

Lund University
Department of Political Science
Peace and Conflict studies

FKVA23
Autumn 2025
Supervisor: Roxanna Sjöstedt

The Weight of Words

A Securitization Analysis of Nigerian Presidential Discourse on Boko Haram
and the Farmer–Herder Conflict



LUND
UNIVERSITY

Alicia Dahlgren & Pontus Jonasson

Abstract

Drawing on securitization theory from the Copenhagen School, this paper examines how Boko Haram and the farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria have been discursively framed by Nigerian political leadership during the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo (2015–2023). This paper offers a qualitative discourse analysis of public speeches and the words chosen regarding the state of security, identifying threats, referent objects, and the need of extraordinary measures, to assess whether and how each conflict was securitized. The findings demonstrate an asymmetry in securitizing moves. Boko Haram is consistently framed as a common enemy threatening Nigeria's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and citizens' lives, legitimizing sustained military and international counterterrorism measures. Contrastingly, the farmer-herder conflict receives limited and inconsistent attention, lacks a clearly defined referent object, and is rarely paired with extraordinary measures, resulting in an incomplete or fragmented securitization. The paper argues that this discursive imbalance may help explain differences in political prioritization and policy responses, contributing to the persistence of the farmer-herder conflict despite its high human cost.

Key words: securitization, discourse, Nigeria, Boko Haram, farmer-herder conflict, Muhammadu Buhari, Yemi Osinbajo

Word count: 7436

Table of contents

- Abstract.....2**
- Table of contents.....3**
- 1. Introduction.....4**
 - 1.1. Purpose and research question..... 4
- 2. Previous research..... 5**
- 3. Theoretical framework..... 6**
 - 3.1. Securitization..... 6
- 4. Research design..... 7**
 - 4.1. Methodology..... 7
 - 4.2. Material..... 8
 - 4.3. Delimitations..... 8
- 5. Background..... 9**
 - 5.1 Boko Haram..... 9
 - 5.2. Farmer-herder conflict.....9
 - 5.3. Muhammadu Buhari and Yemi Osinbajo..... 10
- 6. Securitization analysis..... 10**
 - 6.1. Term 2015-2019: Securitizing actors and speech acts..... 10
 - 6.2. Term 2019-2023: Securitizing actors and speech acts..... 12
 - 6.3. Term 2015-2019: Security threat(s) and extraordinary measures..... 13
 - 6.4. Term 2019-2023: Security threat(s) and extraordinary measures..... 15
 - 6.5. Term 2015-2019: Referent object(s)..... 16
 - 6.6. Term 2019-2023: Referent object(s)..... 17
 - 6.7. Term 2015-2019: Desecuritization..... 17
 - 6.8. Term 2019-2023: Desecuritization..... 18
- 7. Discussion and conclusion..... 19**
- 8. References..... 21**

1. Introduction

Since the early 2010s, Nigeria has seen high levels of violence connected to both the terror group Boko Haram in the north and a more geographically spread conflict between sedentary farmers and cattle-herders. The latter has been called “forgotten” (Bergman, 2018) and is often overshadowed by Boko Haram in public discourse, despite surpassing a death toll six times larger than the terror group during 2018 (International Crisis Group, 2018). In our chosen time span, Boko Haram has caused more fatalities overall than the farmer-herder conflict, but the destabilizing effect of the latter cannot be overlooked, with consequences including large displacement of persons and food insecurity (UCDPa, n.d., Nnam, 2025, pp. 1-3). These parallel conflicts fluctuated in intensity under President Muhammadu Buhari and Vice-President Yemi Osinbaju, who addressed both conflicts to varying degrees during their time in office, with explicit pledges to end Boko Haram (Kazemi, 2022). Yet at the end of their administration, both conflicts still remained unresolved. In line with securitization theory, the words chosen when talking about an issue influence the level of urgency and danger associated with the issue (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 29). From this assumption, a difference in political attention toward the two conflicts could affect the willingness to take action and how certain issues are prioritized. Thus, this paper will examine how the two conflicts have been framed in regards to securitization.

1.1. Purpose and research question

Some scholars mean that the Nigerian federal government has not been effective enough in handling the farmer-herder conflict as well as not being clear or frequent enough in its statements regarding it (Chukwuma, 2020, p.68, Nwozor et al. 2021, p. 71). We want to expand on this by examining if and how the federal government has depicted the conflict as a security threat, in comparison with its narratives about Boko Haram. Our research question is therefore:

How has Boko Haram and the farmer-herder conflict respectively been securitized, or not, in the period 2015-2023?

The purpose of this paper is to answer the research question by looking at speeches made by two Nigerian political officials. By attempting to answer our research question, we mean to contribute to the research field of securitization, as well as the more specific research around political communication and contemporary conflict in Nigeria.

2. Previous research

We have found a substantial amount of research on the root causes and dynamics of both the conflicts, but also a growing literature connected to securitization in Nigeria. Securitization research on Boko Haram suggests that the terror group has caused a politicization of security within the country (Okolie & Ugwueze, 2015, p. 2) as well as contributed to a wider “securitization of Africa” (Efebeh, 2022, pp. 745-746). Counterinsurgency efforts have led to increased military budgets, instead of investments in societal development, and politicians have been accused of framing the war on terror in a way that consolidates their own positions of power (ibid.). Further, Idahosa, Degtrev and Ikhidero discuss how the U.S.A. and European powers have securitized the Sahel region, including Nigeria and Boko Haram, legitimizing military counterterrorism efforts that have had human rights consequences and incentivized further terrorist activity (2021, p. 339).

While securitization research on the farmer-herder conflict is more scarce, a significant study by Chukwuma examines within a critical constructivist framework how Fulani herders in Nigeria have been securitized and depicted as a threat by government officials. However, Buhari is only mentioned when his ethnic affiliation with the Fulani people is discussed (2020, p. 68). This connection is similarly done by several other authors when critiquing the federal government's lack of efficiency in handling the conflict (Muhammed et al., 2024, p.130, Nwozor et al., 2021, p. 71), including arguments that the Buhari government did not respond urgently to the issue due to a failure in securitizing the conflict (Chukwuma, 2020, p. 56). Contrastingly, Nwangwu argues that Nigerian central and sub-national governments have indeed securitized transhumance pastoralism instead of tackling its root causes, but that military operations intended to manage the conflict have instead worsened it (2025, pp. 2-3, p. 13). The security discourse surrounding the farmer-herder conflict is often conflated with other socio-political tensions within Nigeria, with partisan voices from different groups securitizing the conflict and having an interest in persuading people to side with their narrative (Nwosu et al., 2025, pp. 433-434).

