$) and social sciences ($MD = 1,053$, $p < .009$); but no applicability difference found between the technical and social sciences at this decision-making level.¹¹

2. The application of subjects of the first cycle curricula in performing of duties at the tactical level of decision-making differs in the internship opposed to the work performance in ARM:

- The average of the first cycle Military Academy applicability of the subjects at work in the ARM on tactical level is high ($M = 4.24$), within a range of 2.92 to 5.00
- The highest ranked at military leaders duties at a tactical level is the subject of Basics of National security ($N = 12$, $M = 5.00$), and by the mandatory - Physical education ($M = 4.81$) and Weapon theory and practice of shooting ($M = 4.81$), while same grades have Munitions or explosive substances ($M = 4.81$), Common tactic ($M = 4.81$) and

¹¹ Djozo, K., Dimitrovska, A., Angeleski, S. (2014). **Evaluation of the Contents of Military Education according to the Needs of the Contemporary Military Missions.** *International Scientific Conference, Records of Proceeding* (2): p. 540 - 53

Military history (M=4.81); and the lowest ranked are Basis to electrical engineering (M=2.81), and the subjects of natural-mathematical field: Chemistry (M=2.95), Physics (M=3.05) and Mathematics (M=3.19), which coincides with the internship ratings.

- All subjects from the first cycle are more applicable to work in the Army than in the internship, unless the election subjects, where the tactics of branches are not included ($F=12,861$, $p<,001$) and Systems fire management ($F = 11,097$, $p <, 002$), the need is still observed in the internship.
- All scientific areas were showed more applicable on the tactical level of work at ARM than during the internship ($F = 35,471$, $p <, 000$), which indicates that the work experience affect the possibility of appreciating the application of Military Academy knowledge.
- For working in the Army on tactical level as the highest scientific field is ranked military (M = 4.75), and the lowest is the natural and mathematical scientific area (M = 3.10), which difference is significant ($F = 22,406$, $p<,000$); the naturally-mathematical has shown significantly lower application than the social (MD = - 1,25, $p<, 00$) and technical sciences (MD = -, 97, $p <, 00$); while the military showed higher application than the technical sciences (MD = 65, $p <, 015$), as well.

3. The applicability of the subjects from the first cycle of the Military Academy curricula differ when performing duties in the Army on tactical in terms of operational level:

- Overall assessment of the subjects from the first cycle on Military Academy in performing duties at the operational level is high (M = 3.68), within a range of 2.05 to 4.76,
- The highest rated subjects are part of the Factor of specific academic skills (English (M = 4.76), Physical education (M = 4.62) and Informatics (M = 4.52)) and Management and Leadership (M = 4.76) and the lowest rated are the subjects of naturally-mathematical scientific field (Chemistry (M = 2.53), Mathematics and Physics (M = 2.86)), Electrical-Technique (M = 2.05) and Sociology (M = 2.82).
- The study program of the first cycle on the Military Academy is more applicable on tactical than on operational level ($F = 29,026$, $p <, 000$)
- Half of the subjects showed significant differences in the extent of applicability between the decision-making levels, so that they are less applicable to operational than on tactical level. Insignificant are the differences between most of the highest and the lowest rated subjects, where included are the subjects of mathematics, three of social (Military

Andragogy, Constitutional Law with the Political System and Methods of Operations Research) and three of technical sciences (Armored combat vehicles, Theory of systems and Basics of electrical technique 2.

- Three of the first cycle scientific fields are more applicable on tactical than on operational level – those are social ($F=4,329$, $p <,044$), technical ($F=75,975$, $p <,000$) and military scientific field ($F=28,617$, $p <,000$), while it was not found difference in the application of natural and mathematical field between the two levels.
- At the operational decision-making level the most applied are the social and at least the natural-mathematical field, which difference is significant ($F=75,59$, $p <,000$), while the mathematical is less applied than the military ($MD=1.14$, $p <,000$) and the technical ($MD=62$, $p <,02$) and social are less applied than technical sciences ($MD=647$, $p <,015$).

4. The application of the second cycle - SCSD subjects is important for the operational level:

- At operational level of ARM duties the contents of KSHA found more applicability than the first cycle Military Academy curricula ($F = 44,54$, $p <, 000$)
- All subjects of SCSD have high means ($M=4.52$), over a range of 4.22 to 4.96
- The highest ranked is the subject Tactics ($M = 4.96$), and the lowest the elective subject Modelling operations and solving security problems ($M = 4.22$).
- The factor analysis suggests that the SCSD curricula is composed of two factors of their applicability at the operational level of decision-making duties, explaining 82.139% of the variance - first named General security factor (65.057%), and second – the Factor of martial arts (17.082%), which are completely independent ($r = -,02$, $p > .05$)

DUSCUSION

The results show that the knowledge gained at the Military Academy finds its practical application in the performance of military leaders duties, which means that the curricula achieves the purpose of its existence in all three branches. In addition, the priority of the subjects and scientific areas of the two cycles of studies at the Military Academy differs in performing duties depending on the decision making level. All this means that:

- The subjects by the specific way are upgraded among themselves within the military profession, so for good leadership in the military necessary is

acquiring of academic and professional knowledge and skills, which describe the successful soldier and military leader.

- The top rated subjects of the first cycle of the Military Academy curricula correspond to the needs of direct work with people in the military leadership of the tactical decision-making level, while the subjects of natural-mathematical scientific field are difficult, abstract and represent the basis for the acquiring of mandatory subjects, allowing gaining logical thinking skills in reasoning and decision-making as a part of the military leadership duties, of the application of which people are not directly aware. The elected foreign languages are mostly used for reading the tactical and technological guidances or during training abroad, by which cadets have not encountered during the internship, but whose applicability ratings grows significantly with the work experience in the Army.
- The ranking of the first cycle subjects for the tactical level largely overlaps between cadets and military officers, even though work experience increases the need of awareness, and the number of top-ranked subjects is increasing, as well.
- The first cycle curricula is more applicable at the operational then the tactical level - the success at the the operational level is due to the knowledges that are not included in the subjects or it was more about an upgraded knowledge and skills acquired by the army work experience, even though it is not the case by all subjects.
- The top rated subjects in the first cycle curricula for the operational level are a result of the inter-branches, joint and multinational headquarters work duties, where standard operating procedures which correspond to the NATO procedures are provided, that require knowledge of the modern information support and psycho-physical wellbeing of the military leaders.
- The differences in the dominant scientific fields between decision-making levels are due to the fact that the duties at the operational level in priority mean planning of operations and operational skills and less on tactical procedures and techniques of the weapons, equipment and systems use that are typical for tactical level.
- The dominant subjects of the second cycle curricula for the operational decision-making level arise from the planning of the use of forces at the combat field that is a base of the duties at this level versus the lower level of information technologies knowledge and their application in the planning and execution of operations and military games in older generations.

In short, the results can be summarized in the following conclusions presented in the Figures:

- the extent of knowledge application gained on the Military Academy changes depends on the decision-making level of military leaders duties (Figure 1)
- the knowledge of the scientific field which finds the highest applicability in the military leaders work changes depending on the decision making level (Figure 2)
- for military leaders duties' execution at the operational decision making level, of key importance is the knowledge acquired at the SCSD (Figure 3).




Figure 1. The first cycle of the Military Academy curricula applicability level during the internship and execution of the military leaders' duties at different decision-making levels




Figure 2. The highest applied scientific fields of the Military Academy of the first cycle curricula of execution of duties on each of the decision-making levels




Figure 3. The applicability level of the Military Academy curricula during the execution of military leaders' duties at operational decision-making level

Future research. It is important to note that this is a pilot project where the results are based on the respondents' attitudes, but there are missing data about: the degree of success in the work performance; the grades of subjects at the Military Academy curricula; whether and to what extent the subjects provided by the old curricula which are now abandoned have participation in the work performance; are there any subject missing in the Military Academy curricula; the impact of the professor in the subjects' knowledge; degree of subjectivity in the evaluation - whether they were assessing subjects or had aversion towards the professor, the subject, their own lack of knowledge, indifference to the survey, fatigue, etc. On the other hand we have to take into account some disadvantages: 1. the sample size, which is limited by the Military Academy reactivation in 2009 because only one generation finished the two cycles, which increases the error, 2. the selection method of the military leaders' group, which although is an absolute sample KSHA students of this program, are not a representative sample of military leaders; 3. Evaluation of the internship is only an initial indication, so it is likely that the participants did not come in the situation to realize the need for many of the subjects they gave low rating, even this grades are important as a starting level perception in order to follow the military leaders development.

CONCLUSION

The Military Academy is the only institution legally authorized for training and higher education on the military leaders of the country. According to the NATO standards it is currently in the process of transformation, which includes the curriculum as well. In addition, the curricula practical military performance effectiveness evaluation in a scientific way is important. Decision making is a key aspect of leadership performance in the military context, which is particularly complex and differs from all other contexts.

Knowledge is the main positive mediator between cognitive abilities and decision-making. The practical importance of the Military Academy subjects is confirmed, which varies between different subjects, cycles and levels of decision making. A more serious scientific project is recommended to confirm these results, which will include other important indicators of curricula effectiveness assessment, with added proposals for upgrading.

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BORDER RISK MANAGEMENT

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Abstract

We live in a time of increasing threats of illegal migration, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime, that volatile not only the border security, but directly affect and endanger the national security of the state. The expansion of illegal migration in the region of South East Europe, reflected through increased number of migrants and asylum applicants from the Middle East states, supplemented with the inflow of the usual number of migrants towards Europe, including both quantitative and qualitative increase of the organized forms of transnational crime and threats of terrorism, indicates the indispensable need for strengthening of the border security. Proportional response to the illegal migration and the cross-border crime seen through the prism of the national and collective security should be given by national and international border security institutions.

In addition to the national systems of border security of the South European countries, supplemented with the systems on the other European countries, a special response to the occurred problems should be given by the European Union system of collective border security, defined as European Agency for Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX).

The tasks of the border security institutions / organizations, as well as the activities of suppression of cross-border crime and illegal migration, can be considered as potential, and sometimes as proven risk areas. The risk represents the possibility of something negative to occur and to have an influence over the tasks and purposes of border security organizations. The proportional response defined through the tasks of the border security institutions should be implemented with planned activities based on proven risk areas and determined through established Border Risk Management. Border Risk Management is the basis of the Border Security Management Model and it is based on the ISO standards. Using the Model, the border security organizations should estimate the risk through identification, analysis and evaluation of the border security risks, to deal with the risk and at the same time to control the risk. On the other side the Border Risk Management presents a compensatory tool to the border security services for prevention and / or suppression of the illegal migration and the cross border crime. The compensatory aspect of the risk management arises from the inability for 24

hours, 100% protection of the state borders, i.e. border control at 100% passengers, vehicles and luggage, so the risk management should give knowledge on the increased risk of certain types on persons, vehicles and luggage in order to make them subject to the border control.

Keywords: *Border Risk Management, risk assessment, risk treatment, risk control*

INTRODUCTION OF BORDER RISK MANAGEMENT

The risk management in the security systems of the states including the border security services, is not something unknown. There are different models applied in the security agencies that are oriented towards determining of the risks and threats on the border security and they are identified with different names and have different contents. Thus, the terms: security risks, security assessment, risk assessment and similar, are tools that are applied and in some institutions they are still applicable as instruments directed towards the management with risks or threats. The Model for border risks management is applied as a model for combating of the illegal migration and cross-border crime, i.e. to provide border security. The term border security implies an established system of legal norms and institutions for realization of the function of protection of the national or collective interests of the state, directed toward the detection, combat, and prevention of the criminal acts and threats of migration, cross-border crime and military-subversive activities.¹ The model identifies the risks and has a fundamental approach in resolving the problems in which resources can be effectively used against the determined and understandable incidents and problems. It promotes approach of cooperation in working and many solutions for problem resolving that require participation of many law-enforcing agencies, and at the same time improve the possibilities for sharing the information and knowledge through the law-enforcing agencies on local, regional, national and international level of working. The model for border risks management as an instrument of border security systems in the countries for proactive combat against cross-border crime and illegal migration is not directed toward identified persons or criminal groups (specific individuals or specific criminal groups), but its aim is to detect and prevent the risk directed toward individuals, groups or the state as a whole. The aim of this model is not to take measures against specific individuals or groups, but to detect the general risk / threat against individuals, objects or national security and to propose measures for prevention of the risk, i.e. to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence. The basis of border risks

¹ Zafirco Pancev, *Border security as part of the concept of national security* (Skopje: Faculty of Security – Skopje, paper of post-graduate doctoral studies, 2014), p. 9

management arises from two documents. The Schengen catalogue defines the content elements of the Model for border security management, indicating that it is composed of risk analysis (risk management), intelligence and border management.² The second document is ISO 31000 standards of 2009, where risk management is defined as "a trilogy composed of risk assessment, risk treatment, and risk control."³ The development of the scientific thought the risks enable the establishment of a new scientific discipline, and that is the risk management. It is a young scientific discipline, developed in the recent years and several documents for it are established with relevance of standardization of risk management in all areas of the social life, and the social and natural sciences. Since the theory has not established a Model for border risk management, this paper aims to modeling the abovementioned ISO standards for the needs of border security and to present the new model which will be in function of border risks management.

BORDER SECURITY THREATS AND RISKS

There are many definitions that interpret the term risk. Considering the previous explanations of a border security risk, it will be defined in the context of the border security. Hence, in the EU document "Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model", the risk is defined as "a function of the likelihood of a threat occurring at the external borders, given the measures in place at the borders and within the EU, which will have an impact on the EU internal security and / or security of the external borders".⁴ According to McDowell, the risk is defined as "a measure of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to law enforcement, public safety, national security or the environment"⁵. In the document "Concept for defining and implementation of the Risk Analysis in the border police", the risk is defined as "an opportunity or probability to avoid application and non-violation of the state border surveillance regulations"⁶. The Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs has its own definition of risk. Thus, it is defined as a prediction of negative and harmful consequences that can occur during the performance of police duties, and which occurrence is

² Council of the European Union, *EU Schengen Catalogue, External borders control, return and readmission: Recommendations and Best Practice*, 2009, p. 10

³ International standard, ISO 31000. *Risk management, Principles and Guidelines*, 2009

⁴ FRONTEX, *Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model* (Warsaw: An update 2011, 2011), p. 11

⁵ Don McDowell, *Guidelines for Risk Analysis unit* (FRONTEX, Warsaw: European Intelligence centre limited; Developed by EIC Limited for FRONTEX, 2010), p. 72

⁶ Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, *Concept for defining and implementation of Risk Analysis in border police* (Zagreb: 2011), p. 9

uncertain.⁷ For the purposes of this paper, the risk will be defined as a “potential probability of an event or situation that has a negative impact on border security”⁸. In theory and practice, both terms of risk and threat coincide.

The threat represents the possibility of an individual or group to perform an act that exploits some vulnerability.⁹ Herewith, the keyword is the word “possibility”, i.e. by definition, the threat does not imply a reasonable level of risk. For example, we can say that there is a threat of an increased number of citizens from Syria that will illegally cross the state border of the Republic of Macedonia, and use routes of movement from Syria to Western European countries, due to disturbed security and terrorism in their country. But this statement is only an assumption that should be checked and are not based on real and verified information. On the other hand the threat as an assumption does not give an answer to the question “what should be undertaken upon it”.

The difference between the threats and risks is in the probability. Namely, the probability with the threats is much lower than with the risk which probability is higher. The risk can be defined as the probability of harmful consequences arising from an action taken by some source in order to use known vulnerability, or risk is equal to the seriousness of the consequences multiplied by the probability to occur such an event.¹⁰

According to Russell Bond, the risk assessment has two dimensions, so the first dimension is the direct assessment of the probability of adverse event (threat) and the second dimension is the combination of the threat in relation to the consequences of the event (damage).¹¹ Russell defines the threat as an adverse event that may provoke damage. In terms of the threat, the level of probability of occurrence of an adverse event can be determined. Unlike the threat, the risk is defined as an estimate of the probability of an adverse event in proportion to the potential damage caused by the event. So, the risk means to sort the series of events (risks) according to priority, wherein the probability of occurrence of a consequence (threat) is considering as a criterion.¹²

The adverse events are threatening against something or someone, and the goal which is the subject of a threat is called the object of risk.

⁷ Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, *Standard operative procedures for estimation and management of risks in the conduction of police work*, Article No. 22.5 - 63592/1 of 16.10.2013

⁸ Zafircho Panchev, *Guidance on the Risk Analysis Model* (Geneva centre for Democratic control of armed forces: Guidance, 2012), p. 8

⁹ Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the invisible, National security intelligence in an uncertain age* (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2007), p. 25

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Rasel Bond, *Strategic thinking in the intelligence of crime* (Skopje: Tabernakul, 2009), p. 127

¹² Ibid. 128

Vulnerability is a fault or weakness that can be used by an individual or a group.¹³ Basically, it can be a weakness in all segments of border security, such as human weaknesses, organizational, technical, financial, legislative and other. The vulnerability can often be compared with the first element of the risk assessment, and that is the risk identification, since the purpose of identification is to identify the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in all segments of the border security. The threat is consisted of an intention and capability, where the intention is consisted of desire and expectation, while the capability is consisted of knowledge and resources.¹⁴ In this sense, the threat is the result of an intended act, i.e. function of capability and intent.

The FRONTEX, in its document “Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model”, defines the threat as an impact or force that influences on the external border of the European Union, while the vulnerability is defined as the capacity of the system to respond to a threat, so the vulnerability can be understood as a factor that influences on the borders or in the EU, that might increase or decrease the magnitude or probability of the threat, and the impact is defined as the load resulting from the threat on internal security and / or safety of the Union external borders, as well as their ability to successfully overcome it.¹⁵

CONTENT OF BORDER RISK MANAGEMENT

Pursuant to ISO 31000 international standards, the risk management is defined as coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk,¹⁶ while the process of risk management presents systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.¹⁷

In theory and practice there is a general position that the risk management is consisted of risk assessment, risk treatment and risk control. In this paper we will make an effort to explain the three components of risk management,¹⁸ as well as to model them according to the needs of border security.

¹³ Quiggin, *Seeing the invisible, National security intelligence in an uncertain age*, p. 26

¹⁴ Rasel Bond, *Strategic thinking in the intelligence of crime* (Skopje: Tabernakul, 2009), p. 131

¹⁵ FRONTEX, *Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, An update 2011*, p. 49

¹⁶ International standard, ISO 31000, *Risk management, Principles and Guidelines*, p. 2

¹⁷ Ibid. 3

¹⁸ See more in Zoran Dorevski, *Risk Management, Security in crisis situations as a component of security management in the companies in the Republic of Macedonia* (Skopje: Faculty of Security – Skopje, PhD thesis, 2013), p. 37

Risk Assessment

The risk assessment presents integrity of the process of identification, analysis and evaluation of risk,¹⁹ and as contents the risk assessment in border security is consisted of assessment of threats, vulnerability, and impact.²⁰ The risk assessment consists of three elements: threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and impact assessment.

Border risks identification

The border security services should identify the source of risk, areas of impacts, events and their causes and their potential consequences.²¹ The goal is to generate a comprehensive list of risks based on those events that might create, enhance, prevent, degrade, accelerate or delay the achievement of objectives of the border security. The comprehensive identification is important, because if all areas of risk are not identified, then the potential areas of risk shall not be considered in the analysis performance. The identification should predict all risk areas, without distinction whether the source of risk originates from the border security or beyond it, and risk has an impact on the border security. The identification does not consider only the events that have occurred, but it also takes into account the possible scenarios that are possible areas of risk.

The border security services are developing their own tools and techniques for the risk identification. The identification should be subject to continuous updating, while the staff that detects the risks should always be encouraged and trained to detect / identify new areas of risk in the border security. The identification of border risks implies determining the sources of threat of the border security. The border security, and all modern security systems and their subsystems are organized on the basis of two questions, and they are:

- whom from and what form the border should be protected, i.e. what the border security protects, and
- how the tools (laws and border security institutions) should be directed in order to achieve effective border security;

In order to give the answer of both questions, it is necessary to know the sources of threat of the border security. The term threatening implies all kinds of social, natural and technical hazards that threaten the integrity, freedom, property or human health, as well as the integrity, sovereignty and

¹⁹ Ibid. 4

²⁰ FRONTEX, *Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model*, Updated 2011, p. 12

²¹ International standard, ISO 31000, *Risk management, Principles and Guidelines*, p. 17

constitutional order and state law, citizens, nation, social groups or individuals.²² The sources of threat to the border security are:²³

- illegal migration;
- smuggling of goods (drugs, weapons, vehicles, excise goods, legal goods, etc.);
- forgery documents;
- smuggling of migrants;
- human trafficking; and
- armed (military) and subversive activities;

The illegal migration mainly threatens the social and economic order, but also weakens the internal and international stability of the country. Illegal immigration is often a source of various other illegal activities. Smuggling of goods does not simply constitute another criminal activity, but deeply undermines the financial values of the community. Individually or collectively, this illegal activity represents a challenge to the stability of the country, the relations with neighbouring countries and the counter measures. Forgery of documents incites and abets illegal activities leading to other criminal offenses. These are not criminal offenses alone, but are often combined with illegal migration, illegal trafficking, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Smuggling of migrants is increasingly an organized crime activity, when criminal groups provide services for illegal migrants for the purpose of the latter crossing national borders in an organized manner. The border controls made tighter imply a need for organized criminal crossing of national borders with the assistance of local criminal groups. On the other hand, smuggling of migrants is a highly-profitable business with a low detection rate and more and more attractive for organized and local criminal groups. Human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children is a serious phenomenon and a problem in its own right. Human trafficking is manifested in the following ways: actual sale of women and children into slavery, provision of services in the sex industry, prostitution or pornography, marriage or adoption.

Armed (military) and subversive activities as a form of threatening to the border security are not a priority in the security tasks of the border security services, but due to the fact that part of these institutions execute their responsibilities and organizational tasks in the border area / line, make them susceptible to direct threats. Armed (military) actions are manifested in most complex and most difficult forms of endangering the national security of a

²² On the concept of threatening, see more in Ljubomir Stajic, *Bases of Security* (Belgrade: Police Academy, 2004), p. 43

²³ Panchev, *Guidance on the Risk Analysis Model*, 69.

country. Confronting armed actions in the first plan is performed by the army, and then by the other government agencies including border and security institutions, is included. Armed and subversive activities have a tendency to destabilize not only the territory on which they are manifested, but also the wider region / neighboring countries. The reasons may be different, such as: political, diplomatic, economic, geopolitical, and other.

Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the second process element in the risk assessment. It is consisted of determining the consequences and their probabilities of identified risk events, considering the presence and effectiveness of all existing controls.²⁴ Risk analysis includes consideration of the causes and sources of risk, i.e. the probability that these consequence may occur. Also, it includes an assessment of the range of potential threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts resulting from the consequence, as well as their association with the probability for occurrence of the unintended consequence. That assessment is measurable and there are special procedures for measuring the threats, vulnerability, and the impact of the consequence. The risk analysis should give the quantity as a measure of threats, vulnerability and impact of potential consequence on the border security expressed in the unit (quantity). The assessment of threat, vulnerability and impact is necessary in order to determine the quantity of risk.

Risk evaluation

The risk evaluation is a risk analysis phase in which the potential risk exposure of the system is measured up to the threat degree by means of which the development of alarms is enabled upon reaching the potentially critical degree.²⁵ The risk evaluation is measured through the progress in the designated risk areas:

- evaluation of rejected entries, illegal entries and stay related to the amendments in the national Law on Foreigners;
- evaluation of rejected entries, illegal entries and stay in relation to the amendments in the laws on foreigners in the neighbouring countries;
- evaluation of labour force-related activities;
- evaluation of activities related to the new practoces;
- evaluation of activities related to new equipment;
- evaluation of activities related to training;

²⁴ International standard, ISO 31010, *Risk management – Risk Assessment techniques*, 2009, p. 13

²⁵ Patrick Renaux, *Guide to Risk Analysis* (Skopje: Police mission in the Republic of Macedonia, 2011)

- evaluation of activities related to the new organizational structure;
- evaluation of activities related to cooperation activities and agreements;
- evaluation of activities related to strategic decisions;
- evaluation of the gap between patterns and trends;
- evaluation of pending cases and unidentified persons; and
- evaluation of the tracing capability level of detected cases.

According to an alternative approach to the risk exposure evaluation, the influence of the undertaken measures can be measured in relation to the identified threats for each risk area. On the basis of the assessed degree of exposure and the influence of the undertaken measures, the alarm can be raised in cases of:

- detected reduction of activities compared to the available human resources and equipment;
- inexplicable changes in the criminal activity trends;
- inexplicable gaps between patterns and trends;
- detected increase of unresolved cases;
- detected contradictions in the flow of people, vehicles and events, or
- detected absence of influence of preventive measures.

Figure 1: Identified threats, degree of exposure and treatment measures: ²⁶

Identified threats		Degree of exposure		Measures
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ topography ➤ organization ➤ change in position ➤ awareness of the condition ➤ cooperation ➤ intelligence ➤ practices ➤ dissemination ➤ information ➤ access to data ➤ communication ➤ technical means ➤ keeping activities ➤ crime ➤ understanding of threats 	+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ unsolved cases ➤ unidentified persons ➤ serial crimes or offenses ➤ related crimes or offenses ➤ readmission ➤ lack of impact of new practices ➤ gaps between trends 	=	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ monitoring the situation ➤ training ➤ enhance cooperation ➤ technical aids ➤ feedback ➤ motivation ➤ amendments strategy ➤ establishing goals

²⁶ Zafirco Pancev, *Construction of a model for risk analysis as a method of research and management of border security* (Skopje: Faculty of Security – Skopje, Master thesis, 2014), p. 92

Types of evaluation:

- in terms of passenger flow - evaluation of detected criminal offences and misdemeanours in relation to the passenger flow in the last three years;
- in terms of personnel - evaluation of detected criminal offenses and misdemeanours committed by border police employees in the last three years;
- in terms of activities - number of rejected entries on the basis of incomplete documentation in cases of travelling for tourist, private, medical or study visit purposes, percentage of the total number of rejected entries in the last three years;
- in terms of training - number and evaluation of detected forged documents taking into consideration the training provided in the last three years;
- in terms of equipment - detected criminal offenses and misdemeanours related to the use of technical means;
- in terms of neighbouring countries - evaluation of the readmissions from and to the neighbouring countries in the last three years, and
- in terms of incidents in the last three years - description, handling, information, and feedback.

Risk treatment

Once the risks and their threats, vulnerability, and impact on the border security are identified, analyzed and evaluated the decision maker in the border security service in coordination with the unit / staff responsible for analysis and planning makes a decision on how to deal / treat with the risk. There are several alternatives for risk treatment in the border security, and they are:²⁷

- removal of risk;
- reduction of the risk;
- distribution of risk;
- transfer of risk;
- self-assumption of risk occurrence; and
- combinations of the above mentioned treatments of the risk.

Removal of risk implies its elimination. For example, if on a border crossing point many people with forged passports are caught, and border crossing point does not have the technical means (device) for quick detection

²⁷ Robert J. Fischer, Edward Halibozek, Gion Green, *Introduction to security* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013), p. 159

of forged passports, then the risk will be removed by procuring such technical means.

Reducing of the risk means reducing the potential risk consequences for border security on a reasonable level, in terms when it is not possible for the risk to be fully removed. There are many examples of risk reduction. Some examples of reducing the risks are: creation of laws and by-laws, control in the operation of the border security services, staff training, and procurement of technical equipment. Certainly, all these activities should be a result of previous analysis as well as determination of which proposals are needed and to what extent.

Distribution of risk means the risk decentralization, i.e. allocation of risk in several segments in the border security, so it would not cause losses on only one place. An example of distribution of risk is decentralizing of the border security service database by setting up a backup copy elsewhere, so in case of fire or other disaster the function of border security would not be impaired. The transfer of risk means the removal of risk of the border security. An example is the insurance of the objects, buildings, and employees in the border security services, so in case of any losses occurred, the risk is transferred to the company where they are insured.

Self-assumption of risk occurrence includes planning and undertaking the measures in case of an assumed loss. An example is the creation of standard operating procedures for possible risk situations and actions upon them. The preparation of a plan for action in case of fire provides determination of critical locations, substances and modes of fire occurrence, which means daily control over them and proactive prevention from the possible or assumed risks. The alternatives for risk treatment finish up with combinations of all the previously mentioned actions upon the risk, which allows the application of two or more alternative solutions.

Risk control

According to ISO 31000 international standards, the risk control is defined as measures and activities aimed at risk modifying, while the control includes any process, policy, mechanism, practice or other activity that modify the risk.²⁸ According to Don McDowell, the risk control is the process of decision making which is used for risk management, implementation, enforcement of repeated and periodical evolution of those effects, using the results of the risk assessment as an input.²⁹ The risk control means undertaking of proactive actions of treatment or dealing with risks, i.e. selection of one or

²⁸ International standard, ISO 31000, *Risk management, Principles and Guidelines*, p. 6

²⁹ McDowell, *Guidelines for Risk Analysis unit*, p. 72

a combination of several alternatives for dealing with risk (removal of risk, reduction of risk, distribution of risk, transfer of risk and self-assumption of risk occurrence). The process of risk control is consisted of the following elements:

- identifying the source of the risk;
- creating a strategy to eliminate or minimize the risk; and
- eliminating or minimizing the risk.

In the border security the risk control is realized through:

- development and harmonization of legislative acts in the field of border security;
- creation of standard operating procedures for treatment in specific situations;
- sharing experiences, defined as best practices;
- strategic plan, and
- tactical plan.

CONCLUSION

Every organization, including the border security services in the implementation of border security function must consider the risks that threaten to reduce the operation and the function of the border services. The border risks have influence on laws and by-laws that ensure border security function, the organization of the border security services and their daily tasks. A key risks / threats to the border security that should be treated by the border security services are: the illegal migration, smuggling of goods, forgery documents, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, and armed (military) and subversive activities. The border risk management determines the decision making in the border security. As to the managers of border security services, their decisions are made based on the risks assessment, which allows adequate management with the services that they are managing.

The model for border risks management in the border security is created based on modeling by using the original model for risk management according to the ISO 31000 International Standards. The created model is a three-component system composed of the risk assessment, risk treatment and risk control. The risk assessment as a sub model is consisted of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.

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DETERMINANTS IN SHAPING CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY POLICY

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Abstract

The position and environment of the Republic of Macedonia are key determinants in shaping the crisis management policy in the framework of the country's security policy. They need to generate directions on how to make key decisions and what policies we have to build with our neighbors. Regional initiatives have crucial role in the construction of these relations. Macedonia is an important element in the functioning and development of security policy in regional context. In this context, the creators need to have in mind the internal and external security threats, not only for Macedonia but also for its neighboring countries. It should be a positive incentive for security policymakers and crisis management policy in the positioning of our country in regional context and the wider Euro-Atlantic area. There is an important element of cooperation within crisis management and dealing with emergency situations. Analyzing the geopolitical structure and environment of the Republic of Macedonia in the last ten years, the primary trend is the constant expansion of the strategic area of the country. Two reasons are crucial for the stabilization of this process: pacification of the region after a series of wars and conflicts imposed from outside and second, involving the Republic of Macedonia to the essential stages of Euro-Atlantic integration agenda. Keywords: security policy, risks, threats, concepts, strategy

Introduction

The administration of the state through political attitudes is affected by the establishment of the security policy statements. Additionally, it is very important for each policy to take into consideration the analysis of the factor which determining policy, content and character of determination.

In each state, in terms of theory, there are common factors in which only immediate expression are different. But, it should also be recognized that there are factors that are specific to that particular country. This is due to the

security environment, threats and risks to which it is exposed, as well as its security system.

Without going into the theoretical analysis of the similarities and differences between the factors, causes and roots, and in accordance with the theoretical concept that was developed in our country a long time, we can talk about the causes and outcomes that affect the determination of policy. In fact, we can talk about an objective reality that is presented by analyzing the causes, their definition and determination as well as its common reflection on national security.

This relationship of mutual influence of the main national security determinants is marked as a starting point that has the same name or phrase as well as the causes. For the analysis of the documents' scientific aspects and in terms of its preparation and development, we can differentiate two groups of causes and outcomes: social and scientific.

These outcomes should provide a high level of reality of scientific attitudes and determinations that appear in the objectivity function, constraints and criteria for defining security policy, and defining the security and defense system.

When we talk about the most important scientific documents of the state, then it is completely justified that each state, on the basis of theoretical, empirical and methodological knowledge, in its formulation of the statements in the strategic - scientific documents, will tend to start from the more realistic basis.

Outcomes of the security policy can be defined as starting points and main ideas and predictions upon which supreme rules of the states action as well as its state institutions including security system institutions are based.

In accordance with the content and scope of the basic concepts definition in the field of security policy, we can specifically talk about the causes and outcomes. There is a clear difference between them in terms of directness and the impact on the content as well as on accuracy of the statements and commitments.

The security factors of any state actually exist without our will and awareness of them, while the outcomes of national security policy are formulated on the knowledge basis and provided action from internal and external causes of the social and scientific character, state and people security. In defining the security causes, it is difficult to give a general operationalization, because security of any country is very specific and it can be considered as unique.

Whatever the situation, we may define some general issues of national security that are considered in the process of development and implementation of security policy, such as: (1) possible forms of endangering state and doctrine of potential opponents (security challenges, risks and threats); (2)

national interests and objectives in the area of security; (3) physiognomy of modern war and armed struggle; (4) domestic and foreign experience; (5) geo-strategic and military - political situation in the country; (6) material and demographic features; (7) scientific and technological achievements and their application in defense and national security; (8) the achieved level of development of the security system and so on.

Depending on the level of generalization of these causes, they can be defined and detailed with statements as follows: (1) basic national values, interests and goals; (2) military, political and economic integration in the world and their impact on the state security; (3) the development of science and strategy of military alliances, the great powers and neighboring countries; (4) forms of violation of fundamental national values, interests and goals; (5) alliance; (6) physiognomy of contemporary conflicts, wars and armed struggles; (7) domestic and foreign experience in wars and armed conflicts; (8) military-political and geo-strategic location of the country; (9) the characteristics of the space of states as potential battlegrounds; (10) material and demographic features of the country; (11) the level of development of science in society and the military; (12) scientific and technological advances and their application in the system of defense and security; (13) the level of development of the system of defense and security; (14) foreign and domestic policy of the states; (15) economic and commercial potentials of the state; (16) information system; (17) education system; (18) traditions and morals of the people and national minorities; (19) religion and its relationship to the defense and security of the state; and (20) the operational needs of the security system and the capabilities of the state.

After the analysis and impact prediction of internal and external causes of the state security, it is very difficult to determine the veracity of these predictions. It is a challenge and risk for all individuals and institutions involved in the development and verification of documents. Failures in the predictions can have devastating consequences for the people and the state, especially in this period of major changes occurring globally.

Due to the significant and dynamic changes in the world, it is necessary to analyze the causes of national security, to explore their specific aspects and the impact of national security. According to the content, scope, importance and intensity of the change in the actions, it is necessary to take adequate program measures, through the development and redefinition of the strategy for national security, as well as through activities in the field of security policy.

Social causes of security policies represent complex problems that can not be based on subjective assessments and attitudes formed without consulting the science to find the right answers, especially for those whose perception problems in the near future are not possible with reasonable

certainty. International relations are littered with various historical contradictions and conflicting interests.

In order to successfully analyze social outcomes of security policy and to identify reliable conclusions, it is necessary to individually analyze them through: (1) conflicts, as permanent international relations; (2) integration and disintegration processes in the modern world; and (3) strategic security environment at the regional and national level.

The existence of different state interest areas, regional organizations and centers of power in the world affect the development of the theory in their impact on the possibility of the emergence modern wars. Interesting areas are motivated by economic, political, environmental, religious and other values and needs, which may result in future wars.

The concept of national and international security is formalized through centuries of practice and legal norms, which are international and internal. In contrast to them, the forms of security, which includes global security, out of state support, reflect no precise provisions in the philosophical and normative sense.

Changes on the world stage lead the multinational powers that the time had come to realize the idea of world government. Such an approach requires a fundamental change of current relations in the existing system of values and of international organizations and associations. Many countries are included in this process, primarily the United States, which formally acted under the authority of the Security Council, and often without their permission.

In the need for execution of roles in the new security environment, many states clearly define the role of strategy and science. Nonrealistic ambitions and interests resulted in new and critical crisis areas and security complications in the regional and world frameworks.

Based on the definition on the term of security policy and conflict analysis, the process of globalization and strategic security environment may provide many valid views on the definition of the national security strategy.

The security policy should be preceded by various studies and analyzes of the factors that determine it. With the inclusion of relevant professional staff from ministry and scientific institutions, it is possible to create favorable cognitive and methodological terms of understanding and acceptance of the final document. It includes effective realization of all state functions. They reflect the success with different intensity of the organization and implementation security system in war and peace.

After analyzing the basic elements of security policy and strategy for national security, it is possible to derive the general views: (1) almost all strategic and scientific papers on the state of the environment are established and formalized in a similar way; (2) naturally-category apparatus in the field of defense and security of the state is largely unified; (3) the powers and

procedures in the process of preparation and application are defined in much the same way; and (4) there is a high level of agreement regarding the definition of the content, and even the way of formulating certain determinations in them.

Besides cognitive bases that are created upon comparative analysis of security policy in the world, it is necessary to come up with an answer and a number of other issues that are specific in particular to each country in the world. For example, they highlight some open issues and dilemmas that require precise answers to formulate a pragmatic and effective national security policy, such as: (1) the structure and functioning of the security system; (2) the problems of force management of the security system at every level of the organizational structure in war and in peace; (3) the problem of defining the national and state interests, values and goals in multinational and multi-confessional states; (4) the content and scope of undertaken obligations arising from access to security integration, since the admission of countries in security integrations, profiled several criteria that directly reflect the system, logistical support, personnel training, and the training of all profiles of the command staff and command units; (5) the level of military power that will provide optimal line between the needs and capabilities of the state. Any country with no real military power or modest military power in a period of crisis, such as predicting the XXI century, that can be considered with other activities in the field of security policy, can offset this handicap; (6) how army relieve from all structures that are not directly aimed at combat construction and implementation of the constitutionally defined roles; (7) as quickly and effectively to reorganize the existing system of defense in the security system that will be compatible in terms of entry into allies and security integration; (8) as in the reorganization process to preserve the authenticity and originality relative, indicating the rich tradition of the theoretical and practical developments in the field of defense and security, and current knowledge? How much accurate answers are there to above mentioned common questions, they are more in the function of a realistic national security strategy and definition of good statements. Security challenges at the beginning of XXI century are great for all countries in the world, especially for young people, disadvantaged and among developing countries. Natural, material, economic and human potential many countries are unable, without major impact on the people and the state, to maintain sovereignty in the traditional meaning of the term.

Considering that natural legality, their own behavior and actions should be grounded on a rational framework and respecting the facts. That should give opportunity, in a given time, for people to survive and provide conditions for progress and normal life in the future. It depends on the participation in international organizations.

According to natural resources and human potential, many countries advocate a multi-polar world, which is more natural and more humane than the current challenges and perspectives facing the international community. That should be experienced in stable security architecture in the Balkans, Europe and the world. The current integrative processes in the world have an important impact on building and strengthening the trust between nations and states, if they do not turn into the opposite in terms of the declared initial goals.

In this respect, today and in the near future, the Partnership for Peace affects the understanding and ways of dealing with security issues. However, when profiling the place and role in the security architecture, the following facts are necessary to be considered: (1) Among the NATO members, there is no complete agreement on its future, the need for survival and how to resolve some of the key security issues, and therefore the place and role in the Partnership for Peace in the global and European scale; (2) Worldwide there are no reliable analyses, assessments and forecasts that will significantly ensure that existing security architecture in Europe will be included in the next ten or twenty years; (3) The interest of Germany, and the larger number of European countries, excluding the UK, is to build a European security system that would not be under the patronage and control of the United States; while still in the security integration of Europe, Russia could fully participate; (4) The creation of new centers of power in the world in the near future, a reality that could affect national goals and interests, and thus the national security; (5) The entry in security integration, almost automatically, acquires current and future "friends" and "enemies"; (6) Existing defense system gradually, completely reorganized and marginalized segment of the civil protection and defense and construction of system security and defense, completely restricts and controls the military, and so many countries often ignore the real national security needs.

Membership of any security organization and integration significantly affect the autonomy and national security system management of the specified state. States which will properly understand the meaning and essence of the security organization and integration can successfully build an effective system of national security. Once lost values, creativity and the ability of the staff, it would be difficult to make up or recover if there is discontinuity in terms of scientific knowledge, the specifics of doctrinal expression and organizational solutions.

We have always kept in mind that the end of each security organization and integration is an expression of social regularities and patterns in the development of social processes. It is therefore necessary to have a realistic plan that, because plugging in other security integration, at the time would be most appropriate to national values, interests and goals.

We also need to develop a security system which will be effective enough, and in such moments effectively is going to address security challenges. In the long term, the future of Southeast Europe could be built in the framework of promotion and upgrading regional cooperation and building an authentic European security system.

When we analyze the factors of security policy, special attention should be paid to the scientific factor and its composition: the scientific and social achievements of biotechnical, medical, security and military science. These scientific achievements serve as a direct or indirect basis for defining security policy.

The level of development of science and disciplines, in fact, represents the ability of the scientific staff to find quality solutions to the problems which facing the practice of state defense and security, today and in the near future. If staff who decide on the content and views of a national security strategy, in the domain of the "technology" aspect, does not consider the results of scientific work, it will inevitably lead to "subjectivism" and misjudgment, and moreover decisions, which in long term could threaten vital national interests and objectives.

Strategic decisions are made primarily in response to threats to international environment, so they mostly relate to the military power, development and readiness to fight the military means. Strategic decisions determine the structure of power that is needed to carry out decisions. The resources that have been made available determine the extent and scope of the strategic decisions.

We build an approach to realistic strategy based on the knowledge of the content, method and intensity of action of these factors. It means that the projection of security interests and objectives are based on the reliable forecasts for the development of the security situation in the region and in the world. Considering this situation and the vulnerability of vital and national values, interests and goals, there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach to the formulation of the problems associated with the scientific basis of the security policy.

For the development of theoretical and methodological thought in the field of national security strategy, state support and expert discussions that have more experience in this area are very important.

According to other factors, reliability in prediction of outcomes and ways of achieving security interests and objectives is directly influenced by the degree of their scientific merits. Therefore, in many countries scientific institutions (institutes, centers, and agencies) are established to investigate various problems in the area of national security.

Accordingly, we can have a justified talk about the need for the existence of a Scientific Institute for Security Policy, whose program

orientation would be mainly directed towards fundamental and applied (action) research on various issues of security how to resolve them and establishing security integration processes.

The Institute would research various aspects of security and defense of the people and the state. Basically, it would be a scientific institution that will explore security issues in peace and in war, which gives polemical nature of its program orientation. But it would be unjustified to expect that all security issues will be explored only by the institute. Rather, because of multidisciplinary of security issues, various research tasks can be solved through coordination and cooperation with other scientific institutions in the society, and the results of such research would serve for establishing the scientific decisions making process in the state. The leadership will have excellent tool for preparation of security and strategic documents. Based on the estimates and recommendations, it would develop conceptual solutions for individual areas of national security in a particular security environment.

This Institute is best to be established by the Government, or getting directions from the Security Committee and Deputy Prime Minister for political system. He would require them to consider security policy issues, to develop initiatives for security policy and to provide comments to the ministries and agencies, to assess the effectiveness of the security policy, and to monitor and assist the Committee in conducting of implementation of security policy, and to ensure coherence and oversee of the implementation of security policy in accordance with the defined objectives.

Through the Institute, the Government or the Security Committee will prepare initiatives concerning the security policy of the Republic of Macedonia. If necessary, the Committee and the Institute can be established between ministerial and interagency working groups to carry out their functions and to ensure interagency coordination of security policies, procedures and responsibilities. This will create the Cabinet Security Office of the Prime Minister, which will coordinate security institutions and agencies and thus the Macedonian society and the Government will achieve greater security of the Republic of Macedonia.

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SECURITY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS TODAY

THE OPINION OF THE CITIZENS ON SAFETY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract

The subject of security in public urban spaces is constantly actual. It can be reviewed from several aspects. The subject of this paper is the opinion of the citizens about security. It varies through the research results conducted in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2008 to 2014. Namely, in this interval (every year) surveys for police work in the area of the state are conducted. Part of these issues, are also the batteries for the citizens' perception about safety, fear, and sense of security. The feeling of security can be influenced by many factors. This paper will analyze to which extent feelings in security are affected by the fears of the different types of crime and how police and community activities contribute to overcoming these fears.

Regarding this, it is analyzed how public and personal safety are of importance for the public interest because violence and disruption of the public peace and order and the various forms of violence in families are becoming problems of the society and attract the interest of the science and the community. In this sense, in the work we are making an attempt to identify and minimize the risk of conflict situations that arise in the public space.

