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The Perseverance of Guilds in modern China

Evidence from Shanghai (1912-1949)

by

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Abstract: This study explores the persistence of guilds in early 20th century China, contrasting their fate with European guilds. While most European guilds were abolished after the French Revolution, Chinese guilds were reorganized as industrial associations (*tongye gonghui*) under government oversight. Using constitutions from 29 Shanghai associations and thematic analysis, this research examines their organizational features and compares them with traditional Chinese and European guilds. Findings reveal that *tongye gonghui* were self-governed, promoting members' economic and social interests, even though with weaker cultural ties than traditional guilds. Their survival highlights the practical value of guild functions and the role of ideology in shaping institutional change. This study bridges Chinese and Western scholarship, offering a comparative perspective on guilds' enduring significance and contributions to local economies.

Keywords: guilds, China, twentieth century, institutional change, comparative analysis

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1 Introduction

While guilds disappeared in Europe before the emergence of the modern economy, in China they persisted until the mid-twentieth century. China modernized with guilds. Thus, in the mid-twentieth century, a guild of electrical machinery existed in Shanghai, China, which shows an interesting hybrid of premodern institution and modern industry. An analysis of these modern guilds and this different institutional change in China may first, help understand insitutional change and second help illuminate the debate on European craft guilds, which have been regarded as both conducive to growth by one school of thought, and as detrimental to growth by another.

Guilds as a bottom-up institution for merchants and craftsmen have played an important role in economic history. Ogilvie (2019, pp.2-4), defines guilds as an “association of people engaging in the same activities and wishing to pursue shared purposes”, and classifies guilds as a particularized institution which create different rules for different groups. Many of the studies about guilds have been based on the European context. Aligning with the dialogue in new institutional economics, these discussions about guilds have been focused on the influence of guilds as an institution to the economy: whether it was an efficient institution for the general good of the society or it was an institution that only protected the interests of specific groups and therefore hindered economic development (Lucassen, De Moor, & Van Zanden, 2008; Epstein & Prak, 2008 p1-2; Ogilvie, 2004).

To broaden the view of the debate, however, some scholars have called for a more global perspective of guilds study. Lucassen et al. (2008) points out that guilds and guilds-like institutions existed not only in premodern Europe but other societies and cultures as well, from Northern Africa and Middle East to Asia like Japan, China and India, and the European version of guilds is not representative enough for all the variations of guilds and guilds-like institutions across the world. A global perspective can provide a more comprehensive understanding of guilds as an institution and how they functioned in different societies. Also, a global comparative institutional analysis of guilds can be related to the Great Divergence debate about the divergent developments in different parts of Eurasia.

This study, focusing on the modern guild-like institution in Shanghai (1911-1949), aims to extend the study of guilds to the Chinese context by analyzing original guild documents data and investigating the different fates of guilds in China and Europe when facing modernization. This study will provide a comparative perspective for the understanding of the dissolution of guilds and sheds light on the debate about the efficiency of guilds.

1.1 Research Problem

Compared to the European guilds, the Chinese guilds developed much later in history. They originated from the late Ming Dynasty (1573-1644) when the state loosened their intervention in the economy and society and grew rapidly from the mid-18th century (Moll-Murata, 2008). But guilds seemed to be more persistent in China under the challenge of modernization. In most Western European countries, guilds were abolished since the end of the *ancien régime* (political and social system before the French Revolution). In China, however, even though the political change happened more than 100 years later than France, instead of being abolished, Chinese guilds were re-organized by the governments in the Republican Era (both Peking Government (1912-1927) and Nanjing Government (1927-1937)). Therefore, in China, guilds as a premodern institution, survived the transition of society in the early Republican period and continued to exist in the new environment. Why were guilds reorganized by the government instead of being abolished in China compared to Europe? Was it that in the Chinese context guilds were generally regarded as something good for the economy or the government was too weak to restrict the power of the guilds and had to live with them? Before answering this question, however, another question needs to be tackled first. Were these ‘modern guilds’ still guilds? The question about the perseverance of guilds relies on one presumption, that the reorganized guilds were still guilds. One prominent characteristic about guilds is that they were self-governed bottom-up organizations. When guilds in China were re-organized by the governments, did they still have enough autonomy and could be regarded as guilds? Therefore, the research questions of this study are:

1. Could the ‘modern guilds’ in early Republican China actually be seen as guilds?
2. Why did the government support the perseverance of guilds in early 20th China, while in Europe guilds were mostly abolished after French Revolution?

1.2 Aim and Scope

The purpose of this qualitative research is to understand the persistence of guilds in China before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. To fulfill this purpose, this study will concentrate on the guild’s organizations in Shanghai from 1912 to 1949. It will analyze the characteristics of guilds in early Republican China by creating a dataset from Shanghai Archives based on the constitutions of guilds organizations in Shanghai (around 1930s and 1940s) and compare them with the functions of traditional guilds organizations. In the study, the organizational structure, the aim and principle of the guild’s organizations in early 20th century China will be summarized and discussed.

The reasons to use Shanghai as a case study are its representativity and feasibility. Shanghai, as one of the most prosperous cities in China, is the commercial center of China. From 1655 to 1911, Shanghai had the third most guilds organizations among the cities in China, around 20 percent of the total guilds existing (Peng, 1995, p.998). Also, there are good collections of

the primary sources about guilds organizations in Shanghai from 1912 to 1949, which makes the analysis feasible.

About the definition of guilds, Lucassen et al. (2008) proposed a more globally comparative definition of guilds instead of just the European image of guilds, according to them, guild-like institutions should have a combination of these following characteristics: “*more or less independent, self-governing organizations; people with the same or similar occupations; aimed at furthering their common interests; and in almost any respect, i.e. in the economic, political, social cultural, or religious fields.*” Hence, this study will base its analysis of guilds on this definition.

About the typology of guilds, in the European context, merchant guilds and craftsman guilds are two distinctive groups. Their influence on the economy and market can be through very different mechanisms (Ogilvie, 2019 pp.9-10). In the Chinese context, the guilds in early 20th century Shanghai that this study focuses are industrial guilds. They are more similar to craftsman guilds which are for people working in the same industry/producing the same goods or services. But because these industries are about modern manufacturing, they are not really ‘craft’ but industrial. As for the traditional Chinese guilds used for comparison with the industrial guilds in early 20th century, this study does not especially differentiate merchant guilds and craftsman guilds. The reason is that, unlike the European literature which always cut a clear line between craftsman guilds and merchant guilds, most literature about Chinese guilds does not differentiate them two and analyze them separately. And even when some studies focus on the categorization of merchant guilds and craftsman guilds, they find that there were many both commercial and craftsman guilds that were difficult to categorize (Moll-Murata, 2018 p.321).

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research background, outlines the research problem and questions about the perseverance of guilds in modern China (1912-1949). Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, focusing on institutional persistence, adaptation, and path dependency as tools for interpreting the Chinese case and reviews the relevant literature on debate about European guilds, and existing studies about Chinese guilds. Chapter 3 exhibits the historical context of the period studied. Chapter 4 describes the use of guilds documents from Shanghai Archives as the primary sources and discusses the credibility of the sources. Chapter 5 describes the methodology adopted, reasoning sample selection and the usage of thematic analysis Chapter 6 presents the empirical findings, highlighting the organizational structures, economic functions, and many other features of the modern guilds. It also offers a comparison between the modern guilds and the traditional guilds in China and discusses the reasons behind this adaptation of guilds. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings, outlining the study’s contributions and limitations, and suggesting directions for future research.

2 Theory and Previous Research

This section will discuss the theoretical foundation and previous research of the topic. In section 2.1 theories about institutions are presented which lay the theoretical foundation for the analysis of guilds as an institution. In section 2.2 research about European guilds regarding the debate about the efficiency of guilds is presented first and then come with studies about guilds in the Chinese context.

2.1 Theories

2.1.1 New Institutional Economics

Institutions are the rules of society. They can be written laws, formal social conventions, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs about the world (North et al., 2006). North (1986) defines institution as “regularities in repetitive interactions among individuals”. In the view of new institutional economists, institutions are an important part of economic analysis. In contrast to new classical economics, new institutional economics emphasize that all the economic activities are embedded in certain sets of institutions, where the transaction costs of economic activities are determined by the set of institutions and therefore different institutions can suggest different option sets and lead to different optimized outcomes. Good institutions are those that lower transaction costs and enable impersonal exchange among the majority of the society (inclusive institutions). According to new institutional economists, whether having good institutions or not explains the great divergence between the West and the rest of the world in terms of economic growth. For example, by comparing the economic development among countries in 1500 and nowadays, Acemoglu et al. (2005) has shown the differences in the institutions implemented by the colonizers in different countries can explain the reverse of prosperity in those countries nowadays: countries that were more prosperous then other countries were implemented more extractive institutions instead of inclusive institutions and the wealth status of countries is reversed after centuries.

But why do societies evolve different institutional trajectories? Why did only some countries manage to establish good institution systems that brought about economic prosperity? To explain this, new institutional economists shift their focus from transaction cost to political institutions. Some countries in the world managed to establish an open-access social order out of a limited-access social order and fostered economic development (limited-access social order refers to a society uses political manipulation of the economic system to generate rents by limiting entry or access to resources, while open-access social order refers to a society where order is maintained through political and economic competition (democracy and the market) instead of through rent creation). One explanation is that this happened under certain

doorstep conditions that there was impersonal exchange among the elite group and this impersonal exchange expanded to other parts of groups in the society when the elite could gain more in the process of expansion so they would support and not be against the transition of institutions to a more open-access social order (North et al., 2006). Another explanation is that the interplay of political and economic power in the society changed the long run institutions when groups that are more prone to having open access state gain economic power which usually have more influence on the de facto political power and then gradually changed the political setting (Acemoglu et al., 2005).

These explanations focus more on the long-run institutional evolution and explain the different institutions between different societies. But what about the institutional change at a specific time? To understand the different destiny of guilds in China and Europe, it is important to understand how institutions change. In the next sub-section, theories about institutional change will be examined and discussed.

2.1.2 Theories about Institutional Change

How do institutions change or evolve as time goes by? What are the main sources for institutional change? And what other factors may affect the process of institutional change? In the case of guilds, this institution was abolished in most places of Europe after the French Revolution. While in China, guilds adjusted to the new environment under the guidance of the government. To understand these institutional changes and the differences between them, it is helpful to establish a theoretical framework of analyzing institutional change.

Different schools of thought have different perspectives about institutional change considering their different opinions about how institutions are decided. Rational choice institutionalism usually interprets institutions as cooperation mechanisms chosen by the agents out of efficiency optimization purpose based on the contemporary functions of institutions (Thelen & Conran, 2016). Therefore, theoretically institutions change in the view of rational choice institutionalism means the optimal point has changed from one equilibrium to another equilibrium with a different set of institutions. For historical institutionalism, however, institutions are not only decided by the current situations but by the past as well. Historical institutionalism usually emphasizes the concept of “path-dependent” and tends to explain institutional change by “critical junctures”. “Path-dependence” refers to the feature of institutions that they are sticky and persistent over long periods of time as results of previously contingent events or decisions which constrain the available options for actors in the future and lock the institutions in certain trajectory (Campbell, 2010). For this strand of thought, some scholars argue that institutional change happens under critical junctures when institutions change abruptly out of exogenous shocks such as wars and energy crises (Thelen, 1999; Krasner, 1984). Sociological perspectives about institutions have a very different view about how agents matter in the process of institution formation when compared to rational choice institutionalism as well. In contrast to rational choice institutionalism, which regards agents as rational actors and hence choose institution based on the maximization of their own benefits, in the sociological tradition, existing or past institutions shape the view of the agents and influence their choice of future institutions, therefore instead of choosing institutions based on their actual efficiency, agents have internalized a “rational script” about how they

should act and choose a certain type of institutions for granted (Thelen & Conran, 2016). Hence, from a sociological point of view, the change of institutions should come with the change of people's cognition/perception of the institutions.

Same as the "critical juncture" approach, no matter which school of thought they are from, some theories explain institutional change based on a punctuated-equilibrium model, that institutions are stable for a long period but punctuated by some exogenous shocks and are usually accompanied with a wholesale institutional change (Krasner, 1988). This explanation of institutional change is even more justified by the theory about institutional complementarities which further explain the stability of institutions. The complementarities of institutions mean that institutions develop in ways that functionally complement one another and that the interconnectedness of institutions make it very difficult to change one institution without changing the others (Campbell, 2010). But a punctuated-equilibrium model is difficult to explain incremental and evolutionary institutional change and fails to recognize changes that arise from indigenous sources. Many approaches that is not based on a punctuated-equilibrium model have been proposed to explain institutional change from different institutionalism perspectives. For example, institutions tend to change as a functional response to the technologies' environment to adopt a functionally most efficient organizational structure (Williamson, 1985; Chandler, 1977). Institutions can also change due to "diffusion" where one institutional practice spread among countries either because it represents a normatively appropriate institutional script or countries copy the institution with the best outcome in their surroundings with the expectation that themselves will have equally good performance by adopting it (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For instance, nowadays many countries, especially in the west, have adopted common educational, human rights, scientific, and other practices that have been codified through international codes of conduct, treaties, and transnational organizations. Another driving force of institutional change argued by scholars is conflict and power struggles. In this view, institutional change are always related to the competition among different groups for valued resources, market dominance or power and the most powerful groups get the institutions they want and are able to change them to fit their purpose (Campbell, 2010).