While research suggests that securitization of Boko Haram and the farmer-herder conflict indeed occurs in Nigeria, we have not found any clear discursive securitization study on President Buhari or VP Osinbajo, nor within the time period we have chosen. Therefore, we aim to contribute to filling this gap.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Securitization

The theory of securitization originates from the research field of international relations and was developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde in their book *Security: a new framework for analysis* (1998), in the Copenhagen School (CS). According to them, securitization is the process of politicizing an issue to the extent that it is depicted as an existential threat, justifying urgent and extraordinary measures beyond the constraints of normal policy to combat the threat. At the same time, securitizing an issue can be seen as the opposite of politicizing it since labelling it a security issue gives leaders the authority to make decisions outside of an otherwise open political process (pp. 23-24, p. 29). An analysis of securitization is essentially an analysis of discourse as the securitizing actor executes what Buzan, Waever and de Wilde term a speech act (pp. 21-26). A securitizing actor can be an individual, for instance a head of state, or a collective, such as a political party or institution (p. 40). A securitizing speech act is the choice and actual delivery of words that frame an existential security threat (p. 26). They argue that studying securitization is limited by the lack of “an objective measure of security”, which makes it difficult to evaluate whether a securitized issue is in fact a real threat. However, they also state that securitizing an issue is “a political fact”, affecting the actions of the securitizing actor regardless of how well the securitized issue aligns with the potential real issue (p. 30).

The entity that is threatened is termed a referent object, often being the state or nation and its territory, but it can also be smaller groups or broader concepts (p. 21, pp. 36-39). Further, a distinction is made between merely presenting an existential threat to a referent object and the audience actually accepting the securitization of an issue. The former is described as a securitizing move while the latter is a case of successful securitization. A theoretical assumption is that the position of the securitizing actor influences the success of their securitizing move. For instance, a high-ranking political role can be assumed to grant the actor a platform and legitimacy to define security (pp. 31-32). However, a security act can be made without explicitly using the word “security”, and if used, it does not automatically create a securitizing speech act (p. 33).

Stemming from the CS theoretical development of securitization, a plethora of research using the theory or problematizing it has been conducted. Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka present commonly discussed aspects of the theory beyond the Buzan, Waever and de Wilde formulation, such as broader power relations and the intersubjective relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience. The audience has the power to accept or reject the securitizing agenda while the surrounding context also can further or hinder the success of the securitization. He argues that these factors are part of a practical turn in securitization studies (2016, p. 497-507).

If an issue is no longer addressed as an urgent security threat it is desecuritized, and returns into the arena of normal politics (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 29). Desecuritization can entail that the security issue is stabilized, replaced by another threat, rearticulated or silenced. While desecuritization like securitization is a discursive process, improved relations between potential conflict parties or other circumstantial factors can influence whether an issue is once again managed through normal bureaucratic measures (Hansen, 2012, p. 539-545). However, analysing securitization or desecuritization is not about “proving” what the objective security threat is, but rather arguing that a choice of words can have different outcomes on how an issue develops or is managed (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 40).

4. Research design

4.1. Methodology

This paper consists of a qualitative discursive analysis, based on the securitization analysis of the Copenhagen School. Our analysis focuses on political statements as speech acts and examines whether these construct Boko Haram and the farmer-herder conflict respectively as existential threats to defined referent objects, and if they legitimize extraordinary measures. Although the CS theory of securitization depends on both the subjective speech act of the securitizing actor and the intersubjective acceptance from the intended audience (Sjöstedt, 2017, p. 6), examining broader governmental mechanisms and the relationship between actor and audience is beyond the scope of this paper. We intend to study securitization as a speech act, and therefore the main subjects of analysis are the securitizing moves rather than the acceptance of the audience (see Sjöstedt, 2008). Furthermore, our analysis will compare whether and how the two conflicts have been securitized, or desecuritized.

We have chosen to analyse a selection of speeches from President Muhammadu Buhari and his VP Yemi Osinbajo’s entire term of office (2015-2023), in which their high political positions arguably granted them the mandate to perform securitizing speech acts. Although the levels of violence in the respective conflicts have fluctuated during this time period, we want to present an overview of how these leaders have talked about these two long-standing conflicts, and compare how each conflict has been framed. We have also chosen this time period because both conflicts have had relative spikes in violence within this time period (UCDPa, n.d., UCDPb, n.d.) and because it is the latest complete presidential term. The presidential terms will be separated in the analysis for structure.

To analyse the material we have derived from Buhari and Osinbajo, we will identify who the securitizing actor is, what the securitized threat is and if extraordinary measures are issued, as well as what the referent object(s) is. In our discursive analysis, we also aim to analyse what specific words are chosen by Buhari and Osinbajo when speaking and how their choice of words further the securitization or desecuritization of said conflicts.

4.2. Material

The materials we aim to analyse in this paper will be public speeches made by President Buhari and VP Osinbajo during their time in office. With regards to Buhari, the speeches we will analyse are his inauguration speech, his New Year speeches and his speeches on Nigeria's Independence Day.

Osinbajo does not have the same annual speeches and therefore his speeches have been strategically selected based on their contents. Specifically, we have searched for mentions of security, the state of the nation, threats and the conflicts themselves. We have selected sixteen speeches by Buhari and nine by Osinbajo, arguing that the difference in quantity is warranted due to their different hierarchical positions as well as Osinbajo's lack of recurring and consistent speeches. Additionally, we do not aim to compare the politicians themselves but their combined sum of words used to address the conflicts. All speeches have been taken from websites owned by the Nigerian government, and are available for anyone to read.

4.3. Delimitations

We have chosen to limit this paper by only looking at speeches by President Buhari and VP Osinbajo, since they both represent the highest authority in the government, granting their words greater power than the words of other politicians. We only aim to analyse the words found in these speeches and how they securitize or desecuritize these conflicts. We are not aiming to find out precisely what has been done militarily or politically apart from what is mentioned in the speeches. Furthermore, our chosen material may not offer a nuanced depiction of the security situation in Nigeria nor the general perception of security among the population. Nonetheless, we find that Buhari and Osinbajo are relevant cases to study because of their discursive power and ability to shape security practices.