Keywords: sense of security, fear, fear of violence, crime, trust in the institutions

INTRODUCTION

The debate about security in conceptual terms is disputable and causes numerous doubts and different understandings¹. Misunderstandings often refer to the determination of its meaning². It is usually considered that the underlying dispute in the definition of "security" arises from attitudes related

¹ Zoran Dragisic: System of national safety, an attempt to define the term, military work 2009, 162 - 176; p. 172

² Baldwin, David: "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 1997, p. 3 – 26

to values associated with beliefs about those kind of values which should be protected (physical and property safety, political independence, territorial integrity, international peace, and the like), as well as who the main recipient of care is (an individual citizen, the state, the international community, the social security, the economic system, the environment, etc). Thus, it was considered that the end of the Cold War brought new dilemmas about the term security. So, the debate about the safety altered from searching for the answer of how to protect and enable the survival of the state (the so-called “hard security”) to how to ensure economic prosperity and welfare of the population (the so-called “soft security”)³. The actualization of the soft approach of security starts a debate about the asymmetrical threats, in relation to the increased forms on incidents like terrorism and organized crime, i.e. discussion began about the process of “securitization” of the social instability, economic problems, problems with migration, threatening the environment, epidemic infectious diseases and other phenomena and processes which in the traditional concept of “hard security” are not recognized as security processes and phenomena⁴. The term security has preoccupied humanity and community from their existence, and in modern times it began to be used in almost all areas of human activity.⁵ Also, it should be taken in consideration that the concept of security is one of the least explained terms.⁶ Arnold Wolfers in the middle of the last century warned about multi-dimensionality and complexity of the security concept, determining it as an “*ambiguous symbol*” which may have some significance⁷. Bellamy and McDonald noted that states more often represent a problem than a solution. They noted: “Not only that states are unable to create security for their citizens even though they spend huge assets to this need, but also they actively contribute to personal insecurity. They do this with violation of the human rights to their citizens (as in China and South Africa), distribution of the national wealth for development needs and militarization (as in India and Pakistan) or with material and rhetorical support of the Global Economic order, so that some people are extremely rich while one third of the population is impoverished (as in the United States of America and Japan)”⁸.

³ See more: Cohen, Richard and Mihalka, Michael: *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, George C. Marshall Center, 2005

⁴ Zoran Dragisic: System... Ibidem... p. 173;

⁵ Gojko Pavlovich: "Development of the idea of security," Sociological discourse, Year 3, No. 5 / June 2013, 51 - 66; p. 52

⁶ Sinisa Tatalovich, "The concept of security at the beginning of the 21st century", International Studies, Year 6, No. 1 (2006) p. 60 - 80

⁷ See more: Arnold Wolfers, „National Security as an ambiguous symbol“, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 67, No. 4 (1952): p. 481 - 502

⁸ (UNHDR 1994: 22), p. 4;

The opinion about safety is commonly associated with the notion of insecurity, i.e. vulnerability. The concept of negative determination of safety, i.e. vulnerability, is discussed in the concept of human security. It is a concept that first appeared on the international scene in the Human Development Report of the United Nations in 1994, which stated that “the idea of human security, although simple, will revolutionize society in the 21st century”.⁹ In this report, the United Nations maintain a view that the concept of security is too narrow, concentrating on threats to a state and its national sovereignty, and in the future it needs to be expanded in order to include the individuals and the community. In this sense, the human security approach is consistent with the change of course in the economic development and international law with instrumental objectives (such as the growth or the right of the state) of human development and human rights. Thus, human beings have become the “target” of development, not only “assets” for the growth of economic productivity or legal harmony.

In this context, the question is “what makes people insecure¹⁰”? To that question the United Nations list seven sources of insecurity:¹¹

- Economic insecurity: the threat of unemployment, job insecurity, poor working conditions, inequality in terms of earnings, inflation, poorly developed social welfare system and homelessness;
- Insecurity in terms of food: issues related to the physical and economic access to food;
- Health insecurity: threats to health and life due to infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV and other viruses, diseases caused by the pollution of water or air, as well as inadequate access to health services;
- Insecurity in terms of the environment: degradation of the local and global ecosystems, water shortages, flooding and other natural disasters, irrational deforestation, as well as pollution of water, air, and land;
- Personal insecurity: threats of physical violence by the state and criminal organizations, or within the family, the workplace, as well as threats of industrial and traffic accidents;
- Insecurity Community: threats of ethnic tension and violent clashes;

⁹ Ibidem... pg.4

¹⁰ Bellamy, A. J. and McDonald, M. (2002) “The Utility of Human Security: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33 (3), pp. 373 - 377. Cited by: Dajana J. Vinzlou: *Human Security*, Proceedings of the texts: Human Security Fund for an Open Society, Belgrade 2006, p. 16

¹¹ Lammers, E. (1999) *Refugees, Gender and Human Security. A Theoretical Introduction and Annotated Bibliography*. Utrecht: International Books.; (1994: 24 - 33, cited by: Lammers 1999: 47 and Edson 2001: 14);

- Political insecurity: threats of state repression and of human rights threatening¹².

Even the most elementary analysis indicates that there are problems in the aspect of general meaning and comprehensiveness of the term human security. No distinction is made between “general” and “specific” threats to human security. Explanations are that such an approach has an impact on the policy and on the behavior of the international community to some current issues, and awarding the funds to the subjects participating in preventing challenges and threats. For example, one finding displays that after September 11th primacy is given to political terror against other serious problems such as poverty, malnutrition, global warming, and other issues¹³.

People’s life in large cities is filled with numerous challenges. Organized society implemented various strategies to prevent from violence, traces the evolution of delinquency and the sense of insecurity, particularly in public urban areas. Researchers concluded that in big cities “there is an objective insecurity, which maintains a rational relationship between the sense of fear among the citizens and the extent of their exposure to some of the types of violence in urban public areas and that there is subjective insecurity, which represents an undefined fear of violence which does not correspond to the real situation”¹⁴.

The emergence of a perception of insecurity is the cornerstone for more research to be conducted in direction of highlighting of the relationship of the increased level of violence and the feeling of insecurity. Findings are illustrated by the authors James Wilson and George Kelling in the manuscript "Broken windows: Police and neighborhood safety", where in a district town in the United States, the accumulation of “social” disorders (alcoholism, gangs, violence on the streets, selling drugs, etc.) is analyzed, as well as disorders related to “place” (vandalism, abandoned buildings, garbage, etc.). It resulted in an increased feeling of insecurity and modifying informal mechanism of control. Next, it affects the real estate market which loses competitiveness because life is uncertain and leads to the abandonment of the violent suburb. What is more, the media contribute to the feeling of insecurity and fear, as well as private security companies which demonstrate their own

¹² Quoted by: Dajana J. Vinzlou: Human Security, Proceedings of the texts: Human Security Fund for an Open Society, Belgrade 2006 p. 16

¹³ Similarly, Wolf (1999) describes the threats to human security from diseases caused by water pollution. It is assumed that because these diseases each year die between 5 and 10 million people, while half the world's population has inadequate sanitation.

¹⁴ Natasha Hrstich Danilovich, architect.,: The secure public urban space in the process of globalization

www.strand.rs /.../ danilovic-hrstic-bezbedno ... [accessed on 6.09.2014];

interests. This is exemplified by the increase of school incidents in Skopje in the period from 1998 to 2010, which resulted in implementing private security in them, as well as establishing patrol (school) officers by the state. Recent research leads to a conclusion “that there is a complex and dependent relationship between the violence, induced fear, a sense of personal insecurity and change of subject behavior in space. From the perspective of individuals or the community, there is a fear for their own safety and the safety of their families, so the mobility is reduced, and they are losing the desire to leave the area which is perceived as reliable (usually a house / apartment, or the nearest neighborhood of the city)”¹⁵. Thus, the analysis of areas conducted in Germany in 1980, where sexual offenses are committed, determined that their type and character (bad lighting, places that are suitable for hiding and attack, isolation, etc.), corresponds to the expressed fears of the respondents. Another study, also conducted in Germany, suggests that about 30% of the sexual offences were committed by offenders who do not live near the crime scene, i.e. that about 42% of the acts of violence against women are committed by offenders who are part of the community in that neighborhood¹⁶.

In a 1995 UN survey about global security, the participation of citizens, who were victims in urban areas larger than 100,000 residents, is shown in a period of 5 years.

Table 1. Forms of criminal and other offenses by region

Continent / region	Acts associated with vehicles	theft / robbery / injury	Other types of burglary / robbery	Crimes against person	Total (in %)
North America	43	24	25	20	65
South America	25	20	33	31	68
Western Europe	27	18	28	11	56
Eastern Europe	34	16	27	15	60
Asia	12	13	25	11	44
Africa	24	38	42	33	76

Source: Natasha Hrstich Danilovich, architect...: The secure public urban space in the process of globalization
[www.strand.rs /.../ danilovic-hrstic-bezbedno ...](http://www.strand.rs/.../danilovic-hrstic-bezbedno...) [accessed 06.09.2014];

Data indicate that the ratio ranges from 44.00% in Asia to 76.00% in Africa. These research results influenced and forced some cities of the world, in the face of the growing urban violence, to carry out analyses of emergence of fear and the feeling of insecurity. City administration and the police cannot always and everywhere act successfully, on the onslaught of “unjustified” violence, civil unrest, and vandalism (e.g. violent street clashes in the eastern


¹⁵ Ibidem... p.11;

¹⁶ Ibidem... p. 12;

and northern suburbs of Paris in 2005, which is mainly populated by immigrants, as a result of police brutality quickly spread to other cities of France - Marseille, Strasbourg, Rennes, Nantes and Toulouse). Similar events were the demonstrations in Skopje regarding the Court's decision in the case of "Monster".

Human security is treated as a concept, "freedom from deprivation" and "freedom from fear". Thus, for example, researchers from the University of Victoria, Canada, dealing primarily with environmental security¹⁷ developed an index of human security known as: "freedom from deprivation". It is interesting that also the University of Carleton¹⁸ developed risk index of human security. Their project is based on how much a country has resources, territorial disputes, armed forces per 1000 people, as well as the costs for military purposes in relation to a portion of GNP¹⁹. It can be concluded that the research efforts are directed towards ensuring a definition for quantified approaches in presenting human security. It is believed that this approach is inappropriate and that it is the narrow measure of human security²⁰. Therefore, the Network of Human Security at the 4th ministerial meeting, held in Jordan in May 2001, offered too broad measures. The network aim is to solve the problem by dividing it in 5 different dimensions (economic, social, environmental, political, and cultural)²¹.

Absence of fear / Safety of citizens



Izvor: Fen Osler Hampson: Višeznačnost pojma ljudske bezbednosti; str: 31; Vidi: Ljudska bezbednost (ur. Dragana Dulić) Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd, 2006;

Image 1. Three Dimensions of Human Security

¹⁷ See <http://office.georg.uvic.ca/dept/faculty/lonergan/> [accessed on 04.10.2014];

¹⁸ University of Carleton, [accessed on 04.10.2014];

¹⁹ See <http://www.carleton.ca/~dcarment/presents/cifp/sld036.htm> [accessed on 10.04.2014];

²⁰ For details, see: <http://www.Humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.asp> [accession on 15.04.2014];

²¹ http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/santiago_annex1-e.asp, [accessed on 10 04 2016]

Proponents of human security seriously doubt the usefulness of the concept of security based on the existence of the state and the abstract definitions of “national interest”. They find that human beings, even though they are divided by language, culture, ethnicity, religion, and political beliefs, they still have many things in common. It is believed that in spite of all the differences, there is no doubt that the desire for physical security, economic opportunities that go beyond merely survival, freedom of speech and association, the legal and political rights that include the right of association, the right to express and practice their religion, the right of fair and equitable treatment, including the right to a regular trial, are values that make up the modern community, and to which free individuals aspire²².

Even today the discussions about the meaning of the term “human security” are still present. It can be concluded that there are different approaches to the content and implications of the term. The debate about the meaning of „security“ continues as a debate about the limits of “human security”. Thereby, the danger of establishing artificial distinction in discussing “human security” is not averted. The result of the debate are three different views about how to better understand the concept of “human security”.

- The first approach is based on the law. It is defined broadly (in the sense that human security involves a wide range of different legal rights). This approach is firmly based on the rule of law and consensual solution. This approach to human security aims to strengthen the normative and legal framework at the international and regional level, while at the same time enhances and establishes the law on human rights, as well as the legal and judicial system in the country. This approach supports the beginning of the process of approximation of various national standards and practices.
- Another approach is the humanitarian understanding of human security, which explains that “absence of fear” is the highest goal of international intervention. This approach focuses on the need to make bigger efforts, not only to assist in emergency situations but also to deliver humanitarian aid to war-torn societies and conflict environment.
- The third and broadest definition of human security involves “sustainable human development”. According to this concept, human security is defined as economic security, sufficient nutrition, proper health care, environment, as safety of the individuals, the society, and as a political safety. The feeling of security is associated with the state of the individual. Thus, if we take into account that the hierarchy of

²² See: Human Security (ed. Dragana Dulić) Fund for an Open Society, Belgrade, 2006; p. 30

human needs (in science included by the US psychologist Abraham Maslov) is classified into groups, and there is a clear hierarchy among the needs. According to this doctrine, lower levels of needs must be met before the needs of higher levels are activated.




Image 2. Pyramidal Display Theory of Hierarchy of Human Needs Abraham Maslov

needs for food, water, air, sleep, and sex; The safety needs are: safe lives, a permanent job, family safety, health care, property; The need for affiliation: friendship, family, sexual intimacy; The need for respect: self-esteem, achievement, respect of others, recognition of their success; The need for self-realization: morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, acceptance of facts. The need for safety occurs when the physiological needs are met. If they are not met, the person is preoccupied with their satisfaction. When we talk about the need for security, we imply the following phenomena: a) security - when a person cannot tolerate someone's violence, b) permanent job, c) steady income and availability of funds, d) moral and physiological security, e) safety of the family, f) health safety and d) protection of personal property. It should be noted that the desire for security has priority over the complete satisfaction of the physiological needs.

Researches in Europe and the USA, which have been conducted over the last decade, indicate that there is a clear link between the increased number of police officers and the reduction of offenses. Despite the probability that potential offenders become discouraged by greater presence of police officers on the street, primarily because of the fear to be arrested, it is unlikely that there will be a significant reduction in the number of offenses. However, if it happens, researches show that the increased human capacity of the police can lead only to a reduction in minor offenses and violations of the law and order in about 10%, and that this reduction is only temporary. Similarly, the more serious offenses such as robbery, violent crime and homicide will have a

The hierarchy of human needs consists of five groups of needs: *physiological needs, safety needs, the need for affiliation, the need for affirmation and the need for self-realization.* It usually appears in the form of a pyramid divided into five levels, where shares of each group represent one level. The physiological needs are

downward trend due to the increase in the number of police officers so it is necessary the exacerbated security situation to be interpreted in this light²³.

Studies conducted in other countries indicate that empty streets, deserted and empty areas, bus stops, parks, endless stairways and elevators are the most common places where sexual assaults happen to women²⁴.

In order to ensure that women are safer in public places, it is important to understand the difference between security threats for women and men and answer their specific security needs. Many Western countries have realized the importance of this, and they have also introduced some measures to improve safety and reduce the factors that cause a feeling of vulnerability in public area. In Montreal, for example, security of women and their personal feeling of security has increased so that women traveling alone by bus at night have the right to stop the bus and get out of it in between the official stations, i.e. closer to their homes. In addition to street lighting, editing parks and urban infrastructure improvements, great attention was paid to increase the level of trust in the police.

RESEARCH METHOD AND ASSETS

The Faculty of Security in Skopje, starting from 2008, at the beginning of the year (from 8 to 20 January) organizes a field survey on the territory of the country, under the title: "The opinion of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia on policing"*. The applied research pattern is multi-step and random. Multiple stages approach relates to the selection of settlements in which surveys will be carried out, and the selection is based on the coincidence to visit every 5th household (i.e. every 20th apartment in residential buildings) and to interview adult citizens with the nearest day of birth. For the survey, an instrument called "Basis For Discussion" was prepared, and it was in a form of a structured interview. Every year the following set of questions are asked: "14. What is your feeling towards (how you accept) the police?, 15. Do you feel safe in the community where you live and work?, 16. If you feel safe in the community where you live and work, did the police contribute to that?, 17. Have you had any contact with the police recently?, 18. If you have had contact with the police, how do you assess the attitude of the police officer

²³ <http://www.bezbednost.org/Sve-publikacije/5459/Povecan-no-police-will-unaprediti.shtml> [accession on 6.09.2014];

²⁴

http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/pravo_danas/bolje_spreciti_nego_ubijati_.1118.html?news_id=287514 [accession on 6.09.2014];

* The project manager is Prof. Dr. Cane Mojanoski, in collaboration with researchers: Boris Murgoski, Dr.Sc. and Frosina Tasevska Remenski, Dr. Sc.

towards you?, 19. Does this contact help you to change your attitude for police?

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

The research results indicate that the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia answered that they do not feel safe. The percentage of these responses ranges from 32.09% in 2009 to 23.74% in 2014.

Table 2. Do you feel safe in the community where you live and work? - Structure

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1 I do not feel safe	24,91	32,09	16,28	16,75	19,31	16,87	23,74
2 Yes, I feel safe	59,14	52,32	67,97	67,48	64,30	66,61	76,26
3 I cannot decide	15,95	15,59	15,75	15,77	16,40	16,52	0,00
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

If we looked at the development rate of attitudes in the period from 2008 to 2014, then we receive distribution that is shown in the following table:


Table 3. Do you feel safe in the community where you live and work? - The growth rate in %

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1 I do not feel safe	-	28,81	-49,26	2,85	15,27	-12,60	40,68
2 Yes, I feel safe	-	-11,53	29,91	-0,72	-4,71	3,59	14,50
3 I cannot decide	-	-2,25	1,03	0,16	3,95	0,74	

From Table 3 it can be concluded that the number of citizens not feeling safe in 2009 increased by 28.81% compared to 2008, and decreased by -49.26% in 2010 compared to the previous year. The feeling of insecurity has increased in 2012 compared to the year 2011 to 15.27%, and decreased by -12.60% in 2013 and to 40.68% in 2014 compared to 2013. One of the issues raised here is what has changed in the social conditions of the country to influence citizens' attitudes of feeling security to change and to grow rapidly. One possible answer is that the research period is filled with significant contradicting political processes in which the approach of media presentation and imposition of attitudes is strongly expressed. Dominant influence of state authority on the operation of the media leads to such a situation where in reality the state's position will be placed.

It seems like there is a lack of clearly expressed critical, open, and thoughtful critique of the existing.

Chart 1. Do you feel safe in the community where you live and work?



If we look at the distribution of responses on how safe they feel, we will determine that the proportion of responses indicates that in 2008 positively responded 59.14%, 52.32% in 2009, and the following year records an increase of 67.97% since 2010, falling to 64.30% in 2012, but shows an increase in the rate in 2013 to 66.61% and to 76.26% in 2014. In 2009 the university students in Skopje organized a research on fear among the youth on the issue of safety they have in the neighborhood (if you are alone, how safe do you feel in your neighborhood?) Responses were as follows: very safe, responded 110 or 28%, quite safe 137 or 34.9%, safe 122 or 31.0%, and 24 or 6.1% felt threatened. In the research results of fear conducted in Skopje, on specimen of 400 respondents, is received distribution of a street robbery in which 35.53% are very disturbed, elicited with 29.01%, physical attack / hail with 52.42%, theft with 53.55%, vulgar addressing the street with 20.87% and burglaries 71.07%.

Table 4. To what extent you feel anxious in these situations? Structure

	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Street robbery	35,53	31,22	17,51	7,36	8,38	100,00
Fraud	29,01	33,08	19,34	10,18	8,40	100,00
Physical assault / hail	52,42	20,61	9,41	6,62	10,94	100,00
Theft	53,55	23,86	11,42	5,33	5,84	100,00
Rude salutation on the street	20,87	17,30	24,17	20,10	17,56	100,00
Burglaries	71,07	15,23	6,60	1,52	5,58	100,00


If we look at the cumulative proportion of the first three answers: very, pretty, and medium upset we can conclude that 84.26% of them bothered street robbery, then elicited with 81.43%, assaults / fights with 82.44%, thefts with 88%, vulgar salutation on the street with 62.34% and burglary in a flat with 92.9%. Similar responses indicate the distribution of responses to the question: Rate if you agree with the view that theft, robbery (subject entities,

pickpocketing) affect the performance of antisocial behavior and crime in the country?

Table 5. Does, theft, robbery (subject entities, pickpocketing) affect the performance of antisocial behavior and crime in the country?

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
No	35,41	35,71	25,05	22,02	22,93
Yes	64,59	64,29	74,95	77,98	77,07
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Graph 2. Theft, Robbery



Responses suggest that the positive attitude of the respondents to the fact that theft, robbery (subject entities, pickpocketing) affect the show of antisocial behavior and crime in the country, positively responded 64.59% in 2009, and the positive attitude increases from year to year from 74.95% in 2011 to 77.98% in 2012 and 77.07% in 2013. To the question about theft, robbery with breaking and entering (property, houses, apartments), and its consequences to the image for criminality in society, positive answers by age range in 2009 with 68.49%, in 2010 with 74.64%, in 2011 were 81.45%, in 2012 84.4% and 83.27% in 2013. Negative responses are 31.51% in 2009, 25.3% in 2010, 18.55% in 2011, 15.60% in 2012 and 16.73% in 2013. The previous discussion shows that the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in the last six to seven years had a positive attitude towards safety. If we look at the social conditions and economic development of the country in recent years, unresolved remain the issues such as unemployment, the decreasing standards and the general conditions of life, however, it can be concluded that the country achieved a relatively stable political system and the dominance of the political structure, which is oriented towards solving social issues. The general impression is that in this period there is a significant use of media in marketing ideas and projects of the government, and the public perceives various actions related to the prevention of crime and other negative social phenomena.

Table 6. Types of offenses against public order and peace for which they submitted requests for starting legal proceedings in the period 2008-2010

	2008	2009	2010
Argument, yelling and rude behavior Article 4	1076	1098	1009
Throwing, breaking various objects Article 5	326	286	286
Disclosure to the public drunkenness of Article 6	791	611	597
Harassment of neighbors Article 7	903	649	713
Harassment with loud music, noise Article 8	148	398	299
Organizing the fight between animals Article 9	1	2	5
Bullying and exercise coercion Article 10	447	300	397
Participation, arouse or encouraging a fight Article 11	2071	1820	1768
Physical attack Article 12	3661	3620	3757
Belittling police officers Article 13, Paragraph 2	533	509	483
Enjoyment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances Article 20	641	551	628
Enabling the presence of juveniles in facilities for entertainment Article 21	174	223	146
Misrepresentation Article 23	48	50	43
Begging Article 24	104	176	65
Playing mosquito or other prohibited Game of Chance Article 25	12	7	4
Indecent exposure and peace in the common areas Article 26	99	74	69
Damaging or polluting public building, premises, installations Article 27	20	10	8
Posture quick inspection dogs and other dangerous animals Article 29	100	113	135
Unauthorized shooting of fire arms, pyrotechnic devices Article 31	147	150	107
Incurring measures to maintain public order and peace in the catering facilities Article 33	15	16	13
Neglecting the care of a child or dependent	44	58	48
Total fouls (and unreported)	11721	11081	10911

Source: <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/DesktopDefault.aspx?Tabindex=0&tabid=575> [on-accession 8092014];

If we look at the distribution of the first five (the most frequent) offenses in the Republic of Macedonia in the three years (from 2008 to 2010) we can assert that applications for minor offenses are dominant.

Diagram 1. Most frequent offenses against public order and peace in the period 2008-2010

	2008	2009	2010
1	Physical attack Article 12	Physical attack Article 12	Physical attack Article 12
2	Participation, causing or encouraging a fight Article 11	Participation, causing or encouraging a fight Article 11	Participation, causing or encouraging a fight Article 11
3	Argument, yelling and rude behavior Article 4	Argument, yelling and rude behavior Article 4	Argument, yelling and rude behavior Article 4
4	Harassment of neighbors Article 7	Harassment of neighbors Article 7	Harassment of neighbors Article 7
5	Disclosure of drunkenness in public places Article 6	Disclosure of drunkenness in public places Article 6	Disclosure of drunkenness in public places Article 6

Source: <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=575> [on-accession 8092014];

In all three years analyzed, the order of reported offenses is the same for these four offenses: Physical attack Article 12 ranked first, followed by participation, causing or encouraging a fight of Article 11, arguing, yelling and rude behavior of Article 4 and disturbing neighbors of Article 7. Differences occur in the fifth ranked in 2008 and 2009: Disclosure of drunkenness in public places Article 6, and in 2010 the enjoyment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances of Article 20. In the further analysis, our interest is focused on how to determine the dynamic of submission of applications for assault in the period from 2001 to 2013.

Table 7. The submitted reports for assault in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2001 to 2013, in absolute amounts and rates in %


	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Assault Article 2	2069	2469	2625	3566	3695	3476	3743	3661	3620	3757	3656	3749	3426
Rates in %		19,33	6,32	35,85	3,62	-5,93	7,68	-2,19	-1,12	3,78	-2,69	2,54	-8,62

The records of the state authorities, in this case the Ministry of Interior in the period from 2008 to 2013 indicate that physical attacks dominate with over three and a half thousand violations annually, i.e. 3661 in 2008, 3620 in 2009 and 3757 in 2010, in 2011 the number was 3656 applications, in 2012 years 3749 and 3426 reports for physical attacks in 2013. Furthermore, if we analyze the data since 2001 we can say that they range from 2069 in 2002, or 19.33% more than in the previous year, 2625 applicants in 2003 or 6.3% more than in the previous year. This trend extended in 2004 and 2005 with 3566 and 36695 reports or 35.85% and 36.62% compared to the previous year. Negative trends are recorded in 2006, when they filed 3476 criminal report, less for -5.93% compared to the previous year. Positive trend was observed in 2007 with 3743 or 7.68% more applications, and over the next two years records decline in reports of physical attacks from 3661 in 2008 and -2.19%, i.e. in 2009, 3620 or less for -1.12%. Alternating tendencies were observed in 2010 to 3757, or an increase of 3.78% in 2011 and 3656 for the cutback 2.69%,


3749 applications in 2012 and an increase of 2.54% in 2013 and 3426, or a decrease of 8.62 % compared to the previous year.

Having in mind that one image is more sufficient than a thousand words, in the graphs that follow the submitted reports and their dynamics in the analyzed period are displayed in graphical representations.

Graph 3. Submitted reports for physical attack in the period 2000-2013



Graph 4. Submitted reports for physical attack in the period 2000-2013, the rate in %




Graphic views allow us to conclude that the number of criminal reports filed in the last thirteen years attained a slight rise and retains a level of development. However, the pace of development of this phenomenon indicates a very unsteady development. The most elementary analysis shows that in the period from 2004 to 2006 the largest fluctuations appear in relation to the annual rates reported; then follows the period from 2006 to 2007. The answer may be required in the fact that in that period there was staff restructuring in government, but also people were preoccupied with the elections and the election campaigns. This is indicated by the research results. Specifically, citizens' opinion about the disruption of the public order contributes whether they feel safe or not.

Table 8. Does disrupting public peace and order contributes to the feeling of insecurity?

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
No	20,60	20,89	21,73	22,72	20,34
Do not know	17,22	11,94	9,89	10,75	9,46
Yes	62,19	67,18	68,38	66,53	70,20
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Graph 5. Disturbing the peace



Positive responses range from 62.19% in 2009 to 70.20% in 2013. If we look at the data from the state authorities and the respondents' answers, it can be concluded that there is a linear relationship between the reported number of violation of public order and the positive attitude of the respondents, which can be considered as a corresponding indicator that affects the increased awareness of the dangers to the security of the individuals in the environment where they live. It is believed that the presence of police in open areas and the population's level of trust towards them can affect the feeling of safety. Responses indicate that some respondents believe that the increasingly disturbed public order and safety impacts them to feel threatened or unsafe is increasing.

Table 9. Did you have any contact with the police until now?

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1 Yes	76,22	58,27	61,73	64,76	61,91	64,32	69,58
2 No	23,78	41,73	38,27	35,24	38,09	35,68	30,42
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

The results show that respondents in the studied period had the opportunity to communicate with the police from 58.27% in 2009 to 70.22% in 2008 and 69.58% in 2013. It can be concluded that more than half of the respondents stated that they were in a situation to contact the police.

The next question relates to the fact if they had contact, then how they evaluate the ratio of police officers towards them. Comments posted indicate that no matter whether respondents answered the previous question, on whether they had any contact with police, they evaluated the ratio of police officers. It is also planned and an open response that should allow the interviewee to comment, for example, I did not have any contact.

Table 10. If you have had contact with the police, how do you evaluate the attitude of police officers towards you? In %

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1 Kind	27,43	31,49	15,67	17,72	16,07	14,50	13,54
2 Human	8,34	7,66	3,96	4,34	5,39	4,33	3,00
3 Professional	21,67	20,26	36,41	34,75	31,64	39,53	24,08
4 Ethical	13,76	11,84	3,41	3,75	4,68	2,22	2,40
5 A well-intentioned	8,25	8,27	12,35	12,61	14,04	10,88	11,31
6 Indifferent	7,31	7,44	8,94	9,20	10,58	6,55	9,60
7 Impertinent	2,84	3,41	7,83	4,68	6,00	5,73	7,37
8 Unprofessional	10,32	9,33	10,78	12,18	11,29	8,89	11,91
9 Other	0,09	0,30	0,65	0,77	0,31	7,37	16,80
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Respondent's answers, with some variations by age, are predominantly "friendly", "professional" and alternately "well intentioned" and "ethical". Some of the respondents ranged from 8.99% in 2012 to 12.18% in 2011 assessed the contact with a police officer as "unprofessional", which should initiate further efforts to strengthen the capacity and provide training for the officers to master communication skills.

Table 11. Does the contact you have had with the police, contribute to change your attitude for police? In%

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
1 Yes	21,28	21,15	15,09	15,59	19,63	18,84
2 Partially yes	31,11	29,64	20,31	22,91	17,89	26,67
3 Partially no	6,97	10,24	11,68	10,74	8,22	12,37
4 No	23,85	25,73	36,21	33,49	36,07	30,08
5 I cannot decide	16,79	13,24	16,71	17,26	18,18	12,03
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

A logical question is whether the contact realized with the police contributed to change your attitude about the police. The responses indicate that about half of them, from 2008 to 2013, had a positive or partially positive opinion and believe that contact realized basically influenced them to change their attitude of the police.

Table 12. Please tell us how you feel (accept) the police? In %

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
I accept police as a service that takes care of me and my country	43,63	42,03	14,06	16,12	16,38	17,02
I accept police as a responsible authority	44,41	39,45	41,18	42,04	40,36	42,86
I accept police as an authority in the service of the ruling party	10,50	8,42	12,83	12,09	15,42	14,29
I believe that police serves the state more than it serves to me	1,12	9,33	19,56	18,62	17,43	15,61
I cannot decide	0,34	0,76	12,38	11,12	10,41	10,23
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

The distribution illustrates that the attitude of the respondents towards the police is differentiated. In 2008 and 2009, the dominant number accepted it as a service that takes care of them and their property, and as a responsible state authority, while the results in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are predominantly concentrated on the position that it is a responsible authority, and the other qualifications are distributed from 10% to 19%. Responses are concentrated towards these issues because it is likely that this is a period when

the police is concentrated on crime prevention, on the establishment and promotion of the public peace and order, and on television screens only rarely could be seen stories associated with spectacular arrests of “big” criminals.

CONCLUSION

The main disputes are mostly present in the definition of the term *security*. They arise from value judgments, associated with opinions that they should be protected (physical and material security, political independence, territorial integrity, international peace, etc.), as well as determining what is the main subject of protection (the citizen or individual, the state, the international community, the social security, the economic system, the environment, etc.). The feeling of security is usually associated with the term *insecurity* i.e. threat.

Previous research leads to the conclusion that “there is a complex and dependent relationship between violence caused by fear and a sense of personal insecurity and change in behavior of entities in space. From the viewpoint of the individual or the community, there is a fear for their own safety and the safety of their families, so their mobility is reduced and the desire to leave the area is lost if they perceive it as safe (usually a house / flat, nearest neighborhood, part of the city)”. Research results show that in the Republic of Macedonia, the level of security in 2008 was positive according to 59.14% of the respondents, 52.32% in 2009, and the following year records an increase to 67.97% in 2010, falling to 64.30% in 2012, but increases again in 2013 to 66.61% and to 76.26% in 2014. These results indicate that there is a relatively unclear idea of what this term implies. Results show that most of the respondents, and in recent years more than two thirds of the respondents answered with positive response. Similar are the conclusions among university students in Skopje in 2009, where 28.00% of the respondents felt very safe, 34.9% pretty safe and 31% safe, while only 6.1% felt threatened. These results indicate that among the respondents there is absence of fear from uncertainty (mostly from war and other dangers).

Research results show that frequent disturbing of the public order and safety impacts them to feel insecure. Positive answers which deal with that assertion vary from 62.19% in 2009 to 70.20% in 2013. The data gathered by state authorities and answers given by respondents are indicators which show that there is a relationship between the number of filed reports for violation of the public order and the positive attitude of the respondents, which can be considered as a corresponding indicator that influences the increased awareness of the dangers to security of the individuals in the community where they live.

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PEACE AND SECURITY: IS CONFLICT PREVENTION STILL A NORM OF SECURITY POLICY?

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Abstract:

The relationship between security and the process of globalization is relatively under-actualized in the literature, despite the interest and attention attracted by the events of September 11, 2001. One aspect of the explanations derived from the analyses which focus on issues of the national security, and especially the military, and shows that it is sufficiently complex to explain the implications, while the other was aimed at linking terrorism as a global security threat of the dysfunctional states. Both aspects are actually focused on the symptoms but not the causes or the structural factors that contribute to the emergence of various forms of neglect and insecurity in the transformed perception of the modern state, which often manifest crisis in the capacity and legitimacy. Hence, a general conclusion about the relationship between globalization and security within globalization, conflicts erode security and related issues of identity, culture, resources. Globalization has forced the process by which the security is internationalized but it also becomes a more intrastate phenomenon. It forced the process of simultaneous transformation of the state and its security environment in which the capacity of states to identify, discover, to warn or to cope with security risks becomes an extremely important part of the security policy. In fact, globalization increasingly reduces the differences between domestic and international policy, and prevention is one of the key standards that are promoted within the contemporary security policy.

Keywords: globalization, conflict prevention, security policy

INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, many expert and political debates were initiated; these debates included series of questions i.e. security, conflict, human rights, development, integration, etc. as extremely important and interrelated concepts. Placed in the light of the postmodern global society, these issues often caused controversial debates than consensus about the core concepts and their mutual relations. It consequently causes a shift in the understanding of the basic concept of security which along with the political changes caused by disintegration and conflict after the Cold War, the integration and interdependence, was restructured and placed in the broader and deeper theoretical parameters. In this context, what is dominant is the understanding that security as a basic concept is not only an aspect of the state and the product of international security environment, but also a social construction and effect of factors that also affect the safety of the individual / individuals. This broader understanding of security created prerequisites for introducing the concept of human security as a new level of the understanding of the growing threats to the survival of humanity and the individual in a globalized world. This security issues are closer to those problems that individuals and citizens perceive as a threat and insecurity. Politicization and operationalisation of this concept and its penetration into the foreign policy of regional forces is contributing to the formulation of different political strategies for its implementation. This caused a deep multi-track process of review of the theoretical and practical policy solutions to achieve human security, such as threats that should be removed, or the most effective policies and tools for its implementation. It involves removing of the risk of armed conflict, violation of the basic human rights and freedoms, the risk of abuse and torture and the illegal trafficking, crime, corruption, and terrorism.

On the other hand, the broader understanding of security in the era of globalization suggests refocusing policy of the threats against risks and the introduction of prevention as a standard security policy aims to prevent and reduce the deep causes of conflicts. Within the debate on security after the Cold War the concept of human security at the beginning of any theoretical or political aspect sounded too optimistic. However, announcements of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in the Agenda for Peace of the UN promoted the principle of prevention as part of the international agenda and as an instrument of preventive diplomacy as well as the politics of states and their governments. Therefore, prevention became a principle and a motive of conduct of the UN, EU, and OSCE and in some countries prevention introduced as a principle of its foreign and development policy.

SECURITY IN A GLOBALIZED AND INTERDEPENDENT WORLD

Security is a key concept that relates to the survival and sustainability, the dangers and the fear that they cause, there is an important role and impact on human existence and experience. But traditionally, the understanding of this concept was linked to the survival of the state and its relations with other countries and as a dominant concept in the framework of international studies defined the state as the primary entity and as the primary provider of security. Only drastic changes in the security environment, especially after the Cold War, caused by the enormous distribution of nonmilitary risks caused changes in the understanding and perception of safety. That increased the awareness of the relationship and the key influence of nonmilitary security risks that contributed to re-conceptualization and review of the principles and tools of the traditional security concept.

In this regard it is important to mention a few issues that to some extent influenced the new understanding of the security and the direction of the debates that led to crystallize what is now called extended and deepened agenda of international security studies. The issue of interdependence and globalization multiply security issues as they cross the barriers established by the state-centered international system and they are set as primary issues in the international security studies and within other disciplines. Furthermore, in a globalized security environment there is also the question: how states and individuals, regions, sub regions, and individuals are exposed to risks and uncertainties, and that means to realize security in terms of mutually-induced insecurity and conditions of security interdependence. The critical approach to globalization suggests that modern forms of globalization, driven by economic power, are an unpredictable process that can have unpredictable consequences. Viewed as a promoter of the exclusively Western culture and values, this process is blamed for the problems of unemployment and increase risks for the vulnerable groups in the society, the exploitation of cheap labor, the erosion of democracy and social stability, the negative impact on the political and public life and prevention of political control, the problems in defining the public interest and the protection of citizens when it crashes the investment market.

Globalization as a process affects perceptions of security primarily in the fact that not only perceived as a provider but also, the dysfunctional state is perceived as part of the security problems. It is a common perception that states / governments lack the capacity to respond to security challenges and develop a clear and dynamic security agenda to include a wider perspective on issues such as development, political, economic, social, environmental or military. Towards this, the perception that the process of decision-making in the national security is now deeply politicized and is part of the public debate

in which a growing skepticism about these problems appears. On the other hand, globalization and internationalization of security formulated international norms that should be respected and left room for a redefinition of norms and behavior in achieving security. Issues of human rights are a substantial part of the concept of human security and the issue of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. Debate and attempts to crystallize a new understanding of security are the most essential impact on the promotion of the relatively new concepts that will allow a new view on security.

One of the most distinguished and influential concepts derived from these debates, is the concept of human security. Security in the international relations analyzed through the concept of human security is closer to the individual / individuals and their needs for security, more analyzes fears that cause uncertainty for citizens and we can say that this concept tries to open and expand security with developing the human dimension. Thus, the modern understanding of security is a more faded characteristics that defines traditional security concept dominated by state-centered models and emerging new security features that are recognized as a complex concept which affects the dynamic processes of globalization. For example, one of the protective features of security becomes high commercialization of the process that realizes security needs. According to Burg, in this process safety can be bought in the market just like any other product. Cases where the place of the police or the army (in which the traditional national security system have a key position and role) in achieving security process today may be supplemented or replaced by private security firms and consultants in favor of this claim. Another of the signs is security that is now seen to be provoked by risk (relative slippage that draws the attention of the traditional concept) are increasingly relying on the achievements of high technology and less dependent on human potentials. This process can be described as technologization of security analysts as a result will cause greater dependence on the "product" that is offered as an efficient and easily accessible means of removing uncertainty. Search for sophisticated and efficient tools for reducing uncertainty and reliance on high-tech achievements creates a greater dependence in the security process. Security becomes globalized. As attributes of the state are at revising and borders sovereignty associated with new forms of threats, security is increasingly associated with risks as an object of concern. Thus the real danger is upgraded with perceptions of virtual danger characterized as non-specific or atypical but measurable risk.

A long and dynamic debate about the previous and other issues pointed to wider consensus is that in a globalized and interdependent society security is not only an attribute of the state and result of the dynamics of the international security environment, but it is a social construction and effect of

factors acting at different levels (international, regional, local) and do not affect security. As a result of innovative understanding, security is perceived as a shared value and implies that the state and individuals represent equally important safety entities.

The problem of security in a globalized world steers the debate towards specific issues including the evident need to fulfill the concept with what priority imposed critical studies: revising the concept to allow inclusion of subjective dimensions of security primarily related liberation of the individual from fear and not only freedom from threats. By consolidating critical discourse, critical security studies promote a non-centralized approach to security in a way it processed or re-conceptualized concept of security and give different answers to the questions: What is security? Security for whom? Security whatever that means? Setting individual priority sites in the discourses of security in the following two decades, and supporting the direction of humanizing security, critical studies created space for filtering the current views and approaches towards the safety of the individual and the state.

HUMAN SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human security can be found to have become a leading concept which sheds light on the importance of the safety of the individual. But this concept is instrumented and in practice it is often treated as an instrument through which the capacity of countries to produce and guarantee security for its citizens can also be weighed. The UNDP report in 1994 and the widely performed direct influence promoted the new concept in debates on security by linking them explicitly to the development and prosperity as a prerequisite for sustainable security and realization of human rights. This report from the early appearance sparked wider and substantive debates regarding the revision of foreign policy priorities and instruments of the states in achieving political ambitions and activities internationally, primarily to set a new focus of interest and action in dealing with security and humanitarian crises, to security of the individual-citizen.

The concept of human security emerged from the UNDP report on human development in 1994. The UNDP report noted that the problem of security is still too narrowly defined as security in the territory from external aggression or as the protection of national interests in international politics or global security as a result of nuclear holocaust. The marginalized legitimate concerns of ordinary people perceive security in their daily lives. Furthermore, the report defines human security by including two aspects: the first aspect recognizes chronic threats to man as hunger, diseases and repression; while the latter recognizes the urgent, sudden threats that people face in the everyday life, at home, at work or in the community. The main components of the

concept of human security by the Report are: economic security (problems associated with poverty); secure access to food; Security Health (providing access to health care and diseases); security environment; personal security (issues related to physical security of torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drugs, suicide, traffic safety); Community Safety (persistence of traditional culture and ethnic groups as well as their physical security); political security (the exercise of civil and political rights and protection from political pressures). This formulation of human security remained an often quoted definition and illustration of the initial course concept of human security. The defined concept and the Progress report spread further discussions and activities in international institutions and in individual countries to adjust and implement the humanistic message embedded in the concept. Ten years later, in October 2005 the United Nations called on international institutions and countries to a greater commitment and incentive in reaching issues of human safety or to the globalization of responsibility for human security.

In the period from the initiation of the concept of human security were differentiated at least two general guidelines about the understanding and use of the concept. One direction unites interpretations of the concept that supports a broader definition and interpretation of the concept and result from the initial vision of the human security of the mentioned report of UNDP. Through a wider interpretation of the content of the concept is referred to the need of achieving basic human needs related to economic issues, health, and food, social and environmental issues that are recognized as providing the needs. The second direction unites the view that the concept of human security can be a useful analytical and political concept only if it reduces the immediate understanding of the concept described as freedom from fear. This interpretation is a narrowing of the concept of human security to remove the threat or use of force and violence in the everyday life. Both the wider and narrower debate around the concept gather and confirm the safety of the individual / individuals which is equally important as that of the state, or the security seen through the human / human dimension is a much more complex problem than removing the danger of a direct physical violence or aggression. These debates directly influenced the operationalisation of the concept of human security.

In this respect, the Canadian government accepted inner approach by establishing two main goals for the promotion of human security and the implementation of the program adopted in 2002: first, to advocate for policy incentives at the multilateral level as contract Mine or the establishment of the International Criminal Court; and secondly, to initiate and maintain active partnerships with other governments and representatives of civil society and from bottom up approach to promote issues related to human security. In the

period from the initiation of the concept of human security were differentiated at least two general guidelines about the understanding and use of the concept. One direction unites interpretations of the concept that support a broader definition and interpretation of the concept and result from the initial vision of the human security of the mentioned report of UNDP. Through a wider interpretation of the content of the concept it is referred to the need of achieving basic human needs related to economic issues, health, and food, social and environmental issues that are recognized as providing the needs. The second direction unites view that the concept of human security can be useful analytical and political concept only if it reduces the immediate understanding of the concept described as freedom from fear. This interpretation is a narrowing of the concept of human security to remove the threat or use of force and violence in everyday life of man. In 1999 Canada imposed this issue and the G-8, and in 2000 initiated the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which in 2004 published a report Responsibility to protect. The report points to the responsibility of governments through collective action to protect the victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Canada initiated a network of state support policy for Human Security (Human Security Network) within the UN.

On the other hand, the Japanese government accepted the broader concept of human security. Policy towards human security of the Japanese Government formulated in the period 1995 - 1997 was influenced by the Asian financial crisis, and hence the search for new strategies for economic development that will facilitate the problems of vulnerable social groups. The Swiss government is the second co-founder of the Human Security Network (CHF) and its motives and activities related to the status of neutrality. In its approach that includes issues of human rights and humanitarian issues of migration, civilian aspects of peace building and gender issues. Representing the inner approach within CHF opens the issue of small arms and international humanitarian law.

The EU is one of the key international actors to adopt the concept of human security and the report on European security capability, known as the Report of Barcelona (2003), concluded that the concept of human security is the most appropriate security strategy for the EU in trying to formulate specific and unique approach to safety through a report laying down the principles of multilateralism and respect for human rights as a guiding principle in achieving security. Further down the principles of human security and shows the need of combining military and civilian capacities for effective civilian crisis management. It is these aspects that way instrumentalization of the concept in the report in order to "external security" caused most criticism and skepticism. In this direction, critics suggest that the EU militarize its CFSP

and human rights as one of the principles of the concept are seen solely as an "external" problem. This is coupled with criticism about the possible use of human rights as a justification for interventionist foreign policy. Report from Madrid (2007) five years after the appearance of the report from Barcelona, summarize results and criticism regarding the operationalisation of human security that defines the parameters of the European approach to safety and make recommendations for further strengthening and implementation of the concept.

