@misc{9228018,
  abstract     = {{In the context of a deteriorating security landscape, cyberattacks have become increasingly frequent in international relations. Because these operations rarely meet the threshold for the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the principle of non-intervention serves as the applicable legal framework. The purpose of this thesis is to describe and critically analyze the applicability of the non-intervention principle to cyberattacks targeting infrastructure. In particular, it examines the prerequisites for establishing state responsibility when such operations are conducted by non-state actors. The study uses a legal dogmatic method combined with a critical perspective, drawing primarily on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, and the expert doctrine Tallinn Manual 2.0.
The thesis demonstrates that the current framework of international law has significant shortcomings in providing adequate protection to targeted states. The application of the law is impeded by the difficulty of adapting traditional legal criteria to cyberspace. First, the element of coercion poses a major obstacle. While cyberattacks often paralyze vital societal functions, they fall outside the strict legal definition of coercion because they generally lack explicit dictatorial demands. Second, the strict requirement of effective control required for attribution creates an accountability gap when states use private hacker groups. Finally, the thesis concludes that the principle of due diligence fails as an alternative basis for responsibility due to evidentiary challenges regarding state knowledge and territorial control.
The conclusion is that the current legal paradigm, in practice, shields the at-tacking state rather than protecting the victim state. As long as leading cyber nations maintain strategic silence in their state practice to preserve their offensive freedom of action, the development of legal norms will be impeded. Consequently, the unique nature of cyberspace creates a legal imbalance that the traditional system of international law is ill-equipped to manage.}},
  author       = {{Bokwall, Sofie}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Viktlös folkrätt i cyberrymden? En kritisk analys av non-interventionsprincipen och ansvarsluckan vid cyberangrepp}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}