5. Background

5.1 Boko Haram

Boko Haram (in Arabic: Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad), was formed around 2002 in Borno state in northeastern Nigeria. The group is a fundamentalist radical Islamist group, believing in toppling the Nigerian regime and establishing what they believe to be righteous sharia law across the whole nation. The group rose to national prominence in 2009 after their increasingly violent attacks (UCDPa, n.d.). In 2014, the group received international attention after their mass kidnapping of 275 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok. Trademarks for their attacks include kidnappings and targeting civilian areas to cause as much destruction as possible. The group has adapted over the years, expanding across Nigeria's border but focusing its activity in the northern regions of the country. Their longevity can in part be attributed to their evasive tactics, as several joint counterterrorism efforts across the Lake Chad Basin since 2015 still have not eradicated them entirely (Ayandele & Aniekwe, 2024).

5.2. Farmer-herder conflict

Labelling the ongoing conflict in Nigeria as just a conflict between farmers and herders is a simplification of the conflict's dynamics. As not all Fulanis are herders, categorizing them all as such is diminishing the real societal impact of the conflict (Kendrick & Sanders, 2024). Several explanations to the onset and duration of the so-called farmer-herder conflict, beyond cultural identities, have been explored. Prominent arguments include climate insecurity, grazing areas being claimed for agricultural land and broader insecurity in the Lake Chad area. The conflict also has connections to a surge in banditry (Nwangwu, 2025, pp. 2-3, p.13). Precise totals are difficult to produce, but the conflict caused around 6000 casualties between 2016-2024 (Amnesty, 2018, p. 6, Nextier, 2025, p. 38), amounting to 60,000 casualties from 2001-2023 (Omogbolagun, 2023). A violent spike in 2018 surpassed the death toll of the parallel conflict with Boko Haram, which during Buhari's administration was deadlier overall (UCDPa, n.d., UCDPb, n.d.). State-led efforts for peace during 2015-2023 were focused on modernizing livestock production, controlling grazing areas and participating in brief peace talks with different stakeholders (International Crisis Group, 2021, CDD West Africa, 2023).

5.3. Muhammadu Buhari and Yemi Osinbajo

Muhammadu Buhari and Yemi Osinbajo entered office as President and VP of Nigeria in May 2015. They were reelected in 2019, remaining in office until 2023. In 2025, Buhari passed away (Kirk-Greene, 2026). During their administration, they not only had to take over the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency, but also increased tensions between farmers and herdsmen in the northern regions. Buhari, the 15th president of Nigeria, had previously served as the nation's 7th president during a military dictatorship between 1983 - 1985 (Britannica, 2025). Osinbajo had previously worked as Head of Department of Public Law at the University of Lagos, and served as Lagos state's attorney general (The Office of the Vice-President, n.d.). As Buhari was an ethnic Fulani and Osinbajo is an ethnic Yoruba, they together represent two of the nation's largest ethnic groups (Embassy of Nigeria, n.d.). As stated earlier, Buhari's ethnic Fulani affiliation generated accusations of bias towards the Fulani herders in the ongoing conflict. Buhari denied this on several occasions (Daka, 2018).

6. Securitization analysis

6.1. Term 2015-2019: Securitizing actors and speech acts

Following the definition of a securitizing actor laid out by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, both Buhari and Osinbajo execute securitizing speech acts in their speeches. As securitizing actors, the choice of words used by Buhari and Osinbajo hold an important weight in how the situation in Nigeria is securitized. As securitizing moves are shaped through speech acts, the words chosen create an overview of the referent objects, perceived threats and the potential securitization or desecuritization.

This can be seen starting from their first year in office as in his initiation speech, Buhari addresses the fact about "the perceived tension in the land" (Buhari, 2015a) in regards to the state of security in Nigeria. That same year, Buhari highlights his resolve to "work on the immediate, medium-term and long-term problems which we must solve" in regards to the future safety of the nation (Buhari, 2015b). Osinbajo also talks about the security of Nigeria in 2015, when he addresses the northern regions of Nigeria and how they "face the challenge of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict" (Osinbajo, 2015).

The following year, both Buhari and Osinbajo make further securitizing speech acts. In his New Year's message, Buhari notes the extraordinary work towards change in the nation. Specifically what has been done in regards to what he calls "the war on terror" in northern Nigeria, noting that while much has been done, "there is still a lot of work to be done in the area of security" (Buhari, 2016a). Specifically, he highlights the work done by the armed forces and police when it comes to fighting

armed insurgencies and reducing their threat level (Buhari, 2016b). Osinbajo further strengthens Buhari's statements, noting that Nigeria faces "the threat of terrorism" and that "The sheer recklessness" and the "shocking barbarity" terrorises and produces "maximum fear" (Osinbajo 2016).

This rhetoric is furthered in 2017 when Buhari continues speaking on the security in Nigeria and calls for "The support of all Nigerians to security agencies to enable them successfully execute their mandate", something he claims "is crucial in our bid to effectively secure our country" (Buhari, 2017a). He further strengthens his government's resolve to secure the nation, stating that "The APC Government's Campaign rallying cry to restore security ... was not all rhetoric" and that "The country must first be secured" (Buhari, 2017b). Osinbajo furthers the call from Buhari by speaking on the national divisions in the nation. In regards to the possibility of a united and secure Nigeria, Osinbajo states that it "will not happen if we allow our frustrations and grievances to transmute into hatred". Furthermore, he also notes that "No one stands to benefit from a stance like that; we will all emerge as losers" (Osinbajo, 2017).

2018 continues the trend of security on the agenda for both Buhari and Osinbajo. He makes a point to pay tribute to the armed forces and police, stating that they have "been working under the most difficult conditions to keep the country safe" (Buhari, 2018b). Buhari continues by stating that his government also will support initiatives that aim to address "the challenges of our times", with terrorism, regional crises and conflicts and trans-border crime being a few of them (ibid). Osinbajo also addresses the security situation in Nigeria and states that "the challenges of our security infrastructure are the concern of all of us and not just those of us in government" (Osinbajo, 2018). He further states that despite the progress being made "there is no room for complacency in the task of securing Nigeria" calling Boko Haram "the most critical of our security challenges"(ibid). Osinbajo further remarks that because of the scale and width of the security challenges, they have "profoundly tasked the nation's security architecture" and that responding to them has left the security architecture "stretched" (Ibid).

During his 2019 New Year speech, Buhari highlights the importance of national cohesion regarding securing a peaceful future for the nation, noting that "Nigerians desire peace, security, prosperity". He also claims that "We are on this mission together, and I assure you of a firm commitment to the ideals of a safe, secure, fair, just and prosperous country" (Buhari, 2019a).