These examples show that the concept of human security is experiencing various forms of operationalisation within the foreign policy of the developed countries and primarily treated as an ambitious and open concept, though critics argue that the concept includes issues that can clearly assess whether to include the issue of human security or in the field of developmental problems and Human Rights. Dilemmas are transmitted through the skepticism that by implementing the concept of human security in the name of human rights may be abused as an instrument of intervention of international policy, i.e. neglecting the condition that the violation of human rights at the same time to generate or come from violent conflict or the neglect of the situation that is causing economic underdevelopment and inequality generates. Practice shows that the relationship between security and development is complex; it cannot achieve development unless enable basic level of security, and vice versa, that development is a prerequisite for security, therefore, issues such as poverty that can generate violence in society; whether urbanization or inadequate health care can generate conflicts; that issues related to identity and survival of communities can generate civil violence, cannot be treated as incidental and unimportant. Thus human security can be understood as a set of policies that need to protect vulnerable communities from problems that transcend borders and that governments cannot cope alone.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AS A SECURITY POLICY

Globalization as a process that induces security problems seriously affects the formulation of new directions in the security policy. It refers to the following:

- Security institutions, international and national, need to refocus their strategies of deterrence as a classical form of strategies for prevention of conflicts;
- Policy and strategy for deterring military threats, security institutions are directed towards policy formulation of positive security environment and reducing risks through policy principles of cooperative security;

- Besides external security policy priorities and formulate policies and capacities of Homeland Security;
- We formulate rules, norms and procedures for providing security at various levels: global, regional, individual, humane, national;
- The policy of removing the threat is directed towards dealing with the structural violence;
- The security policy influenced by globalization factors is understood as a process in which governments are expected to demonstrate the ability to adapt and convergence of economic and security policy;
- Within the foreign policy non-military instruments of security policy as conflict prevention, peace building and institutions building, development assistance, public diplomacy, humanitarian programs, etc. are introduced;
- The process of decision making is extremely fast and is based on different perspectives of multi-sector problems, and timely and credible information for decision-making;
- For building security policy a multidimensional, political, academic and expert knowledge of the dimensions and causes of conflict is necessary;
- In the realization of interests and promoting the values formation of coalitions on respect for international law is a key aspect of the security policy;
- In globalization though it erases the distinction between foreign and domestic policy one of the key aspects is providing domestic support for international engagements.

The concept of conflict prevention was a motivating factor for many international, governmental and non-governmental institutions to review their policies, instruments and efforts in dealing with the crisis facing the international community in a post-cold war period. The idea of growing acceptability of prevention as an access to conflict against expensive intervention is motivated by at least two aspects: first, spanning academic arguments that conflict violence as a means of conflict resolution is a subject to prevention and the second, which results from a wide consensus among donor governments and agencies that prevention norm foreign policy is more expensive than intervention. A turning point in favor of this norm actually implies that the new priority from the International and security policy should represent multiplied security risks versus traditional (military) security threats. In this regard, it should provide stability through non-violent adaptation to change or to contribute to shaping the world order, would protect the interests and promote values.

Prevention is generally geared towards policy risks to direct and indirect violence. It is a policy instrument to prevent destructive forms and ways of resolving conflicts. Prevention does not apply to prevent conflicts in general. The starting point in the effort to prevent conflicts is actually the view that conflicts are actually an integral part of our daily life and not always cause negative consequences. Constructive, positive sides of the process of conflict that arise in this process changes harmonize interests or positions or recognize the needs. Constructive dismissal of differences within a conflict is also the way in which the changes occur. But, instead find conflicts constructively dismissed by destructive means is what makes prevention a key instrument of effective foreign and security policy, to determine possible causes of the conflict; to monitor the development and escalation and to indicate that to prevent the danger of the use of violent means for resolving conflicts. In terms of prevention and policy as an instrument for conflict resolution we should indicate the following aspects:

First, there is no uniform definition of what theorists and practitioners include this term. Theoretical and practical compliance is achieved on the forms of prevention and distinguishing operational (short term) and structural (long-term) prevention; instruments through which outweigh the reasons for directly or indirectly for / structural violence and debates arise as part of crisis management and peace building;

Second, it is undeniable that when you talk about Prevention in theoretical debates emphasize that it specifically focuses on the prevention of destructive conflict behavior to deal with deep and structural causes of a violent conflict. Prevention is not aimed at preventing constructive, competitive and peaceful exchange of ideas that lead to progress;

Third, it cannot be differentiated a single instrument or institution, which would be completely successful in the application of prevention. While this concept emerged as part of the foreign political activity is more the idea of prevention is accepted and supported by national and local actors. This is due to linking security with development, i.e. the fact that security and prosperity depend not only on providing security but also of enabling conditions for progress and social and economic development;

Fourth, despite policies and instruments of international institutions for prevention cannot represent a universal solution for any kind of conflict, still the problem of political will and consensus on the application of prevention is an integral part or precondition for the application of the concept. Most of the international institutions in the past few years seriously invested in strengthening their capacity to prevent assess the risks and early warning of escalation. Thus it could be expected that prevention would apply successfully, but problems with the consensus, cooperation and coordination of preventive action remain open questions;

Fifth, operational, short-term prevention has limited the effects (as evidenced by the example of Macedonia). The problem of post-conflict peace-building or second generation of preventive action today is a more serious and complex scientific and practical political problem. In fact, the implementation of the policy for post-conflict peace-building is often defined as nation-building or state-building opens the problem of prevention also on the local level. In this framework is formulated the microsphere of human security and the potential for direct structural prevention of conflicts associated with the deep structural causes of inequality and lack access to natural and social potentials necessary for human development and prosperity.

Sixth, prevention and human security are integral components of the development policy and the post-conflict peace-building. In this context, the analysis of various institutions indicates that recognizes close relationship between the development of the economic potential and the potential for restoration of conflicts. In this sense, on the one hand the political aspects of peace-building are the only segment of the policy to reduce conflict potential, while the other resolution of problems related to human security, development, efficiency, and confidence in the local institutions are the basis for long-term conflict prevention.

CONCLUSION

In the era of globalization dominated by the realization that security as a basic concept is not only a state of the state and the product of the international security environment but also a social construction and effect of factors that also affect the safety of the individual / individuals. Although the questions and explanations related to the relationship between security and the process of globalization in the contemporary international relations are relatively under-actualized, it can be divided in two key directions of explanation. On the one hand, explanations derived from analyzes that focus on issues of national security and especially the military but are sufficiently complex to explain the implications, while the other direction is focused on linking terrorism as a global security threat to dysfunctional states. Both directions are actually focused on the symptoms but not the causes or the structural factors that contribute to the emergence of various forms of insecurity in the global world. It overlooked the transformed perception of the modern state, which often manifest crisis in the capacity and legitimacy.

Generally, it can be concluded that the relationship between globalization and security is complex and induces conflicts which erode security on the one hand, and that conflicts complicate the process of globalization. Indeed, globalization has forced the process by which the security is internationalized but also the process by which the security is

becoming more and intrastate phenomenon. It forced the process of simultaneous transformation of the state and its security environment in which the capacity of states to identify, discover, to warn or to cope with security risks becomes an extremely important part of the security policy. In fact, globalization increasingly reduces the differences between domestic and international politics and as one of the key standards that are promoted within the contemporary security policy is prevention. Accepting prevention as a policy aimed at risk means forming a dynamic security agenda that will define priorities for removal of direct and indirect forms of violence will include non-military instruments to reduce the threats but will primarily reduce the structural factors that produce conflicts.

Accepting prevention as a policy aimed at risk means forming a dynamic security agenda that will define priorities for removal of direct and indirect forms of violence will include non-military instruments to reduce the threats but will primarily reduce the structural factors that produce conflicts. It involves strengthening of democracy, respect for the values and interests, and promotes human rights, efficacious and transparent institutions.

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ECONOMIC SECURITY AS A STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF SECURITY

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Abstract

The gray economy, tax evasion, and money laundering as segments of financial crime which is part of the economic crime remain a most vocal threats that diminish society not only economically, but also from a security perspective. Economic security is a major structural component of national security. This is because the lack of economic security which includes: the absence of optimal allocation and reallocation of resources, unequal dissemination of outputs necessary to create the welfare of citizens, unexciting equal access to markets, inability to free trade, lack of security and protection of cash values, etc. inevitably lead to the creation of conflicts or create class division in society which in turn is a real threat to the national security of a country. Economic security in turn reflects the ability of the state to act as an effective guardian of social and national integrity of their country, and also to be able to establish a stable economic and international cooperation.

Extended confiscation or confiscation of property and income from property acquired by performing various criminal attacks in the area of economic crime is closely related to endangering economic security. Real implementation of this measure should answer the problems that arise as a result of the phenomenon of money laundering and putting into circulation of values acquired through criminal and illegal activities. Retroactive effect of confiscation in turn should provide protection of their economic, security and social structure of the society that is, but once you succeed retroactively punish

the perpetrator, but also proactively protect against the increasing number of such returnee crimes.

Keywords: *economic security, crime, strategic combat, national security.*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT SECURITY

No one can be safe and calm (either individual or social group or society as a whole) in the existence of any sources of danger or risks and threats, which in various manifestations and different intensity burden security reality. Although in the theory and practice in contemporary conditions the term "security" is often used, however the current research - theoretical thought has not found a way for unified definition of the security yet. (Angeleski M. 2007: 41). All attempts for defining security usually start from a view that security is an essential attribute of any state that is associated with its protective function. Also, the term security means certain state of protection of the fundamental values of society, and its activities are related to the protection of these values; appropriate organization, function or system; or all together. Because of the importance, the term "security" is associated with the term "system" that includes features, activities and organizations that share responsibility (each in its scope of responsibilities) to provide security (Ivanovski Z., Angeleski M., 2005: 81).

In the last few decades general - theoretical and practical problems in the field of security in the broadest sense of the word has been gradually studied and systematized, so we can see an establishment of a science (or sciences) for the security. According to the nature of things, only after differentiating of all elements of one separate scientific field (own subject of study, general and specific methods, specific objectives and targets; creating a system of theories and their connection with security issues, etc.), security sciences will find their place in the system of social sciences (and in the non-legal disciplines criminal group) in the science orbit. Treating the security, the range of the security sciences is wide and through the prism of protection of the basic values and interests on which each state has based its survival and development, the focus is towards projection of effective mechanisms and models for the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, protection of personal and property integrity of the citizens of any threats and other sources of danger.

One of the main problems that directly affect the understanding of the essence, the type and other elements of the security threat is the knowledge to be able to locate and recognize someone or something that causes the threat. And all this in contemporary conditions (especially after September 11, 2001) is not simple, for the simple reason that international security reality faced the

existence of "threats in which the enemy cannot be recognized". (Z. Ivanovski, Angeleski M. 2005: 13).

Security as a term represents stability of the political, economic, legal, social, cultural, and other relations in one country. There is no state that is located in an ideal non-conflict position in its closer or wider environment. This is because security is a social condition that ensures minimal legitimacy of the state, the opportunity to apply the measures of protection which are prescribed in the case of threat of social interests, possibility of application of the law or legal norms and sanctions when these norms are violated. The processes that lead to violations of security or social interests, non regardless of the degree of their social danger, are security phenomena. (Marković V. 1988: 4) On preventive plan, the subjects of the system of security must inevitably plan and develop security models with included strategic goals which are not only predictive previously recognized or sophisticated new threats that have been treated globally or separately within the "coverage" of each type of security, but for setting tactical-differential diagnosis of current threats and security risks that burden the security reality.

In the modern conditions, most threats are directed against the security on the global international level (international security) or national level (national or internal security) are with cross-border and transnational character, which is a result primarily of the impact of the globalization and other social processes. These tendencies, especially when it comes to appearance of relatively new threats, risks and challenges that threaten world security (terrorism and other forms of organized crime, religious fundamentalism, refugee and humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, etc.) impose the need for building various forms of international cooperation within the existing global security models covered by the international security system, but it seems necessary to make structural changes and innovations in the existing security architecture.

"A new security system is possible only at the level of the international community, based on common established institutions for providing common interests, as well as for directing of the national policy in the direction of greater interdependence of the states." (Ivanovski Z. Angeleski M., 2005: 28)

Up to the 80s of the last century, the basic constitutional part of the concept of security consisted of involvement only of the military aspect. Then, this stereotype in the treatment of the matters of security was overcome by the realization that this one-dimensional approach to the treatment of the term "security" is not a reflection of the contemporary changes in the security environment and that is for wide range of other elements associated with various forms of threats, risks and challenges to citizens, social groups and states.

For favoritism to a wider approach to the definition of the security in terms of the changed security climate, the greatest contribution was made by Barry Buzan and several other Scandinavian authors who have studied security and defense (in the theory and practice known as representatives of the Copenhagen School). In 1983 Buzan published his famous book "Nations, states, threats", in which for the first time in the theory were included five key areas of the security: military, political, social, economic, and environmental. This approach in determining the essence and forms of security is internationally accepted. Thus, the international conference "Disarmament and Development" (which under the auspices of the UN General Assembly was held in 1987) about the importance of the security was concluded the following: "Security is a priority for all nations. It is the foundation for both disarmament and social development. Security consists of different aspects: military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, and the aspect of the human rights." Ullman defines security threat as action and a series of events which:

- threaten drastically and in a relatively short period to reduce the quality of life for residents of the state
- or threaten to significantly reduce the political possibilities of a government or state or private, non-governmental structures (individuals, groups, corporations) within a state. (Ullman R. 1983: 129-153)

This broad view suggests that military threats are just some of the threats that endanger security, where poverty is among the most important. Thus, according to a report by UNDP, major categories or components of human security are:

- Economic security - which includes basic income from productive work;
- Security with regard of the food - which means economic and physical access to food for all people;
- Health security - especially for the poor;
- Safe (healthy) environment;
- Personal Security - reduced threats of violence for citizens;
- Political security - people living in a society that respects their basic rights. (UNDP 1994: 25-33)

Contemporary security threats are a phenomenon that occurs as a kind of ideal in the contemporary treatment which require activity on a global level, which should at least include violence. We are talking about poverty, infectious diseases, environmental destruction, and many other processes that undoubtedly appear everywhere. Providing international standards of human rights does not mean anything without economic security, which may be able

to be threatened in several ways. So, often people are exposed to economic uncertainties due to sudden and unplanned deteriorating economic circumstances or because of drastic political changes that result in economic consequences.

ECONOMIC SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF SECURITY

In the widest perception of security, a very important element is the economic security, which has a significant impact on the basic parameters of the other aspects of security in the whole and separately on the national security. The basic postulates of the national security of each country are inseparably connected with the basic economic parameters as part of the economic aspect of security.

A stable strategic ground of the national security (which is an integral part of the economy and security) of any country cannot be designed, if the economic conditions and the overall parameters of the economic system are not taken into account. That shows that the economic security, or the appropriate level of the economic basis of the national security as well as of the economic capacity of each country, are dimensioned and extend directions of other areas of security. In the security literature the fact that "in the developed countries the national security is determined primarily by the situation and the potential of the economy is rightfully emphasized, given that no other factor could offset the absence of a strong local economy, and that a highly developed economic system largely guarantee national security." (Rachev V. and others, 2005: 214)

Although three decades have passed since the term "economic security" found its place in the security terminology and practice, in theory it is still not defined comprehensively and in a unified way, and neither other major determinants of this segment of national security are fully developed. Orientation of almost all authors dealing with the determination of the term "economic security" is the position of Barry Buzan, which in the above shown significant theoretical achievement for the economic aspect of the security specifies it like a "guarantee of resources, finance and markets necessary for maintain a satisfactory level of welfare of the people and of the power of the state"(Rachev V. and others, 2005: 214).

Economic security in modern conditions is differentiated as one of the main features of the economic system of each country. Rough analysis of attitudes about economic security (as a segment of national security should be primarily seen as a current condition of the national economy which provides protection and guarantees a stable independent economic development and prosperity) are throwing out three general conclusions. "First, economic security reflects the ability of the state to protect the social and economic

structure of society. Second, economic security includes the ability of the state to act as an effective guardian of social integrity. And third, economic security is associated with the ability of the state to cooperate with other countries for establishment of a stable international economic environment." (Ivanovski Z., Angeleski M., 2005: 248). The economic dimension of the security shows that economic security as an integral part of the security system at the national level has a complex structure, which (according to Rachev V. and others. 2005: 217-218) is composed of the following three elements:

- Economic independence (which in terms of globalization of the world economy has a relative character and should be understood as an ability to control the national resources and equal participation in the international market);
- Stability of the economic system (guarantee of equal participation of all property types, creating favorable conditions for entrepreneurship and control over the factors that affect the economic climate destabilization, avoiding serious discrepancy in the distribution of income in order to prevent possible social tremors; combating criminal structures in the economy, reducing of gray economy, etc.);
- Ability for development and progress (creating a favorable climate for: investment, innovation, modernization of the manufacture, increasing the educational, employment and other labor forces, etc.).

THREATS FOR THE ECONOMIC SECURITY

Each state creates its own strategy for socio-economic development and the security component of the functioning of the economic system, taking into account the need for interception, depreciation and removing any threats to economic security. The views on the dangers of threats (especially those that are differentiated as the most important) is based on the fact that they are the intensity and social danger and they can cause damage to the national economy or adversely affect its development. In this direction, the planners not only diagnose and analyze existing threats to economic security, but also plan the dangers of real and potential threats of economic character in the long term future which would endanger national security. Such strategic projections are based on the construction of a system of optimal macroeconomic and other measures that will ensure economic stability and sustainable level of not only economic security but also national security as a whole. Contemporary threats of economic character should be considered through the prism of the global economy and global security. While creating a consistent economic policy (which is typical especially in cases when it comes to countries that had just crossed the contract in a market economy) we should always bear in mind the dangers arising from any sources of threats to economic security. Experience

has shown that there are several types of threats to economic security, such as: poverty; high inflation; high internal and external debt; organized economic crime and criminalization of politics and economics; etc.

Poverty

Mankind is in the stages of demographic explosion in certain regions, and demographic implosion in other, which greatly affects creating imbalances in the development of the world. This imbalance is considered initially in the light of the financial capabilities of the people in different parts of the world to meet their basic needs, and then through the inability of the state to protect the other threats that are often of objective - political nature. For countries that are poor they can affect preventively, regarding the protection of crops and other farmland from natural disasters and on the other side when they occur, the inability to take measures to compensate the population after such a situation is even more difficult position. The need for food remains at the same level, but on the other hand, the rate is too high for that need be done normally.

In this context, first it is necessary to mention that the distinction between rich and poor countries is very big. Poor countries are currently found in essentially subordinate position regardless of the global process question. Thus, any world strategy whose main goal is the reduction of poverty is created by the highly developed countries, focusing on the current results which the strategy would produce, without entering the critical problem resolution and elimination of consequences but their ultimate goal is the consumption of small and so natural and human resources that possess the aforementioned poor regions and countries, for the end result to be maintaining unrealistically high standard of living in their (far more developed) countries.

Researchers in this area today emphasize the fact that the eradication of poverty from deprived areas with high demographic explosion will be used only in developed countries, since modern economic - legal conditions imposed by foreign investment (and donations) as essential for economic development of a country. The isolation of a country in the field of economy and its functioning without any export - import orientation in a global world and the same conditions dictate, impose a very clear perception of things and lead to a logical extreme conclusion that an economically isolated country, in modern conditions of operation cannot exist.

Corruption

Corruption is a direct consequence of the institutional and systemic from lack of global operations at the local level but also the basis for the development of all the negative social phenomena, including the crime as the

most severe form of socio-pathological behavior. Major social changes that have occurred in the not too distant nineties of the last century, created a suitable ground for the development of corruptive behavior at global, national and local level and at the level of the smallest units of governance in the country. Institutions found themselves pushed primarily by the process of globalization which has emerged in a big way and started to work at the world. At this moment the world was not ready for such legal enormous changes, and lack of legal grounds on which to rely, which remained the main culprit for states and institutions, but the overall system to combat corruption, were somehow unable to cope with this phenomenon. As a result of these conditions occurs, a crisis of the system of values, moral norms and standards, leading to moral disorientation. What must be noted is that the consequences of this situation although there are in developed countries feel most in less developed countries, arranged in many respects an ideal ground for the multiplication of negative environmental effects. In such circumstances, the state becomes a tool of ideologically motivated restructuring of the ownership of the general good, which is losing democratic control and bureaucratic form - layer becomes executive body of the coarse capital. (Đorđević I. 2007: 56).

In these cases, international regulations may be emerging as one of the best mechanisms to counter corruption, particularly in countries that despite poverty have a problem with the functioning of the institutions.

CONCLUSION

Considering that economic security as a built structural component of national security whether it is developed, less developed or poor country, its importance is reflected in the fact that it is essential in a modern global society country and it has found its place in this global society ensuring peace, prosperity and fulfilling life of its citizens. In this is reflected the importance that economic security has a national security and its continued functioning and existence.

- "Poverty is the greatest immediate threat to life, as a cause of poverty and hunger, as well as the largest indirect threat to life, as it increases the vulnerability of other threats." When we talk about poverty as a threat to human life, it is important to define the psychological impact that it has as the number one factor for the onset of depression, apathy, etc. Demotivation directly appears as a factor in the everyday sense of danger to the survival of the individual.
- "Deprivation usually has natural causes, but above all, it is a phenomenon caused by people as it has always been politically motivated, and almost always politically avoidable. Deprivation is a high profile way of suffering caused by the general persistent threat of

hunger. "We will separate the politically motivated factor because the world in which we live is moving more in the direction of class division which understands the rule, maintaining power and accumulation of power by uneven allocation of available resources, especially the very threat that imposes fear of hunger and bare existence.

- "Hunger can be avoided because there is enough food in the world for everyone, but it remains a major problem due to global political failures that can be attributed to negligence or deliberate exploitation of the global North, or the failure to" modernize "the global South."
- "Social poverty or life-threatening may occur as a result of economic sanctions targeting governments, although the development of "smart sanctions" is more focused on governments, reduces this side effect." The problem here, and incorporated in it and the decision itself, is that in underdeveloped societies attitudes, decisions, build interpersonal, inter-ethnic and inter-ethnic relations, based on a limited group of people and from here resulting economic sanctions in the democratic sense should represent the correction of the above, but in fact they represent the most aggressive way to perform repression of particular society or nation.
- Economic security of economic-liberal perspective is best achieved through globalization, but from a Marxist perspective through radical global changes (Hugh P. 2009: 123).

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COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY – A WAY OF THINKING

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Abstract

Social communication as a method, way and approach applicable in the social development has acquired new dimensions. Dimensions that make us reconsider the hallmarks of civilization thinking. It is time to look behind the curtain of technological functionality of social communication, even beyond the curtain of traditional psychological reasoning and try and look into its genesis.

The *security issue* is a major one, outlining the real expressions and experiences of the socially organized individual regarding the sustainability of social development and the establishment of an acceptable vision on the meaning of essence and existence. From a structural perspective, *social security* suggests compliance with the expressions and the facts of the material and spiritual world, this being projected in the quantity and quality definition of essences.

Establishing norms of security regarding the social structure of society and their communication logistics is directly linked to the understanding of security as a system – an inseparable part of the essence, existence, functioning and development of society itself on the basis of social communication.

Going back to one of the major issues of our civilization – security – we should bear in mind that social communication is in fact the guarantee for rethinking of the social existence, its reproduction and communication replication.

Social communication as a method, way and approach applicable to the social development has acquired new dimensions. Dimensions that make us reconsider the hallmarks of civilization thinking. Humans have always been challenged to survive and to seek the answer to the question of the meaning of their cultural and civilization experience and the world that surrounds them. Probably that is why the ancient Romans used to say “*Praemonitus – Praemunitus*” (**The warned one is armed**) What should we be warned against today? What happens to us and around us that there are questions to our civilization nature and we seek answers behind the curtain of the established scientific paradigm of humans and their world.

Key words: *alphacommunication, omegacommunication, communication channel, communication security, social communication model*

INTRODUCTION

Social communication as a method, way, and approach applicable to the social development has acquired new dimensions - such dimensions which make us reconsider the hallmarks of civilization thinking. Humans have always been challenged to survive and seek the answer to the question of the meaning of their cultural and civilization experience and the world that surrounds them. Probably that is why the ancient Romans used to say “*Praemonitus – Praemunitus*” (The warned one is armed). What should we be warned against today? What is happening to us and around us that there are questions to our civilization nature and we seek answers behind the curtain of the established scientific paradigm of humans and their world.

1. SOCIAL COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY

1.1 Social communication

It is time to look behind the curtain of technological functionality of social communication, even beyond the curtain of traditional psychological reasoning and try to look into its genesis. If we accept this challenge and are not afraid to clearly express that the inexplicable is not non-existent, then we reach the idea of the inherent fragmentation of public communication. And here comes the question of its start, and in particular its real structure, namely as a sustainable union of two elements - *alphacomunication* and *omegacomunication*. It all starts on the field of alphacomunication but it ends there having evolved on the field of omegacomunication. Here, we must consider two main types of information - sensory and transcendental, respectively materialized through the data and signals. Or if you need to go back to time and space, it is obvious that one of the main features of the phenomenology of social communication is the ability to create realities but also the existing realities to create the fact of social communication.

In the attempts to establish a communication genesis we always start from the assumption that the main participants in the communication process (there must be at least two) - namely, *the sender* and *the recipient* of the message – receive their actual value at the time of implementation of the act of communication. This understanding, despite the knowledge which is given to us by the evolving information and communication technologies does not account for the frequently occurrence of communication barriers leading to communication destructions. In this case, we find a direct connection precisely with the understanding that there are actually two main types of information - sensory and transcendental. Thus, given the heterogeneous information entering the center of ideation (still unknown anatomically in the brain) we

may say that it is derived from two different information sources whose characteristics are defined by their determinability, in terms of experience and knowledge, or lack of such, and flows through two different types of primary communication channels, namely sensory and transcendental communication channels. Receiving *sensory information* and *transcendental information*, decoding and synergy *data* and *signals* as carriers (forms of materialization of information) of the primary information are under the sign of specific information intensity. In turn, it is directly related to the range of options for the association of ideas and the time required for decoding. Thus, communication and information intensity is directly related to the emergence of the *idea*, which leads to the formation of a qualitatively new idea and *knowledge* acquisition. Along with the establishment of *meaning* and *knowledge* in the decoding of *sensory* and *transcendental* information, an idea of the actual temporal moment is received of the location of the specific event, fact or situation and of their relevance towards space. The ability to reproduce notions and combine them with newly acquired knowledge leads to the emergence of bridging "communication and information markers" of the *communication alphacode* and a *unified memory communication code* relating to *faith, hope, morality, morals, ideals, culture, and civilization norms*. The communication and information value of these *markers* occurs on the basis of values and it is reflected in the formation of attitudes and positions against inherently existing dilemmas, such as "human-violence", "human-power", "human-freedom", "human-truth" "human-obedience", "human-prejudice and superstition", "human-esteem." Or if we have to specify, the referenced humanity only confirms the thesis that public communication, namely as a social phenomenon is more than a "mechanical" way to address the challenges; more than people attempting to understand themselves and others; more than achieving goals more easily and in the least just exchanging information.

The understanding of the simultaneous occurrence of social communication and society (something materialists find hard to accept today) actually proves that it is a human "high value", which is valid from the starting point of the existence of *Homo sapiens* and is valid until its end. And right here comes the issue of security of communication and communication in security, which is inseparable from the big issue of security in the context of social development and human civilization manifestations.

1.2 Communication security

The *security issue* is a major one, outlining the real expressions and experiences of the socially organized individual regarding the sustainability of social development and the establishment of an acceptable vision on the meaning of essence and existence. In this direction, it is Plato who interprets the maxim "Know thyself" and places the individual in the context of society.

On the other hand, we assume that uncertainty "kills" the desire and will to creativity, destroys public relations, creates conditions for the emergence of crises and crisis situations, questioning the value of values and ultimately degrades achieved by society civilization results. But, from the communication point of view, in the presence of *insecurity* we can identify striving for success in the condition "at any cost", *fear* understood as a complex of feelings and subjective assessments of reality, based on insufficient information, *anxiety* as a reinforcing the negative capacity mental state of a person, *desire*, often based on attraction to the unreal and unrealizable, *irony* as critical attitude to manifestations, facts and events, which often changes the attitudes and lack of resources supporting the *tranquility* aspiration. At the same time, however, *success, fear, anxiety, desire, irony and tranquility* are at the heart of the motivation for the emergence of ideas / solutions reproducing active participation in social communication. So they have a direct relationship with two of the main manifestations of the human nature, namely *practical response - acting and thinking-understanding-speaking*. It is in the context of these human events that the binary relation *security-insecurity* manifests its communication and information values. The nature of the communication security is formed on the basis of the nature of the following aspects: the *security of society, information security, security of communication and communication in security*. The main criterion by which we identify these aspects is the understanding that the society, information and communication are inextricably linked, mutually affecting systems and interacting in creating realities.

From a structural perspective, *social security* suggests compliance with the expressions and the facts of the material and spiritual world, this being projected in the quantity and quality definition of essences. In conditions of constant movement and development, *security* architecture is subject to the accepted norms of standardization, synchronization, synergism, centralization and autonomy, functionality, regulated temporality and spatial perspective of actions, mechanisms and approaches for optimization and efficiency of the *idea / solution* relating to sustainable social development. In this way, the elements of *social security* are a practical specification of its nature and we can make it happen and find only in the field of public communication. In this sense, one can speak of achieving security as to the relationship human-nature, human - human and human-society, this being placed on the basis of awareness and regulation of conflicting relationships "Body - Soul", "Human - God", "Human - animal", "Human - Person", "Person - Life", "Conscious - Unconscious", "Male - Feminine", "Human free will - Voluntary submission within the social hierarchy."

It is dilemmas arising from these contradictory relations that are the basis for the communication expression of *security*. So, we may find that the direct relation of communication with security is expressed in the following directions: Negotiating synergy parameters of *communication alphacodes* of communication process participants; Regulation of forms of information materialization, regarding the particular sensory and transcendental information, based on the agreed nature and meaning of the *idea / solution* within this particular communication process; Formatting of communication relationships based on contractual rights and obligations of the communication process participants, according to their position in the social hierarchy and therefore in the *Social Communication Model*, and based on their real knowledge, capabilities, skills and abilities; Communication and information interpretation of values and their system based on the quality of the participants' realities experience in the communication process; Communications support for the treatment of the data massifs, implying the sufficiency of *publicity and transparency* within the communication process.

Establishing norms of security regarding the social structure of society and their communication logistics is directly linked to the understanding of security as a system – an inseparable part of the essence, existence, functioning and development of society itself on the basis of social communication. Thus, the correlation of security and communication is as follows: Creating the conditions and environment for the organization and management of two-way communication channels; Relevant to the situation and realities existing environment, communication and information materialization of *ideas / solutions*. This relevance is achieved through development and treatment of communication and information structures; Achieving the objectives and performance of the tasks within the communication process in terms of achieving security by relevance, efficiency and optimality of the used communication models.

2. COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY OF SOCIETY

Finally, on the question of the relationship between communication and security of society, it should be pointed out that it has a direct and specific relationship to security sought on the basis of the meaning carried by information. In this respect, the problem of the so-called "Unifying security function" should be considered and that connects into a whole the other elements of the existing system. And if I have to summarize it, communication security is as follows: Communication and Information manifestations of *security / insecurity* are implemented through *practical action-reaction-act* and *thought-understanding-speech*; Communication security is formed and formatted based on the security in society, information security is the

communication in security; Achieving relevance of the nature and form of the *idea / solution* understood as objects of public communication the main focus here is related to tolerance in the perception of information from the public (social group). This is in the basis of establishment of communication security; *The idea / solution* for security in society with information security and communication security, appears and develops initially on the field of *alphacommunication* and subsequently within *omegacommunication*;

Achieving communication security is possible only in the presence of two-way communication channels; Establishment of communication security is the basis of equilibrium and stability of the relationship human-values-things-public relations; Indoctrination of public opinion, human attitudes and experiences ideological propaganda in social communication and depreciation / insinuating elements of communication alphacode and the unified memory communication code, as well as the forms of materialization of information are the main factors influencing the occurrence of risk to the state of communications security; Communication and information aspects of the communication destructions are identifiable within the public communication by communication and information manifestations such as: lack of communication and information innovation; inefficiency in the utilization of media content within the communication process; presence of the syndrome "Spiral of Silence" and lack of cultural navigation in the communication act; Materialized reflections of communication destructions directly related and influencing the level of communication security have the form of communication-information syndromes and barriers; The quality of the organization and management of the elements by the cultural-psychological and technological and technical boards of communication channels is directly related to the appearance and attitude to communication and information barriers influencing the reproduction of communication destructions; The specific communication and information expression of communication destructions is observed in the process, where a natural rotation of *norm-crisis* occurs. But the actual manifestation of communication destructions, reducing the sufficiency of the communication security is detectable only in times of *crisis*; Achieving sufficiency of communications security should be sought in the direction of communication and information impact on the individual, understood as the subject / object of *alphacommunication* and *omegacommunication* as well as the direction of communication and information impact on the group of participants in communication grouped around a specific *idea / solution*.

Going back to one of the major issues of our civilization – security – we should bear in mind that social communication is in fact the guarantee for rethinking of the social existence, its reproduction and communication replication. In this context, it is obvious that the problems arising in the field

of security in public communication, predominantly have formally religious, idealistic (ideological) or doctrinal orientation. I.e., it becomes obvious that pre-, communication-information limitation of the *idea* and its corresponding *solution* still on the field of alphacommunication, deepens negatively on the field of omegacommunication. This limitation is due to the quality of the used *communication alphacodes* and the *unified memory communication code*. Or to be more precise, it becomes a question of the development of culture, spirituality, and forming attitudes towards nature and the human being and the ability to absorb sufficiently positive and constructive and making them sustainable and working social practices. The toolkit should be sought in the proposed systems of culture, education and art and scientific and practical achievements. Again, it is important to bear in mind the role of the media, especially their three modern manifestations - *carriers of information*, *transformers of information* and *mediators*. In this sense, the achievement of an adequate level of security for public communication must be sought in the direction of communication and information effects on the individual both in terms of their alphacommunication and when taking the role of an active or passive participant in the communication process on the field of omegacommunication.

3. THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY

Considering the issues above, the other important issue in terms of the communication security is its problematic aspects. The problem of communication security is always temporally located and historically specific in terms of its real manifestations in the context of public communication and respectively the real ongoing communication process. It can be said that communications security in terms of the extremes *security-insecurity* and its functionality are aimed at adjustment and protecting the elements of social communication and can be seen in the following ways: In the element of communication areas, where the actual manifestation of *alphacommunication* and *omegacommunication* is established, communications security is manifested by adjustments to the values, the parameters, the shape and the rate of communication activity and communication act;

With the *communication codes* element, given the specifics of *communication alphacode* and the *unified memory communication code*, communication security is manifested by adjustment of the degree of semantic quality of the elements of communication codes as follows: in *communication alphacode* on: IMSSI (identification of the material source of sensory information), IDI (information “data” identification), CDIV (classification of “data” by informational value), DXTIS (differentiating x-transcendental

information source), CIP (complicity of the individual to problems), WIST (will of the individual to solve tasks), FIC (formed individual character), ISI (information “signals” identification) and on used signs, symbols, images and language, based on knowledge and memory; in the *unified memory communication code* having in mind the two types of elements – imported and synthesized – on: communication alphacodes of participants in the communication process, used signs, symbols, images and language, the forms of materialization of information, based on their knowledge, experience and memory.

It is on the basis of the operation of communication security by adjusting the direction of demand reliability and efficiency, including the encoding and decoding of information where we can seek the guarantee of relevance at what we call “understanding of meaning”; in the Element of *communication channels* the destructions that may occur in the context of the communication process, always and in every moment are mostly under the incompatibility between the frames of the communication channel, namely – *cultural and psychological* and *technological and technical*; In the element *positional places of communicators* the expression of communication can certainly be found primarily in adjustments performed on behavioral patterns adopted by the participants in the communication. These adjustments are directed towards: the creation and imposition of identities, images, and forms of legitimacy; overcoming destructions in the context of communication relations and links; controlling the manipulation in terms of public opinion, depending on the particularly protected theses in the context of social development; creating the conditions and environment for communication literacy and competence; controlling the elaboration and implementation of assessments in terms of the experience of reality and human nature based on an accepted value system and its hierarchy; formatting of the used communication and information models and structures in the direction of building trust, and hence achieving persuasion in a particular *idea, solution* or *thesis*.

Problematic aspects of the communication security are oriented towards the implementation of the necessary compensations during an occurring imbalance within the extremes *security-insecurity*, namely: In violation of the balance between the perceived values and aspiration to achieve a material interest; Presumably human nature and the world are only foreseeable, i.e. gross matter only has any value in terms of human experience; Insufficient effectiveness of the functionality of public communication as a result of established or diverging cultural anthropological norms and principles in establishing the communication link and the relationship between the communication participants; Lack of efficiency and relevance in the use and reconciliation of signs, symbols, images and language structures,

understood as forms of materialization of information; Ideological social communication; Emerging problems in encoding / decoding of both primary sensory and transcendental information as well as the information representing the informational flesh of the treated *idea / solution* to the field of omegacommunication; Issues thematically covering the purposes of social communication; Imposing an *idea / solution* is a problematic aspect primarily linked to the degree of resistance to communication and information structures; Negotiating communication relations is a problematic aspect relating to risks to the structuring of models of communication behavior; The issue of playing a constructive social discussion is another problematic aspect directly related to the quality of the process of discussing the *idea / solution*, persuasion and coordination of problematic social issues; Making an impact on public opinion is a problematic aspect of communication security which refers to the degree of involvement of the participants in communication in the course of treating the *idea / solution*; Relations and work with the media is an aspect of communication security in which the risks and threats to social communication can be established in terms of publicity and media interpretation of communication behaviors and expressions of communication participants; Formatting communication relationships within the separate communities is a communication aspect of communication security that is commensurate to maintaining and innovating already established realities in the context of social life.

4. CONCLUSIONS

On balance, we can say that the problematic aspects of communication security are inseparable from issues of social communication itself. Given this, we assume to be true that the basis of stability and regularity of the communication process stands namely in the establishment of a norm of security. In conclusion, perhaps it should be said that the globalized world necessitates the reassessment of the understanding of the forms and approaches used in social development and the human civilization future. Part of this reassessment is that to look at the public communication is not simply transmitting and receiving messages or only an exchange of thoughts and ideas, but a social phenomenon, providing us the opportunity to create such realities that correspond to dream of humanism.

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NATIONAL SECURITY IN SERBIA – DE LEGE LATA ET DE LEGE FERENDA

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Abstract

Through continuous review of the known concept of national security on the territory of the Republic of Serbia which has existed in the radius of the notion of security to the inclusion of social areas in the security of the state up to the present moment, with all known types of threats to the national security, there is a frequent emergence of new forms of threats, which have neither been identified as such, nor discussed with sufficient attention, more and more the question arises about the necessity of a wider and more frequent integration of the society in the areas of intelligence and of law enforcement agencies in the country. In this paper, the main international conventions, system laws and strategies which regulate this issue are reviewed. Attention is given to the military intelligence and security agencies in the country, with critics given, what must be changed according to the attitude of the author in order to protect the value of the goods already recognized as individual and collective human rights and freedoms, as well as eventual institutional changes in terms of creating one service within the Ministry of Defence. Here, some individual conceptual solutions in the fight against certain threats and risks to the national security are presented. At the same time, while following the systems of control of the security services in other countries, the question is whether and to what extent the parliamentary control of security is the most optimal solution, and whether the implementation of such models can provide smooth operation of these services.

Keywords: National Security, security services, security, supervision.

INTRODUCTION

There are different approaches in defining the national security. However, regardless of whether we are talking about the security of the individual, the nation-state, the region or the international community, there is a constantly present desire to provide basic values and conditions which are for all of them vitally important. Thus, following the allegation Anzica we can say that security is built as a biological mechanism, the tendency of the organism to the existence and adaptation of the organism to environmental threatening. Accordingly, biological security is a condition for the basic working life functions, and also the initiator of development, consciously functioning in order to provide security conditions which are established all over again (Anyic, 1999). Safety is a phenomenon (Lat. – *secures / securas* - carefree) which is used as an expression in almost all areas of human life and existence, but as Wolfers said (Wolfers, 1962, mid of XX century) security is an ambiguous symbol which does not even need to have any special meaning. (Dimitrijević, 1973; Ilić 2011) That is why today's more colorful concepts of security cover not only the nation state and its security, but also individuals, groups, and even the international community. Ensuring the national security of a democratic society must be based on the constitution, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as democracy and the rule of law. In this context we must consider the accepted national development documents, laws, and bylaws, and respect the generally recognized principles and rules of the international law or the rights and obligations of the state, taken from international agreements (Article 16 of the Constitution of RS). Duke Miloš Obrenovic in April 1831, with a Special Decree established the function of the secret police for political affairs, there where it comes to interweaving of police and military agencies and services, with a special accent on the military services. In the next period there was a process of institutionalization of the security activities, which are the main carriers where military officials and civilian security services during this period, due to the underdevelopment of the former state administration, were of weaker importance than the military. In modern times, national security is no longer the primary synonym for military issues, but it is also focused on non-military forms of endangerment of the basic economic, political, humanitarian, environmental, social, and other values. A special place in the field of security belongs to the protection of human rights and freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law. Actual organizations dealing with security develop specific resources for activities directed towards crisis management. Following allegations of Gaćinović, the level of the national security today is primarily viewed through the vulnerability of the state with threats. As a form of concretized danger, this vulnerability requires the establishment of the security system as a form of

social organization to protect their vital interests and values (Gacinovic, 2012). National security in turn depends not only on the form of threat, but also of the criteria through which we observe it. From careless acceptance of the violation of some goods, it comes to easier uncritical spending of funds, aggressive policies and the like, while an exaggeration to determine a threshold of tolerance may result in lack of readiness in the event of a serious endangerment. To find the appropriate midfield, it is necessary to have good predictive power, which is *Sun Tzu Wu* marked as *dynamos*, power defined somewhere in the middle of thinking from *Weber* to *Parsons*, as legitimate, professional, prized, but always power - national or supranational powers!

In the empirical analysis of security, compromising its predictive power is undeniable. This analysis depends on three groups: the experts' opinions, policy documents and the public opinion. But, security activities since Machiavelli have represented an inseparable part of the policy, then what with the principle of secrecy leads not only hiding from science, but also of public events. Without this security area somehow escapes not only of science, but also from the fact that the work of the security services is subject to parliamentary, judicial, and any other controls, including the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of man. Safety is the state until the collapse of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to the beginning of the third millennium, differed according to their protective object to the public and the state (some would say military) security. And more importantly, it was placed on an equal sign with the external security of the state security and protection from external aggression and subversive activities by military and intelligence resources. Any attack on the regime in authority has been understood as an attack on security of the country, which means that the safety of individuals and organized groups, their rights, freedoms, life, and property enter the sphere of the so-called public safety. Public safety concerns what is referred to as the value of public order, regulated by imperative standards.

Today, since the beginning of the 21st century, also some irresistible democratic changes in the state and society, in our professional and scientific circles, the term of national security became enrooted. Within the framework of security intelligence agencies they no longer have a crucial role, but only one of the integral elements, the national security. According to Pavlovic, security of the legal state of post-vestfals and post-utrechtskog Peace (Pavlovic and associates 2012 is a condition of balanced protection of the national and state interests and values, through the function of the security of the individual, national and international security mechanism really, with the absence of fear of endangerment of their collective sense of serenity (Mijalkovic, 2011). The national values and interests are protected against any form of threat. National security is perhaps the most important, because it determines the other levels of security protection. In modern conditions,

customary measure of security is sovereign, territorial and legal state (Jez and associates 2011). Areas important for the state of the national security are not included in more military area (offensive and defensive capabilities of the state) and the protection not only of aggression but also of political, military and economic pressure, international status, and even migratory movements, demographic development, and other. A significant part of the non-military threats that come from organized crime, trafficking, drugs, illegal crossing of the border, environmental, natural, and technological disasters, with additional emphasis on endangering national identity, customs, languages, traditions, therefore on social area, which is not yet sufficiently by the competent services, nor is it offers adequate protection, and as such has not been mentioned even in strategic documents. Cultural disorders in values lead to the emergence of a special form of endangerment security through the creation of a subculture that goes beyond the usual social control. In the long run these and other forms of threats to the social field can have devastating implications for the security of the state and the individual. The Republic of Serbia is not even a desert island in the suppression of terrorism, money laundering and financing of terrorism, but it is an active member of the international anti-terrorist coalition and as such it is vulnerable to all forms of terrorist activities. In this context it should constantly monitor the situation in this respect and respond in a timely manner, in order to avoid the consequences of a possible attack on security, and to practice appropriately and to dispose with human resources focused on anti-terrorist activities, coordination of all responsible in this battle: the police, the management for Prevention of Money Laundering (*FIU*) as intelligence services, through judicial authorities to BIA, VBA and VOA. In achieving the proclaimed goals in the protection of security, it is important to determine when and how to perform the function of (national) security. Therefore, the legal and institutional framework of the competent state agencies whose task is to protect the national security, their way of organizing and operating, financing, control and other takes a special place.

1. THE MODERN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE - SECURITY SERVICES

The modern concept of national security has led, in line with the new trends, to expansion activities and taking the appropriate jurisdiction, the state public security. So, the police, as well as the authority of the Interior, exceed the increasing number of jobs and tasks that have until recently been so exclusive jurisdiction of the intelligence and security services, since the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, when these tasks were within the Department of State Protection. Control of movement and residence, movement of passenger, cargo and mail across the state borders, passport control, etc., are

now under the jurisdiction of public safety. Intelligence and security services (BIA as a separate organization; VBA and VOA as organizations within the MO) have also expanded powers in the field of combating organized crime, cyber crime and threats to information and telecommunication systems, financial crime, terrorism, threatening activities of extremist emigration, war crimes, corruption and other especially serious crimes. However, generally the accent of their work is directed to preventing and combating covert and secret phenomenon endangering the security that is performed by individuals, groups, or institutions that work directly with the subversive intelligence in Serbia or abroad, but towards Serbia.

