@misc{9227778,
  abstract     = {{In recent years, situations have attracted attention in which adults have contacted persons online whom they believed to be children for sexual purposes, but where the other party was in fact an adult, often behind a profile belonging to a fictitious child. Such situations raise the question of whether criminal law should intervene against conduct that appears blameworthy and is typically aimed at sexual offences against children, even though no real child has been exposed to the contact. Under Swedish law, contact for the purpose of meeting a child for sexual purposes is criminalised in Chapter 6, Section 10 a of the Swedish Criminal Code. However, the provision presupposes that the contact concerns a real child, and attempt to commit the contact offence is not criminalised.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse whether, and to what extent, criminal liability for contact with fictitious children for sexual purposes can be justified under Swedish law. Applying a legal dogmatic method, the thesis examines the contact offence, attempt liability, and fundamental questions concerning the legitimacy of criminalisation. The theoretical point of departure is the tension between a child-protection perspective and the requirements of legitimacy, restraint and coherence within the criminal law system.

The thesis finds that contact with fictitious children for sexual purposes does not fall within the current scope of the contact offence, since the provision requires that the contact be directed at a real child. Nor does attempt liability offer a clear solution. Attempt to commit the contact offence is not criminalised, and even if such attempt liability were introduced, pure fictitious-child cases appear difficult to bring within the scope of attempt liability, since the offence could never have been completed.

The thesis shows that criminal liability for contact with fictitious children for sexual purposes can be justified on the basis of certain criminalisation-theoretical considerations, but only subject to significant limitations. Children’s health, sexual integrity and protection against sexual offences constitute strong protected interests. At the same time, in fictitious-child cases there is no concrete child, no concrete victim harm and no concrete danger. Criminalisation must therefore primarily be justified by reference to abstract or presumed danger, as well as by the perpetrator’s demonstrated readiness to establish sexual contact with someone perceived by them as a child. The distance to the harm ultimately intended to be prevented is therefore greater than in the case of the contact offence, which places high demands on the criminalisation being clearly delimited and carefully substantiated.

The conclusion of the thesis is that criminal liability for contact with fictitious children for sexual purposes can be justified under Swedish law, but only as an exceptionally acceptable and clearly delimited inchoate offence. It should not be understood as a natural consequence of the contact offence, nor should it be addressed through a general expansion of attempt liability, since this risks disturbing the coherence of the doctrine of attempt. If the legislature considers that the conduct should be subject to criminal liability, an independent and carefully delimited criminal provision appears more systematically coherent. The issue therefore illustrates a difficult legislative problem: although the conduct may be regarded as blameworthy and may indicate a need for criminalisation, it is difficult from a criminal law perspective to criminalise it without disturbing fundamental requirements of legitimacy, restraint and coherence.}},
  author       = {{Skarp, Rasmus}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Kontakt med fiktiva barn i sexuellt syfte – Om tidigarelagt straffansvar och kriminaliseringens legitimitet}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}