New institutional economists also tried to explain institutional change. For example, North (1986) argues that one essential source of institutional change is that persistent changes in relative prices or the reduction of cost of information make certain group in the society want to alter the institutions because they can be better off with a new set of institutions, but other groups that want to sustain the existing institutions may block them from changing and in this case political conflict could occur. Here North includes both rational choice perspective and power struggles in his model of institutional change. In his 1996 work, North improves his theory by adding the elements of imperfect rationality and subjective perception of agents into the model. In this model, North (1996) specifies the importance of the perceptions of the agents (in North's word, agents refer to entrepreneurs who can make decisions in organizations) which can be correct or incorrect regarding the evaluation of costs and benefits as the source of institutional change. It is not just the external relative prices change that leads to actions for institutional change but the perceived relative prices and opportunities by the agents come together with the external change determine the actions by the agents.

In summary, institutions are an important element for economic analysis. But the complexity of institutions also make it difficult to interpret their influences, understand their disappearance or persistence. This pertains to the case of guilds as well. Guilds, as a bottom-up organization for merchants and craftsmen to protect their shared interests, can also be put under the institutional analysis framework. And it has been controversial whether guilds are a good institution for economic growth or not. Scholars have different opinions about this question. Some argue that guilds produce benefits in general to the whole society (Epstein, 1998) but others regard them as rent-seeking organizations for guilds members and harmful to the economic growth of the society (Ogilvie, 2019). And the different approaches to interpret institutional change also provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing the different trajectories of guilds in Europe and China.

2.2 Previous Research

2.2.1 Guilds in the European Context

The Debate about Guilds

As the previous section mentioned, the economic influence of guilds as an institution is controversial. The conventional wisdom of guilds is that they maintained the monopoly power of guilds' members in the market and therefore were detrimental to market competition and innovation.

Some studies have challenged these conventional negative impressions on guilds. Epstein and Prak (2008, p.5) argues that in the language of Douglass North's institutional economics, guilds were efficient institutions that reduced transaction costs in different stages of the industrial process from training successor craftsmen generations, coordinating complicated production processes to reducing information asymmetries between producers and customers at the marketing stage. For example, Lis and Soly's (2008, pp.81-113) study about the urban master artisans engaged in export-oriented industries shows that despite the guilds restriction on workshop size, they were able to achieve economies of scale and become capitalist entrepreneurs with subcontracting which promoted the division of labor and specialization and raised the productivity. Prak's (2003) study about the painters' guilds in Netherland during the Dutch Golden Age argues that the existence of painters' guilds contributed to the flourishing of painting market because they provided a stable framework for training painters and the organizations of the paintings market where they reduced the information asymmetries between producers and consumers about the quality of the paintings by providing information for the consumers.

Another aspect of the influence of guilds on economic development is their influence on technological innovation. According to Epstein (1998), instead of stifling technology

innovation, the existence of craft guilds increased the supply of technology systematically in three ways: “by establishing a favorable environment for technical change; by promoting technical specialization through training and technical recombination through artisan mobility; and by providing inventors with monopoly rents”.

This school of thoughts emphasizing the positive impact of guilds, however, also received criticisms. Ogilvie (2019, pp.23-25) agrees with that guilds might have had good economic effects and in some cases brought certain benefits for the broader public, but it could also cause harm, for example, guilds excluded women and minorities from many trades, guilds' conservatism could reduce the rate of innovation, and it is questionable that if long apprenticeships were necessary to acquire skills in most activities or it was just a way to control the numbers of masters in the trade (Ogilvie, 2004; 2008). According to Ogilvie (2019, pp.24-25) when evaluating the net effects of guilds, it is not sufficient to just find some specific cases of guilds during a specific period where these guilds had some positive effects on the wider economy because “almost any theory of guilds can find at least one guild that did something consistent with that hypothesis” and individual case studies can only draw limited conclusions. In her book “the European Guilds: An Economic Analysis” (2019), where she tried to bring together observations of guilds from hundreds of micro-studies about guilds in different European societies and draw a more generalized conclusion about the net effect of guilds, she compiled two databases, one qualitative and the other quantitative, which collected thousands of observations. And having examined the seven guild activities that were mostly related to the economy, doing deals with governments, limiting entry, manipulating markets, restricting women, supervising quality, regulating training, and controlling innovation, Ogilvie (2019, p.17) concludes that overall, guilds mainly protected and enriched their members at the expense of non-members and consumers and reduced threats from competitors, innovation, and audacious upstarts.

One argument for the competitiveness of guilds proposed by Epstein (1998) is that guilds managed to exist very long and were not outcompeted by other alternative institutions. According to him, guild-based craft production lasted very long and was not out-competed by its major contemporary rival, the rural proto-industry which widely existed before the industrialization, and this shows that guild-based production was efficient and more competitive, and guilds were a good economic institution. But basing the deduction that guilds were an efficient institution just on their long existence is questionable. A bad institution can also persist if it aligns with the interests of those who were in power. As Ogilvie (2008) argued, guilds were rent-seeking institutions in nature and distributed resources from workers, women and consumers to cartel of male masters and other powerful groups like town officials, state bureaucrats and princes, and they existed not because they were an efficient institution but because these powerful beneficiaries made the sustainability of them for centuries.

The Abolishment of Guilds in Europe

The European guilds were abolished, by the definition that their administrative and tax-collecting functions as well as ability to restrict entry was ended, country by country from the 17th to early 20th century, starting in north-western Europe with Holland and Zeeland (the

Netherlands) and England and spreading to for example France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Italy, and Spain primarily in the late 18th and 19th centuries and then onwards to for example Russia (Hickson & Thompson, 1991). In England and Low countries, the merchant guilds and craftsman guilds declined with the development of countryside industries (Davids, 2008) and the increase of individual entrepreneurs (Harreld 2004; Gelderblom, 2015). But in other regions of Europe it was not until the French revolution and France abolished its guilds in 1791, most European countries started to ban their guilds with the French invasion (Ogilvie, 2014).

In Southern and West-Central Europe, the widespread elimination of guilds was accompanied by their acceptance of laissez faire ideology which regarded guilds as an institution block economic development. In their studies, however, Hickson and Thompson (1991) claims that economic disaster often came when the administrative function of the guild was abolished based on ideology: when guilds were removed, this was generally followed by the implementation of national capital tax on industrial and commercial capital to replace the revenue gained from the guilds and under or over taxation following the elimination of guilds often led to underfunding of the army or difficulties for industry to survive. They argue that guilds could not be abolished until “...alternative means of *both* wartime and peacetime finance” (Hickson & Thompson, 1991, p.160) could be introduced, meaning that capital tax could support a standing army while a convertible, precious-metal-based monetary system ensured that the currency was stable, making emergency taxation from guilds unnecessary.

Similarly, the study of Hoogenboom et al. (2018) also mentions that the abolition of guilds naturally meant that a lag period occurred when a national political economy was installed and guild operations was removed, going from local to central and the smoothness of this process was altered by how prepared the country was for this switch. Hoogenboom et al. (2018) also argue that the route of abolishment was not always that clear and even though guilds were abolished formally by regulation in some countries, some of them still, to different degrees, functioned as guilds long after the abolishment.

2.2.2 Research about Chinese Guilds

Unlike the studies about European crafts guilds which usually focus on the evaluation of their efficiency and influence on the economy, research about Chinese guilds is mainly about the descriptive features of the guilds, their typologies, their functions and the space distribution of them. Even though they are both regarded as guilds, the image of Chinese guilds is not identical to the European guilds. This section below is a literature review on Chinese guilds that introduces guilds in the Chinese context.

Huiguan and Gongsuo

Many studies about Chinese guilds start with their origins and typologies. Guilds, as a concept originates from Europe, are not directly applicable to the Chinese context. The most similar Chinese associations of merchants and artisans are the so-called *huiguan* and *gongsuo* that originated in the late 16th century and started to proliferate and play important roles in economic activities from the mid-18th century (Chan, 1975; Moll-Murata, 2018 p.321; Liu, 1988). Before 16th century, the organized craftsman group system consisted of “hang” (行,

streets/lines), “zuo” (坐, manufacture), “tuan” (团, association) in Tang Dynasty(618-907). But it was very different from guilds because these groups mostly worked for the emperor and made crafts for the royal family and were highly controlled by the government (Moll-Murata, 2008; Wu, 1999). It was since 16th century when long-distance markets started to flourish with the development of commercial sector and the state loosened its intervention over market that Chinese guilds were gradually founded in prosperous cities (Tang, 2017 p.10; Qiu, 2024 pp.55-75).

Many scholars divide Chinese guilds by their designations. In Chinese, these two names for guilds organizations, “huiguan” and “gongsuo”, literally referred to a specific building where the merchants/craftsmen group owned together and would hold meeting there. In this case the direct translation of “*huiguan*” is houses of assembly and “*gongsuo*” is public hall. According to Chan (1975), guilds named *huiguan* were established for merchants doing business outside their hometown and were built based on their common geographic origin, while *gongsuo* which came after *huiguan* were built based on the same occupation/trade and sometimes were developed from *huiguan*. Wu (1999) agrees with this classification/distinction but she also points out that in the case of *huiguan*, common occupation or trade could also be a characteristic of *huiguan* because people from the same place usually worked in the same business, though unlike *gongsuo*, *huiguan* tended to exclude people not from the same region or from local even if they were working in the same business. Some scholars, however, disagree with this classification. For instance, Qiu Pengsheng (2024) in his book “Merchants Association in Suzhou and the Societal Transformation of Qing Dynasty” challenges this idea. Qiu (2024, pp.89-93) argues that many merchant guilds would use *huiguan* and *gongsuo* as their designation at the same time and these designations were interchangeable, also the writings from Ming-Qing period indicated that there was no such conscious distinction between *huiguan* and *gongsuo* when the author used the words, therefore it was not clear that if these two designations could represent different types of guilds.

Regional Merchant Groups (商帮, “shangbang”)

Another group of studies about Chinese commercial groups focused on the regional merchant groups. *Huiguan* and *gongsuo* usually refer to a specific building or guild hall in a specific city (Qiu, 2024, p.108). For those that were built based on the same geographic origin, there could be *huiguan* or *gongsuo* with the same name across China, which represent the network of regional merchant groups. For instance, for merchants from Shanxi province, they were in the same community/regional merchant group called Shanxi Merchant, and every place they had business there they would build a guild hall named Shanxi *Huiguan* for people who were from Shanxi. Therefore, there were a lot of Shanxi *Huiguan* in different cities in China. And there were seven main regional merchant groups in Chinese history which were merchant from Shanxi, Huizhou, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces. Each merchant group had their own specialized or monopolized trade types, like Shanxi Merchant on banking (Yan, 2012) and Huizhou Merchant on salt trade (Du, 2015 p.52).

Many studies discussed the origin of these merchant groups. Fan (2007) studied both the national and local conditions that contributed to the emergence of regional merchant groups and explained why these groups emerged at specific places during a specific period. Wu et al.

(2019) in their paper using quantitative methods revealed the positive relationship between the development of local kinship clan and the emergence of merchant groups, and the keju (imperial examination) culture (the tendency of people to devote to take the imperial exam and wish to be an officer) would reduce the positive influence of strong local kinship clan. Some other studies have focused on the differences between merchant groups. For example, Cai et al. (2008) used historical comparative analysis to compare the management mechanism of Shanxi Merchant and Huizhou Merchant and showed how their different culture environments promoted different motivation mechanisms and therefore led to different management systems.

The Functions of Huiguan/Gongsuo

The strong ties within one merchant group and the connections between merchant groups and *huiguan/gongsuo*, to some extent reveal the main purpose of *huiguan/gongsuo* that was built based on common origin: to provide help and convenience to people who had the same identification (based on common origin) when they were sojourning at an unfamiliar place. Therefore, many of the functions of *huiguan/gongsuo* had a strong social aspect. And because the main business they did was trade, most of the functions of *huiguan/gongsuo* certainly focused on the economic aspect so that guild members' common interests in trade can be protected. As for *huiguan/gongsuo* built based on common occupation, their social functions might be different from the other type considering the lack of native-place sentiment. This sub-section will discuss the main functions of *huiguan/gongsuo* both economically and socially.

According to what stated in the inscriptions about the foundation of the guilds, most *huiguan/gongsuo* claimed to be founded under the purpose of holding ritual activities together, connecting origin-place ties and doing charity (Qiu, 2024; Zhang, 1999). The ritual activities were a big component of the function of the guilds. For merchants and craftsmen, ritual activities were where they prayed for the protection from the gods or shew respect to ancestors. The type of gods that different *huiguan/gongsuo* worshiped can differ according to the categories of *huiguan/gongsuo*. For those built based on common origins, they were more likely to worship gods that were regarded as the guardians for the region where the members were from, while for guilds that were built based on common occupation, they were more likely to worship gods or legendary figures who were regarded as the founder of the trade/business (Wu, 1999; Zhang, 1999). Another social function *huiguan/gongsuo* built by common origin was to maintain the network among the group of people and keep friendship. Therefore, *huiguan/gongsuo* would hold festivals and host meals for the gathering of the members throughout the year (Zhang, 1999). Charity was also an important component of guilds' activities. Among all the charity activities, taking care of the deceased of the guild members was the highest rank. In Chinese cities, there were official institutions that were supposed to take care of the bodies and the bury of bodies, but they usually only took care of the locals. For most people sojourning at an unfamiliar place, it was *huiguan/gongsuo* for people from the specific origin that took the responsibility for taking care of their bodies if they happened to die (Zhang, 1999). But in Qiu's study about commercial organizations in Suzhou during Qing Dynasty (2024), he also pointed out that even though these three functions were the official purpose of foundation for most *huiguan/gongsuo* in the recording,

it might be a result of the concerns about the opinions and attitudes of the state: the state valued their social functions which helped with maintaining the stability of the society, therefore to get support from the state, *huiguan/gongsuo* tended to claim their social functions as their purposes for foundation even though the economic functions were essential as a reason for their establishment as well.

