Institutions, Veto Players and Policy Change-The Privatization Process of the Telecommunication Sector in Germany and Switzerland
(2007)Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- Veto player have come to serve as an explanatory fact in the divergence of policy
outcomes. Contemporary research on the subject of policy making argues that
policy stability is more likely in political settings with multiple veto players,
although it restricts a government's ability to push through reforms.
The ambition of this thesis is to examine the affect political institutions have
on the policy making process. More precisely, it aims to evaluate the explanatory
power of the veto player theory as provided by Tsebelis (1995).
This thesis reconstructs and discuss the assumptions and predictions of the
veto player theory. The method being used is a comparative study. The theory will
be tested against the cases of the... (More) - Veto player have come to serve as an explanatory fact in the divergence of policy
outcomes. Contemporary research on the subject of policy making argues that
policy stability is more likely in political settings with multiple veto players,
although it restricts a government's ability to push through reforms.
The ambition of this thesis is to examine the affect political institutions have
on the policy making process. More precisely, it aims to evaluate the explanatory
power of the veto player theory as provided by Tsebelis (1995).
This thesis reconstructs and discuss the assumptions and predictions of the
veto player theory. The method being used is a comparative study. The theory will
be tested against the cases of the telecommunication reforms in Germany and
Switzerland. In both countries the proposal of a complete privatization of the
telecommunication sector been considered, but whereas in Germany (1994), the
second post-reform transformed the state monopoly into a private sector
Switzerland rejected the same proposal, as late as 2006.
Even though the concept of veto player has a central role in explaining policy
outcomes, the findings show that the veto player theory is not alone sufficient
alone to explain the different policy outcomes in selected cases. The more general
critics against the theory derives from how actors endowed with veto power are
conceptualized. To strong assumptions on the actors behavior, might result in
overlooking potential veto players. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1321264
- author
- Ståhle, Johanna
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2007
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Veto Players, Instiutions, Policy Making, Political and administrative sciences, Statsvetenskap, förvaltningskunskap
- language
- English
- id
- 1321264
- date added to LUP
- 2007-06-12 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2007-06-12 00:00:00
@misc{1321264,
abstract = {{Veto player have come to serve as an explanatory fact in the divergence of policy
outcomes. Contemporary research on the subject of policy making argues that
policy stability is more likely in political settings with multiple veto players,
although it restricts a government's ability to push through reforms.
The ambition of this thesis is to examine the affect political institutions have
on the policy making process. More precisely, it aims to evaluate the explanatory
power of the veto player theory as provided by Tsebelis (1995).
This thesis reconstructs and discuss the assumptions and predictions of the
veto player theory. The method being used is a comparative study. The theory will
be tested against the cases of the telecommunication reforms in Germany and
Switzerland. In both countries the proposal of a complete privatization of the
telecommunication sector been considered, but whereas in Germany (1994), the
second post-reform transformed the state monopoly into a private sector
Switzerland rejected the same proposal, as late as 2006.
Even though the concept of veto player has a central role in explaining policy
outcomes, the findings show that the veto player theory is not alone sufficient
alone to explain the different policy outcomes in selected cases. The more general
critics against the theory derives from how actors endowed with veto power are
conceptualized. To strong assumptions on the actors behavior, might result in
overlooking potential veto players.}},
author = {{Ståhle, Johanna}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Institutions, Veto Players and Policy Change-The Privatization Process of the Telecommunication Sector in Germany and Switzerland}},
year = {{2007}},
}