6.2. Term 2019-2023: Securitizing actors and speech acts

As Buhari enters his second term in office during 2019, he furthers his resolve to work for the security of Nigeria, stating that his administration was “re-elected by Nigerians on a mandate to deliver positive and enduring Change – through maintaining our National Security” (Buhari, 2019b). As he speaks on the importance of a united Nigeria in the face of security challenges, Buhari notes that “The path of hatred and distrust only leads to hostility and destruction” (Ibid). Further, Osinbajo highlights the suffering that is needed to secure a nation. He claims that “peace is often paid for with blood and gore. And that no Nation can secure its territory without the selflessness and the supreme sacrifices of many” (Osinbajo, 2019). He strengthens his statement by stating the importance of honoring the people who have died for the nation’s security, and praises the Nigerian people, saying that when it comes to their security, they “share common problems and that they have a common destiny” (Ibid).

In 2020, Buhari remarks on the high levels of violence in the nation, but praises the efforts to combat all violent actors and vows to work hard to “protect the security of life and property” (Buhari, 2020a). He repeats the importance of a united Nigeria when confronting these challenges, stating that “An underlying cause of most of the problems we have faced as a nation is our consistent harping on artificially contrived fault-lines that we have harboured and allowed unnecessarily to fester” (Buhari, 2020b). He further calls for the people to increase their “commitment to peaceful co-existence in a peaceful, secure and united Nigeria” and that he calls on the citizens of Nigeria “to also support government by providing the necessary community level intelligence in addressing these challenges” (Ibid). Osinbajo continues with the praise of the Nigerian people's will when facing national threats, proclaiming that they have “shown uncommon resilience... and a steely commitment to the defence of our freedoms. Well done indeed!” (Osinbajo, 2020). Regarding the efforts to combat these threats, he notes that “each one of the dead, made the supreme sacrifice”, but also the suffering their deaths bring because “their families also have paid and continue to pay a heavy price” (Ibid).

By 2021, Buhari addresses the adversity of both the Covid-19 pandemic and the already present security challenges (Buhari, 2021a). To further strengthen the state, Buhari calls for “Re-energizing and reorganizing the security apparatus”, in order to counter the “war against our communities” (Ibid). He also acknowledges that the state needs to adopt a “proactive and preemptive posture to ensure that these sorts of traumatic incidents do not become a norm”, as well as its responsibility “to protect the lives and property of all Nigerians” and its conviction to “not relent in learning and adapting to changing threats to our national security” (Ibid). He continues this rhetoric, claiming that “the security and welfare of Nigerians continue to be the prime focus” of his government and that they are resolved to reach “a peaceful, united and one Nigeria” (Buhari, 2021b). Buhari once again calls for the need of national unity, claiming that “security is a bottom to top undertaking. Joining hands and hearts together

would enable us to secure ourselves and our country” (Ibid). Osinbajo also continues to speak on the importance of a unified Nigeria for the sake of the nation’s security. He states that “It is within our power to address these issues and emerge from them even stronger as a people”, and when speaking out against the shunning of ethnic groups he notes that “No truly sustainable security umbrella can be built on the basis of exclusion” (Osinbajo, 2021). Furthermore, he calls for all the people in Nigeria to come together, stating that “Neutrality is not an option, and we must all pick a side, knowing that we cannot build a Nigeria that works for all of us with bricks of hatred” (ibid).

Security remains a prime focus on Buhari’s agenda in 2022 as well. In his New Year speech, Buhari states that “There is no doubt that the issue of Security remains at the front burner of priority areas that this Administration has given utmost attention to”, and that his administration is working towards “solutions that will be targeted at addressing human security... before it leads to insecurity” (Buhari, 2022a). He also speaks on the ever evolving situation regarding security threats in Nigeria, stating that “As we continue to de-escalate the security challenges that confronted us at inception of this administration, newer forms alien to our country began to manifest” (Buhari, 2022b). Osinbajo further supports Buhari’s statements, stating that “it has not been a smooth journey; it couldn’t possibly be. The years of building are always difficult, and sometimes, painful” and that a stable foundation is needed to support development (Osinbajo, 2022).

In 2023, despite being the last year of the Buhari administration, his focus still remains steady on the security of Nigeria. During his final New Year speech, Buhari states that his administration “will continue to engage, push back and dismantle the operations of both internal and external extremist and criminal groups waging war against our communities”, as well as how the nation's security forces are “working in partnership to ensure the wins we have got in war against insurgency, banditry, secession and other crimes are sustained and improved upon“ (Buhari, 2023). Osinbajo also continues to speak on how national security remains at the forefront of the administration's agenda. Regarding the security on the northern borders, Osinbajo notes that “there have been efforts to address the situation and strengthen the resilience of the Lake Chad Basin Systems” and that “It is evident that fragile borders not only aggravate conflict but also rob the States of crucial income that could address some of the social issues that contribute to conflict” (Osinbajo, 2023).

6.3. Term 2015-2019: Security threat(s) and extraordinary measures

In 2015, Buhari presents Boko Haram as being the country’s most immediate challenge. The terror group is described as “evil” and “a terrifying force taking tens of thousands of lives and capturing several towns and villages covering swathes of Nigerian sovereign territory”. Osinbajo talks of Boko

Haram as one among many “inter-ethnic and inter-religious” conflicts and that the insurgency is exacerbating “problems of illiteracy, disease and poverty” (Osinbajo, 2015). Buhari addresses that there are other security issues in Nigeria, namely “kidnappings, armed robberies, herdsmen/farmers clashes, cattle rustlings” that contribute to the country’s “general air of insecurity” (Buhari 2015a). These issues are however not assigned extraordinary measures in the same way Boko Haram is. The extraordinary measures presented to confront Boko Haram include rallying “a coalition of armed forces” from five of Nigeria’s surrounding countries as well as attempting to “build an international coalition” after meeting with the G7 and “other friendly presidents” (Buhari 2015a; 2015b). Buhari also states that the Nigerian armed forces “will be fully charged with prosecuting the fight against Boko Haram” (Buhari, 2015a), indicating measures outside of normal politics.

The earlier mentioned security issues are not addressed again.

The next year, Buhari speaks of a “war on terror” and “war against Boko Haram and violent extremism” that despite successes of the armed forces is not over until “normalcy” has been restored (Buhari 2016a). Osinbajo also highlights the national threat of Boko Haram and that even children are at risk of being persuaded by their “warped ideology” to perform acts of terrorism. He briefly mentions “armed herdsmen and host farmers” among other issues that threaten the nation’s peace and security (Osinbajo, 2016).