Intelligence and security services are directly leaning on ensuring national security, with the powers that can apply special means, measures and actions to protect the sovereignty, integrity, protection of human life and other vital interests. It is not just intelligence and counterintelligence operations, but also the security business of certain persons, the security protection of individual authorities and institutions, as well as the security protection of nationals working or residence habituelle (temporary residence) abroad (Mijalković, 2011). Security threats are also not changed, but their list became longer compared to before.

All these jobs have a plan and systematics, through the collection of the necessary information and other activities. Expertise and professionalism are part of it, which depend on the results of specialized organs of the state administration in achieving the objectives of the national security, but that equally affects the way of the organization of government services, who does this, as well as the political system in which they operate and the legal framework for intervention. Both components of work - functional and organizational were equally important to the national security. Therefore, solutions that regulate all that must be part of the security system, rather than an ad hoc, because it often has negative repercussions, such as a few years ago was the case with the separation of the public safety and the BIA, or with the decision of the Constitutional Court of 19 April 2012 that certain provisions of the VBA and VOA are not in accordance with the Constitution of Serbia. Such facts are of different control bodies (as was the different findings of the Inspector General Service in relation to the State Ombudsman's report on the violations of the rights of employees who carry out these tasks), with the changed circumstances and of work regulations, affecting the thinking that it is necessary to reach the new system solutions, with the participation of the state as the exclusive titleholders activities related to national security. Classic security threats have not disappeared and security challenges, risks and threats were daily updated. So, becoming more complex are also the responsibilities of security - intelligence service, which leads to the demand for their overall reform.

2. LEGAL SOURCES OF REGULATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY

In a time of great socio-legal and institutional turbulence which followed our country in the last decade, the field of security has a special place. Many questions to which some are still waiting for answers, have already opened new topics. Except the 2006 Constitution and its solutions, starting from Article 16, paragraph 2, which introduced a direct application of international customs and treaties and obligations under them and continue through the National Security Strategy, the criminal legislation, organization of public administration and the judiciary to the law on security Services, it is obvious that we do not have to end rounded complex security system. The organic laws are supplemented by individually, without synchronizing and making a list of priorities in this approximation. Structured increase in the number and form of threats, risks and challenges to security, as well as their difficult detection and prevention, leads to the traditional methods so far used in the work for them, more often without adequate results, and to which so far it was possible to come in the way that are in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The solution is mainly found in the recomposition of organizational legal rights, security, defense rights, criminal law, etc., with the idea of efficient and effective response to specific problems of (national) security. Security as a public good has a decisive impact on the social and legal and political processes, and its contents is, the definition and regulation of great importance for the entire state and legal system. The need to strengthen the international cooperation in the joint fight against organized crime has led to the adoption and ratification of a number of international conventions. With regard to the constitutional provision that only states based on membership of the European principles and values, and that generally accepted rules of international law and ratified international treaties are an integral part of the legal system of Serbia and are directly applied, some of them will be singled out. We will highlight some of the important international regulations pertaining to this area:

- The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted in 2000, ratified in 2001 with Additional Protocols, the so-called Palermo Convention);
- The Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (adopted in 1990, ratified in 2002, the so-called Strasbourg Convention);

- The Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted in 1988, ratified in 1990, the so-called Vienna Convention);
- The International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999, ratified in 2002), recently adopted and ratified, the Warsaw Convention, and others.

In the domestic law, after the adoption of the Constitution of 2006 several laws, national strategies and regulations which have a special significance for the national security and services were passed, on which also two basic rules about this are based – the Law on Security Information Agency (BIA Act) and the Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency (Law on VBA and VOA). It is the:

- Law on the Security Services of the Republic of Serbia;
- The Law on Defence; the Law on Military;
- The Law on Police;
- The Criminal Procedural Code;
- The Data Secrecy Law; The Law on Electronic Communications;
- Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing;
- Law on the Execution of sentences for organized crime offenses;
- Law on the Protection of Participants criminal proceedings;
- Law on Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime;
- Law on the Government; The Law on Ministries;
- The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia;
- A national strategy for combating money laundering and terrorist financing and other regulations.

New solutions would have the role of raising the efficiency of the security services, but their critics often point out that they are on the border of turning to illegitimate means of oppression in society, because they may violate other interests, such as the protection of human rights. Precisely in this context is interesting the case of Daschner, which is described by prof. Roxin. In fact, no matter what good it is, basic human rights must not be threaten, without exception, even if it may also save the lives of the innocent each exception is turned of *expressis verbis*. According to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the prohibition of abuse ergo coercion can not be suspended even in times of war or other public state of emergency. There are no such circumstances of the case to justify the use of violence, inhuman and degrading treatment, regardless of why is the commission of the offense in relation with terrorism. Work on the perceived threat detection and prevention of terrorist attacks by extremist right from abroad, which we find out with the use of force from the source in country, on Djerdap, which would have incalculable

consequences for the overall security of the country, we will not elaborate further. But whether that coercion was exculpated by the laws of nature or not, it is questionable from the standpoint of human rights (Roxin, 2008).

3. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION

In terms of organization, noticeable is the existence of various government bodies which are most certainly not synchronized, i.e. they have no special coordination and compliance. That just contributes to the diversity of their powers, so for example, it is not surprising that there is not an adequate (satisfactory) the exchange of information, for example, financial intelligence unit (FIU) of the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Defence Intelligence Service, or under-use of the same data by the intelligence services of the Ministry Interior or BIA. And all of them, each in its domain dealing with, for example, preventing the financing of terrorism and terrorism itself, as a form of endangerment national security. The basic document in the field of national security are the national security strategies as state thesaurus for the realization of the goals of security. The structure of the security system by our national strategy consists in a broader sense of the highest authorities in the executive, legislative, and judicial power, and in the narrower sense, make it the system of defense, MUP forces, security and intelligence system and temporarily formed bodies and coordination bodies for some crisis, as much as are certain normative personal solutions through legislation of the government and of the Ministries of 2012. The corrected (not to be official, no matter how professional, to be a member which participate effectively in decision-making in some of the security bodies), so the whole series other understatements remained. They do not relate so much to the work of the competent departments, authorities and agencies, as to deficiencies in the legal and organizational terms, imbalance in the control and responsibility for civil-military relations, inadequate competence of Parliament in the process control of services. The National Assembly should have a major role and responsibility in the process of appointing and dismissal of certain managerial personnel, such as, for example, VBA and VOA Director, the Inspector General Services, Director of BIA, or determination and approval of the budget expenditures for defense and security. Nature itself, as well as the dynamics of the security sector, represents a real challenge to effective parliamentary control. Regulations about the secrets, rules and procedures greatly complicate the members of the National Assembly to carry out their role. Part of these deficiencies could be improved, but not eliminated, without specific intervention in the Constitution directly, which should be the basis of the security system.

Much more attention at this time could be placed to the organization itself, especially the military security services. Specifically, the aforementioned decision of the Constitutional Court of Serbia VBA partially lost one of its instruments for preventive action without court proceedings, which can effectively eliminate security risks and threats. Now this is possible only with the court's decision, but upon the proposal of the authorized public prosecutor or special jurisdiction, the Prosecutor for Organized Crime (Pavlovic, 2012). Except direct protection of human rights on the one hand, because the materials gathered in this case institute court proceedings within a certain period must be destroyed, possibly citizen to be informed, according to the Criminal Procedural Code only if this would jeopardize the conduct of criminal proceedings, on the other hand just to protect human rights stops possibility that this collected data are the basis for recording data and their use, except those documents and data which did not occur with the use of special measures. It just means that you should look for other possibilities for this kind of work. The use of special procedures and measures for covert data collection, as they were now determined (e.g. Article 27 of the VBA and VOA) has only the basis for the exploitation of certain measures. For example, the establishment of legal entities and decorating their work which does not compromise the security services is the basis for the beginning of the creation of the concept of business intelligence, which allows the development of the economic dimension of national security. In the modern organization of the national security of business-intelligence activities, or notification, as well as management of business information, is one of the most important places in the scale of instruments that provide the security, and IT and also social power. The realization of the concept of business intelligence for now without its logical continuation in the part related to associate the service and the question of what happens to them after the end of the contract period in which they established cooperation. Secondly, business intelligence can be used within any of the company; when it comes to national security - interests are directed towards abroad, and vice versa. Strengthening the economy strengthens the economic dimension of the national security in its full meaning. So, the question of founding capital and financial control of such a business is an additional problem that must be solved in order to prevent possible violations.

It might be too much to make a parallel with the experience Puljiz from the Croatian, but one of the possible solutions to the problem about recording data, in the function of the services, could be legally allowed to record talks by members of the VBA and the VOA citizens. According to Pavlovic, in relation to the notification and reporting, it is unclear why they omitted the Prime Minister and the Parliament as a person who would be provided with the information about the work of VBA and VOA. At this point, they only inform the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of

Staff. It is also unclear how actually civil (and not retired officer) could be at the forefront of any of these two agencies, when one of the conditions is to have completed general staff training. But, this is already more a matter of organization, not a legal solution (Pavlovic, 2012).

Spending budget funds should be under parliamentary control, especially in the segment from which it would be visible consumption and justification of funds, in order to avoid possible abuses, without elaborating complete expenditures (and even potential revenue) VBA and VOA, because it could expose the individual service operations. In this regard, a significant role of the state auditor, but as an institution that must play a stronger role and support of the bodies themselves now, as long as the law itself that is not otherwise regulated. The regulations on data confidentiality does not undertake course exclusively members of the VBA and VOA, but DRI, so that the controls could be better implemented.

4. COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES IN ACHIEVING SECURITY

Ensuring national security assumes the activities that protect traditional values, such as territory, population and the constitutional order, but also were mentioned other values already listed; on the other hand there are the bearers of these activities, as well as professional subjects who perform professional tasks of protecting the national security (which is and was the subject of discussion). Regardless of the criticism presented, it is certain that specialized organs - the security services operate in accordance with their constitutional and legal powers, but in order to improve their work is to expect changes that would allow them to even better performance. Are the criticisms outlined fully in place, without serious scientific and technical analysis, it is difficult to end with certainty. For example, the intelligence services in the UK are subordinated to the Minister, in the Czech Republic are subordinated to the President and the Government, the President of Ukraine, Turkey's Prime Minister and the Undersecretary. In none of these countries do not submit intelligence reports to Parliament.

In relation to the jurisdiction of the intelligence services in these countries, in the UK it is the protection of national interests in the Czech basic democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state and official secrets in Ukraine it was protection of the political sphere, military and defense industries, and in Turkey it is protection of the territorial integrity of the state and the constitutional order. Here, we agree with Ronin, the army and police can be created very fast, and intelligence agencies cannot. Therefore, we believe that changes need to be moved, but to be systemic, with full idea what started the reform to be achieved. We can agree with the allegations Gaćinović, that regardless of the methodology, in most countries of the world

today, there are central intelligence agencies, which have a universal character and it is of strategic importance. Other services are narrow specialized mainly built in the portfolios of defense, foreign and internal affairs, economics and elsewhere (Gaćinović, 2012). Their activities are mainly classified into three types, in intelligence, counterintelligence, and subversive activity. As these activities are intertwined, it was all the more reason to ask the question of how these activities and functions are carried out: more dispersed, as now, by various departments, but with a Council of National Security and the Bureau, or all together in one portfolio. Today, we are the closest to solution, in relation to security and intelligence services, which is made in the Republic of Italy. Serbia was in several different areas in the reforms, gained as a model for the legal system of the Republic of Italy. So, during the adoption of the Law of the confiscation of proceeds of crime, as a good example we found in most part the Republic of Italy.

Similarly, with the regulations governing the organization and jurisdiction of state bodies of special competence is the fight against organized crime, corruption and other especially serious crimes. Perhaps the pre brave to claim, but also by the organization of police forces approaching the systemic model. But, as in many other areas, the word must be about systemic, not just organizational solutions. Reforms in the security intelligence services and the services of Italy are a long process, which seems at least for now, was rounded with Act No. 124 of 03.08.2007 - Intelligence and the security system of the Republic of Italy and the new regulations Secrecy (Official Gazette No. 187 of 13.08.2007). The law is a good example in terms of a comprehensive resolution of regulating the intelligence security system of the country continental legal tradition. On the basis of this law, in Italy were reorganized some of the major intelligence and security institutions, which have existed continuously for more than thirty or even forty years. The legislator in the Republic of Italy held the position that these institutions are created difficult and easily disappear, making reform constantly go exclusively in the direction that they are the only part of the mechanism of protection of the state and its public order, which only work if these institutions are adapted to the space and time in order to help in the preservation of national security. By the positive solutions, the role of Parliament in the national security of the Republic of Italy was emphasized.

The parliamentary body of ten members (House of Representatives and Senate) to control intelligence - security services (COPASIR), exercises parliamentary supervision over the legality of the operation of all the Italian security services. The political body that operates under the Government of the Republic of Italy was the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Intelligence - Security Affairs (CSIRO). The Prime Minister is Head of the Committee, which is composed of ministers of foreign and internal affairs, defense, justice,

finance and economics. At the session of the CSIRO's were invited directors of the intelligence services and other officials and experts. The Committee on Intelligence and Security Affairs was responsible for exercising political control over the work of all departments and establishing general guidelines for their operation, as well as giving political assessment of the state of security and monitoring foreign policy activities related to security issues, etc.

Countering terrorism, at the state level, is coordinated within the Central Police Administration for anti-terrorism, in which composition is the Central security and operational units, and units NOCs (Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza), and Italy from 1965 until today passed a set of anti-mob laws, and it was established an ad hoc committee, composed of representatives of both Houses of Parliament, with investigative powers that have judicial power. State-security organization based on the joint action of Parliament, the Government, relevant ministries and judicial authorities of the Italian state enable successful prevention and the fight against potential security challenges, risks and threats faced by the modern state, and it is certain that the greater part of these legislative solutions could also be implemented in our legal system. We get the impression that the issue of control over the work of the wholes is not in question, and their interconnectedness provides much needed legality of work. This is especially implies that it is about built institutionalized system of national security, real for a longer period.

5. CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF SERBIAN SECURITY SERVICES PERFORMED BY GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS

The control of the security services is based on the principles of subordination and accountability elected governments of Serbia. Parliamentary control is done through the Committee for control of the security services, which, on behalf of the National Assembly, controls the constitutionality and legality of the work, in conjunction with the National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, and other documents. The Assembly Committee also supervises the legality of the use of special procedures and measures for covert data collection. The fact is that for granting authorizations for the use of these procedures and measures authorized exclusively by the competent court, so it is here necessary to make certain changes in the existing jurisdiction. The Committee for the control of the security services considers the proposals and petitions of citizens regarding the work of the security services of the perceived illegality or irregularity in the work of the service. In regard to the executive authorities control, surveillance is also done by the Minister of Defense, Inspector General (Government of Serbia), and the National Security Council and Office for the Coordination of Security

Services (the President of the Republic), while in certain segments of the judicial power it is also performed by the Internal Control.

At present, this set of controls and supervision over the work of the security services in the Republic of Serbia give the impression that in relation to the period of a decade or more there have actually been progress in the field of national security, and the constitutionality and legality of the operation of all relevant agencies. However, the fact is that certain responsibilities belong to independent institutions of Serbia, where the first thoughts to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance (the Commissioner) as an autonomous body independent in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the Ombudsman as an independent state body that protects the rights of citizens and controls the operation of the state administration. To understand the position that independent institutions have influence over the control and supervision of the security services must be considered that currently govern relations between the institution of the Commissioner and the Ombudsman on the one hand, and the Ministry of Defense and its security services on the other side. The problem arose regarding two separate cases. A question, whether the Ombudsman to request the competent services of security relevant information within their legal and constitutional authority, and whether the Commissioner can do the same search, regardless of which interest prevails - the interest of keeping state secrets or national saving safety or the public right to free access to information of public importance. How these procedures at the time of writing of this paper are not fully resolved, it is difficult to comment. However, the existence of independent institutions such as the Commissioner and the Ombudsman (or the State Auditor's as it is mentioned above) indicate that in Serbia there is a presence of political will to put on higher level the national security not only with organizational reforms, but also with work of independent institutions which should contribute to a greater democracy in the operation and control and supervision of the security services. A solution that could be offered at this time would require the establishment of a system of control and supervision over the work of the security services, as would be predicted by monitoring and coordination of independent institutions with greater responsibility of all participants in the system of government and the security system.

6. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

The perception of threats to security today is more tied to social (existential) issues, and the most relevant compromising perceived as a threat to the functioning of organized crime and terrorism, while the various forms of military and asymmetric threats is associated with them. In the current constellation of international relations, organized crime and terrorism have

become one of the primary forms of national and supranational (international actually) threat to the system security and values that the system protects, to which no country or even community is immune. Organized crime and terrorism are complex threats that arise from different sources in different intensity, but with the same goal - destabilization of the security system and the conquest of power. At destructive and uncompromising attacks on all social values must be the same kind of answer. But this requires a further modernized and reformed state security structure with trained and educated perpetrators.

Based on the above is the visible organization of intelligence activities with the primary task of their own defense and protection of state institutions. These objectives require altered and customized intelligence and security services in accordance with the modern challenges, their constant de-politicization, effective control and respect for constitutionality and legality. In order to position all of the security services and institutions circled, it is first necessary to do so at the level of normative, and only after that in the practice. Placing under the control of the legislative and executive powers of the Security Intelligence Agency as a key institution for the protection of national security after its separation from the MOI was one of the most important steps. A reform project with thus was not stopped, but had come creating VBA and VOA in their today already known frameworks. However, time has not yet come to the end of regulated and consistent security concept. Partially overlapping or consuming any part of the jurisdiction of certain security services it is also an alarm for further reform.

It seems that when it comes to reform of the intelligence agencies under the Ministry of Defence, one of the solutions could be the integration of certain powers of VBA and VOA, and therefore the creation of a unified Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of Defence. Specifying the position, according to which whatever model it is, it must include all the premises of the rule of law and democracy, with the establishment of an effective mechanism for coordination and control, with the balance of the secrecy of the operation of the service, and civilian control over them. The National Security Council has just a step in creating optimal conditions for the operation responsible for the preservation of national security. Revisiting the constitutional position of the competent state bodies and their powers, on the basis of established National Security Strategy, with the criminal justice system of the country with the most severe innovated group of offenses - violations and endangering the constitutional order and security of Serbia, reviewing the new security challenges, risks and threats, powers and responsibilities state authorities in this framework are part of the tasks for the future. An example of the organization of the security services in the Republic of Italy shows how legislative basis in practice gives good results in the

suppression of danger to the security system of the country. The basic values of society today are to primarily protect the democratic and lawful exercise of power. To make this possible, it is necessary to require a guaranteed system of freedoms, rights and duties in a regulated system of justice, security and other organs. National social values and interests behind that followed are realized only in a country that has ensured the national security system.

This work represents a contribution to security and is open to any kind of criticism, but the topics presented here are more than intriguing, so that each of them could be processed separately: the system of national security, the system security services and public administration, the judiciary, the national parliament, the relationship of traditional security services and other authorized services, the relationship of security services and independent institutions that have the authority to control their work and so on. The speed of reforms that are indisputably in front of us depend on the prediction and security assessment of the security situation of the entire community, with the initial note - the search for new theoretical and institutional concept of national security of Serbia, where it is today, and where it should be.

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SECURITY SCIENCE PARADIGMS IN THE TIME OF EXPANDED APPROACH TO SECURITY: WHEN TO START AND WHEN TO FINISH A SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN A CONFLICT / POSTCONFLICT SOCIETY?

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Abstract

The world order is changing much faster than we think: conflicts are more than ever part of the everyday political life. Interstate conflicts are not a rarity, but the number of intrastate conflicts has significantly increased since the fall of the Iron curtain. Ethno nationalism and a perceived lack of human rights became a root cause for (armed) conflicts in states, with the outcome of strong ethno-political polarization, greater concessions, regional autonomy and even division and “Balkanization” of the state(s). The world has tried to respond to these events appropriately and the number of peace keeping / support missions has also grown. Nowadays, the UN is engaged in more peace keeping mission and is spending more money on peacekeeping than ever. NATO has become engaged outside the Euro-Atlantic area with a new role of peace support operations (first in the Balkans and then even further afar). Security is the first area that needs attention in conflict and post-conflict society. The security system (in all of its dimensions) must be reformed as soon as possible and local ownership of it must be achieved so that a functional system of providing security is set in place. International force should handover security provision as soon as possible, but the question remains: when should the security sector reform (SSR) start and should it ever finish?

This paper will try to give an answer to that question, based on the some UN and NATO examples of SSR in the conflict / post conflict countries occurring since 1990s in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East.

Key words: *Security sector reform (SSR), conflict, international missions, UN.*

1. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AS A HOLISTIC CONCEPT

The fall of the Iron curtain was a major event in the world politics: the Warsaw pact dissolved, some state collapsed (Yugoslavia) and some new states emerged, a huge wave of democratization in the former Eastern European countries occurred with transition towards market economy and reform in the security sector. Also, one of the less visible changes that happened was also the change of the perception of security. In the former divided world between the East and West, the security was predominately seen as state - centric security. The individual was not in the focus of the security.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a concept emerged and slowly evolved at various forums. It became a part of the reform processes of the East European states, but also a part of the military and political interventions in the conflict countries and an essential part of the UN and NATO missions. SSR changed the traditional perception of intervention and security: it went further from the traditional “train and equip” approach towards security reform in the (conflict / post conflict) countries and moved towards a greater integration with the development. It became a prerequisite for development and was seen as central to the international community’s efforts to help prevent violent conflict and building lasting peace¹. The concepts ‘security sector’ and ‘security sector reform’ first appeared in the late 1990s, and although these relatively new terms have become widely used (in various forms: Security Sector Reform, Security Sector Transformation, Security Sector Development, Security Sector Governance, Sector Security Reform, Security Sector Stabilization, etc.), no single globally accepted definition has yet emerged. One of the first international organizations that “reinvented” the concept of the SSR and developed the security / development nexus was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The central theme of the 2004 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance was that “recognition that development and security are inextricably linked is enabling security in partner countries to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue inviting greater public scrutiny”². Then, later in 2007, the official OECD DAC

¹ The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), *SSR in A Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: DCAF, 2011), accessed February 28, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/2970/25352/file/ISSAT%20LEVEL%201%20TRAINING%20MANUAL%20-%20SSR%20IN%20A%20NUTSHELL%20-%202015.2.pdf>, 2.

² Angel Gurria and Richard Manning, foreword to *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, by Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) (Paris: OECD

Handbook on SSR was promoted with the aim to operationalise the DAC SSR guidance and close the gap between policy and practice. There it is stated that the SSR is aimed towards reform in the security sector that is not seen traditionally as only the military and police. SSR is including: core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)³.

The organization of the United Nations, as the world premier and leading international organization that is responsible for international peace and security, (but also development), in general has a preventive approach to conflict and sees SSR as an integral part of that approach. But it was in 2008⁴ when the UN defined *the security sector* (in the Secretary – General report) as a broad term “often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of the security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services⁵”. Now, the United Nations define SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by the national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement

Publishing, 2007), accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en

³ Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC), *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en, 5.

⁴ In reality, the SSR was part of the mission mandate since 2002 in the UN mission in Sierra Leone.

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on SSR (A/62/659-S/2008/39), 23 January 2008.

of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law⁶”.

The UN has a SSR unit and a Task Force (the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force - IASSRTF⁷), established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2007, with a mission to promote an integrated, holistic and coherent United Nations Security Sector Reform (SSR) approach that envisages to assist States and societies in establishing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to the international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all.

SSR became a topic for many other actors that have developed their own SSR policies: the EU, NATO, AU, ECOWAS, as well as individual states (USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, etc) that placed the SSR policy into the military doctrine⁸, even established their own SSR Units (for example, Stabilization Unit⁹ in UK [previously known as Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit], Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force¹⁰ in Canada, etc). The EU principles of SSR contain rule of law, democratic control over armed forces, human rights, accountability and transparency. EU Commission¹¹ and Council¹² adopted the SSR concepts and broad definition that are in line with the OECD DAC principles.

It should be mentioned that the word ‘reform’ is nowadays considered misleading and even outdated since thinking on transforming security and justice sectors and systems has moved forward and terminology has not. One of the proposed term for use is ‘Security and Justice Sector Development (or

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ “United Nations SSR Website,” United Nations, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Home.aspx>.

⁸ See, for example: US Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), accessed February 26, 2015, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>; NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1: Peace Support Operations* (Brussels: NATO, 2001), accessed February 26, 2015, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PeaceSupport.pdf>.

⁹ “Stabilization Unit”, UK Government, accessed February 26, 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit>.

¹⁰ “Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START),” Government of Canada, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

¹¹ Commission of the European Communities, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, SEC(2006) 658, Brussels, from May 24, 2006, accessed on February 26, 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0253:FIN:EN:PDF>.

¹² Council of the European Union, *EU concept for the ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform* (Brussels: EU, 2005), accessed on February 28, 2015, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012566%202005%20REV%204>.

Transformation) – SJSD/T’ as part of a broader post conflict reconstruction and development strategy¹³.

2. CHALLENGES FOR SSR

2.1. *Tailoring the right SSR*

SSR can happen in the all societies. Western European liberal democracies (considered more advanced in the way the security system is functioning and controlled) also undergo regular Security Sector Reform process at regular time cycles¹⁴ so that their security system can be more effective in the ever changing security environment. Reforming the institutions is a paramount in the post conflict societies, since it was in the same societies that complete security (as well as the oversight) system failed in the first place. How can SSR be applied into different societies with deferent political and cultural systems, what is the methodology, how to develop a coherent approach and what to include in the SSR program? In all cases, understanding the specific context is paramount in structuring the right size / type SSR¹⁵ (political, legal, social factors, economy, technology and environment). All conflict settings are unique and the elements such as culture, history, ethnicity, political system, economic foundation and educational level have to be built into the specific country SSR program to accomplish successful implementation¹⁶. We will look more closely the SSR in the conflict and post conflict countries in this paper because it is there where the newly developed SSR concept turns into reality. The SSR as a process has to have a starting point, objectives that need to be accomplished, and a final outcome when we can consider the reform ended. Often the donor countries and international organization insist on “*local ownership*”¹⁷ of the solutions that will bring stability, accountability and effectiveness of the whole security system as well on the “*Whole of Governance approach*”. The selection of the objectives and final outcome are quite challenging both for the post conflict state and for the external actors in the SSR. The local ownership as it is

¹³ Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Gordon Hughes, Associate Senior SSR Advisor at ISSAT, February 2015.

¹⁴ For example, UK has Strategic Defence and Security Review at every 5 years, USA has every 4 years etc.

¹⁵ Even the security systems in the Western European countries are not completely the same.

¹⁶ Peter D. Thruelsen, *Security sector stabilisation in a non-permissive environment* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2010), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/Security%20Sector%20Stabilisation.pdf>

¹⁷ More on the concept of local ownership see Timothy Donais, ed., *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Local-Ownership-and-Security-Sector-Reform>.

described in the SSR handbooks and in reality implies involving the local actors as soon as possible in the reform, but not necessarily in the creation of the SSR program from the start. After creation of the SSR program, the international actors must not lead the program; it must be the national actor that will lead. However, since the selection of program objectives, models and outcomes is not a local solution, that endangers the legitimacy in those cases where most (if not all) of the SSR solutions are external. So, international actors must consult security sector practitioners and local community experts (and at the end, the population) about issues related to recognizing the capacities and needs, also as for parameters closely addressed to local circumstances (tradition, history, subculture [mentality] and other factors influencing the security sector).

2.2. When to start and when to finish the SSR

It is very difficult to select the exact moment of the desired start of the SSR in one society because of the importance of the context in the creation, duration and finally the overall success of the SSR program. However, the need for the reform has to be balanced with the political reality in the state. The UK approach¹⁸ makes a clear distinction between security sector stabilization (SSS) that “seeks to enable essential and minimum security and justice and in doing so protect and promote a legitimate political authority and prepare the foundations for transition to longer-term security sector reform” and SSR. SSS prepares the ground for the SSR in the immediate period after the conflict while “addressing substantively the conflict drivers, (and may include elements of transitional justice), rather than acting as an interim palliative”. The period between the immediate security requirements and the reform process is estimated to be around 12 to 24 month period, but it may take longer since transition to security and justice programming and eventually SSR will be a process rather than an event¹⁹.

During the preparation of the paper, the question when to start and when to finish the SSR process was sent (via questionnaire) to a number of theorist and practitioners of SSR as well as SSR advisers on the ISSAT²⁰ Community of Practice forum. Giving an answer with a specific moment in

¹⁸ As described in the Stabilisation Unit, *Security Sector Stabilisation*, Stabilisation Issues Note, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development, March 2014), accessed February 28, 2015
<http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications/stabilisation-series/496-security-sector-stabilisation/file.html>.

¹⁹ Stabilization Unit, 16 and 18

²⁰ “Forum of the International Security Sector Advisory Team,” DCAF, accessed February 26, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Forum/Starting-and-finishing-a-SSR-program-in-a-conflict-post-conflict-society>.

time, connected to certain event in the post conflict reconstruction of a country (like the Peace process, Peace accord or treaty, DDR process²¹, conflict phases and timing, elections, etc.) is very difficult. The reasons are very simple: different context (that requires an individual case by case approach) and the fact that SSR is concept that is ongoing and holistic, considered as wide as deep²². According to Gordon Hughes, SSR or the proposed term SJSD / T “should begin (with external actor assistance) before the fighting starts as a conflict prevention measure. It is an essential consideration during ceasefire planning and the formulation of peace agreements. Arguably, national SJSD/T programs could finish when the security and justice institutions in a country are effective and accountable, and operating under democratic civil control without the need for any further international cooperating partner (ICP) assistance”.

The perception of the understanding the term SSR plays a key role to the start and end of it: if SSR includes interim security and stabilization measures such as creating conditions for classical SSR through restoration of infrastructure and minimum capacities and capabilities of security and defense forces, facilitating the discussions between various national actors to reach consensus on the future security architecture and the main principles of reforming defense and security forces, then it starts right in the beginning of the peace process in the phase of stabilization; If it means classical SSR, focusing on security sector policies and legislation, civilian oversight and capacity-building, then most of it will start in post-conflict stabilized situation, after the elections of legitimate non-transitional authorities²³.

The peace process and DDR are considered closely connected with the start of the SSR. Some argue that SSR should start as soon as the peace process is consolidated and DDR is basically a part of the SSR²⁴. SSR should be planned to begin just about as DDR nears its end, since reintegration of

²¹ DDR stands for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. More on DDR see at Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, (Frankfurt: GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, and SNDC, 2004), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/04-5358.pdf>.

²² Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Thammy Evans, Advocacy & Outreach Coordinator at ISSAT, February 2015.

²³ Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Sossi Tatikyan, Security Sector Reform Officer at United Nations, February 2015.

²⁴ Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Agustín J Vázquez, former Project Manager for UN Police Operations and International Cooperation in Guinea Bissau, working within an international police team in police reform, training, advising to upgrade and build up Guinean Bissau security services' capacities, February 2015.

combatants might imply creation of a completely new institution²⁵ and SSR should start as is during the peace process or just after it²⁶. The peace process should contain provision about the DDR and SSR by all the relevant parties, local actors and stakeholders.

It is difficult to establish the termination of the SSR because it is difficult to tell if the SSR will succeed in the post conflict country; it requires a lot of attention and commitment so that a peace, even negative one, is achieved. The danger of relapsing in to conflict can always be present. There for, instead of termination, measures for success and reform indicators can be used, and there is already a well established baseline of doctrine for this in the UN as well in individual donor countries. And while the organizations and donor countries expect result fast (and justification for the money and effort spent), the result can happen after years, decade or even more. That does not go well with the donor political and financial cycles, but that is the reality of the post-conflict environment.

3. THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

The reform of the security sector in Macedonia represents an ongoing process, mostly influenced by the foreign partners (OSCE, EU, NATO, USA and other individual partner and donor countries) that were and are involved in the reform processes (in line with the country's aspiration to obtain full NATO and EU membership), and it involves applying international and widely accepted standards in the area of security. The reform was mostly in the major security areas (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Intelligence Agency) where we will limit the scope of this research, but it also initiated substantial changes in other elements of the security sector, and in certain cases it resulted in setting up entirely new government institutions and bodies – in line with the EU standards and practices. Since the country's independence in the early 90s, the reform of the security sector as a part of the overall political and economic reform process in the society was a matter of pure necessity in order to establish a baseline and solid fundamentals of the state security in the new security environment. Since there was not an adequate National security policy or strategy for the reform processes of the security institutions at times when there were many scenarios for de-stabilization of the state, a lot of improvisations were made in the security sector reform

²⁵ Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Marko Savkovic, CSO expert for SSR issues in the Western Balkans, February 2015.

²⁶ Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Igor Cvetkovski, DDR, SSR and Peacebuilding Specialists for the Transition and Recovery Division (TRD) within the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) at the IOM HQ's in Geneva, February 2015.

followed by some scandals²⁷. The domestic creators of the security strategy / policy were looking for the appropriate solutions for some years till most of the inputs for the reforms came externally from the international missions and experts after the 2001 conflict that were in the range of catalyst for excellent solutions in line with the post conflict settlement and rehabilitation to waste of valuable reform time.

The Army started the reform after 1999, when the first NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) was submitted. It was basically a set of criteria that all the countries applying for NATO membership needed to fulfill, as well guidance for the reform process with phases and timings. The Army managed to accomplish all the necessary reform and in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest summit that was clearly noted. Also, the Army formally undertakes a Strategic defense and review process at (i)regular²⁸ cycles.

The Ministry of Interior (the police) underwent a set of organizational changes with an accent on human resources after the 2001 conflict that was in the spirit of the Ohrid Framework treaty. The Police Reform Project started in 2002, with the support by the ECJHT (European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Mission). Accordingly, the Strategy for Police Reform in Macedonia was adapted in 2003. The police fully used potential of the police advisors that were part of the EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) as well as for the following Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the period from 2003 to 2006. Such developments were firm bases for launching the 2-year police reform project leaded by the German police in 2005. In 2008, a new 2-year police reform project began, which was led by the French police²⁹. In the period from 2012 to 2013 (15 months), a partial police reform was achieved addressed on police investigations, intelligence, risk management, strategic planning and legislative reform issues³⁰. A simple qualitative analysis of all the police reform projects that were finished leave us with the fact that the

²⁷ Rade Rajkovcevski, Security Policy Building: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia] (Skopje: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Macedonia Office & Faculty of Security-Skopje, 2014), accessed on February 28, 2015, <http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/en/publications/36931/>, p. 66

²⁸ Stojan Slaveski, "USA in the Macedonian National Strategy", *Nova Makedonija*, March 3, 2015, accessed on March 3, 2015, <http://novamakedonija.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=32151627405&id=13&prilog=0&setIzdanie=23409>.

²⁹ Stojanka Mirceva, and Rade Rajkovcevski, "Policing in the Republic of Macedonia" in *Handbook on Policing in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gorazd Meško, Charles B. Fields, Branko Lobnikar and Andrej Sotlar (New York: Springer Publishing, 2013), p. 144 - 145

³⁰ "Partnership in Macedonian European Integration Reforms Marked", UK Government, News announced by the British Embassy Skopje on November 28, 2013, accessed on February 26, 2015,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/partnership-in-macedonian-european-integration-reforms-marked>.

German partner (Brandenburg Police) offered a decentralized model with a lot of authorizations for the local police, while at the same time the partners from the French national police (from the CIVIPOL project) implemented strictly centralized solutions that were not in line with the local context. After finishing of the reform project conducted with the French partner, most of the solutions were withdrawn or left just as an appreciation of the finished reform process. As an outcome, in a relatively short period of time even 3 primary documents of systematization inside the ministry of Interior (which are paramount for internal organization and delegation of responsibilities) were produced, that is indication of misbalance and obscurity of the whole police reform.

The intelligence part of the reform process, because of the power that intelligence contains and reflects upon the power of the political subject in charge of the relevant ministries (the military intelligence sector from the ministry of Defense and the Directorate of security and counterintelligence from the ministry of Interior), failed to re-structure into one unity in spite of the initiative during the reform process. They underwent the reforms as part of the relevant ministries. However, in hindsight, one has to say that the intelligence services have not internalized the principles of good governance, especially issues related to transparency and accountability³¹. The intelligence is always under strong influence of the ruling political parties that has shown during the past with a lot of interception, phone – tapping incidents of the opposition parties as well as leakage of confidential information.

4. CONCLUSION

The right SSR can create better social and economic development as well as rule of law and promotion and protection of human rights. External assistance must be well defined and outlined in terms of objectives and timeframes, not just containing all the principles of “local ownership,” but truly to be locally owned. The whole security sector must be sustainable by local budget funds at long run, with the financial assistance by international organizations and individual donor countries at short and medium term. All those things are exactly what holistic approach to SSR program is, build and based upon the local context. In general, Security Sector reform still brings more questions than answers in many states in the world, and local ownership is still difficult to achieve in the post conflict countries. External experts from international organizations, partner and donor states is beneficial, if not for

³¹ Andreja Bogdanovski, “Macedonia” in *Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans*, ed. Franziska Klopfer and Douglas Cantwell with Miroslav Hadžić and Sonja Stojanović (Belgrade: BCSP and DCAF, 2012), accessed on February 27, 2015 http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/ALMANAC_FINAL_WEB2.pdf, p. 133

else, then for the resources, commitment, and in most cases, objectivity and recognition of needs and solutions they bring. That on the long run will bring accountability while improving effectiveness, effective and professional civilian / democratic control over armed and security forces, vetting protocols, better community / security forces relations including greater influence by marginalized and vulnerable groups.

SSR is a process, not an event. It is context driven and very difficult to predict when is best to start. It is widely accepted that is best to start as soon as possible, since it is a process that is following the stabilization of the country and that is crucial for achieving stability and with that development. It is best to anchor it to the peace process, and afterwards connect it with all the following events / processes: DDR, elections, build up of institutions, donor financial assistance. Till the desired outcome is achieved: security, development, accountability, effectiveness, rule of law, etc. And the question when will it end in point of time is also very difficult to answer. Depending on the phase in which the conflict was in the first place, it will take years, if not decades. At the end, here is a clear case where the reform is not about the destination, but it is about the journey. As long as there a reform of the institutions and it is going on the right way towards sustainable peace, security and development, with all the systematic and behavioral circumstances being addressed and resolved, with accountability, efficiency of the institutions, justice and rule of law. Unfortunately, that is not so good for the donors that need the results as soon as possible, but it is still cheaper than the price of human life and suffering.

Whether security is possible without development and development can happen without the security in place is a never-ending and ongoing debate, and that's why the SSR holistic approach is considered as an important linkage of both. However, just as the 90ties changed the perception of security, the terminology must follow the transformation of the (perception of) security, justice and development. And there for, SSR may change and lose the "reform" bit from it, but it will not lose the essence and importance of the need to transform, reform, change, and respond. And anyhow the reform happens, it should never end. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, there is still no clear and consistent state policy regarding the security sector reform. Unfortunately, there are no clear guidelines for the reform processes in line with the national security policy and that are locally owned but also, sustainable. The annual MAP process is an external mechanism for annual evaluation of the Army readiness for the NATO membership and certainly it involves a dose of security reform in it. Certain reforms brought less than expected (like the MPRI with the Army and CIVIPOL with the police), but that is, at the end, also part of the learning process.

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CRISIS IN UKRAINE: THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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Abstract

Today, the security situation which is result of the crisis in Ukraine is in apparent degradation and it is difficult to estimate how far the conflict potential can go. This is due to the internal armed conflict related to the vital interests of the Russian Federation and the interests of the Western powers led by the USA. In this sense, the indirect and direct involvement of the major powers in the conflict and their determination to blame the other for escalating the crisis, increases the danger of exceeding the limits of internal conflict and its transformation into international conflict. Hence, it will also arise the underlying assumption that in the case of the Ukrainian conflict, the danger of outbreak of international conflict increased, but it was unlikely to happen.

Keywords: crisis, safety, potential conflict, internal conflict, major powers and international relations

1. INTRODUCTION

The crisis in Ukraine is a typical example of crisis and its most important characteristics could be classified into the matrix of crisis which was already seen in the period from the termination of the Cold war to the beginning of March 2015. In general, it is about crisis whose complexity shaped political and economical crisis, and then their escalation often comes to a war crisis, or even system crisis. What is important for war crises is that they are dominantly of internal type, within a state, only a small number is formed as a conflict between countries.

According to the prestigious Stockholm Institute of peace research (SIPRI) in the period from 1990 to 2005, from the total number of 57 major armed conflicts only 4 were conflicts between countries, all the others or a total of 53 conflicts comprise internal armed conflicts (Harbom, 2006: 108). In the analysis made in the period from 2000 to 2009, the relations were: from a total number of 30 bigger armed conflicts only 3 were conflicts between the countries, and the rest 27 were internal armed conflicts (Harbom, 2010: 61).

Comparatively, this implies that in the first decade of the new millennium, although unequally, a slight fall of the total number of armed conflicts will probably be noticed. The trend of increase of the armed conflicts will be announced shortly before the end of the first decade and the beginning of the second decade of the 21 century, which will have significant attention from the global economy crisis and the Arab spring. According to an analysis of the Organization of United Nations presented in 2014, about 4 military hotspots in the world are recommended to clime crisis on “level 3” which is the highest possible level, due to the crisis in Gaza, the growth of Islamic militants in Syria and Iraq, and the conflict in Ukraine (“Dnevnik”, 2014: 5, Macedonian daily newspaper). In conditions of domination of internal armed conflicts, this is the worst situation which the modern world faces. The crisis in Ukraine will complement another link in the shaping of a new security environment, which seems to culminate and threatens to exceed the threshold of internal armed conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine is an excellent example of an internal armed conflict that began with the appearance of hostility between the two opposing sides in the state, of which one is official - government forces, and the other are the rebels. The rebels are also called by other names, such as terrorists, local militia, bandits, etc. which refers to Ukrainian citizens with Russian origin who live mostly in the southeast of Ukraine. Then, after the conflict escalated, a new phase appeared known as the beginning of hostilities, and then came to the use of violence on both sides. What is characteristic for this phase is that it can remain at the internal conflict that will be terminated and hostilities would end, or escalate and a war would take place. This term is also found as a civil war or armed conflict. What is typical of the major armed conflicts, according to the status, they can be active and with different intensity- small, medium, and high, to reach a ceasefire and peace agreement if the warring parties understand that the ongoing of the conflict is absurd or if one side forces other to such thing. We are witnessing how in the Ukrainian conflict in a very short time, i.e. in February, people began with street protests, or a coup by President Putin, through secession peninsula Crimea in March and the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and the People's Republic of Lugano escalated in April and performances of a larger armed conflict - civil war appeared. As a result of the armed conflict and several thousand victims warring parties and other actors in the conflict, especially the big powers, will decide that change is needed of the status of the conflict. In September they came to an agreement to end the fire – a truce. This allowed resolving some problems facing the actors in the conflict and the opportunity to change its status. Unfortunately such a thing did not happen, did not bring peace and did not cease the fire. This is a condition that is ascertained for one year from the occurrence of the conflict and in conditions in early 2015 will

be made another deal on ceasefire, truce. Considering the involvement of the interests of Russia and the Western powers led by the US, and their direct support of one of the parties and almost of all ways and with weapons and equipment, in a certain way by force, the serious conflict threatened to grow into an armed conflict of two or more states. This conflict will come out of the trajectory of the so-called internal armed conflicts which are dominant in the period from the end of the Cold War until the middle of the second decade of the 21st century. It is of course possible, but it seems unlikely, and above all when it comes to frontal confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation. This mostly requires experience and memory of the great powers in similar situations and the knowledge about the destructive power of their combat vehicles and combat systems that can cause irreparable losses on one side and on the other side of the change of the already mentioned status of the conflict and through ceasefires. Any ceasefire or truce, almost without exception, is a step forward to change the status of the conflict. Based on all this, the main parts of labor can be differentiated and in these frames the content that shape its complexity also by opposing parties within the state will be analyzed, as well as other forces involved in the conflict and especially the Western forces led by the United States and the Russian Federation.

1. THE APPEARANCE OF HOSTILITIES AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE OPPOSING SIDES

The conflict in Ukraine which started in February 2014 and is still ongoing in March 2015, is a typical example of a conflict, which according to its characteristics can be freely included in the body of the major internal armed conflicts. In the typology of conflicts, internal armed conflicts imply all those conflicts occurring between government forces and rebels, or between other groups that control enough territory to support the planned joint military operations (The Military Balance, 2007). In circumstances where over one calendar year conflict on the battlefield in 1000 caused deaths are defined as war (SIPRI, 2010: 61).

In particular it is internal or civil war, which is already the case with the conflict in Ukraine in its early stage, in April 2014. In early 2015 the conflict continues and shows no signs of an end of hostilities and the resolution of conflict. That says that the conflict may take, or if it is not possible to arrange the parties in conflict, the conflict can be frozen. The worst variant is when the conflict would be internationalized involving government forces of major countries. We are witnessing a period after the Cold War until today most of the internal armed conflicts do not exceed the domestic borders and they usually lead to sovereignty or territory. Referendum of Crimea is an

excellent example of conflict in Ukraine when the center of attention is the territory and its joining towards Russia.