Huiguan/Gongsuo as an economic institution had the function of setting the price, regulating the access to the market and the quality of the products just as their European counterpart. Zhu (2006, p.293) summarizes the functions of traditional Chinese guild from the collections of inscriptions of guilds in Suzhou and concludes that the main economic functions of *huiguan/gongsuo* were “setting limits on the numbers of apprentices and the number of workshops and locations, regulating the standards and prices of products and distributing raw materials, setting a consistent wage standard”. And for *huiguan/gongsuo* built for people from the common origin, they would offer temporary accommodation for newcomers, storage for the long-distance trade, places of reference for those who were seeking for work (Moll-Murata, 2008).

Chinese Guilds in the Twentieth Century

As will be discussed more in detail in section 3 historical context, in the first half of twentieth century, the governments of China at that time (at first the late Qing government and later the government of Republic of China) started to enforce more regulations on commercial groups. At first, chambers of commerce (商会) were suggested to be founded at different administrative levels (though they were not any official government department but self-governed by the members). Then, a new type of association for people working in the same industry, which was then called tongye gonghui (同业公会), were required to be formed and some of this new type of associations were formed by the reorganization of the traditional Chinese guilds *huiguan/gongsuo*.

Many scholars regarded tongye gonghui as a product of the development of traditional guilds during the process of modernization (Zhu & Xiang, 2016). Many studies about tongye gonghui focus on its relationship with the chambers of commerce (Fan, 2014b; Zhang & Li, 2013; Li, 2005). For example, Fan (2014b) studies the relationship between tongye gonghui and the chambers of commerce in Shanghai. As an association for one specific industry, tongye gonghui usually would join chambers of commerce as an association member, even though chambers of commerce also admitted and had more non-association members in quantity, association members from tongye gonghui were more likely to be in the manager position in the chambers of commerce (Fan, 2014b). But regarding their functions, tongye gonghui focus more on the coordination within its industry while chambers of commerce were supposed to coordinate inter-industries and as a representative for merchants in front of the government (Zhang & Li, 2013). Many case studies about tongye gonghui were also conducted and the economic, political and social functions of tongye gonghui were examined. There are case studies about tongye gonghui in different industries, from textile, bicycle manufacturing, pharmaceutical and banking and in different regions from central areas to more remote provinces (Zhu & Xiang, 2016). As the association for the industry, tongye gonghui had economic functions like setting the price for the products, solving the disputes

either within the industry (between workers and employers or between employers) or between industries. Ma (2016) in his paper studies how tongye gonghui involved in the dispute resolution mechanism in Jinan. Fan (2014a) in her paper studies the social functions of tongye gonghui in textile, banking, and cotton cloth business these three industries in Shanghai. In her paper, she examines the contribution of tongye gonghui from these industries to education and charitable donation. Some cases studied the transition of a specific traditional guild to the corresponding tongye gonghui. For example, Guo (2024) studies the transition from gongsuo to tongye gonghui of the tea industry association in Wuhan. Many scholars, however, also point out that tongye gonghui as a new type of industrial association had less autonomy than the traditional guilds (Moll-Murata, 2008; Ma, 2015).

3 Historical Context

In this section, the historical context about the period studied will be given. First, the policies about guilds released by the Chinese government in the early 20th century will be discussed and then the historical background about Shanghai will be given. Most of the contents will focus on the period after the establishment of the Republic of China, but some heritage from the late Qing period will be mentioned as well. In general, this period, which is called the Republican Era in China, witnessed dramatic political and societal changes. From the establishment of the Republic of China to the foundation of People's Republic of China, China went through a period full of revolutions, wars but also economic development in many industries. In this period, the governments started to emphasize more on the regulation of the commercial sector and published a series of regulations and laws about guilds. And Shanghai, as the treaty port in the East coast, was one of the most prosperous cities in China. Both foreign and domestic capitals invested in Shanghai as well as most of the manufacturing industries took place there.

3.1 Policies about guilds in early 20th century China

The Chinese state under the feudal system did not regulate much about the commercial sector. For a very long period, the empire did not recognize much of the value of commodity economies. But the defeat in front of the British army in the Opium War in 1840, the subsequent defeat by the Japanese in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 made the state realize that changes had to be made. In the last ten years of the reign of the Qing emperor, the state enforced a series of reforms aimed at strengthening the country. This series of reforms covered a big range of aspects, from political, military, educational, to economic. And in the economic aspect, the Qing government started to pay attention to the importance of merchant associations and tried to intervene into the development of commercial sector by regulating the merchant associations.

In 1904, the Commercial Code (商律) and Chamber of Commerce Charter (商会章程) were issued by the Qing government. Merchant leaders were very supportive of this policy. Under the encouragement of the central government for forming this Western-modelled chambers of commerce (商会), some eight hundred major and minor chambers were established throughout China by 1911 (Chan, 1975).

Even though this policy about chambers of commerce was not related to guilds but in the practice, guilds were an important part of it. Many guilds joined the chambers of commerce as members, and previous leading merchants were more likely to be the head of the chambers of commerce as well.

Chambers of commerce continued to function after 1911 when the Republic of China had been founded, but this new government also directly regulated guilds and facilitated some 'new' organizations of guilds to help governing the economic sector as well. In 1918, the Beijing government (1912-1927) issued the first regulations about associations for specific industries/trades, the 'Regulations on Industrial Trade Organizations' (1918), in Chinese history. In these regulations this government required a re-organization of the traditional associations of *huiguan* and *gongsuo* to a new type of association which they named tongye gonghui (同业公会, guild for the same trade/industry)(Ma, 2013). In this document, the government required the traditional guilds to report and register their constitutions and regulations to the local government before the transformation was finally made and for each industry or trade, one district area could only have one organization for this specific industry or trade (Zhang & Li, 2013; Ma, 2013).

These regulations, though, were not strictly implemented at this early stage. After the government moved to Nanjing in 1927, they promulgated these regulations again in 1927 and made them an Act in 1929. According to these regulations, pre-existing guilds, including all production enterprises, whether they were mechanical or handicraft manufacturers, should all reorganize and report to the authorities in charge. Same as the 1918 regulations, for each administrative region, the associations should be the sole representatives of their industry/trade branch. Moreover, for the government to know the commercial sector better, these associations were expected to cooperate with government authorities by answering questionnaires on the situation of their trade (Ma, 2013). They also set up the organizational rules that the guilds should follow to manage their associations (Ma, 2013). In 1929, the Nanjing government released the 'Law on Industrial and Commercial Associations' (工商同业公会法, Gong shang tongye gonghui fa) and the next year, the 'Detailed Regulations for the Execution of the Law on Industrial and Commercial Associations' (工商同业公会法施行细则, Gong shang tongye gonghui fa shixing xize) was issued. This group of commercial legislation emphasized the compulsory membership for factories and companies to join the respective associations and also the cooperation between these new industrial/trade guilds and government authorities (Peng, 1995 pp.990-995). The old-style guilds were to be reorganized within one year and had to report to a supervisory committee. The names of the associations were unified, and almost all of them were renamed as tongye gonghui.

3.2 Shanghai in late Qing and the early 20th century

Shanghai, first opened as one of the five treaty ports in 1843 according to the Treaty of Nanjing, with its competitive geographical positions, developed rapidly to the financial, commercial and even manufacturing center of China. The economic development of Shanghai can be divided into several sub-periods based on the political and economic changes.

Shanghai's flourishing started with import and export trade. After 1843, foreign merchants came to Shanghai and set up foreign companies (洋行, yanghang) there to conduct business.

During this time, tons of opium were imported to China through Shanghai and Shanghai mostly exported tea and silk. By the mid-19th century, Shanghai started to have the biggest volume of foreign trade among all the treaty ports, and in 1960, it had a total volume of 593,712 tons of import and export (Xu & Huang, 1998 p.7). This period, the interaction with foreign companies exposed local Chinese merchants in Shanghai to the modern business and capitalism. The Chinese intermediate merchant group which was called *maiban* (买办) who helped with foreign companies about the local business also gained a lot profits. All of this prepared Shanghai for the development of modern industries and trades.

Even though before 1895, the Qing government had not officially allowed the establishment of foreign capital invested factories, many foreign factories were set up in Shanghai. From shipping and repair industry to textile and food processing industries, foreign capital had many more advantages and were leading ahead of domestic capital (Xu & Huang, 1998 pp.26-28). During this period, many factories were set up in Shanghai by the state capital (or bureaucratic capital) under the Qing government's self-strengthening movement as well, for example Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau (江南制造总局) in 1865, China Merchants Steam Navigation Company (轮船招商局) in 1872 and Shanghai Mechanical Weaving Bureau (上海机器织布局) in 1890. In the beginning, most national capital (capital from Chinese businessmen, in contrast with the capital from foreigners and the capital from the state) relied on either foreign capital or state capital to invest together with them as a small part of the stock shares. But in the 1880s and 1890s, more and more factories that were founded only by national capital appeared, and they started to include more types of industries as well (Xu & Huang, 1998 p.47).

The next period was between 1895 and 1936. This was a period between the defeat by the First Sino-Japanese War and the beginning of the Second World War in China. After the First Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki required the Qing government to officially permit the investment of foreign capital in China. The influx of foreign capital after 1895 enhanced even further the leading status of foreign companies and factories in Shanghai. In this period, companies and factories sponsored by national capital in Shanghai had a short golden age between 1915 to 1922. The occurrence of the First World War reduced the competition from foreign capital, and national factories were able to gain more market share both domestically and internationally (Ding et al., 1994 p.201).

Between 1937 and 1945, Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese Army. Before 1941, the Japanese only occupied the area outside of the foreign settlement area (where Britain, the US and France had occupied and exercise their own laws) in Shanghai, therefore the industries and trade inside the area were still active during this period. But when the Japan initiated the Pacific War in 1941, the Japanese Army took over this area as well. After the victory of the Second World War, the government of Republic of China took back Shanghai. But during 1945 and 1949, while the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) were fighting for the leadership of the country, cities like Shanghai which were under the governance of KMT experienced extreme inflation and economic fluctuations.

4 Data

This section will introduce where the data is from, the difficulties of collecting them as well as the limitation and credibility of the source.

4.1 Source Material

The source this research uses is from Shanghai Archives. In Shanghai Archives, there are many primary documents about traditional craftsmen and merchant guilds (*huiguan* and *gongsuo*) registered in Shanghai. For instance, the very famous ones like Kwong Chau Guild (广肇公所) and Ningbo Guild (四明公所). Shanghai Archives also have a good collection on the primary documents from the guilds organizations in early 20th century Shanghai which called 同业公会 (*tong ye gong hui*) in Chinese. As shown in their webpage, Shanghai Archives list their collections of about 40 *tong ye gong hui*, whose business including manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment, shoes manufacturing and trade, alcohol production industry, matches production, filature, the cotton industry and so on. Most of the collections of documents from the guilds include their general constitutions, regulations, meeting records, title deed of the guild's buildings, information about personnel including the membership registration forms, accounting documents of the guilds and correspondences with other organizations.

To analyze the perseverance of guilds, this study will use the documents of the guilds' general constitutions from guilds organizations in the early 20th century. Guilds constitutions are a widely used material type in other studies about guilds. They usually contain the most important information about the association, for example, the organizational structures, the main tasks and the requirements for members. And also, Shanghai Archives have an open database of their collections of the guilds' constitutions, and the registration forms of members that is easily accessible online.

One challenge here is that it is difficult to estimate how many collections about guilds in total Shanghai Archives have from their database. Even though they have listed and introduced some of the collections, there are more in the database. And the database mixed guilds constitutions with registration forms together in the same list with 2,315 pages and each page with 10 results. The database is not very stable and always crashes when searching which create difficulties for the data collection as well. But this study selected and managed to transcribe constitution documents of 29 *tongye gonghui* which cover six main industry types in early 20th century Shanghai. For each industry category, 2 to 7 observations of *tongye gonghui* that work in the respective sub-categories are selected. More detailed information will be provided in the 5.1 sampling section. For a study like this, twenty-nine is not a big

sample size, but based on its coverage of industries and the little marginal gain of increasing extra observations, this sample size is good enough to analyze and generalize the patterns.

4.2 The Credibility of the Source

The source used here is a type of social document according to the source typology by Howell and Prevenier (2001, p.22). Shanghai Archives do not give a description about how and where they got these documents, instead, they just claim that these documents were from which guild. This, of course, could create some concerns about the reliability of the source. But some characteristics of the content of the documents can give some support for their authenticity.