By 2017, Buhari calls Boko Haram “our common enemy” and states that the group is partly defeated but that the fight is not yet over. A less detailed statement is made about “lingering security issues” and “ugly crises”, without mention of any specific conflict (Buhari 2017a). Regarding Boko Haram, Buhari thanks international “collective efforts to defeat this world-wide menace of terrorism”. He describes military efforts needed to fight Boko Haram, namely enhanced operational capability of troops, “Mobile Strike Teams in the North East” and targeted air strikes. He mentions other threats of “kidnapping, armed robberies, herdsmen/farmers violence” and states that these have to be fought by government and armed forces to “ensure peace, stability and security in our country” (Buhari 2017b).

In 2018, both Buhari and Osinbajo claim that Boko Haram is defeated, that there has been a “steady improvement in security in the North East” (Buhari, 2018a) and that Boko Haram is reduced to a “shadow of itself” despite having been the “biggest threat” to Nigerian sovereignty “in five decades”(Osinbajo, 2018). The “known goals” of the group are “capturing territories, destroying our democracy and denying our children the right to education”. Buhari also assures state security forces that he will provide “all the necessary force multipliers and enablers required for them to prevail in the field” (Buhari 2018a; 2018b). Osinbajo speaks more than Buhari about the farmer-herder conflict, claiming that no other issue has worried Buhari more and that “everything must be done to provide security”, for instance through deployment of mobile police forces and the military to “troubled areas”

(Osinbajo, 2018). This points to measures out of the ordinary. Buhari also addresses what he calls “the age-long conflict between herders and farmers”, warning aggressors of the peace that they will have to “face the full wrath of the law”. He presents countermeasures of a less military nature, placing the responsibility more on civil society than Osinbajo (Buhari 2018b).

Buhari’s New Year speech in 2019 is focused on the upcoming national elections, omitting any mention of either Boko Haram or the farmer-herder conflict. He does state that “Nigerians desire” peace and security, admitting that there have been continuous security challenges since 2015 but that his government will “combat and overcome them all” (Buhari 2019a). Osinbajo, however, mentions Boko Haram but focuses on the progress made and the committed soldiers that secure the country’s territory by accepting the risk of dying for the “fatherland” (Osinbajo, 2019).

6.4. Term 2019-2023: Security threat(s) and extraordinary measures

In his Independence Day speech in 2019, Buhari highlights the national and international efforts invested to combat “the terrorist scourge of Boko Haram”. The capacity of the country’s armed forces “continues to be enhanced by the acquisition of military hardware”. Reforms in the national security and legal structure as well as larger recruitments into the police force are mandated to tackle not only Boko Haram but “armed robbery, kidnapping and other violent crimes across our nation” (Buhari 2019b).

The next year, Buhari likens Boko Haram to “chaos” and claims that “we are winning the war” which is fought on “several fronts” that include “violent extremists, cultists and organised criminal networks”. Focus is shifted to more preventive measures like tackling “the root causes of violent extremism and the networks that help finance and organize terror”, which will be done through internal and external partnerships as well as Nigeria’s security forces receiving “the best training and modern weaponry”. Buhari affirms that “we will use all the human and emerging technological resources available to tackle kidnapping, banditry and armed robbery” (Buhari, 2020a). Thus, while extraordinary measures are presented, a single existential threat is not.

Buhari commences his 2021 New Year speech by mentioning how difficult 2020 has been because of the COVID-19 pandemic and other security issues. These unspecified security challenges are affirmed by Buhari to be “faced head-on with renewed determination” and the “urgency required”. He also presents security as a “key priority area” for 2021, and aims to strengthen the capacity of the security forces to counter “internal and external extremist and criminal groups waging war against our communities in some parts of the country”. Those instigating ethnic conflict are labelled by Osinbajo

as “our common enemy”. Buhari also addresses the need to shift from offensive action to more preemptive measures to tackle the “cycles of violence that have been unleashed by mindless groups like Boko Haram and others”, while Osinbajo urges “peaceful resolution” to ethnic conflicts (Buhari 2021a; Osinbajo, 2021).

In 2022, Buhari articulates a “persistent insecurity in certain parts of the country”. He states that the government has “invested heavily in re-equipping our military”, “upgrading the platforms and firepower” to undertake both old and new threats. Buhari also mentions human security and the need for a sustainable peace and “real security” (Buhari 2022a). Both Buhari and Osinbajo lift Boko Haram as a main security issue, with Buhari also mentioning “Ethnic and Religious Tension” in some parts of the country (Buhari 2022b, Osinbajo 2022).

In his final New Year speech, Buhari focuses on the upcoming election and positive progress regarding Boko Haram, banditry, kidnapping and other crimes as well as corruption. He remarks that the “patriotic forces” are in continued need of “community intelligence”, which is a “duty and obligation” of all Nigerians to supply. He returns to his previously mentioned “key priority areas” including security, and repeats that efforts are made to tackle “external extremist and criminal groups waging war against our communities in parts of the country” (Buhari 2023). Osinbajo highlights the exacerbating effect fragile borders have on the Boko Haram “crisis”, with consequences including food insecurity and millions fleeing their homes (Osinbajo, 2023).

6.5. Term 2015-2019: Referent object(s)

Within the context of security in 2015, Buhari mentions that Boko Haram is terrorizing “Nigerian sovereign territory”. Other security issues are labelled as “bedeviling our country” and he aims to “bring peace and build prosperity for our people” (Buhari, 2015a). The next year, Boko Haram is said to threaten the country’s territory, which has been “ravaged” particularly in the northeast (Buhari, 2016a). Further, Buhari expresses the need of rehabilitating the “thirty million people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad basin countries”. In 2017, Buhari once again states that “the country must first be secured” (Buhari, 2017b). The following year, the “security of life and property” in relation to Boko Haram is prioritized. Buhari expresses the government’s determination “to protect all Nigerians”, working “round the clock” alongside the security forces and traditional authorities to ensure safety for Nigerian daily life (Buhari 2018a). There is no clear referent object presented in Buhari’s New Year speech in 2019, but Osinbajo recognizes the “unity and territorial integrity of the nation” as the objects which members of the armed forces have sacrificed themselves to protect (Osinbajo, 2019).