In some sources it is also found as annexation of the territory of the peninsula to Russia. The question of the annexation of a territory which is part of another state or the annexation of the territory of the country and its attachment to another country usually treated as a violent act and often with the use of the armed forces. In 1990 Iraq committed aggression on Kuwait, justifying it with the explanation that it is not aggression but annexation of territory that was once part of the state of Iraq. The case of Crimea has particularities that distinguish the case of Kuwait and Iraq, it is seen primarily in existence as part of the territory of a state, and not as a separate state. Tissue binding and similarities of these two cases could be looked at back in 1949 when the internal administrative division between the socialist republics of the USSR, from the composition of the Russian SFSR Crimea peninsula was separated and joined the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In circumstances where decay Soviet Union, Ukraine is constituted as an independent state that the transition process will face evasion that will reach the so-called Orange revolution and pro-Western orientation and influence of Russia, which would initially be small. This seems latent in terms of the conflict in Ukraine, but has grown into a very intense and overwhelming.

Of course this is due to the influence of several factors, such as a very important stand strengthening of Russia as arbitrator in international relations in the period until the emergence of the crisis in Ukraine, and of course the Russian population living on the territory of Ukraine and especially in its south-eastern part. In fact, according to the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Research the Military Balance 2010, in Ukraine with a population of 45,700,395 people of ethnic groups: Ukrainians accounted for 77.8%, 17.3% Russians, Belarusians 0.6%, 0.5% Moldovans, Crimean Tatars 0.5% (the Military Balance, 2010: 195). It shows that more of them are Ukrainians and Russians who together account for 95.1% or 43,460,700 inhabitants of whom Russians are small in numbers but about 8,000,000 and mostly inhabited the territory that borders Russia. In fact, with few exceptions these dominant ethnic groups representing opposing sides in the conflict, which is not a small interest and influence will show Western powers and especially the United States on the one hand and Russia on the other. In circumstances where the head of state will stand Viktor Yanukovich who will attempt to turn back the Western powers and came to Russia in February 2104 will face violent protests. The President of Ukraine Yanukovich will not respond to violence with government forces, the military and police, but by the Russian authorities will flee to Russia. That would set the stage for changing the ruling government and restore previous commitment and strategic interest. After the authority will take pro-west oriented government striving for convergence and

integration with Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures, first of Crimea and then in other parts of Ukraine will come to the opposition and even of violence. On the one hand - the rebels will be attempted to declare the independent People's Republic and the other official Ukraine that will try to prevent this tendency. By comparison, one side in case the official government has a big advantage over the rebels, and in relation to the realization of their intentions and interests. This especially refers to physical force embodied in the security forces, especially the active part of the military with 129.925 members, reserve with 1,000,000 members and paramilitary forces with 84.900 members, equipped, armed and trained to be confronted with similar or identical military formations of other states. Any other group, including the rebels, as in the case has very little chance, but of course if they directly confront and try to come to expressive this superiority.

This concerns in cases when the military can perform its function, and when the other party has no outside assistance that will create conditions disabling the advantage in case the military official of Ukraine. It showed that, after one and other ground military will face impeding the realization of supremacy which is in terms of rebels. In that case it concerns of morality on the one hand and the ability to realization assistance, coordination, and communication and command the military operations of rebels on the other side.

2. INTEREST AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN POWERS AND RUSSIA OVER THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

Almost without exception, in the conflict after the Cold War, the great powers have their interest and influence. Earlier, they were Western powers led by the United States and later and more intensive also the Russian Federation. Interest and influence increased with the recovery and strengthening as an actor in international relations and bringing the Western powers to its territory and through integrative processes erstwhile allies and especially Soviet republics with Euro-Atlantic structures. The case of Ukraine seemed to be milestone between the readiness for tolerance of the Western powers and the readiness for an adequate response which will prevent this influence and interest as the Western powers and the government of Ukraine that is pro-west oriented. Indirectly this means support of the internal forces rebels who confront the government forces of Ukraine and it seems using a wide range methods and activities, and even engagement of forces able to respond also to military challenges. Without it, it seems that pro-Russian rebels could not exist and confront a longer period, or period as in the case which has already entered the second year and shows no signs of termination of violence and conflict resolution. It is obvious that Ukraine is very important

for the Russian Federation and from several aspects, economic, political, geostrategic, defense and security, and other. In fact, it is one of the most important republics during the Cold War for the Soviet Union. Ukraine, according to the territory, is the third largest republic, and the number of population is smaller only than the Russian Republic. According to the mineral treasure it will be included among the richest republics of the Soviet Union. It produces oil, gas terrestrial, rich in quality iron ore, it has manganese, titanium, nickel and large reserves of stone and black coal with high quality. The largest percentage, about 91% of the reserves of stone and black coal are in the Donetsk Basin, which is also the main area of ferrous metallurgy. With the development of mining, ferrous metallurgy and heavy industry, Ukraine will further strengthen its position and importance of the Soviet Union. From defense- security perspective, its location within the Soviet Union and beyond is very important and also as a border country and as part of the Central European valley.

There is a mostly flat terrain which is favorable for exploitation of armored mechanized joining of the armed forces. All this makes mosaic of the importance of Ukraine to the Soviet Union. During the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of Ukraine as an independent state it seems that its importance and interest to the Soviet Union will increase. We could see this immediately after the end of the Cold War when Russia and the United States have agreed that NATO does not extend east of the Elbe. It is a territory that gravitates towards Russia, and more refers to the countries of the former Soviet republics. In this sense, Ukraine has a special place and role, especially in security, for Russia. Dislocation of that balance seems to Russia is unacceptable. This is especially apparent in conditions when using violence and when Western powers led by the US are involved. Thus, protests and shifting of President Viktor Yanukovich of unconstitutional way, they will proclaim coup in which share and influence will have the Western powers. Basically the new president is a pro-Western orientated with commitment and interest to bring Ukraine and integrate with the Euro-Atlantic structures and the European Union. In response Russia will take care of the ousted President and for Crimea peninsula, which by a referendum will be annexed to Russia. The next step will be applied to support the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Republic of Lugano trying to get their new status. It will significantly affect the disabling of the intentions of the authorities in Kiev about the commitment to closer integration with the Western structures, as well as the intensification of the conflict. For official Russia the conflict will escalate into a civil war and considering the involvement of the Western powers and in particular the United States in the same to overcome borders and turn into a major war. It seems that for Russia the behavior and determination of the authorities in Kiev is unacceptable and in particular the

behavior of the Western powers led by the US, which with the takeover of sanctions and other measures and activities will increasingly differentiate as enemies in the estimates of the Russian Federation. In this sense, the official Russia prepares to take appropriate measures and actions to protect its interests, which include military intervention in Ukraine if necessary to protect the pro-Russian rebels in its southeastern area. Aware of the risk and the danger of escalation of the conflict, official Russia will use diplomatic and perfidious methods of opposition and confrontation, leaving space for the termination and resolving the conflict in a manner acceptable to it. It means respecting the rights, freedoms and orientation of the pro-Russian rebels who are not in positions of government interests in connection with the approach to the Western powers. For Russia the deviation from the course of official neutrality of Ukraine seems to be unacceptable. How it is pronounced, so the answer to Russia is more intense. This is of course indirectly through the rebel forces, but as a military operation.

The epilogue to the end of January 2015 will be very unfavorable to the government forces, which will ultimately produce the Western powers to respond to the request for renewal of the truce. Namely, the truce is the status question of any conflict, in this context also the conflict in Ukraine. In circumstances where the warring sides will come to conclusion that it is necessary to stop the hostilities, even in a short time can come to a truce. It is the status question and it represents a step forward towards the termination of the violence and the signing of a peace agreement. But of course that does not have to be so. This is especially the situation when one of the actors will try to break it, as was the case with the truce of September 2014. After that, hostilities continued until the next truce like this in early 2015. It seems that each successive ceasefire leading to the creation of conditions for termination of violence. This particularly occurs when the truce was general. But, as in the previous case, it does not have to be so. Of course, in order to be like that, the reasons for which will start the conflict have to be overcome. Conversely, no matter what the truce will be, in part or in general, the conflict will continue. This increases the danger to intensify the conflict and overcome the internal borders. The danger of intensification is much greater in conditions as is the case with Ukraine that involved the major powers with conflicting interests.

3. INTEREST AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN POWERS AND ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

Ukraine is one of the most important countries of the European Union in the so-called Eastern Partnership. For the United States, according to Stanko Nisic, control of the entire area of southeastern Europe stretching from

Macedonia to the west to Vienna, east to Baghdad, in the south to Cairo and on the north to Kiev is needed (Nisic, 2002: 23). In addition to realizing the influence and interest will change after the Cold War and of course significant forces in the country with pro-Western orientation and commitment. This in terms of constitution of Ukraine as an independent state will especially come to the fore in 2004 / 2005 when the Orange Revolution will happen. The pro-Western political forces will come in power, which answers to the multitude of problems they will face in the transitional period will request by the rich West. Then it seems that the door for around influence has opened and promoted the interests of Western forces in Ukraine.

The chance would seem to be squandered in conditions when the country will face economic collapse, accompanied by great poverty which will be given an injection but with unacceptable conditions. It will open up space for exhibiting the option that goes beyond the expected and conditioned behavior and offer an affordable option for the wider masses. It is evident that it was not enough just to give financial injection and when it is required to tighten the strap on the already impoverished population. It was needed a small impulse in terms of creating conditions to overcome even small poverty, and through financial support. Such an offer will come from the political forces led by Viktor Yanukovich, which will ultimately produce a broad support from the population and taking the power. For the implementation of the new approach and concept of Yanukovich it was needed cash injection that will be asked from the Western institutions and after they will not get it, it clearly made it know that he would ask on the other side. This will be compounded by the cancellation of associate membership in the European Union. It seems Russia will have an impact on this decision, which will ultimately cause a reaction in the West led by the United States. Street protest will be organized after which it will come to violently taking power and now more direct exposure to the western option. That of course would be unacceptable to the other side, especially for the Russian Federation and especially the ethnic Russian community living in Ukraine. Already in March 2014 dissatisfaction with the new situation through a referendum will be expressed by the citizens of the Crimea peninsula. Over 95% will declare an annexation to Russia. On the other hand, this act of official Ukraine will be understood as utterly unacceptable and hostile. It unequivocally will express the European Union and especially the United States through condemnation and by taking appropriate actions and sanctions. With that, crisis will appear also in other sizes. The very next month, in the eastern part of Ukraine will come to self-proclamation of the two republics, on what official Ukraine will responded with bitter opposition. So, the economic and political crisis will grow into an armed conflict.

For the armed conflicts what is important is the knowledge that failure to create conditions for termination of hostilities will continue and be intensified. In addition, threatening of the security in the region will increase. North Atlantic alliance led by the US in the period after the end of the Cold War has several operations first in Europe and then beyond to other continents which will acquire valuable experience in terms of their termination and building peace and stability. The first three peacekeeping missions of NATO will take place in Europe in the area of the former Yugoslav community. First it will be the case with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where after three and a half years of bloodshed, the NATO with an air campaign will stop the conflict and will lead to the signing of the Dayton peace agreement, and then proceed to build peace and stability. The air campaign would end the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, and then proceed to build peace and stability, and by basing part of its armed forces. In 2001, according to Lord Robertson, then Secretary General of NATO, the main culprit for the prevention of conflicts in Macedonia from erupting into a civil war will be NATO. With that, the alliance will become a growing instrument for resolving political and military crises. Then operations will follow outside the Euro-Atlantic area, in Afghanistan, then in Iraq and Darfur, Sudan, with that experience of their dismissal will increase. Of course that every conflict is the case for itself, but mostly it comes to internal armed conflicts. Typical for them is that they are internalizing and often determining the influence of the Western powers and primarily NATO led by the United States. In the case of Ukraine we have a condition in which influence is made also by other major power, and how an adversary helps and supports the other side in the conflict. Otherwise rebels in Ukraine would have almost no chance of a successful confrontation with the forces of official Ukraine, strengthened with the help and involvement of the Western powers. It probably had been known to the rebels, but better known to official Russia. From here it will also arise the intensity of response on initiation of the conflict. For a short time of the confrontation, the conflict will escalate into a civil war.

The number of losses from day to day will drastically increase, topping the thousand and two, three, four and more than five thousand victims in early 2015. Meanwhile, as is the case with other armed conflicts will come to a truce and attempt to resolve problems faced by both sides as a result of the conflict. It is the moment when seeking a solution for other needs and the reduction of the violence. It turned out that the ceasefire of September 2014 will be required, but will not give any significant results. In fact it will be disturbed. This is mostly due to the support and influence of external forces. Of course NATO and especially the US would accuse the Russian Federation. Conversely Russia now will call its more recent friends and partners - enemies. Hostility will develop to the point where within NATO will again be the

question of war in Europe. In response to this and other security challenges an action plan with clear and comprehensive package of measures will be approved (NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, 2014: 2).

They also refer to the specific hybrid-military threats in connection with the conflict in Ukraine. According to NATO, Russia will carry out military intervention in Ukraine, which will disrupt its independence and territorial integrity. With that the international law and Euro-Atlantic security would seriously contravene. Therefore it requires Russia to stick to the international law and their international obligations and responsibilities: to end its illegal occupation of the Crimea, to refrain from aggressive actions on Ukraine to withdraw its troops, weapons and equipment, and to stop creating tension along and across the border of Ukraine.

To use its influence on the separatists to calm the situation and to take concrete steps to allow political and diplomatic solution that will respect the independence and territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders (NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, 2014: 5). For e.g. Russian separatists argue that caused violence in Ukraine and supported by Russia in order to destabilize Ukraine (Ibid. p.24). And Ukrainian according to estimates of NATO is a key to the Euro-Atlantic security. That brings us back to the beginning of the declaration: in its center is the Action plan and package that will response to safety challenge, on the conflict in Ukraine. With that once again is confirmed the interest and impact and internationalization of an internal conflict, and this time on the one hand the Russian Federation and the other Western powers led by the United States. It makes a very complex conflict and risk to international security and opens questions that require a response and on worst variant on their mutual confrontation. Of course that they are aware about the consequences without exception of all parties involved in the conflict and in particular it seems major powers.

Therefore the expectation is that despite showing muscles, they will look for ways and methods to stop the violence and resolve the conflict. With such attempts and through ceasefire and truce already faced during 2014, despite continued violence and truce was halted early in 2015, will again be triggered mechanism to stop the conflict. This time initiated the concept of Putin for a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Hollande will make an effort and through meetings and adjustments to the official representatives of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, in the Belarusian capital Minsk agree to cease hostilities. The agreement will be signed by the official representatives of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia. Indirectly, though not to sign, place and influence will generate US officials and rebels through Russia. Ceasefire will be negotiated starting on 15 February at 12:00 pm. We are witnessing how it is broken up and after hours, but now apart from the first truce, they are making serious efforts of the signatories to

overcome such situations and to create conditions for the change of status of the conflict. Of course, really, it is realistic to expect that and it may come, but on the other hand, the question is whether it wants the actors in the conflict. This is especially true of US and of course the Russian Federation.

4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

Based on the analyzed material, the crisis in Ukraine has come to several general and specific knowledge and insight. Basically, the crisis has its roots in the period which preceded the collapse of socialism and the disintegration of one of the most powerful military and political groups as the world. Changes and evasion that will face the former Soviet Republic will lead to political, economic and military crisis, and the crisis of the system. The military crisis is an excellent example of an internal armed conflict that by mid-2015 will pass the stages of the outbreak of hostilities and the beginning of hostilities which intensification of conflict will shortly turn into a larger armed conflict, civil war, with over five thousand victims. And one year after the occurrence of hostilities by status conflict will not lead to the termination of hostilities, although it will be accompanied by several attempts for negotiations and ceasefire. It seems that the February negotiating for terminating of hostilities will be closest to the creation of conditions for closing the statutory contents of the conflict. In addition to this recognition goes verification of the document by the official representatives of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia. The next phase of the conflict could be freezing of the conflict or its solving with the signing of a peace agreement.

In terms of the hypothesis, it is evident that after one year of the conflict, in circumstances where manner is required and through dialogue and negotiations on several occasions for a ceasefire to come to its decision, the possibility of its transformation into an international conflict is shrinking.

Just as important stands the fact that in conflict environment such as actors despite government forces and rebels will take part and paramilitary forces, mercenaries, volunteers and other forces. It will significantly influence the determination of NATO request response named hybrid warfare.

It shapes the knowledge that the Russian Federation has certain advantage in reaching influence and interests in terms of Western powers and especially the United States, and it is expected that they will soft its pressure and influence, and the conflict will be closer to the termination of violence and its solving. Otherwise, we will witness its intensification with unforeseeable consequences.

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**SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
TREATS TO THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY**

THE SECURITY THREATS AND THE NEED FOR CREATING A REGIONAL SECURITY CENTRE IN THE WESTERN BALKAN REGION

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Abstract

This paper emphasizes the still neuralgic security state in the region of Western Balkans which is in an incomplete process of Euro-Atlantic and European integrations and is in a sort of “fire line” according to the creators of the security policy for the Western Balkans. In this context, the author particularly focuses on the security threats from the aspects of terrorism, the organized crime and the acts of violence at an anti-state level, related to the states in this region. Regarding an efficient discovery in due time and handling with such security threats, this paper suggest the creation of a Regional Security Centre for the Western Balkans which would integrate the security-counterintelligence, the police and the intelligence aspects of discovering and handling the forms of terrorism, organized crime and violent anti-state acts. The author especially focuses on the structure and function by presenting concise schemes of its organization and function. The creation and function of such Regional Security Centre would be a contribution towards the development of cooperation among states in the region; it would strengthen the state of security and open a wider space for development of the overall democratic relations and faster completion of the processes of Euro-Atlantic and European integrations of states within itself including the Republic of Macedonia.

Key words: security, terrorism, organized crime, security threat, security centre, state of security, intelligence, security function.

Introduction

For the states and citizens of the Western Balkans region, whose member is the Republic of Macedonia as well, the internal conflicts and endeavours for stabilisation of the political and security state have been typical so far, combined with occurrences of forms and methods of activity in the field of terrorism and organized crime. Bearing in mind that the security situation on a wider scale (Ukraine, Syria and Iraq) becomes more and more

complicated, and this, of course, affects the state of the countries from the Western Balkans, it can be concluded that many serious challenges and tasks stand in front of the security and intelligence services from these countries in the forthcoming period. Namely, on the part of the creators of the security policy of USA (state secretary John Carry, for example) as leading NATO members, it has been pointed out that the countries in the Western Balkans and the Republic of Macedonia are in the “fire line” and it is necessary for the NATO alliance to form new regional headquarters in Europe and on the line towards Russia and the states of this military-political alliance should develop a new “initiative for innovations in defence” as part of the decisive action for maintaining an advantage in armament before Russia and China¹. Because of this and with the aim to make a significant step forward towards a complete stabilization of the state of security, especially in due time discovery and prevention of the forms of terrorism and organized crime, I believe that the states of the Western Balkans should form a Regional Centre for addressing security threats. In that sense, the following issues will be elaborated in this text: characteristics of terrorism and organized crime, tangent lines of terrorism and organized crime, the structure and function of the Regional Centre.

Basic features of terrorism

Terrorism represents an extreme occurrence in the sphere of social pathology, it is characterised with a systematic use of violence on the part of individuals, groups and organisations and it is politically motivated and directed towards the realisation of political aims. Its roots are found in the political, social, ideological, ethnical, religious and cultural contradictions that exist in the given states and regions. In recent history, which means since the second half of the 18th century up to present times, terrorism is encountered in different forms and with different intensity of applied violence, from the “revolutionary terror” during the French Bourgeois Revolution to the mass attacks on non-selective targets in the first 15 years of the 21st century. Terrorism has long surpassed the local and state borders, acquiring international dimension and it is a real dubbed global phenomenon².

¹ NATO is already working on the creation of rapid intervention forces with 30 000 soldiers in Eastern Europe, including a “spear” of 5000 soldiers as its “striking fist”. The Pentagon will invest 534 billions of dollars in the programme for innovative weapons to oppose Russia and China, - see “Sloboden Pечат”, Skopje, of 06.02.2015 and 09.02.2015, articles titled “NATO clenches its striking fist in Eastern Europe” and “Pentagon invests 534 billions of dollars in innovative weapons”.

² Extensively on the history of terrorism, see G. Chaliand, A. Blin “History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda”, Tabernakul, Skopje, 2009

For serious understanding of the nature of terrorism a multidisciplinary approach is necessary in studying given conflicts from a historic, political, sociological, security, criminally-legal and criminological aspect. In such a way the laws of conflict occurrence and the tendencies of a given territory and in given time period can be discovered and defined. On this basis it is possible to establish a firmly based hypothesis regarding the occurrence of concrete forms of illegal terrorism by organizing and estimating the effects and the consequences on state, regional and international plan.

With regards to terrorism, its feature elements should be emphasized:

- The political nature of terrorist activity- motives and aims of the carriers of terrorism are political and that is the founding principle of this occurrence, alongside violence (*differentia specifica*);
- Systematic and planned use of violence – using physical force, classical weapons, explosive objects, biological and chemical means and radioactive materials;
- Unconventionality in the use of force- terrorists insist that the particular act of attack is out of the “standard framework” of violence, that is, it is too risky for the immediate executors and ,at the same time, unusually frightening and dangerous for the citizens, especially for the target group;
- Causing intensive and constant fear among members of the target group;
- Spreading their own political stands and messages among citizens- terrorists insist, above all, to point out that they are a factor on the social scene that should be respected;
- Selective and non-selective attacks- the history of terrorism shows that in the choice of the direct attack targets some terrorist associations approach selectively, while other, through the non-selective choice of the attack targets, insist to raise the level of fear and panic among citizens to the highest level.³

The history of terrorism from antiquity to the 21st century recognizes many forms of manifestation, from tyrannicide, sultanism and assassism through the “revolutionary terror” of the Jacobins, the individual terrorism of anarchy groups, to the terrorism of the fascist and Nazi groups (“black terrorism”), left-oriented organizations (“red terrorism”), nationalist and terrorism on religious extremism basis.

³ For elements of terrorism see Voin Dimitrijevic “Terorizam”, Radnicka Stampa, Beograd 1982.

About the techniques and technology of terrorism

Terrorist groups and organizations set final political aims to their members that need to be fulfilled through several systematically prepared, separate acts of violence as part of the phase aims. Their programme basis consists of extreme political, social, ethnic, religious and ideological views, the realisation of which is seen through systematic violence towards selective and non-selective targets. That is to say, the final act of violence represents the pinnacle of the great number of previously fulfilled activities on programme, organizational, financial, propaganda, logistics and training plan. All these activities, of course, are carried out under illegal conditions and with special use of security measures of the terrorist groups and the organisations themselves against discovery.

The overall illegal activities of terrorist groups and organisations can be divided into two groups: violent and non-violent.

The violent activities mean the use of physical force, cold and fire weapons, explosives and explosive objects, biological, chemical and radioactive means towards the victims of the attack.

The non-violent acts include reaching a decision to carry out an attack towards a selected or non-selected target, determining the organiser or commanding headquarters for the realisation of the attacks with special teams for execution of the preparatory activities and team for immediate execution of the terrorist act, as well as determining a special team for receiving and protecting the immediate executors after the act of terrorism has been carried out (team of colluders). In a wider sense, of course, non-violent acts encompass the overall organizational activity, the development of programme and other documents, propaganda activity and receiving membership of new members in the illegal structure.

The violent and non-violent acts of terrorist groups and organisations should be understood as a unit of closely related and interdependent elements⁴. In that sense, when terrorist organizations are the issue it should be taken into consideration that their structure is comprised of a commanding body (command, head office, head quarters, etc) and a wider operative network on the field, comprised of several executive and logistic groups, which are illegally deployed throughout the territorial and working units.

The command body has the tasks to create a programme document of the organization, propaganda and other materials, to organise and manage the overall illegal activity, to reach decisions for the concrete attack targets, to

⁴ M. Mijalkovski, he dubs the non-violent activities of terrorist organizations “non-lethal”, while the violent ones “lethal”. See: M. Mijalkovski, “Terrorism and organized Crime”, FB, Beograd, 2011.

determine the teams which will perform the attacks, the teams for preparations of the executors, logistic teams and the protection teams of the culprits after the execution of the immediate attack.

Terrorist associations insist that the final violent acts, which represent the stroke of the victim, be surprising and spectacular and thus the effects on the wider environment would be stronger and longer-lasting and the humiliation of the responsible bodies of government will be at maximum. The newest means of mass destruction, from nuclear to chemical and biological, which can become available to the terrorist groups and organizations, additionally increase the threat of their unscrupulous use.

Basic features of organized crime

Organised crime, alongside “white collar” crime, represents part of the professional crime and its basic feature is the connection of criminal associations (criminal organisations) with individuals from the government (state functionaries and civil servants) who are responsible for the application of law with the aim of gaining unlawful material profits (“black profit”) in larger amounts and over a longer period⁵.

The criminal association or criminal organization represents one of the central elements in the definition of organized crime, thus its following features need to be emphasized:

- ❖ Its basic aim – achieving unlawful material profit (black profit) in larger amounts and over a longer period of time;
- ❖ Because of the ability for self-financing, the criminal organizations are called criminal enterprises;
- ❖ Internal hierarchical structure (pyramid of decision -making and power);
- ❖ Division of duties among the members – criminal tasks;
- ❖ Committing criminal acts according to the competition on the “black market”
- ❖ Corruption of state functionaries and civil servants who are responsible for the application of law;
- ❖ Systematic use of violence outwardly and inwardly of the criminal organization;
- ❖ Application of unwritten laws on silence and revenge (e.g. known in “Cosa Nostra” as omerta and vendeta);
- ❖ Reinvesting of the “black profit” in committing new criminal acts, “money laundering” and investment in luxury spending;

⁵ On the history of organized crime, in detail, see: Michael Lyman and Gary Potter, “Organised Crime”, Magor, Skopje, 2009

- ❖ Constant struggle for the protection of their own “black market” and conquering new “black markets” in the struggle or cooperation with other criminal organizations (division of the “black market”)⁶.

According to its origin and the spheres of performance of criminal activity, criminal organizations are divided into: criminal organizations of the traditional kind; criminal organizations of professional kind and criminal organizations of adaptable kind.

For each criminal organization the size of the “black market” is of exceptional importance, its territorial distribution and its capacity for consuming given criminal goods. In that sense, it can be concluded that parallel to the internationalising of the overall activities in the world, as well as the production of crisis with elements of violence, there is internationalisation of the “black markets” as well. From security, criminal and criminological aspect, it is very important to follow the movement of the “black market” and to define its dynamics. In fact, the “black market” represents the second basic element of the organised crime.

The third basic element of the organized crime is corruption, which is the connection of the criminal organizations with the representatives from the government (police, prosecution, judiciary, customs, politics, etc.) This is very dangerous for any democratic and legal state because it undermines the legal tissue of the state; it endangers the financial flows and depletes the state funds creating informal centres of power at state and regional level and causes insecurity and fear among the citizens on a given territory.

The fourth basic element of organized crime is the use of violence and the threat with violence on the part of the criminal organizations outwardly and inwardly of the framework of the criminal association. Namely, because of the fact that the criminal association acts in the illegal sphere the use of violence and threat with violence are immanent to the essence of its existence. Violence and threat with violence represent necessary means on the road to achieving and securing the “black profit”, which is its basic aim, on the one hand, and a method of efficient execution of the criminal tasks and self-protection from the authorities of discovery and criminal prosecution (the police and the prosecution, above all) on the other hand. Professional criminals in the criminal associations through the corruption of state functionaries and civil servants and by using the methods of violence and threat with violence create a “criminal network” whose aim is acquiring unlawful material profit.

⁶ On the experiences with criminal organizations, in particular in the USA, see: Gjorgje Ignjatovikj, “Organised criminality”, Police Academy, Belgrade, 1998.

Tangent lines of terrorism and organized crime

Terrorism and organized crime are not isolated socio-pathological occurrences in the overall social reality, which is more and more burdened with conflicts on state, regional and global level. The conflicts become internationalized and so do both terrorism and organized crime, whose illegal activities very often touch, intertwine and depend on the conditions in certain situations on a given territory. It can be said that terrorism and organized crime very often complement and collaborate with each other, using its “comparative advantages” in the illegal sphere. From scientific and professional aspect, the following tangent points or zones of intertwining between terrorism and organized crime should be emphasized:

- The use of illegal infrastructure that the criminal associations possess by the terrorist organizations;
- Illegal procurement, transport and storage of weapons, ammunition and explosive bodies -it is about a mutual favour, depending on the particular conditions on a given territory. The criminal association activates its own illegal network and for that it charges the terrorist organization a previously agreed amount;
- Trafficking people and goods- providing secret shelters and residences and transport for which the criminal organizations are very well equipped and enabled;
- Provision of illegal documents - this is one of the specialties of the criminal associations and it is of great importance to the members of terrorist organisations ;
- Borrowing specialists for attacks on certain targets (murders, kidnappings, etc.) In the slang of illegal associations for the completion of such criminal acts the term “to be done” is used;
- Illegal trade with human organs - because of the huge price on the “black market” this criminal activity is more and more present in the illegal milieu;
- “Money laundering” - a criminal activity which is necessary for both the criminal organizations and the terrorist organizations and which represents a branch of the illegal working with a certain tariff.

In certain historical conditions, when there are armed conflicts and crisis, civil wars and cross-border clashes, part of the criminal associations join in “out of patriotic reasons” in the illegal activities in order to “help” the different paramilitary groups and terrorist organisations (in times of crisis it is very difficult to make a clear distinction between them) which are from “their nationality” and with

“their religious beliefs”⁷. Such was the case on the territory of former SFRJ in the course of the armed conflicts after 1991. In such complicated security situations the presence of the external factor is huge, above all, through the involvement of the intelligence services of the states which have their own strategic interests on the given territory. It is not only the use of classical intelligence methods, but also the use of activities from the arsenal of non-intelligence activities of the intelligence services, which means providing secret instruments for the criminal associations and terrorist organizations in the direction of completing the geostrategic aims of the interested external forces.

The need for establishing a Regional Security Centre for Western Balkans

The due time and efficient discovery and opposition to the security threats represents one of the imperatives of the security systems and their segments in modern states. Thus, in order to achieve better results on this plan, cooperation and coordination of separate segments of state security systems are of particular importance, especially if it is about regions that are characterised by the same or similar manifested forms of security phenomenology. When it comes to the region of Western Balkans I consider that the need for establishing such Regional Security Centre arises from the following reasons:

- The overall security situation in the states, if this region is not still at the required level by the contemporary development of democracy because of the frequent presence of political intervention from EU and OSCE, is very obvious. The states from the region are not EU member states and only one (Albania) is a full NATO member country, nevertheless, all the states are clearly and politically directed towards European and Euro- Atlantic integrations. Therefore, their closer cooperation on security level, through establishing such Regional Centre, would certainly be a contribution towards the set political aim-EU and NATO integration;
- The military hot-spots in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq have also a serious influence on the states from the Western Balkans. Namely,

⁷ Regarding certain aspects of connection of terrorism and organized crime, see: G. Amidžikj and Al Lazikj, “Однос организованог криминала и тероризма”, Proceedings of the International Scientific and Professional Conference “Confronting terrorism- international standards and legal regulations”, Higher School on Internal Affairs and Foundation Hans Seidel, Banjaluka, 29-30.03.2011.

all the states in their immediate neighbourhood are members of NATO and it is understandable that this military-political alliance insists that this region does not remain a vacuum space that would burden its plans for positioning strategic directions towards Russia and Asia. In that sense, a development of cooperation on security level would only raise the quality of the process of achieving higher security standards that would be compatible with NATO and EU members. The second possibility would be to remain on the “line of fire” which would represent the most undesirable option in case of deterioration of the security related to the abovementioned military hot-spots;

- In the field of terrorism the territory of the Western Balkans has already been assessed as a possible recruitment centre for the Islamic fundamentalists who participate in the armed conflict in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, one part of the participants in this armed conflict return to their domicile states where they continue with the extremist activity, very often preparing attacks in Western-European countries. This fact perhaps is most urgently directed to the need of implementing a much closer cooperation among the security and intelligence services of the countries in the Western Balkans⁸ ;
- The illegal trade of narcotic substances traditionally links the transit routes of the criminal associations through the countries of the Western Balkans which closely cooperate and modernize the methods of smuggling;
- The proliferation of arms is a field of the security phenomenology that deserves a special attention for the states of the Western Balkans. The efficient discovery and seizure of illegal armaments, on the one hand, and cutting of the illegal routes of importing arms in this region is, of course, of great interest for all the countries of the Western Balkans;
- The illegal migration more and more burdens the security sphere in the countries of the Western Balkans, above all, as a result of the inflammation of the armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It can be supposed that the waves of illegal migrants in near future will intensify because the given armed conflict incites more and more;
- The illegal outflow of financial means outside of the states of the Western Balkans, through different form of “money laundering”, strongly burdens the financial security of the states of the Western

⁸ In more detail on the Islamistic movements, see: Tarik Kulenovikj, “Political Islam”, VBZ, Zagreb, 2008.

Balkans, which means they bring to their impoverishment. On the other hand, there is a process of investing means in their economies that comes from criminal sources which should be discovered and prevented on time.

The modern set up of the security subjects represent a deepened analysis of all the phenomena that endanger the security by building and checking hypothesis (based on assumptions) for the future action of the stakeholders of the threats. That is the basis for the modernization and raising the quality of the structure and function of all the segments of the security systems, especially in its operational part. Establishing a Regional Security Centre of the Western Balkans can only contribute to accelerating that process because the cooperation and coordination of the appropriate services and their operative-research staff, of course, would be a guarantee plus for reaching relevant conclusions and solutions regarding the treated security phenomena.

The structure of the Regional Security Centre

The Regional Security Centre should incorporate the segments of security services and counter-intelligence, the police and the intelligence service of the states of the Western Balkans, bearing in mind the geographical (territorial)- linear(problematic) method of work. The Centre would have three parts: managing and coordinative; operational and research-informative part (in the practice of the services the term “analytics” is used).

The managerial and coordinative board would be comprised of representatives of the security-counterintelligence, of the police and representatives of the intelligence segment of the states with an adjoining administrative-technical secretariat.

The operational part of the Centre would be comprised of departments according to the security problem of treatment, divided internally in sections according to the state territory on which they apply and the aspect of security approach- security- counterintelligence, police and intelligence. Alongside them, there would be a Department for operational coordination. For example:


- Department for terrorism – would have sections for Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and subsections – security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence;
- Department for organized crime – would have sections for Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and subsections – security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence;

- Department for security - would have sections for Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia;
- Department for operational coordination-would be comprised of one representative of the security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence services of these states.

The analytical – informative part would be comprised of departments and sections analogous to the operational part, for example

- Analytical department for terrorism;
- Analytical department for organized crime;
- Analytical department for security;
- Analytical department for synthesizing research materials and preparation of final security assessments.

Schematically, the Regional Security Centre would look like this
Scheme 1



The function of the Regional Security Centre

The Regional Security Centre would have the following basic functions:

- Operational –research;
- Operational-coordinative;
- Operational-directional;
- Analytically- forecasting;
- International- Coordinative.

The operative-research work should take a fundamental place in the work of the Regional Centre. Namely, the operational research work should start from the extensive knowledge of the scientific researches in the field of security, in this case linked to the states of the Western Balkans. In this sense, the operational-research work should, in a creative way, link the criminological, criminal, security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence approach. This is especially from the aspect of the strong implications that terrorism, organized crime and the violent activities on anti-state plan (diversions, assassinations, sabotages, etc) have on the security situation in the states from the Region and on the Region as a whole. Within the framework of the operational-research work, for example, it would be of interest to the states of the Western Balkans to gather and process data on:

- Activity of individuals with extreme political, national and religious stands, ideas and programmes in the field of a possible creation of illegal forms of activity (groups, organizations, conspiracies, etc.);
- The existence of illegal associations that use violence as a method of action;
- Occurrences of alienation to significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, explosives and explosive bodies;
- Occurrences of illegal trade with larger amounts of weapons, ammunition, explosives and explosive bodies;
- More frequent events of violence from individuals for whom there are indications that they are extreme politicians, national or religious fore sign;
- Serious threats towards the legal government structures;
- Serious threats towards certain political, national, religious and other groups in the states in the region;
- Criminal associations in the Region that represent a security threat;
- Connection of criminal associations from the Region with criminal association and terrorist organizations from the surroundings and the world;
- International illegal trafficking channels for people, cold weapons and technical means that are necessary for the activity of the criminal associations and terrorist organizations in the Region;
- Illegal basis in the world that are also used by criminal associations and the terrorist organizations from the Region;
- Potential targets of terrorist organizations in the Region;
- Plans of terrorist organisations and criminal associations for a long-term activity in the Region.

Operative-research work will result in:

- Determining the criminal and security – sensitive (vulnerable) zones in the Region and
- Creation of an extensive operational database of people, groups and organizations in the region that are involved or for whom there are basic presumptions that they can be included in terrorist activities, criminal forms from the field of organized crime or wider acts of violence on anti-state level⁹.

The analytical processing of the data, especially the phase of synthesis within the framework of the Regional Security Centre will enable a precise determination of trends regarding the movement of the object of interest (terrorism, organized crime, violent acts against the state) in the Region and establishing a hypothesis on short, mid and long term. With this, the work of the security services, police and intelligence services in the Region is alleviated and clearly directed and at the same time it is contributed towards lowering the possibility for mistakes, that is to say, their efficiency is increased. At the same time, due time and quality coordination is established among them on the one side, and among them as a whole and the international factor, which contributes to the stabilization of the state of security in the Region and its wider surrounding (the zone of stability is widened).

Schematically, the functional aspect of the Regional Security Centre of the Western Balkans would look like this:



Scheme 2

The Regional Security Centre of the Western Balkans will, of course, perform its functions in the direction of completing the strategic and national concepts of the states from the Region which are at the same time compatible

⁹ For certain aspects of the operational-research work and security forecasting see: Tome Batkovski, “ Security forecasting in early warning and fighting against organized crime and terrorism” Proceedings of Papers of the scientific and professional conference at Tara, 2013, Police Academy, Belgrade.

with the security concepts of the international factor, with EU and NATO above all. Namely, the sooner stabilization of the Western Balkans Region is also an interest of EU and NATO.

Conclusion

The region of the Western Balkans, as part of Europe, is not yet integrated in EU and NATO (the exception here is Albania). Therefore, it is of interest to the international factor and the states of this region to realize its European and Euro-Atlantic integration sooner. One of the most important preconditions in that direction represents the total and long-term security stabilization of the states of the Region and the Region as a whole. In that sense, of course, one of the priorities of the states in the Region is the efficient fight against terrorism, organized crime and other acts of violence on an anti-state level that enter the field of criminal responsibility. On that level, the establishing of a Regional Security Centre that would integrate the security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence segment of the states of the Western Balkans on a higher level, would represent a major step forward towards the relaxation of the overall security state in the region, the development of mutual trust among the states and will open a space for wider democratization of the social life.

The Regional Security Centre would be structured with respect to the basic aspects of discovery, prevention and elimination of all the manifested forms of terrorism, organized crime and violent anti-state acts. The operational-research, analytical-assessment and coordinative work of the Regional Security centre would provide timely, precise and overall direction of the security-counterintelligence, police and intelligence segment in the security systems of the states in the region towards completion of mutual strategic targets at security level. The overall raising of the quality of cooperation through the Regional Security Centre should represent an enormous contribution in strengthening security in the framework of the states and improving the overall security status of the region as a whole.

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EXTREME CASE OF INSECURITY: VIOLENCE NARRATIVES OF SURVIVORS FROM THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract:

The Bosnian war can be seen as a particularly illustrative case of war sociology, based on the ethnic mixture of the population prior to the war. War antagonists often knew each other from before the war. Serbian soldiers and policemen carried out mass executions, forced flight, and systematic rape and set up concentration camps in their effort to drive away Bosniacs and Croats from northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The warfare was directly targeted against civilians. The material for the study was gathered through qualitative interviews with 27 individuals who survived the war in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina. This study joins those narrative traditions within sociology where oral presentations are seen as both discursive and experience-based. An interactionally inspired perspective on human interaction, through symbols and an ethno-methodological perspective on human stories is a general starting point. In addition, I perceive the concept of war violence as an especially relevant component in those specific stories that I analyzed. Previous research on violence during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a one-sided picture of the phenomenon "war violence". Researchers have emphasized the importance of narratives but they have not focused on narratives about war violence, nor have they analyzed the stories of war violence being a product of interpersonal interaction and meaning-making activity. This article tries to fill this knowledge gap by analyzing the narratives of survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia in the 1990s. The aim is to analyze how the interviewees describe violence during the war, and also to analyze those discursive patterns that contribute in constructing the category "war violence". The analysis shows that the individual's interpretation of the biographical consequences of war violence are intimately related to the subjects own war experiences. All interviewees describe war violence as morally reprehensible. Narratives retelling violent situations, perpetrators of violence and subjected to violence

do not only exist as a mental construction, stories live their lives after the war, and thus have real consequences for individuals and society.

Keywords: violence, war, perpetrator of violence, subjected to violence, narrative, Bosnia.

INTRODUCTION

The starting point of this article is the war that took place in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina and more specifically the interpersonal interpretations of violence and the biographical impact of war-time violence. Serbian soldiers and police targeted their use of violent force directly against the civilian populations in northwestern Bosnia. In their quest to expel Bosniacs¹ and Croats from this area, Serbian soldiers and police used mass executions, forced flight, systematic rape, and concentration camps (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). An earlier research concerning violence during the war in Bosnia presents a one-sided picture of the phenomenon “war violence” as well as of the actors - the “violent perpetrator” and those “subjected to violence.” These studies develop a picture of the phenomenon “war violence” based on analyses of sieges and bombings of cities, killing, rape, and the expulsion of civilians, both adults and children. Examples of violent perpetrators are presented through images of soldiers and police who have killed, raped, and expelled civilians. As an example of “subjected to violence,” we often see images of killed or raped and expelled civilian adults and children (Basic 2015, submitted 1,2,3,4,5; Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007; Houge 2008; Maček 2009; Mannergren Selimovic 2010; Skjelsbæk 2007; Steflja 2010; Stover and Weinstein 2004). Researchers have discovered the importance of post-war narratives but have not paid attention to stories on war violence or analyzed the stories on war violence as a product of interpersonal interaction and as a meaning-creating activity (Blumer 1969/1986; Garfinkel 1967/1984).

The aim of this article is to fill this knowledge gap through analyzing the stories told by survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia during the 1990s. The purpose is to analyze how the survivors describe war-time violence and which discursive patterns emerge in the construction of the category “war violence.” My questions are as follows: How do the interviewees describe war-time violence? Which categories of violence are highlighted in the stories? How do war survivors describe sexual violence and other sexual abuse

¹ Bosnian Muslims began to identify themselves as Bosniacs during the war. The term ‘Bosniac’ is actually an old word meaning ‘Bosnian,’ which is now used both in an official context and everyday language. Both “Bosniac” and “Muslim” are used in the everyday speech.

during the war? In this study, I seek to touch on the phenomenon “war violence” by analyzing the narratives of the informants, namely their descriptions in relation to themselves and others (Riessman 1993, 2008).

The phenomenon “war violence” is a consistent theme in this article. I found that earlier research regarding violence during the war in Bosnia was insufficient for this analysis (Basic 2015, submitted 1,2,3,4,5; Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007; Houge 2008; Maček 2009; Mannergren Selimovic 2010; Skjelsbæk 2007; Steflja 2010; Stover and Weinstein 2004). As an aid for the analysis, I therefore used a somewhat more general sociological research on violence based on interpersonal interaction (Åkerström 2002; Betz 1977; Collins 2008; Katz 1988; Presser 2013; Schinkel 2004; Stanko 2003).

This analysis will show that the interpretation of the biographical consequences of war violence is intimately related to the subject’s own war experiences. In the following, I try to highlight how the creation of the concept “war violence” is made visible when the interviewees², in the empirical material, talk about (1) a new social order in society, (2) human suffering, (3) sexual violence, and (4) slaughter of humans.

STORIES OF WAR VIOLENCE AND NEW SOCIAL ORDER

Earlier research concerning violence during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has noted the importance of post-war stories (Basic 2015, submitted 1,2,3,4,5; Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007; Houge 2008; Maček 2009; Mannergren Selimovic 2010; Skjelsbæk 2007; Steflja 2010; Stover and Weinstein 2004). Stories about the “war violence” phenomenon in

² This article is based on different types of empirical material, especially recorded interviews, carried out with 27 survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and field observations (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995; Holstein and Gubrium 1995). The material for this study was collected during two phases. During phase one, March and November of 2004, I carried out fieldwork in Ljubija, a community in northwestern Bosnia. I interviewed 14 individuals who lived there at that time, five men and two women who had spent the entire war in Ljubija, as well as four men and three women who were expelled from Ljubija during the war but had returned afterwards. Six of the fourteen interviewees were Serbs, five were Bosniacs, and three were Croats. During the first phase, I was in Ljubija carrying out observations, including on buses and at bus stops, marketplaces, and cafés. I even collected and analyzed the daily newspapers that could be bought in Ljubija during my stay. Under phase two, from April through June of 2006, I interviewed nine former concentration camp detainees and four close relatives. The detainees had been placed in the concentration camps by Serbian soldiers and police despite being civilians during the war. At the time of the interviews, some of the interviewees lived in Sweden and some lived in Denmark and some in Norway. Eleven of those interviewed came from the municipality of Prijedor (to which Ljubija belongs). The two remaining interviewees came from two other municipalities in northwestern Bosnia. Ten men and three women were interviewed; three interviewees were Croats and ten were Bosniacs.

my study produce and reproduce the image of disintegration of the social order that existed in the society before the war. Daily use of violence, during the war, is *organized* and *ritualized*, thus becoming a norm in society rather than an exception. The stories on war violence reveal how the existing social order from before the war is rejected, and in its place is the war-time social order that is upheld.