The documents are “written” in a mixed way. Some of the documents were written by the traditional Chinese Calligraphy brush (Figure 1) (The characters usually are bigger and take more space because the brush is not as thin as a pen). Others were written manually by pen (Figure 2) or printed (Figure 3). These characteristics of the document are aligned with the historical background in modern China, when the traditional Chinese way and new modern style coexisted with each other. Figures 1, 2 and 3 are examples from the documents. And as most traditional Chinese writings, these texts in the constitutions were written vertically from the right to the left. Another element in these documents that can, to some extent, validate the existence of these organizations and the authenticity of the material is the information about the address of the guilds’ offices. For guilds, they usually needed an office place. In these series of documents, almost all of them have specified where the office was located. For example, for the Shanghai Pharmaceuticals Tongye Gonghui in Figure 1, the address was Xinjia Road, Number 1095, Shanghai. And for the Air-conditioning and Ventilation System Installation Tongye Gonghui in Figure 2, the address was Jiangxi Road, Number 320, second floor Room C. As for the Hardware Manufacturing Tongye Gonghui in Figure 3, the address was Beishanxi Road, Dean Li, the eighth Long, Number 157. The detailed address of these offices increases the credibility of the source. The Road names in Shanghai has changed over time. But many of the Road names used in the documents are still trackable and the time of the constitution matches the name of the road at the time. Take Beishanxi Road for example, the document was written in 1943, and in 1947 this road was renamed Shanxibei Road but before that it was Beishanxi Road.

上海特別市製藥業同業公會章程	第一條 本會定名為上海特別市製藥業同業公會	第二條 本會設於上海新聞路一〇九五號	第三條 本會會務如下	一、關於同業之福利事項	二、關於同業營業之推進事項	三、關於同業原料調查統計及管理事項	四、關於同業出品調查統計事項	五、關於同業委辦事項	六、關於全國商業統制總會指定或委託事項
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Figure 1 Constitutions of the Shanghai Pharmaceutical Tongye Gonghui



Figure 2 Constitutions of the Shanghai Refrigeration Engineering Tongye Gonghui




Figure 3 Constitution of the Shanghai Hardware Manufacturing Tongye Gonghui

5 Methods

This section will introduce the method adopted for this research. In this section, the sampling method is discussed first and then the main analytical approach used for analyzing the source material is presented which is the thematic analysis.

5.1 Sampling

This study adopts stratified sampling when analyzing the primary sources. “*A stratified sample is one that is deliberately selected so that the various groups or strata in the population are represented*” (Hudson & Ishizu, 2016, p211). The original idea was to use survival sampling so that this study can utilize all the materials that are available. But as mentioned earlier, the time constraint made it difficult to achieve. In order to generalize the characteristics of guilds from the source, it is important to select enough varieties of the types to make the results representative. This study selected the samples based on the industry/occupation of the guild’s organization. Guilds in these following industries are included in the sample: textiles, machinery manufacturing and repair, chemical, steel and metal processing, construction materials, light manufacturing and others. Under each category, two to seven guilds from the respective sub-categories are included. Table 1 below summarizes the samples that are used in this study. These are the main industries in early 20th century Shanghai. And the number of sample documents that are transcribed and included in the analysis is determined based on the marginal gain of each document. When there is no more new information about the characteristics of the guilds can be extracted from adding new observations, the sample size is decided. In the end, this study has a sample size of 29 constitution documents about guilds in early 20th century Shanghai.

Industry Category	Example sub-categories	Numbers
Textile	Cotton spinning & weaving (3); Silk (3) & wool textiles (1)	7
Machinery Manufacturing & Repair	Machine-tool factories (2); Electrical Machine (1); Medical machine (1)	4
Chemical	Soap (1); Matches (1); Pharmaceuticals (1)	3

Steel & Metal Processing	Hardware & fittings (2); Steel (3); Electroplating (1); Metal container manufacturing (oil drum) (1)	7
Construction Materials	Glass (1); Metal doors/windows (1)	2
Light Manufacturing	Bicycles parts (1); Rubber goods (2)	3
Others	Air-conditioning & ventilation system installation (1); Weighing and Measuring Instruments Manufacturing (1); Tobacco (1)	3
Total		29

Table 1 Sample selections of the constitution

5.2 Thematic Analysis

To generalize patterns from textual material, the approach that will be adopted is the thematic analysis. The general constitutions source material of guilds contain the information about the main purposes of the guilds, their tasks, their organizational structures, and how they would admit members and so on. To analyze these documents, a dataset based on these previous themes will be constructed, and the elements/texts in the documents will be coded and grouped under each theme. Table 2 is an example of the elements that will be extracted from each document.

Name of the guild	Shanghai Dian Gong Qi Cai Tongye Gonghui (上海电工器材工业同业公会)
Industry	Electrical appliances
Time of the constitution	Republic of China, Year 35 (1946)
Address of the guild	Nanjing Road Number192
Purpose of the institution	To seek industrial improvement and development and correct the evils of the trade
Tasks of the institution	1. set standards for the operation of the business and monitoring the members' production 2. Give guide to the members for the business 3. Buy raw materials together

Admission of members	1. compulsory, all companies or factories working in this industry need to join the guild 2. each company will have representatives for the company; the number of representatives are proportional to the capital of the company
organization structure	Elected by members at the general meeting: board of directors; board of supervisors; executive member of the council
Interaction with the government	need to respond to the government regulations, need to ask government department for approval of the decisions made by the guild for the market
Exit mechanisms	When a factory fails to join in accordance with the law or violates the regulations, a warning shall first be issued. If the warning is ineffective, the factory shall be subject to the following penalties as stipulated in Article 27 of the Industrial Guild Act: • Liquidated damages. • Temporary suspension of business. • Permanent suspension of business (suspension must be approved by the competent authority [Ministry of Economic Affairs]). Members who have not relocated to another region, closed their business, or been subjected to a permanent suspension penalty shall not be allowed to withdraw from the guild.

Table 2 Example Entries of the Compiled Dataset

After finishing the construction of the dataset, this study will summarize and analyze the characteristics of guilds in early 20th century Shanghai based on these themes.

One concern of this method is that these constitutional documents may just be some protocol text and cannot reveal or represent the real situations. It is possible that these guilds do not perform the same way as stated in the constitutions. Therefore, the results from the thematic analysis may just be an ideal perception of how these guilds were. Other materials like guilds meeting records or their accounting books can be helpful to validate the real situations. Unfortunately, these materials are not openly accessible online from Shanghai Archive. But the strength of this study is that it summarizes and analyzes the guild's constitutions in a systematic way and with the dataset it creates it can analyze the qualitative observations quantitatively. Many studies about guilds have used materials like guilds' meeting records or correspondences with outside organizations. Even though there are many good case studies achieved by this type of study, one of their shortcomings is that they usually piece together the evidence of scattered qualitative sources and generalize the conclusion based on individual cases. Therefore, this study by constructing a dataset from the guilds' constitutions and analyzing them in a systematic way can be a supplementary study and contributes to this field of study.

6 Analysis

This section begins with the findings from the thematic analysis of the tongye gonghui constitutions. After summarizing the features of the tongye gonghui examined from the primary resources, a comparison between tongye gonghui and traditional Chinese guilds is provided to see whether tongye gonghui could be regarded as a guild-like institution. Build on this, the last part of the analysis discusses the perceived divergent destinies of guilds in Europe and China.

6.1 Thematic Analysis of the Source Material

The full dataset compiled from the documents are attached in the Appendix A (Table 3-6). The original dataset is compiled in Chinese. And the findings here will be described and translated into English.

For most tongye gonghui that are examined in the dataset, the purpose of foundation was related to the improvement and development of the corresponding industry and corrections of wrongdoings in the industry.

The main tasks of tongye gonghui includes things listed below:

1. Purchase, store, transport and sell the products produced by the members together
2. Get access to and allocate the raw materials for members together
3. Set the price and approve the quantity of the products that are allowed to be produced by the members
4. Study the improvement of production process and technology improvements
5. Mediate the capital required for the members to continue business and help as guarantee for borrowing
6. Regularly check on the machinery and the raw materials used by the members and prohibit the business if they fail to reach the standards
7. Assist in enforcing related government policies, the tasks required by chambers of commerce or party institutions
8. Make charitable donations that are related to the benefits of the industry
9. Solve the disputes between workers and employers for the members or the disputes between members and nonmembers
10. Require government to reduce tax on certain situations
11. Join social movements

And Figure 4 below shows the comparative frequency of each task that have been mentioned in the 29 constitutions. In summary, the tasks of tongye gonghui consists of categories like regulating the business in the industry, interacting with government and other institutions, joining social activities and charity. But of course, not every tongye gonghui had included all these aspects of tasks in their constitutions. For example, out of the 29 documents that had

been examined and included in the dataset, there are 12 of them mentioned the charity and the welfare of the workers in this industry were part of the task of the institution. And even though all of these tongye gonghui mentioned their supervision/regulations on the members' business operation, the level of control specified in the constitutions was different. For instance, 13 tongye gonghui specified that they would control the price and quantity of the products and 17 mentioned that the products and raw material should be handled together by the association.




Figure 4 Comparative frequencies of each task that is mentioned in the constitution

According to the documents, the basic unit of members of tongye gonghui is single enterprises, either a factory or a retailer. To have its interest represented and involved in the decision-making process within the association, each entity should select representatives (usually one person, but for some tongye gonghui it could be more depending on how much capital the member had) to be involved in the general meeting and attend the election. And this representative was expected to be the manager of the enterprise.

How compulsory was it for enterprises to join the association? In their constitution, most of the tongye gonghui had mentioned that all the entities that were having business in their specified field in Shanghai district should join this corresponding tongye gonghui in the same industry. But the coerciveness of this requirement is not very clear and consistent. To investigate this, the aspect of the exit mechanisms specified in the constitution for members to leave the organization can offer more insights. For those that were very strict with this term, members usually were not allowed to exit the organization unless they were moving to another district for their business, which also implies that they probably should join the corresponding tongye gonghui in the new district instead, or they were closing their business. The punishment of not joining the organization when the enterprise met the requirements

were also specified in this case. Some industries, however, were looser with this compulsory participation. For example, the blacksmith tongye gonghui said that members could exit the organization with a formal explanatory statement. Even though it did not seem like that it was compulsory for enterprises working in the blacksmith industry to join the organization, they were required to obey the regulations issued by the blacksmith tongye gonghui. The same applied to the tongye gonghui of weights and measures instruments and electric silk weaving mills.




Figure 5 Generalized organization structure of tongye gonghui

The organization structure of tongye gonghui was very similar among all of the entities that are examined. Figure 5 above illustrates the organization structure. All of them consisted of board of directors and board of supervisors, which were selected at the general assembly of the members. Among the board members of directors, some were selected by the board members as the standing directors. For some tongye gonghui examined, they would select standing supervisors as well. To manage the tasks of the organization, annual general assemblies, monthly meetings of the board of directors and supervisors, weekly meetings of the standing directors would be conducted to discuss the issues and make decisions. While the detailed frequency of the meetings varied across different industries, regularly, the most frequent ones were the meetings of the standing directors, and the least frequent ones were the general assemblies which were usually once a year. As for the board members, many of the organizations had a term of four years for the board members, and every two years, half of the members would be reelected, one might not serve consecutive terms. Some tongye gonghui had a one-year term for the board members and allowed for consecutive terms, others had a term of two years and allowed for consecutive terms. The size of the board varied across the industries as well, the board of directors usually had members between 9 and 21, and the board of supervisors had members between 1 and 7. And for most organizations, the ratio of the number of members between the board of directors and the board of supervisors is roughly 3 to 1.

These constitutions also specify the procedure of approving resolutions at the general assembly of members. According to them, in all of the tongye gonghui, a resolution got approved at the general assembly when half of the representatives were present at the meeting and among those who attended the meeting, more than half voted for the resolution. For certain types of decisions, the approval requires two thirds of the representatives to be present and more than two thirds among the present ones to vote for the decisions, and this included decisions about amendments to the articles of association, disciplinary actions against members, removal of directors and supervisors, appointment of liquidators and matters relating to liquidation.

One feature of this new type of business organization within one industry is that it was highly related to the government. First of all, all these organizations were founded according to the Law on Industrial Associations. Many departments of government would be involved in the process of supervising and managing tongye gonghui. For example, the final version of the constitution that was approved at the general assembly should be presented to Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Social Affairs for filing and recording, the same went for amendment of the constitution. And for the budget and final accounts that were approved at the general assembly should be submitted and recorded as well. The main department that supervising tongye gonghui was mostly the Bureau of Social Affairs. But as stated in some of the constitutions, the Bureau of Economic Affairs was the one responsible for the corresponding organization. And for the tongye gonghui of pharmaceutical industry, the department that received the budget and final accounts was supposed to be the Health Bureau. As mentioned above, tongye gonghui had punishments for enterprises who refused to join the organization and one of the punishments was a permanent suspension of business. For this punishment, it had to be conducted under the approval of the competent authority.

6.2 Comparison with Traditional Guilds

To analyze and discuss whether a tongye gonghui was still a type of guild, the essential question is how to define guilds. As has been stated in section 1.2, the definition for guilds or guild-like institutions used in this study is that *“more or less independent, self-governing organizations; people with the same or similar occupations; aimed at furthering their common interests; and in almost any respect, i.e. in the economic, political, social, cultural, or religious fields”*.

One confusion about this definition when applying it to the Chinese context is the traditional guilds founded for people from the same origin. For this type of guild, even though the members were from the same region, they did not necessarily work in the same industry or trade. In some cases, people happened to work with the same thing because they had the comparative advantage of doing it, but the only criteria for joining the guild was their originality. Therefore, it may look like this type of guild did not fit into the condition that guild-like institution should be composed of people with the same or similar occupations, and instead of being bonded by a similar occupation, they were bonded by their common origin. But here in this study, it allows a little deviation from the definition for organizations built

based on people's common origin and regards them as working in the same occupation considering they were all guest merchants/crafts coming from the same place and now earning a living in another city/town.