6.6. Term 2019-2023: Referent object(s)

Regarding the Boko Haram threat in 2019, Buhari motivates increased resources to the armed forces in order for them to “defend our territorial integrity” (Buhari 2019b). In 2020, the main referent object needing protection from Boko Haram is the “security of life and property” (Buhari 2020a). He also considers the “security of the nation and the safety of our citizens” as his “primary concern” overall (Buhari 2020b). Osinbajo expresses that the armed forces are defending “our freedoms” from current threats, including Boko Haram (Osinbajo, 2020). The following year, Buhari repeats that “lives and property” as well as “national security and civic wellbeing” is threatened if kidnappings continue to happen. He also states that Boko Haram constitutes a threat to the “quality of life of our citizens” (Buhari, 2021a). The new issue of banditry is depicted as a threat to the “security and welfare of Nigerian” (Buhari 2021b) Like previous years, in 2022 Buhari states that the armed forces are mainly protecting the “territorial integrity of this Nation” from internal and external threats. He also asserts that the current main security issues are “threatening our country” (Buhari 2022b). In his last year of office, Buhari advocates for Nigeria remaining “safe and peaceful for all” in the context of fighting different security threats. He also states that “internal and external extremist and criminal groups” are “waging war against our communities in parts of the country” (Buhari 2023).

6.7. Term 2015-2019: Desecuritization

We identified no clear desecuritizing move in 2015. However, in 2016, Buhari calls security a still “salient problem” but that Boko Haram is defeated and that “large areas of the country captured by insurgents” have been rescued by security forces. He affirms that Nigerians in affected and neighbouring states once again can live their daily lives in “relative safety” and “without fear”. He calls this development a “remarkable turn-round” (Buhari, 2016b). This could constitute an attempt to desecuritize Boko Haram, as the threat is depicted as sufficiently stabilized at least to the point that offers the population a living situation closer to normalcy. Buhari continues to present several security threats “besides Boko Haram”, including “herdsmen vs farmers, cattle rustling, kidnappings” and a “new insurgency” by Niger delta militants. As mentioned earlier, corruption is also depicted as an existential threat. He calls it “a cancer which must be fought with all the weapons at our disposal” and that it “corrodes the very fabric of government and destroys society”, with the referent object being the “moral health of the nation” (Buhari, 2016b). Partly in line with desecuritization, the Boko Haram insurgency could be replaced by other threats, although these are not paired with extraordinary measures like the ones appointed to Boko Haram.

Buhari continues in 2017 to articulate successes against Boko Haram and that the group is severely weakened, but still mandates large military operations to eradicate the remaining parts of the insurgency (Buhari 2017a; 2017b). Similar to this, Boko Haram is depicted as both a threat but also defeated in Buhari's and Osinbajo's 2018 speeches. Osinbajo says that "other security threats have shuffled forward to take the place of Boko Haram threats", such as the farmer-herder conflict (Osinbajo, 2018). Boko Haram is not entirely desecuritized, but Buhari rearticulates the threat as partly solved and replaces its discursive focus with kidnapping. Again, corruption is presented as an existential threat and is addressed as "Nigeria's number one enemy" and that the "fate of our country" depends on whether his anti-corruption campaign is successful (Buhari 2017b). We found no clear example of desecuritization in Buhari's 2019 New Year speech, but Osinbajo claims that the armed forces have "destroyed the backbone of Boko Haram" (Osinbajo, 2019).

6.8. Term 2019-2023: Desecuritization

In Buhari's 2019 Independence Day speech, he once again lifts corruption as an urgent issue which has been handled and will continue to be handled through legal work rather than any extraordinary measures. He does however depict the threat as a "blight" that is "fighting back" and that "this is a war, which we shall win by the Grace of God" (Buhari 2019b). His choice of words create an existential tone, which previously was reserved to more violent threats. By 2020, Buhari shifts focus from an active war against Boko Haram to creating peace in a post-conflict context. The "reconstruction of lives, communities and markets" are main parts in joint political and economical efforts to "create a new beginning for the North East" (Buhari 2020a). Moreover, Buhari claims in 2021 that "over eight thousand Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered" in the North East. He notes however that the ongoing pandemic has obstructed "restoring peace in areas confronted with security challenges" and presents banditry as a novel security threat. It demands larger recruitments to security forces together with a readiness to "arrest and prosecute all persons inciting violence through words or action" (Buhari 2021b).

In 2022, Buhari declares that the country's security challenges are being "de-escalated" but also that new threats "alien" to Nigeria are emerging and being tackled by security forces (Buhari 2022b). These statements follow a desecuritizing vein, in that the situation with Boko Haram is depicted as relatively stable and urgency is shifted to new, previously unseen threats. The year after, issues brought up previous years are presented in a more positive light by Buhari, focusing on successes. He claims that "the fight against insurgency in the North East region has recorded very clear wins in the past year" and that a process of returning internally displaced persons is initiated. Moreover, he states that "over 82,000 insurgents with their families have surrendered to the Nigerian military" and are going

through a rehabilitation program. He also highlights that the fight against other security issues “is strong and unrelenting and showing very clear results” (Buhari 2023). Depicting security threats as handled and stabilized could point to an attempt to desecuritize them, while moving focus from military efforts to more social efforts such as rehabilitation.

7. Discussion and conclusion

Based on the speeches we have analysed, several trends can be identified. The securitizing actors, Buhari and Osinbajo, frequently assign security issues a prioritized position related to Nigeria’s national challenges, often stating the government’s urgency and devotion to secure the country as well as affected neighbouring areas. Both politicians often express gratitude to the armed forces, honoring their work as crucial to overcome security issues, but also stating the shared responsibility of all Nigerians to reach a state of peace. There is a frequent use of the word “war”, even when addressing non-military entities, such as corruption. Both Buhari and Osinbajo overall give more discursive attention to Boko Haram than the farmer-herder conflict and more frequently create securitizing moves regarding the former.

Boko Haram is recurrently depicted as a “common enemy” and a terrifying force associated with fear and chaos. In different articulations, the nation of Nigeria with its sovereign territory constitutes the main referent object of the Boko Haram threat, although “life and property” is repeated as an object that needs securing throughout the years. Extraordinary measures needed to face the threat are consistently military operations against the terror group, with increased resources and recruitment as well as international cooperation. Additionally, there are explicit statements concluding that violence and sacrifices on behalf of the state and armed forces are necessary means to end Boko Haram. A trend regarding the desecuritization of Boko Haram is the politicians’ tendency to include statements of having beaten Boko Haram but simultaneously expressing a need for continued security efforts to quell them entirely. Together with the introduction of other security threats, such as kidnappings and corruption, Boko Haram is replaced or increasingly rearticulated into a less urgent threat. For instance, corruption is assigned the status of an existential threat to defined referent objects unless combatted, but lacks extraordinary measures to complete a potential securitizing move.