The war made its entrance in Ljubija³ at the end of spring 1992 when Serb soldiers and police took over the local administration without any armed resistance. Several villages in the Ljubija region (for example, Hambarine, Briševo, and Biščani) were shelled by Serbian artillery while media spread propaganda about “Muslim and Croat war crimes against Serbs” to create panic. The residents of these villages were unarmed and sought shelter in the mountains and valleys surrounding Ljubija. A large number of refugees were caught by Serbian soldiers and police. Some were instantly executed in the woods, and some were transported to Ljubija where they first were battered in the central square in Ljubija or at the Ljubija football stadium. Finally, they were executed in the stadium or at other locations around Ljubija (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). One of the interviewees, Vlado, recounted a violent situation from the central square in Ljubija that he witnessed:

I will never forget when there were 15 Muslims lying on their bellies in the center while Serbs beat them and sang “who is saying, who is lying that Serbia is small.” Such uniformed savages, damn it. They jumped on their backs and kicked their heads, which moved lifelessly, like a football. It still echoes in my head how these poor people screamed. The singing too, “who is saying, who is lying.”

Collins (2008) means that it is difficult to take to violence but it is not impossible. Doing so, usually requires charging - you must be trained or drilled by an army or in other ways induced to take the leap, bypassing the tension and fear that usually hold us back when in an escalating confrontation. Vlado’s story retells an episode “in the middle” of an event that had probably been going on for some time. The United Nations, Hague Tribunal, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Tribunal on War Crime report on events that were ongoing a long time before the war started. These reports and sentences present years of Serbian propaganda, mobilization, identity-creation in contrast to others, and the production of degrading images of Croats and Bosniacs. There are

³ Prior to the war, Ljubija was a multicultural society. The inhabitants lived in two administrative communities (Mjesne zajednice). Upper Ljubija was ethnically mixed, and most of the inhabitants lived in flats. Lower Ljubija was predominately inhabited by Bosniacs, and the townscape was dominated by private houses. Most residents worked in the Ljubija iron mine prior to the war.

concrete examples of glorification of violence and the revival of Serbian ideals from earlier wars (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994; ICTY 2015a; ICTY 2015b). Something must also have happened in the central square in Ljubija before the soldiers started jumping on the subjected-to-violence bodies. The soldiers probably underwent some sort of identity change when enlisted in the Serbian army, when they received their uniforms and weapons. The song itself should, using Collins' conceptual apparatus, be interpreted as a way to evoke violence, similar to chants mustering support for a sports team.

Vlado dramatizes the described situation, aiming at presenting the perpetrators' actions as morally despicable ("Such uniformed savages, damn it") and the subjected-to-violence position as a typical example of submission and weakness (Åkerström 2002; Betz 1977; Collins 2008; Wrong 1979). Those stricken by violence lie "on their bellies" and are weak, almost non-acting. I write "almost" because there is one activity that Vlado notices: These individuals scream while being battered. These screams appear in this story 14 years after the described situation. The image of the perpetrators and those subjected to violence does not seem to exist merely as a construction of the mind. Vlado says that it still "echoes" in his head and that he "will never forget." It seems that stories about perpetrators and those subjected to violence still live, even long after the war.

Another thing that still echoes in Vlado's head is the song: "who is saying, who is lying that Serbia is small." Vlado portrays the perpetrators as a coherent violence-exercising group. In his description, he makes an ethnic generalization of the perpetrators and the subjected-to-violence (Katz 1988: p. 237 - 273). Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993) argues that ethnic identity is an ongoing process of relations between actors who perceive themselves as distant from members of other groups with whom they have or feel having a minimum of regular interaction. Ethnic identity is based on the contrast to the others. Hylland Eriksen believes that ethnic identity is most significant when it is perceived as threatened. Vlado did not call the perpetrators soldiers or policemen; he said that "Serbs" used violence and sang a Serbian nationalist song. To ethnically generalize those subjected to violence, Vlado constructs the abused in the situation as "Muslims." He makes a generalization based on opposing positions between categories.

Through his story on war violence, Vlado highlights the decay of social control which, according to his view, occurred at the beginning of the war. Such a display of violence could not be seen in Ljubija before the war. The social control of the pre-war society could not have accepted a situation in which a group of individuals is beaten publicly in an open square, screaming out loud while the perpetrators sing.

It is interesting to see how the perpetrators and the public describe the violent situation in Ljubija's central square. Vlado's story characterizes the perpetrators as confident during the use of violence, so secure that they even sing. Vlado expresses his disgust, but he does not say anything about the public's reactions. Collins (2004, 2008) argues that the use of violence that is justified as a punishment for an alleged crime can verify and enhance the collective opinion, emotions, and conception and thus the social solidarity.

Coherence between those using violence and the public was retold by several of the informants during my field work in Ljubija. (I personally witnessed some parts of that situation during the war; I also asked about it during my field work, and I analyzed parts of my experiences in Basic 2005: p. 31 - 35) During a field interview, Samira told me how she had seen a lifeless body being kicked repeatedly by several individuals in the Ljubija central square while spectators were cheering. The background story is that the media had singled out a pre-war policeman for an assault against Serbian soldiers. A couple of months later, Serbian soldiers captured him in the forests surrounding Ljubija. In Samira's story, his lifeless body was thrown from a lorry on to Ljubija's central square. Samira says that she was standing at a window overlooking the square from a rather high position. She told me that when the information about the capture was released in Ljubija, a "mob" came running from a street into the square as she was watching. She said that hundreds of Serbian soldiers, policemen, civilians, women, and children had come to the square. Several individuals were shooting firearms into the sky, cheering, and at the same time kicking the policeman's lifeless body. Samira particularly spoke of her neighbor and his family participating in this violent situation. In her story, the neighbor, a former employee in the iron mine, is now uniformed and armed. His son is also participating, and he is also armed. He is shooting in the air. The neighbor's wife and daughter are also participating. The wife is dressed in a house-gown (a practical dress only used in and around the home), and the daughter is wearing sports clothes. These two are kicking the lifeless body. After this episode, which happened on the main square in Ljubija, Samira heard that the policeman had been instantly executed when they caught him in the forest, and after the sequence in the square, they transported him to Hambarine where the soldiers roasted him on a spit (field notes). Presser (2013) means that the social reality is versatile, especially in a war situation. In the eyes of the perpetrators and the audience, this "policeman" was a deviator who did not respect the current social order (or rather the current disintegration of social order according to Vlado's and Samira's perspective) and therefore should be punished. The punishment was carried out with public use of violence and through audience participation. It seems the cheering and joy expressed by the audience encouraged the perpetrators, who thus received confirmation for their actions. The

participation of a large number of individuals enables this ceremony, which fulfills the community systems needed to preserve a new social order that allows this type of violence.

Pre-war social control did not allow executions in the woods or kicking a lifeless body in public, in the square. However, during the war, these events served the purpose of empowering unity and enabling the future use of violence. In the mentioned example, we have a situation where the use of violent force increased dramatically in the war society. Collins (2008) argues that the ritualized use of violence, i.e., that which is done on a daily basis, is organized and becomes a norm in a war society. In this case, new deviants and new crimes emerged, for example, refusing to participate in a war-time use of violence. An old social order is rejected, and a new one emerges and is preserved.

STORIES OF WAR VIOLENCE AND HUMAN SUFFERING

Stories of the phenomenon “war violence” produce and reproduce the image of human suffering during the war. In these stories, a correct moral behavior is constructed as a contrast to the stories of suffering during the war. The stories of war violence paint the picture of the perpetrator as someone who is dangerous, evil, and the ideal enemy, as a real but distant criminal who is seen as a clear threat to the existing social order from before the war. The new war order normalized the existence of concentration camps in the society (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T.; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A.; Case No.: IT-99-36-T.; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). The interviewees who were detained in concentration camps told me that inmates died in great numbers because of food shortage, diseases, battering, and planned executions. Firearms were seldom used; instead, they used baseball bats or knives. According to the interviewees, all inmates lost between 20 and 40 kg of body weight and were so emaciated that they had trouble standing up and moving. The general atmosphere and the ritualized use of violence in the camps made the inmates apathetic, and at times, it seemed that they just waited to be killed to end the pain (Basic 2007: 46). Nesim, a former concentration camp detainee, explains: “Behind your back, Goran (Nesim addressing the interviewer by name), just one meter behind you, they slaughtered and flayed people. There was screaming and commotion. It happened beneath the feet of those lying in the last row - I think I was lying in the fourth. I do not know if you have ever heard a man’s shriek of agony, torment, and pain while being tortured. It is totally different from the cries you hear when someone is in emotional distress. I feel chills to this day when I hear someone crying. People were crying because of the torment, they begged to be killed to escape the pain. This makes your blood freeze. /.../ No one got

worse off than Stipo (a person from Prijedor whom both I and Nesim knew), they strapped him between four vans, I could hear this. They tortured him /.../ They battered him several days in a row while drinking and singing: 'there's no guard (garde) without "kokarde" (Serbian cockade) nor no soldier but the "četnik" (chetnik – Serbian paramilitary soldier).

Nesim, like Vlado, emphasizes the "scream," beating, and nationalist songs when describing this violent situation. Moreover, Nesim notes the slaughter of humans, torture, a human "agony," and pain. A special importance is given to the sounds in Nesim's story. That which he hears can be seen as the discursive basis of his presentation of the perpetrator and those struck by the violence. Nesim says, "I feel chills to this day when I hear someone crying," which shows the importance this described situation has in his present life.

The narratives about sexualized war violence also give an example of how the violence persists in its effects to the present day after the war in Bosnia. Milanko says: "I feel sick from it, they put on their uniforms and go out to the villages to rape and kill women," and Radovan too: "Who gives us the right to rape someone's sister and mother." Rada reveals: "During the war, in this apartment, when Briševo was massacred, I was severely beaten by Serbs and my neighbor was raped." Nada also told me that she saw soldiers and policemen through the window as they were "partying by the Glass house. They raped women there. Drunk." The drunken group of soldiers and policemen "continued and raped Gara (Nada's neighbor who was raped)." Bela gives us instance of the personal, individual aspect of this violence and how it carries into post-war social life. She says that "Ranka and Anka (both friends of the interviewee) became pale-white, I asked them what was wrong, and they answered, here comes Laic. He had raped them lots of times during the war".

Even the stories from the concentration camps contain episodes of sexualized war violence; Zahir's story is one example of this: "Savages (Zahir refers to guards), they forced old Adnan (another inmate) to rape a girl, and she was not older than 15 years. They have also forced men on each other." The rapes described seem to have a ritualized element with the "putting on the uniforms" and other systematized factors and appear to have been ethnically targeted. Stories about war violence and human suffering serve to support my argument that war violence in this war was more personalized / individualized - in many cases these are neighbors committing these crimes against people they know or "who are" (People) in their social networks. In many cases violence was of an individualized and personalized nature (people knew each other, (they) were neighbors) with this characterization of the perpetrators as sadistic, powerful and distant monsters.

Interviewees depict the perpetrators as big, strong, evil, and non-human. The suffering created by the perpetrators is making them distant actors and a threat. The portrayal of the perpetrators produces and re-produces the picture of those submitted to this violence as weak and inferior. By categorizing the perpetrators as such, interviewees also instruct others to identify the results of the perpetrators' actions. By pointing out the perpetrators' position, interviewees implicitly points out the perpetrators' complementary contrast - those subjected to violence. Note how perpetrator and the subjected to violence, in the previous empirical example, are constituted simultaneously. The perpetrators' actions are clearly shaped through a concrete dramatization and an explicit designation. Implicitly, interviewees create the correct morality when they reject the actions of the perpetrators. In other words, interviewees' rejection, which reveals itself during the conversation, contains a moral meaning. Presser (2013) argues that a connection exists between war-time violence and the social order. What interviewees tell us could be seen as a verbal reaction to their unfulfilled expectations. These expectations - for example, helping a human in distress - are morally correct actions, which from interviewees' perspective are absent in the violent situation they retell. Nesim and Zahir seem surprised by the guards' extreme use of violence and the suffering they caused. They implicitly construct the morally correct action regarding the violent situation in contrast to that which they told us. Stories about war violence and human suffering are examples of a certain war interaction that includes upholding normality in different relations, partly between perpetrators and those subjected to violence, and partly between the perpetrators and the narrator. These stories are permeated with retold distance between actors where the war's social order is defined. The interviewed in this study portray the perpetrators as dangerous, mad, and evil - on one hand as a clear threat to the pre-war prevailing order, and on the other, as an ideal enemy, a real but distant criminal.

STORIES OF WAR VIOLENCE AND SLAUGHTER OF HUMANS

Narratives on the phenomenon "war violence" produce and reproduce the image of de-humanized, violence-affected actors, often portrayed as slaughtered in violent situations. The narrator's dramatization of violent situations reveals his own experience of threat to his or others' physical existence and ethnic identity; the description of a violent war situation is emphasized through a *symbolism of ritualized ethnic violence*. The use of violence is described as something carried out both through bureaucratic planning (using lists) and without it. The perpetrators are presented as spontaneous, organized, and rational.

The de-humanization of the non-Serb population in northwestern Bosnia led to the killing of more and more people. Bosniacs and Croats were progressively taken to the concentration camps, and beatings and torture occurred on a daily basis in police stations and the military police headquarters. There were several cases of non-Serb killings at mid-day, in front of or behind their homes, in front of their families and neighbors (Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). The interviewees' stories on war violence depict de-humanized and violence-struck actors. These individuals are often mentioned as being slaughtered in violent situations. Alma was arrested together with almost all residents in her village, and the group was guarded by soldiers and police in a schoolyard. She recounted a series of violent situations taking place in her village during the war: There was the famous "Vojvoda" (warlord). He gathered his neighbors at the beginning and cut the throat of them all. They recently found that mass grave and dug up 13 to 14 people. They cut off one man's head and impaled it on a pole; then they called his wife and said that her husband wanted to talk to her.

Stories about war violence and slaughter of humans show that violence in this war was more personalized and individualized. Alma described Vojvoda as a sadistic monster who is in charge also of another ethnic group but who carries out his acts against his own neighbors, thus, personalized, distinct from the typical industrial violence during the Holocaust (Bauman 1991; Browning 1992; Megargee 2013 a, b).

How the war violence turned into another part of everyday life is described by Irfan, who said, "We had all been chosen for the slaughter; we were to be annihilated, full stop. They started with the intellectuals, none of them survived." The perpetrators in northwestern Bosnia had at their disposal lists of people who were "known" in the society, for example, local leaders, intellectuals, politicians, criminals, and wealthy people who were often imprisoned, robbed, and executed (Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). Irfan says, "They started with the intellectuals" and in this way, retrospectively, the perpetrators are presented as organized and rational in their violent actions.

Even stories from the concentration camps contain examples of organized, rational, and spontaneous perpetrators. According to the interviewees, it was common that perpetrators came to the camps looking for people from their lists to batter or kill. Usually, it was after the third beating that the person died. It was also common that murders were carried out on someone's order. One former concentration camp detainee said, "They selected people from an order to be slaughtered." According to the interviewees, someone may have wanted to get rid of a wealthy neighbor who was detained in the camp, in order to take over his property and capital, and

the guards therefore got paid to murder. This happened on a daily basis, according to all interviewees who were detained in concentration camps during the war. The interviewees say that the perpetrators usually searched individuals by name, and sometimes in the morning, they could see that person on a pile of corpses in front of the “white house.” (Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T.; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A.; Case No.: IT-99-36-T.; Greve and Bergsmo 1994)

Several interviewees describe a widespread ritualized use of violence during the war in northwestern Bosnia, and those descriptions often portray an uncivilized and savage slaughter of humans. These stories are filled with images of how fearsome these perpetrators are, for example, when Alma says that “Vojvoda” rules and has the power, his strength cannot be questioned. The perpetrator is often designated as supreme - he is, for example, capable of killing, mutilating, and exterminating families. The dramatization of the war-time situation is amplified with symbolism of ritualized ethnic violence (Collins 2008, 2004; Hylland Eriksen 1993; Katz 1988: 237-273; Presser 2013). The individuals who were slaughtered in the previous empirical examples are Bosniacs and Croats, and those slaughtering them were the Serbian police and soldiers. Alma uses the term “vojvoda.” During the Bosnian war, the term “vojvoda” was used only when talking about Serbian forces warlords. The meaning of the term “vojvoda” is “Serbian warlord.” The importance of ethnic identity is greatest when it is perceived as being threatened (Hylland Eriksen 1993). The referred description depicts the identities of the narrator and those submitted to violence as being just as threatened as their physical existence.

The bureaucratic charge (lists) in the stories on ritualized use of violence during the war could in post-war stories indicate a vindication of violent acts during the war (Presser 2013). The image created suggests that the perpetrators had some kind of permission and “right” to kill those subjected to violence, and that those “visible” in society had a stamp on them that made them especially susceptible to war violence that became normatively accepted in society. Reality is versatile, according to Presser (2013), especially during a war. Something that is considered the worst atrocity by most people, such as aiming violence against civilians might be seen as an act of heroism among others, probably depending on whether the war has ended or not or if the violent sequence is retold or observed, and depending on who is telling the story.

CONCLUSION

An earlier research on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina recognized the importance of post-war narratives (Basic 2015, submitted 1,2,3,4,5;

Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007; Houge 2008; Maček 2009; Mannergren Selimovic 2010; Skjelsbæk 2007; Steflja 2010; Stover and Weinstein 2004). However, these analyses do not focus on narratives about the “war violence” phenomenon itself. In an attempt to fill this knowledge gap, my primary purpose is to describe how the actual actors portray violence during the war. My secondary goal is to analyze which discursive patterns participate in creating the category “war violence.” My empirical material is analyzed using research on violence based on interpersonal interaction. (Åkerström 2002; Betz 1977; Collins 2008; Katz 1988; Presser 2013; Schinkel 2004; Stanko 2003).

This study shows that after the war in Bosnia, the interpretations of biographical consequences of violence are intimately connected to previous war experiences. Narratives on the phenomenon “war violence” depict a decay of pre-war social order. The use of violence during the war is described as *organized* and *ritualized*, which implies that the use of violence became a norm in society, rather than the exception.

The narratives on the phenomenon “war violence” produce and reproduce the image of human suffering and slaughter. Those subjected to violence are portrayed in a de-humanized fashion and branded as suitable to be exposed to it. In these stories, morally correct actions are constructed as a contrast to the narratives on war violence. In these descriptions, the perpetrator is depicted as a dangerous, evil, and ideal enemy. He is portrayed as a real and powerful yet alien criminal who is said to pose a clear threat to the social order existing before the war. The narratives on wartime violence, war perpetrators, and those subjected to violence during war are enhanced with symbolism of ritualized ethnic violence (“cockade,” “chetnik,” “Serb,” “Muslim,” “warlord”). On one hand, the narrators make an ethnic generalization based on the differences between the ethnic categorizations; on the other hand, they present their own physical existence and ethnic identity and that of those subjected to violence as being threatened by the violent situation.

The disintegration of the existing, pre-war social order produces and reproduces a norm resolution that enables the ritualized war-time use of violence. This development allows the normalization of war violence in this time period even though the result, as this study shows, means human suffering and the slaughter of humans. This study presents this development in society ambivalently, as both allowed and normatively correct (during the war) and as prohibited and condemned (primarily in retrospect, in post-war narratives). It seems as if the category “war violence” means different things depending on whether it happened during a war or not, whether it is retold or observed, and who is telling the story. For some persons, violence targeting civilians during the war is an act of heroism (see also Basic 2014: p. 216). The Holocaust during the Second World War was in many cases highly efficient

and industrialized; the typical goal was to kill from a distance, impersonally (Bauman 1991; Browning 1992; Megargee 2013 a, b). Researchers have noted that those who climbed the ranks to leadership positions or were in charge at concentration camps seemed to have engaged in very personal, sadistic acts in Germany during the Second World War. Is there an interaction of rank / power in wartime and level of motivation / energy input required for violence (i.e., those in charge require less energy input because of the factors that put them in charge in the first place)? The stories and phrasing in this paper emphasize a distant, evil, and / or powerful leader who motivates the crowd (perhaps in part by symbolically reducing an ethnic target to something like a dog or rat) or gives orders, with the distinction from Holocaust violence that the leaders in these stories were neighbors, etc., of those they were harming and killing.

In general contrast, the war violence in Bosnia was more broadly characterized by the *individualized use of violence*, in which the perpetrators often knew those subjected to violence. The stories reveal that firearms were seldom used; instead, the weapons were baseball bats or knives. These features can be compared to examples of violence in Rwanda, e.g., Hatzfeld (2005), where the violence was more similar (and even more “savage”) to that in my material than the typical examples of industrialized extermination violence of the Second World War.

The perpetrators in this study are often portrayed as people who enjoyed humiliating, battering, murdering, and inflicting pain in different ways. This characterization is a contrast to Collins (2008), who suggests that soldiers are not good in acting out *close violence* and that individuals are mostly inclined to consensus and solidarity. An explanation, in my study, of the soldiers’ actions can be that soldiers in a war are pressured into being brave in a close combat, the aim being to reign over the others, the enemy. During war, enemies are targets of violence, to be subjected to it and neutralized. Soldiers and police in northwestern Bosnia were not close to any battlefield, and civilians thus were framed in the enemy role. By exposing civilians to violence, soldiers proved their supremacy over the enemy even when the enemy was an abstract type, unarmed and harmless (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). Another explanation might be found in the degree of mobilization and emotional charge that occurred before the war, through the demonization of the enemy. People were probably brutalized through this process.

Those interpersonal interactions that caused the violence continue even after the violent situation is over. Recollections from perpetrators and those subjected to violence of the war do not exist only as verbal constructions in Bosnia of today. Stories about violent situations live their own lives after the war and continue being important to individuals and social life. Individuals

who were expelled from northwestern Bosnia during the war in the 1990s are, in a legal sense, in a recognized violence-afflicted victim category. They suffered crimes against humanity, including most types of violent crimes (Case No.: IT-95-8-S; Case No.: IT-97-24-T.; Case No.: IT-98-30/1-A; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). Several perpetrators were sentenced by the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015; ICTY 2015a; ICTY 2015b). The crimes committed in Prijedor and Ljubija are qualified as a genocide according to indictments against former Serbian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT). All but two of the interviewees in this study experienced and survived the war in Prijedor and / or Ljubija. These individuals have a present, ongoing relation with these communities: Some live there permanently, and some spend their summers in Prijedor and / or Ljubija (Basic submitted 3). An analysis of the processing of experienced or described violent situations in a society that exists as a product of a series of violent acts during the war must be conducted in parallel both at the institutional and individual levels. Institutions in the administrative entity Republic of Srpska (to which Prijedor and Ljubija now belong administratively) deny the genocide, and this approach to war-time events becomes a central theme in future, post-war analysis of the phenomena “war violence,” “victimhood,” and “reconciliation” (compare Becirevics’ [2010] analysis of denial of genocide in Bosnia). The existence of the Republic of Srpska is based on genocide committed in Prijedor, Ljubija, and other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Case No.: IT-09-92-PT; Case No.: IT-95-5/18-PT; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve and Bergsmo 1994). Therefore, it is very important to analyze the political elite’s denial of the systematic acts of violence during the war that has been conveyed by the Hague Tribunal, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime, and Bosnian media. The narratives in my empirical material seem to be influenced by (or coherent with) the rhetoric mediated in these fora. When informants emphasize extermination and the systematization of violence during the war, they produce and reproduce the image of a mutual struggle on a collective level. The aim of this struggle seems to be that the described acts of violence be recognized as genocide. Another interesting aspect of the phenomenon “war violence,” to be examined in a future analysis, regards the stories of perpetrators describing violent situations (Athens 1997; Katz 1988). Conversations with these actors and an analysis of their stories might add a nuanced perspective of the phenomenon “war violence.” Another question that emerged during my work on this article is: what importance is given to stories told by the perpetrator of violence and those subjected to violence in the development of a post-war society? I believe it is of great importance to study stories in both categories. By recounting their

stories, those subjected to violence could obtain recognition and some degree of self-esteem and the perpetrators be given a chance to explain to themselves and others, display shame over their actions, and possibly restore their social status. Without this type of process, those who are subjected to violence risk a life without recognition, and the perpetrators risk being permanently bound by their war-time actions, a clearly unstable foundation for the future development of a post-war society.

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ADVERSE RISK AND NATURAL PROCESSES AND PHENOMENA AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

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Abstract

In the recent decades the Earth experienced significant natural processes with significant adverse consequences for humanity. Earth is facing a dangerous natural phenomena - geodynamic hazards (earthquakes, landslides, rock falls, etc.), global climate change and others. Europe has been the subject of significant rainfall and flooding. This applies to the Balkan Peninsula and Bulgaria as well. Increased and accelerated significantly, erosion and gravitational processes are primarily in the Danube River and the Black Sea coast. Unfortunately, governmental, regionalal, and municipal authorities were not prepared to face the risk of adverse natural phenomena. In the present study there is an attempt to systematize the types of natural hazards. In the group of endogenous processes that are characterised with sudden effect in significant volume are considered earthquakes - in their chronological and regional aspect. Endo exogenous processes and phenomena are covered in similar terms landslides and landslips in Bulgaria. In the current study are also covered the main risks of adverse climatic and hydrological processes as torrential rains and floods. Indicated geographical points with absolute minimum and maximum values of rainfall and the regions with the most frequent floods. Clearly, there are areas with the greatest risk of torrents and floods. In conclusion, in this study are listed some conclusions and recommendations.

Keywords: risk management, natural processes and phenomena, landslides, floods, and earthquakes

INTRODUCTION

At the present stage in the development of human civilization, a number of complex problems arised covering the entire globe. That is why they are called global. The solution of global problems requires radical and systematic efforts of all nations and representatives of various sciences. In the

recent decades, the Earth has experienced significant natural processes with significant negative consequences for humanity. The Earth is facing dangerous natural phenomena - geodynamic hazards (earthquakes, landslides, rock falls, etc.), global climate changes and others. Europe has become a subject of significant rainfall and flooding. This applies to the Republic of Bulgaria, and the Balkan Peninsula as well. There were increased and accelerated gravitational erosion processes primarily along the Danube River and the Black Sea coast. Unfortunately, the governmental, regional, and municipal authorities were not prepared to face the risk of adverse natural phenomena.

The present study is an attempt to systematize the types of natural hazards. Within the group of endogenous processes with sudden action, a significant attention is paid to the earthquakes, which are considered in their chronological and radical aspect. In the group of endo-exogenous processes and phenomena, the landslides and landslips in the Republic of Bulgaria are covered in similar terms. The current study has also covered the main unfavorable climatic and hydrological processes, such as torrential rains and floods. It indicates the geographical points with minimum and maximum values of rainfall and the regions with most frequent recurrence of floods, clearly outlines the areas with the greatest risk of torrents and floods, and highlights the role of geography in the study of these processes. For all these unfavorable risky natural processes and phenomena, the national security of the Republic of Bulgaria is largely endangered.

THE RISK IN THE ENVIRONMENT

In the literature there is a considerable amount of research devoted to the risk in the environment. Most authors share the opinion that the risk is the probability of occurrence of an unfavourable natural or anthropogenically conditioned event that threatens to inflict particular damage on society [6]. The same source defines the concept of risk management as a tool or system of activities to forecast, reduce or prevent disasters, accidents and crises of all kinds, as well as to overcome the consequences caused by them and implement rehabilitation work after their occurrence [6], [10]

In the scientific literature there are many studies on the risks in the environment. There are different classifications of risky natural processes. According to the most popular American classification, they are divided into three groups - geological risk, atmospheric risk, and others. The first group includes earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, landslides, floods, rock falls, and an impact of space objects. In the group of atmospheric risk, tropical cyclones, tornadoes, droughts, thunderstorms and lightning are considered. The third group includes all natural risks that are not included in the first two. For example - insects, diseases, epidemics, fires, and others. [16]

In the UN report, the risky natural processes and phenomena are divided into meteorological, topographic, tectonic and biological. The group of meteorological ones includes hurricanes, tornadoes, cyclones, torrential rains, floods, lightning, blizzards, droughts, heat waves, and extremely high and low temperatures. The topographic group takes landslides and rock falls; the tectonic group - earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and the biological group - invasions of locusts, bugs, etc. [7] [16]

For the purposes of the present study we consider endogenous processes with a sudden action having risk nature - earthquakes; in the group of endo-exogenous processes - landslides, rock falls and collapses; in the group of unfavorable weather and hydrological phenomena - torrential rains, floods, high water and others.

Endogenetic processes with sudden action of risky nature

For the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, in this group the earthquakes are most important. Bulgaria is part of the Aegean seismic zone of the Mediterranean seismic belt. The seismic foci in neighboring Romania, Macedonia, northern Greece and north-western Turkey also have an influence on the seismicity of the country. Earthquakes with an intensity from 7 degree or magnitude range 5.0-6.0 can be defined as unfavorable processes. Their manifestation has a negative impact on the society in socio - psychological aspect. The permanent release of energy through smaller quakes can be considered as relatively positive. The tremors of an intensity exceeding the above are considered dangerous, as they result in serious damage and casualties. [11], [4], [5], [3]. Of over 250 seismic foci in Bulgaria, most are in southern Bulgaria. [11] Chronologically, significant earthquakes were recorded in the following order - 1818 and 1858 (Sofia); 1894 (Dulovo); 1904 (valley of the Struma river near Krupnik) with a magnitude of 7.8 degrees on the Richter scale; 1901 in the sea near Shabla (7.0); 1913 near Gorna Oriahovitsa (7.0); 1928 - Chirpan region (7.0); 1986 near Strazhica (6.7). There was a considerable damage in the country also after two major earthquakes in the Vrancea mountains (Romania) in 1940 and 1977. The latter caused serious damage for the town of Svishtov, with a magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter scale. In this case there was an increase in the intensity and the devastating impact of the alluvial and loess accumulation cover in Svishtov - Belene lowlands. All seismic tremors until today have been mainly in and around the listed epicenters. A number of Bulgarian scientists led by the Academician Ek. Bonchev made a summary of the seismicity in the country. Also, a set of maps have been created in scale 1: 1 000 000. The maps have a very important prognostic character because they reflect the spatial location and the maximum possible intensity of all seismic areas. [4] [5]

According to several studies in Bulgaria the following seismic zones exist: Dobrudzha - Black Sea Coast, Upper - Thracian, Tundzha, Rhodope, Struma, Mesta, Gorna Oryahovitsa, Sofia. The general conclusion that can be drawn is that in Bulgaria there are clearly outlined areas of high seismic risk, where the efforts of managing authorities can be focused to reduce the damage and victims.

Endo - exogenous processes

In the group of endo - exogenous processes, the landslides are the greatest danger to society. For the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, about 913 landslides have been tested. Most of them are active (510) or 56%. The remaining 403 landslides are relatively stabilized. All landslides represent a substantial area of over 20 thousand hectares. Most of them are located in areas of the Danube and the Black Sea coast. [4] [5] [13] Due to the heavy rainfall in the recent years, the number of landslides has exceeded 1800.

Along the Danube river there are whole strips of landslide areas (eg. between the town of Dunavtsi, Vidin region, and the mouth of the Iskar river); the region of Nikopol, Svishtov, Rouse, Tutrakan, and Silistra. There is major landslide damage in the villages of Elanovtsi (1972), G. Tsibar (1980), Orsoya (1978, 1988), Slivata, and others. The significant concentration of landslides was registered in the Nikopol municipality - over 80 cases, 12 of which are in the town. Only in Veliko Tarnovo area they are above 122 (including the municipality of V. Tarnovo - 3 cases, Zlatarica - 25, Svishtov - 20, Strazhica - 16, Lyaskovets - 16, Elena - 10, Gorna Oriahovitsa - 3, and Pavlikeni - 1. A lower number of landslides occur in the areas of the towns of Iskar, Pleven, Byala, Rousse region, and others.

There are large areas with landslides also on the cliff shoreline of the Black Sea, a total about 200, which cover 52 kilometers of the coastline (mainly between Durankulak and Varna) with a total area of 5400 hectares. Fewer landslides are located in Southern Bulgaria - for example, the Eastern Rhodopes, the valleys of the rivers Struma and Mesta, etc. [1], [3], [4], [5], [13]. All these landslide areas are activated during snowmelt and heavy rainfall as in the recent years (2010 - 2014). This group also includes other unfavorable processes and phenomena, such as landslips and soil subsidence. The landslips are located in Northeastern Bulgaria, including the Black Sea coast, and the Eastern Rhodopes. Landslides are characteristic mainly for the mountainous regions. The landslide with the maximum adverse effect occurred near Veliko Tarnovo. It destroyed a part of the Preobrazhenski Monastery (1991).

Unfavourable climatic and hydrological phenomena

These include heavy rainfall, droughts, hail, frost, fog, and many others. In the current study we pay attention to torrential rains that are with the largest adverse effect. In the long history of Earth, the climate system has always been very dynamic with chaotic processes involved and continuous alternating periods of warming and periods of cold. Geologists have found that global warming began after the end of the last ice age, and continues today. The exact measurements show that over the past 130 years the average surface temperature has risen by the insignificant 0,8 °C. However, the increase leads to many negative effects with a lasting impact. Practically, the economic activity of man is not the prime cause of this process, but simply reinforces it. [11]

In the recent years, significant areas of Europe, including the Balkan Peninsula are covered by torrential rains. Floods have been registered in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Bulgaria is not an exception to these processes. In terms of climate, Bulgaria is on the border between moderate - continental and transitional - continental climate. Due to the prevailing northwest transport of air masses for the territory of the country, there is a usual reduction in the rainfall from west to east. The average rainfall in the country is typically between 550 - 650 mm per year in the plains and valleys and about 800 - 100 mm in the mountain regions. In the scientific literature it is assumed that the annual minima of precipitation are typical of northeastern Bulgaria and the Gornotrakiiska Valley. The absolute minimums were measured in the village of Krasen, Dobrich region in 1965 - 146 mm, and also at cape Kaliakra station - 411 mm and the village of Durankulak - 440 mm. The highest annual rainfall is typical of Stara Planina, Vitosha and the Rhodopes. The absolute annual values were measured at Dalgi Dyal station, Montana - 2293 mm in 1957, in Chekalarevo village, Kardzhali - 1188 mm, and others. [13] The absolute maximum of overnight precipitation was measured at several stations in different years (eg. Constantine and Elena near Varna - 342 mm (1951); In the same area the amount of 258 mm was measured as well. Significant amounts of precipitation were measured in the town of Tsar Kaloyan , Razgrad region on 7 August 2007 - 291 mm, which is 12 times above the norm. [14] Mainly, heavy rainfalls were measured in the Rhodopes - Chekalarevo station, Kardzhali - 226 mm in 1968, in 1970 - 234 mm in Zlatograd station, and others. [3], [4], [5], [13]. In addition to the examples above, others can also be given, but the overall conclusion is that places with heavy rainfall (or over 50 mm a day) are basically repeated over the years and these are the areas with floods in Bulgaria (eg. Varna, Asparuhovo).

In this group of adverse phenomena we put also floods. This is due to the fact that the key factors contributing flooding are climate changes and

related to them heavy rains and deforestation. The Danube River is one of the major European rivers and it has an important international dimension. The Bulgarian section of the river has a length of 470 km. The flow mode is formed mainly in its upper and middle course, and for our area Sava and Tisa are the most important rivers. Bulgarian tributaries have much smaller flow. The average long standing flow of the river at Novo Selo station is 5700m³ / s, and the minimum is 2380m³ / s at the same station to about 2600 m³ / s at Silistra station. [13] [2] The maximum flow of the Danube is in late spring and early summer. This period is known as the cherry waters. The minimum is in the autumn, when it creates problems for shipping. For the most part, the Bulgarian coast is high, but in many places floods are observed (Vidin, Lom, Nikopol, Vardim, Ruse, and others.). The larger floods alternate every few years (1897, 1932, 1937, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1954, 1956, 2005, 2006, etc.). In 1942, Vidin is flooded by an 11 meter wave, which is an absolute maximum. The dikes built between 1920 and 1950 need reconstruction. [13], [2]

Over the years, the territory of Bulgaria has been covered by catastrophic floods. Besides those along the Danube river, we have such floods also on the inland rivers. Rositsa River at Sevlievo is undoubtedly with the highest floods, when its waters rose by 7.5 meters and the flow reached 2760 m³ / s. (June 1939). Then 47 people died. Huge floods have been registered also along the rivers of Maritsa (1911., 1953), Rusenski Lom (1924), Yantra (1944) Tundzha (1951), Arda (1958), and Varbitsa (1990). In this area, floods were repeated in 1996 and thereafter. [4], [13], [14] The absolute maximum run-off was marked at these events, as expected, near the village of Batoshevo (1939) - Rositsa river - 9740dm³ / s / km², which is the absolute run-off module in Bulgaria. With high values it is also at the Krumovitsa river 4209 dm³ / s / km².

After 2000, the catastrophic earthquakes in the country increased (2005, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014). These huge floods destroyed a major part of the infrastructure, and Bulgaria gave more than 40 victims: in Beli Lom river, the town of Tsar Kaloyan (7 August 2007), 8 people died; the village of Biser, Harmanliiska River (6 August 2012) - 11 victims, Varna, Asparuhovo - 14 victims, and Dobrich - 2 victims (19 September 2014); Burgas (6 September 2014) - 3 victims. Particularly devastating is the latest high water at Skat River near the town of Misia and Krushovitsa village, when more than 100 buildings were destroyed and there was one victim.)

The analysis that can be done shows that torrential rains and river flooding, and hence floods are to a large extent with repeatability. A typical example are the rivers of Rositsa (Sevlievo), Yantra (V. Tarnovo), Belica, Varbitsa, Ogosta, and the rivers along the Black Sea coast, tributaries of the Maritsa river and others. According to a research done by scientists of BAS,

the territory of Bulgaria is covered by an average of 37 flood settings yearly. The authors divide the rivers in the country in 5 degrees:

- Rivers with the least strong torrential character - average frequency below 2 - 3 cases per year. This includes small rivers in the Danube Plain (200 - 300m altitude), in Rila - Rhodope Massif and Vitosha (over 1500 m);
- Rivers with a slightly strong torrential character - up to 4 - 6 cases per year (e.g. the rivers of Rusenski Lom, Vrana, Topolovets, Ogosta - the lower stream, Nishava, Gorna and Sredna Struma, Topolnitsa, Chepinska Chepelarska, the middle course of the Iskar river and others);
- Rivers with a medium strong torrential character - up to 6 - 7 cases per year (e.g. Lom, the upper stream of Ogosta, Average Tunja, Sazliika, Treklyanska, Dragovishtitsa, Vacha, etc.);
- Rivers with a very strong torrential character - up to 8 - 9 cases per year (Botunya, Vit, Osam, the middle course of Rositsa, Dzhulyunitsa, Golyama Kamchia, Luda Kamchia, Fakiiska, and Veleka);
- Rivers with the strongest torrential character - more than 8 - 9 cases per year. This is the group of the most - frequent floods. Herein are the rivers of Rositsa - the upper stream, Dryanovska Bistrica, Smolyanska Bistrica, Omurovska, Arda - the middle stream, Rusokastrenska, Sredetska, Mativir, and others. [4], [5]

Following that categorization, we can see that a significant area of the country - over 50%, is with a very strong torrential character of the rivers, which creates flooding conditions.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this survey, a number of topical issues are considered of the study of adverse natural processes and phenomena. The main conclusions and recommendations that can be mentioned are:

- there is an increasing scientific interest in managing the risk of adverse processes and phenomena;
- there is a significant correlation between the endogenous and exogenous unfavorable and risk processes;
- there is a direct link between the climate change, heavy rains, and floods;
- repeatability is clearly registered in some areas of adverse natural processes and phenomena;
- with the help of different sciences including geography, natural disasters can be prevented or their impact be limited;

- by using modern geographical methods (GIS, etc.), quality and contemporary plans should be made for risk management;

In its current form, all authorities of the disaster and accident risk management at all levels cannot perform their tasks. It is necessary to create the State Disaster Management Committee at the Council of Ministers which would bring together the departments previously existing in different ministries at the Presidency, regional governors, mayors, and others.

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THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AS A SECURITY THREAT IN THE FUNCTION OF REALIZATION OF TERRORISTIC AIMS

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Abstract

The main object of the paper is the global threat caused by the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations. Weapons of mass destruction are a threat to the global security. Harmfulness of weapons of mass destruction can be seen at many levels, through its wide range of activities, the mass and its survival after initial use for the purpose for which it was used.

The aim of the paper is scientifically and theoretically to analyze weapons of mass destruction through the identification and differentiation of its types, characteristics and effects. In this regard, in the paper, the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their destructive power and danger to cause a huge number of casualties by their usage will be considered separately.

The possibility that sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology and others can be abused in the creation of weapons of mass destruction posed a serious threat to human life and the environment.

Keywords: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, threats, terrorist organizations.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The use or threatened use of WMD significantly influenced the security environment of the 20th century and will also impact the international security in the foreseeable future. Strides in modern technology and scientific discoveries (especially the development of chemistry, biology and physics) have opened the door to even more destructive weapons. In the recent years, the changing world political climate influenced the beginning of a trend, the old and the new terroristic organizations to carry out more violence than before in order to achieve their goals. The terrorists threaten and use more violent and deadly tactics, techniques and weapons for attacking the opposing forces in their own country and abroad. The traditional methods have ceased to be psychologically effective and sufficient to attract the attention of the public, so the new terrorists recognize the weapons of mass destruction as a new possibility, which is allowed by the advancement of the technology. The term weapon of mass destruction was first introduced in the United States after the Cold War, the moment when the proliferation of all three categories of weapons (chemical, biological, and nuclear) became the main priority and top priority of internal and foreign policy of the United States. The stimulating factors affecting the terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction are causing one or more goals in an economic and dramatic way¹:

- mass casualties;
- overloading of the systems for response in emergencies;
- disruption of normal life in the cities;
- closure and pollution of facilities;
- panic and confusion;
- causing mistrust in the government that can protect the population and prevent terrorist activities.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery such as ballistic missiles are a growing threat to the international peace and security. While the international treaty regimes and export controls arrangements have slowed the spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, a number of states have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a growing threat. Proliferation is driven by a small number of countries and non-state actors, but presents a real threat through the spread of technologies and information and because proliferating countries

¹ Zlate Dimovski, Ice Ilijevski, *International Terrorism*, Faculty of Security, Skopje, 2011, p. 155

may help one another. These developments take place outside the current control regime. The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery adds a new critical dimension to this threat. Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control can make an essential contribution in the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non state actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive materials, and means of delivery.²

The danger of international terrorism has never been as great as it is today, and that is due to the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction in terrorist attacks as a result of the proliferation of this type of weapon. The threat to global security is growing and is largely associated with the development of technology and weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist incidents in the past would have been minor, but the real concern is if terrorists use weapons of mass destruction that would cause mass casualties.

TYPES AND CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS FOR MASS DESTRUCTION

The weapon of mass destruction is different from the rest of the weapons used by terrorist organizations, because as a primary ingredient it includes military, chemical, and biological warfare technologies with agents, radioactive materials or explosives. This weapon has a huge destructive potential and the opportunity to harm thousands of people. The weapons of mass destruction proliferation usually focus on technology and materials like precursor chemicals, biological agents, toxins, and uranium. Yet, delivery devices, projectile weapons, launch platforms and guidance systems are essential components. Weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but also their delivery means – from long-range ballistic missiles to suitcases.

Although, there are a number of definitions and classifications (our remark) of weapons of mass destruction, they all fall into one of the six categories:³

² More of this in the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 10.12.2003. This Strategy contains 3 chapters: Chapter I Proliferation of WMD and means of delivery is a growing threat to international peace and security, Chapter II, the European Union cannot ignore these dangers. It must seek an effective multilateral response to this threat, Chapter III, the European Union must make use of all its instruments to prevent, deter, halt, and if possible eliminate proliferation programs that cause concern at global level.

³ Seth W. Carus., *Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 6

- weapons of mass destruction as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC);
- weapons of mass destruction as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN);
- weapons of mass destruction as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear and high explosive weapons (CBRNE);
- weapons of mass destruction as CBRN weapons that can cause mass destruction or mass casualties;
- weapons of mass destruction, which includes some CBRN weapons, but not limited to CBRN and can cause mass destruction or mass casualties;
- weapons of mass destruction which has a mass effect and can cause mass destruction or mass casualties or the main reason is mass disorder.

Chemical weapon

The chemical weapons as unconventional weapons use certain chemicals that have the potential to cause death or serious damage to the health of human beings, but also have adverse effects on the flora and fauna.

According to the Law for prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in the Republic of Macedonia, the Chemical Weapons include:⁴

- toxic chemicals and their component parts, except when applied to order when not prohibited by the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and while the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
- munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through their toxic content, which would be released by activation of such ammunition and equipment, and
- any equipment specifically designed for use directly related to the activation of the ammunition and means.

The chemical substances of the chemical weapons can easily enter the human body and damage it. The ways of entering these dangerous substances are by inhalation, through the digestive system (by eating, drinking) and per cute way (through the eyes, skin, and mucous membranes). The speed of action of the active substances depends on the beginning of their effect. The negative effects can begin immediately (a few seconds to several minutes) or it can take several hours to manifest themselves in the environment. In both these situations it affects very quickly on the wildlife that is damaged and

⁴ Law for prohibition of development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapon (Official gazette 71/2006, 136/2011) Article 2, item 1

destroyed. There are four types of chemical agents, depending on the way they cause the damage: agents used in cooking, agents that cause gases that affect the blood and nerve gases.⁵ Agents for chemical weapons used by terrorist organizations are:

- standard toxic industrial chemicals used an improvised / expedient way to obtain the same or similar terroristic results;
- super toxic chemicals that are produced and used for deliberately poisoning of the victims (usually, they are military in their nature and similar to the hazardous industrial chemicals, but hundreds of times more toxic).