One feature of tongye gonghui that is distinctively different from huiguan/gongsuo is their spontaneity of founding a group. As shown in the dataset, the foundation of tongye gonghui was a top-down requirement from the central government in early Republican China, therefore from the beginning tongye gonghui was encouraged under the will of the government. While for huiguan/gongsuo, even though they would seek recognition from government, they were formed voluntarily and then tried to get officially recognized. In Qiu Pengsheng's book, *Shiba Shijiu Shiji Suzhoucheng de Xinxing Gongshangye Tuanti* (1990), he outlined the process how huiguan/gongsuo was established in Suzhou: first, a group of artisans or merchants initiated to form a group and raised fund among the members to buy/rent a guild hall for meetings as their common property; then they would seek recognition from the local administration to gain legitimacy so that their common property could be protected; later they would formalize the regulations about the membership fees and the management structure to maintain and organize the group. In contrast, as has been shown in the last subsection, tongye gonghui was founded according to the Law on Industrial Associations from the beginning.

What about the independence of tongye gonghui compared to huiguan/gongsuo? The first criterion to define a guild-like institution is independence and self-governance. In the case of huiguan/gongsuo, previous studies have shown how they govern themselves. Management boards with directors that were recruited among the members were the main body organized the group, and rotational leadership and hereditary leadership could both be found in the selection of board members (Moll-Murata, 2018). Within the organization, there were also democratic elements in their organization system (Peng, 2003): a quorum was required for some important decisions; some guilds put controversial decisions to a secret vote; a yearly rotating directorship by some guilds. As for tongye gonghui, results from previous section can also show that they were organized in a democratic way. In Peng's (2003) book, the democratic elements in huiguan/gongsuo were founded in some cases and under certain circumstances, but in the case of tongye gonghui, their constitutions had clearly specified their organization system which was consistent among all the constitutions examined. The board of directors and supervisors were all determined through election, and the rotational directorship was applied. And all the decisions about the organization and their regulations should be decided together by voting in the general assembly of the members. Financially, both huiguan/gongsuo and tongye gonghui rely on the membership fees to maintain their daily operation (Peng, 2003). It seems like tongye gonghui were well self-governed by their members. But what about the supervision and guidance from the government? Was tongye gonghui really independent from the government. From the constitution that this study has examined, it was clear that tongye gonghui needed to report their change of regulations and their budget and final accounts to the competent department, but in most cases just for the purpose of recording and filing. There is no evidence that government departments would intervene directly to the decision-making process of tongye gonghui at least according to the regulations.

As for the second criterion, people with the same or similar occupations, tongye gonghui was without doubt founded for enterprises who were in the same industry. But what about the third criterion, aimed at furthering their common interests? As specified in their main tasks, tongye gonghui was definitely an organization that aimed to pursue the common interests of the members economically. Similar as huiguan/gongsuo, tongye gonghui would regulate the price of the products in the industry and would monopolize the access to the raw material. But in general, the monopolistic feature of tongye gonghui was relatively weaker than huiguan/gongsuo. As stated in the constitution, tongye gonghui did not regulate whether a person or enterprise could start business in the industry or not. In the constitutions, they only mentioned that any person who wanted to start a certain business needed to be officially registered at the corresponding government department and then join the tongye gonghui. Tongye gonghui's regulations about apprenticeship was also looser than huiguan/gongsuo. In the case of huiguan/gongsuo, they usually had strict restrictions about the number of apprentices and the length of the training to control the labor supply in the market (Moll-Murata, 2018; Zhu, 2004). In the constitutions that have mentioned apprenticeship, there were no strict limits on the number of apprentices that one could have. The regulations about apprentices only regarded the length of the training which was a guarantee of the quality of the training and the registration of the apprentices at the corresponding tongye gonghui together with a certificate when the apprentices finished their training period.

For the social functions, tongye gonghui also emphasized some of them as their tasks but they were generally less broad than huiguan/gongsuo. As we have mentioned before, huiguan/gongsuo would try to get recognition from local administrations to protect their common property, in return they also took the role of offering some public service/goods 'voluntarily'. For example, they would help with municipal tasks like firefighting, policing and maintaining infrastructure (i.e. streets, bridges) (Rowe, 1992; Zhang, 1999) and taxation in their trade (Peng, 2003). Also, many huiguan/gongsuo would provide services like communal cemeteries and elementary schools for their members (Moll-Murata, 2018). For tongye gonghui, however, it was not always their responsibility to undertake those municipal tasks. In 13 of the constitutions, it mentioned that tongye gonghui would help with the tasks requested by the chambers of commerce or the competent departments. But this was more like a one-time request or some temporary tasks instead of partially undertaking the responsibility of the government and offering public goods. And cemeteries or taxation were not mentioned in the constitutions either. Tongye gonghui did mention making charitable donations to activities that were beneficial for the industry.

One outstanding characteristic of huiguan/gongsuo was their cultural common interest. For huiguan/gongsuo built based on common origin, the sentiment of belongingness to the same geographical origin was the bond connecting members (Peng, 2003). For huiguan/gongsuo built solely based on the same occupation, they also shared common beliefs and customs within the trade (Peng, 2003). And both these two types of huiguan/gongsuo would worship their own patron saints as an important activity for the organization.

All of this cultural aspect of bonds was, however, not seen in tongye gonghui. First of all, tongye gonghui had removed the common-origin aspect in their organizations according to the government regulations. While coming from the same region was one of the main selective criteria to build an organization for merchants and artisans in Ming Qing China, for

tongye gonghui, working in the same industry within the same administrative area was the only criterion. Tongye gonghui did not exhibit strong common culture within the trade as the occupational huiguan/gongsuo either. Among all of the constitutions, only the tongye gonghui of weights and measures instrument had mentioned in its regulations that the members should hold memorial ceremony on the birthday of the ancestral master.

Another difference between tongye gonghui and huiguan/gongsuo emerges from their representativeness of the employees/workers. In the case of tongye gonghui, it explicitly specified that the representatives from each enterprise should be the manager who would be involved in the decision-making process of tongye gonghui. Even though tongye gonghui would intervene and help with solving the conflicts between the employees and employers, it is difficult to believe that they would represent the benefits of the workers when the representatives were all managers. In the case of huiguan/gongsuo, masters were also the one who were more powerful in the organization, but journeyman and masters were both members of huiguan/gongsuo in the case of many trades, and in the example of Peking, studies have shown that due to the close personal relationship built through apprenticeship, masters, journeyman and apprentices usually had a harmonious relationship within the guilds and aimed for the welfare of all members (Moll-Murata, 2018). Therefore, compared to huiguan/gongsuo, even though tongye gonghui was supposed to represent the benefits of the whole industry, it represented more for the owners and managers.

In summary, according to the definition of guild or guild-like institution proposed by Lucassen et al. (2008), the analysis above shows that tongye gonghui was a type of guild-like institution: it was self-governed, people in the organization worked in the same occupation, and it aimed at furthering the common interests of its members economically and, to some degree, socially. But compared to the traditional Chinese guilds, huiguan/gongsuo, tongye gonghui had fewer common interests in other aspects, for instance in the cultural and religious aspects. Also, tongye gonghui was very different from huiguan/gongsuo in the sense that it removed the common homeplace bonds in the association and explicitly restricted the representatives to the managers of the member enterprises, which could be attributed to the changing dynamics between the employers and employees and the evolving productive relations due to capitalization.

6.3 Discussion

One question this study tries to answer is the different destinies of guilds in Europe and China. While guilds were mostly officially abolished in Europe in the process of modernization, the Republican Chinese government chose to maintain it and reorganize it to adapt to the new situation. From a rational choice institutionalist view, guilds as an institution were abolished due to their lack of efficiency and harm to modern economic growth. Do the different fates of guilds suggest that opposite to Europe, guilds had an overall positive influence on economy in early 20th century China? Or the Chinese guilds were deep-rooted thus difficult to eradicate?

Based on the empirical results from the primary resources, this study suggests that the perseverance of guilds in the form as tongye gonghui was not a passive choice made by the early Republican Chinese government but an initiative that aligned with the interests of the government. From the constitutions examined, we can see that even though some tongye gonghui were reorganized from traditional guilds, many of them were built for new modernized industries, which had no previous connections with guilds or other powers, and by their regulations on industrial associations, it was the Republican government in China initiated and encouraged the foundation of tongye gonghui for these modernized industries. But how would a guild-like institution benefit the economy in the modern environment? As shown in the thematic analysis of the source, many tongye gonghui had the tasks of setting the price and quantity of the products, controlling the access to raw materials. These were all regulatory restrictions that could place significant constraints on the market mechanism and impede competition. Here this study may give some possible explanations. First, the market practices in China were not very mature yet, a sudden change to the market mechanism of price could lead to turbulence in transactions and affect the whole market. Therefore, tongye gonghui was needed as a mediator for the market operation which could relieve the burden of the government to regulate the market. Second, Chinese industries were facing great competition from their foreign competitors in the early 20th century. Instead of enforcing a free market mechanism, united as a group was a better choice for them to maintain their influence and protect their common interests.

While reflecting on the European case of guilds elimination, the conventional wisdom was that guilds were abolished because that they were old-fashioned, pre-modern institution which hindered modern economic growth. But some nuanced studies have challenged this one-size fits all view. For example, Hickson and Thompson (1991) claim that economic disaster could come when the administrative function of the guild was abolished in many European countries. And Hoogenboom et al. (2018) by studying the case of England, Netherlands and Germany, show that even though guilds were abolished officially, some of them remained the old structure long in the modern world and this could be related to the type of the guilds, how well they could fit within the new world of industrialization and the external political environment. Thus, it is not applicable to adopt a dichotomous view to see the different destinies of guilds in China and Europe and explain it solely on a functionalist view.

A sociological perspective about institutional change may be a better way to understand these different trajectories of guilds as a formal institution. In the view of sociological institutionalism, agents choose institutions based on their cognition about which is the right one and it does not matter whether their cognition is correct or not. In the case of Europe, initially the abolishment of guilds in some countries might be out of an increase of general benefits, the later followers and the enforcement by French invasion were probably motivated by the laissez-faire ideology which shaped people's opinions about guilds and they tended to abolish guilds no matter if they had the capability to take over the function of guild (Hickson & Thompson, 1991). In China, however, this ideology had not diffused there and had relatively less influence. The functions of guilds or guild-like institutions were regarded important for coordinating the market and thus were maintained and enforced by the government to modernized industries.

This analysis of the dissolution of guilds may shed light on the debate of the efficiency of guilds as an institution as well. In their argument about the influence of guilds, Epstein and Ogilvie both recognize the positive sides of guilds but Ogilvie claims that overall, guilds mainly protected and enriched their members at the expense of non-members and consumers. The persistence of guilds in both China and Europe in the process of modernization, however, suggests that guilds were important for the economy and market to function, without them there might be economic disaster and when guilds were officially abolished in some places, some of their functions still maintained long to the new industrialized world. This does not deny the bad sides of guilds which monopolized the resources in the old time. But in the transition to modernity, some functions of guilds maintained because of their positive influence on the economy until they were replaced by other modern institutions. And if we abandon a dichotomous view of tradition versus modernity, many good traits of guilds can be observed in modern organizations as well. For instance, credentialing functions in the associations for professionals like lawyers, doctors, and therapists, making actions for their common interests in trade associations, employer associations or labor unions.

7 Conclusions

This study set out to investigate the perseverance of guilds in early 20th century China. This question arises from the different trajectories of guilds and guild-like institutions in Europe and China. While in Europe most guilds were officially abolished after French Revolution, guilds were reorganized by the government and continued to function officially in the modern time. By going through constitutions from 29 industrial associations in Shanghai during this period and compiling a dataset based on thematic analysis, this research examined the features of the industrial association, tongye gonghui, in early 20th China and by comparing it with the traditional guilds and comparing the Chinese case with the abolishment of guilds in Europe, it has offered a functionalist view and sociological view to answer the question.

The findings reveal that compared to the traditional Chinese guilds, tongye gonghui that were initiated by the Republican Government was also a self-governed guild-like institution, which aimed at furthering the common interests of people working in the same industries both economically and socially, even though the members of tongye gonghui was less culturally or religiously connected to each other compared to the traditional guilds. This perseverance of guilds demonstrates the positive influence of some of their functions on Chinese economies which led the government choose to maintain the organization of guilds. The nuanced comparisons with the European case also reveal that even though guilds were abolished officially, in some places they still maintained some of their functions, which challenged the common wisdom about the abolishment of guilds in Europe. And the different destinies of guilds in Europe and China were mainly due to ideological difference.

Finally, the implications of this study extend to broader debates about institutional change and the efficiency of guilds as an institution. The comparative study between the institutional change of Chinese and European guilds offers a case where ideology interprets institutional change. And the persistence of guilds in modern times also extends the debate about the European guilds regarding their overall influence and shows that some of their functions were important and beneficial to the general public. Also, as a paper written in English, this study functions as a bridge to the study about Chinese guilds which were mostly studied in Chinese and furthers the literature about guilds by offering a comparative view from the Chinese case.

