@misc{9201763,
  abstract     = {{This thesis examines how governance quality influences the legal and financial terms of Chinese sovereign loan contracts in Africa. With a qualitative approach, using a comparative case study of Ghana, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, and Botswana, it examines the presence and severity of clauses such as confidentiality, sovereign immunity waivers, governing law, collateralization, and dispute resolution mechanisms. By linking contract terms to World Governance Indicators, the study finds a correlation between lower governance scores and more creditor-favoring legal structures. Drawing on bargaining theory, institutional theory, and legal asymmetry, the analysis reveals that countries with weaker institutions and limited oversight are more likely to accept restrictive contractual terms. However, it also highlights that this relationship is correlational, not causational, and shaped by broader politics and economics, including limited access to alternative funding and China’s evolving role as a lender. This study contributes to existing literature by offering clause-level comparisons and showing how governance context shapes legal outcomes in sovereign borrowing.}},
  author       = {{Eneqvist, Ebba}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Governance and Control}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}