The facilities required for cultivation and production of many biological weapons require only basic skills and tools that can be found in most laboratories. Many factories for pesticides can easily switch to the primary production of chemical weapons, and many pesticides and their byproducts require only slight reformulation to become toxic and dangerous to humans.

Biological weapon

The biological weapon compared to other types of weapon of mass destruction is more practical for use by terrorist organizations because it is easier to obtain and transport it to the destination, and can cause a high death rate. The biological agents can be found in the nature, but in order to be used as weapons of mass destruction they need to be processed first. Although there is a certain number of biological agents that could be used as a weapon of mass destruction, yet scientists have made a list of four types of biological agents that are commonly used, and they are the following:

- Bacteria (anthrax, plague, cholera, tularemia etc);
- Viruses (smallpox, Ebola, yellow fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, etc.);
- Ricketts (typhus, Q fever, rocky mountain fever, etc.) and
- Toxins (botulism, etc.).

The danger of this type of weapon of mass destruction is given in the Convention on biological weapons, where member states have agreed not to take any action to develop, manufacture, store or in any way keep:⁶ microbiological or other biological agents, or toxins no matter if their origin or method of production, types, and quantities, that have no justification for

⁵ Michael Kort, *Global Issues: Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 132 West 31st Street, New York, 2010 p. 7

⁶ The Biological Weapon Convention, downloaded from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument) [retrieved at 22.02.2014]

prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agentives or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Radiological weapon

The radiological materials could also be acute and dangerous for people. In many ways they act as chemical agentives by causing damage to the cells, and the biggest difference is that radiological agents must not be inhaled or come into contact with the skin to cause harmful effects.

The attack with radiological weapon is attractive, appealing and easier than other (chemical, biological and nuclear) agentives, and it is due to a relatively easy way of using this kind of weapon of mass destruction. The radiological weapon is increasingly used for terror and achieving certain political goals rather than mass murder. Radioactive materials act as toxic chemicals that are very harmful or fatal.⁷ There are two options in performing radiological terrorist attacks: using radiological device and an attack on nuclear facilities. Radioactive materials may be used in passive and active. The passive way implies broadcast radiation from some place, using radiological device for transmitting radiation that can be placed or hidden at some busy places. An active way of performing radiological terrorist attack is when using radiological dispersal device and radiological incendiary device.⁸ There is no doubt that a very small dose of radiological materials used for attack, threat, and contamination can cause serious problems. Covert attacks with radiological materials may be deliberately designed to cause such damage that decontamination will be difficult or impossible. Despite the negative effects on human health, the use of radiological weapons causes tremendous damage to the environment, and its removal requires large funds. The disposal of radioactive substances includes treatment for decontamination of people, their evacuation and removal from the radioactive environments, as well as cleaning of all facilities to remove the remains of the radioactivity.

Nuclear weapon

The fear of terrorism today is so great that it is expected application of nuclear combat vehicles with lower intensity only to achieve the set goals, while not paying attention to the vast number of human casualties and material damage. The illegal trade of nuclear weapon includes smuggling of nuclear materials, change of the use of the weapon technologies, change of the enriching technologies, extraction or purification of a certain isotope of a

⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, USA 2002 p. 194

⁸ Danijela Tufegdžić, *Radiological weapons as a means of terrorism*, Review on Security 3/10, Belgrade, 2010, p. 221

certain element. The nuclear criminal today has expansion, but what is even more dangerous is its inevitable connection or its possibility for nuclear terrorism. The smuggling of the nuclear material, the stolen nuclear weapon constitutes a solid basis for the implementation of nuclear threats, as well as practical implementation of nuclear terrorism⁹. According to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism the nuclear material include: plutonium, except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium - 238; uranium - 233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing a mixture of isotopes as found in nature, but not in the form of ore or residue from ore. Nuclear facility implies any nuclear reactor, including reactors installed on ships, vehicles, aircraft or space devices that are used as an energy source to move; any plant or transmission that is used for production, storage, processing or transport of radioactive material.¹⁰

The nuclear weapon is made on the principle of using thermonuclear reaction in which in a small period of time, a large amount of energy and radioactive materials were released. The nuclear explosions depending on the process of creating can be divided into nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. The nuclear fission is known as the atomic bomb, while nuclear fusion is known as thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb was created by a single atom and on the other hand the thermonuclear bomb is formed of two atoms which are combined into one. The thermonuclear bomb is stronger and more harmful than the atomic bomb. The nuclear explosions whether it comes from atomic or thermonuclear bomb broadcast in explosion shock wave and heat.

In the fight against nuclear terrorism the most important is the countries to endeavor to prevent isolated cases in which terrorist organizations engage in buying or stealing nuclear weapons. Nuclear terrorism is a threat to all nations, and it is necessary to work quickly and urgently in securing all nuclear materials and eradication of all nuclear weapons. It is not an easy task, but the nuclear threat from terrorist organizations must not be ignored.

POWER AND DANGER OF THE USE OF WEAPON FOR MASS DESTRUCTION FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

Today, the world's major threat to international peace and security is the spread and development of weapons of mass destruction, and their transmission. The weapons of mass destruction can be used in military operations on a large scale, but there is an extreme danger if they are used by

⁹ Mitko Kotovcevski, *Modern terrorism, Macedonian civilization*, Skopje, 2003, p. 214

¹⁰ Law for ratification of the International convention for suppressing the acts of nuclear terrorism (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 70/2006)

terrorist organizations. What is further disturbing is that most countries in the world are not prepared to deal with the consequences of the use of this kind of weapon.¹¹ Figure 1 shows the scheme of transfer of various types of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, nuclear, missiles, biological) between some countries of the world. Hence, the conclusion that China is in the initial part of the chain and the largest exporter of this type of weapons and technology, and Iran is a country which intermediary teaches North Korea and Syria. North Korea, however, is a country exporting mainly nuclear Iran, Yemen and Pakistan.




Figure 1: Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 2001-Present¹²

New methods of terrorist activities increase the danger to the lives of many innocent people. The possibility of terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction to achieve their goals increases uncertainty in the world in which we live. Many experts point out that terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction can create great panic because this kind of attacks represent

¹¹ Six conventions, two treaties, one protocol, one regime, one arrangement, one code, one incentive and ten regional or zone treaties have been instituted since 1925 to control these instruments of mass murder. Most of the accords require only passive agreement and are trumped by influence-peddling, profit-seeking and ideology-spreading considerations. As a result, the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise, too.

¹² Carol E. B. Choksy, Jamsheed K. Choksy, WMD Proliferation Threatens the World, A bountiful supply raises risk of WMDs falling into wrong hands, YaleGlobal, 5 April 2013, downloaded from <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/wmd-proliferation-threatens-world> [retrieved at 20.02.2015]

unknown threat without serious warnings which carries the possibility of the spread of disease or contamination of the environment. Others feel that the seriousness goes beyond the undermining and destruction of the social order and a threat to security and democratic governments.

Terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation is an evolving threat to the U.S. national security¹³ and therefore to all countries allies in the fight against terrorism. The frequency of high-profile acts of terrorism has increased over the past decade. Indicators of this increasing threat include the attacks of 11 September 2001, the 2001 Amerithrax letters, the possession of weapons of mass destruction-related materials by Aafia Siddiqui when she was captured in 2008, and multiple attempts by terrorists at home and abroad to use explosives improvised from basic chemical precursors. The challenge presented by these threats is compounded by the large volume of hoax threats that distract and divert law enforcement agencies from addressing real threats.

The terrorist organizations can obtain radioactive materials or nuclear weapons in several ways:¹⁴

- economic crisis and weak state control over radioactive materials and nuclear bombs in some countries of Eastern Europe affected the trade in radioactive materials that may be purchased on the black market;
- it is possible to buy radioactive materials or get from other countries, especially those which support and finance terrorism;
- radioactive materials frequently (e.g. plutonium) are obtained as an additional product in investigating nuclear power reactors;
- even though it is unlikely, but not ruled out terrorist organizations themselves to produce nuclear weapons which require special resources and training;
- terrorists could steal or possess nuclear devices or other hazardous substances from the major powers in the world;
- opportunity to commit terrorist acts using radioactive materials, especially with α - emitters which are very toxic when introduced into the body.

In the more recent past a known attack with weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organization is the attack "sarin gas" in Tokyo, Japan in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo. The Japanese cult seems to have begun its quest for

¹³ In his 2010 testimony before the Senate and the House of Representatives, the director of national intelligence stated that dozens of identified domestic and international terrorists and terrorist groups have expressed their intent to obtain and use WMD in future acts of terrorism. More of this in Weapons of mass destruction, downloaded from the official website of FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs [retrieved at 10.02.2015]

¹⁴ Haris Pesto, Forms of terrorism, Faculty of political sciences, Yearbook 2010/11, No. 5 - 6, Sarajevo, 2011, p. 471

WMD in 1990, five years prior to the attack in the Tokyo subway. Its assets were estimated at \$1 billion, its membership numbered 50,000 world-wide (including 20 scientists with graduate degrees), and it had research facilities. Moreover, Japanese law placed serious constraints on law enforcement surveillance because Aum was a religious group, allowing virtually unimpeded research, despite complaints of suspicious activity in Aum's commune. Even with these advantages, the cult had a very difficult time developing the weapons and launching the attacks: it made 9 attempts prior to the two attacks in the subway and two after it, 22 and had totally failed in using biological weapons prior to turning to Sarin gas. In conclusion, Aum Shinrikyo is an example of a terrorist group that combined motivation to use weapons of mass destruction as well as vast resources, help of scientists, plenty of time, and a virtually uninterrupted environment for research, yet, despite recurring attempts, it failed to use biological weapon, and made ineffective use of chemical weapons. Now, under close national and international scrutiny, the Aum are considered unlikely to repeat their earlier efforts.¹⁵ Indeed, the danger of nuclear, chemical, and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise¹⁶. Since 2001 Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sought weapons of mass destruction capability. During Syria's civil war some sarin, mustard gas, and cyanide from government depots reportedly have fallen into illicit hands. The possibility of Islamists wresting materials from Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction facilities increases as that nation's political instability grows. Iran for its part appears to have transferred some technologies to regional militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

CONCLUSION

The danger of using weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes exists no matter which terrorist organizations we talk about, the way they could be characterized, their motives and reasons because their main target are the civilians. In the fight against the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations the following measures need to be taken:

- Enforceable international agreements to reduce and eliminate WMD, and to regulate the trade in weapons-usable technologies and to support

¹⁵ David Rapoport, *Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse*, National Security Studies Quarterly, 1995, p. 56 - 58

¹⁶ More of this in Carol E. B. Choksy, Jamsheed K. Choksy, *WMD Proliferation Threatens the World, A bountiful supply raises risk of WMDs falling into wrong hands*, YaleGlobal, 5 April 2013, downloaded from <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/wmd-proliferation-threatens-world> [retrieved at 20.02.2015]

international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

- Expansion of the threat reduction programme and related efforts to control and secure fissile materials globally.
- Support CBRN centers of excellencies which are created by European Union and strengthened scientific expertise required for the implementation of regional and international projects related to national capacity building to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Encourage States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture and encourage cooperation among and between States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in this regard.

The weapon of mass destruction has a great potential to provide psychological impact and cause fear among the population, but there is a high risk of failure in its implementation. That may change in the coming years, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons to experience expansion. Also, we should not forget the fact that terrorists are not crazy fanatics, but they are rational individuals who carefully plan their acts of terror to achieve their goals. The importance of weapons of mass destruction to policy makers requires the Intelligence Community to place priority of weapons of mass destruction intelligence. But, this kind of intelligence presents a complex challenge and it will continue to do so in near future.

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CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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Abstract

If the beginning of the twentieth century is characterized by high development of science, technology, computerization, and all in the name of the liberation of humanity from dependence on nature and mastery of the laws that govern nature, the beginning of the twenty-first century is characterized by expansion of violence and terrorism in all parts of the globe exposed through all its forms ranging from assassinations, kidnappings, murders for political purposes, suicides, etc. Terrorism is a global phenomenon, which is characterized by illegally using threats and violence against individuals or groups of people or countries in order to achieve certain political, religious or ideological purposes. When we talk about international terrorism, in particular we talk about a phenomenon that is identical to the national terrorism and the only difference between them consists in the aspect of whether the terrorist act is performed within the territory of the country in which a terrorist organization acts or that he or she committed the terrorist act or the executed terrorist act transcends the boundaries of a state and thus save members of a particular international terrorist organization in the commission of international terrorist act and also citizens who are involved or the entire territory of more than one state. A key factor in the fight against global terrorism is the international cooperation and interplay of forces and means of the different countries in the world. Key stakeholders in the fight against global terrorism are NATO, EU, UN and regional organizations within countries which accomplish individual efforts and mutual economic, political or other types of cooperation. In this regard, the Republic of Macedonia not only as one country alone, but also in

cooperation with other countries in Europe and the world is actively involved in the fight against global terrorism and continuously contributes to building peace and stability in the world.

For the purposes of this paper, the essence, characteristics and forms in which terrorism occurs and acts, and the methods and forces to combat terrorism which are realized within the international community will be studied in detail and explained, and the role that the Republic of Macedonia has and the contribution that we make to the fight against global terrorism will be highlighted and analyzed with due attention, through its participation in peacekeeping operations to combat terrorism and building peace in the world as a candidate member of NATO and the European Union. The purpose of this paper is to prove that the continued participation of the Republic of Macedonia in the international missions to combat terrorism and building world peace spearheading NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, contributes to the strengthening of peace and stability in the world.

Keywords: *terrorism, terrorist operations, missions, cooperation.*

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism today is a challenge and a threat to the global security, and to be able to respond to terrorism, it is necessary to take preventive measures before an attack. The terrorists, carry out terrorist attacks with great confidence, work in groups in which the details about the derivation of the action are not known for everyone, using modern tools, weapons and tools, even mass destruction. For these reasons, for the detection of international terrorist groups, their intentions and purposes, it is necessary to provide adequate information, and the fight against terrorism requires appropriate force, equipped with the proper equipment and trained staff to conduct operations to combat terrorism. A key factor in the fight against global terrorism is the international cooperation and interaction of forces and means of the different countries in the world. Key stakeholders in the fight against global terrorism are NATO, EU, UN and regional organizations in which frames some individual countries make efforts and mutual economic, political or other cooperation. The Republic of Macedonia today is one of the winners of the fight against global terrorism and creating conditions for peace building and maintaining stability and security of the countries in the world. The Republic of Macedonia does that by taking protective measures, exchange of information, and participation of its forces in the international peacekeeping operations led by NATO and the EU, providing a significant contribution to the stability and peace in the world.

When developing the paper everything begins from the definition of global terrorism and the explanation of its features, in order to develop the

issue of combating terrorism and creating capacity by establishing an international force for an adequate response to the terrorists. The role of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against global terrorism consists of activation of all available instruments, notably by participating in operations against global terrorism, giving thus contribution to building security and peace in the world.

DEFINITION OF GLOBAL TERRORISM AND THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

In the literature there are several attempts to define terrorism, but there is not a definition that is generally accepted as universal. Some definitions are aimed at explaining the role of the perpetrators, some at terrorist technique, however most of them emphasize the elements of terrorism where prevailing are the element of use of force and violence (almost all definitions), causing fear and terror, threats and psychological effects and effects (in more than half of the definitions).

We will not carefully analyze the existing attempts to define terrorism as a phenomenon, but rather highlight the conclusion that unlike earlier when terrorism mainly provoked the attention of the world public, today terrorism aims to cause great suffering. The international law has an important role in the suppression of terrorism because they define the concepts and apply standards to prevent individual acts of terrorism that threaten the security and the basic values of more than one country.¹

The international law is determined and based on tools determining which are acts of terrorism; counter-terrorism instruments are created as a framework for cooperation between states in order terrorists to be found, prosecuted and punished. Fighting terrorism means taking defensive measures to prevent people to be injured and not be allowed to create conditions for financing activities. How important is the fight against terrorism, we can see by the fact that the Treaty establishing the European Union's Maastricht Treaty in 1991, as a factor of mutual interest is shown and the necessity of police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, in particular through the exchange of information within the European Police Office. Most analysts fight against global terrorism by analysis within security intelligence and military police instruments of action.

¹ Ksenija Djuric - Atansijevic, *The role of international law in combating terrorism*, (Belgrade: Military Academy 2008), 8

However, if we thoroughly analyze the current operations, we can conclude that a successful fight against terrorism is necessary to achieve the so-called DIME-effect by activating of the following instruments:

- **Diplomacy**
- **Information or Intellegence**
- **Military**
- **Economy**

Which instrument of combat and strategy will be applied depends on the specific circumstances, but in practice we often have a combination of tools and strategies that are known together as transformation of the regime that supports terrorism. An example can be cited "Arab Spring", with the application of strong intelligence training, diplomacy, economic sanctions and blockades, and using special forces deposed regime in several states, primarily in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA SEEN IN TACKLING TERRORISM

If you go by the motto that no state is so strong to be able alone to deal with terrorism or, neither, so small that it cannot contribute, we can conclude that the Republic of Macedonia is a small country, but it gives a great contribution to the fight against terrorism, in fact much larger contribution than most major countries. Previous analyses of the contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against terrorism come down to an individual analysis of an institution or body primarily engaging the Army in peacekeeping operations. In order to see the overall contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to analyze the contribution of all instruments of its domain.

1.1 Contribution intelligence operations in the fight against terrorism

Intelligence services in the Republic of Macedonia as institutions responsible for conducting intelligence operations in the fight against terrorism, in collaboration with other institutions in the country and the intelligence services of other countries, give a major contribution in the fight against global terrorism, as can be seen in the following activities:

- established an efficient exchange of data on terrorist groups and their support networks;
- taking measures and activities to disclose the organizers, perpetrators and the logistics of terrorist activities;
- implementation of the "National Intelligence Database";
- participation in operations led by Europol;

- cooperation with INTERPOL in the implementation of the project IPA 2008 police cooperation: combating organized crime, focused on drug trafficking and prevention of terrorism;
- active participation in the program committee for the fight against terrorism in the Security Council for mutual support, which facilitate the procedures and mechanisms for sharing intelligence
- active participation in the activities of the Conference of the Intelligence Services of Southeastern Europe and the Central Conference.

The results of these activities and programs are great, so the report of the Ministry of Interior of the Year from 10/03/2014 on the organized crime and corruption in 2013², prevented a total of 25 criminal groups with 261 members (238 of them Macedonian and 23 foreign nationals) acting in the field of drug trafficking, organized and economic crime, corruption, cybercrime, counterfeiting documents related crime, smuggling migrants, trafficking in cultural goods, smuggling of excise goods and crimes against the state. In seven of the said criminal groups "criminal association were identified" because the 116 perpetrators members of these groups are reported for 15 such crimes. The report states: "The Ministry in cooperation with foreign security services at regional and international level, as well as independent actions implemented in the area of detection of illicit drug trafficking, prevented 11 criminal groups including 57 people. The members of these criminal groups were involved in trafficking heroin and marijuana, which typically provides funds to finance terrorism".

However, of the isolated criminal "money laundering and other criminal proceeds", in twelve cases 45 offenders were reported. According to the report, "applicants are governors, responsible persons and owners of private companies, officers, agents and notaries who unlawfully abuse of their work position or engage in tax evasion, forgery of documents, fraud, and trafficking drugs, let the legal trade funds totaling over 1.2 billion denars, some of which practically ended in the funding of terrorism.

In addition to these activities, the responsible bodies are contributing in detection and monitoring of NGOs and religious groups that are associated with terrorism on a global scale.

² Ministry of Interior Affaires, "Report on organized crime and corruption in 2013", accessed on September 10, 2014
<http://mvr.gov.mk/ShowAnnouncements.aspx?ItemID=13259&mid=1094&tabId=201&tabIndex=0>

Operational transactions in view of the crime (86)



Figure 1: Joint operations with EUROPOL³

In terms of joint operations of the Ministry of Interior and EUROPOL, only in 2013 there were 86 operational joint operations; the types of crime are given in Figure 1. A very important element is that 7 of them are operations related to the fight against terrorism.

Contribution of the diplomacy of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against terrorism

All previous governments in the country understand terrorism as a serious threat, and expressed their strong condemn for all terrorist actions, no matter where they occur. As a result of their fair policy, the Republic of Macedonia did not distinguish the terrorism of September 11 in the US from the terrorism in the theater in Russia, nor the attacks on the beaches in Turkey. Diplomacy of the Republic of Macedonia is an active supporter and promoter of peace in the world with its strong commitment to the fight against terrorism at the national, regional, and global level.

International Cooperation of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against global terrorism

Promoting regional cooperation and contribution to establishing good neighborly relations, security, and stability in all countries of the South, is an ongoing commitment to the Republic of Macedonia with mutual respect for the values, as part of the global integration. Thus began the process of creating greater certainty and international priorities without establishing cooperation with others, without a sense of reciprocal relationship and dependence. The Republic of Macedonia supports forms of regional organizations and their activities leading to improvement of the social welfare in Macedonia and the region, such as:

³ Ministry of Interior Affairs, Department of Europol, accessed on November 12, 2014, <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/uploads/EVROPOL.pdf>

- Cooperation Process of Southeastern Europe;
- The Regional Cooperation Council;
- The Central European Incentive;
- The National Center for Migration and Asylum, and the return of refugees and others.

The participation of the Republic of Macedonia is evolved in regional incentives, especially those with neighbors, leading to increasing and improving cooperation, tolerance, mutual understanding and enhancement of cooperation, tolerance, mutual understanding and social welfare. Macedonia has a strong commitment to fight against terrorism at the national, regional and global level. The focus of the overall action is facing the preventive actions to eliminate all potential dangers of terrorism and the emergence of further escalation of the consequences. The Republic of Macedonia works for a conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the countries that take measures to prevent the spread of terrorist activities, and establishing close cooperation among the secret services to exchange intelligence. Such cooperation should be carried out through the following steps:

- regular exchange of information among professionals to combat global terrorism;
- adoption of a joint anti-terror laws and regulations in order to provide unique approach in the fight against global terrorism;
- creating a database;
- educating the public to the threat that terrorism has on democratic processes.

Cooperation with neighboring countries

Neighborliness is one of the key factors in achieving peace, security and well-being of an individual, family, village, city, or country. This universal principle, the global importance and values are emphasized in the criteria for membership in NATO and the EU. From these aspects, the Republic of Macedonia is of particular importance to have good relations with all its neighbors. The Republic of Macedonia especially takes into account the preservation and promotion of political and economic relations with all its neighbors, based on the principles of equality, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual respect, and respect for the cultural and national particularities. The Republic of Macedonia is strongly committed to further promoting of regional cooperation, the strengthening of security and stability, the exchange of experiences and support of the countries in the region, construction of joint military units to the joint participation in international operations. The close and fruitful regional cooperation with the US - Adriatic Charter countries (A-5 format), a very successful format to include all countries in the region, including the Republic of Kosovo. The Republic of Macedonia believes that promoting A-5 cooperation is a win-win approach, and for peace and stability and the Euro-Atlantic region of inclusivity.

Cooperation with the international community

The cooperation with international communities in struggle and opposition against global terrorism leads to the achievements of the following objectives:

First, continuing with determining and directing of the core objectives of the international community in the fight against terrorism through the realization of the planned activities of NATO and the EU in the process of training staff, unifying the training, exercises, assignments coordinated and efficient operation of the institutions in power.

Second, intensifying the cooperation of the institutions in the fight against terrorism and realization of the concept to support military missions and activities to combat terrorism by the civil society structures. Undoubtedly, the preparations and development of defense and security capabilities of the Republic of Macedonia are very significant for participation in the peacekeeping operations outside the country.

Third, its massive involvement and training of personnel to combat terrorism even coordinated participation and activities between security agencies and the public and private sector. There is more information which is used related to the activities of terrorism by uninvited persons employed in private companies, public companies, associations, business elites, and the like. Developing creative approaches to achieving national security and defense lies in the success of the state authorities to utilize the information of the citizens.

Because of that, it is necessary to initiate projects to bring the problems in the field of personnel, administrative, information, physical and industrial security to everyone, with the opportunity for their full implementation. In addition, it is necessary to ensure the protection of persons who provide information related to terrorism, organized crime, financing of suspicious activities, etc., their personal safety, conspiracy, place and manner where they can give information and it can be upgraded. By participating in peacekeeping operations, Macedonia confirms that it is part of the anti-terrorist coalition in the world, giving a modest but invaluable contribution to building peace and stability in the Western Balkans and the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond.

The fight against terrorism requires proactive thinking which involves cooperation between the public and the private sector, close cooperation between the relevant political decisive factor on the legislative and executive power that should lead to the development and implementation of a successful strategy. On the other hand, requires the specialization of personnel and training of those involved in the fight against global terrorism, division of resources and strengthening of the regional and international cooperation.

Contribution of economic measures in the fight against terrorism

The Administration for the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism as a specialized agency responsible for prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism follow measures taken by similar institutions in Europe on a daily basis and on the basis that offers the Government adequate measures by the relevant authorities and institutions. As a result, during the 2013, the Government made the next 10 restrictive measures⁴: one against these countries in a way being connected with terrorism: Iran (4 decisions), Syria (3 decisions), Democratic People's

⁴ Ministry of Interior Affairs, Department of Europol, accessed on November 12, 2014, <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/uploads/EVROPOL.pdf>

Republic of Korea (1 decision), Belarus (1 decision) and Zimbabwe (1 decision).
Decisions to introduce restrictive measures concerning:

- prohibition of entry into the Republic of Macedonia (all ten decisions);
- financial measures (making ten in all);
- embargo on arms (nine decisions);
- ban on luxury goods and products (in eight decisions);
- prohibition of access to cargo flights to airports in the Republic Macedonia (one decision);
- embargo on gold and precious metals (in a decision);
- ban on buying and importing oil and oil derivatives (in a decision).




Figure 2: The number of restrictive measures⁵

From the data presented, we can conclude that the Republic of Macedonia has always promptly responded to the decisions of the Council of the European Union to introduce restrictive measures to fight terrorism. Parallel decisions are assessed for bodies and ways to implement those decisions.

Besides the implementation of restrictive measures, the competent authorities have taken legal measures and monitoring of suspicious transactions, monitoring the financing of certain entities as possible supporters of terrorism, control the import and transit of goods throughout the country. The institutions to implement measures are reorganized, staffed, and equipped according to the European Union standards.

⁵ Ministry of Interior Affairs, Department of Europol, accessed on November 12, 2014, <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/uploads/EVROPOL.pdf>

CONTRIBUTION OF THE MILITARY FACTOR IN PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS TO COMBAT GLOBAL TERRORISM

Terrorism, transnational organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious radicalism, extremism, illegal migration, unstable and dysfunctional states, and information attacks, are only part of the contemporary global challenges with which the Republic of Macedonia is facing. Part of the security challenges encountered the Republic of Macedonia on its way to Euro-Atlantic integration, resulting from the process of transition from slow economic growth and the presence of certain deviant phenomena in the region, such as organized crime, corrupt behavior, human trafficking, drugs, weapons, and more.

NATO and the EU are the key factors in dealing with security challenges, risks and threats in the maintenance and strengthening of security and stability at global level for more than two decades.

The Republic of Macedonia continuously develops its democratic institutions that implement the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, economic development, and coexistence. From 2002 onwards, Macedonia became the importer and exporter of security, recalling that as of 2014 the average annual deployed about 180 peacekeepers or about 3 percent of the total staff of the Army deployed in four international operations: ISAF, ALTHEA, UNIFIL contribution to KFOR. By participating in peacekeeping operations, the Republic of Macedonia confirms that it is part of the anti-terrorist coalition in the world, providing an invaluable contribution to building peace and stability in crisis regions. Positive effects of participation in peacekeeping operations are:

- a high level of interoperability of units of the key personnel and ARM;
- gaining experience working in multinational environments and associated high degree of motivation to be engaged;
- exchange of information that is important to take the necessary precautions.

The Republic of Macedonia stands and performs policy of openness to all regional connectivity and increased cooperation among the countries to achieve and maintain interconnected societies based on freedom, peace and democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

According to the tasks, they perform missions in direct combat terrorism operations: ISAF, "Iraqi Freedom" and UNIFIL, but in order to do a full analysis of the role of the Republic of Macedonia to secure world peace, the image shown below is the engagement in ALTHEA mission and support of KFOR.

Table 1: ARM in Peace Operations⁶

Mission	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
ISAF	21+21	75+75	131+131	136+136	160+172	163+79+163	163+166	162+168	2122
	42	150	262	272	332	405	329	330	
IRAQI FREEDOM	35+35	54+53	46+50	81+82	/	/	/	/	436
	70	107	96	163					
ALTEA	/		42+32	12+12	12+12	12+12	12+12	10+10	211
		21	74	24	24	24	24	20	
UNIFIL	/	/	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
KFOR	/	/	In the center are employed 13 people						13
Total	112	278	446	460	357	430	354	351	2788

The first contribution to the establishment of global peace began back in 2002, when within ISAF forces in Afghanistan, NATO-led alliance, ARM sent its first members. The success of the contingents that continuously showed its undoubted ability, professionalism in the performance of assigned tasks and seriousness of the work, provided the continual growth of the contribution to the mission. Namely, in 2010 the highest contribution was reached, the contribution from the highest level, when sending 250 members of the Army, the Republic of Macedonia became the fourth country - contributor to ISAF by the size of population.

Today's total global contribution of the Republic of Macedonia is: 171 peacekeepers deployed in operations led by NATO, the European Union and the UN. Including the contribution of the host country, the Republic of Macedonia in 2012 reached the level of contribution of about 190 people, which represents the level of distribution of approximately 3% of the land forces of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in peacekeeping operations in the world. The percentage contribution is respectable because they cannot reach a large number of member states of NATO and the European Union. Thus, only in Afghanistan, per capita, the Republic of Macedonia in 2012 contributed more than all the countries in the region and more than many members of NATO and its contribution is immediately alongside that of the United Kingdom, USA, and Norway. The strategic partnership with the United Nations (UN) with a Charter which constitutes the fundamental framework of international relations is a priority of the European Union and NATO in the international security arena.

Therefore, the contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the military part to peace operations led by the United Nations, NATO, and the EU, is a confirmation of the effective participation of the Republic of

⁶White Book on Defense, Skopje, Ministry of Defense, 2012, accessed on December 21, 2014, <http://www.morm.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BELA-KNIGA-NA-ODBRANATA.pdf>

Macedonia to the United Nations, as well as its strategic goals for NATO and EU.

The main task of the Army personnel engaged in the peacekeeping operation of ISAF Afghanistan is providing the command of ISAF. This command manages all operations in Afghanistan and thus it is a constant target for terrorists. Only watchful engaging on ARM before this command is secure and safe to perform its obligations. So far, the command of ISAF was the target of several terrorist attacks, and most serious, according to the reports of commanders of contingents the explosion was a car bomb outside the entrance of the base in August 2009, and more direct attacks on command and attempted unauthorized entry persons in the database.

With the explosion of the car bomb, several members of the Macedonian Army were seriously injured, but they even though they were injured they stayed, and with even greater professionalism continued security of the base. According to the commander of the detachment under the attack in September 2011, terrorists attacked from several countries with direct rocket and sniper fire, but with the quick response of our soldiers, the attack was repulsed without consequences for the staff at the base. The reaction of the ARM was analyzed by the command of ISAF and the lessons learned were submitted to the NATO command. For the successful reaction ARM received high marks and praise from the ISAF command, and the high NATO officials in Brussels. The results of the members of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia were the ISAF commanders' continual praise and the medals they received as a confirmation of their commitment, dedication and responsibility in the performing of their tasks.

During 2010, 79 members of the Army participated in the nine-month mission dedicated "Phoenix" in Afghanistan, the main task together with the Vermont National Guard to conduct training and mentoring the Afghan National Army and Police, as well as carrying out joint operations for peace, support, and stability in Afghanistan, providing high-profile NATO and ISAF, and training and support of the Afghan national Army and police in building democracy in Afghanistan. For these nine months, ARM often participated in direct fighting with the terrorists, giving their huge contribution to the stability in Afghanistan and defeating terrorism. For their training, courage, achieved standards and successful execution of tasks in the combat operations against terrorists, the commander of the Vermont National Guard presented medals.

The Republic of Macedonia took active part in the fight against terrorist groups in Iraq, sending its units in eleven rotations in the peacekeeping operation "Iraqi Freedom". Although called a peacekeeping operation, all the time Macedonian troops alongside the coalition forces practically performed combat operations against the terrorists. According to M. H. J, the first commander of the Army contingent in the peacekeeping

operation "Iraqi Freedom", our members conducted combat operations for stabilization and support, or combat actions involving combat terrorism and smuggling of drugs. According to him, "Macedonian soldiers were sitting in the databases as part of the coalition partners, but our troops, for example, had five operations that were performed, said in military jargon - outside of the wire, and the lessons learned were really implemented in tactics, techniques, and procedures in the field."⁷ During the peace operation "Iraqi Freedom", ARM very quickly gained the confidence of the coalition partners, notably the US Army, and our trust in the most sensitive or dangerous actions that must be thoroughly prepared in secret, and performed very quickly. During those operations, ARM showed superb training, so that despite the high risk the lives of staff from the direct fire by terrorists and improvised explosive devices, we had a few injuries. How important was the contribution of the Army in this operation is proved even by the fact that the secretary of defense and senior military commanders of the US Army came to the Republic of Macedonia to thank the Macedonian soldiers' brave deeds and awarded many medals and decorations, four of which were "Bronze star", the fourth award for the meaning of the hierarchy of the US military decorations.

ARM makes a concrete contribution in enabling the construction of solid credible democratic institutions and highly trained security forces in Iraq, forces that guarantee the future of their country, as well as stability and security in their environment and beyond. The Republic of Macedonia, as a responsible member of the international community remains firmly engaged in joint efforts to achieve security and provide a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, in accordance with the principles of the transfer of ownership of the security of the Afghan government and NATO principle: "Together in and out together." The current contribution and mission of the national contingent will gradually change the mission of force protection mission training and assistance to Afghan, i.e. security forces. The Republic of Macedonia is one of the countries that contribute to the global peace and security in the world. Although not a full member of NATO, as per capita, the Republic of Macedonia contributes more than all the countries in the region, and in fact, our contribution is equal to that of the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

2. CONCLUSION

The survey was conducted in the preparation of this paper; it is found that the Republic of Macedonia has the necessary tools, and they are great

⁷ Sinisa Stankovik, "The private spokes of the state mission," *Globus* 88, (December 2008): 31

facilities, power and knowledge for active participation and contribution in the fight against global terrorism in the world. The results are achieved through intelligence operations, diplomacy, taking economic measures and military measures through participation in peacekeeping operations, a measure which reflects the contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against terrorism. Macedonia is a responsible member of the international community, which confirms its contribution to the joint efforts to achieve security and provide a long-term partnership among the countries in building peace and the fight against global terrorism. The contribution of the Republic of Macedonia in the peacekeeping operations as part of the anti-terrorist coalition in the world is invaluable to building peace and stability in the Western Balkans, primarily in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. By participating in peacekeeping operations, the Republic of Macedonia shows a high degree of professionalism and commitment to the preservation of world peace and global security.

The given input and results of participation of the Republic of Macedonia in operations to combat global terrorism and peace building in the world, represent the basis of the fact that the Republic of Macedonia has given highest priority to full membership in NATO and the EU. In the future, we need to continue participation in peacekeeping operations, primarily in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan until its completion in 2014, the post-mission ISAF, as well as participation in other peacekeeping operations led by the EU and the UN.

The role of the Republic of Macedonia in supporting the fight against global terrorism clearly confirms the validity of the commitment of our country to the European integration and implementation of the commitments of the international community to achieve peace in the Middle East and Southeast Europe.

By participating in the peacekeeping operations and actions relating to the fight against global terrorism, the Republic of Macedonia has expressed its commitment and strategic policy to prove how loyal partner in building peace and stability in the world it is. With their professionalism, dedication, and results, ARM consistently exceeds our expectations and the expectations of NATO, and is a valued and desired partner of the Alliance, which persistently, firmly and persistently defends the shared values - peace, freedom, and democracy.

This is evidenced by the consistent participation and numerous successful rotations in the peacekeeping operations of "Iraqi Freedom", ISAF UNIFIL, and Althea. The participation of the Republic of Macedonia in the support of the international community in the fight against global terrorism should form the basis for:

- implementing further reforms in the security sector;

- further participation in the operations to combat global terrorism;
- intelligence sharing in the fight against global terrorism;
- taking economic measures to supporters and sponsors of terrorism;
- logistic cooperation with international forces to combat global terrorism;
- further support and promotion of regional cooperation.

Macedonia selflessly contributes to peace, stability, and democratic values, with the active participation and deployment of forces of the Army in different locations and with different mission. The Republic of Macedonia, with its forces, is an important contributor to achieving the goals of peace operations anywhere in the world. The Republic of Macedonia as a small country proves that no state is so big and strong to be able to deal with terrorism alone, nor so small that it cannot contribute to the fight against terrorism.

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RECONCEPTION OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AS A SECURITY THREAT- EXPANDED APPROACH TO SECURITY

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explicate that the transnational criminal organizations are questioning aspects of national sovereignty and security, which are traditionally accepted as undeniable and protected. They prove the permeability of boundaries that are nominally under the control of the states. Organized crime manages to evade the rule of territorial control that is undividable from the state and significantly corrodes the idea of national sovereignty. Governments retain sovereignty, but if they cannot control the importation of arms, drugs and people on their own territory, their sovereignty loses much of its meaning. In this respect, it can be understood that transnational organized crime as soft security threat does not represent direct military threat to the state, but indirectly threatens the core values leading to internal instability.

Research question is how the analysis of transnational organized crime is different from the analysis on traditional or hard security threats (because that threat does not directly endanger the territory and sovereignty). As an untraditional security threat, transnational organized crime can be explained as a phenomenon that threatens the country's identity, by this means also the shape of the power and politics of a country, and the way other countries perceive in international relations. In order to answer the research question, the paper will examine why conceptualization of transnational organized crime as untraditionally or soft security threat requires analysis on three levels - international, national and individual.

Key words: transnational organized crime, security threat, security, conceptualization.

INTRODUCTION

The term transnational organized crime has a history that probably dates back to the existence itself of sovereign states and their coexistence within the international arena, but it has a more recent history that can be traced back to the early 1900s (Woodiwiss 2003). A non-traditional security threat is a threat that affects the internal mechanisms and functions of a state. Its impact is not always visible, but it may nevertheless affect various aspects of the state through complex connections and networks.

RESHAPING THE CONCEPT

According to Desch, Realism provides a model for studying security in which states are concerned with state survival in an anarchic world (Desch 1998, 166). This is because the state is the actor in international relations, and in order to be recognised as a state, it is necessary to possess territories and sovereignty to control the territories. The principal security threats are war and invasion by other states (Krasner 1995).

Neo-Realists differ from Realists in seeing the structure of the international system as the principal determinant of state action (Walt 1991). The changes within the international system can be analysed through mutual interaction in three levels – international, state, and individual – following the change in the distribution of power in the international system (Waltz 1959). In short, from the Realist and the neo-Realist points of view, threats to a state are mostly posed by state(s), and what is at stake is material: a national security threat for a state is another state's desire to increase its power by obtaining more territories and other resources.

The nature of transnational organized crime has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War; globalization has facilitated the massive expansion and diversification of opportunities for organized crime. As a result, every country is affected in one way or another: for example, as a producer of illicit goods, as a transshipment zone, as a major market place for their distribution and consumption, or several of these together. Violence is closely associated with each stage in this value chain, and consequently transnational organized crime poses a significant threat to security, especially in conflict-affected states and those lacking the institutional strength to counter the influence of transnational organized crime networks effectively (Midgley 2014).

Another sub-state referent object for security concern is discussed by Buzan who argues that sectoral security should be included – such as societal security, that is, the sustainability of a society. Threats to societal security are posed by 'situations in which significant groups within a society feel

threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves' (Wæver, 67). A societal security threat is a threat to affect the traditional moral values and culture in a society. It could lead to a collapse of trust among a community due to differences in morals and disciplines among the society members. According to this new term, nontraditional security threats, such as drugs, may harm society through undermining and discrediting morals and values (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). These arguments indicate that national security can encompass internal aspects of a state rather than being limited to its physical existence. Clark observes the trend that international security comes into focus as globalisation progresses because those new security concerns of states tend to share a transnational character, and the separation of national and international issues became ambiguous (Clark 1999, 111). Finally, the prevalence and power of transnational organized crime is only made possible because it has become so well suited to the prevailing global financial, economic and political system. According to the UNODC, "the process of globalisation has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance, and this deficiency has produced just the sort of regulation vacuum in which transnational organized crime can thrive".

The opening of markets and the rapid expansion of the global trade has allowed for transnational organized crime networks to transport contraband goods (including people, drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, etc.) more easily and cheaply than ever before. Only a tiny proportion of this international cargo can be inspected by customs authorities, making the risks of interdiction low. Meanwhile, people and goods can only be interdicted by national governments. This allows transnational organized crime networks to take advantage of the lack of co-ordination and cooperation between the different legal and judicial systems of the countries (UNODC 2010). For example, illegal human trafficking is a national problem for the recipient states of the illegal immigrants, but simultaneously it is a problem of other states that can potentially be involved as recipient / transit / origin of trafficking. International drug trafficking is non-governmental and non-militaristic in nature; the classic Realist state-centred approach may be appropriate for the analysis of the securitisation of a phenomenon and execution of state policies against the threat.

Considering the connection between societal / individual security and national security, threats posed to individual and societal security could trigger national insecurity concerns through affecting state stability (Strange 1998). The insecurity of individuals and society may also result from the inability of the state to provide necessary services to the people. To some extent, as Wæver maintains, the relationship between national security and societal / individual security are two sides of the same coin (Wæver 1995, 67). Including supra-

state and sub-state elements in the national security as ‘dynamics of national security’ makes the traditional understanding of national security more flexible, allowing it to contain wider issue areas that have come to be recognised as non-traditional security threats.

From the Realist perspective, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking are not recognised as security issues since they do not pose a physical threat to the state. The threat posed by non-traditional security threats is not directly to the physical survival of the state, but more a threat to the function of the state. Hurrell argues that non-traditional threats originated from the weakness of the state (Hurrell 1998, 541).

Williams (1994) maintains that: ‘if one defines security as not just external military threats, but as a challenge to the effective functioning of the society, then drug trafficking is much more serious than many issues that have traditionally been seen as a threat to the security.’ The threats posed by drug trafficking affect the idea and identity of the state through disruption of its societal functions, and the rise of public disorder.

According to the post-positivists, there is no ‘objective truth’ (Terriff, 1999, 100). Threats do not exist until a phenomenon is recognised as a danger to individuals, society, states and the international community. According to Ewald (1991), ‘Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no objective risk. But, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger.’ The existence of an alleged threat is dependent on its interpretation. Bigo (2002) has taken this concept further and concluded that the perception of threats is constructed and directed for political purposes.

Non-traditional security threat needs to be conceptualized in a broader sense than traditional security threats to include dangers to intrinsic aspects of state activities. A non-traditional security threat may be defined as a phenomenon that threatens a state’s identity and undermines the quality of a state. The identity of a state is expressed in the form of governance and policies that reflect the ideology and beliefs of the state (or government) and are perceived as the international representation of the state by other states. The impact of non-traditional security threats to a state is complex and abstract. Furthermore, the threat posed by non-traditional threats to a state can vary because the impact of the threat may be influenced by the strength of a state (Fukumi 2008).

CHALLENGING THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE BY TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS

A state that has lost its capacity to rule has lost its sovereignty. Although transnational criminal organizations seek to control the government in order to create a comfortable environment for their business operations, the

loss of control over the decision-making process and the judicial process may be crucial for its legitimacy. As Buzan, et al. argue, the maintenance of sovereignty is a matter of survival for a state, and hence, 'Anything that can be portrayed as a violation of sovereignty (an intervention) can be presented as a security problem' (Buzan 1997, 150).

The protection of the idea and the identity of the state, as well as its functions could be regarded as the preservation of the status quo (Buzan 1997, 65). This leads to a wider definition of national interests, not just material concern but values, qualities and ideas about the state. Therefore, the phenomena that, Jordan and Taylor have argued about, could 'threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state' and they are regarded as national security threats (Jordan and Taylor 1981, 3). For example, widespread criminal activities undermine public respect for laws and public order. The government becomes unable to control the political, economic and social affairs within its territory and this undermines its sovereignty (Ulman 1983, 133). Transnational organized crime is an important development issue; it can undermine governance systems, increase levels of violence and insecurity and trap communities in cycles of poverty. However the relationship between transnational organized crime and poverty is complex and multi-faceted and simplistic assumptions about this relationship should be avoided (Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli 2014). Transnational organised crime is often associated with violence in different forms. It can lead to an increase in the use of violence by other non-state actors, such as revolutionary groups, and occasionally by legitimate organisations, such as workers' unions. TCOs use violence, not to overthrow the government but to intimidate and to manipulate it for their interests (Frontline 2000). The use of violence and intimidation by transnational criminal organizations undermines public order, the security of individuals and the community environment due to the lack of ability of the government to ensure peoples' safety.