8 References

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9 Appendix A: Compiled Dataset

Name of the guild	category of industry	document number	Time of the constitution	Purpose of the insitution	address
Shanghai Dian Gong Qi Cai Gong Ye Guild			Republic of China, Year 35	To seek industrial improvement and development and correct the evils of the trade	
上海五金工厂同业公会	5	S001-001-00005-0121	1943,	五金工厂同业所组织， 加入上海市“机械工业联合会”为会员。设立意图为协助同业发展便利产销	事务所在北山西路德安里第八弄一五七号
上海市自行车零件制造业同业公会章程	7	S001-001-00005-0152, E2	1943	协力合作研究改良出品及工作效能, 推进同业发展为宗旨	办事处暂借福煦路七十弄五号内
上海特别市冷气工程业同业公会	8	S001-001-00005-0164	1943		办事厅位于江西路三二零号二楼 C 字房
上海特别市机械厂同业公会	3	S001-001-00007-0030	1943	协助政府施行经济政策及增进同业之公共利益为宗旨	设于上海特别市区以内
上海市机器工业同业公会章程	3	S001-001-00028-0022	1946	本会以谋工业之改良发展及矫正同业之弊害为宗旨	上海市江西中路四五一号五零一室
上海市钢铁炼制工业同业公会章程草案	5	S011-001-00007-0001	1947	本会以谋工业之改良发展及矫正同业之弊害为宗旨	上海市南京西路八六八号二楼一零二室
上海市打铁业同业公会会章	5	S015-001-00003-0001	1941	本会以联络同业之感情促进工艺之改良整订划一行规共谋营业之发达	
上海市铁器工程业同业公会	5	S015-001-0003-0015	1946.6	维护增进同业公共利益及矫正弊害	豫园路二三四号
上海市钢窗工业同业公会	6	S016-001-00001-0009	1948	谋工业之改良发展增进同业之公共利益为宗旨	南京东路三五三弄词淑大楼四楼四三 四号
上海市电器材业同业公会	3	S021-001-00004-0036	1946.4	以谋工业之改良发展及矫正同业之弊害为宗旨	南京路一九二号
上海市胶木工业同业公会	7	S026-001-00002-0007	1948	工业之改良发展及增进同业之公共利益为宗旨	无
上海特别市磅秤制造业/度量衡器业同业公会	8	S027-001-00004-0001	1943	协助政府划一推行度量衡新制及增进同业之公共利益	上海浙西路四六二 号二楼二一五至二 一六号

上海市医疗器械工业同业公会	3	S028-001-00002-0012	1946.11	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	南京西路九九六号二楼
上海市细工玻璃工业同业公会	6	S029-001-00006	1948.11	增进同业之利益谋划工业之发展	上海中正中路五零四弄二六号
中华民国纱厂同业公会	1	S030-001-00018-0001	1942	联合同业努力发展改进全国棉纺织业为宗旨	无
上海区毛纺织工业同业公会	1	S031-001-00002-0042	1948.5	增进同业之利益谋划工业之发展	四川中路三三号八楼
上海市机器染织工业同业公会	1	S033-001-00007-0001	1946	本会系上海区域内机器棉织及以机器漂染棉织物并贩卖其制成品之同业	爱多亚路瑞临里二十号
上海市手工棉织工业同业公会	1	S036-001-00008-0015	1948	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	金陵路宝兴里七号
上海市丝厂同业公会	1	S037-001-00014-0060	1930		北山西路海甯路北五七八号
上海市电机丝织厂同业公会（章程/业规）	1	S039-001-00012-0001	1937/1933	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	福建路汉口路绸业大楼五楼
上海市纺/丝线工业同业公会（章程/业规）	1	S053-001-00005	1947/1932	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	徐家汇同口街任美里四号
上海特别市制药业同业公会章程	4	S065	1943		新甲路一零九五号
上海市国货橡胶制品业同业公会	7	S066	1931		爱多亚路西藏路口群西贤坊二零七号
上海市卷烟厂工业同业公会	2	S068	1946	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	新昌九十七街及十二号
上海市火柴工业同业公会	4	S069	1946	谋工业之改良发展增进同业之公共利益为宗旨	上海市
上海市电镀工业同业公会	5	S084	1947	同业出品之改良发展及矫正弊害	派克路二六七号
上海市皂业同业公会	4	S087	1943	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	福州路二二一号五洲大楼三楼三零四号室
上海市五金工业同业公会	5	S090	1948	本会以谋工业之改良发展及矫正同业之弊害为宗旨	成都北路五八一号
上海市油桶商业同业公会	5	S208	1946	维持增进同业之公共利益共谋工业之改良发展及矫正弊害为宗旨	黄河路二七二号

Table 3 Dataset of tongye gonghui constitutions i

Name of the guild	Tasks of the institution	Admission of members
Shanghai Dian Gong Qi Cai Gong Ye Guild	1 set standards for the operation of the business and monitoring the members production 2; Give guide to the members for the business 3. Buy raw materials together	1. compulsory, all companies or factories working in this industry need to join the guild 2. each company will have representatives for the company, the number of representatives are proportional to the capital of the company
上海五金工厂同业公会	关于同业之调查及登记事项；谋同业之发展及调节一切纠纷事项；办理会员 请求协助事项	1、上海市区域内五金工厂均得加入；2、入会手续：经两位会员介绍+理事会审查合格；填写入会志愿书；缴纳会费
上海市自行车零件制造业同业公会章程	关于技术之研究事项；；研究原料及采办事项；研究推进同业工作事项；会员请求协助事项	凡是上海市区域内制造自行车零件之厂号得加入本会成为会员；须经手续：由两家会员介绍+理事会审查；缴纳入会费；缴存保证金（甲级国币四百元，乙级国币二百元）
上海特别市冷气工程业同业公会	关于同业之调查及登记事项；技术研究及鉴定事项；原料采办及支配；关于政府机关及商会委办事项；关于会员营业上的矫正及必要时的维护事项，关于会员请求协助的事项	凡上海特别市内经营装置及制造修理一切冷气工程业的公司行号均应加入本会为会员。入会手续：经两位会员介绍+理事会审查合格；填写入会志愿书；缴纳会费。入会会员如需退会须有会员大会通过，且会费不予退还
上海特别市机械工业同业公会	关于协助政府实施经济政策；关于会员经营物资之共同收买保管运输贩卖及其他必要事项；关于会员制造物资所需原料及燃料之共同取得及分配事项；关于会员经营物资之生产数量及贩卖价格之审议事项；古纳于会员事业资金之调节及债务之担保事项；关于会员经营事业之统计设计指导及检查取缔事项；关于执行主管官署制定或委托之事项；关于其他增进会员公共利益之事项。	凡在上海特别市经营机械制造工厂及与机械制造业有关之工厂并经主管官署核准营业者。入会手续：填写入会表，经理事会审查，缴纳会费。
上海市机器工业同业公会章程	关于会员之设备制品及原料材料之检查取缔并事业经营上必要之统制，关于会员制品之共同加工或发售原料材料之共同购入或处理仓库运输之设备及其他关于会员业务之指导研究调查及统计，办理合于第三条所示宗旨之其他事项	
上海市钢铁炼制工业同业公会章程草案	关于会员之设备制品及原料材料之检查取缔并事业经营上必要之统制，关于会员制品之共同加工或发售原料材料之共同购入或处理仓库运输之设备及其他关于会员业务之指导研究调查及统计，办理合于第三条所示宗旨之其他事项	凡在本区域内经营钢铁炼制工业有机械动力之设备或平时雇佣工人三十人以上 不论公营或私营（除国防公营事业或法令规定的 国家官营事业）；加入公会时应填写会员工厂详细状况表；会员代表以工厂经理人或主体人充任，人数以马力为计算标准，100 匹一人，100-500 匹两人。。。。；会员代表以有中华民国国籍年 20 以上者为限。（违法叛国者不得入选）会员非迁移其他区域或自动停业或受永久停业之处分者不得退会
上海市打铁业同业公会会章	关于同业之调差研究改良整顿及建设事项；关于兴办同业教育及其监督公益事项；关于会员与非会员间争议经会员请求之调节关于同业劳资间争执之调节；关于党政机关及商会委办事项；关于会员营业必要时之维持事项；关于会员营业之矫正；请求政府免除杂税	凡上海区域内经营打铁业之商店依照本会章程遵守本会纪律皆得为本会会员；手续为：经会员二人及以上之介绍；经执行委员会经半数之通过，缴纳入会志愿书及会费
上海市铁器工程业同业公会	1. 共同购入保管运输 会员商品及重要设施；2.统制会员营业；3.指导会员营业并统计/ 这些决议须经会员大会通过三分之二以上并呈社会局批准	1.凡在上海区域经营打铁制品商业的公司行号或工厂售货场所不论公营民营均应为本会会员（特殊情况除外）；2.每会员排会员代表【可为经理人或店员】；3.会员非迁移其他区域或废业或受永久停业之处分者不得退会。
上海市钢窗工业同业公会	关于生产的研究改良；保障会员合法权益；技术原料器材合作；会员事业保险及计划调整；会员设备制品及原料检查取缔；工业产品调查统计；同业纠纷调处	凡在本区域内用标准钢窗原料专门从事于制造钢窗钢门之工厂有机械动力设备平时雇佣工人在三十人以上或无机机械动力设备而平时雇佣工人在六十人以上者不论公营民营除专供军用之工厂外均应为本会会员。

	公断；会员公益事业；劳资合作促进及纠纷调节；参加各项社会运动	
上海市电器材料业同业公会	1.会员设备制品及原料材料之检查取缔并事业经营上必要之统制；2.会员制品共同加工或发售原料材料之共同购入或处理仓库运输之设备及其他会员事业有关之共同设施；3.会员业务之指导研究检查及统计；（前款第一条统制须经全体会员代表表决获三分之二以上同意呈请经济部核准后方可实施）	凡在本区域内由机械动力之设备或平时雇佣工人三十人以上而从事于实际制造电工器材之工厂不会公营或民营除国防公益事业或法令规定国家专营之事业外均应为本会会员。会员推派会员代表，入会时应填送会员工厂详细状况表以备考察。会员代表以工厂经理人主体人或工厂职员充任，人数依据资本额分为五个档次（从低于五十万到五百万以上者）；对于分厂不在本区域的工厂资本额分开计算
上海市胶木工业同业公会	关于生产之研究改良与发展；保障会员合法权益；关于会员事业之保险及计划调整事项；关于技术原料器材之合作；；关于会员设备制品及原料检查取缔；关于工业产品之调查统计；事业纠纷调处公断；会员公益事业之举办；关于劳资合作之促进及纠纷协助调处；关于政府经济政策之协助推行；关于参加各项社会运动	凡在本区域内合于工厂发所定标准之胶木制品工厂无论公营民营均应为本会会员，前项会员应推派代表出席本会；会员工厂详细状况表；
上海特别市磅秤制造业/度量衡器业同业公会	会员经营物资至共同收买报关运输贩卖；会员经营物资之生产数量及贩卖价格之审议；会员经营事业之调查统计设计指导督察检定及检查取缔；会员经营资金调节；货品运销之证明事项；会员与会员或非会员争议之调节；劳资纷争调解；会员营业上之矫正；请求政府免除杂税；政府机关或商会之委办事项；兴办同业教育及其他慈善公益事项	凡在上海市内经营度量衡器（包括经营专用材料及其他一切有关业务）工厂公司行号凡经实业部全国度量衡局核准登记领有许可执照者均应加入本会会员。手续：两人会员介绍，经理理事会半数通过；证明文件；入会志愿书；缴纳入会费
上海市医疗器械工业同业公会	主管官署及商会委办事项；同业务调查研究；会员营业上弊害之矫正；会员营业必要时之维持；兴办同业劳工教育及公益事项；同业业规议定	凡在本区域专营买卖或制造医疗器械之公司行号及工厂均应加入为本会会员；依据担负会费单位多寡决定会员代表人数最多七人；
上海市细工玻璃工业同业公会	生产研究改良与发展；会员合法权益保障；技术原料器材合作；会员事业保险及计划调整；会员设备制品及原料检查取缔；工业产品之调查统计；同业纠纷之调处公断；会员公益事业举办；劳资合作之促进及纠纷协调；政府经济政策协助推行；参与各项社会运动	凡在本区域内具有完整生产设备采用玻璃原料加工制造六角瓶注射仪器及其他细工玻璃登工厂不论公营民营均应为本会会员；每会员以平时生产工具之多寡为标准决定代表人数
中华民国纱厂业同业公会	关于原棉之推广改良及取得分配事宜；关于制造改良发展；关于产品推销及运输事宜；关于专门人才之造就及技术研究；调查统计及出版事宜；同业纠纷及调节事宜；其他公共利益事宜；	凡属中华民国国民所设之棉纺织厂均得为本会会员，每厂派会员代表一至三人，依据厂资本划定；
上海区毛纺织工业同业公会	生产研究改良与发展；会员合法权益保障；技术原料器材合作；会员事业保险及计划调整；会员设备制品及原料检查取缔；工业产品之调查统计；同业纠纷之调处公断；会员公益事业举办；劳资合作之促进及纠纷协调；政府经济政策协助推行；参与各项社会运动	凡在本区域内（苏浙皖三省及南京上海二市）合于工厂法所定标准之毛纺织工厂不论公营民营或依法登记外国人所设工厂均应为本会会员，会员派代表人数按所缴会费多寡（按设备资本定）定位七级，最多七人；
上海市机器染织工业同业公会	关于同业之调查研究改良整顿及建设事项；会员与会员或非会员争议之调节；劳资纷争调解；会员营业上之矫正；请求政府免除杂税；政府机关或商会之委办事项；兴办同业教育及其他慈善公益事项	凡上海市内：经营机器棉织；机器漂染；机器印花；贩卖前者制成品的厂号，皆应为本会会员；每一厂号应派一至二人为代表，以最近一年平均店员人数决定
上海市手工棉织业同业公会	会员设备制品原料材料检查取缔及业务上必要之统制；会员制品共同加工或发售原料材料共同购入；兴办劳工教育及公益事项；会员营业必要的维护；会员业务指导研究调查统计；执行主管官署及商会委办的事项。前项第一二款之统制及事业之兴办，应拟定计	凡在上海市区域内经营手工棉织品之工厂均应加入本会为会员；推选会员代表出席会议；