Before 2018, the farmer-herder conflict is only mentioned when grouped together with other security threats to the nation beside Boko Haram. The farmer-herder conflict is given more attention by Buhari and Osinbajo in 2018, presumably prompted by the spike in fatalities in that period. It is said, among other threats, to have replaced Boko Haram in 2018. However, the desecuritizing move is arguably not complete, due to the lack of a referent object. The measures assigned to handle the conflict differ

between Buhari and Osinbajo, with the former possibly understating its urgency in calling it “age-long” and proposing legal or social measures rather than military to tackle it. In contrast, Osinbajo highlights that “everything must be done”, including the deployment of security forces, suggesting a more securitized stance to the issue. However, the inconsistency in the politicians’ framings of the conflict hinders us from arguing that the issue is part of a consistent securitizing move. Osinbajo also claims that the conflict has worried Buhari more than any other issue, creating the question of why it is not more frequently mentioned as well as contradicting the frequent mentions of Boko Haram being the most important security issue. Security issues with connections to the farmer-herder conflict, such as banditry, are more explicitly and frequently mentioned as threats in the speeches. This could contribute to an indirect securitization of the farmer-herder conflict, but the connection risks being speculative. Rather, from the assumption that silence has a discursive weight, making the active choice to consistently omit the farmer-herder conflict despite its longevity and high fatality could entail that it is silenced and potentially desecuritized. In line with securitization theory, this lack of urgent political attention could provide a possible explanation to why the conflict is not yet resolved.

To conclude, the securitizing moves of Buhari and Osinbajo frame Boko Haram as an existential threat to referent objects connected to Nigeria as a nation. Extraordinary measures of a military nature are mandated, although these develop into more preventative and social measures. In comparison to Boko Haram, the farmer-herder conflict is not discussed to the same extent by Buhari and Osinbajo, depicting the issue with urgency but without a clear referent object, other than ensuring general security. Additionally, extraordinary measures are not presented as consistently as with Boko Haram. The farmer-herder conflict is used to replace the threat of Boko Haram, but is also excluded from any complete securitizing move. Our analysis enabled us to answer our research question, although additional political voices could be studied to gain a deeper understanding. Lastly, we identified securitizing moves regarding other threats than our chosen conflicts, which could be explored in further research.

8. References

- Amnesty International (2018) Nigeria: *The Harvest of Death – Three Years of Bloody Clashes Between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria* (Index: AFR 44/9503/2018). Amnesty International. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/9503/2018/en/> [Accessed:2025-12-20]
- Ayandele, O. & Aniekwe, C.C. (2024) *A Decade After Chibok: Assessing Nigeria's Regional Response to Boko Haram*. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 16 April. Available at: <https://acleddata.com/report/decade-after-chibok-assessing-nigerias-regional-response-boko-haram> [Accessed: 2025-12-9]
- Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016) 'Securitization' revisited: Theory and cases. *International Relations*, 30(4), pp. 494–531. doi: [10.1177/0047117815596590](https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590)
- Bergman, A. (2018) *Nigerias bortglömda konflikt*. Folke Bernadotteakademin - bloggen, 30 November. Available at: <https://fba-bloggen.se/blogg/nigerias-bortglomda-konflikt/> [Accessed: 2025-12-4]
- Britannica Editors. (2025) *Muhammadu Buhari : head of state of Nigeria*. Britannica. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammadu-Buhari> [Accessed: 2026-1-9]
- Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner.
- CDD-West Africa (2023) *Peace & Human Security*. Centre for Democracy and Development. Available at: <https://www.cddwestafrica.org/activities/peace-human-security/> [Accessed 2026-1-9]
- Chukwuma, K. H. (2020) Constructing the Herder–Farmer Conflict as (in)Security in Nigeria. *African Security*, 13(1), pp. 54–76. doi:[10.1080/19392206.2020.1732703](https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2020.1732703)
- Daka, T. (2018) Buhari rejects allegations of ethnic bias. *The Guardian (Nigeria)*, 20 January. Available at:<https://guardian.ng/news/buhari-rejects-allegations-of-ethnic-bias/> [Accessed 2025-12-17]
- Efebeh, V. E. (2022) "The War on Terror and Securitization of Africa" in Oloruntoba, S.O. & Falola, T. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. pp. 745-758. doi: [10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_36](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_36)
- Hansen, L. (2012) Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of International Studies*, 38(3), pp. 525-546. doi: [10.1017/S0260210511000581](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000581)
- Idahosa, S. O., Degterev, D. A. & Ikhidero, S. I. (2021) Securitisation initiatives and the lingering security challenges in Sub-Saharan Sahel region: An appraisal, *African Security Review*, 30(3), pp. 338–367. doi:[10.1080/10246029.2021.1970597](https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1970597)
- International Crisis Group (2018) *Stopping Nigeria's spiralling farmer-herder violence* (Africa Report No. 262). International Crisis Group. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence> [Accessed: 2025-12-15]

International Crisis Group (2021) *Ending Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Crisis: The Livestock Reform Plan* (Africa Report No. 302). International Crisis Group. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/nigeria/302-ending-nigerias-herder-farmer-crisis-livestock-reform-plan> [Accessed 2026-1-8]

Kazemi, E. (2022) *10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022: Nigeria*. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 15 February. Available at: <https://acleddata.com/report/10-conflicts-worry-about-2022-nigeria> [Accessed: 2025-12-11]

Kendrick, C. & Sanders, L. (2024) *Don't Call It Farmer-Herder Conflict*. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 9 February. Available at: <https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/dont-call-it-farmer-herder-conflict/> [Accessed: 2025-12-15]

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (2026) Nigeria under Buhari. Britannica. available at: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Nigeria-under-Buhari> [Accessed: 2026-1-9]

Muhammed, A. Y., Adisa, W. B., Ayodele, J., Gbadeyan, O. J. & Garba, E. (2024) State responses to herder–farmers conflict and peace-building in rural grazing areas of Nigeria. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, 16 (2), pp. 128–146. doi:[10.1108/JACPR-02-2023-0775](https://doi.org/10.1108/JACPR-02-2023-0775)

Nnam, M. U. (2025) Violent herder-farmer conflicts and human security in Nigeria: a focus on food security. *Development in Practice*, pp. 1–12. doi: [10.1080/09614524.2025.2573963](https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2025.2573963)