Challenging the monopoly of violence and supremacy (or internal sovereignty) of the government may result in the lack of a state's ability and capability to control internal security. There is no proof of a stable correlation between levels of violent crime, such as murder, and the presence of organized crime (Van Dijk 2007, 39 - 56). Criminal links to political life can generate a stable set of illicit transactions over long periods: the classic example is Mexico until the 1990s (Astorga 2001). Furthermore, the ties between armed insurgents and criminals in conflict environments are volatile and fractious, and both groups may depend on support from local communities as well as politicians and state officials. It is in these sorts of factionalized environments that "indiscriminate law enforcement can have undesirable outcomes" (Felbab - Brown 2013, 160).

IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ON STATES

Since the early 1970s there have been a significant number of publications produced on the concept and definition of organized crime and its transnational dimension. More recently, an extensive international and legal framework has been developed for combating organized crime (Vermeulen and Beken 2002). The overall implications of transnational organised crime on states are not clearly visible. In addition, the degree of impact of transnational organised crime can vary from state to state because political and economic structures of the state can make a difference in the outcome. The use of violence by the criminals, however, may have the more visible effect of increasing the uncertainty about public safety in the community, and malfunction of the justice system may lead to clear injustice stemming from a state's inability to control the criminals. Consequently, state identity could be affected by declining state quality, which might also change the international impression of a state to a negative one. The international recognition of a state has significance in international relationships since state identity in the international arena plays an influential role for other states' understanding and decision-making in the international affairs. In brief, concerning the threat posed by international drug trafficking, the referent object for security may need to be considered in a holistic manner. The combined impact of international drug trafficking to several referent objects can realise a threat to a state although these impacts might be minor in some of the four spheres (economic, political, public order, and diplomatic). The spheres that international drug trafficking affects the most, therefore, influence the nature of the threat posed to the particular state.

Underpinning this, supports networks like a wide range of social, political, and economic vulnerabilities. These factors make individuals and communities susceptible to becoming strong support networks for transnational organized crime. For example, analysis of patterns of narcotic production and trafficking suggest that these activities (especially production) are clustered in areas where communities have traditionally been estranged from formal state authority and rule of law. According to the Colombian expert in drug trafficking, Francisco Thoumi, "the existence of social groups whose socially accepted behavioral norms conflict with those of the state is a necessary condition" (Thoumi 2012) for the rise of the illicit drug business in a given territory or nation. Whilst there do not appear to be any universal rules, there is evidence to suggest that in addition to the absence of an effective state presence, a number of significant risk factors spur criminal activity as part of a wider illicit business. These factors include high levels of social marginalization (for instance, in Central America), (UNODC 2007) horizontal

inequalities and group rivalries (notably in northern Mali and southern Libya), (Lacher 2014) rapid and disorganized urbanization, and the resilience of strong patronage networks, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, that are able to claw a larger flow of resources from criminal revenues (De Waal 2013).

Furthermore, efforts to combat transnational organised crime tend to be longterm and large projects, and are costly to governments. For example, Plan Colombia is a US\$ 7.5 billion project and the Colombian government is relying on international support for most of the resources necessary for the project. For the details in the case of drug related crimes, the government may need to operate both demand and supply reduction programmes for effective drug control (Hak-Su 2015). The cost of the projects includes not only the expenditures on the project per se, but also the losses caused by the crackdown on criminal organisations. Transnational organized criminal networks operate as part of a complex social, political and economic system that functions at different levels (from local to global). Ultimately, effective efforts to disrupt transnational criminal networks and their impact on conflict and violence will require coordinated and sustained action at each level in this system (Midgley, Briscoe and Bertoli 2014). The states with heavy dependence on transnational organised crime related industries, particularly developing states, could face huge annual economic losses, and unemployment (Bolivia is allegedly facing losses of US\$ 500 million annually due to a crackdown on illicit coca cultivation). Also, in order to carry out law enforcement operations, it is necessary to have adequate equipment, such as helicopters and arms. Military equipment is expensive, particularly for developing states, and according to Ball, these military expenditures have a negative effect on economic growth (Ball, 163-167).

From the economic perspective, transnational criminal organizations can harm a state through penetration and control of the national economic and financial systems. Although the impact of underground economic activities might be unclear, transnational criminal organizations can have a strong impact on the international economy as well as the national economy simply through their power to control markets. Therefore, as Strange argues, organised crime can be 'the major threat to the world system in the 1990s and beyond' because of its potential to equalise the financial power of the criminal organisations to that of a state (Strange 1996, 121).

Transnational organized crime is largely driven by the demand for illicit goods in rich, developed nations. However, the impacts are felt most keenly by communities in poorer countries with weak institutions. Furthermore, action taken to disrupt transnational organized crime in one location can divert activities to new and often more vulnerable areas, whilst doing little to stem to overall scale of crime. Efforts to disrupt transnational

organized crime (and their measurement) must therefore take a global perspective (Midgley, Briscoe, and Bertoli 2014).

As the non-traditional security threats affect states to various degrees, not all states will take the same approach to drug control. Some actors may treat it as a national security threat that affects their vital interests, and deal with it in a militarised way. Others may consider drug trafficking as a societal threat, or a social problem.

The policy of a state on drug control will depend on their understanding of drug trafficking. In other words, it depends on the perception of the cocaine threat by each state. In the international community, however, there might be other elements states might need to consider, including status and identity.

TRADITIONAL VERSUS NEW TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The older crime groups, often in long-established states, have developed along with the states and are dependent on the existing institutional and financial structures to move their products and invest their profits.

Through corruption and movement into the lawful economy, these groups minimize the risk of prosecution and therefore do not fear the power of the state institutions. In contrast, the newer transnational crime groups, often originating in post-conflict situations, thrive in a state of chaos and ongoing conflict. In these regions where the shadow economy is dominant, the crime groups are dominant actors in the shadow economy. The growth of global communications and the internet have allowed for new forms of crime, such as cybercrime and identity theft, and the rapid evolution of other forms of crime, such as child pornography. Many countries have simply been unable to develop and enact suitable legislation fast enough to keep up. Deregulation of the banking sector likewise has facilitated the growth of illicit financial flows out of the developing countries, which in turn have been used to fund competition for power and control by rebel groups, terrorists, organized criminals and governments in a very diverse range of violent contexts (Saferworld 2014). The newer crime groups in ungovernable regions are now forging alliances with terrorist organizations; because the crime groups and terrorist organizations do not possess long-term financial strategies or long-term political horizons, neither the criminals nor the terrorists need fear ineffective and corrupt law enforcement regimes in the conflict regions. Established crime groups have developed in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and the United States; no region of the world, nor any political system, has prevented their emergence, or succeeded in suppressing them (Shelley 1995, 463). States have endured despite the repressive governments of fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese communist systems, and the FBI in

the United States. They have survived because they are often of service to the state, having corrupted or developed collusive relations with the state institutions, or evolved to serve specific functions within the community (Pezzino 1990).

This symbiotic relationship has proved valuable to the rise of traditional crime groups. Italian and Japanese organized crime groups have benefited enormously from the post-war recoveries of their countries. They have profited from valuable public construction contracts possibly as much as from their illegal activities. The economic development of the state is therefore of paramount importance to them because they are parasites on the state's economy and financial institutions.

New transnational crime groups, however, thrive in the chaos of war and enduring conflicts. They have no interest in the endurance of the state; rather, their profits are made by destabilizing the state and its structures. The declining importance of the nation-state in recent decades has fostered these new forms of transnational crime groups. Often embedded in the host society, this crime is not family-based, nor is it hierarchically and rigidly structured like the mafia. Instead, it draws on different levels of society that contribute in different ways to the perpetuation of the crime activity. This pattern has been observed in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Afghanistan.

Table 1: Transnational crime and the state (Shelley 2005).

	Traditional Organized Crime	New Transnational Crime
Attitude to the State	Often nationalistic.	Interests do not coincide with the state.
Relationship to the Nation-State	Grows with the state. Parasitic on nation-state. Depends on state for contracts and services.	Thrives on the absence of effective governance. Grows with the weakened state.
Relation to Corruption	Tool used to influence state officials - operative tool.	Depends on high levels of systemic and institutionalized corruption.
Relation to Terrorism	Usually rejects association with terrorists.	May seek links with terrorists.

In these conflict regions, crime groups see business differently but also citizens see them as a major force in a large shadow economy. They provide goods and services as well as jobs not provided by the legitimate economy. Therefore, many citizens do not see crime groups in post-conflict regions as purely "bad" but as groups that perform the needed economic services for their community. These new crime groups may trade in both legitimate and

illegitimate commodities. The profits of this trade are less likely to wind up in offshore locales as is the case with the longstanding crime groups. As their profits are smaller, their needs are more immediate and they are less interested in the costly maintenance of paramilitaries or other strategic forces. Their funds are therefore not invested with the intention of capital preservation or long term growth (Richards 1999, 47).

CONCLUSION

In the security studies interpretation of transnational organized crime as a security threat is a concept that occurs after the end of the Cold War. This paper has provided a theoretical explanation of non-traditional security threats and how states conceptualise the threat. There is a dispute that the securitisation of non-traditional security threats requires assessment of the influences on wider aspects than just the physical survival of a state. This is because state interests are multi-faceted.

In order to examine the wide-ranging impacts of non-traditional security threats, this paper focused on transnational organized crime-type of threat that does not threaten the physical survival of the state, but it will impact on the quality and identity of the state. This is since the harm created by a non-traditional security threat diverges according to the strength of the political and economic integration of the states concerned.

The paper studies the perception of transnational organized crime conceptually, in order to present a clearer picture of the phenomenon and to assess the different manners in which its existence and activities present a potential menace to security. The concept of organized crime must liberate itself from the narrow visions entrenched in the legalistic theses and those often similarly presented by the security agencies.

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THE ISLAMIC STATE AS A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

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Abstract:

The killing of Osama bin Laden and the decline of the military rhythm in the Global war against terrorism, according to many, had created the feeling that the threat from global terrorism is also in decline. Yet, the developments caused by the terrorist organisation Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) once again confirmed the theses that tackling global terrorism is a process that will last much longer than was expected by some. Using the complexity of the international political arena, ISIS managed to “blitzkrieg” and gain control over significant portion of territory. Thus, not only did ISIS challenge the sovereignty of the two states and destabilize the Gulf, but it also threw other challenges to the world peace and security.

This paper will explore how and in what way ISIS succeeded in a relatively short period of time to raise a threat to the world peace and security. To this end, the main thesis that ISIS represents a threat to the world peace and security will be elaborated under three sub-thesis. First, the complex geopolitical constellations of the relations on the international arena and the slower tempo of the global war against terrorism created security vacuum in which ISIS evolved. The affirmation or defiance of this thesis will be conducted by examining how and in what way certain events and dynamics affected the creation of the security vacuum in favour of ISIS. The paper will analyse the following parameters / variables: withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, the Ukrainian crisis and the strengthening of the regional actors, as well as the absence of effective social policy in many states where ISIS recruits.

The second sub-thesis will address the difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS with a view to demonstrate why ISIS represents a qualitatively new threat to the world peace and security. The key argument in this part of the paper will be the explanation on how ISIS managed to create a new and unique type of threat that is different than the one of Al Qaeda. Unlike Al Qaeda that countered the world peace by sporadic decentralized shock attacks carried out globally, ISIS builds up its presence via new vector of operations. Although the direction and intensity of this vector are perhaps similar to those of Al Qaeda, the core vector that ISIS uses as threat differs in its essence. The inter-civilisation clash is material and direct, not only ideological.

The third part of the paper will try to give some solutions and recommendations that will be directly conditioned by the results from the previous two parts. The conclusions and recommendations will serve to set a platform to be used in future research in this domain.

Key words: global terrorism, global security, Al Qaeda, Islamic State

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), mainly a Sunni jihadist group, is aimed at establishing caliphate, a trans-national Islamic state founded on the Sharia law. The group was formed after the US – led invasion against the Saddam Hussein regime. It was designated as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and organised insurgency and guerrilla war against the coalition forces and their domestic allies. After the launch of the US campaign against terrorism and the Sunni efforts to maintain local security, known as the “Tribal Awakening” in the period 2006-2007, violence by AQI was diminished.

However, with the withdrawal of the US forces, by the end of 2011, the group intensified the attacks, mainly against Shia targets, in an attempt to incite a conflict between the Sunni minority in Iraq and the dominant Shia government of the PM Nouri al-Maliki. According to the UN report in the big wave of violence in 2013, close to eight thousands civilians died and that reflects the bloodiest year in Iraq since 2008. In the meantime, in 2012 the group adopted the new name, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS (sometimes referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL) as an expression of their enlarged ambitions to topple Assad’s regime in neighbouring Syria. Until June 2014, the group fighters suppressed the Iraqi army from the bigger cities of Fallujah and Mosul and established territorial control and administrative structures on the both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border.

1.THE NEW SECURITY VACUUM AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

The founder and inspirer of the Islamic State was the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Through the teaching of one of the most famous modern Salafi/takfiri preachers, the Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who he met in Afghanistan in 1990, Zarqawi inspired his followers to violently implement the anti-Shia agenda (Boekhoff-van der Voort, Versteegh and Wagemakers, 2011, 1). Since that time, Zarqawi established contact with Al Qaeda, however, believing that the region of the Levant is strategically a more important battle field, thus keeping his distance from

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He established training camps in Western Afghanistan and set up the “Army of the Levant” - Jund al Sham. The US invasion in Iraq enabled Zarqawi to create his own militant organisation that he called “Monotheism and Jihad” - al Tawhid wa al Jihad, and in August 2003 it carried out the three major terrorist attacks: in the Jordanian Embassy and the UN Head Quarters in Bagdad, as well as the important Shia mosque “Imam Ali” in Najaf – Iraq. In these three attacks over 130 people were killed and more than 650 were injured.

In 2004 Zarqawi joined Al Qaeda and changed the name of the group to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Zarqawi believed that joining Al Qaeda will attract recruits and funds, while bin Laden needed Al Qaeda presence in Iraq as one of the most Jihadist fronts at that time. Bin Laden also expected Zarqawi to subordinate and accept to implement the decisions made by Al Qaeda centre. However, at the beginning of 2005 Zarqawi as AQI leader called for other groups and together they formed the Mujahedin Council – Shura. In mid 2006 Zarqawi was killed in US led air strike. The new leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and the other leaders of groups in Iraq established by a decision taken by the Mujahedin Council, a new organisation – the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), led by Abu Omar al Baghdadi. At that time, ISI was a branch of Al Qaeda. Abu Hamza and Abu Omar were killed in 2011, which seriously downgraded the movement, even though it was in alliance with many secular opponents to the Shia Iraqi regime that were excluded from the government as former Ba'athists.¹

In May 2010, through a bloody and severe campaign with car-bombs and suicide bomb attacks the movement was restored by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who then became its leader. During 2011 with the expansion of the insurgency in Syria, Abu Bakr decided that one group led by Abu Mohamed al Golani joins the insurgency. Golani, supported by Zawahiri, built an efficient combat force, attracting recruits from the country and abroad. The Syrian force, which was with thousands fighters from all over the world, threw the Iraqi insurgency in shadow. This is why Abu Bakr restored his leadership on both sides of the border and in April 2013 he stated Golani as his subordinate. However, Golani refused to accept that his group “The Support Front for the People of the Levant” (Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al Sham) is subordinated to the Islamic State of Iraq and asked Zawahiri to give public statement on this issue. Zawahiri ordered that Abu Bakr limits his operations in Iraq since Golani was decided by the Al Qaeda centre to act in Syria. Abu Bakr did not follow these recommendations and in February 2014 he stated that Al Qaeda has no longer any connection to the Islamic State in Iraq, which was later re-named by Abu Bakr into the Islamic State of Al-Sham (the Levant) – ISIL. In the period to follow Abu Bakr established a huge collaboration network in Syria, attracting recruits from Al Nusra and other insurgency groups, acquiring donations and support from abroad as a successful Salafi/Takfiri group – opponent to the Bashar al Assad regime.

On June 29, 2014 ISIL declared the establishment of the caliphate giving it the name of Islamic State (IS) and Abu Bakr – the caliph Ibrahim. (*Withnall, 2014*).

¹ Ba'athism - "resurrection" is an Arab nationalist ideology that promotes the development and creation of a unified Arab state through the leadership of a vanguard party over a progressive revolutionary government.

This message was meant to all Muslims and especially to those who share the Salafi /Takfiri beliefs expressed by the IS, gaining a huge support by the supporters in Syria, including al-Nusra. This statement represented a direct challenge for the Zawahiri authority and the role of the Mula Omar who until then had been undisputed leader of the Amir al Mu'minin followers.

All this shows that the Islamic militant movement has entered a new phase of its evolution. Today the remains of the Al Qaeda base are limited at the Afghan-Pakistani border while its branches and remaining groups have control over a bigger territory. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the independent militant groups in Libya and Egypt, Al Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula, Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Islamist militants in Syria – all together cover bigger space than any other religious extremist organisation from any time before. Other changes that are evident are the resources. Today the militant Islamist groups again have a large sum of cash money at their disposal. The financing is being assisted by rich donors via extortion, kidnapping, control over the confiscated recourses – such as, the oil fields and control over the smuggling networks. Furthermore, the tactics has also undergone radical changes. One decade ago the Western “distant enemy” was the major target to the Islamist extremists. That target Osama bin Laden tried to meet via global Muslim radicalisation and mobilisation. He realised it with the perpetration of spectacular violence – “propaganda by deed” to incite global insurgency by the Muslims in the world against the infidels. However, today this is neither the Islamic State leader - Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s main target, nor is the main target pursued by many other militant Islamist groups in the world. Only Al Qaeda on the Arabic Peninsula – a group that is currently closest to the old Al Qaeda, still successively attacks the US interests abroad and on its territory. According to the RAND Corporation Report, only 1% of the terrorist attacks carried out between 2010 and 2013 were international. According to the Islamic State actions carried out so far, we can conclude that its strategic principles are clear: preserving and then expanding the conquered territory. It is also evident the change in their actions, their readiness to form coalitions with much broader parameter of partners which was not the case in the past years and decades. The offensive that the IS carried out in Iraq was successful because of the active participation of groups loyal to Saddam Hussein. Ten years ago such an alliance would have been impossible. There is also a reset of the relations between the extremists and the Middle East states. To some of the Middle East states the Sunni militants represent a cover for re-establishment of balance of the traditional sect rivals in the region. They support the sectarian war over the past four years rendering passive or active assistance.

It can be concluded that all this is not a consequence from the Al Qaeda era. IS represents a new scenery of militants that are much more different than the militants several years ago. Bruce Hoffman, a famous scientist in the security domain, makes a clear distinction among terrorists, between what they do and what they do not represent. According to him, terrorists are not criminals that use similar tactics of violence, but their actions are aimed at direct personal gain. According to him, terrorists are not guerrilla: “Terrorists ... do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid

engaging enemy military forces in combat and rarely exercise any direct control or sovereignty either over territory or population.” (Hoffman, 2006, 35)

These last characteristics are the ones that will help us define the Islamic State. They concurrently extend to the bigger part of the rest Sunni Islamic extremists that currently use the tactics and techniques that are defined as terrorist. The notion “guerrilla”, which became popular during the Cold War, seems not to be entirely compliant. The Islamic State can be defined as an insurgency group that uses terrorism in a systematic way with a view to seize cities and territories, while selling oil at the black market. Since the end of the last century until recently, the global Jihadist movement was defined as terrorist and occasionally it was referred to as insurgency with Al Qaeda being the classic example. What we see today in IS actions is insurgency movement that establishes strategic dominance with the use of terrorism as one of the many tactics. This explains to a certain extent the reason for radicalisation and recruitment of people from West that joins these groups. To them this represents a possibility to fight, adventure, friendships, perception of injustice as a manner of attracting recruits and joining a certain insurgency movement.

The social networks, media and the contemporary transport system make joining the group easier than ever. Leaving the group, on the other hand, is very difficult and the physical and psychological price is very high. The environment in which IS exists can in a very short period of time, turn a single individual that joined in from solidarity / insurgency-related reasons into a merciless killer-a terrorist that can commit murder in front of a camera.

2.1 THE ISLAMIC STATE VS. AL QAEDA

Although media and many political figures today treat these two groups as the same, IS has developed into a significantly different organisation, as compared to Al Qaeda. IS evolved outside the Al Qaeda in Iraq, which during the US occupation, was led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He had a number of misunderstandings with the Al Qaeda leadership and in particular regarding the terrorist attacks against the Shiites. The leadership in Afghanistan did not agree with Al Zarqawi that other Muslims should be attacked, regardless of their beliefs. Al Zarqawi showed a big hatred towards the Shiites, considering them to be outcasts. (Ahmed, 2010, 257). After the killing of Al Zarqawi in 2006, President Bush ordered deployment of additional 20.000 soldiers in Iraq. General David Petraeus was in position to efficiently implement the counter-insurgency strategy through a united force that joined the US army, the Iraqi army and the Sunnis that were disappointed by the Jihadists violence and their severe enforcement of the Sharia law. In several years Al Qaeda in Iraq was almost eliminated. The Sunni tribal leaders were a promised part in the future Iraqi government in return for their role in stabilizing the situation in the areas of Western Iraq that had been deserted.

However, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Maliki, excluded the Sunnis from his government and got close to the Iranian government to ensure the US soldiers would not stay in Iraq. After the US withdrawal from Iraq, Maliki actually dismissed the Sunnis from any important role. Feeling threatened, the Sunnis started to protest

against their plight. Maliki's ham-fisted response essentially prepared the ground for an insurgency. (O'Grady, 2014)

IS is different than Al Qaeda for two key reasons. First, IS – in Al Zarqawi's spirit, is focused on eliminating the Shiites by either converting or killing them. Although the group attacks the Christians and other Sunnis that do not believe in the IS cause, Al Baghdadi sees upon the Shiites as outcasts in the Islam and believes that their elimination should be in the focus of his organisation. Al Qaeda does not approve the Shiites, but does not see them as target for animosity. Secondly, IS is focused on gaining territory. The region controlled by IS is bigger than Israel and extends to the borders with Iraq and Syria. Hence, IS controls a new state whose borders change daily. Bin Laden's position on this issue was that the spectacular terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda will spontaneously lead to insurgency in the Islamic world and will lead to the establishment of the caliphate. Although the Arab Spring seemed like fulfilment of this prognosis until today this has not yet happened.

With the successes achieved by IS, it seems that Al Qaeda has no longer a big importance and its influence on the global Jihadist movement is brought into question. IS, being rejected by the Al Qaeda leadership, now controls a territory bigger than Israel. It has its own sources of financing gathered through kidnappings, robberies and taxes. IS delivers services in the regions it controls. In essence, IS does what Al Qaeda had promised: it began to create an Islamic State with huge support by the Sunni tribes. The tribal leaders and the former Ba'athists expelled with joint forces the Iraqi army from the Sunni regions. IS offers much more dangerous alternative than Al Qaeda that called for terrorism to be spread worldwide. IS calls for the Jihadists worldwide to come and join the organisation. For this reason, it might be much more dangerous in comparison to Al Qaeda.

2.2 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

All the IS achievements so far would not have been successful without the power vacuum that was caused in the region. The countries surrounding IS differently deal with this security problem, ranging from “non-deliberate assistance” to incomplete counter fight.

With Erdogan's government Turkey entirely focused on expanding the influence of the “Turkish belonging”. In his attempts to revive the Ottoman Empire, the struggle for becoming a regional hegemonic power is noticeable. Within this process, from political reasons Erdogan has tried to improve the relations with the Kurds. For many years, the Kurds in Turkey have been facing severe discrimination, including the efforts that were aimed at rooting out the Kurdish language and culture. At the same time, with the support of the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, it has weakened the government in Bagdad, and indirectly, its sponsor in Teheran. If the Kurds dominate in Northern Iraq and have control over the oil fields then Turkey could gain additional profit from the diversification of its energy resources further away from Russia and the transit taxes for transport of the Kurdish oil. Although Turkey would not like to see a new Kurdish state, it would support an enlarged autonomy. With the IS offensive, the Kurdish region expanded for around 30%. The Kurds, also, have their army, called Peshmerga that is supposed to protect the Kurdish region from IS.

To both Turkey and the Kurds, the establishment of a radical Islamic state by the IS represents a real security threat. However, if IS continues to erode the authorities in Bagdad, the gains from the IS victory will be high.

In the case with Iran the most important target the country has is to be a regional hegemonic power and in order to achieve this, it tries to create the “Shiites half-moon” that extends from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and represents a threat to the Sunnis in the region. (Woodward, 2008). The toppling of Saddam Hussein by the US and the attempt to establish democracy meant that the Shiites would dominate given their majority status in Iraq. However, Iran made several key mistakes and the first was the decision to support Maliki – unless their intention was to launch a sectarian conflict. Maliki is a Shiite and when forming the government he excluded the Kurds and the Sunnis. This paved the way for Al Baghdadi and the IS. In addition to this, fearing the loyalty of the Iraqi army, Maliki replaced the expert people with loyal political supporters. The defeat in the fights with IS proved that Maliki had failed to build an efficient army. Another mistake was that Iran insisted, via Maliki’s government, that the US army be removed from Iraq. This proved to be a cardinal mistake. Most likely, Iran believed that with the US presence in Iraq they could never exercise influence over Maliki. However, it is obvious that it was impossible for Maliki’s government to set control over the territory without US military support, and theoretically it would limit Maliki’s sectarian tendencies. Iran slowly gained the regional leadership, however it bordered with irresponsible neighbours that could involve the country into unwanted conflicts. Although Iran could most likely deal with IS it would cost the country huge resources that would, in return, weaken it in relation to the other countries in the region. Last, the more Iran supports Maliki, the easier it would be for the IS to recruit and collect finances.

When it comes to Syria, even though Assad has control over certain parts of the territory, there is little likelihood that Syria will ever again be a unitary country. It is most likely that it would be split, like in the case with Lebanon. Assad continuously avoided attacking the IS forces, relying on other forces in Syria. In most of the cases this tactics proved to be successful, although this policy was not in the interests of Iraq and Iran. However, with IS developing growing a powerful base in Iraq, Al Baghdadi can intensify the IS attacks in Syria. Given the recent success IS had many of the insurgency groups in Syria could easily decide to join the group, which would cause problems to Assad’s government.

Saudi Arabia is not a big IS supporter. The Gulf States consider the radical Sunni groups to be non-religious, corrupt regimes that need to be toppled. At the same time, the strong Sunni power that counters the Shiite half-moon is perceived as positive. The improved relations between US and Iran, to the Saudis, are a bad sign. IS is a process that undermines this friendship, however, at the same time, they would not like to see IS become a strong state with influence in the region.

The Middle East has never in the past faced a similar security situation. Actually, the peoples formed by the Europeans have similar characteristics to the pre - Westphalia Europe, including the personality cult that is needed to rule different groups. The Arab Spring and IS could mark the beginning of similar process to the thirty- year War between the Protestants and the Catholics (1618 – 48). If the events taking place in the Middle East do develop in this direction, which means that in

future we are to face a long-term increase of the regional unrest, it will have global implications.

The threat refers to the capacities and the intentions. From both aspects the Islamic State represents a threat to the Western allies in the Middle East and in their home countries. Although with less international terrorist attacks compared to Al Qaeda, the control that the Islamic State has over the territory of Iraq and Syria resembles more the Taliban where it can offer safe shelter to the international groups and individuals with extremist – militant agenda. Also, the IS is not a monolithic organisation. The Western allies are not the group leadership priority; it is rather the establishment of a government in Iraq and Syria – a vision to be expanded among all fighters, many of whom are foreigners. The open sources show that since the beginning of the Civil war in Syria, around 11.000 foreign fighters joined the Islamic State or the Al Qaeda branches. Only 1 out of 9 Muslim foreign fighters continues to lead terrorist attacks after leaving the battle field. Still, this is not to be underestimated since it represents a significant number that will continue the militant ideology outside Iraq and Syria, with or without the IS leaders guidance.

IS and its predecessors are linked to different plots outside the Middle East. The authorities in UK, Italy, Kosovo, France and Netherlands have records of terrorist attacks committed by individuals that had allegedly fought in Syria. On 24th May this year a man who had fought in Syria entered the Jewish Museum in Brussels and opened fire with gun, killing four people. He was wearing a cloth with an imprint saying “Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant”. Even before the Civil war in Syria predecessors of the Islamic State were linked to attacks in Europe. In 2010 a Swedish citizen, who travelled to Mosul, joined the Islamic State in Iraq and was killed in a suicide bomb attack in Stockholm. In 2007, in UK, in possession of the perpetrators of terrorist bomb attack were found telephone numbers of IS Iraq operatives. However, the threat to the Western allies’ interests in the Middle East is very serious. In 2012, the Jordanian intelligence services prevented terrorist attack organized by predecessors of the Islamic State, a project to “to launch near-simultaneous attacks on multiple civilian and government targets, reportedly including the U.S. Embassy in the capital, Amman, Jordan” (Department of Homeland Security, 2012, 9)

At the moment, the Western allies’ policy in Iraq and Syria draws attention. In Iraq special forces and drones are engaged and intelligence missions are launched to prevent the IS advancement. However, in Syria there is a different policy: there, the main IS adversary is the Syrian government and the Syrian Kurds in the North. They are under IS attack, with IS controlling around one third of the country, including the bigger part of the oil production capacities. The policy of the US, Europe, Saudi Arabia and the Arab States from the Gulf – is aimed at toppling Basher Al Assad; and at the moment this is the very goal pursued also by the IS and other Jihadists in Syria. If Assad government falls, IS will have the biggest gain with the new caliphate likely to extend from the Iraqi border to the Mediterranean. The ongoing contradictory policies in both countries gives IS free space to build its strength and support to its forces in Iraq and Syria and represents a situation in which IS can endure and develop.

CONCLUSIONS

The war against terrorism "failed because it was not aimed at destroying the jihad movement in general and in particular, was not in the direction of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two countries that support jihadism as a religion and as a movement. Western allies did so because these countries are important allies in creating the world political scene. Saudi Arabia is a huge market for Western arms and the Saudis are influential members of the Western political establishment. Pakistan is a nuclear power with a population of 180 million and their army has close ties to the Pentagon. Despite the huge budgets of intelligence spent after the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda affiliates spectacularly returned to life. The governments of the Western allies that led "war on terror" claim that the rights of citizens must be sacrificed to ensure the safety of all. Despite many controversial security measures against movements that were targeted were not defeated, but strengthened. In other words, running the "war against terrorism", which in 2001 had a huge influence on the conduct of global security political scene, proved unsuccessful.

Ending the Iraqi mission by the United States, creates space and time in which was not paid much attention to what is happening on the ground. The indecisiveness of the Western allies to support moderate rebels in Syria fighting against the Assad regime and the lack of action when the Syrian government crossed the "red line" using chemical weapons on his own people, further helped to create a fertile ground for the growth of IS. All this, as well as the weak intelligence capabilities on the ground represented failure combination, which made great time vacuum that jihadists wisely used.

Today, IS is increasingly becoming a serious regional and global security threat. IS is a new and really different group that has a strong religious extremist base, whose goals are simply down to gaining power and influence. It is a rebel group which has the potential to direct its terrorist activities in the West and will certainly do so, especially if they lose control of territories in Syria and Iraq. In combat, this threat on European soil and US we may conclude that it is an extremely difficult detection and prevention. More efficient solution would be the presence of Western allies in the Middle East. Stable and united international front against IS, which will participate in all fields, can be one part of the solution. However, only the military approach will not be sufficient.

Providing stability and prosperity in Iraq and Syria in long term will weaken IS. But also a political solution that will turn IS into a political actor would be useful. This will mean that in any solution for the regional problems IS will be involved in negotiations. For Western politicians, this may represent a very unpopular decision, but it is essential to end the threat and defeat IS. It is well known that terrorist organizations get softer when they get converted into a political force. It is also known that the earlier this process starts, the smaller consequences will be left behind terrorists, in our case allocation of the threat on European soil.

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REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES PROJECTED IN THE MODERN SECURITY THREATS

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Abstract

The starting point in the analysis of the regional security comes from the terminological definition of the region, then the current studies of the regional security and at the end the position and the influence of regional powers in the world today. We are witnessing a series of changes occurring in the security environment which will have a large impact on the global security, the regional one and even the national security of certain communities. Unlikely, in the national income, combined with the general decline in the living standards and poverty; increase of the size of the human population in the world, followed by a rise in hunger and reduction of arable land and lack of drinking water; increase in connectivity of the world with transnational communication networks and information connectivity (the Internet); growth in world demand for oil as a strategic raw material; explosive growth of the drug trade, followed with money laundering and corruption; continuing growth and influence of multinational organizations and their negative impact and the appearance of corruption and violation of human rights, and the emergence of non-democratic regimes and institutions this and similar conditions today represent foundation which is important for the projected and anticipated threats which affect the changes in the security, political, economic and cultural environment of modern living on daily bases. Through this scientific work by using comparative analysis and statistical indicators I will try to stretch a line of distinction between the impact of contemporary security threats backdrop of safety, and the regional and especially national security.

Keywords: regional security, national security, network threats, terrorism, asymmetric warfare, immersive virtual reality

INTRODUCTION

Despite the contemporary trend towards regional security, there has been surprisingly little theoretically informed comparative analysis of this phenomenon. There is a growing literature which analyzes the general phenomenon of regionalism in world politics, particularly the 'new regionalism' that has emerged since the 1990s. However, this literature has primarily an international political economy perspective, reflecting not only the fact that many of the new regional institutions are economic in nature but also an assumption that economic factors are the main drivers behind the new regionalization. This work provides a generic framework for analyzing regional security, as an aspect of global, interstate and intra-state security governance, in the conditions of the first and second decade of the 21st century. Regional security can be reviewed through: broader concept of security, new security concepts as human security, energy security, societal security, private security, corporate security, etc.¹

This work addresses the issue of what defines a region, and regional security. It also gives conceptually different interpretation and understanding of modern prospection of the regional security. In terms of many contemporary security threats in the world affecting security and especially regional security they are illustrated with numerous figures and tables. They serve as a single driver in terms of opportunities for consideration and appointment of the dangers of these threats. Even though the military threats are placed last in terms of contemporary threats, they still occupy a significant place in the threats to national, regional and world security as a whole.

1.REGIONAL SECURITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF MODERN THREATS

1.1. The notion of regional security

The starting point in the analysis of regional security arises from the terminological definition of the region, then, the acknowledged studies on regional security such as: *pluralism, social constructivism, broad and narrow concepts of providing and deepening the security and the global security. Pluralism* as a paradigm in the international relations, in its appearance in the 1960s considered that what happens in international relations can no longer be claimed to be the product of military power or economic power of the states but also of many other factors. Therefore, this view looks for the solution for the bad relations of regional security, and the situation in individual countries

¹ Group of authors: O. Bakrevski, D. Trivan, S. Mitevski, *Corporational Security Systems*, Macedonian Chamber for protection of estate and people, Skopje 2012, p. 26

in the answers to many other questions beyond the threat of war, when the engagement of regional and international organizations has a decisive role i.e., the engagement of the institutions of the international community.²

Paradigms for security among the supporters of *social constructivism*, which appears after the period of the Cold War, is that the issue of security should be viewed with an emphasized respect for the social and cultural dimension of a country, the group of states or regions. Emphasizing the “*wider*” instead of the “*narrow*” concept of security comes from the attitude and interpretation of security within the traditional procedures of international security policy in which a major security threat is the military power, which at the end of the XX century threatened to end by a nuclear war. During the 1990s Copenhagen School³ comes with a new approach which in terms of its predecessors emphasizes the need of highlighting the importance of the unarmed dimensions until they represent “existing threat” and claim that some issues need to be taken into account as security measures as long as they do not represent a threat to any country.

In terms of security, even further in its views go social constructivist with the profound concept of security, especially “*human security*” when they say that the main reference object of security should be people who are building the structure of the institutions of sub national groups and states. Here, particular attention should be paid to economic insecurity, diseases, corruption, Crime, political conflicts, disruption of the environment and other disorders of normal life in one community. And the end is the view of the impact of the *global security* over the regional security, which solves the paradigm in international relations, encompassing all the complexity in defining security with myriad of interactions among the actors that make the modern global system, called globalization. Regional security is projected in the global or world security but also has a decisive impact on national security. National security is defined as the ability of states,, fully and successfully to protect their vital national, state and social values, survival and identity of all forms and types of endangering further ... to provide psychological and freedom of the people and community fears about jeopardizing their values, survival and identity and self peaceful, smooth and overall development.⁴

² Hugh, P. (2009). *Global security*, translation from English, Skopje: Tabernakul, 2009, p. 5

³ Copenhagen School for Security Studies stresses the social aspect of security, particularly regional security and the impact of the major centers of political power, and extension of the frame of the security. The most famous theorists of this academic institution are Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Velde.

⁴ Kotovchevski M. *National Security*, National and University Library “St. Clement of Ohrid”, 2013, p. 24

1.2. Contemporary threats to regional security

In the world today the political non-state violence associated with two factors can be considered as modern threats to regional security. First, there is the possibility that the weaker attacks the stronger, which does not apply only to non-state actors. The second factor relates to the rise of the “era of terrorism“, the advance of communication technology at the end of the XX century. The state of political violence in certain countries and regions in the world at certain times throughout history have been the cause of state terrorism and genocide and civil wars waged due to different ethnic, racial, political and religious reasons. Being the threats to regional and global security which must be taken into account are the factors such as: projections of the situation with the world's resources and uneven distribution of the same in certain regions in the world; then the increased level of consumption of energy in the world, by region; situation with the changes to occur with the level of the gross national income of the new economies (especially China and India); the need to control the economic emigration movements of the world's population and refugee camps, as a result of the regional armed conflicts and national civil crises and armed conflicts in some areas in the world.

More than 2 billion people by 2025 or 56% of the world population will be in Asia, while 66% will live in urban areas along the coasts. The populations of developed countries are aging - fast. The age gap between developed and developing countries will lead to massive migration of labor from the undeveloped towards the developed countries.




Figure 1. Projections for the growth of the world population by region⁵

In the area of the economic globalization the trend that will affect the situation of the development of the economies of less developed economies will continue. All this will lead to dramatic consequences in terms of economic security in the world. Winners in the area of economic transformation will be brought in a state of possible security conflict in regional and global scale, while those countries that lag behind in economic development will be subject

⁵ Source: to 1950 PRB estimates; 1950 - 2050 UN, World Population Projections to 2050, 1998 (medium scenario)

to internal clashes and instability. The rise of emerging Asian powers will be the main orientation of the world. China which is the second largest world economic power today is expected to exceed the EU in 2015, while the US by 2040. India, as the third largest economy - will exceed the EU by 2025.




Figure 2. Projected real GDP per capita growth by country: 2010 - 25⁶

Devastation and shift of the growth of barren areas on the planet Earth will lead to a crisis in food production that provide for the needs of humanity, which means that a significant portion of the world's population will face stress in terms of meeting the daily needs of food and especially water.




Figure 3. IWMI indicator of relative water scarcity⁷

The global energy stress or the need for energy resources as a result of the significant increase of the demands for energy especially in developing and transition countries in terms of increased standards of living standards will continue making the shape the international politics.

⁶ Source: PwC World in 2050 model % real GDP per capita, growth

⁷

Source: http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/IWMI_Research_Reports/PDF/PUB019/REPORT19.PDF




Figure 4. Projected global energy consumption from 1990 to 2030, by energy source (in million metric tons of oil equivalent)⁸

It is estimated that the world today is characterized with exclusively weak economic resources (45 countries in the world are in a state of the so called “Failed economies”, compared to the 25 developed countries). Expectations indicate that by 2020, 60% of the population will be concentrated in larger cities. It is estimated that 66% of today's world population is uneducated and this percentage tends to increase.




Figure 5. Changes in the world of urban population with access to normal conditions and state of the refugee camps in the world.⁹

When it comes to the national security of the Republic Macedonia, which arises from the situation with the regional environment we can adopt

⁸ Source: <http://www.statista.com/statistics/222066/projected-global-energy-consumption-by-source/>

⁹ Source: UNHCR, UNRWA, 2004, World Urbanisation Prospects, 2004, UN-HABITAT, 2003, WHO, UNICEF, 2003

the view that "Macedonian territory with its Vardar participation in the Aegean basin represents ground transmission with the Western and Central European, political, economic and military related states. It also represents the missing "link" in terms of connectivity and completion of the European Union as a whole compact space, with integrated Greece and special status to Turkey. ¹⁰

As a Balkan country and as part of Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the Republic of Macedonia, with its qualitative and quantitative features, represents a determinant which greatly affects the overall political and security processes as well as the state of the regional security in this part of the region. So far, set priorities of the countries of the Balkan region that are oriented for regional connectivity are being positive and they are directed towards the regional integration with tendencies to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures, which in the end will surely lead to a release from the constraints of the "balkanization" and will affect the stabilization of the security situation of the Balkans. Finally would lead to entering a period of self-determination of the region.

2.GLOBALIZATION AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY

In the modern conditions of life, the processes of globalization are manifested in the technological, economic, communications and information connection with the modern world. In the emergence of new centers of technological, economic and political power, the new regional integration that significantly define the relations at the World market but with different power and different social contradictions.¹¹

Integration of science and culture and internationalization of their developments that led to the formation of the so called planetary view of modern man (think globally - act locally). Manifestation of awareness of global environmental problems associated with planetary environmental pollution and a necessity to create a common strategy for protecting and improving the environment and preserving and improving the quality of life on the planet Earth.

On the other hand, Ulrich Beck by the saying that:" Poverty is hierarchical but the smog is democratic" actually indicates the need but also the main risks, threats and hazards and threats to humanity in the era of modern society that must very soon be localized, to become visible and easily determined, and modern societies need to manage time effectively and to deal with the major security issues. When it comes to the present phenomenon and

¹⁰ Mileski T. "*Political-geographic process on the Balkans*", Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Defense and Peace Studies - Skopje, Contemporary Macedonian Defense, No. 12 December 2005, p. 71

¹¹ Giddens A, „Sociology”, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 519

startling picture of the wars as the biggest threats to the world community at regional and global level, some of the conducted polls still put wars as a phenomenon that threatens the security at the last fifth place in the review of the greatest dangers in the world.

Table 1. The biggest danger in the world today.¹²

1. Crime	27
2. Terrorism	15
3. Health / economic insecurity	13
4. Accidents / disaster	12
5. Wars	8

This only indicates that modern man is burdened with daily needs and wishes for a normal life, and horrible and devastating consequences that war as a phenomenon carries to the human community are often forgotten. Military dimension of globalization, would not be functional if the power is not based on the new high-tech armed systems and military equipment. With its sophisticated capabilities they have made a real revolution in the doctrines of the modern armed organizations. New information technologies that have found application in the military sphere declassify the classical way of military organizations. Annual estimates of global costs for the defense of the 1.5 trillion dollars per year (an average of 2.5% of world GDP) is too much in terms of resources for peace and maintaining peace. Certainly these conditions affect and change the line of the national and regional security challenges that they all carry with.

¹² Retrieved from Peter Hugh, Global security, Globalization of Disease, translated from English, Tabernakul 2009", p. 11 (The research is conducted on 6043 people from 11 countries: Brazil, C. Britain, US, Canada, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa and Thailand and Germany. The question was to answer that for them major threats to their life. Source: Centre for Human Security (2005: p. 50 - 53)




Figure 6. Defense spending in the world in 2012, (Funds are expressed in billions of dollars in terms of current currency US) ¹³

The riots that came up with the “Tunisian Spring”, the events in Egypt, Tunisia and the latest civil war in Syria are due to the global economic crisis, class and “tribal” contradictions and undemocratic processes related to violations of human rights in these countries. Potential instability may occur in Saudi Arabia as a result of succession after the death of King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, and the increased demands of the people for political reforms as well as the demographic pressure and high unemployment. With regard to the latest developments in Ukraine, it is important to emphasize the new positioning of the US and the European Union towards this huge European country that possesses exceptional economic performances and development prospects. This country also offers significant grounds in terms of the expansion of NATO to the East, the Euro-Asian area, especially in terms of approximation to the borders of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Russian Federation considers the Ukraine together with Belarus and the Baltic countries as the most valuable part of the geostrategic, economic and political interests.

In the case of Ukraine, primarily because of its strategic importance, cultural differences and the positioning to the east, too clear commitment but

¹³

Source: http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/2012_topline_global_defense_spending/

also high stakes in engagement are being offered. This just once again shows that the military power of regional and global powers for a long time will draw the map of interesting areas and influences, which will include political, economic, cultural, demographic and other spheres of influence.

CONCLUSION

Regional security seen through the prism of the areas of political and military power and the impact of today's leading regional powers in the world has a huge effect on the security of certain national states and communities. It also affects the occurrence of crises and armed conflicts even causing armed conflicts in certain parts of the world. Positioning and the performance of regional powers in certain situations must be controlled and sometimes penalized in terms of respect for the norms of international law that would prohibit or impede their influences of interest and engagement that endanger national and global security in general.

The globalization as the world process has a huge impact on security again, and especially the national and regional security. It generally has negative implications for reasons that the leading countries in the world are the main protagonists of this process in terms of the spread of their national interests globally, primarily with economic influences in the world, resorting to the use of military force that exceed the threshold of positive discrimination in terms of cause-effect relations for the use of military force in international relations. Thus, these countries often are hiding behind the international community (UN or the EU and other organizations), sometimes without their consent or approval, resort to use of force in international relations, which questions the national security of individual nation-states, but also violates international law and the rights of use of force in international relations. This of course a serious threat to the security and providing continuous development of individual national communities and countries worldwide.

Certainly, for the “smaller” national communities and countries such as the Republic Macedonia answer for the connection of globalization and sovereignty, national values and identity has to be found. In addition to the assessment of the situation and the impact of global threats to regional security the smaller national communities should be taken into account despite the impact of the situation with the geopolitical environment and even the role and impact of international organizations that are responsible for the maintenance of global security as for example the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO Alliance and the other international organizations.

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