	划书经会员代表表决权三分之二以上同意并呈主管官署后方得实施，变更时亦同。	
上海市丝厂同业公会	关于同业之调查研究改良整顿及建设；关于兴办及监督工人福利事业；关于会员与非会员间争议经会员请求之调解，劳资纠纷调节，党政机关及商会委办事项；会员营业必要时之维持；会员营业上弊害之矫正，请求政府免除杂税	凡上海市内经营缫丝厂营业者依照本会章程遵守本会纪律履行本会决议案皆得为本会会员但须经下列手续：本会会员介绍，入会志愿书，缴纳入会费；
上海市电机丝织厂同业公会（章程/业规）	关于同业之调查研究改良整顿及建设；关于兴办及监督工人福利事业；关于会员与非会员间争议经会员请求之调解，劳资纠纷调节，党政机关及商会委办事项；会员营业必要时之维持；会员营业上弊害之矫正，请求政府免除杂税	凡上海市区域内经营丝织业之厂商依照本会章程遵守本会记录表履行本会决议案者皆得为本会会员，入会手续：本会会员二人以上介绍，入会志愿书，缴纳入会费；
上海市纺/丝线工业同业公会（章程/业规）	会员设备制品原材料检查取缔及业务上必要之统制；会员制品共同加工或发售原材料共同购入；兴办劳工教育及公益事项；会员营业必要的维护；会员业务指导研究调查统计；执行主管官署及商会委办的事项。前项第一二款之统制及事业之兴办，应拟定计划书经会员代表表决权三分之二以上同意并呈主管官署后方得实施，变更时亦同。	凡在本区域内经营纺线工业不论电力人力之工厂均应加入本会为会员，
上海特别市制药业同业公会章程	关于同业之福利事项；关于同业营业之推进同业原料调查统计及管理；同业出品调查统计；同业委办事项；全国商业统制总会指定或委托事项；	上海华商制药工厂均得加入本会为会员；入会时会费 100 元，月费 30 元；
上海市国货橡胶制品业同业公会	关于同业之调查研究改良整顿及建设；关于兴办及监督工人福利事业；关于会员与非会员间争议经会员请求之调解，劳资纠纷调节，党政机关及商会委办事项；会员营业必要时之维持；会员营业上弊害之矫正，请求政府免除杂税	
上海市卷烟厂工业同业公会	会员设备制品原材料检查取缔及业务上必要之统制；会员制品共同加工或发售原材料共同购入；兴办劳工教育及公益事项；会员营业必要的维护；会员业务指导研究调查统计；执行主管官署及商会委办的事项。前项第一二款之统制及事业之兴办，应拟定计划书经会员代表表决权三分之二以上同意并呈主管官署后方得实施，变更时亦同。	
上海市火柴工业同业公会	会员设备改良及原料检查并事业经营上必要之统制；会员制品共同发售，原料共同购入，仓库运输共同设置或管理；会员业务指导研究检查及统计事项；会员营业必要时之维持；会员福利事业兴办；第一款统制须经全体会员代表表决权三分之二以上同意呈请主管官署核准方得施行；	凡在本区域内制造火柴之工厂不论公营或民营均应加入为本会会员，并派会员代表出席，会员代表人数依据排版车数量为标准，一部至两部者一人，二十一部以上者五人；无排版车设备之工厂，以日产火柴数量为标准，四箱为一辆，本会代表以由中华民国国籍年二十以上为限。会员表决权由其所缴会费单位额由所派代表共同行使。
上海市电镀工业同业公会	会员设备制品检查改进取缔事项；会员制品共同加工发售或材料原料共同购入；会员业务进展指导；会员出品研究及调查统计；会员与会员间争端调解；会员劳资争议调解；会原福利事项；政府机关及商会委办事项；同业业规之订立及执行	凡本市范围内由电力设备取不用动力平时雇佣工人三人以上之电镀厂不论民营公营处关系国防及法令规定外均应加入本会为会员；入会时，经两会员介绍具入会志愿书及经理事会审查合格后给以会员身份；每一会员推派一位会员代表参加会议；中华民国国籍年二十以上。

上海市皂业 同业公会	会员商品共同购入报关运输机其他必要设施；会员营业之统制；会员营业之指导研究及调查统计事项；第一第二项须会员大会三分之二以上同意	凡上海市区域内制造肥皂业厂商均应加入本会为会员；入会手续：会员二人介绍，经调查属实合法合规，入会志愿书，入会费，理事会审查通过，给会员证书。派代表一致五人 参加会议；代表须为中华民国国籍年二十以上；
上海市五金 工业同业公会	会员设备制品及原料材料调查检查并取缔；事业经营上必要之统制，关于会员制品之共同加工或发售原料材料之共同购入或处理仓库运输之设备及其他关于会员业务之指导研究调查及统计，办理合于第三条所示宗旨之其他事项。	凡在本区域内由机械动力设备指导五金铜铁器皿用具（如各类要是拉链）（营造建筑工程窗帘栏杆）（卫生设备消防用具）（螺丝钢网大小元钉）（电话零件）（缝纫器械）（中标零件）（打火机）（各式电灯）（砂布砂纸，电焊材料，军号，）等及其他一切类似之五金家庭用品零件之厂商不论公营或民营处关系国防之公营事业或法令规定之国家专营事业外均应为本会会员。按资本额划定会员代表人数，从一致五人不等，资本从五百万元到四千万元以上不等。本会代表需要为中华民国国籍年二十以上。
上海市油桶 商业同业公会	关于主管官署及商会委办事项；同业之调查研究事项；兴办同业劳工教育及公益事项；会员营业上弊害之矫正；会员营业必要时之维持；	凡在本是区域内经营或制造铁木油桶油箱商业之公司行号工厂不论公营民营或兼营均应为本公会会员。每位会员派代表一人，负担会费满五单位者可加派代表一人，以后每多十单位可派一人，最多七人。

Table 4 Dataset of tongye gonghui constitutions ii

Name of the guild	the rights and duties of members	organization structure
Shanghai Dian Gong Qi Cai Gong Ye Guild		Elected by member's meeting;board of directors; board of supervisors; executive member of the council
上海五金工厂同业公会	参加会议担任职务接受咨询和调查，缴纳会费，出席会议；选举权和被选举权，提出议案及表决权。“移动证”不得转假他人	工厂为单位，以经理或其他代表人出席会议；由会员大会选举九人为理事候补理事两人，监事两人，设正副理事长各一人，会计主任一人常务四人，理事任期为一年，连选得连任。1、每半年开会员大会一次（或临时）；理事每月开常会一次；设秘书及其他职员若干人；公会收入来源：儒会费（依据车床额列为四个标准从60元到200元不等），常会费
上海市自行车零件制造业同业公会章程	选举群与被选举权；提出议案及表决权；义务：遵守章程及决议案、担任职务，接受公会咨询及调查准时出席会议按期缴纳会费	公会以公司或厂号为单位推派一人为待变出席会员大会（经理或负责人）；设七人理事会由会员大会推举，设会计主任由理事会中一人担任，本会理事任期一年，连选得连任。会员大会每半年一次，理事会每月开会一次；公会收入来源：入会费：国币一百元，月费国币十元。
上海特别市冷气工程业同业公会	选举群与被选举权；提出议案及表决权；义务：遵守章程及决议案、担任职务，接受公会咨询及调查准时出席会议按期缴纳会费；不侵害其他会员的职务，不兼营不正当业务	以公司行号为本位，每公司得派代表1-2人，当最近一年职员每超过十人时应增派代表一人最多不超过3人。本会由会员代表大会选举七人理事，候补理事一人，理事中选常务理事3人。本会理监事任期四年，每两年改选半数人，应改选人不得连任。理监事可被会员大会开除。会员大会每年举行一次，理事会每月举行一次，常务理事会每星期举行一次，监事会每月举行一次。会员大会之决议：过半数会员参加，参加中过半数同意为通过（特殊情况可有不同比例）。公会收入：入会费，分三个等级（200元到500元不等，依据会员资本最高等级为高于五万元），每月月费20元到50元不等。
上海特别市机械厂同业公会	选举群与被选举权；提出议案及表决权；义务：遵守章程及决议案、担任职务，接受公会咨询及调查准时出席会议按期缴纳会费	经营机械制造的工厂以工厂为单位每厂指派一人，其他相关工厂应集合同种类会员为组，每组指派代表一致三人（依据各组会员之多寡决定）。设理事21人，监事5人，由会员大会就代表中用无记名投票连选举；理监事任期一年，连选得连任。常务理事七人。会员大会每年一次，理事会每月一次，本会决议会员大会之决议：过半数会员参加，参加中过半数同意为通过（特殊情况可有不同比例）。公会经费：入会费（分五类，以资本额为标准，150元到1500元不等，最高等级为资本二百万元以上）；会员月费（从十五元到一百五十元不等）
上海市机器工业同业公会章程		
上海市钢铁炼制工业同业公会章程草案		理事十一人，监事三人，由会员大会选举得出，常务理事五人由理事会成员互选之；理事会责任：执行会员大会决议案；召集会员大会；执行法令及本章程所规定之任务。理监事每二年改选半数。定期每一年举行一次会议，临时会议由投票决议，理事会每月开会一次，监事会三月一次。公会经费来源：入会费会费、事业费；本会经费预算决算于每年度终了一个月以内编制报告书提出会员大会通过刊布并呈主管官署备案
上海市打铁业同业公会会章	选举群与被选举权；提出议案及表决权；义务：遵守章程及决议案、担任职务，接受公会咨询及调查准时出席会议按期缴纳会费	以公司行号为本位，每公司得派代表1-2人，当最近一年职员每超过十人时应增派代表一人最多不超过3人。本会由会员代表大会选举十五人理事，监察委员五人，候补理事五人，理事中选常务理事五人。本会理监事任期四年，每两年改选半数人，应改选人不得连任。理监事可被会员大会开除。会员大会每年举行一次，理事会每两星期举行一次，常务理事会每星期举行一次，监事会每月举行一次。会员大会之决议：过半数会员参加，参加中过半数同意为通过（特殊情况可有不同比例）。公会收入：入会费，月费，（分为会员和委员月费 两角到六角，一元到三元）
上海市铁器工程业同业公会	无	理事十五人，监事五人，会员大会无记名投票产生。常务理事五人。一人常务监事，理事长一人从常务理事中选出；理事会负责执行会员大会决议案，召集会员大会，执行法令及本章程规定的任务。理监事任期四年，每二年改选半数不得连任。（变更章程/会员处分/理监事解职/清算人选任及清算事项决议）等事项理事会决议须由会员大会2/3以上通过。会议次数。经费来源：会费（入会费+月费）及事业费，会费根据会员资本分为五档，从五千到十万（入会费）；事业费为股份，每位会员至少分摊一股。事业费可退还

上海市钢窗工业同业公会	无	理事会 7，监事会 1，会员大会每半年一次，经费来源：入会费，月费，依据会员工厂母机总份额分为七级；事业费由会员大会筹措，并将总额及每股份额做财产资产负债表呈报主管官署备案。会员退会时会费及事业费均不退还
上海市电器材料同业公会	无	理监事制度；理事十五人，监事七人，由记名选举产生，有候补理监事；常务理事五人，理事长一人；理事会负责执行会员大会决议案，召集会员大会，执行法令及本章程规定的任务；理监事任期四年每两年改选半数得连任一次；每年一次定期会员大会；须多少人通过才能通过某类型决议；本会经费分会费及事业费：会费按资本额分为不同等级，
上海市胶木工业同业公会	每一会员代表 有一权，表决权选举权及被选举权；	理监事制度；理监事任期为两年，连选得连任；每半年一次会员大会；经费分会费及 事业费 ，会费依据会员生产工具几机之多寡分为七等（二元到十四元）
上海特别市磅秤制造业/度量衡器业同业公会	选举群与被选举权；提出议案及表决权；义务：遵守章程及决议案、担任职务，接受公会咨询及调查准时出席会议按期缴纳会费	理监事制，每位会员派代表一人至两人；理监事任期四年，每一年改选半数，应改选者不得连任；每年一次会员大会；经费来源：入会费，根据营业范围大小分为三等（200 元到四百元不等），月费分三等二十元到四十不等；特捐及公会基本金
上海市医疗器械工业同业公会		理监事制（9+3），会员大会定期每年一次，经费来源：入会费月费事业费，会费按资本按分为不同等级（几个单位几个代表），每单位四千元；事业费非退会时不得请求退还
上海市细工玻璃工业同业公会	表决权选举权被选举权，每一会员代表为一权	理监事制度（9+3），会员大会每三月一次，经费来源：会费及事业费。入会费从六十元到四百二十元不等；会费事业费概不退还
中华民国纱厂工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（15+5），任期为两年，连选得连任，会员大会每年一次议决预算决算办理选举及其他重要事件；有雇佣职员：总干事
上海区毛纺织工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（25+9），任期两年，连选得连任，定期会员大会每年一次；经费：会费+事业费；退会时事业费会费概不退还；
上海市机器染织工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（11+5），任期四年，每两年改选半数改选者不得连任；会员大会每年开会一次；经费来源：会费，特捐
上海市手工棉织业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（15+5）；会员大会选举得出，任期四年每两年改选一次得连任一次；会员大会每年开会一次；关于此类决议（变更会章；会员之处分；理监事解职；清算人选任及关于清算事项之决议）以会员代表三分之二以上出席权数三分之二以上之同意行之，出席代表不满三分之二时，先行假决议，一周后二周内重新着急会员大会以出席权数三分之二以上同意对假决议行其决议。其他类型决议以 1/2 代替 2/3。经费收入：入会费月费事业费；会费依据会员机器数订四个登记，入会费从五千元到两万元不等；月费从一千到四千不等。事业费可在迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分时申请退还
上海市丝厂工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	会员大会就会员代表选取执行委员 15 人，任期四年每两年改选半数不得连任，本会办事分总务经济交际调解调查各科主任由常务委员分任之；会员大会定期每年一次，临时会议由十分之一以上请求或执行委员会认为有必要时；经费来源：入会费银币十元，月费/年费 按每厂缫丝车部数每部每年银币 1.5 元（概括公益慈善所需），特别费以及公会基本金 必要时召集会员大会决议之
上海市电机丝织厂工业同业公会（章程/业规）	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	以公司行号为本位每位选派代表一人，但其最近一年间平均使用人数超过十人者得曾加代表一人；执行委员 11，监察委员三人，任期四年每两年改选半数；酌情设总务财务调查等科室或设分组委员会；会员大会定期每年一次，执行委员会议每两星期一次；经费来源：入会费，每代表一人缴纳十元国币；月费按志机数量缴纳，每一架数每月一角五分，公会基本金和特捐随时决议；