Nextier (2025) *Mutations of Terror and Conflicts: Nextier's Annual Violent Conflict Report 2025*. Nextier. Available at: <https://www.thenextier.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Mutations-of-Terror-and-Conflicts.-Nextiers-Annual-Violent-Conflict-Report-2025.pdf> [Accessed: 2026-1-4]

Nwangwu, C. (2025) Herders without borders: transhumance securitisation and the challenges of national security in Ghana and Nigeria. *Security Journal*, 38(3). doi: [10.1057/s41284-024-00455-z](https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-024-00455-z)

Nwosu, B., Okoli, C. R., Olumba, E. & Okpaleke, F. (2025) Farmer-Herder Crises, Uncivil Discourses and the Politics of Nigeria's Security Responses. *Human Affairs*, 35(3), pp. 425-449. doi:[10.1515/humaff-2024-0098](https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2024-0098)

Nwozor, A., Olanrewaju, J. S., Oshewolo, S., Oladoyin, A. M., Adedire, S., & Okidu, O. (2021) Herder-Farmer Conflicts: The Politicization of Violence and Evolving Security Measures in Nigeria. *African Security*, 14(1), pp. 55–79. doi: [10.1080/19392206.2021.1901181](https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1901181)

Okolie, A & Ugwueze, M. I., (2015) Securitization of Politics and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Experience. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 36, pp. 28–40. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343935192_Securitization_of_Politics_and_Insecurity_in_Nigeria_The_Boko_Haram_Experience

Omogbolagun, T. (2023) Over 60,000 people killed in farmers/herders clashes – Reps. *Punch*, 28 August. Available at: <https://punchng.com/over-60000-people-killed-in-farmers-herders-clashes-reps/> [Accessed: 2025-12-17]

Sjöstedt, R. (2008) Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia. *Security Dialogue*, 39(1), pp. 7-29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607086821>

Sjöstedt, R. (2017) Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.479> [Accessed: 2025-12-11]

The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2015 - 2023. (n.d.) *About Prof. Osinbajo*. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/about-prof-yemi-osinbajo/> [Accessed: 2026-1-4]

Uppsala Conflict Data Program:a (n.d.) *JAS*. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1051> [Accessed: 2025-12-10]

Uppsala Conflict Data Program:b (n.d.) *Fulani*. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/607> [Accessed: 2025-12-8]

Speeches

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2015a) *INAUGURAL SPEECH OF PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI FOLLOWING HIS SWEARING-IN AS PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ON 29TH MAY, 2015*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2015b) *ADDRESS OF HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI AT THE OCTOBER 1ST INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION OF Nigeria at 55*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2016a) *PRESIDENT BUHARI'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO ALL NIGERIANS ON 1ST OF JANUARY 2016*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2016b) *INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS OF HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI ON 1ST OCTOBER 2016*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2017a) *PRESIDENT BUHARI'S 2017 NEW YEAR SPEECH TO NIGERIANS JANUARY 1 2017*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2017b) *SPEECH OF HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI ON NIGERIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY OCTOBER 1ST 2017 CELEBRATION*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2018a) *HIS EXCELLENCY MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S 2018 NEW YEAR ADDRESS*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2018b) *SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI ON THE OCCASION OF Nigeria At 58: Independence Day Speech ON OCTOBER 1ST 2018*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2019a) *President Muhammadu Buhari's 2019 New Year Speech ON 1ST JANUARY 2019*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2019b) *ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI ON THE OCCASION OF NIGERIA AT 59: INDEPENDENCE Day CELEBRATIONS ON OCTOBER 1ST 2019*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2020a) *PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO NIGERIANS IN 2020 HELD IN STATE HOUSE, ABUJA. 1ST JANUARY, 2020*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2020b) *SPEECH OF HIS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI ON THE OCCASION OF THE Nigeria At 60 CELEBRATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2021a) *HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI 2021 NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO NIGERIANS HELD AT THE PRESIDENTIAL VILLA, STATE HOUSE, ABUJA, ON 1ST JANUARY 2021*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2021b) *INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY, MUHAMMADU BUHARI, PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ON THE OCCASION OF NIGERIA'S SIXTY FIRST INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY, FRIDAY 1ST OCTOBER, 2021*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2022a) *HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT MUHAMMED BUHARI NEW YEAR SPEECH ON 1ST January 2022*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2022b) *INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS BY MUHAMMADU BUHARI, PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF NIGERIA'S 62ND INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION ON 1ST OCTOBER, 2022*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Buhari, Muhammadu. (2023) *PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S 2023 NEW YEAR MESSAGE*. Federal Ministry of Information and Culture: PMB speeches. Available at: <https://pmbscorecard.gov.ng/speeches/> [Accessed: 2025-12-16]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2015) *Northern Re-awakening Forum Summit*. The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/osinbajo-attends-northern-re-awakening-forum-summit/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2016) *Launch Of The Revised National Counter-Terrorism Strategy Event*. The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/osinbajo-attends-counter-terrorism-strategy-event-abuja/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2017) *VP's Remarks At The Colloquium On Biafra: 50 Years After*. The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/vps-remarks-at-a-colloquium-on-biafra-50-years-after/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2018) *Speech: VP Osinbajo's Remarks at the National Security Summit in Abuja*. Presidential Villa Statehouse. Available at: <https://statehouse.gov.ng/speech-vp-osinbajos-remarks-at-the-national-security-summit-in-abuja/> [Accessed: 2025-12-29]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2019) *Remarks by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, at the Interdenominational Church Service for 2019 Armed Forces Remembrance Day Celebration*. Presidential Villa Statehouse. Available at: <https://statehouse.gov.ng/we-will-not-forget-our-military-heroes-vp-osinbajo-says-at-armed-forces-remembrance-service/> [Accessed: 2025-12-29]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2020) *2020 Armed Forces Remembrance Day Interdenominational Church Service*. The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/2020-armed-forces-remembrance-day-interdenominational/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2021) *National Social Cohesion Dialogue Organized By The Africa Polling Institute*. The Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/national-social-cohesion-dialogue-organized-by-the-africa-polling-institute/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2022) *VP Osinbajos' Speech at the APC National Convention*. Presidential Villa Statehouse. Available at: <https://statehouse.gov.ng/vp-osinbajos-speech-at-the-apc-national-convention/> [Accessed: 2025-12-29]

Osinbajo, Yemi. (2023) *Global Conference On Fragile Borders By World Customs Organisation*. The Office of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Available at:

<https://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/global-conference-on-fragile-borders-organised-by-world-customs-organisation/> [Accessed: 2025-12-28]