上海市纺/丝线工业同业公会 (章程/业规)	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（15+5），任期四年，每两年改选半数，不得连任；会员大会每年一次；经费来源：入会费/月费，依据会员线车数为标准；事业费
上海特别市制药业同业公会章程	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	会员大会每年举行一次，理事制度（5+2）理事会每月举行一次会议，理事任期一年，连选得连任，
上海市国货橡胶制品业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	执行委员任期四年每两年改选半数不得连任
上海市卷烟厂工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制（15+5），定期会员大会每年一次，经费来源分事业费和会费两种
上海市火柴工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（9+3，会员大会无记名选举，任期四年每两年改选半数，定期会员大会每年一次）；本会经费来源为：入会费会费事业费；入会费每一代表五万元，月费每月一万元；事业费缴纳每会员至少一股，最多五十股；事业费总额及每股金额由会员大会决议呈请主管官署核准之；事业费在会员退会时可请求退还；本会事业费总额及每股金额之变更保证责任之规定或本会事业之停止均应依法决议后呈请主管官署备案；
上海市电镀工业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（11+3）；会员大会每年一次；经费：入会费（按资本额分甲乙丙三级，从一万元到三万元不等）；事业费：本会如举办事业时，须筹募事业费，按计划书会员全体三分之二以上同意呈请主管官署核准后施行；
上海市皂业同业公会	选举权被选举权表决权建议权	理监事制度（15+7）；任期四年每两年改选半数；定期会员大会每年至少一次；临时会议如理事会认为必要或经会员代表十分之一请求或监事会函请召集召集之。经费：入会费依据资本额分四等级，三千到两万不等；月费按单位计算，每单位一百元；事业费。
上海市五金工业同业公会		理监事制度（15+5），任期四年每两年改选半数得连任一次。定期会议每年一次。经费来源：入会费，月费，事业费；入会费分四等级从四千元到一万元不等，等级分配由会员大会决议。常会费比例于资本额缴纳，每单位三十元。事业费：本会如举办事业时，须筹募事业费，按计划书会员全体三分之二以上同意呈请主管官署核准后施行；事业费为股份，每位会员至少分摊一股。事业费可退还
上海市油桶商业同业公会		理监事制度（9+3）；任期四年每两年改选半数不得连任；定期会议每年一次；经费：入会费五万元，月费依据资本额分三等，

Table 5 Dataset of tongye gonghui constitutions iii

Name of the guild	Interaction with the government	exit the organization	regulations
Shanghai Dian Gong Qi Cai Gong Ye Guild	need to respond to the government regulations, need to ask government department for approval of the decisions made by the guild for the market		
上海五金工厂同业公会	本会章程经会员大会通过，并呈请上海市机械工业联合会核准后施行		
上海市自行车零件制造业同业公会章程	本会章程依据工商同业公会暂行条例及其实施细则订定之。		
上海特别市冷气工程业同业公会	本会受上海特别市社会运动指导委员会委员会指导及市社会局之监督，本会为上海特别市商会之会员，会章经会员代表大会通过并经指导委员会备案施行。（修改会章亦须经由委员会通过方生效）		
上海特别市机械厂业同业公会	本会章程依据工商同业公会暂行条例及其施行细则订定之；本章程经会员代表大会通过并呈请主管官署核准备案后实施，修订章程亦须经过此程序。		
上海市机器工业同业公会章程	本会章程依据工商同业公会暂行条例及其施行细则订定之		
上海市钢铁炼制工业同业公会章程草案	呈报社会局正式通过；依据工业同业公会法及工业同业公会法施行细则订定；本章程经会员代表大会通过并呈请主管官署核准备案后实施，修订章程亦须经过此程序。	工厂不依法加入时或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法二十七条之规定处以一下处分：十万元以下之违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市打铁业同业公会会章	本会受上海市党支部之指导并社会局之监督；本会为上海市商会会员；本章程经会员大会决议并呈请上海市社会局核准遵奉	会员可退会，须出具理由书	凡在上海市区域内经营打铁业者无论会员与非会员者应一律遵守。1.本业出品由公会执监联系会议议定价目单呈请上海社会局核准并送市商会备案后通告各同业。（如遇原料成本增加男变更价目时亦照上列手续办理）。同业需要政府检定度量衡器具。同业在本市开设店铺厂号者须：遵照本市工商业登记规则之规定警告上海市社会局登记，将店主姓名牌号地址及资本等须通知本会，老店之开设分店者亦依照此要求办理。同业不得挖夺前雇主及业师生意及含有欺骗等事情。学徒饭金相关规定，不得虐待学徒，学徒实习期满由师傅率同到会缴费后领取证书，无证书者不得为同业录用。
上海市铁器工程业同业公会	本会会费预算决算会每年呈报主管官署，本章程呈报社会局正式通过并逐级转报社会部及经济部备案；依据工业同业公会法及工业同业公会法施行细则订定；本章程经会员代表大会通过并呈请	工厂不依法加入时或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法二十七条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；	

	主管官署核准备案后实施，修订章程亦须经过此程序。	永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市钢窗工业同业公会	本会会费预算决算会每年呈报主管官署，本章程呈报社会局正式通过并逐级转报社会部及经济部备案；依据工业同业公会法及工业同业公会法施行细则订定；本章程经会员代表大会通过并呈请主管官署核准备案后实施，修订章程亦须经过此程序。	会员非因迁移他区或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市电工器材业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法和工业同业公会法施行细则订定之；会费预算决算编制报告书经会员大会通过后呈报上海市社会局备案；本章程呈报社会局正式通过并逐级转报社会部及经济部备案	工厂不依法加入时或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法二十七条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准【经济部】），会员非迁移其他区域或废业或受永久停业之处分者不得退会。	
上海市胶木工业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法和工业同业公会法施行细则订定之；会费预算决算编制报告书经会员大会通过后呈报上海市社会局备案；本章程呈报社会局正式通过并逐级转报社会部及经济部备案	工厂不依法加入时或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法二十七条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准【经济部】），会员非迁移其他区域或废业或受永久停业之处分者不得退会。	
上海特别市磅秤制造业/度量衡器业同业公会	本会受上海特别市经济局之指导与监督；位上海特别市商会之会员；预算决算须呈报上海市经济局备案；本章程经会员大会通过并呈请上海市经济局核准备案后施行 修改时亦同。	出会时须具备理由书经会员大会半数通过方得出会	会员店创设不得在同业店附近，须最低间隔世家以上；会员如有设停歇须向公会登记；会员有新发明创造经公会证明虽未立案专利任禁止其他同业效仿；出品售价按公会议定价格不得以非法手段垄断大宗营业；未向本业业师受业业外人不得在本区域范围内经营此业；不良分子经公会议决除名者不得雇佣；同业店不得诱骗挖取其他会员店熟手工友；雇佣及解雇工友时均需向公会汇报；祖师诞辰各会员须组织纪念仪式；本会会员不得向公会单独接营大批以垄断
上海市医疗器械工业同业公会	依据工业同业公会法第五十七条规定准用商业同业工会法及施行细则订定之；本章程经会员大会通过并呈准上海市社会局备案施行	会员非因迁移他区或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市细工玻璃工业同业公会	依据工业公会法及其施行细则订定；预算决算经会员大会通过后须呈上海市社会局备案；本章程经会员大会通过并呈准上海市社会局备案施行	会员非因迁移他区或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时	

		间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
中华民国纱厂业同业公会	由商业部批准施行	自愿出会者营出具出会声明书送本会备案，但在出会本年度内对于本会应尽一切之义务任务须履行	
上海市毛纺织工业同业公会	本会主管官署为社会部经济部监督官署为上海市社会局，依工业同业公会法及其细则订定	会员非因迁移他区或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市机器染织工业同业公会	本会受上海特别市党部之指导并受社会局监督；为上海市商会会员；本章程经会员大会通过后呈请上海市社会局核准备案后施行	出会时须具备理由书经会员大会半数通过方得出会	
上海市手工棉织业同业公会	依据工业同业公会法实施细则制定；年度预算决算呈报主管官署备案；	工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市丝厂业同业公会	受上海市党部指导，并受上海市社会局监督，为上海市商会之会员；收支账目每届选举结束后审核呈社会局备案；本章程亦呈报社会局备案	入会会员如欲请求出会者须具备理由书经会员大会过半数之通过方得其出会	
上海市电机丝织厂业同业公会（章程/业规）	受上海市党部指导，并受上海市社会局监督，为上海市商会之会员；本章程经会员大会通过后呈请上海市社会局核准备案后施行	入会会员如欲请求出会者须具备理由书经会员大会过半数之通过方得其出会	凡在上海市区域内经营电机丝织者无论会员与非会员皆须一律遵守之；同业货价由本会执监联席会议议定呈请社会局核准并请市商会备案后通告同业，遇原料涨跌成本增减须有变更时按前述手续办理。新设工厂须于社会局及本会处登记；凡客户经本会决议拒绝交易时同业各厂不得与之交易；雇佣工人艺徒须于公会登记，解雇时亦同；遵守本会规定且向社会局核准的工厂规约；私向挖用同业已雇佣工人者应负担契约上所规定之以为u；工资之增减应由本会决议呈请社会局备案；有违背规定者由本会议定处罚办法呈请社会局核断后执行
上海市纺/丝线工业同业公会（章程/业规）	依据工业公会法及其施行细则订定，本章程经会员大会通过并呈请上海市经济局核准备案后施行修改时亦同。	工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	凡在上海区域内经营本业者无论会员非会员均需遵守本规定；
上海特别市制药业同业公会章程	本会预算决算于跨级年度终三个月内呈报告书至市卫生局备案		

上海市国货橡胶制品业同业公会	本会受上海市党支部指导，社会局监督，上海市商会会员		
上海市卷烟厂工业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法及其施行细则订定之	会员非因迁移他区或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入时或不缴纳会费或违反条例先给与警告警告无效时按工业同业公会法三十一 条之规定处以一下处分：违约金；有时间之停业；永久停业（停业处分须主管官署核准）	
上海市火柴工业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法施行细则订定之；预算决算呈报主管官署备案；	非迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入本会或不缴纳会费或违反章程及决议者经理事会之给以警告，警告无效时暗器情节轻重以哦工业同业工会法第二十七条规定程序处分：千元一下违约金，有期限停业，永久停业。	
上海市电镀工业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法及其施行细则订定之；预算决算呈报主管官署备案	非迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入本会或不缴纳会费或违反章程及决议者经理事会之给以警告，警告无效时暗器情节轻重以哦工业同业工会法第二十七条规定程序处分：照会员登记三倍之违约金，有期限停业，永久停业	
上海市皂业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法及其施行细则订定之；预算决算呈报主管官署备案	非迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入本会或不缴纳会费或违反章程及决议者经理事会之给以警告，警告无效时暗器情节轻重以哦工业同业工会法第二十七条规定程序处分：照会员登记三倍之违约金，有期限停业，永久停业	
上海市五金工业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法及其施行细则订定之；预算决算呈报主管官署备案	非迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入本会或不缴纳会费或违反章程及决议者经理事会之给以警告，警告无效时暗器情节轻重以哦工业同业工会法第二十七条规定程序处分：十万元以下违约金，有期限停业，永久停业	
上海市油桶商业同业公会	依据工业同业工会法及其施行细则订定之；预算决算呈报主管官署备案	非迁移其他区域或自动废业或受永久停业处分者不得退会；工厂不依法加入本会或不缴纳会费或违反章程及决议者经理事会之给以警告，警告无效时暗器情节轻重以哦工业同业工会法第二十七	

		条规定程序处分：十万元以下违 约金，有期限停业，永久停业	
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Table 6 Dataset of tongye gonghui constitutions iv

10 Appendix B: AI Statement

No AI-based tools were used in the completion of this master's thesis.